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Report No. 07-INTL-06  
March 6, 2007  
Audit

# Inspector General

United States  
Department of Defense



**DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE**

**DoD Involvement with The Rendon Group (U)**

Multiple Sources  
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**Acronyms (U)**

CIFA	Counterintelligence Field Activity
INC	Iraqi National Congress
OSI	Office of Strategic Influence
SIPRNET	Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
TRG	The Rendon Group

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INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY MARY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209-4704

March 6, 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE  
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
(FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER)  
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL  
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Report on DoD Involvement with The Rendon Group  
(Report No. 07-INTEL-06) (U)

(U) We are providing this report for your information and use. We performed the audit in response to a congressional request. No written response to this report was required, and none was received. Therefore, we are publishing this report in final form.

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Questions should be directed to [redacted] at (703) 604-[redacted] (DSN 664-[redacted]) or [redacted] at [redacted]. See Appendix E for the report distribution. The team members are listed inside the back cover.

Shelton R. Young  
Deputy Inspector General  
for Intelligence

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~~Date of Review: August 14, 2007~~

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**Department of Defense Office of Inspector General**

**Report No. 07-INTEL-06**  
(Project No. D2006-DINT02-0134.000)

**March 6, 2007**

**DoD Involvement with The Rendon Group (U)**

**Executive Summary (U)**

**(U) Who Should Read This Report and Why?** DoD officials contracting with public relations firms and those interested in the work of The Rendon Group in the months leading up to and during the Iraq war should read this report.

**(U) Background.** The Rendon Group is a public relations firm that provides strategic communications planning, media analysis, a news monitoring service, public relations training, and crisis management. In the past few years, numerous news articles were printed about DoD contracting with public relations firms to work on behalf of the DoD in the months leading up to and during the Iraq war. Some articles alleged The Rendon Group's participation in activities such as psychological operations. In a December 6, 2005, letter to the DoD Inspector General, Congressman Walter Jones requested a review of The Rendon Group and its role in the months leading up to the Iraq War. Congressman Jones requested that we review elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to determine whether the DoD hired The Rendon Group to deliberately create conditions that would convince the American people and Congress that Iraq was an imminent threat.

**(U) Results.** We did not find evidence that the DoD hired The Rendon Group to deliberately create conditions that would convince the American people and Congress that Iraq was an imminent threat. We examined the activities that The Rendon Group conducted under 46 different DoD work orders and did not find examples of any activities that did not comply with DoD policy and legal requirements.

**(U)** In the letter to the Inspector General, Congressman Jones asked 24 specific questions about the DoD involvement with The Rendon Group. As part of our review, we attempted to obtain answers to questions, which focused on why the Office of the Secretary of Defense hired The Rendon Group; what work it completed for DoD; whether it had access to classified information or any involvement with the Office of Strategic Influence; what work it completed regarding the referendum in Vieques, Puerto Rico; and the Iraqi National Congress. The questions also included concerns about the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

**(U) Management Comments.** We provided a draft of this report on February 16, 2007. No written response to this report was required, and none was received. Therefore, we are publishing this report in final form.

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## **Background (U)**

(U) The Rendon Group (TRG) is a public relations firm that provides strategic communications planning, media analysis, a news monitoring service, public relations training, and crisis management. TRG helps its clients to understand the real-time news and information and how it shapes public opinion and policy decisions. According to TRG, its mission is to analyze the media to provide an objective measurement of the scope, scale, and the content of media coverage about a company, organization, or topic. It has monitored traditional and electronic media in 16 languages, in more than 60 countries. TRG also worked in 91 countries planning and managing strategic and tactical communications programs across Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.

(U) In a December 6, 2005, letter to the DoD Inspector General, Congressman Walter Jones requested a review of TRG and its role in the months leading up to the Iraq War. Congressman Jones requested that we review elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to determine whether the DoD hired TRG to deliberately create conditions that would convince the American people and Congress that Iraq was an imminent threat. The letter included 24 questions about the DoD involvement with TRG, as well as other areas of interest. The questions on TRG focused on why the Office of the Secretary of Defense hired TRG; what work it completed for DoD; whether it had access to classified information or any involvement with the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI); what work it completed regarding the referendum in Vieques, Puerto Rico; and the Iraqi National Congress (INC). This report also discusses the additional concerns presented by Congressman Jones. See Appendix B for the request and list of questions from Congressman Jones.

## **Objectives (U)**

(U) We initiated the audit to assess the activities of TRG for DoD in the months leading up to the Iraq war. We later expanded the objective to assess all activities of TRG for DoD from FY 2000 through FY 2005. Specifically, we examined work orders between TRG and the DoD to determine whether the activities involved in the work orders complied with DoD policy and legal requirements. See Appendix A for a discussion of the scope and methodology.

## Activities of The Rendon Group (U)

(U) We did not find evidence that the DoD hired TRG to deliberately create conditions that would convince the American people and Congress that Iraq was an imminent threat. We examined the activities that TRG conducted under 46 different DoD work orders and did not find examples of any activities that did not comply with DoD policy and legal requirements.

## Concerns with The Rendon Group (U)

(U) In the past few years, numerous news articles were printed about DoD contracting with public relations firms to work on behalf of the DoD in the months leading up to and during the Iraq war. Some articles alleged TRG participation in activities such as psychological operations. In a December 6, 2005, letter to the DoD Inspector General, Congressman Jones asked 24 questions about the DoD involvement with TRG. As part of our review, we attempted to obtain answers to these questions.



(U) From FY 2000 through FY 2005, TRG was a prime contractor to DoD under 39 work orders,\* worth \$81.1 million. During this time, TRG was also a subcontractor under 7 work orders for \$14.7 million. These amounts do not include any work orders under \$25,000 or those awarded after September 30, 2005.

\* (U) The term "work order" will be used synonymously with the term "contract" throughout the report because most of the work orders were awarded under the General Services Administration contracts GS23F0405K or GS10F0144L.

(U) From FY 2000 through FY 2005, several DoD organizations awarded work orders at various times to TRG. The Components included the Army, Navy, Air Force, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the National Defense University, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, the former Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence for the Joint Information Operations Task Force, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict. Based on interviews and contract documentation, the DoD organizations selected TRG because of its expertise in key areas such as media analysis and their work experience in Southwest Asia. These work orders were awarded to assist the different DoD organizations in areas such as analyzing foreign media, creating web sites, establishing public outreach programs, training foreign governments in public relations, conducting focus groups and other studies, and organizing and facilitating meetings. See Appendix C for a complete list of work orders awarded to TRG. Some examples of the work performed follow.

(U) **Foreign Media Analysis.** Shortly after September 11, 2001, the Joint Staff created the Joint Information Operations Task Force. Through a work order awarded by the former Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, the Joint Information Operations Task Force contracted with TRG for media analysis that would help the Task Force understand the information environment throughout the world. TRG interpreted and analyzed information from the media, much in the native language. The most frequent information analysis came from the Iraq and Afghanistan media. See Appendix D for additional details and examples of work products on the foreign media analysis work orders.

