THE “IN LIEU OF” MYTH
AIRMEN IN JOINT GROUND OPERATIONS

DAVID W. MARTTALA
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, USAF
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The SDE-level Air Force Fellows serve as visiting military ambassadors to their centers, devoting effort to expanding their colleagues’ understanding of defense matters. As such, candidates for SDE-level fellowships have a broad knowledge of key Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force issues. SDE-level fellows perform outreach by their presence and voice in sponsoring institutions. They are expected to provide advice as well as promote and explain Air Force and DOD policies, programs, and military-doctrine strategy to nationally recognized scholars, foreign dignitaries, and leading policy analysts. The Air Force Fellows also gain valuable perspectives from the exchange of ideas with these civilian leaders. SDE-level fellows are expected to apprise appropriate Air Force agencies of significant developments and emerging views on defense as well as economic and foreign policy issues within their centers. Each fellow is expected to use the unique access she or he has as grounds for research and writing on important national security issues.

The SDE Air Force Fellows include the National Defense Fellows, the RAND Fellows, the National Security Fellows, and the Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows. In addition, the Air Force Fellows program supports a post-SDE military fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

On the level of intermediate developmental education, the chief of staff approved several Air Force Fellowships focused on career broadening for Air Force majors. The Air Force Legisla-
tive Fellows program was established in April 1995, with the Foreign Policy Fellowship and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Fellowship coming under the Air Force Fellows program in 2003. In 2004 the Air Force Fellows also assumed responsibility for the National Laboratories Technologies Fellows.
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Foreword

The contributions and role of the United States Air Force in Iraq and Afghanistan have been variously debated by politicians, pundits, uniformed service leaders, and even the military rank and file. This debate has grown particularly pointed over the past year, during which troop deployments for the war on terror have gripped public attention and become a key issue in the US presidential campaign. In this paper an Air Force ground commander and scholar, Lt Col Dave Marttala, brings to light a problem previously overlooked in popular discussion: Air Force deployment of large numbers of Airmen to augment the joint ground fight and the consequent breakage of the US war-fighting capability writ large.

Since 2004, the Air Force has deployed increasing numbers of Airmen to perform various combat-support functions doctrinally assigned to the Army or Marine Corps. This program—known as “In Lieu Of” (ILO) deployment—has evolved from a temporary assistance measure to a de facto permanent reallocation of service roles and missions. Previous ILO debates and formal studies have emphasized important but marginal short-term concerns such as ILO organizational relationships, equipment standardization, and training. Yet no attention has been given to the more serious, central problem of the long-term negative effects on comprehensive military capacity to fight modern wars.

Certainly, the ILO program has demonstrated short-term success in filling specific manpower shortages among Army and Marine combat-support forces. However, Colonel Marttala argues that this success has contributed to systemic ignorance of the growing disconnects between force structure and the nature of warfare—a myth that the military we have is in fact the right one for modern warfare. In challenging this myth, Colonel Marttala’s broad historical analysis shows how the battlefield conditions that instigated the ILO program stem from a major evolution in the nature of war, one that fundamentally conflicts with existing US force structure and critically heightens the operational importance of combat-support functions.
While the mismatch between Cold War–era direct combat forces and today’s asymmetric threats is widely recognized, Colonel Marttala argues that a corresponding mismatch among US combat-support forces has gone largely ignored. His paper shows how the present wars in Afghanistan and Iraq represent a long-term evolution of the battlefield. Using Air Force security forces as a case study, he demonstrates that ILO solutions actually do more harm than good, creating an illusion of adaptation that obscures the nature and scope of the problem, thereby jeopardizing future war-fighting capability among our collective military forces. He concludes by offering practical recommendations to rebalance requirements and resources for modern warfare.

This paper is important because it addresses a problem with legitimate strategic effects, one which has been only marginally acknowledged among senior leaders. Given the nature of the conflict in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, support functions have become a central component of how we fight. Combat-support personnel who are inadequately trained, ineffectively organized, or insufficiently resourced will ultimately cause combat-operations functions to fail. Continued allowance of an ill-structured support force—disguised by the ILO myth and sustained by the heroic efforts of today’s Airmen, sailors, soldiers, and marines—gambles away our capability for the next war to hit America’s doorstep. Colonel Marttala’s paper addresses a crucial policy problem of equal significance to any issue of grand strategy and should be of particular interest to planning staffs and leaders at all levels.

DONALD M. GOLDSTEIN, PhD
Lt Col, USAF, Retired
Professor and Interim Director
Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies
Lt Col David W. Marttala received his commission through the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) in May 1987. A career security forces officer, he has served in a variety of positions including shift commander, Ground Launched Cruise Missile Defense Force commander, Ground Combat Regional Training Center officer in charge, and major command staff officer. In 1991 he deployed in support of Operation Desert Storm as the Ground Defense Force commander, 4401st Asset Reconstitution Group (Provisional), Al Kharj AB, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In addition, he deployed for the commencement of major combat operations in 2003 as the commander, 485th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron and later, the 321st Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron, both in execution of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. He previously commanded the 17th Security Forces Squadron at Goodfellow AFB, Texas; the 1st Security Forces Squadron at Langley AFB, Virginia; and the 386th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron at Ali Al Salem AB, Kuwait.

Colonel Marttala holds a bachelor of science degree in international affairs from the USAFA and master’s degrees in public administration from the University of Arizona and in military studies from Marine Corps University. A distinguished graduate of Marine Corps Command and Staff College, he also served as a National Defense Fellow at the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh.
Currently, Colonel Marttala is the chief, Antiterrorism and Critical Infrastructure Protection Division, Headquarters United States Pacific Command. In this capacity, Colonel Marttala leads combatant command efforts to deter and disrupt terrorism and to preserve the combat capability of forces throughout the Pacific theater. He is married to the former Lisa Turley from Granbury, Texas, and they have four beautiful children.
Abstract

The US Army and Marine Corps find themselves increasingly unable to fill combat-support and combat-service-support (CS/CSS) positions in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. To compensate, the Joint Staff has tasked the Air Force to deploy significant numbers of Airmen from its agile combat-support specialties “in lieu of” (ILO) the soldiers who normally fill these positions as prison guards and interrogators, convoy security elements, provincial reconstruction team members, and the like.

Most reviews of the ILO program have focused on short-term execution-level concerns such as organizational relationships, equipment, and training, while completely bypassing the essential long-term strategic problem: while modern warfare places new and critical demands on combat-support forces, US military force structure in this area remains woefully inadequate. A variety of ad hoc measures—critically aided by valiant individual efforts—has progressively ameliorated these secondary problems, while at the same time creating a popular mythology that the fundamental structure of combat-support forces is, if not optimal, at least adequate and that the ILO program is a joint success. As a result of this myth, and in spite of continuing drains on operational effectiveness, combat readiness, and personnel retention, no one has yet offered a feasible alternative to the ILO program.

This paper examines the question, How can the DOD and the services better organize, assign, source, and prepare forces for CS/CSS missions in the joint operations area? Specifically, it uses the security forces career field as a case study by which to assess the comprehensive effects of the ILO program in light of the evolving nature of warfare and the heightened importance of combat support.

This paper finds that because the ILO program inflicts significant critical effects on the long-term health of the supporting—and hence supported—forces, continuing the ILO program as presently administered is not a viable long-term option. In fact, the crux of the problem is bigger: the nature of the modern battlefield has outpaced a legacy force built upon a Cold War-era doctrinal allocation of combat-support roles among the ser-
vices. The ILO problem is merely symptomatic of a long-term, evolutionary change in the war-fighting environment and masks the full impact of combat-support manpower shortfalls that will grow in relative deficiency as this evolution matures. The paper concludes by recommending solutions in four areas: decreasing combatant commander demand for ILO forces, increasing supporting service capacity, reducing home-station demand for support forces, and increasing real-force levels.
Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge the expert assistance of several people in the research for this paper, including Lt Col Kathleen Fadok, Headquarters Air Force Security Forces Directorate; Mr. Mike Glunk, Headquarters Air Combat Command Security Forces Directorate; LTC Scott McCulloch, Joint Staff Global Force Management Office; and Lt Col Walt Shearer, Air Force Operations Group. These experts patiently and meticulously explained the details and subtleties of joint deployment processes and made invaluable suggestions for improvement. My thanks also to Mr. Art Maxwell, PhD candidate at the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, who reviewed the full manuscript draft and provided insightful, comprehensive recommendations. Thanks also to Prof. Don Goldstein of the Matthew B. Ridgway Center at the University of Pittsburgh, an “Airman’s Airman,” a mentor and role model, and a friend. Finally, and most importantly, thank you to my gorgeous bride and our wonderful children—you are why I do what I do.
Chapter 1

Introduction

I’ve got to start planning for the future as well. We cannot do this in a vacuum anymore; I think that’s probably the biggest thing coming out of this war. We cannot grow our services, and our service missions, in a vacuum. We have to all sit down and discuss who can provide what kind of capability.

—Brig Gen Mary Kay Hertog
Director, Security Forces, Headquarters USAF
Interview by the author, 13 November 2007

The Myth

The belief that Airmen are only being provisionally deployed “in lieu of” (ILO) soldiers and marines is a myth. Most people believe that ILO deployments represent a somewhat eccentric albeit necessary response to the demands of current US conflicts. Moreover, while conventional wisdom recognizes the high deployment demands of the ILO program, it fails to acknowledge the broader negative consequences. In fact, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services have effectively ignored the most severe effects of the ILO program. Many observers suggest that where there are negative consequences of the ILO program, they are relatively temporary and can be countered simply through the skill and energies of the troops. A number of misconceptions support the ILO myth: misconceptions about service roles and competencies, the nature of modern battle, and operational requirements. Worse, the relative absence of meaningful debate on this subject belies a misunderstanding of the significance of these conditions to the strategic military capabilities of the United States.

The US Army and Marine Corps find themselves increasingly unable to fill combat-support and combat-service-support (CS/CSS) positions in Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF). To compensate, the Joint Staff has tasked the Air Force to deploy significant numbers of Airmen from its agile
combat-support specialties in lieu of the soldiers and marines who would have normally filled these positions. While an increasing share of ILO deployments have been “sourced” to Airmen already trained in the corresponding specialty—such as explosive ordnance disposal and on-base law-and-order missions—many have been for duties outside of preexisting Air Force core competencies, including deployments as prison guards and interrogators, convoy security teams, and provincial reconstruction teams (PRT). Recently, even sailors have been sourced for land-based ILO deployments.

The Problem

The ILO program has caused a number of problems within the Air Force: manpower inefficiency, training and logistical gaps, and reduced combat mission readiness. To date, the Air Force has managed to sustain ILO mission operations by leveraging the readiness and endurance of its Airmen. However, these oft-cited concerns mask the fundamental problem: while modern warfare places new and critical demands on combat-support forces, US military force structure in this area remains woefully inadequate. A variety of ad hoc measures—critically aided by valiant individual efforts—has progressively ameliorated these secondary problems while at the same time creating a popular mythology that the fundamental structure of combat-support forces is, if not optimal, at least adequate and that the ILO program is an unqualified joint success. As a result of this myth, and in spite of continuing drains on operational effectiveness, combat readiness, and personnel retention, no one has yet offered a feasible alternative to the ILO program.

As a family of military occupational specialties, combat support is often overlooked in discussions of joint operational integration. Given the nature of the conflicts in OIF and OEF, combat-support functions have become a prime component of how we fight the enemy rather than an ancillary planning consideration. The increasing irregularity and diffusion of combatants on the battlefield, blending of combat and noncombat zones, and unique constraints of stability and reconstruction operations all combine to increase the operational significance of combat-support forces in relation to the traditional combat
arms. Combat-support personnel who are inadequately trained, ineffectively organized, or insufficiently resourced will ultimately cause combat operations functions to fail. More importantly, such shortfalls jeopardize US political objectives in the theater of operation.

The ILO program as presently administered is not a viable long-term solution to Army and Marine Corps manpower shortfalls. In fact, the crux of the problem is bigger: the nature of the modern battlefield has outpaced the legacy force structure built on Cold War-era doctrinal allocation of combat-support roles among the services. The negative effects to date are just the beginning, and the DOD must exercise a more sustainable strategic solution. The ILO problem is merely a symptom of an evolutionary change in the war-fighting environment. As such, it requires more than temporarily cross-tasking combat-support requirements to other services.

This Paper

The objective of this paper is to develop solutions to the ILO problem by identifying the root causes of today’s CS/CSS shortfalls, focusing on fundamental joint doctrine and policy solutions, and to design recommendations for the short term that are also valid for future conflict scenarios. This paper will examine the question, How can the DOD and the services better organize, assign, source, and prepare forces for CS/CSS missions in the joint operations area?

Chapter two describes the beginning of the ILO program with the initial tasking for Air Force convoy operators in 2003 and its rapid expansion into other mission areas. The chapter includes a broad description of current ILO operations, along with the more common complaints from the field.

In order to more thoroughly examine ILO outcomes, chapter three presents a case study of the security forces (SF) career field. As the Air Force’s largest and most heavily deployed career field, with one of its most variegated mission sets, the security forces specialty represents a valid case against which to analyze the ILO program writ large. Chapter three describes the SF career field, its role in relation to other joint forces on the battlefield, its history of ILO deployments and outcomes, and various
measures previously applied to mitigate negative effects of the ILO program.

Chapter four extends the security forces case study by analyzing the negative ILO effects presented in chapter three and identifies the mismatch between the modern battlespace and US force structure as the root cause of these effects. Specific gaps are identified in terms of force size, shape, sustainment, and means. Chapter five then develops recommendations to bridge these gaps and presents a range of options across the dimensions of time and cost.

Before proceeding, a note on terminology is necessary. During its first four years, the program discussed in this paper was named “In Lieu Of,” a term that drew some criticism as a pejorative reference to relative service competencies and wartime contributions.¹ As of mid-2007 this program is formally renamed the Joint Sourcing program, of which in-lieu-of deployments now specifically constitute but one subset.² However, the new naming convention has yet to gain popular recognition, and virtually all commentators use the original vernacular, including such senior officials as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in an April 2008 speech.³ Hence, for the sake of clarity this paper will use “in lieu of” to refer to all deployments outside the doctrinally assigned role of a particular force.

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

1. This anti-ILO naming bias persists. For example, Air Force chief of staff Gen T. Michael Moseley has been cited as disliking the “ILO” term because it implies that Airmen are otherwise underemployed in their assigned Air Force duty. See Kreisher, “Ground Force Taskings Go On,” 43.

2. McCulloch, “Global Force Management”; and Shearer, Types of Sourcing Solutions. The current global force management guidance describes four categories of force-selection decisions, known as “sourcing solutions”: standard (a preferred, planned force deploying to perform its core mission); joint (a force deploying in place of another service’s force, yet still performing its core mission); in lieu of (a force that is deployed for missions and tasks outside its core competencies); and ad hoc (a force that is consolidated from various services and commands to provide a nontraditional capability).

3. Gates, address to Air War College.
Chapter 2

Background

When our nation is at war, and a particular component of our Defense Department needs help, we have a responsibility to respond to that. And if it was more of an air war and we needed support from the Army because we ran out of security folks to provide security to our air bases, or if we ran out of folks to provide logistics support, we as a nation, and we as a military, ought to step up and do it. So, doing it is not the issue—the question is how long can you do it before it starts to eat into your capability?

—Maj Gen Gary T. McCoy
Director, Logistics Readiness, Headquarters USAF
Interview by the author, 5 February 2008

Most observers understand that the military regularly tailors its organizational structures to meet the unique demands of particular combat campaigns. However, they assume that these tailoring efforts take place by combining—not reassigning—functions within the mission area boundaries of the various services and that these efforts involve adapting combat forces to exploit enemy vulnerabilities in combat power. While those beliefs are true in the main, there is historical precedent for borrowing forces from other services when combat-support requirements exceed force levels allocated to the service that is assigned a particular role. In World War II, for example, the fledgling Army Air Corps provided Airmen on loan as security guards to the Army at Pearl Harbor, a task doctrinally assigned to the Army.\(^1\) In both World War I and World War II, the Army Air Corps even provided Airmen on loan to the Army as combat convoy operators.\(^2\) So when the Army encountered similar shortages in Operation Iraqi Freedom, it was only natural that the Pentagon would look to other services to fill the gaps.

