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INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

June 18, 2015



(U) Evaluation of the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment's Mobile Ground System

Classified By: DoD OIG
(b) (6)
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20391219

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(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment's Mobile Ground System

(U) June 18, 2015

(U) Objective

(U) Our objective was to determine whether the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment's Mobile Ground System (ITW/AA MGS) can meet Presidential and DOD requirements

(U) Findings

(S) The ITW/AA MGS USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g);
OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

- (S) STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g);
USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)
- (S) STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g);
USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(U) Recommendations

(U) Commander, Air Force Space Command, identify an overarching office or organization to integrate and oversee all efforts of Space Based Infrared System Survivable/Endurable Evolution Mobile Ground System development, delivery, and fielding.

(U) Commander, Air Force Space Command, direct the overarching office or organization to conduct a risk assessment of all Space Based Infrared System Survivable/Endurable Evolution Mobile Ground System interdependencies, to include funding, acquisition, and Major Command planning efforts.

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(U) Recommendations (cont'd)

(U) Capability Director, Directorate of Space Programs, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisitions) identify a lead program element monitor to ensure coordination between all program element codes involved with the Space Based Infrared System Survivable/Endurable Evolution Mobile Ground System.

(S) USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(U) Commander, Air Force Space Command Space and Missile Systems Center, establish an Integrated Process Team to formulate a Mobile Ground System sustainment solution.

(S) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a),
1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a)

(S) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

STRATCOM:
(b) (1), 1.4(a)

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The Commander, Air Force Space Command, disagrees with the first finding but was responsive to our recommendations. The Commander agrees with the intent of our recommendation for the Commander, Air Force Space Command Space and Missile Systems Center, but did not address the specifics of the recommendation. The Commander was partially responsive to our recommendation for the Air Force Space Command Director of Operations. The Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), non-concurs with our recommendation for the Capability Director, Directorate of Space Programs, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisitions) but submitted a plan of action that meets the intent of the recommendation. The Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs, concurs without comment. The Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space non-concurs with our recommendation. We request additional comments on this report. Please see the recommendations table on the back of this page.

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(U) Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Requiring Comment	No Additional Comments Required
Commander, Air Force Space Command	B.1	A.1
Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space	B.2	
Capability Director, Directorate of Space Programs, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisitions)		A.2
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs		A.3
Director of Operations, Air Force Space Command	B.3	

(U) Please provide Management Comments by July 17, 2015.

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

JUN 18 2015

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment's
Mobile Ground System (Report No. DODIG 2015-133)

(S) We are providing this final report for review and comment. We considered management comments on the draft of this report. We conducted this evaluation in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation. ~~STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)~~

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. The Commander, Air Force Space Command, disagreed with Finding A. However, agreed action satisfies the intent of Recommendation A.1. The Commander also responded for the Commander, Air Force Space Command Space and Missile Systems Center, and agreed with the intent of Recommendation B.1 but did not address the specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, we request comments on Recommendation B.1. We revised Recommendation B.3 for clarity based on management comments and request that the Air Force Space Command Director of Operations comment on the recommendation. The Military Deputy for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), responding for the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), disagreed with Recommendation A.2, but took action that satisfies the intent of our recommendation. The Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space, non-concurred with Recommendation B.2. We request that the Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space, reconsider Recommendation B.2 and provide additional comments to the final report. We request all comments be received by July 17, 2015.

(U) Please send Management Comments as a PDF file to ~~DoD OIG (b) (6)~~. Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We cannot accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at ~~DoD OIG (b) (6)~~ or (703) 882-4860.

