The Role of Rhetorical Theory in Military Intelligence Analysis
A Soldier’s Guide to Rhetorical Theory

Gary H. Mills
Major, USAF
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Major, USAF

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Dedicated to
Muir S. F. airchild (1894–1950), the first commander of Air University and the university’s conceptual father. General Fairchild was part visionary, part keen taskmaster, and “Air Force to the core.” His legacy is one of confidence about the future of the Air Force and the central role of Air University in that future.
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Foreword

The Role of Rhetorical Theory in Military Intelligence Analysis: A Soldier’s Guide to Rhetorical Theory by Maj Gary H. Mills is another in an Air University Press series of substantive essays considered too short for publication as monographs but too lengthy to be journal articles. The purpose of The Role of Rhetorical Theory in Military Intelligence Analysis is to share Major Mills’s rhetorical understanding with young officers attending initial intelligence training. Throughout he infuses key elements from the rhetorical discourse community into the discourse community that deals with training in military intelligence. Major Mills notes that his target audience is the military intelligence community. However, Air University Press is pleased to include this study as one of its Fairchild Papers because many aspects of The Role of Rhetorical Theory in Military Intelligence Analysis can enhance the rhetorical analysis of traditional university students and instructors.

Shirley Brooks Laseter

Dr. Shirley B. Laseter
Director
Air University Library & Press
About the Author

Maj Gary H. Mills, USAF, is currently serving as a senior analyst at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. Prior to his current assignment, he was an assistant professor of English in the Department of English and Fine Arts at the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA), Colorado Springs, Colorado. Additionally, Major Mills was design director of *War, Literature and the Arts: An International Journal of the Humanities* and *Andre Dubus: Tributes* (Xavier Review Press, 2001). He holds a Master of Arts in technical and expository writing. Major Mills was commissioned through USAFA in 1990.
Preface

Nimitz’s concept of intelligence was dynamic: Facts were high-grade ore to be sifted carefully, the pure metal of knowledge extracted and forged into a weapon to defeat the enemy.

—Gordon W. Prange

Miracle at Midway

I completed training for USAF intelligence-applications officers more than a dozen years ago. Since then I have used and adapted the USAF’s practical discourse and analytical skills in a wide range of situations around the world. However, I never fully grasped the rhetorical framework behind these critical modes of communication until I was exposed to discourse theory at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock. As a result of my studies, I have learned how the rich backdrop of theory adds to the daily application of intelligence analysis.

Fortunately, as a result of my rhetorical education, I have a greater understanding of the critical theory behind each briefing, presentation, and mission-planning product. More importantly, theory focuses a penetrating analytical view on the power coursing through threat systems and hostile countries. Clearly, Air Force intelligence specialists will benefit from a detailed look at the ways an understanding of rhetorical theory enhances intelligence analysis. My purpose is to share my widened rhetorical understanding with young officers attending initial intelligence training. Throughout this study, I infuse key elements from the rhetorical discourse community into the discourse community that deals with training in military intelligence. As a result of this union, a powerful discourse paradigm shift places military intelligence specialists in a unique rhetorical position—one that will turn rhetorical theory into a powerful force multiplier.

My target audience is the military intelligence community; however, many aspects of this study can enhance the rhetorical analysis of traditional university students and instructors. The same targeted and tailored analytical approach used with threat systems applies equally well with almost any subject placed under the rhetorical “crosshairs.” While adapting this
study to nonmilitary analysis, the reader should feel free to re-
place the intelligence cycle—discussed later—with processes
specific to his or her discourse community. Additionally, the
unit-level issues—addressed in the chapter titled “In the
Trenches”—are applicable to a wide range of nonmilitary or-
ganizations and discourse groups.

Michel Foucault’s rhetorical lens allows a detailed view of
power and discontinuity in a widening range of situations and
organizations. Rhetorical theory’s application, in the enhance-
ment of intelligence analysis, highlights its powerful, universal
utility; with equally powerful utility, other rhetorical masters
are also addressed. Readers should open themselves to the dy-
namic utility of rhetorical theory and remember that it is a
power tool that continues to shape discourse and perceptions.
For many, theory is an ephemeral element in the course of
day-to-day activities; and in 1994, according to Ferdinand
Saussure, “the very ones who use it daily are [often] ignorant
of it.” Fortunately, for those who can see and wield it, theory
serves as a force enhancement and a catalyst for powerful par-
adigm shifts. In 1995 Walter J. Ong noted in his book Orality
and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word that rhetorical
theory will continue to surround and shape our human iden-
tity. Through a strong rhetorical understanding, we bridge the
gap between theory and application, resulting in the enhance-
ment of our daily operations and analytical growth.
Acknowledgments

I thank the following professors for their outstanding support and guidance: Brig Gen (USAF, retired) Jack Shuttleworth, PhD, permanent professor and department head, Department of English and Fine Arts, USAFA, Colorado Springs, Colorado; Dr. Charles Anderson, Dr. Julia Ferganchick, Dr. Michael Kleine, Dr. Barry Maid, Dr. Roger Munger, and Dr. Richard Raymond, all from the Department of Rhetoric and Writing at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock. They excelled as academic authorities and, most importantly, professional mentors. I also recognize Naval Doctrine Publication 2, Naval Intelligence, which served as a key inspiration for my selection of some of the epigraphs for each chapter. Additionally, the Central Intelligence Agency’s A Compendium of Analytic Tradecraft Notes bridged a daunting gap between theory and application, thus helping to open the way for rhetorical theory in the intelligence career field.
Abstract

As an unconventional analytical source, Michel Foucault contributes new power perspectives to intelligence analysis; and he gives a nontraditional look at a growing, evolving threat environment. As highlighted in *The Foucault Reader*, Foucault’s analytical edge confronts these threats “by refusing to separate off knowledge from power.” “His strategy has been to focus his work, both political and intellectual, on what he sees as the greatest threat—that strange, somewhat unlikely, mixing of the social science and social practices developed around subjectivity.” Foucault’s theories address the human behind the satellite images and database numbers: the result generates a powerful perspective on threat countries, systems, and situations.

His power influences resonate in every human system and organization. Specifically, he addresses the flow of power through organizational hierarchies. Through Foucault’s rhetorical vision, one can look at an organization as a power being with a rhetorical circulatory structure supporting its existence. Power (discourse and knowledge) flows through the entire organization. Now, as a power-influenced (human-conceptualized) entity, organizations have spatial, temporal, and social compartmentalizations. These compartmentalizations require a physical means (conduits) of sharing information in order to allow power to flow. Additionally, Foucault addresses—in the 1982 book titled *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*—how the power shifts, ruptures, and discontinuities in the conduits can take on many forms when overlaid against the wide range of global norms. Most importantly, based on theory’s powerful utility, the seeds of analysis must be planted as early as possible. Rhetorical theory is the key to enhanced analytical growth—an outgrowth that serves as a powerful military-intelligence force multiplier.
Chapter 1

Introduction

*Knowledge is for me that which must function as a protection of individual existence and as a comprehension of the exterior world. I think that's it. Knowledge is a means of surviving by understanding.*

—Michel Foucault

As intelligence specialists, the exterior world—more than 260 countries, geographic regions, and their associated political and military challenges—will test your ability to organize, process, and analyze vast amounts of information.¹ You have joined a skilled community responsible for the tireless analysis of potential and active threats against the United States. Fleet Adm Ernest King, USN, retired, effectively voiced the demanding requirements and standards for the modern intelligence specialist: “Institute rigorous, continuous examination of enemy capabilities and potentialities, thereby getting the utmost value of information of the enemy and enabling our forces to be used with the greatest effectiveness. It is particularly important to comprehend the enemy point of view in all aspects.”²

Comprehension of the threat point of view requires a rhetorical vision that can be focused only through a fundamental understanding of how communication (verbal, textual, symbolic, and electronic) influences the intelligence cycle and, ultimately, joint combat operations.³ Simply put, rhetorical theory (the exploration of communication and its impact, influence, and relationships in all forms) is in action all around us; it applies to every aspect of human existence. The role of theory in intelligence analysis is even more pronounced. Theory is a force multiplier; it is a natural, often overlooked, military enhancement.

An operationally tailored application of rhetorical theory can make the intelligence community—more importantly, your day-to-day work—even more effective. Typically, years of train-
ing and operational experience are needed to groom an outstanding analyst. Through a tailored instruction of rhetorical theory, new intelligence specialists just joining the career field can develop and mature at faster rates.

