

The Mechanism for Strategic Coercion

Denial **or** *Second Order Change?*

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Abstract

In the post-cold war environment of shrinking budgets and uncertain threats, America can no longer politically, nor economically, afford strategies that rely on our traditional military strategy of annihilation and exhaustion. Furthermore, America's position as the single remaining superpower virtually guarantees that our vital interests will not be directly challenged. This means that the use of military force is becoming even more politicized. Despite military leaders' apparent adherence to Clausewitz's maxim that war is an extension of policy, they usually approach strategic planning as if the application of force can be planned separately from the political effort. The traditional American military brute-force strategy does not always meet our national needs in this new world order.

Strategic Coercion offers one alternative to this brute-force approach. Simply stated, strategic coercion is the act of inducing or compelling an adversary to do something to which he is averse. It involves using force and threatening action to compel an adversary to cease his current activity, or coerce him to reverse actions already taken. Two contemporary theories of strategic coercion seem to offer promising alternatives to brute force.

First, Robert Pape's *Denial Theory* is based on the assumption that states make decisions as if they are rational, unitary actors attempting to maximize the utility of their choices. Essentially, nations perform a cost-benefit evaluation to determine the best course of action. Theoretically, one may be able to coerce a target nation by raising the expected costs to a prohibitive level, but Pape advocates that this is generally ineffective in conventional conflicts. Instead, coercion requires that the target nation be *denied* the probability of achieving the sought-after benefits. *Denial Theory* proposes that the specific means for coercion is the opponent's military vulnerability: defeating an opponent's military strategy *denies* him the probability of achieving benefits and results in coercion.

On the other hand, Joseph Engelbrecht proposes his *Theory of Second Order Change*. In this theory governmental outcomes result from multiple, often conflicting, political processes. He argues that coercion can be manifested by creating an anomalous situation on the targeted nation, which drives the national leaders into a paradigm shift. The severe anomaly threatens higher order values that were not previously at risk: war prosecution becomes the problem rather than the solution. Yielding to a coercer's demands is the only way to resolve this paradigm crisis. According to Engelbrecht, imposing a *second order change* on the targeted nation will produce strategic coercion.

The fundamental difference between the two theorists boils down to a dispute over risk manipulation. Pape believes that *denial* of a target nation's military strategy will produce a coercive effect. Engelbrecht feels that the decisions to surrender usu-

ally result from a paradigm shift, a *second order change*. *Second Order Change* involves manipulating the *risk* to the target nation: threatening higher order values. Both mechanisms for coercion may be insufficient by themselves. Coercion probably requires the simultaneous imposition of both conditions: *Denial* of the target nation's ability to achieve benefits and *Second Order Change* caused by the threat to higher order values (future costs).

About the Author

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Chapter 1

Strategic Coercion

> *Military strategy can no longer be thought of . . . as the science of military victory. It is now equally . . . the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence. Military strategy, whether we like it or not, has become the diplomacy of violence.*
>
> *—Thomas Schelling*
> *Arms and Influence*

When using military force for political objectives, American military strategists have traditionally pursued a strategy of annihilation or exhaustion that focuses exclusively on "military victory." While this may be a viable strategy in some cases, we also need alternatives that more adequately satisfy many of our contemporary national security needs. *Strategic coercion* is an alternative that seeks to manipulate states' behavior through political and military means. It involves exerting pressure against an opponent in an attempt to compel his behavior in accordance with the wishes of the coercing nation. This action implies that a lower level of force may be sufficient in achieving political ends in comparison to the force requirements for a traditional "victory." Some *coercion* alternatives may allow American leaders the option of applying force without requiring a national commitment to military victory.

This study examines two contemporary *coercion* theories: Robert A. Pape's *Denial Theory*,[1] which advocates thwarting an adversary's military strategy as a means of denying him the opportunity to achieve any substantial benefits, and Joseph Engelbrecht's theory of *Second Order Change*[2] that proposes policymakers decide to surrender when war becomes a threat to higher or *second order* values. In order to distinguish between *Denial* and *Second Order Change*, first I describe the current geopolitical environment and the need for *coercive* strategies. Chapter 1 begins with the contemporary nature of international conflict that drives this need for a new approach and defines *strategic coercion*, contrasting it with traditional American military strategy. The next section introduces two variants of strategic coercion: Pape's *Denial Theory* and Engelbrecht's *Theory of Second Order Change*. Chapters 2 and 3 detail the theories, "unpacking" the mechanisms in each. Chapter 4 provides an in-depth look at the Japanese decision to surrender in 1945 and illustrates the aspects of both theories. These advocates have applied their theory in explaining the Japanese decision to surrender in World War II. Chapter 4 also distinguishes between the two theories, where they diverge and converge. Both theories have utility for strategists, and both suffer from limitations. The purpose of this thesis is to distinguish between two theories' mechanisms,

using the Japanese case study. I also hope to provide some practical observations that will help future strategists devise operational plans.

American Strategy

If one were to query today's military leaders about the political nature of war, you would find that most agree with Clausewitz's dictum that war is "the continuation of policy by other means. . . . War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse. . . . *War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will*."[3] In this context, America's traditional approach to compelling an enemy to our will has been to disarm adversaries, to put their armed forces "in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight."[4] It is through this mechanism that military leaders hoped to destroy the enemy's *will* to resist. Destruction of the armed forces was simply a means—perhaps a prerequisite—to erode an opponent's *will*. Ultimately, *will* was always the target. The rationale was that if the enemy's military were physically destroyed, they would not have the *will* to resist; they would automatically accept our political demands.[5]

As the means to affect *will*, Americans have traditionally relied on the military strategies of annihilation or exhaustion that promise "victory." The best illustration for this is to see how our World War II political objectives for Europe were translated to military objectives. Our political objective was unconditional surrender and as a military objective, Eisenhower was directed to secure the European continent and destroy the German army.[6] The focus was clear. By destroying the Wehrmacht, the allies would certainly break Germany's *will* to resist and compel Germany to accept unconditional surrender. Similarly, in the Korean War, MacArthur was given broad authority to prosecute the war. Secretary of Defense George Marshall told MacArthur: "Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces. We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically. . . ."[7] As the Truman-MacArthur schism developed, MacArthur complained about the rules of engagement, and later during congressional questioning MacArthur remarked: "War's very objective is victory—not prolonged indecision. In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory."[8] This frame of mind epitomizes the traditional American approach to war, that of equating victory with the defeat and surrender of the enemy.[9]

This annihilation-type strategy which pursues the destruction of enemy armed forces has been aptly described by Thomas Schelling as a "brute-force" approach. Generally, brute-force strategies try to impose a victor-vanquished condition to bring about war termination. Wars are terminated when vanquished nations concede military defeat. Another distinction of brute-force strategies is their central concern with enemy strengths, not enemy interest. The implicit assumption is that opponents' interests are irrelevant; if one has

superior strength, one will be able to overcome the enemy's *will* by destroying his military forces.[10]

Despite adherence to Clausewitz's assertion on the political nature of war, past American military strategies have been singularly focused on the destruction of the enemy's war-making capability as the mechanism to affect *will*. These same adherents to Clausewitz's belief in the political nature of war have executed strategies that, in fact, disregard Clausewitz's warning against war prosecution independent of politics: "It is, of course, well known that the only source of war is politics—the intercourse of governments and peoples; but it is apt to be assumed that war suspends that intercourse and replaces it by a wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own. [On the contrary,] War does not suspend political intercourse."[11]

New Strategic Requirements

What America now needs are options that do not solely rely on a costly brute-force strategy. American military strategists must be able to offer viable strategies across the spectrum of conflict that will achieve our political objectives. Although it is often overlooked, Clausewitz himself suggested that wars may often be fought on less than brute-force terms: "We must also be willing to wage such minimal wars, which consist in *merely threatening the enemy*, with *negotiations held in reserve*."[12]

Numerous political considerations are bringing increased pressure on military leaders to achieve national goals at minimal cost. There is the natural desire for efficiency: achieving desired benefits at minimum cost. Political leaders would naturally prefer to achieve their goals without having to fully commit all military forces to war. War imposes both social and political costs on a society that may exceed possible benefits. In these cases, politicians often hope the threat of violence to an adversary may be sufficient to evoke concessions without having to pay the price of brute force. Thomas Schelling described this idea as "risk manipulation," an alternative to brute force: "Victory is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy. And it is no assurance against being terribly hurt."[13] By merely threatening harm on an opponent we may be able to raise his perceived cost so high that submission is his best option. The obvious advantage in risk manipulation is achieving political objectives at significantly reduced cost.

Contributing to this natural desire for efficiency is America's dramatic military draw down following the collapse of communism. No longer is it simply a desire to achieve objectives at least possible cost. We are now in a situation where our declining military forces may be insufficient if we continue to rely on brute force. We may not have enough assets to pursue different objectives concurrently. Les Aspin's "Bottom Up Review" proposed decreasing Army active duty divisions from 18 to 10, Air Force active fighter wings from 24 to 13, and Navy aircraft carriers from 16 to 12. The extent of

the military draw down is significant in itself because of the clearly reduced capability. In the Bottom Up Review (BUR), debate raged over the "two major regional conflict" issues: whether the American military would be able to employ a "Win-Win" strategy, or be forced to resort to "Win-Hold" when confronted with two simultaneous major regional conflicts. Even here, the underlying assumed strategy was still brute force—the need to "win" a military victory. This lack of strategic vision concerning how to achieve national objectives was the source of much criticism of the BUR. "There is really no strategy at all in the review, at least not in the classic sense of providing a foundation statement on how limited resources can be applied to meet unlimited needs."[14] The BUR focus on a "Win-Win" strategy is a reiteration of brute force that is reminiscent of MacArthur's statement that "there is no substitute for victory."

A third element driving the need for an alternative to brute force is the Vietnam syndrome. After America's experience in Vietnam, reluctance to employ military forces to achieve national goals became more pronounced. The Vietnam War was, and still is, the prime example of the slippery-slope phenomenon, where limited political objectives caused an insidious military escalation until we were intractably engaged in a conflict whose costs far exceeded original expectations. The resultant backlash was an American aversion to employment of military force; a deep-rooted fear becoming involved in more Vietnam-type conflicts, where the political and military objectives are not coherently linked. The Weinberger doctrine reflects this same reluctance to employ force. It proposes rigid guidelines for the use of force by tying military commitment exclusively to cases involving vital interests. It implicitly advocates a brute-force strategy to achieve national objectives in these instances.[15] This mind-set significantly limits our ability to employ the military instrument of national policy. We must therefore consider strategies that provide more flexibility to national leaders; that promise to achieve limited benefits without the risk of slippery-slope involvement or the need for brute-force strategy.

Another pressure for alternatives to brute-force strategy is a growing power asymmetry in the world. By virtually any measurement of national power, post-cold war America is the premier world power. No single state could hope to openly challenge our vital interests. Indeed, only a coalition of major industrial powers could hope to overcome the US in open war. One might believe that this dominance would enable the US to carry out its political will unchallenged. On the contrary, this power asymmetry actually works against America in limited conflicts and frustrates leaders' ability to use military force. Because it is a dominant power, no state is willing to directly challenge American vital interests. Therefore, US involvement will tend to be in situations where only peripheral interests are at stake. In these situations there will be no vital interest driving us toward an internal political consensus or common unity of purpose that would serve to focus national effort. It is difficult to mobilize the American people to support brute-force solutions when only peripheral interests are involved. "Where the war is perceived as

'limited'—because the opponent is 'weak' and can pose no direct threat—the prosecution of the war does not take automatic primacy over other goals pursued by factions within the government, or bureaucracies or other groups pursuing interests which compete for state resources."[16] Additionally, when national survival is not threatened, the question of morality becomes more conspicuous. Public debates openly question the morality of applying force, which further erodes the necessary political support and resource allocation required to pursue brute force. Andrew Mack advocates that in these limited conflicts lesser powers have the distinct advantage because they are usually fighting for a core value.[17] So, in the post-cold war environment, America will increasingly find herself involved in limited conflicts where vital interests are not at stake. In these asymmetric situations, leaders' actions will be restrained. It is unlikely they will be able to gather sufficient political support to pursue a brute-force strategy. Instead, they will require strategies that are consonant with the limited, asymmetric nature of future conflicts.

Finally, while a brute-force solution may appear to be effective in the short term, the long-term effects may run counter to national interests.

> The commencement of war . . . has carried with it the assumption of swift termination so that in the minds of combatants there would be something known as early victory or defeat for one side or the other. The fact of victory would be confirmed by an act of surrender and by subsequent ratification of an act of peace.[18]

However, quick victories have been illusory. Furthermore, victor-vanquished types of war termination are often contrary to long-term goals and regional stability. Kalevi Holsti proposes that the proximate causes of war are often rooted in previous conflicts. In his "Peace and War Cycle," victor-vanquished conflict settlements often leave unresolved issues, or create new issues which later become points of contention.[19]

The classic example is the Versailles Treaty of World War I, where Woodrow Wilson attempted to achieve "peace without victory" by creating a new international order. His "fourteen points" were an attempt to avoid the negative long-term effects of a victor-vanquished war termination.[20] However, Britain and France demanded retribution and succeeded in imposing punitive conditions on Germany. This punitive solution not only failed to resolve some of the core issues, it also generated new problems that ultimately led to World War II. While brute-force strategies are not inherently punitive in their termination, they certainly have that predisposition. Rather than resolving the original issues, victor-vanquished war termination associated with brute force tends to sow future contentious issues.

Alternate strategies may be able to avoid the cyclical dangers of brute force. American military strategists should seek out new strategies that satisfy the natural urge for increased efficiency and meet the national security needs in this era of draw downs and limited resources. The alternative strategy must avoid the dangers of slippery-slope involvement, while providing a viable means of achieving political goals in the current asymmetrical environment.

Finally, an effective strategy should offer increased probability of long-term conflict resolution over brute force.

Strategic Coercion

A proposed military strategy must address these recurring problems associated with modern conflict. Military strategies based on *strategic coercion* appear to offer a solution to this quandary. They offer the means to compel an adversary to terminate a conflict, without incurring the cost and destruction associated with a brute-force strategy.

They also seem particularly well suited to the asymmetric environment. Finally, it may be able to prevent the problem of long-term military involvement.

Simply stated, *strategic coercion* is the act of inducing or compelling an adversary to do something to which he is not predisposed. The term *coercion* is synonymous with Schelling's concept of compellence. It involves using the threat of future action to force an adversary to cease his current activity, or coerce him to reverse actions already taken. "To be coercive, violence has to be anticipated. And it has to be avoidable by accommodation. The power to hurt is bargaining power."[21] Similarly, Robert Pape uses this same concept of compellence, labeling it coercion: ". . . the purpose of coercion is to attain concessions without having to pay the full cost of military [brute force] victory."[22]



Figure 1. Continuum of Force

It may further clarify strategic coercion if we contrast it with both deterrence and war-winning strategies (brute force). Military deployment and employment strategies can be viewed as lying along a continuum, from deterrence to war winning . Coercion lies between these two poles of deterrent and war-winning strategies:

Deterrence discourages action through fear of consequences. It involves communicating national interests and resolve, then waiting, in a reactive mode. Deterrence is defensive in nature and overt action is left up to the belligerent. *Coercion*, on the other hand, applies to conflicts short of war, as well as full-fledged armed conflict. It requires overt action, or the threat of action by the coercer. "The threat that compels rather than deters often requires that the punishment be administered *until* the other acts, rather than if he acts."[23] Its purpose is to force concessions prior to the full prosecution of military strategy. Contrasting brute force with *coercion*, brute force is taking what you

want, while coercion is making someone give it up. *Coercion* is the threat of further action whereas brute force is action. Schelling describes successful "brute force" as the efficient application of force. In contrast, threat-based *coercion* requires that force be held in reserve in order to hold hostage an adversary's interests or values. *Coercion* offers the possible advantage of achieving benefits at lower costs because it involves holding back on the use of force and keeping the hostage alive.[24]

Coincidental with the continuum from deterrence to brute force is a scale of national costs of pursuing these strategies in terms of resources, lives, and political costs. Deterrence promises the greatest benefit at the least cost. However, deterrence often requires relinquishing the initiative to the other side. If deterrence fails, a nation may still choose to pursue a *coercive* strategy and avoid the massive cost of brute-force war winning. Still, like deterrence, *coercion* requires effective use of the "art of commitment." An opponent must be firmly convinced of the coercer's commitment. One must convince an adversary that one has a potent force and would fight over the issues. This involves possession of a clear military capability and projecting one's intentions: credibility and resolve.[25] In terms of force, brute force is most effective when military capability is applied directly. Conversely, *coercion* involves holding military force in reserve; coercers use the threat of future force to manipulate risk, hoping to induce action on adversaries.

