

THE COAST GUARD AT WAR

THE PACIFIC LANDINGS VI



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Message from Chief of Naval Operations

"On the eve of the return of the Coast Guard to the Treasury Department, I desire to commend the officers and men of the Coast Guard for their superb performance of duty throughout the war. I desire also to express to them the appreciation of the officers and men of the Navy and Marine Corps for their wholehearted cooperation and to wish for them every future success. Well done."

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
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COAST GUARD AT WAR

THE PACIFIC LANDINGS

THE SOLOMONS - GUADALCANAL

REASONS FOR THE SOLOMONS OFFENSIVE


Shortly after Pearl Harbor, in January 1942, the Japanese established bases in New Britain and in the northern Solomons. In April Tulagi, in the southern Solomons, was occupied. Our victory in the Coral Sea in May did not prevent the steady enemy advance toward New Zealand and Australia, by which our lines of communication were being increasingly menaced. As our fleet, damaged at Pearl Harbor, was gradually repaired, reinforcements were being consolidated in the Southwest Pacific, and in April it was decided to halt the Japanese advance by an attack on the Solomons. The two objectives were to be the small islands just off Florida Island known as Tulagi and Gavutu, where governmental and plantation headquarters had provided modern buildings and equipment. Later in July when our planes observed a landing field being built by the Japanese on nearby Guadalcanal Island from which land-based planes could threaten New Hebrides and New Caledonia, the occupation of that island also became imperative.

NECESSITY FOR HASTE

Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley became commander of all the United Nations' land, sea, and air forces in the South Pacific area, with the exception of New Zealand land defense forces. Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift was to lead the occupation forces as commander of the First Marine Division, the first echelon of which reached New Zealand June 14, 1942. With our success off Midway early in June, preparations were accelerated, and D-day was set for August 7th. On July 21st, the enemy landed at Ambasi and at Buna in a movement down the east coast of New Guinea paralleling that in the Solomons. The series of land-plane bases at Rabaul, Kieta on Bougainville, and on Guadalcanal, together with the seaplane bases at Gavutu, Gizo, Rekata Bay, Kieta and Buka Passage exposed our convoys bound for Australia to torpedo or bombing attack. The enemy was reported already to have 1,850 men in the Tulagi area and 5,275 on Guadalcanal. Quick action was necessary before he became too strong to dislodge without great difficulty. Large enemy ships, especially carriers, had not been observed in southern Solomon waters since the Midway and Coral Sea battles. Altogether it seemed necessary to strike at once.

THREE TASK FORCES ORGANIZED

The area west of the 159th meridian, which just touched the westernmost shores of Guadalcanal was placed under General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area. He was to interdict enemy activities west of the theatre of operations with submarines and planes. The South Pacific forces under Admiral Ghormley would occupy Tulagi and environs and also seize the Santa Cruz Islands to the east to keep them out of enemy hands. Three major Task Forces were provided for this purpose. One, Task Force NEGAT, was to supply aircraft carrier sup-



port for the attack. The second or Amphibious Force, Task Force TARE, was to make the principal attack, transporting and landing the Marines and defending the transport convoys from surface attack. The third, MIKE, was for aerial scouting and advance bombing of the operations area. Among the transports in the Amphibious Force was the transport HUNTER LIGGETT under Commander Louis W. Perkins, USCG. Coastguardsmen also manned the transport ALHENA and other Naval vessels.¹

TASK FORCES
ASSEMBLE


Transports that were loaded at Wellington, New Zealand, had one combat team to each of the 12 transports, including all equipment and supplies needed to put the team ashore and keep it in action for 30 days. For every combat group, consisting of three teams, there was loaded a cargo ship with supplies for the three teams for an additional 30 days. The combined force of transports and cargo ships, including the HUNTER LIGGETT, with escorts, departed Wellington on July 22nd. On July 1st, Group Three of the Carrier Task Force left San Diego. This consisted of the carrier WASP and her escorts conveying five transports, including the ALHENA, with the Second Marines on board. Group One of the Carrier Task Force with the carrier SARATOGA, left Pearl Harbor on July 7th, and Group Two with carrier ENTERPRISE and the battleship NORTH CAROLINA, a few days later. After a rendezvous at sea, the entire force of some 80 ships proceeded to Koro Island in the Fijiis, where rehearsal exercises were held.

PRELIMINARY
AIR OPERATIONS

The air attack on Tulagi and Guadalcanal began a week before the arrival of our ships. Shore based Navy and Army planes at Efate, Noumea, Tongatabu, the Fijiis and Samoa were divided into seven Task Groups. Group One was to search sectors 400 miles northwest of central New Caledonia and conduct anti-submarine patrols. Group Two was to maintain daily search of the southern Solomons and their western waters and attack enemy objectives. Group Three was to search sectors south and east of the Solomons. Group Four was to search a sector north and east of Guadalcanal from Ndeni in the Santa Cruz Islands. Group Five was to proceed three days before the attack to the east coast of Malaita and search a sector to the northeast. Group Six was to provide inshore anti-submarine patrol in the vicinity of Second Channel, Espiritu Santo and operate with Group Seven, which was to provide all possible service to bombers based at Espiritu Santo and also defend the New Hebrides. In addition the three carriers SARATOGA, ENTERPRISE and WASP were to supply air offensive and defense to the Amphibious and Landing Forces. They also obtained excellent photographs of objectives in the Tulagi-Guadalcanal area from which large scale mosaic maps were prepared.

1. For complete list of vessels wholly or partially Coast Guard manned see Appendix A. All but four of the 23 transports and destroyer transports in Task Force TARE had Coast Guardsmen aboard.

U. S. COAST GUARD MANNED COMBAT TRANSPORT HUNTER LIGGETT (AP-27)




ORGANIZATION
OF THE MARINES

It was planned to use about 19,546 Marines who were organized into eight groups. Combat Group A was to land on Beach RED, about half way between Lunga and Koli points on the north coast of Guadalcanal, at H-hour and seize the beachhead. Combat Group B, landing in the same place 50 minutes later, was to pass through the right of Group A and seize the grassy knoll 4 miles south off Lunga Point. The Tulagi Group, landing on Beach BLUE, on the southwest coast of Tulagi at H-hour was to seize the northwest section of the island. The Gavutu Group was to land on the east coast of Gavutu Island at H plus four hours, seize that island and press on to adjacent Tanambogo. The Support Group, with the command post afloat in the Coast Guard manned HUNTER LIGGETT, was to go ashore at Beach RED, Guadalcanal, provide artillery support for the attack, and coordinate anti-aircraft and close-in ground defense of the beachhead area. Division Reserve Group was to be prepared to land Combat Team B on Gavutu Island and attach Combat Team C to the Tulagi Group. The Florida Group was to land on Florida Island near Haleta at H-hour plus 20 minutes and seize that village. The Third Defense Battalion was to be prepared to land detachments on Beach RED and on Tulagi and Gavutu on receipt of orders. Sufficient men were to be left on board to insure expeditious unloading of all ships, working on a 24 hour basis. Shore Party Commanders were to control traffic in beach areas, calling on troop commanders in their immediate vicinity for assistance in handling supplies from landing beaches to dumps.

THE APPROACH
TO GUADALCANAL

The Amphibious Task Force TARE left the Fijiis on July 31st, with Task Force NEGAT maintaining a parallel course a few miles to the north to provide reconnaissance and patrols. Task Force TARE was in circular formation with the 19 transports and cargo ships in five columns in the center, the HUNTER LIGGETT acting as guide. On August 3rd the fleet passed through the southern New Hebrides proceeding northwest until the 159th meridian was reached on August 5th. It then headed almost due north to Guadalcanal. Meanwhile, air attacks were being made almost daily on the target area and these continued through August 6th. On that day an overcast sky and mist fortunately made enemy reconnaissance impossible. At 1615 Squadron YOKE, destined for Tulagi took the lead with Squadron XRAY, bound for Guadalcanal, 6 miles astern. At 0133 on August 7th the dark shore line of Guadalcanal could be plainly seen under the thin crescent of the waning moon. A little later Savo Island was visible. At 0300 the two Squadrons separated, Squadron YOKE passing north of Savo Island toward Tulagi and Squadron XRAY passing east to south of Savo Island along the north shore of Guadalcanal. There was no challenge and our arrival was apparently undetected. At 0530 the first planes took off from the carriers. The 15 transports of Squadron XRAY steamed along the silent Guadalcanal shore in two columns of 7 and 8 ships, arranged in the initial debarkation order. At 0613 the bombardment of the coast was begun by the QUINCY and our dive bombers shortly afterwards began attacking enemy shore positions. At 0647 our transports halted 9000 yards off Beach RED.

