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Guardian Spies:  
The Story of Coast Guard Intelligence in World War II  
by LCDR (USCG) Michael E. Bennett

INTRODUCTION

Most histories written on U.S. communications intelligence and cryptanalysis often highlight the role of U.S. Coast Guard cryptanalytic work during the Rum War of the 1920s-30s and occasionally footnote the role of the Coast Guard up to commencement of hostilities before the U.S. officially entered World War II. Nevertheless, with few exceptions such as Robert Louis Benson’s History of Communications Intelligence during World War II or Stephen Budiansky’s Battle of Wits, most fall short on the full scope of contributions made by Coast Guard code-breakers and traffic analysts. Books like David Kahn’s The Codebreakers and even The Encyclopedia of Cryptology make little or no mention of the contributions of Coast Guard Unit 387 and its role and responsibilities during the war.

The “Guardian Spies” project examines three elements of Coast Guard Intelligence in World War II:

• The relationship between the Coast Guard and the Office of Strategic Services’ Maritime Unit and Operational Swimmer Groups.
• Coast Guard Domestic Port Intelligence Collection and the Role of CG Investigators and Intelligence Specialists in support of the Coast Guard Captain of the Port and local, state, and federal partners to detect, deter, and prevent espionage and sabotage.
• The role of Coast Guard Unit 387 and its contributions to World War II communications intelligence efforts from the pre-war period through April 1946.

In World War II, Admiral Waesche, the longest-serving Commandant of the United States Coast Guard and the first Coast Guard officer to achieve three and four stars, oversaw the transformation of the small peacetime Coast Guard fleet into a force of 160,000 men, manning 30 destroyer escorts, 75 frigates, 750 cutters, 290 Navy vessels, and 255 Army vessels, among scores of smaller craft. Not mentioned in any public history of the War, however, was the unique role Coast Guard Intelligence played in both protecting the homeland and contributing to the national security of the United States.
the services. During World War II, the Coast Guard Cutter Northland was the first unit to have contact with the enemy before Pearl Harbor and seized enemy radio installations in Greenland.

The first military capture of World War II has largely been forgotten over the years. But the fact remains, United States Coast Guard forces, in a foreign land, captured a party of men operating with the Germans three months before war was declared. This was an extremely bold action and a sample of the role that the Coast Guard would play in this nation’s largest war.3

Although the Coast Guard has participated in every war in our nation’s history, the most well-known contributions came during World War II and include active Coast Guard participation in Operations TORCH and ANVIL. Operation TORCH was the invasion of North Africa, which was “the first offensive operation the United States undertook against Germany and … the largest amphibious operation ever undertaken.”4 Operation ANVIL included the landings in southern France in August 1944. On D-Day the Coast Guard’s contributions to Operation OVERLORD included the rescue of over 1,500 torpedoed survivors. In the Pacific, Coast Guard contributions were numerous and included participation at Guadalcanal and Tulagi, which was the first major offensive of the war, and in the planning of Operation OLYMPIC, a plan to invade Japan just before its surrender in August 1945. The Coast Guard was responsible for almost all of the amphibious operations of the war, manning hundreds of Army and Navy vessels and craft.5 The only Coast Guard member to be awarded the Medal of Honor was Signalman First Class Douglas Munro for his heroic action saving the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel “Chesty” Puller, during the battle for Guadalcanal on September 27, 1942.

MOVING TOWARD A FORMAL COAST GUARD INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY

In 1904 the Revenue Cutter Service pioneered ship-to-shore radio communications, which later became the foundation for HF/DF communications intercepts during the Rum War and World War II, often referred to as “Huff-Duff.” In 1915 the Life Saving Service combined with the Revenue Cutter Service to form the modern-day Coast Guard in the “Act to Create the Coast Guard,” Public Law 239, on January 28, 1915. It was through this merger that an official role for Coast Guard Intelligence was codified under Article 304 of the new Coast Guard Regulations and the term “Intelligence” officially entered the Coast Guard lexicon. This new “Chief Intelligence Officer” was placed under the Office of the Assistant Commandant. The responsibilities for this new position included in Article 614 gave the Coast Guard authority for “securing of information which is essential to the Coast Guard in carrying out its duties; for the dissemination of this information to responsible officers, operating units of the Coast Guard, the Treasury Department and other collaborating agencies; and the maintenance of adequate files and records of law enforcement activities.” It further stated in Article 801 that “an Intelligence Officer is assigned to the staff of a District Commander” and was to be placed in the Office of the Chief of Staff. The duties of the District Intelligence Officer were listed in Article 831 as “obtaining and disseminating to proper officials information of the plans and movements of vessels and persons engaged and suspected of being engaged in the violation of laws, the enforcement of which is charged to the U.S. Coast Guard.” Additional language in Public Law 239 stated “the Coast Guard, which shall constitute a part of the military forces of the United States…shall operate…as a part of the Navy in time of War or when the President shall so direct.”

A cursory examination of primary and secondary sources from 1790 to 1947 indicates that the Coast Guard has been engaged in the collection of intelligence since its beginnings.

In his 1998 master’s thesis, Intelligence and the Rum War at Sea, Lieutenant Eric Ensign6 provided an assessment of Coast Guard Intelligence activity during the Rum War. He addressed tactical application of evolving all-source human intelligence (HUMINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT) capability in the U.S. for domestic law enforcement during Prohibition, and the use of this new intelligence “technology” for the interdiction and prosecution of the Rum Runners by the Coast Guard, Treasury Department, and the overall U.S. government. LT Ensign’s work is widely considered the first real contribution to developing a history of Coast Guard Intelligence. [EDITOR’S NOTE: LCDR Ensign later served on the Joint Military Intelligence College faculty as principal Coast Guard instructor and upon promotion to CDR was reassigned to NORTHCOM HQ.] Although there were often “footnotes” on Coast Guard Intelligence and, more specifically, communications intelligence contributions during the Rum War and World War II,7 to date there has been no real examination of the contribution of Coast Guard Intelligence over the years other than the very rare footnote or journal article.

Through my research on the relationship between the Coast Guard and the Office of Strategic Services during World
Alexander Hamilton was appointed as the first Secretary of the Treasury in 1789 and as such took on the enormous task of repaying the country’s war debt, establishing a system of revenue collection and simultaneously promoting the economic development of the country. This was no small task. Because of Hamilton’s extensive experience in commerce from his days in the West Indies, he understood the very essence of traders and smuggling and how best to generate revenue for the fledgling country. This is why his most important task as Secretary of the Treasury was to establish the Customs Service and Revenue Marine to collect the “requisite duties” that privateers and pirates had noticeably evaded for so long. C.F. Shoemaker, Captain and Chief of the Revenue Cutter Service, wrote in the Encyclopedia Americana 1904 that “the original purpose [of the Revenue Cutter Service] was to inaugurate a preventive service as against illicit trade by sea, and in that sense, to aid the customs service in the collection of revenue from duties on imports.” According to author Ron Chernow, “no other founder articulated such a clear and prescient vision of America’s future political, military, and economic strength or crafted such ingenious mechanisms to bind the country together.” Hamilton understood that ports were the lifeblood and the future of the U.S. and that a strong centralized banking system would allow the nation to pay off its debt, leverage the bonds necessary to build credit and trust internationally, and generate the revenue through import duties to provide for necessary government spending without further eroding the ability of the new nation to stand on its own.9

America was rich with raw materials but lacked the necessary industry to transform those goods into marketable products. Hamilton saw American ports as the lifeline for export of raw materials and import of products necessary to sustain commerce and trade. But as Hamilton moved to create his elaborate Customs Service and Revenue Marine, his critics feared that “they would become the Treasury Secretary’s personal spy force and military machine.”10 In April 1790 Secretary Hamilton asked Congress to “commission a fleet of single-masted vessels called revenue cutters that would patrol offshore waters and intercept contraband.”11 The original act provided for the construction of ten revenue cutters, “armed and equipped, and for each a complement of officers and enlisted men.”12 The original ten Cutters were the Vigilant, Active, General Green, Massachusetts, Scammel, Argus, Virginia, Diligence, South Carolina, and Eagle. The first Cutter constructed cost $1,000.13