(U) **Joint Information Operations Center.** For work orders GST0703BG0446 and GST0704BG0246, TRG provided strategic communications and media analysis. Every quarter, a senior representative from TRG, usually the Chief Executive Officer, would visit the Joint Information Operations Center to meet with a team from each Combatant Command to facilitate discussions on topics such as global communications and influence operations on the Global War on Terrorism. TRG also facilitated seminars on relevant issues at the request of the Joint Information Operations Center. One example is a seminar held at the Air Force Air Intelligence Agency on U.S. Southern Command topics. TRG set up the seminar, organized speakers, and provided equipment. TRG also provided quarterly reports, divided by regions in the Unified Command Plan, on the status of anti-American propaganda and sentiment in each region, as well as media analysis of inaccurate reporting about U.S. military operations that was based on overseas propaganda or other inaccuracies. TRG also provided consulting services to counter propaganda and training for media analysis. The cost of these work orders was \$1,827,715.35.

(U) **Air Chiefs' Website.** For work order F38601-01-F0004, the U.S. Central Command Air Forces employed TRG to provide a fully operational web site containing information obtained from open source material. TRG was responsible for developing, submitting for acceptance, translating into Arabic language, verifying translation, and publishing content on the web site each day. The web site was useful to the Air Chiefs and their coalition partners as a one-stop shop for news and information on the region. The web site was available to regional Air Chiefs on a password protected basis. The cost of the work order from April 2001 through March 2006 was \$6,190,389.89.

(U) **Highlands Program.** For work order W74V8H-04-F-0092, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Chief Information Officer employed TRG to conduct forums that would appeal to a cross-disciplinary group of nationally regarded leaders. The forums were in small groups discussing information and technologies and their effects on science, organizational and business processes, international relations, economics, and national security. TRG also conducted a research program and interviews to formulate and develop topics for the Highlands Forum focus group. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration would approve the subjects, and TRG would facilitate the meetings. Total cost for this work order was \$1,073,801.57.

(U) **Question 2. Why is the information of a public relations firm, such as The Rendon Group, classified?**

(U//~~FOUO~~) **Answer.** The information contained in the work orders and statements of work was unclassified; however, it did contain proprietary information, which is exempt from the Freedom of Information Act. Some statements of work contain a DoD requirement for employees of TRG to have security clearances up to the Top Secret with Sensitive Compartmented Information level. From 2004 through 2006, TRG's average number of employees working on DoD work orders was [REDACTED]. Of those, an average of [REDACTED] employees held security clearances ([REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]).

(U) TRG produced some classified work products; for example, work performed in Colombia, Afghanistan, and Iraq was classified because of the sensitivity of working in different functional areas and with foreign governments. For the foreign media analysis work order, TRG worked alongside Joint Staff and U.S. Strategic Command personnel who were responsible for media analysis, inside a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility. TRG would disseminate the unclassified work products on the DoD Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

**(U) Question 3. Please provide us with all contracts between The Rendon Group and the DoD.**

**(U) Answer.** See Appendix C for the list of work orders DoD awarded to TRG from FY 2000 through FY 2005.

**(U) Question 4. Why has The Rendon Group, a public relations firm, been hired by the DoD in every US military intervention since the Panama invasion in 1989?**

**(U) Answer.** The scope of this audit was from FY 2000 through FY 2005. Since FY 2000, the DoD awarded work orders including some from the General Services Administration schedule or through subcontracts to assist with counter-narcotics in Colombia and Afghanistan and strategic communications in Iraq. See Question 23 for discussion on Afghanistan.

**(U//~~FOUO~~) Role in Colombia.** For work orders N00178-01-F-9007, GST0602BN0705, GST0603BN1797, GST0704BG0125, and Lockheed Martin Task Orders 0076 and 0127, TRG provided training support to the Republic of Colombia Ministry of Defense to conduct a more effective counter-narcotics effort. According to DoD officials, TRG helped the Colombian government gain better relations with its own public as well as abroad through media strategies. TRG provided on-the-job training including seminar and classroom training for Colombian nationals, developed media products such as posters and commercials, and provided real-time crisis communication support and trend analysis of news information in local and regional media. The cost of these work orders was \$16,095,667.

**(U) Strategic Communications Operation Support in Iraq.** For work order W27P4A-05-C-0014, TRG provided a team in Iraq to monitor and assess the effectiveness of the Strategic Communication Directorate, Multi-National Forces-Iraq; provide media products to subscribers; and contribute to planning as well as respond to immediate reaction or crisis situations. TRG monitored the media and news alerts system similarly to the overall media analysis discussed previously; however, TRG services in Iraq were more focused. In addition, TRG recommended improving strategic communication programs. One example was a recommendation to conduct recorded interviews rather than live interviews. TRG stated that recording provided an economy of effort with interviews, rather than spending operational time conducting live interviews. TRG did not conduct the interviews, DoD conducted the interviews. The cost of this work order was \$6,400,918.91.

**(U) Question 5. Why does a public relations firm, such as The Rendon Group, have access to the highest levels of intelligence in the intelligence community? Please explain why The Rendon Group participated in a 9:30 a.m. phone call every morning during the Afghanistan invasion with top level Pentagon officials.**

**(U//~~FOUO~~) Answer.** An average of [REDACTED] percent of TRG employees working on DoD work orders held security clearances ([REDACTED] percent held [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] percent held [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]). The different Components within DoD determined that access to classified information was necessary for the TRG work.

(U) The second question relates to a phone call initiated by the White House Coalition Information Center, which is not a DoD organization. The White House created the Coalition Information Center to assist the President and coalition partners in communicating to the world about the Global War on Terrorism. The Coalition Information Center would invite members from TRG to participate in the phone call. Occasionally, the Chief Executive Officer of TRG would actively participate in the phone call. TRG participation was not part of a DoD work order.

**(U) Question 6. In the mid 1990s, The Rendon Group was reprimanded by project managers in Washington when stories they contrived found their way into the American Press. This is a violation of the law. Why were their contracts not terminated?**

**(U) Answer.** The scope of the audit was to review DoD contracts awarded to TRG from FY 2000 through FY 2005; therefore, the mid 1990s and other agencies are beyond the scope of the audit.

**(U) Question 7. What was the role of the Rendon Group, a private defense contractor, in creating the Iraqi National Congress, a militant opposition force with the goal of overthrowing a foreign country? If the Rendon Group is no longer involved with the INC, when did the relationship end?**

**(S//NF) Answer.** The Iraqi National Congress (INC) was formed in 1992 and was not affiliated with the DoD at that time. The responsibilities of the DoD Office of Inspector General are to review DoD Components only. The DoD took over the administration of the Information Collection Program element of the INC in 2002. Based on information we collected through interviews and documentation, TRG did not perform services for DoD, either directly or indirectly, for the INC. See Question 12 for additional information on the INC.