> For traditional military strategy, the assailant imposes change on his adversary's behavior only after victory on the battlefield has been achieved. Hence, battlefield victory leads to the desired political outcome. Military coercion, in contrast, seeks to attain a political outcome without achieving a decisive battle. Indeed, when military coercion occurs in war, a change in the enemy's decision calculus often compels a change of the enemy's behavior on the battlefield. Hence, the political outcome leads to a desired battlefield outcome.[26]

Denial **and** *Second Order Change*

This study examines two particular *Coercion* theories: *Denial* and *Second Order Change*. *Denial* is a utility theory that advocates manipulating specific parts of states' cost-benefit calculus. In utility-based theories leaders' decisions are assumed to revolve around comparisons of expected costs (*EC*) with expected benefits (*EB*). A state may engage in war when expected benefits exceed expected costs: $EB > EC$. Typically, *Denial* attempts to manipulate the benefit side of this calculus and reduce expected benefits well below expected costs. More specifically, *Denial* is a strategy that aims at denying the enemy's capability to achieve his benefits or goals. In terms of the cost-benefit calculation, it prevents achievement of the benefits by defeating opponents' military strategy. So, *Denial* is primarily a military strategy that seeks to obviate the opponent's strategy. Demonstrating the uselessness of an opponent's strategy should create the perception of a low probability of achieving benefits. Pape believes the *denial* of Japan's homeland defense strategy in 1945 was the primary mechanism causing their decision to surrender.

In some ways *Second Order Change* appears to be a punishment type of *coercion*. The proposed mechanism involves the elevation of future costs to a higher order of magnitude than was originally envisioned by the enemy. Expressing it in terms of utility theory, it consists of imposing an exponential increase on the cost side of the calculus: $(EC)^x > EB$. One might think of a *second order* shift as occurring when $x \geq 2$. However, *Second Order Change* is not a utility theory, although it contains some elements of rational decision calculus. It is actually a behavioral-based theory describing how decision making occurs at the top levels of government during conflict. Engelbrecht proposes a competing explanation for the Japanese surrender—*Second Order Change*. Japan's decision to surrender was a result of a shift, by an order of magnitude, in the future costs of continuing WW II. This higher order cost far outweighed any expected benefits and successfully coerced Japanese decision makers.

These two constructs may be interrelated. For instance, *Denial* may be a prerequisite to *Second Order Change*. In a linear type path, *Denial* (A) either causes or directly contributes to a *Second Order* risk (B), which forces a termination decision (C) by the adversary: A ===> B ===> C. The defeat of Japan's strategy in WW II (*Denial*) may have put at risk high order values, such as the survival of the Japanese polity (*second order* risk). In this case *Denial* would have been a prerequisite; a necessary condition, but not sufficient to cause *Second Order Change*.

Using the Japanese decision to surrender, the following chapters will distinguish between these two theories of coercion and discuss their applicability for military strategists and policymakers. My underlying purpose is to contribute to military leaders' ability to formulate appropriate strategies across the spectrum of conflict. And prevent the overreliance on brute-force strategy. The study will seek answers that will assist strategists in devising specific plans: **Which coercive mechanism, *Denial* or *Second Order Change*, is most likely to compel an adversary to terminate a conflict? Are these mechanisms interrelated?** Perhaps neither theory is sufficient to account for coercive outcomes. Instead, strategic coercion may require both *Denial* and *Second Order Change*: *Denial* to prevent the target nation's ability to achieve benefits, *Second Order Change* to impose the threat of high order costs on the target nation.

Notes

1. Robert A. Pape, "Why Japan Surrendered," *International Security 18,* no. 2 (Fall 1993): *154–201*; idem, "Coercion and Military Strategy: Why Denial Works and Punishment Doesn't," *Journal of Strategic Studies 15,* no. 4 (December 1992): 423–75; idem, "Coercive Air Power" (PhD diss., University of Chicago, December 1988); idem, "Coercive Airpower in the Vietnam War," *International Security* 15, no. 2 (Fall 1990): 103–46.

2. Joseph A. Engelbrecht, Jr., "War Termination: Why Does a State Decide to Stop Fighting" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1992).

3. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75–87. Italics in original.

4. Ibid., 90.

5. Raymond G. O'Connor, "Victory in Modern War," *Journal of Peace Research* 4 (1969): 367–84.

6. B. H. Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War* (New York: Perigee Books, 1982).

7. Dean Acheson, *The Korean War* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1971), 56–57.

8. *Congressional Record,* 82d Cong., 1st sess., 19 April 1951, 4125.

9. O'Connor.

10. Schelling, 2–6.

11. Clausewitz, 605.

12. Ibid., 604.

13. Schelling, 22.

14. James Blackwell, "Bottom Up Review," *Military Technology* 17, no. 11 (November 1993): 22-28.

15. The "Weinberger doctrine" is a proposed criteria for employing American military troops. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger proposed these guidelines in a speech to the National Press Club on 28 November 1984:

1. US **vital** national interests must be at stake.

2. We should only commit troops "with the clear intention of **winning**." [Which suggests the only alternatives are winning and losing: a brute-force dichotomy.]

3. We should have clearly defined political and military objectives.

4. "The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary."

5. We must have American public and congressional support for employing troops.

6. "The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort."

Adhering to these requirements would drive us to the exclusive use of brute-force strategies. While brute-force strategies may be the best option in some cases, our national leaders also need more flexible, less restrictive military options. Furthermore, these requirements are so restrictive that perhaps only World War II fits the Weinberger doctrine. Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace* (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 441–46.

16. Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars," *World Politics* 27 (1975): 184.

17. Ibid., 194.

18. Paul Seabury, "Provisionality and Finality," *How Wars End, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 39 (November 1970): 97.

19. Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and the International Order, 1648–1989* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 23.

20. Ibid., 181.

21. Schelling, 2.

22. Pape, "Coercion and Military Strategy," 425.

23. Schelling, 70.

24. Ibid., 2–5.

25. Ibid., 36–55.

26. Pape, "Coercive Air Power," 4.

Chapter 2

Denial

> *. . . in conventional disputes, the success of coercion is likely to be a function military vulnerability and will be largely unaffected by civilian vulnerability. If hitting military targets in the victim's homeland dramatically impairs his confidence of battlefield success, then he is likely to change his behavior.*
>
> —Robert A. Pape

Governmental Outcomes

Robert A. Pape portrays *coercion* as a function of undermining an opponent's **resolve** or **will** by manipulating an adversary's cost-benefit calculus, thereby inducing a state to concede to a coercer's demands. By elevating costs or denying benefits, a coercer may be able to affect a victim's will to continue the conflict: "Coercion is all about altering an opposing state's resolve."[1] Specifically, *Denial* attempts to influence the benefit side of the calculus by targeting military vulnerability. *Denial* thereby tries to convince the adversary that failure to yield will result in military defeat and denial of goals (benefits). The *Denial* mechanism seeks to negate the opponent's perceived probability of achieving benefits by making his military strategy ineffective; it "denies" the expected benefits, therefore expected costs are prohibitive and not worth incurring in a futile effort. In describing *Denial*, the cost-benefit calculus is always framed from the perspective of the victim state as a rational actor.

Rational Actors

It is clear from his discussion of states' decision calculus that Pape views governmental outcomes as a result of unitary rational actors. This is the same concept as Graham Allison's Model I construct,[2] which explains "international events by recounting the aims and calculations of nations or governments."[3] The rational-actor model is tied to the microeconomics concept of "maximization of utility." Actors weigh alternative courses of action and select the course that maximizes one's gain or utility. "Rationality refers to consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints."[4] Similarly, national decision makers base their judgments on a rational cost-benefit calculus.

The basic concepts of these models of rational action are:

> 1. GOALS and OBJECTIVES. The goals and objectives of the agent are translated into a "payoff" or "utility" or "preference" function, which represents the "value" or "utility" of alternative sets of consequences. At the outset of the decision problem the agent has a payoff function which ranks all possible sets of consequences in terms of his values and objectives. Each bundle of consequences will contain a number of side effects. Nevertheless, at a minimum, the agent must be able to rank in order of preference each possible set of consequences that might result from a particular action.
>
> 2. ALTERNATIVES. The rational agent must choose among a set of alternatives displayed before him in a particular situation. In decision theory these alternatives are represented as a decision tree. The alternative courses of action may include more than a simple act, but the specification of a course of action must be sufficiently precise to differentiate it from other alternatives.
>
> 3. CONSEQUENCES. To each alternative is attached a set of consequences or outcomes of choice that will ensue if that particular alternative is chosen.
>
> 4. CHOICE. Rational choice consists of selecting that alternative whose consequences rank highest in the decision-maker's payoff function.[5]

So governmental actions result from nation leaders' selection of courses of action that maximize strategic goals.

National Resolve

Bound up with the rational-actor model is the concept of national resolve. Resolve is the underlying foundation of a nation's cost-benefit analysis. Essentially it is a nation's determination to continue on a selected course of action, and the **will** to resist pressure to the contrary. Therefore, *Denial's* success is highly dependent on the level of a target nation's resolve: "The explanation of coercion outcomes is really about uncovering the standard of resolve."[6] It is vitally important to understand what makes up "resolve" in this calculus. In order to do this, we examine three basic propositions existing in the literature that explains the conditions when military coercion is likely to succeed or fail: balance of interests, balance of force, and balance of risk.

All three of these propositions are single-strand arguments that attempt to explain coercive outcomes as single-variable results. The common linchpin among these is the "balance-of-resolve" argument.[7] That is, each proposition deals with its own specific element as if it constitutes the primary determinant of national resolve; as if coercive success depends on this "balance of resolve." This argument treats coercion as a relationship between assailants' and victims' resolve. In other words, if one compares belligerents' resolve to their adversaries, success favors the side with the most resolve.

Pape's *Denial* recognizes the importance of interests, forces, and risks as elements of resolve in the decision calculus, but refutes the "balance" arguments previously associated with these propositions: "Coercion is not about the balance of resolve between rivals."[8] Instead, successful coercion depends on manipulation of the target nation's resolve. In Pape's *Denial* theory, these different resolve factors—interest, force, and risk—are combined in the victim's cost-benefit calculus.

The classic balance-of-interests argument proposes "that a state's resolve is a function of its interest in the issue in dispute."[9] The state with the greater interest will be more likely to accept the costs and risks inherent in a conflict. The state with lesser interests will be less willing. So, states with the balance of interests tipped in their favor will generally win a coercive contest. In this sense, balance of resolve roughly equates to a contest of interest; a coercive contest favors the more interested nation.[10]

The traditional balance-of-forces argument suggests that a nation with the favorable preponderance of forces will generally succeed over an opponent with a less capable military. Forces are often measured either numerically, or by nations' gross national product (GNP). Pape rejects not only the balance-of-forces argument, but the use of "forces" as a key factor. Instead, he focuses on the probability of success of the victim's military strategy as the critical factor in the victim's decision calculus. And Pape argues that the likelihood of success of the victim's military strategy—military capability—is not simply a function of numbers of forces or national GNPs. However, the specific military capability (or vulnerability) of a victim's military strategy is not totally independent of the assailant's strategy. *Denial* incorporates military capability into the victim's cost-benefit calculus by removing "balance" from "forces" and expanding this term to include nonquantifiable "capabilities." Military capability then is an important element of national resolve. As will be discussed later, Pape also believes it is the primary manipulable component in the victim's cost-benefit calculus.

Finally, there is the classic balance-of-risk argument that asserts that the relative level of risk generally determines success in a coercive contest. It differs from balance of interests by dealing with possibility of losses, not gains. The belligerent with the most to lose will most likely be coerced by an opponent who has less at stake. In other words, by elevating an opponent's risk above one's own, a coercer nation can induce the desired behavior in its opponent. These risks involve threatened civilian destruction, or attacks against economic infrastructure that cause indirect civilian suffering. *Denial* also refutes that this comparative assessment occurs in states: "The cost to one state of attaining its territorial interests is not directly related to the costs that a rival may pay. Indeed, it is quite possible for one state to confront enormous civilian costs, while an opposing state faces practically none."[11] However costs, in themselves, are still an important aspect of national resolve. As such, they constitute another element of national resolve in the *Denial* calculus, expected costs.

Pape's Comprehensive Theory of *Coercion*

Pape departs from "balance" theories by asserting that the important element in coercion is not a comparison of resolve between assailant and victim. Instead Pape argues that coercion depends on manipulating a victim's deci-

sion calculus.[12] "Assessment of resolve depends on breaking down the concept into its constitutional parts, territorial interests, civilian vulnerability, and military vulnerability."[13] So, Pape's *Denial* strategy seeks to manipulate national resolve to achieve coercion. In defining national resolve, *Denial* essen-

COMPETING THEORIES OF COERCION			FACTORS IN THE VICTIM'S DECISION CALCULUS
Balance of [Interests]	⇒	⇒	Benefits (B)
Balance of [Forces]	⇒	⇒	Probability of Success (PB)
Balance of [Risk]	⇒	⇒	Expected Costs (EC)

Figure 2. Elements of National Resolve

tially takes the "balance" out of the balance-of-resolve propositions and constructs three primary elements that constitute the national resolve:

Together, these terms comprise the resolve of the victim state.[14]

Pape's Comprehensive Theory of *Coercion* is based on the belief that national leaders use a rational cost-benefit calculation that incorporates benefits, likelihood of military success, and expected costs in deciding whether or not to continue. Expected benefits (*EB*) consist of the perceived benefits (*B*), usually territory, and the probability of achieving them (P_B):

$$EB = B \times P_B$$

A victim's perception of his own probability of achieving benefits is dependent on his perceived military capability or vulnerability. In order for a state to pursue a course of action it must believe it has a viable strategy. Otherwise, it would be unable to achieve its goals.

Pape describes expected costs (*EC*) as the product of possible costs (*C*) and the probability of actually having to pay them (*PC*):

$$EC = C \times PC$$

Pape equates possible costs (C) to civilian destruction and suffering.

A state's decision calculus is fundamentally a comparison between the expected benefits and costs:

$$EB : EC$$

According to Pape's Comprehensive Theory, coercion supposedly occurs when expected benefits (EB) are less than expected costs (EC):

$$EB < EC$$

$$B \times P_B < C \times P_C$$

This condition for coercion can be achieved theoretically in two fundamentally different ways. One could try to change the expected benefits of the victim or one could attempt to alter the victim's expected costs.

Punishment-Based Theories of *Coercion*

Punishment-based theories propose that raising the expected costs in the victim's decision calculus above expected benefits will result in coercion. Punishment theories assume that the level of risk (expected costs) generally determines success in a coercive contest. By raising the level of expected destruction and suffering to extreme proportions, adversaries will supposedly concede the issues rather than continue the conflict. In terms of the victim's decision calculus, the expected costs will far exceed the expected benefits.

