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Inspector General

United States
Department of Defense



Special Plans and Operations

Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Plans
to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan Air Force

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September 28, 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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FORCE/UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE
FORCE JOINT COMMAND
COMMANDER, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
TRAINING MISSION-AFGHANISTAN/COMBINED SECURITY
TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Field the
Afghan Air Force (Project No. D2011-D00SPO-0234)


The Deputy IG, Special Plans and Operations (SPO) is providing this final report for review and comment. This is the 16th in a series of reports published by the Office of Inspector General's Special Plans and Operations Directorate that focus on the train and equip missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. We considered client comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report.

We request additional comments and information by October 26, 2012:

- Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics-Recommendation 7.a.
- Commander, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan-Recommendations 4.a, 5.e, and 11.
- Commander, NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan-Recommendations 6.

If possible, please send your comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to spo@dodig.mil. Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We are unable to accept the / Signed / symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified documents electronically, they must be sent over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) Network.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. Please direct questions to (b)(6) (703) 604-(b)(6) (DSN 312-664-(b)(6) or (b)(6) @dodig.mil or (b)(6) @dodig.smil.mil.


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Special Plans and Operations

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~~(FOUO)~~ Executive Summary– Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan Air Force

Who Should Read This Report?

Personnel within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the U.S. Central Command and its subordinate commands in Afghanistan, the Military Departments, and agencies responsible for and engaged in training, mentoring, equipping, fielding, and other aspects of the development of the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Afghan National Army (ANA) and Air Force (AAF) should read this report.

Synopsis

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has the overall responsibility for developing the civilian and military security institutions of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). ISAF's two main subordinate commands, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) and ISAF Joint Command (IJC), each have complementary commitments and capabilities with respect to the development of the ANA and AAF.

NTM-A/CSTC-A has the lead responsibility for managing the use of appropriations authorized for training, equipping, and building the capacity of the GIROA Ministry of Defense and the ANA (including aviation assets). Congress has so far appropriated \$68.09 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund in support of the overall “train and equip” mission, of which the Afghan Ministry of Defense, ANA, and AAF are a part.

Afghan Air Force capabilities first formed in the 1920s and were virtually destroyed by the end of the Soviet and civil wars. In 2005, U.S. and Coalition Forces began fielding air advisors and rebuilding the Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC). In 2006, the GIROA Ministry of Defense established the ANAAC as a subordinate command within the ANA.

Initial efforts were led by the U.S. Army as the Combined Forces Afghanistan Air Division. In 2007, development of the ANAAC shifted from the U.S. Army to the U.S. Air Force under the renamed Combined Air Power Transition Force. Later, in 2008, U.S. Central Command Air Forces activated the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing as the U.S. Air Force organization for air advisors assigned to Afghanistan in support of the AAF. The 438th Air Expeditionary Wing commander and his staff have dual responsibilities, also serving as the NATO Air Training Command - Afghanistan (NATC-A). NATC-A fulfills the training, equipping, and capacity building function for Afghan air-power development in NTM-A/CSTC-A.

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In February 2010, U.S. Air Forces Central Command¹ completed an Afghanistan National Security Forces Airpower Requirements Review at the request of GIRoA Ministry of Defense. This document laid the foundation for the recommended roles, missions, and force structure for the ANAAC. The report emphasized sufficient and sustainable solutions, and changed existing acquisition plans to enhance long term affordability.

In March 2010, the Afghan Minister of Defense signed Decree 467 renaming the ANAAC as the AAF. The Decree realigned the AAF from a Corps in the ANA to a complementary organization similar to the Afghan Special Operations Command under the Chief of the General Staff. The AAF was organized with a Headquarters, three Air Wings, four Detachments, eight air units, and a training support infrastructure.

As of June 2012, the AAF was comprised of over 5,800 personnel and 97 aircraft, including the G-222 (C-27A variant) fixed-wing aircraft, the Mi-17, Mi-35, MD-530F helicopters, and 18 training aircraft (Cessna 182 and 208). By 2016, the AAF is expected to grow to over 8,000 personnel and 145 aircraft.

NATC-A was composed of Coalition military personnel, predominantly from the U.S. Air Force, but also included air advisors from 16 partner nations.

This report summarizes notable progress made by the AAF and advisor commands, and discusses 16 observations with recommendations.

Notable Progress

NATC-A has made significant progress towards the goal of creating an operational, independent, and sustainable AAF that meets international aviation standards and effectively supports the GIRoA, the MoD, and the Afghan National Security Forces. In addition to positive developments in the Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand Air Wings, specific areas noted were:

- AAF Professionalization Program,
- NATC-A Assessment and Synchronization Tool,
- Multi-national Composition of NATC-A, and
- Pohantoon-e-Hawayee – the “Big Air School.”

~~(FOUO)~~ Challenges—Areas of Concern

~~(FOUO)~~ Systemic Issues

This report contains four broad observations covering systemic issues. These include:

- ~~(FOUO)~~ difficulty in achieving a common vision for the roles, missions, and capabilities of the AAF,
- ~~(FOUO)~~ need for enhanced capability to exercise command and control of air assets,
- NATC-A personnel shortfalls, and
- institutional integration of NATC-A into NTM-A/CSTC-A.

¹ In March 2008, U.S. Central Command Air Forces were renamed U.S. Air Forces, Central.

~~(FOUO)~~ **Training Issues**

Four observations concerning training were identified:

- Training, guidance, and oversight of air advisors assigned to the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing was insufficient for the effective conduct of air advisor flying duties.
- The AAF Air Wings lacked qualified and certified maintenance personnel to maintain on-hand aircraft.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The Commander, NATC-A, was required to validate Mi-17 air worthiness; differing standards among U.S. military services and NATO country personnel capacity limited the availability of air advisors.
- The proficiency of English language teachers was inadequate to effectively instruct AAF pilots, other aircrew, and maintenance personnel.

~~(FOUO)~~ **Equipping Issues**

Three observations concerning unit and individual equipping were identified:

- ~~(FOUO)~~ The G-222 (C-27A variant) dual-engine aircrafts were not suitable cargo aircrafts to support the development of an independent and sustainable Afghan Air Force in the near or long-term.
- AAF organizations were not issued initial unit and personnel equipment, as authorized and required by GIRoA Ministry of Defense decrees.
- Aircraft operating and maintenance manuals were not available in local Afghan languages.

Fielding Issues

Four observations concerning personnel and equipment fielding were identified:

- The Afghan system for recruiting AAF officers and enlisted personnel assigned individuals with insufficient literacy, education, and potential to meet the technical capability requirements of a modern air force.
- AAF pilot and aircrew compensation was inadequate to ensure retention of individuals who successfully complete technical and language training.
- The designated senior airfield authority for Shindand Air Base did not have a formal command relationship with the organization providing airfield air traffic control.
- A discussion of Base Operation Support–Integration at Shindand Air Base is included in the classified Annex to this report.

Other Issues

This report contains one additional observation that could not be categorized within the preceding topics.

~~(FOUO)~~ **Allegations Concerning G-222 (C-27A) Safety of Flight**

~~(FOUO)~~ In February 2012, U.S. Air Force pilots assigned to the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, responsible for training and mentoring the AAF, raised concerns over the continued safe operation of the G-222/C-27A medium transport aircraft. As applicable, these concerns were addressed in this report (see Observations 5 and 9, and Appendixes G and H).

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~~(FOUO)~~ In addition, in March 2012, the Commander, Air Force Central and the Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing each initiated Commander-Directed Investigations into the allegations. The investigations were completed in April.

~~(FOUO)~~ The primary finding was that the G-222 (C27-A) was not safe to fly in Afghanistan under existing policies and operational circumstances, but the command believed it had the capability to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. The command has made, and continues to make, changes in response to the recommendations contained in the reports of their investigations.

~~(FOUO)~~ Finally, the DoD Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Audit and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations continue to address concerns related to airframe acquisition and procurement and contractor fulfillment of contract requirements. We will continue to monitor these efforts until they are complete.

Conclusion

At the time of this assessment, the AAF was at a nascent stage of development. U.S. and Coalition forces have only recently shifted their focus from generating the force to developing quality and professionalism. U.S./Coalition emphasis also has moved to training, equipping, and fielding ANA enabling organizations, to include AAF logistics and maintenance units, and other supporting infrastructure.

The Coalition designed and was building the AAF to have capabilities that accommodate the human capital and infrastructure of Afghanistan. However, GIROA senior officials seemed to expect that their Air Force should have the same capabilities as the Coalition air forces conducting missions in their country. Moreover, senior civilian and military officials were not always following AAF command and control policies and procedures. This impacted AAF sustainability.

It will take an intensive and patient effort by Coalition advisors and ANA and AAF senior officers to build an independent and sustainable AAF. This complex challenge was made more difficult by the ongoing counter-insurgency campaign. Transitioning the AAF to an operational, independent, and self-sustainable force will require realistic expectations on the part of GIROA, the continued application of sufficient US/Coalition resources, and a common vision between them with respect to AAF development goals and objectives.

Recommendations Table

Office of Primary Responsibility	Recommendations Requiring Additional Comment	No Additional Comments Required
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics	7.a	
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy		1.c
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force		5.a
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe/Commander, U.S. European Command		3.a
Commander, ISAF/U.S. Forces – Afghanistan		1.b, 2, 14.b, 15.a, 15.b
Commander, Air Education and Training Command		5.d
Commander, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan	4.a, 5.e, 11	1.a, 3.b, 4.b, 8, 10, 13, 16
Joint Staff, J-1		3.c
Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs		9
Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central Command		5.b, 5.c, 14.a
Program Manager, non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft		7.b
Commander, NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan/ 438 th Air Expeditionary Wing	6	4.c, 12.a, 12.b

Please provide comments by October 26, 2012.

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~~(FOUO)~~ Introduction

Background

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has responsibility for developing the military and police security forces of Afghanistan and, when they are prepared, transitioning them to an independent role under the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). ISAF's two main subordinate commands, ISAF, ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A), each have complementary roles and capabilities with respect to the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan Air Force (AAF).

NTM-A/CSTC-A has the lead responsibility for managing the use of appropriations authorized for training, equipping, and building the capacity of the GIROA Ministry of Defense and the ANA (including AAF aviation assets). IJC is responsible for counter-insurgency field operations and coordination throughout Afghanistan. ISAF plans, directs, and integrates the contributions of these two commands in support of ANA development.

The history of military aviation in Afghanistan dates from the 1920's when, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan formed its first military flying organizations. The air force was essentially destroyed by the end of the Soviet incursion in 1979-1989 and internal civil wars that led to the takeover by the Taliban in 1996. In 2005, U.S. and Coalition Forces began fielding air advisors and rebuilding the Afghan National Army Air Corps. Initial efforts were led by the U.S. Army as the Combined Forces Afghanistan Air Division.

In 2006, the GIROA Ministry of Defense requested an airpower assessment. U.S. Central Command Air Forces conducted the study and identified missions and required capabilities for the Afghan National Army Air Corps. The GIROA Ministry of Defense established the Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) as a subordinate command within the ANA. In 2007, development of the Afghan National Army Air Corps shifted from the U.S. Army to the U.S. Air Force, under the renamed Combined Air Power Transition Force.

In 2008, U.S. Central Command Air Forces activated the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing as the U.S. Air Force organization for air advisors assigned to Afghanistan in support of the AAF. The 438th Air Expeditionary Wing commander and his staff have dual responsibilities, serving as the NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan (NATC-A). NATC-A fulfills the training, equipping, and capacity building function for the Afghan air-power in the NTM-A/CSTC-A.

In February 2010, U.S. Air Forces Central completed an Afghanistan National Security Forces Airpower Requirements Review, at the request of the MoD. This document laid the foundation for the recommended roles, missions, and force structure for the ANAAC. The report emphasized sufficient and sustainable solutions, and changed existing acquisition plans to enhance long term affordability.

In March 2010, the Afghan Minister of Defense signed Decree 467, renaming the Afghan National Army Air Corps the Afghan Air Force (AAF). The Decree realigned the AAF from a Corps in the ANA to an independent organization with its own forces and chain of command, but still under the authority of the Chief of the General Staff.

The AAF was organized with a Headquarters, three Air Wings, four Detachments, eight air units, and a training base.² As of September 2011, the AAF Headquarters at the Kabul Afghanistan International Airport, the Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand Air Wings, and the Pohantoon-e-Hawayee (Dari for “Big Air School”³) were staffed and equipped at various levels. Detachments were under development at Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Gardez (reporting to the Kabul Air Wing), and Herat (reporting to the Shindand Air Wing).

From March 2010 to February 2012, the AAF grew from 2,800 to over 5,300 personnel, and added 55 aircraft, for a total of 88, including the G-222/C-27A fixed-wing aircraft, the Mi-17 helicopter, and the first three dedicated training aircraft (Cessna 182). A focus on gender integration within the Afghan Air Force enabled the first four female Afghan pilot candidates to complete English language training at Thunder Lab language training in Afghanistan.⁴ They began language and helicopter pilot training in the United States in July 2011.

Fig. 1. Three AAF Cessna 182s Arrive at Shindand Air Base September 18, 2011



Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Matthew Smith

As of September 2011, NATC-A was composed of military personnel predominantly from the U.S. Air Force, but included air advisors from 16 partner nations: Czech Republic, Great Britain, Croatia, Canada, Italy, Hungary, Jordan, Mongolia, Portugal, Lithuania, Latvia, Greece, Afghanistan, El Salvador, Ukraine, and Belgium. Participating partner nations provided diverse capabilities that contributed to the key advisory units and functions identified by the NATC-A Commanding General. The identified areas were:

- Kabul Air Wing
- Kandahar Air Wing
- Shindand Air Wing
- Pohantoon-e-Hawayee
- Operational Capability
- AAF Headquarters
- Command & Control
- Air Interdiction Unit

² Afghan air assets included the Air Interdiction Unit organized under the Ministry of the Interior. The Air Interdiction Unit focused on counter-narcotics missions. Operations, equipment, and training were funded through the United Kingdom and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counter-narcotics and Global Threats.

³ The school is also referred to as the Kabul Air Corp Training Center.

⁴ Thunder Lab is 24/7 aviation English immersion where Afghan pilot candidates live and learn English with U.S. and UK advisors while awaiting pilot training in order to improve out-of-country training.

In the March 2011 guidance, the Commander of the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing further recognized three main focus areas in order of priority: Professionalization, Command and Control, and Shindand Air Wing development.

On April 27, 2011, eight active duty U.S. Air Force advisors and one contract mentor were killed by an Afghan Air Force Colonel working in the Afghan Air Force Command and Control Center (ACCC). This was the single largest loss of life in one day for the NATC-A, and temporarily set-back the recent gains made towards developing AAF operational independence and self-sufficiency.

Afghan National Security Forces Development Funding

Congress has appropriated \$48.34 billion to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund in Public Laws 109-13, 109-234, 109-289, 110-28, 110-161, 110-252, 111-32, 111-118, 112-10, and 112-74. These Public Laws define the “train and equip” mission performed in Afghanistan. The laws specify use of the funds in support of development of the Afghan security force.

Objectives and Methodology

On May 14, 2011, the DoD Office of Inspector General announced the “Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan Air Force,” Project No. D2011-D00SPO-0234. The objective of this assessment was to determine whether U.S. Government and Coalition Forces goals, objectives, plans and guidance to train, equip, and field a viable and sustainable Afghan Air Force were prepared, issued, operative, and relevant.

The assessment team reviewed applicable Federal laws and Department regulations including: the National Defense Authorization Act; DoD, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and U.S. Central Command directives and instructions; ISAF planning documents; and GIRoA Ministry of Defense guidance. The team conducted a site visit in Afghanistan from July 25 to August 8, 2011. We reviewed AAF development program and process implementation, and interviewed Afghan, U.S., and Coalition leaders and other unit personnel responsible for AAF development and operations.

~~(FOUO)~~ Report Structure

This report consists of six separate sections:

- Notable Progress—highlighting five headquarter initiatives and positive developments in the Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand Air Wings.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Systemic Issues—four broad observations concerning a common vision for the AAF, air assets command and control, NATC-A manning, and integration of NATC-A into the NTM-A/CSTC-A.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Training Issues—five specific observations discussing AAF training standardization, airframe air-worthiness certification, training of Afghan aircraft maintenance personnel, and the capability of English language trainers for pilots and crews.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Equipping Issues—four observations regarding the selection of a suitable near and long-term medium-sized transport aircraft, actual supply of AAF unit equipment vice authorized fill, consistency of development plans for the AAF logistical system

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with applicable GIRoA Ministry of Defense Decrees, and translation of maintenance manuals into local languages.

- Fielding Issues—four observations outlining AAF dependency on the ANA recruiting system, comparative pay for skilled AAF professionals, ISAF command relationships at Shindand Air Base, and infrastructure and facilities support at Shindand Air Base (published in a classified annex).
- One additional issue concerning GIRoA Ministry of Defense support to the Ministry of the Interior Air Interdiction Unit.

This is the sixteenth in a series of reports published by the Office of Inspector General's Special Plans and Operations Directorate that focus on the DoD train and equip missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. General areas discussed in these reports include:

- accountability of weapons and night vision devices transferred to the Iraq and Afghan Security Forces,
- effectiveness/responsiveness of the Foreign Military Sales system in support of the Iraq and Afghan Security Forces,
- development of the logistics systems in the Iraq and Afghan Security Forces,
- effectiveness of U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop the Iraq and Afghan Security Forces, and
- review of the Coalition Support Fund Program and other DoD security assistance and security cooperation programs with Pakistan.

This is the first report that focuses solely on the development of the Afghanistan Air Force. Previous reports on Afghan National Security Force subjects may be viewed at <http://www.dodig.mil/spo/reports.html>.

PART I – NOTABLE PROGRESS

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Notable Progress

AAF Professionalization Program

The Commander, NATC-A developed and implemented an AAF Professionalization Program for the AAF in June 2011. The intent of this initiative was to incentivize Afghan leadership by delaying the release of new aircraft to the AAF until they demonstrated significant improvement in the stewardship of AAF airmen, aircraft, and infrastructure. The program included two tiers of performance metrics in three main areas:

- command and control,
- operations and maintenance discipline; and
- accountability and training.

In February 2012, the NATC-A Operations Officer reported the monthly results for all rotary and fixed wing missions. The report showed that the percentage of missions conducted using the required Aviation Mission Requests increased from 14 percent in August 2011, to 62 percent in February 2012.” Further, the report showed that proper mission planning was completed prior to execution in accordance with Afghan command and control policies for 82 percent of the missions flown in February 2012, again a significant improvement.

NATC-A Assessment and Synchronization Tool

Headquarters, ISAF, established consistent, quantitative rating systems for Afghanistan Ministries and subordinate institutions. One rated measure is Afghan organizational level dependence on Coalition Forces assistance. Afghan ministries and other security forces elements are assigned a rating between Capability Milestone Level 4, complete dependence on the Coalition to Capability Milestone Level 1A, able to conduct independent operations.

The Commander, NATC-A developed an assessment tool applicable to AAF development using the standard definitions from the ISAF rating scheme. The NATC-A Assessment Tool required the application of Capability Milestone ratings to all AAF elements advised by the 438 Air Expeditionary Wing and provided an internal assessment of two cross-cutting functions, Command and Control, and operational capability. Air Expeditionary Wing and Group Commanders had access to quarterly assessments of AAF organizations by functional component. The assessment tool included comment boxes with an advisor narrative specifying necessary conditions for assignment to the next higher Capability Milestone rating. Commanders and staff within the 438 Air Expeditionary Wing provided positive feedback about the assessment tool, saying it improved general awareness and synchronization of effort.

Multi-National Composition of NATC-A

The integration of international coalition support for NATC-A was extensive. NATC-A leadership assimilated 147 air advisors from 16 NATO and non-NATO Coalition countries. The international advisors brought invaluable aircraft operations and maintenance experience not available in the U.S. military for the type of aircraft assets the AAF has employed or will employ. NATC-A leadership overcame significant obstacles, including language differences and

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national caveats on the use of advisors, to maximize the contribution of the international air advisors toward AAF development.

Pohantoon-e-Hawayee

Pohantoon-e-Hawayee (Dari for “Big Air School”) provides initial-entry general military and technical aviation training for AAF recruits. Established in January 2008 at the Kabul International Airport, as of August 2011, the school taught 58 classes grouped into five broad areas:

- general education,
- military training,
- mission support technical training,
- maintenance and aviation-related technical training, and
- Professional Military Education.

The 2014 training plan calls for a further increase by the end of that year to 81 courses in the same five areas. The majority of the new courses are concentrated in the technical training area, supporting the effort of the AAF to create a three-level training and qualification system. Challenges remain in the quality of incoming recruits, scarcity of qualified English language instructors, and uncertainty regarding the school’s place in future GIRoA Ministry of Defense plans. Despite these obstacles, the school provides a solid foundation for the training of AAF personnel.

Notable Progress at the AAF Air Wings

The advisor teams demonstrated high morale in the summer of 2011. Although confronted with difficult challenges, advisors interviewed were confident in their ability to ultimately overcome them and succeed in their mission.

Kabul Air Wing

The AAF Kabul Air Wing operates and maintains both the Mi-17 and the G-222/C-27A. The Presidential airlift squadron has succeeded to the point that it independently operates its three Mi-17 helicopters as a stand-alone unit under the GIRoA Ministry of Defense without Coalition advisors. Afghan leaders of and Coalition advisors to the G-222/C-27A squadron intermingled work spaces within the headquarters, including creating a common kitchen and eating area. This led to increased communication between Afghan crews and advisors, and improved English skill of the Afghan crews.