**(U) Question 8. What “perception management” and propaganda activities did the Rendon Group undertake on behalf of the INC? Did any of that propaganda end up in the U.S. media?**

~~(S//NF)~~ Answer. We reviewed the work that TRG performed for DoD under 39 work orders and 7 subcontracts issued between FY 2000 and FY 2005. We did not find any evidence that TRG performed services for the DoD that directly or indirectly pertained to the INC. See Question 12 for additional information on the INC.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ **Question 9. What was the purpose, membership and outcome of the meeting that took place in Rome in December 2002 involving [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], discredited Iranian arms dealer [REDACTED] (of Iran-contra fame) and others from Italy’s intelligence and from Iran?**

~~(S//NF)~~ Answer. There is no evidence that TRG was involved with the following discussion. On September 12, 2003, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence requested the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) to begin an inquiry into the events surrounding any meetings between [REDACTED] and DoD personnel. CIFA officials began the inquiry and submitted several preliminary reports of their findings in October 2003. The scope of the inquiry was limited to interviews of some of the principal DoD personnel identified in news articles as being associated with the matter and their supervisors; review of material voluntarily provided by interviewees; review of records from DoD agencies; and review of open source information. CIFA officials conducted 19 interviews and reviewed documentation. At the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, CIFA halted the inquiry on October 21, 2003. According to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the information that CIFA obtained was satisfactory and there was no need to continue the inquiry. As of October 2003, the inquiry had not identified any violations of law.

~~(S//NF)~~ The interviews conducted revealed two meetings between DoD personnel and [REDACTED]. According to interviews cited in the CIFA inquiry, the first meeting was initiated in November 2001 in response to the Deputy National Security Advisor, then Mr. Hadley, informing the Deputy Secretary of Defense, then Mr. Wolfowitz, that some prominent Iranians wanted to defect. While the defection information was incorrect, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to handle the issue. Based on informal comments to our draft report, officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy claim that they did not know [REDACTED] would attend the Rome meetings.

(S//NF) The first meeting took place from December 10, 2001, through December 13, 2001, in Rome, Italy. The meeting included [REDACTED] (Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs), [REDACTED] (Office of Net Assessments), [REDACTED] (former Office of the Secretary of Defense and National Security Council consultant), [REDACTED] (Iranian exile), [REDACTED] (Iranian exile living in [REDACTED]), [REDACTED], and an unidentified employee of the [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] arranged the meeting with the help of his contacts in Italy and the [REDACTED] who provided the meeting place and other logistical support. The purpose of the meeting was to introduce the [REDACTED] Iranians who had important information about the Iranian Government. Based on information we obtained, we determined DoD was aware of the meeting, allowed it to proceed, and after its conclusion, no further action was planned.

(S//NF) The second meeting took place from June 30, 2003, through July 1, 2003, in Paris, France, and included [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and news broadcaster [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] diverted his business trip in Turkey to travel to Paris to meet with a professor at the American University of Paris. While there, [REDACTED] arranged to meet with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] called his boss, [REDACTED] of Net Assessments), to request permission to meet with [REDACTED]. According to [REDACTED], the meeting was approved. The purpose of this meeting was for [REDACTED] to provide an update on the current political situation and conditions in Iran. [REDACTED] briefed his supervisor at Net Assessments and also officials within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy when he returned and no further action was taken.

(U//FOUO) Question 10. Why, as Air Force [REDACTED] has revealed, were numerous senior Israeli officers allowed to frequently come and go from Douglas Feith's office without having to sign in as others are required to do?

(U//FOUO) Answer. TRG was not involved with the following discussion. During an interview and in a published article, [REDACTED] stated that, to her knowledge, the Israeli officers not signing in as visitors happened only once. According to [REDACTED], normal procedures did not require high level visitors to sign in. However, as a result of a warning notice, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy changed the procedures a few weeks before the meeting with the Israeli officers. [REDACTED] stated that she was filling in as an escort on the day of the meeting, which is why she was in the front office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. On the day cited by [REDACTED] the secretary for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy failed to have the visitors sign in.



(U//~~FOUO~~) According to officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, [REDACTED]'s account is incorrect. [REDACTED] was not familiar with procedures in the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's office. The officials also stated that there was not a failure to follow proper sign-in procedures for senior Israeli officers. There is, and always has been, a requirement to sign in all visitors to a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's front office. According to the security officer, this requirement was not established in response to a warning notice. Senior visitors are not required to sign themselves in. The procedure for senior visitors is that either an employee of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy signs in the visitor, or the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's calendar is filed as a record of the visit. Even if [REDACTED] escorted senior Israeli officers to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's office on one occasion, she was not in a position to know which record-keeping procedure was used that day.

**(U) Question 11. Did former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith conceive of the Office of Strategic [Influence] (OSI)? Was the Rendon Group involved with the OSI? Why would the OSI pursue the Rendon Group?**

**(U) Answer.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy established the Office of Strategic Influence on October 30, 2001, to serve as the DoD focal point for all issues relating to the strategic information campaign in support of the Global War on Terrorism. The Office of Strategic Influence reported to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict. The Office of Strategic Influence did not award any work orders to TRG. However, in a letter to Senator Carl Levin, dated April 6, 2002, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy stated that the Office of Strategic Influence provided a contracting officer's technical representative for 60 days to assist with a work order awarded to TRG. The former Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence funded the work order for the Joint Information Operation Task Force. The technical representative oversaw the deployment of two media advisors to Indonesia to support the embassy public diplomacy and opinion research.

**(U//~~FOUO~~) Question 12. The INC helped orchestrate a meeting between [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] in Thailand. Chalabi and the INC were the primary sources for [REDACTED]'s numerous stories about Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction. [REDACTED] an INC spokesman, said the information that [REDACTED] provided**

went directly to President Bush and Tony Blair. Was The Rendon Group responsible for this? Who was responsible for transferring information from the INC to America?

(S//NF) Answer. We found no evidence that TRG was involved with arranging these meetings or passing information from the INC to the U.S. Government or DoD. The INC began in 1992 as an umbrella organization of Iraqi opposition groups, and represented the first major attempt by opponents of Saddam Hussein to join forces. Under the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, the U.S. Government provided assistance to the INC as part of a transition plan for democracy in Iraq. In March 2001, the Department of State established and administered the Information Collection Program, in which the INC collected information about Iraq from a network of overt sources. The INC established the position of Chief of Operations for the Information Collection Program to coordinate between overt information sources and U.S. intelligence. The Information Collection Program facilitated collection activities against the Iraqi regime and exploited INC resources inside Iraq. Additionally, the INC made available several Iraqi "defectors" with information of intelligence value. The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] assisted in debriefing these individuals, and the Department of State managed the Information Collection Program. On July 25, 2002, the National Security Council's Deputies Committee agreed to transfer administration of the Information Collection Program from the Department of State to DoD. From October 2002 through January 2003, Defense Intelligence Agency officials debriefed sources from the INC Information Collection Program in Europe and East Asia. The sources would also pass information to INC officials in Iraq, who passed it on to the headquarters of the INC Information Collection Program in Washington, D.C., who then passed it to Defense Intelligence Agency officials. In May 2004, the DoD terminated its relationship with the INC. The DoD Office of Inspector General does not have the authority to review INC activities prior to 2002.

(U) Question 13. How does the Smith-Mundt Act apply to The Rendon Group (TRG) and its activities?

(U) Answer. The U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (known as the Smith-Mundt Act) was established to enable the U.S. Government to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries without influencing public opinion within the United States. The Act primarily focused on the Department of State and the United States Information Agency.