Two target sets are often recommended for punishment coercion: coercer's can increase costs by threatening to attack the civilian populace directly, or threatening to destroy the economic infrastructure that indirectly leads to civilian suffering.[15] Early airpower theorists were particularly strong advocates of this punishment-based approach to warfare in one form or another.[16] In other words, coercer nations can manipulate a victim's cost calculus by imposing, or threatening to impose, punishment on the civilian vulnerability. Some theorists believe this punishment may elicit the desired behavior in an opponent.

> . . . the concept of damage is measured in terms of civilian vulnerability which is consistent with the language in the nuclear literature. More specifically, risk of civilian punishment is assumed to refer to the vulnerability of a state's civilian population to attack from an assailant. So, if the risk explanation is credible, one should find that manipulation of civilian vulnerability is the key to success in conventional, as well as nuclear cases of military coercion.[17]

Pape essentially equates risk of punishment to civilian vulnerability.

Intuitively, punishment-based coercion seems viable, but according to Pape, past experience suggests it is ineffective in conventional conflicts. Pape offers three possible reasons for its inadequacy. First, states have shown an ability to absorb tremendous casualties and civilian suffering without being turned away from the pursuit of original goals.[18] There are few historical cases that support the argument that punishment was an effective mechanism for coercion. Second, there are always viable passive and active defensive measures available to buffer conventional attacks on civilians.

Perhaps punishment is a viable strategy in nuclear war. Nuclear war is dramatically different from conventional conflict. It offers no assured security, and civilian damage is more certain. Finally, the extent of damage caused by specific weapons is more limited in conventional than in nuclear conflict. While over time, conventional weapons can cause severe damage to a national infrastructure, nevertheless, these effects are gradual. Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, threaten immediate and extensive destruction.

Two factors make up the subcomponents of the expected cost element (EC). First, civilian vulnerability (C) consists of the susceptibility of the nation's populace or economy to armed force. How vulnerable is the nation to punishment? Related to this is the destructiveness of weapons. In the case of nuclear weapons, destructiveness is quite large and has a corresponding impact on the cost-benefit calculus. However, in conventional conflicts, weapons have a limited destructive capability and are less significant in the nation's rational calculus. So, in conventional conflicts the power of weapons is essentially constant (not manipulable) because the extent of potential damage is limited in comparison to nuclear weapons. Also, nations in conflict have no reason to believe that their adversary will withhold conventional weapons. The expectation usually exists that all or any conventional weapons will be employed.

Theoretically, another way to manipulate expected costs would be to increase the probability that threatened costs will actually be incurred (P_C). However, like benefits, cost-probability appears to be fairly constant, remaining relatively static during conflicts. This is because the probability of costs directly involves the credibility of the coercer. "In fact, coercive threats are often highly credible because they usually occur in war, when there is no reason to doubt the assailant's willingness to inflict damage."[19] Targeted states generally believe that coercers have sufficient determination to impose the costs. After all, they are at war with each other, so the coercer must already have a proven measure of credibility. It's unlikely that P_C can be appreciably elevated above this level.

Punishment strategy may be an effective mechanism in "total wars," or wars involving weapons of mass destruction but has limited usefulness in conventional conflicts.[20] Attempting to target civilian vulnerability may actually lower a nation's coercive leverage by diffusing the military effort to target sets that only marginally affect a war's outcome. Although the threat of punishment may be an effective deterrent mechanism, it does not seem to provide a viable means of conventional coercion.

Historical evidence supports the idea that nations engaged in war are able to absorb tremendous punishment and are surprisingly adaptable to hardship. Also, national leaders either fail to, or are slow to reassess expected costs <u>during</u> conflicts.[21] This occurs for a number of reasons. In pluralistic nations, but especially in autocratic states, political or personal survival is at stake for those who advocate concessions or accommodation. The internal pressures are often greater for war continuation than for seeking termination. "Those who wish to end a war risk exposing themselves to charges that they are promoting . . . betrayals. Close behind charges of betrayal lurk the accusation of treason."[22] Additionally, the immense effort and concentration that is consumed in war prosecution contributes momentum to continue the conflict. Rather than contributing to the cost side of the calculus, these sunk costs actually increase the willingness to resist and add impetus to the war effort.[23]

This brings us to the cornerstone of *Denial* theory. In conventional conflicts, the most promising means of coercing a belligerent is by manipulating his perceived probability of achieving the benefits (P_B), "to reduce the prob-

ability that continued resistance will bring the target state the hoped-for benefits."[24] The primary motivation for continuing a conflict is the belief that one's nation will gain the benefits over which the war is fought, despite the sometimes extreme costs. Once it is apparent that the sought-after benefits are hopelessly beyond reach, a nation will choose to terminate the conflict, as long as costs of surrender do not exceed the costs of continuing the struggle.

The *Denial* Mechanism

Pape's *Denial* theory argues that in conventional conflicts the most effective means of coercion is reducing the victim's expected benefits (EB) below expected costs (EC) in his decision calculus. First, specific benefits (B) may be targeted as a means to reduce expected benefits, but Pape maintains that states are incapable of manipulating opponents' perceived benefits. "The assailant cannot gain coercive leverage by attempting to alter the target's basic interests; it can only hope to persuade the target to ignore or stop acting on these interests."[25] The value of the benefits is relatively static during conflicts and belligerents can do little to change their opponent's perception of the attractiveness of these benefits.[26] "The primary issue in serious international disputes is control over territory, but these interests tend to be fixed during the dispute because they emanate from pressures that change slowly, if at all."[27] Perceived benefits are relatively constant during conflicts.

Instead, Pape recommends that a coercer nation should attempt to lower the victim's confidence in his military strategy. In other words, a state must reduce the victim's expected probability of success (P_B). In conventional conflicts, the other terms in the victim's decision calculus—benefits (B), costs (C), and probability of costs (P_C)—cannot normally be affected to the degree required to coerce the victim.[28] According to Pape's Comprehensive Theory of Coercion, effective coercion is a function of the relationship between expected benefits and costs:

$$Denial = f(BP_B , CP_C)$$

Concerning this decision calculus, Denial attempts to drive expected benefits to zero. The most probable means of accomplishing this is to drive down benefit-probability (P_B).

> The task for the coercer, therefore, is to thwart the victim's military strategy, undermining the victim's confidence that its territorial goals can be achieved. When coercive demands require the target to concede important interests, it does not suffice to deny the ability to succeed at low cost; the victim must be denied the ability to succeed at all.[29]

Once the probability of achieving benefits is effectively reduced, all future incurred costs achieve nothing—unless the coercer has imposed such punitive termination conditions that the victim is motivated to hold out for better terms.[30]

This all said, *Denial* is still a difficult endeavor. Pape describes two factors that affect a nation's resistance to coercion: domestic politics and coercer's demands. Alexander George adds support to this when he describes two variables that determine successful coercion: how strongly is the opponent disinclined to comply, and what is demanded of the opponent.[31] Domestic politics may constrain decision makers to continue the conflict, or restrain their freedom of action in termination. The leadership's political, even physical survival may be internally threatened if he concedes to coercers' demands.

Three additional sources of domestic pressure contribute to the momentum to continue conflicts. First, public pressure will often constrain decision makers to particular courses of action, especially when territorial issues are central to national identity or strategic interests. Second, legislative stimulus may pressure leaders to continue the dispute. Third, nonmilitary elites may influence national decision makers. These may include the media or key industries that have significant leverage in the government. These pressures are not limited to democratic governments, but exist to varying degrees in all forms of government, including autocratic states.[32] In any case, these aspects of national resistance are not readily manipulable by coercers. Attempts to influence adversary's internal politics will only have indirect success at best.

Coercer's demands also have a direct bearing on a state's resistance to coercion. Demands may be so extreme that they constrain the actions of targeted states. Conceding the issues may be nearly impossible for decision makers. So, nations may resist coercion in order to increase the cost of the conflict to the coercer state in hopes that a coercer's demands will be reduced: "The obviously vanquished still has some spoiling capability, and therefore bargaining capacity, until the shooting has stopped . . . so the local enemy in asymmetrical war can charge a high and negotiable price."[33] In these cases, the desire for less punitive terms may actually supplant the original benefits in the targeted states' cost-benefit calculus. This makes any attempt at coercion all the more difficult. As we will see later in the Japanese case study, extreme demands by the coercer may serve to strengthen the victim's resolve.

According to *Denial* theory, the real key to coercion lies in exploiting military vulnerability as the means of driving down the victim's probability of achieving his desired benefit. It is not simply a function of comparative numerical forces or GNPs as suggested by balance-of-forces theory. It includes operational effects that are not quantifiable. Therefore, strategy becomes supremely important: by definition it is the means of attacking military vulnerability and the means of driving the P_B term to zero.

Denial asserts that successful conventional coercion depends on manipulation of opponents' military vulnerability. Further, military vulnerability has an inverse relationship with probability of achieving benefits. If military vulnerability can be driven up, the probability of achieving expected benefits will be forced down, and the whole expected benefits calculus may be theoretically nulled.

An interesting aspect of *Denial Theory* is its resemblance to a brute-force strategy. Similar to brute force, *Denial's* targets an opponent's military strategy. If an opponent fails to be coerced by a *Denial* mechanism, military

leaders are in a position to fully pursue the traditional military victory. Not only is it important to defeat the opponent's strategy, *Denial* must make the opponent perceive his strategy as impotent. Otherwise, he will not realize the futility of his effort. So in practice, a *Denial* strategy may appear to have only minor differences from a brute-force strategy. But these differences would be a result of attempts—which do not contribute directly to a military victory—to convince an adversary of the futility of his military strategy.

Summary

Like all coercive strategies, *Denial* targets the will of the adversary. It attempts to induce a situation in which the opponent will lack the resolve to resist the coercer's demands. *Denial* differs from most *coercion* strategies because it targets the benefit side of the rational calculus rather than the cost side. *Denial* asserts that successful coercion lies in undermining adversaries' resolve by attacking military vulnerability, thereby denying him the possibil-



Figure 3. The *Denial* Mechanism

ity of achieving his goals. By effectively nulling the enemy's military strategy, *Denial* decreases the probability of achieving the benefits:

Pape has combined the three common propositions for coercive success—balance of interest, force, and risk—into a comprehensive theory of coercion that incorporates the important elements of each. This describes the condition for a victim's coercion:

$$B \times P_B < C \times P_C$$

Denial theory predicts that negating an adversary's military strategy offers the most likely mechanism for coercing him in conventional conflicts.

In chapter 4, Pape explains the Japanese decision to surrender in World War II as *Denial* mechanism. However, Engelbrecht proposes a competing explanation of the Japanese surrender. His *Theory of Second Order Change* is discussed in the next chapter.

Notes

1. Robert A. Pape, "Coercive Air Power" (PhD diss., University of Chicago, December 1988), 57.
2. Allison describes governmental outcomes as resulting from three mechanisms:

Model I — Rational actor
Model II—Organizational processes
Model III —Governmental politics

He believes many academic disputes over causes of events actually result from scholars' different approaches to analyzing political events. They frame explanations using these different constructs of governmental outcomes. Graham T. Allison, *The Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).

3. Ibid., 10.
4. Ibid., 30.
5. Ibid., 29–30.
6. Pape, 36.
7. Ibid.., 35.
8. Ibid.., 58.
9. Ibid.., 41.
10. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).
11. Pape, 59.
12. Ibid., 325.
13. Robert A. Pape, "Coercive Airpower in the Vietnam War," *International Security* 15, no. 2 (Fall 1990): 109.
14. Robert A. Pape, "Coercion and Military Strategy: Why Denial Works and Punishment Doesn't," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 15, no. 4 (December 1992): 430.
15. Ibid., 437.
16. For instance Giulio Douhet advocated cities and populations as the primary targets; de Seversky asserted airpower should destroy the economic infrastructure and thereby foment revolt; Billy Mitchell believed destroying a nation's industry, agriculture, and transportation was the means to affect their resolve.
17. Pape, "Coercive Air Power," 39.
18. Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Economics of the Wartime Shortage: A History of British Food Supplies in the Napoleonic War and in World Wars I and II* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1963).
19. Pape, "Coercion and Military Strategy," 430–31.
20. Pape, "Coercive Air Power," 67.
21. Olson.
22. Fred C. Ikle, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 60.
23. Paul Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958), 12–25.
24. Ibid.
25. Pape, "Coercive Airpower in the Vietnam War, " 110.
26. In order to empirically analyze the *Denial* effect, Pape uses territory as the primary benefit over which nations conflict.
27. Pape, "Coercion and Military Strategy," 430.
28. Kecskemeti.
29. Ibid.
30. More on this when I discuss Japan's World War II decision to surrender.
31. Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Diplomacy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).
32. Robert Randle, "The Domestic Origins of Peace," *How Wars End, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 392 (November 1970): 76-85.
33. William T. R. Fox, "The Causes of Peace and Conditions of War," *How Wars End, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 392 (November 1970): 1–13.

Chapter 3

Second Order Change

In his theory of *Second Order Change,* Joseph Engelbrecht proposes that decisions to terminate war result from a radical paradigm shift on the part of national decision makers. This *second order change* comes about because the war itself has become a threat to higher order values. States enter wars to achieve specific goals, but for the losers wars often continue long after any hope of achieving these benefits have disappeared. At some point these national leaders supposedly come to realize that the war itself becomes the problem, because it puts at risk a more fundamental value.

In describing the theory of *Second Order Change*, I answer three questions. First, we must thoroughly understand Engelbrecht's concept of the wartime paradigm. Specifically, how does Engelbrecht explain governmental outcomes, and how is decision makers' rationality bounded? Unlike Robert Pape, Engelbrecht's construct is a behavioral-based theory of decision making. He clearly does not adhere to the idea of decision makers as "rational actors." Instead, he seems to view governmental outcomes as primarily a result of governmental politics.[1] Second, what exactly is a *second order change*? It is important to accurately distinguish between first and second order change to understand the theory's main points. Engelbrecht suggests three required "ingredients," and three "catalysts" that may spark the paradigm shift in *Second Order Change*. The third question is how military strategists might be able to impose a *second order change* on their adversary in order to bring about a decision to surrender? Military force is a blunt instrument, but its use is essential: military events do not always force decisions, but may be a precursor.[2]

Governmental Outcomes

Engelbrecht's explanation of governmental outcomes is distinctly different from Pape's rationally based theory. Engelbrecht readily concedes that individuals behave as rational, utility-maximizing actors, but disagrees that this same analysis can be applied at the international level. Framing governmental outcomes as a product of rational actors is an error of logic-type sets.[3] He believes that Allison's Model III that describes outcomes as a result of governmental politics more closely characterizes the behavior of governments.[4]

Governmental action is a resultant, the sum of the major influence vectors within government.

> What happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence; *political* in the sense that the activity from which decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of the government.[5]

Governmental actions are actually "agglomerations" of decisions and actions taken by individuals and groups.

Key players, who are tied into the power channels, may have varying degrees of influence. Their influence in these power channels is situation-dependent. They will assume more or less significance depending on the nature of the situation. For instance, the secretary of Health and Human Services will have a relatively minor input to national security when compared with the secretary of defense. On the other hand, the positions may be reversed if the issue is national health care.

Decision Making during Conflicts

Some scholars believe termination decisions are based on a rational cost-benefit calculus. The cost-benefit proposition assumes ". . . that a state will pursue its objectives until it reaches a point where marginal costs of continuing the war are not worth the objective, then the state's leaders will decide to seek to terminate the war."[6] However, rational decision making is complicated by other factors. National leaders' fixation on sunk costs often provides an impetus to continue the war, although marginal costs continue to exceed marginal returns. Other scholars believe that during conflict policymakers fail to reassess costs altogether.[7] Furthermore, decision makers' rationality is bounded by their perceptions and access to information. This makes empirical weighing of costs and benefits impossible.[8] Despite these complicating factors, cost-benefit or utility theory asserts that the surrender decision occurs when either costs of continuing will become too high, or the ability to gain benefits becomes negligible.