The duties of the first ten Cutters were legislated by Congress and expanded on by Hamilton to include:

- boarding incoming and outgoing vessels and checking their papers (ownership, registration, admeasurement, manifests, etc.); insuring that all cargoes were properly documented; sealing the cargo holds of incoming vessels; seizing those vessels in violation of the law.14

Additional duties eventually emerged that were not associated with revenue collection and involved charting the local coastline (today we may refer to this as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace), enforcement of embargo and neutrality acts, and transportation of supplies to lighthouses. It was only natural that these Cutters collected information on vessel movements, ship manifests, cargo, and crew and passed it to customs collectors in the port and back to Treasury Headquarters. It was no secret that Secretary Hamilton had an insatiable need for information. This overt human intelligence collection apparatus, with over 122 customs inspectors and surveyors and ten Revenue Cutters in ports up and down the coastline of the U.S., “supplied Hamilton with an unending stream of intelligence.”15 Although most likely an unintended consequence of the need to establish a system of revenue collection for the country while promoting economic development, Hamilton established an overt human information and intelligence collection system that spanned the entire length of the eastern seaboard and into the Caribbean.

THE WAR OF 1812

As the United States drifted closer and closer to war with England, the Revenue Cutter Service acting with privateers and later the Navy would become America’s first line of naval defense. According to Captain C.F. Shoemaker:

During this war the Revenue Cutter Service captured 10 merchantmen, 3 barges, 3 officers, and 60 men; [and] 1 privateer mounting 14 guns. The Cutters Eagle, Mercury and Active did duty as scouts and on blockade service. The Cutters Commodore Barry, Surveyor, and Eagle were captured by the enemy, but [only] after a hard struggle and most gallant defense.16

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Even more interesting than Eagle, Mercury, and Active scouting for intelligence on the status of enemy positions and vessel movements was a document uncovered in the Delaware State Archive by Lieutenant Ben Robinson (USCG) while conducting research on the Revenue Cutter Service. It was a letter from Allen McLane, who in 1789 was appointed Marshall of Delaware and in 1797 appointed as the Customs Collector for the Port of Delaware; he commanded the defenses of Wilmington during the War of 1812. During the British blockade of Delaware Bay, McLane issued a directive to the Revenue Cutter General Green, which would be the equivalent of modern-day Priority Information/Intelligence Requirements (PIRs). His order, dated March 20, 1813, directed the “Commander of the Cutter, Barges, [and] Inspections Officers in the District of Delaware” to obtain information on:

1. The number of the British blockading squadron and the force of the several vessels.
2. Their position every day and night.
3. Have any pilots or other citizens joined them?
4. Do they land on the shores of the Delaware by day or by night and where?
5. How are they off for provisioning and water?
6. Do they destroy all the coasters they fall in with or are they partial?
7. Enquire of the Scallop men that pass up the river if they notice by or near the landings from whence they trade, any strangers who appear to be lurking about their neighborhoods.
8. Examine all oyster boats passing down as well, or coasters, see that they have papers. If you find any provisioning on board more than is necessary for the crew, detain them. If you find passengers enquire and detect if possible alien enemies, and speculating citizens corresponding or having intercourse with the enemy.

[Signed]
Collectors Office, Wilmington Del
March 20, 1813
Allen McLane

Allen McLane’s directive to collect information in Delaware Bay during the War of 1812 is indicative of the immense network that the Customs Officers and Revenue Cutter Commanders were able to establish in ports and harbors up and down the eastern seaboard of the U.S. This combination of information gathering, scouting, and reporting evolved from the creation of the Customs and Revenue Cutter Service to form the foundation for not only how information was collected and organized in Ports across the United States, but also dictated the conduct for law enforcement intelligence collection until Prohibition and the war against the Rum Runners in the early 1920s. These overt HUMINT networks, both foreign and domestic, still benefit the Coast Guard today, making it unique within the Intelligence Community (IC) because of its ability to collect and share law enforcement information and national intelligence in support of U.S. homeland security and national security objectives. In fact, during the Rum War, the Coast Guard was the first agency to fuse HUMINT and COMINT together for the prosecution of the Rum Runners, to include foreign companies and U.S. citizens.