(U) For most of the work orders, TRG did not perform tasks that would be subjected to the Smith-Mundt Act. The statement of work for work specifically performed on the counter-narcotics work orders, stated that work performed would not target the United States.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**(U) Question 15. What are all of TRG's contracts with the DoD? What about other contracts "buried" in other agencies – such as the civilian security contracts for Iraq "hidden" in the Interior Department's budget?**

**(U) Answer.** See Appendix C for a complete list of the work orders awarded to TRG from FY 2000 through FY 2005. The Government Services Administration awarded 8 of the 46 work orders for DoD; 7 work orders for TRG as a subcontractor; and 3 work orders where the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency used the Department of Interior as a contracting vehicle. DoD funded the work orders, which were not part of the Department of Interior's budget. The scope of work for these three work orders was for workshops, scenario developments, and studies. The cost of these work orders was \$1,438,538.

**(U) Question 16. Who is legally responsible for oversight of Rendon's activities at home and abroad? How is that oversight carried out? While DoD officials may not deliberately/willfully lie to US lawmakers and the public – are there any such restrictions on Rendon? If so, please provide us with documentation.**

**(U) Answer.** TRG is required to meet the terms of its DoD work order and is subject to the normal oversight provided on all DoD contracts. This includes complying with laws and regulations regarding providing false information to the public or Congress. The Federal Acquisition Regulation defines a contracting officer as the individual with the authority to enter into, administer, or terminate a contract. The contracting officer signs the contract and all contract modifications. A contracting officer is responsible for performing all the necessary actions for effective contracting, such as complying with the terms of the contract and safeguarding the interests of the United States in its contractual relationships.

(U) However, a contracting officer is not always a technical expert. The Federal Acquisition Regulation allows a contracting officer to delegate certain functions to authorized representatives. The contracting officer representative [also known as a contracting officer's technical representative] provides financial and

technical expertise and oversight. The primary responsibilities of the contracting officer's representative include monitoring the contractor's performance and evaluating the work as it occurs; providing technical direction within the scope of the contract; inspecting and accepting completed work for the Government; and assisting the contracting officer with the contractor's performance evaluations.

(U) Contracting officers and representatives interviewed stated that the contracting officer and the contracting officer representative reviewed all products and invoices produced by TRG for accuracy. Those interviewed stated that the TRG information was valuable to DoD. For the foreign media analysis work orders, the contracting officer's representative canvassed the Combatant Commands to determine whether there was still a requirement for work performed by TRG. Also, the performance assessment reports gave TRG high ratings.

**(U) Question 17. The U.S. Navy engaged Rendon for the purposes of directly influencing the outcome of the Vieques vote in Puerto Rico. TRG "grew" the contract from \$199k to \$1.697 million – and still managed to lose the vote. Admiral McCreary (Navy Public Affairs) explained that a "new" contract modification was "found" and that TRG really didn't break the law in the run-up to the election – although he was not certain about what exactly TRG was doing for its S. The change in task order "objectionable language" is minimal.**

(U) **Answer.** Our review found no evidence that TRG directly tried to influence the outcome of the Vieques vote in Puerto Rico. In January 2000, the Clinton Administration made an agreement with the Government of Puerto Rico to hold a referendum of registered voters of Vieques to determine the future of Navy testing on the island. The referendum would present two choices: 1) the Navy would cease training activities on Vieques no later than May 1, 2003; or 2) allow the Navy to continue training, including live-fire training indefinitely. In the 2001 National Defense Authorization (Public Law 106-398), Congress mandated that the referendum take place 270 days before or after May 1, 2001. The Secretary of the Navy was required to publicize the referendum at least 90 days before the scheduled date. The bill also authorized \$50 million in economic assistance if the vote allowed the Navy to continue training exercises on Vieques. The Navy originally scheduled the referendum for November 6, 2001, but changed the date to January 2002.

(U) According to Navy officials, the Navy had no experience in conducting a referendum, nor did it have a good relationship with the people of Vieques. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations suggested that TRG had the experience needed to

establish better relations with the people of Vieques and had experience with campaigns. The Navy selected TRG from the General Services Administration

Federal Supply Schedule. The work order identified specific tasks that TRG was to perform.

(U) **Task 1.** TRG assessed the extent to which each area (Local-Vieques, Commonwealth, Federal and International) was aware of the facts and topics relevant to the Navy's future use of test facilities on Vieques. Based on this assessment, TRG identified facts and topics for the Navy to discuss, and assembled a team of three or four employees to work with the Navy in Vieques. The Navy funded Task 1 at \$199,990.

(U) **Tasks 2 and 3.** A month after the Navy awarded the work order to TRG, the Navy exercised options Task 2 and Task 3. Under Task 2, TRG developed a communications plan, and under Task 3, TRG developed a Plan of Action and Milestones for implementing the plan. The cost for Task 2 was \$249,840 and for Task 3 was \$330,000.

(U) **Task 4.** The Navy later modified the work order to include a fourth task to conduct public outreach to build grassroots support on Vieques for the referendum and ensure the integrity of the voting process. This task added \$920,000 to the work order, which now totaled \$1,699,830. Because of the large amount, the Navy prepared a sole-source justification for the added task.

(U) In the summer of 2001, the Bush Administration announced the decision to end military testing on the island of Vieques. Congress further reinforced this decision in the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 107-107) by terminating the referendum. By September 2001, the Navy changed the focus of the TRG work order. Modification 4 of the work order was a no-cost modification to extend the period of performance for Task 4. The objective of the task order was to conduct public outreach to improve communication between the local Vieques populace and the U.S. Navy as they prepared to stop testing and leave the island. TRG completed tasks such as small neighborhood-based informational gatherings with Navy representatives in attendance to answer questions. Also, larger scale meetings usually focused on a topic related to Navy economic development. Further, TRG delivered Fact Sheets that the Navy created to the people of Vieques by door-to-door Island-wide distribution. The work order was completed and the final report delivered in March 2002.

(U) **Question 18. Can we expect more of this sort of thing from DoD and its components in the 2006 and 2008 elections?**

(U) **Answer.** We were unable to answer this question.

(U) **Question 19. What public policies and candidates will DoD and its components be supporting or opposing?**

(U) Answer. We were unable to answer this question.

**(U) Question 20. The DoD's "Information Operations Roadmap" identifies, raises questions, and seeks legal guidance re: Smith-Mundt issues with respect to planting news stories and manipulating foreign media – given the 24/7 internet/cable news cycle. Has DoD legal guidance/direction/findings ever been finalized and promulgated concerning these matters? If so, copies please.**

(U) Answer. TRG is not involved in the following discussion. As the Quadrennial Defense Review neared completion, there were several initiatives identified that warranted additional attention. Therefore, the DoD instituted follow-on execution roadmaps to the Quadrennial Defense Review including strategic communications; which are currently being coordinated throughout the DoD. The goal of the strategic communications roadmap was to increase effectiveness by developing a culture that recognizes the value of communication and integrates communication considerations into policy development, operations planning, execution, and assessment to advance national interests. The roadmap included a Plan of Action and Milestones to meet the following objectives:

- Institutionalize a DoD process to incorporate principles of strategic communications.
- Define roles, responsibilities and relationships, and develop doctrine for strategic communication and primary support capabilities such as public affairs; aspects of information operations, especially psychological operations; visual information; and DoD military diplomacy and support to public diplomacy.
- Provide proper resources to the Military Departments and Combatant Commands to organize, train, and equip DoD capabilities supporting primary communications.

