Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan

June 2018

Report to Congress

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This report is submitted in accordance with Sections 1225 and 1532 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended by Sections 1213 and 1531 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92), Sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2017 (P.L. 114-328), and Sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2018 (P.L. 115-91). It includes a description of the strategy of the United States for enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan, a current and anticipated threat assessment, and a description and assessment of the size, structure, strategy, budget, and financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This report was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State and is the seventh in a series of reports required semi-annually through calendar year 2020.

This report describes efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from December 1, 2017, through May 31, 2018. This report complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress and is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. A classified annex accompanies this report. The next report will include an analysis of efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from June 1, 2018, through November 30, 2018.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since President Trump announced the new U.S. strategy for South Asia on August 21, 2017, we have seen a shift in Afghanistan’s military and diplomatic efforts. Our announcement of a conditions-based strategy breathed new life into the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and the Afghan government. The shift from a time-based to conditions-based approach also sowed new doubt in the Taliban, as fighters and leadership recognized that the United States is committed to Afghanistan and committed to transforming the ANDSF into a lethal force capable of defending its homeland. Our increased military pressure, the increased capacity of the ANDSF, and the renewed confidence of the Afghan government led President Ghani in February, at the second Kabul Peace Conference, to offer peace negotiations without preconditions to the Taliban. This unprecedented initiative opens the door for meaningful negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

The Afghan government now pursues a political settlement with the Taliban using a two-pronged approach that emphasizes increased military pressure in order to open the door for meaningful peace negotiations with reconcilable factions of the Taliban. The Afghan government is aware that the offer alone is not enough; it must be matched by a carefully crafted plan for negotiating peace, and a plan for reintegrating Taliban fighters into Afghanistan’s civil society.

During this reporting period, the ANDSF remained in control of all provincial capitals, quickly defeating the Taliban’s sole attempt to take control of the provincial capital of Farah in May. The mild winter allowed for sustained military pressure against insurgent and terrorist forces, and built positive momentum heading into the 2018 fighting season. Combined Afghan Special Security Force (ASSF) and conventional force operations demonstrated ANDSF growth and maturity that promise to translate into increased tactical and operational success on the battlefield.

In February, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) designated Afghanistan as its main effort mission and allocated additional combat enablers such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, attack aviation, fire support, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assets to support ANDSF and coalition forces. These asset shifts do not represent a return to U.S.-led combat operations. Rather, the targeted investment of assets in Afghanistan was designed to dramatically increase the offensive capabilities of the ANDSF this fighting season.

In February 2018, the Commander, Resolute Support (COMRS), shifted resources and personnel to improve the security of Kabul following a string of high-profile attacks (HPA) against Afghan civilians and government officials. The establishment of the Kabul Enhanced Security Zone (ESZ) improved intelligence sharing between the security ministries.

In early 2018, the United States deployed the first Security Force Assistant Brigade (SFAB) to Afghanistan. The SFAB enables advising below the corps and zone levels, at the appropriate level of decision-making, and supplements an increasingly effective train, advise, and assist (TAA) model. The deployment of the SFAB makes it possible to utilize an increasing number of Expeditionary Advisory Packages (EAPs) of advisors focused on improving ANDSF capability at the point of need. The SFAB also allows tailored support to the regional ANDSF commands to fill enduring and emergent capability gaps, particularly fires, ISR, and MEDEVAC.
During this reporting period, Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced that parliamentary elections will be held on October 20, 2018. The ANSF made election security a goal of this fighting season, and successful elections in 2018 should inspire confidence in Afghanistan’s institutions and set the conditions for the presidential election in 2019.

Despite progress in both the military and diplomatic arenas, challenges remain. The Taliban continues to receive external support from regional actors, including Pakistan, Iran, and Russia. The United States and Afghanistan, and our allies and partners, must work tirelessly and together to end external support of the insurgency. We continue to welcome any partner who supports a Kabul-led peace process without further destabilizing Afghanistan.

To maintain momentum on the battlefield and secure continued U.S. and coalition support for Afghanistan, the United States must ensure the long-term plan to support the ANSF remains sustainable. We must remain good stewards of U.S. and coalition funds dedicated to the mission and encourage the Afghan government to accept more financial responsibility for the defense of its country. DoD will routinely assess the conditions on the ground and factor those conditions into the decisions we make that shape the size and capability of the ANSF.

The assets and authorities to implement the South Asia Strategy in Afghanistan are now in place and have generated optimism within the Afghan government and ANSF that a political settlement with the Taliban is possible. The key to success remains sustained military pressure against the Taliban in order to eliminate the idea that they can achieve their objectives through violence and continuation of the conflict. The targeted investment of U.S. assets and personnel have increased the lethality of the ANSF this fighting season. Properly utilized, this increasingly lethal force can apply the appropriate pressure to open the door for peace talks in the future.
SECTION 1 – STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

On February 1, 2018, USCENTCOM designated Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL (OFS) its main effort mission. The initial alignment and rebalance of capabilities from Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) to OFS is now complete. With this shift of priorities and assets, NATO Resolute Support (RS) mission now has the array of tools necessary to implement the military campaign. The United States currently maintains approximately 14,000 military personnel in Afghanistan as part of NATO’s RS mission and OFS.¹ These personnel maintain a presence primarily at bases in Kabul and Bagram with regional outstations in Nangarhar Province in the east, Kandahar Province in the south, Herat Province in the west, and Balkh Province in the north.

The subsequent realignment of forces and combat enablers from Iraq and Syria to Afghanistan and the U.S. Army’s new SFAB provided the final 1,000 personnel uplift. The majority of the uplift personnel will support the RS TAA mission at the tactical level and the remaining personnel will support the U.S. Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A) mission. The SFAB will allow U.S. advisors to work below the corps and zone levels, better enabling the ANDSF to sustain offensive pressure on the insurgency and secure the population. This increased military pressure will complement ongoing diplomatic efforts to compel the Taliban to negotiate with the Afghan government.

The presence of U.S. forces makes possible the execution of two well-defined and complementary mission-sets: the NATO-led RS TAA mission in support of ANDSF development, and the U.S. counterterrorism (CT) mission to defeat al-Qa’ida (AQ) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K), and protect the U.S. homeland, U.S. citizens, U.S. interests overseas, and our allies and partners. This presence also enables the United States to capitalize on the effectiveness demonstrated by EAPs and embedded SFAB advisors that provide tailored support to the regional ANDSF commands to fill enduring and emergent capability gaps. This posture reflects an optimization of forces, taking advantage of efficiencies gained by working and sharing functions with coalition partners and the ANDSF.

1.1 U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

The logical framework for success in Afghanistan is based on the R4+S concept—Reinforce, Realign, Regionalize, Reconcile, and Sustain. The overarching goal is a sustainable political outcome in Afghanistan that preserves U.S. vital interests, including preventing terrorist groups from using Afghan territory to direct or support external attacks against the U.S. homeland, U.S. citizens, and our allies and partners overseas.

Reinforce: The reinforce section of the strategy calls for U.S. and international funding commitments to sustain ongoing ANDSF combat operations and implementation of President Ghani’s ANDSF roadmap. NATO and coalition partners committed to sourcing the majority of the 2018 RS TAA personnel and funding requirements. Although NATO and coalition partner

personnel uplifts will occur in late 2018, the U.S. personnel uplift was ongoing during this reporting period.

USFOR-A used the EAP concept to surge TAA efforts and enablers to main effort missions across Afghanistan. TAA efforts below the corps and zone levels, began in March 2018 with the arrival of the first SFAB.

**Realign:** The South Asia Strategy calls for the realignment of U.S. military and civilian assistance and political outreach to target key areas under Afghan government control. The strategy cites the proper alignment of U.S. and Afghan forces as a key to improved security. The push to realign authorities, resources, and the ANDSF continued to progress on schedule during this reporting period. Major realignment initiatives include reorganizing certain portions of the ANDSF to improve lethality and unity of effort, and shifting resources (lethal and non-lethal) from outside of Afghanistan into theater.

Major initiatives associated with the ANDSF Roadmap are underway, including transitioning paramilitary police forces from Ministry of Interior (MoI) to Ministry of Defense (MoD) control and improving leader development through mandatory retirements and merit-based promotions. In this reporting period, Afghanistan initiated the Afghan National Army (ANA) Territorial Force (ANATF) pilot program, which will be a lower-cost, locally recruited, nationally led and trained hold force used to sustain security in areas after the ASSF and ANA clear territory.

**Regionalize:** Regional efforts in the South Asia Strategy aim to expand burden sharing, neutralize potential spoilers to U.S. and Coalition efforts, limit threats to the United States and our allies and partners, and develop and support a durable political settlement in Afghanistan. In particular, the South Asia Strategy has focused on pressuring Pakistan to limit support and safe-haven for proxy terrorist and militant groups and to play a constructive role in facilitating Afghan reconciliation. In this reporting period, we continued to call on regional partners to reinforce our messages that state support for terrorist proxies would not be tolerated, that cross-border cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan is essential, and that the Taliban must come to the negotiating table.

**Reconcile:** The primary goal of the South Asia Strategy is a durable and inclusive political settlement to the war in Afghanistan. The current military campaign will increase military pressure on the Taliban and complement ongoing diplomatic efforts by the United States, Afghanistan, and our international partners. In this reporting period, President Ghani offered to begin negotiations with the Taliban with no preconditions—a major step forward. As President Ghani extends diplomatic outreach to the Taliban, the ANDSF will continue to battle the Taliban in an effort to convince Taliban leaders they cannot win militarily and they must come to the negotiating table.

**Sustain:** The South Asia Strategy must be sustainable over time. Efforts to achieve a sustainable political outcome in Afghanistan must be feasible, fall within fiscal constraints, and those that the Afghan government can sustain in the future with minimal U.S. and international financial support. Sustainability will be validated through routine, collaborative assessments and evaluations of conditions on the ground. The United States will work to promote Afghan self-sufficiency across
the security, political, and economic spheres; over the long run, such advances will make possible a steady reduction in the Afghan government’s reliance on international support.

1.2 U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN

The United States has a single vital national interest in Afghanistan: to prevent it from becoming a safe-haven from which terrorist groups can plan and execute attacks against the U.S. homeland, U.S. citizens, and our interests and allies abroad. Our ultimate goal in Afghanistan is a negotiated political settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

To achieve U.S. objectives and to build on the gains of the last 16 years, USFOR-A currently conducts two well-defined and complementary missions. First, through OFS, U.S. forces continue the CT mission against al-Qa’ida, ISIS-K, and their associates in Afghanistan to prevent their resurgence and ability to conduct external attacks. Second, in partnership with NATO allies and operational partner nations in the RS mission, U.S. forces train, advise, and assist the ANDSF. The United States supports the institutionalization of ANDSF gains by conducting functionally based security force assistance (SFA) as part of the NATO-led RS mission. U.S. and coalition forces conduct TAA efforts at the ANA corps-level, the Afghan National Police (ANP) zone-level, and with the MoD and MoI to improve their ability to support and sustain the fighting force. During the last reporting period, the President authorized the expansion of the TAA mission for conventional ANDSF below the corps and zone levels. During this reporting period, the 1st SFAB arrived in Afghanistan in March 2018 to begin TAA operations at the tactical-level. U.S. and coalition forces also conduct TAA missions with the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and ASSF at the tactical-level, underscoring the importance of those two critical capabilities.

An array of operational authorities govern the conduct of U.S. military personnel engaged in the U.S. CT and RS TAA missions in Afghanistan. These authorities address U.S. CT operations and security force assistance in support of the ANDSF in their continued fight against the Taliban and other insurgent groups. U.S. forces are authorized to TAA the ANDSF—including the ASSF, AAF, and conventional ground forces—from the national (ministerial/institutional) to the tactical levels to develop institutional capacity, integrate capabilities (e.g., aerial fires and ISR), and improve tactical proficiency. Operational authorities also address circumstances in which U.S. forces may use force in support of the CT and TAA missions, including U.S. accompaniment and combat enabler support to the ANDSF fight against the Taliban and other insurgent groups. The


3 Functionally based SFA is a term developed by ISAF in 2013 to describe its shift from combat to capacity building. SFA is a unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority (RS Security Force Assistance Guide 3.12). Joint force SFA consists of “Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions” (Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, July 12, 2010, and Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, Security Force Assistance, April 29, 2013). The activities described as SFA, particularly the advisory effort focused on “essential functions,” are elements of security cooperation activities normally defined by NATO and DoD as defense institution reform and defense institution-building.
modification of OFS authorities removed some caveats that previously limited U.S. fires and close air support (CAS) to certain ANDSF operations. During the period of this report, these expanded authorities helped the ANDSF prevent insurgent groups from gaining operational momentum and boosted ANDSF confidence and its offensive mindset.

**Current Operational Approach**

During this reporting period, the operational approach employed by U.S. and RS forces to compel the Taliban to enter peace negotiations expanded and acknowledged that military pressure alone is not sufficient to compel reconciliation. The new conditions-based approach to achieving our strategic objectives in Afghanistan outlined in the U.S. South Asia Strategy, provided authorities to support the ANDSF, and allowed for personnel increases by the U.S. and NATO to apply multi-dimensional pressure on the Taliban. In conjunction with the President’s South Asia Strategy, the Afghan government and its international partners applied complementary military, social, and diplomatic pressure on insurgents in a coordinated effort to compel peace negotiations. Military pressure, applied by increasingly effective ANDSF offensive operations, supported by an Afghan and U.S. air campaign, has curtailed insurgent narcotics revenue generation. Social pressure consisted of Afghan government efforts to plan for secure, credible elections in 2018, and efforts to engage internationally with Islamic nations and Islamic scholars to delegitimize insurgent and terrorist forces. The United States and the international community applied diplomatic pressure on Afghan and foreign enablers of the insurgency, particularly those elements in Pakistan that support terrorist networks.

Because USCENTCOM designated Afghanistan as its main effort mission, it was able to allocate additional combat enablers such as ISR, attack aviation, fire support, and MEDEVAC assets to support ANDSF and coalition forces. The shift in assets does not represent a return to U.S.-led combat operations; rather, it acknowledges that the conditions on the ground in Afghanistan require additional assets to capitalize on momentum gained in 2017 and seize the initiative in the 2018 fighting season.

The combination of additional combat enablers, increased authorities, and the introduction of the 1st SFAB allowed for more robust TAA efforts and increased the effectiveness of ANDSF operations. Throughout 2016 and 2017, RS advisors developed and refined the EAP model to complement advisory efforts at the regional Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs). The EAP model allowed for the surge of advisors and advising capabilities to a particular corps/zone in an effort to build capability and achieve ANDSF campaign objectives throughout the year. During previous reporting periods, constrained by authorities, personnel, and available combat enablers, RS executed approximately six EAPs per year. During this 6-month reporting period, RS averaged two EAPs per month, and established persistent advisor presence at select brigade and kandak locations across Afghanistan.

The addition of the SFAB provided an increased level of advising expertise and afforded the flexibility to expand on the current TAAC advising and EAP models to move below the ANA Corps and ANP Zone levels. The 1st SFAB contributed 6 Brigade Advisory Teams (BAT), 36 Maneuver Kandak Advisory Teams (KAT), 14 Combat Service Support Kandak Advisory Teams (CS/S KAT), and one Corps Advisory Team. Each KAT contains personnel trained in a variety
of skills spanning the warfighting functions, including maneuver tactics, intelligence, communications, logistics, and maintenance. SFAB teams employed across the entirety of the ANA, embedded with ASSF, and helped support the increased security operations in Kabul. In Kabul alone, the addition of the SFAB allowed the coalition forces to increase their advisory team presence from three teams to eight. Although it is too early to measure the long-term impact of the SFAB teams, initial reports are positive. Specifically, the logistical expertise provided by the CS/S KATs has enhanced logistical planning, maintenance, and accountability.

1.3 U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION

U.S. CT efforts remain focused on defeating al-Qa’ida and its associates, defeating ISIS-K, protecting U.S. forces, and preventing Afghanistan from serving as a safe-haven for terrorists to plan attacks against the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and allies and partners. Since October 2001, U.S. CT efforts in Afghanistan have prevented another large-scale terrorist attack against the U.S. homeland. However, the existence of more than 20 terrorist or insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including ISIS-K, requires an Afghan-supported U.S. platform in the region to monitor, contain, and respond to these threats.

U.S. efforts against ISIS-K in Afghanistan are part of the U.S. global effort to defeat ISIS. In addition to U.S. unilateral efforts, USFOR-A is enabling the ANDSF to conduct independent operations against ISIS-K. The United States is encouraging more robust intelligence and operational cooperation between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other regional partners in the effort to defeat ISIS. During this reporting period, ISIS-K faced significant territorial, leadership, and personnel losses in Nangarhar due to ANDSF and USFOR-A targeting. However, as ISIS-K loses space in Nangarhar, it has sought refuge elsewhere in the country. Although weakened, ISIS-K will most likely continue to plan and execute high profile attacks in populated areas.

The United States remains in an armed conflict against al-Qa’ida, ISIS, and associated forces. The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) remains the U.S. domestic legal basis for CT combat operations in Afghanistan. In addition to targeting al-Qa’ida and ISIS-K, U.S. forces are authorized to use force against individuals that directly participate in hostilities against U.S. or coalition forces, and U.S. forces always maintain the inherent right of individual and unit self-defense.

The U.S. CT mission complements the NATO TAA mission. Limited U.S. direct action, coupled with a stronger and increasingly capable ANDSF, will help preserve security gains and contribute to a robust, enduring U.S.-Afghan CT partnership. The Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) supports U.S. CT efforts through TAA with the ASSF and accompanying the ASFF on certain operations. The ASSF will use its growing capabilities to continue conducting countrywide operations to address insurgent and transnational threats. The SOJTF-A TAA efforts remain focused on building the ASSF’s capacity in logistics, command and control, fire support, intelligence analysis and sharing, aviation, and ASSF/conventional force interoperability.

SOJTF-A provides TAA support to the ASSF at the operational and tactical levels in two ways: 1) enabled operations that consist of missions where ASSF incorporate coalition enablers such as CAS, MEDEVAC, intelligence, ISR, and logistical support into their operation; 2) advised
operations that include coalition enablers and add U.S. accompaniment to the mission. ASSF independent operations are missions planned, executed, and resourced by the Afghans. Although coalition enablers are available, they are not deliberately integrated into ASSF independent operation.

The ASSF have demonstrated continued improvement in CT and counternarcotics (CN) operations. ASSF progress in intelligence, aviation, mission command, logistics, and institutional systems and processes improved throughout the reporting period. From December 1, 2017, to May 31, 2018, ASSF forces conducted a total of 1,571 ground operations. SOJTF-A components advised the ASSF on 643 of those operations, and provided Coalition enablers on another 215 operations. During that same period, the ASSF executed 713 independent operations.

1.4 NATO-LED RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

The NATO-led RS mission remains focused on training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF, the MoD, and the MoI to achieve and maintain a stable Afghanistan during a period of conflict. The United States continues to consult with NATO Allies and operational partners about RS mission requirements and any follow-on NATO-led efforts to ensure that the U.S. and NATO missions are mutually supportive. RS force-contributing nations strongly supported the new South Asia Strategy, and welcomed the U.S. personnel increase and the transition to a conditions-based approach.

The United States, Germany, Italy, and Turkey serve as the RS mission “framework nations,” each leading a regional Train, Advise, and Assist Command (TAAC) responsible for coordinating support and capabilities within its respective command region. Two regional task forces (TF) conduct TAA missions with the ANDSF, one in the southeast and one in the southwest. During this reporting period, the RS support to the ANDSF focused on organizational and functional based TAA.

The regional TAACs cover four of the six ANA corps and the associated regional Afghan National Police (ANP) zone headquarters. The two regional task forces, TF Southeast and TF Southwest, oversee persistent advising with the Afghan National Army (ANA) 203rd and 215th Corps; and ANP Zone 303 and Zone 505, respectively. The TAACs and TFs serve as the principal connections between the Afghan ministries and fielded forces. The field commands play a central role in the coalition’s ability to assess the efficacy of its ministerial advising efforts, to determine the ministries’ ability to support ongoing ANDSF security operations, and to provide an outer ring of sensors and security for the coalition. In addition, coalition forces provide limited non-combat enabler support, primarily ISR and MEDEVAC, to the ANDSF as the Afghans continue to field and develop their organic capabilities.

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4 NATO launched its non-combat RS Mission on January 1, 2015, following the conclusion of the previous NATO-led combat mission of ISAF and the assumption of full security responsibility by the ANDSF. The NATO Afghanistan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which entered into force on January 1, 2015, provides the legal framework for the NATO presence in Afghanistan and prescribes the terms and conditions under which NATO forces will be deployed in Afghanistan.
As of May 2018, RS consisted of military personnel from 39 nations (27 NATO allies and 12 operational partner nations). The United States remains the largest force contributor in Afghanistan.

**Figure 1: Resolute Support Mission Troop-Contributing Nations, as of May 2018**

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<td>Georgia</td>
<td>872</td>
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</table>

**Resolute Support Headquarters (HQ) Reorganization**

During this reporting period, RS HQ initiated a reorganization in response to the conditions-based approach of the South Asia Strategy. The new HQ structure consists of three base pillars: strategic matters, institutional development, and operational matters.

Strategic matters support Afghan security institutions’ strategic direction, plans, synchronization, and campaign assessments. Advisors assist with the development of strategic domestic and regional engagements and seek to maximize the impact of the ANDSF against the Taliban, in coordination with the Afghan government’s peace negotiations with the Taliban.

Institutional development emphasizes ministerial advising, institutional development, and ANDSF resourcing, equipping, and sustaining. These efforts enable an effective, lethal, and sustainable ANDSF and build the long-term institutional capacity to secure the Afghan population.

Operational matters establish an enhanced TAA unity of effort by coordinating staff elements directly tied to TAA at the Corps level and consolidating simultaneous planning for all TAACs. Operational matters advisors and personnel seek to increase near-term operational effectiveness and integrate strategic and institutional guidance at the operational level.

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5 As listed on the NATO public website, [http://www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int), accessed on May 31, 2018. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name.
Building Institutional Capability

The cornerstone of RS remains the TAA mission to build capability within the MoD, the MoI, and the ANDSF. As such, the advisory effort focuses on developing functions, systems, processes, and organizational development connections between the ministerial and operational levels. Military and civilian advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on one of three levels of advising:

- **Level One:** Advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on a continuous, regular (usually daily) basis, either from an embedded footprint or in close proximity.

- **Level Two:** Advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on a less-frequent basis (determined by commanders) to ensure their continued development. The frequency of this interaction varies based on the proximity to and the capability of their Afghan counterpart, the threat level to advisors, and coalition resources.

- **Level Three:** Advisors are not co-located with their Afghan counterparts and provide TAA support from a centralized location. Expeditionary advisory teams and visits are planned and coordinated with Afghan counterparts to assist periodically with operations and sustainment.
Within the MoD and MoI, the TAA mission focuses on generating, employing, and sustaining capabilities within the ANDSF. The main effort for RS is building capacity within the ministries and the ANDSF at the national and regional levels. The addition of SFAB advisor teams during this reporting period allowed for TAA of select forces below the corps level; however, the main focuses remains on building national and regional capability.

Under the new RS construct, the responsibility for most of the institutional development of the MoD and MoI rests with the Deputy Chief of Staff – Security Assistance (DCOS-SA) for the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A). Despite the removal of the Essential Function (EF) designation assigned to RS subordinate branches, the focus on functionally based security force assistance remains. A U.S. general officer, coalition general officer, or a DoD Senior Executive Service (SES) member typically serves as lead advisor for subordinate branches. Branch leads vertically integrate the efforts of their advisors across the ANA corps, ANP zone, and at the institutional and ministerial levels. RS advisors focus their efforts on building a responsible and efficient MoD and MoI that can support an effective, sustainable, affordable, and credible ANDSF capable of maintaining security in Afghanistan. During this reporting period, DoD, in coordination with USFOR-A, continued to utilize pools of former advisors and regional and functional experts to provide additional expertise and support to functional advisory efforts at the ministerial level.

**Resource Management (RM) (Formerly EF1): Plan, Program, Budget, and Execute**

RM has three priorities: 1) to increase resource management capability within the ministries; 2) to build donor confidence and trust that the Afghan resource management process is transparent, accountable, and effective; and 3) to set conditions to sustain an effective ANDSF in the future. Resource management includes formulating a defense strategy; generating requirements by determining the products and services to purchase to support that strategy; developing a resource-informed budget to meet prioritized requirements; executing a spending plan by awarding contracts to purchase items from the budget; and monitoring the status of the funds expended. Advising efforts in this area focus on enhancing resource management and procurement capability in accordance with Afghan laws, policies, and regulations; assisting with the drafting and execution of funding commitment letters; and helping the Afghans with the integration of various Afghan personnel management and payroll systems into the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS).

**Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (TAO) (Formerly EF 2)**

One of the four key elements of President Ghani’s ANDSF roadmap is counter-corruption. The MoI and MoD Inspectors General (IG) lead a robust anti-corruption program. RS TAO advisors TAA the MoD and MoI IGs to improve policies and procedures in transparency, accountability,
and oversight. The IGs work to prevent corruption through inspections, investigations, assistance, teaching, and training. TAO advisors work with MoD and MoI IGs to develop preventive programs and controls to identify areas vulnerable to corruption and put measures in place to reduce corruption.

**Rule of Law (ROL) (Formerly EF 3)**

To provide security, retain public support, and instill confidence in Afghanistan’s governance institutions, the ANDSF must operate effectively and respect human rights. ROL advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to ensure that the ANDSF respects and adheres to the rule of law and operates in accordance with Afghanistan’s constitution, domestic laws, and international obligations. ROL efforts focus on assisting the ANDSF to prevent and, when necessary, respond properly to significant acts of corruption and allegations of gross violations of human rights (GVHR), such as extra-judicial killings and child sex abuse. RS advisors continue to engage with ANDSF leaders at all levels to reinforce the importance of preventing and responding to GVHR and all types of human rights violations—not only to maintain long-term viability, but also to retain U.S. and coalition assistance to the ANDSF. RS has established a Counter-Corruption Advisor Group (CCAG) to analyze and target corruption networks in the MoI, MoD, and corruption stemming from criminal patronage and narcotics networks. The CCAG will synchronize counter-corruption efforts among Afghan security institutions, RS, and international partners.

**Force Development (FD) (Formerly EF 4)**

FD advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to build combat power through recruiting, training, retaining, managing, and developing a professional security force. The ANA and the ANP utilize the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) to store human resources information, track recruits, record training, and assign qualified personnel into needed assignments based on force requirements. The FD TAA mission is an interconnected and mutually supportive five-fold effort: recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop. These five focus areas help the ANDSF build a professional force. FD is advising on the enforcement of an Inherent Law policy that lowers mandatory retirement ages, time-in-service maximums (e.g., 40 years for generals), and time-in-grade limits (e.g., 8 years for generals). This effort will open senior leadership positions for the next generation of ANDSF leaders. The RS Capabilities Development Directorate (CDD) works closely with FD advisors to assist the MoD and the MoI as the ministries develop their official personnel and equipment requirements through the tashkil development process. The APPS Personnel Management Office (PMO) also supports the ANDSF transition from the current Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) personnel system to the APPS. With biometric registration and a valid Afghan ID card, the APPS will essentially eliminate “ghost soldiers” and improve stewardship of funds.

**Operational Sustainment and Logistics (OS/LOG) (Formerly EF 5): Sustain the Force**

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8 Tashkil means “organization” in Dari and refers to the official list of personnel and equipment requirements used by the MoD and MoI to detail authorized staff positions and equipment items for each unit.
OS/LOG advisors work with the ANDSF to sustain and reconstitute combat power through the development of appropriate maintenance, communications, medical, and logistics systems. Organized into three subordinate staff sections, including Logistics (formerly EF 5.1), Medical Logistics (formerly EF 5.2), and Communications, Information, and Technology (formerly EF 5.3), OS/LOG advisors assist the ANDSF in the logistics and maintenance of vehicles, equipment, and weapons, predominantly at the ANA corps, ANP zone, and national levels to support an affordable and sustainable ANDSF. For medical systems, OS/LOG advisors assist the ANDSF on injury care, ground MEDEVAC, medical logistics, medical equipment maintenance, medical support planning, and medical staffing. For communications, OS/LOG advisors work with the Afghans providing technical advice and guidance for secure, interoperable, and sustainable ANDSF telecommunications and networked infrastructures.

**Strategic Plans: Plan, Resource, and Execute Effective Security Campaigns**

SP&A advisors work with the ANDSF to employ all elements of the ANDSF effectively in support of the Afghan government. SP&A has two sections: strategic planning and policy, and execution and employment of the force. Strategic planning and policy advisors assist the ANDSF strategic planning efforts at the Afghan Office of the National Security Council (ONSC), the MoD, and the MoI. These efforts develop the strategic-level capabilities of the MoD and the MoI to coordinate, plan, and execute campaigns in support of national-level objectives. Once developed, the strategic guidance and objectives are translated into operational and annual campaign plans.

**Intel TAA (INT) (Formerly EF 7): Develop Sufficient Intelligence Capabilities and Processes**

INT advisors work with the ANDSF to develop and integrate intelligence into operations. Advisors work with several organizations, including the Assistant Minister of Defense for Intelligence, the ANA General Staff (GS) Intelligence Directorate, the MoI Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI), and the Nasrat, also known as the National Threat Intelligence Center (NTIC), a national-level intelligence fusion center. The INT goal is to help the ANDSF collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence effectively and integrate intelligence into combat operations. RS intelligence advisors work at the national and regional levels to mature Afghan intelligence capabilities, work with analysts as they learn to prepare intelligence estimates in support of military and policing plans and strategies, and help the ANA and the ANP field expanded ISR capabilities. INT advisors also help the ANP and ANA intelligence schools develop a cadre of instructors to train future intelligence personnel. The INT has four main lines of effort: intelligence integration with operations, intelligence cycle development, training self-sufficiency, and sustainment of intelligence capabilities.

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9 The DPI tasks and coordinates intelligence at a basic level, produces analysis and intelligence products capable of informing senior MoI leaders and shaping MoI operations, and effectively targets terrorist and criminal networks through the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC).
Strategic Communication (STRATCOM) (Formerly EF 8): Maintain Internal and External Strategic Communication Capability

STRATCOM advisors work with the Afghan government to develop counter-insurgent messaging and a positive narrative for the Afghan people and the international community. The advisors help Afghan partners speak with one consistent voice when addressing internal and external audiences. STRATCOM advisors help bridge gaps and overcome challenges to improve communications within the MoD, the MoI, and the ANDSF, while reinforcing successes and seeking opportunities for improvement. Building the MoD and the MoI strategic communications capability depends more on developing human capital and institutionalizing processes than it does on managing resources or developing technical systems.

Resolute Support Gender Office

The RS Gender Office conducts TAA with Afghan leadership to integrate UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325)\textsuperscript{10} and broader gender perspectives into all policy and strategic planning at the ministerial, ANA corps, and ANP zone levels. Although the RS Gender Office is a “stand-alone” advising directorate, it is integrated with all 8 RS subordinate branches as each has gender-related issues relevant to the overall efforts. Recognizing this interdependency, gender-centric issues are included in all major RS briefings and forums with senior RS and Afghan leaders. The RS Gender Office supports the Afghan government as it implements the Afghan constitutional guarantee of equal rights to men and women\textsuperscript{11} and Afghanistan’s National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325, which addresses the inordinate impact of war on women and the role that women should and do play in conflict management, conflict resolution, and sustainable peace.

Train, Advise, and Assist Commands and Regional Task Forces\textsuperscript{12}

RS advisors conduct their TAA mission with the ANDSF at the ANA corps and ANP zone levels through the TAACs and the regional task forces. Turkey currently leads TAAC-Capital (TAAC-C) in the Kabul area, the United States leads TAAC-East (TAAC-E) and TAAC-South (TAAC-S), Italy leads TAAC-West (TAAC-W), and Germany leads TAAC-North (TAAC-N). Personnel at each TAAC conduct training and provide advice and assistance to their Afghan counterparts depending on the need identified by the coalition and their Afghan partners. TF Southwest and TF Southeast provide oversight of TAA efforts for the ANA corps and the ANP zones in their regions, formerly covered by regional Advise and Assist Cells, to ensure full coverage of all ANA corps and ANP zones. Finally, TAAC-Air provides TAA support to the AAF.