Genesis

In late 2003, the Army began experiencing severe shortages among its vehicle operators, those soldiers crewing long-haul
resupply convoys throughout Iraq. Consequently, the Joint Staff tasked the Air Force to send three teams of Airmen to Iraq for a six-month deployment as substitutes for combat convoy soldiers. In recognition of the fact it was essentially outsourcing a function from one service to another that was neither doctrinally assigned nor trained in that mission area, the DOD labeled this the “In Lieu Of” program. These Airmen, primarily vehicle operators, were embedded as company-sized detachments within Army battalions convoying supplies to various US bases throughout Iraq. The ILO program developed on the basic assumption it was a limited-term program to overcome manpower shortages in certain specialties within the Army. Initially showing mixed operational results, the ILO program soon proved such a successful solution for the Army that it rapidly expanded into other combat-support segments. However, even while it eased the Army’s dire manpower straits, the ILO program generated widespread criticism within the Air Force.

**Convoy Airmen**

The initial complement of approximately 300 convoy Airmen attended stateside Army orientation training and a “just-in-time” certification course at the Army’s Udairi Range in Kuwait that eventually ran six weeks long before validating the Airmen were mission ready, highlighting distinct disparities between what the Army expected to receive and what the Air Force was generically prepared to provide in terms of “vehicle operators.” In fact, when the Airmen arrived in Kuwait, close to half of them failed their initial weapons qualification and demonstrated “major deficiencies” in basic combat skills that were prerequisites to conducting convoy-specific training.3

As a result of these discrepancies, the Air Force developed a specialized training course, known as the Basic Combat Convoy Course (BC3), where security forces Airmen instructed vehicle operations Airmen in the fundamentals of battlefield convoy operations. In addition to providing the vehicle operators basic training in convoy tasks, BC3 also provided an invaluable opportunity to develop team cohesiveness prior to departure for the war zone. As a result, the first BC3 graduates earned mission certification at Udairi Range in six days, not six weeks. More
importantly, the Airmen subsequently repelled several insurgent attacks within their first week on the job, sustaining no casual-
ties. Two of the three supported Army battalion commanders rated the Air Force convoy detachments as “best in my unit.”

Assumptions and Expectations

In the beginning it appeared that ILO deployments constituted an extraordinary, albeit necessary, case of “doing the Army’s job.” Most observers assumed this was a temporary situation for a short war—that US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would soon stabilize, Army and Marine require-
ments would drop to a level supportable within those services, and the Air Force would revert to doing strictly “Air Force work.” At the outset, the underlying expectation at both headquarters and unit levels was that operational demands and existing Army forces would return to a point of equilibrium within approxi-
mately two years, negating the need to continue “borrowing” forces from other services.

In-Lieu-of Expansion

Encouraged by the successful performance of the Airmen assigned these initial ILO missions, and based on increasing Army and Marine Corps shortages, the program steadily expanded. The initial convoy deployments were followed later in 2004 by a call for Air Force security forces Airmen to deploy on a six-month mission to the Army’s theater internment facility at Camp Bucca, Iraq, as detainee guards and camp defense forces.

By mid-2007 over 5,000 Airmen, representing the majority of Air Force specialties, were deployed on ILO missions through-
out Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations; in 2008 that num-
ber is planned to break 6,600—a quarter of all Air Force Middle East deployments (see fig. 1). Presently, 70 percent of Air Force ILO deployments are to Iraq, with the remainder distributed throughout other Central Command locations.

Current Operations

The ILO program as executed in current operations is shaped by several key factors: mission-area requirements from the
combat theater, joint matching—or “sourcing”—of requirements to specific service capabilities, the scope of specific missions and tasks assigned, training support for these assignments, and the command and control relationships established to oversee these operations.

**Joint Requirements and Sourcing**

ILO requirements levied on the various services originate from mission requirements submitted by the geographic combatant commander, in this case the commander, United States Central Command. These requirements flow through a vetting process between Joint Forces Command and the Joint Staff, after which they are parsed out to the respective services for an assessment of supportability and associated risk. There is no ILO policy...
statement per se that triggered the cross-tasking of service members. Rather, the 2004 creation of the business-oriented Global Force Management system established a formal strategy to fill combatant commanders’ requirements by sourcing across the collection of all-service “force provider” capabilities.²

Scope

Information concerning the numbers of Airmen performing specific ILO missions is not available in the unclassified domain due to the potential advantage to hostile forces who may exploit that information. However, examples of these functions—demonstrating the wide variety of the ILO mission set—include detainee interrogation, heavy-construction teams, detainee guard operations, convoy driver, teams to counter improvised explosive devices (IED), Army base security (defense), movement control teams, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) (bomb technician), military working dog teams, relocation assistance teams, utility support detachment, police transition teams, stress counseling teams, well-drilling teams, personal security detachment, Afghanistan training teams, facility engineering teams, convoy security, PRTs (Iraq and Afghanistan), Iraqi forces support and training teams, and Army base law-and-order detachment.

Training

All ILO deployments require additional training, primarily when the deployment exceeds the tasked force’s core competencies. But even when deployed within their core competencies, all ILO Airmen attend combat training at one of eight Army installations.⁹ In some cases this training is conducted at a specially designed Air Force training course, such as the Basic Combat Convoy Course. Since 2006, the Air Force’s Second Air Force headquarters has overseen the design and execution of both types of ILO predeployment training and has also managed equipment issues for ILO Airmen.

Command and Control

Deployed command and control of ILO Airmen is established to account for both the manner in which the Air Force organizes
its forces for deployment and the need for unity of command at the tactical, or execution, level. The Air Force organizes its weapons systems and its people among 10 deployable capability segments. These segments, called air and space expeditionary forces (AEF), comprise small teams of aircraft, people, and equipment across the Air Force that are combined to fulfill overseas deployment requirements. In general, two AEFs are preassigned as “deployable” during each successive 120-day time period, or “bucket.” In theory, and barring deployed requirements that exceed the preplanned AEF capacity, Airmen in the AEF system are therefore deployable for four months out of every 20-month AEF “life cycle.” The general idea behind the AEF system is to give units and individuals the ability to deconflict deployed missions with unit activities and personal calendars in advance, thereby minimizing the strain of deployments. To a certain extent, building composite deployable units also seeks to diffuse strain across multiple home bases that support deployed operations. Although the Air Force has begun to move toward a “teaming” concept consolidating the makeup of deployed units, it is not unusual to find deployed squadrons, particularly in the combat-support arena, comprised of several hundred Airmen deployed from 15 to 20 home bases.

In addition, virtually all ILO Airmen deploy under the administrative and operational control of an in-theater air expeditionary group (AEG), commanded by an Air Force colonel.\textsuperscript{10} Three such groups exist: the 586th, headquartered at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; the 732nd, at Balad AB, Iraq; and the 755th, based at Bagram AB, Afghanistan. Administrative control, or ADCON, includes authorities for organization, accountability, discipline, logistics, and training of ILO Airmen.\textsuperscript{11} Operational control, or OPCON, is a broad authority closely subordinate to full command.\textsuperscript{12} OPCON encompasses authorities to organize, assign tasks, and direct all aspects of operations and joint training which the supported commander deems necessary to accomplish assigned missions.\textsuperscript{13} The 586th AEG oversees roughly 1,950 ILO Airmen—1,500 Airmen provide Army base defense, area security, detention, convoy, engineering, and chaplain operations at multiple operations throughout Iraq and another 450 operate the Army logistics port at Kuwait Naval Base.\textsuperscript{14} The 732nd AEG administers OPCON and ADCON to over 1,800 Air-
men in six squadrons that support a variety of security, engineering, interrogation, and intelligence functions for Army and Marine Corps units in Iraq. Finally, the 755th AEG commands approximately 1,250 Airmen who conduct security, counter-IED, medical, intelligence, and other operations across Afghanistan in direct support of US Army and International Security Assistance Force missions.

The supported unit commander wields tactical control, or TACON, over ILO Airmen embedded in the unit. In contrast to the authority retained by the AEG commander, the commander with TACON has very limited authority constrained to that control of movement and action necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by higher authority. Significantly, commanders with TACON do not have authority to reassign or reorganize those forces, to dictate training, or to administer discipline. In practice, the success of TACON-supported operations relies greatly on the relationship between the supported commander and the commander(s) retaining ADCON and OPCON of the supporting forces.

**Popular Criticisms**

Common criticisms of the ILO program focus on negative impacts on Air Force mission capability generated by the requirement to use Air Force resources to support non-Air Force roles. Such arguments cite the employment of Airmen outside the core competencies for which they are trained, the negative force-management impact of deconstructing the AEF deployment schedule, and degradation in home-mission capability. While these arguments are not without foundation, the problem is that they tend to be evaluated on emotional rather than objective grounds, with equity in service-member deployment sacrifices being a major theme. Across the DOD, the ILO providers—the Air Force and Navy—are considered traditionally underemployed in ground-centric campaigns. Yet among the ILO supplier community, deployment rates in current conflicts dramatically exceed previous experience. Consequently, this debate remains unresolved. In subsequent chapters this paper attempts to go beyond this debate to systemically examine ILO impacts.
Before commencing the analysis in this paper, it is appropriate to discuss a related equity concern—the publicly unadvertised but marked objections that the Army wouldn’t need ILO support if it made more efficient use of the soldiers it already has and that the Army has unused capacity, particularly in the Guard and Reserve forces.\textsuperscript{18} These criticisms are not entirely without foundation. According to recent statistics from the Army’s Human Resources Command, 40.6 percent of soldiers have never deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{19} However, that figure alone is misleading. For instance, this group includes soldiers in basic training, serving in critical nondeployable jobs like recruiting, or who are medically ineligible to deploy.\textsuperscript{20} Nevertheless, the command found that 37,000 of these soldiers, some 7 percent of active duty soldiers, appeared to have no immediate excuse from deployment. A quarter of those troops work in medical services while the rest come from space operations, telecommunications, and similar support specialties.\textsuperscript{21} While the Army works to reduce its nondeploying population, the other services appear to have even higher rates of nondeploying personnel. According to October 2007 Air Force figures, 63 percent of Army personnel have deployed, 55 percent of the Marine Corps, 51 percent of the Air Force, and 50 percent of the Navy.\textsuperscript{22}

The picture of comparative deployment equity among the services sharpens somewhat by examining service-specific trends in post-9/11 combat deployments. While the DOD did not consistently collect deployment data until 2001, and isolated data for Iraq and Afghanistan deployments is unavailable, table 1 provides the best data available on comparative rates for worldwide deployments away from a member’s home unit.\textsuperscript{23} These figures demonstrate two key points: first, for all services except the Navy (for which sea time not spent in war zones impacts deployment rates) the deployment load on those who are deploying (“deployed members”) grew dramatically from 2001 to 2004. This increase, generally well publicized and understood among the public, was most pronounced in the Army where deploying members spent 250 percent more days away from home in 2004 than in 2001.
Table 1. Deployment rates by service (total force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component (Active/Reserve/Guard)</th>
<th>FY2001 Deployed Members</th>
<th>FY2001 All</th>
<th>FY2002 Deployed Members</th>
<th>FY2002 All</th>
<th>FY2003 Deployed Members</th>
<th>FY2003 All</th>
<th>FY2004 Deployed Members</th>
<th>FY2004 All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>124.6</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>119.4</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>111.0</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>116.4</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>122.5</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>104.8</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>130.7</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>102.1</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>110.2</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The second point that table 1 demonstrates is less commonly understood. The “all” members data reflects the deployment load as measured against total service end strength and hence indicates deployment strain on each of the services. This data differs from the “deploying members” data, which measures the number of deployed days strictly among those who deployed and thus indicates individual deployment strain. In this sense then, Army deployment strain nearly quadrupled during this period, similar to the increase in individual soldier deployment strain and indicating that Army deployments increased roughly evenly across its population, an unsurprising result. However, the Air Force and Marine Corps figures show a substantially greater increase in deployment strain on each service than on individuals, indicating proportionally broader deploying populations among these two services. In short, while the Army deployment portfolio grew the most during this period, the Air Force and Marine Corps experienced smaller but broader deployment growth.

Overall, while the nature of increased tempo varies by service, suggestions of Army deployment inefficiency appear exaggerated. Similarly, while the available Navy data is skewed by differences in definition of “deployment” and requires further...
study, assumptions of low Air Force deployment participation seem grossly overstated.

**Studying the Program**

The features of the ILO program which draw the most attention, both in the field and among headquarters managers and senior leaders, are second-order concerns that stop short of analyzing the critical, strategic problem of military capacity and force structure. Common complaints tend to focus on current impact to service-specific mission sets rather than on the question of overall DOD operational capacity. Additionally, Air Force resistance to ILO participation is perceived in many circles as a somewhat pathetic form of grumbling from a service that has as yet sacrificed far less than its ground-centric counterparts. Formal analyses of the ILO program have variously understudied or ignored long-term force-management problems and offered operationally infeasible solutions that do little more than add unnecessary bureaucratic overhead without ever considering strategic consequences.

As a result of this analytical uncertainty, meaningful ILO program questioning has been restricted to what are marginal concerns at the tactical level of execution. Certainly, resolution of execution-level problems has generated positive short-term effects, but the general inattention to ILO program effects on force structure, exacerbated by the growing significance of combat-support functions in war, overlooks serious long-term problems. While reducing execution-level friction is a good thing, failing to take action on fundamental disconnects in force structure is very bad. By shifting on the fly without meaningfully adjusting force structure, the United States will eventually break not only its military capacity to sustain the new generation of warfare but its capacity for conventional “big wars” as well. The next two chapters aim to overcome these various critical shortfalls by studying ILO effects in the case of the security forces career field and then evaluating those effects in terms of comprehensive military readiness for modern war.
BACKGROUND

Notes

1. Prof. Donald F. Goldstein (University of Pittsburgh), interview by the author, 11 December 2007.
2. McCoy, interview.
3. Headquarters USAF, staff briefing; and Headquarters USAF, staff summary sheet.
4. Headquarters USAF, staff briefing.
5. Headquarters Air Education and Training Command (AETC), staff talking paper. This view was regularly expressed in headquarters staff coordination between Headquarters Air Force and AETC, as observed by the author during his assignment as Combat Support Training Branch chief, Headquarters AETC, 2004–6. Joint tasking of Air Force elements to deploy for Army convoy support was projected only through the current deployment cycle; successive tasking orders were issued incrementally, usually within a few months prior to the required start of training. See also Headquarters USAF, staff talking paper, subject: Combat Skills Training Options. A deployed group commander who provided ILO forces to the Army in Iraq restated the original understanding that the program was a stopgap until the Army was able to train sufficient forces of its own to fill the shortfalls in transporters, security forces, and engineers. Richards, “Expeditionary Wing Leadership Lessons,” 18–21.
7. Ibid., 45.
8. LTC Scott McCulloch (Joint Operations Division, Headquarters Joint Staff), interview by the author, 14 November 2007. See also Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 2004, 34; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefing, subject: Global Force Management, slide 2 notes.
10. A very small number of Airmen, representing approximately 3 percent of all ILO positions, fill ILO positions at other locations throughout the region. See Schanz, “Air Force World,” 12.
11. The DOD’s full definition of ADCON is listed in the glossary of this paper. See Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, 6.
12. The DOD’s full definition of combatant command, or command authority, is listed in the glossary of this paper (ibid., 98).
13. The DOD’s full definition of OPCON is listed in the glossary of this paper (ibid., 397–98).
14. Compiled from “586th Air Expeditionary Group”; and Schanz, “Air Force World,” 12. Personnel figures presented in this paragraph reflect data from unclassified sources that was marked current as of October 2007; therefore, the total ILO figure for all three AEGs discussed here—5,000 Airmen—falls below the aggregate number for the same period reflected in other sources as well as in other sections later in this paper, which is approximately 5,550.
15. “732nd Air Expeditionary Group.”
17. The DOD’s full definition of TACON is listed in the glossary of this paper. See JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, 539.

18. In the early years of ILO convoy support, this undocumented sentiment was commonly circulated among various Air Force headquarters’ staffs.