(U) One of the DoD tasks was to develop a DoD Directive for strategic communications. As of January 2007, the directive was in draft form, but the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy had not circulated it for coordination. Other tasks scheduled for completion in FY 2007 included updating or issuing Directives, Instructions and Publications supporting strategic communications; developing operational concepts for the capabilities supporting primary communications for the joint warfighter; identifying requirements to enhance

those capabilities for organizational structure, composition, career paths, and leadership positions within public affairs, psychological operations, visual information communications; and training and education.

**(U) Question 21. Can the DoD IG provide us evidence that not a penny of DoD money was spent on the development, launch and maintenance/operations of Rendon's website Internet site "Empower Peace."**

**(U) Answer.** After reviewing statements of work and conducting interviews, we did not find any evidence that DoD money was spent on Empower Peace.

**(U) Question 22. TRG and the Lincoln Group are two public relations firms that the DoD has contracted for millions of dollars. What other companies are doing this sort of work? We are requesting all the contracts. Are these companies registered foreign agents with DoJ?**

**(U) Answer.** The DoD awarded most of the TRG work orders using the General Services Administration Advertising and Integrated Marketing Solutions Schedule 541. As of December 1, 2006, 174 companies were under this schedule. Other companies with the same socio-economic indicators that offer similar services include Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc.; Chemonics International, Inc.; CSC Systems and Solutions; Hill and Knowlton; and SAIC. There are other companies such as the Lincoln Group and SOS International that are not on the General Services Administration schedule. The audit did not review contracts with other companies or determine if they were registered foreign agents.

**(U//FOUO) Question 23. In Afghanistan there is reportedly "an embassy within an embassy" - with the Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG) acting as a "stove-piped" DoD contracting operation outside the control of State Dept. The two names that have been thrown around are very close associates of Secretary Rumsfeld who reportedly "drive" all new contracts: [REDACTED] - - who's been with the Secretary since Searle Pharmaceuticals and Martin Hoffman - - who went to Princeton with Rumsfeld and is a former Secretary of the Army. TRG has a counter-narcotics public education contract in Afghan that is supposedly an utter failure and they are Hamid Karzai's "handlers." Why and what is The Rendon Group providing for Hamid Karzai's?**

**(U) Answer.** There is no documentation indicating that [REDACTED] or Mr. Hoffman were involved with issuing the work order to TRG. At the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, the Lockheed-Martin Corporation modified a task order awarded to TRG, which was under contract for similar work in Colombia. TRG provided a comprehensive program for counter-narcotics public communications, training, and education planning to support the program in Afghanistan. Programs included on-the-job training, classroom training, and mentoring. The period of the contract was from August 2004 through September 2005 and the cost was \$4,107,459.79.

(U//~~FOUO~~) TRG provided on-the-job training for employees in the Afghan government who were involved in counter-narcotics activities. The training focused on enhancing skills of counter-narcotics personnel in the Afghan government on content generation, content dissemination, rapid response, information coordination, media relations, media planning, and scenario planning.

(U//~~FOUO~~) TRG conducted training in a classroom setting for strategic communications and training support for key Afghan government agencies, such as the Ministry of the Interior and Counter-narcotics Directorate, involved in counter-narcotics activities. TRG would bring in experts such as the Navy Crisis Management team and members of the National Security Council. TRG provided assessments of and then assisted in formulating Afghanistan counter-narcotics information, education, and training programs.

(U) Through these methods, TRG trained approximately 100 members of the Afghanistan government. At the State Department's request, DoD extended the subcontract with TRG through September 2005 until the State Department could take over. In September 2005, the Deputy Interior Minister for Counter-narcotics sent a letter to the DoD praising the work of TRG in Afghanistan.

**(U) Question 24. Who inside the Pentagon hired the Rendon Group? Why?**

**(U) Answer.** See Appendix C for the list of 46 work orders that DoD awarded to TRG at a cost of \$95.8 million from FY 2000 through FY 2005. Based on our review, the elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the National Defense University, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, the former office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict selected TRG because of their expertise in key areas such as facilitating forums, conducting studies, analyzing foreign media, and training in public relations.



## Appendix A. Scope and Methodology (U)

(U) We performed this audit in response to a December 11, 2005, congressional request. To accomplish the objective to assess all activities of TRG for DoD, we used a data call to obtain a universe of DoD contracts from FY 2000 through FY 2005; reviewed applicable contract documentation; and conducted interviews. We reviewed and attempted to answer the 24 questions presented by Congressman Jones.

(U) We visited, contacted, or conducted interviews with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration; Office of the Director, Net Assessment; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Joint Staff, J39; the U.S. Central Command (J2, J3, J5, and Public Affairs); Multi-National Force-Iraq; Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan; the U.S. Strategic Command; 55th Contracting Squadron, Offutt Air Force Base; the Special Operations Command (J2, J3, J5, Joint Psychological Operations Support Element, and Public Affairs); the Army Contracting Center of Excellence; the Air Intelligence Agency; Joint Information Operations Center; the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; elements of Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Air Systems Command, and the Naval Supply Systems Command; the Naval Research Laboratory; and the 20th Contracting Squadron, Shaw Air Force Base.

(U) We also visited, contacted, or conducted interviews of former military or DoD civilians from the Joint Staff, J39; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs. We interviewed the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer of TRG, as well as other private citizens to obtain answers to the Congressman's 24 questions. We reviewed available work orders, statements of work, products of TRG, and related contract information.

(U) We reviewed the Federal Acquisition Regulation and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation to identify guidance related to contract award, administration, and records retention. We reviewed the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (known as the Smith-Mundt Act) to document the applicable laws on foreign influence operations. We reviewed the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Information Operations Roadmap, and the Quadrennial Defense Review's Strategic Communication Roadmap to document the DoD strategic communications plan.

(U) We reviewed additional unclassified and classified documentation produced and available from FY 2000 through FY 2006 that included reports, studies, briefings, message traffic, e-mails, first-hand accounts, memoranda, and other official data regarding prewar intelligence.

(U) We performed this audit from February 2006 through February 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We were limited to reviewing DoD activities and work orders awarded from FY 2000 through 2005. The DoD OIG does not have the authority to review organizations and activities outside the DoD.

(U) **Scope Limitation.** We were unable to identify any systemic irregularities in the contracting procedures used to award contracts to TRG. Five contract files that we reviewed contained the required justification for other than full-and-open competition for sole-source contracts. The justifications cited FAR 6.302-2, "Unusual and Compelling Urgency" as the reason for awarding sole-source contracts. Other contract files we reviewed were incomplete. Although FAR 4.805, "Storage, Handling, and Disposal of Contract Files," requires that contracts and related records and documents exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold of \$100,000 be maintained for 6 years and 3 months after the final contract payment, the DoD Components did not always maintain documentation. We were unable to determine whether these contracts were sole-source awards. The General Services Administration awarded eight contracts we reviewed, but according to contracting officials, the General Services Administration did not require documentation. We did not review all of the Army contracts awarded to TRG. The Army did not provide the requested contracts.

(U) **Use of Computer-Processed Data.** We extrapolated data from the DD 350 database. The reliability of computer-processed data used was not determined, but reliability would not affect audit results. We used the data as a starting point for determining whether there were contracts with TRG and who awarded the contracts.