Kandahar Air Wing

The wing staff was reportedly making progress developing the capability for independent planning and conducting operational missions from start to finish. The wing medical department was a highlight. Advisors reported that the clinic was well staffed, providing pilots their required flight physicals, and that Afghan medics performed medical evacuation missions. The medical department was the only location at which the assessment team observed that the Afghan logistic system functioned effectively after a proactive advisor held the Regional

Logistic Support Command accountable for providing those supplies and equipment as required by Decree 4.0.

Also, the Kandahar Air Wing Mi-17 squadron pilots and aircrew were flying operational missions in support of ANA operations. Air advisors reported that 60 to 70 percent of all missions were flown by Afghan-only crews, including hauling sling-loaded cargo and using live rocket ammunition.

Shindand Air Wing

As of September 2011, Shindand Air Base was the second largest in Afghanistan, with the mission to become the sole AAF training base to conduct both introductory and undergraduate flight training. However, as of September 2011, the Shindand Air Wing was the least developed of the three AAF wings. The efforts of three staff sections of the air advisor group stood out:

- Training for Afghan Mi-17 crews began in January 2011, and had been successfully conducted in temporary facilities which were only useable as a result of renovations undertaken by the advisor group. As of September 2011, permanent facilities were still under construction.
- GIRA and ISAF decisions in 2011 tripled the size of Shindand Air Base, resulting in the need for an additional eight miles of perimeter fencing. The new footprint included an IJC Command, an ANA Corps training area, the AAF Wing and training facilities, and the only non-civilian airfield in Afghanistan. The Air Advisor Group was assigned an engineer lieutenant. The Air Advisor Group commander understood the construction engineering challenge and requested and received additional U.S. Air Force civil engineer assistance.
- For the five months prior to August 2011, the Air Advisor Group personnel officer worked alone. Assigned and trained as an advisor, the incumbent was successfully completing group personnel actions (in-processing, awards, departures, etc.), submitting formal requests for forces to allow the group to accomplish their base operations support mission, and advising her Afghan counterpart.

Figure 2. Afghan Air Force Airmen Prepare a Rocket Pod at Kandahar Air Wing.



Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Corey Hook

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PART II – SYSTEMIC ISSUES

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~~(FOUO)~~ Systemic Issues

~~(FOUO)~~ Observation 1. Leadership Vision for the Afghan Air Force

~~(FOUO)~~ Senior Ministry of Defense and General Staff officials did not articulate a common understanding of capabilities necessary to achieve the AAF mission in support of their national security objectives and held unrealistic expectations regarding the future receipt of additional air asset capabilities from international partner countries.

~~(FOUO)~~ This occurred, in part, because senior U.S. and Coalition officials have been inconsistent in communicating their planned support for the AAF and have not thoroughly disabused GIROA aspirations for an air force comparable to the technologically advanced Coalition air forces.

~~(FOUO)~~ Consequently, senior GIROA officials were focused on acquiring specific types of aircraft including fighters and large airlift rather than defining and planning for appropriately executable missions with the aircraft the AAF could likely afford and maintain. GIROA leadership will continue to struggle to effectively employ and sustain their Air Force without a commonly accepted understanding of what and how the AAF supports Afghan national security.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Numbers 14, 25, and 37, for additional details.)

- CSTC-A, “Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces,” September 20, 2008.
- NTM-A/CSTC-A Air Working Group Brief, 9 Jan 2011.
- Decree 5001, “Ministry of Defense Organization and Functions Manual,” March 29, 2011.

~~(FOUO)~~ Discussion

~~(FOUO)~~ Interviews with key GIROA Ministry of Defense, ANA General Staff, AAF, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and NATC-A senior leadership illustrated inconsistent visions between Afghan and Coalition officials concerning the long-term employment capability roles and objectives of the AAF. Specifically, senior Afghan officials discussed their need and/or desire for jet-powered fighter and larger cargo aircraft, which they believed were a strategic necessity for the future security and stability of the country, and expressed concern with their lack of input into U.S./Coalition strategic decisions affecting the AAF. Senior Coalition officers were aware of these concerns but did not accept that the AAF operational roles envisaged by the Afghan government were technologically feasible or logistically sustainable. Rather, Coalition concern was focused on the AAF developing the capability to properly operate and maintain the current aircraft inventory.

~~(FOUO)~~ The rapid growth of the Afghan security forces and the AAF in particular, is a challenge. The Coalition wants Afghan leadership to accept, understand, and adopt Western concepts, organization, and doctrine radically different from those taught by the Russians. Afghan leaders with experience from the 1980's are critical of the lack of major equipment provided by the Coalition compared to the way the Soviet Union supported the Afghan air force. The discrepancy between Afghan government desires and capabilities was underscored by the reality of the technical complexity of a modern air force, the still early stage of training throughout the ANA/AAF, and the challenge presented by educating sufficient personnel at the level of literacy required by the AAF to train pilots and technical support staff.

~~(FOUO)~~ The Campaign Plan for the Development of the Afghan National Security Forces, dated September 20, 2008, and current as of February 2012, described the basic goals of the then Afghan National Army Air Corps as providing air transport and limited combat support.

~~(FOUO)~~ However, in the three years since the plan's inception in 2008, the concept for air power support to Afghan security forces expanded. As of September 2011, AAF selected high priority missions including air attack support for troops in combat, evacuation of casualties and human remains, and emergency unit resupply and sustainment.

~~(FOUO)~~ In March 2010, Minister of Defense Decree 467 established the AAF as a distinct service within the ANA. Decree 5001 tasks the AAF with the mission to "provide trained and ready airmen and soldiers to execute critical tasks from the air in support of the Afghan National Army and when directed by the Ministry of Defense and General Staff, to support the civil authorities of Afghanistan at all levels." The Coalition strategic campaign plan supporting AAF development has not kept pace with institutional and operational changes with respect to the Coalition's defined missions for the AAF or Afghan security officials' expectations.

~~(FOUO)~~ Conflicting verbal messages regarding future AAF capabilities from partner country stakeholders added to the lack of current relevance and clarity in the AAF development planning documents, and detracted from the credibility and effectiveness of advisors. When queried, ISAF leaders agreed that a clear message from senior U.S. leadership stating which capabilities would and would not be supported would help temper Afghan expectations. However delivered, the Coalition message needed to be clear and consistent.

~~(FOUO)~~ During the initial build-up of the AAF, ISAF and NTM-A/CSTC-A admittedly focused on force generation – both equipment and personnel. Supporting ongoing operations, sustainment logistical systems, and Ministry of Defense and General Staff development related to the AAF were lesser priorities. Ministry of Defense leadership followed the Coalition lead and focused on acquiring new and more technologically capable and sophisticated equipment, rather than developing systems for sustaining equipment on-hand.

~~(FOUO)~~ In the absence of a common Coalition and GIROA vision of the role the AAF will play in supporting the Afghan government's National Security Strategy, and a concrete definition of that vision in a jointly agreed campaign strategy for AAF development, the mission to develop an effective and sustainable AAF will likely be impeded by differing expectations and priorities.

~~(FOUO)~~ Recommendations

~~(FOUO)~~ 1.a. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Air Training Command-Afghanistan, coordinate with the Afghan Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and the Afghan National Army on the joint development of a campaign plan for building the Afghan Air Force that reflects current and anticipated roles and capabilities the development of which North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Coalition countries and forces intend to support.

~~(FOUO)~~ 1.b. Commander, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan in coordination with Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Air Training Command-Afghanistan, ensure the updated plan for Afghan Air Force development is understood via Key Leader Engagements and mentor its implementation at all relevant levels of the Afghan Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Afghan National Army, and Afghan Air Force.

~~(FOUO)~~ 1.c. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy provide a consistent and realistic message to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan concerning Afghan Air Force resources/assets that North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Coalition/U.S. intends to provide.

~~(FOUO)~~ Management Comments

Management concurred with the recommendations.

~~(FOUO)~~ NTM-A/CSTC-A commented that joint planning efforts between Coalition and Afghan National Security Forces incorporated AAF development into the SY 1391 Operation NAWOOD Campaign Plan. Implementation included emphasis on senior leader development, command and control, fleet management, and the stewardship of resources.

~~(FOUO)~~ NTM-A/CSTC-A, responding for ISAF, stated that a series of weekly senior leader engagements and monthly Shuras educate senior Afghans towards enterprise thinking and reinforce AAF progress. NATC-A commented that they remained engaged with all levels of the AAF to ensure plans are understood and embodied by AAF leadership.

~~(FOUO)~~ The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated that senior DoD and ISAF leadership have made substantial efforts to communicate expectations to Afghan senior political and defense leaders, citing the April Security Consultations Forum and the May NATO summit in Chicago. As a result, he believed that Afghan leaders' acceptance of U.S. views on the subject has improved since the DoD IG field research was completed, but acknowledged that it may well be an issue requiring the management of different views.

~~(FOUO)~~ NTM-A/CSTC-A added that the Coalition has consistently informed senior Afghan leaders that more advanced equipment is not the solution for the immediate strategic situation in Afghanistan.

~~(FOUO)~~ Our Response

~~(FOUO)~~ Management comments to the recommendations were responsive. The political environment in Afghanistan remains dynamic and warrants ongoing attention from all stakeholders to ensure AAF development requirements and expectations remain consistent. No further response is required.

~~(FOUO)~~ Observation 2. Stewardship of Afghan Air Force Assets

~~(FOUO)~~ U.S. and Coalition efforts to convince the Afghan leadership to properly follow AAF procedures to maintain AAF resources have thus far been unsuccessful.

~~(FOUO)~~ GIROA Ministry of Defense and ANA leadership were not following established AAF policy. Senior Afghan leadership bypassed the ACCC or provided it inaccurate and incomplete information. Additionally, development of the ACCC was delayed by an attack in April 2011 during which nine Coalition Air Advisors were killed.

~~(FOUO)~~ Poor stewardship of the AAF has inadvertently encouraged Afghan dependency and created an unrealistic understanding of how a modern Air Force has to be operated, maintained, and sustained. Routine bypassing of the ACCC resulted in aircraft flying lower priority missions and executing operations in degraded conditions, risking aircrew and aircraft. Without improved command and control over AAF air missions, crew training will suffer and aircraft will become unsafe and inoperable through overuse and lack of maintenance. Moreover, the mission to develop an effective and sustainable AAF will be jeopardized.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Numbers 7, 8, 33, and 37, for additional details.)

- Army Field Manual 3-07.1, "Security Force Assistance," May 1, 2009.
- Army Field Manual 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, "Counterinsurgency," December 2006.
- Afghan Ministry of Defense, "Air Command and Control Doctrine," (Dari-English), May 2011.
- Decree 5001, "Ministry of Defense Organization and Functions Manual," 29 March 2011.

~~(FOUO)~~ Discussion

~~(FOUO)~~ U.S. and Coalition air advisors understood the operational time-frame required for the development of a fully-functioning AAF, planning to achieve an independent AAF operational capability by 2016. However, U.S./Coalition leaders and planners did not anticipate the degree of effort needed to convince senior GIROA Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and ANA leaders to follow proper command and control procedures governing the use of AAF aircraft.

~~(FOUO)~~ As of October 2011, NTM-A/CSTC-A advisors rated AAF command and control as incapable of accomplishing its mission. The poor rating was indicative of an incomplete understanding about the use and care of an air force on the part of Afghan senior leadership. However, the GIROA Ministry of Defense and AAF, in coordination with U.S. and Coalition Forces personnel, developed sufficient and appropriate command and control policies in line with the development of the AAF, including:

- Decree 467, "Organizational Structure," prescribes the GIROA Ministry of Defense and General Staff structure, roles, and missions; defines command and control relationships; and modified the organizational relationship of the AAF within the ANA.

- Decree 5001, “Ministry of Defense Organization and Functions Manual,” promulgates the mission, authorities, roles, responsibilities, and relationships of the GIRoA Ministry of Defense and its major components, including the AAF.
- “Air Command and Control Doctrine” establishes proper procedures for submitting Air Mission Requests and defines national priorities for AAF air missions as shown in Figure 4.
- “Afghanistan Air Corps Command Center Duty Descriptions” promulgates the positions, duties, responsibilities and relationships for AAF personnel working for the ACCC.


~~(FOUO)~~ Of note, improving AAF command and control was the number two priority for the Commander, NATC-A, after professionalization of the AAF.

~~(FOUO)~~ AAF “Air Command and Control Doctrine” requires leaders to request AAF air assets using Air Mission Requests. As shown in Figure 4, the ACCC should validate and/or coordinate all national and local air mission requests. Proper use of Air Mission Requests should provide the AAF, ACCC, and Afghan Air Wings the information necessary to effectively prioritize, schedule, and execute requested missions.

~~(FOUO)~~ Figure 3. National Priority for Air Movement

- A. High Priority**
1. Missions ordered by President of Afghanistan
 2. Missions directed by Minister of Defense
 3. Missions tasked by Chief of General Staff
 4. Support of Troops in Combat
 5. MEDEVAC (Emergency)
 6. Human Remains (HR)
 7. Emergency missions /re-supply/sustainment
 8. Unit deploy / redeploy
 9. Non-Combatant Evacuation
 10. Humanitarian Aid (HA)
 11. Routine MEDEVAC
 12. Election Support
- B. Medium Priority**
13. VVIP (LTG or higher, GIRoA Ministers and Deputies)
 14. Detainees and escorts
 15. Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW's) and escorts
 16. ANA recruit and graduate moves
 17. Unit movement passengers
 18. Unit sustainment cargo
 19. Emergency leave
- C. Low Priority**
20. VIP (BG or higher, GIRoA Directors and Chiefs)
 21. Exercise and training movements/missions
 22. Routine cargo
 23. Leave passengers

~~(FOUO)~~ Figure 4. Afghan Command and Control Scheduling



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~~(FOUO)~~ However, the Air Mission Request process was not the primary means GIRoA and ANA senior leaders used to schedule flights. Senior leaders frequently issued “ciphers,” or orders, which bypassed ACCC procedures and provided in any event insufficient information to effectively prioritize, plan, and coordinate air missions.

~~(FOUO)~~ There was some evidence illustrating that the GIRoA Minister of Defense and his First Deputy were beginning to understand the importance of mission planning and the detriments of bypassing the established chain of command. The GIRoA Ministry of Defense convened a symposium discussing AAF command and control structure in June 2011. Senior GIRoA Ministry of Defense, ANA, and AAF decision-makers attended. Participants were shown the amount of lost training that resulted from short notice “urgent” operational mission requests from government leadership and Army Corps commanders, and the negative impacts on the development of the AAF.

~~(FOUO)~~ U.S. and Coalition Forces advisors also realized that development of a fully-functioning ACCC was the foundation of an effective command and control of AAF assets. The ACCC facilitated the dissemination of mission planning details in accordance with scheduling timelines, tracked AAF missions, and reported mission status to the National Military Command Center. In addition, the ACCC validated Air Wing and Detachment schedules and consolidated all AAF missions into a single schedule published daily.

~~(FOUO)~~ Advisors stated that the initial development of the ACCC was on track until the murder of eight United States military personnel and one contractor at the ACCC, Kabul, Afghanistan International Airport on April 27, 2011. The incident negatively impacted the development of the ACCC as NATC-A had to replace experienced advisors, reestablish rapport with new ACCC personnel, and analyze and adapt future force protection measures.

~~(FOUO)~~ U.S. and Coalition military culture understandably discourages mission failure as an acceptable outcome. Several senior U.S. officers mentioned that individuals are assigned to the advisor mission with this ingrained characteristic, which contributes to unwillingness on their part to allow Afghan personnel they advise to fail and then learn from their mistakes. This, in turn, has cultivated an inflated belief on the part of some Afghan civilian and military leaders regarding AAF abilities and an overreliance on U.S. and Coalition capabilities. There was a perception that new aircraft would be added in order to compensate for lower sortie completion rates. Further, NTM-A/CSTC-A-funded and contracted maintenance, while necessary, discouraged the development of proper Afghan stewardship, including command and control. Nevertheless, NTM-A/CSTC-A and NATC-A air advisors understood that an effective, independent, and sustainable AAF must exercise effective command and control to preserve limited resources of aircraft, aircrew, and their support.

~~(FOUO)~~ Coalition advisors and Afghan commanders, pilots, and support personnel based in Kabul, Kandahar and Shindand stated that some senior Afghan civilian and military leaders routinely ignored priorities for air movement established in doctrine and treated the AAF pilots and aircrew as their private air service. NATC-A personnel provided two examples:

- ~~(FOUO)~~ The movement of senior Afghan personnel to attend the funeral of a large city mayor was requested at the last minute. There was insufficient aircrew and no armed escort available, but the Afghan wing attempted to launch. Coalition advisors cancelled the mission. The senior Afghan personnel used ground transportation over a short, relatively safe route that, in the opinion of the advisors, should have been the primary option.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ A mission was scheduled to pick up human remains, but was re-directed by an Afghan Corps Commander to deliver ammunition. However, instead of executing either of the appropriate missions, the pilots moved 30 civilians and their sheep. Advisors described the mischaracterization of air missions as intended to pick-up human remains as a frequent method to gain higher priority for this task.

~~(FOUO)~~ The lack of control procedures concerning the availability of operational flying hours, and the priority given to operations allowed senior GIRoA officials to view the AAF as their private fleet, irrespective of aircraft maintenance needs, training requirements, or weather conditions.

~~(FOUO)~~ Also, immediate need was used as an excuse to bypass command and control procedures; requests lacked landing zone, passenger, or other detailed information. Effective and properly executed command and control procedures served as an anti-corruption tool, documenting the location, cargo, and timing of AAF air assets.

~~(FOUO)~~ The lack of effective command and control in the AAF has jeopardized aircraft and aircrew operations and missions by increasing unscheduled maintenance, reducing aircrew and aircraft availability for higher priority missions, and inhibiting required training. With respect to training, advisors stated that, while the optimal mix of operations-to-training flight time for the AAF was 60/40, the ratio for the first half of calendar year 2011 was closer to 75/25.

~~(FOUO)~~ At least one element of the GIRoA demonstrated the capability to execute effective command and control of air assets. The Air Interdiction Unit was a squadron sized unit assigned to the Ministry of the Interior to support the counter narcotics mission. The unit followed established command and control procedures for operations and training, and allocated a sustainable 80 hours per month per aircraft. Of the 80 flight hours, 48 were dedicated to mission operations and 32 were reserved for training. The Air Interdiction Unit was further advanced than the AAF, but with Coalition advisor support, elements of the AAF were attempting to follow the example.

~~(FOUO)~~ Effective Command and Control rests with inculcating a culture of increasing stewardship among GIRoA senior leadership. If GIRoA leaders would follow and enforce their own procedures then the General Staff, Corps, and Air Wing Commanders and their personnel would respond likewise.

~~(FOUO)~~ The Commander, NATC-A identified certain significant challenges limiting the development of effective AAF command and control. These included the absence of AAF representation on the General Staff, senior civilian GIRoA interference and influence, and tribal- and family-based assignments within the AAF rank structure not based on merit. To address these issues by means within his control, in 2011, the Commander, NATC-A:

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- ~~(FOUO)~~ instituted the AAF Professionalization Program to encourage the AAF to manage their aircraft fleet, with aircraft delivery tied to improvement,⁵
- ~~(FOUO)~~ withheld delivery of 21 more modern Mi-17s until the GIRoA exercised greater professionalism,
- ~~(FOUO)~~ transferred Mi-17s to Shindand – beyond the political influence of Kabul, and
- ~~(FOUO)~~ encouraged appropriate advisor intervention to prevent the misuse of AAF resources.

~~(FOUO)~~ The AAF Professionalization Program concentrated on three main areas of weakness concerning AAF command and control development.

- ~~(FOUO)~~ Mission Timeliness: Minimize “last minute” mission planning and execution, thereby limiting the disruption to scheduled maintenance and training.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Scheduling Discipline: Increase the use and completeness of Air Movement Requests, improve the accuracy of assigned mission priority, and decrease the impact of requestor seniority on establishing mission priority and urgency.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Information Flow: Improve the transmission of Air Movement Requests via established procedures.

~~(FOUO)~~ Through these initiatives, NTM-A/CSTC-A advisors sought to inculcate an ethos of stewardship among the Ministry of Defense, GS, and ANA senior leadership. However, it was understood that Afghan leadership acceptance of this concept as it applies to the use of AAF air assets would take time.

~~(FOUO)~~ Recommendation

~~(FOUO)~~ 2. Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan continue to support Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, efforts to mentor the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Defense and General Staff, using key leader engagement, delay of new aircraft, and control of aircraft availability to influence behavior, establish the importance of training, and inculcate stewardship of resources.

~~(FOUO)~~ Management Comments

~~(FOUO)~~ Management concurred with the recommendation. NTM-A/CSTC-A, responding for ISAF/USFOR-A, stated that NATC-A engages at every level with their Afghan counterparts enforcing safe aviation practices, resource stewardship, and personnel management. Further, NATC-A assisted the AAF in devising and enforcing an Afghan command and control system that focused on written guidance and centralized control of air assets.

⁵ One indicator of the impact of this decision to tie the delivery of equipment to increasing professionalism was relayed by an NTM-A/CSTC-A General Officer, who stated that regarding the decision to tie resources to behavior, an Afghan Colonel told him that the Coalition were “beginning to think like Afghans.”

Our Response

Management comments to the recommendation were responsive. No further response is required.

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Observation 3. NATO Air Training Command–Afghanistan Personnel Fill

NTM-A/CSTC-A was unable to fill validated NATC-A training and advisory positions necessary for the effective execution of the NATC-A air advisory mission.

Obtaining qualified personnel was a challenge. Specialized skills such as for G-222/C-27A and Mi-17 aircrew were particularly difficult to fill, and some assigned air advisor personnel were limited by national political caveats and other restrictions. In addition, some advisors were forced to spend time providing security as a result of increased force protection requirements in response to the April 2011 attack.⁶

An insufficient number of air advisors will slow the professionalization of the AAF. Also, future AAF operational effectiveness and sustainment will be impaired by having too few properly qualified air advisors on the aircraft.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Number 26, for additional details.)