COAST GUARD-MANNED LANDING BARGES ARE LOWERED AWAY AS DAWN BREAKS OVER GUADALCANAL



Boats were hoisted out and lowered and debarkation began. Cruisers and destroyers which were not giving fire support for the landings, formed a double arc about them as protection against both planes and submarines.

AMPHIBIOUS LANDING

The following brief description of an amphibious landing seems appropriate at this point. The combat-loaded transports and cargo ships (APA's and AKA's) arrive in the Transport Areas, which are as closely convenient to the landing beaches as depth of water and possible enemy fire will permit, and in water as smooth as possible. The ships remain under way in general ready to maneuver in case of any form of attack. Their AA batteries are kept manned; combat air patrol (CAP) for their protection is maintained by the carriers, and anti-submarine patrol is provided by planes, destroyers and other suitable craft. The transport boats, mainly the square-ended, flat-bottomed LCVF's with ramps, holding 36 men, and the larger LCM(3)'s, carrying 120 men or 60,000 pounds of cargo are put in the water and the troops are embarked. Where depth of water will permit these boats run close in to the beaches and lower their ramps in only a few inches of water. But where coral reefs or shallow water extend out so far that troops must wade or swim a considerable distance it is preferable to land as many of the earlier waves as possible in the Amphibious Tractors,¹ which can run through the water, across the reefs, up the beaches and on inland if necessary.

TIMING OF LANDING

The boats or amphibious vehicles, carrying the various Regimental or Battalion Combat Teams which are to make the landing and capture the objective, proceed to the Line of Departure (an arbitrary line, located just outside of gunnery fire from the beaches) and form up in successive waves, under the direction of a Control officer and his assistants. On signal from the Control Officer, the first wave of boats or amphibious vehicles leaves the Line of Departure and heads for the Landing Beaches, their departure being so calculated that they will strike the beaches exactly at H-hour. The bombardment support, whether from aircraft, ships or artillery on shore, has been concentrating on the Landing Beaches and their immediate vicinity with maximum intensity. This is ceased or lifted inland ahead of the troops just as the first wave of troops disembarks on the beaches and deploys. Other waves follow at intervals of 3 to 5 minutes and their first endeavor is to secure a beachhead, which means sufficient area along the beaches and inland from them so that the attacking troops can deploy and maneuver, and the boat traffic can land and unload, without being under fire. As the beachheads are extended and the enemy driven back, sections of beach with fewer obstacles or with more favorable under-water gradients may be found, and the boats beached there for unloading. As the troops advance inland they receive continued support by air, naval, and land-artillery bombardment. To facilitate this Shore Fire Control Parties are landed and maintain liaison between the advancing troops and the ship, planes, and batteries.

1. Amphibious Tractors were first used at Tarawa.

COAST GUARD
MAINS THE
LANDING
CRAFT

The bombardment of the Tulagi area began almost at the same time as that of Beach RED on Guadalcanal. Going into action at 0614 our fighters and dive bombers started fires and destroyed 18 enemy planes on the water, strafing the beaches and pounding every building that might be hiding the enemy. Our ships arrived in the Tulagi transport area at 0637, half an hour behind schedule, and the landing force was immediately ordered ashore. H-hour, scheduled at 0800, remained unchanged so that none of the transports stood idle before landing their troops. Even the preliminary landing force for Haleta, and the one for Halavo some distance away, both of which were in the PRESIDENT JACKSON, were able to make the first landing on time. Most of the landing boats had a crew of three Coastguardsmen. Coastguardsman Daniel J. Tarr was coxswain of a landing barge which put the Marines ashore in this area. Although under withering enemy fire he was able to land his boatload of Marines without the loss of a man. He then made several more trips to the shell-raked beach, carrying ammunition and supplies. Tarr was on board a Destroyer Transport which was transporting the First Raider Battalion of the Marines. At 1100 on the 8th there was an air raid by forty Japanese planes. They were intercepted by American fighters and only twenty managed to reach the transports. All but one of these were knocked down, two of the nineteen being credited to his vessel. Tarr was later awarded the Silver Star Medal for "conspicuous gallantry."

HALETA AND
BEACH BLUE
LANDINGS

The landing east of Haleta was made to prevent the enemy from using a promontory jutting south from Florida Island to enfilade our boats during the landing on Tulagi Island's Beach BLUE. At 0706 the landing craft left the JACKSON, covered by a bombardment from the SAN JUAN, the BUCHANAN and the MONSSEN. As the Marines approached the beach, the fire was lifted and they went ashore at 0740 without opposition. Fire support was then provided for the principal landing on Beach BLUE. This beach was completely surrounded by coral reefs. The landing boats had to halt at the edge of the reef and the men had to wade ashore. Because of this the Japanese had not expected any landing here and it was very lightly fortified. With the three naval vessels furnishing close fire support until 0755, our boats hit the reef at exactly 0800, and the Marines waded ashore without opposition. The shells from the SAN JUAN, however, had failed to dislodge the Japanese who were still dug in on Hill 208, located in the center of Tulagi's southwest coast, and two companies advancing along the south shore were held up by heavy machine gun fire from the hill. Another company entered the jungle and headed directly across the island. By 1012 all the waves had reached the beach.

HALAVO
AND
GAVUTU

The landing at Halavo, on Florida Island near Gavutu, was scheduled for 0830. Marines left the transport JACKSON in landing craft promptly but were late in arriving at the Line of Departure 7 miles away. At a little before 0800 a battery on Gavutu opened fire on them at 4,000 yards. Fire support was provided by three naval vessels who were firing at the beach line at Gavutu and at a battery on the hill.

NIGHT DISPOSITION OF SCREENING FORCE

NORTH PATROL FORCE
 VINCENNES
 ASTORIA
 QUINCY
 & 2 DDs

SOUTH PATROL FORCE
 AUSTRALIA
 CANBERRA
 CHICAGO & 2 DDs

GUADALCANAL I.

FLORIDA I.

SAVO I.

BUENA VISTA I.

OLEVUGA I.

SANDELY PASSAGE

TULAGI

TULAGI TRANSPORT AREA

SEALARK CHANNEL

LENGUA CHANNEL

KOLI PT.

MAKILLO

BEACH

RED

KUKUM

P. C. CAMP

AIRFIELD

LINE ISLANDS

LINE ISLANDS 125° 110° 105° 100° 95° 90° 85° 80° 75° 70° 65° 60° 55° 50° 45° 40° 35° 30° 25° 20° 15° 10° 5° 0°

160° 155° 150° 145° 140° 135° 130° 125° 120° 115° 110° 105° 100° 95° 90° 85° 80° 75° 70° 65° 60° 55° 50° 45° 40° 35° 30° 25° 20° 15° 10° 5° 0°

BLUE Radar Patrol

RALPH TAILOUT Radar Patrol

SAN JUAN, HONOLULU and 2 DDs

By 0845 the Marines landed at Halavo and were soon ready to give fire support to our troops who were to land on Gavutu at 1200. At 1026 the first Gavutu wave left the HEYWOOD and started the 7 mile run to the Line of Departure. Two other waves followed at five minute intervals. The small boats encountered choppy seas, drenching all personnel and equipment and making many Marines seasick. Shelling by the SAN JUAN and bombing and strafing by planes failed to dislodge the enemy from his dugouts near the beach and on the hill. To avoid coral shoals, the landing was made on the northeastern side of Gavutu near the causeway connecting it with Tanambogo. The Japanese let them land, but many of our men were cut down by heavy fire as they crossed the beach. The second and third waves were similarly hit and one out of every ten men became a casualty. Hills honeycombed with dugout fortresses, both on Gavutu and Tanambogo commanded the beach and were manned with Japanese armed with machine guns, rifles, and automatic rifles. Their fire held up our men landing to the right of the beach for almost two hours, while those on the left advanced slowly.

THE GUADAL-
CANAL LANDING

Expecting to encounter the greater resistance on Guadalcanal we had concentrated most of our landing forces there. This was one reason for the comparative ease with which the initial landing was made. Another was that the enemy could and did retire to the hills on Guadalcanal while on the small islands of Tulagi and Gavutu he was trapped and fought almost to the last man, refusing to surrender. Zero hour had been set for 0910 for the Guadalcanal landing and fire support began soon after 0900 lasting for 9 minutes. At 0913 the first troops landed without opposition on Beach RED between Lunga and Koli Points. Occupation of the Guadalcanal shore front proceeded expeditiously despite interruptions caused by enemy air attacks and about 11,000 Marines went ashore during the day. Supplies piled up faster than they could be moved away. A Coast Guard Beachmaster and about forty Coastguardsmen went on the beach to supervise the landing of the boats, their unloading, repair, and salvage when they became damaged or stranded.


