


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INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

MARCH 29, 2018



U.S. Special Operations Command's Management of Excess Equipment

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Results in Brief

U.S. Special Operations Command's Management of Excess Equipment

March 29, 2018

Objective

We determined whether U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was identifying excess equipment and storing only equipment with valid requirements in its inventory. We nonstatistically selected five Special Operations–Peculiar (SO-P) equipment programs to include in the audit—Binocular Night Vision Device, Future Assault Shell Technology-Helmet, Next Generation Tactical Communication Capability (Handheld Radio), Sensitive Site Exploitation-Biometrics, and Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures.

Background

USSOCOM provides SO-P equipment to USSOCOM units. USSOCOM establishes the requirements for SO-P equipment through an internal review and approval process, culminating with the final approval of SO-P equipment requirements by the Vice Commander, USSOCOM. During the review and approval process, USSOCOM establishes the total amount of the SO-P equipment needed to perform USSOCOM missions (authorized allowance). USSOCOM also determines the amount of the authorized allowance to be allocated to each Service Component commands, theater special operations commands, and other users.

SO-P equipment authorizations are recorded in the USSOCOM Table of Equipment Distribution and Allowances (USTEDA). The USTEDA is designed to maintain the authorization and allocation quantities for SO-P equipment, identify the total USSOCOM

Background (cont'd)

authorization, and indicate the amount of equipment allocated to the Service Component commands, the theater special operations commands, and the program manager.

DoD Manual 4140.01, Volume 6, defines excess equipment as equipment that is more than the amount needed to meet mission requirements and is subject to return, redistribution, or disposal. USSOCOM Directive 700-22 defines excess equipment as SO-P equipment that exceeds the command's authorized allowance. Therefore, to identify excess SO-P equipment, USSOCOM officials must know the authorized allowance for each SO-P equipment program and the amount allocated to each Service Component command. USSOCOM officials must then compare those amounts to the SO-P equipment inventory. If inventory is more than the overall authorized allowance or the Service Component command has more than its allocation, the equipment is excess. Excess equipment could result from USSOCOM erroneously buying more equipment than authorized, from distributing equipment incorrectly, or from a failure to dispose of equipment replaced by newer models.

Finding

(FOUO) USSOCOM did not identify that the Service Component commands' inventory exceeded their allocation for three of the five SO-P programs included in our nonstatistical sample. Across the three programs with excess equipment, we identified a total of [REDACTED] pieces of excess SO-P equipment with a value of at least \$26.3 million. For example, USSOCOM did not identify that the U.S. Army Special Operations Command had 17,571 handheld radios according to its property records but was allocated only 13,351 in the capability documents, for an excess of 4,220 radios.

USSOCOM did not identify excess SO-P equipment because the authorized allowance and allocation data in the USTEDA were not accurate or complete, and could not be reconciled with inventory. In addition, USSOCOM guidance did not require periodic reconciliations between the inventory and the USTEDA to identify excess SO-P equipment for redistribution or disposition.



Results in Brief

U.S. Special Operations Command's Management of Excess Equipment

Finding (cont'd)

(FOUO) As a result, USSOCOM is not effectively managing [REDACTED] pieces of excess SO-P equipment in the programs reviewed. Because USSOCOM officials were not identifying excess equipment at the Service Component commands, USSOCOM was not aware that there was excess equipment available for redistribution to the Service Component commands or disposal if all the commands had reached their full allocation of authorized allowances. For example, USSOCOM allocated [REDACTED] Biometrics kits to the Naval Special Warfare Command. According to the Naval Special Warfare Command accountable property system of record, the command had [REDACTED] kits in its inventory, for an excess of [REDACTED] kits. Had USSOCOM identified those [REDACTED] kits as excess, the kits could have been redistributed to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, which had not received its full allocation.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Commander, USSOCOM:

- Update USSOCOM guidance to include detailed procedures for reporting and updating SO-P equipment authorizations and allocations in the USTEDA. The procedures should provide clear and concise policy outlining the source of the authorization data and how this data should be presented, and should establish periodic reviews of the information to ensure that the authorizations match the capability documents.
- Direct a review of existing SO-P equipment authorizations and allocations and update the USTEDA and all systems and documents that contain authorizations and allocations accordingly.
- Update USSOCOM guidance to include detailed procedures for conducting periodic reconciliations of SO-P equipment authorizations and allocations to inventory.

Recommendations (cont'd)

- Direct a reconciliation of SO-P equipment authorizations and allocations to inventory based on the updated guidance, and if excess equipment is identified, redistribute or dispose of the excess equipment.

Management Comments and Our Response

The USSOCOM Director, Special Operations Forces, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, agreed with the report finding and all of the recommendations. The Director agreed to update USSOCOM guidance to include detailed procedures for reporting and updating SO-P equipment authorizations and allocations in the USTEDA. He stated that once USSOCOM updates guidance to establish procedures for capturing and reporting authorizations, the USSOCOM Directorate of Logistics will compare the authorizations in the requirements documents to the USTEDA and modify the USTEDA as needed.

The Director, Special Operations Forces, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, also agreed to direct a reconciliation of SO-P equipment authorizations and allocations to inventory based on the updated guidance, and if excess equipment is identified, redistribute or dispose of the excess equipment.

We consider all recommendations resolved, and we will close the recommendations once we verify that USSOCOM has completed the specific actions proposed in the management comments. Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of the recommendations.

Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command	None	1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d	None

Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations:

- **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.





INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

March 29, 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

SUBJECT: U.S. Special Operations Command's Management of Excess
Equipment (Report No. DODIG-2018-100)

We are providing this report for your information and use. We conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards

We considered U.S. Special Operations Command management comments on the draft of this report when preparing the final report. Comments from the Director, Special Operations Forces, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, addressed all specifics of the recommendations and conformed to the requirements of DoD Instruction 7650.03; therefore, we do not require additional comments.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703)-699-7331 (DSN-499-7331).