Well-worn steps and checklists are deeply ingrained in the military mind-set; however, the rich tapestry of rhetorical theory is unfortunately lost in the application of intelligence analysis at the level of a typical small unit. Dr. Charles Anderson, graduate-program director of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock's Department of Rhetoric and Writing, believes that we all know what to do come Monday morning, but theory helps us understand why. At unit level, theory takes a backseat to operations tempo, additional duties, and challenging requirements to meet a growing range of duties with fewer personnel. Typically, as a mission-oriented community, we tend to shun concepts and theories that do not appear to directly support the war fighters (soldiers, sailors, and airmen) in the completion of a broadening array of duties ranging from direct, conventional combat to peacekeeping operations. Theory is a powerful and integral part of current and future military conflicts. However, a look at a few unconventional rhetoricians is in order to focus the power of theory.

Sherman Kent, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) senior analyst and author, highlights the changing role of theory in intelligence analysis: “Intelligence today is not merely a profession, but like most professions it has taken on the aspects of a discipline: it has developed a recognized methodology; it has developed a vocabulary; it has developed a body of theory and doctrine; it has elaborate and refined techniques. It now has a large professional following. What it lacks is a literature. From my point of view, this is a matter of greatest importance. As long as this discipline lacks a literature, its method, its vocabulary, its body of doctrine, and even its fundamental theory run the risk of never reaching full maturity.”

Kent’s call for a refined and tailored intelligence discourse makes the need for a solid comprehension of rhetorical theory even more critical. Additionally, he provides a superb example of rhetorical theory in action:
The literature I have in mind will, among other things, be an elevated debate. For example, I see a Major “X” write an essay on the theory of indicators and print it and have it circulated. I see a Mr. “B” brood over this essay and write a review of it. I see a Commander “C” reading both the preceding documents and reviewing them both. I then see a revitalized discussion among the people of the indicator business. I hope that they now, more than ever before, discuss indicators within the terms of a common conceptual frame and in a common vocabulary. From the debate in the literature and from the oral discussion, I see another man [or woman] coming forward to produce an original synthesis of all that has gone before. His [her] summary findings will be a kind of intellectual platform upon which the new debate can start. His [her] platform will be a thing of orderly and functional construction and it will stand above the bushes and trees that once obscured the view. It will be solid enough to have much more built upon it and durable enough so that no one need get back in the bushes and earth to examine its foundations.

Rhetorical theory can work exactly, and as easily, as Kent advertises in many settings with impressive results. Unfortunately, many analysts view this process as an administrative speed bump instead of an intellectual catalyst. Additionally, Kent’s analytical foundation is only partially constructed if you fail to bring the right tools to the work site. With luck this guide will serve as a useful tool kit.

Application of targeted theory takes on many forms. For example, the CIA calls its process an “analytic tradecraft”—a process based on creative use of all source information and in-house best practices, in order to support “individual intelligence consumer’s concerns.” Former deputy director for intelligence John Gannon—currently chairman of the National Intelligence Council—clearly recognizes both strengths and challenges of discourse. The growing “revolution in information technologies has improved our access to sources and our ability to quickly deliver intelligence.” Conversely, the rapid flow of information “has also made our [intelligence community’s] work more challenging as we are bombarded with information of varying quality, relevance, and depth.”

All too often stereotyped and disregarded as pure academia, rhetorical theory is at the very core of military analytical development. Additionally, the same theory forms the basis of what many military intelligence specialists all too easily chalk up to mere experience. Through an operationally tailored analysis of Michel Foucault, this study will uncover a rhetorical framework
supporting the military analysis process: a rhetorical template designed to bridge the application gap between strict checklist discipline and power analysis, resulting in the highest quality of intelligence analysis.

Notes


5. Ibid.


7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.
Chapter 2

Let’s Get Rhetorical

The DI (Directorate of Intelligence) will need greater interaction with outside experts to meet the broad and complex analytic challenges it faces. It must position itself to compete in a new information age in which consumers increasingly will have ready access to alternative sources of high-quality data and expertise.

—Analysis: Strategic Plan
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence

As an integral part of the military’s new information age, you need to be aware of alternative sources available to enhance your communication and analytical skills. Recently re-titled as intelligence operators, intelligence personnel must apply every available tool in order to support worldwide warfighter operations. As highlighted by the CIA Directorate of Intelligence, your effective use of “outside experts will yield useful information and insight, along with constructive challenges to [your] working assumptions, that can only sharpen [your] analysis.”1 In this study, Foucault’s discourse theories serve as the primary rhetorical workshop. As a result, there is a need to define the wide and essential scope of rhetorical theory, including a brief look at its history. The word rhetoric brings to mind many different meanings: “The practice of oratory [discourse or speech]; the study of strategies of effective oratory; the use of language, written or spoken [or electronic], to inform or persuade; the study of the persuasive effects of language; the study of the relation between language and knowledge; the classification and use of tropes and figures; and, of course, the use of empty promises and half-truths as a form of propaganda.”2 Intelligence officers interface with most of these overlapping meanings.3 You even study many influences and forms of propaganda. However, most importantly, you must understand that “rhetoric is an action” and that it affects communication and analytical perspectives.4 “In
one sense, rhetoric is an action human beings perform, and in a second sense, it is a perspective humans take. As an action, rhetoric involves humans’ use of symbols for the purpose of communicating with one another. As a perspective humans take, rhetoric involves focusing on symbolic [and analytic] processes. With some luck, this study will effectively communicate the strength of rhetoric’s influence on intelligence—ultimately changing and shaping your perspective on analysis.

As service-trained communicators, you use written, spoken, and electronic discourse on a daily basis. Unfortunately, aside from military briefing style and training in audience awareness (for aircrews, command staffs, threat working groups, etc.), military technical schooling provides very little instruction in rhetorical theory. Your job is to organize, analyze, and share information; yet, ironically, you get very little training in the formal discipline critical to the core of your military profession—a fifth-century B.C. discipline that was initially established to settle conflicting property claims.

“A revolution on Syracuse, a Greek colony on the island of Sicily, in about 465 B.C.” brought about the end of a dictator’s reign and ushered in a democratic system of government. As a result of this change, Corax of Syracuse saw the need to equip citizens with skills to settle their property disputes since “they could not hire attorneys to speak on their behalf as we can today.” “Corax realized the need for systematic instruction in the art of speaking in the law courts and wrote a treatise called the ‘Art of Rhetoric.’ Although no copies of this work survive, we know from later writers that the notion of probability was central to his rhetorical system. He believed that a speaker must argue from general probabilities or establish probable conclusions when matters of fact cannot be established with absolute certainty.”

It is intriguing to consider that the standard “Probable Course of Action” portion of our crisis and situation briefings shares a formal genesis that extends as far back as Corax’s Art of Rhetoric. Origins of this often elusive and mystic discipline are based on a very pragmatic and simple need to clarify and establish truth.
Development of rhetorical theory has changed dramatically over the years. “The historical development of rhetoric [is] divided into conventional chronological periods: the Classical (from the birth of rhetoric in ancient Greece to about 400 [A.D.]), the Medieval (to about 1400), the Renaissance (to the early seventeenth century), the Enlightenment (from the seventeenth to the end of the nineteenth century, a bit longer than in conventional usage), and the twentieth century.”10 Years can easily be spent studying each period of rhetorical development. This study includes these rhetorical divisions to underscore the fact that, much like the military, rhetorical theory is always changing and establishing new communication paradigms.

Intimately tied to origins of the formal art of rhetoric, the classical preparation of a speech or briefing—a principal medium used to share intelligence information—is particularly important. “Aristotle devoted a large portion of his Rhetoric to invention, or the finding of materials and modes of proof to use in presenting those materials to an audience.”11 Aristotle's canons (rules or laws) resulted in the first “pragmatic processes of presentation.”12 The rhetorical process of preparing a speech or briefing is divided into five stages: “(1) invention, search for persuasive ways to present information and formulate arguments; (2) arrangement, organization of the part of a speech to ensure that all means of persuasion are present and properly disposed; (3) style, use of correct, appropriate, and striking language throughout the speech; (4) memory, use of mnemonics and practice; and (5) delivery, presenting the speech with effective gestures and vocal modulation.”13 These five canons remain the cornerstone of the study of rhetorical organization, and key elements of this organization are in all effective intelligence briefings (fig. 1).14 Additionally, it is important to note, under the arrangement stage, that “Aristotle says that all speeches have four parts: the introduction, the statement of the issue, the argument, and the conclusion.”15

As an essential element in modern intelligence briefings, “classical emphasis on logos [logical appeals used to persuade during the invention step] is presented as if in recognition that human beings respond most strongly to rational appeals.”16 Aristotle codified two additional forms of persuasion: ethos (character and
credibility) and pathos (the production of a certain attitude or emotion in the audience).\(^\text{17}\) Obviously, you need to focus on logos and ethos—a logical analysis shored by credible sources (and a credible, ethical presenter) will serve you well. Methods you select to shape an audience’s perception greatly influence your credibility. “As a rule, then, the consumer’s confidence in the analyst’s estimative judgment comes only after he or she has established credentials for expert command over all source information.”\(^\text{18}\) Importantly, you must respect pathos as a very powerful form of persuasion; however, please try to avoid emotional appeals—a sure way to crash and burn during a mission or current intelligence briefing.

