ENHANCING SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN
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Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan

December 2018

Report to Congress

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This report is submitted in accordance with Sections 1225 and 1532 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended by Sections 1213 and 1531 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92), Sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2017 (P.L. 114-328), and Sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2018 (P.L. 115-91); Section 1223 of H.R. 5515 of the NDAA for FY 2019 (P.L. 115-232); and Section 1216 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92). It includes a description of the strategy of the United States for enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan, a current and anticipated threat assessment, and a description and assessment of the size, structure, strategy, budget, and financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This report was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State and is the eighth in a series of reports required semi-annually through calendar year 2020.

This report describes efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from June 1, 2018, through November 30, 2018. This report complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress and is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. A classified annex accompanies this report. The next report will include an analysis of efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from December 1, 2018, through May 31, 2019.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The principle goal of the South Asia Strategy is to conclude the war in Afghanistan on terms favorable to Afghanistan and the United States. Over the past 16 months, the United States and its partners have used military force to drive the Taliban towards a durable and inclusive political settlement. There have been some notable developments – the Eid al-Fitr ceasefire and the support for peace from the broader Islamic community – which threatened the legitimacy of the Taliban and may represent leading indicators of success. The Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR) has reinforced U.S. diplomatic engagements with Afghans, neighboring states, and interested parties in the broader region. Increased military pressure on the Taliban, international calls for peace, and the new SRAR’s engagements appear to be driving the Taliban to negotiations. While an array of challenges remain—Afghan political stability, Afghan security force capacity, and regional spoilers—the combination of military escalation and diplomatic initiative have made a favorable political settlement more likely than at any time in recent memory.

The current military situation inside of Afghanistan remains at an impasse. The introduction of additional advisors and enablers in 2018 stabilized the situation, slowing the momentum of a Taliban march that had capitalized on U.S. drawdowns between 2011 and 2016. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) remain in control of most of Afghanistan’s population centers and all of the provincial capitals, while the Taliban control large portions of Afghanistan’s rural areas, and continue to attack poorly defended government checkpoints and rural district centers. The ANDSF have continued to excel in offensive operations; the bulk of their casualties have come in defense of isolated checkpoints, command posts, and bases. The ANDSF, with U.S. and coalition support, have limited new Taliban territorial gains and quickly regained control of population centers when attacked. The intensity of the fighting and level of bloodshed on both sides has risen as both sides vie for leverage at the negotiating table.

The reinforcement and realignment of U.S. and coalition forces and authorities under the South Asia Strategy have significantly increased pressure on the Taliban. Continued DoD partnership with the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) has produced an extremely lethal and agile offensive force. Enhanced efforts to train, advise, and assist (TAA) the ANDSF, from strategic to tactical levels, including by employing the Army’s 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) in March improved Afghan offensive capabilities. The 1st SFAB demonstrated its ability to tailor the advisory approach to changing ground conditions and provided advisory assistance at the point of need. To enhance Afghan operational readiness cycles (ORCs) and support Kabul security priorities, SFAB teams shifted assets to Regional Military Training Centers (RMTCs) and the Kabul Security Force advisory mission mid-way through their deployment, resulting in an improvement in ANDSF readiness and fewer attacks within Kabul.

Islamic religious authorities have also increased religious and social pressure on the Taliban, calling for an end to the jihad and condemning terrorist tactics to include suicide bombings. Pakistan’s ulema issued a fatwa on January 16, 2018. A conference of Afghan, Pakistani, and Indonesian ulamas in Indonesia issued a declaration on May 11, 2018. The Afghan ulema issued a fatwa on June 7, 2018. The Grand Imam of Mecca released a declaration on June 13, 2018. On
July 13, 2018, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation conference released a declaration condemning terrorist tactics. U.S. and Afghan military and diplomatic pressure coupled with unprecedented social pressure set the stage for the June 2018 Eid al-Fitr ceasefire, the first nationwide event of its kind in seventeen years. The ceasefire revealed the widespread interest in peace among both Afghan security forces and Taliban fighters.

NATO Allies and partners remain committed to Afghanistan’s long-term security and stability. At the July 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, Allies and partners reaffirmed their commitment to the Resolute Support (RS) TAA mission and agreed to extend financial sustainment of the ANDSF through 2024. Furthermore, RS welcomed Qatar and the United Arab Emirates as new operational partners, increasing the coalition from 39 to 41 Allies and partners and providing evidence that our partners and Allies know that our strategy is working. These notable achievements strengthened the RS mission, ensure the long-term sustainability of the ANDSF, and demonstrate to the Taliban the international communities’ firm resolve in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan held Parliamentary elections in late October, and did so with minimal U.S. military support. Although the elections were not without violence, ANDSF preparation to secure polling stations resulted in an election that was less violent than any election conducted over the past ten years. The Parliamentary elections demonstrated the significant growth and development of Afghanistan’s institutional and security capabilities, and help set the stage for the upcoming Presidential elections in 2019.

Elections, increased diplomatic efforts, and social and religious pressure on the Taliban this reporting period have generated optimism within the Afghan government and ANDSF that a durable and inclusive settlement with the Taliban is possible. The key to success remains sustained military pressure against the Taliban. By convincing the Taliban that they cannot win on the battlefield, and credibly committing to a conditions based strategy, we have greatly increased the odds of concluding a settlement on terms favorable to the United States and Afghanistan.
SECTION 1 – STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

The ultimate goal of the South Asia Strategy is a durable and inclusive political settlement to the war. There have been more promising indicators on reconciliation during this reporting period than in any period since 2002. Diplomatic, religious, military, and social pressures, enabled by the conditions-based strategy, and buoyed by increased international engagement, have forced the Taliban senior leadership to debate whether to enter negotiations with the Afghan government.

Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL (OFS) remains USCENTCOM’s main effort mission. This designation allowed the Department of Defense (DoD) to shift much-needed resources, enablers, and authorities from Iraq and Syria to the NATO mission to Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) the Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) more effectively and enable conventional force TAA down to the tactical level. The United States currently maintains approximately 14,000 military personnel in Afghanistan as part of NATO’s Resolute Support (RS) mission and OFS. These personnel maintain a presence primarily at bases in Kabul and Bagram with regional outstations in Nangarhar Province in the east, Kandahar Province in the south, Herat Province in the west, and Balkh Province in the north. Changes to the U.S. force presence will be driven by conditions on the ground and informed by ongoing assessments of current efforts.

This reporting period saw the deployment of the U.S. Army’s 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB). The SFAB extended the reach of U.S. advisors to eight different ANA brigades and 34 ANA kandaks. SFAB advisor teams and Expeditionary Advisor Packages (EAPs) provided tailored support to ANDSF units building capability across a variety of functions including operational planning, maneuver, indirect artillery and mortar fires, route clearance, and logistics. SFAB Logistics Advisor Teams (LATs) were particularly significant providing critical training and assistance in areas long considered critical deficiencies at all levels throughout the ANDSF. While the full impact of advising at the tactical level is still being determined, SFAB and EAP advisors contributed to increased ANDSF readiness levels and execution of offensive operations. During this reporting period, the ANDSF conducted multiple offensive operations with elements of two separate ANA Corps working together in Taliban-contested areas. This increased military pressure complemented ongoing diplomatic efforts to compel the Taliban to begin negotiations with the Afghan government.

The presence of U.S. forces makes possible the execution of two well-defined and complementary mission-sets: the NATO-led RS TAA mission in support of ANDSF development, and the U.S. counterterrorism (CT) mission to defeat al-Qa’ida (AQ) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K), and protect the U.S. homeland, U.S. citizens, U.S. interests overseas, and our allies and partners.

1.1 U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan as Part of the South Asia Strategy

The logical framework for success in Afghanistan is based on the R4+S concept—Reinforce, Realign, Regionalize, Reconcile, and Sustain. The overarching goal is a sustainable political outcome in Afghanistan that preserves U.S. vital interests, including preventing terrorist groups
from using Afghan territory to direct or support external attacks against the U.S. homeland, U.S. citizens, and our allies and partners overseas.

**Reinforce:** The reinforce section of the strategy calls for U.S. and international funding commitments to sustain ongoing ANDSF combat operations and implementation of President Ghani’s ANDSF roadmap. NATO and coalition partners committed to sourcing the majority of the 2018 RS TAA personnel and funding requirements.

NATO troop contributions increased from an 80% requirement fill rate in early 2017 to a 95% projected fill rate by the end of 2018. This is the highest level in the history of the RS Mission and includes the addition of more than 2,600 personnel, resulting from an increase in troop contributions from 29 different nations. More than 50 nations are now contributing $15 billion toward the Afghan mission. This surge in international support reinforces military and diplomatic pressures and sends a strong message of coalition unity to the Taliban.

**Realign:** The South Asia Strategy calls for the realignment of U.S. military and civilian assistance and political outreach to target key areas under Afghan government control. The strategy cites the proper alignment of U.S. and Afghan forces as a key to improved security. The push to realign authorities, resources, and the ANDSF continued to progress on schedule during this reporting period. The United States continued shifting resources (lethal and non-lethal) from outside of Afghanistan into theater.

Major initiatives associated with the ANDSF Roadmap continued, including the formal integration of paramilitary police forces from Ministry of Interior (MoI) to Ministry of Defense (MoD) control. Under a program known as Inherent Law, both the MoD and MoI continued with mandatory retirements and merit-based promotions, ushering in a cadre of younger, better-trained leadership in an attempt to build institutional capacity and further institutional reforms. To date, the MoD has retired 223 General Officers and 991 Colonels through two waves of retirements, and the MoI has retired 142 General Officers and 738 Colonels through one retirement wave.

**Regionalize:** Regional efforts in the South Asia Strategy aim to expand burden sharing, neutralize potential spoilers to U.S. and Coalition efforts, limit threats to the United States and our allies and partners, and develop and support a durable political settlement in Afghanistan. The South Asia strategy prioritizes regional engagement to limit hedging against the Afghan government and create an international consensus for peace. There have been a number of international efforts over the past six months to re-energize international engagement in support of peace. In particular, the South Asia Strategy has focused on pressuring Pakistan to limit support and safe-haven for proxy terrorist and militant groups and to play a constructive role in facilitating Afghan reconciliation. In this reporting period, the U.S. continued to call on regional partners to reinforce our messages that state support for terrorist proxies will not be tolerated, that cross-border cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan is essential, and that the Taliban cannot achieve its objectives through continued military conflict.

**Reconcile:** The primary goal of the South Asia Strategy is a durable and inclusive political settlement to the war in Afghanistan. The current military campaign will increase military pressure on the Taliban and complement ongoing diplomatic efforts by the United States,
Afghanistan, and our international partners. In this reporting period, President Ghani declared a nationwide ceasefire from June 12-19, covering the Eid al Fitr holiday. The Taliban reacted by issuing an independent ceasefire from June 15-17. In August, President Ghani offered a second ceasefire during Eid al Adha; however, the Taliban did not respond. President Ghani’s offer extended to the Birthday of the Prophet on November 20, 2018, but the Taliban did not act.

**Sustain:** The South Asia Strategy replaced a rigid timeline with a focus on achieving specific U.S. objectives at acceptable cost. The strategy seeks to maximize fiscal, military, and political return on investment; and to decrease levels of U.S. and international investment over time. Efforts to achieve a sustainable political outcome in Afghanistan must be feasible. On September 5, President Trump appointed Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad as the Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation (SRAR). The United States and NATO will work to promote Afghan self-sufficiency across the security, political, and economic spheres; over the long run, such advances will make possible a steady reduction in the Afghan government’s reliance on international support. At the July Summit in Brussels, NATO agreed to maintain support for the RS mission through 2024.

**Afghan Government Peace and Reconciliation Organization and Activities**

The United States remains committed to supporting an Afghan-led and owned peace and reconciliation process. U.S. efforts to assist the Afghan government are likely to increase the stress on the Taliban movement inside and outside of Afghanistan. DoD will continue to apply direct and indirect military pressure on the Taliban, while supporting nascent efforts by the Afghan government to facilitate local peace initiatives, including de-escalation, defections, and declarations of neutrality. Although we cannot forecast with precision the timing of a breakthrough on reconciliation, the positive leading indicators on U.S. and Afghan efforts argue strongly for continued investment in the South Asia Strategy.

On February 14, 2018, the Taliban issued an open letter to the American people that outlined their vision for peace. On February 28, President Ghani announced the GIRoA’s own unconditional peace offer to the Taliban. In early March, a Taliban suicide attack in Helmand catalyzed peace movements in 20 provinces across the country. On May 11, the trilateral Ulema Conference of religious scholars from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia issued a declaration supporting the GIRoA’s offer of peace and emphatically denounced both terrorism and violent extremism.

During this reporting period, on June 4, more than 2,000 Afghan Ulema members issued a Fatwa declaring “the ongoing war in Afghanistan is forbidden under the Islamic law.” The Fatwa enjoyed wide support from the international community, including both Shia and Sunni Islamic countries. In response to these favorable conditions, President Ghani declared a nationwide ceasefire from June 12-19, covering the Eid al Fitr holiday. The Taliban reacted by issuing an independent ceasefire from June 15-17. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Saudi Arabia furthered momentum with a July 11 statement strongly endorsing peace in Afghanistan. Saudi King Salman and the Imams of the Two Holy Mosques bolstered the OIC statement by invoking Islam’s holiest places to encourage “dialogue, reconciliation and tolerance on the lines of our religion of Islam.”
Even though fighting increased in the weeks following the Eid ceasefire, it did not come at the expense of ongoing discussions in multiple provinces between governors and local commanders. These channels, either created or reinforced during the ceasefire, provide the Afghan government an important conduit to continue exploring ways to reduce violence. In August, President Ghani built a broad base of support across Afghan civil society for a second ceasefire during Eid al Adha. The ANDSF prepared and effectively implemented safeguards to protect urban areas from any Taliban provocations. Even though the Taliban did not publicly accept the second ceasefire offer, there are indicators of support within the Taliban Senior Leadership and a desire to pursue negotiations. The United States and NATO remain postured to exploit opportunities for de-escalation and peace, even while maintaining military pressure on the enemy.

The U.S. State Department is the lead U.S. agency charged with assisting the Afghan government in preparations for peace negotiations. During this reporting period, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul formed the Peace and Reconciliation Advisory Group (PRAG) to synchronize ongoing efforts to initiate peace negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban at state levels with efforts to de-escalate violence and capitalize on opportunities to end fighting at local levels. The PRAG consists of representatives from across the Afghan government and includes leaders from the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A). The PRAG provides an opportunity for DoD planners to integrate peace and reconciliation activities into current and future campaign planning. The PRAG has helped identify the need to adjust authorities on the ground in Afghanistan to allow assistance to local efforts to de-escalate violence.

The Afghan government faced challenges in organizing for reconciliation and reintegration operations during this reporting period. At the onset of the reporting period, National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar served as the principal organizer for Afghan reconciliation and reintegration efforts; however, NSA Atmar resigned on August 25.

Reintegration of personnel denouncing violence and seeking to rejoin Afghan society is a critical part of peace and reconciliation. Although some members of the Taliban may be weary of fighting and ready to lay down their weapons, they will only rejoin society if they believe their safety and the safety of their families are guaranteed, and if they have an opportunity to earn enough money to provide for their families. Leaders at the local level are beginning to develop programs that may offer a path to peace on a small scale. At the time of this report, the Afghan government has not developed a national reintegration program.

1.2 U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN

The United States has a single vital national interest in Afghanistan: to prevent it from becoming a safe-haven from which terrorist groups can plan and execute attacks against the U.S. homeland, U.S. citizens, and our interests and allies abroad. Our ultimate goal in Afghanistan is a negotiated political settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

USFOR-A currently conducts two well-defined and complementary missions. First, through OFS, U.S. forces continue the CT mission against al-Qa’ida, ISIS-K, and their associates in Afghanistan to prevent their resurgence and ability to conduct external attacks. Second, in partnership with NATO allies and operational partner nations in the RS mission, U.S. forces train, advise, and assist
(TAA) the ANSF. The United States supports the institutionalization of ANSF gains by conducting functionally based security force assistance (SFA) as part of the NATO-led RS mission. U.S. and coalition forces conduct TAA efforts at the ANA corps-level, the Afghan National Police (ANP) zone-level, and with the MoD and MoI to improve their ability to support and sustain the fighting force. During the last reporting period, the U.S. President authorized the expansion of the TAA mission for conventional ANSF below the corps and zone levels. During this reporting period, the First SFAB arrived in Afghanistan in March 2018 to begin TAA operations at the tactical level. U.S. and coalition forces also conduct TAA missions with the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) at the tactical level, underscoring the importance of those two critical capabilities.

An array of operational authorities govern the conduct of U.S. military personnel engaged in the U.S. CT and RS TAA missions in Afghanistan. These authorities address U.S. CT operations and SFA in support of the ANSF in their continued fight against the Taliban and other insurgent groups. U.S. forces are authorized to TAA the ANSF—including the ASSF, AAF, and conventional ground forces—from the national (ministerial/institutional) to the tactical levels to develop institutional capacity, integrate capabilities (e.g., intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and aerial fires), and improve tactical proficiency. Operational authorities also address circumstances in which U.S. forces may use force in support of the CT and TAA missions, including U.S. accompaniment and combat enabler support to the ANSF fight against the Taliban and other insurgent groups. The modification of OFS authorities removed some caveats that previously limited U.S. fires and close air support (CAS) to certain ANSF operations. During the period of this report, these expanded authorities helped the ANSF prevent insurgent groups from gaining operational momentum and boosted ANSF confidence and its offensive mindset.

Current Operational Approach

During this reporting period, the U.S., Afghan and Coalition governments and forces continued to apply complementary military, social, and diplomatic pressure on insurgents in a coordinated effort to compel peace negotiations. Military pressure is applied through development of stronger Afghan security forces, as well as advising ANSF as they plan and execute offensive operations, complemented by a combined air campaign to target insurgents and curtail insurgent narcotics revenue generation. Social pressure consists of GIRoA efforts to conduct secure, credible elections and to delegitimize the enemy through Ulema condemnation. The international community made progress placing diplomatic pressure on the enablers of the insurgency. These three forms of pressure are only effective in compelling reconciliation when applied together. Military pressure alone is necessary but not sufficient to achieve a successful outcome.

Military Pressure

Successful ANSF campaigns and operations apply military pressure. The Afghan government lays the foundation for military pressure by generating offensive action to expand population security and government influence. The ANDSF Roadmap enables this action by doubling the ASSF, tripling the size of AAF, and increasing the pace of ANDSF reform by implementing the Inherent Law, and improved training, education, and leader development. These capabilities will
increase the ANDSF’s ability to clear and hold new gains. TAA activities and ANDSF operations also enable Afghan security forces to counter ISIS-K and al-Qaida influence in the country. U.S. and Coalition partners seek to facilitate constant Afghan military pressure by enabling simultaneous offensive operations across multiple Corps areas in conjunction with counter-revenue activities.

During this reporting period, ASSF offensive operations to disrupt the Taliban and prevent them from massing became the primary instrument used to apply military pressure. Conventional ANDSF were unable to generate momentum against the Taliban due to a preponderance of its force defending from checkpoints and static positions, and the remainder of the force reacting to Taliban attacks. Beginning in September, ASSF forces became the supported force and increased the number of operations against the Taliban with the conventional ANA assuming a follow and support role. This shift in responsibilities resulted in fewer Taliban attacks and fewer incidents of Taliban massing.

**Social Pressure**

Parliamentary elections contributed to the social pressure placed upon the Taliban. Offensive operations by the ANDSF secured more polling places in advance of elections. Greater security at polling places enabled more voters to reach the polls and more observers to watch the elections, both of which enhanced the credibility of the elections. Credible elections are required to empower the Afghan populace and further legitimize the Afghan government.

Social pressure also comes in the form of Islamic scholars and Ulema speaking out against suicide bombing and insurgent violence in Afghanistan, challenging the false religious narrative that contributes to insurgent recruiting. The social pressure applied to de-legitimize the insurgency for their narco-criminal and other illegal activities is just as essential as building the legitimacy and trust of the Afghan government.

**Diplomatic Pressure**

Diplomatic pressure comes in three forms: targeting external enablement, building regional and international consensus for peace, and encouraging a more inclusive government. The United States and Coalition partners will assist efforts to build international consensus and support for a viable reconciliation process while convincing regional actors that a stable and viable Afghanistan is in their best interest. By increasing dialogue and building an actionable political framework for reconciliation, the Afghan government will be in position to reintegrate reconcilable insurgents. An entire Coalition effort is required to achieve this objective, and a unified political commitment is central to success. In order for diplomatic pressure to be effective, the GIRoA must directly address concerns of corruption that have long stigmatized both domestic and international trust in Afghan institutions.

**1.3 U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION**

U.S. CT efforts remain focused on defeating al-Qa’ida and its associates, defeating ISIS-K, protecting U.S. forces, and preventing Afghanistan from serving as a safe-haven for terrorists to
plan attacks against the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and allies and partners. Since October 2001, U.S. CT efforts in Afghanistan have prevented another large-scale terrorist attack against the U.S. homeland. However, the existence of more than 20 terrorist or insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including ISIS-K, requires an Afghan-supported U.S. platform in the region to monitor, contain, and respond to these threats.

U.S. efforts against ISIS-K in Afghanistan are part of the U.S. global effort to defeat ISIS. In addition to U.S. unilateral efforts, USFOR-A is enabling the ANDSF to conduct independent operations against ISIS-K. The United States is encouraging more robust intelligence and operational cooperation between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other regional partners in the effort to defeat ISIS. During this reporting period, ISIS-K faced significant territorial, leadership, and personnel losses in Nangarhar due to ANDSF and USFOR-A targeting. As ISIS-K loses space in Nangarhar, however, it has sought refuge elsewhere in the country. Although weakened, ISIS-K will most likely continue to plan and execute high profile attacks in populated areas.

The United States remains in an armed conflict against al-Qa’ida and associated forces, and against ISIS. The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) remains the U.S. domestic legal basis for CT combat operations in Afghanistan. In addition to targeting al-Qa’ida and ISIS-K, U.S. forces are authorized to use force against individuals who directly participate in hostilities against U.S. or coalition forces, and U.S. forces always maintain the inherent right of individual and unit self-defense.

The U.S. CT mission complements the NATO TAA mission. Limited U.S. direct action, coupled with a stronger and increasingly capable ANDSF, will help preserve security gains and contribute to a robust, enduring U.S.-Afghan CT partnership. The Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) supports U.S. CT efforts through TAA with the ASSF and accompanying the ASFF on certain operations. The ASSF will use its growing capabilities to continue conducting countrywide operations to address insurgent and transnational threats. The SOJTF-A TAA efforts remain focused on building the ASSF’s capacity in logistics, command and control, fire support, intelligence analysis and sharing, aviation, and ASSF/conventional force interoperability.

ASSF and OFS forces continue to conduct persistent operations and intelligence collection against ISIS-K, AQ, and HQN in order to degrade their networks, Interdict high-profile attack (HPA) threat streams into Kabul, mitigate ISIS-K and AQ expansion, and deny them sanctuary. During this reporting period, ASSF executed sustained operations against the Taliban and HQN to disrupt command and control nodes, support zones, and HPA networks. NATO Special Operations Component Command (NSOCC-A) degraded the northern-based ISIS-K cell by killing the emir of Jowzjan on April 5, 2018. The emir’s death led to the Jowzjan enclave’s surrender to the GIRoA on August 1, 2018. This capitulation diminished the ISIS-K presence in northern Afghanistan. U.S. counter-terrorism forces and ASSF maintain continuous pressure on remaining ISIS-K enclaves in Nangarhar and Kunar.

SOJTF-A provides TAA support to the ASSF at the operational and tactical levels in two ways: 1) enabled operations that consist of missions where ASSF incorporate coalition enablers such as CAS, MEDEVAC, ISR, and logistical support into their operation; 2) advised operations that include coalition enablers and add U.S. accompaniment to the mission. ASSF independent
operations are missions planned, executed, and resourced by the Afghans. Although coalition enablers are available, they are not deliberately integrated into ASSF independent operation.

The ASSF have demonstrated continued improvement in CT and counter-narcotics (CN) operations. OFS operations targeting narcotic operations have directly supported ANA offensive operations and denied an estimated $200 million to those involved in the illegal drug trade in Afghanistan; more than $42 million to the Taliban specifically.

ASSF progress in intelligence, aviation, mission command, logistics, and institutional systems and processes improved throughout the reporting period. From June 1, 2018 to November 30, 2018, ASSF forces conducted 1,284 ground operations. SOJTF-A components advised the ASSF on 623 of those operations and provided Coalition enablers on another 211 operations. During that same period, the ASSF executed 703 independent operations.

The ANDSF is reliant on the ASSF to respond to security crises and occupy static checkpoints, which degrades readiness and detracting from planned offensive operations. The 2018 national campaign plan calls for limited offensive operations to expand government control of population centers. Throughout 2018, the ASSF were responsible for conducting approximately 70% of all offensive operations, including responding to attacks on the provincial capitals of Farah and Ghazni. The ASSF are sometimes asked to operate static checkpoints, and to act as a security detail for political officials. Continued overuse of the ASSF elements could create risks for 2019 offensive operations.

1.4 NATO-LED RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

The NATO-led RS mission remains focused on training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF, the MoD, and the MoI to achieve and maintain a stable Afghanistan during a period of conflict. The United States continues to consult with NATO Allies and operational partners about RS mission requirements and any follow-on NATO-led efforts to ensure that the U.S. and NATO missions are mutually supportive. RS force-contributing nations supported the South Asia Strategy, and welcomed the U.S. personnel increase and the transition to a conditions-based approach.

The United States, Germany, Italy, and Turkey serve as the RS mission “framework nations,” each leading a regional Train, Advise, and Assist Command (TAAC) responsible for coordinating support and capabilities within its respective command region. Two regional Task Forces (TF) conduct TAA missions with the ANDSF, one in the southeast and one in the southwest. During this reporting period, the RS support to the ANDSF focused on organizational and functional based TAA.

The regional TAACs cover four of the six ANA corps and the associated regional Afghan National Police (ANP) zone headquarters. The two regional task forces, TF Southeast and TF Southwest, oversee persistent advising with the Afghan National Army (ANA) 203rd and 215th Corps; and ANP Zone 303 and Zone 505, respectively. The TAACs and TFs serve as the principal connections between the Afghan ministries and fielded forces. The field commands play a central role in the coalition’s ability to assess the efficacy of its ministerial advising efforts, to determine the ministries’ ability to support ongoing ANDSF security operations, and to provide an outer ring
of sensors and security for the coalition. In addition, coalition forces provide limited non-combat enabler support, primarily ISR and MEDEVAC, to the ANDSF as the Afghans continue to field and develop their organic capabilities.

As of November 2018, RS consisted of military personnel from 41 nations (27 NATO allies and 14 operational partner nations). The United States remains the largest force contributor.

**Figure 1: Resolute Support Mission Troop-Contributing Nations, as of November 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>136</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>1,300</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
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**2018 NATO Summit Overview**

At the July 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, Allies and partners in NATO’s Resolute Support Mission reaffirmed their shared commitment to Afghanistan’s long-term security and stability. The nations committed to sustain the non-combat RS Mission to deliver TAA to the Afghan security institutions and ANDSF until conditions indicate a change of mission is appropriate; extension of financial sustainment of the ANDSF through 2024; and to progress development of political and practical partnerships with Afghanistan through the enduring partnership. With the addition of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates as operational partners, the RS mission has grown from 39 nations (27 NATO allies and 12 operational partner nations) to 41 nations (27 NATO Allies and 14 operational partner nations). These outcomes serve to strengthen and broaden the RS mission and will have a significant impact on the overall sustainability of the ANDSF.

NATO’s commitment to extend financial support of the ANDSF through 2024 enables the Afghan government and its security forces to preserve past gains and maintain progress towards steadily increasing its financial contributions to security, and helps set the conditions for an Afghan-led political settlement. NATO allies and partners will revisit their contributions prior to completion.

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1 As listed on the NATO public website, [http://www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int), accessed on November 30, 2018. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name.
of the current 2017-2020 funding cycle, as previously established at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. Future funding levels will be dependent on the current and future ANDSF force size and structure with the goal of ensuring the ANDSF maintains the capacity and capability to apply the appropriate amount of military pressure to compel a negotiated peace settlement with the Taliban and secure the Afghan government and populace. The magnitude of NATO’s past financial contributions and its reliability in the future are critical to the effectiveness of Afghan security forces on the battlefield.

Building Institutional Capability

The cornerstone of RS remains the TAA mission to build capability within the MoD, the MoI, and the ANDSF. As such, the advisory effort focuses on developing functions, systems, processes, and organizational development connections between the ministerial and operational levels. Within the MoD and MoI, the TAA mission focuses on generating, employing, and sustaining capabilities within the ANDSF. The main effort for RS is building capacity within the ministries and the ANDSF at the national and regional levels. The addition of SFAB advisor teams during this reporting period allowed for TAA of select forces below the corps level; however, the main focuses remains on building national and regional capability.

Under the RS construct, the responsibility for most of the institutional development of the MoD and MoI rests with the dual-hatted Deputy Chief of Staff – Security Assistance (DCOS-SA) / Commanding General—Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A). Despite the removal of the Essential Function (EF) designation assigned to RS subordinate branches, the focus on functionally based security force assistance remains. A U.S. general officer, coalition general officer, or a DoD Senior Executive Service (SES) member typically serves as lead advisor for subordinate branches. Branch leads vertically integrate the efforts of their advisors across the ANA corps, ANP zone, and at the institutional and ministerial levels. RS advisors focus their efforts on building a responsible and efficient MoD and MoI that can support an effective, sustainable, affordable, and credible ANDSF capable of maintaining security in Afghanistan.

U.S. Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) Impacts

The U.S. sourced some of its advisor requirements under RS with the first purpose-built and designed SFAB. The SFAB extended advisory reach-down capabilities to the tactical level and helped validate TAA effectiveness to select brigades and kandaks. During this reporting period, SFAB advisors provided TAA to eight ANA brigades and 34 kandaks. It is too early to judge the enduring impact on ANDSF capability created by SFAB tactical advising; however, initial indications are positive.

1st SFAB is partnered with numerous kandaks, brigades, corps/zone HQs, and training centers. Of the 36 maneuver Combat Advising Teams (CAT), more than half are advising kandaks; several are actively advising brigades, while the remaining CATs are advising regional training centers. All Battalion HQs are fully engaged and partnered with multiple Brigades. Throughout its deployment, the scope and coverage of the 1st SFAB continued to grow as the formation validated its operational capabilities and capacity.
SFAB advisors were integrated with ANDSF units in support of Operations TALON and WEREWOLVES REBORN, which were part of an overall strategy to expand military pressure across Afghanistan in order to compel Taliban reconciliation. Operation TALON focused on advising and assisting the ANDSF to increase military pressure in Kandahar. Operation WEREWOLVES REBORN took place in Farah Province in western Afghanistan.

The training provided by SFAB advisors to their ANDSF counterparts during this reporting period included individual training such as combat casualty care, communications, maintenance, individual soldier skills, as well as substantial staff and leader training. SFAB advisors improved ANDSF systems, focusing on: implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS); property accountability, maintenance, and operational planning. SFAB advisors also assisted their ANDSF counterparts with the employment of Afghan organic UAS assets, integration of the Afghan Air Force in ground maneuver, and integration of Afghan artillery with ground maneuver.

Logistical Advisory Teams (LAT) earned praise from senior RS leaders in charge of advising both ASSF and conventional ANDSF forces. Sustainment and logistical operations are major weaknesses throughout the ANDSF and have been for many years. Efforts to build ANDSF logistical capacity have been subordinated to TAA efforts to improve the lethality of the force. LATs provided persistent logistics training and advising at the ANA Corps and Brigade levels, improving sustainment and logistics relationships between the Corps, Brigades, and \textit{kandaks} where they were assigned. Lack of persistent advisor presence at supply and logistics hubs and depots between the MoD and the Corps resulted in gaps in the advisory chain and prevented further progress towards building ANDSF sustainment and logistics capacity.

The flexibility of SFAB advisory teams proved to be a major strength. At the beginning of the deployment, five SFAB teams were assigned to assist the ANDSF in securing Kabul and preventing HPAs in the Afghan capital. As the threat of HPAs increased, an additional eight SFAB teams were reassigned to the KSF advisory mission and played key roles in lowering the number of attacks within Kabul. The SFAB contribution to Kabul security came at a critical time when diplomatic efforts to begin peace negotiations were ramping up and the Afghan government prepared for parliamentary elections in October.