ENEMY AIR
ATTACKS

At 1320 on August 7th some 20 to 25 high level, twin engine bombers came in over Savo Island at 10,000 to 14,000 feet. Their attack was centered on the transports off Guadalcanal. Three were knocked down by our screening ships and transports and the rest, after attempting a pattern bombing at 10,000 feet with very poor marksmanship, disappeared behind Guadalcanal's mountains without hitting any of our ships. An hour later, 7 to 10 single engined dive bombers from the direction of Tulagi suddenly dived on Squadron XRAY off Guadalcanal, hitting the MUGFORD, with considerable damage. Fighters from the three carriers engaged enemy planes throughout the afternoon of the 7th.

LAND FIGHTING
TOUGH ON TULAGI
AND GAVUTU

The Raiders had occupied the western area of Tulagi with no opposition but the going was exceedingly rough on the eastern end. Here the enemy was sheltered from the bombardment in long-tunneled limestone caves in the cliffs from which they emerged to attack the Marines from machine

TANK LIGHTERS' ROUTE TO TANAMBOGO



gun nests and sniping posts in the trees. At Hill 208 our men were delayed for an hour with only one platoon able to advance along the southern shore to the eastern tip of the island. By nightfall a company on the north side of the ridge was about parallel with our forces on the south. During the night the enemy concentrated on the steep slopes of Hill 281, sortied and counter-attacked, but ultimately was halted. On Gavutu our men were greatly hampered, in driving the Japanese from the dugouts and tunnels in Hill 148, by machine gun fire from adjacent Tanambogo. During the afternoon Tanambogo was heavily bombed by our planes and shelled by our destroyers, so that by 1800 we had control of Gavutu. We were unable, however, to advance across the causeway to take Tanambogo. An attempted landing on the northeastern shore to take the Japanese in the rear under cover of darkness, was defeated by an exploding gasoline tank on shore which brightly illuminated the scene. On Guadalcanal Combat Group A had reached the mouth of the Tenaru 2 miles west of Beach RED by nightfall. No contact had yet been made with the enemy anywhere on Guadalcanal.

ENEMY
RENEWALS
AIR ATTACK


When word was received at 1038 on the 8th that 40 enemy twin engine bombers were passing over Bougainville and proceeding southeast, all ships were ordered out of the transport areas to assume cruising disposition.

When the planes appeared at noon all ships were maneuvering at top speed. The planes approached around southeast Florida Island at about 50 feet above the water making for Guadalcanal. Our ships at Tulagi opened an intense anti-aircraft fire as the planes passed them and nine to fifteen planes were knocked down. Zero fighters were engaging carrier planes at high altitudes. While the transport formation was being turned away from the approaching planes, the screening vessels opened fire and downed several planes. When the transports added their anti-aircraft fire, the enemy formation began to break up. Many glided into the sea in flames and others crashed headlong. Only three passed entirely through and around the transports, and two of these were shot down by screening vessels to the westward. One falling plane crashed the deck of the GEORGE F. ELLIOTT setting her afire. The destroyer JARVIS was torpedoed but still able to operate under her own power. Coast Guardsman Orviss T. O'Neal recounts this experience: "I was running between my ship, the transport ELLIOTT, and the beach. On one trip, I had just taken a load of gasoline aboard and was moving away from the ship when the air raid alarm sounded. A few minutes later I watched as a flaming Jap plane crashed into the ELLIOTT setting it afire. I hate to think what might have happened to my landing boat if it had ever come within reach of those flames." The fire in the ELLIOTT spread despite all efforts to check it and she was finally ordered sunk. Four torpedoes were fired at close range but the vessel was still afloat and on fire the following evening.

TULAGI AND
TANAMBOGO
SECURED

Two more battalions of Marines were landed on Tulagi about 0700 on the 8th and ordered to clear the island of Japanese, one operating in the western end and the other in the eastern. An advance over the top of Hill 281 to the southwest side of the island gave the Marines

COAST GUARDSMAN DIRECTS TRAFFIC AS LANDING CRAFT, MANNED BY COAST GUARD CREWS BRING IN STREAMS OF SUPPLIES
TO THE AMERICAN BASE OF GUADALCANAL



mortar and machine-gun positions on three sides of the enemy concentration and at 1500 occupation of the island was complete. Only 3 of the 500 Japanese surrendered. The Marines had 90 casualties of whom 3 officers and 33 men were killed. Meanwhile, the BUCHANAN and MONSSEN had been shelling Gavutu and Tanambogo and at 1600 the BUCHANAN stood into Gavutu Harbor and opened fire on Tanambogo hill at 1100 yards. Then standing toward Gaomi, a nearby island, she shifted her fire to the southeast side of Tanambogo. About 1700 a Tank Lighter with one tank and a detachment of Marines left Gavutu for Tanambogo and landed after having met with some casualties. A second trip brought more Marines. A second Tank Lighter landed another tank which became caught on a stump and all except one of its crew were killed. A company of Combat Team C followed the two tanks ashore, half of it pushing up the southern slope of Tanambogo hill, the rest working to the east and north sides along the shore. Then a platoon of paratroops crossed the causeway from Gavutu to the south side of the island. By 2200 both Gavutu and Tanambogo were completely secured except for a few isolated nests of snipers. Of the 1,000 Japanese on Gavutu and Tanambogo all were killed except 20 captured and 70 who escaped to Florida Island. Our casualties were 158, with 5 officers and 67 men killed.

AIRDROME OCCUPIED ON GUADALCANAL

By 1500 on the 8th Combat Team A on Guadalcanal had crossed the Lunga River and entered the village of Kukum, with only light enemy fire from low knolls near the village. Combat Group B had taken possession of the airdrome by 1600 with all installations and a 3600 foot runway, encountering only one small enemy patrol. Camp sites at the airdrome had evidently been hastily abandoned, with arms and personal equipment left behind in large quantities and with no effort at demolition.


CARRIERS, TRANSPORTS AND CARGO SHIPS RETIRE

Late on the night of the 8th the aircraft carriers WASP, SARATOGA, and ENTERPRISE and their escorts began retiring to the South, as their fuel was running low and their fighter strength had been reduced from 99 to 78 planes. It was decided to move out all the transports and cargo ships at 0600 the next day. A warning had been received that two Japanese destroyers, three cruisers and two gunboats had been sighted at 1127 on the 8th just north of Bougainville. This force was encountered that night in the Battle of Savo Island.

"DID THEY GET OFF?"

After the first landings on Guadalcanal many Coast Guard manned transports included in the first landings made numerous trips from their bases to the Guadalcanal area carrying reinforcements and supplies. They were under constant sea and air attack and the waters were heavily infested with enemy submarines. Guadalcanal was not entirely freed of Japanese until 8 February, 1943. It was while evacuating a detachment of Marines from a point where enemy opposition had developed beyond anticipated dimensions that Douglas A. Munro, a signalman first class, of the U.S. Coast Guard died heroically on September 27, 1942. Munro had been in charge of the original detachment of ten boats that landed the Marines

A COAST GUARD-MANNED ASSAULT TRANSPORT UNLOADS AMERICAN MARINES



at the scene. He had gotten them ashore and headed his boats back. On his return he was advised by the officer in charge that, due to unanticipated conditions, it was necessary to evacuate the men immediately. Munro volunteered for the job and brought the boats inshore under heavy enemy fire and proceeded to evacuate the men on the beach. Realizing that the last man would be in greatest danger, he placed himself and his boats in position to serve as cover. He was fatally wounded and remained conscious long enough to say only four words "Did they get off?" He was posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. His citation read in part "By his outstanding leadership, expert planning and dauntless devotion to duty, he and his courageous comrades undoubtedly saved the lives of many who otherwise would have perished."


COAST GUARD
JOINS IN
FIGHTING

The Coast Guard did not confine itself to operating boats, according to Coast Guardsman James D. Fox. When the going was tough and relief was not in sight while the Japs were putting on the pressure, the Coast Guardsmen dug their own machine gun nests which they set up in defensive spots. Others joined artillery men manning guns and still others pitched in with the infantry. One day Boatswain's Mate John Lydon volunteered for the perilous job of taking a detail of Marines to the Japanese occupied Russell Islands, sixty miles away, in an open landing boat. He completed his mission successfully and returned to Guadalcanal. Ten days later he again volunteered for the same journey. En route he heard the motors of another boat. It was dark and he cut his motor completely. The Americans remained silent as a much larger Japanese boat passed them by. Then Lydon started his motor and completed his mission. On another occasion the Japanese artillery fire became so heavy that Coast Guardsmen had to evacuate their advance point. They evacuated seventeen of their landing boats before the Japanese became aware of the maneuver and redirected their fire on the remaining boats. Two Coast Guardsmen remained there for five days repairing the shell damaged boats and then evacuated them with the aid of reinforcements. As soon as their supplies arrived they returned to the base and pushed the Japanese back farther than ever.