Underlying the military’s technical paradigm shifts, from linear formations to joint warfare and from muskets to precision weapons, exists an even more impressive rhetorical transition that continues to gather strength. Rhetorical theory is as alive today as it was during the days of its two key architects, Corax and Aristotle. Rhetorical theory is not as murky a
subject as some may have initially envisioned. You are already using, adapting, and improving on the rhetorical blueprints of the greats. “But there is more to say about the marriage of war [the profession of arms or military analysis] and knowledge.”19 Aristotle, a critical analytical cornerstone, raised an issue of analytical proficiency that should balance your growth as an analyst and officer.20 He details the levels of knowledge required for true proficiency:

Every systematic science, the humblest and the noblest alike, seems to admit of two distinct kinds of proficiency; one of which may be properly called scientific knowledge of the subject, while the other is a kind of educational acquaintance with it. For an educated man [or woman] should be able to form a fair offhand judgment as to the goodness or badness of the method used by a professor [or commander, allied or enemy] in his [or her] exposition [or leadership/tactics]. To be educated is in fact to be able to do this; and even the man [or woman] of universal education we deem to be such in virtue of his having this ability. It will, however, of course, be understood that we only ascribe universal education to one who in his [or her] own individual person is thus critical in all or nearly all branches of knowledge, and not to one who has a like ability merely in some special subject. For it is possible for a man [or woman] to have his [or her] competence in some one branch of knowledge without having it in all.21

You must avoid becoming strictly competent in only one branch of knowledge. Be “able to tell the difference between sense and nonsense, as we might say using modern terms, about the field [of intelligence].”22 You must also be critical of a wide range of disciplines and be “able to distinguish between sense and nonsense even when [we are] not . . . specialist[s] in any one area of knowledge.”23

Rhetorical theory is one of many disciplines at the heart of Aristotle’s universal education—an education you will need in order to excel as an analyst.24 Thanks to rhetorical theory, you can apply discourse-power theory to better understand how power flows influence real-world threat systems. Additionally, even without specific technical specialization, you can apply this rhetorical template to any system, resulting in a honed, critical perspective: a viewpoint filtered from the nonsense and focused on threat systems and potential crisis situations.25

Critical analysis is the trademark of the intelligence career field; however, it is impossible to accomplish without rhetorical theory. Interestingly, the topic of this project has been dis-
cussed with many of my friends in the intelligence community, and I have received a wide range of winces and head tilts in response to rhetorical theory. Ironically, rhetorical theory is at the root of my colleagues’ most basic skills of organization and discourse: tasks they accomplish daily with little to no understanding of theory’s rich history and framework. It is easy to live in theory denial; however, if you open yourself to an element of universal education, you will enhance the theory you are already using—and potentially take into combat.

Notes
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 14.
6. Ibid., 1.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 2.
9. Ibid.
10. Bizzell and Herzberg, 1.
12. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 5.
16. Ibid., 4.
17. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 135.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 135–36.
23. Ibid., 136.
24. Ibid., 135.
25. Ibid., 136.
Chapter 3

Intelligence Process

The success of any crisis deployment hinges on the existence of a reliable command and control system and of a flexible, reliable system for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating strategic and tactical intelligence.

—Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf
United States Army
Operation Desert Storm, 1991

Before pressing forward with Foucault’s rhetorical theories, I will review basic military intelligence pedagogy to highlight the key process that serves as a rhetorical road map. According to Joint Publication (JP) 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations, the intelligence cycle is the “process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users.”

As evidenced by the joint (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) document on the subject, the cycle is well ingrained into each military service. It forms a fundamental bond among 13 national-level and service-level intelligence agencies (fig. 2).

Planning and Direction Phase

The intelligence cycle begins with the planning and direction phase (fig. 3), in which commanders and intelligence analysts “identify and prioritize information requirements.” Key elements of information are identified, and a plan is then developed to satisfy as many user requirements as possible. “Early discovery of any requirements that cannot be satisfied through organic (internal to the unit or service), theater, or national intelligence collection resources will highlight potential intelligence gaps.”

Before continuing, I must highlight a critical distinction between information and intelligence: “Information is data that have been collected but not further developed through analysis, interpretation, or correlation with other data and intelligence. The application of analysis transforms information into intelligence.” A particular style or method of transforming information

**Figure 2. Intelligence Organizations (Agencies)**


**Figure 3. Intelligence Cycle**
into intelligence is also at the core of rhetorical theory. You join the ranks of the great rhetoricians every time you take a piece of data, such as an image, troop positions, and so on, and process it through your experiences or knowledge of past or similar events. The widening range of information mediums presents additional rhetorical challenges to experience throughout the course of your career. Unfortunately, military events have proven that many of you will be “thrown into the mix” with a relatively limited experience base soon after graduation from intelligence school.

**Collection Phase**

Since 1960 the quality and quantity of artifacts made available to intelligence analysts have dramatically increased due to many technical advancements associated with the collection phase of the intelligence cycle. Collection of intelligence data has a firm, often infamous, footing in world history. Maj Gen Oleg Kalugin, the KGB’s first chief directorate, now retired, highlights that “spying (politically toned as collecting) has been with the human race from time immemorial; it has often been called ‘the second oldest profession’ and was used by ruling elites as a major tool to protect their power from real or imaginary threats and rivals, both domestic and external." General Kalugin intimately understands how “intelligence-gathering was transformed by satellites, lasers, computers, and other gadgetry capable of ferreting out secrets from every corner of the globe." Specifically, an example of one of the most sophisticated collection organizations was publicly unveiled in 1992 with declassification of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). NRO also revealed a revolution in data collection that began with the 1960 launch of the Corona reconnaissance satellite (photo below).
Examples of the early artifact evolution include more than 800,000 Corona satellite images (one example is provided in the photograph below) that were declassified in 1995. NRO “enable[s] U.S. global information superiority, during peace through war.” A quick look through NRO’s archives clarifies the concerns of former CIA deputy director Gannon about the increasing flow of information. Obviously, since the launch of Corona, subsequent collection platforms have increased the number, type, and quality of intelligence artifacts.

In addition to spaceborne satellites, there are air-breathing (operating within Earth’s atmosphere) collectors spanning from reconnaissance aircraft (photos shown on next page) all the way to original air-breathing collectors—humans. “Rulers and military leaders have always needed to know the strengths, weaknesses, and intentions of their enemies. Consequently, the trade of spying [intelligence collection and analysis] is as old as civilization itself. Around 500 B.C., ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu wrote about the importance of intelligence and espionage networks in his classic book The Art of War. The Bible [also] contains more than a hundred references to spies and intelligence-gathering.” Importantly, through collection and analysis, rhetorical theory has been there to put the key pieces together.
Processing and Exploitation Phase

In addition to the collection of information, the processing and exploitation phase takes information and converts it into “forms suitable for analysis and production.” Processing information includes “translating foreign languages, developing film from tactical reconnaissance aircraft, generating hard (paper) or soft (electronic) images provided by electro-optical or infrared sensors, and converting raw electronic intelligence data into a standard message format suitable for automated handling.” Suitable analytical forms are often intimately tied to systems collecting the data, as evidenced by the Corona satellite images. The exploitation phase is a rich discourse mechanism for rhetorical research.

Production Phase

The production phase turns planned, collected, and processed information into “finished intelligence.” “Intelligence production is the integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of information from all available sources into tailored, usable intelligence. A key principle in production is the fusion of information from various sources to form a complete and accurate product. Fusion is essential for an effective intelligence production
process that accurately reflects and supports the commander’s prioritized essential elements of information (EEI)."  

The human element is not only key to the transformation of information into intelligence but it also shapes your analytical techniques. Additionally, the fusion from multiple sources demands an understanding of both operational and rhetorical benefits of each intelligence source (table 1).