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Carol N. Gorman".

Carol N. Gorman
Assistant Inspector General
Cybersecurity Operations

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Introduction

Objective

We determined whether U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was identifying excess equipment and storing only equipment with valid requirements in its inventory. We nonstatistically selected five programs to include in the audit—Binocular Night Vision Device (BNVD), Future Assault Shell Technology-Helmet (FAST-Helmet), Next Generation Tactical Communication Capability (handheld radios), Sensitive Site Exploitation-Biometrics (Biometrics), and Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures (Countermeasures). We selected those programs based on the size of the program, including both the number of items reported in USSOCOM inventory and the dollar value of the equipment. We also selected programs from different program offices to determine whether the offices managed authorized allowances differently. See Appendix A for our scope and methodology and prior coverage related to the audit.

Background

USSOCOM consists of Headquarters USSOCOM, USSOCOM Service Component commands, and theater special operations commands (TSOCs).¹ USSOCOM Service Component commands are the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC). TSOCs are located globally to support geographical combatant command special operations missions. USSOCOM's mission is to synchronize planning of special operations and provide special operations forces to support persistent, networked, and distributed geographical combatant command operations to protect and advance the interests of the United States.

Special Operations–Peculiar Equipment

Special Operations–Peculiar (SO-P) equipment is unique to USSOCOM units and funded and managed by USSOCOM. SO-P programs provide the equipment, materiel, supplies, and services needed to meet capability requirements for special operations missions. Each SO-P program may contain diverse variations of equipment to meet that mission requirement. USSOCOM Directive 700-2 states that the Commander, USSOCOM, is accountable for all SO-P funded equipment and responsible for developing associated equipment management policies and

¹ A theater special operations command is a subordinate command of USSOCOM under the operational control of a geographical combatant command.

procedures.² USSOCOM uses the Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integration and Development System (SOF CIDS) process to validate, certify, review, and approve SO-P equipment requirements.³ During the SOF CIDS process, USSOCOM officials identify:

- a specific mission need for SO-P equipment,
- the required equipment specifications, and
- the total quantity of equipment authorized to meet program needs.

USSOCOM officials record these requirements in SOF CIDS capability documents, which include the Capability Development Document, Capability Production Document (CPD), and the Delegated Authority Capability Document (DACD).⁴ The final step in the SOF CIDS process is the Special Operations Command Requirements Evaluation Board. The board is a forum for the USSOCOM Vice Commander to consult Headquarters, USSOCOM Staff, USSOCOM Directorates, Service Component commands, and TSOCs before approving capability documents. Equipment authorizations in approved capability documents are listed by the total quantity of equipment required to meet full program needs. In addition, USSOCOM also determines the amount of the authorized allowance to be allocated to each Service Component command, TSOC, and other users. Finally, changes or updates to the program requirements or equipment authorizations are made by revising the program's capability documents or by issuing and validating other requirements documents, including Program Parameter Changes (PPCs) and Joint Tables of Allowances (JTAs).⁵

USSOCOM Table of Equipment Distribution and Allowances

USSOCOM Directive 700-2 establishes the USSOCOM Table of Equipment Distribution and Allowances (USTEDA) as USSOCOM's authoritative record for SO-P equipment authorizations. The USTEDA is designed to maintain the authorization and allocation quantities for SO-P equipment. USSOCOM's Directorate of Logistics is responsible for establishing and maintaining the USTEDA. The approved authorizations in the USTEDA should be based on the authorizations in the capability documents. The USTEDA identifies the total USSOCOM authorization,

² USSOCOM Directive 700-2 "Special Operations-Peculiar/Major Force Program-11 Material Management," April 16, 2015.

³ USSOCOM Directive 71-4, "Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integration and Development System (SOF CIDS)," May, 10, 2012.

⁴ USSOCOM Directive 71-4, "Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integration and Development System (SOF CIDS)," May, 10, 2012.

⁵ According to USSOCOM officials, Program Parameter Changes and Joint Tables of Allowances are used to change the authorization levels and allocation of SO-P equipment at the Service Component commands, TSOCs, and other organizations holding SO-P equipment.

followed by the amount allocated to the Service Component commands, the TSOs, and the program manager.⁶ The USTEDA also identifies the program executive office or program manager responsible for managing the program.

Excess Equipment

DoD Manual 4140.01, Volume 6, defines excess equipment as equipment that is more than the amount needed to meet mission requirements and is subject to return, redistribution, or disposal.⁷ USSOCOM Directive 700-22 defines excess as SO-P equipment that exceeds the command's authorized allowance.⁸ Therefore, to identify excess SO-P equipment, USSOCOM officials must know the authorized allowance for each type of SO-P equipment and the amount allocated to each Service Component command. USSOCOM officials must then compare those amounts to the SO-P equipment inventory.⁹ If inventory is more than the overall authorized allowance or the Service Component command has more than its allocation, the equipment would be considered excess for that command. Excess equipment could result from USSOCOM erroneously buying more equipment than authorized, distributing more equipment than allocated to a command, or from failure to dispose of equipment replaced by newer models.

Review of Internal Controls

DoD Instruction 5010.40 requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls.¹⁰ We identified internal control weaknesses in USSOCOM's management of excess SO-P equipment. Specifically, USSOCOM officials did not identify SO-P equipment that exceeded the Service Component command allocations for three of the five programs reviewed during the audit. We will provide a copy of the report to the senior official responsible for internal controls at USSOCOM.

⁶ According to USSOCOM officials, program manager equipment is spare equipment stored at USSOCOM warehouses.