19. “Army Prioritizing GIs for Combat Tours.”

20. “37,000 Soldiers Have Not Deployed.”

21. “Army Prioritizing GIs for Combat Tours.”


23. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has noted problems in the collection and tracking of individual deployment data, specifically within the Army and Marine Corps. For instance, in 2005 inspections from separate agencies found that approximately three-quarters of individual personnel tempo data was improperly recorded. Nearly half of the Marine Corps units inspected in 2005 and 2006 had inconsistently or inaccurately reported personnel tempo to the DOD. Nonetheless, the GAO found that these errors most likely underreported personnel tempo, possibly by as much as 20 percent for the Army and 50 percent for the Marine Corps. See GAO, Military Personnel, 15–16, 20–21. The service data is included in the DOD’s annual defense report on force management, the most recent of which is from 2005. See Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 2005, B-1–B-3.

24. The Army deployment data from table 1 represents a 250 percent increase in individual deployment strain and a 268 percent increase in service deployment strain, an insignificant difference.

25. Air Force deployment strain increased 79 percent during this period whereas individual deployment strain on Airmen increased 59 percent. For the Marine Corps, service deployment strain increased 100 percent while individual deployment strain grew 62 percent.


27. Eagan, Future of “In Lieu Of” Forces.
Chapter 3

Case Study

Security Forces

And at some point we woke up and said, “Oh, man. The Navy’s getting involved and taking folks from different specialties. They’re taking the cooks, the bakers, and they’re turning those into detainee ops guys.” And we didn’t catch onto that, and by that time it was too late.

—Col Steve Robinette, director, Security Forces
Headquarters Air Combat Command
Interview by the author, 15 November 2007

In addition to representing the largest career field in the Air Force, the security forces were one of the first specialties assigned to ILO missions. As one of the most regularly deployed fields—even before the post-9/11 boom in contingency deployments—security forces have a long track record of fulfilling split missions at home station and abroad. And given their wartime mission as quasi-infantry for the defense of air bases, they possess relatively more advanced ground combat skills than do most other Airmen. These characteristics make security forces an attractive case study for ILO program analysis. Since in many ways ILO missions would seem a more natural fit for SF Airmen, to the extent that problems have resulted for SF, the causes should be particularly instructive for other Air Force specialties.

Moreover, other Air Force career fields are beginning to experience SF-like ILO demands. Recently, the Air Force announced that in order to keep pace with increased ILO mission demands, civil engineering specialties will shift in 2008 to longer six-month tour lengths for all deployments—both Air Force and ILO.¹ In fact, according to a recent Air Force Times article, as a result of joint requirements, by the end of 2007 over 44 percent of all deployed Airmen were on six-month deployments, and roughly 6 percent were on yearlong deployments.²
Description of Security Forces

The Air Force’s largest enlisted career field, and traditionally one of its most heavily deployed, is security forces. Security forces mission tasks and manpower requirements in the typical home-base operating environment are fundamentally different from those of most deployed locations—a fact that was often overlooked in the pre-9/11 Air Force. This divergence has become more pronounced and problematic as the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have matured.

Personnel Strength

Over 22,000-strong among the active force, the SF specialty comprises roughly 7 percent of Air Force personnel strength. Whereas there are nearly 24,000 active duty enlisted SF manpower authorizations, the actual number of assigned personnel is typically much less. As of January 2008 there were 22,695 SF personnel assigned against these positions, a 95 percent effective manning rate. Due to the tactical ground combat character of SF duties, the force is naturally heavy in junior-ranking Airmen and is highly reliant on first-tier noncommissioned officer leadership. Currently the force is configured much like the Marine Corps model, with roughly two-thirds of its strength in the bottom third of the rank structure.

Functional Roles and Core Competencies

SF Airmen fulfill three core mission areas, or roles, at Air Force installations: law enforcement, physical security of aircraft and other critical operational assets, and infantry-like air base defense. Each of these general roles encompasses a set of task competencies, the nature of which requires regular, intensive training to perform safely and effectively. While at the time of this writing no detailed list of these competencies has been formally promulgated, the Air Force understands the importance of codifying these competencies to enable appropriate use and sourcing of its SF Airmen within the joint community. Accordingly, the Air Staff Security Forces Directorate is staffing a “Mission Essential Task List,” an early draft of which includes such items as installation entry and circulation control; active
CASE STUDY

and passive base defense operations; area control; mounted, dismounted, and aerial patrolling; local intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; standoff attack defense; convoy security; and law-and-order operations.\textsuperscript{6}

**Operational Tempo**

SF Airmen have a history of higher-than-normal deployment rates relative to the rest of the Air Force. However, after Khobar Towers SF deployments rose substantially; following 9/11 those deployments more than tripled, as reflected in figure 2. Today, SF Airmen serve deployed tours that are minimally 50 percent longer than the Air Force’s standard. A number of SF positions are non-deployable, such as presidential and nuclear security positions, and like all forces a portion is unavailable due to hospitalization, reassignment, pending separation, and similar conditions. These deductions leave roughly 10,300 active duty SF Airmen available for home-base and deployed missions, and over 3,500 of them are deployed at any given time, despite Reserve SF Airmen absorbing an average of 15 percent of the deployment burden.\textsuperscript{7} Based on deployment pace and length, this translates to a deployed-to-non-deployed “dwell ratio” of 1:1.9, meaning that on average, Airmen in deployable positions are deployed one day for every 1.9 days they are not deployed.\textsuperscript{8} Despite this exceptionally high deployment rate, home-station operations continue unabated since SF parent units have full-time base support missions. Consequently, in between deployments the Airmen back home are securing their bases with less than 80 percent of the people the Air Force has validated for the mission, and they work an average of 46 percent more hours in a week than the Air Force’s 42-hour planning factor.\textsuperscript{9} These combined effects produce a challenging operational tempo (optempo), one that in many respects equals that of the most highly deployed elements of any branch of the military.

**Post-Khobar Career Field Merger and Task Overmatch**

Khobar Towers was obviously a watershed event in many ways, but for the security forces career field it marked the beginning of an institutional decision that the classic tripartite division of roles and functions was no longer viable. Toward this
end, in October 1997 the career field merged its separate police and security subspecialties, together with its wartime base defense duties, into a single all-inclusive field, renamed security forces. Two primary effects resulted from the SF merger: an expanded set of individual skills whereby all SF Airmen exercised all three legacy disciplines; and, since training time dropped relative to the expanded skill set, so did proficiency levels. Before the merger, SF Airmen were specialists with expertise in a relatively narrow field. Post-merger, these Airmen are trained in more skills but demonstrate the classic shortfall of becoming a “jack of all trades, and master of none.”

The problem of task generalization is nothing new in the Air Force. In fact, the problem for SF is analogous to that of fighter aircrews in the 1970s, when the Air Force recognized the inherent risk in training multimission generalists and opted to train its crews as specialists in a single type of mission such as air superiority or ground attack. “The move away from commonality and homogeneity in the force allowed more units to be excellent at their primary tasks and avoided the danger of creating a service in which all aircrews were mediocre at everything.” More recently, this same recognition has surfaced in the Air Force’s response to the late-2007 incident with uncontrolled transporta-
tion of nuclear weapons from Minot AFB, North Dakota, to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Reviewers have recommended decoupling conventional and nuclear mission-area crews in order to reestablish necessary focus and expertise on nuclear weapons handling. Unfortunately, this lesson has been overlooked in the case of security forces. The struggle to overcome task-specific mediocrity consumes every security forces unit.

The compound problems of a high optempo and task generalization have overwhelmed the training capacity of Air Force security units. A 2006 RAND report analyzed the training load in 16 operational SF units by examining the ratio of junior on-the-job trainees to middle-grade noncommissioned officers. This ratio was analyzed both for the planned rank structure as well as for the actual rank population assigned to a unit. Figure 3 shows the comparison of these two ratios for the nine-year period overlapping the 1997 SF career field merger, revealing an increase of more than 50 percent over the planned training load that began precisely as the merger took effect. Increased training load leads to increased time away from primary duties as trainers struggle to bring their subordinates up to mission-ready skill levels, even while these same trainers by necessity fill tasks that cannot be performed by the partially trained junior Airmen.

Figure 3. Training load in SF units. (Reprinted from Raymond E. Conley et al., *Maintaining the Balance between Manpower, Skill Levels, and PERSTEMPO* [Personnel Tempo] [Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006], 60.)
Security Forces Transformation 2004–Present

In 2004 the then-director of Air Force Security Forces and Force Protection, Brig Gen Robert Holmes, initiated a ground-breaking effort to redefine the career field into a capability better fitted to modern mission demands and more relevant to the modern threat profile. Unfortunately, that effort is heavily dependent on outsourcing air provost (police) services and certain aspects of personnel and administrative security to DOD civilians while orienting active duty SF Airmen mainly on the base security function. To date, that effort has been hampered by manpower constraints, reinforced in the main by the Air Force’s elimination of 40,000 Airmen as a method to generate critical funds to recapitalize the aging aircraft fleet. Although an updated SF manpower formula was released in late 2007 authorizing the use of deployed mission requirements to justify manpower, this new allowance does not necessarily mean newly justified positions will translate into funded authorizations for manpower. In fact, despite recent speculation over the success of the ongoing Air Force manpower reductions to free up funds for recapitalization, senior officials are not counting on any manpower growth. According to General Hertog, despite ongoing mission growth, “we are not going to get additional manpower,” a view shared by over a dozen senior military officials the author interviewed for this paper. For the time being, SF leaders are managing transformation and mission requirements as a zero-growth problem.

Role Relationships of Military Police and Security Forces

Security forces perform functions that in many ways resemble those of Army military police (MP), yet the two service specialties are unique in certain distinct ways. For example, joint doctrine designates the land component commander as responsible for securing lines of communications (LOC), or movement corridors, and the Army executes this function by using military police in their battlefield circulation control capacity. The Army is also designated as the executive agent for detainee operations, a function it has assigned to its MP forces. The assignment of these functions is singular among the services—more precisely, the
point is that no other service is manned, funded, or organized to perform this function.

A common misperception within the Air Force is that SF Airmen only recently began performing air base defense operations outside the relatively protected confines of the base perimeter, and then did so as part of the ILO program. In fact, this function always has been an SF core competency. A major reason for this misconception lies in a 1985 agreement between the Army and Air Force, Joint Service Agreement (JSA) 8 (full text at appendix). JSA 8 was intended to formalize and clarify Army support to protect Air Force bases by providing military police response forces in an on-call capacity. However, many observers mistakenly interpreted the agreement’s conflicted language to mean that the Army had exclusive, full-time responsibility for external base defense.21 Despite this agreement, Airmen retained their previously assigned function to defend the base from inside and outside its perimeter as required by terrain and the local threat. The fact that this relationship was widely misunderstood stemmed more from its peacetime obscurity and the ambiguity of JSA 8 than from Army task ownership. Although JSA 8 has now nearly faded from corporate memory, and was formally terminated in 2005, the assumption persists that the external air base is an Army mission.22 When other Airmen observed SF execute their doctrinally-appointed defense mission in the tactical terrain around their bases in Desert Storm, Afghanistan, and Iraq, many assumed this was due to Army manpower shortages. Curiously, this misconception still exists today, even among congressional members who have suggested that all ground combat operations are somehow out of place for Airmen.23

**In-Lieu-of Deployments**

Notwithstanding its unique disposition among Air Force specialties, the ILO program has generated unprecedented reliance upon security forces. This reliance has manifested in terms of expanded mission-type sourcing, increased deployed-force levels, and increased deployment tempo. The extended duration of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has disproven the original assumption of ILO support as a short-term program. In fact, all
indications are that the shortfall in ILO mission types will continue indefinitely.

**Mission Types**

Security forces perform a wide variety of ILO missions at over a dozen main operating bases and three dozen forward operating bases, and smaller locations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Chief among these missions is the guarding of detainees in prisoner-of-war facilities and Iraqi police training teams (PTT). The first dedicated security forces ILO deployment took place in late 2004, when a squadron of Airmen trained at Fort Lewis, Washington, and deployed for a six-month mission to secure the US Army’s Camp Bucca and guard Iraqi detainees in its enemy prisoner facility.\(^{24}\) Today, security forces on PTTs provide training for new Iraqi police members. These Airmen conduct individual and team training, provide security for training operations, and run convoys to and from police stations and other training locations. Prior to their deployment, PTTs attend two months of specialized training at an Army power projection platform.\(^{25}\) In addition, security forces Airmen deploy as members of PRTs throughout Iraq and Afghanistan, assisting in critical infrastructure recovery operations. SF also deploy as law-and-order detachments on certain Army operating bases, conducting the Army’s provost marshal function. Security forces man gun trucks on resupply convoys across Iraq and provide personnel security details for designated officials. Finally, SF military working dog teams embed in a variety of tactical Army units to provide IED detection capability.

**Numbers**

A large portion of the SF deployment burden, currently 52 percent, supports ILO deployments. Figure 4 shows the increasing ILO demand for SF and the corresponding increase in total SF deployments (ILO and Air Force missions combined). While this figure depicts a downward trend in 2008, this is merely an artifact of the process by which requirements are forecasted; historically, true requirements increase during execution.\(^{26}\) Security forces comprise one of 10 career fields, representing 42 percent of deploy-
ing Airmen, whose members now deploy for either six or 12 months at a time versus the AEF standard of four months.\textsuperscript{27}

**Duration**

In every respect, the initial assumptions and expectations for the ILO program have not borne out. The reason is fundamentally tied to the fact that the war in general has run far longer than anticipated. As the United States enters the sixth year of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the nature and scope of operations show no signs of reduction in the immediate future. In February 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated for the first time that he supported a potential pause in Iraq troop withdrawals below presurge levels,\textsuperscript{28} which senior Iraq commander Gen David Petraeus subsequently recommended. The prospect of the new American president directing a perfunctory contraction—or even termination—of military operations in Iraq is certainly conceivable, but so long as withdrawal remains predicated on Iraqi self-security the US presence there could easily extend into the 2020s. Therefore, US planning needs to proceed on the assumption that operations will continue at their present level indefinitely.

\textbf{Figure 4. Air Force and ILO deployments.} (Adapted from Lt Col Kathleen M. Fadok, chief, Security Forces Plans, Headquarters USAF, Washington, D.C., “Current SF Career Field Snapshot,” PowerPoint briefing slide, to the author, e-mail, 14 November 2007.)
CASE STUDY

Effects

ILO support has tested the readiness of individual Airmen and units as well as the overall robustness of the Air Force’s combat-support force structure. For security forces, the results have been mixed. In the short term, the program has demonstrated remarkable operational outcomes: ILO Airmen have acquitted themselves famously. However, this benefit has not come without substantial risk and has done serious damage to the long-term health of the force. Ultimately, the negative effects are not restricted to the Air Force alone but jeopardize joint war-fighting capability.

Positive Outcomes

The ILO program has certainly produced benefits. Foremost, the program has met its immediate objective: filling quantitative shortfalls in combat-support capability. Second, ILO Airmen have demonstrated widely acclaimed energy and motivation. Third, a by-product of ILO training and extended ILO deployments has been cross-feed of broader tactical skills. Fourth, participation in these missions has boosted confidence among individual Airmen to learn new skills and to perform under the rigors of combat.

Negative Outcomes

The ILO program has also produced a number of negative effects that outweigh the benefits and threaten to undermine immediate Air Force military capability and future DOD capacity to prosecute military campaigns. First, because many of the joint-sourcing-solution (JSS) missions tasked to SF have been outside their core competencies, a great deal of predeployment training has been required. This has generated new training costs for both services, but primarily for the Army, which conducts the bulk of such training. In fiscal year (FY) 2007, 2,738 SF Airmen attended Army predeployment training for ILO missions. At an average of 30 days per Airman, this equates to something over 80,000 man-days of ILO-driven training time, or the equivalent of 220 full-time manpower positions.
Second, skills-competencies mismatches mean that SF Airmen are not as effective in their first JSS deployment as they ought to be when going to war. There is a decided learning curve in individual and team tactics over time. Even concentrated training just prior to deployment is insufficient to overcome the relatively shallow experience base of Airmen on their first deployment in a new ILO mission. There is no substitute for long-term repetition of tasks which demand a high degree of conditioned physiological response. Lack of such experience places Airmen and the mission at undue risk.