### Table 1
**Intelligence Sources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intelligence Source</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMINT*</td>
<td>Imagery Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOTINT</td>
<td>Photographic Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT*</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMINT</td>
<td>Communications Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELINT</td>
<td>Electronic Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISINT</td>
<td>Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELINT</td>
<td>Telemetry Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADINT</td>
<td>Radar Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT*</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASINT*</td>
<td>Measurement and Signature Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACINT</td>
<td>Acoustical Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTINT</td>
<td>Optical Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELECTRO-OPTICAL</td>
<td>Electro-optical Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRINT</td>
<td>Infrared Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LASINT</td>
<td>Laser Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUCINT</td>
<td>Nuclear Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RINT</td>
<td>Unintentional Radiation Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSINT*</td>
<td>Open Source Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECHINT*</td>
<td>Technical Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI*</td>
<td>Counterintelligence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Primary Sources


Along with accelerated political and military events, advances in technology have accelerated the need for a heightened rhetorical understanding. Unfortunately, at the unit level (your primary training grounds), analysis is subtly pushed to the sideline in favor of information management. Technology provides a wide array of artifacts (imagery, electronic signals, databases, and so on), and inexperienced personnel often mistake these artifacts as analyzed intelligence. Rhetoricians
Russell S. Tomlin, L. Forrest, M. M. Pu, and M. Kim highlight the analytical implications of these artifacts: “This artifact, in essence, contains the meaning intended by the speaker [or the reporting-collection platform]. It is conducted to the listener [or analyst] in either spoken [or visual] or written form. The text [or image, data, etc.] is then unpacked and its meaning extracted from the text artifact by the listener [or analyst].”\textsuperscript{17}

Within this process, analysts must extract meaning from data and images. The collecting system (camera, electronic spectrum receiver, and so on) may not accurately or adequately frame meaning or significance with the artifact. An analyst’s difficult task is further complicated by the nature of the artifact. Without an associated, precise meaning, “the source, sometimes the only source [of information],” requires the analyst to engage “actively in constructing [his or] her own conceptual representation of the matters [or situation] at hand.”\textsuperscript{18}

Analysis is often confused as a product instead of a key (critical) rhetorical process. Conflict between artifact (product) and process will continue to complicate intelligence analysis. However, rhetorical theory is integral to the packing and unpacking of meaning behind modern artifacts.\textsuperscript{19} Specifically, theory enhances the ability to visualize a battle space or situation when the artifacts fail to contribute to analytical “knowledge integration.”\textsuperscript{20} Rhetoricians have focused on challenges that thwart effective artifact analysis; the problem is twofold. The first hurdle deals with an analyst’s ability to integrate information (knowledge integration) into a “coherent representation,” resulting in construction of “concepts and events virtually identical” to the actual situation.\textsuperscript{21} Deception and misinformation can significantly degrade your ability to develop a comprehensive understanding of a system or event. Equally debilitating, the second obstacle deals with management and control of the ever-increasing information flow (information management) in a “dynamic, real-time interaction.”\textsuperscript{22} Knowledge integration and information management continue to stress and stretch military analysts’ capabilities. Unfortunately, the distinction between intelligence integration and information analysis is often blurred. “Knowledge integration (analysis) requires effective information management, but effective information management
is not enough to account for knowledge integration.” With the growing number and diversity of artifacts, the intelligence community’s focus on effective integration must remain paramount.

**Dissemination and Integration Phase**

During the dissemination and integration phase of the intelligence cycle, intelligence is provided directly to the user in a format that is “readily understood.” Answers to the commander’s EEI are satisfied in a “timely manner without overloading the user and minimizing the load on communications capabilities.”

Getting the product to the user is the last step in the intelligence cycle; but, because the cycle is dynamic, the process does not end with dissemination. First, intelligence personnel must ensure that the product is actually used. This is a particular obligation of intelligence personnel who are members of operational staffs. They are in the best position to demonstrate the value of intelligence products to commanders and other staff members. Second, intelligence personnel must see to it that dissemination is refined by gathering feedback from the commander or other users (aircrews) to ensure that intelligence requirements have been satisfied and the finished intelligence products are usable.

Intelligence within this phase is “pushed” and “pulled” (as seen in photographs below) as analysis flows through intricate communication networks from command echelons down to individual flights, companies, and naval elements.

*Left to right: Formal intelligence briefings “push” information to users, but tactical intelligence briefings “pull” it from them.*
The intelligence cycle is a proven tool to effectively fulfill many of the commander’s objectives, as shown in the next photograph. An operationally focused instruction in rhetorical theory can strengthen this process. Specifically, rhetorical theory can help ensure that analysis efforts and resources are tasked against threat pivot points. Seeds of analysis must be planted as early as possible through a focused interest in theory. Rhetorical theory is key to enhanced analytical growth. We will look to Michel Foucault, the master rhetorical gardener, for guidance before this author spreads more fertilizer.

Aircraft scored a direct hit on a reinforced Iraqi aircraft shelter.

Notes

4. Ibid., 25.
5. JP 2-01, II-2.
7. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
13. JP 2-01, ix.
15. JP 2-01, ix.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 65.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. JP 2-01, x.
25. Ibid.
27. JP 2-01, x.
Chapter 4

[What the] Foucault?

I think we should have the modesty to say to ourselves that, on the one hand, the time we live in is not the unique or fundamental or irruptive point in history where everything is completed and begun again. We must also have the modesty to say, on the other hand, that even without this solemnity—the time we live in is very interesting.

—Michel Foucault

*Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*

Paul-Michel Foucault—a prominent philosopher, historian, and rhetorician—was born in Poitiers, France, in 1926. School was an exciting aspect of Foucault’s life from a young age, and he excelled rapidly through the French school system. While in his teens, Foucault experienced the toils of war as his town fell under control of German occupation forces during World War II. “In his Jesuit school, Paul-Michel wasn’t exactly a war hero [then again, he was only in his teens], but he did help other kids steal wood from the Nazis to heat the school.” During the German occupation, he experienced his “intellectual, sexual, and political coming of age” under an oppressive power shift that resulted in the “disappearance, flight and arrest of teachers, town’s people, and relatives in the horizon of Nazi authority.”

Even after the rigors of a trying childhood, Foucault progressed intellectually and academically after the war. “Foucault went from school to school, doing extremely well on his exams, until he had reached the summit: he scored fourth among all the students in the country competing for entry to the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris—the most exclusive and intellectually intense college-level school in France.” His driven study of philosophy, psychology, and psychopathology fostered his drive to chart the “independent systems” that shape discourse and society.

Foucault never served in the military; however, his firsthand occupation experience and painstaking study of history,
human behavior, and—most importantly—power, made him a social and intellectual tactician of the highest order. The breadth of his studies covers many expansive and elusive aspects of society.

Foucault’s early studies concerned the history of mental illness and society’s response to it. Society’s use of the concept of madness in the 17th century is the subject of his *Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique* (1961; *Madness and Civilization*). In his book *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison* (1975; *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*), he examined the origins of the modern penal system. In these and other books, Foucault put forth the thesis that institutions such as asylums, hospitals, and prisons are society’s devices for exclusion and that by surveying social attitudes in relation to these institutions, one can examine the development and uses of power.


His works are sometimes difficult to read, and he can test the mettle of even the best students of rhetorical theory. Furthermore, these books do not take up much shelf space in the military community’s libraries. However, do not let this discourage you from seeking rhetorical sources to help you think and operate outside of the box. Foucault’s work in this study is transplanted into the realm of military analysis, far from his original target audience. However, contemporary author and rhetorician Sonja K. Foss highlights the utility of Foucault’s rhetorical theory: “In the area of rhetorical scholarship, Foucault’s originality lies not in the introduction of totally new concepts for use in rhetorical theory but in how his notions may be used by others to stretch existing conceptualizations or may be applied to new domains.”

Foucault would frown upon this “institutional” use of his power analysis. He once stated that “the goal of my work during the last twenty years has not been to analyze the phenomena [sic] of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.” Fortunately, Foucault’s analysis of the cultural modes and norms results in a striking power blueprint: a social projection that is bolstered by his refusal “to separate off knowledge from power.” Most importantly, even as a very reluctant,
unintentional military tactician, Foucault understood the critical, pivotal elements and practices of society: his most general aim was to “discover the point at which these practices [social, political, economic, legal, philosophical, and scientific traditions] became coherent reflective techniques with definite goals, the point at which a particular discourse emerged from these techniques and came to be seen as true, the point at which they are linked with the obligation of searching from the truth and telling the truth.”13 His detailed studies of mankind reveal critical discourse linkages—such connections are discussed in greater detail later in this paper.

Interestingly, he superbly catalyzes the domain of tactical analysis. Specifically, elements of his military applicability are highlighted during an interview conducted by Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino. Foucault was asked the following question concerning the military model of power: “You have said about power as an object of research that one has to invert [Carl von] Clausewitz’s formula so as to arrive at the idea that politics is the continuation of war by other means. Does the military model seem to you, on the basis of your most recent researches, to be the best one for describing power; is war here simply a metaphorical model, or is it the literal, regular, everyday mode of operation of power?”14 Foucault frames his power response to the above question and generates even more compelling questions:

As soon as one endeavors to detach power with its techniques and procedures from the form of law within which it has been theoretically confined up until now, one is driven to ask this basic question: Isn’t power simply a form of warlike domination? Shouldn’t one therefore conceive all problems of power in terms of relations of war? Isn’t power a sort of generalized war which assumes at particular moments the forms of peace and the state? Peace would then be a form of war, and the state a means of waging it. A whole range of problems emerges here. Who wages war against whom? Is it between two classes, or more? Is it a war of all against all? What is the role of the army and military institutions in this civil society where permanent war is waged? What is the relevance of concepts of tactics and strategy for analyzing structures and political processes? What is the essence and mode of transformation of power relations? All these questions need to be explored. In any case it’s astonishing to see how easily and self-evidently people talk of warlike relations of power or class struggle without ever making it clear whether some form of war is meant, and if so what form.15
Foucault’s understanding of power relations serves as a primary analytical platform. More power specifics are discussed later.

