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Report No. DODIG-2012-034.1 January 20, 2012

Inspector General

United States
Department of Defense



Special Plans and Operations

Assessment of Afghan National Security Forces Metrics--Quarterly

Afghan National Police (ANP)
Jul - Nov 2011

~~Classified by: Gordon S. Heddell, IG, DoD~~
~~Reason: 1.4(a)~~
~~Declassify on: 20360630~~

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Inspector General

United States Department of Defense

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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January 20, 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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TRAINING MISSION-AFGHANISTAN/COMBINED SECURITY
TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN

SUBJECT: Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) Metrics Product-Afghan National
Police and Afghan National Army (Project No. DODIG – 2012-034)

We are providing this quarterly metric report for information and use. The product is a compilation of data obtained from briefings, plans, and reports produced by NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTMA-A)/Combined Security and Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the ISAF Joint Command (IJC).

This product is intended to provide a summary of the ANSF's readiness to take the lead in Afghanistan security operations. We coordinated with management during development of the draft product. We considered all comments in the preparation of this final report. We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff by NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC.

If requested, we are prepared to brief the product to stakeholders. If you have any questions, please (b) (6) at (703) 604- (b) (6) (DSN 664- (b) (6)) or (b) (6) (703) 604- (b) (6) (DSN 664- (b) (6)).

Kenneth P. Moorefield
Deputy Inspector General
Special Plans and Operations

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January 17, 2012

Afghan National Police Metrics – Quarterly (Jun. 2011 – Nov. 2011) (U)

(U) WHO SHOULD READ THIS?

(U) This reporting product is directed to personnel within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, United States Central Command, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the Congressional committees responsible for and engaged in oversight, training, mentoring, partnering, equipping, and other key aspects of the development of the Afghan National Police.

(U) PURPOSE

(U) Over the past year, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) has issued a series of reports assessing U.S. Government efforts to train, equip, and mentor the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF).¹ This begins the first of two series of quarterly reports that will address ISAF development of the Afghan National Police (ANP)² and the Afghan National Army (ANA).

(U) These quarterly reports will focus on tracking ANSF progress towards assuming an independent and sustainable role in security operations, as indicated by ISAF metrics derived by the OIG from recurring briefings, reports, and other data collected by them and their subordinate commands (hereafter referred to as the Command).³ The OIG did not independently validate the data.

(U) The OIG-selected metrics used for these reports provide indications of ANP growth and maturation over the reporting period. Variations of ISAF monthly data sets should be considered in the context of Command efforts to meet intermediary and end-state goals.

(U) The metrics track ANP development in three key areas: Growth, Professionalization, and Ministry of Interior (MoI) and ANP Transition to Afghan Security Lead. These metrics will adapt over time to reflect the progress of the ANP and the ANA towards building their respective capability to take leadership responsibility for their own security.

(U) SYNOPSIS

(U) NTM-A was established on November 21, 2009 to help build a professional, enduring, and self-sustaining ANSF. This is the baseline and the beginning of the transition to Afghan Security Lead for the purposes of this metrics report. The major challenges at that time included:

- (U) ANSF lacked effective Afghan leadership,
- (U) ANSF training capacity was insufficient and ANP personnel were assigned to the force with no or inadequate training,
- (U) ANP overall strength was 97,000 and ANSF recruiting was near record low levels, and
- (U) ANP wages were poor and not commensurate with other Afghan security forces.

¹ Accessible at www.dodig.mil

² For purposes of this product we summarize statistics for these elements of the ANP: the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP) and the Afghan Local Police (ALP). We have not summarized statistics for the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) since it has only recently been established in 2010.

³ International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and subordinate commands include NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and ISAF Joint Command (IJC).

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(U) Since 2009 the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), in coordination with ISAF, has established the goal of transitioning security leadership to the Afghan government by the end of 2014. A March 2011 NATO Media Background paper identified the criteria a geographic area must achieve in order to transition to Afghan Security Lead.⁴

- (U) ANSF are capable of shouldering additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF.
- (U) Security is at a level that allows the population to pursue routine daily activities.
- (U) Local governance is sufficiently developed so that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced.
- (U) ISAF is postured properly to thin out as ANSF capabilities increase and threat levels diminish.

(U) As an indicator of transition progress, a joint GIROA-ISAF agreement was signed in July 2011, that began the process of transitioning several provinces and districts to Afghan Security Lead (see Figure 1). This decision indicates the degree of security stability in these districts and provinces.