Engelbrecht discounts the cost-benefit calculus as the primary mechanism for termination decisions. First, he does not believe its basic presumption that nations act like "rational actors." Second, and related to this, is the failure of most utility theories to adequately substantiate their mechanisms with behavioral research or theory. Decision making is inherently a behavioral phenomenon, yet many theorists fail to include behavioral theory in their constructs.

Second Order Change Theory contests two central tenets of the rational actor model. First, the idea of dominance is central to rationality: ". . . if one option is better than another in one state [condition] and at least as good in all other states, the dominant option should be chosen." Second, there is tenet of invariance: ". . . different representations of the same choice problem should yield the same preference. That is, the preference between options should be independent of their description."[9] In their research on decision making under conditions of risk, Tversky and Kahneman have found that these two tenets do not hold true.

They propose in their *Prospect Theory* that decision makers' evaluations are highly dependent on the framing and editing of problems.[10] So all evaluation of options is not rational, instead it is dependent on reference frames or paradigms.

Wartime Paradigms

A decision to engage in war is inherently different from a decision to terminate. Most modern wars end long past the point of any utility for the loser. This is because, once committed to war, national leaders enter into a wartime paradigm, which causes the perspective to be narrowly focused.

> The observation that in a wartime paradigm, leaders fixate on the issues of war fighting and avoid the strategic choice of accepting defeat is consistent with most psychological approaches. In particular, *prospect theory* [Tversky and Kahneman] provides insight into why actors fail to make rational choices when objective analysis indicates they should. Prospect theory describes human behavior and explains that actors are more willing to take risk in the domain of losses than in the domain of gains. That is, actors take risky actions to avoid loss. This willingness to continue to take risks accounts for war continuing past the point when rational analysis would predict.[11]

This concept of "paradigm" must be further clarified. The common use of the term *paradigm* has come to be equated with the simplistic concept of a model. Its use in describing *second order change* is much more complex. It basically is a construct of reality, a lens, a tautology, through which individuals perceive the universe, and by which they order their reality.[12] In this sense, a paradigm shift is such a radical departure from one's previous construct that it creates a severe external anomaly, which forces one to re-order basic beliefs. As an example, Engelbrecht offers the "pile-of-pebbles" anecdote. An individual is given a pile of pebbles of assorted sizes and instructed to divide them into three equal piles. Initially he may try sorting by size, but that does not yield three "equal" piles. Perhaps he next tries sorting by using three weight categories. Once again the results are unsatisfactory. After repeated attempts and mounting frustration, the anomaly grows. Finally, the crisis forces the individual to reframe his perspective and look at the problem differently. He sorts the rocks by color and comes up with his three equal piles.[13] In international conflicts a decision to surrender also requires looking at the problem through a completely different lens: a paradigm shift reorients decision makers. *Second order change*, then, involves the dynamic of individual-environment interaction. When his paradigm shifts dramatically, the individual's entire system, or construct, becomes redefined. He must fundamentally change the way he interacts within this newly defined system. *Second order change* is this paradigm shift, and the subsequent policy decisions are a measurable indication that *second order change* has occurred.

Likewise, the absorbing commitment to execute the war forms a ". . . framework (or group of rules) which logically excludes efforts to terminate the conflict. An attempt to terminate the war is logically inconsistent with efforts to prosecute it."[14] Robert Jervis also suggests decision makers become so involved in the war prosecution that they don't recognize avenues for escape: ". . . a strong concern with a problem can create a kind of tunnel vision."[15] The

result is a dogged determination to fight on. The decision to terminate requires reframing the problem. This can occur only after decision makers have jumped the logic-type sets in their paradigm shift, and recognized that the war is now the problem instead of the solution.

Second Order Change

Second order change is distinctly different from normal—or first order—change. First order change is a change within the "system," defined by the current paradigm. For instance, in response to wartime setbacks, decision makers may change operational strategy or tactics, perhaps even replace some military or political leaders. However, these internal adjustments are first order changes that may not solve the root problem. The solution may require a radical systemic change. *Second order change* is a ". . . form of change which modifies the system itself, by changing the relationship of the parts or adding others. . . ."[16] In wartime environments, this reframing of paradigms may force decision makers to focus on the future consequences of the war that threaten higher order values.

For an illustration of the difference between first and *second order change*, we can look to a theory of human motivation. In some ways, the values of a nation and its leaders may be similar to Maslow's "hierarchy of needs."[17] For individuals, the most basic motivational drive in the hierarchy is fulfillment of basic physiological needs such as food and shelter. The subsequent, ordered levels are safety, love, esteem, and self-actualization (fig. 4).

> These basic goals are related to each other, being arranged in a hierarchy of prepotency. This means that the most prepotent goal will monopolize consciousness and will tend of itself to organize the recruitment of the various capacities of the organism. But when a need is satisfied, the next prepotent [lower order] need emerges in turn to dominate the conscious life. . . .[18]

Therefore, gratified needs are not active motivators in decision-making theory. Conversely, if a previously satisfied need becomes unsatisfied, it once again becomes the overriding motivating force. This shift from one hierarchical level to another is a shift in logic-types or a *second order* shift.

Similarly, nations may have a hierarchy of values or national interests that serve as determinants of their behavior. Cultural preservation or national survival may be examples of these underlying basic values. If nations' basic values are satisfied, they no longer act as motivators. On the other hand, the values for which the nations initiate war (perhaps territory) are often a different level and may act as the primary motivator only as long as the underlying values are satisfied. The impetus to pursue the war will continue within this logic-type set. However, if an extreme crisis occurs which puts at risk a higher order value, the newly threatened value becomes the overriding motivating force: a *second order change* occurs. If a higher order value becomes threatened, it reverts to being the primary motivator.



Figure 4. Comparative Hierarchies

This *second order change* is the mechanism that **prompts** the decision to surrender: the decision that results is actually a measurable effect of a *second order change*. As an analogy from physical science: sunlight that strikes the earth is a measurable effect of the nuclear fusion occurring on the sun. The cause is distinct from the effect.

> . . . the commitment statesmen must make to prosecuting the war creates a decision making and psychological framework that only allows first order changes—changes within the framework of the war effort. When statesmen admit to themselves that the future consequences of their course threaten other values which they hold dear, they decide to seek an end to the war.[19]

In order for this second order change to occur, there must occur a severe anomaly that puts the national decision makers "in a box" from which their current wartime paradigm offers no acceptable exit-solutions. It is only when confronted by such an extreme crisis that the paradigm shift occurs. *Second Order Change* is this paradigm shift, when the victim displaces the wartime paradigm with a paradigm in which they are able to contemplate surrender.[20]

"Ingredients" and "Catalysts"

What are the conditions that may cause a *second order* paradigm shift? Engelbrecht believes there are three interrelated ingredients. First, the military situation must reframe decision makers' environment. It is not only important to neutralize an opponent's strategy, but he must also be made to perceive his strategy as dysfunctional—an impaired or disordered strategy. Belligerents who have even limited military success are rarely compelled to reorient their perspective. Therefore, strategic impotence is a necessary ingredient, but it is not sufficient by itself.[21] Numerous historical examples exist of states continuing to fight long after the realization that their strategy was ineffective. A second ingredient must also be present. Key decision makers

must shift their focus from the war aims to higher order values. There must be a credible threat to these higher order values.

> Threats to values, different values than those directly associated with statesmen's wartime policy, furnish a necessary ingredient to the change of policy in favor of war termination. As long as decision makers are thinking within a wartime paradigm, they are likely to misperceive, ignore, or play down those threats.[22]

This leads to the third ingredient. There must be a shock factor that highlights the extreme anomaly in the decision makers' wartime paradigm. This may be, but is not necessarily, a military event.[23] While it may be possible to impose a *second order change* without this shock factor, it seems that the temporal compression associated with an anomalous event may be instrumental in forcing the paradigm dilemma to a head.

Additionally, three catalysts may provide the spark for *second order change*. First, new people entering the central decision-making group may cause a dramatic shift in the group dynamics. The new dynamic allows the problems to be viewed from a different perspective. Contrary to Fred Ikle,[24] this new membership in the decision-making group is not an independent variable causing the termination decision. It simply permits reorientation which might have been impossible under the previous group dynamics. Second, new information may cause leaders to see their dilemma in a new light. This new information must be radically divergent from their previous expectations. It must ". . . produce such a sense of urgency, loss of control, and sense of inevitability that the decision makers reform their problem to see termination as inevitable."[25] Third, new conditions must be perceived as radically different from expectations or past experience. Policymakers must also believe the new situation warrants a new course of action.



Figure 5. ***Second Order Change***

These three catalysts (new people, new information, and new conditions) may operate independently or in combination to precipitate *second order change*.[26] Of course the next question is how to operationalize *Second Order Change* in developing a coercive strategy?

Triggering *Second Order Change*

At first glance, *Second Order Change* may appear very much like a Schelling risk-manipulation strategy. That is, if we can credibly threaten or hold higher values hostage, we may compel an adversary to act in accordance with our wishes.

> Strategic and long-range planners use this device by projecting a future environment and illustrating the horrible consequences that current policy will likely have on important *organizational values*. If potential consequences are startling enough, senior leaders may begin to recognize the need for dramatic change.[27]

Yet, *Second Order Change* differs significantly from a Schelling strategy. First, Schelling advocates the graduated escalation of violence as a means to demonstrate resolve to an opponent. The use of force should be periodically halted as a means to allow the target nation the opportunity to seek termination. Accompanying this graduated escalation of force is a coordinated diplomatic effort.[28] Engelbrecht believes that graduated escalation actually has the opposite effect. Rather than signaling a threat to higher order values, a typical Schelling escalation will cause the target nation to doubt the coercer's resolve. The graduated escalation and periodic respite also permit the target nation time to adapt to the adverse conditions. Imposing a *second order change* requires dramatic, compressed application of force, to force a dilemma on the target state's decision makers and is dependent on the presence (to varying degrees) of at least some of the ingredients and catalysts.

The very first requirement for implementing a strategy of *Second Order Change* is to understand an opponent's wartime paradigm.[29] In a thorough analysis of the target nation, strategists must identify key actors, including their frames of reference. Also, one must understand how the actors interact with each other and with the nation: the cultural, political, and organizational elements of the state. This will then lead to the identification of their value construct, including the national interest that may have caused the conflict. It should also reveal the fundamental (higher order) values held by the society and its national leaders. The object in all this is to accurately frame the adversary's paradigm and identify key values that may be effectively threatened.

Once an opponent's wartime paradigm is reasonably well understood, the "ingredients" and "catalysts" for *second order change* offer possible means for imposing a paradigm shift. The first ingredient of *second order change* is to impose a hopeless military situation on the adversary. In this sense, military force becomes an "exogenous," not independent, variable:

> It sets the conditions for peace once those decision makers are focused and absorbed by the war. That is, the war termination process occurs for the loser only after enough force has been applied so that leaders feel the effects of the defeat of their armies and their strategy. Such force is a necessary, but not sufficient condition pressuring statesmen.[30]

More specifically it must be a failure of a defensive strategy, because nations are rarely coerced to terminate war by the failure of an offensive strategy—only after denial of defensive strategy will *second order* values become threatened.[31] So, as a prerequisite to *second order change*, the target state must be forced to a defensive strategy. This defensive military strategy must then be made impotent. A second ingredient to *second order change* is a refocus of concerns to a higher order of values. National leaders must somehow be shown that threats to higher order values now override any previous concerns. Finally, military events may serve another purpose, as a shock ingredient.[32] The use of force may serve to defeat the opponent's strategy but may also serve as the necessary shock ingredient to *second order* decision: Military force may serve ". . . to trigger an end. A brief shocking application of force after the initial strategy of the opponent has been thwarted, can serve . . . for a reappraisal of the war situation and contribute to termination."[33] In Japan's World War II decision to surrender, the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, or the dropping of the atomic bombs may have provided just such a shock.

In addition to the ingredients for *Second Order Change*, Engelbrecht proposes three factors that may serve as catalysts: new people, new information, and new conditions. These catalysts are not always manipulable by the coercer. First, it is unlikely that coercer nations can insert new members into the core of the target state's decision-making structure. However, that does not exclude strategists from using a change of enemy government leaders as an opportunity to precipitate a *second order change*. For instance, if a coercer nation learns that formerly militant members of the target government have been replaced with moderates, the coercer nation may decide to time diplomatic or military events in hopes of inducing a *second order change*. The second catalyst, new information, may also spark a *second order change*. In this case, decision makers receive information that does not fit their expectations and beliefs, and for which they have no plans. As an example, in World War II, President Truman intentionally timed the announcement of the Potsdam Declaration to maximize the effect on Japanese decision makers, hoping to induce surrender.[34] This new information may force decision makers to see their problem in a new light, which reorients them to seek termination. Finally, a dramatic change of the environment, or new conditions may induce *second order change*. New conditions may be so unexpected, and the ability to adjust so negligible, that the only means of preserving *second order* values is through termination. As one can see, these three catalysts are not always distinct but actually overlap. For instance, new information may expose new conditions, which in turn prompts a change in membership of the decision-making elite.[35]

Summary

Engelbrecht proposes that the mechanism that compels national leaders to seek war termination is *Second Order Change;* the war ceases to be a means to achieve benefits, but becomes the problem. When decision makers perceive higher order values threatened they are likely to seek war termination. *Second Order Change* provides the means to coerce nations by using diplomacy and military force to threaten higher order values. It is more complex than Pape's *Denial* or Schelling's *Risk Manipulation* theories, which propose single causes. *Second Order Change* proposes multiple, interacting causes.[36]

Engelbrecht proposes three ingredients for *Second Order Change*: (1) sterilize the target nations military strategy, (2) refocus concerns to higher order values, and (3) impose a crisis, or severe shock on the target. Additionally, three catalysts may serve to spark the *Second Order Change*: (1) new people in the decision making group, (2) new and unexpected information, and (3) new conditions. In a sense, *Second Order Change* is a threat-based, risk-manipulation strategy that relies on elements of both denial and punishment.

Notes

1. Allison's Model III. Graham T. Allison, *The Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).

2. Joseph A. Engelbrecht, Jr., "War Termination: Why Does a State Decide to Stop Fighting?" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1992), 298.

3. Logic-type sets are constructs that explain differing levels of operations. For instance, one cannot take microeconomics theory and directly apply this at the macroeconomics level. What may be true in explaining individual behavior does not necessarily hold true for larger "sets" or groups composed of many individuals. Similarly, although rational behavior may be an adequate construct for describing individual national leaders' behavior, it does not necessarily account for the behavior of nations: The individual and the nation are examples of two distinct logic-type sets. Watzlawick provides additional clarification:

> The Theory of Logical Types is not concerned with what goes on inside a class, i.e., between its members, but gives us a frame for considering the relationship between member and class and the peculiar metamorphosis which is in the nature of shifts from one logical level to the next. . . . it follows that there are two different types of change: one that occurs within a given system which itself remains unchanged, and one whose occurrence changes the system itself.

Paul Watzlawick, John H.Weakland, and Richard Fisch, *Change: Principles of Problem Formation and Problem Resolution* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1974), 10.

4. Engelbrecht believes Allison's Model III (governmental politics) provides a better explanation of governmental outcomes than Model I (rational actor), it still has significant limitations. Engelbrecht, from a series of interviews at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, September 1993–June 1994.

5. Allison, 162.

6. Engelbrecht, 39.

7. Robert A. Pape, "Coercion and Military Strategy: Why Denial Works and Punishment Doesn't," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 15, no. 4 (December 1992): 423–75.

8. Engelbrecht, 30 and 277.

9. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions," *Journal of Business* 59, no. 4 (1986): S251–S278.