- NTM-A/CSTC-A “Commander’s Vision for 2011–Accelerating Progress,” 10 February 2011.

Discussion

The NATO Combined Joint Statement of Requirements, version 11.5, January 2012, included 222 validated positions for NATC-A. As of February 14, 2012, only 66 percent of the validated positions had an incumbent or confirmed pledge. NATC-A had 17 G-222/C-27A and 47 Mi-17 advisor positions vacant.

The Commander, NTM-A/CSTC-A, uses four personnel systems to establish validated positions and then requests qualified personnel. The first two are NATO systems. The third and fourth systems are unique to the U.S. military.

- Combined Joint Statement of Requirements
- Crisis Establishment
- Joint Manning Document
- Request for Forces

NATO uses the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements and Crisis Establishment systems to assign personnel to one or two year obligations, respectively, in Afghanistan. ISAF and subordinate commands generate requirements, which NATO validates. NATO member countries volunteer to fill validated positions consistent with their national military capabilities.

⁶ The attack at North KAIA on April 27, 2011 resulted in the death of eight NATO service members and one civilian trainer.

The U.S. military uses Joint Manning Documents to source positions from the Military Services through individual augmentation. All positions are approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approval is subject to national and DoD-imposed limitations. NTM-A/ CSTC-A and NATC-A periodically re-validate manning requirements.

Coalition partners were limited by national caveats, the size and capacity of their own military forces, English language proficiency, and a variety of other restrictions and constraints. NTM-A/ CSTC-A engaged many coalition partners to request air and air crew advisors. These negotiations are in various stages of maturity. Partner nation responses have varied: some have provided support, and others have pledged support. However, pledges have and may be modified creating challenges in staff planning.

The U.S. Air Force provided almost all of the U.S. military advisors in NATC-A. U.S. Navy personnel accounted for 10 percent of NATC-A advisors, serving in staff or aviation-related ground operations policy, but were prohibited from serving in active flying billets. Additionally, NATC-A advisors explained that one obstacle to U.S. Army air advisor presence was that U.S. Army personnel were only authorized to fly in aircraft meeting Army airworthiness standards, and most Afghan aircraft were not certified per Army requirements.⁷

The Commander, NTM-A/CSTC-A, had made filling the qualified Mi-17 and G-222/C-27A air advisor gap his number one personnel priority. The NTM-A/CSTC-A International Security Cooperation office reported conducting weekly video teleconferences with NATO headquarters to work the issue with NATO nations. The same office reported pursuing bi-lateral agreements with non-NATO countries, and hoped to acquire additional air advisors from Thailand and El Salvador. Other non-NATO nations with Mi-17s and G-222s in their active inventory were also contacted and were engaged in discussions regarding possible support.

The Commander, NATC-A, changed the force protection requirements following the attack on April 27, 2011. Air advisors actively engaged with the Afghans required an accompanying security detail. Manning for the security details was often provided by other air advisors. As a result, some advisors reported their time spent mentoring and advising their Afghan counterparts was reduced, amplifying the shortage of air advisors.

In his vision statement for 2011, the Commander, NTM-A/CSTC-A, identified the aviation trainer shortfall as a potential risk to progress toward transitioning security lead to the ANSF and urged “Afghan and international partners to seek innovative ways to overcome this risk or mollify its effects.” On October 5, 2011, the U.S. Secretary of Defense reinforced the importance of the general shortage of NATO trainers, raising the issue in a speech prior to his first meeting with NATO Defense Ministers.⁸

Finally, the directed reduction in force to meet the ceiling of 68,000 U.S. military personnel no later than September 15, 2012, will reduce NATC-A personnel authorizations from 421 to 339. This reduction, while improving the reported percent fill for personnel, will further limit the

⁷ See Observation 7, “NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan Air Worthiness Certification Support”

⁸ Remarks by Secretary Panetta at Carnegie Europe, Brussels, Belgium, October 5, 2011. Accessed from <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4895>.

ability of NATC-A to advise and assist, and increase the time necessary to effectively transition the AAF to an effective, independent, and self-sustainable air force.

NATC-A will not be able to meet the requirements for G-222/C-27A training or conduct specialized Mi-17 training without more air advisors. This increases the risk of either not meeting the targeted 2016 transition date for the AAF or accepting a less effective force on that date.

Recommendations

- 3.a. Supreme Allied Commander Europe/Commander, U.S. European Command, continue to use all means at his disposal to encourage North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations to support valid manning requirements.
- 3.b. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, continue efforts to complete bilateral agreements to leverage military expertise from non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations.
- 3.c. Joint Staff, Global Force Management, review joint allocation for North Atlantic Treaty Organization Air Training Command-Afghanistan requirements, particularly rotary wing, to diversify Service support to accommodate the transition from training to operational emphasis.

Management Comments

Management concurred with recommendations 3.a. and 3.b.

U.S. European Command stated they continued to support NTM-A requirements by manning as many validated requirements as possible, within the constraints of their operational environment.

NTM-A/CSTC-A commented that bilateral agreements were a valuable source of manpower, citing the provision of instructors from Jordan and Mongolia, and ongoing negotiations between GIRoA and the Indian Defense Attaché. However, the specific technical qualifications required may limit the effectiveness to AAF development.

Management non-concurred with recommendation 3.c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff J-1 stated that the recommendation as written in the draft was misdirected. We contacted the Joint Staff, J-1 Personnel Readiness Division, Operations Branch, resulting in a redirection of the recommendation from the J-1 Manpower and Personnel Directorate to the Office of Global Force Management. Management concurred with the redirected recommendation and on August 23, 2012. During a sourcing video tele-conference, the Army agreed to provide eight rotary wing trainers in support of AAF training.

Our Response

Management comments were responsive. No further response is required.

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Observation 4. Obstacles to NATC-A and NTM-A/CSTC-A Alignment and Integration

The NATC-A staff organization structure was not fully aligned and integrated with NTM-A/CSTC-A.

While NATC-A is a multi-national headquarters, the U.S. Air Force provided over 80 percent of the military staff and all of the senior leaders. Further, NATC-A was established and resourced after other primary NTM-A/CSTC-A components had achieved organizational and programmatic maturity. Finally, until mid-2011, NATC-A was headquartered at the Kabul International Airport, geographically separate from NTM-A/CSTC-A Headquarters at Camp Eggers. These obstacles interfered with NATC-A's complete alignment and integration with NTM-A/CSTC-A.

As a result, some NTM-A/CSTC-A staff and GIRoA senior advisors were unaware of NATC-A goals and requirements, and support to NATC-A groups advising AAF Air Wings was insufficiently developed. Continued overreliance on the U.S. Air Force for air advisors could impact the clarity of the NTM-A/CSTC-A advisor message, and the integration of the AAF into the Afghan military structure.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Numbers 3 and 9, for additional details.)

- Air Force Doctrine Document 2, "Operations and Organization," April 3, 2007.
- Army Field Manual 101-5, "Staff Organization and Operations," May 31, 1997.

Discussion

The incomplete alignment and integration of NATC-A into NTM-A/CSTC-A appeared to result from a combination of factors. As outlined in the Introduction of this report (page 7), in May 2007, responsibility for development of the AAF was transferred from the U.S. Army to the U.S. Air Force. In November 2008, U.S. Central Command Air Forces activated the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing (NATC-A) to accomplish the AAF advisory mission. This organization grew from 160 to 277 authorized personnel in 2009.

The establishment and staffing of NATC-A as a predominantly U.S. Air Force command impacted the relationship with NTM-A/CSTC-A and, potentially, their advising mission. NATC-A headquarters was organized following traditional staff functions, but concurrently functioned as a combined/joint staff in NTM-A/CSTC-A and a U.S. Air Force Wing in support of the advisor groups. NTM-A/CSTC-A staff officers we interviewed stated the functional difference between NATC-A (usually U.S. Air Force [USAF]) and NTM-A/CSTC-A (usually not USAF) were sufficient to cause confusion when non-principal staff officers attempted to coordinate and synchronize developmental and support actions.

The mission of NATC-A is to, "Set the conditions for a professional, fully independent and operationally capable Afghan Air Force that meets the security requirements of Afghanistan today...and tomorrow." While it was natural that the advisors brought their culture of an

independent air service to their assignments, the differing concepts of independence could impact the clarity of the NTM-A/CSTC-A message.

Further, the establishment of an ANA air component and the accompanying Coalition advising effort lagged the ANA ground component. The GIROA Ministry of Defense and ANA mentoring program was established in May 2002, under the Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan, Department of State. The partnership with the AAF (the Afghan National Army Air Corps at the time) began three years later in 2005.

Prior to April 2011, personnel assigned to NATC-A lived and worked at the Kabul International Airport, the location of the AAF headquarters. Travel between the Kabul International Airport and NTM-A/CSTC-A headquarters at Camp Eggers was time consuming. Force protection considerations and command awareness of coordination challenges between NATC-A and NTM-A/CSTC-A led to the relocation of some NATC-A staff personnel from the Kabul International Airport to Camp Eggers. The co-location should have improved integration with NTM-A/CSTC-A, but not all NATC-A staff sections could support a split staffing arrangement.

Some NTM-A/CSTC-A staff questioned why the Afghans needed an air force and several key NTM-A/CSTC-A mentors could not explain their role supporting the development of the AAF within the GIROA Ministry of Defense. This indicated that the NATC-A mission was not well understood within NTM-A/CSTC-A and not uniformly supported by NTM-A/CSTC-A staff elements, and that senior GIROA Ministry of Defense officials were not receiving a coherent message concerning AAF development.

The NATC-A advisor groups interviewed believed the primary impact of the less-than-complete integration of NATC-A and NTM-A/CSTC-A was that the support and development of AAF Air Wings would continue to lag. For example, the 738th Group received almost no support from the NTM-A/CSTC-A Regional Support Command-South. As part of the effort by NTM-A/CSTC-A to improve Afghan literacy, the Regional Support Command-South provided training resources to the ANA Corps based in Kandahar. The AAF Kandahar Air Wing was not a recipient. Also, less than full integration between NTM-A/CSTC-A and NATC-A, combined with the unique nature of aviation-specific support, led to AAF Kandahar Air Wing logistics sustainment efforts operating independent of the logistics development efforts for the ANA.

The lack of sufficient clarity, coordination, and integration of effort between NATC-A and NTM-A/CSTC-A was impeding the development of the AAF as an integral force within and in support of the ANA and General Staff.

Recommendations

- 4.a. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Air Training Command-Afghanistan, ensure that staffs and assigned advisors in both organizations fully understand and support Afghan Air Force development efforts.
- 4.b. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Air Training Command-Afghanistan, use all available means to minimize the impact of physical separation.
- 4.c. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Air Training Command-Afghanistan, explore options to include more Coalition nation, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps personnel in the command.

Management Comments

Management concurred with the recommendations.

NTM-A/CSTC-A stated that all advisors attend the 28-day Air Advisor Course. However, their comments did not address the education and orientation to AAF development of NTM-A/CSTC-A staff not assigned to NATC-A.

NTM-A/CSTC-A stated that they minimize the impact of the physical separation of the NATC-A staff through leadership presence at both locations, multiple weekly meetings between the staffs, and the permanent assignment of some NATC-A staff from the Kabul International Airport to the NTM-A/CSTC-A basecamp at Camp Eggers.

NATC-A commented that the decision for which military Service fills a position resides with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see recommendation 3.c. above). Also, a change in NATC-A policy allowed Coalition partners the opportunity to bid on all NATC-A positions, with the exception of positions coded specifically for U.S. military.

Our Response

NTM-A/CSTC-A comments to recommendation 4.a. were partially responsive. Air advisors assigned to NATC-A attended the 28-day course. The intent of our recommendation was to ensure that all advisors assigned to NTM-A understood the AAF development efforts. We ask that NTM-A/CSTC-A describe plans or efforts to orient NTM-A/CSTC-A staff to AAF development.

The remaining management comments to the recommendations were responsive. No further response is required.

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PART III – TRAINING ISSUES

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~~(FOUO)~~ Training Issues

Observation 5. Afghan Air Force Air Advisor Training, Guidance, and Oversight

The 438th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) air advisors did not consistently receive training, guidance, and oversight support necessary to perform their mission effectively.

The 438th AEW was unable to gain clear guidance from security assistance and USAF channels regarding the ownership of the C-222/C-27A or other aircraft purchased for the AAF through pseudo Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases. Therefore, pre-deployment Air Advisor flight training could not incorporate sufficient policy guidance and operational procedures for Air Advisors flying in U.S. Government or host nation-owned aircraft, specifically the G-222/C-27A aircraft standards.

Without decisive action to clarify guidance and ensure that general purpose Air Advisors, as well as pilots and crews, possess the necessary knowledge and skills, they will be unable to execute their mission responsibilities with clarity and confidence. This will further impede timely development of the Afghan Air Force.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Numbers 10, 11, 12, and 23 for additional details.)

- USAF Air Advising Operating Concept 1.0, 3, February 2012.
- AETC Operating Instruction Air Advisor Education and Training 1 July 2010
- U.S. Air Forces Central Instruction 16-101, USAFCENT Air Advisor and Training, August 3, 2010.
- U.S. Air Forces Central Instruction 90-101, USAFCENT Standardization Program, February 16, 2010.
- NATC-A, “Air Advisor CONOPS, version 11,” May 11, 2011.

Discussion

Headquarters Air Education and Training Command and 19th Air Force oversee the Air Advisor pre-deployment training in order to provide general purpose force personnel tasked as Air Advisors with the knowledge and skills necessary to assess, train, advise, and assist partner nations. U.S. Air Force Central Command (USAFCENT) has responsibility for setting training requirements and providing oversight for Air Advisor missions in theater.

Achieving Coalition-established transition goals requires well-trained and informed Air Advisors. Air Advisors are required to be able to apply “aviation expertise to assess, train, educate, advise and assist foreign personnel in the development and application of their aviation resources to meet their national needs...”⁹ This implies an understanding of clearly defined operational guidance and procedures with respect to the specific aircraft and physical environment that applies to the Air Advisor training mission.

⁹ U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Air Advisor Academy Charter, April 2010.

The inherent complexity of the Air Advisory mission and operating environment was significantly reinforced by inadequate or unclear guidance regarding flight operations and procedures for the G-222/C-27A in Afghanistan.

Afghan National Security Forces Funding purchased the AAF aircraft through a pseudo FMS process. Normally, aircraft ownership in FMS transactions is transferred to the purchasing country once the DD form 250 is signed. In this case, CSTC-A signed the DD 250 to retain ownership of the aircraft until the AAF demonstrated the capacity to exercise appropriate stewardship of these assets. However, this action created a unique situation and introduced confusion as to which U.S. Government department or agency was responsible for oversight of the aircraft and also what rules applied to pilots flying the aircraft. This situation existed from the delivery of the first G-222/C-27A in 2009 and continued through spring 2012, and continues to be the practice during on-going delivery of other AAF aircraft.

USAFCENT Instruction 16-101 required the Commander, 438th AEW, to determine the safety of host nation units and aircraft for flight operations involving U.S. Air Force personnel. In addition, the instruction directed each Air Advisor aviation squadron to develop and maintain a standardization and evaluation program in accordance with USAFCENT 90-101, "USAFCENT Standardization Program." And, though USAFCENT did conduct a Standardization/Evaluation staff assistance visit in October 2011, it did not consistently execute effective oversight over the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing or its predecessor, the Combined Air Power Transition Force, which resulted in confusion regarding reporting responsibilities and disposition of reporting on aircraft flight safety incidents and other mishaps.

Further, the lack of clarity regarding central oversight and conflicting policy guidance between Headquarters United States Air Force, Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) and its designated lead for foreign military sales (FMS) the Air Force Security Assistance Center (AFSAC), USAFCENT, CSTC-A, and other agencies regarding who maintained operational control of the aircraft contributed to confusion regarding applicable regulations. As a result, the 438th AEW itself had not formulated, validated, and implemented required operational flying guidance standards for U.S. Government or host nation-owned aircraft. The 438th AEW was the only U.S. Air Force wing responsible not only for developing and implementing, but also for validating, its own policies and procedures. Insufficient oversight by a single Major Command meant this guidance had not been independently validated by USAF leadership.

For example, Air Advisors reported that safety reports were sent to the 88th Air Base Wing, Air Force Materiel Command at Wright Patterson Air Force Base. Copies were provided to the U.S. Air Force Central safety office because the G-222/C-27A aircraft were not owned by the U.S. Air Force, but rather CSTC-A. Yet, no process was defined for Air Force Materiel Command to take action regarding these reports. This reflected lack of a common and clear operating picture regarding maintaining the performance readiness status of the 438th AEW.

In addition, statements from Air Advisors indicated some USAF pilot and aircrew had not received optimal training relating to operating/training foreign military air forces on the specific aircraft to which they would be assigned. For example, Air Advisors reported that the majority of advisor pilots and aircrew training Afghan personnel on the Mi-17 helicopters were previously

non-combat UH-1 pilots. Air Education and Training Command developed a comprehensive Combat Mission Training course utilizing the UH-1 providing basic combat mission training for these UH-1 pilots; however, this training cannot fully bridge the gap between a crewmember from a tactical rotary wing platform and a crewmember from a non-combat platform selected as a rotary wing Air Advisor. Due to personnel sourcing limitations for General Purpose Forces (GPF) Air Advisors, many GPF Air Advisors lacked the experience and specialized training provided to special operations combat air advisors in teaching and mentoring aviation skills to foreign aviators, as well as advising on employing and leading aviation commands.

Additionally, aircrew assigned as Mi-17 door gunners received no aircraft training prior to arrival in Afghanistan, but relied on the special operations command standardized checklist and local aircraft qualification in country. AETC A3Q reports they are ready to provide this training, and are awaiting the official NTM-A training request and requirements.

In conclusion, as a result of the lack of centralized oversight and conflicting policy guidance, the necessary operational policy and procedures were not clearly defined by the 438th AEW, AFCENT, Air Force Material Command, or Headquarters United States Air Force. The confusion led to insufficient training for the 438th commanders, field grade officers, non-commissioned officers, including aircrew, and negatively impacted training essential to mission performance. As a result, aircraft flight training could not formally incorporate Afghanistan specific instruction regarding applicable Air Advisor guidance, or address the policy differences in flying U.S. Government-or host nation-owned aircraft.

Recommendations

5.a. Commander, U.S. Air Force Central, with assistance as required from the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, provide centralized oversight and clarify guidance for 438th Air Expeditionary Wing assigned U.S. Air Force Airmen operating aircraft, either owned by the U.S. Government or the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, in the execution of the United States Forces-Afghanistan or Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, Security Force Assistance or Air Advisor mission.

5.b. Commander, U.S. Air Force Central, in coordination with Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, finalize G-222/C-27A interim supplement to U.S. Air Force Central Instruction 16-101, Air Advisor and Training, to codify operational guidance.

5.c. Commander, U.S. Air Force Central, in coordination with Commander, Air Education and Training Command and Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, A3, continue to review and modify applicable pre-deployment training and syllabi, expeditionary Air Advisor squadron guidance, and standardization/evaluation programs for Air Advisors, contractors, and the Afghan Air Force for compliance with the U.S. Air Force Air Advising Operating Concept and applicable U.S. Air Force flight and Air Advisor regulations as they are released.

5.d. Commander, Air Education and Training Command, review and modify the Air Advisor Academy and Air Advisor Flight Training to incorporate policy guidance and mission readiness training regarding aircraft flight standards for Air Advisors flying the G-222/C-27A when released, and review compliance for other non-U.S. Air Force aircraft owned by either

the U.S. Government or the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

5.e. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, conduct and finalize legal ruling regarding the ownership of NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan /438 Air Expeditionary Wing aircraft.

Management Comments

Management concurred with the recommendations.

The Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force agreed with the intent of the draft recommendations, and provided clarification concerning responsible U.S. Air Force commands. They stated that the G-222/C-27A aircraft were not U.S. Air Force aircraft and ownership would eventually transfer to the Government of Afghanistan. Therefore, while G-222/C-27A standardization/evaluation, training program oversight, safety, aircrew flight equipment, and aviation management required assistance, formally assigning a U.S. Air Force lead command was not appropriate. They agreed that as personnel in Afghanistan identified specific tasks necessary in each area, they would support U.S. Air Force Central to identify U.S. Air Force organizations to provide the required assistance. The result will be a support structure that meets the intent of the recommendation.

U.S. Air Force Central stated that they were revising U.S. Air Force Central Instruction 16-101, and that the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing was operating under approved interim guidance.

U.S. Air Force Central stated they planned to conduct a review of pre-deployment training and syllabi, unit guidance, and standardization/evaluation programs for U.S. Air Force air advisors and contractors assigned to the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing to ensure compliance with applicable U.S. Air Force Instructions and other guidance.

The Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force stated that Air Education and Training Command would take actions to implement the recommendation as written.

Finally, U.S. Air Force Central commented that the lack of clear ownership of the G-222/C-27A made review and oversight by leaders outside of the acquisition chain nearly impossible. Local U.S. Air Force policy assumed that aircraft procured for the Afghan National Security Forces became GIRoA property upon delivery in Afghanistan. This would allow U.S. Air Force aircrew to perform inflight duties in the aircraft, if it is in the interest of the U.S. Government, without necessitating compliance with standard U.S. Air Force policy and regulations. Assessing aircraft ownership was central to correcting the confusion, misapplication, and limited application of operational guidance through the chain of command.

Our Response

Management comments to the recommendations were responsive.