The TAACs and TFs assist Afghan units in ANA corps and ANP zone level reporting, while reinforcing the importance of building and improving the systems and processes that support

\textsuperscript{10} UN Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted on October 31, 2000, among other provisions, urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional, and international institutions. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N007%202018


\textsuperscript{12} Additional information on each TAAC’s activities can be found throughout the report.
combat operations. With the re-establishment of the ANP zones, the TAACs and TFs focus TAA support at the ANP zone headquarters level rather than at the provincial police headquarters-level. TFs Southeast and Southwest have also succeeded in strengthening relationships between the MoD, MoI, ANA corps, and ANP zones in areas without a persistent coalition presence. RS relies on the TFs and their expeditionary advising teams\textsuperscript{13} to maintain progress in building Afghan capabilities in select parts of the country.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Capital**

TAAC-C, which includes Kabul Province (except Sarobi District, which falls within the 201\textsuperscript{st} Corps area of responsibility), provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 111\textsuperscript{st} Capital Division, ANP Zone 101 / Kabul City Police, Afghan Border Police (ABP), and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) elements operating in Kabul. Turkish forces lead the TAA effort with forces from several other contributing nations. TAAC-C maintains Level 1 advising with the ANA 111\textsuperscript{st} Capital Division and Levels 1 and 2 advising with ANP Zone 101 and the Kabul City Police.

During the reporting period, the Afghans maintained an enhanced security zone within Kabul due to HPAs in the capital. The enhanced security zone modifies the physical area of the Green Zone and the requirements for the ANP to secure the area. ANP Zone 101 realigned two kandaks to provide the necessary security force. The two kandaks have similar training and skills as the Presidential Protection Services Unit (PPSU) and provide a level of security that prompts the international community to return and keep their embassies staffed.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East**

TAAC-E (Headquarters in Laghman), which includes U.S. and Polish forces, covers Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, and Nuristan Provinces. TAAC-E provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 201\textsuperscript{st} Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 202. TAAC-E maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – South**

TAAC-S (Headquarters in Kandahar), led by U.S. forces, includes Daykundi, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul Provinces. TAAC-S provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 205\textsuperscript{th} Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 404. TAAC-S maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – West**

TAAC-W (Headquarters in Herat), led by Italian forces, includes Badghis, Farah, Ghor, and Herat Provinces. TAAC-W provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 207\textsuperscript{th} Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 606. TAAC-W maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

\textsuperscript{13} Expeditionary advising teams are composed of a mission command cell to provide command and control for the advising effort; the team is further augmented by select functional advisors as appropriate.
Train, Advise, and Assist Command – North

TAAC-N (Headquarters in Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province), led by German forces, includes Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Samangan, Sar-e-Pul, and Takhar Provinces. TAAC-N provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 209th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zones 707 and 808. TAAC-N maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

Task Force Southwest

TF Southwest, formerly TF Forge, led by U.S. forces, includes Helmand Province. TF Southwest provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 215th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 505. TF Southwest maintains Level 1 advising at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

Task Force Southeast

TF Southeast (Headquarters in Paktiya Province), formerly TF Anvil, led by U.S. forces, includes Paktika, Khost, Paktiya, Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, and Bamyan Provinces. TF Southeast provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 203th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 303. TF Southeast maintains Level 1 advising at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

TF Southwest and TF Southeast have both become their own independent General Officer-led commands with target engagement authority (TEA). They serve as a persistent coalition presence rather than serving in an expeditionary role. Over the course of the reporting period, both TFs have become more independent in their logistics and operational functions.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air

TAAC-Air is a functional command that covers all of Afghanistan. TAAC-Air’s U.S. and coalition advisors provide functionally based SFA to the AAF from the ministerial level down to the wing, group, and squadron levels. TAAC-Air’s TAA priorities for this reporting period included: ensuring the timely flow of AAF personnel into formal training programs; improving operational level command and control; encouraging AAF force management and a flying hours program; improving in-country maintenance and logistics; and developing and fully integrating aviation platforms, including the C-130, C-208, A-29 fixed-wing platforms, the Mi-17, UH-60, UH-60 FFF, and MD-530 rotary-wing platforms.
1.5 INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS

The Afghanistan Compact

On August 23, 2017, two days after the United States unveiled its South Asia Strategy, President Ghani announced the establishment of the Afghanistan Compact, a set of specific reform measures the Afghan government has voluntarily committed to fulfill and allow the United States to monitor. The Afghan government developed the Compact to hold itself accountable for making progress towards milestones and objectives linked to the desired conditions described in the U.S. conditions-based strategy. President Ghani directed the creation of four Compact committees to examine ways to improve efforts and measure progress in the following areas: Governance, Economic Growth, Peace and Reconciliation, and Security. President Ghani asked the U.S. to hold the Afghan government to these reforms and invited U.S. officials to take part in the steering group meetings that monitor progress. The Executive Committee (EC), composed of senior U.S. and Afghan leaders, meets monthly to assess and measure progress in all four areas.

The Compact commits MoD and MoI leadership to maintain pressure on their respective ministries to accomplish milestones. President Ghani’s personal oversight of the Compact provides the ministries an additional incentive to achieve positive progress. Examples of significant accomplishments within the security portion of the Compact include: the replacement of more than 60 corrupt or ineffective senior leaders; the transfer of the Afghan Border Police from MoI to MoD; Afghan receipt of 13 UH-60 Blackhawks and graduation of the initial cadre of 15 pilots; and implementation of the Inherent Law (with the first tranche of general officers and colonels being retired in January 2018). Many challenges remain, however, including: the transition to the Afghan Personnel Pay System; the back-fill of key general officer vacancies created by the Inherent Law; the transfer of the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) from the MoI to the MoD; and counter-corruption efforts. To maintain the initial momentum, the milestones set for 2018 will require continued focus by advisors, the Afghan ministries, and the ANDSF, particularly throughout the fighting season.

Coalition and the associated ministry officials track MoD and MoI progress using mutually agreed upon milestones and processes. RS advisors measure progress in ministerial development using a program of actions and milestones (PoAM) developed in conjunction with Afghan MoD/MoI counterparts. The PoAMs consist of five categories of information: essential function, system, organization, process, and action. RS advisors developed 12 key work strands (WS) to address projects and tasks across the Institutional Development pillar of the RS headquarters in support of Roadmap activities. Of the 12 WS, five were unique to specific staff sections, and seven impacted multiple sections.

RS advisors identify critical processes to develop milestones and measure progress for their section. These processes are completed over time through the execution of a series of supporting actions or tasks that achieve desired effects and/or preclude undesired effects. Progress toward each milestone is dependent upon the progress made within each of the listed actions or tasks. A five-stage capability and effectiveness scale (see Figure 3) is used to rate overall ministerial progress on actions and milestones, and the associated series of tasks are listed in each PoAM.
**Figure 3: Capability and Effectiveness Rating Levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Agreed</td>
<td>Work Strand milestone scoped and agreed to between advisors/advisees; efforts to develop baseline capability and measures in progress but not complete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>In Progress</td>
<td>Work Strand milestone initiated: baseline design to achieve capability and associated measures initiated by Afghan element; plan to move forward is sound and ready for implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Partially Complete</td>
<td>Work Strand milestone in progress/incomplete: Afghan element is partially capable/effective. Measures have been designed and partially implemented, but neither fully operational nor adequately effective. Condition can be achieved by the end of RS with current level of TAA; advising will continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fully Capable</td>
<td>Work Strand milestone nearly achieved/incomplete: Afghan element fully capable but still requires attention to improve effectiveness and to solidify the day-to-day use of processes and systems that will lead to sustaining capability. Condition on track to be achieved by end of RS; advising will continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sustainable</td>
<td>Work Strand milestone fully achieved: Condition achieved; Afghan element actively applying capability effectively and refining associated processes and systems as needed to drive future growth/progress. Advising will only continue on this effort as requested by Afghan counterparts and as opportunity allows.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Levels three through five are based on a combination of focused advising and reporting, data-informed assessments, and the professional judgement and subjective assessment of the lead advisor. Each staff directorate maintains and updates its PoAM assessments using the tracking methodology maintained by the RS SFA Center, which is responsible for the integration, coordination, management, and synchronization of functionally based SFA across the coalition. The various staff sections synchronize their PoAMs on a monthly basis by either validating or updating their consolidated PoAM. Every six months, the SFA Center and RS subordinate branches refine the PoAMs to ensure they accurately project the ministries’ ability to achieve functional milestones.

The TAAC and TF commanders account for ANDSF progress quarterly at the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters level through an ANDSF Assessment Report. The report tracks ANDSF capability development by assessing progress along the five pillars of leadership, combined arms operations, command and control, personnel and training, and sustainment. Similar to the PoAMs, the ANDSF assessment has five capability and effectiveness ratings. The ANDSF assessment is one component of the larger RS mission assessment; it reflects the advisors’ assessments of the ANDSF at the headquarters level.

14 In addition to the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters, the report also provides an assessment of the AAF headquarters, ANASOC division headquarters, the Ktah Khas at the kandak level, SMW headquarters, General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) headquarters, and the ALP Staff Directorate within the MoI.

15 Leadership is the ability of the commander and subordinate leaders (including staff primaries) to demonstrate a mastery of their functional area and to provide purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish all assigned tasks and missions while being accountable for their actions and responsibilities. Combined arms operations is the ability to field and integrate new systems and develop the capability to bring all available forces, assets, and enabler systems to bear effectively. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over all assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Personnel and training is the ability to conduct individual and collective mission-focused training and institutional training, and to assess and maintain proficiency on all critical tasks. Sustainment is the ability to sustain training and operational missions independently.
Advisors at the regional TAACs submit their assessments of ANDSF capabilities to the RS Afghan Assessment Group (AAG), which then combines the assessments into an overarching assessment of the ANDSF as it relates to the campaign plan. MoD and MoI advisors use the assessments along with the ministerial leadership’s strategic priorities to develop their focus areas for TAA efforts. Assessments of the ANDSF’s progress on achieving milestones are conducted continuously and are collected by the SFA Center on a monthly basis. Each month, the lead advisors provide their assessments to the RS senior advisors to the MoD and the MoI, and synchronize TAA efforts across the multiple functional areas of focus. The AAG and the SFA Center continuously determine methods to improve and streamline reporting and assessment processes. Despite changes to the milestones in the PoAMs, the ANDSF assessment methodology, and advisor reporting mechanisms, the strategic conditions required for the success of the RS mission have not changed.
SECTION 2 – THREAT ASSESSMENT

Afghanistan faces a continuing threat from an externally supported insurgency and the highest regional concentration of terrorist groups in the world. These pervasive insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks constitute a threat to Afghanistan’s stability. Revenue from drug trafficking, taxation/extortion, illicit mining, and foreign financial support continues to sustain the insurgency and Afghan criminal networks. Additionally, extortion and kidnappings by low-level criminal networks continue.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains a sanctuary for various groups, including the Taliban, al-Qa’ida core (AQ), al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the Haqqani Network (HQN), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ISIS-K, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Terrorist sanctuaries on both sides of the border present security challenges for Afghanistan and Pakistan and pose a threat to regional security and stability.

2.1 IMPORTANCE OF AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

The Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship remains tenuous and leaders from each country have accused the other of harboring terrorists and allowing the planning of attacks from their soil. The United States continues to encourage both countries to work together to solve common problems, such as border security, but deep-rooted mistrust remains a significant barrier to progress. The April 6 completion of negotiations over the Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS) marks a slight improvement in relations but is unlikely to change security conditions.

Although Pakistani military operations have disrupted some militant sanctuaries, certain groups—such as the Taliban and the Haqqani Network—retain freedom of movement in Pakistan. The United States continues to convey to all levels of Pakistani leadership the importance of taking action against all terrorist and militant groups.

Increased collaboration between Afghanistan and Pakistan is critical to maintaining pressure on militant and terrorist groups and for meeting the enduring security requirements on both sides of the shared border. The trust deficit resulting from Pakistan’s support of and inaction against Afghan-oriented militants, and Pakistan’s concerns about terrorist attacks launched from Afghanistan, hamper the bilateral military collaboration required to achieve enduring security.

Since the beginning of President Ghani’s tenure, leaders from both countries have attempted to improve relations and to address mutual security interests, such as the threat from various terrorist groups that reside in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, more effectively. These efforts have been inconsistent, interrupted by security incidents on both sides of the border, and public statements by each government disparaging the other. Each country publicly claims that the other provides sanctuary to certain militant groups and lacks the will to combat them.

Cross-border firings continued in this reporting period, and represent a sustained, significant impediment to improved bilateral relations. Likewise, Afghanistan and Pakistan made little
progress on border control or cooperation during this reporting period. RS continues to facilitate
meetings between Afghanistan and Pakistan through its Tripartite Joint Operations Center (TJOC).
Meetings focus on border management and security, countering terrorist groups, and countering
the threat from improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In an effort to de-escalate border incidents
more effectively, Afghanistan and Pakistan established telephone hotlines for corps commandres
that serve across the Durand Line from each other; however, these lines are not used and commanders resort to calling personal phones instead of strengthening the institution of the hotlines, which are meant to be tools of crisis de-escalation.

**Military Cooperation**

Two types of one star meetings are held at HQRS: a monthly operation and information (O&I)
sharing meeting, and a one-star tripartite. The O&I meeting is intended to provide a venue to share
and plan complementary near-border operations, discuss counter-IED operations, and serve as a
working-level collaborating meeting. The one star tripartite enables the Deputy ANA General
Staff Director of Operations (GSG3) for Borders, and Pakistan’s Director of Military Operations-
Western Border (DMO-B) to discuss military-to-military relationship issues, including border
management and border crossings.

There is also a quarterly two star meeting held at rotating locations in HQRS, Kabul, and
Rawalpindi. The RS attendees at the meeting include the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy and
Policy (DCOS S&P), Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCOS Int), and the NATO Special
Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) Commander. ANDSF representatives include the ANA GSG3, and a representative from the Afghan Border Force. Pakistan’s military is represented by the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), the
Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), and the DMO-B

Previous Afghanistan-Pakistan military cooperation efforts, such as an Interim Military
Coordination Mechanism (IMCM), made limited progress, and each side continues to blame the
other for the stalled progress.

Pakistan provided the APAPPS in November 2017 as a broad framework for cooperation between
the two countries, including in the military-to-military arena. The military coordination section of
APAPPS contains many of the provisios of the previously-proposed IMCM.

After the APAPPS discussion between the two Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) ocured in
February 2018, the Pakistan military stated that all aspects of the IMCM were contained in
APAPPS and needed to be discussed at the MoFA level, with the exception of re-establishing
ground coordination centers (GCCs) and exchange of liaison officers (LNOs) in the GCCs. This
is not ideal, as it may open the door for political challenges to hold up military cooperation and
coordination. Although a tentative agreement on GCCs and LNO exchange was reached at a one
star bilateral meeting held in May 2018, it is apparent that no action will be taken until the APAPPS
agreement is formalized.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister and President Ghani in April 2018 agreed on seven principles to finalize
the APAPPS:
1. Pakistan will support the Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process and reconciliation;

2. The two countries will undertake effective actions against fugitives and the irreconcilable elements posing security threats to either of the two countries;

3. Both countries commit to deny use of their respective territories by any country, network, group, or individuals for anti-state activities against either country;

4. To put in place a joint supervision, coordination, and confirmation mechanism through liaison officers for the realization of the agreed actions;

5. To avoid territorial and aerial violations of each other’s territory;

6. Both countries will avoid the public “blame game” and instead use APAPPS cooperation mechanisms to respond to mutual issues of contention and concern; and

7. To establish working groups and necessary cooperation mechanisms as per APAPPS for full implementation of the APAPPS and above mutually reinforcing principles.

2.2 CURRENT SECURITY CONDITIONS

Afghanistan continues to face an externally enabled and resilient insurgency. Afghan forces have shown determination and growing capability in their fight against the Taliban-led insurgency. The Afghan government retains control of Kabul, major population centers, most key transit routes, provincial capitals, and a majority of district centers. In this reporting period, the Taliban contested district centers; however, the Taliban did not seriously threaten provincial capitals, which was a significant milestone for the ANDSF. In May 2018, the Taliban attempted to capture Farah city, the capital of Farah Province, but the government quickly regained control and drove the Taliban out.

As of May 2018, RS assessed that the Afghan government maintained control or influence over approximately 65 percent of the population, while insurgents had control or influence over approximately 12 percent of the population, with the remainder contested. In this reporting period, ANDSF operations increased compared to the same period 12 months ago. With these increased operations, the ANDSF successfully pushed the Taliban from population centers into rural areas and denied the Taliban their operational goal of capturing provincial centers.

On April 25, 2018, the Taliban announced the commencement of Operation Al-Khandaq to start the fighting season. The Taliban strategy will focus on an offensive, guerilla insurgency. The Taliban also indicated that the target of its violent attacks would center on foreign forces, particularly U.S. forces. Of note, the Taliban claims that they will take caution to minimize civilian casualties. The 2018 Operation Al-Khandaq announcement, including the identified targets of the Taliban’s offensive operations and the claim to minimize civilian casualties, is similar to the Taliban’s 2017 announcement regarding Operation Mansouri.
The Taliban and other militant groups continue to perpetrate high-profile attacks (HPAs), particularly in the capital region, to attract media attention, create the perception of widespread insecurity, and undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan government. From December 1, 2017, through May 31, 2018, the number of HPAs increased in Kabul and in the remainder of the country compared to the same period last year. It is very likely that the Taliban will continue to execute HPAs in urban areas this year as they face battlefield losses elsewhere and if the ANDSF continues to deny them control of provincial capitals. The Taliban conduct HPAs to cast doubt on the ability of the Afghan government to secure its citizens.

To counter the HPAs in Kabul and other urban areas this reporting period, on February 1, 2018, COMRS shifted the RS main effort to the security of Kabul to provide space for continued diplomatic efforts to further the peace process. Responsibility for the Kabul ESZ (KSF), which includes ANA, ANP, and National Directorate of Security (NDS) forces. This transfer consolidated all aspects of Kabul security to one command and allowed for the synchronization of ANDSF security plans and RS advisory priorities. During this reporting period, coalition and ANDSF forces worked together closely to delineate responsibilities for security, share intelligence, and ensure unity of effort with the goal of preventing HPAs inside the Kabul ESZ. Under the current construct, ANP forces maintain responsibility for security within Kabul city, ANA forces secure the perimeter of the city, and NDS ensure information and intelligence collection and sharing remain focused on the prevention of HPAs.

To move away from the traditional Afghan practice of using private militias and other armed groups to address local security challenges, President Ghani intends to establish an ANATF. The ANATF is meant to employ locally recruited, nationally trained and led forces in areas where security conditions permit the use of lighter, more affordable forces to provide local security. If successful, the ANATF model will allow the ANA to transition to a smaller, more affordable force in the future, provide some short-term cost savings, and allow for increased support to the ASSF and AAF. An ANATF pilot program will begin in up to three provinces in 2018, with a possible second round of pilot programs in 2019. If successful, the ANDSF plans to incorporate ANATF units into the permanent force structure starting in 2019. Recruiting for the first ANATF pilot companies began during this reporting period. The first ANATF companies will integrate into the ANA later this year.

**Influence of Other Regional Actors**

U.S. strategy calls for a regional approach to enhance stability in South Asia. This includes building a broad consensus for a stable Afghanistan, emphasizing regional economic integration and cooperation, stressing cooperation for an Afghan-led peace process, and holding countries accountable for their use of proxies or other means to undermine stability and regional confidence. DoD is part of a whole-of-government approach designed to isolate the Taliban and other terrorists from sources of external support and to mitigate malign influence from regional actors.

In February 2018, President Ghani hosted the second Kabul Peace Conference (KPC), which focused on how Afghanistan’s partners can support peace and stability in the region and end support for terrorist groups. The United Nations, the United States, NATO, RS force-contributing nations, the European Union, regional neighbors, including Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan, all
sent representatives. The KPC attempts to increase Afghan ownership of regional peace forums and synchronize peace initiatives.

**Russia**

Russia has security concerns regarding stemming from Afghanistan-based terrorism and narco-trafficking. Russian-Afghan relations suffered due to Russia’s public acknowledgment of communications with the Taliban and support of the Taliban’s call for coalition withdrawal from Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, Russia publicly called the new South Asia Strategy a “dead end.” During the reporting period, Russia continued to seek ways to undermine U.S. influence in the region by engaging with the Taliban, disseminating false information about U.S. support to ISIS-K, disseminating false information about U.S. objectives in Afghanistan, and pressuring Central Asian neighbors to deny support to U.S. and NATO stabilization efforts in Afghanistan.

**China**

China’s low levels of military, economic, and political engagement in Afghanistan are driven by domestic security concerns that terrorism will spread across the Afghan border into China and China’s increasing desire to protect its regional economic investments. China is a member of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) seeking to support Afghan and Taliban peace and reconciliation efforts. Afghanistan continues to seek Chinese pressure on Pakistan to assist reconciliation efforts and eliminate insurgent sanctuaries.

**Iran**

Iran and the United States share certain interests in Afghanistan, such as counternarcotics and opposition to ISIS-K. However, Iran seeks to expand its influence and limit U.S. influence and military presence, particularly in western Afghanistan. Although U.S. and Iranian political dynamics are not currently conducive to direct coordination on areas of mutual interest in Afghanistan, the United States and its Afghan partners could explore ways to leverage Iran’s interests in support of U.S. and Afghan objectives in the areas of counternarcotics, economic development, and counterterrorism.

Iran’s desire for influence in Afghanistan remains strong. Iran seeks increased influence in Afghanistan through government partnerships, bilateral trade, and cultural and religious ties. Iran’s ultimate goal is a stable Afghanistan where Shi’a communities are safe, Iran’s economic interests are protected, and the U.S. military presence is reduced.

Iran provides some support to the Taliban and publicly justifies its relationship with the Taliban as a means to combat the spread of ISIS-K in Afghanistan. Iran’s support to the Taliban undermines the Afghan government’s credibility, adds to instability in the region, and complicates strategic partnership agreements.
India

India is Afghanistan’s most reliable regional partner and the largest contributor of development assistance in the region, including civil development projects such as the Afghanistan-India Friendship Dam and the Afghan parliament building. The latest of these development projects, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, began on February 23, 2018. India provides significant training opportunities for Afghan officers and enlisted personnel and has frequently offered to increase its burden sharing for Afghanistan. Approximately 130 Afghans travel to India each year to attend various military academy and commissioning programs. India has also donated limited security assistance, previously purchasing four Mi-35 aircraft and attempting to acquire more. The United States welcomes additional Indian economic, medical, and civic support to Afghanistan.

Saudi Arabia

Afghanistan prioritizes Saudi Arabia’s religious credibility and political support over seeking material support from Saudi Arabia. Particularly, Afghanistan seeks greater recognition of fatwas and statements by the Grand Mufti condemning terrorists and ISIS-K as “incompatible with Islamic values.” Historically, Saudi Arabia has not provided material or fiscal support to Afghanistan, despite Afghanistan’s entry into the Saudi-led Counter Terrorism Coalition.

Central Asian States

Central Asia continues to be an important region for U.S. security interests based on our continued need for access via the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). The United States must continue steady engagement to maintain our access, support regional sovereignty, build regional capacity against transnational threats, and develop closer ties between the Central Asian States and Afghanistan.

Threats from Insurgent and Terrorist Groups

Collectively, terrorist and insurgent groups continue to present a formidable challenge to Afghan, U.S., and coalition forces. The presence of more than 20 terrorist organizations in the region creates the largest concentration of terrorist and extremist organizations in the world.

The Haqqani network continues to be an integral part of the Taliban’s effort to pressure the Afghan government in Kabul and eastern Afghanistan. Sirajuddin Haqqani’s role as a Taliban deputy probably increased Haqqani influence within the Taliban leadership, and resulted in an increase in Haqqani influence to areas outside its normal operating areas of Paktika, Paktiya, and Khost provinces in eastern Afghanistan.

The Taliban has demonstrated increasing capability to threaten district centers; however, the ANDSF has also proven its ability to recover district centers lost to the Taliban quickly. Seeking to exploit ANDSF weaknesses and the reduced international military presence, the Taliban maintains control in some rural areas that lack effective Afghan government representation.
ISIS-K has suffered setbacks from U.S. CT operations, ANDSF operations, pressure from the Taliban, and from difficulties in gaining local populace support. Despite some losses of territory, fighters, and leadership, ISIS-K remains a threat to coalition forces and retains the ability to conduct HPAs in urban centers, particularly Kabul.

ISIS-K recruits and distributes propaganda in many Afghan provinces. ISIS-K claimed responsibility for attacks against Shia minorities and the ANDSF around the country, including increased claimed attacks in Kabul. Command, control, and funding from core ISIS elements in Iraq and Syria are limited. The group relies on external funding; however, they appear to have funding streams within Afghanistan. The struggle for resources has brought ISIS-K into conflict with the Taliban and other groups vying to raise revenue from illegal checkpoints and the trade of illicit goods. ISIS-K continues to draw its members from new recruits in Pakistan and Afghanistan, disaffected TTP fighters, Afghan Taliban, and militants from other violent extremist organizations who believe that associating with or pledging allegiance to ISIS-K will further their interests.

The al-Qa’ida threat to the United States and its allies and partners has decreased, and the few remaining al-Qa’ida core members are focused on their own survival. The remnants of the organization likely reside along the southeast Afghanistan border with Pakistan with a smaller element in isolated areas of northeast Afghanistan. Some lower- and mid-level Taliban leaders provide limited support to al-Qa’ida; however, there is no evidence of strategic ties between the two organizations and the Taliban likely seeks to maintain distance from al-Qa’ida. In addition, al-Qa’ida’s regional affiliate, AQIS, has a presence in south and southeast Afghanistan, and in Pakistan, and is composed primarily of militants from within the broader South Asia region.

Security Trends

From December 1, 2017, to May 31, 2018, the number of effective enemy-initiated attacks, averaging 15 per month, was significantly lower than the previous reporting period (June 1, 2017 to November 30, 2017), which averaged 28 per month.
The number of reported effective enemy-initiated attacks was low during the winter months and gradually rose as the Taliban and the ANDSF increased operations in the spring. The overall level of reported enemy-initiated attacks during this reporting period was 25 percent lower than the same period the previous year. Consistent with the two previous reporting periods and the overall trend since the end of the U.S. and NATO combat missions and the transition to OFS and the RS mission, there have been very few effective enemy-initiated attacks on coalition or U.S. forces.

The coalition relies largely on ANDSF reporting for all metrics, including effective enemy-initiated attacks, which are a subset of all security incidents. Direct fire remains by far the largest source of effective enemy-initiated attacks, followed by IED attacks and mine strikes (see

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16 Reports on security incidents and effective enemy-initiated attacks are often delayed by several weeks due to translation and long data base reporting and processing timelines. In addition, ANDSF units frequently do not report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties, such as indirect fire or attempted IED explosions that do not wound or kill ANDSF personnel.

17 Since ANDSF units often do not report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties, the number of effective enemy-initiated attacks is the most representative metric of overall security conditions rather than the total number of reported security incidents. Security incidents comprise all enemy action, including enemy-initiated direct fire and indirect fire, such as mortar, rocket, and artillery; SAFIRE and explosive hazard events, including executed attacks (IED explosion, mine strike); and potential or attempted attacks (IEDs or mines found and cleared, premature IED detonations, and IED turn-ins). Security incidents do not include friendly action (e.g., direct fire and indirect fire initiated by friendly forces).
Figure 5). Consistent with trends over the last several years, indirect fire and surface-to-air fire (SAFIRE) remain the least frequent sources of effective enemy-initiated attacks. The number of IED attacks and mine strikes has remained relatively steady over the last 18 months.

**Figure 5: Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Type**

![Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Type](image)

**ANDSF Casualties**

The number of ANDSF casualties suffered while conducting local patrols and checkpoint operations was 14 percent higher during this period than that of previous December 2016 - April 2017. The number of casualties incurred during planned offensive operations has decreased over the same period. The majority of ANDSF casualties continue to be the result of direct fire attacks; IED attacks, and mine strikes contribute to overall casualties but at a much lower level.

**U.S. Casualties and Insider Attacks**

Although OFS and RS are considered non-combat missions, conducting U.S. CT operations and RS TAA missions with the ANDSF still entails risks to U.S. and coalition forces. Since the beginning of U.S. operations in Afghanistan in October 2001, 1876 U.S military personnel have been killed in action (KIA) and 20,385\(^{19}\) have been wounded in action (WIA), as of May 31, 2018. During the reporting period, there were two U.S. military deaths as a result of hostile actions and 22 U.S. military personnel WIA.

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\(^{18}\) Additional information on ANDSF casualties can be found in the classified annex to this report.

\(^{19}\) Data was accessed in the Defense Casualty Analysis System on May 31, 2018.)
On January 1, 2018, insurgents attacked military personnel conducting operations in Mohmand Valley, Nangarhar Province. The attack resulted in one KIA and four WIA. One service member was KIA as a result of small arms fire. Three of the military personnel suffered minor injuries. One service member received more serious injuries from small arms fire.

On January 3, 2018, one service member was WIA while on a dismounted patrol in Dadel Village, Nerkh District, Wardak Province. This service member received serious injuries from small arms fire.

On January 11, 2018, one service member was WIA in Mohmand Valley, Nangarhar Province. The service member received serious injuries from small arms fire.

On January 13, 2018, one service member was on an Expeditionary Advisory Platform mission in FOB Sultan when two IDF rockets landed and exploded near the vicinity of the service member, who suffered minor injuries.

On January 18, 2018, two military personnel were WIA in Zad Village, Helmand Province when they encountered an IED and suffered minor injuries.

On January 25, 2018, two military personnel were WIA while on a dismounted patrol in Kajaki District, Helmand Province when they encountered an IED. One service member received serious injuries. The other service member suffered minor injuries.

On February 3, 2018, one service member was WIA while on a dismounted patrol in Sarband, Helmand Province. The service member suffered minor injuries from small arms fire.

On February 17, 2018, two military personnel were WIA as a result of small arms fire in Kapisa Province. The service members suffered minor injuries.

On February 26, 2018, one service member was WIA while on a mounted patrol in Paktika Province. The service member suffered very serious injuries from small arms fire.

On April 27, 2018, one service member was WIA while clearing an observation post in Nangarhar Province when the service member encountered an IED. The service member suffered minor injuries.

On April 30, 2018, insurgents attacked military personnel conducting operations in Tagab District, Kapisa. The attack resulted in one service member KIA and three military personnel WIA. One service member was killed as a result of small arms fire. One service member suffered life-threatening injuries from small arms fire. Two military personnel suffered minor injuries from shrapnel from a RPG.

On May 8, 2018, three military personnel were conducting clearing operations in Uruzgan, when a hand grenade exploded near them. The three military personnel suffered minor injuries.
During this reporting period, there were no insider attacks against U.S. personnel. U.S. forces and the Afghan government intensified their efforts to reduce the number of insider attacks (also known as “green-on-blue” attacks). Improvements included the increased use of enhanced screening techniques for existing ANDSF and new recruits. On September 8, 2017, the Afghan MoD signed a new Force Protection / Insider Threat policy. The new policy improves training and procedures on force protection of Afghans and coalition members. The new policy and enhanced screening measures resulted in the removal of 235 ASSF from the force during this reporting period. The MoI is developing a similar policy.

U.S. forces took additional measures to mitigate the threat of insider attacks. USFOR-A created the position of Insider Threat Advisor (ITA) to ensure the MoD and MoI were properly advised on how to address the threat. The ITA works with Afghan Army Counter-Intelligence to assist in countering insider threats. U.S. forces received additional in-country force protection (“Guardian Angel”) training. In addition, the Force Protection Working Group (FPWG) and Force Protection General Officer Steering Committee (FP GOSC) were created to ensure proper emphasis and actions take place to mitigate the insider threat.

Although it is impossible to mitigate all risk to U.S. personnel, coalition advisors assess that current force protection measures have been successful in limiting insider attacks. Investigation and analysis of insider attacks will continue to shape the coalition’s approach to mitigating this threat. RS Headquarters employs Joint Casualty Assessment Teams (JCAT) following any insider attack. These teams seek to determine the causes of the attack quickly and to identify any lessons learned for immediate dissemination throughout the command. The JCAT report is the foundation for more in-depth analyses conducted by the Insider Threat Assessment Board to determine causation, motivation, and lessons learned.

Afghan security forces continue to face attacks from within their own forces (also known as “green-on-green” attacks). During this reporting period, there were 47 “green-on-green” attacks. RS advisors continue to engage the MoD and MoI to establish a national policy to require formal screening of all ANDSF personnel. Insider attacks against the ANDSF and the deaths and the wounded caused by those attacks increased by over 50 percent compared to the same time period last year.

**Civilian Casualties**

The RS Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team (CCMT) collects information on civilian casualties for the coalition. The CCMT relies primarily upon operational reports from the TAACs and the ANDSF. From December 1 2017, to May 31, 2018, the CCMT documented more than 4,223 civilian casualties, of which approximately one-quarter were deaths and three-quarters were injuries. This represents an approximately 73 percent increase compared to the same time one year ago. The majority of the rise in civilian casualties can be attributed to the rise in insurgent use of IEDs (up 75 percent).