10. Ibid.

11. Engelbrecht, 319.

12. Pat A Pentland, from a series of discussions that concern psychological and sociological issues of "nonlinear dynamics" and "extension transference," January–June 1994.

13. Engelbrecht, 41.

14. Ibid., 42.

15. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 212.

16. Engelbrecht, 38–41.

17. Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," in *Classic Readings in Organizational Behavior*, ed. Steven J. Ott (Pacific Grove, Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1989), 48–65.

18. Ibid.

19. Engelbrecht, 45.

20. Engelbrecht from a series of interviews at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, September 1993–June 1994.

21. Ibid.

22. Engelbrecht, "War Termination," 327.

23. Ibid., 272–75.

24. As an explanation for the way most decisions to surrender occur, Fred Ikle proposes a change of national leadership. Surrender will occur when the doves in government succeed in wresting power from the hawks. Fred C. Ikle, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).

25. Ibid., 328.

26. Ibid., 327–29.

27. Ibid., 336. Emphasis added.

28. Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).

29. The key actors and the system or the frame of reference.

30. Engelbrecht, "War Termination," 303.

31. Ibid., 304.

32. Ibid., 298.

33. Ibid., 316.

34. Leon V. Sigal, *Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988).

35. Ibid., 327–29.

36. In mathematics, a linear equation explains a straight line relationship between terms: a + bx = y. Nonlinear relationships involve curvilinear functions, for example $x^2 + 2xy + y^2$. In the context of coercion theory I'm using these terms slightly differently. Linear means a direct cause-effect relationship. By nonlinear relationship, I mean multivariate relationships with the different factors having distinct impacts; some may have additive effects, while others may be exponential.

Chapter 4

Japan's Decision to Surrender

Robert A. Pape's *Denial* and Joseph A. Engelbrecht's *Second Order Change* models propose different mechanisms for the Japanese surrender in World War II. Pape asserts the mechanism that induced the surrender was the denial of Japan's military strategy. In effect, Japan's probability of achieving any benefits dropped to zero. Conversely, Engelbrecht suggests that *second order change* brought about the decision: A *second order* escalation in the future costs of continuing the conflict required the emperor to violate the "rules of the game" and directly intervene in the Japanese political machinery. The emperor felt this was the only way to preserve the national polity.

This chapter serves two purposes. First, the Japanese case study provides a lens through which these theories may be viewed, in hopes that the precise mechanisms will be further clarified. Second, the critical evidence for *Denial* and *Second Order Change* will be compared in an attempt to discern which theory best explains the Japanese surrender. In turn, this may enhance policymakers' ability to actually formulate military strategies, depending on the underlying theory they adopt. However, before proceeding, I will first discuss Japanese politics and events leading to the Japanese surrender.

The Japanese Polity—*Kokutai*

Contrary to the common belief, the Japanese government was not a monolithic military dictatorship. Actually it consisted of an oligarchy with numerous, sometimes conflicting factions. Some influential actors had opposed the war from the very beginning, like the Tojo Cabinet Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo who had resigned in protest of the decision to initiate war against America.[1] Other members of the government moved toward war termination as they perceived the situation becoming hopeless. But still the military, more specifically the army, was the dominant force in the Japanese government until the end of the war. The army had achieved this political dominance through assassination and intimidation that began after the turn of the century. Opponents to the army's ultranational, militaristic agenda were often brutally silenced.[2]

Japan had a unique political structure through which the military exercised influence. The Meiji Restoration in 1868 had done away with 700 years of Shogunate rule—a virtual military dictatorship. As a result, the emperor

was elevated as the supreme head of the nation. He granted the constitution, and he alone could amend it. The politicians, the people, and even the ardent militarists viewed the emperor "through an emotional and reverent haze."[3] In practice however, the emperor was not directly involved in policymaking. The premier[4] and his cabinet made decisions of state. These decisions required unanimous agreement within the cabinet before they could be presented to the emperor for his approval. In turn, the emperor virtually always accepted decisions of the unanimous cabinet. If the cabinet was at an impasse and not able to present a unanimous decision, the emperor would direct that a new government be formed. In effect, the emperor's role was ritualistic although theoretically he was the center of Japanese politics.[5]

The premier and his cabinet ran the country and recommended legislation. The cabinet was composed of 14 ministers, the most important of whom were the ministers of war, navy, and foreign affairs. In addition, the army and navy chief of staff exerted great influence on the cabinet. All these individuals had virtually unlimited access to the emperor. One of the unique aspects of cabinet formation was the military's ability to select their own ministers and chiefs of staff. This increased the army's ability to push its own agenda. It is especially revealing that all three wartime cabinets were headed by a premier who was a former flag officer: Gen Hideki Tojo, Gen Kuniaki Koiso, and Adm Kantaro Suzuki. This also illustrates the extent to which the military exerted influence in Japanese politics. Later in the war the political structure was altered to improve coordination of the war effort. Premier Koiso established an "inner cabinet" called the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War. This body comprised the premier; army and navy chiefs of staff; and war, navy, and foreign affairs ministers. The Supreme Council was a coordination organization that decided war policy. It became the central organ for policy-making in the final days of the war.

Other actors and organizations played significant roles. The Privy Council was composed of revered statesmen who were given a lifetime appointment by the emperor. This body reviewed legislation treaties and appointments, advising the emperor on these issues. The Privy Council membership overlapped somewhat with the *Jushin*, a panel of former premiers, one of whom was the designated president of the Privy Council.

The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal controlled access to the emperor and was his closest adviser. Throughout the war this position was held by Koichi Kido, who was initially opposed to the war and later became one of the principle agents in bringing about surrender. But in his role as Lord Keeper he was severely restrained in the action he could take. As the emperor's closest adviser, convention required the Lord Keeper to maintain strict political neutrality to ensure the emperor was kept informed of all sides to the issues. He could not be perceived as taking sides in disputes. Japan's parliament, the Diet, passed legislation as the supposed voice of the people. But "the opinions and attitudes of the general public had significance only as a single and subsidiary factor in the considerations of the leaders."[6] "The Diet was moribund. Opposition had long been silenced; it was called into session only to

provide a means of rallying public opinion behind programs the military considered necessary."[7]

Events Leading to Surrender

Within six months of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan's strategy was rendered a serious blow at Midway. The Battle of Midway in June 1942 was regarded as the turning point of the war, even by many Japanese. The United States sank four Japanese carriers, losing only one of its own. This effectively neutralized Japan's carrier force. Midway also marks the furthest Japanese expansion. From this point on, the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere steadily receded.[8]

Other Japanese leaders viewed Guadalcanal as the war's turning point. From the initial landings in August 1942 to the Japanese withdrawal the following February, numerous naval engagements occurred with losses on both sides being fairly equal. However, Japanese naval air suffered much higher attrition than the Allies. "The Japanese Navy had suffered so heavily that its chiefs urged abandonment of Guadalcanal . . . the prolonged struggle for Guadalcanal was a very serious defeat for Japan . . . she had lost 600 planes, with their trained crews. At the same time America's strength in all spheres was continually increasing."[9] By 7 February 1943, Japan had withdrawn all troops from Guadalcanal. At the same time, the British were pressing the Japanese in the Burma theater. These events clearly led some Japanese leaders to believe there was no hope for a victory.

As early as 11 June 1942, four days after Midway, some Japanese statesmen began discussing ways to terminate the war. Former ambassador to England, Shigeru Yoshida discussed with Kido a scheme to send Prince Konoye, a former premier, to Switzerland. Konoye, a member of the *Jushin* and a peace advocate, was to establish contacts with other nations so they would not miss an opportunity to end the war. Although nothing came of this proposal, it clearly indicates an early assessment by some policymakers that costs were beginning to outweigh benefits. Early in 1943 Prince Konoye and other members of the *Jushin* began attempts to insert a propeace advocate into the Tojo cabinet. They were unsuccessful because of Tojo's powerful influence. Meanwhile, in June 1943 Admiral Takagi, of the Naval Staff, began a study of the war's lessons to date. This study was prompted by further setbacks in the Solomons. Takagi concluded that Japan could not possibly win the war. Therefore, it must seek a compromise peace. Takagi reasoned that in the worst case, the Allies would stipulate withdrawal from China, Manchuria, and the Southern Sakhalins. The Allies would also probably demand withdrawal from Formosa and Korea.[10] However, political power was still concentrated in the army, and Tojo's militaristic government was unwilling to consider negotiating peace while it still possessed viable military force. The Cairo Declaration in December 1943 served to further cement the army's

resolve against negotiating surrender. This declaration demanded that Japan be stripped of all possessions it had gained since 1914 and dictated unconditional surrender to Japan.

Allied Pacific successes in 1943, albeit incremental, pressured Japanese military leaders to reassess their strategy. Realizing their forces were far too dispersed, the Imperial GHQ laid out a "New Operational Policy" in mid-September. This policy was based on the minimum area essential for the fulfillment of war aims, termed the "absolute national defense sphere."

> . . . extending from Burma along the Malay barrier to Western New Guinea, and from there to the Carolines, the Marianas, and up to the Kuriles. This contraction of the defensive area meant that most of New Guinea, and all the Bismarcks (including Rabaul), the Solomons, the Gilberts and the Marshals were now considered, and classed as non-essential—although they were to be held for a further six months. By then, it was hoped, the minimum or "absolute" area would have been developed into an invulnerable barrier. . . .[11]

In 1944 the Allied war machine increasingly gained momentum. Japanese forces in the Southwest and Central Pacific were continually pressed back or bypassed and isolated. By March 1944, MacArthur had made significant progress in New Guinea and the Solomons, including the capture of the Bismarcks, the Admiralties, and the isolation of Rabaul with its garrison of 100,000 Japanese soldiers. It was also during this spring that Col Makoto Matsutani and a group of General Staff officers drafted a paper titled "Measures for the Termination of the Greater East Asian War." This paper proposed that Japan should try to end hostilities in the event of Germany's surrender in Europe. In this paper, three termination plans were suggested, with the "rock-bottom" plan being a settlement that guaranteed only the national polity (*Kokutai*) and safeguarded the imperial homeland. Matsutani's proposal was circulated among the top decision makers. However soon after explaining his thesis to Tojo, Matsutani was reassigned to the expeditionary forces in China in order to stifle any initiatives aimed at negotiating war termination.[12]

Meanwhile, the Allied Central Pacific advance proceeded so rapidly that Adm Chester Nimitz's forces were led to switch their line of advance northward, toward the Marianas Islands. This would put Allied forces within 1,400 miles of the Japanese mainland, striking distance for the newly developed B-29 bomber. It was in June, during this operation to capture Saipan, Tinian, and Guam that the Battle of the Philippine Sea took place, also known as the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot."

> The American pilots gained an overwhelming advantage over the less experienced Japanese, who lost 218 aircraft and brought down only twenty-nine American planes. Worse still, two of the Japanese carriers, the Shokaku and Taiho, both containing many more aircraft, were torpedoed and sunk by American submarines. . . . the Japanese loss of aircraft in the battle had totaled about 480, over three-quarters of their total, and most of their crews were lost.[13]

This battle and the subsequent Allied capture of Saipan, on 7 July 1944, had two strategic effects. First, it terminally weakened Japanese airpower, par-

ticularly with the loss of trained aircrews. Second, Saipan provided a base from which began the strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese mainland.

The loss of Saipan and the simultaneous collapse of the Burma front were catalytic events in Japanese politics. They triggered the fall of the ultramilitaristic Tojo government on 18 July, and brought in the Koiso cabinet. Kuniaki Koiso was a retired army general and known critic of Tojo. The emperor gave Koiso a mandate to give Japan's situation a "fundamental reconsideration" for terminating the war.[14] Many propeace advocates felt the Koiso government was too cautious in pursuing negotiations. But significantly, Koiso did form the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War. This body later played an important role in Japan's surrender. It basically comprised an "inner cabinet," which like the formal cabinet required unanimous decisions to establish policy, but the Supreme Council also had direct access to the emperor, who could initiate meetings with the council. During these meetings alternate courses of action could be discussed. In all, the Supreme Council served to engage the emperor more directly in national decision making and streamlined the decision-making process within the Japanese government.

In October 1944 Allied forces landed on Leyte Island, Philippines. As a counter to this, the Japanese navy attempted to lure away the US Navy carriers and destroy the Allied landing force. On 23 October, the Battle of Leyte Gulf ensued; it actually consisted of five distinct naval battles. Leyte Gulf essentially finished off Japanese naval power. While the Battle of Philippine Sea had been more strategically decisive because of its effect on Japanese naval airpower, the Battle of Leyte Gulf effectively destroyed any remaining semblance of Japanese sea power. In this battle, the Japanese lost four carriers, three battleships, six heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and eight destroyers. This was a heavy toll compared to American losses: one light carrier, two escort carriers, and three destroyers. With the loss of the carriers, the Japanese navy's six remaining battleships were helpless and made no further contribution to the war. Furthermore, American industry could replace lost assets; Japanese industry in their weakened state could not. Most historians agree that from this point on, the Japanese navy ceased to exist. Ultimately, the few remaining Japanese vessels were scuttled and used as artillery platforms.[15]

In April 1945, two key events combined to force the dissolution of the Koiso cabinet. On 1 April, the Allies invaded Okinawa. At the same time, the Soviet Union terminated its neutrality pact with Japan. The prowar elements in the Koiso government had prevented real progress on war termination, despite the imperial admonition to attempt to end the war. Nevertheless, politicians in favor of negotiations were building support and successfully had Adm Kantaro Suzuki appointed premier. Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, told the newly appointed premier, that "the question was not whether to end the war, but by what means and how quickly."[16] Suzuki told postwar interrogators that "it was the emperor's desire to make every effort to bring the war to

a conclusion as quickly as possible, and that was my purpose."[17] Suzuki appointed Shigenori Togo as foreign minister, and along with the navy minister, Adm Mitsumasa Yonai, the three made up the propeace faction on the Supreme Council. Opposed to them and in favor of continuing the war were Minister of War Korechika Anami; Army Chief of Staff Yoshijiro Umezu; and Navy Chief of Staff Soemu Toyoda.

On 17 June 1945 Allies completed the capture of Okinawa at a cost of 110,000 Japanese and 49,000 American casualties. Progress towards peace became even more of an imperative to the Japanese. "On 20 June the Emperor on his own initiative called the Supreme Council to have a conference and stated that it was necessary to have a plan to close the war at once, as well as a plan to defend the home islands."[18] However, the Japanese diplomatic effort focused on using the Soviet Union as an intermediary. This proved ineffective. Unknown to Japan, at the Yalta Conference the Soviet Union had already committed to entering the war against Japan within three months after Germany's surrender. The Soviet Union had ambitions to force Japan out of Manchuria and to gain Southern Sakhalin, Port Arthur, and the Kuril Islands.

The workings of Japanese politics in July and August accelerated to a feverish pace. The propeace group desperately sought a way to end the war despite the army's reticence. Meanwhile, the army made desperate preparations to repel the Allied invasion. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these events in detail, but I will highlight the remaining key events that led to the imperial rescript announcing Japan's surrender on 15 August 1945.