As a result of written comments and follow-on discussions with representatives from the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, we modified recommendation 5.a. The recommendation now assigns overall responsibility for U.S. Air Force oversight and guidance to the Commander, U.S. Air Force Central. In lieu of assigning an U.S. Air Force major command, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force agreed to coordinate all U.S. Air Force organizations identified to provide necessary assistance.

Finally, as a result of comments received and discussions with responsible officials, it became clear that the legal ownership of aircraft under the control of NATC-A was still in question. The suspended transfer, starting in 2009, of aircraft acquired for a foreign government was unique and left the G-222/C-27A in a policy vacuum. Therefore, we added an additional recommendation to this final report requesting a definitive legal ruling concerning the ownership of aircraft under the control of NATC-A, prior to transfer to GIRoA.

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Observation 6. Training and Qualification of Afghan Air Force Maintenance Personnel

The AAF maintenance training program was not producing sufficient qualified and certified fixed and rotary-wing maintenance personnel to be able to eventually maintain their assigned aircraft independently.

As of September 2011, all airmen that entered the AAF as aircraft mechanics were assigned to their squadrons with the assumption that they would first be sent to the central maintenance training facility and then receive additional training at their units. However, some mechanics did not receive their maintenance training course before they arrived at the wings and the wing-generated training attempting to compensate for this deficiency was inconsistent and inadequate.

Failure to implement a standardized maintenance training program to attain the appropriate level of proficiency will prolong AAF dependency on contract maintenance and could prevent the development of an operationally independent and sustainable AAF.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Numbers 6, 13, and 39, for additional details.)

- Amendment to Contract Number: FA8504-08-C-0007-P00017, August 19, 2011.
- Contract Number: FA8504-08-C-0007, G-222 Acquisition for ANAAC, September 29, 2008.
- Ministry of Defense Policy, “Afghan National Army “ANA” Bonus and Incentive Pay Policy,” November 6, 2008.

Discussion

The AAF Air Wings lacked qualified and certified maintenance personnel to maintain their aircraft inventory. For example, in July 2011, the Kabul Air Wing reported that less than 50 percent of their authorized maintenance personnel were assigned. Also in July 2011, NTM-A/CSTC-A officials reported that there were over 130 students in aircraft maintenance courses at Pohantoon-e-Hawayee,¹⁰ but also wrote that “the training requirement mechanisms at the Afghan wings are currently non-existent or non-functional – due to staffing challenges and a lack of initiative and planning.”

The training curriculum for aircraft mechanics was jointly developed and established at Pohantoon-e-Hawayee in January 2008. Prior to that, AAF maintenance personnel were assigned and reported to their squadrons at the completion of ANA basic training, without receiving aviation maintenance training since there was a lack of specific courses. Advisors supporting the receiving AAF Air Wings developed local training courses for AAF personnel who were assigned to them directly without attending the central maintenance training facility. AAF maintenance personnel who attended Pohantoon-e-Hawayee were provided a standard course of instruction and received training certifications, which were reportedly useful to establish their level of competence and reinforce confidence.

¹⁰ Pohantoon-e-Hawayee is Dari for “Big Air School.”

During our field work, advisors expressed concern that the local training was not consistent across the AAF Air Wings and had not been reviewed or validated by a central authority for compatibility with Pohantoon-e-Hawayee-taught course content. As more certified maintainers arrived at the Afghan Air Wings, there developed two classes of maintenance personnel – those with appropriate training but no experience and those with experience but without recognized or insufficient training.

The initial maintenance contract with Alenia North America, established in September 2008, required the contractor to equal or exceed a mission capable rate of 80 percent for the aircraft. This was amended to a mission capable rate of 65 percent in August 2011, adding the requirement to train Afghan maintenance personnel. The contract states that:

The LSC [Lead Service Contractor] shall develop a structured maintenance training course and on the job training (OJT) to train the Afghan National Army Air Corp (ANAAC) in servicing and maintaining the G222.”

The contract described training requirements for AAF personnel in detail. However, during our site visit in 2011, we were informed that the contracted maintenance staff was not complying with the maintenance training requirements but were emphasizing maintaining the fleet mission capable rate at the expense of training Afghan maintenance personnel. In some instances, reportedly, contract staff had set aside no time for Afghan on-the-job experience and training. Several advisors expressed concern that ultimately the Afghans would not be able to maintain the aircraft on their own because they had not received enough training to be proficient.

NATC-A staff explained that in early 2011, in response to a very low operational ready rate for the G-222/C-27A fleet (e.g. 29 percent in February 2011), the contractor prioritized improving aircraft availability over training the Afghan fixed-wing maintenance personnel.

Until all aviation maintenance personnel receive consistent, appropriate training, AAF Air Wings will continue to have gaps in their maintenance capabilities that will negatively impact AAF operational capability and aircraft sustainability. Maintaining a mix of certified and uncertified maintenance personnel will likely be detrimental to morale and aircrew confidence.

Recommendations

6. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Air Training Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Afghan Air Force A7 develop and publish Afghan Air Force-wide standards for training Afghan Air Force maintenance personnel that ensure airmen assigned to Afghan Air Wings receive training and certification that consistently meets established proficiency standards.

Management Comments

Management non-concurred with recommendation 6. NATC-A stated that the Afghan General Staff A7 was responsible for developing and publishing training standards, not the Director, Pohantoon-e-Hawayee. However, in the absence of appropriate guidance, Pohantoon-e-Hawayee, in coordination with Kabul Air Wing maintenance commander and Coalition contractors, developed on the job training mission essential task lists for maintenance training in

order to provide an Afghan-wide level of standardization for maintenance personnel. In addition, Pohantoon-e-Hawayee developed maintenance orientation and aircraft specific academic training for maintenance personnel entering training, and is developing a hands-on training course that will offer the opportunity for maintenance personnel in the Air Wings to return to school for training. Finally, Coalition mentors are working with their Afghan counterparts to improve the selection and assignment process, to increase the number of maintenance personnel capable and ready for training and service.

U.S. Central Command non-concurred with a draft recommendation concerning training requirements in an airframe maintenance contract, asserting that the contract was awarded by the U.S. Air Force, not the contracting command in Afghanistan, as the draft report indicated.

Our Response

Management comments to the recommendation were responsive. We modified the responsible Afghan official in the recommendation as identified by NATC-A. We request that NATC-A reconsider their non-concurrence in response to the final report.

U.S. Central Command was correct. Further, on August 19, 2012, and after publication of the draft report, NATC-A modified the contract in question to include appropriate maintenance training requirements. As a result, the associated recommendation was deleted from this final report.

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~~(FOUO)~~ Observation 7. NATO Air Training Command– Afghanistan Air Worthiness Certification

~~(FOUO)~~ NATC-A has a significant shortfall in the air advisors needed to carry out its training mission. This includes the need for additional U.S. advisor personnel, especially from the U.S. Army, for the Mi-17 rotary air training mission.

~~(FOUO)~~ DoD has interpreted the relevant U.S. law as authorizing each DoD military department to determine the air worthiness of aircraft procured for its use. However, this led to different air worthiness standards being applied across the U.S. military Services. In particular, the U.S. Army adopted a different air worthiness standard than those used to certify legacy Mi-17 aircraft by the 438th AEW commander and the AAF.

~~(FOUO)~~ As a consequence, based on its standard, the Army did not certify the air worthiness of the 29 legacy Mi-17 aircraft in the Afghan Air Force fleet. As a result, U.S. Army aviators have been excluded from flying on the Mi-17, leaving NATC-A without sufficient air advisory personnel and putting the accomplishment of the AAF training mission at risk.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Numbers 4 and 30 for additional details.)

- All Army Activities (ALARACT) Vice Chief of Staff Message, “Soldiers transported by or performing crew duties in partner nation Mi-8/Mi-17 aircraft,” P242258Z, March 2010.
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense-Non-Standard Rotary Wing Acquisition Decision Memorandum, January 19, 2010.

~~(FOUO)~~ Discussion

~~(FOUO)~~ Air worthiness standards but not air worthiness for each type of aircraft in the MoD and MoI fleet were established and maintained by the original equipment manufacturer. As of August 2011, the AAF owned 6 Mi-35 and 41 Mi-17 (export version of the Mi-8) helicopters. Both aircraft were of Russian manufacture and the U.S. military considered them non-standard airframes. Of the 41 Mi-17 AAF helicopters, 8 were purchased for the Air Interdiction Unit of the Ministry of the Interior, and an additional 4 were undergoing overhaul at original equipment manufacturer facilities. The U.S. Army established the air worthiness of these 12 airplanes.¹¹

~~(FOUO)~~ The remaining 29 Mi-17 airframes were assigned to the AAF Air Wings for training and operational missions. The Commander, NATC-A and the Commander of the AAF Maintenance Group in Kabul certified air worthiness of these helicopters, based on recommendations from the Mi-17 maintenance contractor, the NATC-A Director of Maintenance, and other relevant coalition advisors.

¹¹ The responsible U.S. Army office issued an airworthiness release for the eight Mi-17 helicopters assigned to the Ministry of the Interior Air Interdiction Unit because the Army overhauled the aircraft prior to assigning them for Afghan use and also managed ongoing maintenance. The remaining four were undergoing overhaul repairs at original equipment manufacturer facilities. Completion of the overhaul and inspection by the non-standard rotary wing aircraft office of NATC-A would be sufficient for air worthiness release.

~~(FOUO)~~ On July 26, 2011, the Commander, NATC-A reported that there were continuing maintenance, parts and other issues with the 29 Mi-17 helicopters belonging to the AAF Air Wings. The main concerns were:

- limited access to fleet service bulletins,
- issues with parts of questionable origin including those that were counterfeit,
- improper logbook documentation, and
- poor ongoing maintenance.

~~(FOUO)~~ In addition, the Army Audit Agency¹² reported that the original equipment manufacturer design specifications and technical data were not available. The totality of the concerns led the Army to conclude that they could not gain “full engineering cognizance” over the aircraft, and hence could not properly assess and mitigate the risk in order to issue an air worthiness release.

~~(FOUO)~~ Ideally, GIRoA would validate the air worthiness of the aircraft they own. However, the institutional capacity to conduct appropriate oversight and validation did not exist. In the NATC-A Commander’s July 2011 report, he requested the non-standard rotary wing aircraft office of the Aircraft Engineering Division, U.S. Army, to assist with the issue, specifically with the development and establishment of an Afghan military air worthiness authority.

~~(FOUO)~~ DoD has interpreted the relevant U.S. law as authorizing and requiring each military Service department to determine the air worthiness of aircraft procured for its use. In addition, U.S. Air Force instructions allowed local commanders to certify aircraft owned by a foreign government, as suitable for U.S. Air Force aircrew to operate. The U.S. Army did not recognize this airworthiness certification. Therefore, the decision not to certify the air worthiness of the 29 legacy Mi-17 aircraft by the responsible office in the Army effectively prohibited U.S. Army aviators from flying in those aircraft.

~~(FOUO)~~ U.S. and Coalition purchased more Mi-17s for the AAF using Afghan Security Force Funding. CSTC-A had retained ownership of other AAF aircraft purchased through a pseudo FMS case using ASFF. The authority to certify airworthiness depends on the ownership of the aircraft. Therefore, if the new Mi-17s were not transferred to GIRoA, the authority to certify airworthiness belongs to the military Service airworthiness authority, and not the Commander, NATC-A.

~~(FOUO)~~ The U.S. Army authorizes the use of waivers, but these required approval of the first U.S. Army general officer in the chain of command (Deputy Commanding General, CSTC-A) for pilots flying in the aircraft for each mission flown. The U.S. Army has had authority for determining Mi-17 aircraft air worthiness since January 2006. In January 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics established the Program

Figure 5. Afghan Air Force Mi-17 Hip



¹² “Mi-17 Helicopter Airworthiness and Flight Safety,” 11 Feb 2011, Audit Report A-2011-0060-ALM (FOUO).

Manager–Non Standard Rotary Wing Aviation, under the Army Program Executive Office for Aviation, and transferred Mi-17 management to the program manager.

~~(FOUO)~~ The Audit component of the Office of the Inspector General, DoD conducted an audit of the DoD management of acquisition and support of non-standard rotary wing aircraft in 2011.¹³ They determined that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics did not fully authorize the non-standard rotary wing aircraft project management office to make DoD-wide decisions, resulting in potential cost increases, schedule delays, and risk of program failure. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Strategic and Tactical Systems was partially responsive agreeing that there should be a single Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft program manager.

~~(FOUO)~~ The Commander, NATC-A, a U.S. Air Force brigadier general, could only certify the Afghan owned legacy Mi-17 aircraft as air worthy for U.S. Air Force personnel according to Air Force Instruction 11-401. The U.S. Army did not recognize the Commander, NATC-A's authority to certify airworthiness certification for AAF owned aircraft. This has limited the available pool of qualified U.S. military personnel for Mi-17 advisor duty and contributed to a significant shortfall in AAF advisory support. The consequence of having insufficient air advisor personnel could include not accomplishing the training mission with respect to this aircraft on a timely basis and consistent with the operational needs of the AAF.

~~(FOUO)~~ Recommendations

~~(FOUO)~~ 7.a. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, produce a mechanism to standardize air worthiness approval procedures for Mi-17 helicopters across the military Services.

~~(FOUO)~~ 7.b. Program Manager, Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft Program Management Office, support the request by the Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Air Training Command-Afghanistan, for assistance developing the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Defense Military Airworthiness Authority.

~~(FOUO)~~ Management Comments

~~(FOUO)~~ Management partially concurred with recommendation 7.a. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics asserted that the Army Office of Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aviation was not the appropriate office to standardize air worthiness approval procedures, as indicated in the draft recommendation. However, they stated that DoD was staffing an airworthiness policy directive to regulate and coordinate the air worthiness authority of the systems commands of the military departments.¹⁴

~~(FOUO)~~ Management concurred with recommendation 7.b. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology commented on the efforts of a technical working group that conducted an air worthiness assessment of the AAF Mi-17 fleet and

¹³ "DoD Needs to Improve Accountability and Identify Costs and Requirements for Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft," Report Number DODIG-2012-036, January 5, 2012. The final report is marked For Official Use Only.

¹⁴ Section 2319(g), title 10, United States Code as amended by Public Law 108–136, Nov 24, 2003.

training program in May 2012. The Army Office of Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aviation further stated that they were working with NATC-A to understand airworthiness deficiencies and assisting to define requirements for a Military Airworthiness Authority for Afghanistan.

~~(FOUO)~~ Our Response

~~(FOUO)~~ Management comments to the recommendations were responsive. We modified recommendation 7.a. to retract the reference to the Program Manager of the Army Office of Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aviation and acknowledge the ongoing development of the DoD Directive applicable to all DoD-owned and operated aircraft. In light of the expected processing time for the Directive, our recommendation requests an interim mechanism to standardize air worthiness approval procedures until the Directive is finalized.

No further response is required for recommendation 7.b.

Observation 8. Increased English Language Training

The proficiency of English language teachers was inadequate to effectively instruct AAF pilots, other aircrew, and maintenance personnel.

Growth of the AAF and a reduction in support from Defense Language Institute contractors created a gap between requirements and capabilities. The English proficiency of locally-hired Afghan contractors was often inadequate to train commanders, air crew, and maintenance personnel assigned to AAF air wings.

As a result, NATC-A advisors spent time teaching English, detracting from their advising mission. Without adequate English skills, AAF pilots and aircrew will have difficulty training and operating with U.S. and Coalition Forces, extending the timeline of the AAF development.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Number 2, for additional details.)

- Afghanistan National Security Forces Air Power Requirements Review, February 28, 2010.

Discussion

The Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIETC) conducts English language comprehension testing for various types of jobs relevant to the AAF, as measured by the English Comprehension Level test:¹⁵

- 60 for training in “hands-on” jobs;
- 70 for “technical” jobs;
- 80 for professional military education and undergraduate pilot training; and
- 85-90 for advanced flying, safety, engineering, and intelligence positions.

The AAF has a high demand for personnel with English proficiency since English is the official language of international aviation,¹⁶ and is necessary to maintain situational awareness and operate with U.S. and Coalition air traffic controllers and aircrews in Afghanistan air space.

NATC-A and the AAF established several priority programs to help AAF pilot candidates to meet English fluency requirements. They included:

- Kabul English Language Training Center – an eight-month long, full-time English language program of instruction; and
- Thunder Lab – a 24 hour, 7 days a week English immersion course, training up to 68 AAF officers (54 males and 14 females) at a time.

¹⁵The English Comprehension Level (ECL) test is a 100 question multiple choice test of listening and reading comprehension that takes 75 minutes to administer. Also, there is a proficiency test for English listening comprehension and speaking ability using the face-to-face or telephonic interview version of the Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI).

¹⁶ http://www.aviation-esl.com/ICAO_English.htm

This training was designed for and provided to recruits. Local instructors provided the only source for continuing English language training for senior AAF officers and previously qualified air crew assigned to the AAF Air Wings.

The size of the AAF increased from just fewer than 3,000 personnel in November 2009 to 4,950 in September 2011, generating a steady increase in the need for continuing English language training. In August 2011, NTM-A/CSTC-A reported there were between 30 to 40 contract English language instructors teaching over 60 classes to nearly 800 students throughout the AAF. Information concerning instructor proficiency was not available, but NTM-A/CSTC-A reported monitoring program effectiveness using direct observation, questionnaires, and interviews with students, supervisors, and instructors.

Both Afghan and Coalition commanders believed the locally-hired Afghan contractors did not possess sufficient English fluency to train Afghans assigned to the AAF in the more technical English necessary for aviation operations and maintenance. During our site visit, the NTM-A/CSTC-A Director of Training (CJ7) listed the qualifications for locally procured English language trainers:

- score 70 or above on the American Language Course Placement Test or the English Comprehension Level test,
- have prior teaching experience, and
- complete successful interviews with Director of Education and the Religious and Cultural Affairs Department of the GIROA Ministry of Defense.¹⁷

Unfortunately, advisors in both Kabul and Kandahar stated that meeting these requirements did not provide sufficient English language fluency to meet AAF training needs. Air advisors recommended increasing the use of native English speakers as instructors. As of August 2011, the AAF Air Wings in Kandahar and Shindand had submitted requests for an additional two to three English language instructors at each base.

In early 2011, the Kandahar Air Wing had use of a certified native-speaking English teacher from the Department of Defense Education Agency Schools, through a contract with the Defense Language Institute (DLI). The individual departed in June 2011, and air advisors at Kandahar stated they were continuing their own English language courses using the DLI training manuals the instructor left behind. This English language training initiative was having a positive impact, but was not sustainable since it was intended as a short term remedy. Air advisors in Kabul and Shindand also reported providing English refresher training to their Afghan counterparts through both formal and informal classes.

The team found that the advisory relationship was impeded or promoted, depending on Afghan aircrew English language proficiency. Additionally, having English fluency at the level required for AAF training had other implications. For example, the Director, Air University (Pohantoon-e-Hawayee), told the OIG team that their students are selected for attendance partially based on their English abilities. Also, Afghan aircrew assigned to the AAF Kabul Air Wing noted that

¹⁷ NTM-A/CSTC-A representatives reported participating in interviews and deemed them appropriately rigorous.

advisors seemed to favor pilots with better English speaking skills, regardless of the experience level of the pilot.

The AAF Commanding General believed in the importance of English language training, stating that a Western-oriented, English-speaking, advanced Afghan Air Force could serve as the nucleus for a modern Afghanistan.

Recommendation

8. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, modify hiring processes to provide the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Air Training Command-Afghanistan with language instructors possessing native English language fluency to teach Afghan Air Force personnel to the appropriate Defense Language Institute's English Comprehension Level.

Management Comments

Management concurred with the recommendation. NTM-A/CSTC-A commented that they provided intensive oversight of English instruction and were expanding the English language teaching program for the Afghan Air Force. Also, the Defense Language Institute contributed a significant number of native English instructors to teach classes.

Our Response

Management comments to the recommendation were responsive. No further response is required.

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PART IV – EQUIPPING ISSUES

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~~(FOUO)~~ Equipping Issues

~~(FOUO)~~ Observation 9: Afghan Air Force Medium Transport Aircraft

~~(FOUO)~~ The refurbished G-222/C-27A variant dual-engine aircraft has not proven to be a suitable cargo aircraft to provide the medium lift support capability necessary for the development of an independent and sustainable Afghan Air Force.

~~(FOUO)~~ The high altitudes and temperatures common in Afghanistan have significantly limited the G-222/C-27A's operational capability and mission effectiveness. The aircraft has not demonstrated consistent airworthiness and sustainability due to the poor condition of acquired airframes, ongoing maintenance challenges, and the lack of spare parts.

~~(FOUO)~~ This has resulted in significant operational limitations and safety concerns. Poor mission capable rates have delayed the training of Afghan pilots, aircrew, and maintenance personnel. Senior Afghan leadership indicated a lack of confidence in the aircraft.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Numbers 2, 5, 6, 13, 14, and 20, for additional details.)

- Afghanistan National Security Forces Air Power Requirements Review, February 28, 2010.
- Amendment to Contract Number: FA8504-08-C-0007-P000170, January 27, 2011.
- Amendment to Contract Number: FA8504-08-C-0007-P000170, August 19, 2011.
- Contract Number: FA850408C0007, G-222 Acquisition for ANAAC, September 29, 2008.
- CSTC-A, "Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces," September 20, 2008.
- Joint Publication 3-07.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense," April 30, 2004.

Discussion

~~(FOUO)~~ Joint Publication 3-07.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)," April 30, 2004, states that equipment, maintenance, training and sustainability should be tailored to the needs of the Host Nation. The geography of Afghanistan is dominated by the Hind Kush mountain range in the north and deserts in the south and southwest. The country possesses only one major highway and virtually no railway infrastructure. The ANA relies on air transport for the timely mobility of personnel and supplies in support of operations around the country.