SFAB teams also demonstrated flexibility by adapting their advisory approach throughout the summer as conditions on the ground continued to change. Across the ANDSF units struggled to adhere to operational readiness cycles (ORC) and keep pace with combat operations. In several instances, SFAB teams adjusted their focus to Regional Military Training Centers (RMTCs) in order to maximize the limited time ANDSF units were allowed to train during their ORC. SFAB involvement at RMTCs improved the quality and efficiency of those centers and resulted in decisions to increase focus on improving RMTCs as KMTC works address its deficiencies and as advisors continue to urge compliance with ORCs across the ANDSF.

During this reporting period, the 1\textsuperscript{st} SFAB began redeploying and the next U.S. SFAB will not arrive in Afghanistan until early in 2019. The temporary gap between SFABs was identified by military planners before the 1\textsuperscript{st} SFAB arrived in Afghanistan, and the plan to mitigate the absence of SFAB teams has been complete for some time. A combination of U.S. and NATO advisors have already been identified to backfill SFAB teams at unit and institutional locations deemed...
most critical by RS planners. The footprint and method of employment of the next SFAB will be determined by conditions on the ground and RS priorities.

**Resolute Support Headquarters (HQ)**

The Resolute Support Headquarters (RSHQ) structure consists of three base pillars: strategic matters, institutional development, and operational matters.

**Figure 2: Resolute Support Mission Headquarters Organization**

Strategic matters support Afghan security institutions’ strategic direction, plans, synchronization, and campaign assessments. Advisors assist with the development of strategic domestic and regional engagements and seek to maximize the impact of the ANDSF against the Taliban, in coordination with the Afghan government’s peace negotiations with the Taliban.

Institutional development emphasizes ministerial advising, institutional development, and ANDSF resourcing, equipping, and sustaining. These efforts enable an effective, lethal, and sustainable ANDSF and build the long-term institutional capacity to secure the Afghan population.

Operational matters establish an enhanced TAA unity of effort by coordinating staff elements directly tied to TAA at the Corps level and consolidating simultaneous planning for all TAACs. Operational matters advisors and personnel seek to increase near-term operational effectiveness and integrate strategic and institutional guidance at the operational level.
**Resource Management (RM): Plan, Program, Budget, and Execute**

RM has three priorities: 1) to increase resource management capability within the ministries; 2) to build donor confidence and trust that the Afghan resource management process is transparent, accountable, and effective; and 3) to set conditions to sustain an effective ANDSF in the future. Resource management includes formulating a defense strategy; generating requirements by determining the products and services to purchase to support that strategy; developing a resource-informed budget to meet prioritized requirements; executing a spending plan by awarding contracts to purchase items from the budget; and monitoring the status of the funds expended. Advising efforts in this area focus on enhancing resource management and procurement capability in accordance with Afghan laws, policies, and regulations; assisting with the drafting and execution of funding commitment letters; and helping the Afghans with the integration of various Afghan personnel management and payroll systems into the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS).

**Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (TAO)**

One of the four key elements of President Ghani’s ANDSF roadmap is counter-corruption. The MoI and MoD Inspectors General (IG) lead anti-corruption program. RS TAO advisors TAA the MoD and MoI IGs to improve policies and procedures in transparency, accountability, and oversight. The IGs work to prevent corruption through inspections, investigations, assistance, teaching, and training. TAO advisors work with MoD and MoI IGs to develop preventive programs and controls to identify areas vulnerable to corruption and put measures in place to reduce corruption.

**Rule of Law (ROL)**

To provide security, retain public support, and instill confidence in Afghanistan’s governance institutions, the ANDSF must operate effectively and respect human rights. ROL advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to ensure that the ANDSF respects and adheres to the rule of law and operates in accordance with Afghanistan’s constitution, domestic laws, and international obligations. ROL efforts focus on assisting the ANDSF to prevent and, when necessary, respond properly to significant acts of corruption and allegations of gross violations of human rights (GVHR), such as extra-judicial killings and child sex abuse. RS advisors continue to engage with ANDSF leaders at all levels to reinforce the importance of preventing and responding to GVHR and all types of human rights violations—not only to maintain long-term viability, but also to retain U.S. and coalition assistance to the ANDSF. RS has established a Counter-Corruption Advisor Group (CCAG) to analyze and target corruption networks in the MoI, MoD, and corruption stemming from criminal patronage and narcotics networks. The CCAG will

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2 CSTC-A commitment letters stipulate how the MoD and the MoI can allocate funding for the Afghan fiscal year and under what conditions CSTC-A will provide funding. CSTC-A commitment letters also identify various legal constraints, such as the Berry Amendment and the Leahy law, that apply to U.S. funding.

3 The Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) is an enterprise resource planning system that will integrate existing MoD and MoI systems for personnel management and payroll into a single platform providing timely and accurate accountability of all personnel, including civilians, within the MoD and the MoI. Additional information on APPS can be found in Section 3.4.
synchronize counter-corruption efforts among Afghan security institutions, RS, and international partners.

**Force Development (FD)**

FD advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to build combat power through recruiting, training, retaining, managing, and developing a professional security force. The ANA and the ANP utilize the APPS to store human resources information, track recruits, record training, and assign qualified personnel into needed assignments based on force requirements. The FD TAA mission is an interconnected and mutually supportive five-fold effort: recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop. These five focus areas help the ANDSF build a professional force. FD is advising on the enforcement of an Inherent Law policy that lowers mandatory retirement ages, time-in-service maximums (e.g., 40 years for generals), and time-in-grade limits (e.g., 8 years for generals). This effort will open senior leadership positions for the next generation of ANDSF leaders. The RS Capabilities Development Directorate (CDD) works closely with FD advisors to assist the MoD and the MoI as the ministries develop their official personnel and equipment requirements through the *tashkil* development process. The APPS Personnel Management Office (PMO) also supports the ANDSF transition from the current Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) personnel system to the APPS.

**Operational Sustainment and Logistics (OS/LOG): Sustain the Force**

OS/LOG advisors work with the ANDSF to sustain and reconstitute combat power through the development of appropriate maintenance, communications, medical, and logistics systems. Organized into three subordinate staff sections, including Logistics (formerly EF 5.1), Medical Logistics (formerly EF 5.2), and Communications, Information, and Technology (formerly EF 5.3), OS/LOG advisors assist the ANDSF in the logistics and maintenance of vehicles, equipment, and weapons, predominantly at the ANA corps, ANP zone, and national levels to support an affordable and sustainable ANDSF. For medical systems, OS/LOG advisors assist the ANDSF on injury care, ground MEDEVAC, medical logistics, medical equipment maintenance, medical support planning, and medical staffing. For communications, OS/LOG advisors work with the Afghans providing technical advice and guidance for secure, interoperable, and sustainable ANDSF telecommunications and networked infrastructures.

**Strategic Plans: Plan, Resource, and Execute Effective Security Campaigns**

Strategic Plans and Assessments (SP&A) advisors work with the ANDSF to employ all elements of the ANDSF effectively in support of the Afghan government. SP&A has two sections: strategic planning and policy, and execution and employment of the force. Strategic planning and policy advisors assist the ANDSF strategic planning efforts at the Afghan Office of the National Security Council (ONSC), the MoD, and the MoI. These efforts develop the strategic-level capabilities of the MoD and the MoI to coordinate, plan, and execute campaigns in support of national-level objectives. Once developed, the strategic guidance and objectives are translated into operational and annual campaign plans.

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4 *Tashkil* means “organization” in Dari and refers to the official list of personnel and equipment requirements used by the MoD and MoI to detail authorized staff positions and equipment items for each unit.
**Intel TAA (INT): Develop Sufficient Intelligence Capabilities and Processes**

INT advisors work with the ANDSF to develop and integrate intelligence into operations. Advisors work with several organizations, including the Assistant Minister of Defense for Intelligence, the ANA General Staff (GS) Intelligence Directorate, the MoI Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI), and the *Nasrat*, also known as the National Threat Intelligence Center (NTIC), a national-level intelligence fusion center. The INT goal is to help the ANDSF collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence effectively and integrate intelligence into combat operations. RS intelligence advisors work at the national and regional levels to mature Afghan intelligence capabilities, work with analysts as they learn to prepare intelligence estimates in support of military and policing plans and strategies, and help the ANA and the ANP field expanded ISR capabilities. INT advisors also help the ANP and ANA intelligence schools develop a cadre of instructors to train future intelligence personnel. The INT has four main lines of effort: intelligence integration with operations, intelligence cycle development, training self-sufficiency, and sustainment of intelligence capabilities.

**Strategic Communication (STRATCOM): Maintain Internal and External Strategic Communication Capability**

STRATCOM advisors work with the Afghan government to develop counter-insurgent messaging and a positive narrative for the Afghan people and the international community. The advisors help Afghan partners speak with one consistent voice when addressing internal and external audiences. STRATCOM advisors help bridge gaps and overcome challenges to improve communications within the MoD, the MoI, and the ANDSF, while reinforcing successes and seeking opportunities for improvement. Building the MoD and the MoI strategic communications capability depends more on developing human capital and institutionalizing processes than it does on managing resources or developing technical systems.

**Resolute Support Gender Office**

The RS Gender Office conducts TAA with Afghan leadership to integrate UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) and broader gender perspectives into all policy and strategic planning at the ministerial, ANA corps, and ANP zone levels. Although the RS Gender Office is a “stand-alone” advising directorate, it is integrated with all eight RS subordinate branches as each has gender-related issues relevant to the overall efforts. Recognizing this interdependency, issues pertaining to women are included in all major RS briefings and forums with senior RS and Afghan leaders. The RS Gender Office supports the Afghan government as it implements the Afghan constitutional guarantee of equal rights to men and women and Afghanistan’s National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325, which addresses the inordinate impact of war on women and the role that women should and do play in conflict management, conflict resolution, and sustainable peace.

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5 The DPI tasks and coordinates intelligence at a basic level, produces analysis and intelligence products capable of informing senior MoI leaders and shaping MoI operations, and effectively targets terrorist and criminal networks through the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC).
Train, Advise, and Assist Commands and Regional Task Forces

RS advisors conduct their TAA mission with the ANDSF at the ANA corps and ANP zone levels through the TAACs and the regional task forces. Turkey currently leads TAAC-Capital (TAAC-C) in the Kabul area, the United States leads TAAC-East (TAAC-E) and TAAC-South (TAAC-S), Italy leads TAAC-West (TAAC-W), and Germany leads TAAC-North (TAAC-N). Personnel at each TAAC conduct training and provide advice and assistance to their Afghan counterparts depending on the need identified by the coalition and their Afghan partners. TF Southwest and TF Southeast provide oversight of TAA efforts for the ANA corps and the ANP zones in their regions, formerly covered by regional Advise and Assist Cells, to ensure full coverage of all ANA corps and ANP zones. Finally, the U.S.-led TAAC-Air provides TAA support to the AAF.

The TAACs and TFs assist Afghan units in ANA corps and ANP zone level reporting, while reinforcing the importance of building and improving the systems and processes that support combat operations. With the re-establishment of the ANP zones, the TAACs and TFs focus TAA support at the ANP zone headquarters level rather than at the provincial police headquarters-level. TFs Southeast and Southwest have also succeeded in strengthening relationships between the MoD, MoI, ANA corps, and ANP zones in areas without a persistent coalition presence. RS relies on the TFs and their expeditionary advising teams to maintain progress in building Afghan capabilities in select parts of the country.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Capital (TAAC-C)

TAAC-C, which includes Kabul Province (except Sarobi District, which falls within the 201st Corps area of responsibility), provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 111th Capital Division, ANP Zone 101 / Kabul City Police, Afghan Border Force (ABF), and Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF) elements operating in Kabul. Turkish forces lead the TAA effort with forces from several other contributing nations. TAAC-C maintains Level 1 advising with the ANA 111th Capital Division and Levels 1 and 2 advising with ANP Zone 101 and the Kabul City Police.

During the reporting period, the Afghans maintained an enhanced security zone within Kabul due to the threat of HPAs in the capital. Under the command of the Kabul Garrison Command, MoI, MoD, NDS, and Coalition advisors worked together to share intelligence and strengthen Kabul’s security. In September, combined Kabul Security Force conducted numerous operations targeting ISIS-K within the city of Kabul and arrested 47 people suspected of facilitating ISIS-K attacks. As a result, the Shia holiday of Ashura passed without violence despite ISIS-K’s intent to attack Shia targets.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East (TAAC-E)

TAAC-E (Headquarters in Laghman), which includes U.S. and Polish forces, covers Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, and Nuristan Provinces. TAAC-E provides functionally based SFA

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6 Additional information on each TAAC’s activities can be found throughout the report.
7 Expeditionary advising teams are composed of a mission command cell to provide command and control for the advising effort; the team is further augmented by select functional advisors, as appropriate.
to the ANA 201st Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 202. TAAC-E maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – South (TAAC-S)**

TAAC-S (Headquarters in Kandahar), led by U.S. forces, includes Daykundi, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul Provinces. TAAC-S provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 205th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 404. TAAC-S maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – West (TAAC-W)**

TAAC-W (Headquarters in Herat), led by Italian forces, includes Badghis, Farah, Ghor, and Herat Provinces. TAAC-W provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 207th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 606. TAAC-W maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – North (TAAC-N)**

TAAC-N (Headquarters in Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province), led by German forces, includes Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Samangan, Sar-e-Pul, and Takhar Provinces. TAAC-N provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 209th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zones 707 and 808. TAAC-N maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

**Task Force Southwest**

TF Southwest, formerly TF Forge, led by U.S. forces, includes Helmand Province. TF Southwest provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 215th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 505. TF Southwest maintains Level 1 advising at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

**Task Force Southeast**

TF Southeast (Headquarters in Paktiya Province), formerly TF Anvil, led by U.S. forces, includes Paktika, Khost, Paktiya, Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, and Bamyan Provinces. TF Southeast provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 203rd Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 303. TF Southeast maintains Level 1 advising at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air (TAAC-Air)**

TAAC-Air is a functional command that covers all of Afghanistan. TAAC-Air’s U.S. and coalition advisors provide functionally based SFA to the AAF from the ministerial level down to the wing, group, and squadron levels. TAA priorities for this reporting period included: ensuring the timely flow of AAF personnel into formal training programs concurrently with planned growth and aircraft delivery schedules; improving operational-level command and control; encouraging
AAF force management and a flying hours program; improving in-country maintenance and logistics; developing and fully integrating aviation platforms, including the C-130, C-208, A-29 fixed-wing platforms, the Mi-17, UH-60, UH-60 FFF, and MD-530 rotary-wing platforms; and assisting with AAF implementation of elections planning.

1.5 INDICATIONS OF PROGRESS

The Afghanistan Compact

On August 23, 2017, two days after the United States unveiled its South Asia Strategy, President Ghani announced the establishment of the Afghanistan Compact, a set of specific reform measures that the Afghan government committed to fulfill. The Afghan government developed the Compact to hold itself accountable for making progress towards milestones and objectives linked to the desired conditions described in the U.S. conditions-based strategy. President Ghani directed the creation of four Compact committees to examine ways to improve efforts and measure progress in the following areas: Security, Governance, Peace and Reconciliation, and Economic Growth. The Security Compact committee designated 22 task areas comprised of more than 400 tasks and associated milestones. Task areas include increased ANDSF Offensive Fighting Capability, Leadership Development, Increased Afghan Close Air Support Capability; Supply Chain Management, Gender Equality in ANDSF, Counter-Corruption, and Police Reorganization. The task area with the greatest number of reforms is ANDSF Intelligence Capability, for which the Afghan government pledged itself to undertake 100 tasks to improve capability, capacity, and effectiveness.

The Compact is a mechanism for routine review by a monthly Joint Committee meeting co-chaired by Afghanistan’s Deputy National Security Advisor (NSA) and RS Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy and Policy (DCOS S&P). An Executive Committee (EXCOM) meets quarterly and includes the President of Afghanistan (PoA), the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, and the RS Commander (COM RS). Both venues provide opportunities to add, adjust, or remove tasks and adjust milestones as needed. In its first year, the EXCOM added one hundred and seventeen (117) tasks, including rigorous counter-corruption/anti-corruption tasks co-developed by RS ROL advisors and their MoD counterparts.

The Compact commits senior MoD and MoI (Deputy Minister) leadership to maintain pressure on their respective ministries to accomplish milestones. The Afghan National Security Council is responsible for monitoring and reporting ministerial progress to PoA. President Ghani’s personal oversight of the Compact provides his NSA and ministers with incentive to achieve positive progress. Examples of significant accomplishments within the security sector include the replacement of more than 60 corrupt or ineffective senior leaders; the transfer of the Afghan Border Police from MoI to MoD; Afghan receipt of 13 UH-60 Blackhawks and graduation of the initial cadre of 15 pilots; and implementation of the Inherent Law. The 2019 milestones require continued focus by advisors, the Afghan ministries, and the ANDSF to maintain the initial momentum of 2018.

8 Information on the Afghanistan Compact addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1223(e)(2)(K) of the NDAA for FY 2019 (H.R. 5515).
Coalition and the associated ministry officials track MoD and MoI progress using mutually agreed upon milestones and processes. RS advisors measure progress in ministerial development using a program of actions and milestones (PoAM) developed in conjunction with Afghan MoD/MoI counterparts. The PoAMs consist of five categories of information: essential function, system, organization, process, and action. RS advisors developed twelve key work strands to address projects and tasks across the Institutional Development pillar of the RS headquarters in support of Roadmap activities. Of the twelve key work strands, five were unique to specific staff sections, and seven impacted multiple sections.

RS advisors identify critical processes to develop milestones and measure progress for their section. These processes are completed over time through the execution of a series of supporting actions or tasks that achieve desired effects and/or preclude undesired effects. Progress towards each milestone is dependent upon the progress made within each of the listed actions or tasks.

The TAAC and TF commanders account for ANDSF progress quarterly at the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters level through an ANDSF Assessment Report. The report tracks ANDSF capability development by assessing progress along the five pillars of leadership, combined arms operations, command and control, personnel and training, and sustainment. Similar to the PoAMs, the ANDSF assessment has five capability and effectiveness ratings. The ANDSF assessment is one component of the larger RS mission assessment; it reflects the advisors’ assessments of the ANDSF at the headquarters level.

Advisors at the regional TAACs submit their assessments of ANDSF capabilities to the RS Assessment and Analysis Group (AAG), which then combines the reports into an overarching assessment of the ANDSF as it relates to the campaign plan. MoD and MoI advisors use the assessments along with the ministerial leadership’s strategic priorities to develop their focus areas for TAA efforts. Assessments of the ANDSF’s progress on achieving milestones are conducted continuously and are collected by the CSTC-A on a monthly basis. Each month, the lead advisors provide their reports to the RS senior advisors to the MoD and the MoI, and synchronize TAA efforts across the multiple functional areas of focus. The AAG and the SFA Center continuously determine methods to improve and streamline reporting and assessment processes. Despite changes to the milestones in the PoAMs, the ANDSF assessment methodology, and advisor reporting mechanisms, the strategic conditions required for the success of the RS mission have not changed. CSTC-A convenes a monthly Synchronization Meeting of key RS stakeholders to assure unity of effort and coordination across Compact, Work Strands, and AAG initiatives.

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9 In addition to the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters, the report also provides an assessment of the AAF headquarters, ANASOC division headquarters, the Ktah Khas at the kandak level, SMW headquarters, General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) headquarters, and the ALP Staff Directorate within the MoI.

10 Leadership is the ability of the commander and subordinate leaders (including staff primaries) to demonstrate a mastery of their functional area and to provide purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish all assigned tasks and missions while being accountable for their actions and responsibilities. Combined arms operations is the ability to field and integrate new systems and develop the capability to bring all available forces, assets, and enabler systems to bear effectively. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over all assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Personnel and training is the ability to conduct individual and collective mission-focused training and institutional training, and to assess and maintain proficiency on all critical tasks. Sustainment is the ability to sustain training and operational missions independently.
For the Compact’s first year, security reforms were the priority. In May of 2018, however, the priority changed from security to governance and priorities were established for the remainder of the year for each of the four working groups. The Security Working Group prioritized four key reforms: removal of soldiers identified as high-risk for Green-on-Blue attacks; timely back-fills for general officers in key billets; full implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS); and, completion of the list of action items generated at the July 2016 Anti-Corruption Conference. The Governance Working Group prioritized three reforms: execution of all warrants for corruption-related crimes; complete adoption of the Case Management System (CMS) in Kabul; and completion of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) database of registered voters. The Peace and Reconciliation Working Group prioritized three reforms: development and implementation of guidelines for de-escalation agreements with the Taliban; production of a joint fatwa with the Pakistan Ulema condemning jihadist activities; and establishment of an implementation board for the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund’s (ARTF) Citizen Charter. The Economic Growth Working Group prioritized three reforms: issuance of temporary marble processing licenses; expansion of the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) Export Clearance One-Stop Shop; and development and implementation of a system to issue advance customs rulings.

At the September 2018 meeting, the EXCOM identified two Governance reforms that are especially lacking: Advancement of High-Profile Corruption Cases and Prosecution of Drug Kingpins. As of the September 2018 meeting, 138 (34 percent) of the tasks had been completed and 94 percent of the remaining tasks are on-schedule for completion. However, given the complexity of the remaining tasks and pending new tasks it is unlikely the “on-schedule” metric will remain at such a high level. The Afghan government has completed all current tasks in MOI Strategic Document Implementation and the Establishment of National and Regional Joint Commands. Tasks in three other areas are nearly complete: ABP Transfer, ANCOP Transfer, and Training and Education. As the results of the initial tasks are evaluated, it is likely additional tasks will be added to each area to continue improvement over time.

This year’s events, which include the Eid al-Fitr ceasefire, the first anniversary of the new South Asia Strategy, and the parliamentary elections, have brought the government of Afghanistan under additional international scrutiny. The U.S. Afghanistan Compact, with President Ghani’s personal involvement, aided by consistent information-sharing and oversight from RS, represents an essential, effective means for the Afghan government to demonstrate real progress towards improved security, prosperity, and good governance.

Beyond the 400+ Compact tasks, there are approximately 700 other non-Compact Functional Area and Work Strand (FA/WS) tasks that guide the campaign. The combined, Compact and non-Compact tasks are foundational to the holistic RS TAA effort. Measuring progress across these 1,000+ tasks provides NATO assurance that there is continual oversight and monitoring of the issues that matter most to the security of Afghanistan.

CSTC-A and the Executive Advisory Group (EAG) are currently revising the Afghanistan Compact Benchmark functional area/workstrand format to eliminate milestones that describe broad policy goals rather than tangible and measurable outcomes. When complete, the updated tool will be used to assess, monitor, and evaluate RS TAA efforts.
SECTION 2 – THREAT ASSESSMENT

Afghanistan faces a continuing threat from an externally supported insurgency and the highest regional concentration of terrorist groups in the world. These pervasive insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks constitute a threat to Afghanistan’s stability. Revenue from drug trafficking, taxation/extortion, illicit mining, and foreign financial support continues to sustain the insurgency and Afghan criminal networks. Additionally, extortion and kidnappings by low-level criminal networks continue.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains a sanctuary for various groups, including the Taliban, al-Qa’ida core (AQ), al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the Haqqani Network (HQN), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ISIS-K, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Terrorist sanctuaries on both sides of the border present security challenges for Afghanistan and Pakistan and pose a threat to regional security and stability.

2.1 IMPORTANCE OF AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

ANDSF allegations of PAKMIL cross-border fires are significantly lower since May 2018. Although tension between the two militaries has lowered correspondingly, there has not been a noticeable improvement in the relationship. It remains mistrustful and prone to misunderstanding. Since the initiation of talks on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS), PAKMIL has been unwilling to discuss border coordination separately from the APAPPS process with the exception of Border Coordination Centers (BCCs). In August 2018, ANDSF and PAKMIL established BCCs on their respective sides of the border at Torkham and Spin Boldak (ANDSF), and Landi Kotal and Chaman (PAKMIL), but the liaison officers assigned there have not been given any tasks or authorities and are not allowed to coordinate with each other on border issues.

Due to mistrust, the two militaries continue to refuse to share details of near border operations in a timely manner that would allow for cooperation or coordination. Since April 2018, however, there have not been any near border operations on either side that resulted in a noticeable increase in cross-border fires or other incidents. PAKMIL continues fencing the border and ANDSF routinely protests activities associated with the fencing.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship remains tenuous, and leaders from each country have accused the other of harboring terrorists and allowing the planning of attacks from their soil. The United States continues to encourage both countries to work together to solve common problems, such as border security, but deep-rooted mistrust remains a significant barrier to progress. The April 6 completion of negotiations over the Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS) marked a slight improvement in relations but has yet to change security conditions. Although a tentative agreement on Ground Coordination Centers (GCC) and LNO exchange was reached at a one-star bilateral meeting held in May 2018, no action has been taken to implement the tentative deal.
Pakistan’s Prime Minister and President Ghani in April 2018 agreed on seven principles to finalize the APAPPS:

1. Pakistan will support the Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process and reconciliation;

2. The two countries will undertake effective actions against fugitives and the irreconcilable elements posing security threats to either of the two countries;

3. Both countries commit to deny use of their respective territories by any country, network, group, or individuals for anti-state activities against either country;

4. To put in place a joint supervision, coordination, and confirmation mechanism through liaison officers for the realization of the agreed actions;

5. To avoid territorial and aerial violations of each other’s territory;

6. Both countries will avoid the public “blame game” and instead use APAPPS cooperation mechanisms to respond to mutual issues of contention and concern; and

7. To establish working groups and necessary cooperation mechanisms as per APAPPS for full implementation of the APAPPS and above mutually reinforcing principles.

Although Pakistani military operations have disrupted some militant sanctuaries, certain groups—such as the Taliban and the Haqqani Network—retain freedom of movement in Pakistan. The United States continues to convey to all levels of Pakistani leadership the importance of taking action against all terrorist and militant groups.

Increased collaboration between Afghanistan and Pakistan is critical to maintaining pressure on militant and terrorist groups and for meeting the enduring security requirements on both sides of the shared border. The trust deficit resulting from Pakistan’s support of and inaction against Afghan-oriented militants, and Pakistan’s concerns about terrorist attacks launched from Afghanistan, hamper the bilateral military collaboration required to achieve enduring security.

Since the beginning of President Ghani’s tenure, leaders from both countries have attempted to improve relations and to address mutual security interests, such as the threat from various terrorist groups that reside in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. These efforts have been inconsistent, interrupted by security incidents on both sides of the border and public statements by each government disparaging the other.

**2.2 CURRENT SECURITY CONDITIONS**

Afghanistan continues to face an externally enabled and resilient insurgency. The Afghan government retains control of Kabul, major population centers, most key transit routes, provincial capitals, and a majority of district centers. In this reporting period, the Taliban capitalized on the freedom of maneuver they maintain in rural areas to mass combat power against poorly defended
district centers and checkpoints. Despite the Taliban’s proclaimed intent to adopt a more asymmetric approach, the group continued to mass and conduct raids on checkpoints, district centers, and threaten population centers. These types of attacks did not result in significant expansion of Taliban-controlled territory; however, they did test the ability of the ANDSF to respond, resulting in over-extension of the ANA in certain areas, and they provide the Taliban opportunities to score public affairs wins.

On August 9, the Taliban launched a major offensive against Ghazni City, the provincial capital of Ghazni province, and wrested control of most of the city until August 14, when ASSF supported by substantial Coalition enablers regained control. The Taliban also attacked ANDSF convoys along the Kabul-Kandahar highway en route to support operations in Ghazni City.

While operations were ongoing inside and surrounding Ghazni City, the Taliban attacked and temporarily gained control of the rural district centers of Ajristan and Khwaja Omari in Ghazni Province. The Taliban also conducted attacks against ANA positions at Camp Chinese in Gormach District, Faryab Province and Baghlan provinces, contributing to mounting casualties this year.

As of November 2018, RS assessed that the Afghan government maintained control or influence over approximately 63 percent of the population, while insurgents had control or influence over approximately 11 percent of the population, with the remainder contested.

The Taliban and other militant groups continue to perpetrate high-profile attacks (HPAs), particularly in the capital region, to attract media attention, create the perception of widespread insecurity, and undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan government. The total number of high-profile attacks decreased in both Kabul and the country as a whole. From June 1, 2018, to November 30, 2018, there were 59 high-profile attacks in Kabul, as compared to 73 during the same period last year. The 14 high-profile attacks in Kabul included ISIS-K attacks on Sunni Religious Scholars.

During an October 18 meeting between Afghan representatives in Kandahar and U.S. and Coalition personnel, a member of the Kandahar Provincial Governor’s security team opened fire on Afghan and U.S. personnel, including the U.S. Commander, General Miller, at the governor's compound, killing Kandahar Chief of Police General Raziq and wounding several others. U.S. and Afghan security personnel quickly eliminated the threat and safely transported the wounded for immediate treatment. Following the attack in Kandahar, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) postponed parliamentary elections in Kandahar province by a week.

In the immediate aftermath of the General Raziq assassination, General Miller temporarily suspended the majority of direct partner advising with the ANDSF to mitigate the risk of green-on-blue threats; to conduct an internal review of security measures, vetting processes, and security responses; and to capture lessons learned and best practices to ensure the safety and security of U.S. and Coalition forces. Although some forms of TAA activities continued uninterrupted, RS conducted a phased resumption of TAA activities. The temporary suspension of direct partner advising allowed Resolute Support to assess ANDSF capabilities and sustainability with limited advisory support, resulting in a better understanding of how to align advisory efforts.
The period leading up to and immediately following parliamentary elections marked a change in trends for both the ANDSF and the insurgency. The ANDSF, supported by coalition enablers, increased its operational tempo in the run-up to the elections while the Taliban organized a campaign of threats, intimidation, and harassment to disrupt the process and discourage participation. Overall, election-related violence was lower than anticipated. Afghan and international commentary focused on the procedural and logistical challenges faced by the Independent Electoral Commission, while most of the attacks occurred outside city centers due to the strong ANDSF security posture during the elections. Of note, voting took place in Kandahar Province on October 27. Following the electoral period, the ANDSF and Coalition advisors pivoted to an ongoing winter campaign of increased pressure, breaking with the historical pattern of an end to the annual “fighting season” for both the insurgency and the ANDSF.

To move away from the traditional Afghan practice of using private militias and other armed groups to address local security challenges, President Ghani established the ANA Territorial Force (ANA-TF). The ANA-TF is meant to employ locally recruited, nationally trained, and nationally led forces in areas where security conditions permit the use of lighter, more affordable forces to provide local security. If successful, the ANA-TF model will provide some short-term cost savings, allow the ANA to transition to a smaller, more affordable force in the future, and allow for realignment of the ASSF and AAF to more offensive operations. The pilot phase of the ANA-TF implementation plan began this summer. The first three tolays (companies) completed training in September and are now functioning in their home districts under ANA leadership. During this reporting period, RS ordered a pause in the recruiting beginning in September in order to evaluate the pilot ANA-TF companies and incorporate lessons learned into the program going forward. More than 20 more tolays are currently in training. The greatest impediments to bringing the ANA-TF online are the chronic limitations of the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC), which suffers from infrastructure, manning, and organizational shortfalls.

**Influence of Other Regional Actors**

U.S. strategy calls for a regional approach to enhance stability in South Asia. This includes building a broad consensus for a stable Afghanistan, emphasizing regional economic integration and cooperation, stressing cooperation for an Afghan-led peace process, and holding countries accountable for their use of proxies or other means to undermine stability and regional confidence. DoD is part of a whole-of-government approach designed to isolate the Taliban and other terrorists from sources of external support and to mitigate malign influence from regional actors.

**Russia**

Russia is engaging a wide range of actors in Afghanistan, including the Taliban, to secure its interests in Central Asia and to expand its influence in the region. The Russian government seeks to renew arms sales, maintenance, and training to Kabul, which would provide influence with the Afghan government. Russia has long supported Afghan power brokers in order to establish a security buffer in northern Afghanistan. Russia has also reinforced the 201st Military Base in Tajikistan to counter what Moscow believes is a growing ISIS-K threat in northern Afghanistan. Russian-Afghan relations suffered due to Russia’s public acknowledgment of communications with the Taliban and support of the Taliban’s call for coalition withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Russia increased its multilateral outreach on Afghan reconciliation last year, hosting three Russia-led conferences on reconciliation.