On 26 July, the Allies issued the Potsdam Declaration which called for "unconditional surrender of all **Japanese armed forces.**" Other key points of the declaration included:

- Elimination of the authority and influence of the Japanese militarists (para. 6)
- Destruction of Japanese war-making capability (para. 7)
- Occupation of Allied designated areas of the Japanese homeland (para. 7)
- Limitation of Japanese sovereignty to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and other designated minor islands (para. 8)
- Adherence to the terms of the Cairo Declaration (para. 8)
  - Strip Japan of all territory seized "since the beginning of the First World War"
  - Japan's government to be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people
- Complete disarming of Japanese military forces (para. 9)

Suzuki's response to the Potsdam Declaration was "*mokusatsu*": to kill with silence, not worthy of attention or response. There is significant disagreement over whether this response reflected Suzuki's actual position, or if his response was constrained by political exigencies. Some contend his response

was meant to maintain army support for the cabinet while he pursued a *haragei* political tactic—indirectly maneuvering to undermine the army's militant position. Some scholars believe that its purpose was to prevent further erosion of civilian morale.[19] Still others assert that Suzuki was not yet convinced of the need to accept unconditional surrender.[20]

By this point in the war, the two contentious issues were the occupation of the home islands and the question of imperial sovereignty. Both were left unclear by the Potsdam Declaration. "There was only one point of agreement: the necessity of safeguarding and preserving the national polity. So far as the steps to achieve that end were concerned, there had never been any meeting of minds and there apparently was never going to be any."[21] The army felt homeland defense would impose such a high cost on the Allies that they would soften their terms. The propeace group felt the army was committing the nation to a path that would lead to the very destruction of *Kokutai*.[22]

The pace quickened in the final days of the war. On 6 August the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Then, late on the night of 8 August, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, informed the Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Sato, that the Soviet Union was declaring war on Japan. This dashed any hopes of Moscow serving as a conduit for war-termination negotiations. On 9 August, Soviet forces invaded Japanese-held Manchuria and Sakhalin Island. That same day, an American B-29 dropped the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki.

Still the Supreme Council was divided. Foreign Minister Togo and Navy Minister Yonai both felt the Potsdam Declaration should be accepted immediately. They believed the terms, although ambiguous, left the imperial institution intact. Perhaps earlier, but certainly by 9 August, Suzuki began to openly advocate acceptance of the Potsdam terms. The other three members of the Supreme Council were still unconvinced and continued to advocate a "decisive battle" to repel the invaders, believing this would bring about moderation of the harsh Allied terms.[23] Suzuki, Togo, and Kido maneuvered for an unprecedented imperial conference, later that night.

At the imperial conference, the council informed the emperor of their impasse. With the council unable to reach a unanimous decision, the emperor intervened and directed acceptance of the Potsdam conditions: ". . . the time has come when we must bear the unbearable . . . I swallow my own tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation. . . ."[24] Soon after, Japan relayed its first offer to surrender through the Swiss. However, they still sought clarification on the sovereignty issue.

> The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam on July 26th, 1945 . . . with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.[25]

Japan received the Allied response, in the form of the Byrnes note, late on 12 August:

> From the moment of surrender the authority of the emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers . . . The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.[26]

This response reheated the debate between the hawks and doves within the government. The hawks opposed occupation and wanted to hold out for stronger guarantees of imperial sovereignty and national polity.

Suzuki, Togo, and Yonai interpreted the Byrnes note in a different light, giving its ambiguities the benefit of the doubt. The reference to "the Government" in the Byrnes note was interpreted as *seifu,* or administration of government without any connection to the throne, whereas "government" referred to *Kokutai,* or national polity which included the imperial system. The advocates for acceptance of Potsdam conditions believed "freely expressed will of the Japanese people" would certainly be to retain the imperial system. Additionally, the subjection of the authority of the emperor to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers was interpreted to mean the "Supreme Commander would oversee and even limit—but would not eradicate—Imperial prerogatives and governmental authority."[27] Suzuki, Togo, and Yonai believed the Byrnes note, implicitly allowed retention of the imperial system of *Kokutai.*

Still it required a second imperial conference with the Supreme Council to quell internal dissension. At 1050 on 14 August the second conference began. The Byrnes reply had actually stiffened army and navy attitude against surrender. But the emperor made it clear. Despite ambiguities concerning the imperial institution, he directed the council to accept the surrender terms:

> It is my desire that you, my Ministers of State, accede to my wishes and forthwith accept the Allied reply. In order that the people may know of my decision, I request you to prepare at once an imperial rescript so that I may broadcast to the nation. Finally, I call upon each and every one of you to exert himself to the utmost so that we may meet the trying days which lie ahead.[28]

Army Chief of Staff Umezu, Army Minister Anami, and Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda acceded to the emperor's wishes. A late plot by some army officers to overthrow the government was effectively suppressed and the emperor read his rescript announcing surrender at noon on 15 August.

The *Denial* Mechanism

Japan accepted defeat prior to the Allied invasion, while it still possessed two and a half million[29] soldiers, and a 9,000-plane kamikaze force.[30] Why was Japan coerced to surrender instead of having to be defeated in the classic sense? Pape's core argument is that military vulnerability—the *Denial* mechanism—resulted in Japan's decision to surrender in World War II. Further, Japan would probably have surrendered before the proposed Allied invasion, even if the nuclear bombs had not been dropped. "The decisive factor

was the Japanese leaders' recognition that their strategy for holding the most important territory at issue—the home islands—could not succeed."[31]

Pape discounts civilian vulnerability as playing any significant role in Japanese decision making. As a result of aerial firebombing and the blockade, the civilian populace and economy had already suffered extreme hardship without causing a termination decision. Punishment did not seem to provide any leverage. Pape asserts that the hostage was already dead: further devastation would have had little impact on the Japanese decision makers.[32]

Instead, he asserts that Japanese military leaders became convinced that their strategy for homeland defense was not viable. The Allied sea blockade had virtually choked off essential imports, including oil and other vital raw materials. This crippled their war industry and prevented them from keeping pace with materiel attrition. When Okinawa fell in June 1945, American tactical airpower could now reach the home islands. Finally, even the military leaders doubted their ability to defend the homeland after the surprising success of the Soviet advances against the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria. With the crack Manchurian army being routed by a supposedly inferior Soviet army, Japanese military leaders could not expect any better performance from less well-trained homeland defense forces.[33] Thus, the defeat of the Japanese defense strategy—*Ketsu-go*—was the primary cause of the decision to surrender.

In supporting his thesis, Pape categorizes the two independent variables (military and civilian vulnerability) as low, medium, high, and very high. He then codes these variables for specific times throughout the war. For instance, when Allied bombing began from the Marianas, the civilian vulnerability was medium and military vulnerability was low. Soon after the massive fire raids began, the civilian vulnerability was elevated to high, while military vulnerability remained low. If civilian vulnerability was the key to successful coercion, one would expect to see some evidence supporting a shift toward war termination.

Pape next describes the attitudes of the three important political entities within Japan—military leadership, civilian leadership, and Emperor Hirohito—as the dependent variables. Pape describes their respective policy preferences at the different times in the war in terms of four ordinal measurements:

> (1) "no surrender" (ns), unwilling to surrender prior to invasion;
> (2) "limited surrender" (ls), willing to surrender possessions other than the homeland islands;
> (3) "flexible surrender" (fs), willing to surrender before invasion, but attempting to gain more favorable terms; and
> (4) "immediate surrender" (is), willing to accept unmodified American terms.[34]

First, civilian leadership policy preference changed very little in response to increasing civilian vulnerability. Instead, shifts toward "immediate surrender" appear to correspond more closely with the increased military vulnerability. "The attitudes of civilian leaders were determined largely by their loss of confidence in Japan's ability to execute the army's *Ketsu-go* plan."[35] Second,

the emperor's primary concern was also military, not civilian vulnerability. Pape indicates that in June 1945 the emperor shifted towards "flexible surrender" largely as a response to the results of a study he had commissioned that painted a dim picture of Japan's military capability.[36] It is unclear whether the emperor's change to "immediate surrender" on 6 August came as a result of the increased civilian vulnerability from the Hiroshima attack, or his lack of confidence in the military's preparation for homeland defense.[37] Pape suggests that although the atomic bombing of Hiroshima may have been a catalyst, the emperor's lack of confidence in the army was the main factor. Finally, the military viewpoint was exclusively driven by military vulnerability. In June 1945 the army had moved toward "limited surrender," and by the end of July even Anami and Umezu were not fundamentally opposed to the Potsdam Declaration. They did, however, continue to insist on the sovereignty assurances. But even the atomic attack on Hiroshima (coded as very high civilian vulnerability) did not appear to have swayed the military leaders. The

		Vulnerability		Leaders		
Date	Event	Civ	Mil	Civs	Emp	army
<7/44		nil	nil	ns	ns	ns
7/44	Marianas fall	low	low	ns[a]	ns	ns
11/44	Bombing from Marianas	med	low	ns	ns	ns
3/45	Massive fire raids	high	low	ns	ns	ns
4/45	Okinawa invaded	high	med	ls	ns	ns
6/45	Okinawa falls	high	high	fs	fs	ls
8/6/45	Hiroshima	very high	high	is[b]	is	ls
8/9/45	Soviet Attack	very high	very high	is	is	is[c]

KEY: ns = no surrender; ls = limited surrender; fs = flexible surrender; is = immediate surrender.
[a] Tojo's government fell and Shigemitsu sought Soviet mediation.
[b] Some civilians (e.g., Togo) advocated immediate surrender, while others (e.g., Suzuki) did not do so until 9 August.
[c] army leaders still wanted some conditions for surrender, but abandoned them in obedience to the emperor's request.

Figure 6. Changes in Japan's Vulnerabilities and Leaders' Surrender Policies[39]

Soviet attack against the Kwantung Army finally pressured the army to accept "immediate surrender."[38]

Pape concludes that the Soviet attack in Manchuria elevated the Japanese military vulnerability to very high. The military leaders, along with civilian leaders and Hirohito were all finally convinced to accept "immediate surrender" under the conditions of the Potsdam Declaration.

> The Soviet invasion of Manchuria on August 9 raised Japan's military vulnerability to a very high level. The Soviet Offensive ruptured Japanese lines immediately, and rapidly penetrated deep into the rear. Since the Kwantung Army was thought to be Japan's premier fighting force, this had a devastating effect on Japanese calculations of the prospects for home island defense. If their best forces were so easily sliced to pieces, the unavoidable implication was that the more poorly equipped and trained force assembled for Ketsu-go [homeland defense] had no chance of success against American forces even more capable than the Soviets.[40]

Japan's perceived inability to execute a homeland defense strategy led to the decision to surrender; "denying" their military strategy resulted in their coercion.

Critical Evidence for *Denial*

In order to appraise the *Denial* explanation of Japan's surrender, one must



Figure 7. The Japanese Surrender and the *Denial* Mechanism

render it down to its core argument. Essentially, Pape asserts three events lead to the *denial* of Japan's *Ketsu-go* strategy: the Allied sea blockade, the fall of Okinawa, and the collapse of the Kwantung Army. The collapse of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria finally persuaded military leaders that they could not forge a viable defense.

To make his case for *Denial,* Pape first uses evidence to establish that military vulnerability was the decisive factor for all three elements of national leadership—the army, civilian leaders, and the emperor (fig. 6). Second, Pape asserts that the military's acceptance of unconditional surrender was the key to coercion; the army was the dominant force in Japanese politics. The Japanese would not surrender unless the military acquiesced. To support his argument, Pape had to provide adequate evidence that military vulnerability was the primary consideration in the leaders' calculus, and that the *denial* of their defensive strategy coerced the decision makers, especially the military, to accept Allied conditions for surrender. He presents evidence that the elevation of Japan's military vulnerability to "very high" caused Japan's decision to surrender. He correlates the change in Japan's vulnerability to government's behavior. Japan did not surrender until civilian leaders, the army, and the emperor perceived military vulnerability to be very high. In this case, military vulnerability was the "cause"; and Japanese surrender, the "effect" (see chap. 4).[41]

In order to prove that military vulnerability was the decisive factor in coercing the Japanese, Pape illustrates the transition of Japan's three leadership elements (fig. 6) from their no surrender (ns) positions to their acceptance of immediate surrender (is). Certain key military events convinced the respective leaders that the military was unable to execute the *Ketsu-go.* The lack of confidence in the military's capability led directly to their acceptance of unconditional surrender. The Allied invasion of Okinawa initially moved

civilian leaders to advocate limited surrender. Later, the fall of Okinawa and the atomic attack on Hiroshima successively moved them to flexible, and then immediate surrender. According to Pape, the Hiroshima attack also caused the emperor to support immediate surrender. However, the military did not support even limited surrender until the fall of Okinawa. Instead, they endorsed immediate surrender only after the Soviet attack in Manchuria, and upon the insistence of the emperor. Even then, the army leaders still wanted to extract some conditions from the Allies.

Civilian Leadership

Of the three elements of Japanese leadership, Pape feels the attitudes of civilian leadership had the least impact on the decision to surrender. Still, even they were influenced primarily by military vulnerability, according to Pape. For instance, as evidence that Premier Suzuki was primarily concerned with military, not civilian, vulnerability he cites Suzuki's lack of response, or *mokusatsu*, to the Allied Potsdam proclamation.[42] In his postwar interview, Suzuki responded to interrogators' questions about strategic bombing saying that the firebombing [civilian vulnerability] was his main concern. Pape discounts this testimony, stating that if civilian casualties were actually his concern, Suzuki would have advocated surrender in March 1945, not as late as August. Additionally, when Suzuki heard of the Kwantung Army's collapse, he responded: "Is the Kwantung Army that weak? Then the game is up."[43] Pape interprets this Suzuki's comment to mean that the extent of Japan's military vulnerability suddenly became apparent to Suzuki.

This evidence is largely inferential and does not, by itself, indicate the dominance of military vulnerability as the primary factor in the civilian leadership's decision calculus. Most of the historical evidence regarding Suzuki can be explained in terms of internal Japanese politics. Despite the fall of Tojo's government in 1944, the military was still the dominant force in Japanese politics. Suzuki walked a fine line between pursuing negotiations and incurring the army's wrath. His *mokusatsu* response was most probably one of political necessity, as was his inability to openly advocate surrender until August 1945. He felt he could not openly advocate surrender without causing either the dissolution of his cabinet, or his own assassination. In a postwar interview, Suzuki stated his dilemma:

> I was naturally in a very difficult position because, on the one hand I had to carry out, to the best of my ability, the mission given me by the emperor to arrange for a conclusion of the war, whereas if anyone heard of this I would naturally have been attacked and probably killed by people opposed to such a policy. So that on the one hand, I had to advocate an increase in the war effort and determination to fight on, whereas through diplomatic channels and any means available, I had to try to negotiate with other countries to stop the war.[44]

For those who openly opposed the militaristic agenda, there was still the threat of political assassination by radical army officers.

Pape also disputes the assertion that the Koiso and Suzuki governments were expressly formed to end the war.[45] This assertion directly contradicts

records that show Prince Konoye, Lord Kido, Premier Koiso, and others pursued negotiations, albeit within political restraints.[46] So, sufficient evidence is available to explain the actions of civilian leadership as being driven by factors other than just military vulnerability. But their action was constrained Japanese internal politics.

The Emperor

Pape explains the emperor's unprecedented intervention in Japanese internal politics as resulting from his lack of confidence in the military's ability to execute a viable home island defense—he perceived military vulnerability to be very high. While the atomic attack on Hiroshima may have provided a "catalyst" for the emperor's decision, Pape believes his primary concern was still military vulnerability.[47] But the emperor could have been influenced as much by the destructiveness of the war on Japanese society.

The emperor's statements are subject to various interpretations. As evidence for the emperor's overriding concern with military vulnerability, Pape recounts the emperor's statement to the cabinet on 9–10 August:

> I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. Ending the war is the only way to restore world peace and to relieve the nation from the terrible distress with which it is burdened.
>
> I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June, new divisions would be placed in fortified positions at Kujukurihama so that they would be ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed. Even the equipment for the divisions which are to fight is insufficient and reportedly will not be adequate until after the middle of September. Furthermore, the promised increase in the production of aircraft has not progressed in accordance with expectations.
>
> There are those who say that the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experience of the past, however, shows that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. I do not believe that the discrepancy in the case of Kujukurihama can be rectified. Since this is the shape of things, how can we repel the invaders?[48]

In his treatment of the emperor's statement, Pape points to the emperor's stated lack of confidence in the military (paragraphs 2 and 3) as indicating his overriding concern with military vulnerability. However, an alternative explanation is that this statement was specifically intended as a preemptive counterargument to any military objections to surrender, rather than as an expression of overriding concern with military vulnerability. Knowing that the military would resist any attempts to surrender, the emperor may have chosen to suppress their arguments for a decisive battle by pointing out their inability to adequately prepare for the homeland defense.