THE HUNTER
LIGGETT AT
GUADALCANAL

Before daybreak of August 7, 1942, the transports of Task Force 62 approaching Guadalcanal divided into two units, one of which passed to the northwest of Savo Island to take position for the assault on the Tulagi-Gavutu-Florida area. The LIGGETT headed the other unit of transports, which passed to the south of Savo Island for the landing of Marines on the north coast of Guadalcanal. The LIGGETT's troops were composed of support, special weapons and headquarters groups, none of which were to be landed in the assault waves. The greater part of her boats, therefore, were dispatched to other vessels for the first trip. At 1323 about twenty Japanese bombers flying from 12,000 to 15,000 feet dropped bombs but there were no hits. Air raids continued intermittently while unloading continued, until 2200 when the beach became

FOUR-YEAR-OLD RICHARD DEXTER
SON OF COMMANDER DWIGHT H. DEXTER, U.S. COAST GUARD
STUDIES WITH PUZZLED INTEREST THE NEW SILVER STAR HIS FATHER IS WEARING



so clogged that unloading of the LIGGETT ceased, the ship remaining off Guadalcanal overnight. On the 8th at 1054 the LIGGETT and the rest of the unit got under way in anticipation of an air attack which came at 1204.

FOUR JAPANESE
BOMBERS SHOT
DOWN

Seventeen Mitsubishi heavy bombers swept over the rear screen in an apparent torpedo attack and dropped to less than 100 feet in altitude before reaching the transports. Three of the bombers passed to starboard of the LIGGETT below the level of the bridge at a distance of about 75 yards. Two of these were shot down by the starboard batteries, while two were downed by the port batteries. None of these Japanese planes escaped, for those which the transports missed or crippled were shot down by the forward screen. The LIGGETT suffered no casualties to either personnel or equipment. During the afternoon Lt. Comdr. D.H. Dexter, USCG, was detached to set up the naval establishment on Guadalcanal.


SURVIVORS
TAKEN
ABOARD

In the evening the commanding officer of the USS GEORGE F. ELLIOTT came aboard the LIGGETT with 22 officers and 308 enlisted survivors. In the noon attack a crippled Japanese bomber had crashed upon her deck and set her afire. Soon afterward the ELLIOTT had sunk. The LIGGETT continued to discharge cargo while drifting off the north coast of Guadalcanal. At 0145 on August 9 heavy gunfire was heard off Savo Island where the savage battle of Savo Island was raging. Enemy flares, dropped from a great height silhouetted the transports as though a full moon were shining. The transports sounded general quarters and got under way, maneuvering in the vicinity of Guadalcanal. Secured from general quarters at 0350 they returned to the transport area. Twice more they stood out in cruising disposition to maneuver in open water off Guadalcanal because of reports that enemy aircraft were approaching. Shortly before noon on August 9 orders were received to hoist all boats and prepare to get under way. Many survivors and casualties of the USS VINCENNES, USS ASTORIA and USS QUINCY, three of the cruisers sunk during the engagement off Savo Island, were taken on board. The LIGGETT, acting as guide of Transport Group XRAY of Task Force 62, put to sea at 1510 and set course for Noumea, New Caledonia.

LIGGETT BRINGS
REINFORCEMENTS
TO GUADALCANAL

On October 22, 1942, the HUNTER LIGGETT, in company with the USS BARNETT and USS PRESIDENT HAYES left Tangatabu for Pago Pago, Samoa, where she took aboard 69 officers and 1,458 enlisted troops of Marine Combat Team No. 3. Proceeding to Vala Harbor, Efate Island, New Hebrides the troops were put thru landing exercises and on the 31st the three transports departed for Guadalcanal. After retreating southward, due to the activity of Japanese warships and planes, the convoy again headed for Guadalcanal arriving there on November 4, 1942. There she unloaded off Lunga Point. The ships had to move out of range once from Japanese shores batteries, and that night they got under way and maneuvered throughout the night. Next morning they got under way and headed for Espiritu Santo as enemy planes arrived to bombard Henderson

COAST GUARD SALVAGES SUB NEAR GUADALCANAL



Field. In the struggle to win Guadalcanal during the remainder of 1942, the LIGGETT carried troops and cargo to support the Marines fighting to hold the island. Many times she transferred her officers and men and boats for duty on Guadalcanal with the Naval Advance Base. She brought casualties south to hospitals and carried troops and Navy personnel south to rest and recreation centers. She transported Japanese prisoners and fueled destroyers in the forward area. On December 3 and 4, 1942, after fueling five destroyers at Guadalcanal, she took aboard 16 officers and 191 men from one cruiser and 79 casualties from five other naval vessels that had just engaged the enemy.

ENEMY SUBS
ARE PRINCIPAL
THREAT

Japanese submarines were the principal threat to the LIGGETT and other ships at Guadalcanal at this time. Arriving at Guadalcanal again on the 13th of December the LIGGETT took on board 1,635 troops and officers of the First Marine Division and left for Brisbane, Australia. On January 4, 1943 the LIGGETT again arrived safely at Guadalcanal carrying 60 officers and 1,419 enlisted Army and Marine Corps personnel and their cargo. Submarine contacts during the trip had been numerous. This time she took back 17 officers and 744 men of the 6th Naval Construction Battalion to Auckland, New Zealand. There were also 27 planters and missionaries evacuated by the submarine USS NAUTILUS from Bougainville. On February 7, 1943 the LIGGETT again arrived at Guadalcanal this time with 2,085 troops and passengers aboard. On the way, because of the danger from enemy submarines, the convoy had turned back to Espiritu Santo and waited there for three days. Taking aboard 109 men of the destroyer DeHAVEN, sunk in recent naval action, she started for Espiritu Santo, but was ordered to return to Guadalcanal which she approached on February 9th for the first time during daylight. Units of the 8th Marines were embarked for Wellington, New Zealand where she arrived safely on the 16th, after taking a longer course through the New Hebrides because of enemy submarine activity. On February 28th the LIGGETT again arrived safely at Guadalcanal and taking on board personnel and equipment of the 104th Infantry got under way for Suva, Fiji Islands. Here she took on other troops and cargo for Espiritu Santo. On March 28 she left for Lautoka, Viti Levu, Fiji Islands, and took on 115 officers and 1,520 enlisted men for Guadalcanal. Arriving on April 6th, she was almost unloaded and was under way for the night, when 6 high-flying Japanese bombers, just out of range of a continuous barrage of anti-aircraft fire, dropped bombs on Henderson Field.

JAPANESE
AIR RAIDS

Next morning, while the USS CHEVALIER, was taking on fuel alongside, Japanese planes were detected approaching. So quickly did the CHEVALIER cast off that she left an officer and 2 men aboard the LIGGETT. And so swiftly did the Transport Division and its escorts get under way that the LIGGETT left behind 23 boats and 61 members of her crew. Although the Japanese on Guadalcanal were said to be defeated and the island secured on February 8, 1943, this Japanese air strike on April 7, 1943 was


a big one. In an effort to halt the American advance north through the Solomons, over 100 planes had been sent to attack the ships present at Guadalcanal. No enemy planes came near the Transport Division, which had gotten away barely in time, but bombs were seen dropping 4 to 5 miles astern of the LIGGETT on a formation of ships, several of which were hit and sunk. On April 16 the LIGGETT arrived at Wellington for one month's availability. On May 16, 1943 she proceeded to Pago Pago and brought units of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines back to Auckland. Arriving at Wellington on June 3rd, her next departure for Guadalcanal was June 30th with 49 officers and 1,159 enlisted men of the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines. Depth charges were dropped for a fifteen minute period on this trip by the escort and the ships made a series of emergency turns until the contact was lost. Returning to Auckland on July 15th the LIGGETT took aboard 79 officers and 1,643 men of the 2nd Battalion, 19th Marines and arrived at Guadalcanal on the 30th. On August 13th the LIGGETT, while on her 11th trip to Guadalcanal, was to undergo another air attack. At 2030 Condition Red was established and shore searchlights sweeping the sky, occasionally picked up a high-flying Japanese plane. Then came a terrific explosion. A fierce fire was seen, the flames rising high into the sky. The victim was the USS JOHN PENN, sunk by an aerial torpedo while berthed in the anchorage off Lunga Point that had been occupied by the LIGGETT on the previous day. On the next trip to Guadalcanal, on September 3rd, two or three bombs exploded close off the LIGGETT's starboard bow. The LIGGETT arrived with troops again on the 5th of October from Wellington and on the 17th of October, 1943 from Vela Harbor. Then she returned to Vela Harbor and made preparation for landing Marines on Bougainville.