Ever since you were young cadets or officer candidates, an understanding of Clausewitzian principles on the spectrum of conflict formed the basis of your understanding of combat. From structured, gentlemanly conflict under Gen Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini’s warfare theory to chaotic conflicts described by Clausewitz, warfare is a historically prevalent element of human life. Clausewitz’s concepts of fog and friction were readily seen in the conflict in Kosovo. The fog (uncertainty) of combat is highlighted by smart weapons missing targets, US soldiers being captured, and stealth aircraft (F-117s) being inexplicably uncloaked (mangled debris) by Serbian television. Similarly, the friction (countless minor complications) of supporting large combat formations with weapons, fuels, maintenance, personnel (aircrews and ground-support technicians), and accurate intelligence also complicates modern conflicts.

At this point you may be asking, “What the Foucault?” Well, underpinning the entire spectrum of conflict is a complex, ever-shifting flow of power, ruptures, and discontinuity. “One can never be absolutely positive that all enemy capabilities [power pivot points and decisive points] are associated with evaluating enemy intentions . . . intelligence preparation of the battlefield can reduce vulnerability to enemy actions by describing enemy courses of action so that they can be countered, forestalled, or exploited.” Power, as briefly discussed above, is often veiled: its absence is as poignant as its presence. As intelligence officers, your task is to chart the power plays on the political fronts and battlefields (fig. 4).

Foucault highlights many avenues for the analytical development of power. Conflicts share integral power relations resulting in valuable “concepts of tactics and strategy for analyzing structures and political processes.” Most importantly, Foucault asks, “What is the essence and mode of transformation of power relations?” In order to help answer at least a portion of this critical question, I use Foucault’s understanding of power flows and discontinuity. The effective preparation of the battle space for the prevention or prosecution of conflict
begins with an understanding of these “warlike relations of power.”

All too often you focus on the physical platforms of the profession of arms (aircraft, computers, ships, tanks, etc.); however, it is the human element that allows the entire process to succeed. By the end of this discussion, I hope you have an appreciation of how rhetoricians such as Foucault can help you better understand the elusive human element of conflict—and the analysis of human struggles. As intelligence officers, you are also instructors, mentors, and subject-matter experts on a wide range of operational and tactical issues. Along these lines, you have an obligation to remain current in many forms of intellectual literacy. Marcus Cicero (106 to 43 B.C.), a famous Roman statesman, lawyer, and scholar, is remembered as one of history’s greatest orators. Cicero clearly highlighted his commitment to the arts: “No one should be numbered with the orators who is not accomplished in all those arts that befit the
well-bred; for though we do not actually parade these in our
discourse, it is nonetheless made clear to demonstration
whether we are strangers to them or have learned to know
them."25 You simply, much like your rhetorical forefathers,
need to remain open-minded to the best available concepts in
all fields. Unfortunately, discourse theory spends little time in
the spotlight. However, as the primary communicators (orators
as Cicero put it) of the military, you need to understand the
underlying concepts of your trade.

Notes
1. Lydia A. Fillingham, Foucault for Beginners (New York: Writers and
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ronald C. Tobey, Foucault, Michel, n.p., on-line, Internet, 11 March
7. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on
9. Ibid.
10. Sonja K. Foss, Karen A. Foss, and Robert Trapp, Contemporary Per-
spectives on Rhetoric, 2d ed. (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1991),
232.
11. Quoted in Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 65.
16. “Leadership: Combat Leadership,” lecture, Squadron Officer School,
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Lan-
guage, 9.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
25. Quoted in Erika Lindemann, A Rhetoric for Writing Teachers, 3d ed.
Chapter 5

**Power Plug**

*Here I believe one’s point of reference should not be to the
great model of language (langue) and signs, but to that of
war and battle. The history which bears and determines us
had the form of a war rather than that of a language: rela-
tions of power, not relations of meaning.*

—Michel Foucault  
*Power/Knowledge: Selected
Interviews and Other Writings*

During spring 1999, I watched as 22 aircraft laden with air-
borne infantry and equipment from the 3d Battalion, 504th
Parachute Infantry Regiment surged forward to form an im-
pressive line of gray and camouflaged aircraft feeding onto the
runway at Pope Air Force Base (AFB), North Carolina (see
photos, next page). Each C-130 turned out of its parking lo-
cation onto taxiways with near-drill-team precision. I reflected
on the four previous 16-hour days involved in planning and
preparation of the formation, including route analysis, many
modifications, and then the scramble to provide each crew
with mission-ready products. The mission was now under
way. Concept and formation briefings were long since over.
The final mission presentation, the joint mission briefing, was
met with approving head nods and closing remarks from an
Army brigadier general and an Air Force colonel. While stand-
ing at the edge of the legendary Green Ramp, the loading area
for airborne troops and equipment, I was overwhelmed by the
roar of 88 propellers cutting through the air. Although this
was just an exercise, I could not help considering the physical
and rhetorical ramifications of the event.

Later that evening, after all the aircraft were aloft, I returned
to the mission-planning area to observe a second rhetorical
event. An Army officer, one of the evaluators of the loading
process, was honing his power-analysis skills and reading
Robert Kaplan’s *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History*. Con-
sidering the conflict in Kosovo, the officer’s effort to explore a
critical element of rhetorical analysis (history) was impressive—specifically, the officer’s drive to bridge a daunting, expansive gap between a volatile region’s history and the potential application of the power, like the force now airborne. Obviously, the two power events vary greatly in magnitude; yet, they share a common rhetorical thread—a tailored analysis of your own and the threat’s power infrastructure.

Since you are intelligence specialists, understanding the power in both your and the adversary’s capabilities and systems is extremely critical. Sun Tzu clearly understood the value of this critical examination of adversary and self: “So it is said that if you know others and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know others but know yourself, you win one and lose one; if you do not know others and do not know yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.”1 Knowing yourself and others, as Sun Tzu puts it, requires a detailed understanding of the physical (weapon systems, ranges, guidance types, etc.) and rhetorical (origin, history of use or misuse, supporting institutions, and infrastructure) power coursing through every aspect of intelligence analysis.

It is difficult to use power effectively unless it is studied and observed from an appropriate vantage point. For Foucault, the vantage point starts at the “panopticon.”2 Foucault adapts Jeremy Bentham’s concept (physical plan) for the panopticon in order to give each power event its proper perspective.3 “The panopticon consists of a large courtyard, with a tower in the center, surrounded by a series of buildings divided into levels

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1 Sun Tzu, *The Art of War.*
2 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Knowledge.*
3 Ibid.
and cells. In each cell there are two windows: one brings in light and the other faces the tower, where large observatory windows allow for the surveillance of the cells. The cells become ‘small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible.”\(^4\) Bentham’s panopticon represents an actual architectural mechanism for observing and controlling a subject from a central position.\(^5\) Although not exactingly adapted by Foucault, the panopticon is crucial to his power analysis.\(^6\) Foucault uses the observation point in his search for power mechanisms and architectures. Figure 5 illustrates a potential hierarchical flow of power or discourse through two typical organizations. The pyramid on the left—shown in each of these panoptic illustrations—represents a sample US organization while the structure on the right represents a look at an adversary’s power connections. The centrally placed observation tower, or panopticon, represents Foucault’s power-observation position. The transparent cubes of the pyramid represent the panoptic cells with windows we

![Figure 5. The Panopticon’s Point of View](image)
look through with the help of many intelligence sources. 7 Spread before the panopticons are Foucault’s “institutions, economic and social processes, behavioral patterns, systems of norms, types of classification, [and] modes of characterization.” 8 “The panopticon offers a particularly vivid instance of how political technologies of the body function. It is a ‘generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men. . . . [I]t is the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form. . . . It is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use.” 9

Analysts can identify the same power infrastructures in everything ranging from an integrated air defense system to the training doctrine behind an individual soldier in the field. There are many operational panopticons in the military. Airborne command, control, and surveillance systems (see photos below) take their place as the high-tech, mobile observation points. These modern advancements embody many of the essential elements of Bentham’s original concept. Military installations, field camps, and airborne formations depend heavily on the ability to observe and analyze a battle space or conflict. “Thus, through spatial ordering, the panopticon brings together power, control of the body, control of groups and knowledge.” 10 The power analysis “perch” is well defined

Left: The E-3 Sentry is an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft that provides all-weather surveillance, command, control, and communications needed by commanders of US and NATO air defense forces. Right: The E-8 joint surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS) is an airborne platform equipped with a long-range, air-to-ground surveillance system designed to locate, classify, and track ground targets in all weather conditions. Its capabilities make JSTARS effective for dealing with any contingency, whether actual or impending military aggression, international treaty verification, or border violation.
and well organized; however, it too is subject to its own level of control. “As the final step in architectural and technological perfection, the panopticon includes a system of observing and controlling the controllers. Those who occupy the central position in the panopticon are themselves thoroughly enmeshed in a localization and ordering of their own behavior.”