Classified by: ~~DoD OIG (b) (6)~~
Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 2039-12-18


Anthony C. Thomas
Deputy Inspector General for
Intelligence and Special
Program Assessments

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Distribution:

Commander, Air Force Space Command

Commander, Air Force Space Command Space and Missile Systems Center

Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space




Capability Director, Directorate Of Space Programs, Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force (Acquisitions)

Assistant Deputy Under Secretary Of The Air Force, International Affairs

Director of Operations, Air Force Space Command

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(U) Introduction

Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) Mobile Ground System (MGS) can meet Presidential and DoD requirements. Specifically, we planned to determine whether:

- the current MGS can be sustained until the replacement system attains Full Operational Capability (FOC), and
- the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Survivable/Endurable Evolution (S2E2) modified Mobile Ground System (SMGS) can attain FOC by FY 2019 to allow the Air Force to discontinue funding for the MGS, Survivable Relay Ground Station, and the Survivable Mission Control Station.

Background

(S) STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) NSC: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NSC: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g); STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) NSC (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(f), 1.4(g), STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(S) OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(U) The MGS is operated and maintained by the 233rd Space Group at Greeley Air National Guard Station, Colorado. Headquarters Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) is the gaining major command (MAJCOM), mission owner, and functional area manager of the survivable/endurable TW/AA systems and performs the standard MAJCOM organize, train and equip functions.

(U) Six force packages (FPAKs) comprise the system, each consisting of six major components and four general purpose trucks, as shown in Figure 1. The Mobile Ground Terminal (MGT) consists of a tractor/trailer mounted High altitude Electro-Magnetic Pulse (HEMP) hardened shelter which houses the mission data processing hardware and software and a Phased Array Sub-System antenna attached to the road-side portion of the shelter. The Milstar Communication Vehicle (MCV) is a tractor/trailer mounted HEMP hardened shelter which contains Air Force Command Post Milstar terminal communications equipment. Four support vehicles complete the FPAK: the crew quarters vehicle, which includes sleep and shower facilities for the FPAK crew; the crew support vehicle, which includes a kitchen and conference room with video capability; the field spares vehicle, which contains equipment spares; and a fuel tanker.

Figure 1: (U) Current Mobile Ground System FPAK



Source: 233 Space Group

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(U) The new SMGS will consist of five FPAKs, each with a new S2E2 Mobile Ground Terminal (SMGT). The SMGT includes a tractor-trailer mounted HEMP hardened shelter that houses the mission processing hardware and software, and three parabolic dish subsystem antennas on trailers. Additionally, the SMGS will include a Universal Ground NUDET Terminal (UGNT). This is another tractor-trailer mounted HEMP hardened shelter that houses the NUDET mission processing hardware and software. The current crew quarters vehicle, crew support vehicle, field spares vehicle, tanker, and other security and support vehicles will continue to support the new SMGS.

(U) Once delivered, the SMGT and UGNT will incrementally replace the missile warning and NUDET capabilities of the current MGT. The Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T), which will be installed in the UGNT, will replace the current MCV to provide both Milstar and Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite communications. The Survivable Relay Ground Station (SRGS) and the Survivable Mission Control Station (SMCS) can be retired once the SMGS attains full operational capability.





Figure 2: Survivable Fixed Facilities



Source: U.S. Air Force Official Photos

(U) Finding A

(S) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) [REDACTED]
STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) [REDACTED]

(S) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)
[REDACTED] OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Program Interdependencies and Schedule Risks

(S) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a)
[REDACTED] STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)
[REDACTED] OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Each program listed above establishes initial and full operational capability dates independent of the other programs. The draft integrated master schedule does not identify when the entire SMGS, to include the FAB-T, will attain initial operating capability or FOC. Delays in a single program could cause the Air Force to sustain both the legacy and replacement baselines. As of February 2015 the integrated master schedule was still not published. Therefore, stakeholders may not be aware of delays or shortfalls until it is too late to act.

(U) Finally, numerous individual program FOC dates has caused confusion about when all five SMGS FPAKs will attain FOC. Multiple program offices and organizations state this confusion exists because there is no single, overarching program office or lead organization, and the existing Air Force Space Command Concept of Operations has not been formally distributed.