⁷ DoD Manual 4140.01, Volume 6, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Procedures: Materiel Returns, Retention, and Disposition," March 8, 2017.

⁸ USSOCOM Directive 700-22, "Cataloging of USSOCOM Materiel," January 17, 2013.

⁹ For the purposes of this report, inventory means the equipment listed in the unit's accountable property system of record.

¹⁰ DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," May 30, 2013.

Finding

USSOCOM Did Not Identify Excess Equipment

(FOUO) USSOCOM did not identify that the Service Component commands' inventory exceeded their allocation for three of the five SO-P programs included in our nonstatistical sample. Across the three programs with excess equipment, we identified a total of [REDACTED] pieces of excess SO-P equipment, with a value of at least \$26.3 million.¹¹ For example, USSOCOM did not identify that USASOC had 17,571 handheld radios according to its property records but was allocated only 13,351 in the capability documents, for an excess of 4,220 radios.

USSOCOM did not identify excess SO-P equipment because the authorized allowance and allocation data in the USTEDA were not accurate or complete, and could not be reconciled with inventory. In addition, USSOCOM guidance did not require periodic reconciliations between the inventory and the USTEDA to identify excess SO-P equipment for redistribution or disposition.

(FOUO) As a result, USSOCOM is not effectively managing [REDACTED] pieces of excess SO-P equipment in the programs reviewed. Because USSOCOM officials were not identifying excess equipment at the Service Component commands, USSOCOM was not aware that there was excess equipment available for redistribution to the Service Component commands or disposal if all the commands had reached their full allocation of authorized allowances. For example, USSOCOM allocated [REDACTED] Biometrics kits to NAVSPECWARCOM. According to the NAVSPECWARCOM accountable property system of record, the command had [REDACTED] kits in its inventory, for an excess of [REDACTED] kits. Had USSOCOM identified those [REDACTED] kits as excess, the kits could have been redistributed to USASOC, which had not received its full allocation.

USSOCOM Did Not Identify Excess Equipment at the Service Component Commands

USSOCOM did not identify that the Service Component commands' inventory exceeded their allocation for three of the five SO-P programs included in our nonstatistical sample (BNVD, Biometrics, and handheld radios). To identify excess equipment, we compared the Service Component commands' equipment allocation to the inventory in their respective accountable property system of record (APSR). We reviewed the capability documents for the five programs to determine the total amount of SO-P equipment USSOCOM allocated to each Service Component

¹¹ To determine the value of the excess equipment, we identified the piece of equipment belonging to the program that had the lowest unit cost and applied that cost to the number of excess items for the program.

command. Appendix B contains the authorization and allocation data obtained from each source document for the five programs included in the audit. We then compared the allocations to the inventory reported in the APSR at the Service Component commands to determine whether the commands had excess equipment. To ensure the inventory levels listed in the APSR were accurate, we performed reviews at each Service, comparing the records in the APSR to the on-hand quantities. We confirmed that the data in the Service Component command APSR were reliable. Table 1 contains the amount of SO-P equipment we identified that exceeded the authorized allowance, by program and Service Component command.

(FOUO) Table 1. Amount of Equipment Exceeding Authorized Allowances at the Service Component Commands

Program	Service Component Command	Authorized Allowance Allocated to Service Component Command	APSR Inventory	Excess	Value of Excess Equipment
BNVD	NAVSPECWARCOM	2,786	3,097	311	\$2,083,700
BNVD	MARSOC	1,393	1,421	28	187,600
Biometrics	NAVSPECWARCOM	██████	██████	██████	270,108
Handheld Radios	USASOC	13,351	17,571	4,220	20,829,920
Handheld Radios	NAVSPECWARCOM	5,475	6,076	601	2,966,536
Total				██████	\$26,337,864

Source: The DoD OIG.

USSOCOM Did Not Maintain Accurate or Complete Equipment Authorization or Allocation Data

The USSOCOM Directorate of Logistics officials did not maintain accurate or complete authorized allowance and allocation data in the USTEDA to reconcile against the Service Component command inventory. The USTEDA overstated authorizations for four of the five programs reviewed. Table 2 on the next page shows the authorized allowance data we compiled from the source documents compared to the authorizations contained in the USTEDA.

(FOUO) Table 2. USTEDA Overstatement of Authorized Allowance

Program	Approved Authorizations from Capability Documents	USSOCOM Table of Equipment Distribution and Allowances	Difference	Percent Overstated
BNVD	19,968	75,413	55,445	278
FAST-Helmet	16,059	233,346	217,287	1,353
Handheld Radios	28,438	77,570	49,132	173
Biometrics	(b) (5)	(b) (5)	(b) (5)	202
Countermeasures	206	206	0	0

Source: The DoD OIG.

USTEDA Authorization Data Was Inaccurate

Inaccuracies in the USTEDA authorizations occurred when USSOCOM officials did not use the correct authorization and allocation amounts from the capability documents for all five programs reviewed.¹² USSOCOM officials then duplicated the incorrect authorization amounts for each variation of SO-P equipment in four of the programs. USSOCOM officials could not identify where the authorization numbers in the USTEDA came from or why the authorizations were duplicated. Table 3 shows an example of the approved authorizations from the capability documents for the FAST-Helmet and the authorizations identified in the USTEDA.

Table 3. Example of USTEDA Data for the Future Assault Shell Technology-Helmet Program

Program/Item Description	Approved Authorizations From Capability Documents	USTEDA Authorizations
FAST-Helmet	16,059	
Helmet, 3 Hole Ranger, Small/Medium		38,891
Helmet, 3 Hole Ranger, Medium/Large		38,891
Helmet, 3 Hole Ranger, Large/Extra Large		38,891
Helmet, 3 Hole, Small/Medium		38,891
Helmet, 3 Hole, Medium/Large		38,891
Helmet, 3 Hole, Large/Extra Large		38,891
Total	16,059	233,346

Source: The DOD OIG.