US military services, especially their service infrastructure, are built around many of the same “system[s] of observing and controlling the controllers.” From controlling who has information access through panoptic background investigations to centralized control of access mediums—message traffic, encrypted Internet Web sites, and compartmented programs—intelligence agencies carry many of the same watermarks of Bentham’s original panopticon blueprint.

Importantly, the system of checks and controls adds to an organization’s “economy of power.” “That is to say, procedures which allowed [and still allow] the effects of power to circulate in a manner at once continuous, uninterrupted, adapted, and ‘individualized’ throughout the entire social body.” A clear understanding of an organization’s circulatory system will lead to the heart of its key strengths and weaknesses. Physical and social procedures surrounding the flow of power serve as key power conduits that you must take a look at through Foucault’s rhetorical lens.

Foucault’s analysis techniques not only match the intelligence architecture but they also work as a “focusing lens” for the organization’s power flow. Additionally, Foucault’s analytical lens works equally well to magnify the often-hidden power conduits in an adversary’s structure. A detailed understanding of power conduits and the restrictions placed upon them is needed to apply Foucault’s analytical tools.

From the combatant commander down to the soldier in the field, a conceptually simple yet powerfully complex power architecture exists. Each power level in the architecture acts as a power plug in a “network of relationships that are systematically interconnected” in a series of standard and potential connections (fig. 6). Our routine conduits constitute what is seen as standard operating procedures; furthermore, these connections end up in baseline field orders, air tasking orders,
and special instructions to energize US power architecture with discourse power. Intelligence officers can excel as “power boosters” and/or “surge protectors” in order to maintain an optimal balance in the flow of “juice.”

In this task of adjustment, discipline had to solve a number of problems for which the old economy of power was not sufficiently equipped. . . It must neutralize the effects of counterpower that spring from them and which form a resistance to the power that wishes to dominate it: agitations, revolts, spontaneous organizations, coalitions—anything that may establish horizontal conjunctions. Hence the fact that the disciplines use procedures of partitioning and verticality; that they introduce, between the different elements at the same level, as solid separations as possible; that they define compact hierarchical networks; in short, that they oppose to the intrinsic, adverse force of multiplicity the technique of the continuous, individualizing pyramid.17

As you partition your view of yourselves and others, an objective view of critical-power choke, pooling, and stop points gains strength and clarity.

![Figure 6. Power and Knowledge Flow](image)

Power, pyramids, and vertical partitions were covered. Just in case you are wondering—no, you do not need to splice an electrical engineering degree with a course in Egyptology. Just keep in mind that observation and control of power depends on a complex group of relations—interactions that depend heavily on
communication. For Foucault, “discourse is a form of social action” built on networks of archives, social practices, and institutions (fig. 7). “[Foucault] demonstrates the microphysics of power that resides in the knowledge that is disseminated in discourse and embodied in laws, regulations, tests, and in the very architecture of hospitals, schools, and prisons, showing the ways that seemingly diverse discourses come together in formations that affect social practices and social controls.”

If you can understand both your own and the adversary’s discourse formation, you can better identify pivot points to reinforce, degrade, or attack. Appropriate action can be initiated if you can highlight the tactics of power that fulfill Foucault’s three criteria for “the ordering [structuring] of human [power] multiplicities.” These social pivot points serve as critical elements in power analysis. Key discourse pivot points (fig. 8) and target areas will exercise power economically (a significant reduction of hierarchical effort, social resistance, and physical/monetary expense). They will take power to its maximum intensity and range; they will link power and economy through amplifying mediums (visual, electronic, tactile, etc.) and organizations (educational,
military, industrial, etc.) in order to add clarity and strength.\textsuperscript{22} If you can understand these areas, you will fully realize your own capabilities. These points are also known as centers of gravity and decisive points. Additionally, these pivot points will help you comprehend the enemy point of view.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure8.png}
\caption{Discourse Tactical Considerations}
\end{figure}

The fighters in figure 8 represent just one element of a country’s military capability. Additionally, they embody every aspect of Foucault’s three criteria. For example, the aircraft on the left represents a US plane, and the one on the right represents a hostile force’s air capability. The corresponding countries’ power structures are directly responsible for employment of their aircraft. Power flow starts at the top of the discourse hierarchies and proceeds down a complex system of conduits (shaped by social and physical procedures, tactics, and strategies) with each aircraft representing the military manifestation of the power flow. Inside each aircraft, there are several additional sets of power conduits. Each aircraft’s physical power (speed, range, weapons, etc.) and each pilot’s capability repre-
sent another critical set of conduits. The aircraft's physical power is readily seen; however, the pilot's training (aircraft systems and procedures), threat knowledge (systems and tactics), and access to information via (a secure and reliable) connection to the main conduit (with the panoptic view of the battle space) are rarely acknowledged. Overall strength of an allied or hostile power flow is directly tied to the economy, intensity, and linkage of the flow.

Operation Allied Force (Kosovo conflict), the air campaign against Serbian forces, is an example of economy, intensity, and linkage in action. NATO successfully engaged Serbian military infrastructure through an effective use of its own economy, intensity, and linkage. According to DOD News Briefing (July 1999), NATO's economy was demonstrated through destruction of 110 Serbian tanks, 210 armored fighting vehicles, and 449 pieces of artillery and mortars, with loss of only two aircraft (pilots rescued unharmed) during 78 days of flight operations. The monetary economy or expense of the operation was considerable. However, the ultimate economy was realized through preservation of NATO and civilian lives throughout the operation. According to Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, “of the 23,000 bombs and missiles used, only 20 went astray causing collateral damage.”

Equally, intensity of the weapons employed by NATO aircraft was very evident, as highlighted by the number and variety of targets disabled or destroyed. Additionally, unrestricted range and employment of NATO aircraft highlight the intensity of their employment. Finally, linkage of the employment was underscored by use of multinational command and control systems, aircraft, and personnel in attainment of a common objective. The airpower portion represents only one component during one phase of the conflict in Kosovo. Operation Joint Guardian, the follow-on operation, involved employment of NATO peacekeeping forces (ground troops) in Kosovo.

During the Persian Gulf War, intelligence analysts effectively identified Iraqi pivot points as they determined critical targets against which coalition forces would apply physical power. According to the Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 1, Planning and Command and Control, experienced intelligence analysts were
able to chart the flow of power through the Iraqi military architecture.

American intelligence recognized the highly centralized nature of the Iraqi military and political systems. And this leadership resided in the person of Saddam Hussein. The CIA, DIA, and State Department devoted a great deal of effort to examining him and concluded that he would remain in power for the foreseeable future despite the presence of numerous, ineffective, and demoralized opposition groups. . . . Saddam and the Ba’ath Party maintained their power through a pervasive, effective, and harsh intelligence and security apparatus that periodically infiltrated and decimated internal opposition groups. Thus, both CENTCOM [Central Command—responsible for the Iraqi area of operation] and CENTAF [Central Command Air Forces] staffs targeted leadership before the crisis erupted, but only the military portion of this foundation supported the Baghdad regime. The inclusion of additional political targets into air campaigning occurred only after the United States was committed to Operation Desert Shield.24

The Iraqi power structure’s economy, intensity, and linkage were effectively identified.

Unfortunately, a misapplication or misunderstanding of our own pivot points can create unwanted entropy that can wreck an operation. Effective discourse fuses power and knowledge critical to any successful military operation.25 Again, drawing from Operation Desert Storm, a delayed amplification of our own pivot points resulted in an initially poor rhetorical economy of power that was successfully overcome via our superior physical force.26

As in past conflicts, intelligence enabled the planning for Desert Shield and Desert Storm—it did not formulate it. In the case of defensive planning for USCINCENT [US combatant commander of Central Command] OPLAN [operations plan] 1002–90, intelligence analysts were caught in the post–Cold War transition from Soviet-European emphasis to smaller, but more numerous regional threats. As a result of the region’s relatively low priority before Desert Storm, their information on Iraq was less than comprehensive and woefully out of date. Even when those analysts who were watching the Arabian Peninsula detected early signs that Baghdad might be preparing for military operations, they were unable at first to capture the attention of senior policy makers who, up until the summer of 1990, had been advised that Iraq had been exhausted by its war with Iran and would limit its bellicosity to the diplomatic arena.27

Fortunately, thanks to Foucault’s power analysis, the ability to chart this power flow will help you to operate more effectively during any future conflict—at any echelon (from higher headquarters down to the unit level). Specifically, use of the
military's panopticons can help map the power conduits in each level of an organization—conduits shaped by the organization's social hierarchies, physical structures, procedures, tactics, and strategies. Additionally, an understanding of how Foucault's elements of economy, intensity, and linkage dramatically affect the flow of power or discourse through the conduit structure of any organization, system, or situation will prove helpful.