(S)

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(S)

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

SAF/NSA (SAF/NSA) (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(U) No Overarching Program Office or Lead Organization Exists

(U) Each program office and organization we evaluated is appropriately managing risk for their respective program or product. However, the lack of an integrated program office or lead organization at both AFSPC and the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force/Acquisitions has resulted in several risks. For example, during this evaluation, we discovered that the lack of intra-service coordination led to \$33.5M of UGNT funding designated for an incorrect appropriation category and program element code. This error required immediate general officer action to change funding categories before the Air Force submitted the Program Objective Memorandum to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In a second example, errors in the FAB-T fielding plan were identified by both USSTRATCOM and the DoD IG.

(U) Mechanisms to ensure oversight of the ITW/AA mission exist. They include the Mission Oversight Board (MOB), the Operations Approval Board, and the Operations Approval Panel. The MOB is co-chaired by the USSTRATCOM/J3 and NORAD/J3 and consists of two-star general officers from USSTRATCOM, NORAD, and AFSPC. The Operations Approval Board is the 0-6 level board and reports directly to the MOB. HQ AFSPC/A3 chairs the Operations Approval Panel and oversees all ITW/AA missile warning sensors for the Operations Approval Board. Despite the existence of these boards, timely and actionable information is not reaching senior leaders at the MOB. Because of this, the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System directed the Air Force to establish a tiger team to assess options, risk, costs, and potential mitigation measures to sustain survivable/endurable missile warning and NUDET detection capabilities (See Appendix B).

(U) The following events will most likely cause the Air Force to sustain both baselines past FY 2020:

- (U) A funding disconnect exists for the Mission Specific Vendor Plug-in software and the Standard Space Trainer necessary to train SMGS operators. Program shortfalls or delays will not allow for sufficient time to train operators to transition between systems.

- (S) STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

- (U) Facility, security, and power costs to support SMGT, UGNT, and FAB-T integration were not included in Operations and Maintenance funding projections for the 233rd Space Group at Greeley Air National Guard Station, Colorado. Schedule delays could occur unless funding is included in future year budgets.
- (U) Operations and maintenance training costs for the new SMGT, UGNT, and FAB-T were not included in Operations and Maintenance funding projections for the 233rd Space Group at Greeley Air National Guard Station, Colorado.
- (U) The 233rd Space Group and Headquarters, Air National Guard Bureau, cannot formally plan for increased training cycles and fulltime manpower requirements necessary for the SMGS without the AFSPC Concept of Operations.
- (U) The UGNT was designed and manufactured before final FAB-T design specifications were available. Integration risks were mitigated by the UGNT incorporating a more robust HVAC and power supply in anticipation of integrating the FAB-T terminal. The absence of design specifications during manufacturing may lead to retrofit delays and unforeseen costs during FAB-T integration. Any delays in FAB-T integration will extend Air Force Space Command's requirement to sustain increasingly obsolescent legacy Milstar Communication Vehicles.

Finding A

(S) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(U) Conclusion

[illegible]

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(U) Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

(U) Commander, Air Force Space Command

(S) OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] STRATCO M. (b) (1),
OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] STRATCO OM. (b) OSD JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(U) Although the Commander, Air Force Space Command, disagreed with our finding, the actions the Commander agreed to take in response to the recommendations will strengthen Air Force Space Command's ability to sustain the legacy system until the replacement system is fielded and operationally accepted. No further comments are required.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation A.1

(U) We recommend that the Commander, Air Force Space Command:

- a. Identify an overarching program office or lead organization to integrate and oversee all efforts of Space Based Infrared System Survivable/Endurable Evolution Mobile Ground System development, delivery, and fielding.
- b. Direct the overarching program office or lead organization to conduct a risk assessment of all Space Based Infrared System Survivable/Endurable Evolution Mobile Ground System interdependencies, to include funding, acquisition, and Major Command planning efforts; and brief the results to the Mission Oversight Board.