COAST GUARD INTELLIGENCE AND THE RUM WAR

During the 1920s and 1930s, a combination of novel use of cryptology and dedicated investigative tactics brought about tremendous operational success in the battle to interdict illegal rum runners and other smuggling. Known as the “Father of Coast Guard Intelligence,” Admiral Frederick C. Billard, Commandant of the Coast Guard from 1924 to 1932, pushed the growth in size (to approximately 50 billets) and sophistication of Coast Guard Intelligence by elevating its status at Headquarters and establishing an intelligence center and intelligence stations. Coast Guard Intelligence provided direct support to operations including equipping a Coast Guard patrol boat as the first U.S. signals intercept ship, employing an aggressive counterintelligence campaign against the smugglers, and innovatively fusing human source intelligence and imagery. Coast Guard Intelligence was the core of the service’s successful reduction by 60% of a massive flow of illegal smuggling along the 12,000-mile coastline from 1927 to 1928, and to a mere trickle by the end of Prohibition. Elizebeth and William Friedman, both renowned cryptologists and pioneers of early U.S. efforts in this field, were key players in this endeavor. Elizebeth was the Chief of the Cryptanalysis Unit and LCDR Charles Root Chief of Coast Guard Intelligence at Headquarters. The success of this small cryptanalytic unit, assigned to the Coast Guard but working for the Treasury, was instrumental in laying the foundation for what later became known as Coast Guard Unit 387.
In his seminal work on Coast Guard intelligence operations during the Rum War, LT Ensign stated:

The development of an Intelligence Section marked the turning of the tide in the Coast Guard’s favor in the Rum War...The battle for information superiority was fought by both sides, but an understanding of the value of intelligence and the “all-source” approach of tapping the unique abilities of each intelligence discipline allowed the Coast Guard to support interdiction operations with well-fused intelligence.

At the beginning of the Rum War, Coast Guard Intelligence was a one-man show. Admiral Billard, Commandant of the Coast Guard, had tasked LCDR Charles Root to provide “all information obtainable bearing on the mission” to all major Coast Guard commands. This task quickly overwhelmed LCDR Root; on a wall at Coast Guard Headquarters he maintained a complete description and status on vessels “that frequent Rum Row” and sent information on the “blacks” to the fleet via “Intelligence Circulars.”

In 1925 LCDR Root was provided clerical assistance to help with the volumes of secret information that were building up from numerous government agencies and a few foreign governments. According to David Kahn, author of *The Codebreakers*, “…although the Coast Guard radio-men had long been intercepting them [coded messages] and forwarding them to headquarters, no law enforcement agency could break them down. By April 1927 hundreds of intercepts had accumulated in the Coast Guard Intelligence Office files,” and it was becoming more obvious that LCDR Root did not have the kind of assistance needed to work on the complicated codes and ciphers that were being used by the Rum Runners.

In just a few short months Mrs. Friedman was able to reduce the backlog of messages and, in her first three years with the Coast Guard, was able to decode 12,000 messages and discarded about the same number. As the Office of Intelligence at Coast Guard Headquarters became more proficient in code-breaking and cryptanalysis under the leadership of CDR Root, his successor, LCDR F.J. Gorman, and the expertise of Mrs. Friedman, LT Frank Meals, Commanding Officer of the 75-foot patrol boat CG-210, was “making crude attempts at locating illicit radio stations…which became the preamble to the Coast Guard’s widespread use of high frequency radio direction finders (HFDF) to locate both illegal radio stations ashore and rum running vessels at sea.” Although the Coast Guard made several unsuccessful attempts to have MAJ William Friedman reassigned to assist the Coast Guard in the development of training and doctrine, in the end he was loaned to the Coast Guard for just two short weeks in September 1930, where he was able to “solve the code used by a group of smugglers off the coast of New York and read the operating orders of their ships,” demonstrating the value of the investment being made by the Coast Guard in the new underway HFDF and COMINT capability. “The secret systems of communications employed by the smuggling syndicates became as extensive as their radio networks...in June of 1930 more than 30 systems of code, cipher, and enciphered code were in use on the Pacific Coast alone.”