**China**

China’s military, economic, and political engagements in Afghanistan are driven by domestic security concerns that terrorism will spread across the Afghan border into China, and also by China’s increasing desire to protect its regional economic investments. China is a member of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) seeking to support Afghan and Taliban peace and reconciliation efforts. Afghanistan continues to seek Chinese pressure on Pakistan to assist reconciliation efforts and eliminate insurgent sanctuaries.

In September 2018, Afghanistan’s ambassador in Beijing told reporters that Afghan troops planned to train in China and establish an Afghan mountain brigade to patrol the Wakhan Corridor, which borders China’s Xinjiang Province. China is concerned that Uighur militants transiting through the Wakhan Corridor could pose a threat to Chinese interests in the region. During this reporting period, no formal planning to form the mountain brigade or train Afghan soldiers in China took place, and there is a high probability that the initiative will not gain further traction.

During Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan's visit to Beijing in November, Pakistani and Chinese officials issued a joint statement supporting an Afghan-owned, Afghan-led peace and reconciliation process. They agreed on the importance of Foreign Minister-level consultations and trilateral cooperation to achieve shared progress, development, and security, and for strengthening peace and stability in Afghanistan. They also agreed to cooperate closely in the fight against terrorism.

**Iran**

Iran seeks a stable Afghan government that is responsive to Iranian goals, the elimination of ISIS-K, the removal of the U.S./NATO presence, and the protection of Iranian concerns, such as water rights and border security. Iran pursues these goals using a multitrack strategy of engaging and trying to grow ties with the Afghan government, expanding trade and economic investments, and providing calibrated support to the Taliban while trying not to alienate Kabul. Iranian involvement is most prominent in western, central, and northern Afghanistan, where local Afghans share common history, culture, religion, and language with Iran.

Iran provides weapons, explosives, training, financing, and political support to the Taliban to counter the U.S. and Coalition military presence, combat ISIS-K, and position itself as an arbiter for peace talks. Iran has historically calibrated its assistance to the Taliban to provide enough aid to maintain influence with the group without enabling the Taliban to threaten the Afghan government in Kabul and return to power. Iran provides this support through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), Iran’s external operations element.

Iran reportedly provides funding to political candidates in Afghanistan in order to gain influence. Members of Parliament and security officials also report that Iran bribes local and central government officials to advance Iranian interests. Iran is Afghanistan’s largest trading partner,
having surpassed Pakistan in 2016. Iran’s joint development of the Chabahar Port with India has positioned Iran to increase economic activity with Afghanistan while bypassing traditional trade routes running through Pakistan.

The collapse of Iran’s rial, Iran’s monetary unit, has effectively cut remittances from Afghan migrant workers in Iran to almost zero. As a result, absorbing the 500,000-plus returnees in 2018 (compared to 230,000 in 2017) will carry heavy economic and social support burdens in Afghanistan’s less stable western provinces. Of the returnees, 96 percent are unskilled or semi-skilled single male laborers under age 30, a population that could be vulnerable to recruitment into extremist groups or the illicit economy. A U.N. International Organization for Migration (IOM) expert believes the rial’s steep devaluation has effectively stopped remittance flows from the estimated two to three million Afghan nationals who remain in Iran; IOM estimated these remittance payments represented over half of the income for up to 30 percent of families in Afghanistan’s western provinces. The loss of remittance support has exacerbated the impacts of Afghanistan’s severe drought by removing a vital coping mechanism for many poor families.

The combined impact of increased returns and the sharp fall in Iran-sourced remittances could reduce Afghanistan’s GDP by three percent or more, based on World Bank estimates of remittance flows from Iran and other remitting nations. Further devaluations of the Iranian currency, for which street market rates hit a new record low on September 5, will potentially precipitate additional returns of Afghans still residing in Iran. Secondarily, although the returnees do not qualify under traditional definitions for refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs), their needs for livelihood will present an additional burden to the economy – and to local communities – that is more difficult to quantify.

**India**

India is Afghanistan’s most reliable regional partner and the largest contributor of development assistance in the region. India interprets the new U.S. South Asia policy as an opportunity to increase its economic involvement with Afghanistan. Since late 2015, India has pledged $1 billion in development assistance in addition to the approximate $2 billion already spent on Afghan infrastructure. India continues to invest in the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline. India provides significant training opportunities for Afghan officers and enlisted personnel and has frequently offered to increase its burden-sharing for Afghanistan. Approximately 130 Afghans travel to India each year to attend various military academy and commissioning programs.

**Gulf Countries**

Afghanistan prioritizes Saudi Arabia’s religious credibility and political support over seeking material support from Saudi Arabia. Particularly, Afghanistan seeks greater recognition of *fatwas* and statements by the Grand Mufti condemning terrorists and ISIS-K as “incompatible with Islamic values.” Historically, Saudi Arabia has not provided material or fiscal support to Afghanistan, despite Afghanistan’s entry into the Saudi-led Counter Terrorism Coalition.
In July 2018, a conference for the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), with participation from more than 50 countries, issued a statement calling for reconciliation in Afghanistan. Evidence that the Taliban aimed to weaken and delegitimize the OIC declaration indicates the extent to which the Taliban is actively concerned about its religious legitimacy.

Central Asian States

Central Asia continues to be an important region for U.S. security interests based on our continued need for access via the Northern Access Corridor (NAC). The United States continues steady engagement to maintain access, support regional sovereignty, build regional capacity against transnational threats, and develop closer ties between the Central Asian States and Afghanistan.

Threats from Insurgent and Terrorist Groups

Collectively, terrorist and insurgent groups continue to present a formidable challenge to Afghan, U.S., and coalition forces. The presence of more than 20 terrorist organizations in the region creates the largest concentration of terrorist and extremist organizations in the world.

The Haqqani network continues to be an integral part of the Taliban’s effort to pressure the Afghan government in Kabul and eastern Afghanistan. Sirajuddin Haqqani’s role as a Taliban deputy probably increased Haqqani influence within the Taliban leadership, and resulted in an increase in Haqqani influence to areas outside its normal operating areas of Paktika, Paktiya, and Khost provinces in eastern Afghanistan.

The Taliban has demonstrated increasing capability to threaten district centers; however, the ANDSF has also proven its ability to recover district centers lost to the Taliban quickly. Seeking to exploit ANDSF weaknesses and the reduced international military presence, the Taliban maintains control in some rural areas that lack effective Afghan government representation.

ISIS-K has suffered setbacks from U.S. CT operations, ANDSF operations, pressure from the Taliban, and difficulties in gaining local populace support. Despite some losses of territory, fighters, and leadership, ISIS-K remains a threat to coalition forces and retains the ability to conduct HPAs in urban centers, particularly Kabul.

ISIS-K recruits and distributes propaganda in many Afghan provinces. ISIS-K claimed responsibility for attacks against Shia minorities and the ANDSF around the country, including increased claimed attacks in Kabul. Command, control, and funding from core ISIS elements in Iraq and Syria are limited. The group relies on external funding; however, they appear to have funding streams within Afghanistan, as well. The struggle for resources has brought ISIS-K into conflict with the Taliban and other groups vying to raise revenue from illegal checkpoints and the trade of illicit goods. ISIS-K continues to draw its members from new recruits in Pakistan and Afghanistan, disaffected TTP fighters, Afghan Taliban, and militants from other violent extremist organizations who believe that associating with or pledging allegiance to ISIS-K will further their interests.

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11 Information in this section addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1223(e)(2)(C) of the NDAA for FY 2019 (H.R. 5515).
The al-Qa’ida threat to the United States and its allies and partners has decreased, and the few remaining al-Qa’ida core members are focused on their own survival. The remnants of the organization likely reside along the southeast Afghanistan border with Pakistan with a smaller element in isolated areas of northeast Afghanistan. Some lower- and mid-level Taliban leaders provide limited support to al-Qa’ida; however, there is no evidence of strategic ties between the two organizations, and the Taliban likely seeks to maintain distance from al-Qa’ida. In addition, al-Qa’ida’s regional affiliate, AQIS, has a presence in south and southeast Afghanistan, and in Pakistan, and is composed primarily of militants from within the broader South Asia region.

Security Trends

From June 1, 2018, to November 30, 2018, the total number of effective enemy-initiated attacks was 5,562 and the monthly average was 926. By comparison, the total number of effective enemy-initiated attacks during the same time last year (June 1, 2017 to November 30, 2017) was 5,547 and the monthly average was 924.

Figure 3: Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks

The coalition relies largely on ANDSF reporting for all metrics, including effective enemy-initiated attacks,12 which are a subset of all security incidents.13 Direct fire attacks against

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12 Reports on security incidents and effective enemy-initiated attacks are often delayed by several weeks due to translation and long data base reporting and processing timelines. In addition, ANDSF units frequently do not report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties, such as indirect fire or attempted IED explosions that do not wound or kill ANDSF personnel.

13 Since ANDSF units often do not report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties, the number of effective enemy-initiated attacks is the most representative metric of overall security conditions rather than the total number of reported security incidents. Security incidents comprise all enemy action, including enemy-initiated direct fire
minimally-manned Afghan outposts and checkpoints remain by far the largest source of effective enemy-initiated attacks, followed by IED attacks and mine strikes (see Figure 4). Consistent with trends over the last several years, indirect fire and surface-to-air fire remain the least frequent sources of effective enemy-initiated attacks. The number of IED attacks and mine strikes has remained relatively steady over the last 18 months.

**Figure 4: Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Type**

The ANDSF decreased the number of operations by 60 percent compared to the same period last year, primarily due to the Eid al Fitr ceasefire in June, and elections security in October. However, the average duration of operations doubled.

**ANDSF Casualties**

The number of ANDSF casualties suffered while conducting local patrols were 15% lower and checkpoint operations were 58 percent higher during this period than that of previous June 2017 through November 2017. The number of casualties incurred during planned offensive operations has decreased over the same period. The majority of ANDSF casualties continue to be the result of direct fire attacks; IED attacks and mine strikes contribute to overall casualties but at a much lower level.

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and indirect fire, such as mortar, rocket, and artillery; SAFIRE surface-to-air fire and explosive hazard events, including executed attacks (IED explosion, mine strike); and potential or attempted attacks (IEDs or mines found and cleared, premature IED detonations, and IED turn-ins). Security incidents do not include friendly action (e.g., direct fire and indirect fire initiated by friendly forces).

14 Additional information on ANDSF casualties can be found in the classified annex to this report.
U.S. Casualties and Insider Attacks

Conducting U.S. CT operations and RS TAA missions with the ANDSF still entails risks to U.S. and coalition forces. Since the beginning of U.S. operations in Afghanistan in October 2001, 1,887 U.S. military personnel have been killed in action (KIA) and 20,456\(^{15}\) have been wounded in action (WIA) as of November 30, 2018. During the reporting period, there were 11 U.S. military deaths as a result of hostile actions up from two the previous reporting period and nine during the same period last year. There were 73 U.S. military personnel WIA up from 22 the previous reporting period and 18 less than the same period last year.

During this reporting period, U.S. forces and the Afghan government intensified their efforts to reduce the number of insider attacks (also known as “green-on-blue” attacks). Improvements included the increased use of enhanced screening techniques for existing ANDSF and new recruits. On September 8, 2017, the Afghan MoD signed a new Force Protection / Insider Threat policy. The policy improves training and procedures on force protection of Afghans and coalition members. The policy and enhanced screening measures resulted in the removal of 199 ASSF from the force during this reporting period. The MoI is developing a similar policy. The following summary includes KIA casualties from operations and from apparent insider attacks:

On July 7, service members conducting guardian angel operations during an advising mission were attacked with small arms fire and grenades. The attack resulted in one KIA and two WIA.

On July 12, a mission in Pakita Province resulted in one service member KIA.

On August 7, one service member was KIA and three service members were WIA in Mush Qalah District, Helmand Province when their patrol was hit by an IED.

On September 3, one service member was KIA and one service member was WIA. The service members came under small arms fire in an apparent insider attack.

On October 4, one service member was KIA as a result of a Vehicle Borne IED (VBIED) in Helmand Province.

On November 3, one service member was KIA and one service member was WIA while in an apparent insider attack in Kabul.

On November 24, one service member was KIA and one service member was WIA while engaging enemy forces during in Nimroz Province.

On November 27, four service members were KIA and three service members were WIA when an IED detonated during operations in Andar District, Ghazni Province.

During this reporting period, there were four insider attacks against U.S. personnel. U.S. forces and the Afghan government intensified their efforts to reduce the number of insider attacks (also

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\(^{15}\) Data was accessed in the Defense Casualty Analysis System on December 12, 2018.
known as “green-on-blue” attacks). Improvements included the increased use of enhanced screening techniques for existing ANDSF and new recruits. On September 8, 2017, the Afghan MoD signed a new Force Protection / Insider Threat policy. The policy improves training and procedures on force protection of Afghans and coalition members. The policy and enhanced screening measures resulted in the removal of 199 ASSF from the force during this reporting period. The MoI is developing a similar policy.

During this reporting period, there were 34 insider attacks against Afghan personnel (also known as “green-on-green” attacks). RS advisors continue to engage both the MoD and the MoI on the requirement for formal personnel screening to be included in official policy at the national level. Compared to the previous reporting period and to the same time-period last year, insider attacks against the ANDSF, and the deaths caused by those attacks, have increased significantly by almost 60 percent.

**Civilian Casualties**

The RS Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team (CCMT) collects information on civilian casualties for the coalition. The CCMT relies primarily upon operational reports from the TAACs and the ANDSF. From June 1, 2018 to November 26, 2018, CCMT documented 5,061 civilian casualties (CIVCAS), of which approximately one third were deaths and two thirds were injuries. This represents a roughly 12 percent increase compared to the same time-period one year ago. The majority of the rise in civilian casualties can be attributed to the rise in insurgent use of IEDs (up 75 percent).

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) report covering January 1 to September 30 claimed 8,050 civilian casualties, of which 5,252 civilians were killed and 2,798 civilians were wounded. By comparison, the RS CCMT reported 6,775 total civilian casualties, of which 2,022 were killed and 4,753 were injured, during that same period. The UNAMA numbers reflect similar levels of civilian harm from the same period the previous year. Although CCMT and UNAMA report differing numbers due to different collection methodology, both sources attribute the largest portion of civilian casualties to the actions of insurgents. RS CCMT primarily relies upon operational reports from the TAACs, other CF headquarters, ANDSF reports, and operational video feeds. UNAMA compiles its figures from site visits by locally employed staff who speak with victims, witnesses, and local leaders, as well as from statements made by local officials and open source reporting.

Preventing civilian casualties remains a major concern of the ANDSF, the Afghan government, and U.S. and coalition forces. U.S. and coalition advisors continue to work closely with the Afghan government to reduce civilian casualties by raising awareness of the importance of civilian casualty prevention and mitigation. The coalition is continuing TAA efforts with the ANDSF on practical measures that they can adopt at the tactical level to prevent civilian casualties. The Afghan government also continues to host its quarterly Civilian Casualty Avoidance and Mitigation Board to discuss civilian casualty prevention procedures. Since the beginning of 2017, RS has provided training to ANDSF in the prevention and mitigation of civilian casualties, focusing on accurate definition and identification of civilians during conflict and civilian casualty preventing and mitigation efforts during pre-operational planning, execution of operations, and
Security of Afghan Women and Girls

Structural barriers, traditional cultural norms, and insecurity remain key challenges facing Afghan women throughout Afghan society and the ANDSF. Relevant indicators such as literacy and employment rates show the disparities between men and women. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) office in Kabul reports that only 17 percent of women are literate, compared to nearly half of the men, and just 15 percent of women are in paid employment. Conflict, criminality, and narcotics continue to be critical threats to women’s safety, public service delivery, and private investment. Fighting, family economic instability, and conflict-induced displacement all hinder women’s access to education.

Security remains a concern for female members of the ANDSF. Some women are afraid to wear their uniforms while travelling to work sites for fear of harassment and personal attacks. Once at work, inadequate facilities and a lack of female changing rooms contribute to an air of exclusion and present opportunities for sexual harassment. With the support of RS advisors, MoD and MoI officials conduct site surveys of Afghan locations that employ women to determine how to improve those facilities for the women.

The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), in coordination with the MoD and MoI, developed an ombudsman program to enable external reporting, oversight, and victim support for MoD and MoI female employees. Once implemented, this program will enable the ANDSF and the Afghan population to report gender-based violence and human rights abuses safely to the AIHRC, which can take action or assist law enforcement as appropriate. The program will provide an avenue for MoD and MoI female employees to seek independent mediation outside of their chain of command if the chain of command is complicit or fails to act appropriately in such cases. The ombudsman program, although developed and planned, has yet to be funded and implemented.

During this reporting period, the MoD and MoI Gender Integration Offices accompanied a Gender Interdepartmental delegation from Kabul, which included the MoD Gender Director, MoI Director of Human Rights, Women’s Affairs and Children Directorate, and a representative from the MoI Family Response Unit. The delegation hosted a seminar in which participants discussed topics on gender integration, female participation in the ANDSF, female employment and career progression in the ANDSF, and the effectiveness that female ANDSF.

The MoD and MoI Gender Integration Offices are developing policies and processes to prevent and report sexual harassment and assault. The offices also develop systems to provide support and assistance to male and female victims of sexual misconduct. In addition to policy, the gender

16 Information on the security of women and girls addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1531(c)(1)(A) of the NDAA for FY 2016.
integration offices will also focus on improved education and training in the management and investigation of sexual harassment and assault allegations.

The MoI established a Sexual Harassment and Assault Prevention Committee, composed of members from various directorates and chaired by the First Deputy Minister, with procedures to report and respond to sexual harassment complaints. This achievement reflects the MoI’s commitment to reduce sexual harassment and gender-based violence. RS advisors ensure the committee remains focused on the effort to ensure women feel safe reporting incidents of sexual harassment and violence, allegations are investigated, and offenders are held accountable.

**Family Response Units**

Most reported cases of violence against women are the result of domestic abuse. The MoI established Family Response Units (FRU) across Afghanistan in 2014 to assist women and children victims of domestic abuse. Some FRUs are staffed with specialists, such as psychologists and social workers, who interview and screen victims for follow-on physical and mental health treatment.

During this reporting period, the MoI issued a cipher granting the FRU Director command and control of all FRU offices at the provincial and district levels. Prior to the cipher, the FRU Director only had management and oversight of her own office. The new construct enables the Director to support all FRU police with staffing, training, furnishing, and equipment needs. A number of FRU police are enrolled in refresher training regarding FRU specific crimes hosted by the MoI Criminal Technique. The FRU Director is also seeking to conduct training at the Regional Training Centers to have more police in attendance. This training will comprise First Aid and the investigation of sexual abuse, domestic violence, kidnapping, and other related crimes.

The FRU Director requested *tashkil* revisions to realign additional positions for FRU sites and within the FRU office at the MoI HQ. The MoI goal for each FRU site is to have an onsite female FRU manager, an additional female police officer to allow for breaks of coverage in the event of multiple simultaneous cases, and a male officer to ensure their safety. Some FRUs continue to lack a permanent male officer, and engagements with the MoI secured a verbal commitment for additional assistance to address this issue. A recent focus on realigning the existing *tashkil* to accommodate growth in the Afghan Special Security Forces has delayed progress in filling the onsite FRU positions. The FRU realignment request will be reviewed for approval and incorporation into the 1398 *tashkil* (March 2019 to March 2020).
SECTION 3 – OVERVIEW OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

The ANDSF’s 2018 Annual Campaign Plan (NASRAT) marked the transition from a defensive, reactive posture to a deliberate offensive posture. Intelligence-based planning and synchronization of organic enablers, including artillery, ISR, CAS, rotary-lift, and Special Forces, were key enhancements to the force. During this reporting period, the ANDSF conducted multiple operations that involved two ANA Corps executing sustained cross-pillar offensive operations into enemy contested terrain across several provinces. The first of these types of operations took place in Northwest Afghanistan and involved the 207th and 209th Corps. The Chiefs of General Staff provided command and control. These types of operations demonstrate increased capability and the potential for the ANDSF to evolve into a more offensive-minded force.

Although the ANDSF are making modest strides in their efforts to become more offensive, there is still much work to do. ANDSF intelligence capabilities still require significant improvement. ANDSF intelligence failed to detect enemy staging and preparation prior to the attacks on Farah (May 2018) and Ghazni (August 2018) until mere hours before the enemy struck. While the ASSF response was effective in both cases, defeating the insurgents within four days, the lack of early warning handed the Taliban an avoidable public relations success.

ANA branch schools and training centers are receiving renewed attention as more coalition and Afghan personnel with the right expertise are assigned to advise these institutions. During this reporting period, the effectiveness of the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) came into question after several classes were delayed and the classes that did graduate were filled well below capacity resulting in fewer recruits entering the ANDSF. Advisors cite poor leadership, deteriorating facilities, and lack of trainers at KMTC for the facility’s underproduction. Coalition advisors are working to improve the efficiency and quality of the training at KMTC, and exploring ways to make better use of Regional Military Training Centers (RMTC). The standup of the Afghan National Training and Education Center (ANATEC) in early 2019 will steadily improve the professionalism of the force. NATO led EAPs in TAACs North and West extended coalition reach to previously unadvised units.

Kabul remains a target for insurgent and terrorist groups. HPAs in Kabul undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan government and undercut population confidence in Afghan security forces. The main effort for the Resolute Support Mission in 2018 was to enhance Kabul security through an intensified TAA effort with MoD and the MoI. The Afghan government employed a comprehensive approach, which included replacing all police district commanders, establishing Kabul Garrison Command (KGC) as the lead for city security, renovating the Kabul city gates, reinforcing the Enhanced Security Zone (ESZ), building an intelligence fusion cell, and increasing active ANDSF patrolling. The next step in this development process is initiation of an integrated and coordinated program of police mentorship at police district level. This program is set to begin in November 2018. JFC Brunssum will play a key enabling role by hosting a Police Development conference in October 2018.
3.1 ANDSF ROADMAP

This reporting period marked the end of the second full campaign season under President Ghani’s ANDSF Roadmap. The Roadmap is designed to seize the initiative in the fight against insurgent and terrorist forces; further professionalize the ANDSF; modify the force structure to extend security; expand governance and economic development; and compel the Taliban to seek reconciliation. The ANDSF Roadmap does not encompass all advising and capacity building efforts, but includes four key elements that are critical to enabling the effectiveness and sustainability of the ANDSF.

- **Increase Fighting Capabilities.** Create a more agile and lethal force by increasing the size and capability of the ASSF and subsequently increasing the amount and effectiveness of offensive operations. Modernize and expand the Afghan aviation fleet to provide a larger, more capable air force through a combination of aircraft acquisition, pilot training, maintenance training, target development, and integration throughout the ANDSF. Improving ANDSF ability to hold key terrain and population centers through the establishment of ANA Territorial Force (ANA-TF) units designed to provide security in strategic locations.

- **Leadership Development.** Produce honest, competent, and committed ANDSF professionals by introducing merit-based selection of leaders, better instruction and education, and a unified training system. Reform and improve human resource and personnel management systems to provide appropriate leader development from recruitment through retirement and assign trained leaders to the right positions.

- **Unity of Command/Effort.** Increase unity of command and effort between the MoD and the MoI, through realignment of combat forces under the MoD. Optimize existing command and control structures to improve MoD and MoI cooperation. Explore alternative command structures that improve overall ANDSF performance.

- **Counter-Corruption.** Implement reforms to address illicit activity and patronage networks within security organizations in order to reduce corruption and increase ANDSF effectiveness.

The ANDSF Roadmap serves as the campaign plan building towards a more offensive-oriented and sustainable security strategy and it provides a framework for reform aimed at achieving irreversible positive change to key security institutions. The Roadmap calls for a robust and expanded ASSF to improve ANDSF agility and lethality and implements reforms within the conventional forces to make them increasingly capable of protecting the population, holding key terrain, and securing critical infrastructure. The ANDSF plan called for an increasing amount of offensive operations starting in 2018 and accelerating in 2019 to expand security to increasing portions of the population. Increased military pressure and expanded security are critical factors required to convince the Taliban that they cannot achieve their objectives through military means, and to compel the group instead to seek a political settlement to the conflict.
**ANDSF Roadmap Progress**

**Increase Fighting Capabilities**

*Special Forces Growth.* The ASSF accounts for a small portion of the ANDSF, but conducts the majority of the ANDSF offensive missions. The doubling of the ASSF will add 33 new Commando companies and Mobile Strike Commando companies to the force by the end of 2020, increasing the Commando force level 73 percent. The ASSF Growth Plan, initiated in 2017, will provide the ANDSF the capacity to extend offensive overmatch to more areas of the country.

During this reporting period, ASSF growth progressed on schedule despite a delay in additional instructors being assigned to the School of Excellence (SOE) to assist with ANASOC Commando training. Adding additional instructors requires a change to the MoD *tashkil*. That process was delayed for nearly a year before finally being approved this reporting period. At the current pace, ANASOC growth will have added a fourth Commando company (*toly*) to most of the Special Operations *Kandaks* (SOK) by the beginning of the 2019 fighting season. Additionally, most of the Mobile Strike *Kandaks* (MSK) will have completed Commando training during that same time, and all three of the new National Mission Units (NMU) will have been added to the MoI’s General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU).

The GCPSU is evolving into an effective law enforcement agency, capable of conducting high-risk, warrant-based arrests. ANASOC as a whole is on schedule to double the number of trained Commandos by 2020; the command now consists of eight MSKs, which are in the process of receiving the advanced training necessary to become Cobra Strike *Kandaks* (CSKs). These growing formations will allow ANASOC forces to employ Commandos more rapidly to remote areas and population centers.

*Aviation Modernization.* The Afghan Aviation Modernization Program (AAMP) seeks to address ANDSF aerial fires and lift gaps and replace the Mi-17 fleet with U.S.-made helicopters while ensuring sustainment costs are affordable. As of the end of December 2018, DoD has delivered to Afghanistan 30 UH-60s for the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and the first five new armed MD-530 helicopters to add to the 30 that were fielded previously. The first AC-208 attack/ISR light fixed-wing aircraft will be delivered in January 2019, with a total of seven scheduled to be fielded through March. The AAF pilot training is maintaining pace with AAF growth milestones and incoming platforms.

In the last year, AAF combat operations surpassed Coalition combat air support operations in number. Three years ago, the AAF Headquarters could not build a targeting package for independent AAF offensive operations and the AAF had almost no aerial fires capability. After improving Air-Ground Integration (AGI), the AAF is now able to develop and execute up to eight targeting packages. They are now conducting more than half the in country airstrikes. During this reporting period, the AAF increasingly used precision munitions in combat. Afghan A-29 pilots are becoming more precise, with over 88 percent of their laser-guided munitions landing within one meter of their target. This increased accuracy is contributing to the prevention of civilian casualties while the number of CIVCAS attributed to the Taliban and ISIS-K continues to grow. After improving Air-Ground Integration (AGI), the AAF is now able to develop and execute up to eight targeting packages a
day. Moreover, on December 8, 2018, the AAF demonstrated a further expansion of its capability when an AAF A-29 conducted its first night strike.

**ANA-Territorial Force (ANA-TF) Pilot Program.** The ANDSF Roadmap added the ANA-TF as a new ANA component. The ANA-TF is a President Ghani-directed effort to create a more effective, professional, sustainable, and MoD-led local security force. ANA-TF was designed to serve as a local “hold” force in government-controlled areas as ANDSF offensive operations progress in contested areas. Unlike the Afghan Local Police (ALP), the MoD will command and control the locally recruited, nationally trained ANA-TF. ANA-TF soldiers will receive the same basic training as all ANA soldiers and be led by full-time ANA officers. The first three “pilot” ANA-TF *tolays* completed training in September and have begun operating with their parent ANA *kandaks*, brigades, and corps.

The ANA-TF presents an opportunity to generate further operational momentum by providing the ANA with additional hold force capacity. During this reporting period, RS ordered a pause in the recruiting beginning in September in order to evaluate the pilot ANA-TF companies and incorporate lessons learned into the program going forward. Specific emphasis is being placed on determining the conditions that must be established in a community before an ANA-TF will be allowed to thrive. The location of future ANA-TF units will remain subject to a variety of factors that include conditions on the ground and local support.

**Expanding TAA Efforts.** During this reporting period, RS extended TAA efforts to an increasing number of ANA Corps and Brigades. The U.S. SFAB placed advisor teams with 33 *kandaks*, 18 brigades, 4 training centers, and 1 Corps headquarters. Additionally, the SFAB added an additional 8 advisory teams to the 5 already assigned to work with the Kabul Security Force (KSF) to help the KGC secure the capital and prevent HPAs. SFAB teams also helped improve ORC training cycle productivity by serving as trainers at select RMTCs. ORC discipline within the conventional ANA is still inconsistent; however, efforts to increase the quality of the training will help convince ANA leadership that ORCs are necessary to maintain readiness.

**Leadership Development**

**New Leadership.** The increase in ANA offensive military pressure on the enemy throughout winter was a result of a culture shift within the force driven by the new leadership, including replacing five of six Corps commanders, the Chief of General Staff (CoGS), and the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Interior. Parliament subsequently confirmed the appointments of Minister of Defense Bahrami and Minister of Interior Barmak, empowering both leaders to pursue much-needed reform. For example, soon after his confirmation, Minister Barmak replaced seven Provincial Chiefs of Police (in Farah, Sar-e Pul, Herat, Takhar, Samangan, Khost, and Kabul) and all 18 Kabul District Chiefs of Police. Selection for replacements included a merit-based screening and board process culminating with Presidential approval.

**Inherent Law.** A generational change in leadership began within the MoD in January 2018 with the first wave of Inherent Law retirements (including 656 colonels and generals)—and subsequent merit-based promotions—and continued this reporting period when the MoD retired 497 colonels and 61 generals under the second wave of Inherent Law. Similar changes in MoI leadership began.
this reporting period when the first wave of MoI Inherent Law retired 738 colonels and 142 generals. This generational change of leadership will open senior leadership positions for the next generation of ANSF leaders selected based on merit rather than patronage. The anticipated rapid turnover of personnel underscores the importance of ministerial commitment to facilitate an orderly transition and oversee the education and training of new leadership.

**Figure 5: Inherent Law Retirement Waves**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>293 Generals 1,619 Colonels</td>
<td>Wave 1 162 Generals 494 Colonels</td>
<td>Wave 2 61 Generals 497 Colonels</td>
<td>Wave 3 24 Generals 344 Colonels</td>
<td>247 Generals 1,335 Colonels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>302 Generals 1,473 Colonels</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Wave 1 142 Generals 738 Colonels</td>
<td>Wave 2 139 Generals 400 Colonels</td>
<td>281 Generals 1,138 Colonels</td>
</tr>
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*Some waivers pending approval

**Unity of Effort/Unity of Command**

The FY17-18 MoD Optimization program sought to correct command and control shortcomings by decreasing the span of control of some organizations and by increasing the number of civilian positions at the ministerial level. Reducing the top-heavy structure, civilianizing the workforce, and enabling a progressive generation of leaders are all among the optimization goals. These efforts led to more than 900 personnel reductions, which allowed for ASSF and AAF growth. In 2017, the Afghan Border Police transferred to MoD and became the Afghan Border Force (ABF).

**Counter-Corruption**

The Afghan government made tangible progress on important anti-corruption reforms, but more work remains. President Ghani unveiled the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) in September 2017. Corruption remains the top strategic threat to the legitimacy and success of the Afghan government. President Ghani continues to demonstrate his commitment to reform in this critical area by enforcing the investigation and prosecution of corrupt officials through the concerted efforts of the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC), and the Afghan Attorney General’s office.

During this reporting period, the ACJC and MCTF added an investigative function to maintain counter-corruption momentum within the Afghan government. The MCTF investigates high-level corruption, organized crime, kidnappings, and other serious crimes. The ACJC focuses exclusively on prosecuting high-level corruption cases. President Ghani established the ACJC to provide oversight and transparency for the prosecution of major crimes, including those over $75,000 and all cases involving flag officers. During its first year in operation, the ACJC

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17 Information on counter-corruption addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1223(e)(2)(A) of the NDAA for FY 2019 (H.R. 5515).
successfully prosecuted 27 major corruption cases, heard 23 appellate court cases, and addressed 20 Afghan Supreme Court cases.