~~(FOUO)~~ The NATO Training Mission Campaign Plan recognized the requirement, and planned for an Afghan Air Force organized, trained, and equipped to "perform a wide range of mission types, including Presidential Airlift, MEDEVAC/CASEVAC (medical/casualty evacuation),

battlefield mobility, airlift, reconnaissance/airborne command and control (C2), training, and light attack.”¹⁸

~~(FOUO)~~ In 2008, the U.S. paid for a contractor to refurbish and deliver three donated Ukrainian An-32 Light Tactical Transport aircraft to the AAF, supplementing their existing fleet of three aircraft. The An-32 were designed and built for service in hot and mountainous areas such as in Afghanistan, but were provided as an interim solution.

~~(FOUO)~~ In September 2008, NTM-A signed a sole-source contract to purchase 18 G-222/C-27A Spartan Tactical Medium-lift aircraft from Alenia North America, with an option to purchase two additional aircraft.¹⁹ The first two aircraft were delivered in November 2009. The command exercised the option and purchased the remaining two aircraft in September 2010, following the delivery of the first six refurbished aircraft. The contract required the contractor to configure 18 aircraft for tactical missions and two for VIP missions.

~~(FOUO)~~ The planned role for the G-222/C-27A in the AAF was to provide medium airlift support to the ANA, a role for which the dual-engine aircraft has not yet proven to be suitable. In fact, Afghan Air Force leadership and crews indicated they believed the G-222/C-27A was an ineffective replacement for the Russian An-32, an aircraft still flown by the Indian and Ukrainian military.

~~(FOUO)~~ First, the single engine capabilities of the G-222/C-27A in the elevation and temperatures of Afghanistan limited the lift capacity and required unusual waivers, even for basic flight operations. Second, the aircraft were limited to operations using visual flight rules.

~~(FOUO)~~ The single engine capabilities of the G-222/C-27A required flying with significant risk of injury, loss of life and/or equipment. In the event of engine loss, the standard minimum climb rate for U.S. Air Force aircraft is 200 feet per nautical mile (3.3 percent). However, the 438th AEW Flight Crew Information File: “Operations Guidance for the G-222/C-27A,” August 12, 2011, established an allowable single engine climb rate of 100 feet per nautical mile (1.6 percent). The guidance further states that, “military necessity may dictate the need to operate outside these parameters.”

~~(FOUO)~~ The main airfield for the G-222/C-27A was Kabul International Airport, elevation 5,877 feet. Several mountains within 10 miles of the airport rise to an altitude of 10,000 feet. This means that during optimal conditions, in the event of engine failure, the allowable climb rate would leave the aircraft 3,000 feet below the mountain tops. Optimal conditions do not include the additional power required to carry cargo loads or high summer temperatures impacting air density.

Figure 6. G-222 (C-27A Variant) Landing in Farah, Afghanistan.



Source: <http://www.g222.org/>

¹⁸ CSTC-A, “Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces,” 20 Sep 2008.

¹⁹ Contract No. FA850408C0007.

~~(FOUO)~~ The Minimum Sector Altitude surrounding the airport was 16,100-17,500 feet, while the Single Engine Ceiling for the G-222/C-27A was 10,000 feet. In the event of engine loss, the recommended minimum altitude is 6,000 feet lower than the Minimum Sector Altitude at Kabul International Airport. Also, the Missed Approach Minimum Climb Altitude is 11,200, over 1,000 feet higher than the stated best performance achievable by an unloaded G-222.

~~(FOUO)~~ Unfortunately, the G-222 has experienced multiple in-flight engine losses. The 538th Air Expeditionary Advisor Squadron (AEAS) reported two near fatal incidents during October to December 2011, in addition to multiple pre-flight engine failures. One pilot estimated that an engine failure occurs every 100 flights.

~~(FOUO)~~ Finally, while the aircraft were outfitted for day and night operations, pilots reported the operational capabilities of the G-222/C-27A effectively restricted the aircraft to daylight missions only (Visual Flight Requirements). The inability to train AAF pilots using instruments prevents the certification of AAF pilots as aircraft commanders.

~~(FOUO)~~ While the G-222/C-27A airframes provided through the contract were supposedly the best available, it was reported that the majority of the aircraft were in derelict condition at the start of refurbishment, having been stored for a number of years in an open field in Italy. Before being brought to the factory for overhaul, the aircraft suffered from corrosion, fluid leaks (see Figure 7), electrical issues, and mechanical failures, to include wing flaps and landing gear. Only 2 of the 20 aircraft were airworthy at the time of purchase and 1 still had damage from a crash landing in 2002. The contractor was able to deliver only 15 of the required 20 refurbished G-222/C-27A aircraft by the September 29, 2011 contract date. The poor condition of the aircraft caused the contractor to request, and the command to approve, additional time for refurbishment.

Figure 7. G-222 (C-27A Variant) Prior to Refurbishment.



Source: <http://www.g222.org/>

~~(FOUO)~~ Sources stated that the poor condition and age of the refurbished C-27A/G-222 has caused them to consume spare parts at a greater rate than planned with a negative effect on mission capable rates. Parts issues included T64 and T67 engines and auxiliary parts such as wiring harnesses, landing gear, and integrated navigation units. Consequently, the contracting officer planned a contract modification to conduct a diminishing military supply analysis to pre-identify parts in short supply or no longer manufactured to extend the useful life of the G-222/C-27A aircraft past December 2012.

~~(FOUO)~~ A particularly critical part in short supply was propeller blades, an item no longer manufactured. The last remaining source in Japan sold their 60 propeller inventory to the U.S. Government in 2011, and it was difficult to estimate how long 60 blades would last the AAF.

The G-222/C-27A System Program Officer was considering a high-cost and long lead time purchase of propeller castings. Common maintenance issues exacerbating the high demand for spare parts already in short supply included chronic electrical shorts, fuel leaks, and various other engine problems.

~~(FOUO)~~ On August 19, 2011, the contracting officer modified the contract, reducing the required mission capable rate for the G-222/C-27A fleet from 80 to 65 percent. However, the deteriorated condition of the aircraft and the shortage of spare parts contributed to a reported mission capable rate of approximately 35 percent between December 2011 and February 2012. In February 2012, eight of the 15 aircraft had fuel leaks and the contractor was using five for spare parts to keep the remaining 10 aircraft mission capable for some missions. The extended low mission capable rate for the G-222/C-27A limited their availability for operations and pilot training.

~~(FOUO)~~ Throughout the term of the contract, the Defense Contract Management Agency filed numerous corrective action requests to the maintenance contractor. Following personal observation of maintenance practices in December 2011, the Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing ordered a complete stand-down of G-222/C-27A operations and training to ensure the safety of Afghan and U.S. personnel until each G-222/C-27A passed a thorough inspection. Although aircraft simulators are used for ground training, the lack of operational G-222/C-27A aircraft adversely impacted medium airlift operations and has extended advanced fixed-wing pilot training for an indeterminate time period.

~~(FOUO)~~ In February 2012, air advisors from the 438th Air Expeditionary Advisor Group filed a series of complaints describing safety concerns with G-222/C-27A operational limitations. On February 27, 2012, the Deputy Inspector General, Special Plans and Operations, issued a memorandum describing concerns raised by the complaints (Appendix G). In response, the Commander, NTM-A provided a NTM-A/NATC-A consolidated response on March 12, 2012 (Appendix H), and the Commander, U.S. AFCENT, directed an investigation of the G-222/C-27A aircraft to review, among other issues, aircraft performance characteristics, contractor support, and the applicability of U.S. Air Force guidance and instructions regarding air training flight operations in Afghanistan.

~~(FOUO)~~ The AFCENT Command-Directed Investigation team was led by a U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Investigating Officer and included aviators from all DoD Services, a U.S. Marine Corps Aviation Maintenance Officer, and seven additional subject matter experts from different maintenance disciplines. The team performed visual inspections of the aircraft, reviewed aircraft systems, and assessed the spare parts inventory, ground support equipment, technical manuals, and maintenance practices.

~~(FOUO)~~ The investigating officer provided the Commander, U.S. Air Force Central with his findings in April 2012. The report concluded that although the G-222/C-27A was not safe to fly in Afghanistan under existing policies and operational circumstances, the command had the capability to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. Flying the aircraft in Afghanistan at temperatures and elevations found there without expanded performance data raised the risk to “unjustifiable” levels and reduced operational effectiveness. Overall, the report of investigation supported the observations included in our DoDIG report. The command has made, and

continues to make, changes in response to the recommendations contained in their report of investigation.

~~(FOUO)~~ The findings of the U.S. Air Force investigation and the NTM-A/NATC-A response to the DoD Office of the Inspector General concerns underscores the need for continued command attention to ensure the safe operations of the G-222/C-27A.

(FOUO) Recommendation

~~(FOUO)~~ 9. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Air Training Command-Afghanistan, demonstrate that the G-222/C-27A can be made air worthy and sustainable when transferred to the Afghan Air Force or expedite the evaluation and selection of a replacement aircraft for the Afghan Air Force G-222/C-27A medium transport aircraft.

~~(FOUO)~~ Management Comments

~~(FOUO)~~ Management concurred with the recommendation. In response to the draft recommendation, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs commented that they did not have the authority to demonstrate airworthiness and sustainability. However, they were actively engaged with the NATC-A, Air Force Materiel Command, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition to improve the sustainability and safe operations of the G-222/C-27A, and were prepared to help expedite the evaluation and selection of a replacement aircraft.

(FOUO) Our Response

~~(FOUO)~~ Management comments to the recommendation were responsive. We modified the draft recommendation, transferring responsibility for action from Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs to NTM-A/CSTC-A and NATC-A. The G-222/C-27A aircraft were owned by DoD, not the U.S. Air Force, until transferred to GIRoA, meaning the NATO commands held ultimate responsibility. We will continue to monitor command implementation of the recommendations contained in the U.S. Air Force Central report of investigation. No further response is required.

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Observation 10. Afghan Air Force Individual and Unit Equipment Shortages

AAF organizations were not being systematically issued initial unit and personnel equipment, as authorized by GIRoA Ministry of Defense decrees. Moreover, resupply of aviation specific items has not proven reliable.

The AAF did not receive necessary initial equipment or resupply from the ANA because the ANA logistics system was not sufficiently developed.

Equipment shortages hindered AAF training and impacted mission safety. The immature logistics system eroded Afghan and U.S. advisor confidence, contributing to continued reliance on Coalition and contractor support for logistics. Consequently, AAF development was being impeded and thus the point at which it would become independent and sustainable was delayed.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Numbers 1, 14, 34, and 35 for additional details.)

- Afghan Air Force Master Plan v17, Annex D, Logistics.
- CSTC-A, Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces, September 20, 2008.
- Afghanistan National Army Approved Tashkils–1390–Supplement–110606.
- Decree, 4.0, Ministry of Defense, Office of the Assistant Minister of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, “Supported and Supporting Unit Logistics Policy and Support Procedures,” January 2009.

Discussion


AAF development was impeded by the ineffective ANA and contract supported logistics system. Field work and interviews with AAF personnel and air advisors confirmed that a significant amount of organizational and individual crewmember flight equipment was not issued as the unit was fielded. In addition, resupply of ANA-AAF common items, such as medical supplies and uniforms were not supplied without advisor intervention.

As ANA units were established and fielded, they were supplied with equipment necessary for initial combat effectiveness (“push” system). Units were to receive missing authorized equipment and supplies using this “push” model as equipment became available. This system was Coalition-driven and run primarily by contractors. GIRoA Decree 4.0 established the system for routine resupply of ANA units with equipment and other items based on demand (“pull” system). This system was intended to be Afghan-run, with advisor support and assistance.²⁰ AAF units required many aviation specific items which were not provided during their initial equipment “push.”

²⁰ See DoD Inspector General Report Number DoDIG-2012-028, “Assessment of the U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army,” December 9, 2011 for a detailed description of the ANA logistics system as of 2011.

As shown in Figure 6, the GIRoA Ministry of Defense, with assistance from NTM-A/CSTC-A, created the ANA logistics structure. ANA logistics command and control included the Army

Figure 8. Afghan National Army Logistics Structure



Source: NATO Training Command – Afghanistan, March 2011

Support Command and subordinate Regional Logistics Commands, Corps Logistics Battalions, and Forward Support Depots.

GIRoA Ministry of Defense Decree 4.0 directs the forward support depots to support all ANA units within their assigned operating area, including AAF Air Wings, with all classes of supply. As shown, the ANA logistics structure included an Aviation Support Depot for aviation specific parts, tools, and support equipment. The NATC-A ministerial development plan for AAF Logistics prescribes that Depot 2 will track inbound equipment and notify AAF units when the equipment arrives.

Coalition advisor frustration and limited Afghan competency contributed to logistic system ineffectiveness. NTM-A/CSTC-A purchased major items of equipment for ANA using the “pseudo” Foreign Military Sales procurement procedure. In the case of equipment for the AAF, the time from order to delivery to ANA Depot 2 was up to 18 months. The staff at Depot 2 was tasked to track inbound equipment and notify AAF units when the equipment arrives. However, since this notification process was unreliable, NTM-A/CSTC-A and NATC-A logistics advisors also had to track the cases through NTM-A Security Assistance Officers, who controlled the

acquisition process until the equipment was transferred to Afghan control at Depot 2. U.S. Security Assistance Officers informed the Coalition logistics advisors when equipment arrived at Depot 2 then the logistics advisors informed their AAF counterparts of the equipment arrival.

In many cases, advisors at Depot 2 incorrectly instructed AAF unit personnel to submit a MoD-14, "Request for Equipment," form to obtain initial equipment. This form was part of the "pull" system described above, and was not necessary for the requisition of initial issue equipment. However, advisors said that the "Request for Equipment" appeared to be the only way to obtain the status of initial issue equipment that was expected. The problem was compounded by inexperienced/untrained ANA technicians at Depot 2 who routinely and appropriately denied the requests for initial equipment, but would also routinely and inappropriately neither forward initial equipment nor inform the requesting unit. Consequently, follow-up by logistics advisors was the only effective method for the unit to obtain accurate and timely information.

In a December 2011 report, the Office of the Inspector General team concluded that ANA logisticians, as well as U.S./CF trainers, lacked understanding about when, why, and how to rely on the "push" system for initial issue of supplies vice the "pull" system for resupply.²¹ The report also concluded that ANA depots and units remained dependent on the Coalition to push supplies.

ISAF and NTM-A/CSTC-A acknowledged the logistics network was still very much a work in progress, citing that two-thirds of the logistical nodes were not at initial operating capacity in October 2011.²² A senior Coalition logistician cited additional impediments to effective logistics operations:

- Senior Afghans were trained by the former USSR, which stressed the "push" model, reinforced by Afghan culture and recent experience, which taught that it was more valuable to possess items than to provide them to others.
- The literacy and technical proficiency was low, detracting from their ability to properly manage property books, supplies, and complete forms.
- The forward support depots were run by the ANA and prioritized supply to ANA units above AAF units.
- Formalized feedback regarding requests for equipment was non-existent. Requests that were not immediately completed went unfilled, were denied, and customers were not notified.

The stocking, ordering and issue of aviation-specific items provided a concrete example of the impediments listed above. The AAF Master Plan v17, Annex D Logistics states:

A standard set of clothing and equipment is required for the members of ANA to perform their day-to-day mission. AAF aircrew will receive the same items as the ANA soldiers; however, aircrew has additional OCIE [Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment] requirements. AAF supply will

²¹ Ibid.

²² "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces," October 2011 published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

requisition these items from the ANA Central Supply Depot. Since aircrew uniforms and life support equipment are unique to the AAF, such items will be stored and maintained at the General Purpose warehouse at KAIA [Kabul International Airport].

According to a senior logistics advisor, aircraft maintenance related parts and supplies, including aircrew clothing and individual equipment, were maintained at Depot 1 under the control of ANA rather than forwarded per policy to the Aviation Support Depot under contractor control. He stated that Depot 1 received the aircrew life support equipment, but did not issue it. Rather, in general, equipment had built up to levels that overflowed the space available and Depot 1 personnel contracted for additional space at a civilian warehouse called the Todd Maritime Services International Facility.

The failure to issue all authorized equipment and ineffective resupply impacted AAF mission effectiveness and safety. For example, at the Kandahar and Shindand Air Wings, multiple crew members were sharing flight helmets and Aviation Life Support Equipment.

Further, the Kandahar Air Wing crash rescue section was authorized nineteen vehicles, including ten specifically for hazardous material response and fire and crash rescue missions. Three years after unit establishment, the Air Wing had only been issued one fire and crash rescue vehicle. And, that single vehicle required direct intervention by the Coalition air advisor over the course of two months. Further, as of August 2011, the vehicle was non-mission capable, waiting parts ordered for required maintenance. The result was that the Afghan Air Wing was wholly dependent on Coalition Forces for fire and crash rescue support.

Coalition advisors and AAF logistics personnel stated that the equipping and supply process is broken, and that it rarely produced positive results. The NATC-A logistics advisor in Kabul discovered that, six weeks after he arrived, most of the items ordered by the previous mentors at all NATC-A bases had either undetermined status, been cancelled, or been shipped by vendors, but never received at the depots. The result of constant advisor intervention was that Afghans did not receive information regarding the status of requisitions through the ANA logistics system and had very little incentive to complete tasks required by the development plan.

The NATC-A development plan for AAF logistics operations states, “Progress towards AAF logistics *autonomy* (italics added) is a matter of leadership and initiative, more so than policy and structure,” and “...this includes procuring, receiving, storing and issuing aircraft parts, petroleum, oils and lubricants, uniform items, and office supplies for the theater.” As written, the development plan appeared to establish NATC-A policy supporting AAF development of a logistics system independent of the ANA logistics system.

However, section 1-9.1 of GIROA Ministry of Defense Decree 4.0 states that the Afghan National Army Air Corps (now the AAF) will utilize: “...the existing ANA logistics infrastructure and processes for common items used across the ANA. The ANAAC [AAF] will adhere to all policies in this decree and utilize all prescribed MoD Forms to manage all assets under its control.” This decree unambiguously states that the supply of common, non-aviation-specific items will be through the ANA logistic system.

Getting the ANA logistics system to provide reliable logistics to the AAF was a significant challenge, and a build-up of pressure for timely implementation of the AAF development plan increased concern among AAF air advisors that only a separate AAF logistics system would enable them to achieve AAF training and mentoring objectives. However, both NTM-A/CSTC-A and NATC-A leadership stated that the ANA and AAF logistics were to be integrated with the AAF having responsibility and accountability for aviation specific equipment, parts and supplies.

Recommendation

10. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, mentor the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Defense and the Afghan National Army General Staff to ensure that the Afghan Air Force becomes supported by and fully integrated in the Afghan National Army logistics system.

Management Comments

Management concurred with the recommendation. NTM-A/CSTC-A commented that AAF aircraft-specific spare parts will continue to be supplied by U.S.-managed contracts through the Afghan National Aviation Support Depot until the AAF and national logistics planning and procurement processes are mature enough to demonstrate the functional competency to ensure aircraft fleet air worthiness.

Our Response

Management comments to the recommendation were responsive. No further response is required.

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Observation 11. Translation of Aircraft Operations and Maintenance Manuals

AAF fixed and rotary wing aircraft do not have operating and maintenance manuals in local Afghan language.

Safe operation of aircraft requires adherence to established operations and maintenance standards. Because AAF aircraft manuals have not been translated into the native languages of the ultimate users, Afghan aircrew and maintenance technicians were unable to read and understand technical orders. This significantly impeded their training development and ultimate ability to independently provide aircraft flight safety and maintenance, and perform effective and sustainable flight operations.

As a result of this limitation, NATC-A and its contractor were unable to train AAF personnel to the required level of operating and maintenance proficiency with the capability to independently operate and sustain AAF aircraft.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Number 2, for additional details.)

- Afghanistan National Security Forces Air Power Requirements Review, February 28, 2010.

Discussion

While Coalition air advisors and contractors provided personal training direction to and oversight of Afghan maintenance personnel, the OIG team observed that the AAF lacked aircraft operating and maintenance manuals in either Dari or Pashto, the most common local languages. This prevented the preparation of technical orders by Afghan maintenance personnel and the performance of other fundamental procedures in a well-functioning aircraft maintenance program.

Aircraft original equipment manufacturers (OEM) normally publish aircraft manuals in the native language of the production country but are not usually contracted to provide them in the language of the purchasing country. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) officials, with world-wide responsibility, could not provide an example where aircraft technical manuals had been translated by OEM or suppliers for aircraft purchasers and users. However, the DSCA noted cases in which translated manuals were included in several non-aviation procurements. Specifically, the purchase of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles from American Motors and mobile strike force vehicles from Textron included translated manuals as part of the contract.

The production of aircraft operations and maintenance manuals in local languages presents some unique challenges and requires additional expense. Several concerns were cited, including the potential for translation errors leading to liability and warranty issues. Air advisors in Afghanistan pointed out an additional problem – the local languages did not have sufficient technical terms to allow for an accurate and comprehensible translation of aircraft manuals.

In fact, Alenia, the G-222 refurbishment contractor, provided technical manuals in Dari in 2010. However, they were unusable due to poor translation of technical aviation terms which led to air worthiness concerns. Consequently, NATC-A chose to use the English language technical manuals provided by the original equipment manufacturer rather than the manuals in Dari, and during training, supplemented the English manuals with interpreters.

NATC-A was aware of and starting to address the problem of not having translated manuals. The updated contract with Alenia, North America for the refurbished G-222/C-27A aircraft requires the delivery of a comprehensive list of operating and maintenance technical manuals translated in Dari. This will address one of seven airframes the Coalition planned to procure for the AAF or that are already in service, such as the G-222.