¹² While the USTEDA total authorization amount for the Countermeasures program matched the capability documents, the amounts allocated to the Service Component commands were incorrect.

Without accurate authorization data, USSOCOM officials could not effectively identify excess equipment and could be improperly allocating or procuring equipment to meet overstated authorizations. Table 4 on the next page shows an example of how inaccurate authorizations in the USTEDA prevent USSOCOM from identifying excess equipment.

Table 4. Comparison of APSR Inventory to USTEDA Authorizations and Capability Document Authorizations for the Handheld Radio Program

Items Compared	Approved authorizations from Capability Documents	USTEDA Authorizations	APSR Inventory	Difference	Excess Identified
APSR Inventory of Handheld Radios to USTEDA Authorizations		40,516	17,571	-22,945	No
APSR Inventory of Handheld Radios to Capability Document Authorizations	13,351		17,571	4,220	Yes

Source: The DOD OIG.

USTEDA Did Not Contain All SO-P Equipment

In addition, the USTEDA did not contain a complete list of equipment for the five programs reviewed. During the audit, we requested that USSOCOM officials provide a listing of all the equipment variations that made up each program reviewed. We compared the listings to the equipment listed in the USTEDA. Table 5 shows a comparison between the number of equipment variations reported in the USTEDA and the actual number of equipment variations in the programs.

Table 5. Additional Equipment Variations Identified That Were Missing from the USTEDA

Program	Equipment Variations Contained in USTEDA	Total Equipment Variations in Program	Difference Between Total Equipment Variations and USTEDA
BNVD	4	5	1
Biometrics	6	20	14
Helmets	6	12	6
Handheld Radios	10	37	27
Countermeasures	2	3	1

Source: The DoD OIG.

Incomplete data in the USTEDA would prevent USSOCOM officials from identifying excess equipment. If USSOCOM officials compared only the inventory for the equipment variations that appeared in the USTEDA against the approved authorizations, they may not capture all the equipment in the program. For example, only 10 of the 37 equipment variations in the handheld radio program appeared in the USTEDA. If USSOCOM officials compared the approved authorizations with the inventory at USASOC for the 10 variations of handheld radios contained in the USTEDA, they would not identify excess equipment. However, if officials compared the inventory for all 37 equipment variations, they would identify excess equipment. Table 6 demonstrates that a comparison of the APSR inventory of only the equipment identified in the USTEDA against the approved authorizations for handheld radios at USASOC would not identify excess, while a comparison of all the equipment in the capability would.

Table 6. Comparisons of Equipment Variations Contained in USTEDA and Total Equipment Variations to Approved Authorizations for Handheld Radios at USASOC

	Approved Authorizations from Capability Documents	Number of SO-P Equipment Variations	APSR Inventory in Variations	Difference	Excess Identified
Equipment Variations Contained in USTEDA	13,351	10	9,476	-3,875	No
Total Equipment Variations in Program	13,351	37	17,571	4,220	Yes

Source: The DoD OIG.

USTEDA Needs Accurate and Complete Data to Identify Excess

In order for USSOCOM officials to identify excess equipment, the USTEDA needs to contain accurate authorization data. However, USSOCOM Directive 700-2 does not indicate how USSOCOM officials should maintain the authorized allowances or require periodic reviews to ensure the data is recorded accurately. USSOCOM should update guidance to include detailed procedures for reporting and updating SO-P equipment authorizations and allocations in the USTEDA. The procedures should provide clear and concise policy outlining the source of the authorization data and how this data should be presented, and should establish periodic reviews of the information to ensure that the authorizations match the capability documents. To ensure that the USTEDA is accurate for SO-P equipment already fielded, USSOCOM officials should review all USSOCOM SO-P authorizations and allocations and update the USTEDA and all system and documents that contain authorizations and allocations accordingly.

USSOCOM Did Not Require a Periodic Reconciliation of Equipment Authorization and Allocation Data to Inventory

USSOCOM guidance did not require periodic reconciliations between the inventory and the USTEDA to identify excess SO-P equipment for redistribution or disposition. USSOCOM directives contain parts of the materiel management process, but do not include requirements to identify excess SO-P equipment. For example, USSOCOM Directive 70-1 states that the USSOCOM Directorate of Logistics is responsible, through its Material Management Activity, for materiel management of SO-P equipment, including cataloging authorized allowances data, recording new equipment, ensuring accountability of fielded quantities and chain-of-custody tracking, providing asset oversight of SO-P equipment, and monitoring SO-P equipment readiness. USSOCOM Directive 700-22 states that the USSOCOM Directorate of Logistics establishes and maintains property records for inventory and manages authorized allowances. Finally, Directive 700-2 states that the USSOCOM Excess Equipment Program manages the disposition of SO-P equipment and maintains accountability of USSOCOM equipment through redistribution and disposal.

However, none of these directives establishes who is responsible for performing the reconciliation of the authorized allowances to the inventory to identify excess SO-P equipment. To identify excess equipment, USSOCOM should update guidance to include detailed procedures for conducting periodic reconciliations of SO-P

equipment authorizations and allocations to inventory. USSOCOM should conduct a reconciliation of SO-P equipment authorizations and allocations with inventory based on the updated guidance, and if excess equipment is identified, redistribute or dispose of the excess equipment.