In just a few short years, because of its success with HFDF, the Coast Guard established a separate “satellite intelligence office” in New York City under the command of LT Meals. “The New York Intelligence Unit was tasked with providing intelligence support to the units of the Eastern New York, Norfolk Divisions, and Destroyer Force.” To accommodate this growth, three new “Six Bitters” (75-foot Patrol Craft, CG-131, CG-214, and CG-141), outfitted with high frequency receivers and HFDF equipment similar to the CG-210, and a staff of 11 officers and 45 enlisted men, were assigned to perform “rudimentary cryptanalysis in order to provide time-sensitive COMINT-derived information to the anti-smuggling fleet.” Additionally, a portable HFDF capability was created that allowed the Coast Guard to better identify and locate the illicit radio stations on land. Experimentation with this portable and deployable HFDF capability honed by the Coast Guard during the Rum War would become an integral part of its clandestine HFDF collection capability in Central and South America during World War II.

In his final analysis of the Rum War, David Kahn states, “As a result of the information obtained from cryptanalysis and from direction-finding, the Coast Guard put increasing pressure on the smugglers’ activities.” This pressure resulted in thousands of decoded messages by the Coast Guard, Mrs. Friedman, and other Government agencies resulting in the interdiction of illicit radio stations and

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...this portable and deployable HFDF capability would become an integral part of its clandestine HFDF collection capability in Central and South America during World War II.

In 1927 LTJG Clifford D. Feak was assigned to the Headquarters Intelligence Office, where he was immediately sent to train with MAJ William Friedman of the War Department’s Signal Corps. With LTJG Feak on board, CDR Root worked with the Bureau of Prohibition regarding the acquisition of two additional analysts: Mrs. Elizabeth Friedman and Anna A. Wolf. Although they remained Bureau employees, they were detailed to the Coast Guard until the repeal of Prohibition in 1933.
communications networks, and the arrest and conviction of the individuals and companies at the heart of the bootlegging and rum-running operations. Because of the pioneering work by CDR Root, LT Meals, LCDR Gorman, MAJ William Friedman, and Mrs. Elizbeth Friedman, plus that of other government agencies, major experimentation and implementation of new COMINT technology both on land and at sea became the foundation for what would become the Coast Guard’s network for communications intelligence and radio operations up and down the coastline of the U.S. At the beginning of World War II, the Coast Guard through its numerous radio stations and networks was ideally placed to intercept HFDF communications from merchant and military vessels at sea, decode and analyze them, and provide them to government agencies.

THE END OF THE NOBLE EXPERIMENT

In 1933 President Roosevelt repealed the “Noble Experiment,” called Prohibition. The Coast Guard actually saw an increase in liquor smuggling from those traffickers trying to avoid paying tax and simultaneously started to notice narcotics smugglers using COMINT as well. Coast Guard Unit 387 continued its support of Coast Guard and Treasury missions with great success and even trained two members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Marine Section in cryptanalysis through liaison with its New York Division Intelligence Office headed by CDR S.S. Yeandle.35 In the late 1930s the Coast Guard COMINT stations began to notice similar traffic to the rum runners and narcotics smugglers but, once the signals were decrypted, realized they were in fact picking up non-neutral communications of Axis and Italian agents.

In March 1938, during the Munich Crisis in the build-up to World War II, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau tasked Coast Guard Unit 387 with the responsibility to track and report on all non-neutral communications in order to assist him with his responsibility to enforce the laws related to illicit trade of non-neutral nations and develop “any clues pointing to changes in the International situation or indications of entry into war by powers other than Germany.” CG Unit 387 “monitored all transatlantic commercial traffic and monitored all ship traffic for potential belligerents.”