Operating and maintaining aircraft is a complicated challenge, necessitating exact performance of specified tasks, in sequence, in order to achieve the desired result. Original equipment manufacturers establish standards for safe operation that are described in technical orders enabling the most complex (e.g. engine replacement) to the more mundane (e.g. maintaining proper tire pressure) maintenance procedures. Personnel accomplish aircraft maintenance by direct reference to the standards published in manuals and job guides.

According to air advisors, failure to procure maintenance manuals that both the advisors and the Afghan trainees could read complicated their interaction because there was no standard reference for aircraft maintenance. Further, reliance solely on memory is not a sustainable or an accepted professional practice even for the most experienced technicians.

The problem caused by unreadable aircraft technical orders will fully manifest itself once air advisors depart and Coalition-funded support contracts end. Afghans will have complete responsibility for maintenance of AAF aircraft, and it is quite unlikely that they can be maintained solely based on memory of trained tasks. To be sustainable in the long term, the AAF must be given the proper training and tools to succeed. Local language manuals are one of those key tools.

This understanding was underscored by an airpower study sponsored by the U.S. Air Forces, Central, issued in February 2010, which stated that, "...a translation of technical manuals from English to Dari will allow ANAAC [Afghan National Army Air Corps – AAF] vehicle maintainers to better train their personnel and better maintain their equipment."

Recommendation

11. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, modify existing contracts and include the requirement in new aircraft acquisition contracts to provide aircraft maintenance manuals in the native language(s) of the ultimate users.

Management Comments

Management non-concurred with the draft recommendation. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency commented that NTM-A/CSTC-A, as the Building Partner Capacity requesting authority

and requirement owner for Afghan Security Forces Fund, had responsibility for the action. If directed and funded by NTM-A/CSTC-A to provide native language aircraft operating and maintenance manuals, DSCA will process amendments to existing cases and/or establish new cases to accomplish such directions.

NTM-A/CSTC-A stated that it was their position to provide manuals in English, the standard of the Original Equipment Manufacturer. They also said that technical guidance did not translate well into Dari, and they had begun to extend English language training to AAF maintenance personnel.

Our Response

Management comments to the recommendation were responsive. We initially redirected action for the recommendation to NTM-A/CSTC-A. We agree that providing manuals in English to maintain the Original Equipment Manufacturer standard is necessary. We also recognize the technical limitations of native Afghan languages, and that pilots and most air crew will receive English training and demonstrate proficiency. However, educating maintenance personnel to sufficient English proficiency to fully comprehend manuals in technical English and then independently perform required tasks and complete documentation is likely a long-term effort.

We therefore modified our recommendation, limiting the translation of only maintenance manuals into native languages, and request an additional response from management. Native language manuals will assist with the training of personnel and a comparison with manuals from the Original Equipment Manufacturer will increase comprehension. We anticipate AAF Wings would receive native language manuals in addition to the manuals in English.

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PART V – FIELDING ISSUES

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Observation 12. Afghan Air Force Personnel Recruiting, and Initial Training, and Assignments

The Afghan system for accessing (recruiting, and initial training and assignment) AAF officers and enlisted personnel improperly assigned individuals with insufficient literacy, education, and potential to satisfy the technical requirements of a modern air force.

The ANA personnel accessions system was deficient because technical requirements of the AAF were not taken into account, senior Afghan officials routinely modified selection lists for political and personal reasons, and GIRoA Ministry of Defense officers directed annual changes to AAF unit personnel authorizations.

Continued difficulty in the acquisition of qualified leaders, pilots, aircrew, maintainers, logisticians, and other skilled personnel will hinder, delay, and possibly prohibit the development of an independent and sustainable AAF.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Numbers 27 and 37.b, for additional details.)

- NTM-A/CSTC-A, “Ministerial Development Plan for Afghanistan Air Force Chief of Personnel (AAF/G1),” July 12, 2011.
- Decree 5001, “Ministry of Defense Organization and Functions Manual,” Chapter 21 GS-G1, March 29, 2011.

Discussion

Senior Afghan officials provided examples of negative impacts on the AAF resulting from the ANA personnel system. Officers at the Kandahar Air Wing stated that shortages of engineers, firemen, mechanics, and transportation specialists forced them to rely on assistance from the ANA 205th Corps to conduct ground support operations. The personnel officer for the Shindand Air Wing believed that poor wing staffing was the result of commanders, at all levels, not effectively enforcing existing personnel acquisition, assignment, and unit manning policies.

To obtain personnel, commanders sent a request through channels to the GIRoA Ministry of Defense. When requests were approved, the Ministry of Defense notified the General Staff in writing. The letter from the GIRoA Ministry of Defense included individuals by name. Senior AAF officials stated that the AAF used the same procedures. NTM-A/CSTC-A advisors told us that the ANA General Staff assigned the AAF the same priority as any ANA Infantry Corps. Senior Afghan officials and the NATC-A air advisors described several issues with the system in place.

- The ANA was still growing, while conducting combat operations, which kept the primary focus on unit development. When interviewed, statements from the Afghan Minister of Defense and the AAF Vice Chief of Staff both highlighted their concerns about sufficient numbers of soldiers and airmen. The AAF Vice Chief of Staff outlined the sequence as personnel, equipment, training, and then transition.

- The AAF required greater literacy and technical capability than the ANA. Air crew and virtually all ground support personnel needed capabilities beyond the skill required by an infantryman. The AAF personnel officer stated he wanted the authority to pre-test and select AAF personnel prior to or during ANA basic training. Ministry of Defense dictate was not assigning personnel with the right skills to the AAF. Specialty positions were especially difficult to fill, because only one of six selections for the AAF was literate.

Obtaining AAF air crew was a special case. Using the personnel system described above, the AAF was only able to test officer candidates after their names were on an approved list. This contributed to a 60-70 percent failure rate for individuals selected for pilot training. NATC-A air advisors suggested that the AAF should be allowed to select and pre-screen pilot candidates, but believed that approval from the GIRoA Minister of Defense would be necessary.

Further, senior Afghan officials routinely modified selection lists for political and personal reasons. Multiple Afghan and Coalition officials stated that the Afghan Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff delayed the release of accession lists because they did not like the results presented. Ensuring the ethnic balance of the AAF, in accordance with Afghan law, was also a challenge. Two examples illustrate the issue.

- In one instance, a previously approved list was returned to the Vice Chief of the General Staff with name changes because there were too many of one ethnic type.
- In the other instance, a senior Afghan official insisted on replacing a departing officer with a member of the same ethnic group, instead of the fully qualified chosen candidate. The replacement proved incapable of performing the duties of the position and was relieved.

Finally, the AAF personnel officer discussed the challenges created by yearly changes to personnel authorizations. Year over year updates change authorized ranks and add and eliminate positions. For example, one position initially required a Captain. The position was later re-graded as a non-commissioned officer, and later changed to require a Lieutenant.

The AAF continued to field new aircraft and additional ground equipment. Operating and properly maintaining aircraft and equipment requires technically capable aircrew and ground support personnel. The inability of the ANA personnel system to provide literate, capable personnel will extend the time and effort necessary to develop a sustainable AAF.

Recommendations

12.a. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Air Training Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with senior Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Defense officials, develop and implement a plan for testing personnel aptitude and literacy prior to assignment in the Afghan Air Force.

12.b. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Air Training Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Afghan General Staff, develop and implement a plan for re-assigning unqualified Afghan Air Force personnel to other Afghan National Army Corps.

Management Comments

Management concurred with the recommendations.

NATC-A commented that they developed a policy that would establish minimum education, aptitude, literacy, and other unique skill requirements for AAF service. The policy was at the Afghan Ministry of Defense for final approval.

In addition, NATC-A and the AAF were developing job specialty and training requirements, and the ANA/AAF Personnel Assignment system was capable of re-assigning members between the ANA Corps and the AAF.

Our Response

Management comments to the recommendations were responsive. No further response is required.

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Observation 13. Afghan Air Force Aircrew Compensation

AAF aircrew compensation was inadequate to ensure retention of individuals who successfully complete technical and language training.

The base wages and incentive pay for the all AAF aircrew, including; pilots, navigators, flight engineers, loadmasters, crew chiefs, maintainers, flight medics and aviation staff were not:

- commensurate with the personal risks and mobility requirements,
- competitive with non-military positions which require some or all of the newly acquired skills, and
- comparable to similar positions in the GIRoA Ministry of the Interior Air Interdiction Unit.

As the AAF increases the number of younger, technically-trained and English-qualified pilots and aircrew, the potential exists for wage disparities with the private sector to cause a personnel exodus to higher paying positions outside the AAF. High attrition of trained personnel would adversely impact AAF mission performance and threaten the capability to reach sustainability after the transition to independent operations.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Numbers 37.b, 38, and 39, for additional details.)

- Decree 5001, “Ministry of Defense Organization and Functions Manual,” Chapter 21 “GS-G1,” March 29, 2011.
- Minister of Defense Order (0257): “Afghan Air Force Aviation Incentive Pay for Pilots, Navigators, Flight Engineers, Loadmasters, Flying Crew Chiefs, Maintainers, Aviation Staff and Flight Medics,” (English), July 8, 2011.
- Minister of Defense Policy” “Afghan National Army (ANA) Bonus & Incentive Pay Policy / Regulation,” November 6, 2008.

Discussion

The General Staff developed pay and compensation plans to ensure retention of all ANA personnel. GIRoA Ministry of Defense Policy number 0144 establishes the rules, regulations, categories, and requirements for aviation incentive pay intended to retain quality service members and sustain aviation operations within the AAF. Unfortunately, AAF Aircrew pay structure was uncompetitive.

The base wages and incentive pay for the AAF aircrew were not commensurate with the personal risks and required mobility. The general lack of experience, unfamiliarity with equipment and operations, and the ongoing insurgency made flying AAF missions, an inherently risky job, even more dangerous for personnel.

Similar to the ANA, compensation for AAF aircrew was expected to cover basic sustenance, housing, and security costs. During interviews with AAF aircrew at all three Air Wings, housing availability and cost was a consistent concern. Security of housing and transportation to and from the base was a major concern at the Kandahar and Shindand Air Wings.

Where the AAF compensation needs differed from that of the ANA was the expectation that aircrew would be assigned away from their permanent homes. While the ANA often provided ANA soldiers the opportunity to serve locally, there were few opportunities for AAF aircrew to serve in or near their home towns or villages. AAF pilots and aircrew could enter the AAF from anywhere in the country, but could only be stationed in Kabul, Kandahar, or Shindand.

Personnel stationed away from their permanent residences had additional travel costs and security risks to visit their families. In most cases, long distance overland travel was the only option for a member of an aircrew wishing to return home on leave. Living off-base with or without their families would entail an additional expense, and often was inconvenient to their work and inherently dangerous. The AAF was in the process of relocating pilot training from Kabul to Shindand, yet on or off-base housing in Shindand was virtually non-existent for AAF personnel. This prohibited AAF aircrew from bringing their families, impacting morale.

AAF aircrew received intensive technical and English language proficiency training. Once this training was completed, they had a significant potential for higher earnings in selected jobs outside the AAF, including some supporting the local civilian sector or translating for U.S. and Coalition forces. The addition and modification of flight incentive pay only partially addressed this disparity issue. However, the combined base wage and incentive pay was still less than the salary paid to a proficient English language interpreter working for Coalition forces.

Finally, pilots assigned to the Ministry of the Interior Air Interdiction Unit were paid significantly more than the AAF pilots of similar experience. Additionally, many AIU pilots possessed higher skills and English language ability. Funding for the Air Interdiction Unit was separate from funding for the ANA. The unit was also a smaller group of highly-trained, English-proficient pilots that performed complex missions and interacted with international law enforcement agencies. Notwithstanding these factors, the perception of the AAF pilots that they were flying the same aircraft on similar missions with less pay had validity.

Dissatisfaction with pay was a consistent topic raised during interviews with pilots and aircrew. Actual and perceived pay inequity was impacting morale and could also therefore contribute to absenteeism, attrition, and corruption, as individuals use AAF-trained skills and assets for personal gain.

Recommendation

The recommendation regarding Afghan Air Force aircrew compensation was deleted based on management comments below.

Management Comments

Management non-concurred with the recommendation. NTM-A/CSTC-A commented that compensation rates implemented for unique AAF skill sets were adequate to ensure retention. Pay for junior pilots with training, experience, and English proficiency was competitive with pay for NATC-A interpreters. In addition, all AAF members received compensation for combat, location, and annual leave, and GIRoA will eventually shoulder the burden of pay. Finally,

NTM-A/CSTC-A asserted that a number of individuals working as interpreters were considering becoming pilots.

Our Response

Management comments to the recommendation were responsive. We accept the NTM-A/CSTC-A conclusion that compensation rates are adequate, and agree that total compensation must be sustainable by GIRoA over the long term. As a result, we deleted the recommendation.

However, additional competitive compensation includes considerations not discussed in the draft recommendation, such as housing and medical care, and the impact of location within a Kabul-centric society. This issue is not unique to the AAF, and was discussed in a prior report by the Office of Inspector General.²³

²³ See DoD Inspector General Report Number DoDIG-2012-028, “Assessment of the U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army,” December 9, 2011 for a detailed description of the ANA logistics system as of 2011.

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Observation 14. Shindand Air Base Support (Classified)

This observation is discussed in the classified Appendix E.

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Observation 15. Command and Control Relationship at Shindand Air Base

The designated senior USAF airfield authority for Shindand Air Base did not have a formal command relationship with the organization providing airfield air traffic control consistent with USCENTCOM Regulation.

The Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan had assigned senior airfield authority for Shindand Air Base to the Commander, 838 Air Expeditionary Advisor Group, whose unit fell under NTM-A/CSTC-A. However, an element of the ISAF Joint Command, U.S. Army Task Force Spear, continued to provide air traffic control capability.

The lack of a unified command relationship of Shindand airfield operations precludes control of the air traffic function by the senior airfield authority and could negatively impact AAF pilot training, and the ability of the Commander, 838th Air Expeditionary Advisor Group to mentor his AAF counterpart.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Number 32, for additional details.)

- USCENTCOM Regulation 415-1, 15 April 2009, “Construction and Base Camp Development in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility-The Sand Book,” April 15, 2009.

Discussion

U.S. Central Command Regulation 415-1 defines senior airfield authority responsibilities.

The component responsible for the control, operation, and maintenance of the airfield to include the runways, associated taxiways, and parking ramps as well as land and facilities whose proximity affects airfield operations. The SAA [Senior Airfield Authority] is responsible for coordination of all component/JTF [Joint Task Force] aircraft and airfield facilities (responsibilities will not be split among Services). The SAA controls flight line access and is responsible for the safe movement of aircraft in the airport traffic area and on all airfield surfaces. The SAA will develop and coordinate airfield improvement master plans with the BOS-I [Base Operation Support – Integration] and submit them to the BOS-I for inclusion in the overall base master plans.

In January 2010, the Commander, ISAF, assigned senior airfield authority for Shindand Air Base to the Commander, 838 Air Expeditionary Advisor Group.²⁴ The 838 was one of three Air Expeditionary Advisor Groups assigned to the 438 Air Expeditionary Wing, a subordinate command of NTM-A/CSTC-A. As of September 2011, Foxtrot Company, 2-227 Infantry of Task Force Spearhead, retained air traffic control responsibilities for the Shindand airfield. Task Force Spearhead was a subordinate element of the IJC Regional Command-North.

In August 2011, the 438 Air Expeditionary Wing operations officer reported he was developing a fragmentary order for coordination that would assign tactical control of the unit providing air

²⁴ U.S. Forces Afghanistan Fragmentary Order 11-009, January 7, 2010. This order was classified.

traffic control to the 838 Air Expeditionary Advisor Group. There was no estimated completion date for the action. Further, in October 2011, the NTM-A/CSTC-A Afghanistan Strategic Review proposed reducing the number of runways from two to one at Shindand Air Base. This would further complicate air traffic control by combining operational and training flights on the same runway.

As cited in Regulation 415-1, senior airfield authority includes responsibility for “the safe movement of aircraft in the airport traffic area and on all airfield surfaces.” In order to meet this requirement, the senior airfield authority needs formal command authority over the air traffic control function.

The Commander, 838th Air Expeditionary Advisor Group, is the senior airfield authority, and should have command of the Shindand Air Base air traffic control function. A clear and empowered local command and control will simplify AAF pilot training and operations, and provide a good example for AAF commanders and controllers who will assume responsibilities from the advisor group in the future.

Recommendations

15.a. Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, establish a formal command relationship between the existing Shindand Air Base senior airfield authority and the air traffic control element.

15.b. Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, in the future, realign command and control of Shindand air traffic control under the senior airfield authority.

Management Comments

Management concurred with the recommendations.

NTM-A/CSTC-A, responding for ISAF/USFOR-A, commented that the 838th Air Expeditionary Advisor Group will establish a memorandum of agreement with U.S. Forces-Afghanistan. The memorandum will assign the Senior Airfield Authority sufficient control of air traffic control operations, specifically NATO TACON (“tactical control”) of the air traffic control element.

They also stated that U.S. Forces-Afghanistan had an air traffic control element tasked to continue support at Shindand Air Base. NATC-A was evaluating future air traffic control options, including a partnering agreement with the Afghan Ministry of Transportation and Civil Aviation or the development of an AAF air traffic control career path.

Our Response

Management comments to the recommendation were responsive. No further response is required.

OTHER ISSUES

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Observation 16. MoD—MoI Support Agreement for the Air Interdiction Unit

The GIRoA Ministry of the Interior (MoI) Air Interdiction Unit (AIU) did not have long-term infrastructure and service support agreements in place with the MoD to support logistically/administratively its field operations at the Kabul International Airport or at other AAF bases.

The AIU, the only aviation asset of the MoI, was a squadron-sized unit and a tenant on the AAF compound at the Kabul Afghanistan International Airport that was almost entirely supported by Coalition Forces and contractors. However, it could not receive facility support from the AAF without a service support agreement between the MoI and MoD, which controlled the AAF compound and its facilities.

This resulted in an inefficient use of resources and an over-reliance on Coalition support which will not be sustainable in the future.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Number 8, for additional details.)

- Army Field Manual 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, "Counterinsurgency," December 2006.

Discussion

The AIU provided counter narcotics support to the Afghan National Police. The unit was based at the AAF compound at Kabul International Airport in a "tenant" relationship with the MoD. The Air Interdiction Unit headquarters building and maintenance facility were collocated in facilities assigned to the AAF Kabul Air Wing.

Although the AAF provided building space and utilities, the Air Interdiction Unit personnel were not authorized to use base quarters, dining facilities, or other personnel and unit support services. As an example, the AIU set up their own temporary dining facilities rather than using the fully-staffed AAF facility located on Kabul International Airport. AIU leaders and mentors stated that the relationship with the Kabul Air Wing was strained, with the root cause being a perceived lack of support from the ANA and AAF. This occurred because there was no support agreement between the MoD and MoI for support of the AIU. This prohibition on the AIU use of facilities extended to other AAF bases in Afghanistan.

ANA and AAF support for the AIU will become critical as Coalition support decreases in the future.

Recommendation

16. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, promote development of a cooperative agreement between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Interior, formalizing the support relationship between the Afghan National Army, Afghan Air Force and the Air Interdiction Unit.

Management Comments

Management concurred with the recommendation. NTM-A/CSTC-A stated that the Afghan Air Interdiction Unit transitioned to the Afghan Special Mission Wing in July 2012, and a joint Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior memorandum was developed formalizing the relationship between the ANA, AAF, and the Special Mission Wing.

Our Response

Management comments to the recommendation were responsive. No further response is required.

Appendix A. Scope, Methodology, and Acronyms

We conducted this assessment from May to November 2011 in accordance with Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, “Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations,” January 2011. We planned and performed the assessment to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our observations and conclusions, based on our assessment objectives. Data collection included a site visit to Afghanistan from July 25 to August 8, 2011.

In February, during the course of the assessment, additional concerns over the continued safe operation of the G-222/C-27A medium transport aircraft were raised. As much as practicable, these concerns are addressed in this report. However, the USAFCENT Command Directed Investigation results are pending. We will continue to provide oversight of this issue until it is resolved.

The objective of this assessment was to determine whether U.S and Coalition Forces goals, objectives, plans and guidance to train, equip, and field a viable and sustainable Afghan Air Force are prepared, issued, operative, and relevant.

We reviewed documents such as Federal Laws and regulations, including the National Defense Authorization Act, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions, DoD directives and instructions, and appropriate U.S. Central Command, ISAF, IJC, U.S. Forces- Afghanistan, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and GIRoA Ministry of Defense guidance.

We also visited or contacted organizations and individuals in the U.S. and Afghanistan that were directly responsible for, or advised the commanders responsible for, developing the AAF. We reviewed the programs and processes used in the development and function of the AAF, and spoke with appropriate U.S./Coalition and Afghan leaders and managers, ranging from general officers, through staff officers, to training and mentor team members in the field.

The AAF assessment chronology was:

20 May 2011	Project Announcement
20 May–July 2011	Research and fieldwork in the U.S.
25 July–8 August, 2011	Fieldwork in Afghanistan
August 7, 2011	Out Brief to NTM-A/CSTC-A and NATC-A
August 2011–June 2012	Analysis and report writing
June 29, 2012	Draft report issued
31 August 2012	Management comments received and evaluated
September 28, 2012	Final report issued

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this assessment.

Acronyms Used in this Report

The following is a list of the acronyms used in this report.

AAF	Afghan Air Force
ACCC	Afghan Air Force Command and Control Center
AEW	Air Expeditionary Wing
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANACC	Afghan National Army Air Corps
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
NATC-A	NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
USAF	U.S. Air Force

Appendix B. Summary of Prior Coverage

During the last four years, the DoD, the Government Accountability Office, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, and the DoD Office of Inspector General have issued a number of reports and testimony discussing the development of the Afghan National Security Forces. Reports published directly pertaining to the Afghan Air Force include one each by the DoD Office of Inspector General and U.S. Air Forces Central.