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) data from December 2017 through March 2018 reports 2,258 civilian casualties, including 763 civilians killed and 1,495 civilians wounded. As noted above, the RS CCMT reported 4,223 civilian casualties during the
same 6-month period from December 2017 through May 2018. Although CCMT and UNAMA report differing numbers due to different collection methodology, both sources attribute the largest portion of civilian casualties to the actions of insurgents. RS CCMT primarily relies upon operational reports from the TAACs, other CF headquarters, and ANDSF reports provided by the Afghan Presidential Information Command Centre (PICC). UNAMA compiles its figures from site visits by locally employed staff who speak with victims, witnesses, and local leaders.

Preventing civilian casualties remains a major concern of the ANDSF, the Afghan government, and U.S. and coalition forces. U.S. and coalition advisors continue to work closely with the Afghan government to reduce civilian casualties by raising awareness of the importance of civilian casualty prevention and mitigation. The coalition is continuing TAA efforts with the ANDSF on practical measures that they can adopt at the tactical level to prevent civilian casualties. The Afghan government also continues to host its quarterly Civilian Casualty Avoidance and Mitigation Board to discuss civilian casualty prevention procedures.

**Security of Afghan Women and Girls**

Structural barriers, traditional cultural norms, and insecurity remain key challenges facing Afghan women throughout Afghan society and the ANDSF. Relevant indicators such as literacy and employment rates show the disparities between men and women. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) office in Kabul reports that only 17 percent of women are literate, compared to nearly half of the men, and just 15 percent of women are in paid employment. Conflict, criminality, and narcotics continue to be critical threats to women’s safety, public service delivery, and private investment. Fighting, family economic instability, and conflict-induced displacement all hinder women’s access to education.

Security remains a concern for female members of the ANDSF. Some women are afraid to wear their uniforms while travelling to work sites for fear of harassment and personal attacks. Once at work, inadequate facilities and a lack of female changing rooms contribute to an air of exclusion and present opportunities for sexual harassment. With the support of RS advisors, MoD and MoI officials conduct site surveys of Afghan locations that employ women to determine how to improve those facilities for the women.

The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), in coordination with the MoD and MoI, developed an ombudsman program to enable external reporting, oversight, and victim support for MoD and MoI female employees. Once implemented, this program will enable the ANDSF and the Afghan population to report gender-based violence and human rights abuses safely to the AIHRC, which can take action or assist law enforcement as appropriate. The program will provide an avenue for MoD and MoI female employees to seek independent mediation outside of their chain of command if the chain of command is complicit or fails to act appropriately in such cases. The ombudsman program, although developed and planned, has yet to be funded and implemented.

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20 Information on the security of women and girls addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1531(c)(1)(A) of the NDAA for FY 2016.
The MoD and MoI Gender Integration Offices are developing policies and processes to prevent and report sexual harassment and assault. The offices also develop systems to provide support and assistance to male and female victims of sexual misconduct. In addition to policy, the gender integration offices will also focus on improved education and training in the management and investigation of sexual harassment and assault allegations.

The MoI established a Sexual Harassment and Assault Prevention Committee, composed of members from various directorates and chaired by the First Deputy Minister, with procedures to report and respond to sexual harassment complaints. This achievement reflects the MoI’s commitment to reduce sexual harassment and gender-based violence. RS advisors ensure the committee remains focused on the effort to ensure women feel safe reporting incidents of sexual harassment and violence, allegations are investigated, and offenders are held accountable.

Family Response Units

Most reported cases of violence against women are the result of domestic abuse. The MoI established Family Response Units (FRU) across Afghanistan in 2014 to assist women and children victims of domestic abuse. Some FRUs are staffed with specialists, such as psychologists and social workers, who interview and screen victims for follow-on physical and mental health treatment. Since establishing 41 FRUs in 2014, the program has expanded to 208 FRUs in 2018, and currently operates in all 34 provinces.

The FRU Director requested tashkil revisions to realign additional positions for FRU sites and within the FRU office at the MoI HQ. The MoI goal for each FRU site is to have an onsite female FRU manager, an additional female police officer to allow for breaks of coverage in the event of multiple simultaneous cases, and a male officer to ensure their safety. A recent focus on realigning the existing tashkil to accommodate growth in the Afghan Special Security Forces has delayed progress in filling the onsite FRU positions. The FRU realignment request will be reviewed for approval and incorporation into the 1398 tashkil (March 2019 to March 2020).

A recent initiative requires FRU police to receive first aid training. Each adequately trained FRU office will be equipped with first aid kits and supplies for the appropriate level of care that police would provide to abuse victims. Out of the 413 FRU police, only 85 have participated in the first aid training course due to challenges at the ANP Training General Command, such as a lack of instructors, a poor training plan, and poor budget execution. The FRU Director submitted a request to commence training later in June.

Concerted efforts to galvanize the Afghan Criminal Investigation Division (CID) to support and equip the FRUs have not resulted in any measurable improvements. The FY 18 MOI Commitment letter requires CID to develop the FRUs, with penalties for lack of FRU support. Four Kabul area police districts (4, 8, 12, and 17) will receive new FRU facilities. The new facilities, with estimated completion by June 2019, will assist the FRU police in their mission mandate and enhance the public trust. The facilities will include a First Aid area, a child-friendly waiting area, a restroom with shower, and a private interview room.
2.3 ANTICIPATED SECURITY CONDITIONS

As the ANDSF and USFOR-A continue to inflict losses on the Taliban and deny the group strategic victories, it is likely that the Taliban will continue the use of high profile attacks in urban centers to appear relevant and attempt to bolster flagging militant morale. Additionally, as the U.S. air campaign continues to target narcotic financial streams, it is possible that the Taliban will move drug laboratories and relocate fighters to provinces with low levels of combat. The Taliban may change their goals from capturing provincial capitals to capturing district centers. RS advisors continue to work with the ANDSF to improve their combat capabilities and double the size of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) and the Afghan Air Force (AAF) in order to maintain country-wide operations against the Taliban. ISIS-K will likely continue to plan attacks against the ANDSF and Shia minorities without any regard for civilian casualties.

Although the Government of National Unity (GNU) remains relatively stable, it continues to face political, ethnic, and tribal challenges. If serious divisions emerge, they may threaten the capability and coherence of the government. Ethnic minorities remain concerned that President Ghani is excluding them from government and consolidating power around the Pashtun elite. This concern has grown with the inclusion of the Pashtun-dominated Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group into the government. Violence or Taliban rhetoric may peak leading up to provincial elections later this year. The ANDSF focused on securing elections during this reporting period.
SECTION 3 – OVERVIEW OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

During this reporting period, the ANDSF conducted offensive operations as part of Operation Khalid through March 2018. Simultaneously, the ANDSF planned, and in some cases implemented, several significant reforms, including: the transfer of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) and the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) from the MoI to the MoD; preparatory steps for the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS); and implementing the initial round of Inherent Law retirements within the MoD. Additionally, the ANDSF prepared their Annual Operational Plan (AOP) for 2018, Operation Nasrat.

The ANDSF sustained more offensive military pressure on the enemy throughout the winter than in previous years. In support of their offensive operations, the ANDSF increased its use of its organic ISR asset (ScanEagle) for integrated employment of ISR, maneuver, and AAF fires. The offensive mindset was a result of leadership changes during 2017, when the GIRoA replaced five of six Corps commanders and the Chief of General Staff (CoGS), and appointed a new Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior. Parliament subsequently confirmed both Minister of Defense Bahrami and Minister of Interior Barmak in December 2017.

During this reporting period, the Afghan government took aggressive steps to improve the security of Kabul in response to a series of HPAs in the capital. RS supported President Ghani and the security ministers as they initiated plans to enhance the security situation in Kabul. Immediate actions included: (1) improving the leadership of the security forces tasked with Kabul security, and (2) hardening Kabul’s outer security ring to deny insurgents the ability to smuggle men, weapons, and equipment into the city. President Ghani started this process by replacing the Kabul Chief of Police and the top five leaders in each of Kabul’s police districts. President Ghani assisted in the selection of the replacements, accepting only senior security professionals with the requisite experience to affect immediate change. RS advisors assisted in the integration of the new ANDSF officials. RS also worked with the ANDSF to plan and conduct operations in the surrounding provinces to reduce insurgents’ ability to stage and facilitate HPAs in Kabul, to protect the civilian population in Kabul, to enhance the public trust and confidence in the Afghan government, and to protect the international community.

Operation Nasrat began in March 2018 and marked the second annual campaign plan created by MoD, MoI, and National Directorate of Security (NDS) leaders. Throughout the planning period for Operation Nasrat, RS staff and advisors facilitated constant communication and joint approaches to problem solving, and reduced interdepartmental friction between ANDSF ministerial and operational commands. Based on RS advisory efforts, the ANDSF demonstrated marked improvement in the following areas: publishing of timely warning orders; holding a series of key senior leader planning meetings and conferences to align efforts; and publishing a significantly improved, highly detailed, and comprehensive joint operations order for Operation Nasrat. The synchronization of ASSF and ANA operations are the key focus for TAA and multi-echelon planning and execution. This integration of special operations and conventional forces efforts, in addition to maximizing air campaign effects and encouraging ANP to stabilize districts...
seized from insurgent control, will set conditions for the ANDSF to seize the initiative in 2018 and lay the foundation for secure and credible Parliamentary elections.

3.1 STRATEGY

This reporting period marked the beginning of the second year of President Ghani’s ANDSF Roadmap. The Roadmap is designed to seize the initiative in the fight against insurgent and terrorist forces; further professionalize the ANDSF; modify the force structure to extend security; expand governance and economic development; and compel the Taliban to seek reconciliation. The ANDSF Roadmap is a broad-based reform effort with four key elements.

- **Increase Fighting Capabilities.** Reinforce the success of ASSF by increasing the size and capability of the force to increase offensive reach and lethality. Modernize and expand the Afghan aviation fleet to provide a larger, more capable air force through a combination of aircraft acquisition, pilot training, maintenance training, target development, and integration throughout the ANDSF. An organic, relatively large, and highly capable air force will provide the ANDSF with a distinct advantage against its enemies.

- **Leadership Development.** Produce honest, competent, and committed ANDSF professionals by introducing merit-based selection of leaders, better instruction and education, and a unified training system. In addition, the ANDSF will employ improved human resource and personnel management systems to provide appropriate leader development from recruitment through retirement and assign trained leaders to the right positions.

- **Unity of Command/Effort.** Increase unity of command and effort between the MoD and the MoI, starting with a review of command and control structures. Improve unity of effort by transitioning paramilitary portions of the MoI (ABP and ANCOP) to control of the MoD.

- **Counter-Corruption.** Implement reforms to address illicit activity and patronage networks within security organizations in order to reduce corruption and increase ANDSF effectiveness.

The intent of the ANDSF Roadmap is to move towards a more offensive-oriented and sustainable security strategy and provide a framework for reform aimed at achieving irreversible positive change to key security institutions. A robust and expanded ASSF will improve ANDSF agility and lethality while the conventional forces become increasingly capable of protecting the population, holding key terrain, and securing critical infrastructure. The ANDSF plan to increase offensive operations incrementally through 2018 and 2019 and expand security to cover the preponderance of the population by 2020, compelling the Taliban to seek a political settlement to the conflict.

**ANDSF Roadmap Progress**

**Increase Fighting Capabilities.** ANDSF continued to employ the three offensive components of their force effectively – conventional ground forces, Special Forces (ASSF), and the Afghan Air Force (AAF) through the winter months. All six ANA Corps were frequently engaged in simultaneous offensive operations. In January 2018, the ANDSF conducted offensive operations in 13 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces simultaneously. ASSF overuse and misuse continue to present
a challenge, with ASSF units often engaged in hold operations long after they have cleared an area. Conventional forces still struggle to consolidate gains in those instances, limiting the flexibility and agility of ASSF units.

TAAC advisors worked diligently with ANDSF leaders to establish improved mission profiles for offensive operations to leverage the capabilities of each of the ANDSF components. ASSF forces conducted night missions against enemy objectives effectively and facilitated the maneuver of conventional forces into the area to conduct extended clearance missions. Additionally, the ANDSF demonstrated increased proficiency in controlling their own fires and employing their own airlift missions. Although U.S. air power destroyed Taliban support elements in the deep fight, Afghan A-29 and MD-530 attack helicopters provided quick, lethal support to Afghan ground forces in the close fight.

**Expanding TAA Efforts.** The RS TAA effort increased ANDSF capacity to plan and execute offensive operations. During this reporting period, the ANDSF increased their ability to employ organic ISR assets in support of Afghan offensive operations. For example, in Helmand Province, the ANDSF conducted offensive operations around Lashkar Gah to expand population control. Coupled with improved fighting capabilities, the ANDSF made modest improvements in logistics and enforced a nascent but improving Operational Readiness Cycle (ORC) program to move their conventional forces to a sustainable readiness model. Improving these institutional capabilities is a focus of Corps and MoD-level advising. During this reporting period, ANDSF improved ORC discipline, which allowed for the conduct of sustained offensive operations through the winter campaign. However, the disciplined use of an ORC is not yet uniform across all Afghan corps.

During this reporting period, RS began validating TAA within each corps by integrating additional advisors at select brigade and kandak levels. Validation below the corps level is important for new ANDSF commanders taking command after the implementation of the Inherent Law.

As RS expands TAA efforts, force protection remains the top priority. Efforts to screen ANDSF who will encounter RS advisors and remove high-risk ANDSF to protect the force continued. RS also created a more secure environment to support TAA efforts. During this reporting period, USFOR-A reallocated fire support, ISR, and MEDEVAC assets to enable the conduct of TAA in a secure environment.

**Special Forces Growth.** The ASSF is a vital component of the overall Afghan security strategy. ASSF accounts for a small portion of the ANDSF; however, historically the ASSF conducts the vast majority of the ANDSF offensive missions. The doubling of the ASSF will add 33 new Commando companies and Mobile Strike Commando companies to the force by the end of 2019, increasing the Commando capability by 73 percent. The ASSF Growth Plan, initiated in 2017, will provide the ANDSF the capacity and ability to achieve offensive overmatch across the entire country in the coming years.

During this reporting period, ASSF growth slowed due to challenges with recruiting across the ANA. Basic training courses designed to process 13 classes per year with approximately 1,000 soldiers per class were undermanned and, in several instances, delayed or canceled until classes reached full capacity. As a result, ASSF graduates were assigned to conventional units and ASSF
units primarily as replacements rather than new ASSF units associated with the growth plan. ANDSF recruiting and retention efforts must improve in the coming months to meet future ASSF growth milestones.

**AAF Growth.** The AAF now conducts more airstrike sorties than the U.S. Air Force in Afghanistan. The AAF modernization program includes a 40 percent increase in AAF personnel and nearly triples the number of Afghan aircraft by 2023. This expansion introduces multiple new platforms, including the UH-60A helicopter and the AC-208 attack/ISR light fixed-wing aircraft. AAF modernization took a major step forward in January 2018, when the initial six UH-60A helicopters arrived in Kandahar and the first six UH-60 Afghan pilots completed Aircraft Qualification Training in January 2018. The current training program is designed to produce up to 64 pilots per year.

**ANATF Pilot Program.** The ANDSF Roadmap added the Afghan National Army Territorial Force (ANATF) as a new ANA component. The ANATF is a President Ghani-directed effort to create a more effective, professional, sustainable, and MoD-led local security force. ANATF will serve as a local “hold” force in government-controlled areas as ANDSF offensive operations progress in contested areas. Unlike the Afghan Local Police (ALP), the MoD will command and control the locally recruited, nationally trained ANATF. ANATF soldiers will receive the same basic training as all ANA soldiers and be led by full-time ANA officers. Over the next several months, the first “pilot” ANATF tolays will complete training and begin operating with their parent ANA kandaks, brigades, and corps.

**Leadership Development.** A generational change in leadership began within the MoD this period when the first group of retirements (including 656 colonels and generals)—and subsequent merit-based promotions—occurred as part of Inherent Law implementation. Similar changes in MoI leadership will begin later in 2018 as Inherent Law implementation begins within the ministry. Based on the Inherent Law, more than 5,000 colonels and generals will retire from the MoD and MoI gradually over the next two years. This generational change of leadership will open senior leadership positions for the next generation of ANDSF leaders selected based on merit rather than patronage. The anticipated rapid turnover of personnel underscores the importance of ministerial commitment to facilitate an orderly transition and oversee the education and training of new leadership.

**New Leadership.** The increase in ANA offensive military pressure on the enemy throughout winter was a result of a culture shift within the force driven by the new leadership, including replacing five of six Corps commanders, the Chief of General Staff (CoGS), and the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Interior. Parliament subsequently confirmed the appointments of Minister of Defense Bahrami and Minister of Interior Barmak, empowering both leaders to pursue much-needed reform. For example, soon after his confirmation, Minister Barmak replaced seven Provincial Chiefs of Police (in Farah, Sar-e Pul, Herat, Takhar, Samangan, Khost, and Kabul) and all 18 Kabul District Chiefs of Police. Selection for replacements included a merit-based screening and board process culminating with Presidential approval.

**MoD and MoI Professional Education.** During this reporting period, the coalition filled critical instructor and advisor positions at most Afghan Army and Police schools. However, the Combat
Service Support Branch School remains unsourced among the eight Army branch schools, and two of three Police schools still contain open positions. During the reporting period, the U.S. Department of Defense sent requests to RS partner nations soliciting personnel with professional expertise to fill these important advisory and instructor positions and gather momentum in the police development arena.

The Afghans took a decisive step to underline the important role of education and training with approval of the Unified Training, Education, and Doctrine-Command (UTED-C) structure. The UTED-C establishes a center of excellence for institutional development and education within the MoD and a center to establish doctrine informed by lessons learned in combat. Efforts will continue to complete the RS validation process to fill this command as soon as possible with qualified personnel. A strong command role is required to overcome the challenges of integrating ABP and ANCOP into the MoD and to oversee the development of the new ANATF and increasing demands on the Regional Military Training Centers (RMTCs).

Unity of Effort/Unity of Command. In 2017, the ANDSF began streamlining reporting chains and achieving unity of effort among security institutions by consolidating and unifying MoD command structures. The ANDSF are building joint operations centers to overwatch maneuver and control fires. New organizational structures like the ANA Special Operations Corps are improving unity of command and coordination between the ANA Corps and ASSF.

MoD/MoI Reorganization. RS continues to facilitate significant reorganization of both MoD and MoI security forces to ensure unity of effort and delineate security responsibilities between the two ministries. The reorganization included the transfer of most of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) from the MoI to the MoD in December 2017, renaming them the Afghan Border Force (ABF). Although the MoI maintained 4,000 ABP personnel to conduct customs operations at border crossing points and at airports, the ABF responsible for security along the Afghan border realigned with the regional ANA corps to address previous security gaps between ABP and ANA units. In March 2018, the majority of the ANCOP transitioned from the MoI to the MoD becoming the Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF). The ANCOF mission did not change, and they were used primarily as crisis response units in urban areas. Some ANCOP forces remained in the MoI and were renamed the Public Protection Service (PPS). The PPS are now the MoI’s primary riot control force. These transfers were not without challenges, and issues with logistics, accountability of equipment, and personnel management will require sustained effort to resolve in the coming months.

Counter-Corruption. The Afghan government made tangible progress on important anti-corruption reforms, but more work remains. President Ghani unveiled the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) in September 2017. Corruption remains the top strategic threat to the legitimacy and success of the Afghan government. President Ghani continues to demonstrate his commitment to reform in this critical area by enforcing the investigation and prosecution of corrupt officials through the concerted efforts of the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC), and the Afghan Attorney General’s office.

During this reporting period, the ACJC and MCTF added an investigative function to maintain counter-corruption momentum within the Afghan government. The MCTF investigates high-level
corruption, organized crime, kidnappings, and other serious crimes. The ACJC focuses exclusively on prosecuting high-level corruption cases. President Ghani established the ACJC to provide oversight and transparency for the prosecution of major crimes, including those over $75,000 and all cases involving flag officers. During its first year in operation, the ACJC successfully prosecuted 27 major corruption cases, heard 23 appellate court cases, and addressed 20 Afghan Supreme Court cases.

The Afghan government countered corruption at the operational and tactical levels through merit-based civil servant leader appointments, enforcement of electronic records for fuel and personnel pay systems, and the integration of qualified young professionals into key government positions. President Ghani reduced the number of procurement contracts and consolidated all major contractual awards at the national level through the National Procurement Commission (NPC), which he personally chairs. Other important examples of counter-corruption efforts include the biometric enrollment of MoD and MoI personnel into the Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS) coupled with audits of the Ministry of Finance and Da Afghan Bank (DAB). Biometric enrollment of all MoD personnel is ongoing having slowed due to the transition of Afghan Border Police (ABP) and Afghan National Civil Order Police from the MoI to the MoD. Biometric enrollment of all ANDSF personnel is scheduled to be complete in late 2018, causing a corresponding delay in full APPS implementation.

Shortly after his arrival, Minister Barmak ordered the refinement of the MoI Strategic Plan (MISP) to prioritize counter-corruption and develop a merit-based assignment and promotion process. Despite these initiatives, issues related to undue external and political influence on the MoI still exist. A culture of patronage and pervasive corruption continues to stifle the development of a truly professional police force. The MoI is in the process of completing an anti-corruption strategy and action plan. Realigning the ANP to enforce rule of law remains a critical requirement. However, continued gaps in the MoI advisory team, particularly the absence of civilian police expertise, continues to hamper TAA efforts.

With new police leadership established in Kabul, RS is working with Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCBS) and the NATO Center of Excellence for military police expertise to train the new Afghan MoI leaders. RS will also seek to expand these training and mentoring offerings to the new MoI leadership as they are selected through the MoI’s merit-based selection process.

3.2 BUDGET

The Afghan government relies on international funding for the vast majority of its security costs. The total amount required to fund the current ANDSF force structure is $6.0 billion annually, funded by contributions from the U.S. Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the Afghan government, the Law and Order Trust Fund – Afghanistan (LOTFA), and the NATO ANA Trust Fund Office (NATFO). The FY 2018 ASFF appropriation totals $4.667 billion, including $3.633 billion for the MoD (including funds for aviation modernization) and $1.034 billion for the MoI. The Afghan government will provide approximately $500 million primarily for food and subsistence. The remaining $789 million of ANDSF costs will be funded by international donors. The NATFO received $410 million in donations in 2017, a significant increase over the anticipated $380 million pledged for 2017. Donor nations have pledged $383 million for 2018 and have
funded $245 million for projects as of May 31, 2018. The LOTFA entered 2018 with an existing balance of $324 million, and received an additional $98 million in donations during this reporting period. LOTFA expects to receive an additional $358 million by the end of 2018.

ANDSF Roadmap initiatives will require additional funding, placing the anticipated requirement for ASFF funding at or above $5 billion annually through at least 2023. When increased to its planned size, the ASSF will require approximately $1 billion annually to sustain. Growing and sustaining the AAF will cost approximately $11.4 billion over the FY 18 – FY 23 time period, including procurement of aircraft, sustainment, personnel, training, ammunition, fuel, and infrastructure. This is consistent with previous cost estimates. When grown to its planned capacity in FY 23, the AAF will require $1.8 billion annually to sustain. The largest element of restructuring the ANDSF command and control is the transfer of ABF and ANCOF from the MoI to the MoD, which is expected to increase total personnel costs by $100 million in FY 2019.

3.3 FORCE SIZE AND STRUCTURE

The current ANDSF authorized force level as part of the tashkil remains at 352,000 ANA and ANP personnel21 plus 30,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP). The United States is the sole supporter of the ALP. Although the ALP fall under the MoI for oversight, they are not part of the 352,000 authorized ANDSF tashkil. Although the total authorization of 352,000 did not change, ABF and ANCOF transfers did change the apportionment of forces between MoD and MoI. Prior to transfer, the MoD was authorized 195,000 forces while the MoI was authorized 157,000. After the transfer of the ABF and the ANCOF, the MoD is now authorized 227,374 while the MoI is authorized 124,626.

During this reporting period, efforts to double the ASSF’s capacity by 2020 progressed; however, the rate of growth slowed a bit. Shortfalls in the conventional ANA recruiting and retention resulted in undermanned basic training courses and delays in course start dates. ANA overall recruiting and retention goals were set at levels below requirements to keep pace with attrition and grow the force in accordance with ANDSF Roadmap goals. Therefore, despite meeting recruiting and retention goals, the ANA will have to recruit and retain soldiers at higher than current rates throughout the year in order to keep pace with attrition and Roadmap milestones. The plan for ASSF growth contains key milestones for unit availability and total numbers of trained personnel. As of May 19, 2018, there are 26,291 personnel in the ASSF. Given current capacity limitations at the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) School of Excellence (SOE), recruitment challenges across the ASSF components (ANASOC, General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU), and the Special Mission Wing (SMW)), Counter Intelligence (CI) vetting requirements, and active force attrition, meeting the planned growth of the ASSF to 33,919 personnel by 2020 will be a challenge. The proper prioritization of unit generation, and the expansion of training facilities, are critical to maintaining the growth rate necessary to achieve the directed ASSF growth targets. These challenges are not insurmountable, and NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) remains optimistic that ASSF capability enhancement goals will be achieved.

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21 The authorized strength of 352,000 includes 227,374 ANA and 124,626 ANP.
In December 2017, the MoI transferred 19,558 ABP positions to the MoD in support of the ANDSF Roadmap. ABP brigades became Afghan Border Force (ABF) brigades assigned to the different ANA corps with responsibility for the geographic area where the ABF operated. The mission of the ABF did not change and some ABP responsible for customs and border crossing security remained under MoI control. During this reporting period, the MoD worked through challenges associated with ABF logistical, administrative, and personnel support. ANA Corps administrative and logistical support systems struggled in some instances to integrate the ABF; however, these systems improved steadily over time. Property accountability proved significantly challenging as ABF standards fell far below those of the ANA. Efforts to update property books and incorporate ABF material into ANA systems continued throughout the reporting period.

In March 2018, eight ANCOP brigades transitioned from the MoI to the MoD becoming the Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF). Adopting lessons learned from the ABF transfer, the ANCOF maintained the same geographical footprint and mission set. Similar to the ABF, each ANCOF brigade is assigned to the ANA Corps responsible for security where they are located. As with the ABF transition, logistical, administrative, and personnel support challenges proved problematic. Lessons learned from the ABF integration helped prepare ANA Corps for the transition. The role of the ANCOF may change in the future; however, in 2018, they will provide valuable assistance to the ANA as they seize the initiative and facilitate secure and credible Parliamentary elections later this year.

Under the ANDSF Roadmap, the SMW will also expand to provide additional 10 helicopter crews (40 total personnel), consolidate the PC-12 aircraft into a new fixed-wing kandak, and create an aviation support kandak. This growth provides the initial phase of a more modern and capable Afghan Air Force that can absorb and employ the influx of new aircraft. Ultimately, the combined future growth of the SMW and the AAF will be approximately 3,000 personnel over a four-year period.

The MoD continued to explore options to optimize the conventional ANA and improve its ability to hold key terrain and protect the population in rural areas where the Taliban seek to gain influence. Several ANA corps worked to recruit former ANA soldiers who served honorably to rejoin the ANA on one-year enlistment contracts.

On February 4, 2018, President Ghani issued a decree calling for the creation of the Afghan National Army Territorial Force to assist the ANA in its mission to focus on offensive operations while continuing to hold population centers. The ANATF is designed to be a locally recruited, nationally trained and led, affordable, and sustainable part of the ANA. ANATF units will provide security in districts with relatively permissive security environments that still require ANA presence. During this reporting period, recruiting for the first of seven ANATF companies began as part of a pilot program to test the concept. ANATF pilot companies will begin integrating into ANA kandaks later this year and, pending successful outcomes, more ANATF companies will be established in 2019. If successful, the ANATF could provide a model for an effective, affordable, and sustainable ANA in the future.
Attrition

Attrition\(^\text{22}\) remains problematic for both the ANA and the ANP. ANA attrition is tracked with greater fidelity than ANP attrition due to better personnel systems and higher enrollment rates in AHRIMS and APPS. The number of personnel dropped from the rolls (DFR) significantly impacts ANA and ANP attrition rates. DFR personnel are those soldiers and police who leave the organization prior to the end of their contract for reasons that include desertion or being absent without leave (AWOL) for over a month. DFRs occur for a variety of reasons, including low pay or delays in pay, austere living conditions, denial of leave, and intimidation by insurgents. The single greatest contributor to DFRs is poor leadership. Soldiers and police grow disillusioned with leaders who fail to take care of them with leave, promotion, and pay in accordance with standing policies.

The ANA and ANP have policies to prevent personnel from going absent without leave. Enforcement of the policies and accountability for offenders remain inconsistent. Coalition advisory efforts continue to focus on the ANDSF’s ability to regenerate forces through recruitment and operational readiness programs. During this reporting period, the ANA initially set recruiting and retention goals lower than what was necessary to keep pace with attrition and grow the force in accordance with the ANDSF Roadmap. Efforts are underway to realign future recruiting and retention goals to ensure strength levels do not impact readiness and remain relatively stable as they have over the past two years.

Inherent Law retirements promise to address ANDSF leadership problems that lead to attrition. Other tangible initiatives include: (1) the MoI High Ranking Officer Board; (2) the MoD leader assessment operation executed under direction of the recently formed Leadership Development Working Group; and (3) the ANDSF Officer Force Balancing plan. The purpose of these three programs is to identify and remove corrupt and incompetent leaders and replace them with high-performing officers with demonstrated potential.

Force Posture

The ANA sustained offensive operations throughout the mild winter, and spring and into the summer as part of Operations Khalid and Nasrat. Winter operations focused on expanding the security around population centers by clearing the area of enemy personnel, weapons, and equipment. ABF personnel transitioned from the MoI to the MoD in December 2017 while performing the same missions. In March 2018, ANCOF personnel transitioned from the MoI to the MoD, with some ANCOP personnel remaining with the MoI to perform riot control operations in major urban areas. Full integration of the ABF and ANCOF into the ANA will take time as the MoD works through challenges, such as accountability of equipment, logistical support, and personnel management.

\(^{22}\) Attrition is unplanned and planned total losses, including Dropped from Rolls (DFR), Killed in Action (KIA), Separation, and Other [disappearance/captured, disability, death (not in action), retirement, exempted (i.e., AWOL or permanent medical), or transfer to the ANA/ANP] losses. Attrition rate uses the current month’s attrition numbers (total losses) divided by the previous month’s strength numbers.
The use of static checkpoints continue to reduce the available combat power for maneuver, and remains an area of concern for the ANDSF. Significant social and political pressure to maintain checkpoints around villages and along highways contribute to the continued employment of static checkpoints. Many of these checkpoints are tactically unsound and present opportunities for the enemy. The overwhelming majority of successful Taliban attacks against ANDSF forces occur at poorly manned static checkpoints.

The MoD agreement to reduce the number of permanent fixed checkpoints across Afghanistan has not progressed. ANA corps previously agreed to employ no more than 25 percent of their forces in the operational phase of the ORC in permanent static checkpoint positions. Despite these stated goals, the ANA did not reduce checkpoints significantly during this reporting period. The ANA continue to evaluate checkpoints to determine if they are properly resourced and tactically sound.

During this reporting period, the ANDSF demonstrated increased ability to focus aviation, fire support, and mobile strike efforts. Increased use of EAPs, coupled with the addition of embedded SFAB advisors at select levels below corps, proved extremely effective against the Taliban. After failing to accomplish its military objectives in 2017, the Taliban increasingly resorted to guerilla tactics and HPAs in major population centers, including Kabul. ANDSF forces established the Kabul ESZ during this reporting period, thereby hardening the capital’s defenses and providing space for diplomatic efforts aimed at peace negotiations.

In eastern Afghanistan, ASSF forces, combined with U.S. CT efforts, maintained constant pressure on ISIS-K. Throughout the reporting period, U.S. and Afghan forces combined to eliminate ISIS-K leadership, and degrade and disrupt ISIS-K forces. As the fighting season began, ISIS-K forces were isolated in a small number of districts.

### 3.4 CAPABILITIES

#### Resources

During this reporting period, MoD and MoI resource management and procurement capabilities steadily improved. RS advisors worked with both ministries to develop systems that categorized resources into tiers, a process that improved requirements prioritization. Resources most critical to the warfighter were prioritized highest, and both ministries were required to procure the highest priority items first. Additionally, both ministries shortened the procurement process by requiring fewer officials to approve purchases.