(U) Commander, Air Force Space Command

(U) The Commander, Air Force Space Command, was responsive to this recommendation. Air Force Space Command Space and Missile Systems Center has developed a draft agreement that assigns a program lead and documents the roles, responsibilities, and expectations of all parties related to the integration and sustainment of their systems. The Commander stated that the realignment will be complete within six months.

(U) Our Response

(U) The Commander, Air Force Space Command, was responsive to our recommendation and no further comment is required.

(U) Recommendation A.2

(U) We recommend that the Capability Director, Directorate of Space Programs, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisitions), identify a lead program element monitor to ensure coordination between all program element codes involved with the Space Based Infrared System Survivable/Endurable Evolution Mobile Ground System.

(U) Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition)

(U) The Military Deputy for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), responding for the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), disagreed with our recommendation. The Military Director wrote that it is not feasible to assign an individual Program Element Monitor to the S2E2 program. However, the Military Director will assign the SBIRS PEM as the lead integrator to more effectively coordinate actions across the S2E2 programs.

(U) Our Response

(U) Although the Military Deputy for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) did not concur with this recommendation, the actions taken to identify the Space Based Infrared Systems Program Element Monitor as the lead program element monitor satisfies the intent of the recommendation.

(U) Recommendation A.3



OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(U) Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force,

STRATCOM (b) (7)(E), USAF (b) (7)(E)

(U) The Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force,

STRATCOM (b) (7)(E),
USAF (b) (7)(E)

, concurs without comment.

(U) Our Response

(U) The Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force

STRATCOM (b) (7)(E),
USAF (b) (7)(E)

, was responsive to Recommendation A.3 and no further comments are required.

(U) Finding B

(S) STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(S) STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(U) DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E) Equipment

(S) STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(S) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

Table 1 reports the mission capability for the MGT and MCV from April 1 to September 30, 2014.

Table 1: (U) MGS Mission Capability (percent)

Component	Not Mission Capable	Partially Mission Capable	Full Mission Capable
Mobile Ground Terminal	STRATCOM: (b) (7)(E); USAF: (b) (7)(E)		
Milstar Communication Vehicle			

Source: Space and Missile Systems Center, AFSPC

(S) STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(U) Maintenance of the legacy MGT and MCV has proved difficult at best. A Milstar Communication Vehicle was delivered to the Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center Depot in 2011 for an overhaul of the shelter cooling, airflow, and a fuel tank modification. The depot estimated the maintenance would take approximately DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E) DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E)

(U) Parts Availability Challenges

(U) The Air Force must balance the requirement to sustain the legacy MGS while designing, manufacturing, delivering, and ensuring the S2E2 attains full operational capability. To do so, the Air Force must carefully manage resources and risk. The MGS is approximately 20 years beyond its designed life cycle. The SBIRS Capacity Integrated Process team reported in August 2013 that sustainment modifications have been deferred since 2009. The Air Force is challenged because of MGS parts obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortages. For example, there are

DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E)

. Table 2 identifies additional mission critical parts for both the Milstar Communications Vehicle and Mobile Ground Terminal suffering from sustainment issues. STRATCOM: (b) (7)(E); USAF: (b) (7)(E)

Table2: (U) MGS Mission Capability, (percent)

Unclassified (Information Current as of February 2015)		
Parts	Serviceable	Unserviceable
DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E)	DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E)	

Source: Space and Missile Systems Center, AFSPC

(S) OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(U) The Mobile Ground Terminal experiences similar sustainment issues. The

DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E)

DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E) A

DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E)

As of

January 2015, 17 of 26 DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E) were on backorder. Of the nine delivered, four required product quality deficiency reports.

(U) In another example, an original lifetime purchase of DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E) was based on the estimate that the MGS would be retired by 2012. Because there are not enough replacement DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E) in supply, DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E) were reengineered for \$1M each.