The Afghan government countered corruption at the operational and tactical levels through merit-based civil servant leader appointments, enforcement of electronic records for fuel and personnel pay systems, and the integration of qualified young professionals into key government positions. President Ghani reduced the number of procurement contracts and consolidated all major contractual awards at the national level through the National Procurement Commission (NPC), which he personally chairs. Other important examples of counter-corruption efforts include the biometric enrollment of MoD and MoI personnel into the Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS), coupled with audits of the Ministry of Finance and Da Afghan Bank (DAB). Biometric enrollment of all MoD personnel is ongoing, having slowed due to the transition of Afghan Border Police (ABP) and Afghan National Civil Order Police from the MoI to the MoD. Biometric enrollment of all ANDSF personnel is scheduled to be complete in late 2018, causing a corresponding delay in full APPS implementation.

Shortly after his arrival, Minister Barmak ordered the refinement of the MoI Strategic Plan (MISP) to prioritize counter-corruption and develop a merit-based assignment and promotion process. Despite these initiatives, issues related to undue external and political influence on the MoI still exist. A culture of patronage and pervasive corruption continues to stifle the development of a truly professional police force. The MoI is in the process of completing an anti-corruption strategy and action plan. Realigning the ANP to enforce rule of law remains a critical requirement. Continued gaps in the MoI advisory team, however, particularly the absence of civilian police expertise, continue to hamper TAA efforts.

With new police leadership established in Kabul, RS is working with Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCBS) and the NATO Center of Excellence for military police expertise to train the new Afghan MoI leaders. RS will also seek to expand these training and mentoring offerings to the new MoI leadership as they are selected through the MoI’s merit-based selection process.

3.2 ANDSF SIZE, POSTURE, AND ASSESSMENT

The current ANDSF authorized force level as part of the tashkil remains at 352,000 ANA and ANP personnel18 plus 30,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP). The United States is the sole supporter of the ALP. Although the ALP fall under the MoI for oversight, they are not part of the 352,000 authorized ANDSF tashkil. The ANDSF consists of three components: conventional ground forces (ANA and ANP), the Afghan Air Force (AAF), and the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF). The MoD oversees the ANA, the Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF), the Afghan Border Force (ABF), the AAF, and the MoD’s pillars within the ASSF: the ANASOC and the SMW. The MoI oversees the four ANP forces that include Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Public Security Police (PSP) (remaining elements of the former Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)), Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP), ALP, and the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). The MoI also provides oversight of three special

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18 The authorized strength of 352,000 includes 227,374 ANA and 124,626 ANP.
units of the General Command Police Special Units (GCPSU), and the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA).

MoD forces provide security to the Afghan people through the execution of offensive combat operations against threats to the government and the Afghan populace. MoD forces also provide security along the Afghan border and protect lines of communication and critical infrastructure. MoI forces execute community policing and Rule of Law and also conduct counter-corruption and counter-narcotics operations. In December 2017, the MoI transferred ABP positions to the MoD and, in March 2018, eight Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) brigades to the MoD. These force transfers enhanced the capabilities of the ANA and allowed the MoI to focus on building a professional and effective police force focused on community-centric, traditional, evidenced-based law enforcement policing.

MoD and MoI authorizations changed with the transfer of ABF and ANCOF, but the total ANDSF authorization remains 352,000. The MoD is authorized 227,374 and the MoI is authorized 124,626. Since the beginning of the RS mission, ANDSF reported on-hand strength has remained stable at around 316,000. Lack of U.S. and Coalition presence at lower levels throughout the ANDSF forces increased reliance on manual Afghan reporting. Over the past two years, Coalition advisors have assisted the MoD and MoI in the conduct of Personnel Asset Inventories (PAI) to account properly for ANDSF personnel and facilitate enrollment in the APPS system. PAIs were completed earlier this year, but the process of enrolling ANDSF personnel into the APPS system is ongoing. The collection of biometric data and other information required for APPS has begun to provide a more realistic assessment of the actual size of the force. Beginning in 2017, CSTC-A began paying salaries based on personnel strength showing in the APPS database despite Afghan reporting of personnel strength at higher levels.

During this reporting period, APPS became Fully Operationally Capable (FOC) in both the MoD and MoI. Based on current APPS data, ANDSF personnel strength appears to be lower than Afghan reported data. It will likely take several more months to complete enrollment into the APPS system, and the true overall size of the ANDSF is likely to fall between the Afghan reported numbers and the numbers accounted for in APPS. The MoD reports that it has 190,753 personnel assigned and the MoI reports 117,231. This accounts for a total of 307,984, or 87 percent of the authorized total. MoD and MoI reported numbers may be revised as APPS reporting solidifies and it becomes clearer whether all personnel currently reported are, in fact, on hand.

**Attrition**

Attrition remains problematic for both the ANA and the ANP. ANA attrition is tracked with greater fidelity than ANP attrition due to better personnel systems and higher enrollment rates in AHRIMS and APPS. The number of personnel dropped from the rolls (DFR) accounts for the

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19 Prior to the change in authorizations, MoD was authorized 195,000 and MoI was authorized 157,000. The ALP are counted as a separate authorization.
20 Attrition is unplanned and planned total losses, including Dropped from Rolls (DFR), Killed in Action (KIA), Separation, and Other [disappearance/captured, disability, death (not in action), retirement, exempted (i.e., AWOL or permanent medical), or transfer to the ANA/ANP] losses. Attrition rate uses the current month’s attrition numbers (total losses) divided by the previous month’s strength numbers.
greatest portion of ANA and ANP attrition rates, but DFR rates for both the ANA and the ANP are at the lowest (best) they have been during RSM. DFR personnel are those soldiers and police who leave the organization prior to the end of their contract for reasons that include desertion or being absent without leave (AWOL) for over a month. DFRs occur for a variety of reasons, including low pay or delays in pay, austere living conditions, denial of leave, and intimidation by insurgents. The single greatest contributor to DFRs is poor leadership. Soldiers and police grow disillusioned with leaders who fail to take care of them with leave, promotion, and pay in accordance with standing policies. Within the ANA and ANP, seasonality appears to have an effect on DFR rates. In the months preceding the fighting season each year, the DFR rate tend to be lower than the months immediately following the fighting season.

The ANA and ANP have policies to prevent personnel from going absent without leave. Enforcement of the policies and accountability for offenders remain inconsistent. Coalition advisory efforts continue to focus on the ANDSF’s ability to regenerate forces through recruitment (ANAREC), training (KMTC), and operational readiness programs. Inefficiencies in any of the stages of force regeneration will prevent the ANDSF from achieving and maintaining its assigned force levels.

**Force Posture**

The ANDSF force posture aimed to sustain offensive operations and seize operational momentum as part of Operation Nasrat. The AAF and the ASSF maintained offensive pressure in conjunction with ANA operations. The ANDSF continued to demonstrate increased ability to focus aviation, fire support, and mobile strike efforts. RS’s use of EAPs coupled with the addition of embedded SFAB advisors at select levels below corps, increased the effectiveness of the ANA.

**ASSF Misuse**

During this reporting period, ASSF misuse increased to unsustainable levels. ASSF are purpose-built to pressure the Taliban. ASSF are thoroughly vetted, trained, and uniquely equipped to provide offensive capability for crisis response and high-risk operations supporting strategic-level priorities. Afghan government and MoD senior leaders have increasingly turned to ASSF forces to respond to Taliban attacks on population centers and remote district centers when conventional ANA proved incapable of responding quickly enough. In many cases, ASSF units, specifically ANASOC Commandos, remained deployed for extended period of time after ANA Corps commanders refused to relieve them with conventional forces. The extended deployments of ASSF forces resulted in many units failing to implement ORCs and lowering overall readiness of the force. Additionally, ASSF misuse reduced the number of offensive operations executed by the ASSF this summer. Continued misuse of these elite troops on static checkpoints, district center security, and holding forces poses a challenge to future ASSF operations against the Taliban.

To address the effects of ASSF misuse, NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A), the Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the Ministry of Interior (MoI), in coordination with RESOLUTE SUPPORT Headquarters, authored Concept of Employment (CoE) documents to outline roles, coordination, and responsibilities for employing ASSF. The CoEs are signed and currently being implemented. Associated financial penalty letters issued through
CSTC-A to MoD/MoI are based on the type of misuse and its frequency. Seven penalty letters have been executed since August 1, 2018.

According to the CoE, *proper* employment of ANASOC is described as:

- Short-duration offensive deployments to deny enemy sanctuary and freedom of action including disrupting enemy lines of communication.
- Limited direct action attacks against enemy command and control nodes, infrastructure, and lines of communication.
- Targeted raids against high-value targets to achieve strategic objectives and set conditions for conventional forces.
- Limited duration disruption operations in support of ANDSF and prevent the loss of control of critical areas to enemy forces.

The CoE describes *proper* employment of Special Mission Wing (SMW) as:

- Precision insertion and extraction of forces into permissive or non-permissive helicopter landing zones (HLZ), primarily at night using Night-Vision Devices (NVD).
- Aerial reconnaissance primarily using PC-12 in support of ASSF combat assaults.
- CASEVAC of ASSF in environments not accessible to conventional AAF lift capability.
- Resupply of ASSF in environments not accessible to conventional AAF lift capability.
- ASSF Personnel Recovery operations.
- Reinforcement of ASSF units.
- Expeditionary operations in support of ASSF.
- Special operations air support of ASSF efforts countering terrorism, insurgency, and narcotics primarily at the National-Strategic level.
- Strike integration of A-29 aircraft in support of ASSF.

Misuse of forces is also described in the CoE. Examples of ANASOC *misuse* described in the CoE include:

- ANASOC not retaining command and control over ANASOC subordinate units.
- Tasks not within the capability of ANASOC.
- Tasks that exceed 72 hours of employment.
- Deployments that result in an inability to support and sustain ANASOC forces adequately.
- Tasks more appropriately assigned to conventional forces (static defensive positions, personal security, etc.).
- Tasks that result in the disruption of ANASOC operational readiness cycles (ORC).

The CoE describes *misuse* of Special Mission Wing (SMW) as:

- Tasking SMW assets outside of the approved tasking process (i.e. order from the JSOCC/Nasrat).
- Tasking SMW assets to move civilian personnel to include VIPs.
- Tasking SMW assets to conduct resupply missions of non-ASSF units.
- Tasking ASSF units to conduct CASEVAC of non-ASSF personnel. Tasking SMW assets without appropriate mission planning time to execute.
Beginning in August, CSTC-A began levying financial penalties of $1 million per week against the MoD for ANASOC misuse in an effort to restore ANASOC formations and reinvigorate ANASOC ORCs. These penalties proved effective in the near term with ANASOC misuse levels dropping and readiness rates increasing beginning in September. The penalties coupled with a shift to ASSF forces becoming the supported force with conventional ANDSF in a follow-and-support role have begun to improve the overall effectiveness of the ASSF and reduced the number of Taliban attacks. During this reporting period, CSTC-A withheld $3,583,425 for ANASOC misuse. A penalty of $895,856 continues to accrue since September 10, 2018 and has not yet been withheld from MoD.

Also in August, CSTC-A began enforcing financial penalties of $100,000 per flight hour of Mi-17, $40,000 per flight hour of PC-12. In September, the fines rose to $150,000 per flight hour of Mi-17 and $60,000 per flight hour of PC-12. These penalties proved effective in the near term with SMW misuse levels dropping in September. During this reporting period, CSTC-A withheld $582,306 for SMW misuse.

Although the ASSF demonstrated enhanced lethality and effectiveness in offensive operations, cases of ASSF misuse continue to undermine efforts to exert military pressure on the Taliban, ISIS-K, and other terrorist groups. The lack of an established, capable local hold force to exploit operational successes often leads to ANDSF leadership routinely tasking ASSF elements to hold district centers and checkpoints in remote locations. These taskings force ASSF to conduct static defense operations, fail to leverage ASSF training and equipment, decrease morale, increase desertions, impact operational readiness circles, and reduce the overall combat effectiveness of the force. Reversing the current trend requires recognition of the need to maintain operational readiness cycles, concepts of employment, and apolitical use of Afghan security forces. This must be understood and respected from the ministerial level down to the tactical. RS TAA emphasize the proper use of ASSF capabilities, but continued misuse threatens the sustainability of the ANDSF. ASSF personnel are highly trained with developed, collective skills, but only fundamental military planning and execution applied properly by the chain of command can optimize ASSF talent. When employed correctly, the ASSF is a force multiplier on the Afghan battlefield.

The use of static checkpoints continues to reduce the available combat power for maneuver and remains an area of concern for the ANDSF. Significant social and political pressure to maintain checkpoints around villages and along highways contributes to the continued employment of static checkpoints. Many of these checkpoints are tactically unsound and present opportunities for the enemy. The overwhelming majority of successful Taliban attacks against ANDSF forces continue to occur at poorly manned static checkpoints.

The MoD agreement to reduce the number of permanent fixed checkpoints across Afghanistan has not progressed, and the number of checkpoints occupied by ANDSF forces may actually be growing. ANA corps previously agreed to employ no more than 25 percent of their forces in the operational phase of the ORC in permanent static checkpoint positions. Despite these stated goals, the ANA did not reduce checkpoints significantly during this reporting period. This sustained misuse of conventional forces on checkpoints and static positions has reduced the mobility of the ANDSF, lowered the morale of ANDSF personnel placed at risk, and contributed to soldier
desertion and recruiting shortfalls. Failure to reinforce or reduce the number of checkpoints poses a significant risk to the ANDSF’s ability to seize the initiative from the Taliban.

**Assessment**

The ANDSF’s performance in combat operations continued to improve, and during the reporting period, the ANDSF made modest gains against the Taliban in some parts of Afghanistan. This reporting period marks the beginning of the third year of a sustainable security strategy that focuses on securing the Afghan population, key infrastructure, and lines of communication.

During this reporting period, the ANA demonstrated increased capability to command and control offensive operations involving multiple Corps. Operation TALON involved one brigade from three separate ANA Corps maneuvering in support of each other to force Taliban forces to displace from portions of southern and eastern Afghanistan. Operation TALON utilized ANASOC forces to disrupt the Taliban in advance of conventional ANA maneuver and forced ANA leaders to synchronize combat enablers including ISR, aerial fires, and artillery.

Large-scale operations were not the norm during this reporting period, and although operations such as Operation TALON demonstrated increased capability, ANDSF offensive operations were typically much smaller and hampered by a lack of available combat power due to excessive commitments to checkpoints and static defensive positions. Additionally, Taliban raids on remote district centers and populated areas forced the ANDSF to react and deploy forces to regain control of these areas rather than execute planned offensive operations. The net result was a continued stalemate with the ANDSF maintaining control of most of the populated areas and lines of communication, and the Taliban consolidating gains in rural and remote portions of Afghanistan as well as areas surrounding population centers.

**Election Security**

In October, Afghanistan held Parliamentary elections, marking the first Afghan-owned, Afghan-led election in the last 17 years. The election, which the Afghan security institutions secured and executed, demonstrates the significant growth and development of Afghanistan’s institutions and capabilities. The performance of the ANDSF during the parliamentary elections exceeded expectations and resulted in an overall lack of violence, specifically high profile attacks, when compared to previous elections. ANDSF performance prior to elections set the stage for peaceful elections and was accomplished by a series of coordinated and well-executed operations that kept disrupting the enemy’s planning and resourcing efforts. During this reporting period, the MoD and MoI placed significant emphasis on security planning for Parliamentary elections by working across electoral and security institutions to ensure delivery of materials and security of polling locations. Throughout the summer, ANDSF offensive operations expanded security around voter registration sites and polling centers to increase voter participation and provide proof of concept for security operations in support of Presidential elections scheduled for April 20, 2019. In the lead up to Parliamentary elections, leaders from the MoD, MoI, NDS, and the Afghan government demonstrated unprecedented levels of cooperation and joint planning. In September, Coalition advisors hosted an Afghan elections rehearsal in Kabul to solidify the concept, delineate security
responsibilities between the ministries, and identify areas for improvement. In the month that followed, similar rehearsals took place at ANA Corps and below levels.

To support delivery and retrieval of election materials (SEM), the AAF planned and conducted airlift support of sensitive election materials (SEM), voting supplies, biometric kits, and IEC personnel and materials for 78 districts, displaying the Air Command and Control Center’s (ACCC) strong utilization of centralized command and control (C2) of mobility assets. The success of the ACCC’s C2 and the AAF’s delivery demonstrates Afghanistan’s air capacity and ability to support national initiatives across the country.

The security during the parliamentary elections exceeded expectations but was not entirely positive. During the 2010 elections, there were 611 enemy initiated attacks (EIAs). On election day, 20 October, only 243 EIAs were reported. Twelve were attacks on polling centers. Election-related civilian casualties, however, likely increased from 2014 to 2018. Specific numbers are problematic due to changes in methodology and collection capability by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the RS Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team. But the analytical consensus held that civilian casualties increased. Kandahar, which delayed its elections a week to 27 October, had zero incidents involving polling stations despite the turmoil caused by LTG Raziq’s assassination. Only 371 polling stations were closed compared to 938 in 2010, providing further evidence of increased security across the country.

Election planning provided the most difficult test for MoD and MoI planners. In advance of the October 20, Parliamentary elections, planners from both ministries met with planners from other government agencies and Coalition advisors to develop an integrated plan that would allow for security at polling sites and safe delivery of election materials. MoI’s proactive planning for security during the elections proved successful. The MOI Planners were successful in implementing an effective Command and Control (C2) Cell during Parliamentary Elections that was responsible for daily tracking of reports used to inform senior MoI leaders and other Senior Command Staff to mitigate potential issues that would impact the elections. This C2 node also had direct oversight of voter registration packets where both essential and unessential materials used by the polling centers.

3.3 CAPABILITIES

Resources

During this reporting period, MoD and MoI resource management and procurement capabilities steadily improved. The MoD utilized the FY 2018 Draft Prioritization Procurement Plan to focus on procurement priorities that emphasize ANA readiness, promote key Roadmap initiatives, and support operational and warfighting needs. The MoD met major Requirements Approval Board (RAB) timelines and awarded over 90 percent of the contracts identified in the Draft Prioritization Procurement Plan. The FY 2018 MoI Draft Prioritized Procurement Plan reestablished the focus on setting procurement priorities that emphasize readiness and key Roadmap initiatives. Poor

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21 Additional information on ANA and ANP force component capabilities and MoD and MoI capacity and ministerial support to the ANDSF is provided in the relevant sections below.
communication between MoI and the National Procurement Authority, however, continues to impede the development of standard bid documents, which delays bid announcement and contract award.

**Rule of Law**

The Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) helps lead the fight against corruption. During this reporting period, the court’s output has stagnated relevant to the numbers of prosecutors and the court’s overall capacity to handle a robust docket and successfully prosecute major corruption cases at the primary, appellate, and Supreme Court levels. The number of cases initiated, trials conducted, and prosecutions completed have slowed. Currently, the ACJC appears to be avoiding its mandate to try “major” corruption cases, as evidenced by its proclivity to try “low-level” cases over “high-level” cases. In 2018, the ACJC has only tried four General Officers. Since its inception, the ACJC has tried approximately 40 cases, declined roughly 300 cases due a lack of jurisdiction, and continues to investigate about 150 cases.

**Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS)**

Since the beginning of the RS mission, ANDSF reported on-hand strength has remained stable at around 315,000. Lack of U.S. and coalition presence at lower levels throughout the ANDSF forces increases reliance on manual Afghan reporting. Over the past two years, coalition advisors have worked to reduce reliance on manual Afghan reporting through implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS).

APPS is an enterprise resource planning system that will integrate existing MoD and MoI systems for personnel management and payroll, like the Afghan Human Resources Information System (AHRIMS) and Afghan Automated Biometrics Information Systems (AABIS), into a single platform providing timely and accurate accountability of all personnel, including civilians. This extensive, multi-year effort to implement APPS will strengthen transparency, audit capability, personnel accountability and the elimination of “ghost soldiers,” and limit ANDSF payroll fraud across the ministries. MoD and MoI personnel must provide personal data, possess an identification card, have biometric data on file, and occupy a valid position on the current tashkil to be validated and slotted within the APPS system. During this reporting period, APPS achieved Full Operational Capability (FOC) in both the MoD and MoI. In September 2018, CSTC-A began funding monthly ANA payroll disbursements only to those personnel that are validated and slotted in APPS and meet the minimum base pay requirements. To meet minimum base pay requirements, APPS must contain validated information for an individual’s biometric number, name, father’s name, grandfather’s name, ID card number, date of birth, and actual rank. At the end of this reporting period, 159,490 ANA personnel (85 percent of ANA on-hand personnel) have been slotted in APPS and met minimum base pay requirements. Within the MoI, 70,426 ANP personnel (60 percent of the ANP on-hand personnel) have been slotted in APPS and met minimum base pay requirements in APPS.

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22 Information on APPS addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1215 of the NDAA for FY 2017 (P.L. 114-328)
APPS is a major shift in the ministries’ traditional way of managing pay and personnel. This transformation will encounter challenges; however, with RS assistance, the MoD and MoI have made progress towards greater accountability and transparency.

**PAI and Enrollment Efforts**

RS and the ministries completed PAIs earlier this year, but the process of enrolling ANDSF personnel into the APPS system is ongoing. Over the last three years, MoD personnel and coalition advisors conducted PAIs at each ANA corps location to update and validate soldier data in the AHRIMS and ensure personnel data accurately populates in the APPS system. PAI enrollment within the MoD reached 98 percent in December 2017, but the transfer of MoI forces to the MoD during the last reporting period resulted in a drop in overall enrollment. The MoD conducted its first round of PAI from April to May 2018 to validate forces that transferred from the MoI. A second round of PAI began in July and reached 97 percent by the end of the reporting period. ANA unit members must be validated in the biometric system every three years. The ANA GS G1 has set up full PAI operations in each Corps HQ under the leadership and management of Defense Security Service (DSS) to ensure all new recruits and those returning to service are biometrically enrolled. The new process will eliminate the need to send out periodic PAI teams.

Beginning on January 1, 2017, CSTC-A only disbursed salaries to the ANA for individuals validated in the AHRIMS system. When APPS reached FOC in September 2018, CSTC-A transitioned its payroll funding model and began funding monthly ANA payroll disbursements only to those personnel that are validated and slotted in APPS and meet the minimum base pay requirements.

The MoI’s PAI effort began in late 2016 but did not advance as quickly as the ANA due to challenges with geographic displacement of police forces in hazardous or non-permissive areas. PAI efforts collected data on a large number of the current ANP forces, resulting in the processing and validation of a majority of the force. On November 30, 2018, APPS reached FOC in the MoI.

Proper assignment of MoD and MoI personnel to valid tashkil positions has slowed the enrollment process and delayed the transition to APPS. Every iteration of the tashkil requires a revalidation and reslotting of a number of individuals in APPS. Based on current APPS data, ANDSF personnel strength appears to be lower than Afghan reported data. It will likely take several more months to complete enrollment into the APPS system, and the true overall size of the ANDSF is likely to fall between the Afghan reported numbers and the numbers accounted for in APPS.

**Training**

APPS training within the MoD continued during this reporting period, with the last 20 percent of APPS operators in training. The four-week operator training classes graduate approximately 100 students per month. After the four-week class, over-the-shoulder (OTS) training occurs at each unit for four to eight weeks to reinforce daily time and attendance record requirements, assist with identifying and reconciling pay discrepancies, and troubleshoot issues that arise now that APPS has reached FOC.
Approximately 1,039 MoI APPS operators have graduated from the 4-week APPS training class and received OTS training. In preparation to launch APPS, the ANP conducted one-month human resource training and one-week finance training classes in Kabul. RS advisors mentored ANP trainers and helped guide the implementation process since human resources personnel must adapt their daily procedures from a paper based attendance policy to APPS. To date, 705 and 334 individuals have received human resource and finance training, respectively. In coordination with the APPS Program Manager, there will be additional training offered in Kabul with a specific focus on PME and attendance to help improve this process for remaining groups.

**Utilization**

The benefits of APPS extend beyond payroll system improvements. RS advisors and the ANDSF gain greater understanding of personnel information, force size, real-time personnel data, unit strength, and general human resource information. APPS alone cannot solve the problem of poor career path management, and simply understanding where a soldier, NCO, or officer is slotted on the tashkil is insufficient to build a sustainable personnel management capacity. Although APPS is capable of managing personnel moves, HRM professionals that use the system must understand the career path a soldier, NCO, or officer should follow in order to remain competitive for promotion and selection to positions of increased responsibility. HRM professionals must understand when ANA personnel should attend professional military education (PME) and work with UTEDC to use APPS as a tool to ensure training occurs and soldiers are assigned to positions to utilize their new skills. At present, the ANA HRM system is not designed to perform critical functions such as career path management. The implementation of APPS will help set the conditions for a successful HRM system to grow. Intensive advisor support is required in order to build an HRM system that maximizes APPS and ensures rising leaders occupy critical positions as they progress in their career.

**Personnel Management**

The MoD and MoI made incremental improvements in personnel management; however, this is still an area in need of much improvement. As APPS has come online, the tashkils for both the MoI and MoD have undergone major modifications. Implementation of the ANA-TF program in the MoD, ministerial transfers of forces from MoI to MoD, and consolidation of tashkil data within the MoI resulted in delays in finalizing the tashkils associated with APPS. Once APPS is fully implemented, it will be used to manage personnel assignments across the ANDSF. Both ministries are still absent a holistic human resource management (HRM) program govern personnel assignments and career path management. Inherent Law retirements made room for merit-based promotions and provided opportunities to manage personnel more effectively. Initiatives in the MoD to address senior leader personnel management are underway. The lack of a formalized performance evaluation system poses a challenge to selecting the right leader for the right job. In the absence of evaluations, talent assessments are conducted at each of the ANA Corps to identify the ANA officers best suited for positions of increased responsibility. The assessments are subjective, but a step in the right direction with respect to personnel management.
Training

The MoD continued to make incremental progress in strengthening its institutional training this reporting period, while the MoI continued to struggle in most areas. The MoD approved the establishment and implementation of the Unified, Training, Education, and Doctrine Command (UTEDC) last reporting period. The UTEDC is an integrated Headquarters responsible for developing doctrine and training programs to govern branch schools and PME institutions. In July, LTG Mohammad Nazim Payenda assumed command of the UTEDC. Over the course of this reporting period, LTG Payenda and his staff, temporarily located at the MoD HQ, began working to establish a permanent HQ at the Marshal Fahim National Defense University in Qagha. RS advisors plan to consolidate TAA efforts to ensure targeted TAA at the future UTEDC locations.

Although MoI training continues to lag behind MoD, the Subject Matter Expert (SME) program is a bright spot that has enhanced capability at the ministerial headquarters level. The SME program involves the hiring of experienced, educated, and technically proficient Afghans to provide skilled civilian support to the MoI. These SMEs have been able to build systems and train others within the ministry, and have allowed the MoI to transition some uniform billets to civilian positions helping with continuity.

Initial entry training for both the MoD and MoI are areas of concern. During this reporting period, MoD’s Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) came under scrutiny after the facility delayed classes and after reports of unsatisfactory training, poor living conditions, and inadequate trainer support. In September, COL Mohammad Amion “Wahidi” replaced the commander of KMTC and was charged with restoring order to KMTC, increasing the quality of training, and ensuring ANA soldiers were provided better care. The conditions at KMTC had deteriorated to the point where trainees were becoming malnourished and arriving at their units in poor health and not trained to standard. Command emphasis on KMTC has also led to increased advisor involvement.

Pilot and aviation maintenance training continues to progress, constrained only by the number of English language classes available to potential recruits. Force protection requirements for English language instructors and classes limit the number of opportunities available to candidates and challenge RS advisors to keep enough personnel in the training pipeline to meet ANDSF Roadmap milestones.

Logistics and Maintenance

ANDSF sustainment systems are becoming more efficient, but logistics and maintenance remain areas of concern for both the MoD and MoI. Building on success from previous reporting periods, the MoD began performing mandatory 10 percent inventory assessments. MoD and RS advisors review these assessments in conjunction with on-hand inventory reports and inputs in Core-Information Management System (Core-IMS). By reconciling random inventory assessments with Core-IMS, the MoD have been able to improve visibility of inventory and RS advisors have been able to identify reporting weaknesses by geographic locations, allowing them to tailor their TAA efforts as necessary. As reporting accuracy improves, MoD leaders can direct materials to be cross-leveled when appropriate to meet critical demands, an area where ANA consistently
struggles. MoI and Coalition advisors are considering a similar system for incorporation in the ANP.

SFAB LATs provided increased logistics and maintenance capability at the ANA Corps level and helped build capability within the ANASOC. Primarily assisting during training and readiness portions of ORCs, the LATs showed ANA leaders why ORCs are critically important to maintaining an effective combat capability. Unfortunately, significant challenges remain with respect to logistics and maintenance operations above Corps and Zone levels. Inefficiencies in the reporting and requisition systems often result in a lack of critical supplies delivered to the point of need and prevent necessary maintenance from occurring. Automated reporting systems, including Core-IMS, the Military Maintenance Module (M3), and Property Book Module (PBM), are either in place or scheduled for integration within both MoD and MoI and should provide greater visibility of ANDSF logistics and maintenance issues to ANDSF leaders and Coalition advisors.

**ANDSF Equipment Distribution and Accountability**

The CSTC-A Security Assistance Office (SAO) is responsible for receiving and title transferring all Foreign Military Sales (FMS) materiel procured in support of the ANDSF. All FMS materiel originates from the United States and is shipped into theatre via air or surface depending on the commodity type. In FY 2018, the SAO managed $2.95 billion worth of pseudo-FMS cases.

All Class-II Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE), Class-V Ammunition, Class-VII Weapons and Aircraft, and Class-VIII Pharmaceuticals arrive at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul (HKIA). Upon receipt of all FMS weapons, ammunition and aircraft, SAO immediately transfers title to the MoD or MoI at HKIA for integration into the Afghan supply system. OCIE and pharmaceuticals flown into Kabul are transported to nearby SAO-managed FMS Logistics Waypoints for temporary storage in preparation for future title transfer to the ANDSF. Conversely, all Class-III Packaged POL, Class-VII Major End Items (e.g., Vehicles) and Class-IX Repair Parts are shipped and then trucked through Afghanistan and delivered directly to the FMS Logistics Waypoints in Kabul.

Once FMS materiel is delivered and title transferred to the Afghan government, materiel oversight and life-cycle management transfer to the corresponding coalition requirement owner with appropriate reach-back support from acquisition program managers in DoD. For example, TAAC-Air maintains oversight and life-cycle management of all FMS-procured aircraft, whereas program managers in the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army provide life-cycle management of the fixed wing and rotary wing fleets, respectively. CSTC-A’s Operations Sustainment-Logistics (OS-LOG) branch maintains the same oversight and life-cycle management of all FMS-procured weapons, ammunition, vehicles, pharmaceuticals, repair parts, and OCIE, reaching back to program managers in the U.S. Army to manage the National Maintenance Contract-Ground and procurement of tactical vehicles and ammunition.

When ANDSF units are ready to demilitarize FMS materiel at the end of its life-cycle, the owning units request approval from its corresponding ministry. Upon approval, the owning Ministry then

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23 Information in this section addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Sections 1223(e)(2)(D), 1223(e)(2)(F), 1223(e)(2)(G), 1223(e)(2)(H), and 1223(e)(2)(I) of the NDAA for FY 2019 (H.R. 5515).
submits a Change of End Use Request (CoEUR) to SAO. SAO verifies that the serial numbers included on the CoEUR correlate to an FMS-procured asset, then approves or disapproves the CoUER. After approving the CoEUR, the ANDSF unit coordinates with the requirement owner, like OS-LOG or TAAC-Air, to turn in the assets to DLA for demilitarization. After physically demilitarizing the asset, DLA submits a demilitarization certificate to SAO. Finally, SAO updates the corresponding case in Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP), thus completing the life-cycle of the FMS asset.

Although equipment transferred to the Afghan government is no longer considered U.S. property, U.S. advisors and personnel continue to develop the ministries’ logistics and distributions practices to ensure supplies, equipment, and weaponry supplied by the United States are appropriately distributed, employed by, and accounted for by the ANA and ANP. Core-IMS serves as the primary tool to maintain property accountability and oversight.

**Core-IMS**

Core-Information Management System (Core-IMS) is an internet-based property accountability system of record that has been continually evolving since beginning in 2010 as a small-scale, off-the-shelf, PC-based tracking tool. It has been expanded to allow the MoD and MoI to track transfers of equipment out of national warehouses to forward supply depots. U.S. materiel purchased for the Afghans through pseudo-FMS cases populates directly into the Core-IMS system through linkages with the SCIP, DoD’s system to track the shipment of equipment from the United States. Implementation and expansion of the Core-IMS system have enhanced transparency and accountability of U.S.-funded equipment and supplies, including OCIE, weapons, ammunition, and vehicle spare parts across the ANDSF’s warehouse network, but requires additional TAA to reach its operational capability.