Figure 1. Provinces In Transition to Afghan Security Lead

(U) ANP DEVELOPMENT METRICS

(U) The OIG selected three broad indicators of development as they apply to the MoI and ANP: Growth, Professionalization, and MoI/ANP Transition to Security Lead. Using November 2009 as a baseline for comparison, the metrics reflect MoI and ANP monthly changes over the past six months with respect to goals established by GIROA-ISAF.

(U) “Growth” refers to the recruitment and basic training of police personnel. Specifically, the metrics reflect:

- (U) Strength of the professional components of the ANP, including the; Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)

⁴ NATO Media Backgrounder, “Transition to Afghan lead: *Integral*,” dated March 2011.

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- (U) Strength of the Afghan Local Police (ALP)
- (U) Training Capacity and Fill (Utilization)
- (U) Recruitment
- (U) Attrition

(U) “Professionalization” focuses on the developmental progress of the ANP’s organizational capability to perform its core Counter-Insurgency missions – to protect the population and to uphold the Rule of Law. Metrics report:

- (U) Number of Certified ANP Trainers
- (U) Number of NATO Police Trainers
- (U) Strength of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO)
- (U) Literacy Training Progress for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Grades

(U) Finally, “MoI / ANP Transition to Afghan Security Lead” reports key indicators of ANP readiness to conduct independent operations. The indicators are:

- (U) Ministry of Interior Capability Milestone (CM) Ratings for eight OIG-selected critical functional areas⁵
- (U) ANP “Priority Unit” Effectiveness⁶
- (U) Key Terrain District (KTD) Readiness to Transition⁷

(U) Metrics Discussion

(U) ANP Growth



OSD JS: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(g)



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OSD JS: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(g)

⁵ These eight indicators were chosen from the 26 assessed by ISAF mentors and advisors as for being particularly important to establishment of an enduring Afghan capability.

⁶ Police “Priority units,” also called “pacing units,” include: ABP and ANCOP Kandaks (Battalions), Provincial Response Companies, District Police Precincts in Key Terrain Districts (KTD).

⁷ “Key Terrain Districts” are 94 command-identified districts of the 402 districts throughout Afghanistan determined to be significant to Coalition Forces COIN efforts.

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(U) ANP Professionalization

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(U) Mol / ANP Transition

 OSD JS: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(g)



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 OSD JS: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(g)



⁸ The transition (Inteqal) to security lead is a conditions-based process consisting of four phases: 1) Support 2) Mentor 3) Enable, and 4) Sustain. The entire process may take 12-18 months to complete for each area.

(U) ACRONYMS

MoI – Ministry of Interior – the agency within the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan with command, administrative, and fiscal responsibility for the Afghan National Police.

ANP – Afghan National Police – the combined force of all police organizations. Subordinate organizations of the ANP described below:

AACP – Afghan Anti-Crime Police – the force that focuses on investigative and police intelligence capacities.

ABP – Afghan Border Police – the force charged with border defense and operate border crossings.

ALP – Afghan Local Police – the “informal” force paid for by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, trained by Coalition Forces special operations forces and specially trained conventional forces, and answering to village elders.

ANCOP – Afghan National Civil Order Police – the para-military force authorized to operate independently or with the Afghan National Army anywhere within Afghanistan.

AUP – Afghan Uniformed Police – the “formal” force of local police in the villages and districts.

KTD – Key Terrain District – 94 of the 402 Command identified districts throughout Afghanistan determined to be significant to Coalition Forces efforts.

(U) Assessment Definitions

(U) We illustrate summary statistics for ANP Growth and ANP Professionalism using the “stoplight” format, assigning colors to percentages indicating progress toward a Command established goal. The few blank spaces represent unreported data. Percentages and assigned colors follow Command-established stratification. Summary statistics for progress towards MoI/ANP Transition to Afghan Security Lead are based on direct observation of performance by members of the Command and corresponding subjective values assigned by Coalition forces. The rating schemes are described below.

⚡ Capability Milestone Ratings for the MoI (assigned by NTM-A / CSTC-A)

⚡ Table 1. MoI Capability Milestone Ratings			
	CM Rating	Definition	Description
	1A	Autonomous	Ministry is capable of autonomous operations.
	1B	Capable with Coalition Oversight	Ministry is capable of autonomous operations or capable of executing functions with coalition oversight only.
	2A	Capable with Minimum Coalition Assistance	Ministry is capable of executing functions with minimal coalition assistance; only critical ministerial functions are covered or can accomplish its mission but requires some coalition assistance.
	2B	Capable with Some Coalition Assistance	Ministry is capable of executing functions with some coalition assistance; only critical ministerial functions are covered or can accomplish its mission but requires some coalition assistance.
	3	Capable with Significant Assistance	Ministry cannot accomplish its mission without significant coalition assistance.
	4	Cannot Accomplish the Mission	The department exists but cannot accomplish its mission.