Third, the number of ILO deployments has resulted in all SF deployments—both ILO missions as well as those for Air Force missions—exceeding the AEF planning basis. SF deployments are now a minimum of six months in duration, with many extending to 12 months. Earlier, this paper presented the SF deployed-to-nondeployed dwell ratio as 1:1.9. However, after predeployment training and travel time are factored in, deployable SF Airmen actually sustain a 1:1 “effective dwell ratio” between the number of days deployed and the number of days at home, producing physiological stress on individuals and operational strain on home units.

Fourth, due to the higher dwell ratios, time to train and execute the primary SF mission at home base has dwindled to a dangerous level. Unlike most of their Army and Marine counterparts, SF Airmen have a home-base operational mission in addition to a deployed mission; when these Airmen are deployed, their home mission suffers. Available SF resources are not projected to grow to fulfill ILO requirements because “on the books” these roles are assigned to other services. Hence, the Air Force earns no manpower authorizations to handle ILO requirements. Furthermore, such use draws those resources away from the core mission readiness of the supporting service. Moreover, in contrast to many CS/CSS forces in the Army and Marines, Air Force support forces are authorized manpower based strictly on their home-base mission, not for deployed wartime missions. Consequently, deploying forces represent a one-for-one decrement in the strength of the associated home unit; every Airman deployed represents one less Airman to perform the corresponding support function at the base from which the service member deployed (e.g., security, communications, engineering, etc.).
Fifth, because of the cumulative toll on SF Airmen and their families, morale has suffered, which can cause a variety of other problems within units. Discipline, energy, and rates of misbehavior are all prey to the pervasive effects of dissatisfaction with quality of military life. While refined empirical data on this effect is virtually nonexistent, career-field leaders from squadron level to the Pentagon are aware of the growing hazard of deployment-related morale.

As a direct consequence of degraded morale, a sixth negative effect has manifested in declining retention rates that, through second- and third-order effects, could decimate home-station and deployed operations. Contrary to public understanding, this problem is not merely speculative; in fact, low retention has already reached epidemic proportions. Until very recently, senior Air Force leaders have regularly cited the success of the AEF in meeting personnel management challenges of an increased optempo. In 2003 Gen John Jumper, then chief of staff, said that “the AEF is allowing us to highlight our stressed career fields. We are able to pinpoint them and able to size the level of our stress. . . . We are working hard to right-size our force. . . . We are enjoying excellent results in our recruiting and retention.” And as recently as mid-2007, Gen T. Michael Moseley, chief of staff, affirmed AEF capability to handle war-time deployment demands: “We can stay at this level as long as we have to.” It makes sense that the Air Force remains committed to the AEF structure, which is based largely on the maintenance cycles of aircraft and their support systems. At the same time, the Air Force is ready and willing to support deviations from the 120-day AEF rotations when the combatant commander needs particular Air Force support. Maj Gen Anthony F. Przybyslawski puts it this way: “We’ll never say to the COCOM that, ‘I’m sorry, we can’t support this because we only go for 120 days.’ This is war, Americans are getting killed, and airmen are in the fight.”

However, more recent statements from Air Force officials have begun to acknowledge signs of stress in the force. In November 2007, Lt Gen Roger Brady, then-deputy chief of staff for Air Force Manpower and Personnel, told some members of Congress and staffers that security forces—along with EOD and transportation—were not retaining enough noncommissioned officers in
the six-to-14-year career band.\textsuperscript{35} In February 2008, Brady’s successor, Lt Gen Richard Y. Newton III, testified to the House Armed Services Military Personnel Subcommittee that overall Air Force retention was at acceptable levels. General Newton then continued with brief reference to problems in certain specialties:

For FY07 . . . enlisted retention fell below goal (92.7\% of goal), still within acceptable margins. The AF Reserve fell short of its enlisted retention goal by 3\%, attaining 97\% and was .2\% shy of the officer retention goal, attaining 99.8\%. The ANG [Air National Guard] met their overall officer and enlisted retention goals for FY07. Even with these successes, some enlisted specialties in the active Air Force did not achieve their overall retention goal, including Air Traffic Control, Mid East Crypto Linguist, Structural Civil Engineering, and Pavement[s] and Construction Equipment[,] Vehicle Operations, and Contracting. . . .

Our warfighting Airmen are committed to serving, including those experiencing high deployment rates. . . . COCOM requirements and the GWOT [global war on terror] levy a high demand for pilots, navigators, intelligence, civil engineers, and security forces officers as well as enlisted Airmen in aircrew, special operations, intelligence, vehicle operators, civil engineering, and security forces. Despite an increased operations tempo and deployment rate, the Air Force continues to achieve acceptable retention levels across the officer and enlisted force.\textsuperscript{36}

It is important to note that four of the six low-retention specialties General Newton highlighted—structural engineers, pavement and construction, vehicle operators, and contracting—are among the most heavily tasked under the ILO program, having been fully removed from the four-month AEF schedule and programmed instead for six- to 12-month deployments.

This subtle turn in Air Force pronouncement of retention trends is more significant than might be judged from General Newton’s statement alone. In the case of security forces, the fact of the matter is that the Air Force is well beyond the point of early warning. Real retention has dropped significantly, predominantly among so-called second-term Airmen, those members completing their second enlistment period, typically after about eight years of service. Figure 5 depicts the most recent 10-year trend in SF reenlistment rates.\textsuperscript{37} Disregarding the Stop Loss–induced artificial spike in 2002, second-term reenlistments have dropped steadily, from 74 percent in 1997 to 40 percent in 2007—a 46 percent relative decline.\textsuperscript{38} While first-term reenlistments have certainly exhibited more fluctuations
during this period, the 46 to 36 percent retention decline among that population is also cause for concern.

One factor impacting determination of retention health is the recent recalculation of the required retention targets. Two years ago, retention of first- and second-term Airmen had already eroded to the point where drastic management moves were instituted to preserve overall career-field strength, creating a seventh negative ILO effect: an out-of-balance enlisted rank structure. In 2006, Air Force personnel managers adjusted the SF manpower management model to account for reduced reenlistment rates. This move generated several second-order effects. First, it created the appearance of retention program success by lowering the reenlistment target to match the reality of declining retention. Second, it increased the number of new Airmen who needed to be brought into the career field, effectively front-loading more resources to deal with increased attrition and increasing the SF recruiting and training load. Third, since this adjustment took place within a zero-growth environment, it required shifting manpower authorizations from higher to lower ranks in order to
achieve the desired front-loading, thereby creating the appearance of overmanning in the middle noncommissioned officer corps. Historical data on these shifts is not widely available, but while real manning dynamics tend to lag shifts in the authorized structure, a glance at authorized levels in each rank is instructive. The 11-year trends in SF manpower are portrayed in figure 6, which shows the percentage of the SF enlisted force assigned within each pay grade from E-1 Airman basic through E-9 chief master sergeant. As shown, the late 1990s witnessed high volatility, particularly for the E-1 through E-5 grades, as the career field underwent its bottom-up specialty merger. The 2001–3 period was heavily impacted by the post-9/11 engagements, as SF deployments tripled and Stop Loss interrupted normal force outflows. During 1997–2003 the SF career field grew by roughly 20 percent, from slightly over 20,000 to roughly 24,000 personnel, with proportionally greater increases in lower ranks. By 2003, however, all these separate effects had largely stabilized. Since the start of the ILO program, there has been a relative exodus of Airmen finishing their second enlistment, virtually all of them E-5 staff sergeants. At the same time, expanding requirements and zero-growth resources have led to inflation of the E-1 through E-3 population by approximately 1,500 Airmen. In sum, ILO-driven retention problems have caused a major reshaping of the SF rank structure, creating an imbalance in effective supervisory ratios and relative experience levels.

**Temporary “Fixes”**

Caught between the competing challenges of increasing tempo and constrained resources, the Air Force has aggressively employed a variety of corrective measures to control the damage to the SF career field and sustain mission capability. While comprising a broad array of alternatives, these measures represent short-term fixes to ILO program effects on the SF force.

**Home Unit Augmentation**

Personnel augmentation is nothing new in security forces units. What is new is that, traditionally, security forces have sought outside support for their mission, rather than the other way around.
For instance, for more than two decades the Air Force maintained a formal program to augment certain emergency base operating functions during crises. This program, known as resource augmentation duty (READY), involved local ancillary training of a contingency pool of Airmen allocated across all other units on a base. When the base came under attack, experienced an industrial accident, or otherwise encountered a rapid requirement for additional security or police manpower, the pretrained READY augmentees were activated. Since 9/11, the Air Force has variously employed large numbers of Air Reserve Component volunteers, Army National Guard units, and contractors to augment home-base security units degraded through the heavy deployment of their full-time military SF Airmen. Each of these measures has entailed high costs, and with the limited exception of contractors none of these programs are in significant force.

**Direct Reenlistment Incentives**

These factors include such things as targeted reenlistment bonuses, priority choice for assignment location, and so on. Ac-
according to House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee chairman John P. Murtha, D-PA, DOD money for enlistment and reenlistment bonuses has grown more than tenfold from 2006 to 2007, to $2 billion.\textsuperscript{41} Except for the relatively small numbers of SF K-9 and combat-arms specialists, however, the application of reenlistment bonuses for the security forces career field was terminated following two relatively brief experiments in 1998 and from 2002 to 2004.\textsuperscript{42} While these bonuses failed to produce the desired results for SF, it was the overwhelming size of the career field that drove their demise.\textsuperscript{43} While the Air Force continues to pay reenlistment bonuses for Airmen in certain so-called low-density/high-demand fields, typically topping $25,000 each, the cost to do this for SF is viewed as prohibitively expensive.\textsuperscript{44} The cost of paying reenlistment bonuses for the 3,000 or so first- and second-term SF Airmen finishing their service term each year could easily exceed $75 million.

Quality-of-Life Initiatives

There are other programs that at least implicitly target personnel retention. Primarily categorized as “quality-of-life” and “family support,” these programs certainly improve daily living for military members and their families and are generally appreciated. However, aside from the moral imperative of leaders to reasonably take care of military people, there remain serious questions about the cost-effectiveness of such programs. In fact, a RAND study found virtually no evidence—due mainly to lack of rigorous academic study—that programs like this had succeeded in improving retention rates within any of the services.\textsuperscript{45} “[There] is a general acceptance, mostly based on anecdotes, that quality of life affects the retention of service members and the readiness of the armed forces. At another level, it is the individual programs that need to be assessed.”\textsuperscript{46} There is certainly great variability in the design, resourcing, and likely effectiveness of quality-of-life programs. Some have encouraging titles but offer little in terms of likely perceived value among troops, and cannot reasonably be expected to generate any significant retention effects. For instance, the Defense Department’s Post Deployment/Mobilization Respite Absence program grants between one and four days of addi-
tional time off for each month a member deploys in excess of DOD thresholds. Under this program, an Airman who deployed for 18 months in a three-year period (a typical rate for SF Airmen) would earn an extra eight days of leave, hardly likely to influence a person to reenlist and actually increasing the workload for his or her nondeployed colleagues.

**Redrawing the Sustainment Model**

As described earlier in greater detail, the SF specialty is undergoing an unplanned, resource-driven reshaping of its rank demographic profile. This reshaping has already retooled the career field into a Marine-like force structure with a disproportionally high share of first-term Airmen versus second-term and career Airmen. Although impelled by tempo-driven declines in retention, the redesign of the sustainment formulae represents a conscious management decision and hence bears inclusion among this summary of temporary corrective measures.

**Increased Accessions**

In order to feed the larger requirement for new recruits to flow into the SF training pipeline, career field managers had to gain formal approval to increase their share of recruits graduating Air Force Basic Military Training. Since recruits in training count against total service end-strength limits, the increase for SF accessions was subsidized by manpower authorizations from other Air Force specialties, effectively underresourcing other Air Force specialties to pay the SF recruit "bill." In addition, the capacity of the SF training academy was constrained and required additional infrastructure and manpower, at significant cost.

**Battlefield Outsourcing**

Use of contractors has extended beyond simply filling positions at home bases vacated by deploying active duty Airmen. In 2007 the Air Force began exploring the possibility of using contractors in the deployed theater and, in fact, is in the process of identifying specific positions to be outsourced to civilian companies. To the extent that they replace deployed SF Airmen, contractors could increase system capacity to fill ILO requirements.
However, in light of recently highly publicized tragedies involving armed private security contractors, it seems most likely that SF contractors would be used for low-visibility duties in interior areas of Air Force bases, thereby limiting the potential benefit.

**Augmenting Security Forces Teams**

In mid-2007, the Air Staff Security Forces Directorate drafted a proposal to essentially cross-task certain SF ILO deployment requirements to other Air Force specialties. The basis for this proposal was twofold: first, there are many Air Force specialties with a far slower optempo than SF; and second, SF Airmen are marginally better prepared to execute many of the ILO mission sets than are other Airmen. With baseline training in specific tasks, such as guarding prison detainees, the idea was that teams of non-SF Airmen could be led by SF noncommissioned officers. The effect was to distribute a portion of the SF ILO missions across lesser deployed career fields. Not surprisingly, this proposal gained little traction among other Air Staff directors. As of this writing, the concept has not been approved.

**Reclaiming “Lost” Manpower**

The Air Staff has focused a great deal of effort on trying to tap into the large pool of previously untouchable Airmen securing nuclear weapons at Air Force Space Command bases. Two specific efforts in this area are (1) adapting the Guard and Reserve volunteer program to replace active-duty, nuclear security Airmen at their home base while they deploy and (2) introducing security policy changes to free up some of those Airmen within existing manning levels.

Additionally, the Air Force also recently identified 359 “non-core” positions across the Air Force that are filled by security forces Airmen even though these duties do not actually require an armed security forces military member. Examples of such positions range from base protocol offices, to antiterrorism staff advisors, to classified program security administrators. Consequently, the Air Staff has directed these Airmen be replaced with civilians or other specialties unless the unit owning the position can justify retaining an SF specialist. The Air Staff
estimates roughly half of these Airmen will return to core SF units and staffs.\textsuperscript{52}

**Reserve/Guard Mobilization**

In addition to the Space Command Reserve/Guard volunteer program, the Air Staff is planning to mobilize an unknown number of these Airmen to take over security at specific bases in Southwest Asia, which will then be perpetually manned by successive deployments from those same Reserve and Guard units.\textsuperscript{53}

**Competency-based Mission Sourcing**

The Air Force chief of staff has largely succeeded in shifting his service’s ILO missions away from functions lying outside Air Force core competencies. As of late 2007, virtually all ILO deployments sourced to Airmen fall within their defined core competencies, those skill sets the Air Force has determined align within their trained primary specialty. For SF though, despite this positive step there remains a critical problem: the disparity between formal core competencies for which Airmen receive episodic peacetime training and the operational core competencies that Airmen actually exercise in the course of their routine duties outside the war zone.

Unfortunately, while representing the near limit of what can be done from the perspective of the resource-limited ILO supplier, these various measures incompletely address the problem. These temporary fixes seek to reduce the operational strain on SF Airmen but treat only the marginal symptoms of a much more fundamental problem: the misalignment of joint combat-support force structure for modern military operations. Because these fixes operate within the set domain of the supplier—the Air Force in this case—they are insufficient to resolve the central DOD-wide problem. Further, these fixes have proven insufficient to curb the heavy damage already inflicted on universal SF mission capacity: the SF rank profile is out of balance, relative competency and experience levels are down, and without firm strategic correction these conditions will worsen.

These problems jeopardize more than just Air Force missions; the Army units that depend on ILO support will see increasingly inexperienced and inadequately trained first-term Airmen led by
an ever-smaller supervisory cohort. The tendency—already exhibited over five years of Air Force experience—will be to tackle these problems through aggressive training immediately prior to deployment. However, such efforts drive huge growth in training costs, at the expense of time and money previously allocated for other required missions assigned to the Air Force and Army. This outcome is representative of the predicament ultimately facing all ILO-tasked Air Force combat-support specialties. Worse, among the present debates over transforming, rebalancing, and in some cases growing DOD capabilities to meet these emergent challenges, all are focused on combat forces—none address problems on the combat-support side of the equation. Modern warfare places unique demands on combat-support forces, but critical gaps have opened between those demands and the associated capabilities of our military, a discussion taken up in the next chapter.