#### Rule of Law

Although the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) and Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) continued to prosecute corruption cases, efforts to improve rule of law capabilities stagnated during this reporting period. Despite the increased attention from high-profile cases tried before the ACJC, the court’s failure to utilize the approved Case Management System (CMS) resulted in

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23 Additional information on ANA and ANP force component capabilities and MoD and MoI capacity and ministerial support to the ANDSF is provided in the relevant sections below.
administrative issues such as delays and cases being dropped. RS advisors worked throughout the reporting period to enforce the use of CMS to increase efficiency and hold the courts accountable.

**Personnel Management**

The MoD and MoI continued with efforts to gain accountability of their personnel through Personnel Asset Inventories (PAI) and enrollment into the Afghan Human Resources Information System (AHRIMS). PAI efforts included a minimum of three trips to ANA corps and ANP zone locations to account for all personnel through enrollment in AHRIMS prior to the implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) as the system of record. The MoD expected full transition to APPS during this reporting period; however, gaining full accountability of the ABF and ANCOF after their transition from the MoI to the MoD caused a delay. The MoD now plans to attain full implementation of APPS for pay purposes by July, with the MoI following later this year.

APPS implementation will improve overall personnel and pay procedures significantly. Soldiers and police are required to provide personal and biometric data, possess an identification card, have an authorized mobile bank account, and be assigned to a valid tashkil position in order to be validated in APPS and receive pay. RS already restricts pay to those enrolled in AHRIMS. APPS will add greater fidelity to the system and potentially eliminate the problem of fictitious or “ghost” personnel drawing pay. APPS will also allow for better management of soldier and police assignments, establishment of proper recruiting and retention goals, retirements and separations, and other personnel actions.

Although APPS will help improve overall personnel management within the MoD and MoI, the ministries need to develop their policies, procedures, and systems to establish an effective human resource management (HRM) program. Both the MoD and MoI struggle to manage the careers of their personnel from entry into the service through retirement or separation. Career paths that include merit-based selection and assignment of personnel to positions of increased responsibility remain a challenge, as does the integration of professional military educational opportunities along the career paths. APPS has the potential to serve as an effective tool; however, APPS must function within an effective overall HRM program to reach its full potential.

**Training**

The MoD continues to outpace the MoI in training. ANA soldiers receive quality training upon entry into the service through programs at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) and at other regional training sites. ANASOC and AAF training programs are robust and continue to mature. MoI training at all levels, with the exception of the GCPSU, needs improvement. Police training at provincial training centers lacks standardization. RS advisors are working with the MoI to consolidate training into regional training centers where advisors can provide better oversight and accountability.

Pilot and aviation maintenance training continues to progress, constrained only by the number of English language classes available to potential recruits. Force protection requirements for English language instructors and classes limit the number of opportunities available to candidates and
challenge RS advisors to keep enough personnel in the training pipeline to meet ANDSF Roadmap milestones.

Institutional training is an area where there is a large difference between MoD and MoI capabilities. The MoD continued to develop the Unified Training, Education, and Doctrine Command (UTEDC) during this reporting period and improved its Pre-Command Courses (PCC) and Command and Staff School. The ANA sent 6 brigade commanders and over half of its kandak commanders to PCC training. Turkish, Portugese, and Polish partners agreed to increase advisor presence at the KMTC, Artillery, and Armor schools, respectively. The ANA Combat Service Support School requires more advisor support.

MoI institutional training is below the standard set by the MoD, and the MoI training is below standard required to produce a professional police force. The MoI has no institutional training beyond entry-level, and after entry into the force, all ANP training occurs on the job. Currently, the MoI has no clear plan to develop a command similar to the UTEDC or create PCCs or a Command and Staff School. Also, there is no collaboration between the ministries’ institutional training, and ANP personnel do not attend ANA schools.

**Logistics**

Providing logistical support to their personnel in the field remained a challenge for the MoD and MoI. RS advisors worked diligently to help both ministries build systems to improve their ability to account for equipment, build maintenance capability, and sustain their subordinate units. Logistical training and proper employment of trained mechanics and logisticians are the greatest factors limiting progress.

Improvements in the implementation of the Core-Information Management System (Core-IMS), an internet-based property accountability system of record that links the MoD and MoI, helped provide greater fidelity on equipment levels within the MoD and MoI. The ministries are planning to modify the system to track equipment at the corps/zone level and below. MoD property accountability outpaces the MoI as evidenced by the transition of the ABF and ANCOF from the MoI to the MoD during this reporting period. Property accountability standards and records within the ABF and ANCOF were extremely poor, and it will take months to account for all of the former MoI property and add it to the MoD and ANA property books.

The National Maintenance Contract (NMC), previously referred to as the National Maintenance Strategy, consolidated multiple ANDSF maintenance contracts into one, and mandated increasing levels of ANDSF maintenance capabilities over time. The goal is to shift 20 percent of the maintenance responsibility for ground equipment to the Afghans each year. During this reporting period, the ANA maintained responsibility for nearly half of their ground equipment maintenance, while the ANP were responsible for 5 percent of their own maintenance. Building Afghan aviation maintenance capability will take much longer and require sustained levels of U.S. and coalition investment.
Planning

The MoD and MoI demonstrated modest improvements in their ability to plan operations. Operation *Nasrat* provided an opportunity for MoD and MoI planners to work together to design the annual operations plan. Although RS HQ and TAAC level advisors provided significant coaching, ANDSF planners demonstrated an increased ability to synchronize assets and operations compared to the planning of Operation *Khalid* in 2017. Logistical planning remains an area of weakness for the MoD and MoI.

Following a string of HPAs in Kabul in early 2018, MoD and MoI planners worked together effectively to improve the security situation in Kabul, sharing information and intelligence, and delineating responsibilities within the Kabul Enhanced Security Zone (ESZ). Election planning is ongoing and will require sustained MoD and MoI coordination to ensure secure, credible elections take place in October 2018.

Strategic Communications

Strategic communications (STRATCOM) proficiency remained relatively the same across the MoD and MoI during this reporting period. At the national level, the Government Media and Information Center (GMIC) met daily with STRATCOM representatives from the MoD and MoI. The MoD’s Religion and Cultural Affairs (RCA) officer demonstrated the most influence in the GMIC. National-level STRATCOM delivered by television and social media resonated in Kabul, Kandahar, and select population centers with television and internet access. Radio is the primary source of information in most parts of Afghanistan. Despite the GMIC’s national-level effort, the most effective strategic communications occurred at the corps/zone level and below, particularly through local religious and tribal leaders.

Operational and Tactical Capabilities

Enabler integration, such as attack aviation, ISR, and indirect fires, is improving. The ANDSF regularly conduct airstrikes with MD-530 rotary-wing and A-29 fixed-wing aircraft with decreasing levels of coalition assistance, relying instead on Afghan Terminal Air Coordinators (ATAC) to control fires through direct communication with Afghan pilots. In March 2018, the ANDSF executed their first airstrike using ATACs to direct a laser-guided bomb dropped by an A-29 pilot. The ANDSF continued to train ATACs and conduct collective training on combined arms maneuver to integrate air assets into operations more effectively. Additionally, Afghan target development and prioritization continues to improve as the *Nasrat* intelligence center, also known as the National Threat Intelligence Center (NTIC), under the direction of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and Joint Special Operations Coordination Center (JSOCC), mature. Both the ASSF and AAF benefit from this improved relationship with assets allocated based on command priorities, not the order in which they were received.

The ANDSF’s ability to use ISR to plan and, to a lesser extent, control combat operations is limited, but improving. The ANA successfully use ScanEagle at four ANA Corps sites (the 201st, 205th, 209th, and 215th Corps) for force protection and targeting support. The 215th Corps Detachment at FOB Shorab in Helmand Province is the most advanced, routinely utilizing their
ScanEagle Detachment to support the 215th Corps targeting efforts. The 209th Corps also relies heavily on their ScanEagle Detachment at Camp Pamir in Kunduz Province to action their own targets. The 205th Corps ScanEagle Detachment, which reached initial operational capability (IOC) on October 13, 2017, is unique in that it operates as a hub and spoke. The detachment is stationed at Kandahar Airfield (the hub) and has a Ground Control Station (GCS) at Tarin Kot (a spoke), which can take control of an aircraft while in flight.

The use of indirect fires from Afghan artillery and mortar systems lags behind other enablers. The primary obstacle to the use of indirect fires is a lack of trained forward observers and competent fire-direction controllers. Artillery and mortars are used primarily as direct-fire systems or counter-fire systems following insurgent rocket attacks. The ANDSF prefer aerial fires, if available, to indirect fires during offensive operations.

The ASSF remained a bright spot in ANDSF capabilities. When senior ANDSF leaders employ them properly, the ASSF consistently overmatch the enemy on the battlefield. During this reporting period, the ASFF focused on: building combat power; achieving unity of effort across the wider Afghan Security Infrastructure (ASI); developing leaders; countering corruption; and exercising disciplined operational readiness cycles (ORC) to improve ASFF effectiveness during Operation Nasrat.

**Ministerial and ANA-ANP Coordination**

Ministerial coordination continued to improve at the national level due to the decision to reinforce security around Kabul. The increase in HPAs in and around Kabul City resulted in greater emphasis on securing the city, specifically the diplomatic parts of the capital. Political developments, including the second Kabul Peace Conference in February 2018, increased optimism that the Afghan government is on the right path towards peace negotiations with the Taliban, and contributed to the need for increased security in Kabul to allow space for further diplomatic efforts. The establishment of the Kabul ESZ required close coordination between the MoD and MoI, and their respective ANA, ANP, and NDS forces. Coalition advisors worked across the ministries to establish information and intelligence sharing mechanisms. Both ministries worked well together to delineate responsibilities clearly for each component of the ANDSF.

Operation Nasrat provided another opportunity for the MoD and MoI to improve coordination and planning efforts. As was the case with Operation Khalid in 2017, MoD and MoI planners worked together under the tutelage of coalition advisors to construct the annual operational plan to guide the employment of ANDSF forces in 2018, including planning for Parliamentary elections later this year. The Afghan government and U.S. and coalition forces all consider secure and credible elections to be critical to the mission and key to successful peace negotiations. Security planning for elections continued throughout the reporting period and will accelerate as the elections approach.

Coordination on STRATCOM provides another example of coordination between the MoD, the MoI, and the Afghan Presidential Palace. The GMIC director chairs a weekly strategic communications meeting to synchronize messaging on security issues with the MoD and the MoI.
As a result, the Afghan government counters insurgent information operations more effectively. The ANA runs a recurring STRATCOM working group, which synchronizes many non-lethal capabilities and assets of the MoD and ANA, including religious leaders, Psychological Operations, Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, Operations Security, and Military Deception. Additionally, with the inclusion of the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs, Ministry of Information and Culture, High Peace Council, and Afghan civil society organizations in the information operations working group, there is increased optimism for greater STRATCOM success across Afghanistan.

3.5 ASSESSMENT

The ANSF’s performance in combat operations continued to improve, and during the reporting period, the ANDSF seized the initiative in the fight against the Taliban in most parts of Afghanistan. This reporting period marks the beginning of the third year of a sustainable security strategy that focuses on securing the Afghan population, key infrastructure, and lines of communication.

Mild winter conditions allowed for more operations against the Taliban and terrorist forces, disrupting enemy efforts to reconstitute and prepare for offensive operations in 2018. During this reporting period, the ANDSF improved the integration of ASSF operations into extended conventional operations resulting in positive effects on the battlefield. Coalition TAA efforts helped to synchronize U.S. air campaign objectives with ground operations. ASSF operations against insurgent and terrorist forces dealt significant blows to insurgent and terrorist forces facilitating follow-on clearance operations by conventional forces that removed large numbers of enemy personnel, weapons, and equipment from the battlefield and extended security around population centers. Increased use of ISR and aerial fires during this reporting period improved the overall effectiveness of ANDSF operations. Increased use of EAPs, coupled with persistent SFAB TAA below the corps and zone levels, ensured that ANDSF units balanced maintenance and training activities with the demand for continued operations. In some instances, ANDSF units proved unable to adhere to a strict ORC and put little effort towards training.

24 The classified annex to this report contains ANDSF assessments by force pillar.
SECTION 4 – MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

4.1 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

The MoD oversees the ANA, the AAF, and the MoD’s pillars within the ASSF: the ANASOC, the *Ktah Khas*, and the SMW (see Figure 5). Major General Tariq Shah Bahrami, the former MoI Senior Deputy Minister, was appointed Minister of Defense in April 2017 and confirmed by Parliament in December 2017. Parliament’s confirmation of Minister Bahrami empowered him to pursue continued leadership and organizational reform and focus priorities on campaign planning and execution, procurement of resources, counter-corruption, and improved force protection. Lieutenant General Mohammad Sharif Yaftali was promoted from Commander, 203rd ANA Corps, to Chief of General Staff (CoGS) in April 2017. All relevant security and operations functions fall under the direct supervision of CoGS Yaftali, particularly directing Corps Commanders to execute the Campaign Plan. During this reporting period, the MoD’s focus areas included eliminating corruption; professionalizing of the military; campaign planning and execution; improving resource planning, programming, budgeting, and execution; improving force protection; increasing transparency and accountability; and implementing civilianization policies.

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25 The *Ktah Khas* is a light infantry special operations *kandak* accomplished in conducting intelligence-driven counterterrorism raids, particularly against high-value individuals, and vehicle interdictions utilizing both ground and air mobility platforms.
Figure 6: Ministry of Defense Organizational Chart

The MoD-authorized end-strength includes positions for the MoD headquarters, various command staffs, the ANA, the AAF, and elements of the ASSF (see Figure 6). The MoD also includes an additional 5,835 authorized civilian positions that augment military forces for certain duties, build institutional knowledge and experience within the ministry, and free up soldiers to perform inherently military functions. The current FY 2018 MoD-authorized force level as part of the tashkil increased to 227,374 personnel to reflect the transfer of ABP and ANCOP from the MoI, and the creation of the pilot ANATF units.

26 Although the MoD and MoI budget process coincides with the Afghan fiscal year, the tashkil process coincides with the Afghan solar year (SY). The Afghan fiscal year follows the SY numbering system, but is offset by one quarter. The Afghan FY 1397 began December 22, 2017, and ended December 21, 2018. For ease of understanding, within this report FY 1397 is referred to as FY2018.
Figure 7: Ministry of Defense Manning Authorization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MoD Echelons</th>
<th>FY 16</th>
<th>FY 17</th>
<th>FY 18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense Headquarters</td>
<td>2,308</td>
<td>2,247</td>
<td>1,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Staff</td>
<td>6,392</td>
<td>6,492</td>
<td>4,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Commands</td>
<td>26,382</td>
<td>27,888</td>
<td>22,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Commands</td>
<td>119,651</td>
<td>119,814</td>
<td>153,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
<td>11,669</td>
<td>11,924</td>
<td>22,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force and SMW</td>
<td>8,407</td>
<td>8,626</td>
<td>8,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTHS Accounts(^27)</td>
<td>13,359</td>
<td>13,359</td>
<td>10,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unassigned Resources</td>
<td>6,832</td>
<td>4,650</td>
<td>2,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherent Law</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Military Authorized</strong></td>
<td><strong>195,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>195,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>227,374</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Civilians (Not in 227k)</td>
<td>8,004</td>
<td>5,502</td>
<td>5,835</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Resource Management and Procurement

The MoD improved and streamlined its budget execution and procurement procedures, but continues to struggle with identifying requirements below the corps level. In the past, delays in finalizing spending and procurement plans led to inefficient acquisition planning and procurement prioritization. During this reporting period, the MoD Draft Prioritization Procurement Plan reestablished focus on procurement priorities that emphasize ANA readiness, promote key Roadmap initiatives, and support operational and warfighting needs.

The FY 2018 Draft Prioritization Plan has three tiers, with Tier I consisting of the highest priority procurement requirements. Once the MoD identifies requirements according to the tier system, it submits packages to the Requirements Approval Board (RAB), which reviews the package and completed bid evaluation. Advisors incentivized prioritization by withholding Tier II funds until the RAB completed at least 75 percent of package bids evaluations for FY 1397 Tier I requirements. As of May 16, 2018, the MoD awarded 17 FY17 contracts totaling $16.5 million, and the RAB approved 77 of 100 contracts identified in the FY 2018 Draft Prioritized Procurement Plan. The Minister of Defense and CSTC-A leadership receive bi-weekly execution status briefs from the MoD budget units. Through May 2018, the MoD executed 41 percent of its current budget. Although this is slightly behind the 2017 execution rate, the MoD did not receive its budget until January 2018, delaying its ability to expend funds.

\(^{27}\) TTHS denotes training, transient, holding, and students.
The MoD, with RS TAA, streamlined processes to reduce the bureaucracy associated with the historically slow procurement process within the MoD. The acquisition process typically takes 224 days to complete due to mistrust and cumbersome roadblocks. Every acquisition or procurement request must navigate a myriad of offices, often resulting in misplaced or wrongly prioritized requests and substantial delays in the approval process. The maturation of the procurement tracking system improved the MoD’s ability to track compliance with its procurement plan. Additionally, Minister Bahrami instituted a Procurement Executive Oversight Committee that meets on a bi-weekly basis to manage execution and address procurement issues. RS advisors work with the MoD to streamline the process; however, the lengthy procurement and acquisition process is the single greatest contributing factor to timely execution of the MoD spend plan.

**Legal Affairs**

MoD advanced a number of counter- and anti-corruption initiatives during this reporting period. On December 19, 2017, Minister Bahrami signed the MoD Policy to Prevent and Combat Corruption; he signed the follow-on Implementation Plan on January 2, 2018. The policy and implementation plan lay the foundation for MoD counter-corruption activities.

Although the MoD made progress in implementing counter-corruption initiatives, leadership vacancies within the MoD Inspector General (IG) office remain persistent. The MoD IG is the lead agency for advising and assisting MoD leaders on readiness, effectiveness, and the well-being of the force through objective and impartial inspections, assessments, and investigations. During this reporting period, the MoD IG operated without a permanent IG, which converted to a civilian position, and the MoD has neglected to fill two key General Officer positions with appropriately graded individuals. Without a confirmed IG, the Acting IG lacks the authority to make substantial progress in key areas. At the corps-level, personnel gaps remain a consistent issue, and the MoD has not taken significant steps towards hiring slotted civilian positions.

Based on projected implementation of the Inherent Law, approximately 50 percent of the MoD IG workforce will retire once the Inherent Law is implemented within the MoD IG. Although the retirements will clear the way for civilianization and merit-based promotion within the MoD IG, the MoD will need to take steps to mitigate the short-term risks associated with reduced force structure within the IG. RS Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (TAO) advisors are working with the MoD to think ahead, anticipate personnel gaps, and seek ways to mitigate risks. TAO engaged with the MoD General Staff (GS) G1 to ensure the MoD fills IG slots with the appropriate cadre of skilled personnel. The GS G1 often assigns personnel without strong consideration for the knowledge and skills required on the job. Although this issue cuts across the ANDSF, it significantly threatens the MoD IG’s credibility and mission to combat corruption. Consistent training of MoD IG personnel can help sustain the MoD IG as the Inherent Law takes effect and new personnel are hired. In January 2018, the MoD hosted a training class attended by 43 MoD IG and 10 MoI IG personnel. TAO TAA hopes to improve the quality of this training and build consistency over time.

In 2017, for the first time, as required by Afghan law, high-ranking military officers were required to provide their asset declarations to the High Office of Anti-Corruption (HOOAC), the government entity responsible for vetting and validating asset declarations. During this reporting
period, many of the functions performed by the HOOAC, including vetting and validating asset declarations, transitioned to a new office on President Ghani’s staff. This transition could indicate greater importance placed on these functions, but could also allow for further accusations of nepotism levied against the President Ghani.

Contrary to past reporting periods, advisors during this reporting period assessed degrading capabilities within the MoD IG to receive and respond to complaints from the ANA and MoD. In the past, the IG distributed complaint calling/business cards and placed complaint boxes and TAO posters at various unit locations. Advisors reported that many of these posters are outdated. At times, call-in numbers listed on the posters are tied to individuals that may have departed the MoD IG. To date, the IG has not established a formal procedure for fielding call-in complaints. Whereas earlier efforts likely resulted in greater awareness among the general population of the mechanisms for submitting complaints, these shortcomings may undermine confidence in the MoD IG’s ability to field and appropriately address concerns.

A key tenet of MoD IG TAA has been advising on inspections and investigations. Although the MoD IG made progress in implementing these initiatives, the current trend has been flat. The IG often loses sight of inspections and investigations once it issues recommendations, thereby restricting its ability to track progress from start to finish. Additionally, the IG does not have a central repository of past reports to serve as a source for institutional knowledge. TAO TAA has identified these issues and emphasized the importance of conducting thorough inspections and investigations, providing recommendations or findings, and following up to ensure proper implementation or action on recommendations and findings.

In previous reporting periods, the MoD demonstrated progress towards identifying, investigating, and appropriately responding to GVHR allegations, as well as providing adequate GVHR training and qualified personnel. However, the MoD was unable to provide substantive information about many GVHR cases through this reporting period, and open GVHR cases appear to have stalled. There were no credible GVHRs reported to the MoD in the reporting period (i.e., GVHR allegations determined to be credible through U.S. processes).

RS targeted this shortcoming through TAA efforts to identify training and capability gaps. RS advisors prepared MoD Legal for the Minister of Defense’s anticipated signature on an International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights (HR) Policy that addresses IHL/HR violations, including GVHR and torture. The new policy mandates appropriately tailored annual Law of Armed Conflict training for all MoD personnel. On December 5, 2017, Minister Bahrami signed the Child Protection Policy to address Children and Armed Conflict. The Human Rights Policy and the Child Protection Policy codify Afghanistan’s commitments under international and domestic law and will require the ANDSF’s strict compliance with, and enforcement of, the policies.

**Personnel Management**

Building the institutional capacity to manage the Ministry’s personnel has been a key priority of MoD and RS advisors for several reporting periods. Advisory and reform efforts have culminated into three key focus areas: validation of personnel in the ministry, identification of future leaders,
and management of career paths. These complementary lines of effort seek to establish a self-sustaining, merit-based institutional ability to manage personnel. Proper validation of personnel allows the Ministry to administer salaries only to those validated in its system and provides visibility on the ministry’s leadership structure. Enhanced visibility sets the conditions for better identification of future leaders, and allows the ministry to optimize ongoing Inherent Law and merit-based promotion reforms. Finally, as leaders rise into newly vacated positions, the MoD, with the continued assistance of advisors, can utilize its Human Resource Management (HRM) processes to institutionalize career paths through professional military education and progressive assignments. During this reporting period, the MoD and ANA took several steps to account for personnel and identify leaders. The MoD requires additional TAA to build its HRM and career progression capabilities.

Although personnel accountability and validation remains a concern, the MoD, along with U.S. and coalition advisors, continue to conduct PAIs to account for personnel properly and enroll them into the APPS system to reduce personnel management problems and eliminate “ghost soldiers” from the ANDSF. Throughout the reporting period, the MoD and advisors conducted PAIs at each ANA corps location to update and validate soldier data in the AHRIMS and ensure personnel data accurately populates in the APPS system. The MoD continues to transfer AHRIMS data to the APPS personnel module in advance of full APPS implementation in July 2018. Soldiers must provide personal data, possess an identification card, have biometric data on file, and occupy a valid position on the current tashkil to be validated.

Over the past two years, PAI efforts have collected data on a majority of the current ANA forces, and reached 98 percent enrollment during the last reporting period. With the transfer of invalidated ABP and ANCOP forces from the MoI to the MoD, the current enrollment rate is approximately 81 percent. The final round of PAI for all corps personnel began in December 2017; however, another round of PAI in April 2018 was necessary to validate those forces that transferred from the MoI. This extensive, multi-year effort will increase the accuracy of personnel data and limit ANDSF payroll fraud.

Once validated in the AHRIMS system, ANA personnel are eligible to receive salary payments from CSTC-A salary disbursements. On January 1, 2017, CSTC-A began funding the monthly ANA and ALP payroll disbursements from the validated personnel records within AHRIMS. Accordingly, CSTC-A withheld funds for those personnel not accounted for in AHRIMS. The estimated number of soldiers not enrolled in AHRIMS for the MoD is 34,043 as of May 11, 2018.

During this reporting period, the MoD continued phased implementation of the APPS system. Advisors expect APPS to reach full operational capability during the next reporting period, at which time APPS will become the MoD’s system of record for personnel and pay management. APPS is a major shift in the MoD’s traditional way of managing pay and personnel. Although a transformation of this magnitude will encounter challenges, the success of the MoD and advisors to date represents a significant and positive reform towards greater accountability and transparency.

APPS training continued during this reporting period, with the last 20 percent of APPS operators in training. The four-week operator training classes graduate approximately 100 students per
After the four-week class, over-the-shoulder (OTS) training occurs at each unit for four to eight weeks, including comparisons of pay calculations between APPS and AHRIMS. OTS training reinforces daily time and attendance record requirements, assists with identifying and reconciling pay discrepancies, and helps troubleshoot issues that may arise with the full implementation of a completely new pay and management system. RS continues to encourage stronger oversight of reported personnel numbers by linking funding for ANA personnel to approved tashkil positions, a requirement under APPS. During this reporting period, 81 percent of the ANA were assigned to valid tashkil positions.

The MoD and ANA took several steps to reduce the size of its officer corps, enforce merit-based promotion practices, and eliminate the presence of “ghost soldiers” on the ANDSF payroll. Under President Ghani’s new Inherent Law, officers are subject to mandatory retirement upon reaching a specified time in service or time in rank, or if the officer exceeds a specific age tied to his or her rank. For years, the MoD and ANA retained significantly more general officers and senior leaders than the tashkil authorized. Many excess colonels serve in positions designated for junior officers, resulting in many senior officers receiving significantly higher salaries for performing duties well below their rank. Implementation of the first wave of the Inherent Law occurred on January 1, 2018. 162 General Officers and 494 Colonels retired, accounting for 656 retirees. No General Officers and only 12 Colonels were slotted in General Officer or Colonel positions, respectively, at the time of retirement.

The MoD continued its “civilianization” reform effort to transition some senior leader ANA positions from military to civilian billets. Civilianization will provide greater civilian oversight of the force, leverage subject matter expertise, and build continuity within the organization. MoD plans to civilianize 4,728 positions, held by Officers and NCOs, through a phased approach, which began in FY17 and continued this reporting period. To date, the MoD has converted 4,067 military positions to civilian ones. The MoD has established a transfer process. The MoD will announce current vacant positions and identify “blocked” or “R coded” positions, positions occupied by military personnel but identified for transition to civilian billets. Once military personnel vacate “blocked” positions through reassignment, retirement, or natural attrition, the MoD will seek civilian replacements for those positions. As of May 2018, the MoD identified 405 “blocked” positions that cannot be backfilled by another military member. Implementation of the civilianization plan remains slow for several reasons. Transitioning a position from military to civilian threatens the job security of senior military leaders. Culturally, the idea of civilians working alongside combat soldiers has not resonated with many ANDSF senior leaders. The MoD completed seven of ten internal hiring actions for senior civilian leadership positions over the past year. The civil service commission advertises, interviews, and screens applicants for civilian hires. Although processing positions through the civil service commission for approval has been slow, and key stakeholders have made repeated attempts to circumvent merit-based procedures, three of the remaining four hires are now in progress. RS advisors have focused on improving the recruitment processes and filling positions that will bring the MoD closer to the civilianization goal.

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The benefits of APPS extend beyond payroll system improvements. RS advisors and the ANDSF gained much greater understanding of personnel information through the PAI and AHRIMS updates. APPS allows for real-time personnel data and unit strength. APPS alone cannot solve
the problem of poor career path management, and simply understanding where a soldier, NCO, or officer is slotted on the *tashkil* is not enough. Although APPS is capable of managing personnel moves, HRM professionals that use the system must understand the career path a soldier, NCO, or officer should follow in order to remain competitive for promotion and selection to positions of increased responsibility. HRM professionals must understand when ANA personnel should attend professional military education (PME) and work with UTEDC to use APPS as a tool to ensure training occurs and soldiers are assigned to positions to utilize their new skills. At present, the ANA HRM system is not designed to perform critical functions such as career path management. The implementation of APPS will help set the conditions for a successful HRM system to grow.

Intensive advisor support is required in order to build an HRM system that maximizes APPS and ensures rising leaders occupy critical positions as they progress in their career.

**Institutional Training**

The MoD provides robust training opportunities for personnel; however, the MoD must strengthen institutional training as a parallel, mutually reinforcing effort to improve the overall capability and leadership within the MoD. Historically, TAA efforts to build strong training institutions have been insufficient, with TAA resources and efforts going to field units rather than institutions that train and develop ANDSF forces throughout their careers. The focus has shifted towards building stronger institutions, and the renewed presence of RS advisors below the corps level may assist the coalition’s efforts to understand the full impact of training efforts.

ANA branch schools such as the Infantry, Artillery, and Logistics schools remain undermanned and lack the Afghan subject matter expertise necessary to hand over the instruction. Advisor involvement at the institutional level has been episodic over the last few years. However, the recent U.S. personnel uplift enabled the RS Army Institutional Advisory Team (AIAT) to provide more instructors to some schools as they seek an enduring solution that is less reliant on coalition partners committing institutional trainers in the future. Turkish advisors are now assisting with training at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTIC). Portuguese advisors will participate at the ANA Artillery School, and Polish advisors will contribute personnel to the ANA Armor School by the end of June 2018. Unfortunately, the Combat Service Support School has not benefited from U.S. or coalition personnel uplifts and requires an advisory presence to progress.

Human resource and career path management remains underdeveloped. The existing human resource management (HRM) system does not allow for proper identification of ANA personnel in need of training at various points along their career paths, nor does it ensure trained personnel are assigned to *tashkil* positions where individuals can properly utilize their training. The APPS system promises to provide greater visibility and, provided major improvements are made to the career management aspect of ANA HRM, improved training management may follow.

Schools and courses such as the Command and Staff School and Pre-Command Courses made moderate improvements during this reporting period. Seats in these courses often are still apportioned based on patronage; however, the new CoGS’s emphasis on professional military education (PME) resulted in six Brigade commanders completing the Pre-Command Course (PCC). Progress has been slower at the *kandak* level where roughly 50 percent of sitting *kandak* commanders are PCC-qualified. The MoD’s goal is for all brigade and *kandak* commanders to
complete the Pre-Command Course. Advisors are prepared to alter courses and schedules in accordance with the need for leadership training and changes based on the Inherent Law.

The MoD intends to establish a Unified Training System (UTS) by the end of 2020 to help standardize ANA training and education. As part of that overall strategy, the MoD made progress towards development of the Unified Training, Education, and Doctrine Command (UTEDC). The UTEDC is an integrated Headquarters with command and control over the entire ANA Training and Education Landscape (TEL). The UTEDC provides the MoD with an organization responsible for developing doctrine and training programs to inform activity within branch schools and PME institutions. Over the course of this reporting period, the MoD developed, validated, and obtained approval by the Minister of Defense for the detailed structural concept. In February 2018, the MoD validated the tashkil positions for the new HQ, which was integrated into the overall tashkil in March 2018. With an established structural concept and validated tashkil, the next step is selection of a 3-star commander and staff to begin the transition to a unified command.

**Logistics and Maintenance**

The MoD demonstrated limited, but increasing, capacity to maintain accurate equipment accountability, but struggles with overall maintenance capabilities. In the past, inconsistent and inaccurate equipment readiness reporting restricted the MoD’s ability to identify equipment shortages and build procurement plans. During this reporting period, the increased use of the Core-IMS improved accountability and visibility into key commodities at the MoD and ANA corps levels. Additionally, linking the Core-IMS to the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) system has allowed U.S. materiel purchased for the Afghans through pseudo-FMS cases to populate directly into the Core-IMS system. In the coming months, OS/LOG advisors hope to add a Property Book Module to the Core-IMS system that will allow for even greater fidelity and accountability at the corps level and below.

The Core-IMS allows the MoD to track transfers of equipment out of national warehouses to corps forward supply depots. In the past, equipment shipped from the MoD required manual re-entry by the corps upon receipt. Now, equipment transferred from the MoD automatically generates a receipt at the forward supply depot so the receiving ANA corps knows the contents and expected arrival date of the shipment. The MoD has contracted for fiber-optic cable to connect the Core-IMS to 17 different sites, including all ANA Corps headquarters. Extension of the fiber-optic cable began in October 2017 and continued during this reporting period. Expanding the fiber-optic network forms the basis of overall connectivity to the Core-IMS system at the various corps HQs, and is fundamental to MoD and TAA efforts to improve accurate accountability and serviceability.