Additionally, Pape argues that the Potsdam Declaration and the subsequent Byrnes note offered no assurances that the emperor could retain his sovereignty, thereby discounting tacit bargaining as an explanation for the surrender.[49] Still, other scholars believe the Potsdam Declaration and Byrnes note were intentionally ambiguous and did offer implicit guarantees to the

Japanese. Some members of the US State Department believed that successful occupation of the Japanese home islands would require the retention of the imperial institution. However, US domestic politics and Allied commitments prevented any overt actions that would appear to rescind the demand for unconditional surrender. American leaders could not politically afford to appear as if they were negotiating with Japan.[50] If it is true that Japanese leaders perceived that the Allies had provided assurances of imperial sovereignty, then *Denial* may not have been dominant cause of coercion. Instead, *Denial* might simply have been one factor of many. There is evidence that the Japanese leaders recognized the opportunity offered to them by the ambiguity of the Byrnes reply to their request for clarification of the emperor's status.

> The authority of the emperor and the Japanese government to rule shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. [Additionally] the ultimate form of government of Japan shall . . . be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.[51]

Togo, the Japanese foreign minister, interpreted this to mean that the position of the emperor remained unimpaired, in principle. The emperor would naturally be obliged to carry out the terms of surrender. In fact, the note stated the emperor would carry out the specific terms of surrender. This clearly required his retention. Also, by stipulating that the Japanese government be established by the people's freely expressed will, the Allies had virtually assured the survival of the emperor.[52] Civilian leaders and the emperor were fairly certain the Japanese people would remain loyal to the imperial institution and would choose to retain it. Similar to the civilian leadership, the emperor's decision to surrender was certainly influenced by military vulnerability, but it is unclear whether this was the dominant factor.

The Military and Political Dominance

Pape believes that Soviet invasion of Manchuria on 9 August 1945 and the subsequent collapse of the Kwantung Army destroyed any illusion that Japan's defense forces could successfully defend the home islands. This event raised the army's perception of military vulnerability to "very high" and in turn resulted in the army's acceptance of unconditional surrender. But in fact, the army did not agree to unconditional surrender. Although Umezu and Anami obeyed the emperor, other officers unsuccessfully attempted a coup. According to the Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda "even on 15 August, when the Imperial Rescript to terminate the war was actually issued, we found it difficult to hold down the front-line forces who were all 'raring to go,' and it was difficult to hold them back."[53] Vice Chief of the Army General Staff Lieutenant General Kawabe confirmed this sentiment: "As far as the Army is concerned, the termination of the war was declared by the Emperor and not by the Army."[54] Despite Pape's assertions, the army never supported the surrender decision that was mandated by the emperor. The minister of war and the army chief of staff agreed to adhere to the emperor's wishes, but continued to argue for conditional surrender, even after 10 August 1945. Furthermore, in

order to preclude an army revolt, Anami required all his officers to swear an oath to abide by the emperor's decision.

So, Pape's support hinges on evidence that the primary motivation to accept unconditional surrender was the emperor's, the civilian leadership's, and mostly the army's realization that they no longer had a viable military strategy for home island defense. According to Pape, the emperor's intervention into domestic politics was important, but not as significant as the army's willingness to accede to his wishes. Pape maintains that the army withheld its ability to veto decisions of state by not actively opposing the surrender. Pape maintains that by their tacit acquiescence, Umezu, Anami, and Toyoda implicitly supported the surrender as the best course, and they would not have agreed to this if they had still possessed a viable strategy.

The Coercive Outcome

The military may have in fact been the dominant element of Japanese leadership in the sense that they certainly had the physical power to override decisions of the emperor and civilian leadership. However, in determining whether military leadership's perception of their own military vulnerability was the key to coercion, one must ask a rhetorical question: If the emperor had not mandated acceptance of the Potsdam terms of surrender on 10 August 1945, would the coercive outcome been the same, or would the war have continued? If one believes the war would have continued without the emperor's intervention, then the influences on the emperor must be the central focus in explaining coercive outcome. The factors that cause the emperor to intervene would be as important as the factors that prevented the military from exercising its capability to override the decisions of the emperor and civilian leadership. The issue then reverts back to whether military vulnerability was the dominant factor in the emperor's calculus. Pape does not adequately resolve this debate. The question remains: was military vulnerability the decisive factor?

Second Order Change

Joseph Engelbrecht suggests that a different mechanism accounts for the Japanese decision to surrender. *Second Order Change* induced Japanese leadership to radically shift from their self-confining paradigm. The war itself was viewed as the problem—no longer the solution. It became threatening to higher order values. So, a transformation, or systemic change, was required to find a way out of this system. *Second Order Change Theory* predicts the point at which national leaders seek to terminate a war: "When statesmen admit to themselves that the future consequences of their course threaten other values which they hold dear, they decide to seek an end to the war."[55] In the case of Japan, the war created a severe anomaly, or crisis, that had reached such proportions it threatened Japan's internal coherence. The anomaly was eventually perceived as "un-

coaptable." Therefore, the war threatened higher order values and forced a *second order change* which produced the decision to terminate.[56]

"Ingredients"

The first required ingredient was the creation of a military situation which reframed the context of decision makers' environment. Beginning with the Battle of Midway, a steady stream of events occurred that forced national leaders to reframe their perspective. The loss of Guadalcanal, the Battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf, strategic bombing by Saipan-based B-29s, and German capitulation all contributed to the reorientation of their paradigm. As evidence of this shifting frame of reference, the 1943 Takagi study showed the war to be a lost cause. Also, in September 1943 the army's "New Operational Policy" contracted the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to a smaller minimum "defense sphere." Matsutani's 1944 paper, "Measures for the Termination of the Greater East Asia War," further supports the assertion that the military situation was forcing a dilemma on Japanese leaders. All first-order attempts to resolve the conflict were ineffective. For instance, their attempt to get Soviet mediation proved to be a dead end, and the Japanese were actually surprised by the Soviet Union's declaration of war. Perhaps this provided a shock ingredient that catalyzed the *second order change.*

The second ingredient for *Second Order Change* is the refocus of national leaders to higher order values that were previously not at risk. For Japan, this higher order value was the national polity, or *Kokutai.* Many years earlier, the army had initiated a national education program aimed at fostering a universal dedication to the sacred Japanese homeland and loyalty to their "emperor-god." The national religion, Shintoism, also reinforced this extreme reverence to the homeland, ancestors, and emperor.[57] To the army, occupation of the sacred homeland by westerners and the threatened defilement the imperial institution meant the destruction of *Kokutai.* To prevent this, the army was willing to go to extreme measures, including mass suicide attacks to repel the invaders. It soon became apparent to other national leaders that this fanatical insistence to fight to the bitter end may have posed an even greater threat to *Kokutai:* for the civilian leaders and the emperor, the war itself, rather than providing a solution, threatened *Kokutai.* The Allies had made the threat clear by announcing their intention of pursuing the utter destruction of Japan, unless she surrendered unconditionally:

> **CAIRO DECLARATION:**
>
> The Three Great Allies [US, China, United Kingdom] expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies . . . [the Allies] will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.[58]

> **POTSDAM DECLARATION:**
>
> The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, *will* mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

> We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.[59]

If these Allied statements were any indication, they were more than willing to accommodate the Japanese military leaders' insistence on fighting to the last man. This plan for homeland defense became a larger threat to core Japanese values than did accepting unconditional surrender, and constituted another ingredient for *second order change:* a refocus of decision makers from original war aims to higher order values.

For Japan in World War II, it is difficult to precisely pinpoint a single shock event, the final ingredient for *Second Order Change.* There are numerous candidates, but three particular events may have worked in unison: (1) Soviet entry into the war on 9 August, (2) Collapse of the Kwantung Army shortly thereafter, and (3) the dropping of the two atomic bombs on 6 and 9 August. Together these events created such an anomaly that a paradigm shift occurred and subsequently the emperor directed his cabinet to accept the Potsdam terms.

"Catalysts"

Engelbrecht's three catalysts were also operative in the Japanese decision. The group of top decision makers had changed dramatically. Tojo's militaristic cabinet had been replaced with a more moderate Koiso cabinet. However, the army still resisted attempts to seek termination. Finally, in April 1945, the Suzuki cabinet was formed. Its membership included two well-known peace advocates, Togo and Yonai. These new people in government supposedly created a different dynamic that provided one of the catalysts that fostered a paradigm shift.

Second, new information became available to the leaders. The Soviet surprise attack had multiple effects. It cut off any hope of using the Soviets as intermediaries in negotiating softer terms. This attempted first-order solution the Japanese government had been pursuing became dead end and contributed to the dilemma.[60] The dilemma was that the only way to prevent occupation and preserve the imperial institution was to militarily defend against the Allies, yet this itself would end up destroying the very thing it sought to defend.[61] The Soviet success in Manchuria also provided new information to the Japanese concerning their lack of defensive military capability. The catalyst of new information overlaps somewhat with the third catalyst, new conditions, but suffice it to say, Japan was "put in a box" from which there was no way out.[62] Japan's acceptance of unconditional surrender resulted from *second order change.* In Engelbrecht's explanation the key indicator of this *second order change* was the emperor's unprecedented intervention in the state's policy-making apparatus.[63]

Engelbrecht discounts other explanations as the mechanism causing surrender. First, classical cost-benefit propositions do not accurately describe the Japanese decision. Similar to *Denial Theory, Second Order Change* asserts

that costs are not reassessed during a war. In fact, sunk costs have a tendency to promote war prosecution despite the increased costs and diminished prospects for success. Past costs had a marginal impact on the decision-making process. Second, a "losers-winners" theory fails to account for the Japanese surrender. Japan was not a vanquished nation. Its army had more than two and a half million soldiers and was actively planning the "decisive battle" for homeland defense. Third, the change in political leadership was not the major cause of Japanese surrender. While implementation was much more likely with the politically balanced Suzuki cabinet, it was the "systemic change" that caused national leaders to accept the terms of Potsdam. So, according to Engelbrecht, the driving force behind Japan's surrender was *second order change:*

> What produces the decision [to terminate]? The theory of second order change offers the best explanation for this case. Statesmen decide to seek to terminate a war to which they are committed when the future consequences of the war effort threaten basic national values which were previously submerged.[64]

Critical Evidence for *Second Order Change*

Similar to Pape, Engelbrecht believes that "*denial*" is an essential ingredient in Japan's decision to surrender, but asserts alone it is insufficient to account for the coercive outcome. Instead, Engelbrecht views the surrender decision as the product of a paradigm shift to a *second order* paradigm, which was brought on by a threat to higher order values. "Decision makers will not make the shift to a second order paradigm unless the events of the war produce a threat to a value they hold more dear."[65] In his analysis, Engelbrecht argues that three events were key. First, an Allied invasion was imminent. Second, the atomic attack on Hiroshima provided the shock ingredient for *Second Order Change,* but it also threatened the national polity with destruction. Third, the Allied demand for unconditional surrender posed an additional threat to the emperor and national polity.

According to Engelbrecht, to many Japanese it appeared that the longer the war continued, the more stringent would be the Allied insistence on social engineering of postwar Japan. These three events led to a policy dilemma in which the war no longer offered the means to achieve political ends. Instead, the war became the threat to higher order values. The result of this paradigm shift was the emperor's unprecedented intervention in the internal decision making.[66]

To support his argument for *Second Order Change* as the mechanism for Japan's surrender, Engelbrecht must first show that this *second order* paradigm shift was brought on by the military vulnerability, the shift of focus to higher order values, and finally a shock event that provoked immediate action. Second, Engelbrecht must firmly establish that the emperor's decision to surrender culminated from a *second order change:*



Figure 8. *Second Order Change* and the Japanese Surrender

"ingredients" ====> paradigm shift ====> emperor's intervention

The timing of events is also important to this pathway. For *Second Order Change* to be a viable cause-effect explanation, the ingredients must precede the paradigm shift. The emperor's intervention must similarly result from this paradigm shift.

First, Engelbrecht documents the steady erosion of Japan's military capability, from the defeat at Midway to the fall of Okinawa. Similar to Pape, Engelbrecht documents the "*denial*" of Japan's defensive strategy with historical evidence. Japanese leadership certainly believed invasion was imminent and their effectiveness against the Allied invasion force was in grave doubt. Unfortunately, he does not clearly articulate the linkage of *denial* to the paradigm shift. The reader is required to accept this assertion at face value.

Second, numerous other events contributed to the **refocusing** of Japanese leaders: The Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration, Soviet Union's abrogation of the Non-Aggression Pact, to name just a few. These events led Japanese leaders to believe that their national polity was threatened. Engelbrecht believes that these events and the increased Allied punishment on Japanese society contributed to the refocusing on higher order values. As evidence to support the idea that civilian suffering was a primary concern of the national leaders, Engelbrecht quotes Hirohito: "I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. Ending the war is the only way to restore world peace and to relieve the nation from the terrible distress with which it is burdened. . . ."[67]

However, Engelbrecht is unclear whether Japanese leaders felt that surrender offered higher probability of retaining the emperor's sovereignty than did continuing the war, or if they were simply willing to sacrifice imperial sovereignty to prevent further destruction. Some scholars give ample evidence

that the Allies implicitly guaranteed imperial sovereignty.[68] If Engelbrecht had similarly proposed that the Allies had backed off of unconditional surrender, his argument would be more plausible—that the war was more of threat to the emperor than surrender. Yet, he denies that bargaining made a significant impact on the decision to surrender.

> The Japanese views of the Americans . . . appear to focus on the war rather than explicitly considering bargaining for its end. . . . It is difficult to find evidence of Japanese leaders' attitudes towards the United States as a potential negotiating partner or that consideration of the terms of war termination was the mechanism that led to its end.[69]

This complicates his assertion that "the American demand for unconditional surrender and the atomic bomb attacks tended to heighten the threat to the Japanese key values of the throne and preserving the national polity."[70] Engelbrecht seems to say that unconditional surrender threatened *Kokutai,* so in order to preserve *Kokutai,* the emperor surrendered unconditionally. Yet, it is unclear if he means that refusing to surrender would have resulted in the Allies imposing more punitive conditions on postwar Japan through a more stringent adherence to the terms of unconditional surrender. If the defense of the home islands had been fought like the battle for Okinawa, the Allied perception of Japanese as fanatics would probably have been etched deeper into the Allied mind. The natural tendency would be for a more punitive occupation and a push for extensive social engineering. Perhaps Japanese leaders believed that surrender offered them a better chance to preserve their higher order values.

Finally, Engelbrecht believes that while the Hiroshima attack did not singularly cause Japan's decision to surrender, it did provide a shock ingredient. "Their [Japanese leaders'] anxiety was heightened by the news of the atomic bomb attacks. Their impact added a sense of shock and urgency and thus likely had an indirect effect on the emperor's action."[71] Even Pape agrees with this assessment: "The . . . final change in the emperor's views was caused by the Hiroshima bomb, which increased Japan's civilian vulnerability."[72]

Engelbrecht sufficiently supports his assertion that the impending invasion, demands for unconditional surrender, and the atomic bomb had a significant impact on Japanese paradigm. It is also apparent that the emperor's actions in mandating acceptance of surrender were highly uncharacteristic, when compared to his previous noninvolvement.