Notes

1. “Longer Tours Ahead,” 7; and Eulberg, written response to advance questions provided during interview by author.
2. “12 Things You Must Know.”
5. Ibid.; and Western to the author, e-mail.
7. Ibid., briefing, e-mail, 19 December 2007; and Ibid., 14 November 2007.
8. Ibid., 14 November 2007.
13. Ibid., 61.
16. Hertog, interview (see chap. 1, p. 1).
17. Ibid.
18. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, 1 August 2006, V-1. Specifically, JP 3-10 assigns responsibility for LOC security to the commander designated with responsibility for the operational area, i.e., the land-component commander for areas outside of tactical base boundaries. It further explains that “the area commander uses selected air assault, mechanized, or motorized combat units to man combat outposts at critical locations along
the assigned route” (ibid., V-5). The selection of specific elements will vary with the situation, but the allocation of this function to land-component forces is universally acknowledged.


23. In its report on the fiscal year (FY) 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, the House Armed Services Committee discussed its concerns regarding permanent ILO deployment of Airmen and sailors and expressed displeasure over establishing dedicated training facilities to support ILO requirements. In this discussion, the committee implied that all ground combat operations should by definition fall within the role of the Army or Marines, indicating a misunderstanding of certain Air Force and Navy support capabilities in areas such as base security, which fall cleanly within service roles. See United States House of Representatives, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,* 301–2.


27. Svan, “Air Force Personnel.”


30. The arithmetic is as follows: (80,000 man-days) / (365 days per year) = 220 man-years. One man-year roughly approximates the available capacity of one full-time manpower position.

31. This subjective judgment reflects the author’s experiences in operations and training over a 20-year career. There is widespread support for this judgment among senior ILO commanders in the field. For example, see Richards, “Expeditionary Wing Leadership Lessons Learned,” 8, 18–21.


34. Ibid., 35.


37. For clarity, the chart depicts rates only for non-subspecialty qualified SF personnel, excluding the more reenlistment-troubled subspecialties of military working dog (MWD) handlers and combat-arms (CA) weapons specialists. While they are deploying at even higher rates than so-called straight-leg SF Airmen, the MWD and CA groups are falling far below required force-sustainment levels.

38. As an immediate response to the 9/11 attacks on America and the declaration of the US global war on terror, the Air Force instituted a freeze on
retirements and separations known as “Stop Loss.” This policy was in effect from 2 October 2001 through 2 August 2002. As a result of Stop Loss, Air Force reenlistment tracking databases reflect an artificial increase for 2002. Similarly, the 2003 data probably show an overcorrection effect due to forcibly delayed separations. See Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC), "Air Force Stop Loss Message #6.”

39. Western to the author, e-mail.

40. SF manpower data from AFPC, Interactive Demographic Analysis System (IDEAS).


42. Bonuses were paid, during these periods only, to so-called core SF Airmen, while the SF specialty shreds for CA and MWD handlers have received reenlistment bonuses continuously, through present. See AFPC, “SRB History 98–04.”

43. The Air Force paid reenlistment bonuses to core security forces reenlistees in 1998 and 1999, and again from 2002 to 2004, during which time the associated reenlistment rates failed to respond (ibid.; and AFPC, R-Status Report Generator).

44. The latest roster of Air Force specialties eligible for reenlistment bonuses includes 43 different career fields, including various hard-to-retain but low-population specialties in special forces, medicine, and linguistics. The average bonus multiplier for a first-term reenlistee is 2.8; assuming an E-5 who reenlists for four more years, this equates to a bonus payment of $26,937. See AFPC, “SRB AFSCs.”

45. Rostker, America Goes to War, 81–83.

46. Ibid., 81.

47. Rolfsen, “More Days Off for War-Zone Service.” This article also points out that the “Air Force announcement of the program’s details came four months after the other services announced their time-off plans. When the other services were unveiling their programs, the Air Force downplayed the significance of the [DOD] mandate, claiming the service’s deployment system kept airmen from exceeding the Defense Department’s deployment guidelines.” The delay indicates an as yet slow recognition within the Air Force regarding the extent to which deployment tempo is impacting Airmen.


49. Hertog, briefing, subject: “QFEZU: Force Protection Enhancement UTC [Unit Type Code].”


51. Brady to Air Staff and vice commanders, all USAF major commands, memorandum.

52. Hertog, interview (see chap. 1, p. 1).

Chapter 4

Modern Battlefield, Legacy Force

The 19th-century “battlespace” in the [American] West was noncontiguous, nonlinear, and of varied terrain and weather. This was an environment in which a mobile, lethal, and determined enemy, prone to acts of “terrorism,” could attack at any time and from any direction. This environment consisted of long lines of communication, along which there were relatively few friendly forces available to provide security. Every wagon master and every family knew that the wagon train must be organized and prepared to conduct its own defense. In the same manner, every Army supply column knew it also must be prepared to defend itself.

—Col Gregory Fontenot, US Army, Retired

On Point, 2005

The ILO problem exists because the US military has failed to adapt its combat-support forces with appropriate capability to meet the demands of current and future conflict. Throughout the twentieth century, the United States developed its military assuming symmetrical conflict between marked forces arrayed across a linear battlefield. Following the Cold War and Desert Storm, the United States significantly downsized its forces. Today, that smaller force is overwhelmed by the demands of the simultaneous military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. While there is widespread agreement that US force structure does not match the demands of current conflicts, that understanding generally targets two shortfalls: the number of soldiers and marines needed to sustain ground combat operations, and the weapons and equipment needed to conduct nation-building in the middle of an insurgency. Importantly, the critical shortage of combat-support forces has largely escaped public attention. Moreover, so has the fact that this shortage is as important to campaign success as are the more widely publicized areas of shortfall in the ground combat arms, particularly Army infantry. What is not generally recognized is that today’s battlespace—and indeed, those most likely to manifest in the near future—require
a vastly different combat-support force than exists. More critically, the disconnect between the modern battlespace and the legacy combat-support force jeopardizes US military capabilities across the spectrum of conflict.

**US Force Structure**

Since the end of World War II, US military force sizing and shaping has been driven more by fiscal constraint than by any other single factor. During this period, military forces have steadily declined, as depicted in figure 7. This decline has been buttressed by beliefs that modern threats really don’t endanger America’s national survival and that technology has rendered manpower-intensive “big wars” obsolete. Yet US military strategy still levies war-fighting requirements across the full spectrum of conflict intensity. As a consequence, the DOD has sought to maintain full-spectrum readiness by becoming more efficient. Specifically,

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the military has sought to maximize what is commonly called the “tooth to tail ratio” between combat and support forces—the higher the better, according to most military experts.\textsuperscript{2}

Traditionally considered as a necessary but ancillary part of campaign execution, combat support comprises those functions which directly enable but don’t directly engage in combat with the enemy. Due to differences in service terminology, this paper will use the term “combat support” to refer to all forces other than “combat” forces (i.e., the combination of what in the US Army lexicon is considered two separate categories: combat support and combat service support).\textsuperscript{3} The distinction between combat and combat-support forces underpins the organization and funding of the military services and the planning of the campaign operations which they execute. Since traditional military planning culminates in decisive actions executed by combat forces that either destroy or checkmate enemy forces, combat forces tend to receive proportionally greater investment in weapons systems, equipment, and manpower than do their support counterparts.

In the mid-1970s, the conventional forces of the Soviet Union vastly outnumbered those of North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies in Central Europe. In order to increase the odds of defeating a Warsaw Pact attack in the long, vulnerable period before US reserves could be activated and deployed—and without resorting to nuclear weapons—the Department of Defense determined that a significant increase in active combat forces was necessary. Consequently, Army chief of staff Gen Creighton Abrams shifted the bulk of combat-support forces into the Reserve and used the offsetting active force capacity to add more combat units. As a result, General Abrams’s strategy achieved the rather amazing feat of increasing active combat forces over 20 percent between 1975 and the early 1980s—from 13-plus to 16 divisions—while holding end active strength steady.\textsuperscript{4}

In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War and the overwhelming American performance in Desert Storm, the nation expected to reap a victor’s dividend, and it did, reducing active Army end strength from 751,000 to less than 500,000 soldiers between 1990 and 1996.\textsuperscript{5} This reduction was driven by two assessments of the military force structure necessary to support US strategy in the new security environment: the Joint Chiefs’ 1991 Base Force proposal, and Secretary of Defense
Les Aspin’s 1993 *Report on the Bottom-up Review (BUR)*. Both assessments shifted the military planning focus from global to regional threats, postulating a requirement to conduct two simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC). The Base Force concept, formally documented in the 1992 *National Military Strategy*, proposed a structural realignment to provide a core—or base—military capability to meet four mission areas: strategic deterrence, crisis response in the continental United States, forward presence, and regional crisis response. This strategy projected significant force reductions, particularly for the Army, which was to shrink from 26 to 20 active and Reserve divisions within four years—a 23 percent reduction. The *BUR* went even further in its proposed force cuts, calling for a 15-division Total Army force by 1999. Like the Base Force, the *BUR* allowed for the likelihood of peace enforcement or other interventions short of major war, but considered such “smaller-scale contingencies” to pose relatively small demand for forces, on the order of 10 combat brigades and a total of 50,000 combined combat and support forces. Based on that assumption, the *BUR* considered that if such a crisis emerged simultaneously with two ongoing MRCs, “then we might be required to activate significant numbers of reserve component forces.” Although commonly referred to as a two-war strategy, this latter concern effectively resulted in a 2-plus-1 strategy: a capability to fight two major wars plus one smaller conflict.

Today’s force structure continues the basic *BUR* construct. The 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* Report calls for maintaining a US surge capability to fight two nearly simultaneous campaigns, one of which may be a “large-scale, long-duration irregular campaign” while “selectively reinforcing deterrence.” The *QDR* further states that steady-state operations for homeland defense, the war on terror, and conventional deterrence represent the main determinant of force size. Although somewhat incoherently, the *QDR* appears to return to the nominal two-war approach, with one such war resembling a larger version of the *BUR*’s irregular operations short of war. While the 2006 *QDR* appropriately recognizes a shift in the form of modern war, a central problem occurs in its incomplete specification of the military capabilities necessary to operate successfully in the modern battlespace.
The Modern Battlespace

OEF and OIF have witnessed the culmination of an evolution toward asymmetric, nonlinear battle. The traditional line between combat operations and most combat-support and service-support functions is now barely visible. Support forces are now engaged throughout the length and breadth of the physical battlespace as thoroughly as are traditional combat forces. The environment in which today’s conflicts occur is fundamentally different than that of any previous era. It is more amorphous, and hence endangers support forces more directly, than any previous conflict in history.

The evolving nonlinearity and overall complexity of the battlefield is widely recognized. Retired Army general Gary Luck, the Desert Storm XVIII Airborne Corps commander, describes the modern battlespace as much more complex than the relatively unfettered fighting environment of the traditional battlefield, populated by much larger numbers and varieties of actors, and less able to be monitored and controlled by establishing traditional operating area boundaries. Army major general Jeanette Edmunds, commanding officer of the 19th Theater Support Command, has explained that in modern wars like Iraq “there is no room for a ‘rear-area’ mindset, unless that mindset is one that acknowledges that in war being in the rear area or in the vital logistics lines of communication may well be the most dangerous place to be.”

US military doctrine formally recognizes the unique features of the modern battlespace. Following Operation Desert Storm, the Army developed the concept of the contemporary operating environment (COE) to describe the field of conflict in the twenty-first century. The COE is characterized by “intelligent and adaptive enemies who seek asymmetric advantages across the battlespace.” In its updated 2006 keystone doctrine document—Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations—the Joint Staff refined this idea by altogether discarding the traditional concept of battlespace in favor of the “operational environment,” which includes the combination of enemy and friendly physical, procedural, and cognitive factors impacting a commander’s design and control of operations. While acknowledging the contextual accuracy of the Joint Operations terminology, this paper will use “battlespace” to refer to the tactical
level of the operational environment within a given campaign theater. *Joint Operations* recognizes the differences between linear and nonlinear operations, as well as whether they are conducted in contiguous or noncontiguous areas. This typology is depicted graphically in figure 8. The concept of linearity refers to the geometrical forms of troop displacement, operating boundaries, sequencing, and whether operations orient on enemy forces or on noneo graphically associated objectives. The concept of contiguousness refers to degree of tangency and physical coordination between units. Stability or civil-support operations typically are designed as nonlinear operations within

![Joint operational environment diagram](image-url)

*Figure 8. Joint operational environment.* (*JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006, incorporating Change 1, 13 February 2008, V-19.*)
contiguous operations areas—such as Bosnia, Joint Task Force Andrew, and Vietnam. JP 3-0 states that in nonlinear, contiguous operations, vulnerability increases due to extended troop exposure, and complexity increases due to the fluidity of operations and high presence of noncombatants. In this sense Operation Iraqi Freedom, particularly as prosecuted since mid-2007, represents a nonlinear, contiguous operation.

Another unique characteristic of the modern battlespace is its dramatically decreasing density. In his 2000 report Heavy Matter: Urban Operations’ Density of Challenges, Russell W. Glenn offers numerical estimates of the historical trend in battlefield combatant density, as presented in table 2. This characteristic increases the distance between friendly units and troops, lengthens lines of communication, and generally increases friction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Antiquity</th>
<th>Napoleonic</th>
<th>US Civil War</th>
<th>WWII</th>
<th>1970s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban Examples</td>
<td>Plataea New Carthage</td>
<td>Jungingen Aaspm-Essling</td>
<td>Monterey Churubusco Rorke’s Drift</td>
<td>Stalingrad Aachen Manila Berlin</td>
<td>Beirut Khorrampshahr Hue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatants per km²</td>
<td>100,000 4,970 3,883 32 25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Examples</td>
<td>16,300 46,400 11,600 1,300 1,100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Km² per Combatant</td>
<td>10 201 258 31,000 40,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Examples</td>
<td>61 22 86 769 909</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*km² = square kilometer


In addition to these changes in the battlespace, the modern enemy himself is different today than that encountered in previous conflicts. General Luck argues the enemy himself cannot now be attacked in the usual manner: “The traditional military-centric single center of gravity focus that worked so well in the cold war doesn’t allow us to accurately analyze today’s emerging networked, adaptable, asymmetric adversary. This adversary has no single identifiable ‘source of all power.’”

47
Moreover, the nature of the enemy threat has increased the criticality of CS/CSS missions to the overall campaign, along with their associated mortality and lethality. Operations to reconstruct, secure, and stabilize a country require promulgating human capacity throughout virtually the entirety of the political geography. In so doing, the modern enemy has increased opportunity to attack friendly forces in small elements using guerilla tactics. Exposure to enemy attack is distributed equally across space and no longer restricted mainly to defined areas between the front lines of opposing forces. As a result, the risk of attack is shared equally among combat and support troops, both because the enemy seeks out targets in all areas and because support troops must venture broadly to conduct their assigned missions. As seen in Iraq, reactively withdrawing into protected enclaves defeats the ability to achieve the necessary interaction with the civilian populace, thus placing friendly forces on the horns of a dilemma between doing what’s effective and doing what’s safe.

Perhaps the most salient feature of the modern battlespace is not measured in physical characteristics or dimensions, but in time. Today’s conflict in Iraq has been observed as a culmination of sorts of an evolution in warfare toward “fourth generation warfare” (4GW). The Joint Forces Command’s Trends and Challenges for the Future Joint Force through 2030 uses 4GW to frame its vision of future war. This vision highlights the 4GW adversary’s will to use unrestricted violence, false propaganda, and his nonbureaucratic adaptability to overwhelm US social and political will to continue the fight. According to Col Thomas X. Hammes, the salient feature of this form of warfare is that it lasts much longer than the wars Americans are used to fighting—decades long, rather than months or even years.