Obviously, our intelligence capabilities do not allow a complete, unhindered view of an adversary's discourse infrastructures. Moreover, we cannot address discourse mechanisms of real-world threat systems; doing so would move this discussion into a classified realm. Discourse and power flows can be encrypted, hidden, duplicated, and circumvented by many high- and very low-technology means. From satellite communications to hand signals, discourse power flows can branch, ebb, and pool in many ways. However, if you can understand how to isolate, block, or manipulate the discourse flow of any weapon system, you have effectively removed it as a threat. As more is learned about megatons, Mach numbers, cyclic fire rates, and ranges of a wide array of weapon systems, it is very important to consider the power plug for each system; it will undoubtedly highlight the most pivotal characteristics to avoid or exploit.

Notes
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 19.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 20.
7. Ibid., 19.
10. Ibid., 19.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 61.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
25. Bizzell and Herzberg, 1128.
Chapter 6

Discontinuity Fever

The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.

—F. Scott Fitzgerald

The Crack-Up

Foucault raises a key question in reference to the flow of power and knowledge: “What is the essence and mode of transformation of power relations?”1 This discussion has shown how the panopticon can help identify critical pivot points in the power relations of a given architecture. However, in order to fully evaluate power surges, you must examine the flow with a power analysis focused on complex shifts, ruptures, and discontinuities underlying the power structure (fig. 9).2 The base-line requirement is to “differentiate the networks and levels to which they [power events] belong” and to use power analysis to “reconstitute [detect, characterize, and evaluate] the [discourse] line along which they are connected and engender one another.”3 Foucault clearly understands the strengths and difficult consequences of power analysis: “The notion of discontinuity is a paradoxical one: because it is both an instrument and an object of research; because it divides up the field of which it is the effect; because it enables the historian [tactician] to individualize different domains but can be established only by comparing those domains.”4 A “powerful and flexible grid of interpretation with which to approach relations of knowledge and power” forms the architecture of the organization.5 You monitor “longer-range continuities in cultural [power] practices” that form Foucaultian norms in order to highlight trip-wire events.6 Unfortunately, even norms expand and contract to set new and sometimes dangerous tensions on trip-wire power events.

Power shifts, ruptures, and discontinuities can take on many forms when overlaid against a wide range of norms across the globe. For example, the death in 1994 of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung created a relatively small ripple in the power flow
when compared to deaths of other leaders in other regions. Conversely, the death of Marshal Tito (1892–1980)—anti-Nazi resistance hero from 1941 to 1945 who served as “godfather of all Yugoslavs” after the war—created not only a power shift but a power rupture (creation of new power nodes) with innumerable discontinuities. There are many positive and negative aspects to these power mutations. Obviously, Tito’s cohesion of volatile Balkans came at a high price—specifically, his secret police and island prisons. Power ruptures and discontinuities continue to surge throughout the former Yugoslavia—as witnessed in Bosnia and Kosovo (photo, next page). Also, Iraq experienced a dramatic power shift in 2003. The regime change there opened many ruptures and discontinuities as this once repressed country gradually moves toward democracy. Observe the new power nodes that are established, modified, and removed as Iraq is returned to the control of its people. Importantly, consider how these changes can be viewed and analyzed with the help of a rhetorical lens.
Other countries (the former Soviet Union, Iran, Cuba, etc.) have faced significant bends in power flow over the years. David Brownstone and Irene Franck’s *Timelines of War: A Chronology of Warfare from 100,000 BC to the Present* exhaustively lists recurring (some ongoing from their very origins) issues behind the world’s conflicts. The need and the importance of effective intelligence analysis are in no danger of decreasing. James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay comment on the analysis of global strife: “Wars don’t just happen. Organized violence, like the weather, is never a complete surprise. There are signs and long-term trends. You cannot predict exactly what the weather will be at noon tomorrow. You can, however, analyze past and ongoing conflicts and use the results to project the major trends shaping similar current and future events.”

Shifts, ruptures, and discontinuities (trip-wire events) often precede many signs and long-term trends. You must carefully examine a battle space and help determine a wide array of trip-wire events. Assets, ranging from local (organic) to national level, can be tasked through the intelligence cycle in order to observe these events.

Unfortunately, according to Enoch Powell, even with trip wires, conflicts will remain a permanent part of our history. “The various techniques through which power is enacted are acceptable to us only because most of the power is hidden. The effectiveness of power increases as its visibility decreases.
This disciplinary, normalizing power is far more subtle and pervasive than the easily identifiable, spectacular, repressible, and potentially violent types of power, so we acquiesce readily in ways we would not to more overt forms.11 As a result of this hidden potential, trip wires can in no way be redirected from the power infrastructure into an isolated checklist. Uncertainties of knowledge (photo below) continue to exist even during our age of high technology.12

Directly tied to uncertainty is the possibility of deception. The CIA’s *A Compendium of Analytic Tradecraft Notes* highlights several key warning signs associated with deception.13 An understanding of a target country’s capabilities, opportunities, and motives helps to scale “the likelihood that a country or organization is engaged in an attempt to distort the analyst’s perceptions.”14 “Knowledge of which secrets an adversary most seeks to protect adds a distinctive perspective to the analysts’ understanding of the country’s military, political, and economic priorities.”15 Additional warning signs highlight the “anomalies in the information available to the analyst.”16 Suspicious gaps in collection, suspicious confirmations, and contradictions to carefully researched patterns represent discontinuities underscored as key warning signs (fig. 10).17

Suspicious gaps in collection are generated when “conclusions and judgments received through one collection channel are not supported to the extent expected from the take of other collection systems.”18 Although certain patterns of behavior are subject to rapid change, analysts “should examine criti-
cally information that signals an inexplicable change, for example, in an adversary’s priorities and practices” resulting in contradictions to carefully researched patterns.19 As a final warning sign to a deception operation, suspicious confirmations result “when a new stream of information from clandestine sources or technical collection seems to reinforce the rationale for or against a U.S. policy initiative.”20 “In these circumstances, receiving the same ‘story’ from more than one DO [director of operations, or other source] does not in itself speak to the authenticity of the information.”21

In an attempt to understand power flows and uncertainty or deception, you must remember that analysis is a process—analytical steps steeped in rhetorical theory. Power and discontinuity analysis represent two effective ways to analyze a foe’s actions or capabilities. However, prior to initiating any analysis, you need to understand that power (its conduits and flows) influences everyone. Consequently, Foucault’s power influences can be found in every human organization and system. Now, you can look at an organization as a power being with a rhetorical circulatory structure supporting its existence. Power (Foucault’s discourse and knowledge) flows through the entire organization. As a power-influenced (human conceptualized) entity, an organization has “spatial, temporal, and social compartmentalizations.”22 which must have a physical means of sharing in-
formation in order to allow power to flow. If you understand the power movement, you can understand the entire organization.

The simplest example of an organization is two people occupying their individual compartmentalizations just a few feet away. You can observe them communicate (visually, verbally, or physically) and can watch what actions take place. The conduits they use are shaped by “social processes, behavioral patterns, systems of norms, types of classification, [and] modes of characterization.” Through the proper vantage point (panopticon), you can learn more about how conduits are socially and physically shaped. You can then understand how and when power moves from compartment to compartment. The conduit—along with its content—may take the form of a simple verbal message from one person to another, or it could take on the form of an encoded satellite communication link from headquarters to the cockpit of an aircraft many miles away. Once each actual (suspected or possible) conduit is identified, you can associate actions and events with each type of power flow and conduit. Additionally, critical pivot points—as defined by the Foucaultian elements of economy, intensity, and linkage—can be isolated, attacked, or avoided. If you plot and highlight the conduit’s pivot points, you can effectively map the power flow of any organization.

Power shifts, ruptures, and discontinuities in conduits can take on many forms when overlaid against a wide range of global norms. You must be aware that conduits can rapidly change, fail, and fall from expected norms. According to Foucault, “the problem is no longer one of tradition, of tracing a line, but one of division, of limits; it is no longer one of lasting foundations, but one of transformations that serve as new foundations, the rebuilding of foundations.” Importantly, many of these power transformations occur naturally. However, you must understand that deception can effectively hide or disguise transformations. Deception can affect your analysis of an organization: a standard consideration for CIA and military analysts. The CIA’s Tradecraft Notes underscores a need to consider the possible use of deception from the beginning of your observation of an organization, system, or situation.
If uncertainty remains, you continue to focus on the threat power flow, but now you repeat the intelligence process with a different rhetorical perspective/lens. The views of rhetorical theorists such as Kenneth Burke, I. A. Richards, and Walter Ong can also serve as superb perspectives for intelligence analysis. Power flow is one of an unlimited number of rhetorical tools. Historians and tacticians represent “the diversity of sources and thought that both enrich and complicate” analysis. Hopefully, this (Foucaultian) rhetorical sampler illustrates at least one way theory can enrich your analytical perspective.