(U) **Government Accountability Office High-Risk Area.** The Government Accountability Office has identified several high-risk areas in DoD. This report provides coverage of the DoD Contract Management high-risk area.

## **Prior Coverage (U)**

(U) During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) have issued three reports

discussing public relations firms and related prewar intelligence issues in the lead up to the Iraq war. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.gao.gov>.

**GAO (U)**

(U) GAO Report No. GAO-06-305, "Media Contracts: Activities and Financial Obligations for Seven Federal Departments," January 13, 2006

**DoD IG (U)**

(U) DoD IG Report No. 07-INTEL-04, "Review of the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (U)," February 9, 2007 (Secret//NOFORN)

(U) DoD IG Report No. D-2007-001, "Information Operations Activities in Southwest Asia (U)," October 6, 2006 (Secret)

## Appendix B. Congressional Request (U)

AMERICAN OVERSIGHT

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-3303

December 6, 2005

Inspector General Thomas F. Gimble  
DoD Inspector General's Office  
1600 Army Pentagon Drive  
Washington, DC 20310

Dear Inspector General Gimble:

Through considerable media attention and our own investigation, we are increasingly concerned about the role of public relations firms contracted by the Pentagon. Specifically, we are requesting that the Inspector General initiate an investigation into the Rendon Group and their role in the lead up to the Iraq War. The Rendon Group is a secretive public relations firm that has provided communication services in over 80 nations and participated in every U.S. military intervention since the 1989 Panama invasion. The founder of the Rendon Group, John Rendon, describes himself as "an information warrior and perception manager."

The Rendon Group has procured millions of dollars from government contracts since 1991 when it was hired by the [REDACTED] to help establish the Iraqi National Congress (INC) to create conditions for the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. In the mid 1990s after allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse the Rendon Group was investigated by the [REDACTED]. This investigation resulted in the severing of ties between the [REDACTED] and the Rendon Group. Consequently, the Rendon Group pursued the Department of Defense where they have won numerous no-bid contracts worth millions of dollars that extend into this year.

In light of recent revelations that now conclude the evidence produced by the Bush administration to justify the invasion of Iraq was wrong, I believe it is worth examining the role of the Rendon Group in providing that information. As The Rendon Group's history suggests and considering the secretive nature surrounding their activities, I am concerned that elements inside the Pentagon may have deliberately hired the Rendon Group to create conditions that would sell the American people and Congress on Iraq's imminent threat. As you are aware, it is a violation of the law to use federal funds to propagandize the American people. I am requesting that the Inspector General's office initiate an immediate investigation into the waste, fraud and abuse of the Rendon Group. It is vitally important that we work to preserve the integrity of the Pentagon and ensure the protection of the American taxpayers from government sponsored propaganda.

WALTER B. JONES  
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

Resident  
1200 North 17th Street  
Washington, DC 20515  
Telephone: 202-227-5871  
Office: 202-227-5871  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL SERVICES  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-3303

11/11/81  
11/11/81  
11/11/81  
11/11/81

I have attached a list of questions concerning the Rendon Group that I would like for the Inspector General's office to investigate and answer.

With Deep Concern,  
*Walter B. Jones*  
Walter B. Jones  
Member of Congress


WALTER B. JONES  
20 Belmont Street, Cambridge, MA 02142

FORM 101  
CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20540  
TELEPHONE (202) 225-3415

COMMITTEE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES  
COMMITTEE ON RECRUITING

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-3303

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
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- (2) Why is the information of a public relations firm, such as The Rendon Group, classified?
- (3) Please provide us with all contracts between The Rendon Group and the DoD.
- (4) Why has The Rendon Group, a public relations firm, been hired by the DoD in every US military intervention since the Panama invasion in 1989?
- (5) Why does a public relations firm, such as The Rendon Group, have access to the highest levels of intelligence in the intelligence community? Please explain why The Rendon Group participated in a 9:30 am phone call every morning during the Afghanistan invasion with top level Pentagon officials.
- (6) In the mid 1990s The Rendon Group was reprimanded by project managers in Washington when stories they contrived found their way into the American Press. This is a violation of the law. Why were their contracts not terminated?
- (7) What was the role of the Rendon Group, a private defense contractor, in creating the Iraqi National Congress, a militant opposition force with the goal of overthrowing a foreign country? If the Rendon Group is no longer involved with the INC, when did the relationship end?
- (8) What "perception management" and propaganda activities did the Rendon Group undertake on behalf of the INC? Did any of that propaganda end up in the U.S. media?
- (9) What was the purpose, membership and outcome of the meeting that took place in Rome in December 2002 involving [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] discredited Iranian arms dealer [redacted] (of Iran-contra fame) and others from Italy's intelligence and from Iran?

WALTER B. JONES  
10101-District North Carolina

Room 427  
Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515  
Telephone (202) 225-3241

Committee  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-3303

FORM NO. 100  
MAY 1992 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6  
5010-108-01

(10) Why, as Air Force [REDACTED] has revealed, were numerous senior Israeli officers allowed to frequently come and go from Douglas Feith's office without having to sign in as others are required to do?

(11) Did former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith conceive of the Office of Strategic Planning (OSI)? Was the Rendon Group involved with the OSI? Why would the OSI pursue the Rendon Group?

(12) The INC helped orchestrate meeting between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in Thailand. Chalabi and the INC were the primary sources for Miller's numerous stories about Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction. [REDACTED] INC spokesman, said the information that [REDACTED] provided went directly to President Bush and Tony Blair. Was The Rendon Group responsible for this? Who was responsible for transferring information from the INC to America?

(13) How does the Smith-Mundt Act apply to The Rendon Group (TRG) and its activities?

[REDACTED]

(15) What are all of TRG's contracts with the DoD? What about other contracts "buried" in other agencies— such as the civilian security contracts for Iraq "hidden" in the Interior Department's budget?

(16) Who is legally responsible for oversight of Rendon's activities at home and abroad? How is that oversight carried out? While DoD officials may not deliberately/willfully lie to US lawmakers and the public are there any such restrictions on Rendon? If so, please provide us with documentation.

(17) The US Navy engaged Rendon for the purposes of directly influencing the outcome of the Vieques vote in Puerto Rico. TRG "grew" the contract from \$199K to \$1.697 million – and still managed to lose the vote. Admiral McCreary (Navy Public Affairs) explained that a "new" contract modification was "found" and that TRG really didn't break the law in the run-up to the election – although he was not certain about what exactly TRG was doing for its \$. The change in task order "objectionable language" is minimal.

WALTER B. JONES  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ROOM 422  
CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515  
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-1211

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL SERVICES  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESOURCES

CONTACT: (202) 225-1211  
FAX: (202) 225-1211  
WWW: www.house.gov

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-3303

(18) Can we expect more of this sort of thing from DoD and its components in the 2006 and 2008 elections?

(19) What public policies and candidates will DoD and its components be supporting or opposing?

(20) The DoD's "Information Operations Roadmap" identifies, raises questions, and seeks legal guidance re: Smith-Mundt issues with respect to planting news stories and manipulating foreign media - given the 24/7 internet/cable news cycle. Has DoD legal guidance/direction/findings ever been finalized and promulgated concerning these matters? If so, copies please.