USSOCOM Is Not Effectively Managing SO-P Equipment

(FOUO) USSOCOM is not effectively managing [REDACTED] pieces of excess SO-P equipment. USSOCOM Directive 700-2 states that lateral equipment redistributions are to be conducted when excess equipment exists in one organization and shortages exist in another to maximize use of Government materiel. However, because USSOCOM officials were not identifying excess equipment at the Service Component commands, USSOCOM was not aware that there was excess equipment available for redistribution to the Service Component commands or disposal if all the commands had reached their full allocation of authorized allowances. Table 7 shows the excess and the amount of equipment needed to reach full allocation at the Service Component commands for the BNVD program.

Table 7. Excess and Amount Needed to Reach Full Allocation Levels for the BNVD Program

Service Component Command	Amount of Excess Equipment	Amount Needed to Reach Full Allocation
USASOC		1,642
NAVSPECWARCOM	311	
AFSOC		786
MARSOC	28	

Source: The DoD OIG.

(FOUO) If USSOCOM officials reviewed programs to identify excess equipment, they would have identified that both NAVSPECWARCOM and MARSOC stored excess items in the BNVD program and that USASOC and AFSOC had not received their full allocation. USSOCOM officials would then be able to redistribute the excess items to either USASOC or AFSOC. In addition to the BNVD program, USSOCOM also had excess equipment at the Service Component commands for the biometrics program. USSOCOM allocated [REDACTED] biometrics kits to NAVSPECWARCOM. According to the NAVSPECWARCOM APSR, the command had [REDACTED] kits in its inventory, for an excess of [REDACTED] kits. If USSOCOM program managers identified the excess equipment, they could have redistributed the [REDACTED] kits to USASOC, which had not received its full allocation.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

Recommendation 1

We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command:

- a. **Update U.S. Special Operations Command guidance to include detailed procedures for reporting and updating Special Operations-Peculiar equipment authorizations and allocations in the U.S. Special Operations Command Table of Equipment Distribution and Allowance. The procedures should provide clear and concise policy outlining the source of the authorization data and how this data should be presented, and should establish periodic reviews of the information to ensure that the authorizations match the capability documents.**

Director, Special Operations Forces, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Comments

The Director, Special Operations Forces, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, agreed stating that the resolution to the recommendation will involve multiple phases that will be conducted concurrently. First, USSOCOM organizations responsible for authorizations will formally designate the value that will be used as sub-unified command authorization quantity and the methodology to determine the allocation of that authorization to the subordinate commands. Second, USSOCOM will modify Command directives to document the method to designate and modify authorizations to the subordinate commands. Third, USSOCOM will develop an internal process to ensure Command-wide notification of modification to the authorizations. Finally, USSOCOM will develop USSOCOM Directive 700-21, "Authorizations Management," which will designate the USTEDA as the authoritative source for authorizations and subordinate command allocations. The directive will also provide specific procedures for capturing and reporting authorizations. Finally, the directive will require a semiannual validation of the authorizations to the requirements documents.

Our Response

Comments from the Director, Special Operations Forces, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, addressed all specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the new policies and procedures outlined above are completed.

- b. Direct a review of existing Special Operations–Peculiar equipment authorizations and allocations and update U.S. Special Operations Command Table of Equipment Distribution and Allowance and all systems and documents that contain authorizations and allocations accordingly.**

Director, Special Operations Forces, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Comments

The Director, Special Operations Forces, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, agreed stating that once the USSOCOM authorization decision is made in response to Recommendation 1.a, the USSOCOM Directorate of Logistics will conduct a comprehensive comparison of the authorizations in the requirements documents to the data in the USTEDA, and any modifications to the USTEDA data would be made. In addition, a semiannual review will be conducted to validate the accuracy of the USTEDA.

Our Response

Comments from the Director, Special Operations Forces, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, addressed all specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the reconciliation was completed and any modifications necessary were made.

- c. Update U.S. Special Operations Command guidance to include detailed procedures for conducting periodic reconciliations of Special Operations-Peculiar equipment authorizations and allocations to inventory.**

Comments from the Director, Special Operations Forces, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

The Director, Special Operations Forces, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, agreed stating that the USSOCOM Directorate of Logistics will modify USSOCOM Directive 700-2 to require a semiannual comparison between the authorization quantity and the grand total of the on-hand quantity from all of the subordinate units. In addition, the Directorate of Logistics will develop a tracker system to ensure the directed actions take place.

Our Response

Comments from the Director, Special Operations Forces, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, addressed all specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the Directorate of Logistics has updated the directive and the first semiannual reconciliation is complete.

- d. Direct a reconciliation of Special Operations–Peculiar equipment authorizations and allocations to inventory based on the updated guidance, and if excess equipment is identified, redistribute or dispose of the excess equipment.**

The Director, Special Operations Forces, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Comments

The Director, Special Operations Forces, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, agreed stating that the completion of the recommendation is dependent on the completion of Recommendations 1.b and 1.c. He stated that within 6 months of the completion of those recommendations, the reconciliation of SO-P equipment authorizations and allocations with the on-hand quantities will be completed. If USSOCOM identifies excess equipment, the Directorate of Logistics will make recommendations for the redistribution or disposal of the excess equipment and forward these recommendations to the respective materiel manager.

Our Response

Comments from the Director, Special Operations Forces, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, addressed all specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the reconciliation is performed and any recommendations for redistribution or disposal are provided.

Appendix A

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from October 2016 through January 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Interviews and Policies

We interviewed officials responsible for managing USSOCOM SO-P equipment programs from USSOCOM Special Operations Forces Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the USSOCOM Directorate of Resource and Requirements. In addition, we interviewed officials from the USSOCOM Service Component commands to determine how the commands managed the SO-P equipment provided by USSOCOM. During the audit, we visited the following commands.

- USASOC, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
- NAVSPECWARCOM, Coronado, California
- AFSOC, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida
- MARSOC, Sneads Ferry, North Carolina

We reviewed the following DoD and USSOCOM guidance to determine the definition of excess equipment and the roles and responsibilities to identify excess equipment.