(U) Several MGT components are at their end of design-life. The lack of spares in the supply chain prompted the 233rd Space Group to request a technical refresh from Air Force Space Command. The following components are not mission critical, but the absence of spares without a timely technical refresh will cause an increase in maintenance costs and a decrease in availability rates:

- Mobile Ground Terminal Display Unit
- Grid Server
- STRATCOM (b) (7)(E), USAF (b) (7)(E)
- Sub-array Interface Test Assembly

(S)

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(S)

OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(S)

OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(S)

OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

STRATCOM:
(b) (1), 1.4(a)

(S) STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)


[Redacted] OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[Redacted] STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[Redacted]

Figure 3: DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E)



Source: 233rd Space Group

(S) STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[Redacted] OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) [Redacted] STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[Redacted] OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) [Redacted] STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[Redacted] OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Finding B

OSD/JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g)

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1-4(a)

(S) OSD/JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g)

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g); USAF (b) (1), 1-4(a)

OSD/JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g)

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g); USAF (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g); OSD/JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g)

(S) STRATCOM (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g); USAF (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g); OSD/JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g)

(U) Conclusion

(S) OSD/JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g)

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1-4(a)

1-4(g); (b) (1)

JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g)

USAF (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g); OSD/JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g)

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g); USAF (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g); OSD/JS (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g)

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation B.1

(U) We recommend that the Commander, Air Force Space Command Space and Missile Systems Center, establish an Integrated Process Team to formulate a Mobile Ground System sustainment solution. At a minimum, representatives should include the Global Positioning Systems Directorate, Remote Sensing Systems Directorate, the Military Satellite Communications Systems Directorate, the Space Logistics Directorate, and the 233rd Space Group.

(U) Commander, Air Force Space Command Space and Missile Systems Center

(U) The Commander, Air Force Space Command, responding for the Commander, Air Force Space Command Space and Missile Systems Center, agreed with the intent of Recommendation B.1. He stated that the command is proactively working to ensure there are no gaps in capability, but did not state what actions would be taken to ensure the sustainment of the Mobile Ground System.

(U) Our Response

(U) Although the Commander, Air Force Space Command, agreed with the intent of the recommendation, he did not address the specifics of the recommendation. Therefore we ask that the commander provide a response to the final report, specifying the action to be taken to ensure sustainment of the Mobile Ground System until the replacement system attains full operational capability.

(U) Recommendation B.2

(S) OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(e) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(e); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(e)
[REDACTED] JS: (b) (1), 1.4(e)

(U) Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space

(S) OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(e) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(e); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(e); OCSAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(e)
[REDACTED] (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(e)
[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(S) OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(e) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

OS JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(U) We request that the Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space, reconsider establishing an Office of Primary Responsibility and provide additional comments to the final report.

(U) Recommendation B.3

(S) We recommend that the Air Force Space Command Director of Operations, in coordination with the Mission Oversight Board and the 233rd Space Group,

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(U) Air Force Space Command

(S) The Commander, Air Force Space Command, responding for the Air Force Space Command Director of Operations, was partially responsive to Recommendation B.3. The Commander, Air Force Space Command, correctly stated in the provided comments that the

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

. This provides the ability to exercise all facets of fielding and deploying the Mobile Ground System.

(U) Revised Recommendation

(U) As a result of management comments and additional fieldwork, we revised Recommendation B.3 for clarity.

(U) Revised Recommendation B.3

(S) We recommend that the Air Force Space Command Director of Operations, in coordination with the Mission Oversight Board and the 233rd Space Group,

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

(U) Our Response

(S) We request that the Air Force Space Command Director of Operations provide comment to the revised recommendation in response to the final report.

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from September 2014 through February 2015 in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation. These standards require that we plan and perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our evaluation objectives.

(U) We conducted interviews with representatives from U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Northern Command, the Joint Staff, office of the DOD Chief Information Officer, OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisitions), and Air Force Space Command. We also visited with Air National Guard operational unit personnel and toured Mobile Ground System facilities and vehicles.