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(23) In Afghanistan there is reportedly "an embassy within an embassy"-- with the Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG) acting as a "stove-piped" DoD contracting operation outside the control of State Dept. The two names that have been thrown around are very close associates of Secretary Rumsfeld who reportedly "drive" all new contracts: [REDACTED] - who's been with the Secretary since Searle Pharmaceuticals and Martin Hoffman - who went to Princeton with Rumsfeld and is a former Secretary of the Army. TRG has a counter-narcotics public education contract in Afghan that is supposedly an utter failure and they are Hamid Karzai's "handlers." Why and what is The Rendon Group providing for Hamid Karzai's?

(24) Who inside the Pentagon hired the Rendon Group? Why?



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## Appendix C. Work Orders Awarded from FY 2000 through FY 2005 (U)

<u>Contracting Organization</u>	<u>Tasking Organization</u>	<u>Work Order No.</u>	<u>Year Began- Year Ended</u>	<u>Contract Amount</u>
Air Intelligence Agency	Air Intelligence Agency	F41621-00-F-8110	09/25/00 - 02/24/01	\$ 89,691.89
Naval Surface Warfare Center	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict	N00178-01-F-9007	01/08/01 - 01/07/02	\$ 2,566,782.76
Department of Interior	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	NBCHF010148	03/19/01 - 09/18/01	\$ 336,589.00
Naval Air Warfare Center	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	N61339-01-C-1012	09/28/01 - 12/28/01	\$ 157,103.00
Navy	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	N61339-01-C-0072	08/10/01 - 01/09/02	\$ 279,184.77
20 <sup>th</sup> Contracting Squadron	Central Command Air Forces	F38601-01-F0004	04/05/01 - 03/31/06	\$ 6,190,389.89
Naval Supply Systems Command	Chief of Naval Operations	N00600-01-F-6339	06/06/01 - 05/25/02	\$ 1,699,830.00

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<u>Contracting Organization</u>	<u>Tasking Organization</u>	<u>Work Order No.</u>	<u>Year Began- Year Ended</u>	<u>Contract Amount</u>
Contracting Center of Excellence	Office of the Secretary of Defense	DASW01-01-F-1488	09/24/01 - 12/31/01	\$ 25,000.00
Air Intelligence Agency	Air Intelligence Agency	F41621-01-F-8158	09/25/01 - 11/15/01	\$ 29,128.98
Air Intelligence Agency	Air Intelligence Agency	F41621-02-F-8038	09/25/01 - 03/24/02	\$ 498,813.65
Contracting Center of Excellence	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence	DASW01-02-F-0249	10/03/01 - 12/31/02	\$16,789,000.00
General Services Administration	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict	GST0602BN0705	12/04/01 - 01/07/03	\$ 3,017,995.85
Department of Interior	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	NBCHF020477	05/07/02 - 02/29/04	\$ 926,462.00
General Services Administration	Air Force	GST0602BN2191	06/15/02 - 09/30/03	\$ 480,967.21
Contracting Center of Excellence	Office of the Secretary of Defense	DASW01-02-F-1501	08/30/02 - 07/15/03	\$ 160,000.00
General Services Administration	Joint Information Operations Center	GST0703BG0446	11/25/02 - 11/24/03	\$ 429,312.18

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<u>Contracting Organization</u>	<u>Tasking Organization</u>	<u>Work Order No.</u>	<u>Year Began- Year Ended</u>	<u>Contract Amount</u>
General Services Administration	Joint Information Operations Center	GST0704BG0246	11/25/03 - 11/24/06	\$ 1,153,223.28
General Services Administration	Joint Information Operations Center	GST0704BG0246	11/25/02 - 06/24/04	\$ 245,179.89
Contracting Center of Excellence	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information and Integration	DASW01-03-F-0322	01/15/03 - 02/26/03	\$ 342,016.29
Contracting Center of Excellence	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence	DASW01-03-F-0462	02/16/03 - 04/30/03	\$ 2,999,862.15
Department of Interior	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	NBCHF030199	03/06/03 - 09/30/03	\$ 175,487.00
General Services Administration	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict	GST0603BN1797	03/31/03 - 10/31/03	\$ 1,722,064.43
Contracting Center of Excellence	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence	DASW01-03-F-0824	05/01/03 - 09/30/03	\$ 7,799,641.59
Net Assessment	Net Assessment	72362	05/14/03 - 01/16/04	\$ 128,042.53
Contracting Center of Excellence	Office of the Secretary of Defense	DASW01-03-F-1469	09/29/03 - 12/31/04	\$ 279,583.93

<u>Contracting Organization</u>	<u>Tasking Organization</u>	<u>Work Order No.</u>	<u>Year Began- Year Ended</u>	<u>Contract Amount</u>
General Services Administration	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict	GST0704BG0125	10/16/03 - 10/31/04	\$ 1,050,076.92
General Services Administration	U.S. Strategic Command	GST0804BG0451	12/24/03 - 02/03/04	\$ 1,387,248.86
Contracting Center of Excellence	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information and Integration	W74V8H-04-F-0092	01/15/04 - 12/31/06	\$ 1,073,801.57
Air Intelligence Agency	Air Intelligence Agency	FA7037-04-F-8123	5/1/2004 - 5/10/2004	\$ 284,913.17
Air Intelligence Agency	Air Intelligence Agency	FA7037-04-F-8104	05/14/04 - 12/31/04	\$ 7,043,215.52
Naval Research Laboratory	Naval Research Laboratory	N00173-04-F-0801	05/26/04 - 12/31/05	\$ 90,000.00
Contracting Center of Excellence	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information and Integration	W74V8H-04-F-0645	07/02/04 - 04/29/05	\$ 274,999.99
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	HR0011-04-0028	07/23/04 - 03/22/05	\$ 123,663.00
Naval Undersea Warfare Center	Naval Undersea Warfare Center	N66604-05-M-0395	12/01/04 - 04/30/05	\$ 79,406.00

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<u>Contracting Organization</u>	<u>Tasking Organization</u>	<u>Work Order No.</u>	<u>Year Began- Year Ended</u>	<u>Contract Amount</u>
Naval Undersea Warfare Center	Naval Undersea Warfare Center	N66604-05-C-0293	12/01/04 - 05/31/05	\$ 180,000.00
Naval Undersea Warfare Center	Naval Undersea Warfare Center	N66604-05-C-0394	12/08/04 - 06/07/05	\$ 248,241.00
55 <sup>th</sup> Contracting Squadron	U.S. Strategic Command	FA4600-06-F-8104	01/01/05 - 06/30/06	\$13,747,673.19
Joint Contracting Command - Iraq/Afghanistan	Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan	W913TY-05-F-3527	06/01/05 - 05/31/06	\$ 641,328.08
Joint Contracting Command - Iraq/Afghanistan	Multi-National Forces-Iraq	W27P4A-05-C-0014	09/28/05 - 09/27/06	\$ 6,400,918.91
SAIC	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence	██████████	01/15/00 - 01/12/01	\$ ██████████
Lockheed Martin	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict	██████████	03/03/04 - 12/31/06	\$ ██████████
Lockheed Martin	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict	██████████	08/16/04 - 07/31/05	\$ ██████████