NEW GEORGIA

ENEMY AIR- DROME AT MUNDA

The offensive which opened on 30 June, 1943, to clear the New Georgia area of Japanese was the first continued land, sea, and air effort undertaken by our forces after the capture of Guadalcanal. After their failure to gain command of the air over Guadalcanal in November, 1942, the Japanese had begun the construction of an airdrome near Munda Point on the southwest coast of New Georgia Island. This location had only two approaches by sea, one from the north through a deep, narrow channel and the other from the west across shallow Munda Bay. The construction of the airdrome was cleverly camouflaged so that it was not discovered until 3 December, 1942, about three weeks before its completion. During the next three months aircraft from Guadalcanal conducted more than 80 raids on the airdrome without much interruption to its continued use. A bombardment by a task group of cruisers and destroyers on 4 January, 1943 seemed the most destructive, but it was again in operation within 18 hours. Meanwhile the Japanese had begun to build a second air base near the mouth of the Vila River on the southern tip of Kolombangara Island.

AIRDROME AT SEGI POINT



OCCUPATION OF
RUSSELL ISLANDS

Plans for occupying the Russell Islands were made soon after the fall of Guadalcanal. These were to be used as a staging point for our advance on New Georgia. Unopposed landings were made in the Russells on 21 February and we began the construction of a radar station, a PT boat base and an air strip. Reinforcements of men, supplies and equipment were brought in nightly and by the end of February there were more than 9,000 of our men in the islands. During June, 1943 supplies for the New Georgia campaign were moved up to the Russell Islands from the Guadalcanal area.

NEW GEORGIA
OPERATION PLAN

D-day for New Georgia landings was set for 30 June, 1943 when we were to make simultaneous landings at several points on Rendova Island, at Viru Harbor and Segi Point on New Georgia and at Wickham Anchorage off Vangunu Island, just south of New Georgia. A landing field would then be constructed on Segi Plantation, while Wickham Anchorage and Viru Harbor would be used as staging refuges for small craft. Troops from Rendova were to move across Roviana Lagoon and land east of Munda, capturing the airfield. There would be preliminary landings on Sasavella and Baraulu Islands, securing the Onaiavisi entrance to the Lagoon. This attack would be accompanied by seizure of positions in the Bairoko-Enogai area on northeast New Georgia to prevent reinforcements reaching the Munda garrison. This attack would come from our forces on the Russell Islands. After these positions were occupied, preparation would be made to capture the Vila-Stanmore position on Kolombangara.


LANDING AT
SEGI POINT

As there were reports that the Japanese were moving in to the Segi Point area, the landings there took place on 21 June. Two companies of the 4th Marine Raider battalion made an unopposed landing from the APD's DENT and WATERS. The next day the APD's SCHLEY and CROSBY landed two companies of the 103rd infantry and the Acorn SEVEN Survey. The Army took over on the 28th and on the 30th the construction of a fighter strip began.

LANDING ON
RENDOVA

After a diversionary bombardment of the Vila-Stanmore area and also of the Buin-Shortland area on southeast Bougainville, 200 miles away, so as to disrupt temporary enemy surface raids and reduce temporarily his air strength, the second landing took place at Rendova Harbor, on the north side of Rendova Island at 0700 on 30 June. Two groups of our destroyers patrolled the two entrances of the harbor, while others screened the transports. Our boats went ashore in the face of machine gun fire from the beach. Batteries on Munda Point scored a hit on the GWIN and the BUCHANAN and FARENHOLT obtained hits on the Munda Point area putting seven batteries out of action. By 0730 all troops except working details had been landed and within two hours newly emplaced shore batteries on Kokurana Island, just north of Rendova, were shelling enemy installations at Munda. A 32 plane combat air patrol from our bases in Guadalcanal and the Russells drove off two enemy air attacks in the forenoon. Within an hour after unloading had been completed at 1500 a group of 24 to 28 enemy torpedo bombers, escorted

AERIAL VIEW OF VIRU HARBOR



by an unknown number of Zero fighters was sighted coming in very low over the northwest corner of New Georgia Island. All vessels opened fire and hits were scored, but ignoring their losses the bombers released their torpedoes at 500 yards. The FARENHOLT was hit by a dud and the McCALLA bracketed by three torpedoes. The 7,712 ton transport McCRAWLEY was struck amidship in the vicinity of the engine room and a hole 18 to 20 feet in diameter was opened in her side. An hour later the McCRAWLEY, dead in the water, was attacked by 12 to 15 dive bombers who were driven off by the salvage crew who manned the guns. When it became apparent that she could no longer be kept afloat all hands were ordered to abandon ship. At 2023 she was struck by three torpedoes and sank. At first an enemy submarine was believed to have fired the torpedoes but later it was learned that she had been sunk by friendly PT boats who mistook her for an enemy.

REINFORCEMENTS
MOVED IN

Between 30 June and 31 July, 25,556 Army, 1,547 Navy and 1,645 Marine personnel were moved into Rendova by our transport command. Thousands of tons of rations, fuel, ammunition, vehicles and other freight were unloaded at Rendova.


LANDINGS AT
ONAIIVISI
WICKHAM AN-
CHORAGE, VIRU
AND RICE AN-
CHORAGE

On 30 June a destroyer and a minesweeper arrived off Onaiavisi at 0230 and began to debark units of the 169th Infantry on Sasavele and Barulu Islands. On 2 July a good beach was located at Zanana on the south coast of New Georgia six miles east of Munda and several units of Infantry were landed there. Assault boats conveyed the troops from Rendova. The first landings in the Wickham Anchorage area were made at Oloana Bay at 0630 on the morning of 30 June and consisted of Marines in seven LCI's escorted by a Task Force composed of a minesweeper and 2 APD's. They landed without opposition after some confusion resulting from the APD's lying off the wrong side of Oloana Bay. The landing at Viru was delayed until 1 July awaiting the arrival of the advance unit landed at Segi on the 21st and dispatched overland to Viru. Eventually they were landed at Nono Point and proceeded overland to Viru capturing it at 1700, after which additional forces were able to land directly from seaward that night. On 5 July landings were made at Rice Anchorage on the north coast of New Georgia in order to make possible an advance on the Bairoko-Enogai area preventing reinforcements reaching Munda from Kolombangara. After a bombardment of artillery emplacements at Enogai Inlet during the night of 4-5 July, during which one of our destroyers, the STRONG, was sunk by the batteries at Enogai, the transports were unloaded into Higgins boats. Many of the boats touched bottom in crossing a narrow, shallow bar at the entrance to the beach, which was so short that it accommodated only four boats at a time. The transports cleared the area before dawn when fire from shore batteries was rapidly increasing.

COAST GUARD
PARTICIPATION

One Coastguardsman, John Gadowski, MoMM 2c, gives a vivid account of operations which followed. He was on board the Troop Transport WATERS which, shortly after the Battle of Kula Gulf on the night of 6 July,

SUPPLY ECHELON APPROACHES RENDOVA



was bringing reinforcements and supplies to the Marines on Enogai off New Georgia. They got in and started to unload. They were taking the last load in when the Japanese opened up with heavy guns from Kolombangara, just across Kula Gulf. The transports had to pull out leaving them behind. This was the regular procedure under such circumstances, it being understood that the men left behind would be picked up later. This time they were all reported missing as there was no way of communicating with them. Months later the crew of the WATERS was surprised when they saw the missing men, whom they thought were all dead. Altogether they spent four months on the New Georgia group. They were attached to Amphibious Force Boat Pool #8 on New Georgia, which the Japs tried very hard to knock out by bombings and shellings. The Japs, however, never could seem to find out where they were hiding. They were continually carrying troops and supplies from island to island. They were often shelled or strafed by planes and bombers dropped their loads all around them.

FALL OF MUNDA

The end of the New Georgia Island operation came early in August when the Munda airfield was captured by our forces following a campaign marked by the coordinated use of infantry, artillery, tanks, flame throwers, and air and naval bombardment. On 2 August the left flank of one of our Divisions finally pushed across the Lambeti Plantation and reached the east end of the airfield. Two days later the northern flank of another Division spearheaded by elements of two Infantry Divisions broke through to the western shore 600 yards north of the airfield, completely severing communications with Bairoko. By 1500 on 5 August all major organized resistance at Munda had ceased, after an operation lasting six weeks.