In addition to connecting ANA corps to the supply depots, the MoD sought to account for the significant amount of material in storage at the depots. At present, contracted personnel manually enter all equipment stored at supply depots into the Core-IMS to track materiel. At the corps level, inconsistent and inaccurate reporting of equipment readiness through the Core-IMS inhibits the MoD’s ability to identify equipment shortages and build procurement plans. Full integration of the Core-IMS at the ANA corps and connectivity back to MoD Headquarters will provide greater visibility into the supply system in its totality.
The successful inventory management of Class IIX material at regional hospitals serves as a potentially effective model for corps-level reporting and inventory management. During this reporting period, the MoD began extending the Core-IMS to regional hospitals to improve visibility of Class IIX materials provided from the Central Supply Depots (CSD) to the hospitals. Seventy-one percent of the regional hospitals have integrated the Core-IMS, and full integration at all hospitals is expected in August 2018. Additionally, regional hospitals execute monthly random inventory assessments on 10 percent of their on-hand inventory. By correlating these assessments with Core-IMS, the regional hospitals have demonstrated an extremely high level of accuracy in their inventory reporting. This provides the MoD and CSD with more accurate visibility and control of medical items, resulting in greater transparency and reducing opportunities for corruption. As reporting accuracy improves, MoD leaders can direct materials to be cross-leveled when appropriate to meet critical demands. The regional hospitals’ ability to conduct random inventory assessments that correlate accurately with the Core-IMS demonstrates successful equipment inventory management and reliable reporting.

Using the success of the regional hospitals as a model, the MoD sought to improve its overall management of ammunition, particularly accurate inventory reporting. Inaccurate inventory reporting poses a risk to MoD’s fighting capability. Monthly inventory reports provided by the corps often differ from Core-IMS inventories. This gap in information affects the MoD’s understanding of the actual inventory of on-hand ammunition, how often ammunition is issued, and how much ammunition can be cross-leveled to a corps in need. During this reporting period, the MoD Core-IMS Director and OS/LOG advisors worked together to address these issues. The MoD signed a cypher implementing mandatory 10 percent inventory assessments of ammunition and agreed to an updated ammunition commitment letter with CSTC-A. The previous commitment letter required the MoD to provide a monthly inventory report of ammunition. Under the new commitment letter, the MoD must provide a monthly inventory report and a monthly 10 percent inventory assessment, and correlate the report and assessment with Core-IMS values to verify and validate overall accuracy. Although this represents another significant step towards improving ammunition visibility on reported inventories, cross-leveling ammunition between corps remains a significant challenge requiring continued TAA and MoD direction. Although the MoD made positive improvements in equipment reporting, confidence in overall MoD equipment reporting accountability remains moderate.

Historically, the ANA struggled to maintain proper accountability and safe storage of ammunition. In several instances, ANA personnel were injured or killed when ammunition bunkers exploded due to improper storage techniques or inadequate storage facilities. During this reporting period, the Afghan government entered into an agreement with the HALO Trust, a non-governmental organization (NGO) from the United Kingdom, to assist with the removal of mines and unsafe ammunition stored in its ammunition supply points. The HALO Trust is considered the world’s largest humanitarian mine clearance organization.28 Capitalizing on the good work done by the HALO Trust, OS/LOG advisors often conducted ESATs to sites where the HALO Trust had finished removing unsafe ammunition and worked with ANA personnel to establish safe ammunition storage and handling procedures to ensure conditions remained safe.

28 The HALO Trust, [https://www.halotrust.org](https://www.halotrust.org)
Although the MoD demonstrated increased capacity for logistics planning and execution, MoD logisticians will require persistent TAA as underdeveloped national logistics planning remains a vulnerability to the mission. Expeditionary Sustainment Advisory Teams (ESATs) typically consist of logistics and sustainment personnel and help identify shortcomings in logistics planning and coordination between MoD and the ANA corps’ headquarters. ESAT teams perform regular site visits to ANA corps for greater insight into logistics and sustainment issues. During this reporting period, ESATs expanded to include medical logisticians and engineering personnel to assess medical and facility needs at the corps. Corps site visits by multi-functional ESATs enable improved MoD-level support and supply of repair parts, clothing and individual equipment, and other commodities from MoD depots to the points of need. In late 2018, the MoD plans to deploy ESATs to a limited number of zones to provide support beyond the corps level.

The National Maintenance Contract (NMC), launched during last reporting period, reached full operational capability (FOC) on December 28, 2017. The NMC consolidated six individual vehicle maintenance contracts into one ANDSF-wide contract to improve near-term maintenance while building long-term Afghan maintenance capacity. It focuses on improving the overall maintenance capability of the ANDSF while simultaneously providing formal training and mentoring to ANA personnel in the maintenance and supply chain management function.

In the first year of the contract, MoD maintains responsibility for 50 percent of the overall maintenance of on-hand vehicles, with contractors responsible for the remaining 50 percent. Although in its nascent phases, the NMC enabled the ANA to focus on maintaining and managing readiness while contracted maintainers provide additional support for more complex maintenance issues. The ANA previously relied on replacement-in-kind rather than having a coordinated maintenance program. The corps have been dependent on external resources such as Central Workshops or contractor maintenance for preventative maintenance and repair. However, the NMC seeks to reverse this trend with consistent training and mentoring and a designated distribution of responsibility. The NMC allows the ANA to improve its general maintenance, inventory management, and quality control, and enables the ANA to increase its capacity and capability to absorb gradual increases in maintenance responsibilities. Overall, the NMC enables the progressive, incremental yearly transfer of responsibility to the ANA for vehicle maintenance. During this reporting period, the ANA displayed a steady month-to-month increase in their maintenance capabilities as defined by the NMC.

The proper utilization of trained mechanics and supply chain specialists remains a critical requirement for successful development of overall ANA maintenance capability. To mitigate this risk and establish long-term, improved maintenance capabilities, the MoD launched a “civilianization” of mechanics test program in the 201st Corps to provide a more enduring maintainer presence. Under the pilot program, the 201st ANA Corps will recode a limited number of tashkil maintenance positions from military personnel to civilian maintainers. At the end of a three month trial period, the MoD, with OS/LOG TAA advisors, will evaluate and decide whether to increase the number of civilian mechanics, locations, and equipment items to maintain. The introduction of civilian mechanics, and gradual improvement in how the ANA tracks and utilizes military mechanics, demonstrate positive steps towards improving the MoD’s organic maintenance capability.
Complementing its efforts to improve on-hand vehicle maintenance, the MoD streamlined its processes for reporting recoverable and non-recoverable battle damaged vehicles. When a vehicle suffers battle damage, the corps code the vehicles as damaged, estimate the cost of damage, and remove these vehicles from their property book to display accurately on-hand, operationally ready vehicles. Historically, bureaucracy and the number of officials required to approve this process stretched the procedure’s timeline to up to two years, causing inaccurate reporting of vehicle operational readiness. With the assistance of OS/LOG advisors, the MoD reduced the number of officials required to sign for non-recoverable and recoverable vehicles from 26 to 5 and 26 to 11, respectively. These efforts have significant positive impacts. First, the MoD and RS have greater visibility into vehicle fleet operational readiness. Second, the MoD can better identify the extent of its recoverable battle-damaged fleet. Finally, the process re-emphasizes the importance of property book, tashkil, and excess fleet management.

**Strategic and Operational Planning**

The MoD continues to create strategic and operational plans in support of the Afghan Sustainable Security Strategy. During Operation *Khalid*, the ANDSF operational plan for 2017-2018, the MoD demonstrated an ability to manage multiple problem sets simultaneously, identify future issues, and generate contingency planning. The MoD continues to hone ministry-level focus on strategic and operational level issues; however, at times, ministry personnel respond to tactical-level challenges instead of delegating to commanders in the field. RS TAA efforts continue to stress the need to focus on strategic-level guidance, intent, and end-state to steer the operational planning process. During the reporting period, the MoD primarily focused on protecting major population centers and provincial capitals. Understanding that portions of the ASSF must rotate from the battlefield to schools to further Roadmap initiatives, the MoD focused combat power in specific geographic areas. Throughout the reporting period, the MoD shifted the main effort and worked with RS advisors to use EAPs and deny the Taliban any strategic victories.

While the MoD planned and executed Operation *Khalid*, the MoD simultaneously conducted improved planning for their 2018 Annual Operational Plan (AOP), Operation *Nasrat*. The 2018 AOP focuses on parliamentary elections, securing multiple national economic projects, providing security and governance to the Afghan population, and seeking reconciliation with the Taliban. Operation *Nasrat* will focus on integration of the ASSF and AAF capability growth and offensive operations. The GS staff professionally planned Operation *Nasrat*, meeting RS’s expectations for planning. Throughout the process, the NATO RS staff remained available to facilitate communication and encourage multi-faceted approaches to resolve problems.

The MoD displayed its ability to conduct joint planning throughout the AOP development phase. The MoI and MoD worked jointly on complex issues surrounding the ABP and ANCOP transfer by engaging in a combined joint working group (CJWG). Branch meetings also occurred outside the CJWG to address some specific issues coming from the CJWG. Furthermore, the recent Joint Plan for Kabul Security directs the MoD, MoI, and NDS to work together under a joint command structure, the Kabul Garrison Command (KGC).
Intelligence

The MoD faced challenges during this reporting period, but also made encouraging gains. Leadership changes, in part due to the Inherent Law, will usher in creative junior leaders who are more technologically savvy than their predecessors, and more accustomed to collaboration with MoI counterparts. Additionally, the MoD increased its training courses in Kabul, and designed career paths for intelligence specialists. Although MoD made progress in executing a proper intelligence cycle, from requests for information, to collection and dissemination, the MoD still suffers from a lack of proper prioritization of intelligence requirements and failure to use the correct intelligence tools for collection. TAA efforts will focus on improving these shortfalls.

Intelligence sharing is a major area for improvement and the new GS G2’s leadership and personal involvement in operations generated a spike in information sharing between leaders from the MoD and CoGS, and corps, brigade, and Military Intelligence kandak commanders. During this reporting period, the MoD’s Intel Watch Center began sharing intelligence with the MoI, the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC), and other ministry-level sections via the Nasrat Center to avoid duplicate reporting. NMIC’s Current Intelligence Section (CIS) consistently disseminates products downward on a case-by-case basis, and the CIS increased its intelligence sharing of custom-built products to higher-level MoD entities, the NDS, and the Office of the President of Afghanistan (PoA).

The new GS G2 embraces technology and demonstrates keen interest in the more technical systems, such as the National Information Management System (NIMS), Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS) aerostats, Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) towers, the Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS), ScanEagle, and the Wolfhound Electronic Warfare System. To build up technological capabilities, the GSG2 Systems Directorate initiated and completed a network upgrade between multiple headquarters elements to provide additional data transmission capability.

The ANDSF improved its use of basic signals intelligence (SIGINT) in operations, especially the successful utilization and integration of ScanEagle. ScanEagle allows for target surveillance, air-to-ground integration for aerial fires, and battle damage assessments after strikes. Plans to increase the number of ScanEagle detachments are underway. During this reporting period, the increase in targets engaged based on intelligence gained from ScanEagle use almost doubled. ScanEagle operators are now included in the tashkil, but the ANDSF still needs to determine the career progression for ScanEagle operators. Additionally, the cost of continued U.S. training and maintenance on the system is not sustainable. The ANDSF will work to transfer technical sustainment from contractors to Afghans over the next two to three years.

Strategic Communication

The MoD increased its engagements and improved transparency with the media by delivering information on a regular and timely basis. Strategic communications (STRATCOM) remains largely uncoordinated and sporadic across the ministry and corps. At the national level, the GMIC met daily with STRATCOM representatives from the MoD and MoI. The MoD’s Religion and
Cultural Affairs (RCA) officer demonstrated the most influence in the GMIC. The most effective strategic communications occurred at the corps/zone level and below.

The MoD spokesperson conducted daily news briefings and frequent media engagements highlighting successful ANA, ASSF, and AAF operations. The MoD spokesperson also provided information about high-profile insurgent attacks and operations, and responded to journalists’ questions. However, the MoD still struggles to address and clearly communicate points regarding potentially unpopular topics. The most effective STRATCOM occurs at the tactical level with local religious and tribal leaders demonstrating the most influence.

During the reporting period, MoD STRATCOM continued its civil outreach program. The outreach program is now part of the Key Leader Training (KLT) program, which emphasizes the importance of strategic communications and community relations. The KLT focused on Corps Commanders and Chiefs of Staff and on Information Operations (IO), Religious and Cultural Affairs (RCA), and Public Affairs officers. The KLT included instruction on community engagement, information coordination, press conferences, media interviews, and the Morale Strategy. Training concluded with a press conference and a gathering of local civilian leadership, tribal elders, and civil society representatives.

MoD STRATCOM and Public Affairs (PA) will face new challenges in the coming months with the MoD’s restructuring. STRATCOM and Public Affairs (PA) will be divided and move into different organizations: PA will integrate with the Religious and Culture Advisor (RCA), and STRATCOM will fall under Strategy and Policy. Additionally, the Inherent Law will force the retirement of senior leaders in those offices.

The ANA Corps made slow but steady improvement in conducting their own media operations, independent of direction from the MoD Strategic Communication Office. The current MoD strategic communication policy allows corps commanders to engage the media directly to address issues in their specific areas of operation. Although not standardized across the ANA, several corps commanders and their spokespersons actively engaged media and improved relationships with the provincial governors and their spokespersons, enabling constant and consistent messaging to the press and populace.

**Gender Integration Initiatives**

The number of women in the ANA increased over the last year, with 1,179 in April 2018, compared to 1,044 in April 2017.

Although circumstances have improved for Afghan women since 2001, sexual abuse, harassment, gender-based violence, cultural norms, and certain inequalities threaten the successful integration and long-term retention of women in the ANDSF. The current ad hoc method of recruitment, training, and placement can lead to women being underutilized and, therefore considered ineffective. Although gender imbalances in professional militaries are not unusual, the ANA continues to struggle to recruit and retain women. The ANDSF lack a significant cadre of highly performing, middle-to-senior ranking women to serve as inspirational role models for the younger generations of Afghan women. Further compounding the issue, units continue to place men into
positions reserved for women because there are not enough qualified women to fill the empty positions. NATO RS and the MoD are developing policies and refining processes to address the myriad of issues that contribute to low recruitment and retention rates for women.

The draft 2017-2018 Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter invokes up to a 5 percent penalty of total allocated funds per month against noncompliant units that do not appoint women to authorized P3 positions. Further, CSTC-A will levy a 5 percent penalty of total allocated funds if a women’s recruitment plan is not completed. This includes recruiting, training, and placing 6,425 women over the next eight years (about 200 per quarter) in positions based on their career management field. This goal is considered more attainable than the previous goal of 400 per quarter. These penalties will take effect once the MoD and GS G1 establish a tashkil plan that effectively places female recruits into appropriate positions.

The MoD continued to update the tashkil in this reporting period, and filed paperwork to designate some P1 and P2 positions to P3 positions, and most P1 (men only) to P2 positions (either men or women). Multiple RS offices participate in a weekly P3 optimization working group meeting. Progress is slow, but ongoing. The penalty for failure to create 200 P3 tashkil positions quarterly will be assessed against the GS G3 budget per the SY 1397 commitment letters signed at the end of May.

Women, like the men in the ANDSF, suffer from the absence of a clearly defined career progression. RS’s Gender Advisors continue to assist the MoD to develop a career path plan for ANA women from recruitment through retirement. This plan, called the Planning Pyramid, consists of six stages. Each stage must be complete before creating the next stage. The pyramid steps include the tashkil plan, training plan, promotion plan, facility plan, recruiting plan, and retention plan. This complex plan requires coordination and collaboration between the Gender Office and multiple MoD Directorates. Given its complexity, the plan must be iterative, with adjustments made to the tashkil as the needs arise throughout recruitment, training, and placement.

In this reporting period, the only female general in the ANA was retired under inherent law. There are currently three female colonels in the ANA, and they will be eligible for promotion through merit-based selection.

**Education and Training**

Additional initiatives to address the ANA gender integration effort include the promotion of development programs, enhanced training, and salary incentives. Women in the ANA have access to an undergraduate sponsorship program, the Gender Occupational Opportunity Development (GOOD) program, overseas training programs, childcare provisions, and retention bonuses. Although top echelons of the ANA and the Afghan government have displayed a strong and enduring commitment to these efforts, many MoD gender inequalities have yet to be addressed, primarily the inadequacy of facilities dedicated to women in the ANA.

GOOD is a NATFO-funded program that provides training to the uniformed and civilian members of the ANDSF in Dari and Pashto literacy and English language, computer skills, and office administration. The GOOD Program maintains training locations throughout Kabul and has
planned expansion into Mazar-e-Sharif in May 2018 and Helmand in June 2018. RS works with NGOs in Afghanistan to ensure that efforts to improve women’s literacy are de-conflicted and not duplicative.

During this reporting period, approximately 450 women attended GOOD Program training throughout Afghanistan, primarily in Kabul with locations at the MoD HQ, Camp Scorpion, HKIA, Kabul National Military Hospital, the MoD Sewing Factory, Camp Qargha, the Afghan National Army Officer Academy, and Camp Zafar in Herat. This training will improve the women’s proficiency in their current duties and improve their career prospects, making them more competitive with their colleagues.

Additionally, women are able to participate in advanced training in Turkey for specialized training related to their military occupational specialty. The United Kingdom currently has one female student at the Sandhurst Military Academy, and prospective female pilots are offered training in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates on full scholarships. Women continue to be placed in positions unrelated to their specialized training when they return-a persistent ANDSF problem that men also face. RS advisors monitored the placement and progress of 75 women who attended advanced training in October 2017 and found that none were placed in positions that properly utilized their new skills due to a failing personnel management system.

Since October 2017, women have not gone to training in Turkey, but 100 nursing students, 100 officers, and 100 non-commissioned officers will attend training in SY 1397. The RS advisor recommended that while these students are in Turkey, the Gender Director determine the feasibility of conducting training in Afghanistan.

The Dunya University Scholarship Program is available to the ANA women, and there are 208 students participating in this higher education opportunity, working towards undergraduate degrees in Law and Political Science, Business Administration, and Computer Science. The NATFO-funded contract with Dunya was cancelled, however, due to a lack of donor funding since April 1, 2018. Alternate options are being explored with other universities. If endorsed and funded, classes may resume at other universities as early as August 2018. The NATFO board is reviewing project briefs that were due at the end of May.

Facilities

The ANA facilities for women remain largely inadequate or misused. In some instances, men have broken the locks to female restrooms and used the restrooms for themselves, leaving female employees without immediate access to the facilities. Elsewhere, despite plans and funding, substandard facilities remain in disrepair. During this reporting period, the MoD Gender Director continued to conduct site assessments in Kabul to identify female facility needs at locations that employ women. The site assessment will be broadened to all provinces where women are currently employed. In response to a President of Afghanistan and Ministry of Defense Gender Program initiative, the GS G2 Resource Supply Directorate (RSD) is developing a Course of Action Decision Brief regarding construction of a barracks facility for female ANA members attending courses in Kabul.
To address these problems, RS developed commitment letters with the MoD and MoI to ensure secure female facilities are built, maintained, and properly utilized. Under the commitment letters, CSTC-A reserves the right to withhold 34 million Afghanis, assessed on budget lines of the coalition’s choosing, per compound found in sub-par condition or improperly utilized. CSTC-A will release the funds upon mitigation of the problems or an exception granted by the relevant minister. CSTC-A withheld funds in 2017 due to misuse of women’s facilities, and this practice will continue when the next round of letters are released for this reporting period.

The commitment letters hold the MoD and MoI responsible and accountable for the proper use and long-term sustainability of facility upgrades and new projects underway across a range of military installations designed to provide a safe and secure work environment for women. These projects include efforts to increase the number of facilities and accommodations, provide women’s bathrooms and toilets, and establish segregated recreational areas and training facilities where required. Some of the upgrades include:

- Kabul National Military Hospital Pediatrics and Women’s Wellness Clinic
- Ministry of Defense Headquarters daycare renovation and addition
- Afghan Air Force Academy women’s barracks
- Kabul Military Training Center daycare
- Camp Zafar daycare
- Marshal Fahim National Defense University women’s gym; conference center; and daycare
- National Military Academy of Afghanistan women’s gym
- Afghan National Army Officer’s Academy women’s gym
- Afghan Air Force Base women’s barracks, daycare, and dining facility addition

Three facility events took place at the MoD HQ in early May: a ribbon cutting ceremony for the daycare expansion, funded by the Netherlands; the ground breaking for the MoD women’s Training Center funded by Germany; and the unveiling of the construction plans for the Pediatric and Women’s Wellness Center at the Kabul National Military Hospital, funded by Italy.

Although progress is slow due to changing Afghan building regulations, the MoD has a countrywide plan to build more women’s facilities that will include bathrooms, a gym, conference rooms, and classrooms. However, the MoD must first validate the need for these facilities prior to planning and construction.

4.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

The ANA GS commands and controls all of Afghanistan’s ground and air forces, including the ANA conventional forces, the AAF, the SMW, the ANASOC, and the recently transferred ANCOF and ABF. In total, the ANA consists of 24 combat brigades, 3 combat air wings, 24 branch and basic training schools, and additional support facilities (e.g., depots and hospitals).
Afghan National Army Strength

The ANA has an authorized end-strength of 227,374 personnel. Shortfalls in conventional ANA recruiting and retention resulted in undermanned basic training courses and delays in course start dates. ANA overall recruiting and retention goals were set at levels below what was needed to keep pace with attrition and grow the force in accordance with ANDSF Roadmap goals. Therefore, despite meeting recruiting and retention goals, the ANA will have to recruit and retain soldiers at higher than current rates throughout the year in order to keep pace with attrition and Roadmap milestones.

Attrition remains problematic for the ANA. As AHRIMS and APPS become fully operational, RS advisors and the ANA will gain better access to attrition metrics to track and project future losses with improved accuracy. The number of personnel dropped from the rolls (DFR) significantly impacts ANA attrition rates. Personnel who are DFR consist of those soldiers and police who leave the organization prior to the end of their contract for reasons that include desertion or being absent without leave (AWOL) for over a month.

Afghan National Army Structure

The largest ANA elements are the six regional corps. Each corps is typically composed of a headquarters kandak, three to four infantry brigades, and various specialty kandaks. The 201st Corps, 203rd Corps, 205th Corps, 207th Corps, 209th Corps, and 215th Corps are responsible for their geographic regions that follow the provincial boundaries (see Figure 6). The 111th Capital Division is independent from any corps and is responsible for security in Kabul.

ANA Territorial Force (ANATF)

The ANATF is a pilot program designed to create ANA units that serve as the hold force in permissive security environments that typically require ANA presence to allow conventional ANA forces to conduct offensive operations in contested areas. ANATF are locally recruited, nationally trained and led personnel. The ANATF is designed to be more affordable and sustainable than traditional ANA units due to their lighter equipment. The MoD recruits ANATF soldiers from select districts where the MoD has determined an ANATF company is required. The collection of soldiers from a particular district attend traditional ANA basic training together at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC), followed by an additional six weeks of collective training as a company.

With the exception of the leadership, ANATF units are composed of personnel from a district that serve in their home district. The platoon level and above leadership for an ANATF unit come from the conventional ANA brigade that serves as the ANATF company’s higher headquarters. The ANATF leadership do not come from the district where the ANATF unit serves. The ANATF unit mission is to hold and secure their home district. ANATF units are not intended, nor are they equipped, to deploy away from their home district to conduct offensive operations.

ANATF units are more affordable and sustainable than conventional ANA units for several reasons: ANATF soldiers receive 75 percent of the pay a conventional ANA soldier receives; the
units are equipped with light trucks, motorcycles, and small arms rather than High-Mobility, Multi-
Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and artillery; and ANATF units will occupy existing
bases and facilities, avoiding new infrastructure construction costs.

During this reporting period, soldiers for ANATF pilot units entered training and will be employed
later this year. If the pilot program, which consists of up to 7 companies, is successful, additional
ANATF companies will join the force in 2019 and potentially replace conventional companies in
uncontested areas.

**Afghan Border Force Transfer**

The MoD successfully transferred the Afghan Border Force, formerly known as the Afghan Border
Police (ABP), from the MoI to the MoD in December 2017. This transition increases the fighting
capacity of the ANDSF, improves unity of command by combining ANA and former police
combat forces under ANA corps leadership, aligns forces conducting military operations within
hold zones, and allows the MoI to shift its focus to customs and border protection at border crossing
points and airports. The ABF maintains security in the border security zone, which extends 30
miles into the territory of Afghanistan, to deter terrorists, criminal groups, and smugglers. The
ABF mission includes securing and patrolling border areas and supporting ANA operations against
insurgent and terrorist forces. The ABF mission remained relatively unchanged from its mission
under the MoI to facilitate faster integration into the ANA. The seven ABF brigades report to the
ANA corps commanders, while an ABF HQ element within the MoD facilitates the administration
of the border forces. Full integration of the ABF into the ANA will require additional time to
overcome the remaining leadership, logistical, and training challenges. Changes required by the
Inherent Law and MoD optimization have not yet impacted the ABF. ABF generals and colonels
that meet the criteria for Inherent Law retirement will be processed under MoI timelines beginning
in July 2018. For MoD optimization changes, ABF brigades will be organic to the ANA corps.

**Afghan National Civil Order Police Transfer**

The majority of the ANCOP completed the transition from the MoI to the MoD in March 2018
and were renamed the Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF). Despite the change in
ministries, the ANCOF mission did not change. The ANCOF missions include: dealing with civil
unrest, reacting to insurgent activities in remote and high-threat areas, conducting civil order
presence patrols, and providing crisis response to public unrest and terrorist attacks in urban and
metropolitan areas. The ANCOF support clearing operations by providing intelligence, tactical
support, and manpower to secure seized terrain. An ANCOP force of 2,550 remained under the
MoI’s control to serve as a riot control force referred to as the Public Security Police (PSP).
Afghan Air Force

The AAF, the primary air enabler for the ANDSF, is responsible for air mobility and aerial attack missions across Afghanistan. The AAF can independently plan for and provide air assets for logistics, resupply, humanitarian relief efforts, return of human remains, MEDEVAC, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), non-traditional ISR, air interdiction, close air attack, armed overwatch, and aerial escort missions. The AAF headquarters is in Kabul and provides command and control of 11 detachments and three wings: the Kabul Air Wing, the Kandahar Air Wing, and the Shindand Air Wing. TAA at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the Afghan Air Force primarily occurs in three locations: Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif. NAC-A and TAAC-Air TAA the AAF at the ministerial, AAF headquarters, wing, group, and squadron levels.

The aviation modernization program remains ahead of schedule, with 13 UH-60s fielded as of the end of this reporting period and the first Afghan-only UH-60 combat mission flown. In addition, preparations under way for receiving additional MD-530 helicopters and for initial AC-208 training. NATO Air Command – Afghanistan (NAC-A) and TAAC-Air TAA priorities continue

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29 MEDEVAC differs from CASEVAC in the level of care provided to the patient and the type of vehicle or aircraft used. MEDEVAC missions typically have en route care provided by a medic, and make use of dedicated or specialty vehicles. CASEVAC missions are usually on an ad hoc basis, often without medical care provided en route, and in vehicles or aircraft not specifically designated for patient transfer.
to focus on guiding the AAF to become a professional, capable, and sustainable force while absorbing the fleet expansion.

NAC-A and TAAC-Air personnel identified several issues with the existing, three-wing AAF structure and advised the AAF to consider a reorganization of the AAF wing structure. The reorganization would be a key step to manage the growth of personnel that will accompany the growth of the fleet over the next several years. The AAF began a process to standardize wing structures, reduce staff redundancies, and empower mid-level officers and enlisted leaders to reorganize the top-heavy rank structure, all while attempting to cut overall costs. AAF growth includes the planned introduction of a new wing in Mazar-e-Sharif in 2019, and 20 squadrons spread throughout the four wings.

Human capital development remains the dominant challenge to AAF modernization success. Recruiting individuals with the requisite education and language skills remains the primary recruiting challenge. English Language skill is the first and most critical enabler for the AAF due to the technical nature of air operations (for aircrews, maintainers, and logistics sustainment). Training pilots and maintenance personnel takes time, and in many instances, the training programs and infrastructure lack the capacity to produce enough trained pilots to keep pace with the new aircraft joining the fleet. Given these challenges, any recruiting shortfall or higher than anticipated trainee attrition rate would limit the AAF’s ability to operate and maintain its growing force.

On November 23, 2017, the Minister of Defense signed a policy allowing the AAF to conduct AAF-specific recruiting separate from the ANA. The policy accounts for the technical nature of AAF flight and maintenance operations and provides for a higher assessment and selection standard for new recruits; it also allows the AAF to recruit regionally. The new policy resulted in positive recruiting results during this reporting period, with AAF recruiters meeting all prescribed recruiting targets. In anticipation of the changes due to the Inherent Law, NAC-A and TAAC-Air advisors identified the next generation of leaders for appointment to senior positions. The advisors anticipate the first wave of planned leadership changes in the next reporting period, and they are working with the MoD and AAF leadership to fill these positions based on merit.

**Airframes**

As of May, 2018, the AAF has 136 aircraft, of which 126 are operational. Fixed-wing platforms include C-208s, C-130s, and A-29s. Rotary-wing platforms include MD-530s, Mi-17s, UH-60As, and Mi-35s. Some platforms are limited by understaffed crew positions, like flight engineers, that are required to assemble fully trained flight crews. During this reporting period, 15 pilots and 16 Special Mission Operators (SMOs) completed Mission Qualification Training (MQT) for the UH-60A, the AAF’s newest platform. Training is ongoing for, 14 more pilots and 16 more SMOs and should be complete in August.

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30 SMW aircraft are not included in this total.
31 The Government of India donated four Mi-35s to Afghanistan. The AAF’s prior Mi-35 fleet reached the end of its service life and is not included in the official Tashkil. The coalition does not provide TAA support to the Mi-35 aircraft or their crews. All four aircraft have exceeded their 500-hour inspection and have been grounded until completed. The AAF is trying to source funding to complete repairs.
As part of the ANDSF Roadmap objective to increase fighting capability, the AAF will grow in both capacity and capability. According to the current aircraft delivery schedule, the total AAF fleet will reach 225 aircraft by the end of 2020, including: 18 Mi-17, 60 UH-60, 18 UH-60 fixed-forward-firing, 60 MD-530, 25 A-29, 16 AC-208, 24 C-208, and 4 C-130 aircraft. The total AAF fleet will reach 264 aircraft by the end of 2023, including: 81 UH-60, 38 UH-60 fixed-forward-firing, 60 MD-530, 25 A-29 (all U.S. training aircraft transferred to Afghanistan), 32 AC-208 (all U.S. training aircraft transferred to Afghanistan), 24 C-208, and 4 C-130 aircraft. Of note, the first UH-60As arrived in Kandahar in September 2017, and the first six Afghan Pilots began training on the Black Hawks in early October 2017. Figure 9 details the number of AAF airframes, fully trained pilots, and fully trained flight crews currently on hand.

**Figure 9: Summary of AAF Airframes, Pilots, and Aircrews**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>Current Inventory</th>
<th>In Country &amp; Available or in Short-term MX</th>
<th>Qualified Aircrews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC-208</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>Mi-35 (4-not counted)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cheetah</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>No Coalition TAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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32 Numbers represent a snapshot in time and are based on multiple reporting sources. Numbers in this column include aircraft available for tasking (combat ops/training) as well as those in short-term routine or unscheduled maintenance.

33 One C-208 is NMC due to a hard landing. The 2 aircraft that belong to the Shindand Air Wing (no advisor presence at Shindand) expired in terms of required periodic maintenance. TAAC-Air is advising the AAF through the re-baselining process for those two C-208s.

34 The first AC-208 will be delivered in FY19. A total of 32 will be delivered by FY23.

35 Twelve aircraft are in Afghanistan with one unusable due to wing structural issue (possible but unconfirmed over-G event). Seven aircraft are at Moody AFB, Georgia, for training utilization. One U.S.-based A-29 was destroyed during training operations and is awaiting official disposition to be removed from the fleet.

36 This number does not include the additional Mi-17 helicopters used by the SMW. Ten aircraft are in overhaul, twelve aircraft are awaiting 500-hour extensions, six are expired used as maintenance. Two aircraft crashed. The Army transferred an additional two Mi-17s from Fort Rucker, one in January 2018 and one in February 2018.
C-130 Transport Aircraft

The C-130 transport aircraft provides a medium- airlift capability in support of personnel and equipment transport, CASEVAC, and return of human remains.

AAF C-130Hs assigned to the Kabul Air Wing conduct operations throughout Afghanistan to locations with improved airfields. AAF C-130Hs provide a strategic airlift capability for large passenger movements and CASEVAC operations. In addition, C-130Hs transport cargo too large or unsuitable for the C-208 or Mi-17 aircraft, such as maintenance equipment and parts and weapons and munitions.