- DoD Manual 4140.01, Volume 6, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Procedures: Materiel Returns, Retention, and Disposition," March 8, 2017
- USSOCOM Directive 70-1, "Acquisition Management System Policy," September 21, 2016
- USSOCOM Directive 700-2, "Special Operations-Peculiar/Major Force Program-11 Materiel Management," April 16, 2015
- USSOCOM Directive 700-22, "Cataloging of USSOCOM Materiel," January 17, 2013
- USSOCOM Directive 71-4, "Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integrated and Development System (SOFICIDS)," May 10, 2012

Program Selection and Documentation Reviews

We nonstatistically selected five USSOCOM programs to review based on the size of the program, including both the quantity and total dollar value of the SO-P equipment. In addition, we selected programs from different program offices to determine whether the offices managed program authorized allowances differently. Specifically, we chose the following five programs to review: (1) Binocular Night Vision Device (BNVD), (2) Future Assault Shell Technology-Helmet (FAST-Helmet), (3) Next Generation Tactical Communication Capability (Handheld Radio), (4) Sensitive Site Exploitation-Biometrics (Biometrics), and (5) Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures (Countermeasures). For each program, we identified the authorized allowance and allocation to the Service Component commands. Finally, we identified the unique pieces of SO-P equipment that made up each program.

Identification of Excess at the Service Component Commands

To determine whether USSOCOM was storing excess equipment at the Service Component commands, we obtained data from each Service Component command's APSR for the programs reviewed. We compared the APSR data against the USSOCOM authorized allowance allocation. Based on the definition of excess equipment in DoD Manual 4140.01, Volume 6, and USSOCOM Directive 700-22, we considered any equipment on the APSR inventory above the Service Component command's allocation of the USSOCOM authorized allowance to be excess equipment. To determine the value of the excess equipment, we identified the piece of equipment belonging to the program that had the lowest unit cost and applied that cost to the number of excess items for the program.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We used computer-processed data to perform this audit. To determine whether USSOCOM was identifying excess equipment and storing only equipment with valid requirements, we obtained data from six APSRs.

- Army—Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced
- Army—Global Combat Support System—Army
- Navy—Special Warfare Automated Logistics Information System
- Navy—Defense Property Accountability System
- Air Force—Air Force Equipment Management System
- Marine Corps—Global Combat Support System—Marine Corps

To determine whether the information in the six APSRs was reliable, we performed a verification of on-hand quantities for the units located at each Service Component command. Specifically, we nonstatistically selected units that were co-located with each Service Component command headquarters that maintained equipment from the five programs we reviewed, and were present during our site visit. We excluded units that were deployed or preparing for deployment. During the verification at the Service Component command units, we considered equipment verified if we physically observed the equipment or obtained documentation showing the equipment was transferred and not available for inspection. We verified that the equipment quantities reported by the Service Component command's APSR were accurate. During the site visits to the Service Component commands, we met with officials from the following organizations.

- USASOC
 - 3rd Special Forces Group
 - 95th Civil Affairs Brigade
- NAVSPECWARCOM
 - Naval Special Warfare Group 1
 - Naval Special Warfare Group 11
 - Naval Special Warfare Center
 - Special Boat Team 12
- AFSOC
 - 720th Special Tactics Group
- MARSOC
 - Marine Raider Training Center
 - Marine Raider Support Group
 - Marine Raider Regiment
 - 2nd Marine Raider Battalion
 - 2nd Marine Raider Support Battalion
 - 3rd Marine Raider Battalion
 - 3rd Marine Raider Support Battalion

Based on the results of the verifications, we determined that the data within the APSR were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) and the Army Audit Agency have issued five reports related to the management of excess equipment. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/>. Unrestricted Army Audit Agency reports can be accessed from .mil and gao.gov domains at <https://www.aaa.army.mil/>.

DoD OIG

Report No. DODIG-2017-043, “Management of Excess Material in the Navy’s Real-Time Reutilization Asset Management Facilities Needs Improvement,” January 23, 2017

The Navy did not effectively manage excess material stored in 10 of the 12 Navy Real-Time Reutilization Asset Management facilities. Specifically, the Navy retained excess material that had no demand for more than 4 ½ years without adequate justification. The Navy did not effectively manage excess material because the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations did not provide clear, comprehensive guidance for the retention, disposition, categorization, and validation of continued need for the excess consumable material in the Real-Time Reutilization Asset Management facilities. As a result, the Navy potentially incurred unnecessary costs to store and manage 51,039 unique item numbers, valued at more than \$99.6 million, in the Real-Time Reutilization Asset Management facilities.

Report No. DODIG-2017-030, “USSOCOM Needs to Improve Management of Sensitive Equipment,” December 12, 2016

USSOCOM did not properly account for sensitive equipment because the Special Operations Logistics Management System inventory data differed from the Service Component command’s equipment management systems by 30,014 items, valued at \$615.49 million. The inventory data differed because USSOCOM officials did not establish comprehensive guidance that outlined processes and procedures on accounting for the sensitive equipment. As a result, USSOCOM did not have accurate inventory data needed to make timely and informed sensitive equipment management decisions and to determine whether to initiate a property loss investigation for inventory discrepancies.

Report No. DODIG-2014-119, “Excess Inventory Acquired on Performance-Based Logistics Contracts to Sustain the Air Force’s C-130J Aircraft,” September 22, 2014

The Chief, Tactical Airlift Division, and the contracting officer did not efficiently manage spare parts inventory, under the Lockheed Martin and Rolls-Royce performance-based logistics contracts for the long-term sustainment of

the C-130J aircraft. The management and purchase of spare parts was inefficient because the chief and contracting officer established inadequate performance-based requirements that did not include inventory control metrics and did not track inventory data to forecast future inventory needs. In addition, specific guidance was not established to control the retention, reuse, and disposal of DoD inventory. As a result, the Air Force paid Lockheed Martin and Rolls-Royce to accumulate excess C-130J spare parts inventory.