Unrestricted DoD reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.defense.gov/pubs>. Unrestricted Government Accountability Office reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction reports can be accessed at <http://www.sigar.mil>. Unrestricted DoD Office of the Inspector General reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports>.

Some of the prior coverage we used in preparing this report included:

Department of Defense

Report to Congress in accordance with sections 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” October 2011.

Report to Congress in accordance with sections 1230/1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” and “United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces,” April 2011.

Report to Congress in accordance with sections 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” November 2010.

Report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” April 2010.

Report to Congress in accordance with section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), “United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces,” April 2010.

Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” June 2009.

Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” January 2009.

Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), "Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," June 2008.

Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1231, Public Law 110-181), "United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces," June 2008.

Department of Defense Inspector General

Report No. D2011-D000AS-0030.00. "DoD Needs to Improve Accountability and Identify Costs and Requirements for Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft," Draft for Management Comments, October 18, 2011.

Report No. D-2011-113. "Improved Pricing and Oversight Needed for the Afghan Air Force Pilot and English Language Training Task Order", September 30, 2011.

Report No. D2011-D00SPO-0172-000, "Assessment of US Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army", Draft for Management Comments, 8 September 2011.

Report No. D-2011-080/DOS Report No. AUD/CG-11-30, "DOD and DOS Need Better Procedures to Monitor and Expend DOD Funds for the Afghan National Police Training Program," July 7, 2011.

Report No. D-2010-042, "DOD Obligations and Expenditures of Funds Provided to the Department of State for the Training and Mentoring of the Afghan National Police," February 9, 2010.

Report No. SPO-2009-007, "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces," September 30, 2009.

Report No. D-2009-100, "Afghanistan Security Forces Fund Phase III – Accountability for Equipment Purchased for the Afghanistan National Police," September 22, 2009.

Report No. SPO-2009-006, "Assessment of the Accountability and Control of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) Provided to the Security Forces of Afghanistan," September 11, 2009.

Report No. SPO-2009-001, "Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Control and Accountability; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Afghan National Security Forces," October 24, 2008.

Report No. IE-2007-005/DOS Report No. ISP-I-07-34, "Interagency Assessment Of the Counternarcotics Program in Afghanistan," July 2007.

Government Accountability Office

GAO-11-948R, “Afghanistan’s Donor Dependence”, September 20, 2011.

GAO-11-760, “Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to Support the Advising Mission,” August 2, 2011.

GAO-11-710, “Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Improve Accountability of U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan Government,” July 2011.

GAO 11-66, “Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long Term costs Not Determined,” January 27, 2011.

GAO-10-842T, “Preliminary Observations on DOD’s Progress and Challenges in Distributing Supplies and Equipment to Afghanistan,” June 25, 2010.

GAO-10-655R, “Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan,” June 15, 2010.

GAO-09-280, “Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation,” March 9, 2009.

GAO-09-263SP, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan’s Border Area with Afghanistan,” February 23, 2009.

GAO-08-883T, “U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability,” June 18, 2008.

GAO-08-661, “Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces,” June 18, 2008.

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Audit 12-2, “Better Planning and Oversight Could Have Reduced Construction Delays and Costs at the Kabul Military Training Center,” October 26, 2011.

Audit 11-6, “Inadequate Planning for ANSF Facilities Increases Risks for \$11.4 Billion Program,” January 26, 2011.

Audit-10-11, “Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments,” June 29, 2010.

Commission on Wartime Contracting

Final Report to Congress, “Transforming Wartime Contracting—Controlling costs, reducing risks,” August 2011.

Second Interim Report to Congress, “At what risk? Correcting over-reliance on contractors in contingency operations,” February 24, 2011.

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Interim Report to Congress, "At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,"
June 10, 2009.

United States Air Forces Central (AFCENT)

Afghan National Security Forces Airpower Requirement Review, 28 February 2010.

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Appendix C. Criteria

DoD Regulations and Policy

1. **Afghan Air Force, Master Plan v17 Annex D Logistics.** The NTM-A/CSTC-A, NATC-A and AAF jointly developed this Annex to the master Planning Document for AAF Development. Establishes and formalizes the expectations of both organizations in providing “cradle to grave” management of the AAF Logistical Management Process in direct support of incoming aircraft and personnel.
2. **Afghanistan National Security Forces Air Power Requirements Review, February 28, 2010.** Based upon a Dec 2009 request from the Commander of the CAPTF and the ANA G-3, the USAFCENT Commander chartered a review of ANSF Airpower development progress to ensure existing plans enabled the GIRoA to conduct a full range of aviation operations supporting specific National Security and Military Strategy. Recommendations regarding the size and structure of the future Afghan Air Force were provided.
3. **Air Force Doctrine Document 2, “Operations and Organization,” April 3, 2007.** This document describes how the U.S. Air Force organizes and employs air and space power at the operational level across the range of military operations. Concepts include; the role and responsibilities of the senior warfighting Airman; the basics behind the expeditionary organizational model; the fundamentals of joint and Service command arrangements; and how to plan operations.
4. **All Army Activities (ALARACT) Vice Chief of Staff Message/Soldiers transported by or performing crew duties in partner nation Mi-8/Mi-17 aircraft, P242258Z, March 2010.** This message declares it is high risk for soldiers to ride in/perform duties aboard any Mi-8/Mi-17 aircraft that do not meet Army airworthiness standards as defined in AR 70-62. Further guidance includes that the first U.S. Army General Officer in a soldier’s chain of command is the approval authority for a soldier to ride aboard another nation’s or contracted Mi-8/Mi-17 aircraft not recognized as airworthy by the US Army. The message states awareness of the U.S. Air Force quarterly special operational airworthiness release (SOAR) for Mi-8/Mi-17, and although these inspection results can be incorporated into the U.S. Army General Officer overall risk assessment, the SOAR may not be a substitute for AR 70-62 requirements.
5. **Amendment to Contract Number: FA8504-08-C-0007-P000170, January 27, 2011.** The purpose of this modification was to revise aircraft (G-222) delivery schedules for CLINs 0016-0027 in exchange for considerations extended by the ANA.
6. **Amendment to Contract Number: FA8504-08-C-0007-P000170, August 19, 2011.** This Amendment provides for a reduction in the G-222 Mission Capable Rate (MCR) from 80 to 65 percent in consideration of providing On-the-Job-

Training (OJT). Further clarification was also added stating, "Mission requirements will take priority over training activities."

7. **Army Field Manual 3-07.1, "Security Force Assistance," May 1, 2009.** This field manual provides the doctrinal guidance and direction for how U.S. forces contribute to security force assistance. It requires that foreign personnel cross-train on all types of weapons, communications, and other equipment, and skills particular to their unit. Personnel losses must never cause weapons, communications equipment, or essential skills to be lost due to a lack of fully trained replacement personnel.
8. **Army Field Manual 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, "Counterinsurgency," December 2006.** This field manual establishes doctrine/fundamental principles for military operations in a counterinsurgency environment. Additionally, it establishes that the most effective force requirement gauge is troop density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation's military and police forces, as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. This field manual also stipulates that a clear-hold-build operation should be executed in a specific, high-priority area experiencing overt insurgent operations and has the following objectives: (1) create a secure environment, (2) establish a firm government control of the populace and area, and (3) gain the populace's support.
9. **Army Field Manual 101-5, "Staff Organization and Operations," May 31, 1997.** This publication is the Army's capstone manual for staff organization and operations of major tactical and major tactical support commands at corps level and below. It describes basic doctrine of the roles, relationships, organization, and responsibilities of staffs in the U. S. Army.
10. **USAF Air Advising Operating Concept 1.0, 3, February 2012.** This publication establishes a common framework and guidelines for planning and conducting USAF air advising activities in support of geographic combatant commander (GCC) requirements.
11. **US Air Forces Central Instruction 16-101 USAFCENT Air Advisor and Training, August 3, 2010.** This instruction establishes a stand-alone policy for the training, equipping, deployment, and support of USAFCENT personnel performing advisory or non-traditional support duties. Additionally, it establishes USAFCENT standards for Air Advisor qualification, training, and certification for aircrew members operating partner nation and other non-standard aircraft.
12. **US Air Forces Central Instruction 90-101, USAFCENT Standardization Program, February 16, 2010.** This instruction establishes the USAFCENT Air Force Forces (AFFOR) Standardization Program, including, policy, procedures, and authority. It provides the USAFCENT Commander a tool to monitor mission readiness and unit effectiveness supporting operations within the USAFCENT AOR. The rotational nature of forces in the USAFCENT AOR necessitates an active program and commander involvement at all levels.

13. **Contract Number: FA850408C0007, G-222 Acquisition for ANAAC, September 29, 2008.** This Letter Contract was issued to Alenia North America for the funding of \$287,000,000 for tasks, including; 18 refurbished G-222 Aircraft, Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) services, Ground Support Equipment (GSE), Spare Parts, Ballistic Protection, Very Important Person (VIP) modules, Technical support for publications and manuals, Mission Support Kits, and more.
14. **CSTC-A, “Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces,” September 20, 2008.** This document provides an overarching strategy for the development of the ANSF, to include the MoD and the MoI. The plan aims to synchronize security sector development efforts across the MoD, MoI, CSTC-A, and the wider International Community. The plan lays out the guidance and the processes for security ministry and Afghan security forces generation and development. It also takes into account the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, dated April 2008, and the altered circumstances since conception of these agreements and strategies, including changes to the security environment. It is complementary to Commander, ISAF Operations Plan 38302 and supports the ISAF security effects.
15. **Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, “Defense Contingency Contracting Officer Representative Handbook,” June 30, 2010.** Provides the basic knowledge and tools needed by CORs to support contingency operations. It specifically addresses the realities faced by CORs in operations outside the continental United States. It provides comprehensive guidance and training qualification requirements from the FAR; the DFAR Supplement; the Joint Ethics Regulation; DoD directives, instructions, publications, and policies; and countless CORs and Contingency Contracting Officers who have learned hard lessons in deployed environments. This document is meant to supplement, not replace, formal COR training given by various DoD/OSD.
16. **DoD Directive No. 7045.14, “The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS),” November 21, 2003.** Establishes policy, procedures, and responsibilities for the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, the primary resource management process in the DoD. The U.S. and its coalition partners’ ministerial development of the Afghan MoD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System process is mirrored in large part after this U.S. DoD Directive.
17. **DoD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations”, September 16, 2009.** Provides guidance on stability operations and will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, missions, and lessons learned aid in the development of DoD policy and assignment of responsibility for the identification and development of DoD capabilities to support stability operations.
18. **DoD, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” October 2011.** This report is submitted consistent with Section 1230

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended. It includes a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. This report is the eighth in a series of reports required every 180 days through fiscal year 2014 and has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary of Agriculture. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. The information contained in this report is current as of September 30, 2011.

19. **Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance “Afghan National Army Mentor Guide,” March 25, 2011.** Provides force structure, organizational culture, and challenges of the ANSF as well as insight into lessons learned from ongoing security force assistance and counterinsurgency efforts. It is suggested reading for anyone deploying to Afghanistan, and is considered a must read for advisors, leaders, and trainers preparing to conduct stability operations in Afghanistan.
20. **Joint Publication 3-07.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense,” April 30, 2004.** Sets forth doctrine and selected Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed forces of the United States in joint operations. It provides the doctrinal basis of interagency coordination and U.S. military involvement in multinational operations. Page V-27, para 10.d(4) states “Tailor the proper types of equipment maintenance and training sustainability packages to the needs of the Host Nation.”
21. **Joint Publication 4-10, “Operational Contract Support,” October 17, 2008.** Establishes doctrine for planning, conducting, and assessing operational contract support integration and contractor management functions in support of joint operations. It provides standardized guidance and information related to integrating operational contract support and contractor management, defines and describes these two different, but directly related functions, and provides a basic discussion on contracting command and control organizational options.
22. **IJC Operation Order OMID 1390 001-2010, “ISAF Joint Command Operations in Afghanistan” – Annex R: Logistics, October 9, 2010.** This document is classified.
23. **NATC-A, "Air Advisor CONOPS, version 11," May 11, 2011.** States how the Air Advisors will build, train, and educate an AAF capable of sustaining air operations; to provide an example of a professional military force; to train the AAF to conduct COIN operations; and to train the AAF to provide HA/DR capabilities to the GIRoA

24. **NTM-A/CSTC-A “Afghan Ministry of Defense Programming & Analysis Department Strategic Plan for Self-Sufficiency,” December 23, 2010.** The Programming and Analysis Department’s Strategic Plan for Self-Sufficiency provides the framework for the Directorate to annually develop and coordinate the most comprehensive, cost-effective, and executable three-year Final Program Position that matches limited resources to the strategic priorities of the MoD and the GIRoA.
25. **NTM-A/CSTC-A, Air Working Group Brief, January 9, 2011.** This brief describes how MoD Decree 467 will develop of the AAF through phases based on the development of its qualified personnel as well as its capacity to manage, train and equip.
26. **NTM-A/CSTC-A “Commander’s Vision for 2011–Accelerating Progress,” February 10, 2011.** States how the Commander, NTM-A/CSTC-A intends to achieve the Lisbon Declaration’s goals of setting the conditions “for irreversible transition to full Afghan security responsibility and leadership... by the end of 2014.” It describes five critical areas; Train Afghan Trainers and Instructors, Accelerate Leader Development, Build Literacy and Vocational Skills, Inculcate an Ethos of Stewardship, and Develop Enduring Institutions, Systems and Enablers.
27. **NTM-A/CSTC-A, “Ministerial Development Plan for Afghanistan Air Force Chief of Personnel (AAF/G1),” July 12, 2011.** This document describes how the end state of a functional, self-sustaining personnel management system, capable of recruiting, retaining, managing, and developing a 4,000-plus strong , ethnically balanced AAF rising to 8,000-plus by 2013, with a view to sustaining continued growth in the future, should be achieved.
28. **NTM-A/CSTC-A “Ministerial Development Plan for the Assistant Ministry of Defense for Strategy and Policy,” Mar 2011.** The development plan provides the framework for AMoD S&P to develop and recommend National Security Strategy, Defense Policy, International Military Policy and Intelligence Policy for the MoD. It also prescribes the process for program review and analysis to synchronize force management and defense system development with budget planning actions and defense budget requests.
29. **NTM-A/CSTC-A Training Requirements: Request for Forces Plan Y, Titled: “Analysis of Unfilled Requirements”, March 2011.** This is a classified document.
30. **Office of the Under Secretary of Defense-Non-Standard Rotary Wing Acquisition Decision Memorandum, January 19, 2010.** This decision memorandum designated the Department of the Army as the lead service for the DoD in performing Mi-17, and potentially other non-standard rotary wing aircraft procurement and support activities. It further directed the Army to establish a program management office responsible for executing all procurement, sustainment, and technical support to

meet requirements for aircraft and crews in support of DoD and partner nations, including airworthiness coordination.

31. **OPORD 01/2010 APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX F.** This document is classified.
32. **USCENTCOM Regulation 415-1, “Construction and Base Camp Development in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility-The Sand Book,” April 15, 2009.** This publication provides guidance, and establishes responsibilities and procedures for the planning and development of contingency and permanent base camps that support associated missions in U.S. Central Command’s Area of Responsibility. The publication establishes consistent standards for facility design, development, security, sustainment, survivability, and safety with affordable working and living environments for personnel. The provisions of this Regulation apply to all Service Component forces, Combined/Joint Task Forces, and DoD Contract Construction Authorities operating within the geographic area assigned to U.S. Central Command by the Unified Command Plan.

GIRoA Decrees and Regulations

33. **Afghan Ministry of Defense, “Air Command and Control Doctrine,” (Dari-English), May 2011.** Air Command and Control (C2) Doctrine is the initial framework that the MoD uses to control and schedule resources to best use the AAF to meeting GIRoA’s security requirements. The document specifies how air missions are requested, validated, prioritized, tasked and reported.
34. **Afghanistan National Army Approved Tashkils–1390–Supplement–110606.** This document establishes the end strength, rank and skill structure, and equipment requirements for the AAF and subordinate units.
35. **Decree 4.0, Ministry of Defense, Office of the Assistant Minister of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, “Supported and Supporting Unit Logistics Policy and Support Procedures,” January 2009.** This decree describes common procedures, formats, and forms for the communication of logistic information between supported activities and the supply and materiel management of the MoD.
36. **Decree 467, “Organizational Structure,” March 2010.** Directs a MoD/GS internal review of roles, responsibilities, authorities and command structures, with assistance from ANA Development, to provide a principles-based phased approach for revision and update of Decree 5001. Established the AAF, and included C2 relationships.
37. **Decree 5001, “Ministry of Defense Organization and Functions Manual,” March 29, 2011.** Prescribes the command relationships from the President of Afghanistan through the MoD and GS to all elements of the ANA. It also prescribes the organization and functions of all approved organizational structures (Tashkil) of the offices of the MoD and GS of the ANA and AAF. This manual, along with existing

Ministerial Decrees, policies, standard operating procedures and ANA and AAF regulations serves as the basis for assigning and coordinating staff actions.

- a. **Chapter 20: Mission of the Office of Vice Chief of Air Force:** This chapter directs the establishment of the Vice Chief of the Air Force (VCoAF). The VCoAF is responsible to the CoGS for developing strategic plans and policies involving the organization, manning, training and equipping of the AAF. He serves as the principal advisor on the use of air power at the national command.
 - b. **Chapter 21: Mission of the Chief of Personnel (GSG1):** This chapter directs the establishment of the General Staff, Chief of Personnel (GSG1). The GSG1 is responsible to the CoGS for the management, evaluation, and execution of manpower and personnel policies, plans, and programs of all components of the Army, including active and reserve personnel for peacetime, contingency, and wartime operations.
 - c. **Chapter 34: Mission of the Afghan Air Force:** This chapter directs the establishment of the AAF. The AAF is responsible to provide trained and ready airmen and soldiers to execute critical tasks from the air in support of the Afghan National Army and, when directed by the Minister of Defense and the CoGS, provides air support to civil authorities of Afghanistan.
38. **Minister of Defense Order (0257): “Afghan Air Force Aviation Incentive Pay for Pilots, Navigators, Flight Engineers, Loadmasters, Flying Crew Chiefs, Maintainers, Aviation Staff and Flight Medics,” (English), July 8, 2010.** This order provides guidance to effectively retain quality AAF service members required to sustain aviation operations within the AAF. The Aviation Incentive Pay (AIP) is based on six categories, including experience and English language abilities.
39. **Ministry of Defense Policy: “Afghan National Army “ANA” Bonus and Incentive Pay Policy,” November 6, 2008.** This regulation provides guidance regarding additional bonuses and incentive pay for ANA service members to fill ANA shortages in key positions in the development and sustainment of a modern force.

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Appendix D. Organizations Contacted and Visited

We visited, contacted, or conducted interviews with officials (or former officials) from the following NATO, U.S., and Afghan organizations:

United States

- Air Advisor Course Joint Base Fort Dix-McGuire, NJ

Afghanistan

U.S. Central Command

- Deputy Commander, NTM-A/CSTC-A
- Deputy Commander-Programs and staff (CJ4, CJ6, CJ7, CJ8, SAO, CJ SURG, CJ ENG)
- NTM-A/CSTC-A Chief of Staff (CJ1, CJ3, CJ5)
- Deputy Commander-Air (438th Vice Commander and Wing Staff)
- Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Advisor Group, and staff (Kabul)
- Commander, 738th Air Expeditionary Advisor Group, and staff (Kandahar)
- Commander, 838th Air Expeditionary Advisor Group, and staff (Shindand)
- Selected Uniformed Afghan Air Force Advisors
- Uniformed Advisors for the Air Interdiction Unit
- Selected Contract Advisors

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Ministry of Defense, General Staff

- First Deputy Minister MoD
- Vice Chief of the General Staff, ANA
- Vice Chief of the General Staff, AAF
- Assistant Minister of Defense, Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics
- MoD & GS Inspectors General
- General Staff G4
- Ministry of the Interior Air Interdiction Unit Commander and Staff

Afghan Air Force

- Commander, AAF
- Chief of Staff, G1, G3, G4, G6, G7, G8, Safety and Civil Engineer
- Kandahar Wing Commander and Staff
- Shindand Wing Deputy Commander and Staff
- Director, Afghan Air University
- 60+ Afghan Fixed and Rotary Wing Pilots

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Appendix E. Classified Appendix

Classified Appendix is available upon request.

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~~(FOUO)~~ Appendix F. Management Letter to ISAF



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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

September 30, 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF)

SUBJECT: 838th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group (AEAG) Lacks Resources to Accomplish
Training and Advisory Mission

Ref: Assessment of Efforts to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan Air Force (AAF)
(Project No. D2011-D00SPO-0234)

Background

On May 20, 2011, the DoD Office of the Inspector General (IG) announced an assessment to determine whether U.S. Government and Coalition Forces goals, objectives, plans, and guidance to train, equip, and field a viable and sustainable AAF are prepared, issued, operative, and relevant. An IG team from the Office of Special Plans and Operations (SPO) conducted site visits to Afghanistan from July 25 to August 8, 2011.

During its fieldwork, the IG team held over eighty individual and/or group meetings with senior leaders and staff of NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan / Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A), ISAF Joint Command (IJC), 438th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW), and numerous mentors and advisors. The team also met with senior Afghan Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Air Force officials responsible for the AAF and visited AAF bases at Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand. During the visit to Shindand Air Base, the team interviewed the 838th AEAG leadership and staff, met with senior members of the AAF and extensively toured the areas under construction.