Small fleet size and aircraft availability currently limit C-130H operations. Two of the four AAF C-130Hs were in out-of-county depot during this reporting period; however, one aircraft will return to Afghanistan by early June 2018, ahead of the originally estimated July 2018 delivery date. Despite this limitation, TAAC-Air trained six pilots in assault landings and night-vision goggle (NVG) enroute operations.

The AAF relies on a DoD CLS contract for C-130H logistics and maintenance.
The C-208 aircraft provides light-lift, personnel transport, CASEVAC, and recovery of human remains capability for the ANSF. NAC-A and TAAC-Air continues to expand the C-208 employment envelope by developing soft field landing and airdrop capabilities to free Mi-17 helicopters for other mission sets.

C-208s operate from Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand. C-208s can forward deploy to improved and some unimproved airfields throughout the country. The C-208 fleet relies on a mix of CLS and AAF organic maintenance.

NAC-A and TAAC-Air continue to help the AAF develop its nascent airdrop capability, with the intent to reduce demands on Mi-17s and increase operational flexibility. During this reporting period, the AAF conducted its second operational airdrop. Airdrop capability is limited to low threat areas due to the C-208 airdrop altitude, airspeed, lack of armor, and a maximum cargo load of 900 pounds. NAC-A and TAAC-Air advisors coordinate with other TAAC advisors to educate ANA commanders on the new AAF airdrop capability. TAAC-Air is coordinating the modification of the last five C-208 aircraft with rolling-door kits to facilitate the growing airdrop capability.
The AAF uses the A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft to attack targets of strategic significance and provide close air attack in support of ground forces. The A-29 can carry Mk-81 250-lb bombs, Mk-82 500-lb. bombs, rockets, and two .50 caliber machine guns mounted in the wings. The A-29 can employ laser-guided bombs; however, the A-29 pilots continue to achieve high accuracy with unguided bombs.

No additional A-29s were delivered to the AAF during this reporting period. A-29s are assigned to the Kabul Air Wing with a detachment at Mazar-e-Sharif that will transition to squadron status based on the AAF reorganization.

Instructor Pilot (IP) Upgrade training is an important step in creating a training program that can be transitioned to the AAF. The focus by advisors this winter has been certifying AAF IPs for day precision-guided munitions operations (PGM), basic night air interdiction, and introduction of night PGM use. During this reporting period, A-29s flew 609 missions and executed strikes on 109 of those missions, enabling key ANDSF tactical and operational successes. The A-29 pilots continue to show disciplined restraint in not dropping munitions on targets with ambiguous parameters or the possibility of civilian casualties.

Fifteen maintainers (officers) graduated from A-29 maintenance on January 12, 2018. Seven maintainers are in training at Moody AFB, and an additional seven are in training developing their English Language skills. As aviation maintenance training continues, the AAF will require CLS and supporting training contracts to maintain combat capability in these airframes over the mid-term.
The Mi-17 helicopter conducts day and night personnel transport, MEDEVAC, resupply, close-combat attack, aerial escort, and air assault missions. The AAF is capable of deploying and operating Mi-17s throughout the country.

Thirteen Mi-17s can be configured for a fixed-forward-firing capability, including 11 capable of employing rockets. Armed Mi-17s accounted for more than 28 percent (128/454) of the aerial fires missions tasked in support of ANDSF operations during the reporting period. Using the Mi-17s as armed gunships limits the AAF’s ability to employ Mi-17s in support of other mission sets, such as MEDEVAC and aerial resupply.

The AAF has proven more than capable of maintaining the Mi-17. However, advisors continue to stress better maintenance and more disciplined use of the Mi-17. Furthermore, advisors mentor the AAF on flying hour program management to preserve the rotary-wing capability while the AAF integrates the UH-60 fleet.
The MD-530 helicopter provides close air attack and aerial escort to the ANDSF. The MD-530 has two weapons pylons, capable of firing .50 caliber machine guns and rockets. As of May 1, 2018, the AAF has six operational MD-530 Scout Weapons Teams.

The AAF’s MD-530s currently rely on a DoD CLS contract; however, the AAF is building an organic maintenance capability for the MD-530. TAAC-Air is working with the AAF to increase the number of MD-530 pilot and maintenance students in training to maximize independence and sustainability of the fleet.

MD-530s have made significant contributions between December 1, 2017, and May 1, 2018, conducting 201 air strikes while participating in Afghan-led aerial escorts, close air attacks protecting forces in contact, and deliberately planned strike missions. Aircrew manning has improved for the MD-530 fleet, with crew ratios rising from 30 percent to 79 percent of authorized levels. Aviation maintenance training is ongoing and progressing well. Currently, the AAF has the capability to support MD-530 operations at forward-deployed locations for short intervals without CLS presence. The AAF will continue to require CLS and supporting training contracts to maintain combat capability in the mid-term.
The UH-60 Black Hawk is a medium-lift, multi-role utility helicopter recently introduced to the AAF. Once fully operational, the UH-60 will perform air assault missions, personnel transport, MEDEVAC, resupply, and other lift missions, with the ability to operate in the vast majority of the country. DoD has provided the AAF with thirteen UH-60s have been fielded, of which 11 are available for training and are currently operating at Kandahar Air Field.

**Training**

TAAC-Air advisors have trained current Afghan Mi-17 aircrew how to fly and operate the Black Hawk. The AAF began its second phase of training on February 18, 2018. This second phase, known as Mission Qualification Training (MQT), is a 10-week, contractor-led, academic and flight instruction course that builds on the basic UH-60 flying skills gained during the six-week Aircraft Qualification Training (AQT).

Human capital and capacity remain the two primary limiting factors to AAF growth. U.S. and coalition-sponsored English language training remains the critical enabler to successful pilot training in Afghanistan. TAAC-Air advisors have implemented a phased transition plan to consolidate English language training resources to support the AAF and modernization needs effectively. The emerging program provides the requisite English proficiency for a broad range of training and operational needs. The program is currently operating at less than 50 percent of planned efficiency due to force protection shortages at the primary training location.
Overall efforts to identify qualified candidates with the necessary technical skills to complete training present enduring challenges, and the AAF still lacks a cadre of English-trained, proficient pilots and crews. In recognition of the capacity shortfalls, the AAF is pursuing several avenues to train new AAF airmen. 311 students are currently enrolled in the Afghan Air Force Academy commissioning program (245 pilot candidates); 12 students are at Moody Air Force Base for A-29 training (7 pilots, 5 maintainers); three A-29 pilots at Columbus Air Force Base (one for aviation leadership training & two for T-6 lead-in); 13 pilots at Fort Rucker for UH-60 pilot training; and 12 UH-60 pilots at Defense Language Institute. NAC-A TAA future efforts will focus on educating leadership on the proper application of airpower and assets to ensure the proper application of aircraft and personnel. At the senior level, NAC-A is designing a training/exercise program to improve senior-level AAF leadership decision-making for the development, sustainment, employment, integration, and command and control of the AAF within the ANSF.

Sustainment

The AAF increased capability for overall maintenance of Mi-17s and C-208s with minimal coalition or Contractor Logistics Support (CLS). AAF maintainers accomplish approximately 80 percent of overall Mi-17 maintenance, including 90 percent of scheduled maintenance, and 50 percent of unscheduled maintenance. The difference between scheduled and unscheduled maintenance is attributable to the AAF’s nascent ability to troubleshoot and identify discrepancies.

TAAC-Air maintenance advisors have identified fleet management as an area that requires additional development. The high operational tempo demanded on the fleet during this reporting period forced fleet usage rates to a higher level than predicted, adversely affecting the overall ability to manage the fleet. Although the AAF does not currently employ expediters, pro-supers, debrief, or similar fleet management positions, these positions will be necessary as the fleet increases and should help resolve some of these issues.

Currently, the AAF accomplishes 60 percent of C-208 maintenance, 35 percent of MD-530 maintenance, and 40 percent of A-29 maintenance; however, the AAF performs no maintenance for the C-130 and UH-60 programs. Overall, inadequate English language skills within the AAF maintenance community inhibit independent inspections. Although some AAF personnel are qualified to do most interval inspections, they still require CLS assistance to interpret.

Operations

The AAF’s effective use of the MD-530 and A-29 has improved in parallel with its Air-to-Ground Integration (AGI) capabilities. The AAF improved AGI capability by integrating strike aircraft, ISR, and Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators (ATACs) to coordinate and conduct air strikes in support of ANDSF operations. Cooperation between the ANA corps, the AAF, and MoD improved substantially through the last fighting season. Advisors added a 9-week training course and pre-selection recruiting standards in an effort to improve retention, quality, and performance of future AGI personnel.

The AAF’s targeting process is maturing and ANA Corps Commanders recognize the instrumental role of AAF airpower in meeting the ANDSF’s mission objectives. However, the ground forces
often do not effectively capitalize on the AAF’s deliberate and dynamic targeting process, resulting in inefficiencies and missed strike opportunities. Obstacles and inefficiencies span the whole process, including generation of target packages, decision-making between the corps and the MoD, and target preparation for the pilots. TAAC-Air advisors initiated reviews to address these shortfalls.

The AAF now embeds Air Liaison Officers (ALO) teams in four corps, on a rotational basis, to provide persistent AGI support, planning, and coordination. Although the ATACS and ALOs have not fully integrated with all corps, they have made progress in helping ground commanders understand how to integrate air assets into operations.

AAF MEDEVAC capability continues to evolve and improve. Over the past three years, the total MEDEVAC missions have increased significantly from 1,243 missions in 2014; 3,169 missions in 2015; and 3,289 missions in 2016. The AAF conducted 3,506 medical airlift missions in 2017, of which 1196 were MEDEVAC and 2310 were CASEVAC. During this reporting period, the AAF has conducted 595 medical airlift missions, 120 MEDEVAC & 475 CASEVAC.

**Afghan National Civil Order Force**

As described above in the ANCOF Transfer section, the ANCOF (formerly the ANCOP) completed its transition from the MoI to the MoD in February 2018, retaining the same mission. The ANCOF consists of eight brigades, assigned to ANA corps headquarters in their geographic location. The ANCOF’s capability to respond effectively to civil disorder and conduct clearance operations in urban terrain addresses deficiencies in some of the ANA corps. The future role of the ANCOF may change; however, maintaining continuity of mission will assist in the integration of the ANCOF into the ANA and reduce the requirement for additional training as the fighting season begins. An ANCOP force of 2,550 will remain under the MoI’s control and serve as a riot control force.

**Afghan Border Force**

The Afghan Border Force (formerly the Afghan Border Police) transitioned into the MoD in December 2017. The ABF maintains security in the border security zone—which extends 30 miles into the territory of Afghanistan—to deter terrorists, criminal groups, and smugglers. The ABF mission, which remained relatively unchanged, includes securing and patrolling border areas and supporting ANA operations against insurgent and terrorist forces.

**MoD Afghan Special Security Forces**

Afghan special operations forces remain among the best in the region, and they continue to mature with coalition assistance. The ASSF have proven their ability to conduct counterterrorism raids successfully and are furthering their capability to analyze and exploit intelligence gained from these operations. Expanding the ASSF is a key pillar in the ANDSF Roadmap and essential to seizing the momentum against insurgent and terrorist forces in 2018.
The MoD’s ASSF components rely primarily on MoD elements and typically the closest ANA corps headquarters and regional logistics node for sustainment support. During this reporting period, ANASOC brigades improved their use of general support *kandaks* (GSKs) to help build logistical capability and reduce reliance on conventional ANA corps. ANASOC logistical nodes at the forward supply depots and regional logistics centers ensured material designated for ANASOC units was not redirected to other ANA units as had occurred in the past.

Conventional ANA overreliance on the ASSF continued during this reporting period. In response to enemy offensive operations, particularly those against fixed targets such as District Centers, the ASSF provided an emergency response force to secure threatened locations and recapture those that have fallen to the enemy. When the ANA employs the ASSF in conventional roles, they restrict the ASSF from deploying offensively against insurgent targets or preparing for future operations.

*Figure 10: ASSF Expansion*

**EXPANSION OF THE AFGHAN SPECIAL SECURITY FORCES**

Under the Road Map, the size of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) will more than double, from 19,022 personnel to 33,896 personnel by 2020. In addition, the ASSF will become more independent. At the MoD, the current ANASOC Division of 2 Special Operations Brigades and 30 Commando Companies will expand to an ANASOC Corps with 4 Special Operations Brigades, 2 Special Forces Kandaks, 63 Commando Companies, an expanded Special Mission Wing capability, and organic sustainment and ground support assets.

**MINISTRY OF INTERIOR**

**PRE-ROADMAP**

3 GCPSU National Mission Units

**ROADMAP EXPANSION**

6 GCPSU National Mission Units

**MINISTRY OF DEFENSE**

**PRE-ROADMAP**

1 ANASOC Division

- 2 Special Operations Brigades
- 30 Commando Companies

**ROADMAP EXPANSION**

1 ANASOC Corps

- 4 Special Operations Brigades
- 1 National Mission Brigade
- 2 Special Force Kandaks
- 63 Commando Companies

Increased Special Mission Wing Helicopter and Fixed-Wing Platforms

Organic Sustainment and Ground Support Assets

**Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC)**

ANASOC’s mission is to increase the Afghan government’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations, and, as directed, execute special operations against terrorist and insurgent networks in coordination with other ANDSF pillars. ANASOC is a corps headquarters responsible for command and control of all ANA special operations forces. With the December 2017 approval of the FY 2018 *tashkil*, ANASOC is authorized 16,040 personnel, organized into four Special Operations Brigades (SOB) and a National Mission Brigade (NMB). The NMB differs from the SOBs in that it has a deployable mission command package, including the 6th
Special Operations Kandak (SOK), *Ktah Khas* (KKA), and two Special Forces Kandaks (each SFK includes five AOBs with eight ANA Special Forces teams per AOB). MoI and NDS liaisons serve in the NMB HQ to ensure ANA-ANP coordination. The SMW and the AAF provide priority support to the NMB. The SOKs, ANASOC’s primary tactical elements, conduct core special operations tasks against threat networks to support regional corps’ COIN operations and provide a strategic response capability against select threats. Nine of the ten SOKs are aligned with regional SOBs with the ability to work with a specific ANA corps if requested. The 6th SOK (assigned to NMB), located in the Kabul area, functions as the ANA’s national mission unit. Although ANASOC only accounts for a very small percentage of ANA manning, it conducts a majority of ANA’s offensive missions.

ANASOC’s largest challenge remains the misuse and overuse of its forces by the MoD. Misuse is the employment of ANASOC forces outside of their designed mission set, while overuse is the tasking of ANASOC forces at a rate that precludes rest and recovery cycles. The MoD and ANA corps headquarters often request more commandos than are available, causing ANASOC to commit forces designated for a rest and recovery cycle.

The open-ended deployment of 5th SOK to Baghlan and Faryab Provinces serves as an enduring example of ANASOC misuse. The 5th SOK continues to reinforce checkpoints and District Centers, a mission that falls within the 209th Corps Area of Responsibility (AOR). This misuse limits the SOK’s adherence to the ORC and restricts its ability to receive U.S. Special Operations Forces TAA.

As part of the ANDSF Roadmap, the ANASOC division expanded from a division of 11,300 personnel to a corps with four brigades and a National Mission Brigade, totaling 22,994 personnel. Both of the Mobile Strike Force Vehicle (MSFV) brigades completed transition from the conventional ANA to the ANASOC. The 6th Mobile Strike Kandak (MSK) completed Commando school in 2017 and the Cobra Strike Maneuver Course (CSMC) in April 2018. The 5th MSK graduated Commando school in April 2018 and begin the CSMC in late June 2018. Nine of the ten SOKs will add an ANASOC Commando company, and each Special Operations Brigade (SOB) will gain a General Support Kandak (GSK).

The ANASOC School of Excellence (SOE) is meeting the training need for growth. In April 2018, the SOE had more than 2,000 ASSF students from the 5th and 6th MSKs going through numerous courses, including the 14-week Commando Qualification Course (CDOQC) and the CSMC. There were 617 students enrolled in the CDOQC class that graduated in late April 2018, and 998 students in the CDOQC class that graduated in early May. The SOE had 734 6th MSK students enrolled in the CSMC class that graduated in early May 2018.

ANASOC’s Mobility School, established in January 2018, trains select Commandos to operate and employ M117 wheeled-armored vehicles. MSK capabilities include lightning strike, enhanced direct fire lethality, strongpoint penetration, and high mobility. This capability greatly enhances ANASOC’s firepower, mobility, survivability, and lethality on the battlefield. The Mobility School will support the training for two MSKs per training year, which will be a significant component of the newly formed SOBs over the course of the Roadmap.
**Ktah Khas**

The *Ktah Khas* (KKA) is a light infantry SOK assigned to ANASOC’s NMB. The KKA has eight companies: three operational companies, a training company, an engineer company, a military intelligence company, a support company, and a headquarters company. These additional companies support the *Ktah Khas* training cycle and support operations, including transportation for the *Ktah Khas* strike forces, explosive ordnance disposal to conduct counter-IED (C-IED) operations, and supporting the female tactical platoon, which enables interactions with women and children on missions. *Ktah Khas* platoons and companies conduct successful intelligence-driven counterterrorism raids, particularly against high-value individuals, and vehicle interdictions utilizing both ground and air mobility platforms. A focus on recruiting and retention has enabled the *Ktah Khas* to remain near full strength.

*Ktah Khas* recruiting is a two-month process where incoming recruits, selected primarily from recent ANA, ANP, or National Directorate of Security basic course graduates, are screened and selected to enter a thirteen-week *Ktah Khas* basic course. The *Ktah Khas* course focuses primarily on physical fitness, marksmanship, mobility, medical, and small-unit tactics to prepare candidates for integration, training, and deployment. Between the recruiting and basic training process, candidates for the *Ktah Khas* have a pass rate of approximately 12 percent.

*Ktah Khas* is capable of executing a well-planned ORC. The *Ktah Khas* ORC is a 32-week cycle that consists of “Red, Amber, and Green” phases. During the red cycle, units focus on individual training tasks and individual combat specializations. The amber cycle includes collective training tasks, such as a platoon live-fire exercise, full-mission profiles, fire support coordination, and a validation exercise. Lastly, the green cycle is when the units focus on deployment and are available to execute missions. The three *Ktah Khas* companies are staggered in their cycles to have one company in each phase of the ORC at all times. Each cycle is separated from the next by one week, allowing soldiers to take leave. *Ktah Khas* members are authorized an additional four weeks of leave following an operational deployment.

**Special Mission Wing**

The SMW is a special aviation wing that provides persistent reach for the ASSF during counterterrorism (CT) and counternarcotics (CN) missions designed to disrupt insurgent and drug smuggling networks in Afghanistan. The SMW supports helicopter assault force raids and provides resupply, CASEVAC, and ISR support for ASSF and ANA conventional forces. The SMW is the only ANDSF organization with night-vision, rotary-wing air assault, and fixed-wing ISR capabilities. The SMW consists of four squadrons, two located in Kabul, one in Kandahar Airfield, and one in Mazar-e-Sharif, providing the ASSF with operational reach across the country.

Recruiting standards, competition with other ANDSF forces, and training timelines remain the largest hurdles to long-term SMW recruitment. Recruitment standards for the SMW are higher than for the AAF or other ANDSF pillars and employ additional levels of screening. The selection, recruitment, screening, and training timeline for new SMW aircrew can take up to 15 months. The MoD and the coalition vet all SMW recruits to ensure that they can meet the high demands of the unit. The SMW struggles to find qualified candidates to fill pilot and maintenance personnel slots.
The SMW Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) and TAAC-Air will determine the proportions of recruits going to the SMW and AAF, supporting President Ghani’s request to grow the SMW and AAF. In the short-term, the largest obstacle to SMW growth is a lack of approved *tashkil* positions required to recruit additional SMW personnel to meet ANDSF Roadmap goals for 2018.

In early April 2018 an agreement was signed between the SMW SOAG and TAAC-Air in which both parties agree on the proportions of recruits going to the SMW and AAF in order to best support President Ghani’s request to grow the SMW and AAF. In the short term, the largest hurdle to the SMW growth is a lack of approved *tashkil* positions into which to recruit personnel. Without approved *tashkil* positions, the SMW cannot start recruiting additional personnel to meet ANDSF Roadmap goals for 2018. A new *tashkil* signed this reporting period added additional pilots and rear crew, to start training for the arrival of the UH-60 in 2020. The courses that will train these personnel are already scheduled. No plan is in place for the requisite growth of the necessary mission support and maintenance personnel. To encourage recruitment and retention, the SMW utilizes incentive pay, especially for aircrew. Better pay, defined aircrew and non-aircrew career paths, and strong leadership enhances the SMW’s credibility and organizational culture and attracts volunteers from the wider ANDSF.

The SMW will expand to provide the necessary command and control and support structure for organizational growth. Over the next five years, the SMW will grow to approximately 1,350 personnel with 85 aircraft with the mission of supporting ASSF ground units nationwide. This growth will mirror the AAF Wing structure, including a 2-star command; Operations, Maintenance and Mission Support Groups; and subordinate squadrons for specific functions.

**Airframes**

The SMW has 33 Mi-17 and 18 PC-12 airframes on hand. Pending *tashkil* approval, the SMW could have 37 Mi-17s authorized in FY 2019. With 23 Mi-17 crews and 17 PC-12 crews, the SMW met the 2017 ANDSF Roadmap requirements. During this reporting period, the loss of flight engineers reduced the number of Mi-17 crews to 22; however, ongoing training will increase the number of crews.
**PC-12 Aircraft**

The SMW utilizes the PC-12 fixed-wing aircraft to conduct ISR in support of CT and CN operations, including overwatch of ASSF ground assault forces and helicopter assault force raids during both daytime and nighttime operations.

Currently, 18 PC-12 aircraft are operational, providing the ANDSF with day and night surveillance and air-based signals intelligence capabilities. The PC-12 can send full-motion video (FMV) to a ground station, and the onboard crew can perform real-time analysis of collected data. Despite these capabilities, SMW personnel require training to improve the integration of intelligence into combat operations.

The SMW is now considered at full operational capability (FOC) for the PC-12 and no longer requires enduring support from AFSOC’s 6th Special Operations Squadron. However, with no enduring lifecycle management program for the PC-12, U.S. program managers must determine how best to provide the required upgrades and critical modifications necessary over the life of the aircraft.

**Mi-17 Helicopter**

The primary mission of the SMW Mi-17 fleet is to conduct precision helicopter assault, by day and night, in support of the full-spectrum, partnered and unilateral, MoD, MoI, and NDS-mandated activity to secure Afghan citizens, interests, and property. Additionally, the Mi-17s conduct
resupply operations, CASEVAC, quick reaction force missions, and personnel movement. Under the AAF modernization plan, the SMW will receive UH-60A aircraft in 2020 to replace its Mi-17s, with a total of 20 lift and 20 fixed-forward-firing variants being delivered by summer 2023.

**Training**

The SMW makes use of multiple training opportunities under its CLS contract, including maintenance training, English language training, and flight training. All SMW personnel attend English classes, including conversational, aviation, and maintenance vocabulary.

Through the Kabul Security Assistance Office, the SMW utilizes extensive International Military Education and Training program opportunities. The SMW has sent one soldier to National Defense University, one to the U.S. Marine Corps Warfare Course, and three to the Building Partnerships Aviation Capacity Course Seminar.

During this reporting period, Afghan instructors took ownership of the training program known as “Green Platoon.” Green Platoon provides collective training to new SMW members on their ability to receive, plan, and conduct multi-ship operations with NVGs. U.S. military and contractor personnel ran the first six iterations of this training. Of note, Afghan instructors, with support from SOAG, planned and conducted the last two iterations of Green Platoon. The current Green Platoon represents the first time the full spectrum of intelligence personnel participated in the training.

The SMW continues to impress coalition partners with merit-based promotions and selection. Given a class capacity of three officers for the PC-12 Instructor Pilot Course, the Wing developed a written test and administered it to all PC-12 aircraft commanders. The top three scorers interviewed with the SMW Commander and selected for the PC-12 course.

With the influx of new UH-60A aircraft for the SMW, SMW aircrew and the SOAG prepared training requirements for the aircrew. As part of the AAF modernization, the SMW requested and obtained approval for the first 10 UH-60 crews; the tashkil update for those crews was approved by MoD in April 2018. These authorizations allow the SMW to recruit, select, screen, assign, and train new personnel. The first SMW aircrew for the UH-60 will begin AQT/MQT training during the next reporting period.

**Sustainment**

The SMW continues to demonstrate advanced aviation standards, particularly for aircraft maintenance. During this reporting period, Afghan instructors removed an officer from Mi-17 training due to lack of performance, and the crew chief was recycled to the subsequent training class because of poor progression. Although seemingly minor occurrences, these actions signify an understanding of standards and accountability for those who do not meet the standards.

The SMW is slowly increasing its ability to conduct independent maintenance actions, particularly involving regularly scheduled 25-hour and 50-hour Mi-17 maintenance services. The SMW has completed more unilateral 100-hour and above inspections on Mi-17s in the first half of FY 2018 than in all of FY 2017. From October 2017 to March 2018, the SMW completed three PC-12 100-
hour inspections, nine 100-hour or above Mi-17 inspections, and an additional sixty 25- and 50-hour inspections on the Mi-17, all unilaterally. The SMW conducted 51 Mi-17 services and 30 PC-12 services partnered with CLS maintenance during the same period.

Operations

The SMW operates four squadrons capable of conducting independent missions in support of ASSF elements. They continue to demonstrate improvements in operational effectiveness and efficiency, as well as independence. During this reporting period, the Afghans executed 95 percent of all SMW operations independently.

Most SMW missions during this reporting period were CT operations, with air movements, CASEVAC, and a smaller number of CN operations. The SMW remains agile and capable of executing increasing numbers of planned and short-notice missions in support of ASSF.

The SMW is capable of fielding helicopter assault forces at night and from multiple locations, unilaterally. More than 85 percent of Mi-17 missions and 100 percent of PC-12 missions were flown unilaterally. In the first half of FY 2018, the SMW flew a total of 5,237 hours without incident. They flew successfully in multi-ship formations, using NVGs, and often in zero illumination conditions. Of the more than 2,770 Mi-17 hours flown during the period, more than 68 percent were flown utilizing NVGs.

Of significance, the SMW began developing an HPA response capability. During this reporting period, the SMW achieved initial operational capability for Fast Rope Insertion Extraction System (FRIES) capability and should achieve full operational capability early in the next reporting period.
SECTION 5 – MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

5.1 MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

The MoI requires continued and persistent RS and international support to improve delivery of ministerial functions (policy, strategy, administration, and support) and create irreversible institutional change. In most functions, the MoI continues to lag far behind the MoD in terms of progress and institutional capabilities. RS advisors have a willing partner in Minister Barmak who desires reforms and change; however, significant gaps in personnel and corruption continue to threaten the credibility and longevity of MoI functions and organizations. Despite these challenges and shortcomings, the MoI enacted or participated in significant reforms, particularly the transfer of a large number of forces from the MoI to the MoD, while simultaneously supporting the ANDSF efforts to secure the population and engage the Taliban. Significant barriers to progress remain within the MoI—challenges that will require revitalized international support. RS advisors remain dedicated to building the MoI’s institutional capacity and operational functionality.

The Four Pillars of the MoI include the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), Public Security Police (PSP) formerly known as ANCOP, Afghan Boarder Police (ABP) and the Afghan Anti-Corruption Police (AACP). Two sub-pillars also exist which include the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and the Afghan Personal Protection Force (APPF). Three special units within the MoI are the General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU), Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and the Prisons and Detention Center Police (PDCP).

Parliament confirmed then-Acting Minister of Interior Wais Ahmad Barmak as the Minister of the Interior in December 2017. Parliament’s confirmation empowered Minister Barmak to pursue continued leadership and organizational reform. Since his confirmation, Minister Barmak ordered refinement of the MoI Strategic Plan (MISP) to prioritize counter-corruption and development of a merit-based assignment and promotion process. Minister Barmak also replaced seven Provincial Chiefs of Police (Farah, Sar-e Pul, Herat, Takhar, Samangan, Khost, and Kabul) and all 18 Kabul District Police Chiefs. Selection of replacements included a merit-based screening and board process culminating with President Ghani’s approval. A culture of patronage and pervasive corruption continues to stifle the development of a truly professional police force; however, Minister Barmak’s initiatives represent high-level interest and dedication to reform and rooting out corruption within the MoI. Approximately 1,500 MoI colonels and general officers will retire under the first tranche of Inherent Law retirements in 2018. This generational change of leadership should positively impact counter-corruption efforts. The personnel gaps and rapid turnover underscore the importance of a coalition-led advisory commitment to facilitate an orderly transition and oversee the education and training of new leadership.

The Ministry of Interior Affairs Strategic Plan (MISP) for FY 2018-2021 lays the groundwork for MoI reform and progress. The implementation of the plan will commence along with an annual plan developed for FY 2018 and each year thereafter across the four-year lifetime of the strategy. The MISP incorporates Ministry reform, police reform and reorganization, the Afghan Security Roadmap, and U.S.-Afghan Security Compact milestones into one comprehensive document. The
The greatest challenge to MoI Reorganization is the MoI’s ability to implement the plan and provide the public with visible change.

**Figure 11: Ministry of Interior Organizational Chart**

RS continues to facilitate significant reorganization of the MoD and MoI to align functions and organizations more effectively for their intended purpose. This included the transfer of Afghan Border Police (ABP) and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) from the MoI to the MoD and their new designations as the Afghan Border Force (ABF) and Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF), respectively. Divesting the MoI of these forces enables the MoI to focus on constructing a professional and effective community policing force. Despite a 20 percent reduction in MoI forces, the MoI HQ did not reduce at commensurate levels. Coalition advisors continue to seek ways to realign the MoI HQ.

In addition to RS, eight other organizations and several bilateral advising programs focus on MoI institutional reform and improvement of the ANP’s professionalism. These organizations include the UN Development Program, UNAMA, the German Police Project Team, and U.S. Government departments and agencies, including the Department of State and the Department of Justice. Several of the organizations coordinate their efforts through the International Community Advisor Steering Council, which meets weekly in Kabul.

The MoI’s authorized uniformed end-strength includes positions for the MoI HQ and the ANP pillars (see Figure 12). The Afghan government also funds more than 9,500 civilian positions for the MoI. Beginning in 2015-16, the MoI adjusted its *tashkil* to account for the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) under the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) authorized level. However, the AACP remains a separate pillar and retains a separate command and control system.
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<th>FY 18</th>
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**Resource Management and Procurement**

The MoI lacks the ability to identify resource requirements to build annual budgets or to base those requirements on MoI strategic objectives. Unclear strategic guidance and understanding of how the MoI strategic plan should inform requirements development and prioritization contribute to this problem. Zone and provincial leaders often fail to define or justify their requirements properly, and subordinate organizations fail to follow the requirements submission process, with many organizations bypassing the local, provincial, or zone headquarters. Budget units compound this issue through ineffective communication with subordinates at the zone and provincial levels and fail to consolidate and prioritize MoI requirements. These shortcomings demonstrate poor vertical and horizontal communication and coordination across the ministry. To date, the MoI Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy has not released programming procedures and guidance for the FY 2019 requirement build, which will hinder the ability of develop prioritized requirements.

The FY18 MoI Draft Prioritized Procurement Plan reestablished the focus on setting procurement priorities that emphasize readiness and key Roadmap initiatives. Currently, the lack of sufficient technical specifications and clear requirements continue to slow the submission of requirement packages to the Requirements Advisor Board (RAB). The Procurement Plan has three tiers, with Tier 1 being the highest priority requirements. Only those requirements that directly support readiness or are key readiness enablers are eligible for ASFF funding. The Requirements Approval Board (RAB) reviews the requirements by tier. Through May 2018, the RAB approved all 24 Tier I requirements and 10 of 26 Tier II requirements. Fifteen contracts have been awarded to date. MoI is behind on its FY18 budget execution, with 19.55 percent of its $154 million budget executed. The MoI Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy's Plans and Programming Directorate (PPD) provided 2019-2021 programming procedures in March 2018. To date, 31 of 34 provinces have submitted their requirements to the MoI Budgetary Units, and 10 of the 11 Budgetary Units

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\(^{37}\) In FY 2016, the MoI and ANP adjusted the training, transient, holding, and student account on their *tashkil* to account for those members participating in out-of-country training for periods greater than six months.
have submitted their requirements to PPD. The Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy has not released clear guidance for 2019 District priorities, which will hinder the development of a prioritized requirements list as PPD begins its deep dives on 26 May to prioritize requirements for the 2019 budget.