LANDING ON NASSAU BAY, NEW GUINEA

While the attack was being made on New Georgia a powerful attack was made on the night of 29-30 June by Allied troops in New Guinea. A successful landing was made on Nassau Bay, ten miles south of the Japanese base at Salamaua and the landing force moved inland to Mubo and Komiatum. Navy PT boats and planes prevented enemy reinforcements from being put ashore by harassing enemy landing barges.


WOODLARK AND TROBRIAND ISLANDS

On 30 June surprise landings were made virtually unopposed in the Woodlark and Trobriand Island groups, located between the Solomons and New Guinea. By 5 August we had thus ended the first phase of our progress northward. Despite the 1,671 Japanese dead counted at Munda some Japanese were able to withdraw to the last major center of Japanese resistance at Bairoko Harbor on New Georgia. Others had evacuated by barge to Vila-Stanmore on Kolombangara.

A CHANGE IN STRATEGY

The Japanese apparently had no intention of withdrawing from Kolombangara, despite the effective neutralization of the Vila-Stanmore airfield by the capture and use of the Munda airstrip. There were indications that they

VILA AIRFIELD AND BLACKETT STRAIT




intended to augment the garrison there by barges and destroyers from the north under cover of darkness. On the night of 6-7 August, a force of six of our destroyers encountered four enemy destroyers off the northwest coast of Kolombangara and destroyed all of them without loss to ourselves. As a result, heavy enemy reinforcements were prevented from reaching Kolombangara and this probably decided the Japanese to evacuate the island instead of holding it. Again on the night of 9-10 August our task force sunk at least four enemy barges evidently bound for Vila. Meanwhile, plans to attack Kolombangara had been set aside in favor of an assault on Vella LaVella. This was an important departure from the strategy hitherto followed in the South Pacific of advancing from one enemy occupied and defended island to the next. We were now to by-pass Kolombangara with a garrison of 5,000 Japanese troops, strong fortifications and a formidable airstrip, and advance to an island many miles beyond with negligible defenses and no airfield. Vella LaVella lay in the path of the supply routes to Kolombangara and could be used for bases for the more effective patrol of Vella Gulf and Blackett Strait, which provided the favored route for Japanese barges running supplies to the garrison at Vila. From a minor naval base and airstrip to be established on Vella LaVella, Japanese shipping and air bases of southern Bougainville might also be attacked. On the night of 21-22 July a reconnaissance party landed on the southern part of the island, unoccupied by the Japanese, and selected Barakoma as the site for the landing and for the construction of an airstrip.

LANDING ON
VELLA LAVELLA

At dawn on 15 August, 1943, the advance group of seven APD's arrived off Barakoma with 6 destroyers as escorts and began unloading troops and equipment. Within an hour they had completed the operation and departed on the return trip to Guadalcanal with a screen of four destroyers. When the second group of 12 LCI's arrived at 0715 it was discovered that only 8 of them could be accommodated at one time by the three beaches and the unloading of the last four was delayed until about 0900. Meanwhile, the third Group of 3 LST's had arrived on schedule at 0800 and were awaiting their turn to beach. At 0801 between 15 and 20 enemy fighters and dive bombers attacked for 20 minutes without damage. At 1227 when the LST's were still unloading, came the heaviest air attack by 8 to 12 dive bombers and 7 fighters. This attack was broken up with the loss of 10 enemy planes. About 1736 still another attack by 8 dive bombers was broken up by our Combat Air Patrol. At 1810 the third group of LST's got under way, leaving about 130 tons of supplies still unloaded in order to avoid night attacks while without fighter cover. On the return to Guadalcanal, under a full moon and clear sky, two of the three Groups were subjected to repeated air attacks but without damage. Altogether 4,600 troops, including 700 naval personnel had been landed with 15 days supplies. Within the next fifteen days four more echelons of from 3 to 4 LST's each, with destroyer escort, made the trip from Guadalcanal to Vella LaVella with additional supplies. While all of these were attacked by air only slight damage resulted. One LST ignited by its own ship's fire burned to the water, but survivors were taken off by destroyers. On the night of 17-18 August four of our destroyers attacked four enemy destroyers, 2 large barges and several tugs or trawlers towing a number of smaller barges off northern

KOLOMBANGARA AFTER OUR LANDING



Vella LaVella. One enemy destroyer was sunk and 2 damaged. One or two of the larger barges and several of the smaller were also sunk.

EVACUATION OF
KOLOMBANGARA

By 27 September the airfield at Barakoma was placed in operation and, caught between Munda on the southeast and Barakoma on the northwest, and with no strong air or surface support, the 10,000 Japanese on Kolombangara were expected to attempt evacuation on the moonless nights of 1 and 2 October. On the night of 27 September a task unit destroyed 3 or 4 enemy barges and again on the night of 29 September, 7 or 8 barges were damaged or sunk. On the 30th further attempts to evacuate were broken up by our destroyers, 6 out of 12 barges being destroyed. On the night of 1 October about 35 barges were encountered of which 20 were sunk and twenty more were sunk on the night of 2 October. Between 28 September and 2 October, however, some 10,000 Japanese were reported evacuated from Kolombangara, 3,000 to Choiseul by barge and the remainder to Rabaul by destroyers. Our forces had destroyed 60 barges and damaged many more.


EVACUATION OF
VELLA LAVELLA

On 18 September, a New Zealand Division relieved our 35 Regimental Combat Team on Vella LaVella and it was planned to pocket the Japanese in the northwest corner by moving combat teams simultaneously up the east and west coasts, the operation to be semi-amphibious, moving from bay to bay in invasion craft. By 5 October one combat team had reached Marguana Bay on the west and another Warambari Bay on the east. The 500 Japanese were hemmed in on the narrow strip of land between. Under cover of a naval battle off northwest Vella LaVella on the night of 6 October the evacuation of the last of the Japanese troops was accomplished. The successful occupation of Vella LaVella, at the cost of only 150 of our men killed, demonstrated the soundness of by-passing enemy strongholds, then blockading and starving them out.

COAST GUARD
AT VELLA
LAVELLA

The Coast Guard manned LST-167 was a unit in a convoy which departed Guadalcanal on 24 September and was ordered to beach at Ruravai, Vella LaVella, a beach not previously used by LST's. It was consequently without shore defenses and with a minimum of facilities for beaching and unloading. The beaching was made on the 25th at 0745 and all of the 77th Marine Combat Battalion's equipment had been unloaded by 1115. At 1116 the executive officer reported a possible "bogie" distant about 40 miles. Thirty seconds later a patrol plane reported "lots of bogies and about 20 angels." A few seconds later three dive bombers were picked up coming in directly out of the sun and diving at the ship. At 1117 the order was given to open fire. All 20 guns opened fire but before any of the planes were hit, their bombs had been released. Then one plane burst into flames and another began to smoke heavily. Two bombs struck the LST 167-and a third was a near miss. When the bombs struck, the terrific impact knocked nearly everyone off his feet. One bomb struck the main deck port side, exploded, penetrated the deck and came out through the skin of the ship. The second struck the main deck forward and exploded in the provision room. This started a fire on the

IST-204 AT FINSCHAFEN



tank deck in the gasoline and oil which had not been unloaded. Flames immediately leapt up through the cargo hatch and after ventilators. The electrical circuits had been damaged and power could not be kept on. Dead and wounded littered the main deck. The order was given to secure all engines and abandon ship. Between 1122 and 1135 all living casualties were removed and given first aid at an emergency casualty station in a native dwelling on the beach. In fighting the fire on the LST the CO2 extinguishers were ineffective due to the draft of air through the tank deck. There was no pressure on the fire main. The 40 mm ammunition on the main deck began exploding about 1140, so fire fighting was discontinued and the order given to stay clear of the ship. At 0900 on the 26th the ship was still burning and exploding too heavily to permit inspection. At 1530 when the fire had subsided, a portable fire pump was rigged and water played on the fire. The total casualties were 2 officers and 5 enlisted men killed in action, 3 enlisted men died of wounds, 5 enlisted men missing in action and 1 officer and 19 enlisted men wounded in action. All except the wounded embarked on the LST-472 for Guadalcanal and the LST-167 was unbeached and towed to Rendova.


NEW GUINEA - FINSCHHAFEN

LANDINGS ON HUON GULF AND AT FINSCHHAFEN

An amphibious landing was made at Hopi on Huon Gulf and at Buhem River, New Guinea on 3 September, 1943. Within three days 14,000 troops were landed in these areas without casualty. On 11 September Salamaua was captured. On the 16th Lae was occupied by our forces after the enemy had withdrawn. Landings were made in the Finschhafen area on the 22nd.