Army

Report No. A-2016-0148-IEX, "Audit of Disposition of Excess Equipment and Materiel in Europe," September 28, 2016

U.S. Army Europe and the 21st Theater Sustainment Command did not effectively implement programs and procedures to properly identify and dispose of 21,325 pieces of excess property, valued at about \$293 million. This occurred because command emphasis at the unit level was lacking and U.S. Army Europe did not effectively oversee and manage excess property during monthly sustainment readiness reviews. In addition, the two commands allowed activities to turn in excess property that needed to be maintained or repaired before redistribution, which added to the existing maintenance backlog. As a result, the two commands did not have complete visibility of excess property within the theater and missed opportunities to redistribute at least 6,017 pieces of excess property, including 3,671 mission-essential pacing items, totaling about \$100.2 million, to satisfy unit shortages.

Report No. A-2016-0064-IEX, "Audit of Disposition of Excess Equipment and Materiel in Europe, Mission Rehearsal Exercise Equipment Authorizations," March 24, 2016

Joint Multinational Training Command did not have proper authorization documents for the 483 vehicles in the mission rehearsal exercise fleet. In addition, the size of the fleet exceeded requirements to support training exercises. This occurred because none of the 483 vehicles had an approved table of distribution and allowances authorization. In addition, the fleet was overstated because training requirements were not evaluated as the mission evolved. As a result, Joint Multinational Training Command should reduce the fleet by 246 vehicles to ensure maximum use of all vehicles and to be consistent with training requirements. Furthermore, without proper authorization, the 246 vehicle fleet is considered excess and should be turned in for redistribution or disposal in accordance with Army Regulation 71-32, "Force Development and Documentation," July 1, 2013.

Appendix B

SO-P Authorized Allowance and Allocations

The following tables show the total authorizations for USSOCOM and the allocation totals for each component command. The USSOCOM and component command totals were taken from authorization documents provided by USSOCOM personnel.

Table 8. Binocular Night Vision Device

Capability Document	USASOC	NAVSPECWARCOM	AFSOC	MARSOC	TSOC	Other	Total
CPD	13,743	2,786	1,290	1,393	—	—	19,212
Joint Operational Stock PPC	—	—	—	—	—	48	48
Special Operations Command—North JTA	—	—	—	—	8	—	8
Special Operations Joint Task Force—Afghanistan PPC	—	—	—	—	—	300	300
AFSOC PPC	—	—	400	—	—	—	400
Total	13,743	2,786	1,690	1,393	8	348	19,968

Source: The DoD OIG.

Table 9. Future Assault Shell Technology–Helmet

Capability Document	USASOC	NAVSPECWARCOM	AFSOC	MARSOC	TSOC	Other	Total
DACD	5,303	—	1,139	—	—	—	6,442
USASOC PPC	7,464	—	—	—	—	—	7,464
MARSOC DACD	—	—	—	2,153	—	—	2,153
Total	12,767	—	1,139	2,153	—	—	16,059

Source: The DoD OIG.

Table 10. Next Generation Tactical Communication Capability

Capability Document	USASOC	NAVSPECWARCOM	AFSOC	MARSOC	TSOC	Other	Total
CPD	12,881	5,475	2,484	2,118	115	4,333*	27,406
USASOC PPC	470	—	—	—	—	—	470
Special Operations Joint Task Force–Afghanistan PPC	—	—	—	—	—	60	60
MFP	—	—	—	—	214	—	214
Special Operations Command North JTA	—	—	—	—	35	—	35
Joint Operational Stock PPC	—	—	—	—	—	71	71
USSOCOM Headquarters JTA	—	—	—	—	8	—	8
Special Operations Command Korea JTA	—	—	—	—	32	—	32
Special Operations Command Central Command JTA	—	—	—	—	9	—	9

Capability Document	USASOC	NAVSPECWARCOM	AFSOC	MARSOC	TSOC	Other	Total
Special Operations Command South JTA	—	—	—	—	16	—	16
Special Operations Command Europe JTA	—	—	—	—	30	—	30
Special Operations Command Pacific JTA	—	—	—	—	52	—	52
Special Operations Command Africa JTA	—	—	—	—	35	—	35
Total	13,351	5,475	2,484	2,118	546	4,464	28,438

* The Other category contains equipment allocated to military liaison elements, Joint Operational Stock, USSOCOM, and the Special Operations Forces Support Activity/Depot.

Source: The DoD OIG.

Table 11. Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures

Capability Document	USASOC	NAVSPECWARCOM	AFSOC	MARSOC	TSOC	Other	Total
CPD	106	—	100	—	—	—	206
Total	106	—	100	—	—	—	206

Source: The DoD OIG.

(FOUO) Table 12. Sensitive Site Exploitation Biometrics

Capability Document	USASOC	NAVSPECWARCOM	AFSOC	MARSOC	TSOC	Other	Total
CPD	(b)(7)(F)	(b)(7)(F)	—	(b)(7)(F)	—	—	(b)(7)(F)
Special Operations Command North PPC	—	—	—	—	(b)(7)(F)	—	(b)(7)(F)
Special Operations Command Africa JTA	—	—	—	—	(b)(7)(F)	—	(b)(7)(F)
Total	(b)(7)(F)	(b)(7)(F)	—	(b)(7)(F)	(b)(7)(F)	—	(b)(7)(F)

Source: The DoD OIG.