(U) We reviewed Presidential directives, public laws, DoD policy, and Air Force guidance to identify requirements for survivable and endurable Nuclear Command and Control operations.

(U) Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data for this review.

(U) Use of Technical Assistance

(U) We did not use technical assistance in performing this review.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) No prior audits or evaluations have been conducted in the last five years on the sustainment of the Mobile Ground System.

(U) Appendix B

(U) Program of Record Shortfalls Assessment

(S) OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g);
OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S) OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) [Redacted]
[Redacted] STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a),
1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a),
[Redacted] OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S) Table 3: OSD JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g) [Redacted]

SECRET		Cost above baseline	Total
Options	Course of Action/Results		
STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)			
[Redacted]			

* DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E) [Redacted]

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Appendixes

Options	Course of Action/Results	Cost above baseline	Total
<div> <div>SECRET</div> <div> <div>STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)</div> <div></div> </div> </div>			

(U) Source: ITW/AA Survivable/Endurable Tiger Team

(5)

OSD/JS. (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g)

STRATCOM (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g); USAF, (b) (1), 1-4(a), 1-4(g); OSD/JS (b) (1), 1-4(a).

OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

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(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFSPC	Air Force Space Command
FAB-T	Family of Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminal
FOC	Full Operational Capability
FPAK	Force Packages
ITW/AA	Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment
MCV	Milstar Communication Vehicle
MGS	Mobile Ground System
MGT	Mobile Ground Terminal
NUDET	Nuclear Detonation
STRATCOM (b) (7)(E)	
DoD OIG: (b) (7)(E)	
S2E2	SBIRS Survivable and Endurable Evolution
SBIRS	Space Based Infrared System
SMGS	S2E2 Mobile Ground System
SMGT	S2E2 Mobile Ground Terminal
SRGS	Survivable Relay Ground Station
UGNT	Universal Ground-Based Nuclear Detection

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Management Comments

(U) Management Comments

(U) Headquarters Air Force A10



CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

MAY 1 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS
AUDIT

FROM: HQ USAF/A10
1488 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1488

SUBJECT: (U) DoDIG Draft Report: Evaluation of the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack
Assessments Mobile Ground System (S)


(U) On behalf of both the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Evaluation of the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessments Mobile Ground System. The Air Force appreciates the efforts of the IG to help us further strengthen the nuclear enterprise. We concur overall with the findings, with the exceptions below. Included are comments and signed memos from SAF/AQ and AFSPC as well as comments from SAF/SP.

(U) SAF/IA concurs without comment.

(U) SAF/AQ non-concurs with recommendation A.2. Detailed reason for non-concur and amplifying comments are in their signed memo and comment resolution matrix (CRM) at tab 1 and 2.

(U) AFSPC non-concurs with Finding A and concurs with comments on Finding B within the report (Tab 3). The attached AFSPC CRM at Tab 3 provides additional specific comments designed to accurately reflect current issues, status and updates.

(U) My POC for this matter is DoD OIG (b) (6)


MICHAEL R. SHOULTZ, SES, DAF
ACS, Strat Deterrence and Nuc Integration

Tabs

1. SAF/AQ Memo (U)
2. SAF/AQ CRM (U)
3. HQ AFSPC Memo (S)
4. HQ AFSPC CRM (S)
5. SAF/SP CRM (S)

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Management Comments

(U) Air Force Space Command



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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND

APR 22 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE AND
SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS AUDIT

FROM: AFSPC/CC
150 Vandenberg Street, Suite 1105
Peterson AFB CO 80914-4020

SUBJECT: DoD/IG Draft Report: Evaluation of the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack
Assessments (ITW/AA) Mobile Ground System (MGS) (S)

1. (U) Thank you for the opportunity to review the DoD/IG draft report on this critical mission.