Core-IMS software is functional at National and Regional Levels of the ANDSF. At the National Level, the MoD’s Central Supply Depot (CSD) and the MoI’s National Logistics Center (NLC) utilize Core-IMS. Regionally, Core-IMS link to the MoD Forward Supply Depots (FSDs) and the MoI Regional Logistics Centers (RLCs). During this reporting period, the MoD completed fiber-optic cable expansion to connect the Core-IMS to 17 additional sites, including all ANA Corps headquarters except the 215th Corps HQ. The MoD expects to connect the 215th Corps HQ in 2019. This effort began in October 2017 and is fundamental to MoD and TAA efforts to improve accountability and serviceability.

Broad deployment of Core-IMS transforms the ministries’ traditional way of logistics; challenges associated with human capital, literacy, computer skills, and corruption remain a concern. Training of Core-IMS users persisted this reporting period. Since February 2018, Afghan Logistics Specialists (ALS) have trained 500 MoD personnel and 90 personnel within the MoI on Core-IMS. The Afghan Logistics Specialists (ALS) are college-educated, English speaking, local nationals hired to train the ANDSF on Logistics Operations, Warehouse Management, and Core-IMS, and are the link between the ANDSF and Core-IMS. A total of 274 ALS are deployed at the national and regional level, with 181 operating within the MoD pillar and 93 within the MoI pillar. Additionally, CSTC-A contracted support maintains a Core-IMS HelpDesk as well as overall software maintenance and services. Core-IMS instructor training for four instructors began at the
National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA) in August 2018, and Core-IMS curriculum is in development for all logistics training at the NMAA. In the future, RS advisors hope to expand Core-IMS curriculum to Officer and Senior leadership courses at the Marshal Fahim National Defense University.

Like APPS, Core-IMS optimization relies on accurate and consistent inputs to ensure proper accountability of equipment and readiness. Although equipment visibility and accountability at the national level and regional level have improved, many transfers have not been completed within Core-IMS, leaving transactions unacknowledged or improperly receipted. For example, customers typically do not close out transactions once received from the depot. This has led to a steady increase of “In Transit” items, which reduces the accuracy of the system. The MoD released a cipher to explain the Core-IMS process and direct proper use by the Corps. RS advisors continue to monitor the issue through observation and site-visits, but lack of trained personnel, poor connectivity, lack of access below the Corps, and, in some areas, a lack of interest or engagement by senior leaders continue to hamper full implementation of the system.

In previous reporting periods, inconsistent and inaccurate equipment reporting restricted the ministries’ ability to track equipment transfers, identify equipment shortages, and build procurement plans. In general, Afghan logistics relied on paper-based transfers rather than automated systems. With Core-IMS system, equipment transferred from the ministry automatically generates a receipt at the forward supply depot so the receiving corps knows the contents and expected arrival date of the shipment. This has eliminated the need for manual re-entry by the corps upon receipt; however, users must close out transactions once received.

At the corps level, inaccurate reporting of equipment and equipment readiness through the Core-IMS inhibits the MoD’s ability to identify equipment shortages and build procurement plans. In April 2018, the MoD instituted random inventory assessments on 10 percent of on-hand inventory. Unfortunately, these reports are often inaccurate or formatted improperly. Similarly, in August 2018, MoI Logistics directed monthly ten percent inventory checks of all supply classes. OS-LOG continues to identify discrepancies between on-hand 10 percent inventory reports and Core-IMS data. Although both MoD and MoI have taken steps to reconcile the discrepancies, OS-LOG advisors have emphasized a need for policy to highlight the process for reconciling discrepancies between Core-IMS and on-hand inventory. Although full integration of the Core-IMS at the ANA corps and connectivity back to MoD Headquarters will provide greater visibility into the supply system in its totality, the MoD and MoI must continue to ensure that Core-IMS inputs reflect material in storage at the depots. To address these concerns, contracted personnel manually enter all equipment stored at supply depots into the Core-IMS to track materiel.

During this reporting period, RS advisors added a PBM and M3 for the Core-IMS system, which adds enhanced capability to assign and move assets between organizations and personnel with real-time transparency. Advisors fielded the Core-PBM to the ANCOF and the M3 to the ANASOC and 215th Corps. The phased approach allows OS-LOG to pilot the programs, capture lessons learned, and tailor future TAA efforts in support of a full rollout within the MoD and MoI.

As Core-IMS expands, advisors continue to monitor the number of users, logins, and overall user activity. OS-LOG advisors assess activity on a monthly basis to ensure continued growth and use.
Additionally, RS proponents for various web-based platforms, like APPS, Core-IMS, NIMS, AFMIS, and others, participate in a working group to identify data requirements, map the networks, and instill discipline regarding network access and controls. This working group aims to synchronize the various web-based lines of efforts across the RS TAA mission.

**End-Use Monitoring**

In accordance with statutory requirements, equipment provided to the ANDSF is subject to end-use monitoring. In Afghanistan, DoD administers two types of end-use monitoring (EUM): routine and enhanced. For non-sensitive equipment provided to the ANDSF, the SAO conducts routine monitoring in conjunction with other required security assistance duties. These actions include observations made during interactions with the ANDSF, visits to defense facilities, and Afghan reporting of on-hand equipment along with serial numbers of lost or damaged equipment. CSTC-A has included this Afghan reporting requirement in its commitment letters for the MoD and MoI. Enhanced EUM for sensitive articles and technologies requires more intensive and formal monitoring. Enhanced EUM includes equipment delivery records with serial numbers, routine physical inventories of the equipment by serial number, and quarterly reporting on inventory results. In Afghanistan, night-vision devices (NVD) are the primary articles requiring enhanced EUM. Out of the roughly 19,000 NVs purchased for the ANDSF, mostly for the ASSF, the SAO has verified and accounted for more than 18,000. SAO logistics personnel are currently performing enhanced EUM efforts to gain accountability of the remaining NVs. Core-IMS, with PBM and M3, will allow improve ANDSF equipment reporting and enhance accuracy and accountability of equipment purchased and transferred to the ANDSF.

**Planning**

ANDSF planners, with assistance from TAA teams, are becoming more proficient at developing plans to integrate enablers such as ASSF and air support. The ANDSF still lacks, however, a depth of competent planners who can understand the operational environment and develop comprehensive plans independent of advisors.

Operation *Nasrat* provided opportunities for MoD and MoI planners to work together and to conduct offensive operations into contested areas. During this reporting period, the ANA conducted offensive operations incorporating up to three ANA Corps to target Taliban and ISIS-K personnel operating along Corps boundaries. ANP Zone commanders and Provincial Chiefs of Police (PCoP) were included in the planning and helped serve as part of the hold force in the aftermath of ANDSF operations.

Following a string of HPAs in Kabul in early 2018, MoD and MoI planners worked together effectively to improve the security situation in Kabul, sharing information and intelligence and delineating responsibilities within the Kabul Enhanced Security Zone (ESZ). During this reporting period, MoD, MoI, and NDS planning efforts matured and resulted in a decrease in spectacular attacks in Kabul. In September, planning efforts resulted in 27 coordinated operations within Kabul to arrest ISIS-K militants and facilitators planning attacks on Shia targets during the Shia Ashura holy period. As a result, no violence occurred during Ashura.
Election planning provided the most difficult test for MoD and MoI planners. In advance of the October 20, Parliamentary elections, planners from both ministries met with planners from other government agencies and Coalition advisors to develop an integrated plan that would allow for security at polling sites and safe delivery of election materials.

**Strategic Communications**

During this reporting period, the MoD and MoI took steps to build credibility with the Afghan people. Traditionally, MoD and MoI strategic communications (STRATCOM) has been a weakness compared to propaganda activity carried out by the Taliban. Renewed emphasis by President Ghani on STRATCOM coupled with increased TAA efforts at the Strategic Communications Coordination Center (SCCC) have resulted in markedly better synchronization of messaging across the ANDSF. STRATCOM teams at the MoD, MoI, NDS, and the ONSC meet weekly as part of the Strategic Communications Working Group (SCWG) to share information and ensure messages are mutually supporting.

The ANDSF’s ability to respond to crises with proper messaging is improving thanks to a Crisis Management Team at the SCCC consisting of representatives from the MoD, MoI, NDS, IDLG, and the Coalition. When the Taliban launched an attack on Ghazni city in August, ANDSF public affairs officers rose to the occasion engaging the public through a variety of media explaining the situation and keeping the public informed of ANDSF operations to quell the violence and regain control of the city.

Deliberate SRATCOM planning is also improving. Prior to the Eid al Fitr ceasefire, representatives from across the ANDSF built comprehensive communications plans that included branch plans for a variety of contingencies. The same type of planning effort took place before the Eid al Adha ceasefire offer. Despite the Taliban’s rejection of the ceasefire, ANDSF STRATCOM efforts resulted in a series of messages that the Afghan government used effectively to demonstrate its desire for peace and willingness to engage the Taliban.

**Operational and Tactical Capabilities**

ANDSF capabilities are improving in most areas as advisors implement new systems and processes. Intelligence is improving with the addition of limited ISR becoming available at the Corps level; however, the Intelligence and ISR enterprise still faces significant challenges as evidenced by its failure to detect the Taliban attack in Ghazni in early August.

ANSDSF are becoming increasingly reliant on organic communication equipment and less on personal cellular phones. This was highlighted during the latest attack on Ghazni when insurgents disabled the local cellular network, leaving the conventional ANDSF forces dependent upon advisors to coordinate operations. Fortunately, this is a question of training and enforcing standards. Experiencing the effects of losing the civilian communication infrastructure provides the motivation to use available military equipment.

The ANDSF regularly conduct airstrikes with MD-530 rotary-wing and A-29 fixed-wing aircraft with decreasing levels of coalition assistance, relying instead on Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators
(ATAC) to control fires through direct communication with Afghan pilots. In March 2018, the ANDSF executed their first airstrike using ATACs to direct a laser-guided bomb dropped by an A-29 pilot. The ANDSF continued to train ATACs and conduct collective training on combined arms maneuver to integrate air assets into operations more effectively. Additionally, Afghan target development and prioritization continues to improve as the Nasrat intelligence center, also known as the National Threat Intelligence Center (NTIC), under the direction of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and Joint Special Operations Coordination Center (JSOCC), mature. Both the ASSF and AAF benefit from this improved relationship with assets allocated based on command priorities, not the order in which they were received.

The ANDSF’s ability to use ISR to plan and, to a lesser extent, control combat operations is limited, but improving. The ANA successfully use ScanEagle at four ANA Corps sites (the 201st, 205th, 209th, and 215th Corps) for force protection and targeting support. The 215th Corps Detachment at FOB Shorab in Helmand Province is the most advanced, routinely utilizing its ScanEagle Detachment to support the 215th Corps targeting efforts. The 209th Corps also relies heavily on its ScanEagle Detachment at Camp Pamir in Kunduz Province to action its own targets. The 205th Corps ScanEagle Detachment, which reached initial operational capability (IOC) on October 13, 2017, is unique in that it operates as a hub and spoke. The detachment is stationed at Kandahar Airfield (the hub) and has a Ground Control Station (GCS) at Tarin Kot (a spoke), which can take control of an aircraft while in flight.

The use of indirect fires from Afghan artillery and mortar systems lags behind other enablers. The primary obstacle to the use of indirect fires is a lack of trained forward observers and competent fire-direction controllers. Artillery and mortars are used primarily as direct-fire systems or counter-fire systems following insurgent rocket attacks. The ANDSF prefer aerial fires, if available, to indirect fires during offensive operations.

The ASSF remained a bright spot in ANDSF capabilities. When senior ANDSF leaders employ them properly, the ASSF consistently overmatch the enemy on the battlefield. During this reporting period, the ASFF focused on: building combat power; achieving unity of effort across the wider Afghan Security Infrastructure (ASI); developing leaders; countering corruption; and exercising disciplined operational readiness cycles (ORC) to improve ASFF effectiveness during Operation Nasrat.

**Intelligence**

Both MoD and MoI made strides in improving organic intelligence capabilities. The ANA is improving its use of ScanEagle ISR assets deploying them more appropriately due to TAA efforts from Coalition advisors. ANA commanders are beginning to use intelligence gained from ScanEagle employment with operational planning efforts and force protection. Instances of ScanEagle use to monitor subordinate ANA units are decreasing.

In February 2018, the Minister of Interior declared the National Information Management System (NIMS) as the system of record for MoI agencies. NIMS is designed to improve information and intelligence sharing across the ministry and will also make it easier to share intelligence across ministries. Proper use of NIMS may also benefit criminal case prosecution. NIMS can be used to
track evidence from collection to entry into the Case Management System (CMS) where case progress can be monitored.

MoD and MoI leadership culture poses challenges to better intelligence analysis. Despite the improving capability of MoD and MoI intelligence analysts to collect data and perform proper analysis, MoD and MoI leaders often discourage analysts from evaluating the data and presenting their analysis. Too often commanders simply ask for the data and attempt their own analysis. Leaders either lack trust in their analysts or want to avoid the appearance that they may not be as informed as their analysts should they provide an opinion that differs from their own. As the amount of data continues to increase, commanders simply will not have the time to perform their own analysis and must begin empowering and trusting their intelligence sections. Intelligence TAA advisors are aware of the problem and have made this a specific point of emphasis in their training plans.
SECTION 4 – MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

4.1 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

The MoD oversees the ANA, the AAF, and the MoD’s pillars within the ASSF (ANASOC and the SMW). Major General Tariq Shah Bahrami serves as the Minister of Defense and Lieutenant General Mohammad Sharif Yaftali serves as Chief of General Staff (CoGS) of the ANA. All relevant security and operations functions fall under the direct supervision of CoGS Yaftali, particularly directing Corps Commanders to execute the Campaign Plan. During this reporting period, the MoD’s focus areas included election security; eliminating corruption; professionalizing the military; campaign planning and execution; improving resource planning, programming, budgeting, and execution; improving force protection; increasing transparency and accountability; and implementing civilianization policies.

Information in this section addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1223(e)(2)(B) of the NDAA for FY 2019 (H.R. 5515).
Resource Management and Procurement

The MoD improved and streamlined its budget execution and procurement procedures, but continues to struggle with identifying requirements below the corps level. In the past, delays in finalizing spending and procurement plans led to inefficient acquisition planning and procurement prioritization. During this reporting period, the MoD utilized the FY 2018 Draft Prioritization Procurement Plan to focus on procurement priorities that emphasize ANA readiness, promote key Roadmap initiatives, and support operational and warfighting needs. The MoD met major Requirements Approval Board (RAB) timelines and awarded over 90 percent of the contracts identified in the Draft Prioritization Procurement Plan.

The FY 2018 Draft Prioritization Plan has three tiers, with Tier I consisting of the highest priority procurement requirements. Once the MoD identifies requirements according to the tier system, it submits packages to the Requirements Approval Board (RAB), which the reviews the package and completed bid evaluation. Advisors incentivized prioritization by withholding Tier II funds until the RAB completed at least 75 percent of package bid evaluations for FY 2018 Tier I requirements. As of November 21, 2018, the MoD awarded 49 FY 2018 contracts totaling $2.995 billion, and the RAB approved 97 of 102 contracts identified in the FY 2018 Draft Prioritized Procurement Plan. The MoD and CSTC-A leadership receive bi-weekly execution status briefs from MoD budget units. To date, the MoD executed 48 percent of its current budget.

This reporting period, the MoD developed the FY 2019 Procurement Database by collecting requirements generated by the Corps and their subordinate units. Additionally, the MoD is preparing publication of the FY 2019 Budget Circular. Both the Budget Circular and the Procurement Database will allow the MoD to prepare the FY 2019 Procurement Plan by tier and priority. The plan requires Minister of Defense approval and ultimately serves as the guide for FY 2019 budget execution.

Legal Affairs

The Ministerial Internal Control Program (MICP) is an oversight mechanism within the MoD and MoI Inspector Generals’ (IG) offices to minimize fraud and ensure efficiency. In the past, the ministries’ IGs, with significant TAA efforts by Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (TAO) advisors, aimed to implement the MICP from the ministry-level down to the corps and zone levels by conducting MICP training at the corps and zones. Implementation at levels below the ministry requires a substantial degree of understanding, conceptualization, and detailed analysis to develop the internal controls to the necessary depth and breadth for full optimization, a difficult request in even the most permissive environments. Therefore, TAO has determined to retain the MICP at the ministerial level while simultaneously empowering commanders at the Corps level to adopt and Organization Inspection Program (OIP). OIP uses “staff inspections” to focus efforts on establishing internal controls in subordinate units. This new approach allows TAO’s TAA efforts regarding MICP to remain focused at the ministerial level, where it has resulted in improved understanding and execution of internal controls, encourages the ministries to inspect the OIP process, and empowers commanders to own the OIP process.
MoD leadership vacancies within the MoD IG office persisted this reporting period. The MoD IG Director position has been vacant since March 2017 and the General Staff (GS) IG position has been vacant since March 2018. Both positions are currently filled by appointed acting directors, which severely limits the ability of the IG to fulfill its responsibilities. Aside from leadership challenges inhibiting the ability to advance meaningful reforms, TAO advisors identified the lack of a trained and professional IG core as the greatest threat to long-term sustainability and independence of the MoI IG. To address this gap in capabilities, TAO advisors worked towards developing policy, curriculum, and a permanent staff to lay the foundation for a training pipeline that can produce a professional IG core. The MoD IG Director approved the restructure of the MoD IG Training and Education (T&E) Directorate, which fielded five certified, permanent instructors to teach all the required subjects and functions within the IG system. Furthermore, the MoD IG developed a curriculum committee to address outdated curriculum. The committee, with assistance from TAO, is currently updating and improving the IG curriculum through the creation of guideline manuals for assistance, investigation, complaints, and inspections. This committee will also assist the instructors in creating lesson plans, accompanying training slides, and other materials for future IG courses. TAO advisors will continue working with permanent instructors to develop training for IG Basic, Refresher, and Advanced courses throughout the year. Overall, these advancements by TAO and the MoD IG represent significant steps to ensure the sustainability of the IG office, starting with the Training and Education Directorate.

Personnel Management

Building the institutional capacity to manage the Ministry’s personnel has been a key priority of MoD and RS advisors for several reporting periods. Advisory and reform efforts have culminated into three key focus areas: validation of personnel in the ministry, identification of future leaders, and management of career paths. These complementary lines of effort seek to establish a self-sustaining, merit-based institutional ability to manage personnel. Proper validation of personnel through APPS allows the Ministry and RS to administer salaries only to those validated in its system and provides visibility into the ministry’s leadership structure. Enhanced visibility sets the conditions for better identification of future leaders, and allows the ministry to optimize ongoing Inherent Law and merit-based promotion reforms. Finally, as leaders rise into newly vacated positions, the MoD, with the continued assistance of advisors, can utilize its Human Resource Management (HRM) processes to institutionalize career paths through professional military education and progressive assignments. The MoD and ANA has taken steps to account for personnel and identify leaders, but HRM and career progression management have not matured.

The MoD and ANA took several steps to reduce the size of its officer corps, enforce merit-based promotion practices, and eliminate the presence of “ghost soldiers” on the ANDSF payroll. Under President Ghani’s Inherent Law, officers are subject to mandatory retirement upon reaching a specified time in service or time in rank, or if the officer exceeds a specific age tied to his or her rank. For years, the MoD and ANA retained significantly more general officers and senior leaders than the tashkil authorized. Many excess colonels serve in positions designated for junior officers, resulting in many senior officers receiving significantly higher salaries for performing duties well below their rank. The MoD completed the first wave of the Inherent Law occurred on January 1, 2018 and the second wave ahead of schedule on September 1, 2018. Inherent Law helps pave the
way for generational change, but the MoD must continue to develop transparent merit-based promotions and assignment to support the advancement of the next generation of senior leaders.

The High Oversight Board conducts professional evaluations and recommends appointment, promotion, and separation of high-ranking officials, including generals, based on merit. This reporting period, responsibility for the High Oversight Board transitioned from the Office of the National Security Council to an independent body. Although transparency in the promotion process has increased, the system remains fraught with patronage. Persistent TAA has helped to nullify some patronage, but more work must be done to instill a sustainable, cultural discipline to the concept of merit-based promotions.

MoD human resource and career path management lacks strong institutional oversight and development. Currently, the MoD does not use a formal system to ensure soldiers and leaders are assigned to appropriate positions of need or benefit from professional military education as their careers progress. Although branch schools and courses such as the Command Staff Academy exist and have expanded over the years, the MoD generally fails to identify the right candidates to attend courses. Some vacancies in professional development courses are apportioned based on relations, and graduates at times are not assigned to critical positions that allow them to utilize their skills, perpetuating corruption and patronage. RS TAA renewed the Leadership Development Working Group, helped advise on policy development for career path management, and continue to assist the MoD’s development of a system that supports succession planning and career advancement.

**Institutional Training**

The MoD provides robust training opportunities for personnel; however, the MoD must strengthen institutional training as a parallel, mutually reinforcing effort to improve the overall capability and leadership within the MoD. Historically, TAA efforts to build strong training institutions have been insufficient, with TAA resources and efforts going to field units rather than institutions that train and develop ANDSF forces throughout their careers. The focus has shifted towards building stronger institutions, and the renewed presence of RS advisors below the corps level assisted the coalition’s efforts to understand the full impact of training efforts.

During this reporting period, MoD’s Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) came under scrutiny after the facility delayed classes and advisors received reports of unsatisfactory training, poor living conditions, and inadequate trainer support. In September, COL Mohammad Amion “Wahidi” replaced the commander of KMTC and was charged with restoring order to KMTC, increasing the quality of training, and ensuring ANA soldiers were provided better care. The conditions at KMTC had deteriorated to the point where trainees were becoming malnourished and arriving at their units in poor health and not trained to standard. Coalition advisors are working to improve the efficiency and quality of the training at KMTC, and exploring ways to make better use of Regional Military Training Centers (RMTC). The standup of the Afghan National Training and Education Center (ANATEC) in early 2019 will steadily improve the professionalism of the force. NATO-led EAPs in TAACs North and West extended Coalition reach to previously unadvised units. Additionally, SFAB involvement at RMTCs improved the quality and efficiency of those centers and resulted in decisions to increase focus on improving RMTCs as KMTC works
address its deficiencies and as advisors continue to urge compliance with ORCs across the ANDSF.

The ANDSF Unified Training System (UTS) aims to support leadership development and ANSDF capability development through coordinated, structured professional training and education performed in combination with human resources management from recruitment through retirement. As a central part of the UTS, the nascent Unified Training and Education Command (UTEDC) provides “unity of command” and coordinates all efforts related to institutional training and education, as well as efforts in support of training fielded forces. The MoD approved the establishment and implementation of UTEDC last reporting period. The UTEDC is an integrated Headquarters with command and control over the entire ANA Training and Education Landscape (TEL). The UTEDC provides the MoD with an organization responsible for developing doctrine and training programs to inform activity within branch schools and PME institutions. Over the course of this reporting period, UTEDC staff, temporarily located at the MoD HQ, began working to establish a permanent HQ at the Marshal Fahim National Defense University in Qagha. The UTEDC commander instituted a weekly Command Group and initiated a major review of the initial officer training curriculum. RS advisors plan to consolidate TAA efforts to ensure targeted TAA at the future UTEDC locations.

The ANA Branch Schools are comprised of 12 individual branch schools distributed into Combat Arms, Combat Support, Combat Service Support, and General Service Centers. Advisor involvement at the institutional training level has been episodic over the last few years. This reporting period, RS advisors noted that cadre of professional advisors from different NATO countries maintain a persistent advisor presence at 75 percent of the Branch Schools and only the three General Service Schools lack enduring advisor presence. However, the schools with advisor presence have a training utilization rate of roughly 18 percent due to a lack of consistent enforcement of ANA professional military education criteria at the ministerial level, which requires a soldier to attend the basic warrior training followed by branch-specific training at one of the 12 branch schools. The problem is compounded by corps-level commanders who remove trainees from the training pipeline to reinforce mission requirements. These inconsistencies result in under-trained soldiers assigned to combat units without necessary advanced individual or unit-level collective training. CSTC-A is considering a variety of refinements and reforms to the institutional training arena to ensure adequate advanced training while meeting the operational needs of the ANA.

Logistics and Maintenance

MoD capability to utilize Core-IMS and perform required ground vehicle maintenance improved this reporting period, but struggle with cross-leveling equipment and equipment readiness rates. Over the past year, OS-LOG has worked to streamline and coordinate TAA efforts to ensure the ANDSF are properly equipped and resourced on the battlefield. A reliable, accountable, and transparent Afghan logistics and supply chain enables ANDSF operational capabilities, and OS-LOG is a central node in the RS TAA mission.

Building on success from previous reporting periods, the MoD began performing mandatory 10 percent inventory assessments. The MoD and RS advisors review these assessments in
conjunction with on-hand inventory reports and inputs in Core-IMS. By reconciling random inventory assessments with Core-IMS, the MoD have been able to improve visibility of inventory and RS advisors have been able to identify reporting weaknesses by geographic locations, allowing them to tailor their TAA efforts as necessary. As reporting accuracy improves, MoD leaders can direct materials to be cross-leveled when appropriate to meet critical demands, an area where ANA consistently struggles.

The ANA continues to struggle with cross-leveelling equipment, particularly ammunition, between Corps, and a number of Corps continue to hoard certain “battle winning” equipment and ammunition. Corps commanders are reluctant to do lateral transfers of excess equipment to address shortages in other locations. Advisors will continue to TAA on this issue. Persistent TAA and MoD direction have improved overall ammunition accountability. The MoD submitted nearly all monthly ammunition reports, and Corps and Depots submitted inventory and consumption reports in a timely and accurate fashion. Steady improvement in this arena remains critical to forecasting ammunition needs across the GS G4 and avoiding overstocked ammunition at the forward supply depots.

The MoD continued extending the Core-IMS to regional military hospitals (RMH) to improve visibility of Class IIX materials provided from the Central Supply Depots (CSD) to the hospitals and identified soldiers at all RMHs to receive Core-IMS training. With the exception of the 201st Corps, the MoD established internet connectivity at all RMHs. Additionally, the ANA are now working to create Ministry of Defense Activity Address Codes (MODAACs) for each RMH, which will allow them to operate as an independent unit within Core-IMS. Once created, the RMHs will have the ability to fully utilize Core-IMS.

MoD logisticians require persistent TAA as underdeveloped national logistics planning remains a vulnerability to the mission. Expeditionary Sustainment Advisory Teams (ESATs) typically consist of logistics and sustainment personnel and help identify shortcomings in logistics planning and coordination between MoD and the ANA corps’ headquarters. ESAT teams perform regular site visits to ANA corps for greater insight into logistics and sustainment issues. During this reporting period, ANA ESATs partnered with multi-discipline ESATs to conduct joint assessments of ANA logistical staff and business systems. Assessments of commodity and service areas included: Class II, III, V, VII, IX, Maintenance Management, and Property Book accountability. These visits help identify systemic and emerging trends across the Corps, and recent visits identified the need for sustainable HVAC solutions, excess CL VIII stockage at RMHs, and excess property for redistribution. Upon completion of the visit, ANA members of the ESAT team brief MoD leadership on current findings, trends, and recommendations. Follow-up site visits to these Corps review the mitigating actions taken to address previously identified trends. Within the RMHs, ESAT visits have improved RMH performance through a standardized inspection process. ESATs utilize a single checklist to evaluate each RMHs and the integration of ANA inspectors allows MEDCOM increased visibility within the ANA and an opportunity to raise RMH-specific concerns.

The National Maintenance Contract (NMC) for ground vehicles, which reached full operational capability (FOC) on December 28, 2017, consolidated six individual vehicle maintenance contracts into one ANDSF-wide contract to improve near-term vehicle maintenance and build
long-term capacity. It focuses on improving the overall maintenance capability of the ANDSF while simultaneously providing formal training and mentoring to ANA personnel in the maintenance and supply chain management function.

Under the NMC, in 2018, the ANA was responsible for 50 percent of the maintenance tasks for on-hand vehicles, with contractors responsible for the rest. In September, the workshare split increased to 55 percent for the ANA and 45 percent for contractors. Although in its nascent phases, the NMC enabled the ANA to focus on maintaining and managing readiness while contracted maintainers provide additional support for more complex maintenance issues. The NMC allows the ANA to improve its general maintenance, inventory management, and quality control, and enables the ANA to increase its capacity and capability to absorb gradual increases in maintenance responsibilities. The contract’s structure enables progressive, incremental yearly transfer of responsibility from the contractor to the ANA. During this reporting period, the ANA displayed a steady month-to-month increase in their maintenance capabilities as defined by the NMC. Although maintenance capabilities advanced, low enrollment and attendance at NMC-provided technical persists as it did with the previous vehicle maintenance contract. CSTC-A will continue to advise Afghans to take advantage of available training.

Figure 7: Percentage of ANA - NMC Workshare Responsibility

Fuel allocation and consumption remains a commodity that RS monitors to root out corruption and ensure operational readiness. As equipment readiness reporting has improved through TAA and the NMC, OS-LOG identified that MoD fuel consumption rates did not vary in accordance with fluctuations of vehicle readiness rates or operational tempo. To protect against fraud and abuse, CSTC-A is linking fuel allocation with mission-capable vehicle rates, which are verified through the NMC contractor. In November, OS reduced fuel allocation by approximately ten million liters. CSTC-A and the U.S. Army Contracting Command are redesigning the fuel receipt process to incorporate counter corruption controls, such as designating authorized signatories by site and
requiring identification numbers for the driver, vehicle, and receiver of fuel, allowing OS-LOG to track and validate fuel transfers more accurately.

**Strategic and Operational Planning**

During this reporting period, MoD planning efforts, supported by RS advisors, centered on four key elements: election security planning, operational security plans, APPS enrollment, and force posture consolidation. At the ministerial level, the MoD produced Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), allowing the development of other strategic documents and subordinate planning initiatives. At the General Staff level, GS G5 developed the Annual Plan, a comprehensive and scheduled framework of routine and contingency planning efforts, and has fulfilled its commitments captured within the plan. At the operational and tactical level, the ANDSF showed an increased capability to develop and coordinate joint operations; however, there is still space for improvement. GS G3 was able to show its capability to provide a reliable consolidated Corps readiness report to all GS branches on a monthly basis, improving the awareness and control required to support Command decisions.

**Intelligence**

Although the MoD made progress in executing a proper intelligence cycle, from requests for information, to collection and dissemination, the MoD still suffers from a lack of proper prioritization of intelligence requirements and structural failure to enable intelligence analysis below the strategic level. Under the current cultural intelligence environment, MoD senior leadership fails to empower intelligence analysts at the Corps and below to conduct analysts, which results in oversaturation of intelligence products at the highest level. TAA efforts will focus on improving strategic-level analysis and empowering tactical-level analysis.

ScanEagle tactical unmanned aerial systems detachments have improved in technical proficiency and tactical integration since last reporting period, helping facilitate basic signals intelligence (SIGINT) in operations. ScanEagle allows for target surveillance, air-to-ground integration for aerial fires, and battle damage assessments after strikes. INT TAA MoD efforts on the ScanEagle enterprise focus on integration of ScanEagle assets for the targeting process, including targeting development. Advisors continue to encourage the ANA to utilize ScanEagle collection data to better identify target locations and descriptions. The ScanEagle School is in the process of moving from Mazar-e-Sharif to Kandahar Air Field (KAF) in an effort to increase throughput of trainees and train in a more weather-conducive environment. Field Service Representatives (FSRs) for the ScanEagle report that some ANA ScanEagle detachments fail to adhere to checklist and procedures, resulting in decreases operational readiness of the platforms. Advisors continue to TAA on this issue and hope that KAF-based training will instill greater discipline in Detachments.

Improved intelligence-sharing and the GS G2’s leadership and personal involvement in operations has resulted in a spike in information sharing between leaders from the MoD and CoGS, and corps, brigade, and Military Intelligence kandak commanders. Through the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC), the MoD can track the location, maintenance status, and operational

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25 See section 3.2 for more information on elections security and planning.
tracking of all ANA ISR assets. Additionally, the GS G2 approved liaison officer access to the ISR portal and ISR live feeds, including ScanEagle, at the National Military Command Center (NMCC). This has facilitated communication between liaison officers and operators in the field during insurgent attacks. The MoD’s Intel Watch Center began sharing intelligence with the MoI, the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC), and other ministry-level sections via the Nasrat Center to avoid duplicate reporting.