Rating Definition Levels for Priority ANP Units (assigned by the IJC)

Table 2. Readiness Levels (descriptions abbreviated by OIG)		
	Rating	Description
	Independent with Advisors	Unit personnel and equipment levels are $\geq 75\%$ of the authorized strength (Present for Duty) and are sufficient for the unit to undertake its assigned tasks. The unit is able to: 1. plan and execute its missions and maintain command and control of subordinate elements; 2. call for and integrate joint effects from coalition forces and is capable of exploiting intelligence; 3. operate, account for and maintain its equipment and meet its basic logistic needs with no assistance from Coalition Forces; 4. coordinate operations with other ANSF units and headquarters.
	Effective with Advisors	Equipment and personnel levels $\geq 75\%$. Unit is able to: 1. effectively plan, synchronize, direct, and report on operations and status; 2. coordinate and communicate with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined/joint units; 3. maintain effective readiness reports. Unit leaders and staff adhere to the ANSF Code of Conduct, and are loyal to GIRoA. All unit enablers are present and effective, providing most of the support. Coalition Forces provide only limited, occasional guidance to the staff and augment support on occasion. Coalition Forces may provide enablers that are missing from HIGHER or LOWER ANSF levels.
	Effective with Partners	Equipment and personnel levels $\geq 65\%$. Unit requires routine mentoring to 1. plan, synchronize, direct, and report on operations and status; 2. coordinate and communicate with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined/joint units; 3. maintain effective readiness reports. Unit leaders, staff, and most of the unit adhere to the ANSF Code of Conduct, and are loyal to GIRoA. Most unit enablers are present and effective. Those enablers present provide most of the support to the ANSF unit. Coalition Forces may provide enablers that are missing from this level, and augment enabler support at this level.
	Developing with Partners	Equipment and personnel levels $< 65\%$. Unit requires partner unit presence and assistance to 1. plan, synchronize, direct, and report on operations and status; 2. coordinate and communicate with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined/joint units; 3. maintain effective readiness reports. Leaders and most of the staff usually adhere to the ANSF Code of Conduct, and are loyal to GIRoA. Some unit enablers are present and effective at this level of unit. Those present provide some of the support to the ANSF unit. Coalition Forces provide the missing enablers and most of the support at this level.
	Established	Equipment and personnel levels $\leq 50\%$. The unit is starting organization. It is barely capable to: 1. plan, synchronize, direct, or report on operations and status, even with the presence and assistance of a partner unit; 2. coordinate and communicate with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined/joint units; 3. report on missing personnel, logistics, training, or readiness. Leadership and staff may not adhere to the ANSF Code of Conduct, or may not be loyal to GIRoA. Most of the unit's enablers are not present or are barely effective. Coalition Forces provide missing enablers and most support at this level.
	Unassessed	No data available on the unit.

Key Terrain Districts – Time to Transition to Afghan Security Lead (assigned by the IJC)

Table 3. Transition Timeline		
In Transition – Four-phase, condition-based process. Inclusion depends on: ANSF capability, threat level, local governance, and ISAF posture. The phases are: 1. Support 2. Mentor 3. Enable 4. Sustain	Time to “In Transition” Process	
		< 6 Months
		6 – 12 Months
		12 – 18 Months
		18 – 24 Months
		> 24 Months

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Roll-up Summary Statistics of Afghan National Police (ANP)

DoD IG - Special Plans & Operations

(Data from U.S. / NTM-A / CSTC-A and IJC)

January 17, 2012

OSD JS (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(g)



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ANP Growth

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(Data from U.S. / NTM-A / CSTC-A and IJC)

January 17, 2012

OSD/JS: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.4(g)



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ANP Professionalization

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
Afghan Mol / ANP Transition

DoD IG - Special Plans & Operations

(Data from U.S. / NTM-A / CSTC-A and IJC)

January 17, 2012

OSD JS (b) (1), sec. 1-4(a), 1-4(b), 1-4(g)



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General Information

Forward questions or comments concerning this assessment and report and other activities conducted by the Office of Special Plans & Operations to spo@dodig.mil

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