2. (S) Regarding the finding: STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[Redacted]

3. (S) Additionally, the second finding states: STRATCOM (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g), USAF (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g),
OSD/JS (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)

[Redacted]

4. (U) The attached Comment Resolution Matrix (CRM) provides specific comments designed to
accurately reflect current issues, status and updates.

5. (U) My POC is: DoD OIG (b) (6)

[Redacted]

JOHN E. HYTEN
General, USAF
Commander

Attachment:
AFSPC Consolidated CRM (S)

GUARDIANS OF THE HIGH FRONTIER

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Management Comments

(U) Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition)



CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

APR 27 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS
AUDIT

FROM: SAF/AQ

SUBJECT: (U) DoDIG Draft Report: Evaluation of the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack
Assessments (ITW/AA) Mobile Ground System (MGS)

(U) Thank you for the opportunity to review this report. We non-concur with your recommendation for the Capability Director, Directorate of Space Programs, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisitions) to identify a lead program element monitor (PEM) to ensure coordination between all program element codes involved with the Space Based Infrared System Survivable/Endurable Evolution Mobile Ground System (S2E2). While we appreciate the need for better coordination and value the DoD IG's insight, the recommendation is not practicable to implement.

(U) As described in the report, the SBIRS S2E2 program also touches the UGNT and FAB-T programs. Each of these highly complex programs has a PEM assigned to it. Based on our long experience, it is not feasible to assign the S2E2 program its own individual PEM. The Directorate is downsizing the numbers of personnel as part of the Future Air Force Organization restructure to reduce headquarters' staffs. We simply do not have the billet to assign additional PEMs. We will work to more effectively coordinate across these three programs with assigning the lead S2E2 integration role to the SBIRS PEM.

(U) I thank the DoD IG for its thorough and illuminating report and will devote more focus to the three programs cited in the report. If you have any questions please contact

DoD OIG (b) (6)

ELLEN M. PAWLIKOWSKI
Lieutenant General, USAF
Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force (Acquisition)

Attachment:
1. SAF/AQS Consolidated CRM

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED



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Management Comments

(U) Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space

	<p>SECRET</p> <p>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND</p>	<p>MAY 18 2015</p>
<p>Reply To: JFCC SPACE/JOCC 747 NEBRASKA AVE STE A300-R VANDENBERG AFB CA 93437-6268</p>		
<p>MEMORANDUM FOR The Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program Assessments</p>		
<p>SUBJECT: (U) Draft Review - DoD OIG Draft Report Evaluation of the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment's Mobile Ground System</p>		
<p>1. (U) JFCC SPACE has reviewed the Draft Review - DoD OIG Draft Report Evaluation of the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment's Mobile Ground System and has identified 5 issues (Attachment), to include 2 critical comments with recommendation B.2.</p>		
<p>2. (S) Recommendation B.2 states: STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)</p> <div style="background-color: black; height: 60px; width: 100%;"></div>		
<p>3. (S) STRATCOM: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); USAF: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g); OSD/JS: (b) (1), 1.4(a), 1.4(g)</p> <div style="background-color: black; height: 40px; width: 100%;"></div>		
<p>4. (U) Please review the attached CRM for further supporting comments. My point of contact for this endorsement is: DoD OIG: (b) (6)</p> <div style="background-color: black; height: 15px; width: 300px; margin-left: 100px;"></div>		
<p style="text-align: center;"> JOHN W. RAYMOND Lieutenant General, USAF Commander</p>		
<p>Attachment: JFCC SPACE CRM - IG Report, 12 May 2015</p>		
<p>SECRET</p>		

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Whistleblower Protection

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 requires the Inspector General to designate a Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman to educate agency employees about prohibitions on retaliation, and rights and remedies against retaliation for protected disclosures. The designated ombudsman is the DoD Hotline Director. For more information on your rights and remedies against retaliation, visit www.dodig.mil/programs/whistleblower.

For more information about DoD IG reports or activities, please contact us:

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congressional@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

Media Contact

public.affairs@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

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
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