The MoI continues to make use of the Subject Matter Expert (SME) program to hire experienced, educated, and technically proficient Afghans to provide skilled civilian support to the MoI. CSTC-A will fund up to 268 SMEs, 32 fewer than last year, to work on one-year contracts for the MoI to meet critical needs and enforce the transition of the positions to typical civil servant positions funded by Afghanistan. Currently, 19 SMEs are serving in acting MoI management and leadership positions, and 34 SMEs have transitioned to civil servant positions within the MoI. RS hopes to sunset the SME program through 2020 and transition SMEs into full-time civil servant positions paid by the MoI. RS will continue to reevaluate the program and transition challenges on an annual basis.

The MoI Procurement Directorate took steps to rebuild its personnel core and “civilianize” the Directorate. In October 2016, the National Procurement Authority fired several MoI procurement department officials and removed the ministry’s procurement authority, leaving the procurement offices without senior leadership, experience, and knowledge. In the previous reporting period, the Director of Procurement billet remained vacant. Applicants for the position took a written test and interviewed in September 2017, and the MoI hired new leadership and enlisted the help of several SMEs to reestablish the organization and regain procurement authority. Additionally, the Minister of Interior named two Senior Procurement Advisors to assist him with the Directorate’s reform. These efforts have achieved some success. In early February 2018, the Procurement Directorate removed and reassigned all military personnel, named a civilian as the Acting Procurement Director, and selected five SMEs as Acting Managers. Although the new civilian leadership team is actively working to improve the procurement process, their status of “Acting” rather than permanent will likely hinder effectiveness. MoI Procurement advisors remain dedicated to the development of new Procurement Directorate leaders and building an efficient procurement organization.

Legal Affairs

Counter-corruption represents one of four key initiatives under the ANDSF Roadmap and remains essential to the success of the RS mission and the legitimacy and viability of the Afghan government. Although the government made important steps towards countering corruption, progress within the MoI administrative bodies tasked with fighting corruption became stagnant during this reporting period due in part to confusion over divided responsibilities and leadership roles. RS Rule of Law (ROL) and Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (TAO) advisors identified this issue and began coordinated and cross-organizational TAA to attack this problem.

The Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) helps lead the fight against corruption. Since conducting its first trial in October 2016, the court demonstrated a growing ability to handle a robust docket and successfully prosecute major corruption cases at the primary, appellate, and Supreme Court levels. The number of cases initiated, trials conducted, and prosecutions completed represented early indicators of progress. Although the ACJC continues to prosecute cases, these
statistics do not necessarily reflect the ACJC’s overall capability to try cases with enduring impacts. As such, ACJC advisors have increased and coordinated efforts to reenergize the ACJC, which stagnated during the reporting period. The Counter-Corruption Advisor Group (CCAG) coordinated efforts across RS, the Afghan government, and international organizations to synchronize counter-corruption areas, which include identifying criminal cases and ensuring the appropriate Afghan institution acts. ACJC advisors and CCAG representatives plan to continue these efforts to ensure MoI legal bodies remain in the lead to fight against and prevent corruption.

Although the ACJC handles many corruption cases, the Afghan Attorney General’s Office (AGO) tries the majority of the corruption cases. With the exception of cases referred to the ACJC, the AGO communicates very little information on the progress, status, or disposition of a case. Although RS does not have advisors in the AGO, RS did gain better access to the AGO during this reporting period. Through joint discussions with the AGO and their U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of State advisors, the AGO agreed to provide RS visibility into ACJC and AGO cases from summons to prosecution.

The MoI adopted the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)-sponsored Case Management System (CMS) to track all cases from submission to completion. The CMS offers reporting mechanisms for a multitude of information and serves as a forcing function for transparency by providing greater public access to information, if used regularly. RS advisors will leverage the CMS to complement TAA efforts. In the future, proper and routine use of the CMS, particularly at the AGO and judicial level, is one potential avenue to promote transparency in the Afghan legal sector.

During this reporting period, the MoI IG did not improve its ability to collaborate with the AGO or intelligence organizations, despite Minister Barmak’s direction to address corruption issues within the Ministry. The MoI IG consistently struggles to hold basic anti-corruption meetings, and the IG did not submit any of the annual Statements of Assurance (SoA) for the Ministerial Internal Control Program (MICP) as required. The IG often loses sight of inspections and investigations once it issues recommendations, thereby restricting its ability to track progress from start to finish. Additionally, the IG does not have a central repository of past reports to serve as a source for institutional knowledge. With upcoming implementation of the Inherent Law, the MoI IG will suffer from personnel shortcomings. TAO TAA has identified these issues and emphasized the importance of conducting thorough inspections and investigations, providing recommendations or findings, and following up to ensure proper implementation or action on the recommendations and findings.

The MoI IG improved its strategic communications. Every month, the MoI IG hosts an hour-long call-in radio show to provide listeners with updates on the state of the ANP. This forum provides listeners with the ability to express concerns or ask the IG questions. To build on the potential success of this forum, TAO advised the MoI IG to follow-up on listeners’ questions and respond in future radio shows to demonstrate the IG’s responsiveness to listeners’ concerns, comments, or questions.

During this reporting period, the MoI did not receive any new gross violations of human rights (GVHR) cases, and the MoI has not indicated whether any cases were resolved or closed. Latest
reports indicate the MoI has 26 open cases, half of which were referred to the AGO for adjudication. As stated above, RS does not have an advisory relationship with the AGO. The MoI faces greater challenges in the area of legal training, lagging behind in its capacity to train their personnel and units on rule of law and human rights issues. RS advisors have renewed TAA engagements with the MoI Legal Affairs Office to address these concerns.

Transparency, Accountability, and Law Enforcement (TALE) committees, active at the ministerial, IG, and ANP zone levels, seek to address corruption, elevate significant issues to senior leaders, and disseminate decisions downward, as appropriate. The TALE meetings foster information sharing and promote collaboration across the MoI. During the last reporting period, TALE meetings convened sporadically, and RS advisors continued to encourage the IG to schedule more meetings in accordance with the TALE terms of reference. During this reporting period, the MoI displayed positive momentum by convening a Minister-chaired TALE Steering Committee, the first under Minister Barmak, and two monthly IG-chaired TALE Executive Committees. These meetings are a positive indicator and must be sustained.

**Personnel Management**

Institutional capacity to manage the Ministry’s personnel remains underdeveloped. Advisory and reform efforts have culminated into three key focus areas: validation of personnel in the Ministry, identification of future leaders, and management of career paths. These complementary lines of effort seek to establish a self-sustaining, merit-based institutional ability to manage personnel. Proper validation of personnel allows the Ministry to administer salaries only to those validated in its system and provides visibility into the Ministry’s leadership structure. Enhanced visibility sets the conditions for better identification of future leaders and allows the Ministry to optimize Inherent Law and merit-based promotion reforms. Finally, as leaders rise into newly vacated positions, the MoI, with the continued TAA, can utilize its Human Resource Management (HRM) processes to institutionalize career paths through professional military education and progressive assignments.

Although personnel accountability and validation remains a concern, the MoI, along with U.S. and coalition advisors, continues to conduct PAIs to account properly for personnel and enroll them into the APPS system to reduce personnel management problems and eliminate “ghost soldiers” from the ANDSF. Throughout the reporting period, the MoI and advisors conducted PAIs to update and validate data in the AHRIMS and ensure personnel data accurately populates in the APPS system. PAI teams visited all eight Zone and Provincial HQs, as well as a handful of lower echelon facilities. PAI teams are re-visiting select ANP units that had relatively lower turn-out during the main collection phase from May 2017 to May 2018. The MoI continues to transfer AHRIMS data to the APPS personnel module in advance of full APPS implementation in the MoI in November 2018. ANP personnel must provide personal data, possess an identification card, have biometric data on file, and occupy a valid position on the current *tashkil* to be validated. Proper assignment of MoI personnel to valid *tashkil* positions has slowed the enrollment process and delayed the transition to APPS. Only 51 percent of the ANP are in valid positions on the current *tashkil*. Of those personnel, some perform duties elsewhere because their assignment office lacks an adequate number of slots to accommodate them. The MoI is working to correct allocation of offices that do not have enough slots for assigned personnel. RS continues to
encourage stronger oversight of reported personnel numbers by linking funding for ANP personnel to approved *tashkil* positions, a requirement under APPS.

Over the past two years, PAI efforts have collected data on a large number of the current ANP forces. Of the units processed to date, 80 percent of the ANP (including the AUP, ABP, and ANCOP) and 49 percent of ALP have been validated. This extensive, multi-year effort will increase the accuracy of personnel data and limit the abuse of the ANDSF payroll. Once validated in AHRIMS system, ANP personnel are eligible to receive salary payments from CSTC-A salary disbursements. On January 1, 2017, CSTC-A began funding the monthly ANA and ALP payroll disbursements from the validated personnel records within AHRIMS. Accordingly, CSTC-A withheld funds for those personnel not accounted for in AHRIMS. The estimated number of MoI police not enrolled in APPS is 42,820 as of May 11, 2018.

During this reporting period, the MoI continued phased implementation of the APPS system. APPS reached IOC last reporting period, primarily in Kabul-based units. Advisors expect APPS to reach full operational capability during the next reporting period, at which time APPS will become the system of record for personnel and pay management within the MoI. MoI continues to train personnel on APPS to reach FOC. The MoI, with the assistance of RS advisors, have divided ANP zonal zones into various groups and plans to provide phased training by group. The training schedule is as follows: Group B (Zone 101) will complete over-the-shoulder (OTS) training by the end of May 2018. Group D (Zones 404, 505, and 606) will complete OTS training by the end of August 2018. Group E (Zones 707 and 808) will complete OTS training by the end of September 2018. Lastly, Group C (Zones 202 and 303) will complete OTS training by November 2018. AHRIMS will run parallel with APPS until November 2018 when APPS goes into FOC.

APPS is a major shift in the MoI’s traditional way of managing pay and personnel. This transformation will encounter challenges; however, with RS assistance, the MoI has made progress towards greater accountability and transparency.

APPS training continued this reporting period. Approximately 21 APPS operators graduated from the 4-week training class. After the 4-week class, OTS training continues at each unit for 4-8 weeks, including comparisons of pay calculations between APPS and AHRIMS. OTS training will reinforce daily time and attendance record requirements, assist with identifying and reconciling pay discrepancies, and help troubleshoot issues that may arise in advance of APPS declared the pay system of record. Unfortunately, several trained APPS users have moved to positions outside of HR/APPS responsibilities. TAA efforts will continue to vet class rosters and ensure proper assignment of graduates.

The Force Management Directorate (FMD) oversees the MoI’s force structure, and advisors noted that FMD capabilities advanced during this reporting period. Overall discipline with matching force structure and management to mission requirements remains underdeveloped, and the MoI continues to struggle with long-term force structure planning. The FMD successfully partnered with RS advisors and the MoD to transfer ABP and ANCOP forces to the MoD, while retaining around 4,000 ABP and 2,550 ANCOP authorizations within the MoI. The FMD is currently utilizing the residual ABP posts to build capabilities to support airport and border crossing
checkpoints. With RS advisor assistance, the FMD made good progress identifying required force structure reductions to support the ANDSF Roadmap growth, including publishing the first on-time tashkil. The FMD learned many lessons through this experience, including the need to enforce the use of standardized documents throughout the MoI. Although the FMD improved the MoI’s force management capabilities, MoI force managers still require continued coalition-led training and advising focused on force structure concepts and adherence to planning timelines.

On September 5, 2017, the MoI awarded a consulting contract to perform a comprehensive workforce analysis in which the contractor will identify elements of the MoI that should participate in “civilianization” efforts. “Civilianization” aims to provide strong civilian leadership, leverage subject matter expertise, and build continuity within the MoI, in accordance with the MISP. The civilianization initiative, which began on December 15, 2017, and runs through August 31, 2018, covers the following areas: human resources, strategy and policy, and administration.

Despite this effort, “civilianization” remains elusive due to a lack of designated ownership and funding disparities. The MoI continues to lack a Single Responsible Owner (SRO) with complete responsibility for all the civilian mechanisms, resulting in different civilianization processes executed across the Ministry. This long-standing problem plagues implementation efficiency and timelines. The presence of several different funding mechanisms—the Afghan government, LOTFA, and CSTC-A—hinders efforts to harmonize MoI salaries across the civil service pay scale. The Afghan government funds the baseline salaries of 66 senior-level and 125 mid-level civilian positions, with additional LOTFA funds added to their salaries through the Capacity Building for Results (CBR) initiative. This has created a salary differential between the MoI civilians hired as “experts,” with LOTFA funds added to their salaries, and their traditional civil service counterparts conducting the same tasks at the lower, base civil service pay rate. The Afghan government funds 9,449 of the remaining 9,640 civil servant positions in the MoI with LOTFA funding 191, and CSTC-A funds the SME program. The deputy ministers have used the SME program to circumvent requirements to employ more civilians by consistently requesting SME extensions rather than developing integration plans to transition the positions to the civilian workforce. A civilianization plan for the SMEs is nearing completion for approval and signature, paving the way for the SMEs to integrate into civil service positions as planned under the original program design. Although the various salary augmentation programs succeeded in recruiting top civilian talent, their reliance on outside funding streams threatens the longevity and sustainability.

**Institutional Training**

The MoI’s institutional training remains a critical deficiency and lags far behind institutional training in the MoD. Despite U.S. and coalition TAA efforts, strong training institutions have not emerged. MoI field units did not benefit from partnered TAA efforts in the same manner as in the MoD. The combination of weak institutions and resource shortfalls in the field resulted in a police force that requires better institutional training. MoI training efforts have vacillated between combat training and law enforcement training as U.S., coalition, and Afghan leaders struggled to determine the best use of the police force. Even today, the focus has not shifted towards building strong institutions the way it has in the MoD. Efforts such as the MoD’s UTEDC are absent as the MoI struggles to establish a long-term training plan.
During this reporting period, the Training General Command (TGC) disbanded Provincial Training Centers and Mobile Training Teams (MTT), and directed training be consolidated at Regional Training Centers (RTC), potentially affecting personnel located in more austere locations. As highlighted in previous reporting periods, the MoI does not exercise authority over the RTCs. ANP zone commanders own the RTCs and, as a result, RTC training was not standardized. During this reporting period, RS Police Institutional Advisory Team (PIAT) personnel noted that these challenges remain, but began developing a plan to streamline the RTCs and gain improved visibility into their operations. Currently, there are ten RTCs across eight zones. Because the RTCs consistently operate below capacity, advisors plan to reduce the number of RTCs, with primary training consolidated in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. Future efforts to build MoI institutions, including training capabilities, is largely reliant on coalition partners’ willingness to commit institutional trainers in the future.

The MoI also lacks human resource expertise and career path management. Although personnel pass through the RTCs, there is no system to assign trained police to positions of need and no system to provide additional education or training opportunities to police as their careers progress. Schools, such as the MoD’s Command and Staff School and Pre-Command Course, do not exist in the MoI.

**Logistics and Maintenance**

The MoI lacks the systems and capabilities to procure and maintain equipment, and there is low confidence in the accuracy of MoI’s equipment reporting. Outdated equipment tashkils, significant disagreements regarding approved equipment levels, and leadership turnover hamper progress in MoI logistics and maintenance.

During this reporting period, a joint MoI/MoD team finalized ABF and ANCOF equipment inventories and initiated the final transfer of equipment to the MoD. However, property accountability standards and records within the ABF and ANCOF were extremely poor, and it will take months to account for all of the former MoI property and add it to MoD and ANA property books. Coalition advisors continue to emphasize logistical planning and execution. Major challenges include a lack of timely and accurate reporting of inventory levels and consumption across key commodities, and resistance to sharing and cross-leveling supplies and equipment. Although the MoI published a zone SOP in 2016 to make zone commanders responsible for the submission of logistical reports and requisitions, implementation and adherence to the SOP remain uneven and inconsistent.

The National Maintenance Contract (NMC), previously referred to as the National Maintenance Strategy (NMS), launched during the last reporting period and reached FOC on December 28, 2017. The NMC consolidated six individual vehicle maintenance contracts into one ANDSF-wide contract to improve near-term maintenance while building long-term Afghan maintenance capacity. The NMC focuses on improving the overall maintenance capability of the ANDSF while simultaneously providing formal training and mentoring to ANP personnel in the maintenance and supply chain management function. The NMC seeks the progressive, incremental yearly transfer of responsibility to the MoI for the maintenance of their vehicle holding.
In the first year of the contract, the MoI maintains responsibility for 5 percent of all maintenance of unit-held vehicles, with contractors responsible for the remaining 95 percent. In anticipation of the transfer of increasing maintenance workload from the NMC contractor, MoI units seek to maximize training opportunities at the ANA Combat Service Support (CSS) School for initial maintenance and leadership courses. The NMC will augment formal CSS School training through the provision of classroom instruction and shoulder-to-shoulder mentoring and training for maintenance and supply chain personnel. The MoI and ANP units continually engage with contractors in each zone to inform the class enrollment process and influence the training needs, quantities, priorities, and locations. Although in its nascent phases, the MoI demonstrated a steady, but limited, month-to-month increase in its maintenance capabilities. Proper utilization of trained mechanics and supply chain specialists remains a critical requirement for successful development of overall ANP maintenance capability. MoI-trained mechanics and supply chain specialists continue to perform duties other than maintenance or supply-related tasks. The MoI must develop strategies to mitigate the risks of improper use of trained mechanic and supply specialists, and persistent TAA will be required in the future.

MoI fuel contracts remained under the control of RS due to the risk of corruption. RS does not anticipate a change to this policy in the near future.

**Strategic and Operational Planning**

The MISP represents the MoI’s primary strategic and operational planning document over the next four years, and incorporates directives and taskings from the ANDSF Roadmap and the U.S.-Afghan Security Compact. The primary MoI focus during this reporting period was planning and implementing the 2018 Annual Plan, the first of four annual implementation plans for the MISP.

The 2018 Annual Plan addresses security for the upcoming elections. Although the progress has been slow, the MoI has conducted joint planning with outside institutions, including the MoD, the Independent Election Commission (IEC), the Ministry of Women Affairs, the Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs, and other relevant agencies. Other areas in which the MoI continues to develop capabilities for joint planning include planning for: Operation *Nasrat*; Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline security; the Kabul Process Conference; the transfer of ABF and ANCOF to the MoD; and the ongoing plans to improve security within Kabul.

MoI planners were deeply involved Operation *Khalid* and have remained engaged in the planning process for Operation *Nasrat*. The MoI Operations and Plans department, under the direction of the Deputy Minister for Security, maintains responsibility for operational planning. The Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy, who reports to the First Deputy Minister, conducts strategic planning. Within this system, strategic plans from the Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy flow through the Deputy Minister for Security and his team down to the ANP zone level. The system’s efficiency depends on personality, political backing, education, and literacy.

Despite improved ability to conduct operational planning, reporting by ANP zone headquarters is generally poor. Commanders do not enforce proper reporting procedures and routinely bypass
chains of command to address issues directly with senior leadership. As a result, zone headquarters rarely have acceptable situational awareness of the status of their units.

**Intelligence**

The MoI continued to improve its intelligence sharing during this reporting period. The Directorates of Police Intelligence (DPI) and Counter Terrorism Police (CTP) engaged in greater information sharing as Resolute Support priorities shifted to Kabul Security. The MoI focused on implementing a revised expansion plan for the National Information Management System (NIMS), appointing an executive chair to develop strategic-level guidance and direction for all MoI NIMS users. The CTP Directorate increased its number of liaison officers at the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC) and the National Directorate of Security (NDS) to facilitate timely intelligence sharing regarding force protection and enemy operations.

As part of the effort to improve security, the MoI’s Biometrics Team completed configuration and testing of mobile biometric devices for use by Crime Scene Teams and Special Police Units. When fielded, this capability will allow these specialized units at the zone and provincial levels to conduct on-scene biometric enrollments and rapidly classify enrollees. This new capability will be the Afghan government’s first use of these types of devices.

Based on overwhelming positive feedback, MoI advisors at the NTEC increased the number of open source media analysis classes for MoI intelligence specialists to meet the demand for additional advanced training.

During this reporting period, advisors focused on improving processes to ensure quality and validity of target packages to support the prosecution of warrants and evidence-based operations. Previously, MoI intelligence was duplicating efforts and not properly validating criteria. The MoI expects to establish a lawful intercept program during the next reporting period.

**Strategic Communication**

Although the MoI made minor improvements in STRATCOM engagements and capabilities during the reporting period, STRATCOM remained largely uncoordinated and sporadic across the ministry and down to the zones. At the national level, the MoI provided STRATCOM representatives to the daily GMIC meetings. Like the MoD, the MoI’s most effective strategic communications appear to occur at the zone level and below. The MISP includes STRATCOM goals and milestones, which were incorporated into the MoI’s Annual Plan; however, the current level of STRATCOM integration into MoI planning is relatively limited.

In accordance with the Annual Plan, provincial ANP chiefs of police frequently participate in media events in conjunction with provincial governors and regional ANA leaders (corps commanders); however, it is unclear if local leaders synchronize their messaging with national-level messaging. In December 2017, the MoI launched a weekly call-in radio show to encourage listeners to bring MoI-related issues directly to the Minister, and for him to communicate his reforms directly to the people. MoI STRATCOM continues to work towards improving trust and credibility with the Afghan population regarding MoI’s community policing efforts.
Gender Integration Initiatives

Approximately 3,200 women serve in the Afghan National Police. The MoI recruitment target is 600 women per year, with a medium-term goal of 5,000 women in the MoI, and a long-term goal of 10,000. Although women have a higher presence in the ANP as compared to the ANA, the same challenges exist in the ANP as the ANA to successfully integrate women. During this reporting period, NATO RS and the MoI continued initiatives to recruit and retain women.

A number of incentives help overcome cultural recruitment barriers. The MoI’s incentives policy offers ten types of incentives for women: recruitment bonuses; re-contracting bonuses; referral bonuses; retention incentives; instructor incentives; child care allowance; relocation and housing allowances; training and education allowances; police prison incentives; and medical attendant travel allowances. To date, there are no assessments to determine the success of these initiatives as a recruitment or retention tool. There is a risk financial incentives could work against successful integration, especially if women are paid substantially more than their male counterparts. Careful management of financial incentives and the development of non-financial incentives are required to increase the chances of successful integration. Advisors continue to TAA and manage expectations regarding the incentives policy; it is paid in whole by CSTC-A, and if donor funding ceases, either GIRoA must pay the incentives or they will cease to exist.

As part of the recruitment and awareness campaign, the Gender Office distributes backpacks with ANP logos, pens, and notebooks to high school girls throughout the provinces. These efforts help reach students and young women in outlying zones and provinces beyond the reach of radio and television advertisements. The Ministry submitted a procurement package approved by the Requirements Approval Board in March 2018 for recruiting advertisements on television and radio at peak periods to reach young women who may be interested in serving as police. The package will go before the Procurement Approval Board in June and be awarded in July 2018.

The MoI continues to hold shuras to address the concerns of ANP women and elevate matters requiring senior leadership attention, such as incidents of sexual harassment. The ANP’s senior female police officer, BG Shahi, leads the forum and encourages subordinates to promote professional development for female staff and report incidents of sexual harassment and assault. BG Shahi also co-chaired January and April 2018 Ministry Support Team Gender Working Group to synchronize international and coalition efforts. The group’s current focus is women in the Afghan Border Patrol, literacy training for women in the ANP, and barriers to inclusive recruitment of women in the ANP.

Minister Barmak reconfirmed his commitment to the women of the Ministry during the recent ceremony recognizing their service during International Women’s Day in March. He continues to encourage their participation, professional development, and retention, and has an open door policy for women, especially to report harassment and assault.

The MoI personnel tashkil is under review to ensure that there are clear lines of career progression for females and ensure that more senior positions are available to women. The recent focus on realigning tashkil positions to accommodate the growth of the Afghan Special Security Forces has delayed significant work in this area.
Support and enforcement of existing policies for recruiting, training, and placing women into the ANP tashkil continue to lag behind expectations. The draft SY1397 Commitment Letter for the MoI reflects a five percent penalty per month, as of June 2018, until the Training General Command (TGC) develops and approves a training and career plan for ANP women. The Police Institutional Advisory Team (PIAT) works closely with the TGC on these issues. The Minister recently approved the plan to conduct female officer training at the Afghan National Police Training Academy. Female NCO training will continue at Sivas, Turkey, for the remainder of 2018. Initial Police Training for females will take place at the Regional Training Center in Balkh. TGC will include Female Training Requirements in the SY1398 Annual Training Plan. Additional female training will be conducted at the Afghan National Police Academy, the Central Training Center in Kabul, and RTCs in Balkh, Parwan, and Herat. Female career paths will be developed for SY1397 through SY1400 with annual reviews based on personnel levels and operational requirements.

The full introduction of the APPS will provide the more reliable and timely data necessary for targeted recruiting and training, and placement of females in valid tashkil vacancies commensurate with their skills.

**Education and Training**

Unique training and education opportunities provide incentives for women to join the ANP. The MoI trains women in areas such as basic police training, radio maintenance, and C-IED training. During this reporting period, 156 new recruits and 86 police officers attended basic police training in Turkey and graduated in mid-March. Like their ANA counterparts, women recruited in Afghanistan and trained in Sivas, Turkey, return without detailed knowledge of Afghan-specific laws and procedures. Often, women return from specialized training and are assigned to positions without the proper technical training, or they are not assigned at all due to a lack of proper skill sets.

The desired end-state is to recruit women for specific tashkil vacancies and train them in Afghanistan with the technical skills required for initial assignments. The offices would like the training completed in Afghanistan so the program can have more oversight; however, the UN Development Program (UNDP), not RS, controls the funding. Current MoI concerns regarding the safety of women in training in Afghanistan resulted in the extension of NCO training for women at Sivas Police Training Academy in Turkey through the end of 2018.

Additional training opportunities continue to raise awareness and provide unique opportunities to women within the ANP. The Human Rights, Women Affairs and Children Directorate, in conjunction with the international community, conducts training seminars to educate women on their international and domestic rights. Available records reflect that approximately 1,105 women received specialized training through these courses during the last quarter. The MoI Training General Command recently developed a new program of instruction designed to provide women within the General Command Police Special Units (GCPSU) with the skills to operate within the provincial and national police special units.
The Special Police Female Foundation Course builds upon the Initial Police Training Course content. This course will improve the proficiency of GCPSU women and teach them the necessary skills that are unique to their specific role as special police operators. Following individual proficiency training, the Special Police Female Foundation Course will provide repetitive and realistic sensitive site exploitation (SSE) and Special Response Team exercises consistent with special police operations conducted across Afghanistan. Afghan instructors drawn from operational police special units will teach the course.

The GOOD Program was incorporated into the MoI, and initial literacy testing was held at the MoI HQ in March 2018. Fifteen women will attend Level 1 or basic literacy classes, and the class size will increase to 25 students as the information reaches other women within the Ministry.

**Facilities**

A lack of adequate facilities remains an obstacle to recruitment of women into the ANP. Basic requirements such as separate bathrooms and toilets, segregated recreational areas, and training facilities negatively impact female recruitment despite $590 million being spent on female ANP initiatives. The MoI is still in the process of identifying police districts that lack appropriate facilities for women. Major training facility construction projects are on hold until the MoI determines how and where training will be conducted for men and women in the country.

To address these problems, RS developed commitment letters with the MoI to ensure adequate facilities are built and available for women, are not misused by men, and are subject to the withholding of funds if the compound is found in violation. CSTC-A will release the funds after the MoI mitigates the problems or the Minister grants an exception. CSTC-A withheld funds in 2017 due to misuse of women’s facilities, and the next round of commitment letters is scheduled to go out in this reporting period.

The MoI will monitor the following MoI construction projects to ensure they are available for female use:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Facility Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balkh</td>
<td>Mazar e Sharif</td>
<td>Zone 707 HQ</td>
<td>Daycare and Barracks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>GCPSU ATF 444</td>
<td>Daycare and Barracks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>Jalalabad</td>
<td>AUP PHQ</td>
<td>Daycare and Barracks</td>
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<td>Kabul</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>ABP HQ Kabul</td>
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<td>Bazaarak</td>
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<td>Daycare and Barracks</td>
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<td>Herat</td>
<td>RTC Herat</td>
<td>Training Facility for 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>Jalalabad</td>
<td>ABF HQ</td>
<td>Daycare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapisa</td>
<td>Mahmood Raqi</td>
<td>AUP PHQ Kapisa</td>
<td>Daycare and Barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paktya</td>
<td>Gardez</td>
<td>RTC Gardez</td>
<td>Training Facility for 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>CTC Kabul</td>
<td>Training Facility for 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>ANP Academy</td>
<td>Training Facility for 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>PDs 4, 8, 12, 17</td>
<td>Family Response Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>Police Town</td>
<td>Phase 1; 90 family units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Additionally, several extensive facility upgrade and development projects were completed this reporting period:

1. MoI HQ Women’s Participation Program Compound;
2. Renovation of Regional Training Center Parwan facility, to include training and daycare renovation;
3. Renovation of Afghan Border Force Brigade HQ Gardez women’ billeting, offices, and daycare;
4. Construction of women’s training facility in Gardez to provide offices, classroom, billeting, and daycare;
5. Renovation of the Afghan Border Force Brigade HQ Nangarhar facility to provide billeting, offices, changing rooms, and bathrooms;
6. Construction of the Afghan Uniformed Police Provincial HQ Nangarhar to provide daycare and billeting; and
7. HKIA checkpoint female search rooms.

5.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

The ANP mission is to maintain civil order; reduce corruption; prevent the cultivation, production, and smuggling of illegal narcotics; provide security for individuals and the community; and safeguard legal rights and freedoms. Although the ANP currently focuses on working with and alongside the ANA to fight the insurgency, the long-term goal as described in the ANDSF Roadmap is to transition the ANP to a more traditional community police force.

One of the key initiatives in the ANDSF Roadmap during this reporting period involved the transfer of most of the ANCOP and elements of the ABP to control of the MoD. ANP forces remain on the front lines augmenting the ANA during the “hold” phase of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations; however, with limited or no crew-served weapons, anti-armor weapons, armored vehicles, or ISR assets, the ANP are not sufficiently trained or equipped for traditional COIN tactics. The ANP’s focus and employment in COIN military functions have hindered their development of sufficient anti-crime and other community policing capabilities. The ANP is several years behind the ANA in its development.

The desired ANP end-state is a professional and effective police force focused on community-centric, traditional, evidenced-based law enforcement policing. Milestones include determining the proper operating model and force distribution to police Afghanistan effectively, redefine ANP roles and responsibilities, assign ANP pillar responsibilities, and establish training standards and work ethics to facilitate effective policing.

Afghan National Police Strength

The ANP has an authorized end strength of up to 124,626 personnel. The ANP recruiting/recontracting strategy remains informal and ad hoc, and monthly casualty reports drive recruiting. ANP recruiters generally make trips to zones/districts where losses were greatest the previous month and where replenishment of personnel is most needed to maintain end strength. Although the ANP continues to demonstrate positive recruiting rates, reenlistment remains the primary challenge to maintaining effective strength. As in the ANA, the number of ANP personnel dropped...
from the rolls continues to comprise the largest portion of overall ANP attrition. The combination of frequent and lengthy deployments to remote checkpoints with minimal provisions and equipment, difficult living conditions, and the near-constant prospect of combat contributes explains high ANP attrition.

**Afghan National Police Structure**

The ANP is composed of four pillars (AUP, PPS, ABP, and AACP) and three sub-pillars (ALP, Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), and Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)). There are plans to transfer the ANCOP and the ABP to the MoD by the end of this year, allowing the MoI to focus its resources and efforts on counter-corruption campaigns and law enforcement.

The GCPSU is the MoI’s component of the ASSF. Although they too provide security, and fall under MoI control, the ALP and the APPF are not counted as part of the 124,626 *tashkil*; however, they provide additional security under the MoI. The ALP are funded by ASFF, while the APPF do not receive any U.S. funding. The ANP is divided into eight zones that generally align with the ANA corps areas of responsibility (see Figure 13).

*Figure 13: ANP Zones*
**Afghan Uniform Police**

With its current authorization of 99,068 people, the AUP is the largest police agency in Afghanistan and the primary police force the local populace encounters in their daily lives. The AUP consists of the traffic police, the fire and rescue departments, and a provincial police headquarters in each of the 34 provinces.

The AUP mission is to maintain the rule of law, provide security and civil order, prevent cultivation and smuggling of narcotics, and prevent the smuggling of weapons and other public property, such as historical and cultural relics. Other AUP duties include the detention of criminal suspects to be handed over to the judicial system, maintenance of reliable security measures for key infrastructure including roads and facilities, intelligence collection, and the provision of firefighting and rescue services during natural or man-made disasters. Leadership across AUP units varies, but generally senior MoI and AUP leaders do not empower lower-level leaders to make decisions. Moreover, local AUP units and leaders are susceptible to influence by local power brokers and government officials.