COAST GUARD AT FINSCHHAFEN

On 21 September the LST-204, Coast Guard manned, departed Lae, New Guinea with a combat load of 500 Australian troops of the 9th Division and their equipment. She was one of an echelon of three ships that beached at Scarlet Beach, several miles above Finschhafen at 0656 on the 22nd. Unloading of cargo and disembarking of troops began immediately under a protective air cover and was completed without incident at 0925. Five minutes later the LST began retracting from the beach but had not moved off more than 25 yards when a lone Japanese Zero fighter, sneaking in unobserved over the hills, swooped down to masthead level and dropped two small bombs, both falling wide of their mark on the beach, about 40 yards away. The LST joined formation and headed south for Buna. At 1240 six Japanese medium bombers were sighted on the horizon approaching on the port quarter at very low altitude. Two "Zeros" at high altitude were immediately engaged by our planes. All ships broke formation and began weaving at emergency speed, according to plan. The main batteries of escorting destroyers opened fire at about 5,000 yards and two bombers crashed into the sea, one exploding in mid-air. The remaining bombers broke formation but continued coming in. Two were approaching on the port quarter when the order was given to fire



and hits were scored almost immediately with the 20 mm guns. One torpedo was launched by a bomber but passed astern missing the LST by several hundred yards. The bomber was then seen to fall into the water, bounce back up again and burst into flames. About 400 yards astern and to port the other "Sally" kept coming at deck level. As she passed to starboard not more than 25 yards abeam direct hits were observed peppering her cockpit. The bomber began leaving a trail of smoke and appeared out of control. When about 100 yards off the port bow she crashed into the sea. The remaining bombers were now engaged by the P-38's and two more were seen crashing about 5,000 yards to port. One Japanese Zero was seen to plummet seaward in flames, while one P-38 was falling nearby. The pilot, however, had bailed out and was subsequently picked up by the escorts. At 1305 all clear was sounded and formation resumed with no casualties suffered by the LST-204. Other Coast Guard manned LST's participating in the Finschhafen landing were LST's Nos. 18, 67, and 168.

BOUGAINVILLE


CHOISEUL AND TREASURY ISLANDS

As a diversion for the Treasury Islands and Bougainville landings, the 2nd Marine Parachute Battalion, acting as infantry, made an unopposed landing on Voza on the southwest coast of Choiseul at 0045 on 28 October, 1943. On the 29th at 1800 the Marines met a strong force between Vagara and Voza. On the afternoon of the 30th they captured Sangigai, destroying installations and killing 72 Japanese. The enemy's attention was completely diverted from Bougainville. On 27 October five transport units arrived off Blanche Harbor, Treasury Islands and, preceded by a bombardment from destroyers, the initial wave of troops reached the beach at Falamai on Mono Island at 0626. The landing was opposed by some machine gun, mortar, and sniper fire but casualties were light. The landing on Stirling Island was unopposed. At the same time a party was put ashore without opposition at Soanotalu on the north side of Mono Island where a radar station was to be established. The 2nd echelon arrived 1 November and the 3rd on the 6th. In all 6315 personnel and 3870 tons of equipment were landed. The enemy were driven north to Woleai where they were either killed or evacuated. The Coast Guard manned LST-71 was in the 2nd echelon to arrive.

SELECTION OF EM- PRESS AUGUSTA BAY

In September, 1943 plans were made to establish a base on Bougainville from which aircraft could strike at Rabaul. The choice narrowed to the Kieta area on the east coast and Empress Augusta Bay Area on the west coast. The latter was chosen after reconnaissance patrols had landed from submarines. Just off Cape Torokina, near the northern end of Empress Augusta Bay were two small islands, Puruata and Torokina. After a period of training at Efate and Guadalcanal the First Echelon, consisting of 8 attack transports, 4 attack cargo ships, 7 destroyers, 4 destroyer minesweepers and 2 fleet tugs, assembled south of Guadalcanal on 31 October.

LEAPING FROM LANDING BARGES, U.S. MARINES RUSH FOR COVER AS THEY BEGIN THE AMERICAN INVASION OF EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY



LANDING ON
BOUGAINVILLE

Keeping well to sea on the southwest side of the Solomon Islands, the First Echelon approached Cape Torokina early on the morning of 1 November. An hour and a half bombardment from surface vessels and bombing and strafing of the landing beaches by 31 TBF's preceded the first assault wave which reached the beach at 0726. Surf conditions were worse than had been previously observed and some 91 LCVP's and LCM's beached and were abandoned. Of the 12 beaches the three northernmost, were unusable. This necessitated doubling up on the next three. The beaches were narrow and steep affording considerable trouble in unloading cargo. There were only about 300 Japanese concentrated at Cape Torokina and on Puruata Island, but they resisted stubbornly with heavy machine gun fire. Northwest of Cape Torokina the landing was almost unopposed. By the end of the day 14,321 Marines and most of the supplies had been landed, at a cost of 70 killed and missing and 124 wounded. Half the enemy force was killed and the remainder fled inland. Our fighter cover of 34 planes from New Georgia airfields drove off most of the enemy planes in 2 enemy air attacks during the day. Bombs dropped in the transport area missed the transports which got under way and maneuvered during both attacks, shooting down 4 planes.

REINFORCEMENT
AND SUPPLY

Eight more echelons, 3 of them consisting of attack transports and cargo ships, and 5 of high speed transports, LST's and LCT's were sent to Cape Torokina during November, 1943. Unloading of the LST's took longer than expected due to inadequate personnel and organization at the beaches. By the end of November, 44,430 officers and 40,338 tons of supplies and equipment were landed. Air harassment was constant and several of our craft were hit, including the LCI-70, PT-167, and the transports FULLER and PRESIDENT JACKSON. The MCKEAN (APD) was sunk, and a third of her complement and Marine Troop passengers lost. At least 26 enemy planes were shot down with only 8 of ours lost.


OBJECTIVE
ATTAINED

There was no thought of carrying out a large scale campaign for the conquest of Bougainville. Our objective was to establish a firm foothold over an area, sufficient for use as an airstrip. By the end of the month, we had a beachhead 9,000 yards wide and 7,000 to 8,000 yards deep. Work on the airstrip began on the 9th and it was used for an emergency landing on the 24th. It was located near Piva, 2½ miles north of Cape Torokina. During November there were 33 night bombing attacks with 600 bombs dropped on the occupied area and on our shipping.

COAST GUARD
MANNED TRANS-
PORT AT FIRST
LANDING

The flagship of the amphibious forces that landed at Bougainville was the Coast Guard manned attack transport HUNTER LIGGETT. Coming in at dawn the Coast-guardsmen saw the blue-gray mountainous island of Bougainville, with an active volcano shrouding the peaks with smoke. From a mile out they could see the foam, white tossing against the shore and they knew it was going to be a tough landing. In the landing barges swinging from the davits along the

FIRST WAVE GOES IN AT BOUGAINVILLE




side of the ship, the Coast Guard coxswains and their crews waited silently for the signal to be lowered away. The Marines, huddled in their boats, looked strangely alike. Suddenly the signal came and the barges were lowered. As they touched the water, they scooted away with the boats from the other transports. The destroyers fanned out ahead shelling the beach. Our planes which had formed a protective umbrella peeled off and screamed down bombing and strafing the Jap's machine gun emplacements, which disintegrated into muddy holes on the beach. A flare went up from the shore and they knew that the first wave had made a landing. Three more waves went in before the enemy planes attacked. All the transports immediately got under way and headed for the open sea. Above, a dog fight was in progress. A bomber streaked for the LIGGETT coming in at mast-height, then suddenly banked away, losing altitude fast. Four bombs bracketed a tiny destroyer and its guns flamed viciously. Two bombers immediately began smoking and plummeted into the sea. A little later the transport returned to the beach and the barges swarmed out to begin unloading supplies. Early in the afternoon all the ships again put to sea as bogies appeared high in the clouds. Bombs dropped and white geysers appeared around them but none of the ships were hit. One of the transports was aground and seven bombers poised over her for the kill, but a destroyer standing by sent shells into the sky so fast that the planes sheared away and left. Then nine new Jap night fighters, painted black, with the red ball insignia on their wings came out of a pass in the mountains and sped down the beach very low strafing our barges and men on the beach. After that there was no more opposition and unloading continued all that day and part of the next. Many barges were lost in the first landing when the heavy surf caught them, spilling out the men as they capsized.