In 1939 the Coast Guard had a High Frequency Direction Finding Net (HF/DF) that spanned the entire continental United States. There were 20 primary HF/DF stations, nine secondary HF/DF stations, six contributory HF/DF stations, and five Coast Guard radio stations. There were three net controls located just north of San Francisco (COMWESTSEAFRON), in Miami (COMGULFSEAFRON), and in New York (COMESTSEAFRON). Subordinate nets were located at the District Coast Guard Offices (or DCGOs) in Districts 12, 7, and 3. Of note, in 1936 the Navy recognized the Coast Guard was “10 years more advanced than the Navy in Communications.” Additionally, the Coast Guard used Cutters, trucks, briefcases, and handbags with DF equipment to identify and track “wildcat” stations across the United States, a capability developed and mastered during the Rum War.

(TO BE CONTINUED IN SPRING 2010 ISSUE)

LCDR Michael E. Bennett is currently a Research Fellow at the National Security Agency, following a tour at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy as an instructor. During his time in New London, he was instrumental in setting up an intelligence studies program that is the trendsetter among all federal service academies. Mike is a graduate of the National Defense Intelligence College, where he earned an MSSI degree. He is active in the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) and is an Advisor to the NMA Board of Directors, representing the Coast Guard and its rapidly growing professional intelligence officer corps.

Notes

2 The Encyclopedia Americana 1904.
4 Coast Guard Historian Web site.
5 Coast Guard Historian Web site.
7 Authors such as David Kahn, who wrote The Codebreakers (1967), and Stephen Budiansky, who wrote Battle of Wits (2000), make brief references to the contributions of Coast Guard cryptanalysis during the Rum War and in World War II.
10 Chernow p. 339.
12 The Encyclopedia Americana 1904.
13 From the Coast Guard Historian’s Web site, “This painting purported to illustrate the first cutter named Massachusetts but it incorrectly shows the cutter flying the Revenue ensign and commission pennant, which were not adopted until 1799, well after the first Massachusetts had left service. Nevertheless, the
illustration does show those characteristics typical of most of the first few generations of Revenue cutters: a small sailing vessel steered by a tiller, with low freeboard, light draft, lightly armed, and usually rigged as a topsail schooner. The first Massachusetts was a 60-foot schooner that displaced 70 43/95 tons. She was launched on 23 July 1791, and sold out of service on 9 October 1792.”

http://www.uscg.mil/history/webcutters/USRC_Photo_Index.asp.

14 Coast Guard Historian Web Site.
15 Chernow, p 341.
16 The Encyclopedia Americana 1904.
17 Obtained scanned copy of original document via e-mail correspondence with LT Benjamin Robinson on July 18, 2008. He scanned a copy of the original from his visit to the Delaware State Archive.
18 For a complete overview of the Coast Guard Intelligence Division and cryptanalytic capability during the Rum War, see Eric Ensign, “Coast Guard and the Rum War at Sea.”
19 Ensign, 17.
20 Ensign, 18.
21 Ensign, 18.
22 “Blacks” was the term used to describe the Rum Runners.
24 Ensign, 19.
26 Kahn, 806.

27 In Captain Root’s obituary it noted he was killed in a tragic accident in Washington, DC, when “he was struck by a Taxi Cab and fractured his skull” on August 8, 1930. LCDR F.J. Gorman was appointed to succeed CDR Root. Copy of obituary provided by Operational Intelligence School in Yorktown, VA, in 2006. Original source of article unknown.
28 Ensign, 29.
29 Kahn, 806.
30 Redman Memo, p.2.
31 Ensign, 33.
32 Ensign, 33.
33 Ensign, 33.
34 Kahn, 803.
35 National Archives Record Group 26. Letter from J.F. Jacct (Acting), Intelligence Officer, New York City, to the Chief Intelligence Officer, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, November 1, 1938.
36 National Archives Record Group 38 (The Crane Files). Memo to CDR John Redman (USN) from CAPT J.F. Farley (USCG), March 6, 1942. This memo was an overview of CG Unit 387 history for CDR John Redman. Hereafter referenced as the Redman Memo.