The Deputy IG, SPO is providing this memorandum to the Commander, ISAF for action as appropriate. Response to this memorandum is not required. However, should the command opt to provide comments, please provide them no later than 15 October 2011. The draft report summarizing our complete findings regarding this assessment, including this observation, should be issued by 1 November 2011.

Discussion

The purpose of this DoD IG assessment was to focus on the progress of US and Coalition forces in training, equipping, and fielding the AAF. The team did not attempt to validate specific contract requirements or execution. However, the team discovered that the 838th AEAG was not able to perform its advisory mission effectively due to its very significant Base Operating Support Integrator (BOS-I) tasks. Lack of personnel to oversee base master planning, construction project synchronization and execution, was a matter of growing concern to the command with respect to accomplishing BOS-I and its training and advisory mission responsibilities.

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Shindand Air Base is intended to be the AAF and Afghan National Army (ANA) training center of excellence, while also providing operational capability in support of Regional Command West (RC-W) and the ANA 207th Corps. This will be the only AAF base dedicated to training new pilots, a crucial element in the development of the next generation of professional Airmen. The first class of pilot training is scheduled to begin in December 2011. Construction of the AAF training facilities and classrooms, along with a second training runway dedicated to AAF pilot training, was behind the timeline necessary to support the scheduled start-up of pilot training.

Although established as a training and advisory force, US Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) FRAGO 11-009 directed the 838th AEAG to also assume the BOS-I function for Shindand Air Base. Typical advisor groups are not organized with robust organic base support element resources as part of their structure, and the 838th is the only advisor group in theater delegated BOS-I. The 838th has not been able to invest the personnel resources necessary to support its training and advisory duties because they had to be diverted to BOS-I tasks.

The BOS-I mission requires converting what was the relatively small Shindand Forward Operating Base (FOB) into the second largest Air Base in theater in terms of land area over the next 12 to 18 months. During that time over \$650M+ in construction is planned, utilizing Afghan Security Forces Funds (ASFF), military construction funds (MILCON) and operation and maintenance (O&M) funds. The base population is expected to increase from nearly 4,000 to roughly 9,000 Afghan military, Coalition forces, and contractors.

Risk Mitigation

In June 2011, the Commander, NTM-A provided a force protection squadron of over 220 additional personnel from his allocated forces. The 577th Expeditionary Prime Beef Group (EPBG) is also providing temporary engineering assistance through December 2011, and personnel assigned in response to one request for forces (RFF) for the 838th allocated an additional small team of engineers.

In addition, USFOR-A/ JENG and the 838th AEAG have submitted, or were staffing, several RFFs for BOS-I heavy construction, troop construction, and engineer support elements. Formal requests for additional personnel support also have been made to RC-W.

However, a critical shortage of civil engineering expertise and oversight still remained. The 838th AEAG leadership indicated that in order to become fully BOS-I mission capable, it would need to have six BOS-I squadrons, including civil engineering, logistics readiness, aerial port, force support, security forces, and communication, along with a judge advocate general (JAG), contracting, and public affairs representative. In any event, additional personnel were needed for the unit to perform necessary training and advisory functions.

Observation

The 838th AEAG was not properly resourced to accomplish its original mission of training and advising the AAF, while also performing the additional mission assigned it to conduct extensive BOS-I duties.

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Many personnel assigned as advisors were spending the majority of their time executing BOS-I duties rather than fully carrying out their training and advisory role. Nonetheless, the 838th still was significantly short of the essential personnel resources to accomplish effectively its BOS-I mission.

The 838th ABAG will assume significant risk of delay or failure in either or both of these missions unless it is sufficiently resourced -- soon. The potential consequences of not being appropriately staffed include delaying the AAF transition to an operationally independent and sustainable force; inadequate oversight and timely execution of major engineering and construction initiatives at Shindand; and inefficient and wasteful use of DoD funding.

Recommendation

Commander, ISAF ensure that the 838th ABAG at Shindand Air Base receives the personnel resources necessary to accomplish both its training and advisory and BOS-I missions.

We would be pleased to discuss this preliminary observation and recommendation at your convenience.



Deputy Inspector General
Special Plans and Operations

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~~(FOUO)~~ Appendix G. Memorandum to NTM-A and USAFCENT



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22304-1500

27 February 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, NATO TRAINING MISSION –
AFGHANISTAN/COMBINED SECURITY ASSISTANCE
TRANSITION COMMAND – AFGHANISTAN
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AIR FORCES CENTRAL
COMMAND

SUBJECT: Concerns over the Safe Operation of the C-27 Aircraft in Afghanistan

During the course of our assessment of the U.S. and Coalition efforts to train, equip, and field the Afghan Air Force, the DoD Office of the Inspector General (OIG) received information requiring your attention. In written allegations and interviews, air advisors and maintenance personnel assigned to the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing in Afghanistan have expressed serious concerns over the continued safe operation of the C-27 (G-222 variant) aircraft in Kabul. Issues reported to the OIG that could contribute to the increased potential for a C-27 fatal mishap include:

- inadequate aircraft performance characteristics for conditions in Afghanistan,
- significant refurbishment shortcomings and substandard aircraft maintenance by contractors, and
- unclear applicability of U.S. Air Force guidance and instructions governing C-27 ground and flight operations in Afghanistan.

The information provided to the OIG further describes ongoing critical maintenance problems and a series of near-fatal incidents.

It is our understanding that the Defense Contract Management Agency has documented a history of continuing infractions on the part of Alenia, the prime aircraft procurement contractor, and L-3, the maintenance subcontractor. The Defense Contract Management Agency has made multiple requests to the contractors for corrective action regarding serious maintenance shortcomings.

Recent queries by the OIG have identified lingering questions concerning C-27 aircraft ownership and the applicability of U.S. Air Force instructions to C-27 ground and flight operations. In addition, as a result of the overlapping NATO and U.S. command structures, responsibility for the review and validation of 438th wing-generated policies and procedures for C-27 airworthiness and safety remains unclear.

In light of the potential flight safety impact of reported issues concerning C-27 operations, we recommend that you as the Commanding General, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan / Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, in coordination with the Commander, United States Air Forces Central Command, take immediate action to address

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reported or otherwise identified concerns that impact the safety of the C-27 fleet operated by the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing. Specifically, we ask that you verify and/or clarify:

- responsibilities and authorities regarding ownership of the aircraft,
- effective maintenance, operations, and safety policies and procedures are in effect, are reviewed by appropriate command authority, and air advisor pilots and crews understand these standards,
- priorities for aircraft operations and training missions, and
- that the C-27 is safe to fly without unnecessary and excessive risk to flight crews.

We acknowledge that Afghanistan presents a difficult operating and training environment, and we also understand that there is a general awareness within the respective commands of the challenges involving the C-27 fleet. I spoke with [REDACTED] on Sunday, February 26, 2012, to share with him the information the OIG had received regarding the C-27, and understand from that conversation that he has taken, or is taking, a number of actions to improve C-27 operations safety and sustainability.

Nonetheless, we request that you respond to this memorandum within 15 days of receipt, indicating what actions have been or will be taken by the concerned commands to address risks posed to personnel and the viability of the C-27 training mission. We are prepared to provide additional information and support as you deem necessary. If you have any questions, please



Deputy Inspector General
Special Plans and Operations

cc:
Inspector General, United States Air Force
Inspector General, United States Air Forces Central Command

~~(FOUO)~~ Appendix H. NTM-A and NATC-A Consolidated Response



HEADQUARTERS
NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO, AE 09356

REPLY TO:
ATTENTION OF:
NTM-A/CSTC-A-CG

9 2 MAR 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR Deputy Inspector General, Special Plans and Operations (Personal for [REDACTED] 4800 Mark Center drive, Alexandria, VA 22350

SUBJECT: Concerns over the Safe Operation of the C-27A Aircraft in Afghanistan

1. Safe operations of the NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan (NATC-A) in planning and executing the Afghan Air Force (AAF) air advisory mission is a top priority. Based on your memorandum of 27 February 2012, [REDACTED] Commander, Air Force-Central (AFCENT) has initiated a Command Directed Investigation to investigate these serious matters more fully. Supported by a joint service team from NTM-A/CSTC-A, an AFCENT general officer will look specifically at the AAF C-27A maintenance posture, as well as at the more general questions related to policy delineating safe operations while carrying out security force assistance. This will be a 45-day effort, commencing this month. We welcome this good, hard look. We have to get this right.

2. This memorandum and the detailed enclosure offers our interim response. We know we have more work to do. Once we have the results of the Command Directed Investigation, we will share those with you as well. We focused on your request to verify and/or clarify four areas of concern pertaining to the AAF C-27A program.

a. **Responsibilities and authorities regarding ownership of the aircraft.** Definition of aircraft ownership has contributed to uncertainty regarding applicable regulatory guidance. The aircraft have only recently been determined to be "Department of Defense (DoD) owned," but not part of the U.S. Air Force inventory, that is, "Non-USAF." Therefore, no Major Air Force Command (MAJCOM) managed these aircraft. To fill the regulatory gap, the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing (438 AEW) Commander published interim guidance in early December 2011. Earlier this month, Headquarters, Air Force, clarified the authorities and regulatory guidance, setting the stage for development of the full range of appropriately tailored flying regulations.

b. **Effective maintenance, operations and safety policies and procedures are in effect, are reviewed by appropriate command authority, and air advisor pilots and crew understand these standards.**

(1) **Effective Maintenance.** When made aware of the poor performance of the contract logistics support (CLS) contractors, the NATC-A/438th AEW Commander, working closely with the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), responded immediately and decisively. His actions included ordering a full fleet stand down, an exhaustive safety and maintenance review; and firmly engaging the prime contractor, Alenia North America. This direct engagement resulted in Alenia's decision to replace its CLS sub-contractor. All these actions resulted in an enhanced partnership with highly qualified DCMA personnel, whereby group and

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NTM-A/CSTC-A-CG

SUBJECT: Concerns over the Safe Operations of the C-27A Aircraft in Afghanistan

(2) **Operations.** The unique operational environment of the Afghan advising mission, coupled with the ownership ambiguity discussed above, resulted in uneven operational guidance in the past. The NATC-A/438 AEW Commander has recently developed an Operating Instruction (OI) with considerable aviator, commander and operations staff input. The OI ensures the safe, effective operation of the C-27A as a trainer and mission asset. It also serves as a mechanism to allow Afghans, with advisor oversight, to build their own comprehensive flying regulations for the future. Combining appropriate USAF regulations, international procedures, Afghan regulations and aircraft specific flying manuals, the OI supplies our air advisors a safe, all-inclusive and relevant set of flight rules that define how air advisors are to perform their flying duties in "non-USAF" aircraft. In February 2012, upon direction of the 9th Air Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan (9 AETF-A) Commander, the OI became the official interim operating guidance for the NATC-A C27A program.

(3) **Safety Policies.** In the absence of clear guidance on what organizational safety policies and regulations apply to Non-USAF aircraft in an advisory mission; the 438 Commander has directed that the 438 AEW operate its safety program as closely as possible to the USAF's program.

c. **Priorities for aircraft operations and training missions.** Instilling in the Afghan Air Force (AAF) the discipline to adhere to operational and training mission priorities has been a challenge. Our work is now beginning to bear fruit. Previously, the AAF re-tasked or cancelled a high percentage of crew training missions. NATC-A/438 personnel have emphasized to the Afghan leadership the importance of training for the long-term success and sustainability of the AAF, explaining that lost training missions risk the AAF reaching operational relevance in 2014 and independence in 2016. This line of effort is showing results with a marked reduction in re-tasking of training missions.

d. **C-27A is safe to fly without unnecessary and excessive risk to the flight crews.** No C-27A flight will take place unless I am personally satisfied the aircraft is safe and the aircrew properly trained. The C-27A is capable of safely performing aircraft qualification training and operational medium-airlift missions in Afghanistan when maintained to standard and operated under the appropriate conditions. Further, NATC-A/438 has implemented, and will continue to implement, additional safety measures.

3. My point of contact for NATC-A/438AEW IG issues is [REDACTED]

Encl

[REDACTED]
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding



HEADQUARTERS
NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO, AE 09356

INFORMATION PAPER

NTM-A/STC-A-CG
12 March 2012

SUBJECT: Concerns Over the Safe Operation of the C-27A Aircraft in Afghanistan

1. **Purpose:** To provide additional information regarding the investigations and actions taken in response to the IG memo dated 27 Feb 12.

2. **Facts:**

a. Responsibilities and authorities regarding ownership of the aircraft

Uncertainty of ownership of the aircraft has beset the unit since program inception. This vagueness affects the regulatory guidance the aircrews follow and is as a factor relating to the difficulties the 438 AEW faces today. The 438 AEW/IG identified the issue in mid-September 2011 and the 438 AEW/CC has since attempted to acquire a definitive answer. Since October 2011, AFCENT/A3, Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) and Air Force Security Assistance Center (AFSAC) have all agreed the aircraft were NOT Afghan owned. However, they could not agree on the question of U.S. Air Force ownership. Some agencies they were USAF owned because the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center was the Program Management Office, while others believed they were Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) owned because they requested the initial purchase. The effect of this uncertainty has been a regulatory confusion in a non-standardized and improperly implemented collection of locally produced instructions and operating procedures.

Based on this uncertainty, the 438 AEW/CC immediately ordered a full review of available guidance. In early December 2011 the 438 AEW/J3 published mandatory interim guidance affirming all flying units must operate in accordance with USAF flying regulations until a definitive solution was developed. This interim guidance provided an immediate mechanism to manage risk, but created an unintended environment where aviators could not fully comply with the administrative portions of some USAF regulations in order to accomplish the mission.

NATC-A and USAFCENT ordered a full legal review of C-27A ownership from the CSTC-A Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) in February 2012. In a 05 Mar 12 legal opinion the OSJA determined that, the aircraft are DoD owned until the aircraft are handed over to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) but are not part of the USAF inventory (non-USAF). As a result of being non-USAF aircraft,

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no Major Air Force Command (MAJCOM) has been assigned to manage these aircraft. Therefore, in accordance with USAF instructions in the absence of an assigned MAJCOM, AFCENT is responsible for the management of these aircraft. AFCENT/A3T initiated a formal clarification to HQ USAF. HAF/A3O-AI released a clarification memorandum on 07 Mar 12 stating that CSTC-A procured aircraft are "Non-USAF" and clarified the authorities and regulatory guidance accordingly.

- b. Effective maintenance, operations and safety policies and procedures are in effect, are reviewed by appropriate command authority, and air advisor pilots and crew understand these standards**

Effective Maintenance: In December 2011, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) provided detailed information on the extent of Alenia Aeronautica's (Alenia) and L3 Communications' (L3) contract logistics support (CLS) deficiencies and poor maintenance procedures. Based on this information, the commander ordered a full fleet stand down until a comprehensive review of the CLS program and the health status of the entire C-27A fleet was completed. The review required Alenia and L3 to put all flyable aircraft through a comprehensive "return to fly" protocol that included a complete aircraft forms review, a robust phase/basic check, a full three system hydraulic bleed, a full pitot static system check, a complete weight and balance check, a thorough maintenance aircraft preflight, a full Air Advisor preflight, engine runs on all engines, high-speed taxi tests and performance runs. NATC-A/438 AEW commanders, air and maintenance advisors as well as DCMA oversaw development of this all-inclusive protocol. The protocol checked or tested every major aircraft system and when finished, ensured the airworthiness of every aircraft in the fleet.

A continued lack of confidence in Alenia and L3 ensued based on a series of ground mishaps caused by the CLS maintenance personnel in December 2011 and January 2012. In direct engagement with Alenia-North America, and in coordination with the Program Management Office, the NATC-A/438 AEW commander requested additional contractor leadership and oversight to monitor flightline activity. The NATC-A/438 AEW commander made the decision to keep the fleet stood down until the new experienced personnel were in place. Alenia North America subsequently decided to discontinue the contract with L3Communications and replaced them with DynCorp International – a proven CLS provider that currently maintains the C-27A for other government agencies as well as the NATC-A/438 AEW's fleet of 41 Mil Mi-17 Hip helicopters.

To enhance the capability of his U.S. maintenance advisors, the NATC-A/438 AEW commander has collaborated with DCMA's three highly experienced personnel assigned to the Kabul Air Wing, leveraging their expertise as well as their contract oversight authority to ensure Alenia, L3 and DynCorp are continually providing safe, properly maintained aircraft. Along with correcting problems identified by the advisors, DCMA also performs routine audits and reviews of Alenia and L3's quality control program, standard operating procedures and task level maintenance actions to ensure

they are consistently performing in accordance with published G222/C-27A technical maintenance data.

Operations: Effective operational guidance for the C-27A has been problematic due to the aforementioned ambiguity of ownership. The NATC-A/438 AEW commander has identified the challenges of performing the advisor mission in Afghanistan and has implemented a way ahead in anticipation of a "non-USAF" aircraft decision.

The Air Advisor mission is designed to be performed in partner nation aircraft in accordance with partner nation regulations supplemented by specifically developed local regulations. AFCENTI 16-101 was designed to be the primary top-level instruction regulating Air Advisor operations within the US Central Command. It specifically defines how aviation advisors are to fly, qualify and train in "non-USAF" aircraft but does not provide general flight rules. This allows operational commanders to develop their own local supplementary guidance to enable the execution of a safe and effective air adviser program within the unique characteristics of their specific battle space. Efforts are currently underway to revise AFCENT 16-101 directing the 438 AEW/CC to develop and publish general flight rules required to conduct air advisor operations.

The 438 AEW Operating Instructions (OI) is the NATC-A/438 AEW local supplement to AFCENTI 16-101. The Wing OI provides relevant supplementary guidance to the AFCENTI 16-101 Chapter Four, as well as specific 11-2MDS series type guidance to the aircrews. It supplies our air advisors a safe, all-inclusive and relevant set of flight rules that define how air advisors are to perform their flying duties in "non-USAF" aircraft. The Wing OI captures the policies found in the 11-series regulations that are incompatible with AAF but still apply to USAF personnel. It is a holistic tool to identify those applicable elements in the AFIs and are unique to the Afghan advisor mission. The Wing OI also lays the foundation for their future incorporation into the AAF 15-series regulations. The 17 Jan 2012 Standardization and Evaluation Conference identified that compliance with a substantial number of AFIs was not possible. This prompted a 5 Feb 2012 talking paper focusing on aircraft ownership and AFI waiver options. The Wing received interim guidance from Major General Wolters, 9 AETF-A (MFR) on 22 Feb 2012 to operate on draft 438 AEW OI and AAF series 15 regulations guidance and to continue to pursue waiver and clarification on ownership. The Wing OI continued development and is presently in final coordination. All the MDS volumes will reside in the Wing OI until they incorporated into the AAF 15-series regulations. Wing FCIF 12-003, stipulating further regulation guidance, use of the AAF series 15 regulations, and the 438 AEW OI is programmed to be released immediately.

Safety Policies: The NATC-A/438 AEW/CC has recognized and takes full responsibility for the implements in the command climate and will ensure all members of the unit understand and believe that their safety is of the highest priority. The commander has further emphasized his safety priorities by taking administrative steps to change the rank and experience requirement of the future Wing Chief of Safety.

USAFCENT, in support of NTM-A/CSTC-A, is conducting a general-officer led Commander Directed Investigation to clarify the policy limitations and will report the results to CG NTM-A/CSTC-A and the USAFCENT Commander. Once the policy is clarified, the 438 AEW intends to reassess if any of the past accident reports over the previous 12 months need to be reaccomplished. As well, the 438 AEW CC will conduct an internal investigation to assess internal safety reporting results. In the interim, the 438 AEW will operate the safety program as close as possible to the USAF rules. After a review of existing 438 AEW programs, the 438 AEW will request USAFCENT to conduct a Safety Program SAV in May 12.

c. Priorities for aircraft operations and training missions

Prioritization and scheduling of AAF missions are to meet GIRoA and MoD directed requirements but sacrificing training lines for operational requirements was not the desired endstate. A required ratio of 60% operational missions and 40% training missions was developed. This 3 to 2 ops/training ratio was established through key leadership engagements with Afghan officials and it is an objective goal based on the desired number of qualified aircrew and the time remaining to train them. During the last four months of 2011, an average of 43% of training missions were re-tasked by Afghan command and control to operational missions. The loss of 114 training missions cost the ANSF approximately five qualified helicopter crews from the training base. Without dedicated training missions, the AAF will continue to fall behind the planned aircrew deliverable numbers. Through diligent engagements during the last month only five training sorties have been re-tasked to other missions across the AAF, a stark contrast to the rate of nearly 54 % of training missions were previously re-tasked.

d. That the C-27A is safe to fly without unnecessary and excessive risk to the flight crews

The C-27A is capable of safely performing aircraft qualification training as well as operational medium-airlift missions in Afghanistan. Key to the successful employment of the C-27A is a thorough understanding of the aircrafts performance capabilities and limitations. High temperatures and high-pressure altitudes pose definite challenges for the C-27A; particularly with one engine inoperative. The NATC-A/438 AEW commander has requested through WR-ALC to acquire additional aircraft performance data from Alenia that would enable aircrews to understand performance parameter at higher temperatures. Updated performance data will ultimately increase aircrew safety as it will enable the development of Special Departure Procedures and Special MAJCOM Certified departures from the most challenging airfields in Afghanistan.

The endstate of all our current and future initiatives is to establish a sustainable and safe flight, maintenance, and support training program. While operations in this region inherently entail risk, unnecessary risk is not acceptable. Safe aircraft operations parameters are known and I expect the crews to operate within that envelope. The

USAFCENT Commander's Directed Investigation in support of NTM-A/CSTC-A will more closely examine the issues associated with the C-27A maintenance performance and reporting related to contractual obligations, as well as explore the insufficiency of applicable USAF safety guidance for the C-27A/G222 program and security force assistance operations in the broader sense.



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