The modern battlespace consumes combat-support forces at a historically unprecedented rate. The Army’s first historical report on Operation Iraqi Freedom identified combat service support as one of its key shortfalls. “The current system emphasizes efficiency over effectiveness—from parts and supply distribution to the physical equipping of CSS units. In combat, however, effectiveness is the only real measure of success; many CSS units struggled to perform their mission due to ‘savings’ realized in recent changes in organization, equip-
ment, training, resources, and doctrine.” Further, this same report found the active/Reserve component mix “inappropriate to meet post–Cold War realities. The demands on the Reserve components—to support a crisis contingency force while simultaneously supporting homeland security, major combat, and stability operations and support operations requirements, require a full review of missions and force structure.”

A specific example of the modern demand for combat-support forces is the role of military police in OIF. The anticipated rates of advance for V Corps and the I Marine Expeditionary Force, along with expected enemy surrender rates, generated large requirements for military police to secure both enemy prisoners of war and rapidly liberated areas. But a large portion of the military police forces, along with other combat-support forces, was drawn from the Army Guard and Reserves, and in many cases the process of mobilization and training led to missed deployment timelines.23

Moreover, even if these timelines had been universally met, the judgment of many experts is that even the planned levels of forces to secure the areas behind advancing forces were inadequate.24 During the transition from combat to stability operations, this mismatch only intensified. According to Thomas Friedman, “The U.S. forces arrived in Iraq with far too few military police and civilian affairs officers to run the country. As a result, the only way U.S. troops could stop the massive looting was by doing the only thing they knew how: shooting people. Since they didn’t want to do that . . . Iraqi government infrastructure, oil equipment, and even nuclear research sites were stripped bare.”25

Gaps

It takes more than a decade to procure a major weapons system, to develop a military leader, or to realize the practical effect of major bureaucratic reorganization. When force planning perfectly matches the shape of future conflict, there is a seamless fit between military means and what is required to win. However, when force planning is off target the resultant gaps between requirements and capabilities generally are first visible in major conflict. In the case of today’s combat-support forces, these gaps began forming at the end of the Cold War but did
not fully manifest because the conflicts of the 1990s were not yet fully evolved toward 4GW. Today, in the face of two mature fourth-generation wars, these gaps in force size, shape, sustainment, and means produce critical negative effects on mission capability, as described in the previous chapter. The identification of gaps is important because it helps develop operational solutions by narrowing the analytical divide between cause and effect and keeps the focus on meaningful solutions.

Size

The first gap lies between the force size required to conduct modern battles and the available resources. Mr. Aspin conceived the BUR based on an assumption that future MRCs could be handled by four to five Army divisions and four to five Marine expeditionary brigades, or 16–20 combined ground combat brigades, roughly equivalent to the US troop levels actually employed in Iraq. Despite the rough parity between BUR assumptions and current experience, force size turns out to represent a huge gap on the support side of the force. This gap results from three primary causes: the geometry of the modern battlespace, budget-driven force sizing, and the operational strategies inherent in modern conflict.

According to Frederick Kagan, one of the key assumptions in General Abrams’s calculus was that the dense battlefield likely in a conventional war in Europe would generate economies-of-scale savings in combat-support forces. However, as discussed earlier the modern battlespace evinces much more diffuse requirements for support forces than envisioned by General Abrams. Indeed, not only does the battlespace overwhelm any potential for support-force economies, it generates losses of scale compared to the conventional battlefield.

The 1980s deactivation and misbalancing of combat-support functions was only exacerbated by the BUR force reductions, just as analysts had predicted soon after completion of the BUR. For instance, a 1995 RAND report found that while the BUR-structured Army possessed sufficient combat forces to meet the two-MRC construct, the force fell approximately 100,000 personnel short of requirements for combat support in the near-simultaneous MRC scenario. Moreover, the same
report found that Army combat support was barely sufficient even for a single major regional conflict, requiring 180,000 of the planned 193,500 active and Reserve support forces and thereby jeopardizing military capacity to do anything else, even to conduct a smaller-scale contingency operation.\textsuperscript{29} Thus, even by BUR standards, planned force levels were reduced to a quantity barely sufficient to handle a major conflict.

Historically, support troops represent an increasing share of the total military force applied in war. According to Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, in Vietnam combat troops represented less than 20 percent of total deployed forces.\textsuperscript{30} In Operation Desert Storm, roughly 125,000 of the 300,000-plus deployed soldiers represented combat units; the remainder—approximately 60 percent—was in support units.\textsuperscript{31} Similarly, a Multinational Force-Iraq headquarters spokesman stated that US forces in Iraq include 60 percent support forces, and statistics attributed to a 2006 Pentagon report put the figure as high as 77 percent.\textsuperscript{32} Certainly, the definition of “combat troops” is variously interpreted, particularly among the media, yet there is widespread agreement that even the narrowest definition of “support” translates to over half of the deployed force. Moreover, these estimates discount the significant levels of contract workers in Iraq supporting military combat functions. By every indication, the proportion of support forces required to prosecute modern war continues to rise, increasing the force size gap.

Shape

Even more disconcerting than the mistaken projections of aggregate support-force requirements though, is the crude method by which support forces have been drawn down in the post–Cold War era. Not only are there barely sufficient support forces in overall numbers, the shortages are worst in the very support specialties that have turned out to be in highest demand. This result was also foreshadowed in uncanny detail by the 1995 RAND analysis. According to this report, the broadest possible comparison of active and Reserve forces to single-MRC requirements showed that “six branches (adjutant general, composite services, medical, military intelligence, quartermaster,
and transportation) . . . have shortfalls totaling about 13,500 personnel . . . the transportation branch alone would be short by over 6,000 personnel.” The principal cause identified was shortages in specialty manpower to carry out Army executive agent all-service theater support, primarily in ground transportation of combat supplies such as fuel, ammunition, and rations. Figure 9 compares support requirements to personnel available in the active and Reserve support population, known as the contingency force pool (CFP).

Similarly, a December 2002 DOD report observed the unique skill sets required of modern operations other than war (OOTW): “Contingencies such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations place a high demand on some capabilities—civil affairs, military police and security forces, public affairs units, air traffic control services, deployable air control squadrons, and the reserve intelligence community—that are low in density to overall forces . . . [and] are high in demand as the Department strives to meet global security requirements.”

![Figure 9. Single-MRC Army requirements and CFP manpower by branch.](adapted from Ronald E. Sortor, Army Active/Reserve Mix: Force Planning for Major Regional Contingencies [Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995], 27.)

**Sustainment**

Another gap, perhaps most significant of all, exists in the dimension of time. The duration of modern conflicts is significantly longer than what is supportable by the current force structure. Operation Desert Storm required nearly twice as
many troops as deployed over the greatest period of the Iraq War, but this was a relatively short conflict, and the force was still relatively large. The predrawdown US military was able to absorb the huge scale of Desert Storm because it required no lengthy sustainment of forces and was able to surge forces. The length of the current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, in their seventh and sixth years, respectively, has exposed the limited endurance of the US military for 4GW operations. This shortfall goes beyond simply imposing hardships on the troops. It even exceeds the hazard of constricting readiness for other missions, although that in itself represents a serious dilemma. The problem is that after the first two deployment rotations, the US Army simply runs out of troops to perform all of its assigned combat-support functions.

**Means**

Finally, there is a huge gap between the mix of technological and human means in the existing force and that required in 4GW. This gap is widely acknowledged. As Anthony Cordesman writes in *The War after the War*, while diplomacy must play the dominant role in stabilization operations and nation-building, there is still a necessary military component, but it depends on manpower-intensive capability rather than technology. He continues on to say that

> the military missions of low-intensity combat, economic aid, civil-military relations, security, and information campaigns are manpower dominated, and they require skilled military manpower. . . . Although technology has been, is, and will be critical to US power and military success, it is correct to question whether the United States has any credible way of using technology to further cut forces and manpower without taking unacceptable risks. Creating the proper mix of capabilities for asymmetric warfare, low-intensity conflict, security and Phase IV operations, and nation building requires large numbers of skilled and experienced personnel.36

According to US Naval War College professor Peter Dombrowski, “[Current US military reforms] largely avoid the problem of numbers. Effective postconflict operations, whether in Iraq or in the future in Iran and elsewhere, require large numbers of well-trained, prepared, and equipped troops on the ground. [Absent corrective measures], the United States may win every force-on-force encounter but lose wars because it will be unable to provide
the security necessary for political and economic stabilization in defeated countries.”37

The Army and defense transformation programs of the 1990s and early 2000s, billed as a way to squeeze greater effectiveness out of fewer troops, failed to produce any revolutionary technological or organizational answer to the reality of manpower-intensive modern nation-building. As Kagan observes in his comprehensive review of American military transformation, Finding the Target:

[None] of the service visions really considered what the requirements of [OOTW] missions might be in any detail. All treated them primarily as lesser-included missions within a force structure designed for major war. . . . The U.S. strategy community in the 1990s was in general so caught up with the minutiae of technology that it lost sight of the larger purpose of war, and therefore missed the emergence of a challenge even more important than that of technology—the challenge of designing military operations to achieve particular political objectives.38

For a military experienced in OOTW, and which even in hindsight was adequately sized for major-conflict combat forces, the shortage of support forces is discouraging but understandable. Alongside earlier reports of sufficient support forces for at least one MRC, a 1997 RAND analysis determined there was enough combat support to cover even a large OOTW. However, the report observed high organizational friction in conducting such operations: historically, units were commonly tailored up or down from their conventional structures, personnel were temporarily cross-leveled among units and specialties, and partial unit deployments were used in order to preserve as much conventional war-plan capability as possible.39 Given the scale and duration of 4GW operations, such as that ongoing in Iraq, we see the worst of both worlds: the force-skills-management complexity of OOTW coupled with the size and duration of an MRC. The combination of major operational gaps in size, shape, sustainability, and means poses a dire set of 4GW challenges. Clearly, the US military force structure is misaligned for the modern battlefield.

**A Point of Crisis**

On the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the DOD itself observed a number of indicators that its force structure was out of bal-
ance: “Routine use of involuntary recall of reserves; increased operational tempo in selected areas, anecdotal evidence that the ongoing partial mobilization may have a negative impact on reserve recruiting and retention in the future; the mismatch between the new defense strategy and current force structure; and the length of time it takes to adapt force-mix allocations in today’s rapidly changing security environment.”

Exacerbated by the post-1990 force cuts, the Army’s 1970s decision to shift most of its support forces to the Guard and Reserve has proven ill suited to the modern battlefield. Force-structure shortfalls have led the DOD to dip into its strategic reserves to an extent that jeopardizes both its ability to support a large conventional conflict and to respond to a homeland catastrophe. According to a recent report from the Commission on the National Guard and the Reserves, fewer Army National Guard units are ready for an attack on the United States today than were ready a year ago, when the commission reported a 12 percent readiness level. Many of the same specialties for which the Army turns to the Reserves for support in Iraq would also be particularly crucial in most homeland defense and emergency response scenarios—specialties like military police, transportation, and civil affairs. In an interview about the commission’s report, chairman and retired Marine general Arnold L. Punaro said, “We think there is an appalling gap in readiness for homeland defense, because it will be the Guard and reserve that have to respond for these things. . . . Because the nation has not adequately resourced its forces designated for response to weapons of mass destruction, it does not have sufficiently trained, ready forces available.” The strain on Guard and Reserve readiness grew so high that in January 2007 the secretary of defense limited their deployments to one year in every five.

The nexus of 4GW, US foreign policy, and legacy force structure has of course strained the active force in ways previously seen only in acknowledged wars of national survival, particularly so in the Army, where signs of overreach are beginning to appear: recruiting waivers for education and other factors are on the rise; desertions are up 80 percent since 2003; suicide rates are at a 25-year high; and lack of training time is jeopardizing readiness for other missions. The Army’s manpower chief has reported the Army is “out of balance” and “demand for forces
exceeds our capacity to supply them on a sustained basis.”

According to Gen George Casey, Army chief of staff, the current deployment pace is “unsustainable.” Commenting on the challenge of managing deployed tour lengths, General Casey remarked in December 2007, “We are now in a position of having to sustain an all-volunteer force in a protracted confrontation for the first time since the Revolutionary War, and so we are in uncharted territory. We’re measuring all of these things very carefully, but I’ve got to tell you, it’s a dicey game.”

In spite of several ongoing force-management initiatives, there is no indication that the Army’s ability to supply the full requirement for combat-support forces will improve, certainly not within the next five years. While the Army growth initiative plans to add 65,000 new active duty soldiers to the force by 2013, roughly half of those are destined for new combat-support or service-support units. Army growth takes place alongside the Army transformation effort, but the extent to which these parallel efforts can correct the balance of active-Reserve support capabilities remains unclear, as does the ability of the Army to meet its corresponding recruiting goals or effectively budget for the associated infrastructure and equipment. The deployment tempo and recapitalization strain on Army resources have compounded the difficulty of staying on course with these plans. Originally slated to conclude by 2011, at a cost of $52 billion, the GAO recently reported that the Army’s transformational brigade conversion will run through 2019 and overrun original cost forecasts by an as-yet-undetermined amount.

Similarly, there is no indication that strategic demands will require fewer combat-support forces. Future Iraq troop-level requirements—even in the very near term—are highly unpredictable, particularly given the uncertainty of the policy of the new US presidential administration. Even if the Army is able to draw down Iraq combat brigades in the next year, there is no guarantee that will necessarily translate to reduced combat-support requirements. The number of support troops required will depend more on the operational and basing strategies employed than on the number of combat troops; indeed, it could even increase.

Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, chances are very high that the United States will continue to face the same challenges it has
confronted in the first decade of the new century. T. David Mason, in a recent Strategic Studies Institute monograph, cites data from the two preeminent conflict-tracking databases showing that since World War II there have been more than four times as many intrastate wars as interstate or extrastate conflicts.\[^{56}\] According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in the period 1997–2006 there were only three interstate conflicts, and during the last three years of that period there were none.\[^{57}\] Even more disturbing, Mason reports that a single intrastate war makes a state highly likely to suffer another such war, indicating something of a chronic nature to intrastate conflicts.\[^{58}\] SIPRI’s 2007 report points out that strife-torn, failed, or failing states not only cause problems for their populations but also typically inflict second-order damage, serving as havens for transnational terrorists and criminals and contributing to conflict diffusion across state borders.\[^{59}\] One-third of the world’s major armed conflicts ongoing in 2006 directly involved the United States (i.e., the conflicts against Iraqi insurgents, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and al-Qaeda worldwide), and were the deadliest.\[^{60}\] In the global context of the US war on terror, odds are that the conditions contributing to complex, diffuse, and violent 4GW conflict will continue to shape US military involvement.

Overall then, it would be wishful thinking to simply assume that demand for combat-support forces will subside or that future conflicts will better match the US legacy force structure. Positive action must be taken to overcome the joint shortage in combat-support forces necessary to sustain the full slate of ongoing missions, without hazarding big-war readiness.

**Notes**

1. For one example of the widespread agreement on this point, see Correll, “In the Wake of the QDR,” 70–76.
3. While combat-support forces operate on the battlefield, often alongside combat forces, they are not designed for the purpose of fighting the enemy, as are combat forces. The combat-arms, combat-support, and combat-service-support lexicon is part of the US Army Regimental System. *Combat forces* (also known as the “combat arms”) include those functions focused on enemy engagement: air defense artillery, armor, aviation, cavalry, field artillery.
infantry, and special forces. Combat support refers to units which provide fire support and operational assistance to aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat; this support comprises the areas of chemical warfare, intelligence, police/security, and communications. Combat service support encompasses logistical support services required by the soldiers of combat units to continue their missions in combat; these services consist of quartermaster, ordnance, transportation, adjutant general, finance, chaplain, legal, and medical functions. For further description, see Wikipedia, s.v. “U.S. Army Combat Arms Regimental System,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Army_Combat_Arms_Regimental_System (accessed 16 February 2008).

4. Kagan, Finding the Target, 19–21. There are various theories on General Abrams’s motivation for his combat-support-force realignment, including what has become known as the “Abrams Doctrine,” that he intended to limit the president’s ability to deploy combat strength without engaging public support vis-a-vis a large-scale Reserve mobilization (ibid., 17–18; and Carafano, “Army Reserves and the Abrams Doctrine”).