What remains unclear is the case for a paradigm shift, whether a paradigm shift occurred in this case, and if the paradigm shift produced the Japanese surrender. The problem comes down to identifying that a *second order change* occurs. How does one detect or measure such a shift? Are there distinct events that would clearly indicate its occurrence? Engelbrecht presents no clear evidence or answers to these questions. While his postulated ingredients for *Second Order Change* were present in the Japanese surrender, Engelbrecht does not fully link these ingredients to a paradigm shift. Subsequently, the emperor's decision to surrender and his intervention are presumed outcomes of *second order change.*

Summary

Both theorists have proposed different mechanisms for the Japanese surrender in 1945. However, they are not as divergent as they first appeared. Both explanations have a common thread: the disruption, or "*denial*" of Japan's military strategy. The difference in their approach is Pape presents his case for *Denial* by portraying military vulnerability as a linear function with a single independent variable: military vulnerability is the dominant factor in strategic coercion. Japan was coerced, when Japanese leaders, particularly the military, no longer had confidence in their ability to defend the home islands. Pape clearly articulates his specific linkages and supports his assertions with extensive evidence. Japanese leadership was dominated by the army. Therefore the surrender occurred only after the army realized it no longer had a viable defensive strategy. Military vulnerability led to the *denial* of benefits, which in turn eroded their resolve to continue fighting.

In Engelbrecht's *Theory of Second Order Change*, *denial* is one of three required "ingredients," albeit an essential one. Two other ingredients are required: the **refocus** of decision makers to higher order values and shock events that precipitate action towards resolving the crisis. The shift to a *second order* paradigm occurred because of the threat of imminent invasion, the refocus of leaders on higher order values, and the shock of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. The emperor's mandate for surrender offered the national leaders a "way out of the box."

Overall, Engelbrecht's argument for *Second Order Change* is a richer explanation than Pape's *Denial Theory* proposes. Richer in the sense that his theory tries to account for more of the factors that influence national decision making. Engelbrecht substantially supports his argument that the three ingredients were present for a paradigm shift and reasonably support his assertion that the emperor's intervention was the critical event in the coercion of Japan. However, the link between the ingredients and the paradigm shift is ambiguous. He offers no empirical measurement that a paradigm shift occurred, other than the emperor's unprecedented intervention in Japanese politics. Moreover, the emperor's intervention is presented as an outcome of *second order change*, so using it as an indicator, or measurement, of a paradigm shift would be a tautological argument.

Despite their shortcomings both theories offer modern strategists valuable conceptual frameworks. I see two critical elements for *Strategic Coercion*, one element from each of the theories. First, *denial* is probably an absolute necessity for compelling target nations to concede to coercer demands. Second, the threat to higher order values may be equally important. If this is true, then a coercer nation must not only overcome the target state's military strategy, but he must also hold core values at risk.

Notes

1. Robert J. C. Butow, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954).

2. Hugh Byas, *Government By Assassination* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942).

3. United States Strategic Bombing Surveys (USSBS), No. 2, *Japan's Struggle to End the War* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1 July 1946), 2.

4. The premier was selected by the emperor. In Japan's oligarchic government, the primary influences on the emperor's selection was (1) the advice of the *Jushin*, (2) the military input, and (3) the candidate's perceived ability to build a consensus cabinet. Butow, 24.

5. Lester Brooks, *Behind Japan's Surrender: The Secret Struggle That Ended an Empire* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968).

6. USSBS No. 2, 2.

7. Brooks, xv.

8. Butow, 11.

9. B. H. Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War* (New York: Perigee Books, 1982), 362.

10. Paul Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958), 155. Butow, 14–29.

11. Liddell Hart, 506.

12. Butow, 27.

13. Liddell Hart, 619.

14. USSBS No. 2, 3.

15. Liddell Hart, 627.

16. USSBS No. 2, 6.

17. Ibid., 6.

18. Ibid., 7.

19. Kecskemeti, 190.

20. Pape believes military vulnerability drove Suzuki to accept unconditional surrender. "Suzuki appears to have harbored hopes of inflicting a major defeat on American forces up until the Soviet invasion of Manchuria [9 Aug 1945]." Robert A. Pape, "Why Japan Surrendered," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 181.

21. Butow, 201.

22. *Kokutai* was the Japanese expression for their national polity.

23. The most objectionable terms to the Japanese were (1) occupation of the home islands, (2) subjugation of the emperor to the Supreme Commander Allied powers, and (3) the issue of war crimes tribunal.

24. Butow, 176.

25. Ibid., 244.

26. Ibid., 245.

27. Ibid., 190–94.

28. Ibid., 208.

29. USSBS No. 2, 1.

30. Robert C. Mikesh, *Broken Wings of the Samurai* (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife Publishing Ltd., 1993), 28.

31. Pape, 156.

32. Ibid. Other sources dispute this claim that the hostage was dead. There were an estimated 806,000 Japanese civilian casualties during the war compared to 780,000 combat casualties, but 185,000 of the civilian casualties were incurred during the firebombing of Tokyo on 9 March 1945 and 280,000 of the casualties resulted from the two atomic bombs. After the Tokyo bombing, the Japanese civil defense measures became much more effective. Furthermore, neither electric power nor rail transportation were directly targeted by the Allies. USSBS, *Summary Report (Pacific War)*, 20; idem, No. 10, *Civilian Defense Division Summary Report*; and idem, No. 11, *Final Report Covering Air-Raid Protection and Allied Subjects in Japan*.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., 194. The *Ketsu-go* was the plan for the decisive battle for the home islands. It was highly reliant on the use of suicide units and was designed to impose maximum casualties on the Allies. The Japanese military leaders felt the Allied leaders would soften their terms rather than accept the high costs associated with invasion.

35. Ibid., 195.

36. Hasegawa's Report. Ibid., 199. Butow, 43–50.

37. Butow, 175.

38. Pape, 201.

39. Ibid., 189.

40. Ibid., 192.

41. Ibid., 188.

42. Meaning to kill with silence; not worthy of reply.

43. Cited in Pape, 183.

44. Headquarters Army Air Forces (AAF), Assistant Chief of Staff/Intelligence, *Mission Accomplished: Interrogations of Japanese Industrial, Military, and Civil Leaders of World War II* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 36. Hereafter referred to as Headquarters AAF.

45. Pape, 183. For specific support for the assertion that there was a serious peace movement within the Japanese polity as early as 1943, see Brooks, Butow, Kecskemeti, Headquarters AAF, and USSBS, No. 2.

46. Brooks, Butow, and Kecskemeti.

47. Pape, 184.

48. Cited in ibid., 185. See also Butow, 175.

49. For arguments that propose the US offer implicitly allowed retention of imperial sovereignty, see Kecskemeti; Shigenori Togo, *The Cause of Japan* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956); and Leon V. Sigal, *Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988).

50. Butow, 191.

51. Togo, 324.

52. Ibid., 326–28.

53. Headquarters AAF, 38.

54. Ibid.

55. Joseph A. Engelbrecht, Jr., "War Termination: Why Does a State Decide to Stop Fighting?" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1992), 120.

56. Pat A. Pentland from a series of discussions concerning psychological and sociological issues of "nonlinear dynamics" and "extension transference," January–June 1994.

57. Byas; and W. G. Beasley, *The Modern History of Japan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981).

58. Cited in Butow, 241.

59. Ibid., 243.

60. Engelbrecht describes the Japanese effort to use the Soviet Union as intermediaries in negotiations as an attempt at first-order solutions. They were still attempting to solve their problems by effecting change "within the system." It was not until the system itself changed (paradigm shift) that they were able to make the surrender decision.

61. The lack of clarity in this idea is one of the shortcomings of Engelbrecht's theory. Engelbrecht repeatedly reiterates this idea that the Japanese strategy began to threaten the very values it sought to defend. Because he does not clearly articulate his meaning, the reader must make his own inferences. I believe he means that Japanese leaders could not be assured of having a viable defense against Allied invasion and continuing to fight as a means to secure some concessions from the Allies would threaten the very survival of Japanese culture.

62. Engelbrecht from a series of interviews at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, September 1993–June 1994.

63. Engelbrecht, "War Termination."

64. Ibid., 126.

65. Ibid., 334.
66. Ibid., 120.
67. Ibid., 123.
68. See Butow, Kecskemeti, and Togo.
69. Engelbrecht, 104–6.
70. Ibid., 124.
71. Ibid.
72. Pape, 185.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The twin problems of modern warfare:

How to persuade the adversary to come to terms without inflicting on him such severe damage as to prejudice all chances of subsequent stability and peace?

Under what circumstances can armed force be used, in the only way in which it can be legitimate to use it, to ensure a lasting and stable peace?

—Michael Howard

Soldiers usually are close students of tactics, but rarely are they students of strategy and practically never of war.

—Bernard Brodie

After World War II, the United States unquestionably emerged as a superpower. Only the Soviet Union could compete with our global status and influence. Yet, this new-found prestige had an adverse effect on our use of force. Previously, America engaged in wars only when our vital interests were at stake, or when overwhelming public sentiment supported armed action. The Korean War was the first of America's military engagements in which we had neither a public mandate nor a core interest at risk. Still, we pursued the traditional American strategy of annihilation/exhaustion. The United States can no longer afford the political and economic costs associated with this type of strategy, nor will Americans support it unless our vital interests are threatened. We increasingly find ourselves in situations where our use of military force serves peripheral interests: in Somalia, feeding a starving nation; in the Balkans, stabilizing a region. However, no politician attempts to link either of these situations with US vital interests.

Unfortunately, the military has been slow to search for strategies that offer anything other than traditional military victory. Even now, our ongoing budget debates center on our ability to "win" two major regional conflicts simultaneously. Military leaders must devise strategies that are useful to our nation in this asymmetric environment; strategies that involve limited use of force with a reasonable chance of success. *Strategic Coercion* offers a possible solution to this problem.

Theoretical Distinctions

This paper discussess two of the more promising theories for *Strategic Coercion*. First, Robert Pape proposes his *Denial Theory* which involves at-

tacking the targeted nation's military strategy, thereby focusing on its military vulnerability. *Denial* is based on the presumption that a nation's decision calculus is fundamentally an economic, utility-maximizing function. That is, states compare expected benefits with expected costs. As long as benefits outweigh the costs, actions will be profitable. Therefore, Pape proposes that we can coerce nations by *denying* their expected benefits. He feels that nations may be willing to absorb tremendous costs, but only if there exists a reasonable probability of acquiring the benefits. If the probability of achieving these benefits is *denied,* they will be unwilling to pursue them.

Joseph Engelbrecht posits a significantly different mechanism for *Strategic Coercion*. He asserts that *Second Order Change* compels national leaders to accept the demands of their coercers. This *second order change* is a dramatic paradigm shift that produces coercive outcomes. Three ingredients combine to induce this *second order change.* First, the targeted nation's military capability must be significantly degraded. Essentially, this is the same as Pape's *Denial* argument. Second, the targeted leaders must be made to refocus on higher order values that were not previously threatened. Finally, an anomalous event or shock must force an urgency on the decision makers. Together, these three ingredients combine to create a paradigm shift. The decision to surrender is a result of this shift.

It appears that the common factor in these two theories is the target state's military vulnerability. Pape asserts that *Denial* was the "decisive factor" in producing the Japanese decision to surrender in World War II. He concedes that past costs and the threat of future costs had a marginal influence, but only on the margin. However, Engelbrecht believes that military vulnerability was critical, but does not sufficiently explain the decision to surrender by itself.

> The role of force in war termination is indirect. Force is part of the strategic interaction between states that influence decision makers. Its effects are potentially attenuated by military strategy, tactics and force posture, and domestic political and social activity.[1]

> It sets the conditions for peace once those decision makers are focused and absorbed by the war. That is, war termination process occurs for the loser only after enough force has been applied so that they feel the effects of the defeat of their armies and their strategy. *Such force is a necessary, but not sufficient condition pressuring statesmen.*[2]

The threat to higher order values and shock were also required to coerce the Japanese to surrender.

If one accepts the assertion that *Denial* is embedded in *Second Order Change,* it follows that *Denial*—attacking a target nation's military vulnerability—may sometimes be an effective means of strategic coercion. However, the other implication is that sole reliance on *Denial* may have only moderate success, and its effectiveness will depend on the fortuitous presence of the other "ingredients" and "catalysts." On the other hand, *Second Order Change* is a vague concept, difficult to operationalize. Furthermore, the linkage between ingredients, catalysts, and the paradigm shift is ambiguous.

The Sullivan Spin

There appears to be a middle ground between these theories. First, although *Denial* does not appear to be the authoritative explanation for the coercion of Japan in 1945, Pape definitely establishes military vulnerability as one of the most important factors for *Strategic Coercion*. Second, while *Second Order Change* seems somewhat abstract and difficult to empirically evaluate, Engelbrecht was able to argue persuasively that expected future costs had an equally important impact of Japanese decision makers.

Many scholars have approached coercion theories from the aspect that one could target either a state's expected costs or expected benefits. This self-imposed dichotomy overlooks the possibility that effective coercion may require that *denial* and *risk*[3] be simultaneously manipulated. Perhaps *denial* and *risk* are self-compensating. For instance, a nation's military strategy may be *denied*, but they might still resist coercion until core values are put at *risk*. Alternatively, a coercer nation may put a target state's core values at *risk*, but the state will not be coerced as long as they perceive their military strategy to be effective; this keeps alive the hope of countering the coercer's threat. Therefore, a more promising means of coercion may be a *Denial-Risk* strategy that both *denies* expected benefits and increases expected costs by threatening higher order values (*risk*).

	TARGET	MECHANISM	OUTCOME
DENIAL	Military Vulnerability	*Denial* of benefits	Coercion
SECOND ORDER CHANGE	Military Vulnerability Refocus of Concerns Shock	Paradigm shift	Coercion
THE SULLIVAN SPIN	Military Vulnerability Threaten Core Values	*Denial* of benefits & *Risk* of Future Costs	

Figure 9. Comparison of the Critical Paths

For strategists attempting to formulate a plan for *Strategic Coercion*, one must first *deny* target nations' probability of achieving benefits by attacking the military vulnerability. They must also manipulate the *risk* to target state's core values. In unison, these two mechanisms promise an effective means to coerce a target nation.

Pursuing such a strategy would require extensive intelligence and coordination with political, economic, and informational instruments of national power. A *Denial-Risk Strategy* requires extensive coordination with the diplo-

matic effort. Diplomacy can be crucial to the reorientation of targeted leaders. For example, in April 1945 the Soviet Union abrogated their Non-Aggression Pact with Japan. At Yalta, the Soviet Union agreed to enter the Pacific war against Japan within 90 days of Germany's surrender. These American diplomatic efforts—although largely unintended for this explicit purpose— contributed significantly to the refocusing of Japan's leaders on higher order values. When the diplomatic and military efforts are well coordinated, they often have complementary effects, but conversely, disjointed efforts stymie the achievement of national goals. The strategist would also need extensive knowledge of the target state's core values, economic vulnerabilities, the social-cultural paradigm, and government operations. With these reasonably well known, a strategist can devise a plan that will concentrate on disruption of their military strategy and manipulating the *risk* to higher order values.

The argument for *Denial-Risk* is simple. Armed conflict is a matter of resolve or **will.** If one nation can adversely affect another's resolve to continue the conflict, then that targeted nation will likely decide to seek termination. To affect national resolve, a coercer nation must *deny* the target's military capability **and** manipulate the *risk* to key values.

> *In war, situations are the products of mutually exclusive and incompatible wills. Thus they are practically always fluid.*
>
> —S. B. Griffith

Notes

1. Joseph A. Engelbrecht, Jr., "War Termination" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1992), 315.
2. Ibid., 303. Emphasis added.
3. *Risk* in this instance refers to the threat of future costs. These are the objects of the **refocus** of national decision makers; one of the ingredients in Engelbrecht's *Second Order Change.*

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