The GS G2 embraces technology and demonstrates keen interest in the more technical systems, such as the National Information Management System (NIMS), Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS) aerostats, Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) towers, the Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS), ScanEagle, and the Wolfhound Electronic Warfare System. During this reporting period, Afghan Intelligence Reports (AIR) database within the NIMS houses more than 300,000 intelligence reports. The database continues to grow in size by an average of more than 200 reports per day.

**Strategic Communication**

MOD developed four strategic communications training strands to build long-term MoD capacity for personnel. These training strands cover STRATCOM message development, digital media engagement and social media, video production standards and values, and still photography basics with cutline writing. The MoD’s newly appointed civilian Director of Strategic Communications provided contemporary solutions to the STRATCOM security arena. Advisors note that they have willing partners within the MoD’s STRATCOM divisions, and that vertical and horizontal synchronization has improved over the past few months. Although the MoD must improve to own the information environment, momentum is building within the ministry and the Corps.

The MoD conducted significant strategic engagements this year that allowed the MoD to communication coherent priorities on an international scale. These strategic communications included engagements at the Munich Security Conference, NATO Defense Ministers Meetings, India Bi-Lateral, Saudi Arabia Bi-Literal, Turkmenistan Bi-Lateral, and Tajikistan Bi-Lateral.

Overall, advisors note that the MoD has increased its STRATCOM engagements, improved transparency with the media by delivering information on a regular and timely basis, and demonstrated credibility with the Afghan population. Although reports show that MoI messaging holds higher credibility with the Afghan population than the MoD, advisors believe that MoD STRATCOM is becoming institutionalized through improved structural procedures, coordination, transparency, and timeliness.

**Gender Integration Initiatives**

Although circumstances have improved for Afghan women since 2001, sexual abuse, harassment, gender-based violence, cultural norms, and certain inequalities threaten the successful integration and long-term retention of women in the ANSF. The current ad hoc method of recruitment, training, and placement can lead to underutilization or ineffective use of women in the ANSF. Although gender imbalance in professional militaries is not unusual, the ANA struggles to recruit, retain, and manage the career progression of women. Units continue to place men into positions
reserved for women because there are not enough qualified women to fill the empty positions. NATO RS and the MoD are developing policies and refining processes to address the myriad of issues that challenge integration of women into the ANA.

Women, like the men in the ANDSF, suffer from the absence of a clearly defined career progression. RS’s Gender Advisors continue to assist the MoD to develop a career path plan from recruitment to retirement for ANA women. This plan, called the Planning Pyramid, consists of six stages, and each stage must reach completion in series. The pyramid steps include the tashkil plan, training plan, promotion plan, facility plan, recruiting plan, and retention plan. This plan requires coordination and collaboration between the Gender Office and multiple MoD Directorates. Given its complexity, the plan must be iterative, with adjustments made to the tashkil as the needs arise throughout recruitment, training, and placement.

The ANA must optimize its force development and management processes to enable successful recruitment of women. The MoD has set a recruitment and placement goal of roughly 200 women per quarter in the proper career management field. Although this goal is considered more attainable than the previous goal of 400 per quarter, gender advisors stress that TAA efforts must first address optimization issues to be able to meet any female ANA recruitment goals for women. Part of this effort includes targeted TAA regarding the MoD’s tashkil. Currently, an absence of available junior enlisted and junior office positions restricts tashkil billets for recruited women. The MoD continued to update the tashkil in this reporting period, and filed paperwork to designate and transition some P1 (men only) and P2 (male and female) positions to P3 (women only) positions and most P1 to P2 positions. The MoD has set a long-term goal of establishing 6,425 P3 positions. In 2018, the MoD started the year with 581 P3 positions and reached 796 P3 designated positions by the end of this reporting period.

**Education and Training**

Additional initiatives to address the ANA gender integration effort include the promotion of development programs, enhanced training, and salary incentives. Women in the ANA have access to an undergraduate sponsorship program, the Gender Occupational Opportunity Development (GOOD) program, overseas training programs, childcare provisions, and retention bonuses.

GOOD provides training to the uniformed and civilian members of the ANDSF in Dari and Pashto literacy and English language, computer skills, and office administration. The GOOD Program maintains training locations throughout Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Helmand. RS works with NGOs in Afghanistan to ensure that efforts to improve women’s literacy are de-conflicted and not duplicative.

During this reporting period, approximately 450 women attended GOOD Program training throughout Afghanistan, primarily in Kabul with locations at the MoD HQ, Camp Scorpion, HKIA, Kabul National Military Hospital, the MoD Sewing Factory, Camp Qargha, the Afghan National Army Officer Academy, and Camp Zafar in Herat. This training will improve the women’s proficiency in their current duties and improve their career prospects, making them more competitive with their colleagues.
Facilities

The United States, coalition partners, and the international community has funded the construction of several ANA facilities for women, but issues like mismanagement, inadequate, and misuses female facilities persist. During this reporting period, advisors assisted the MoD to draft a policy defining the proper use of female facilities, but persistent TAA and comprehensive emphasis on the importance of gender integration is necessary to ensure a sustainable cultural shift in management of female facilities. To address these problems further, RS developed commitment letters with the MoD and MoI to ensure secure female facilities are built, maintained, and properly utilized. Under the commitment letters, CSTC-A reserves the right to withhold funds, assessed on budget lines of the coalition’s choosing, per compound found in sub-par condition or improperly utilized. The commitment letters hold the MoD and MoI responsible and accountable for the proper use and long-term sustainability of facility upgrades and new projects underway across a range of military installations designed to provide a safe and secure work environment for women. These projects include efforts to increase the number of facilities and accommodations, provide women’s bathrooms and toilets, and establish segregated recreational areas and training facilities where required. Some of the upgrades in the MoD include:

- Kabul National Military Hospital Pediatrics and Women’s Wellness Clinic Estimated
- Ministry of Defense Headquarters daycare renovation and addition
- Afghan Air Force Academy women’s barracks S HKIA
- Kabul Military Training Center daycare
- Marshal Fahim National Defense University women’s gym, conference center, and daycare
- Afghan Air Force Base women’s barracks, daycare, and dining facility addition
- Camp Zafar daycare
- Female Tactical Platoon Facility – Camp Scorpion
- MoD Women’s Training Center – Kabul

4.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

The ANA GS commands and controls all of Afghanistan’s ground and air forces, including the ANA conventional forces, the AAF, the SMW, the ANASOC, ANCOF, and the ABF. In total, the ANA consists of 24 combat brigades, 3 combat air wings, 24 branch and basic training schools, and additional support facilities (e.g., depots and hospitals).

Afghan National Army Strength

The MoD is authorized 227,374. Shortfalls in conventional ANA recruiting and retention resulted in undermanned basic training courses and delays in course start dates. Attrition remains problematic for the ANA. APPS should allow RS advisors and the MoD to gain better access to attrition metrics to track and project future losses with improved accuracy. The number of personnel dropped from the rolls (DFR) significantly impacts ANA attrition rates. Personnel who are DFR consist of those soldiers and police who leave the organization prior to the end of their contract for reasons that include desertion or being absent without leave (AWOL) for over a month.

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26 See Section 3.2 for more information on size of the ANDSF.
Afghan National Army Structure

The largest ANA elements are the six regional corps. Each corps is typically composed of a headquarters kandak, three to four infantry brigades, and various specialty kandaks. The 201st Corps, 203rd Corps, 205th Corps, 207th Corps, 209th Corps, and 215th Corps are responsible for their geographic regions that follow the provincial boundaries (see Figure 8). The 111th Capital Division is independent from any corps and is responsible for security in Kabul.

ANA Territorial Force (ANA-TF)

The ANA-TF is a pilot program designed to create ANA units that serve as the hold force in permissive security environments that typically require military presence, so that ASSF and conventional ANA forces are free to conduct offensive operations in contested areas. ANA-TF soldiers are locally recruited, nationally trained, and nationally led personnel; the officers and senior non-commissioned officers come from the sponsor ANA corps, but the soldiers serve in their home districts. The MoD’s ANA Recruiting Command (ANAREC) recruits ANA-TF soldiers from select districts where the MoD has determined an ANA-TF company is required. The recruits attend traditional ANA basic training together at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC), followed by an additional six weeks of collective training as a tolay (company).

The ANA-TF unit mission is to hold and secure their home district. ANA-TF units are not intended, nor are they equipped, to deploy away from their home district to conduct offensive operations. Additionally, ANA-TF units are more affordable and sustainable than conventional ANA units: ANA-TF soldiers receive 75 percent of the pay a conventional ANA soldier receives, and ANA-TF units will occupy existing bases and facilities, avoiding new infrastructure construction costs.

During this reporting period, soldiers for ANA-TF pilot units entered training and will be employed later this year. The first three tolays (companies) completed training in September and are now functioning in their home districts under ANA leadership. More than 20 more tolays are currently in training, and recruiting is ongoing for the next round of trainees. Additional ANA-TF companies will join the force in 2019 and potentially replace conventional companies in uncontested areas. The greatest impediments to bringing the ANA-TF online are the chronic limitations of the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC), which suffers from infrastructure, manning, and organizational shortfalls.

Afghan Border Force

The Afghan Border Force, formerly known as the Afghan Border Police (ABP), transferred from the MoI to the MoD in December 2017 to form seven ABF Brigades under the operational control of the ANA corps commanders. Each Corps maintains command and control (C2) over one ABF Brigade in its geographic location (the 209th Corps maintains C2 over two ABF brigades), while an ABF HQ element within the MoD facilitates the administration of the border forces becoming organic to the Corps. The ABF maintains security in the border security zone, which extends 30 miles into the territory of Afghanistan, to deter terrorists, criminal groups, and smugglers and
support ANA operations against insurgent and terrorist forces. The ABF transition increases the fighting capacity of the ANDSF, improves unity of command by combining ANA and former police combat forces under ANA corps leadership, aligns forces conducting military operations within hold zones, and allows the MoI to shift its focus to customs and border protection at border crossing points and airports.

**Afghan National Civil Order Force**

The Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF), formerly known as the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), transferred from the MoI to the MoD in March 2018 to form seven ANCOF Brigades under the operational control of the ANA Corps Commanders in its geographic location. Unlike the ABF, each ANCOF Brigade has its own support Kandak. The ANCOF missions include: dealing with civil unrest, reacting to insurgent activities in remote and high-threat areas, conducting civil order presence patrols, and providing crisis response to public unrest and terrorist attacks in urban and metropolitan areas. The ANCOF support clearing operations by providing intelligence, tactical support, and manpower to secure seized terrain. The ANCOF’s capability to respond effectively to civil disorder and conduct clearance operations in urban terrain addresses deficiencies in some of the ANA corps.

**Figure 8: ANA Corps and 111th Capital Division Boundaries**
Afghan Air Force

The AAF serves as the primary air enabler for the ANA ground forces by providing aerial fires and lift support to ground forces across Afghanistan. The AAF can independently plan for and provide air assets for logistics, resupply, humanitarian relief efforts, return of human remains, MEDEVAC, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), non-traditional ISR, air interdiction, close air attack, armed overwatch, and aerial escort missions. The AAF headquarters is in Kabul and provides command and control of 18 detachments and three wings: the Kabul Air Wing, the Kandahar Air Wing, and the Shindand Air Wing. TAA at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the Afghan Air Force primarily occurs in three locations: Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif. NAC-A and TAAC-Air TAA the AAF at the ministerial, AAF headquarters, wing, group, and squadron levels.

Implementation of Inherent Law within the AAF led to the removal of ineffective senior leaders. Air advisors report that the officers appointed to the vacated positions are motivated to improve the AAF, receptive to training, and display better leadership characteristics than their predecessors. Advisors have noted that for some AAF functions, the advisory challenge has shifted from interfacing with unreceptive AAF personnel to advising motivated, but less experienced, AAF officers. Although this requires review of core skills for the new AAF personnel, the AAF officers are more receptive to the training, incorporate their staff officers, and transfer that training to peers. New leaders have risen through the ranks, but the AAF does not have a formalized merit-based promotion system. At times, advisor-nominated AAF leaders have been ignored, demonstrating that patronage and influence continues to exist within the AAF.

Although AAF personnel at the tactical level capably execute operations, centralized control and centralized execution within the AAF restrict operational-level capabilities. Until the AAF delegates and recognizes authority at the Group Command level, AAF development will not reach full potential.

Human capital limitations remain one of the largest challenges to meeting increased AAF manning requirements. The AAF requires personnel with a minimum level of education and critical thinking skills. The limited pool of Afghans that meet these basic qualifications, however, creates challenges for both the AAF and their supporting air advisors. Resolving basic administrative shortfalls (e.g., timeliness of pay) coupled with the continued development of both the officer and enlisted force is vital to retain and maximize the effectiveness of AAF Airmen.

Airframes

During this reporting period, the AAF received deliveries of five UH-60As, five MD-530s, and one C-130 returning from depot maintenance. In total, AAF has 152 aircraft, of which 110 are in country and available or in short-term MX, and seven are in the United States in support of Afghan

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27 MEDEVAC differs from CASEVAC in the level of care provided to the patient and the type of vehicle or aircraft used. MEDEVAC missions typically have en route care provided by a medic, and make use of dedicated or specialty vehicles. CASEVAC missions are usually on an ad hoc basis, often without medical care provided en route, and in vehicles or aircraft not specifically designated for patient transfer.
training needs. The AAF’s fixed-wing platforms include C-208s, C-130s, and A-29s, and its rotary-wing platforms include MD-530s, Mi-17s, UH-60A+s, and Mi-35s. Some platforms are limited by understaffed crew positions, like flight engineers, that are required to assemble fully trained flight crews. Under the aviation modernization program, DoD is delivering two UH-60A+s per month and five armed MD-530s per quarter to the MoD until program objectives are met.

With a growing body of operational data of the AAF and SMW since the modernization plan was developed, DoD will continue to ensure the plan meets operational requirements while keeping sustainment costs manageable. Figure 9 details the number of AAF airframes, fully trained pilots, and fully trained flight crews currently on-hand.

Figure 9: Summary of AAF Airframes and Aircrews*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>Current Inventory</th>
<th>In Country &amp; Available or in Short-term MX</th>
<th>Number of Qualified Aircrew (Pilots and Co-Pilots)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23&lt;sup&gt;31&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-208</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;32&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12&lt;sup&gt;33&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>21&lt;sup&gt;34&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60A+</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60+FFF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-35</td>
<td>(4&lt;sup&gt;35&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheetah</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>28</sup> SMW aircraft are not included in this total.
<sup>29</sup> The Government of India donated four Mi-35s to Afghanistan. The AAF’s prior Mi-35 fleet reached the end of its service life and is not included in the official tashkil. All four aircraft have exceeded their 500-hour inspection and have been grounded until completed. The AAF is trying to source funding to complete repairs. The United States does not provide advising or funding for the Mi-35 aircraft or aircrew.
<sup>30</sup> Numbers represent a snapshot in time and are based on multiple reporting sources. Numbers in this column include aircraft available for tasking (combat ops/training) as well as those in short-term routine or unscheduled maintenance.
<sup>31</sup> One C-208 is NMC due to a hard landing.
<sup>32</sup> The first AC-208 will be delivered in 2019.
<sup>33</sup> Twelve aircraft are in Afghanistan. Seven aircraft are at Moody AFB, Georgia, for training utilization.
<sup>34</sup> This number does not include the additional Mi-17 helicopters used by the SMW. Seven aircraft are undergoing depot repair, and 17 are expired.
<sup>35</sup> Not counted. See footnote 31.
The C-130 transport aircraft provides a medium-airlift capability in support of personnel and equipment transport, CASEVAC, and return of human remains.

AAF C-130Hs assigned to the Kabul Air Wing conduct operations throughout Afghanistan to locations with improved airfields, providing a strategic airlift capability for large passenger movements and CASEVAC operations. C-130Hs transport cargo too large or unsuitable for the C-208 or Mi-17 aircraft, such as maintenance equipment and parts. Additionally, the C-130 is the primary mode of transportation for munitions between the AAF Wing locations.

Small fleet size, aircraft availability, and aircrew availability currently limit C-130H operations. Two of the four AAF C-130Hs were in out-of-country depot maintenance during until August 2018. Three C-130Hs will remain in country through the end of October. Despite these limitations, TAAC-Air trained six pilots in assault landings and night-vision goggles (NVG) en route operations. TAAC-Air anticipates continued human capital issues to delay the AAF in achieving a 2:0 crew ratio.

The AAF relies on a DoD contractor logistics support (CLS) contract for C-130H logistics and maintenance.
The C-208 aircraft provides light-lift, personnel transport, CASEVAC, and recovery of human remains capability for the ANDSF. C-208s operate primarily from Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand. NAC-A and TAAC-Air focus on expanded C-208 employment envelope by developing soft field landing and airdrop capabilities has resulted in successful forward deployment to improved and, in some cases, unimproved airfields throughout the country. The C-208 fleet relies on a mix of CLS and AAF organic maintenance.

NAC-A and TAAC-Air continue to help the AAF develop its nascent airdrop capability, with the intent to increase operational flexibility. During the previous reporting period, the AAF planned, rigged, and flew its first emergency combat airdrop using the C-208, dropping almost 1,000 pounds of needed ammunition to the ANP within six hours of notification. C-208s conducted a total of three emergency combat airdrops during this reporting period; however, the MoD’s demand signal for this capability remains low. In the future, the AAF will need to support airdrop operations with platform integration (PC-12 and A-29) to facilitate safe airdrops in contested environments. Overall, airdrop capability is limited to low threat areas due to the C-208 airdrop altitude, airspeed, lack of armor, and a maximum cargo load of 900 pounds. NAC-A and TAAC-Air advisors coordinate with other TAAC advisors to educate ANA commanders on the new AAF airdrop capability.
The AAF uses the A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft to attack targets of strategic significance and provide close air attack in support of ground forces. The A-29 can carry Mk-81 250-lb. bombs, Mk-82 500-lb. bombs, a GBU-58 250-lb. laser-guided bomb, a GBU-12 500-lb. laser-guided bomb, rockets, and two .50 caliber machine guns mounted in the wings. In March 2018, the AAF A-29s started using precision munitions in combat, which went from a training concept to reality in under one year. The A-29 has significantly increased its accuracy with precision-guided munitions, and A-29 pilots continue to achieve high accuracy with unguided bombs. The first night strike by an AAF A-29 occurred on December 8, 2018, adding a significant capability for fighting terrorists and insurgents.

A-29s are assigned to the Kabul Air Wing, with a detachment at Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar. The AAF will stand up the next A-29 Squadron at MeS concurrently with the MeS Wing. An A-29 maintenance squadron is assigned to the Kandahar Air Wing and aircraft rotate from Kabul to Kandahar on a weekly basis.

Instructor Pilot (IP) Upgrade training is an important step in creating a training program that the AAF can sustain. The A-29 pilots continue to show disciplined restraint in not dropping munitions on targets with ambiguous parameters or the possibility of civilian casualties.

As aviation maintenance training continues, the AAF will continue to require CLS and supporting training contracts to maintain combat capability in these airframes over the mid-term.
Mi-17 Helicopter

The Mi-17 helicopter conducts day and night personnel transport, MEDEVAC, resupply, close-combat attack, aerial escort, and air assault missions. The AAF is capable of deploying and operating Mi-17s throughout the country.

A portion of the AAF Mi-17 fleet can be configured for a fixed-forward-firing capability, including some capable of employing rockets. Using the Mi-17s as armed gunships limits the AAF’s ability to employ Mi-17s in support of other mission sets, such as MEDEVAC and aerial resupply.

The AAF has proven more than capable of maintaining the Mi-17. Advisors continue to stress better maintenance and more disciplined fleet management of the Mi-17. Furthermore, advisors mentor the AAF on flying-hour program management to preserve the rotary-wing capability while the AAF integrates the UH-60 fleet.
The MD-530 helicopter provides close air attack and aerial escort to the ANDSF. The MD-530 has two weapons pylons, capable of firing .50 caliber machine guns and rockets. As of May 1, 2018, the AAF has six operational MD-530 Scout Weapons Teams.

The AAF’s MD-530s currently rely on a DoD CLS contract; however, the AAF is building an organic maintenance capability for the MD-530. TAAC-A is working with the AAF to increase the number of MD-530 pilot and maintenance students in training to maximize independence and sustainability of the fleet.

Currently, the AAF has the capability to support MD-530 operations (rearm and refuel only) at forward-deployed locations for short intervals without CLS presence. The AAF will continue to require CLS and supporting training contracts to maintain combat capability in the mid-term and long-term. Finally, five “glass-cockpit” MD-530s arrived at KAF, with difference training completed this reporting period. These advances allow for better situational awareness in mountainous and combat flying environments in Afghanistan.
The UH-60 Black Hawk is a medium-lift, multi-role utility helicopter that performs cargo and personnel transport and patient and human remains transfer, and has the ability to operate throughout Afghanistan. DoD has provided the AAF with mission-configured and training-configured UH-60A+s that have been refurbished and upgraded to an A+ variant with the UH-60 L model engine. These helicopters operate out of Kandahar Air Field. Once fully operational, the UH-60 fleet will perform air assault missions, personnel transport, MEDEVAC, resupply, and other lift missions, with the ability to operate in the vast majority of the country.

During the previous reporting period, the AAF flew its first UH-60A+ combat mission. Since then, AAF UH-60s have flown over 1,141 sorties, 5,605 passengers, 159 patient transfers (WIA), and 116 Human Remains, and moved over 400,000 pounds of cargo. The AAF can field seven UH-60 mission crews and is on track to produce additional crews commensurate with additional UH-60 deliveries.

AAF UH-60 pilots receive basic UH-60 flying skills through a the six-week Aircraft Qualification Training (AQT). Upon graduation, pilots can attend Mission Qualification Training (MQT), a 10-week contractor-led, academic and flight instruction course that graduates pilots as mission-certified “co-pilots.” Through accrual of flying time and certification, squadron leadership can certify pilots as aircraft commanders. The AAF has trained a total of 24 qualified UH-60 pilots, consisting of 16 qualified co-pilots and eight certified aircraft commanders.
Training

Training pipelines for the AAF are meeting growth targets. Training for the A-29, C-208, and MD-530 is on track to produce the requisite number of aircrew to meet fleet capabilities and operational demands. All A-29 and AC-208 pilot and maintainer students and a portion of UH-60 students receive their training in the United States. Due to continued absconding by up to 20 percent of these students, DoD is shifting all of this training to OCONUS locations and is working with the MoD to improve security of pilots.

The AAF produces C-208 and MD-530 aircrew directly from the initial pilot training courses. UH-60 training is placing high demand on UH-60 training aircraft to train, season, and upgrade aircrew to build full crews. Additionally, NVG and combat skills training has placed a new demand on the training needs of UH-60 pilots. Due to these challenges, the UH-60 training production temporarily fell behind planned growth by three crews. Current projections are that this gap will close in late 2019 upon completion of current efforts to streamline the AQT/MQT pipeline and syllabus revisions to incorporate necessary NVG and combat skills requirements. Due to the temporary slow in the training pipeline, the AAF will be able to utilize excess airframes to stand up units at Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif in 2019 while simultaneously minimizing impact to AAF battlefield capabilities, which subsequent crews will then fill by the fall of 2019 when the gap is closed. A-29, AC-208, MD-530 aircrew training is currently or is expected to keep pace with incoming aircraft deliveries.

Identifying qualified AAF airmen candidates with the necessary technical skills to complete training remains an enduring challenge, and the AAF still lacks a cadre of English-trained, proficient pilots and crews. U.S. and coalition-sponsored English language training (ELT) remains the critical enabler to successful maintenance and pilot training in Afghanistan. TAAC-A advisors have implemented a phased transition plan to consolidate ELT resources to support the AAF and modernization needs. The emerging program provides the requisite English proficiency for a broad range of training and operational needs, including training AAF Officers to teach ELT to other AAF personnel. To consolidate resources, TAAC-A shifted training to a single location in Kabul and will focus on train-the-trainer, pilot, and maintenance candidates.

Human capital and capacity remain the two primary limiting factors to AAF growth of a fully capable cadre of mechanics and pilots. Because AAF maintainer training differs across airframes, contractor logistics support (CLS) training providers, and specialties, it could take as many as five to seven years for an aviation maintainer to obtain formal training and on-the-job training, and to consolidate skills.

Initial training to achieve a routine-level maintenance competency (Level 3) takes 12 to 18 months and includes general English-language training. Subsequent training to achieve an intermediate-level maintenance competency (Level 2) takes an additional two to three years and includes enhanced English training. Finally, achieving high-level competency (Level 1) requires an additional two to three years and includes continued English training to achieve literacy in technical English. The AAF does not formally track the training status of AAF maintainers. To address these concerns, TAAC-A is in the process of developing an AAF Master Training Plan to standardize and define skill level descriptions across platforms. This standardization should allow
the AAF, CLS provider, and TAAC-A to capture the number and qualifications of trainer personnel accurately across the force.

**Figure 10: Training Requirement for AAF Maintainers by Total Years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maintainer Training Level</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Level 3</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
<th>Level 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60A</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NAC-A TAA educates leadership on the proper application of airpower and assets to ensure the proper application of aircraft and personnel. At the senior level, NAC-A is designing a training/exercise program to improve senior-level AAF leadership decision-making for the development, sustainment, employment, integration, and command and control of the AAF within the ANDSF.

The development of qualified, experienced, and correctly slotted Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators (ATACs) remains a key AAF training effort. The nine-week ATAC training course revised by advisors during the last reporting period produced eight additional fully qualified personnel, increasing the ANA and AAF ATAC cadre to 44. Advisors, working with the AAF, ensure these ATACs are correctly slotted in the *tashkil* and fulfilling ATAC roles. TAAC-A expects this course to produce 30-40 AAF ATACs per year. In addition, the AAF has trained a total of 17 ALOs. In January 2019, the AAF will graduate another class of eight ALOs.

**Sustainment**

The AAF increased capability for overall maintenance of Mi-17s and C-208s with minimal coalition or CLS. AAF maintainers accomplish approximately 80 percent of overall Mi-17 maintenance, including 90 percent of scheduled maintenance, and 50 percent of unscheduled maintenance. The difference between scheduled and unscheduled maintenance is attributable to the AAF’s inability to troubleshoot and identify discrepancies.

TAAC-A maintenance advisors have identified fleet management as an area that requires additional development among all airframes. The high operational tempo demanded of the fleet during this reporting period increased fleet usage rates above AAF policy, adversely affecting the overall ability to manage the fleet. A lack of defined utilization and commitment rates leads to inadequate fleet management. Although the AAF does not currently employ expediters, pro-supers, debrief, or similar fleet management positions, these positions are required for fleet sustainment. The AAF does not yet have the organic capacity to perform maintenance for C-130 and UH-60s. Overall, inadequate English language skills within the AAF maintenance community
inhibit independent inspections. Although some AAF personnel are qualified to do most interval inspections, they still require CLS assistance to translate the English-language technical data.

TAAC-Air Maintenance & Logistics advisors began dedicating energy and resources to the development and implementation of the National Maintenance Strategy for Air (NMS-A), with a primary focus on reducing contract costs and increasing organic AAF capability. Execution of the strategy is divided into four Integrated Product Teams (IPT): Rotary-Wing, Fixed-Wing, Intermediate Aircraft Maintenance, and Logistics. These IPTs are developed in concert with a variety of agencies, but TAAC-Air remains the overall proponent for the effort in collaboration with the MoD. This planning, along with invaluable contractor maintenance advising, is necessary to ensure AAF long-term sustainability.

**Figure 11: Percentage of AAF Organic Maintenance and CLS Maintenance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Organic</th>
<th>CLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operations**

The AAF’s targeting process remained a key focus of TAA efforts, resulting in significant improvements to the number of prioritized and approved target packages per day. Three years ago, the AAF Headquarters could not build a targeting package for independent AAF offensive operations. The AAF is now able to develop and execute up to eight targeting packages a day, but targeting package quality will require additional TAA in the future.

The AAF improved AGI capability by integrating strike aircraft, ISR, and Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators (ATACs) to coordinate and conduct air strikes in support of ANDSF operations, resulting in more effective use of the MD-530 and A-29. The MoD and NAC-A continue to formalize the targeting process and update relevant policies, including the first edition of AGI doctrine at AAF Headquarters. Advisors added a 9-week training course and pre-selection recruiting standards in an effort to improve retention, quality, and performance of future AGI personnel.

The AAF’s targeting process is maturing, and ANA Corps Commanders recognize the instrumental role of AAF airpower in meeting the ANDSF’s mission objectives. ANA conventional ground forces, however, often do not effectively capitalize on the AAF’s deliberate and dynamic targeting process, resulting in inefficiencies and missed strike opportunities. Shortfalls along the targeting process spectrum include generation of target packages, decision-

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36 Organic maintenance data are general averages due to fluctuations in OPTEMPO, phased maintenance, and the degree of maintenance needs.
making between the Corps and the MoD, and target preparation for the pilots. TAAC-A advisors initiated reviews to address these shortfalls. Although obstacles and inefficiencies exist in particular areas and can vary from Corps to Corps, ALO personnel co-located with ANA Corps throughout the country have aided the decision-making and planning process between the Corps, MoD, and AAF and help ground commanders understand how to integrate air assets into operations. The AAF now embeds Air Liaison Officers (ALO) teams in five corps, on a rotational basis, to provide persistent AGI support, planning, and coordination. AAF leadership struggles, however, to utilize ciphers to direct locations and deployment duration for ALOs. Increasing these targeting experts will mitigate targeting process issues, such as poorly selected and prioritized target sets, and improve coordination from target submitter to pilot in the planning process.

**MoD Afghan Special Security Forces**

Afghan special operations forces remain among the best in the region, and they continue to mature with coalition assistance. The ASSF have proven their ability to conduct counterterrorism raids successfully and are furthering their capability to analyze and exploit intelligence gained from these operations. Beginning in September, ASSF forces became the supported force and increased the number of operations against the Taliban with the conventional ANA assuming a follow-and-support role. This shift in responsibilities resulted in fewer Taliban attacks and fewer incidents of Taliban massing.

Conventional ANA overreliance on the ASSF continued during this reporting period. The ANA were unable to generate momentum against the Taliban due to a preponderance of its force defending from checkpoints and static positions, and the remainder of the force reacting to Taliban attacks. Therefore, in response to enemy offensive operations, particularly those against fixed targets such as District Centers, the ASSF provided an emergency response force to secure threatened locations and recapture those that have fallen to the enemy. When the ANA employs the ASSF in conventional roles, they restrict the ASSF from deploying offensively against insurgent targets or preparing for future operations.

**Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC)**

Beginning in September, ANASOC Commandos became the supported force and increased the number of operations against the Taliban with the conventional ANA assuming a follow-and-support role. This shift in responsibilities resulted in fewer Taliban attacks and fewer incidents of Taliban massing.

ANASOC is a Corps-level organization responsible for command and control of all ANA special operations forces. Although ANASOC only accounts for a small percentage of ANA manning, it conducts a majority of ANA’s offensive missions. ANASOC is organized into four Special Operations Brigades (SOB) and a National Mission Brigade (NMB), as depicted in Figure 12. Ten battalion-sized ANA Commando SOKe, eight CSKs, and seven support elements are spread throughout the Corps. Additionally, the ANASOC Corps maintains a General Support Kandak

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37 During the last reporting period, the AAF only embedded ALO teams in four corps.
(GSK) that conducts emergency resupply and facilitates delivery of SOF-specific equipment and supplies to the Kabul Cluster units. ANASOC’s mission is to increase the Afghan government’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations and, as directed, execute special operations against terrorist and insurgent networks in coordination with other ANDSF pillars. ANASOC can respond to simultaneous crises across the country, as well as conduct future operations planning with other ASSF components and ANDSF. As part of the ANDSF Roadmap, the ANASOC division expanded from a division of 11,300 personnel to a corps with four brigades and a National Mission Brigade, totaling 22,994 personnel.

Figure 12: ASSF Expansion

The SOKs, ANASOC’s primary tactical elements, conduct core special operations tasks against threat networks to support regional corps’ COIN operations, provide a strategic response capability against select threats, and can forward-deploy expeditionary mission Command packages, supporting both planned offensive and contingency operations. Nine of the ten SOKs are aligned with regional SOBs with the ability to work with a specific ANA corps if requested. The 6th SOK (assigned to NMB), located in the Kabul area, functions as the ANA’s national mission unit.