5. DOD, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2008, table 7-5, 212–13. Other sources often cite different numbers, most likely referring to actual troop strength, which at times slightly exceed authorized manpower ceilings in real time. For example, see Fontenot, On Point, 5, who cites a reduction from 786,000 active Army soldiers in 1990 to 500,000 by mid-1993.

6. For an excellent and concise review of force-structure evolution through the 1990s and the disconnects with the requirements of the US war on terror, see Schmitt and Donnelly, “Numbers Matter,” in Of Men and Materiel, 5–29.


8. Ibid., 19.


10. Ibid., pt. 4.


12. Ibid., 36.


17. Ibid., V-16–V-19.


20. Hammes, Sling and the Stone, 44–47, 207–23. I have, of course, somewhat crudely condensed here Hammes’s description of 4GW. He catalogs various tactical, operational, and strategic characteristics unique to 4GW and its evolution throughout Vietnam and subsequent key conflicts, which require a full reading to appreciate.


22. Ibid., 69.

23. Ibid., 72–73.

24. Record, Dark Victory, 102.
26. Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-up Review*, pt. 3. In addition to the Army divisions, the BUR postulated that a future MRC would require 10 Air Force fighter wings, 100 bombers, four to five Navy carrier battle groups, and special operations forces.
29. Ibid., 25–26. RAND analysts based their calculations on historical and doctrinal rules that figured a ratio of 2.5 support troops for every combat soldier, once the theater had matured to a steady-state level. Additionally, the analysis used Army force-deployment-planning databases and modeling software (ibid., 22–24).
30. Quoted in Shanker, “Pulling out Combat Troops.”
32. Shanker, “Pulling out Combat Troops.”
33. Sorter, *Army Active/Reserve Mix*, 27. Interestingly, these figures are very close to the combined total of current Air Force and Navy ILO support to the Army.
34. Ibid., 29–31. This study estimates an active Army shortage of 20,000–60,000 personnel based strictly on the theater executive agency requirements, necessitating Reserve augmentation.
38. Kagan, *Finding the Target*, 252–53. Kagan is not alone in observing the failure to adapt US force structure to post–Cold War OOTW. In *America Goes to War*, Rostker points out that Somalia provided a telling example of the imbalance of the incongruity between these operations and DOD force structure (57–59). He observes that “in Somalia, the planning assumption that an OOTW engagement was the lesser but included case of conventional war proved wrong. Understanding the nature of future military engagements, defining the appropriate force structure for the future, and developing an appropriate set of personnel policies for an all-volunteer force should have been the legacy of Somalia, but it was not” (ibid., 58).
41. Baldor, “U.S. Military May Not Be Ready.”
43. Gates, DOD policy memorandum.
44. Rochelle, statement in House of Representatives, 6.
45. Baldor, “Army Desertion Rates Rise.” At the same time (FY 2007), Marine Corps and Navy desertions were at three- and seven-year lows, respectively, and their combined desertions represented less than half the Army total of 4,698. The Air Force had 16 desertions during FY07. See McMichael, “Number, Rate of Army Desertions,” 28–29.
46. Martin, “Soldier Suicide Attempts Skyrocket.”
47. Baldor, “War Demands Strain Military Readiness.”
51. "Army Announces Stationing Decisions."
52. Pine, “Army, Marine Corps Struggle.”
53. Scully, “GAO Says Cost of Army’s ‘modular’ Conversion Will Climb.”
54. Grant, “Reports Warn of Impending Army Budget Crisis.”
55. Although the author developed this opinion independently, it is appropriate to note that Maj Gen Del Eulberg (Air Force Civil Engineer, Headquarters USAF, Washington, D.C.) also articulated this view independently. Interview by the author, 20 November 2007.
57. SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2007, 79. For a similar description of the trend in conflict, and external interventions to resolve conflict, see Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, 30–34.
58. Mason, Sustaining the Peace, 2.
60. SIPRI reported deaths for 2006 in the three US conflicts totaling 8,800; deaths in the other 14 conflicts totaled 5,400, as follows: Burundi (100), Sudan (100), Uganda (200), Colombia (500), Peru (25), India (700), Myanmar (100), Nepal (400), Philippines (325), Sri Lanka (1,950), Chechnya (300), Israel (500), and Turkey (200). See SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2007, 82–90.
Chapter 5

Closing the Gaps

Under political guidance that is certain to be unsatisfactory, likely to contain contradictions, and almost bound to bear the stamp of some unsound assumptions, defense planners are obliged to decide what is a good enough defense establishment when one cannot know precisely whether, when, where, or for what ends war will be waged.

—Colin S. Gray
“RMAs [Revolutions in Military Affairs] and the Dimensions of Strategy”

So, we’ve got to be a little careful as a service [of saying], “You know what, this is messy, and therefore this is a ground combat thing, therefore the default is the Army.” I think that’s unfair as hell. The question is, as our nation is facing an enemy we’ve never faced before . . . how are we adapting as a truly interdependent joint force? That’s the question.

—Maj Gen Del Eulberg, Air Force Civil Engineer
Interview by the author, 20 November 2007

The security forces case study shows that the ILO program has already inflicted broad negative effects on Air Force and Army capabilities. The evolving nature of war indicates that the associated gaps in combat-support capacity will continue to widen. Despite this hazard, it would be naïve and pointless to propose solutions to the combat-support problem that are restricted solely to requirements for unrealistic budget increases. While the best generic answer may be one that is unconstrained with respect to resources, it may be politically unachievable. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to offer executable solutions that close the combat-support gaps in size, shape, sustainment, and means discussed in the previous chapter.
CLOSING THE GAPS

Solutions

The following solutions represent a range of cost and time requirements and are ordered by increasing degree of complexity. While neither an exhaustive nor precise list of detailed program actions, these recommendations nonetheless represent critical areas of effort that stand to generate decisive improvements to close important gaps in combat-support capability.

Increase Department of Defense Force Levels

The most straightforward—albeit crudest—solution to close the combat-support-force gaps would be to simply add more manpower, consistent with current service roles and functions. Not only would such an approach provide headroom within which to reshape the force, it would add the necessary size to properly sustain long modern wars. Strength increases form the essential argument behind the Bush administration’s 2007 announcement to grow the Army and Marines by a combined 92,000 troops over the next five years. \(^1\) However, it is not clear what portion of this increase will go toward combat-support functions. For instance, of the 65,000 new active-duty soldiers, only about 14,000 are projected for ground CS/CSS brigades, while roughly 20,000 others are slotted for scattered smaller CS/CSS elements. \(^2\)

While Army and Marine Corps growth will help, many analysts believe it’s not nearly enough to fulfill current and likely requirements across the spectrum of assigned military capabilities. For instance, Gen Charles Campbell, commander of US Army Forces Command, has estimated that in order to meet all current operational demands without breaking normal deployment schedules, the Army would require 800,000 soldiers. \(^3\) Similarly, Kagan calls for a return to a 750,000-soldier active Army to handle the prolonged and manpower-intensive conflicts ongoing and likely in the future. Kagan puts the cost of all-volunteer expansion to this level at $45 billion a year for the first five years, then $33 billion annually thereafter, about 30 percent above the FY 2007 baseline defense budget. \(^4\) And it is this cost of personnel, typically a quarter of the DOD budget, that makes meaningful force increases politically unpalatable to the American public.
The decline of US defense budgets relative to the size of the economy is commonly understood. Figure 10 shows total combined defense spending since 1940, which currently sits at 4.2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), the post–Cold War defense share of which is its lowest since 1948. What is not well understood is the fact that DOD manpower as a share of the American labor force has dropped even more dramatically. In 2008, only 1.3 percent of the eligible US pool worked in the DOD, the lowest level since these measures were formally tracked beginning in 1940, and only half of the 1989 figure of 2.6 percent.

In a relative sense, the American public is thus much less vested in its national defense than at any previous point in nearly 70 years. The level of economic and familial detachment from today’s military effort is historically significant and not likely to improve. Even ignoring the impact of election year rhetoric, the reality is that the US economy is in trouble. And despite its relative decline in defense spending, the United States outspends its nearest potential opponent more than 10 to one. Most citizens think the defense establishment remains bloated with excess resources. Indeed, recent polling suggests that economic pres-
sures heavily impact public sentiment over how to handle a military that is increasingly considered as inefficient as it is necessary.\textsuperscript{8} Thus, any additional growth in budgets or personnel seems highly unlikely, and this alternative shows little real promise of resolving the combat-support-force gaps.

**Reduce Service Home-Base Demand**

Two potential solutions exist within the domain of Air Force control and, hence, are significantly more feasible than are outright force-level increases. Both approaches deal with increasing the internal capacity of the Air Force to support ILO requirements by reallocating existing manpower. Because these approaches seek no manpower increases, they are legitimate options that could be enacted even in the short term, without major budget action. The first such approach is to minimize Air Force home-base mission-support operations in order to free existing manpower to perform war-zone combat support. This approach goes against the grain of what the services have traditionally provided their base communities. The Air Force in particular, and to a similar extent its ILO partner, the Navy, is known for a distinctly high quality of living on its bases. Yet somehow over time, the notion of quality of life has gone beyond sustaining what is reasonable and appropriate. Base and community support programs show very few signs of curtailment, even during periods of national economic difficulty and expanding operational military requirements. However, in many areas of base support, including security, there is room to cut certain manpower-intensive services. The real hazard of this approach is not that of decreasing the real benefit to base personnel; rather, the principal difficulties are low institutional risk aversion and the possibility of alleged disregard for military troops and families.

The high likelihood of public complaints would challenge base commanders to explain why cuts are wartime necessities. For example, reducing base-entry-gate manning is a low-risk way to reduce home-base security requirements, save for the fact it tends to extend the wait for drivers coming on base, particularly during rush hour. A standard workaround to this effect is to stagger base work schedules to disperse traffic concentrations throughout the day. Yet this option is universally
assailed as unacceptably inconvenient and almost never employed; in over 20 years, the author has seen it instituted twice, and then for just a few days. As Gen Ronald E. Keys, commander of Air Combat Command, said of home-base customer-service expectations, “We’re just like any big city, and so we have a requirement for some law and order on our bases.” While on its face this is more than a fair statement, institutional and customer-service expectations have failed to evolve over time in relation to available resources.

In this regard, I propose a comprehensive review of base-support service standards to determine manpower that can be eliminated, reduced, or perhaps outsourced. Similar approaches have been employed previously in other mission areas, such as the outsourcing of health care services and health contractor administration. In the few existing cases of base support services—including outsourcing dining hall work, groundskeeping, and facility maintenance and automating many personnel management functions—those moves have largely paid for troop drawdowns rather than providing management headroom to support deployed operations. In the current operational environment, the time has come to conduct a bottom-up review of base support services. Such a review would very likely identify significant numbers of combat-support Airmen who could be reallocated to ameliorate the negative effects of the ILO program.

**Increase Zero-Growth Deployable Capacity**

The second internal Air Force option considers expanding the pool of available combat-support resources, within existing manpower limits, by apportioning ILO support taskings across a broader population of Airmen. One possibility to increase such flexibility, without necessarily committing particular career fields to specific levels of support, would be to train all Airmen to an introductory level in a secondary skill set. A form of this proposal was recently proposed by Col Linda Dahl, of the Headquarters Air Force Logistics Readiness staff, in an interview with the author. Colonel Dahl suggested providing new Airmen a basic level of training in a secondary wartime function. During their career, those Airmen would perform their primary specialty during normal operations, but during
contingencies they could be activated as a sort of “READY-plus” augmentee for security operations, facility construction, or similar requirements.

This proposal, similar to the 2007 SF team augmentation initiative, would likely meet broad opposition unless mandated by the chief of staff. The idea does offer a number of potential advantages though, including greater capacity to fill ILO missions, enhanced flexibility to fill home-base support requirements during austere manning periods, and increased agility of deployed Air Force bases under attack. This idea could even be extended across the services to create a pool of joint combat-support specialists administered by Joint Force Command (JFCOM).

To date, the problem with such proposals is not that they are without merit but that there has been little cross-functional cooperation in the policy development stages. Therefore, I recommend the Joint Staff direct a cross-service review of a joint combat-support augmentation program. Further, the respective service chiefs of staff should conduct similar reviews within their services.

**Reduce Combatant Command Demand**

Lastly, the quickest, most complex, and least costly solution is to reduce the overall demand for combat-support forces by eliminating unnecessary requirements. This solution—actually, a family of solutions—has the extra benefit of generating potential reductions in the overall number of US troops deployed to the war zone. Depending on the degree of such reduction, the ILO program could be significantly diminished or even eliminated. Due to the significant interservice friction involving sourcing, training, and administering forces outsourced from another service, it is in the best interest of all DOD elements to maximize the use of organic (directly assigned) resources. ILO forces are even defined within headquarters circles as “nonpreferred” forces. Yet despite the common preference for organic forces, there is growing evidence of inefficiency and inflation in the process of defining and vetting ILO force requirements.

The author’s direct contact with ILO-supporting unit commanders in-theater, extensive review of ILO after-action reports from the Air Force Lessons Learned database, and interviews
with headquarters staffers and general officers confirm what many have long suspected: there is waste, at an undefined but potentially significant level, within the requirements submitted by supported commanders and ultimately levied on the services. For example, in one case a group of security forces was tasked as an ILO military assistance team (MAT) to train Iraqi military personnel in garrison force protection and military police operations, with the specific exclusion of conducting offensive operations. Yet once they arrived in Iraq, these Airmen were ordered by their Army commander to conduct offensive combat patrols, a mission they continued for the first four months of their deployment. In another case, Airmen deployed for a MAT mission wound up conducting long-range convoy patrols, and in a third episode a MAT team wound up assigned to the exclusive function of driving Iraqis to transportation hubs so they could travel to their hometowns on vacation. In 2005, over 30 percent of the Airmen who arrived at their ILO base to conduct combat convoys were immediately reassigned by the Army commander to perform air-shipment packing and crating, supply, administrative, and even trash pickup duties as part of a garrison-support “personnel tax” assessed across base units. Many other cases point to problems where the requirement for ILO forces specified particular numbers of Airmen required to perform the respective mission, rather than simply stating the mission and desired effect as required by Joint Sourcing guidelines. Still other episodes demonstrate ILO force-management problems, including a report from 2007 where a satellite operations team arrived at its war-zone location only to find that the job had been contracted out the prior year, so the Army commander sought to reassign the Airmen to an unauthorized function; similar episodes happened with at least two ILO movement control teams.

There are probably many reasons for such cases, but the number and diversity of these examples indicate the primary cause lies within the ILO requirements and sourcing system. In fact, action officers interviewed at the Air Staff and Joint Staff explained that once an initial requirement is validated and filled, when the same requirement is subsequently submitted for a replacement in successive deployment cycles, the level of scrutiny applied is significantly reduced. This introduces suc-
cessively expanding degrees of inaccuracy in the validation process as the supported unit mission and organization evolve over time. Requirements that were valid one year ago may not be valid in the current term or may not require the same mix of skills and numbers of personnel.

The degree of requirements waste is uncertain, but there is a clear need for objective analysis and review of the way in which supported units have organized themselves to execute their mission and the way in which they integrate ILO supporting forces. Similarly, the overall US basing “footprint” requires review in terms of campaign supportability. More bases mean more requirements for security, facilities and utilities, transport of resources to and among these bases, and so on. To date, the determination of US basing appears to have been driven, in isolation, by the geography of counterinsurgency engagement zones. Just as in any other operation, it stands to reason that if operational requirements exceed logistical support, then it’s time to rework the plan. In this case, where the level of basing required for operations is beyond the level of what’s reasonably sustainable by the force, the basing strategy must be streamlined.