Appendix C

Director, Special Operations Forces, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Comments



UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
7701 TAMPA POINT BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5323

12 March 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR AUDIT DRAFT REPORT, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

SUBJECT: USSOCOM response to the draft report for DODIG Project D2017-D000RE-0029.000, U.S. Special Operations Command's Management of Excess Equipment

In response the Inspector General, Department of Defense, draft report dated January 25, 2018, U.S. Special Operations Command provides the following responses.

1. Recommendation 1.a: Update U.S. Special Operations Command guidance to include detailed procedures for reporting and updating Special Operations–Peculiar equipment authorizations and allocations in the U.S. Special Operations Command Table of Equipment Distribution and Allowance. The procedures should provide clear and concise policy outlining the source of the authorization data and how this data should be presented, and should establish periodic reviews of the information to ensure that the authorizations match the capability documents.

USSOCOM RESPONSE: CONCUR – The resolution to this recommendation will involve multiple phases that will run concurrently.

Phase 1a. Discussions with the USSOCOM Director of Operations (J3), the USSOCOM Director of Resources and Requirements (J8), the Acquisition Executive/Director of Special Operations Forces Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (SOF AT&L) and the Director of Logistics (J4) to formally designate the value which will be used as a sub-unified command authorization quantity and the methodology to determine the allocation of that authorization to subordinate commands. ECD - April 30, 2018.

Phase 1b. Modifications to multiple USSOCOM Directives to document the enterprise method to designate and modify Sub-Unified Command authorizations and the allocation to subordinate commands. ECD – July 31, 2018.

Phase 1c. Develop an internal Headquarters USSOCOM process to ensure enterprise wide notification of modifications to the authorizations. ECD – July 31, 2018.

Phase 2. USSOCOM J4 will generate USSOCOM Directive 700-21, Authorizations Management. Most of the directive will be written as Phase 1 takes place but the directive cannot be completed until the final decision from phase 1 is determined.

The directive will designate that the U.S. Special Operations Command Table of Equipment Distribution and Authorizations (USTEDA) as the authoritative source for Sub-Unified Command Authorizations and Subordinate Command Allocations. An appendix to the Directive will provide specific procedures that links the end of the Authorizations determination process, to the update of the Sub-Unified Command Authorization data, to the allocation of the Sub-Unified Command Authorization quantity to their respective subordinate commands, to the dissemination of the data to the respective service authorization systems. The directive will also require at a minimum a semi-annual validation to SOFCIDS documentation. ECD for USSOCOM D700-21 is September 30, 2018.

Recommendation 1.b. Direct a review of existing Special Operations–Peculiar equipment authorizations and allocations and update U.S. Special Operations Command Table of Equipment Distribution and Allowance and all systems and documents that contain authorizations and allocations accordingly.

USSOCOM RESPONSE: CONCUR – Once the enterprise authorization decision is made and the policy documents are modified/generated and implemented, USSOCOM J4 will conduct a comprehensive comparison of authoritative source documents managed by J8 to the data in the USTEDA. Modifications will be made as required. In accordance with the Authorizations Management Directive, USSOCOM D700-21, a semi-annual review will be conducted to validate the accuracy of the USTEDA. ECD – December 31, 2018

Recommendation 1.c. Update U.S. Special Operations Command guidance to include detailed procedures for conducting periodic reconciliations of Special Operations–Peculiar equipment authorizations and allocations to inventory.

USSOCOM RESPONSE: CONCUR – USSOCOM J4 will modify the Special Operations-Peculiar/Major Force Program-11 Materiel Management, USSOCOM Directive 700-2, to require a semi-annual comparison between the Sub-Unified Command Authorization quantity to the grand total of the on hand quantity from all of the subordinate units. When the reconciliations are conducted, the J4 will develop a tracker system to ensure the directed actions take place. ECD – December, 31 2018

Recommendation 1.d. Direct a reconciliation of Special Operations–Peculiar equipment authorizations and allocations to inventory based on the updated guidance, and if excess equipment is identified, redistribute or dispose of the excess equipment.

USSOCOM RESPONSE: CONCUR – The completion of this recommendation is dependent on the completion of Recommendation 1.b and Recommendation 1.c. Within six months of the completion of each Recommendation, the reconciliation of Special Operations-Peculiar equipment authorizations and allocations with the on hand quantities will be completed. If excess equipment is identified, recommendations for

redistribution or disposal of the excess equipment shall be forwarded from J4 to the respective materiel manager. ECD – June 30, 2019

USSOCOM J4 has developed an interim solution for SO-p equipment redistribution until the completion of recommendations 1.b and 1.c. The USSOCOM Retail/Property excess program disposes of or redistributes property identified by the USSOCOM SOF AT&L Program Executive Offices (PEO)/Program Managers (PM), Component Commands and TSOCS.

The current process starts with the Program Manager's representatives creating directives that provide authoritative guidance regarding the divestiture of materiel. Equipment is vetted through the Joint Force and Asset Search Tool (JFAAST). As part of the vetting process the Program Manager's disposition instructions are populated to the directive. Once the directive is approved, it is forwarded to the applicable unit for action. The J4 in coordination with the Sub-Unified Command monitor and ensure that the action directed meets the suspense date.



JAMES H. SMITH
Director, Special Operations Forces,
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
APSR	Accountable Property System of Record
BNVD	Binocular Night Vision Device
CPD	Capability Production Document
DACD	Delegated Authority Capability Document
FAST	Future Assault Shell Technology
JTA	Joint Table of Allowances
MARSOC	Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command
NAVSPECWARCOM	Naval Special Warfare Command
PPC	Program Parameter Change
SO-P	Special Operations–Peculiar
SOFCIDS	Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integration and Development System
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
USASOC	U.S. Army Special Operations Command
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
USTEDA	U.S. Special Operations Command Table of Equipment Distribution and Allowance

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