The NMB provides the President of Afghanistan and the MoD with rapidly deployable Special Operations Forces capable of conducting national-level operations to achieve strategic effects across Afghanistan. The NMB has a deployable mission command package, including the 6th SOK, Ktah Khas (KKA), and two Special Forces Kandaks (each SFK includes five AOBs with eight ANA Special Forces teams per AOB). Its mission is to conduct counterterrorism operations, crisis response, national emergency response, and internal defense and development, also known as Special Forces Partnership, theater-wide at short notice. In support of those operations, the NMB
has the ability to conduct direct action, hostage rescue, special reconnaissance, security forces assistance, and counterinsurgency. MoI and NDS liaisons serve in the NMB HQ to ensure ANA-ANP coordination. The SMW and the AAF provide priority support to the NMB.

The *Ktah Khas* (KKA) is a light infantry SOK assigned to ANASOC’s NMB. The KKA has eight companies: three operational companies, a training company, an engineer company, a military intelligence company, a support company, and a headquarters company. These additional companies support the *Ktah Khas* training cycle and support operations, including transportation for the *Ktah Khas* strike forces, explosive ordnance disposal to conduct counter-IED (C-IED) operations, and supporting the female tactical platoon, which enables interactions with women and children on missions. *Ktah Khas* platoons and companies conduct successful intelligence-driven counterterrorism raids, particularly against high-value individuals, and vehicle interdictions utilizing both ground and air mobility platforms. A focus on recruiting and retention has enabled the *Ktah Khas* to remain near full strength. *Ktah Khas* is capable of executing a well-planned ORC. The *Ktah Khas* ORC is a 32-week cycle that consists of “Red, Amber, and Green” phases. The three *Ktah Khas* companies are staggered in their cycles to have one company in each phase of the ORC at all times. Each cycle is separated from the next by one week, allowing soldiers to take leave. *Ktah Khas* members are authorized an additional four weeks of leave following an operational deployment. According to RS advisors, *Ktah Khas* are not subject to the same misuse as the rest of the ASSF forces.

**Training**

The ANASOC School of Excellence (SOE) is meeting the training need for growth and continues to improve as an institutional training site. The ANASOC SoE graduated more than 3800 students from 43 courses since June 2018. The ANASOC SoE instituted critical changes to its Program of Instruction to prepare soldiers and leaders more effectively across ANASOC and add additional Special Operations Forces-focused leader courses. Upon completion of the 14-week Commando Qualifications Course (CDOQC), each Mobile Strike Kandak (MSK) proceeds through the Cobra Strike Maneuver Course (CSMC). The CSMC is a twelve-week course covering topics from dismounted infantry collective training, vehicle commander training, gunnery skills training, Mobile Strike Fighting Vehicle (MSFV) platoon collective training, and Battalion Senior Leader and Staff training, after which a newly trained and re-designated Cobra Strike Kandak (CSK) deploys to its operations base. The 6th Mobile Strike Kandak (MSK) completed CDOQC in 2017 and the CSMC in April 2018; after graduation, the re-designated 6th CSK immediately deployed in support of combat operations. The 5th MSK graduated CDOQC in April 2018, began the CSMC in July 2018, and graduated in October 2018. The ASSF now have two qualified CSKs and seven MSKs, with 1 MSK nearing graduation from CSMC in January 2019. Nine of the ten SOKs will add an ANASOC Commando company and each Special Operations Brigade (SOB) will gain a General Support Kandak (GSK).

ANASOC’s Mobility School, established in January 2018, trains select Commandos to operate and employ M117 wheeled- armored vehicles. This training has expanded beyond a focus on vehicle capabilities to encompass training the MSK to utilize maneuver with combined arms, increasing the effectiveness of MSK units. MSK capabilities include lightning strike, enhanced direct fire lethality, strongpoint penetration, and high mobility. This capability greatly enhances
ANASOC’s firepower, mobility, survivability, and lethality on the battlefield. The Mobility School will support the training for two MSKs per training year, which will be a significant component of the newly formed SOBs over the course of the Roadmap.

_Sustainment_

During this reporting period, RS advisors noted a lack ANASOC maintenance and logistical support from the Corps and MoD. ANASOC’s logistical system extends for roughly 72 hours when ANASOC deploys in support of conventional ANA forces, after which the unit or company should return for refit and resupply. Due to continued misuse over the past six months, ANASOC Commandos remained deployed for extended periods after ANA Corps commanders refused to relieve them with conventional forces, outstretching units’ typical logistical and supply chains and timelines. Lack of logistical support results in significant portions of ANASOC forces operating with broken or damaged equipment and poor readiness overall. Over the next several months, advisors plan to increase TAA efforts on training enablers and ensuring logistical support from the Corps.

ANASOC’s largest challenge remains the misuse and overuse of its forces by the MoD. Misuse is the employment of ANASOC forces outside of their designed mission set, while overuse is the tasking of ANASOC forces at a rate that precludes rest and recovery cycles. The MoD and ANA corps headquarters often request more commandos than are available, causing ANASOC to commit forces designated for a rest and recovery cycle.

_Special Mission Wing_

The SMW is a special aviation wing that provides persistent reach for the ASSF during counterterrorism (CT) and counternarcotics (CN) missions designed to disrupt insurgent and drug smuggling networks in Afghanistan. It supports helicopter assault force raids and provides resupply, CASEVAC, and ISR support for ASSF and ANA conventional forces. The SMW is the only ANDSF organization with night-vision, rotary-wing air assault, and fixed-wing ISR capabilities. SMW structure consists of four squadrons, two located in Kabul, one in Kandahar Airfield, and one in Mazar-e-Sharif, providing the ASSF with operational reach across the country.

Recruiting standards, competition with other ANDSF forces, and training timelines remain the largest hurdles to long-term SMW recruitment. Recruitment standards for the SMW are higher than for the AAF or other ANDSF pillars and employ additional levels of screening. The selection, recruitment, screening, and training timeline for new SMW aircrew can take up to 15 months. The MoD and the coalition vet all SMW recruits to ensure that they can meet the high demands of the unit. The SMW struggles to find qualified candidates to fill pilot and maintenance personnel slots. The SMW Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) and TAAC-Air will determine the proportions of recruits going to the SMW and AAF, supporting President Ghani’s request to grow the SMW and AAF. In the short-term, the largest obstacle to SMW growth is a lack of approved _tashkil_ positions required to recruit additional SMW personnel to meet ANDSF Roadmap goals for 2018. In the longer term, the SMW will expand to provide the necessary command and control and support structure for organizational growth.
The SMW utilizes the PC-12 fixed-wing aircraft to conduct ISR in support of CT and CN operations, including overwatch of ASSF ground assault forces and helicopter assault force raids during both daytime and nighttime operations.

PC-12 aircraft provide the ANDSF with day and night surveillance and air-based signals intelligence capabilities. The PC-12 can send full-motion video (FMV) to a ground station, and the onboard crew can perform real-time analysis of collected data. During this reporting period, advisors noted an increase in SMW’s ability to integrate PC-12 ISR into combat operations.

**Mi-17 Helicopter**

The primary mission of the SMW Mi-17 fleet is to conduct day and night precision helicopter assault in support of the full-spectrum, partnered and unilateral, MoD, MoI, and NDS-mandated activity to secure Afghan citizens, interests, and property. Additionally, the Mi-17s conduct resupply operations, CASEVAC, quick reaction force missions, and personnel movement. Under the AAF modernization plan, the SMW will receive ten UH-60A aircraft in 2020 to begin the transition away from SMW Mi-17s by the end of 2023.
Training

The SMW makes use of multiple training opportunities under its CLS contract, including maintenance training, English language training, and flight training. All SMW personnel attend English classes, including conversational, aviation, and maintenance vocabulary.

Through the Kabul Security Assistance Office, the SMW utilizes extensive International Military Education and Training program opportunities. The SMW has sent one soldier to National Defense University, one to the U.S. Marine Corps Warfare Course, and three to the Building Partnerships Aviation Capacity Course Seminar.

The SMW continues to impress coalition partners with merit-based promotions and selection. Given a class capacity of three officers for the PC-12 Instructor Pilot Course, the Wing developed a written test and administered it to all PC-12 aircraft commanders. The top three scorers interviewed with the SMW Commander and were selected for the PC-12 instructor course.

Sustainment

Afghan maintainers performed 50 percent of Mi-17 maintenance on their own over the last year. Afghan maintainers collaborated with Coalition advisors and contracted maintainers to perform an additional 24 percent of the maintenance. During this reporting period, Afghan unilateral Mi-17 maintenance remained steady at 58 percent, with another 22 percent completed with the assistance of advisors and contracted support. Afghan maintainers complete 5 percent of PC-12 maintenance on their own and rely on contracted support for the other 95 percent. The disproportionate PC-12 maintenance is related to higher airworthiness standards and the lack of a nationally governed program manager.

Operations

The SMW operates four squadrons capable of conducting independent missions in support of ASSF elements. They continue to demonstrate improvements in operational effectiveness and efficiency, as well as independence. SMW conducts day and night infiltration and exfiltration from three locations throughout Afghanistan in support of Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF). Afghans flew unilaterally in 81 percent of Mi-17 and 90 percent of PC-12 missions. For the second half of 2018, Mi-17 and PC-12 aircraft flew 1,970 and 2,435 hours, respectively, and 70 percent of Mi-17 sorties were under night-vision goggle conditions.

During this reporting period, SMW flew 1,202 missions. This included A-29 strike support, casualty evacuation, resupply, unit rotation, assault support, preparation of the battlefield, ISR, overwatch, Quick Reaction Force, and unit staging. This excludes tail swaps, maintenance, training, standby, and VIP passenger movements. Forty-four (3.7 percent) missions were in support of counternarcotics and 928 (77.2 percent) missions were in support of counterterrorism. Of significance, the SMW began developing an HPA response capability. During this reporting period, the SMW achieved initial operational capability for Fast Rope Insertion Extraction System (FRIES) capability and should achieve full operational capability early in the next reporting period.
Although MoI institutional capabilities and progress remains underdeveloped, it is important to note that MoI lack of progress and reform must be assessed against the backdrop of an ongoing insurgency that often places MoI personnel, particularly the ANP, on the frontlines of insurgent activity. The MoI requires continued and persistent RS and international support to improve delivery of ministerial functions (policy, strategy, administration, and support) and create irreversible institutional change. In most functions, the MoI continues to lag far behind the MoD in terms of progress and institutional capabilities. RS advisors have witnessed some reform and progress relating to logistics, STRATCOM, and personnel management; however, significant gaps in legal affairs, institutional training, personnel management, proper use of forces, and corruption threaten the credibility and longevity of MoI functions and organizations. RS advisors remain dedicated to building the MoI’s institutional capacity and operational functionality.

Minister of Interior Wais Ahmad Barmak retains responsibility for leadership and organizational reform within the MoI. During his tenure, he has overseen implementation of the MoI Strategic Plan (MISP), prioritized counter-corruption, and improved the MoI’s merit-based assignment and promotion process. The Ministry of Interior Affairs Strategic Plan (MISP) for FY 2018-2021 lays the groundwork for MoI reform and progress. Implementation of the MISP commenced in 2018 with the FY 2018 annual plan, and the MoI plans to develop subsequent annual plans through 2021. The MISP incorporates Ministry reform, police reform and reorganization, the Afghan Security Roadmap, and U.S.-Afghan Security Compact milestones into one comprehensive
The greatest challenge to MoI Reorganization is the MoI’s ability to implement the plan and provide the public with visible change.

RS and international organizations, including UN Development Program, UNAMA, the German Police Project Team, and U.S. Government departments and agencies, assist with MoI institutional reform and ANP professionalization as a community policing organization. Several of these international organizations coordinate their efforts through the International Community Advisor Steering Council, which meets weekly in Kabul. In October, Resolute Support chaired a police reform conference in Istanbul. The conference provided a platform for the international community and senior Afghan officials from the MoI to discuss and devise proposals for various police reform activities and opportunities in Afghanistan. Areas of focus included recruitment, training, HRM, and strategic communications.

Resource Management and Procurement

The MoI generally lacks the ability to identify resource requirements to build annual budgets or to base those requirements on MoI strategic objectives. Unclear strategic guidance and understanding of how the MoI strategic plan should inform requirements development and prioritization contribute to this problem. Zone and provincial leaders often fail to define or justify their requirements properly, and subordinate organizations fail to follow the requirements submission process, with many organizations bypassing the local, provincial, or zone headquarters. Budget units compound this issue through ineffective communication with subordinates at the zone and provincial levels and fail to consolidate and prioritize MoI requirements. These shortcomings demonstrate poor vertical and horizontal communication and coordination across the ministry.

The FY 2018 MoI Draft Prioritized Procurement Plan reestablished the focus on setting procurement priorities that emphasize readiness and key Roadmap initiatives. The Procurement Plan has three tiers, with Tier 1 representing the highest priority requirements. Only those requirements that directly support readiness or are key readiness enablers are eligible for ASFF funding. In the past, lack of sufficient technical specifications and clear requirements slowed the submission of requirement packages to the Requirements Approval Board (RAB). This reporting period, the MoI submitted requirement packages to the RAB with better technical specifications and clear requirements. Poor communication between MoI and the National Procurement Authority, however, continues to impede the development of Standard Bid Documents, which delays Bid Announcement and contract award. CSTC-A Procurement Advisors continue to work with the MoI to prioritize budget requirements to improve the timeliness of requirement package submission and increase execution rates. CSTC-A Finance Advisors and Procurement Advisors are working with their MoI counterparts to increase the expenditure of funds by focusing on contract management and contract administration. As of December 2, 2018, the RAB approved 99 of 99 requirements totaling $57.2M, which represents 96 percent of the MoI's FY 2018 procurement budget. Additionally, the MoI made slow but steady progress on its FY 2018 budget execution, executing 54 percent of its $150.6 million budget.

The MoI’s Deputy Minister (DM) Support established a working group to validate Budgetary Unit’s FY 2019 procurement plan and merge the eight plans into a single FY 2019 MoI
Procurement Plan. During this reporting period, DM Support consolidated all eight Budgetary Unit Procurement Plans and presented the Draft FY 2018 Procurement Plan to RS advisors, which demonstrated significant MoI ownership of the prioritization process and a marked improvement over previous reporting periods.

Last reporting period, the MoI reassigned all military personnel within MoI-Procurement and began “civilianization” of positions. The MoI appointed an acting Procurement Director, two Senior Procurement Advisors, and five Procurement SMEs as Acting Managers while the civilian hiring process began. Communication between MoI-Procurement and the Finance directorate and National Procurement Authority increased. Since his selection as the Acting Procurement Director in April 2018, the Procurement Director has focused on improving the development of Standard Bid Documents and the timeliness of the Bid Evaluation process. As of the end of this reporting period, contracts have been awarded compared to 37 contracts as of the same time last year.

Legal Affairs

The MoI IG structure, function, and personnel made significant inroads towards creating a sustainable, professional IG cadre, serving as one of the primary success stories within the MoI’s legal affairs arenas. Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (TAO) advisors identified the lack of a trained and professional IG core as the greatest threat to long-term sustainability and independence of the MoI IG. To address this gap in capabilities, TAO advised the MoI IG to form a Training and Education (T&E) directorate. TAO and MoI personnel formed a working group to collaborate on developing IG course curriculum, staffing requirements, and an IG manual. Furthermore, TAO collaborated with the U.S. Army IG School Academic Program to provide assistance, as needed, to the MoI IG on developing curriculum. Currently, advisors are assisting the MoI IG on hiring an Afghan Education Administrator to serve as a subject matter expert for the T&E directorate and oversee IG curriculum development and train-the-trainer efforts for IG instruction. These advancements stem from positive and persistent TAA efforts, a permanent IG that exhibits strong buy-in on TAA and progress, and an overall emphasis by TAO and the IG on the development of a sustainable mechanism to select and train a professional IG core.

The Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) helps lead the fight against corruption. During this reporting period, the court’s output has stagnated relevant to the number of prosecutors and the court’s overall capacity to handle a robust docket and successfully prosecute major corruption cases at the primary, appellate, and Supreme Court levels. The ACJC hears about two cases per month, resulting in about an 80 percent conviction rate. The ACJC appears to be avoiding its mandate to try “major” corruption cases, as evidenced by its proclivity to try “low-level” cases over “high-level” cases. In 2018, the ACJC has only tried four General Officers. A majority of the conviction by the primary court are appealed to the ACJC’s appeals court, and many of the appellate court’s convictions are then appealed to the Supreme Court. Collectively, both courts uphold approximately 95 percent of the primary court’s decisions.

The ACJC lacks a credible warrant enforcement mechanism or accurate report of outstanding warrants, and has not complied with the international community’s requests to provide copies of

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39 See “Legal Affairs” subsection in Section 4 for additional information on TAO efforts to assist the MoD IG and MoI IG.
warrants awaiting service or an updated list of warrants needing to be served. In the few instances where warrants were served, most individuals were quickly released on individual guarantees. As of the end of this reporting period, the ACJS reported that 30 arrest warrants remain outstanding and fewer than 10 of these warrants have been served, including individuals who voluntarily reported to the ACJC.

In response to this issue, the Afghan government plans to establish a fugitive recovery and asset forfeiture task force, with associated statutory and regulatory instruments, that designate the process and single point approval authority to execute warrant based operations in support of the ACJC. The JAWED Task Force, composed of representatives from the ACJC, Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), Mol-Criminal Investigation Division (CID), GCPSU, and AACP, will meet bi-weekly to conduct interagency coordination to work through challenges with regards to upcoming apprehensions and share lessons learned from previous apprehensions. RS ROL advisors, including the ROL Director or his designated surrogate, as well as ACJC Liaison, will have seats on the task force targeting board. Pending establishment of the task force, the Afghan government will support JAWED and execute all ACJC warrants currently in possession of advisors.

Transparency, Accountability, and Law Enforcement (TALE) committees, active at the ministerial, IG, and ANP zone levels, seek to address corruption, elevate significant issues to senior leaders, and disseminate decisions downward, as appropriate. The TALE meetings foster information sharing and promote collaboration across the MoI. In past reporting periods, TALE meetings convened sporadically, and RS advisors continued to encourage the IG to schedule more meetings in accordance with the TALE terms of reference. Although some meetings during this period were postponed, the MoI IG chaired two monthly TALE Executive Committee meetings in June and October and the MININT chaired one quarterly TALE Steering Committee meeting in October. TAO advisors note that the overall quality of meetings has improved. Executive TALE committee meetings include attendance by MoI members outside the IG Office, such as the DPI, MCTF, Gender/Human Rights, and Prisons Department, which substantially increases the effectiveness of each engagement. The forum allows participants to address information flows from provincial and zone TALE committees, which continue to occur with relative consistency. According to advisors present at TALE meetings, participants effectively highlight and discuss issues raised from the zone level TALE meetings, including investigations of complaints received from call centers and the administration of drug tests to ANP individuals. The forum also delves into ongoing corruption concerns and gender and human rights issues, particularly as they relate to prison conditions. The TALE Steering committee remains an important forum to solve issues that cannot be resolved at the Executive level.

**Personnel Management**

Institutional capacity to manage the Ministry’s personnel remains underdeveloped. Advisory and reform efforts have culminated into three key focus areas: validation of personnel in the Ministry, identification of future leaders, and management of career paths. These complementary lines of effort seek to establish a self-sustaining, merit-based institutional ability to manage personnel. Proper validation of personnel through APPS provides the Ministry, RS, and the international community with visibility into the ministry’s leadership structure and force size. Enhanced visibility sets the conditions for better identification of future leaders, and allows the ministry to
optimize ongoing Inherent Law and merit-based promotion reforms. Finally, as leaders rise into newly vacated positions, the MoD, with the continued assistance of advisors, can utilize its Human Resource Management (HRM) processes to institutionalize career paths through professional military education and progressive assignments. During this reporting period, the MoI initiated the first wave of retirements under Inherent Law. Wave 2 implementation is scheduled to begin in early 2019.

On September 5, 2017, the MoI awarded a consulting contract to perform a comprehensive workforce analysis in which the contractor will identify elements of the MoI that should participate in “civilianization” efforts. “Civilianization” aims to provide strong civilian leadership, leverage subject matter expertise, and build continuity within the MoI, in accordance with the MISP. The MoI requested an analysis of seven priority directorates: finance and budget, facilities, logistics, passport, office of Inspector General, General Directorate of Personnel, and procurement Directorate. MoI staff received initial reports in August 2018 and, along with UNDP advisors, reviewed reports to prepare results and recommendations for the Minister of Interior.

MoI personnel management continues to focus on slotting and enrolling personnel in APPS while simultaneously meeting UNDP WEPS requirements for pay. Although APPS is a human resource tool that allows for career management and personnel validation, APPS and WEPS do not communicate and APPS is not the system of record for UNDP to validate pay requirements. RS advisors will continue to work to increase the accountability and validity of the MoI force.

**Institutional Training**

The MoI’s institutional training remains deficient and lags far behind institutional training in the MoD. Despite U.S. and coalition TAA efforts, strong training institutions have not emerged. Past MoI training efforts have vacillated between combat training and law enforcement training as U.S., coalition, and Afghan leaders struggled to determine the best use of the police force. Initiatives like the MoD’s UTEDC are notably absent within the MoI. The MoI’s request for senior MoI leaders to improve ANP training and education may, however, signal a new opening for progress in this arena. In the short term, RS advisors will continue to assist the MoI to build organic institutional training capacity. In September, a cadre of Romanian advisors began to TAA at ANP Staff College.

The MoI also lacks human resource expertise and career path management. Although personnel pass through the Regional Training Centers, there is no system to assign trained police to positions of need and no system to provide additional education or training opportunities to police as their careers progress. Schools, such as the MoD’s Command and Staff School and Pre-Command Course, do not exist in the MoI.

The MoI continues to make use of the Subject Matter Expert (SME) program to hire experienced, educated, and technically proficient Afghans to provide skilled civilian support to the MoI. CSTC-A has agreed to fund up to 268 SMEs, 32 less than last year, to work on one-year contracts for the MoI to meet critical needs and enforce the eventual transition of the positions to typical civil servant positions funded by Afghanistan. RS plans to sunset the SME program in 2020 as the MoI transitions SMEs into full-time civil servant positions.
Logistics and Maintenance

OS-LOG’s advisory efforts within the MoI primarily focuses on increasing and improving equipment readiness rates. This reporting period, the MoI appointed a new Deputy DM Security who has already demonstrated passion for aggressive improvements and reform within the MoI’s supply and logistics chains. The MoI reports equipment readiness to RS through the Force Readiness Report (FRR), which historically has been unreliable, poorly constructed, and generally lagging behind the MoD in quality and accountability. The new Deputy DM Security indicated his desire to improve FRR, actively participates FRR working groups, and successfully hosted a three-day seminar in September for operational and tactical-level officers responsible for compiling FRR data. MoI organic desire to improve the FRR is yielding some positive momentum. For example, this reporting period, advisors requested to see every MoI vehicle within a six-month period for that vehicle to remain on the tashkil. This served as a forcing function for advisors to account for on-hand vehicles, validate FRR vehicle reporting, and ensure proper annual maintenance. Through November 2018, advisors accounted for 19,069 of the reported 28,488 vehicles.

The National Maintenance Contract (NMC) seeks progressive, incremental yearly transfer of responsibility to the MoI for the maintenance of their vehicle holding. In the first year of the contract, the MoI struggled to maintain responsibility for five percent of all maintenance of unit-held vehicles, but steadily increased its share of the overall maintenance by reaching 15.9 percent in November 2018. Between May and June 2018, the ANP exceeded its goal of performing 5 percent of 97 percent of the fleet, due to a slow uptake of the NMC in the first five months. Beginning in September 2018, the ANP was responsible for 10 percent of all maintenance of its vehicle fleet, with contractors responsible for the remaining 90 percent. The MoI achieved an average of 15 percent maintenance for its fleet in the final three months of the reporting period.

Figure 14: Percentage of ANP - NMC Workshare Responsibility
While OS-LOG and NMC efforts have resulted in progress, challenges with MoI logistics persist. The MoI lacks the systems and capabilities to procure and maintain equipment, and there is low confidence in the accuracy of MoI’s equipment reporting. Outdated equipment *tashkils*, significant disagreements regarding approved equipment levels, and leadership turnover hamper progress in MoI logistics and maintenance.

**Strategic and Operational Planning**

The MISP represents the MoI’s primary strategic and operational planning document over the next four years, and incorporates directives and taskings from the ANDSF Roadmap and the U.S.-Afghan Security Compact. The primary MoI focus during this reporting period was planning and implementing the 2018 Annual Plan, the first of four annual implementation plans for the MISP.

The 2018 Annual Plan addresses security for the upcoming elections. Although the progress has been slow, the MoI has conducted joint planning with outside institutions, including the MoD, the IEC, the Ministry of Women Affairs, the Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs, and other relevant agencies. Other areas in which the MoI continues to develop capabilities for joint planning include planning for: Operation Nasrat; Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline security; the Kabul Process Conference; the transfer of ABF and ANCOF to the MoD; and the ongoing plans to improve security within Kabul. MoI’s proactive planning for security during the elections proved successful.

MoI planners were deeply involved Operation Khalid and have remained engaged in the planning process for Operation Nasrat. The MoI Operations and Plans department, under the direction of the Deputy Minister for Security, maintains responsibility for operational planning. The Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy, who reports to the First Deputy Minister, conducts strategic planning. Within this system, strategic plans from the Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy flow through the Deputy Minister for Security and his team down to the ANP zone level. The system’s efficiency depends on personality, political backing, education, and literacy.

Despite improved ability to conduct operational planning, reporting by ANP zone headquarters is generally poor. Commanders do not enforce proper reporting procedures and routinely bypass chains of command to address issues directly with senior leadership. As a result, zone headquarters rarely have acceptable situational awareness of the status of their units.

**Intelligence**

The MoI continued to improve its intelligence sharing during this reporting period. The Directorates of Police Intelligence (DPI) and Counter Terrorism Police (CTP) engaged in greater information sharing as Resolute Support priorities shifted to Kabul Security. The MoI’s focus on NIMS expansion and strategic-level guidance resulted in more information sharing. Across the intelligence spectrum, RS advisors noted increased access and dissemination of intelligence. Intelligence sharing remains considerably underdeveloped as various Afghan agencies protect access and stovepipe dissemination, but continued TAA efforts have resulted in limited, but positive, success in this arena.
In February 2018, the Minister of Interior declared the National Information Management System (NIMS) as the system of record for MoI agencies. NIMS accounts increased by over 15 percent since August. Despite the low percentage of accounts added to the NIMS database, the INT TAA advisors saw an increase in the amount of reports added in the quarter. In total, 259,644 reports were entered into the system this quarter. INT TAA advisors began providing demonstrations to the TAACs as well as their Afghan Counterparts to facilitate the move of intelligence, operational, and administrative duties to the digital database and to help mature the MoI’s access to and use of NIMS.

During this reporting period, advisors noted an increased willingness by the Counter Terrorism Police (CTP) Directorate to expand the directorate’s capabilities. In the past, the CTP has been hesitant to share key intelligence assessments. Advisors hope that the newfound access results in improved intelligence sharing from the CTP across all Afghan intelligence directorates in support of dismantling criminal and insurgent groups.

The Afghan forensics enterprise has matured. TAA efforts by Forensics mentors resulted in the inaugural Afghan-led Evidence Collection and Processing Seminar, hosted by the Criminal Techniques Laboratory-Kabul. Forensics specialists, crime scene investigators, and leaders from across the MoI’s Criminal Investigations Division and Criminal Techniques Directorate attended the seminar. Afghan directors and subject matter experts shared their forensics techniques and invited inputs from attendees. The event highlighted growing organic capabilities and a willingness to share information across the spectrum. Unfortunately, forensic and law enforcement specialists lack a feedback mechanism to communicate whether forensics led to law enforcement action or prosecution. Proper use of NIMS to track evidence from entry to disposition and the Case Management System (CMS) to track progress of a case could help address this issue, but both systems, and particularly CMS, lack full utilization.

**Strategic Communication**

MoI STRATCOM produces reliable, credible communication to the Afghan population. The MoI’s STRATCOM structure enables agile, proactive, and coordinated engagement in the information environment, and is more advanced than the MoD’s STRATCOM. Although advisors can TAA product development, these efforts would be muted without significant top-down strategic structural and process capabilities. The MoI is in the lead for STRATCOM, and RS TAA efforts support amplifying and supporting their efforts, not generating their messaging.

During this reporting period, the MoI established a communication directorate that includes public affairs, public outreach, corporate communication, and ministerial information support. Additionally, the MoI initiated a weekly Strategic Communication Working Group that draws participation from across the ministry. The working group has addressed changes necessary to institutionalize strategic communication. The combined STRATCOM efforts of the MoI hope to lay the foundation for assessing the Afghan information environment and monitor communication impacts and outcomes.

Ministerial-level STRATCOM capability has grown significantly during this reporting period, but coordination and synchronization below the ministry lack connectivity. MoI communications
functions will continue to build relationships with provincial communications functions to strengthen overall messaging. According to RS advisors, the MoI recognizes that STRATCOM requirements and messaging differs across various spectrums within Afghanistan. RS advisors continue to assess MoI STRATCOM leadership to ensure that leaders demonstrate the proper teamwork, capability, and credibility necessary to achieve STRATCOM objectives. Poor top-level leadership within MoI STRATCOM are a major roadblock to continued reforms.

**Gender Integration Initiatives**

Approximately 3,215 women serve in the Afghan National Police. The MoI recruitment target is 600 women per year, with a longer-term goal of reaching a 10 percent female representation in the Ministry of Interior, as stated in the MISP. Although women have a higher presence in the ANP as compared to the ANA, the same challenges exist in the ANP as the ANA to integrate women. RS’s Gender Advisors continue to assist the MoI to develop a career path plan from recruitment to retirement for ANA women.

A number of incentives help overcome cultural recruitment barriers. The MoI’s incentives policy offers ten types of incentives for women: recruitment bonuses; re-contracting bonuses; referral bonuses; retention incentives; instructor incentives; child care allowances, relocation and housing allowances; training and education allowances; police prison incentives; and medical attendant travel allowances. There is a risk that financial incentives could work against successful integration, especially if women are paid substantially more than their male counterparts. Careful management of financial incentives and the development of non-financial incentives are required to increase the chances of successful integration. Advisors continue to TAA and manage expectations regarding the incentives policy; it is paid in whole by CSTC-A, and if donor funding ceases, either the GIRoA must pay the incentives or they will cease to exist.

As part of the recruitment and awareness campaign, the Gender Office helps TAA on the use of television, radio, and printed media advertising to encourage women to join the Afghan National Police. However, efforts to provide safe working environments, proper facilities for women, including restrooms, changing rooms, search rooms, and daycare centers, and policies on sexual harassment and assault prevention remain primary TAA focal points for the RS Gender Office.

**Education and Training**

Unique training and education opportunities provide incentives for women to join the ANP. The MoI trains women in areas such as basic police training, radio maintenance, and C-IED training. The final Police Training Academy class in Sivas, Turkey, graduated 156 individuals in March of 2018. The MoI began recruitment for the next iteration of the Sivas Police Training Academy in October 2018. A cadre of 168 recruits began the six-month Sivas Police Training Academy on November 1, 2018.

The desired end-state for females in the ANP is to recruit women for specific tashkil vacancies and train them in Afghanistan with the technical skills required for initial assignments. RS advisors have expressed a desire for ANP female training to be completed in Afghanistan so the program
can have more oversight; however, the UN Development Program (UNDP), not RS, controls the funding for this effort.

The MoI incorporated the GOOD program and held initial literacy testing at MoI HQ in March 2018. Twenty-one females currently attend GOOD program classes at MoI HQ.

The Family Response Units Director was recently appointed to command and control all Family Response Unit offices located at the provincial and district levels. This construct will enable the Director to support all FRU police with staffing, training, furnishing, and equipment needs. A number of FRU police have enrolled in refresher training for FRU-specific crimes, hosted by MoI Criminal Technique. The FRU Director is also seeking to conduct training at the Regional Training Centers to increase police attendance. This training would include First Aid, investigation of sexual abuse, domestic violence, kidnapping, and other related crimes.