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<u>Contracting Organization</u>	<u>Tasking Organization</u>	<u>Work Order No.</u>	<u>Year Began- Year Ended</u>	<u>Contract Amount</u>
Lockheed Martin	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict	██████████	08/01/05 - 09/27/05	\$ ██████████
Lockheed Martin	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict	██████████	09/14/04 - 03/31/05	\$ ██████████
██████████	National Defense University		07/23/05 - 07/22/06	\$ ██████████
Global Business Network	National Security Agency		06/28/05 - open	\$ ██████████

## Appendix D. Foreign Media Analysis (U)

(U) In October 2001, the work order for foreign media analysis began to support the Joint Information Operations Task Force. The Army Contracting Center of Excellence processed the work order. This work continued through September 2003 when there was a break in service. In December 2003, the media analysis function moved to the U.S. Strategic Command. The General Services Administration issued a new work order with a similar statement of work for a short period while the DoD determined who would be responsible for administering the work orders. The Air Force picked up the work orders, first at the Air Intelligence Agency and then the 55th Contracting Squadron at Offutt Air Force Base. The table below shows each work order number and amount of the contract.

<u>Contract Office</u>	<u>Work Order Number</u>	<u>Contract Amount</u>
Center of Excellence	DASW01-02-F-0249	\$16,789,000.00
Center of Excellence	DASW01-03-F-0462	\$ 2,999,862.15
Center of Excellence	DASW01-03-F0824	\$ 7,799,641.59
General Services Administration	GST0804BG0451	\$ 1,387,248.86
Air Intelligence Agency	FA7037-04-F-8123	\$ 284,906.21
Air Intelligence Agency	FA7037-04-F-8104	\$ 7,043,215.52
55th Contracting Squadron	FA4600-05-F-8104	<u>\$13,747,673.19</u>
<b>Total</b>		<b>\$50,051,547.52</b>

(U) The work orders for the Foreign Media Analysis provided approximately 55 employees from TRG to support joint operational planning related to intelligence, DoD information operations, Global Strike, and strategic communications in support of the Global War on Terrorism, as well as the U.S. Strategic Command mission and assigned tasks. The objective was to access, analyze, coordinate, and disseminate foreign media analysis in a multi-layered approach for joint operational planning and situational awareness. Products included:

**(U) Alert Notification System.** TRG maintained a proprietary state-of-the-art news wire collection system that used keyword sorts of real-time newswire reports as they were filed, before they were on the Internet and 24 hours before they appeared in the morning press. TRG would forward the alerts by email. TRG provided this service 7 days a week, 24 hours per day.

**(U) Overnight News Summary.** TRG would deliver the overnight news summary at 6:30 a.m. to provide recipients with key headlines and hypertext links to articles on the Global War on Terrorism and other areas affecting the U.S. Government around the world. The overnight news summary also included alerts distributed by TRG for each command during the preceding 12-hour period.

**(U) Weekly Combatant Command Media Summaries.** TRG monitored the media of 36 countries on a daily basis and prepared weekly media summaries, organized by Combatant Command, highlighting stories on the war on terrorism, Operation Iraqi Freedom, anti-U.S. sentiment, North Korea, domestic concerns, and other topics that dominated the media in each country or were of interest to the U.S. Strategic Command and the Combatant Commands.

**(U) Iraq Worldwide Review.** TRG would repackage the storylines on the situation in Iraq drawn from newspapers in 36 countries during the past week from the Command Media Summaries to give the reader a weekly review of how Iraq appeared in selected countries. Key communicator statements and Iraq dates of importance were also included in the report.

**(U) Calendar Planning Memo.** Every Wednesday, TRG would distribute a weekly summary of upcoming calendar database entries covering the next 6-week period. The memorandum included background information and suggestions for actionable items.

**(U) Key Communicator Memo.** Each Thursday, TRG prepared the key communicator memo, which provided information on recent developments for key communicators from around the world.

**(U) Threat Panel Support.** Drawing from over 140 publications reviewed by TRG media analysts and an extensive Internet search, TRG prepared briefing slides and back-up articles for the weekly Threat Panel meeting.

**(U) Command-based Threats and Opportunities.** Based on the real-time alerts and the observations of the media analysts, TRG identified threats and opportunities and made recommendations on possible courses of action for the Combatant Commands as well as other DoD Components as appropriate.

**(U) Early Warning News Service.** TRG maintained an early warning news service for information operations planners to help them maintain situational



awareness of events specific to their interests, to assist them in identifying important news stories, and to implement a proactive approach to information operations. The system tracked specific topics across a series of news wire sources and provided several ways to view the information. TRG categorized stories by topic, grouped them by storylines, and highlighted alerts that would require attention in addition to identified associated threats and opportunities.

**(U) Media Mapping.** The map-based Internet application featured media outlets (print, radio, TV, cable and Internet) in 68 countries and over 10,700 outlets. Media outlet information included, where available, audience size, political bias, distribution, language and programming, and contact information.

**(U) Media Analysis.** On a daily basis, quotes, statements, assertions of fact and sentiments relating to the Global War on Terrorism that appeared in selected international media outlets were analyzed against DoD objectives to provide an overview of information situational awareness and feedback on Government and DoD efforts to deliver messages to international audiences. Seven days a week, 35 analysts monitored over 140 print publications in 36 countries in addition to the Pan Arab media.

**(U) Key Communicator Database.** The key communicator database tracked statements and relevant articles on selected key communicators that were carried in open media sources. Every day, TRG would conduct searches on key communicators from 37 countries and they would capture relevant articles in the database. The database was searchable in a variety of ways such as a key communicator's country of operation, religion, and key word. Users could search the database by quote type such as using the terms anti-American or moderate. The database included selected world leaders, Islamic religious leaders, religious leaders of other denominations, journalists, heads of organizations, academics, and political leaders and activities.

## **Appendix E. Report Distribution (U)**

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### **Office of the Secretary of Defense**

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer  
Deputy Chief Financial Officer  
Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)  
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration

### **Joint Staff**

Director, Joint Staff

### **Department of the Army**

Auditor General, Department of the Army

### **Department of the Navy**

Naval Inspector General  
Auditor General, Department of the Navy

### **Department of the Air Force**

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)  
Auditor General, Department of the Air Force

### **Combatant Commands**

Commander, U.S. Central Command  
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command  
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command

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## **Other Defense Organizations**

Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
Director, Counterintelligence Field Activity

## **Office of the Director of National Intelligence**

Director of National Intelligence  
Inspector General, Office of the Director of National Intelligence

## **Congressional Committees and Subcommittees**

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Appropriations  
Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations  
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services  
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Homeland Security  
and Governmental Affairs  
Chairman and Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence  
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Appropriations  
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee  
on Appropriations  
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Armed Services  
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Oversight  
and Government Reform  
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House Subcommittee on Government  
Management, Organization, and Procurement, Committee on Oversight and  
Government Reform  
House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight  
and Government Reform  
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House Permanent Select Committee on  
Intelligence

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## Team Members

The Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence prepared this report. Personnel of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General who contributed to the report are listed below.

Shelton R. Young



**SECRET//NOFORN//25X1**



**Inspector General  
Department of Defense**

**SECRET//NOFORN//25X1**