Theoretically, reduction of COCOM demand for ILO forces also includes tasking the Army to increase internal capacity to fulfill its own requirements by moving manpower from low- to high-demand specialties. To some extent, this has already happened, but this approach has not yet generated visible effects on optempo, possibly because of the lag between simply shifting personnel authorizations on the books and retraining and reassigning the people filling those authorizations. It remains to be seen if the large numbers of claimed “rebalanced” Army strength will manifest in reduction of ILO requirements. Additionally, there is significant hazard in this approach, in that it jeopardizes Army capacity to handle “big war” conventional conflicts, which require a greater proportion of combat troops. Herein lies the dilemma for planners: the exigency of the current Iraq-induced stresses notwithstanding, fixing today’s “small war” problem by borrowing resources tied to unique big-war tasks jeopardizes US ability to meet uncertain future threats. Put another way, whereas today’s asymmetrical threats target our relative vulnerability in low-end warfare, tomorrow’s asymmetry might actually reside among our historical strengths:
high-end combat vulnerabilities left uncovered by shifting around capability in a zero-sum resource game. While there are some functions that obviously overlap high- and low-end conflict, to a great extent the force structures for each are mutually exclusive. For this reason, rebalancing the force without growth represents significant strategic security risk and is not a viable solution.

There is significant room for improved oversight of the requirements generation and validation process, and JFCOM is the prime agent for that oversight. There is an ongoing project to standardize management data to facilitate greater visibility into available resources, but there is no evidence of any movement to increase the rigor of the requirements validation process. There are no explicit criteria for assessing when ILO forces are appropriate—that determination is left to service-defined and JFCOM- adjudged “level of risk.” Thus for the sake of equity and, more importantly, efficiency, JFCOM should establish quantitative and more specific qualitative ILO support thresholds. Separately, the organization of Army combat support— independent of the ILO effect—warrants a review as there is ample evidence that suggests deployed capability exceeds true requirements, regardless of whether those capabilities are provided by Army or ILO forces.

**Moving Forward**

The United States has a demonstrated history of recovering from interwar force reductions by rapidly regenerating capacity through a variety of means, both for hardware and manpower. But in the absence of a general agreement that an existential threat exists, the nation has not committed any dramatic increase of manpower to sustain current and planned operations, meaning that we’ve traded a large degree of big-war readiness for the demands of today’s small-war, 4GW conflicts.

The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are fundamentally different than any previous war in American history. Combat support figures more prominently in campaign operations than ever before, yet the US military is barely able to sustain these functions. Consequently, the Air Force is deploying increasing numbers of Airmen in lieu of the soldiers and marines who
traditionally performed these tasks. To date, the Air Force has managed to fulfill these requirements through a series of temporary measures, and Airmen have generally excelled in these missions. However, these temporary measures have also induced Air Force personnel inefficiencies, eroded primary mission readiness, and reduced retention in critical specialties. As demonstrated in the security forces case study, these effects have critically weakened capacity not just for Air Force missions but have also jeopardized the capability of Army units supported by ILO forces.

Certainly, the future of global conflict is largely unknown, and the requirements of future wars can only be generally estimated. As in the past, chances are that future wars will never perfectly match the preplanned force at hand, and so adjustments will be required in the way forces are organized and employed. In this sense, the ILO program has clearly enabled short-term adaptation of the force to the exigencies of Iraq and Afghanistan. But its use now exceeds its effective life span, and the negative effects as presently administered outweigh the benefits.

The degree of shortfall in US combat-support capability should have come as no surprise, having been variously assessed and predicted over the past 15 years. At the same time, the nature of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan represent an evolved form of warfare reminiscent in many ways of the US experiences in Vietnam and other unconventional conflicts of the past 40 years. Modern conflict poses unique demands on combat-support forces which are not served by the current US force structure. The consequent gaps between force structure and the requirements of fourth-generation warfare—in terms of size, shape, sustainment, and means—undermine US military capacity across the spectrum of potential conflict.

For Iraq and Afghanistan, and for the conflicts to come, a long-term strategy must be developed to support joint combat-support requirements while minimizing the hazards of doing so with short-term solutions. The solutions proposed in this paper all require further study before they can be implemented, but they offer a range of options across the dimensions of time, cost, and feasibility. Most importantly, because these solutions
are derived from observation of key gaps between legacy force structure and the modern battlespace, they emphasize decisive factors that will close those gaps and sustain US military capacity for the future.

Notes

2. “Army Announces Stationing Decisions.”
4. Kagan, “Protracted Wars,” in Schmitt and Donnelly, Of Men and Materiel, 44. These estimates include expenditures for personnel, operations and maintenance, and equipment to outfit the new units. Kagan does not itemize his recommended increase in terms of weapons systems or numbers of units. However, this level of expansion is virtually identical to that contained in one of six “future Army” options defined against various alternative future world scenarios in a 2005 RAND report. In this scenario, “competitive multipolarity,” the report recommends a “global maneuver Army” approximately 50 percent larger than today’s force and capable of reasonably sustaining five deployed divisions against two major and one minor operational commitment. See Nichiporuk, Alternative Futures and Army Force Planning, 91–96.
5. DOD, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2008, 217. According to the Office of Management and Budget, the defense slice of the GDP is projected to fall to 3.1 percent by 2013. See Grant, “Girding for Battle.”
7. In constant 2007 dollars, the United States led global 2006 military spending with $546 billion. Following the United Kingdom and France—neither hardly a potential enemy—China was estimated to have spent $51.4 billion. See SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2007, 310–16.
8. According to a Gallup telephone poll of 1,007 national adults conducted 11–14 February 2008 (sampling error of +/- three percentage points at a 95 percent confidence level), while the number of Americans (47 percent) who think US national defenses are not strong enough is at a 25-year high, a growing proportion of the public (currently 44 percent) thinks that US defense spending is “too much.” See Newport, “Almost Half of Americans Say Military Is Not Strong Enough.”
11. “SF Mission.”
12. “Tasked AFSCs Not Used as Intended in AOR.”
13. For example, see “332 AEW [Air and Space Expeditionary Wing] AAR [After-Action Report].”
14. “Army Re-sourcing Movement Control Forces.”
15. Shearer, interview (see chap. 3, n. 26); Lt Col Kathleen M. Fadok (chief, Security Forces Plans, Headquarters USAF, Washington, D.C.), interview by the author, 14 November 2007; and McCulloch, interview (see chap. 2, n. 8).

16. In fiscal years 2003–5, the DOD converted 50,000 military reserve positions from low-demand to high-demand specialties, and the Army reported a similar conversion of 5,600 active slots in 2003, mainly in chemical, military police, engineering, medical, quartermaster, and transportation specialties. See Rostker, *America Goes to War*, 61–62. Additionally, according to the DOD, “The Services have executed rebalancing of about 89,000 [active and reserve] spaces from FY03–6 and an additional 37,000 spaces are programmed from FY07–12 for a total of approximately 126,000 spaces.” See Hall, “Changes in Reserve Component Forces,” 11.
Appendix

Joint Service Agreement 8
25 April 1985

JOINT SERVICE AGREEMENT
USA-USAF AGREEMENT FOR THE
GROUND DEFENSE OF
AIR FORCE BASES AND INSTALLATIONS

This Agreement sets policies for the Departments of the Army and the Air Force for the ground defense of Air Force bases and installations.*

The policies set forth in this Agreement will be used to guide appropriate Army and Air Force regulations, manuals, publications, and curricula. This Agreement also serves as a basis for future development of joint doctrine and supporting procedures for ground defense of Air Force bases and installations. It recognizes the Army’s fundamental role in land combat and the need to protect the Air Force’s ability to generate and sustain air power for joint airland combat operations. This Agreement is effective immediately and shall remain in effect until rescinded or superseded by mutual written agreement between the Army and the Air Force. It will be reviewed every two years.

JOHN W. WICKHAM, JR. CHARLES A. GABRIEL
General, United States Army General, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff Chief of Staff

1 Atch

*Davis, 31 Initiatives, 125–31.
ARTICLE I
REFERENCES AND TERMS DEFINED

1. REFERENCES:


2. TERMS DEFINED:

   General: The following terms form the basis for the remaining articles of this agreement.

   a. **Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD)**: Local security measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify and reduce the effectiveness of enemy ground attack directed against USAF air bases and installations.

   b. **Base or Installation Boundary**: Normally the dividing line between internal and external defense. The exact location of the dividing line is subject to minor deviation from the local base boundary on a case by case basis to accommodate local conditions. Such delineations should be incorporated into appropriate OPLANS.
c. **Rear Battle**: For the purpose of this Agreement, rear battle consists of those actions taken by all units (combat, combat support, combat service support, and host nation), singly or in joint effort, to secure the force, neutralize or defeat enemy forces in the rear area, and ensure freedom of action in the deep and close-in battles.

d. **Base**: A locality from which operations are projected or supported, or an area or locality containing installations that provide logistic or other mission support (JCS Pub 1).

e. **Base Defense**: The local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base or installation so as to insure that the maximal capacity of its facilities is available to US forces (JCS Pub 1).

f. **Installation**: A grouping of facilities, located in the same vicinity, which support particular functions. Installations may be elements of a base (JCS Pub 1).

g. **Level I Threat**: Enemy activity characterized by enemy-controlled agent activity, sabotage by enemy sympathizers, and terrorism.

h. **Level II Threat**: Enemy activity characterized by diversionary and sabotage operations conducted by unconventional forces; raid, ambush, and reconnaissance operations conducted by combat units; and special mission or unconventional warfare (UW) missions.

i. **Level III Threat**: Enemy activity characterized by battalion size or larger heliborne operations, airborne operations, amphibious operations, ground force deliberate operations, and infiltration operations.

**ARTICLE II**

**BACKGROUND**

1. The references in Article I provide guidance to the Army and the Air Force on rear battle operations, including the ground defense of air bases and installations.
a. The Army has responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping forces for the conduct of sustained operations on land, specifically to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, secure, occupy, and defend land areas.

b. The Air Force base or installation commander is the officer responsible for the local ground defense of his base or installations (reference c). The forces of Services other than his own, assigned to his base or installation for the conduct of local ground defense, shall be under his operational control.

2. The Army has responsibility (reference d) for the provision of forces for ABGD operations outside designated Air Force base or installation boundaries.

3. Overseas, a variety of existing arrangements for ABGD are explicitly recognized by international agreements. In some countries, both within the NATO alliance and elsewhere, external ABGD is a host nation responsibility prescribed by status of forces agreements or separate negotiation. In other countries, responsibility is shared between the host nation and US Forces.

ARTICLE III

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this Agreement is to develop combat forces for ABGD to ensure Air Force sortie generation and missile launch capability. ABGD forces must be capable of:

a. Detecting and defeating Levels I and II attacks;

b. Delaying a Level III attack until the arrival of friendly tactical combat elements capable of defeating this level of attack.

ARTICLE IV

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The Army and the Air Force will establish a Joint Air Base Ground Defense Working Group (JABGDWG). The tasks of the JABGDWG are to monitor, coordinate, examine, and
report to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans and the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations on the actions necessary to ensure the implementation of policies and preparation of forces for ABGD.

a. The Army and the Air Force will appoint co-chairmen for the JABGDWG. Support will be provided by functional staffs from the Departments of the Army and the Air Force, and by the appropriate subordinate commands.

b. The JABGDWG will conduct a yearly review of ABGD requirements in time for joint recommendations to be made in July of each year prior to the initiation of the following DOD POM [program objective memorandum] cycle. This review will recommend specific planning and programming actions designed to ensure mutual support for respective service programs.

2. The Army and the Air Force are jointly responsible for:
   a. Participating in the JABGDWG.
   b. Developing joint doctrine for rear battle, to include ABGD.
   c. Coordinating proposed changes in ABGD concepts, doctrine, and force structure.
   d. Ensuring the provisions of this Agreement are addressed appropriately in operational and contingency plans to avoid any security degradation.

3. The Army is responsible for providing forces for ABGD operations outside the boundaries of designated USAF bases and installations.
   a. When assigned the ABGD mission to counter the level I and level II threats to specific USAF bases or installations, Army forces will be under the operational control of those Air Force base or installation commanders.
   b. Within 90 days of approval of this Agreement, the Army will provide a transition plan to the JABGDWG for a time-phase[d] transfer of responsibility for external ABGD. *Transfer will start 1 October 1985.*
APPENDIX

c. The Army will initiate, where feasible, requests for host nations to provide ABGD external to Air Force bases and installations (except as noted in paragraph 4f below).

d. The Army will provide multi-source intelligence on enemy ground forces for Air Force threat assessments and tactical counterintelligence efforts.

4. The Air Force will provide for physical security and internal defense within the boundaries of its bases and installations.

a. Air Force base and installation commanders are responsible for the local ground defense of their installations.

b. As dictated by the threat, environment, and availability of Army or host nation forces provided for external defense, the Air Force, in coordinating with the local ground force commanders, may employ external safeguards to provide early warning and detection of, and reaction to, enemy threats to air bases and installations.

c. The Air Force will provide the command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) resources required by Air Force base and installation commanders to effect operational control of forces assigned to them for ground defense. C3I provided by both services in supporting rear battle operations will be interoperable.

d. The Air Force will lead in the collection of data and assessment of the overall threat to air bases and installations worldwide. It will retain the lead in Ground Combat Intelligence and Tactical Counterintelligence covering each ABGD area of influence, as defined in reference e.

e. The Air Force will submit requirements for ABGD to the Army, to include a list of locations to be defended, updated as required.

f. The Air Force will seek host nation commitment for ABGD in agreements relating to the use of Collocated Operating Bases (COBS) and Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APODs).

5. Army and Air Force delineations of responsibilities will not preclude the deployment of forces from either Service to support the other should the tactical situation dictate.
## Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADCON</td>
<td>administrative control</td>
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<td>AEF</td>
<td>air and space expeditionary force</td>
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<td>AEG</td>
<td>air expeditionary group</td>
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<td>AETC</td>
<td>Air Education and Training Command</td>
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<td>AEW</td>
<td>air and space expeditionary wing</td>
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<td>AFPC</td>
<td>Air Force Personnel Center</td>
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<td>BC3</td>
<td>Basic Combat Convoy Course</td>
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<td>BUR</td>
<td>Bottom-up Review</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs; combat arms</td>
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<td>CE</td>
<td>civil engineering</td>
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<td>CFP</td>
<td>contingency force pool</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
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<td>COE</td>
<td>contemporary operating environment</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>combat support</td>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>combat service support</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<td>4GW</td>
<td>fourth generation warfare</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>in lieu of</td>
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<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>Joint Force Command</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>JSA</td>
<td>joint service agreement</td>
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<td>JSS</td>
<td>joint sourcing solution</td>
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<td>K-9</td>
<td>police canine (also “MWD”—military working dog)</td>
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<td>LOC</td>
<td>line of communication</td>
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<td>MAT</td>
<td>military assistance team</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>military police</td>
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<td>MRC</td>
<td>major regional conflict</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWD</td>
<td>military working dog (also “K-9”—police canine)</td>
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<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<td>OOTW</td>
<td>operations other than war</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>provincial reconstruction team</td>
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<td>PTT</td>
<td>police training team</td>
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<td>QDR</td>
<td><em>Quadrennial Defense Review</em></td>
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<td>READY</td>
<td>resource augmentation duty</td>
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<td>SDE</td>
<td>senior developmental education</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>security forces</td>
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<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
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<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
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<td>USAFA</td>
<td>United States Air Force Academy</td>
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Glossary

administrative control. “Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.”¹

combat forces (combat arms). Includes those functions focused on enemy engagement: air defense artillery, armor, aviation, cavalry, field artillery, infantry, and special forces.²

combat service support. Encompasses “logistical support . . . services required by the soldiers of combat units to continue their missions in combat”;³ these services consist of quartermaster, ordnance, transportation, adjutant general, finance, chaplain, legal, and medical functions.⁴

combat support. “Refers to units which provide fire support and operational assistance” to aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their combat missions; this support comprises the areas of chemical warfare, police/security, intelligence, and communications.⁵

combatant command (command authority). “Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (‘Armed Forces’), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and
Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority).”

**dwell ratio.** The ratio of the number of days an individual is deployed (away from the home unit and/or station to which permanently assigned) to the number of days the individual is not deployed.

**operational control.** “Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.”

**optempo.** Operational tempo. Generally refers to the strain on individuals generated by frequent deployment to temporary duty away from the home unit and/or duty station to which permanently assigned.

**tactical control.** “Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direc-
tion and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task."\(^8\)

**Notes**
3. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 397–98.
8. Ibid., 539.
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