Unfortunately, all too often you underestimate the power flow and conduit capacity of an organization. You tend to gravitate towards a simple (inadequate) analysis of a threat country’s capabilities. According to Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, an inadequate analysis—a setback the Israelis faced during the 1973 Yom Kippur War—results from “the products of a failure to think through the many dimensions of a changing strategic challenge.”

Moreover, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] underestimated the import of substantial improvements in the quality of Arab (and above all, Egyptian) training and coordination since 1967. Because of intensive Soviet advice and, more important, their own efforts, the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces had improved considerably since that war, at virtually every level. To be sure, the IDF had also made tremendous strides in this period, and hence many IDF officers then and since have argued that the relative gap remained the same or had even opened slightly in Israel’s favor. The Israeli conception of relative advantage, however, oversimplified the changing relationship between the two sides.

Equally devastating, you also tend to overestimate the power flow and conduit capability of our own military forces. A clear path to understanding our unintentional self-deceptions starts with a step towards understanding our (individual) power strengths and limitations, resulting in an effective “comparative assessment of doctrine and effectiveness”—a penetrating view providing a clear “net assessment” of any situation.

Each one of us serves as a positive or negative pivot point in our organization’s power flow. Take the time to learn more about yourself and the other power players in your unit. Learn from those who can successfully analyze the key pivot points and trip wires. Additionally, while in the trenches, document your successes and pass the best analytical processes throughout your
unit and the intelligence community, thereby establishing a powerful conduit for the “rebuilding of [rhetorical] foundations.”

Notes

5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
9. Dunnigan and Bay, 205.
10. Ibid., xv.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 43.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
23. Foss, Foss, and Trapp, 14.
25. Ibid., 5.
26. Foss, Foss, and Trapp, 12.
29. Ibid., 129–30.
30. Ibid., 129.
Chapter 7

In the Trenches

But war is not a true adventure. It is a mere ersatz [imitation]. Where ties are established, where problems are set, where creation is stimulated—there you have adventure.

—Antoine de Saint-Exupéry

*Flight to Arras*

Real adventure begins at your first assignment when you interact with your primary customers (commanders, crews, and support personnel). The schoolhouse world quickly disappears in a flurry of daily demands. Within your office, you will experience influences of internal Foucaultian power surges from “innumerable points.”¹ Some challenges to face include manpower reductions, equipment shortages, and many deployments, as well as a wide array of additional duties. High demand for intelligence support continues to increase as shown in the following photo. Simply put—you will be expected to do more with less. Fortunately, your understanding of rhetorical theory can help.

The F-16—referred to as the Viper by its pilots—is one of many systems you will be expected to support.
From force protection to follow-on test and evaluation of new aircraft and tactics, intelligence support is deeply seeded in daily military operations. Unfortunately, depending on your specific situation, the job may turn from intelligence operator to analysis “medic”—you will hustle to meet operational needs as quickly as they arrive. Usually, this is when theory takes a backseat to providing time-critical products. Yet, even during times of intelligence triage, a few quick notes concerning discourse analysis can help. For example, many well-organized briefings, summaries, and reports are readily available in classified and unclassified formats through the Internet. Specifically, your access to the high-speed Secret Internet Protocol Router Network system makes an incredible array of polished products available. In the trenches, you will depend increasingly on preanalyzed products as you pull down briefings to satisfy short-notice requests. These are excellent products; however, you need to keep in mind that most of these products are not targeted to your specific audience.

Erika Lindemann offers the communication triangle shown in figure 11 as a simple way to help define rhetorical problems. The

Legend:
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
MSIC, Missile and Space Intelligence Center

Figure 11. Communication Triangle
problem you will face is rapid adaptation of discourse products influenced by someone else’s rhetorical perspective in order to satisfy your customers. As a quick and sound guide, the communication triangle can aid in the formulation of questions concerning the “relationship between terms [corners of the triangle].” The triangle can be used to formulate questions concerning the author’s relationship to the subject and audience as depicted in Lindemann’s work. Basically, you are “reverse engineering” the originating author’s rhetorical process.

As you use products designed for other audiences, you must take on positions (fig. 12) of reader, then writer, editor, and, ultimately, briefer to your specific audience (commanders, crews, and others). Correspondingly, depending on the depth of your analysis, you can significantly enhance your final presentation.

Audience analysis, directly tied to the communication triangle, is critical to all forms of communication. “As you learn more about your audience, the possibilities for your own role as a writer [briefer] will become clearer.” This process can be energized by approaching and asking the audience for input. A good recommendation is that you should sit down with your new commanders and crews and ask them what they would

![Figure 12. Communication Analysis](image-url)
like to see. You will build tremendous ethos in the unit and significantly cut your presentation-tailoring time.

Additionally, analysts must ask some critical questions when they use the communication triangle. Specifically, you must understand your audience. Development of an audience profile can help narrow and define audiences through a look at their ages, occupational specialties, and experiences. As this writer (briefer)/reader (listener) relationship grows and matures, your communication triangle actually shrinks at the base; and your message moves with greater speed and clarity. The new, enhanced triangle in figure 13 represents a comprehensive audience understanding, and the writer can use a medium that optimizes this advantage. The CIA, much like other intelligence organizations, skillfully uses audience analysis in order to tailor products “to the individual intelligence consumer’s concerns.”
Chapter 8

Conclusion

So nations have armies to help them, rulers have ministers to assist them. When the helper is strong, the nation is secure; when the helper is weak, the nation is in peril.

—Sun Tzu

The Art of War

Your primary job as analysts is to excel as the military’s helpers to war fighters and decision makers. Hopefully, this discussion has assisted your “pursuit of expertise in analytic tradecraft” through a deeper understanding of rhetorical theory. Rhetorical theory builds a superb foundation, enhancing the intelligence-analysis process at all levels of the discourse spectrum (from unit-level training to combatant-commander briefings). Specifically, the force of Foucault’s power and discontinuity analysis provides an insightful analytical perspective.

As Admiral King emphasized, “It is particularly important to comprehend the enemy point of view in all aspects.” Importantly, the enemy point of view is in its greatest state of flux since the Cold War. The former Soviet Union, our Cold War “enemy,” has transformed from a power-projection threat into an advanced weapons-proliferation concern. Although this transition is troubling, smaller, highly unconventional threats (countries, organizations, and threat systems) are now in the forefront, resulting in some of the greatest challenges for intelligence analysts. Consider the unconventional attacks orchestrated by Osama bin Laden, resulting in the near-simultaneous bombing attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 7 August 1998. Additionally, the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon underscored a critical need to modify our understanding of the enemy point of view.

As an unconventional analytical source, Foucault provides new power perspectives for intelligence analysis, and he gives
an unconventional look at an ever-growing unconventional threat environment. Foucault's analytical edge helps confront these threats "by refusing to separate off knowledge from power."[3] "His strategy has been to focus his work, both political and intellectual, on what he sees as the greatest threat— that strange, somewhat unlikely, mixing of the social science and social practices developed around subjectivity."[4] Foucault's theories address the human behind the satellite images and database numbers. He reminds you to "distinguish among events, to differentiate the networks and levels to which they belong, and to reconstitute the lines along which they are connected and engender one another."[5]

Some of you are already using many components of these powerful rhetorical tools. Some organizations, such as the CIA, are compiling key elements of these theories that directly apply to their craft. These theories work to bridge practical application gaps in the intelligence community—enhancing our ability to adapt and thwart failure. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, authors of *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*, underscore the basic reasons for failure in military organizations:
“failure to learn, failure to anticipate, and failure to adapt.” The theory allows you to learn from rhetorical lessons of the past, resulting in an intelligence service that can anticipate and adapt to power flows, shifts, ruptures, and discontinuities. These authors also underscore the importance of the skill of adaptation (specifically referencing the US Navy’s recovery from a string of setbacks during its 1940–42 antisubmarine warfare campaign): “Indeed, the ability to adapt is probably most useful to any military organization and most characteristic of successful ones, for with it, it is possible to overcome both learning and predictive failures. In the interim, however, the cost of such failures will be—and in the case was—high, in terms of blood, treasure, and time.” The end result of an enhanced understanding of theory is an adaptive intelligence organization that is able to provide a comprehensive view of the battle space to war fighters. As intelligence operators, you must strive to enhance your analytical growth through rhetorical theory—a force-multiplying education that extends our comprehension of an evolving, growing threat environment.

Notes

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 56.
7. Ibid., 94.
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