**Facilities**

A lack of adequate facilities remains an obstacle to recruitment of women into the ANP. Basic requirements such as separate bathrooms and toilets, segregated recreational areas, and training facilities negatively impact female recruitment. To address these problems, RS developed commitment letters with the MoI to ensure adequate facilities are built and available for women, are not misused by men, and are subject to the withholding of funds if the compound is found in violation. CSTC-A has not withheld funds as of the end of this reporting period.

Women's participation projects include:

- ANP WPP New Women's Compound, Gardez
- Camp Zafar Daycare Facility
- Provincial HQ, Laghman - Barracks and Changing Room
- Provincial HQ, Kunar - Barracks
- 503 Afghan Border Police, Kandahar Airport Security - Barracks and Checkpoint
- Kandahar Police District - 17 changing rooms
- Provincial HQ, Helmand - Barracks
- Provincial HQ, Farah - Barracks, Changing Room and Bathroom
- Provincial HQ, Kunduz - Daycare, Bathroom, Changing Room, 3x Classrooms
- Provincial HQ, Baghlan - Daycare and Office
- MoI HQ Compound - Daycare
- Kabul Police Academy
- Kabul International Airport Checkpoint – Female Search Room
- Afghan Civil Order Police HQ, Kabul – Daycare
- Camp Commander Female Barracks

**5.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE**

The ANP mission is to maintain civil order; reduce corruption; prevent the cultivation, production, and smuggling of illegal narcotics; provide security for individuals and the community; and safeguard legal rights and freedoms. Although the ANP currently focuses on working with and
alongside the ANA to fight the insurgency, the long-term goal as described in the ANDSF Roadmap is to transition the ANP to a more traditional community police force.

One of the key initiatives in the ANDSF Roadmap during this reporting period involved the transfer of most of the ANCOP and elements of the ABP to control of the MoD. ANP forces remain on the front lines augmenting the ANA during the “hold” phase of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations; however, with limited or no crew-served weapons, anti-armor weapons, armored vehicles, or ISR assets, the ANP are not sufficiently trained or equipped for traditional COIN tactics. The ANP’s focus and employment in COIN military functions have hindered their development of sufficient anti-crime and other community policing capabilities. The ANP is several years behind the ANA in its development.

The desired ANP end-state is a professional and effective police force focused on community-centric, traditional, evidenced-based law enforcement policing. Milestones include determining the proper operating model and force distribution to police Afghanistan effectively, redefine ANP roles and responsibilities, assign ANP pillar responsibilities, and establish training standards and work ethics to facilitate effective policing.

**Afghan National Police Strength**

The MoI is authorized 124,626 personnel. Unlike the ANA, the ANP do not offer financial re-contracting incentives, a possible explanation for why the ANA outpaces ANP retention rates. The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which funds the majority of the ANP salaries, concluded a pay analysis of all ANP positions that will allow the ANP’s pay structure to keep pace with the rising cost-of-living. As in the ANA, the number of ANP personnel dropped from the rolls continues to comprise the largest portion of overall ANP attrition. The combination of frequent and lengthy deployments to remote checkpoints with minimal provisions and equipment, difficult living conditions, and the near-constant prospect of combat contributes explains high ANP attrition.

**Afghan National Police Structure**

The ANP is composed of four pillars (AUP, PSP, ABP, and AACP) and three sub-pillars (ALP, APPF, and CNPA). The GCPSU is the MoI’s component of the ASSF. The ALP and the APPF are not counted as part of the 124,626 tashkil; however, they provide additional security under the MoI. The ALP are funded by ASFF, while the APPF do not receive any U.S. funding. The ANP is divided into eight zones that generally align with the ANA corps areas of responsibility.

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40 See section 3.2 for more information on size of the ANDSF.
Afghan Uniform Police

The AUP is the largest police agency in Afghanistan and the primary police force the local populace encounters in their daily lives. The AUP consists of the traffic police, the fire and rescue departments, and a provincial police headquarters in each of the 34 provinces.

The AUP mission is to maintain the rule of law, provide security and civil order, prevent cultivation and smuggling of narcotics, and prevent the smuggling of weapons and other public property, such as historical and cultural relics. Other AUP duties include the detention of criminal suspects to be handed over to the judicial system, maintenance of reliable security measures for key infrastructure including roads and facilities, intelligence collection, and the provision of firefighting and rescue services during natural or man-made disasters. Leadership across AUP units varies, but generally senior MoI and AUP leaders do not empower lower-level leaders to make decisions. Moreover, local AUP units and leaders are susceptible to influence by local power brokers and government officials.

Afghan Local Police

The ALP provide security within villages and rural areas to protect the population from insurgent attacks and to protect facilities. ALP personnel are recruited in concert with local elder approval and employed within villages to provide local security and prevent the spread of insurgent attacks.
influence and activity in that area. When properly directed and supported, the ALP perform well and provide security within villages and rural areas to protect the population from insurgent attacks and to protect facilities. NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) provides TAA support to the ALP at the ALP Staff Directorate (SD) level. ALP personnel are not included in the overall ANDSF tashkil, and the United States funds the salaries for the ALP. The ALP does not suffer from the same types of recruiting issues as the broader ANDSF due, in part, to the fact that ALP are locally employed and connected with the locations that they protect.

**Public Security Police**

Following the transition of eight ANCOP brigades to the MoD in March 2018, a force of 2,550 personnel remained under the control of the MoI and formed the Public Security Police (PSP). The PSP mission is to provide crisis response to public unrest and terrorist attacks in urban and metropolitan areas.

The MoI has initiated an effort to reorganize the PSP into kandak-sized units under the operational control of Zone Commanders. Once approved, the PSP will be focused on the major population centers of Kabul, Kunduz, Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. The PSP mission will be twofold: to execute riot control operations and to act as a medium-level response force.

**Afghan Border Police**

When the majority of ABP transitioned to the MoD in December 2018, the ABP dedicated to customs and security operations at border crossing points and at airports remained under the control of the MoI. The ABP secure and safeguard national borders and provide security at Afghanistan’s international airports to deter terrorists, criminal groups, and smugglers. The ABP mission includes securing and patrolling border and control entry ports, such as airports and border-crossing points, and guarding against the illegal entry of persons, weapons, narcotics, and other goods. The ABP headquarters is located in Kabul.

**Afghan Anti-Crime Police**

The AACP provides specialist police expertise and counterterrorism, anti-corruption, criminal investigation, biometrics, forensics, and specialized security detail support. Coalition subject matter experts work alongside their Afghan counterparts in the AACP’s forensic and biometric programs to support evidence-based operations. AACP personnel also work closely with criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges to ensure the police, not the military, remain the primary face of the rule of law. The AACP organizational structure includes the AACP headquarters, the Criminal Investigation Directorate, the Counterterrorism Police Division, and the Major Crimes Task Force. The AACP is authorized 1,220 personnel.

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41 Evidence-based operations entail arresting individuals for whom there is sufficient unclassified evidence to attain a conviction in an Afghan court of law.
**Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan**

The CNPA is the lead ANDSF pillar for counternarcotics (CN) efforts. The CNPA has regular narcotics police and specialized units located in all 34 provinces. Specialized units include the Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU), the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and the Intelligence Investigation Unit.

The MoI’s NIU and SIU conduct interdiction operations that target senior narcotics traffickers. NSOCC-A supports the NIU for joint CN and CT operations, training, and sustainment. These advisors collaborate with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, including the Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Agency.

**Afghan Public Protection Force**

The APPF is a state-owned enterprise under MoI’s authority originally established to provide contract-based facility and convoy security services. The APPF currently guards key infrastructure, facilities, governmental and non-governmental public welfare projects, and other international projects. The APPF also escorts and protects convoys against insurgent attacks and provides security for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations with diplomatic immunity, and political agencies of foreign countries located in Afghanistan. Additionally, the APPF protects facilities donated to the Afghan government by international organizations and the private sector. Currently, NATO and U.S. forces do not support the APPF, except through the security contracts already in place, and the coalition does not advise the APPF as part of the RS mission.

**MoI Afghan Special Security Forces**

**General Command of Police Special Units**

The GCPSU is the MoI component of the ASSF, and it provides the ANP with a capability to conduct high-risk rule of law operations such as CT, CN, and counter-organized crime based on evidence, in accordance with Afghanistan’s Criminal Procedure Code. These operations include both the execution of high-risk arrests and crisis response operations including hostage recovery. Due to its employment in these situations, the GCPSU incurs a higher rate of casualties than other specialized ANP units, which contributes to combat fatigue, higher attrition, and challenges with maintaining overall personnel and equipment readiness.

The GCPSU HQ is responsible for the command and control of all MoI special police units, including three National Mission Units (NMUs), which will increase to 6 as part of ASSF Growth; 33 PSUs that operate in direct support of the Provincial Chiefs of Police (PCoPs); and 25 Provincial Intelligence (J2) Detachments. In practice, because PCoPs and Provincial Governors oversee

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42 The APPF was established subsequent to Presidential Decree #62, signed on August 17, 2010. The decree’s intent was to decrease the presence of private security contractors operating in Afghanistan. In August 2015, however, President Ghani signed Presidential Decree #66, which allows U.S. forces, NATO, and their respective contractors to use private security contractors outside of NATO and U.S. facilities or if they are in “direct support” of the ANDSF.
payroll systems and salaries for the PSUs, they are frequently more responsive to provincial officials’ directives than to the GCPSU chain of command.

The GCPSU Special Police Training Center (SPTC) and the Special Police Training Wing (SPTW) provide basic and advanced special police training, respectively. The SPTC routinely conducts three basic police operational courses each year with 450 students per class, while the SPTW routinely conducts four advanced special police operational courses per year with 40 students in each class. This pipeline was modified, however, to enable growth and will adapt to support the post-growth organization. GCPSU recruits typically are drawn from other AUP units or as new recruits. During this reporting period, a number of high-risk arrest operations demonstrated the ability to conduct complex, independent helicopter and ground assault force operations. The GCPSU remains reliant on coalition enablers, including ISR support, to be fully effective.

During this reporting period, the GCPSU continued to focus on developing its High-Profile Attack (HPA) response and High-Risk Arrest (HRA) capability. Historically, CRU 222 and CF 333 have been the only NMUs that managed an HPA readiness tasking. Because of the national elections, and with the establishment of three new NMUs, the GCPSU mandated the extension of these tasks across all NMUs. HRA of Counter-Terrorist-related warrants remains the focus for the NMUs. The PSUs, through their tasking by the PCoPs, typically focus on lower complexity operations and as a show of force in areas of increasing criminal activity. Both PSUs and NMUs have been used heavily this year in a crisis response role across Afghanistan. Crisis Responses in Ghazni, Farah, Faryab, and Jalalabad have seen extended deployments of GCPSU special police. These responses are independent of the advisors. The majority of GCPSU operations are independent ground assault forces (GAFs), with advised operations typically occurring when coalition air assets and ISR are required. Misuse of GCPSU special police by the PCoPs, DMSec, MoI, COGS, MoD, and PoA continues. The combination of ASSF preparation for the elections as well as the endorsement by the MoI of the GCPSU Concept of Employment has raised an awareness of the damage of misuse. Misuse of SMW during this period has slowed the desired development of an independent HAF HRA capability.

The ANDSF Roadmap calls for the expansion of the GCPSU HQ and Training Directorate, an increase in the number or Provincial J2 Detachments, and the creation of three additional NMUs as part of ASSF expansion. The new NMUs will provide crisis response, HPA prevention and reaction, and high-risk arrest capabilities to areas in western, northern, and eastern Afghanistan. Recruiting and training for the three new NMUs progressed during this reporting period, as did the preparation of infrastructure for training and eventual operations.

According to the NMU growth model, during Phase 1, new recruits will complete the four-month GCPSU non-commissioned officer (NCO) course, immediately followed by the two-month National Unit Operators Course (NUOC) conducted by the Special Police Training Center (SPTC) in Kabul. GCPSU personnel serve a minimum of two years in PSU units to gain experience before entering NUOC; however, timelines for NMU growth accelerated this training timeline. The first cycle of Phase 1 and Phase 2 training graduated 349 recruits from SPTC on February 22, 2018.

Upon completion of the NCO and NUOC course, selected graduates of each NUOC course form into NMU squadrons and begin Phase 3 training at the GCPSU Special Police Advanced Training
Wing (SPATW) in Mazar-e-Sharif, while remaining graduates of each NUOC are assigned to Provincial Special Units (PSU) or existing NMUs as replacements to supplement for natural and battlefield attrition. The first Phase 3 courses began on March 24, 2018. During Phase 3 training, the graduates of the NUOC receive specialist individual training, building toward collective training. During this reporting period, Phase 3 culminated with a GCPSU SOAG-led operational evaluation of the first three squadrons of the new NMUs in September 2018. In Phase 4, the new squadrons deploy to their new base locations. The new squadrons will partner with existing NMU squadrons. This four-phase plan is poised to achieve an effects-based IOC by the end of 2018, and FOC by 2020. Although this plan appears compliant with growth targets, the second and third order effects regarding the provision of mission-essential equipment, attrition throughout each phase of training, and attrition within operational NMUs and PSUs remain an enduring risk.
SECTION 6 – FINANCING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

The ANDSF continues to be funded primarily through annual congressional appropriations to the DoD via the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). This annual appropriation enables the Secretary of Defense to provide assistance to the security forces of Afghanistan, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, and supports the equipping, sustainment, training, and operations of Afghanistan’s security forces. NATO Allies and partner nations also play a prominent role in the financial support of the ANDSF by contributing to the NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF), which supports the ANA, and the UNDP-administered LOTFA that pays the salaries of police and builds MoI capacity. In addition, the Afghan government draws upon its domestic revenues to contribute to ANDSF sustainment operations for ANDSF personnel. The ANDSF will continue to depend on coalition security and advisory assistance and donor financial assistance for 2018 and beyond.

6.1 HOLDING THE AFGHAN MINISTRIES ACCOUNTABLE

CSTC-A makes use of bilateral funding, commitment letters, and the Common Policy Agreement (CPA) to hold the MoD and MoI accountable for ASFF-funded equipment and services and for direct contributions of ASFF funding provided to them. CSTC-A implemented bilateral commitment letters with the MoD in May 2018 and the MoI in July 2018 for the remainder of FY 2018 and FY 2019. Although the MoI and MoD have made incremental progress to meet their commitments in several areas, some insufficient progress has resulted in financial penalties.

During this reporting period, CSTC-A imposed the following penalties: 552,396,000 Afghanis ($7,286,655) on the MoD for the first and second quarters of FY 2018 and 118,200,000 Afghanis ($1,559,176) on MoI for second and third quarters of FY 2018. These penalties were associated with a variety of issues, including lack of progress in counter corruption, equipment inventory, accountability, and readiness; misuse of female facilities; personnel management; inventory management; and facility status reporting.

DoD assesses that the Afghan government currently provides adequate access to financial records associated with its use of DoD appropriated funds, specifically the ASFF. CSTC-A signed a financial records transparency MoU with the Ministry of Finance in August 2017. This MoU grants CSTC-A full access to the financial records of ASFF money transferred to the MoF, allowing additional transparency and oversight. Specifically, the MoU provides CSTC-A permanent access to the cloud-based Afghan Financial Management and Information System (AFMIS) to monitor the flow ASFF funds from commitment through expenditure. The MoU also asserts CSTC-A’s right to withhold, and to recall, any ASFF funds if terms and conditions of the funds are not met by the ANDSF. This agreement helps protect more than $1 billion per year of ASFF provided directly to the Afghan government, most of which funds the ANA payroll while the remainder funds Afghan government facility maintenance contracts and other projects. The

43 Information in this section addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1223(c)(2)(J) of the NDAA for FY 2019 (H.R. 5515).
majority of ASFF—typically, about $2 to $3 billion per year—is spent on DoD contracts to provide equipment, training, maintenance, supplies, and other support to the ANSF.

Before CSTC-A deposits ASFF allotments into the Afghan MoF Treasury Single Accounts for the MoI and MoD, the MoF must provide CSTC-A a monthly reconciliation of the accounts. This allows CSTC-A to validate the ANDSF’s current holdings and determine what additional funding is required prior to additional funding disbursements. CSTC-A deposits money on a monthly basis based on the ministries’ estimated requirements for the following month. This maximizes CSTC-A’s control over ASFF funds and minimizes the amount of ASFF funds at risk under Afghan control.

Other financial accountability measures aimed to protect U.S. appropriated funds include development of APPS and improved efforts to hold the MoD and MoI accountable for conditions in commitment letters. DoD continues to develop and update these commitment letters to improve their effectiveness. To address concerns about the lack of credibility or effectiveness of conditionality, CSTC-A conducted a thorough review of all terms, conditions, penalties, and incentives in commitment letters to enhance their effectiveness. As a result, CSTC-A reduced the number of commitment letters from 130 to 71. The 130 original commitment letters proved too difficult to enforce and track accurately. In addition, penalties in the original letters would often detract from the combat effectiveness of the ANSF. Successful penalty constructs serve as the core of the commitment letters and create the incentive to comply without negatively affecting ANSF capabilities. To address additional concerns of CSTC-A’s ability to oversee the commitment letters, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is working with CSTC-A to review procedures properly, and, if necessary, identify and implement a more effective approach.

6.2 U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS

The United States provides the bulk of funding necessary to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF through the ASFF. The ASFF provides the ANSF with the resources needed to fund ongoing ANSF operations while developing the ANSF into an effective and independent force capable of securing Afghanistan, protecting the Afghan people, and contributing to regional security. The majority of ASFF funding is executed through DoD contracts on pseudo-FMS cases; the remainder is provided directly to the Afghan government primarily to fund ANA pay, logistics, and facilities sustainment contracts. Since FY 2005, Congress has appropriated more than $77 billion for ASFF. The yearly ASFF request is based on the overall ANSF force structure that the United States is willing to support; the aim of the ASFF is to ensure Afghanistan can provide security to its population.

In many cases, Afghan nationals are employed in Afghanistan by DoD contractors to support U.S. forces. Figure 16 displays the number of Afghan nationals employed by or on behalf of

U.S. forces in Afghanistan from July 1 through December 1, 2018. The number of the Afghan national contractor personnel declined in September and October 2018 due to renewal or conclusion of contracts at the end of FY 2018. However, the Department projects that U.S. Forces in Afghanistan will continue employing approximately 6,000 Afghan nationals until the next reporting period.

Figure 16: Afghan Nationals Employed by or on Behalf of the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Nationals</td>
<td>6,267</td>
<td>5,769</td>
<td>3,328</td>
<td>3,622</td>
<td>5,866</td>
<td>6,153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3 INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

At the July 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, the international community agreed to extend financial sustainment of the ANDSF through 2024. This extension builds on prior commitments made at past NATO Summits and exemplifies continued international support for the ANDSF. At the 2012 Chicago Summit, donors agreed to support the training, equipping, financing, and capability development of the ANDSF until the end of 2017. At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, donor nations pledged about $900 million in annual funding for the ANDSF until the end of 2020, totaling approximately 93 percent of the contributions pledged at Chicago. The United States does not commit to a specific amount but funds the majority of ANDSF requirements by annually seeking an ASFF appropriation from Congress.

International donors provide funding either on a bilateral basis or through one of two multi-lateral channels, NATF and LOTFA. Approximately one-half of annual international contributions pledged at Warsaw are expected to flow through the NATF, with the remainder through LOTFA. U.S. funding is not part of the Warsaw commitment. To provide transparency and accountability, donor nations can participate in the Kabul-based ANDSF Funding Oversight and Coordination Body, co-chaired by the Afghan MoF and representatives from major international donors, which receives regular updates from the Afghan government and CSTC-A.

NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF)

The NATO ANA Trust Fund serves as a flexible, transparent, and cost-effective mechanism to support and sustain the ANDSF. Created in 2007, the NATF was adapted, following agreement at the 2012 Chicago Summit, as part of NATO’s commitment to support the training, equipping, financing, and capability development of the ANDSF beyond 2014. Over time, the scope of the Trust Fund expanded to support the sustainment of the ANA, literacy and professional military education, women’s participation in the ANDSF, and capacity-building activities. In early 2018,

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46 The Department provides numbers of contractor personnel in Afghanistan employed by the U.S. forces in a quarterly report to Congress in accordance with section 1267 of the NDAA for FY 2018 (Public Law 115-91). The Department also publishes quarterly data of contractor employees in Afghanistan on its website at https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/ps/CENTCOM_reports.html for public viewing.

47 The number of Afghan national contractor personnel employed by U.S. forces during the previous six months and the projected number of such personnel who will be employed by the U.S. forces is submitted in accordance with Section 1216 of H.R. 114-270, which accompanied H.R. 1735 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92).
the NATF Board took additional steps to enhance the overall reliability and transparency of the Trust Fund while increasing flexibility to apply support to some areas to other elements of the Afghan security forces, thereby providing donor nations with broader visibility into Trust Fund projects and NATO’s support to ANDSF sustainment.

The United States manages the NATF on behalf of international donors to provide support and sustainment of the ANA. Since the NATF’s inception in 2007, 33 nations have contributed nearly $2.5 billion. In 2018, 24 nations pledged a total of $380 million to the NATF. As of the end of this reporting period, the NATF received over $425 million in international contributions, exceeding expected pledges by $45 million. Several countries either donated without a pledge or exceeded their pledge.

Activities funded through the NATF are directly linked to mission requirements generated, reviewed, and approved by the Afghan MoD and CSTC-A. Activities funded through the Trust Fund are implemented in accordance with a yearly Implementation Plan, which is approved by the NATFO Board composed of national representatives from donor nations and the NATF manager. This body monitors the NATF and reviews its costs effectiveness, financial integrity, and accountability, including through quarterly performance reports and annual financial audits. From 2014 to 2017, CSTC-A enforced a NATF commitment letter with the MoD and MoI that relied on the same stringent controls included in ASFF commitment letters. Since 2018, all NATF-funded projects have been handled through primarily DoD or NATO Support and Procurement Agency contracts rather than as direct contributions to the Afghan government.

NATO HQ hosted the NATO ANA Trust Fund annual Plenary Board meeting on May 29, 2018. The NATO Secretary General and the Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands co-chaired the plenary session. All donor nation representatives from NATO HQ Missions attended, as well as other nations interested in the Trust Fund. DoD representatives provided an overview of the Fund's management and future, and provided an overview of the performance of the Fund during the past year. Donor nation representatives reaffirmed their support to the Fund and endorsed the continuation of current Fund management practices and outcomes.

On May 10, 2018, the Department of Defense released the results of the Independent Public Accountant’s (IPA) report on applying agreed-upon procedures of the NATF Contributions to the Afghan security forces, which was conducted in accordance with the DoD Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with NATO regarding the management of ANA Trust Fund donations. The independent assessment reviewed implementation of the agreed-upon procedures between FY 2015 through FY 2017. According to the report, no fraudulent activity was identified, and DoD will use the findings to make improvements for future engagements. The report’s findings, as well as the continued strong fund management and leadership by donor nations, contribute to the overall functionality and reliability of the Trust Fund.

**Law and Order Trust Fund**

The UNDP has managed LOTFA since its inception in 2002. The UNDP receives and manages donor contributions through LOTFA to pay the salaries of up to 124,600 members of the ANP. In
2018, LOTFA has managed new or existing donor funds in excess of $500 million. CSTC-A coordinates closely with the UNDP regarding the use of LOTFA, and donor nations can participate in the LOTFA Project Board, which provides oversight over LOTFA-funded activities.

6.4 AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS

At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, participants agreed that, as the Afghan economy and revenues grow, Afghanistan’s yearly share of the cost of the ANDSF will increase progressively from at least US$500m in 2015, with the aim that it can assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces. At the 2012 exchange rate, $500 million equals about 25 billion afghani. The 2016 Afghan national budget allocated 24.7 billion Afghanis ($387 million) for the ANDSF, falling just short of the goal in afghani terms. In 2017 the Afghan national budget allocated 26.9 billion Afghanis ($396 million) and in 2018, the Afghan government allocated 30.3 billion Afghanis ($445 million) for the ANDSF. Therefore, the Afghan government has continued to meet its 2012 pledge. Given the persistence of the insurgency and continued slow growth of the Afghan economy, however, full self-sufficiency by 2024 does not appear realistic, even if levels of violence and, with it, the ANDSF force structure, reduce significantly by then. DoD continues to review the costs of ASFF-funded programs to ensure responsible stewardship of U.S. taxpayers’ funds to address long-term affordability of the ANDSF.

At the 2012 Chicago Summit, the Afghan government committed to providing an annual minimum of 25 billion Afghanis, or $500 million at the 2012 exchange rate, to support the ANDSF. 2012 NATO Summit Participants agreed that Afghanistan gradually increase its share of the financial responsibility for the ANDSF, with the aim of assuming full responsibility for its own security forces by 2024. The 2016 Afghan national budget allocated 24.7 billion Afghanis ($387 million) for the ANDSF, falling just short of the goal in afghani terms. In 2017, the Afghan national budget allocated 26.9 billion Afghanis ($396 million), and in 2018, the Afghan government allocated 30.3 billion Afghanis ($445 million) for the ANDSF. Therefore, the Afghan government has continued to meet its 2012 pledge. Given the persistence of the insurgency and continued slow growth of the Afghan economy, however, full self-sufficiency by 2024 does not appear realistic, even if security or economic conditions change dramatically. DoD continues to review the costs of ASFF-funded programs to ensure responsible stewardship of U.S. taxpayers’ funds to address long-term affordability of the ANDSF.

Efforts to Increase the Afghan Government’s Financial Responsibility for the ANDSF

The Afghan government remains dependent on international support to fund both security and non-security sector costs. Donor nations are working with the Afghan government to implement economic reforms with a goal to increase economic growth and government revenues. In a strong signal of international support, donor nations pledged $15.2 billion for development for Afghanistan through 2020. Continued international support for development is based on the Afghan government’s progress towards economic and social reforms necessary to remove constraints on private-sector investment to spur economic growth and job creation.
## ANNEX A – INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essential Function</th>
<th>Indicators of Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resource Management (Formerly EF 1)</td>
<td>- The MoD and MoI are able to identify requirements, programs, and funding accurately over a three-year horizon based on strategic guidance.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The MoF provides timely guidance to enable the MoI and MoD to develop a budget.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- The MoD and MoI are able to formulate an accurate annual budget to meet internal and external requirements.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- The MoD and MoI are able to develop an executable procurement plan and execute their spend plan within budget and stipulated timeframes.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- The MoD and MoI are able to submit, award, and complete contracts to ensure execution as planned.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- The MoD and MoI can fully pay all of its employees accurately, timely, and in a secure fashion.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The MoF provides timely approvals, in-year guidance, and funds to the MoI and MoD.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- The MoD and MoI possess an effective and efficient system to recruit and hire subject matter experts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (Formerly EF 2)</td>
<td>- The MoD’s Ministerial Internal Controls Program is effectively implemented and sustainable.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>- The MoD and MoI IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- GS IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Critical items (the “big four” issues – fuel, ammunition, food, and pay) are managed by transparent, accountable, and sustainable processes to the appropriate organizational level.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ensure the appropriate engagement of relevant external and internal agencies to establish transparency, accountability, and oversight within the Afghan government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rule of Law and Governance (Formerly EF 3)</td>
<td>- The MoD and MoI have appropriately staffed and qualified units to prevent or address extra-judicial killings and other GVHR.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- The MoD and MoI identify, investigate, and appropriately act upon acts of major corruption and GVHR.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The MoD and MoI conduct inter-ministerial cooperation with the Attorney General’s Office on corruption adjudication and GVHR allegations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Force Development (Formerly EF 4)</td>
<td>- The MoD utilizes AHRIMS down to the corps level to manage the force, and the MoI utilizes AHRIMS down to the provincial headquarters level to manage the force.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Operational Sustainment and Logistics (Formerly EF 5) | - Measurement and reporting has command emphasis.
- The ANDSF documents processes for generating and capturing requirements.
- The ANDSF has adequately executed a demand-based inventory management system.
- ANDSF organic maintenance is supplemented by contractors.
- The MoI assumes responsibility for equipment maintenance, which is transitioned from the coalition-funded AMS contract.
- The MoD has developed an operational medical resource optimization process that is sustainable.
- The MoD and MoI have sufficient numbers of trained and qualified health care personnel to fill *tashkil*.
- The MoD and MoI have an operational and sustainable medical logistics process.
- The ANP operates inventory management processes, including cold chain management for medicines.
- The Afghan government-backed Afghan Medical Council establishes and sustains ANDSF and Afghan national healthcare.
- The MoD is capable of managing its portion of the frequency spectrum for the Afghan government.
- The MoD and MoI are able to identify and sustain key information and communications technology infrastructure.
- The MoD is able to sustain information management systems throughout their lifecycles.
- The MoD implements fundamental cybersecurity structures and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information and information systems.
- The MoD is able to produce and sustain information and communications technology forces that are manned, trained, and equipped to conduct operations. |
The MoI is capable of managing its portion of the frequency spectrum for the Afghan government.

Command and Control Operations (Formerly EF 6)

- The Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy and Policy lead delivers strategic documents (National Military Strategy and Guidance for Operational Planning) in time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat-informed, and resource-aware) to inform subordinate planning.
- Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy and Policy lead delivers the Defense Capabilities Planning Guidance in time and of sufficient quality to inform and drive the departmental capability development process.
- The GS Plans Directorate delivers planning guidance and a coherent, synchronized campaign planning process.
- The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy delivers strategic documents (MIS, MIP, and Strategic Programming Guidance Directive) in time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat-informed, and resource-aware), monitors implementation, and manages change through a robust force management process.
- The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy monitors MICP and strategic plan implementation and delivers guidance to ensure a robust departmental force management process.
- The ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct combined arms operations.
- The ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct operations in coordination with the ANP.
- The ANA has assessed its capability gaps at the operational level and implemented improvements to address the gaps.
- The ANA has a sustainable capability to prepare detailed plans and orders at the corps level from strategic guidance from the MoD.
- The ANP has an established and sustainable capability to coordinate ANP inputs to ANA operations.
- ANASOC develops as a strategic MoD asset capable of Manning, equipping, training, employing, and sustaining the force.
- ANASOC is able to synchronize special operations brigade and special operations kandak operations within the framework of corps security operations in support of the Afghan government and MoD objectives.
- The SMW develops as a strategic Afghan government organization capable of manning, equipping, training,
employing, and sustaining a force to conduct special operations
force air assault and airborne ISR capability in support of the
ASSF.
- The AAF has developed sustainable enterprise manning, a
sustainable aerial fires capability, and a sustainable theatre
mobility system.

| Intelligence TAA (Formerly EF 7) | - The Afghan police intelligence model effectively engages
security issues.
- MoD intelligence integrates into MoD strategic decision-making
and into ANASOC and ANA corps-level operations.
- DPI human intelligence institutes a sustainable human
intelligence network that can action and report on intelligence
requirements and tasking.
- Establish NMIC as an operational intelligence center capable of
retrieving and analyzing information obtained from various
intelligence sensors and developing products that support
Afghan government intelligence operations.
- DPI trains technically proficient personnel for intelligence
operational needs and manages intelligence sustainment
requirements to meet operational needs.
- Establish an enduring and sustainable organic intelligence
capability at the Intelligence Training Center, ANA corps, and
ANASOC. |

| Strategic Communication (Formerly EF 8) | - Develop and sustain events and mechanisms designed to
facilitate cross-ministerial coordination and delivery of strategic
communication guidance, priorities, and direction.
- The National Unity Government develops and distributes
strategic communication guidance; guidance will be utilized to
develop respective MoD and MoI communication plans and
products.
- GS Operations Directorate Information Operations has the
knowledge and capability to submit effectively (and modify as
necessary) yearly (personnel and equipment) *tashkil* inputs, as
well as to plan and submit its yearly budget requirements, which
will enable MoD information operations capability throughout
the country. |

| Gender Integration and Mainstreaming | - The MoI and MoD/ANA implement approved strategies and
plans on gender integration.
- The MoI and MoD provide safe training and working
environments (facilities) for women.
- The MoI and MoD take actions to eliminate gender-based
violence and other types of violence and sexual harassment of
women. |
## ANNEX B – ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AACP</td>
<td>Afghan Anti-Crime Police</td>
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<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
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<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
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<td>Afghan Border Force</td>
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<td>Anti-Corruption Justice Center</td>
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<td>Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission</td>
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<td>Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent</td>
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<td>R4+S</td>
<td>Reinforce, Realign, Regionalize, Reconcile, and Sustain</td>
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<td>Resource Management</td>
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<td>SAFIRE</td>
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