**Afghan Local Police**

The ALP provide security within villages and rural areas to protect the population from insurgent attacks and to protect facilities. ALP personnel are recruited in concert with local elder approval and employed within villages to provide local security and prevent the spread of insurgent influence and activity in that area. NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) provides TAA support to the ALP at the ALP Staff Directorate (SD) level.

During this reporting period, 679 new ALP recruits received training. In 17 of 31 provinces, between 90 and 99 percent of ALP are trained. Three provinces (Parwan, Khost, and Daykundi) reported 100 percent of the ALP trained. Despite these numbers, approximately 4,000 ALP personnel have not received training, according to ALP training reports as of April 1, 2018. The ALP Staff Directorate implemented a Winter Training Plan in an effort to reduce the number of untrained ALP personnel. However, the TGC decision to decertify all Provincial Training Centers and forbid the use of Mobile Training Teams impacted the training plan. RTCs are now the only option for training. Consequently, ALP must travel greater distances unilaterally, or Provincial Chiefs of Police (PCoP) must coordinate with the General Recruiting Command for transportation, both of which increase risk and slow down the training throughput.

The MoI selected the ALP SD as a pilot to test APPS. Within the ALP SD, personnel have received the necessary APPS training and the APPS terminals are secured within the ALP SD. The ALP currently show 100 percent slotted in the Kabul capital area, and greater than 90 percent within the ALP SD have undergoing PAI.

Throughout the reporting period, ALP SD leadership faced continued pressure to make changes within the ALP *tashkil* to increase total numbers and move authorizations from one district to another. In total, the ALP SD received 35 requested changes, potentially affecting 14,433 Guardian Angels, or 47 percent of the total force. To ensure future ALP *tashkil* stability and prevent changes that could disrupt operational effectiveness during critical fighting periods, the
ALP SD, with advisor oversight, determined that the *tashkil* cannot be amended during the fighting season, due to the time required for recruiting, vetting, equipment transfer, and training. The *tashkil* will open for recommended changes at the end of fighting season for implementation during the winter lull. These changes (not to exceed 10 percent of the total force) allow for stability during the fighting season, for analysis to take place over the course of the fighting season, and time for implementation in order to set conditions for the next fighting season.

**Public Security Police**

Following the transition of eight ANCOP brigades to the MoD in March 2018, a force of 2,550 personnel remained under the control of the MoI and formed the Public Security Police (PSP). The PSP mission is to provide crisis response to public unrest and terrorist attacks in urban and metropolitan areas. The PSP units are assigned responsibility for regions throughout Afghanistan.

**Afghan Border Police**

When the majority of ABP transitioned to the MoD in December 2018, the ABP dedicated to customs and security operations at border crossing points and at airports remained under the control of the MoI. The ABP secure and safeguard national borders and provide security at Afghanistan’s international airports to deter terrorists, criminal groups, and smugglers. The ABP mission includes securing and patrolling border and control entry ports, such as airports and border-crossing points, and guarding against the illegal entry of persons, weapons, narcotics, and other goods. The ABP headquarters is located in Kabul.

**Afghan Anti-Crime Police**

The AACP provides specialist police expertise and counterterrorism, anti-corruption, criminal investigation, biometrics, forensics, and specialized security detail support. Coalition subject matter experts work alongside their Afghan counterparts in the AACP’s forensic and biometric programs to support evidence-based operations. AACP personnel also work closely with criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges to ensure the police, not the military, remain the primary face of the rule of law. The AACP organizational structure includes the AACP headquarters, the Criminal Investigation Directorate, the Counterterrorism Police Division, and the Major Crimes Task Force. The AACP is authorized 1,220 personnel.

**Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan**

The CNPA is the lead ANDSF pillar for counternarcotics (CN) efforts. The CNPA has regular narcotics police and specialized units located in all 34 provinces. Specialized units include the Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU), the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and the Intelligence Investigation Unit. The CNPA is authorized 2,596 personnel.

The MoI’s NIU and SIU conduct interdiction operations that target senior narcotics traffickers. During this reporting period, the NIU and Commandos found and destroyed more than $41.8

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38 Evidence-based operations entail arresting individuals for whom there is sufficient unclassified evidence to attain a conviction in an Afghan court of law.
million worth of narcotics revenue, equipment, precursors, and refined narcotics. Such operations demonstrate the significant capability of the NIU and Commandos to conduct successful CN operations to disrupt the enemy’s revenue stream. NSOCC-A supports the NIU for joint CN and CT operations, training, and sustainment. These advisors collaborate with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, including the Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Agency.

**Afghan Public Protection Force**

The APPF is a state-owned enterprise under MoI’s authority originally established to provide contract-based facility and convoy security services. The APPF’s authorization is 13,712 personnel. The APPF currently guards key infrastructure, facilities, governmental and non-governmental public welfare projects, and other international projects. The APPF also escorts and protects convoys against insurgent attacks and provides security for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations with diplomatic immunity, and political agencies of foreign countries located in Afghanistan. Additionally, the APPF protects facilities donated to the Afghan government by international organizations and the private sector. Currently, NATO and U.S. forces do not support the APPF, except through the security contracts already in place, and the coalition does not advise the APPF as part of the RS mission.

**MoI Afghan Special Security Forces**

**General Command of Police Special Units**

The GCPSU is the MoI component of the ASSF, and it provides the ANP with a capability to conduct high-risk rule of law operations such as CT, CN and counter-organized crime based on evidence, in accordance with Afghanistan’s Criminal Procedure Code. These operations include both the execution of high-risk arrests and crisis response operations including hostage recovery. Due to its employment in these situations, the GCPSU incurs a higher rate of casualties than other specialized ANP units, which contributes to combat fatigue, higher attrition, and challenges with maintaining overall personnel and equipment readiness. The GCPSU is authorized 3,455 personnel as of May 2018.

The GCPSU HQ is responsible for the command and control of all MoI special police units, including three National Mission Units (NMUs), which will increase to 6 as part of ASSF Growth; 33 PSUs that operate in direct support of the Provincial Chiefs of Police (PCoPs); and 25 Provincial Intelligence (J2) Detachments. In practice, because PCoPsand Provincial Governors oversee payroll systems and salaries for the PSUs, they are frequently more responsive to provincial officials’ directives than to the GCPSU chain of command.

The GCPSU Special Police Training Center (SPTC) and the Special Police Training Wing (SPTW) provide basic and advanced special police training, respectively. The SPTC routinely conducts

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39 The APPF was established subsequent to Presidential Decree #62, signed on August 17, 2010. The decree’s intent was to decrease the presence of private security contractors operating in Afghanistan. However, in August 2015, President Ghani signed Presidential Decree #66, which allows U.S. forces, NATO, and their respective contractors to use private security contractors outside of NATO and U.S. facilities or if they are in “direct support” of the ANDSF.
three basic police operational courses each year with 450 students per class, while the SPTW routinely conducts 4 advanced special police operational courses per year with 40 students in each class. However, this pipeline was modified to enable growth and will adapt to support the post-growth organization. GCPSU recruits typically are drawn from other AUP units or as new recruits. During this reporting period, a number of high-risk arrest operations demonstrated the ability to conduct complex, independent helicopter and ground assault force operations. However, the GCPSU remains reliant on coalition enablers, including ISR support, to be fully effective.

When six insurgents initiated a High-Profile Attack (HPA) on the Kabul Intercontinental Hotel on January 20, 2018, GCPSU’s Crisis Response Unit 222 (CRU222) and Commando Force 333 (CF333) responded to the attack. CRU222 deployed rapidly as first responders and quickly assessed the situation on arrival, while the Kabul Security Force (KSF) provided a perimeter cordon. The GCPSU Commander took command of the incident, controlled the clearance of the hotel, and demonstrated the GCPSU’s capability to respond to rapidly evolving, high-threat scenarios. In all, GCPSU force elements rescued more than 150 civilian hostages and neutralized all 6 insurgents during the clearance operation.

The ANDSF Roadmap calls for the expansion of the GCPSU HQ and Training Directorate, an increase in the number or Provincial J2 Detachments, and the creation of three additional NMUs as part of ASSF expansion. The new NMUs will provide crisis response, HPA prevention and reaction, and high-risk arrest capabilities to areas in western, northern, and eastern Afghanistan. Recruiting and training for the three new NMUs progressed during this reporting period, as did the preparation of infrastructure for training and eventual operations. The three new NMUs will build towards IOC in late 2018 with FOC in March 2020.

To expedite the growth of the NMUs, the GCPSU expanded its training infrastructure. New training sites include abandoned and/or underutilized facilities in northern Afghanistan near existing bases and training centers. Additionally, the number of personnel assigned to the GCPSU Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) increased by 32 over January through February 2018. This uplift was required to establish the Special Police Advanced Training Wing, Special Operations Advisory Team (SOAT). There will be further increases in manning with the planned addition of a number of SOATs who will train, advise and assist the new NMUs. New recruits, along with a small number of personnel serving in PSUs, will undergo a year-long, four-phase cycle of training in order to establish the new NMUs.

During Phase 1, new recruits will complete the four-month GCPSU non-commissioned officer (NCO) course immediately followed by the two-month National Unit Operators Course (NUOC) conducted by the Special Police Training Center (SPTC) in Kabul. GCPSU personnel serve a minimum of two years in PSU units to gain experience before entering NUOC; however, timelines for NMU growth accelerated this training timeline. The first cycle of Phase 1 and Phase 2 training graduated 349 recruits from SPTC on February 22, 2018.

Upon completion of the NCO and NUOC course, selected graduates of each NUOC course form into NMU squadrons and begin Phase 3 training at the GCPSU Special Police Advanced Training Wing (SPATW) in Mazar-e-Sharif, while remaining graduates of each NUOC are assigned to Provincial Special Units (PSU) or existing NMUs as replacements to supplement for natural and
battlefield attrition. The first Phase 3 courses began on March 24, 2018. During Phase 3 training, the graduates of the NUOC receive specialist individual training, building toward collective training. Phase 3 culminates with a GCPSU SOAG led operational evaluation in Sep 2018. In Phase 4, the new squadrons deploy to their new base locations. The new squadrons will partner with existing NMU squadrons. This four-phase plan is poised to achieve an effects-based IOC by no later than October 2018, and FOC by no later than March 2020. Although this plan appears compliant with growth targets, the second and third order effects regarding the provision of mission-essential equipment, attrition throughout each phase of training, and attrition within operational NMUs and PSUs remain an enduring risk.
SECTION 6 – FINANCING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

The ANDSF continue to be funded primarily through annual congressional appropriations to the DoD via the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). This annual appropriation enables the Secretary of Defense to provide assistance to the security forces of Afghanistan, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, and supports the equipping, sustainment, training, and operations of Afghanistan’s security forces. NATO Allies and partner nations also play a prominent role in the financial support of the ANDSF by contributing to the NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF), which supports the ANA, and the UNDP-administered LOTFA that pays the salaries of police and builds MoI capacity. In addition, the Afghan government draws upon its domestic revenues to contribute to ANDSF sustainment operations for ANDSF personnel. The ANDSF will continue to depend on coalition security and advisory assistance and donor financial assistance for 2018 and beyond. At the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, the Afghan government reiterated its original commitment made at the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago to steadily increase financial contributions to its security costs incrementally each year.

6.1 HOLDING THE AFGHAN MINISTRIES ACCOUNTABLE

CSTC-A makes use of bilateral funding, commitment letters, and the CPA to hold the MoD and MoI accountable for ASFF-funded equipment and services and for direct contributions of ASFF funding provided to them. During this reporting period, CSTC-A imposed a penalty of about $12 million on the MoD and MoI for high-profile incidents of illegal fuel truck detention.

DoD assesses that the Afghan government currently provides adequate access to financial records associated with its use of DoD appropriated funds, specifically the ASFF. CSTC-A signed a financial records transparency MoU with the Ministry of Finance in August 2017. This MoU grants CSTC-A full access to the financial records of ASFF money transferred to the MoF, allowing additional transparency and oversight. Specifically, the MoU provides CSTC-A permanent access to the cloud-based Afghan Financial Management and Information System (AFMIS) to monitor the flow ASFF funds from commitment through expenditure. The MoU also asserts CSTC-A’s right to withhold, and to recall, any ASFF funds if terms and conditions of the funds are not met by the ANDSF. This agreement helps protect over $1 billion per year of ASFF provided directly to the Afghan government, most of which funds the ANA payroll while the remainder funds Afghan government facility maintenance contracts and other projects. The majority of ASFF—typically, about $2 to $3 billion per year—is spent on DoD contracts to provide equipment, training, maintenance, supplies, and other support to the ANDSF.

Before CSTC-A deposits ASFF allotments into the Afghan MoF Treasury Single Accounts for the MoI and MoD, the MoF must provide CSTC-A a monthly reconciliation of the accounts. This allows CSTC-A to validate the ANDSF’s current holdings and determine what additional funding is required prior to additional funding disbursements. CSTC-A deposits money on a monthly basis

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40 This section provides information on the extent to which the Department of Defense has adequate access, for accountability purposes, to financial records of the Government of Afghanistan as directed in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 Conference Report to Accompany S. 2943.
based on the ministries’ estimated requirements for the following month. This maximizes CSTC-A’s control over ASFF funds and minimizes the amount of ASFF funds at risk under Afghan control.

Other financial accountability measures aimed to protect U.S. appropriated funds include development of APPS and improved efforts to hold the MoD and MoI accountable for conditions in commitment letters. DoD continues to develop and update these commitment letters to improve their effectiveness. To address concerns about the lack of credibility or effectiveness of conditionality, CSTC-A conducted a thorough review of all terms, conditions, penalties, and incentives in commitment letters to enhance their effectiveness. As a result, CSTC-A reduced the number of commitment letters from 130 to 71. The 130 original commitment letters proved too difficult to enforce and track accurately. In addition, penalties in the original letters would often detract from the combat effectiveness of the ANDSF. Successful penalty constructs serve as the core of the commitment letters and create the incentive to comply without negatively affecting ANDSF capabilities. To address additional concerns of CSTC-A’s ability to properly oversee the commitment letters, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is working with CSTC-A to review procedures, and, if necessary, identify and implement a more effective approach.

6.2 U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS

The United States provides the bulk of funding necessary to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANDSF through the ASFF. The ASFF provides the ANDSF with the resources needed to fund ongoing ANDSF operations while developing the ANDSF into an effective and independent force capable of securing Afghanistan, protecting the Afghan people, and contributing to regional security. The majority of ASFF funding is executed through DoD contracts on pseudo-FMS cases; the remainder is provided directly to the Afghan government primarily to fund ANA pay, logistics, and facilities sustainment contracts. Since FY 2005, Congress has appropriated more than $74 billion for ASFF. The yearly ASFF request is based on the overall ANDSF force structure that the United States is willing to support; the aim of the ASFF is to ensure Afghanistan can provide security to its population.

6.3 INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

At the July 2016 Warsaw Summit, the international community agreed to continue national contributions to the financial sustainment of the ANDSF until the end of 2020. This extended prior commitments made at the 2012 Chicago Summit, where donors agreed to support the training, equipping, financing, and capability development of the ANDSF until the end of 2017. At Warsaw, donor nations pledged about $900 million in annual funding for the ANDSF for the years 2018-2020, totaling approximately 93 percent of the contributions pledged at Chicago. The United States does not commit to a specific amount but funds the majority of ANDSF requirements by annually seeking an ASFF appropriation from Congress. The 2018 Brussels Summit will revisit international contributions beyond 2020.

International donors provide funding either on a bilateral basis or through one of two multi-lateral channels, NATF and LOTFA. Approximately one-half of annual international contributions pledged at Warsaw are expected to flow through the NATF, with the remainder through LOTFA. U.S. funding is not part of the Warsaw commitment. To provide transparency and accountability, donor nations can participate in the Kabul-based ANDSF Funding Oversight and Coordination Body, co-chaired by the Afghan MoF and representatives from major international donors, which receives regular updates from the Afghan government and CSTC-A.

The United States manages NATF on behalf of international donors to provide support and sustainment of the ANA. At the May 2017 NATF Board meeting in Brussels, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to managing the NATF for an additional three years. Since the NATF’s inception in 2007, 33 nations have contributed more than $2.2 billion. For calendar year 2018, 22 nations have pledged $383.6 million to the NATF. From 2014 to 2017, CSTC-A enforced a NATF commitment letter with the MoD and MoI that relied on the same stringent controls included in ASFF commitment letters. However, in 2018, all NATF-funded projects are being handled through off-budget contribution channels and therefore no NATF commitment letter is required at this time.

The UNDP has managed LOTFA since its inception in 2002. In FY 2017, the international contributions apportioned for LOTFA was $523.7 million. The UNDP receives and manages donor contributions through LOTFA to pay the salaries of up to 124,600 members of the ANP. CSTC-A coordinates closely with the UNDP regarding the use of LOTFA and donor nations can participate in the LOTFA Project Board, which provides oversight over LOTFA-funded activities.

### 6.4 AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS

At the 2012 Chicago Summit, the Afghan government committed to providing an annual minimum of 25 billion Afghanis, or $500 million at the 2012 exchange rate, to support the ANDSF. The international community’s expectation is that Afghanistan’s contribution would gradually increase over time to assume greater financial responsibility for the ANDSF by 2024. The 2016 Afghan national budget allocated 24.7 billion Afghanis ($387 million) for the ANDSF. Due to persistent security challenges and limited economic growth, the United States and the international community accept that the Afghan government is meeting its obligations. CSTC-A recognizes GIRoA’s annual progress to meet its committed contribution of 25 billion Afghanis per year. In FY 2018, the Afghan government allocated 29.8 billion Afghanis ($438 million) for the ANDSF.

#### Efforts to Increase the Afghan Government’s Financial Responsibility for the ANDSF

The Afghan government remains dependent on international support to fund both security and non-security sector costs. Donor nations are working with the Afghan government to implement economic reforms with a goal to increase economic growth and government revenues. In a strong signal of international support, donor nations pledged $15.2 billion for development for Afghanistan through 2020. Continued international support for development is based on the Afghan government’s progress towards economic and social reforms necessary to remove constraints on private-sector investment to spur economic growth and job creation.
## ANNEX A – INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essential Function</th>
<th>Indicators of Effectiveness</th>
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| **Resource Management** (Formerly EF 1) | - The MoD and MoI are able to identify requirements, programs, and funding accurately over a three-year horizon based on strategic guidance.  
- The MoF provides timely guidance to enable the MoI and MoD to develop a budget.  
- The MoD and MoI are able to formulate an accurate annual budget to meet internal and external requirements.  
- The MoD and MoI are able to develop an executable procurement plan and execute their spend plan within budget and stipulated timeframes.  
- The MoD and MoI are able to submit, award, and complete contracts to ensure execution as planned.  
- The MoD and MoI can fully pay all of its employees accurately, timely, and in a secure fashion.  
- The MoF provides timely approvals, in-year guidance, and funds to the MoI and MoD.  
- The MoD and MoI possess an effective and efficient system to recruit and hire subject matter experts. |
| **Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight** (Formerly EF 2) | - The MoD’s Ministerial Internal Controls Program is effectively implemented and sustainable.  
- The MoD and MoI IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability.  
- GS IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability.  
- Critical items (the “big four” issues – fuel, ammunition, food, and pay) are managed by transparent, accountable, and sustainable processes to the appropriate organizational level.  
- Ensure the appropriate engagement of relevant external and internal agencies to establish transparency, accountability, and oversight within the Afghan government. |
| **Rule of Law and Governance** (Formerly EF 3) | - The MoD and MoI have appropriately staffed and qualified units to prevent or address extra-judicial killings and other GVHR.  
- The MoD and MoI identify, investigate, and appropriately act upon acts of major corruption and GVHR.  
- The MoD and MoI conduct inter-ministerial cooperation with the Attorney General’s Office on corruption adjudication and GVHR allegations. |
| **Force Development** (Formerly EF 4) | - The MoD utilizes AHRIMS down to the corps level to manage the force, and the MoI utilizes AHRIMS down to the provincial headquarters level to manage the force. |
- The MoD meets civilianization goals and objectives as outlined in the bilateral agreement.
- MoD and MoI manpower plans are developed and used to project future manpower requirements that inform recruiting goals, mitigates attrition rates, and achieve the desired end-strength.
- The MoD and MoI establish systems to integrate lessons learned; tactics, techniques, and procedures; doctrine; and programs of instruction.
- All untrained ANP receive formal police training, and the MoI prevents future untrained police by forecasting training requirements and scheduling courses to accommodate recruit intakes.
- The ANA has established a system for training in air and ground coordination; capability is established and used for information operations delivery.
- Training is delivered that results in reduced casualties.

### Operational Sustainment and Logistics (Formerly EF 5)

- Measurement and reporting has command emphasis.
- The ANDSF documents processes for generating and capturing requirements.
- The ANDSF has adequately executed a demand-based inventory management system.
- ANDSF organic maintenance is supplemented by contractors.
- The MoI assumes responsibility for equipment maintenance, which is transitioned from the coalition-funded AMS contract.
- The MoD has developed an operational medical resource optimization process that is sustainable.
- The MoD and MoI have sufficient numbers of trained and qualified health care personnel to fill tashkil.
- The MoD and MoI have an operational and sustainable medical logistics process.
- The ANP operates inventory management processes, including cold chain management for medicines.
- The Afghan government-backed Afghan Medical Council establishes and sustains ANDSF and Afghan national healthcare.
- The MoD is capable of managing its portion of the frequency spectrum for the Afghan government.
- The MoD and MoI are able to identify and sustain key information and communications technology infrastructure.
- The MoD is able to sustain information management systems throughout their lifecycles.
- The MoD implements fundamental cybersecurity structures and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information and information systems.
- The MoD is able to produce and sustain information and communications technology forces that are manned, trained, and equipped to conduct operations.
The MoI is capable of managing its portion of the frequency spectrum for the Afghan government.

| Command and Control Operations (Formerly EF 6) | The ONSC delivers national security guidance through the national strategic security document set (National Threat Assessment, National Security Policy, National Security Strategy, and National Campaign Plan). The Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy and Policy lead delivers strategic documents (National Military Strategy and Guidance for Operational Planning) in time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat-informed, and resource-aware) to inform subordinate planning. Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy and Policy lead delivers the Defense Capabilities Planning Guidance in time and of sufficient quality to inform and drive the departmental capability development process. The GS Plans Directorate delivers planning guidance and a coherent, synchronized campaign planning process. The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy delivers strategic documents (MIS, MIP, and Strategic Programming Guidance Directive) in time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat-informed, and resource-aware), monitors implementation, and manages change through a robust force management process. The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy monitors MICP and strategic plan implementation and delivers guidance to ensure a robust departmental force management process. The ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct combined arms operations. The ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct operations in coordination with the ANP. The ANA has assessed its capability gaps at the operational level and implemented improvements to address the gaps. The ANA has a sustainable capability to prepare detailed plans and orders at the corps level from strategic guidance from the MoD. The ANP has an established and sustainable capability to coordinate ANP inputs to ANA operations. ANASOC develops as a strategic MoD asset capable of Manning, equipping, training, employing, and sustaining the force. ANASOC is able to synchronize special operations brigade and special operations kandak operations within the framework of corps security operations in support of the Afghan government and MoD objectives. |

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| **Intelligence TAA (Formerly EF 7)** | • The SMW develops as a strategic Afghan government organization capable of manning, equipping, training, employing, and sustaining a force to conduct special operations force air assault and airborne ISR capability in support of the ASSF.
• The AAF has developed sustainable enterprise manning, a sustainable aerial fires capability, and a sustainable theatre mobility system. |
| **Strategic Communication (Formerly EF 8)** | • The Afghan police intelligence model effectively engages security issues.
• MoD intelligence integrates into MoD strategic decision-making and into ANASOC and ANA corps-level operations.
• DPI human intelligence institutes a sustainable human intelligence network that can action and report on intelligence requirements and tasking.
• Establish NMIC as an operational intelligence center capable of retrieving and analyzing information obtained from various intelligence sensors and developing products that support Afghan government intelligence operations.
• DPI trains technically proficient personnel for intelligence operational needs and manages intelligence sustainment requirements to meet operational needs.
• Establish an enduring and sustainable organic intelligence capability at the Intelligence Training Center, ANA corps, and ANASOC. |
| **Gender Integration and Mainstreaming** | • Develop and sustain events and mechanisms designed to facilitate cross-ministerial coordination and delivery of strategic communication guidance, priorities, and direction.
• The National Unity Government develops and distributes strategic communication guidance; guidance will be utilized to develop respective MoD and MoI communication plans and products.
• GS Operations Directorate Information Operations has the knowledge and capability to submit effectively (and modify as necessary) yearly (personnel and equipment) *tashkil* inputs, as well as to plan and submit its yearly budget requirements, which will enable MoD information operations capability throughout the country. |
| **Gender Integration and Mainstreaming** | • The MoI and MoD/ANA implement approved strategies and plans on gender integration.
• The MoI and MoD provide safe training and working environments (facilities) for women.
• The MoI and MoD take actions to eliminate gender-based violence and other types of violence and sexual harassment of women. |
### ANNEX B – ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AACP</td>
<td>Afghan Anti-Crime Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACJC</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Justice Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGO</td>
<td>Attorney General’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH</td>
<td>Academie-e-Hawayee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHRIMS</td>
<td>Afghan Human Resource Information Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIAT</td>
<td>Army Institutional Advisory Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIHRC</td>
<td>Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA-0</td>
<td>Doctrine Development System Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANASOC</td>
<td>Afghan National Army Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANATEDC</td>
<td>ANA Training Education and Doctrine Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANATF</td>
<td>ANA Territorial Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTS</td>
<td>Afghan National Tracking System</td>
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<tr>
<td>APAPPS</td>
<td>Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity</td>
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<td>APPF</td>
<td>Afghan Public Protection Force</td>
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<td>APPS</td>
<td>Afghan Personnel and Pay System</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQ</td>
<td>Al Qa’ida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIS</td>
<td>Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASFF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Security Forces Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASSF</td>
<td>Afghan Special Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AT&amp;L</td>
<td>Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATAC</td>
<td>Afghan Tactical Air Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUMF</td>
<td>Authorization for Use of Military Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP</td>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAT</td>
<td>Brigade Advising Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSA</td>
<td>Bilateral Security Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>Counter- and Anti-Corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASEVAC</td>
<td>Casualty Evacuation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCAG</td>
<td>Counter-Corruption Advisor Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCMT</td>
<td>Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Capabilities Development Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDO</td>
<td>Commando</td>
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<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-IED</td>
<td>Counter-Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJWG</td>
<td>Combined Joint Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLS</td>
<td>Contract Logistics Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNPA</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoGS</td>
<td>Chief of General Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMRS</td>
<td>Commander, Resolute Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Core-IMS</td>
<td>Core-Information Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Common Policy Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS/S KAT</td>
<td>Combat Service Support <em>Kandak</em> Advising Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Command and Staff Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
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<td>CTF</td>
<td>Counter Threat Finance</td>
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<td>DCOS-SA</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff – Security Assistance</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPI</td>
<td>Directorate of Police Intelligence</td>
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<td>EAP</td>
<td>Expeditionary Advisory Package</td>
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<td>EF</td>
<td>Essential Function</td>
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<td>EPZ</td>
<td>Export Processing Zones</td>
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<td>ESZ</td>
<td>Enhanced Security Zone</td>
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<td>FD</td>
<td>Force Development</td>
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<td>FP GOSC</td>
<td>Force Protection General Officer Steering Committee</td>
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<td>FPWG</td>
<td>Force Protection Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRU</td>
<td>Family Response Unit</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Ground Coordination Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCPSU</td>
<td>General Command of Police Special Units</td>
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<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>GOOD</td>
<td>Gender Occupational Opportunity Development</td>
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<td>GS</td>
<td>General Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>GVHR</td>
<td>Gross Violation of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOOAC</td>
<td>High Office of Anti-Corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>HPA</td>
<td>High Profile Attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Election Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
</tr>
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<td>IID</td>
<td>Intelligence Investigation Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMCM</td>
<td>Interim Military Coordination Mechanism</td>
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<td>IMU</td>
<td>Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan</td>
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<td>INT</td>
<td>Intelligence TAA</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>ISIS-K</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Khorasan</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>ITA</td>
<td>Insider Threat Advisor</td>
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<td>JCAT</td>
<td>Joint Casualty Assessment Team</td>
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<td>JSC</td>
<td>Joint Steering Committee</td>
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<td>KAT</td>
<td><em>Kandak</em> Advising Team</td>
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<td>KGC</td>
<td>Kabul Garrison Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed In Action</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
KPC  Kabul Peace Conference
KSF  Kabul Security Force
KSS  Kabul Surveillance System
LIP  Lawful Intercept Program
LOTFA  Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MAT  Medical Advisory Teams
MCTF  Major Crimes Task Force
MEDEVAC  Medical Evacuation
MFNDU  Marshall Fahim National Defense University
MICP  Ministerial Internal Controls Program
MoD  Ministry of Defense
MoF  Ministry of Finance
MoI  Ministry of Interior
MRD  Military Research and Doctrine
MSFV  Mobile Strike Force Vehicle
MSK  Mobile Strike Kandak
NAC-A  NATO Air Command – Afghanistan
NATF  NATO ANA Trust Fund
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA  National Defense Authorization Act
NDS  National Directorate of Security
NIMS  National Information Management System
NIU  National Interdiction Unit
NMB  National Mission Brigade
NMIC  National Military Intelligence Center
NMS  National Maintenance Strategy
NMU  National Mission Unit (ASSF portion of GCPSU)
NPCC  National Police Coordination Center
NSOCC-A  NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan
NTB  National Transportation Brigade
NTEC  Network Targeting and Exploitation Center
NTIC  National Threat Intelligence Center
NUOC  National Unit Operators Course (GCPSU)
NVG  Night-Vision Goggles
OCC  Operations Coordination Center
OCC-P  Operations Coordination Center – Provincial
OCC-R  Operations Coordination Center – Regional
OFS  Operation Freedom’s Sentinel
OIP  Organizational Inspection Program
ONSC  Office of the National Security Council
ORC  Operational Readiness Cycle
OS/LOG  Operational Sustainment and Logistics
PAI  Personnel Asset Inventory
PCASS  Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System
PIAT  Police Institutional Advisory Team
PMO  Personnel Management Office
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>PoAM</td>
<td>Program of Actions and Milestones</td>
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<td>PSP</td>
<td>Public Security Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSU</td>
<td>Police Special Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>QCG</td>
<td>Quadrilateral Coordination Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>R4+S</td>
<td>Reinforce, Realign, Regionalize, Reconcile, and Sustain</td>
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<td>RAB</td>
<td>Requirements Approval Board</td>
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<td>RAID</td>
<td>Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment</td>
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<td>RM</td>
<td>Resource Management</td>
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<td>ROL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>RS</td>
<td>Resolute Support</td>
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<td>SAFIRE</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Fire</td>
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<td>SAT</td>
<td>Sustainment Advisory Teams</td>
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<td>SCIP</td>
<td>Security Cooperation Information Portal</td>
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<td>SES</td>
<td>Senior Executive Service</td>
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<td>SFA</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance</td>
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<td>SFAB</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance Brigade</td>
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<td>SMAF</td>
<td>Self-Reliance Through Mutual Accountability Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<td>SMW</td>
<td>Special Mission Wing</td>
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<td>SOB</td>
<td>Special Operations Brigade</td>
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<td>SOJTF-A</td>
<td>Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>SOK</td>
<td>Special Operations Kandaks</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>SP&amp;A</td>
<td>Strategic Plans and Assessments</td>
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<td>STRATCOM</td>
<td>Strategic Communication</td>
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<td>SY</td>
<td>Solar Year</td>
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<td>TAA</td>
<td>Train, Advise, and Assist</td>
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<td>TAAC</td>
<td>Train, Advise, and Assist Command</td>
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<td>TAAC-Air</td>
<td>Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air</td>
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<td>TAAC-C</td>
<td>Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Capital</td>
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<td>Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East</td>
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<td>TAAC-W</td>
<td>Train, Advise, and Assist Command – West</td>
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<td>TAC</td>
<td>Transparency and Accountability Committee</td>
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<td>TALE</td>
<td>Transparency, Accountability, and Law Enforcement</td>
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<td>TAO</td>
<td>Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight</td>
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<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force</td>
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<td>TJOC</td>
<td>Tripartite Joint Operations Center</td>
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<td>TMAF</td>
<td>Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework</td>
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<td>TTHS</td>
<td>Training, Transient, Holding, Students</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>U.S. Forces – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UTEDC</td>
<td>Unified Training Education and Doctrine Command</td>
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<td>WIA</td>
<td>Wounded in Action</td>
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<td>WS</td>
<td>Work Strand</td>
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