BATTLE OF EM-
PRESS AUGUSTA
BAY

On the night of 1-2 November a naval action took place in an area about 45 miles northwest of Empress Augusta Bay between our Task Force 39 consisting of four light cruisers and eight destroyers and a Japanese force estimated at 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 8 destroyers. We lost one destroyer, torpedoed but brought into port, and the enemy one light cruiser. Damage to surviving enemy ships was apparently heavy as they abandoned the mission which was undoubtedly to attack our shipping at Empress Augusta Bay.

LST-70 SHOOT-
DOWN PLANE

On 17 November the Coast Guard manned LST-70 beached on Puruata Island as part of a convoy bringing reinforcements and supplies from Guadalcanal. Five minutes later a bomb was dropped in the bay about 1,500 yards on the port quarter. At 0805 seven enemy planes of mixed types, including what appeared to be Zekes and Vals, appeared in broken formation over Puruata Beach. All AA guns of the four LST's beached there engaged these planes as long as they were within range. At 0809 one Val flew directly into two 3"50 bursts fired from the LST-70 and immediately entered a long glide and lost altitude rapidly. When last seen this plane was still losing altitude and heading inland over Bougainville Island north of Puruata. It is assumed to be the same plane later reported to have crashed several miles inland.



LST-207 BRINGS
DOWN TWO "BETTYS"

A large column of black smoke was observed off the port quarter of Coast Guard manned LST-207 about 0320 during bright moonlight on 17 November, 1943, when the vessel was in Empress Augusta Bay, about 15 miles off shore. Shortly afterward there were two heavy explosions and it was later learned that the APD MCKEAN of the same convoy had been torpedoed. At 0337 an enemy aircraft was observed slightly abaft the LST-207's starboard beam, low and heading toward the vessel. It was about 400 yards distant when the LST opened fire, firing a total of 300 rounds. The plane, identified as a "Betty" burst into flames, passed over the vessel, veered to the right and crashed into the water two points off the port bow, 300 yards distant. Five minutes later an enemy plane crossed astern from starboard to port. LST-207 opened fire as did other ships astern. The plane crashed into the bay, burned and exploded. Two other planes were fired on shortly afterward but the damage was unknown.

PURPOSE OF
CAMPAIGN
ACHIEVED

Admiral Wm. F. Halsey, when detached as Commander South Pacific Force and Area summed up the Bougainville operation as follows: "The Bougainville campaign was intended to accomplish the destruction of enemy air strength in the Bismarcks; not only was this accomplished, but the by-products of the campaign were so extensive that the subsequent operations at Green Island and Emirau were accomplished virtually without enemy opposition, and the entire enemy offensive potential in the Bismarcks area was destroyed. In the matter of ultimate achievement and importance in the Pacific war, the Bougainville operation was successful beyond our greatest hopes."

GILBERT ISLANDS - MAKIN AND TARAWA

ORGANIZATION
AND MISSION

The Central Pacific Force which began the occupation of the Gilbert Islands with amphibious landings on Makin and Tarawa Atolls on 20 November, 1943, involved some 116 combatant vessels and 75 auxiliaries. These were organized into 3 major groups, the Assault Force (Task Force 54), the Carrier Force (Task Force 50) and the Defense Forces and Shore Based Air (Task Force 57). The Assault Force was composed of Northern Attack Force (Task Force 52) and a Southern Attack Force (Task Force 53). Each of these was composed of a Transport Group, a Fire Support Group, an Air Support or Carrier Group, a Minesweeper Group, a Landing Force, and LST and Garrison Groups. The Coast Guard manned Assault Transport LEONARD WOOD was one of the Transport Group of the Northern Attack Force, while the Coast Guard manned Assault Transport ARTHUR MIDDLETON was part of the Southern Attack Force. Five of the LST's assigned to the Tarawa landing were Coast Guard manned, these being LST's Nos. 20, 23, 69, 169, and 205. There were Coast Guard personnel assigned to a number of other units. This was the first amphibious assault against strongly defended enemy atolls. The distance from our bases and the size and complexity of the forces involved required a high degree of coordination and cooperation.

These forces had to be assembled from widely separated areas, trained for the specific operation, furnished detailed plans, given a final rehearsal and made ready for a coordinated attack against separated objectives, while being prepared to repel a major sea attack. In attacking small fortified atolls there was no element of surprise except possibly as to the exact time. Unlike landing on a large island where lightly defended beaches may generally be found, making possible surprise attacks on the enemy's flank or rear, the size of the atolls made it relatively easy to fortify them completely, rendering their capture difficult and costly in casualties.

ASSEMBLY AND BOMBARDMENT

The forces destined for the operation had been widely dispersed at the beginning of the assembly and training period early in October. They were brought together in two groups, the Southern Attack Force in the New Hebrides Area and the Northern Attack Force in the Hawaiian Area. After intensive training and rehearsals in their respective areas, the Northern Force departed Pearl Harbor on 9 November and the Southern left Efate, New Hebrides on 12 November. The final general approach of the main Attack Forces was from the eastward with the Task Forces within sight contact on the 18 and 19 November. Due to the slow speeds of the two LST groups from the Ellice Islands and the necessity that their arrival coincide with that of the Main Transport groups, they were much closer to the Gilbert Islands on the 18 and 19 November than the Attack Forces. The LST's were sighted on the 18 and 19 by enemy planes and two air attacks made on them. Through the period 13-19 November, 350 to 400 aircraft of Task Force 57, based on islands of the Ellice, Phoenix and Samoan Groups, and on Baker Island, made daily strikes on the Japanese bases in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. Carrier air strikes were made on Nauru and Tarawa on the 18th and on Tarawa, Mille and Makin on the 19th. Also on the 19th a Cruiser Division of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers bombarded Bititu Island on Tarawa Atoll with 250 tons of HC projectiles at 20,000 yards.


TRANSPORTS UNLOAD

The beaches selected for the initial landings at Tarawa were inside the lagoon on the northern side of Bititu Island. The entire island was surrounded by a shallow coral reef which extended for about 500 to 1,000 yards off shore. The transports arrived outside the lagoon entrance at 0355 on the 20th and commenced unloading. The LST group, with their cargoes of LVT's arrived shortly afterward. Unloading was completed at 0616.

PRE-LANDING BOMBARDMENTS

Enemy shore batteries opened fire at 0507 and our counter battery fire commenced two minutes later ceasing at 0542 in anticipation of the dawn air strike. When this failed to develop counter battery fire was recommenced at 0600 and continued 12 minutes. The air strike was finally delivered between 0610 and 0620. At 0622 battleships opened fire at 10,000 to 15,000 yards closing to 2,000 to 6,000. Cruisers followed battleships at 20 to 30 minute intervals. Destroyers screened the heavy ships. This phase ended at 0735, with large fires and explosions

COAST GUARDSMEN UNDER FIRE, LANDING AT TARAVA, BRINGING SUPPLIES TO BEACHHEAD



frequently observed. Due to change in H-hour about this time from 0830 to 0900, the timing of Phase Two firing was considerably interrupted. Actually the first wave of assault troops did not reach the landing beaches until about 0917. Fire was to begin at H minus 45 minutes and cease at H minus 5 minutes. Due to the 17 minute delay in the boats reaching the Line of Departure gunfire actually ceased at H minus 22 minutes. This left the enemy on the beaches under only relatively light attack during the last 22 minutes of the approach of the first wave of assault troops. Fighter planes strafed the beaches between 0825 and 0840, failing to get word of the change in H-hour. They strafed them again at 0917 just prior to the landing of the first wave. Phase Three was to be as requested by Shore Fire Control parties and on the whole was well carried out. Destroyers stationed in the lagoon gave invaluable support to troops ashore.

LANDING
ON
TARAWA

Beginning with H-hour six waves of landing craft (LVT's, LCVP's, and LCM's) were scheduled to land in 25 minutes. Loaded LVT's of the first three waves proceeded from transports to the Rendezvous Area and from there into the lagoon to the Line of Departure. Overloading, wind, sea, and the ebb tide slowed the first wave to $2\frac{1}{2}$ knots instead of the 3 knots expected and it reached the Line of Departure 39 minutes late. This necessitated changing H-hour to 0900. The first three waves of LVT's had no difficulty in crossing the reef and no underwater mines or obstructions were encountered. However, all waves were under heavy enemy fire. About 95% of the LVT's reached the reef and 85% reached the beaches. The fourth, fifth, and sixth waves of LCVP's and LCM's could not pass over the reef and troops and equipment were put ashore either by loading into LVT's or on rafts, or by landing at the pier which extended out across the reef to deeper water. Troops attempting to wade ashore over the reef other than along the pier met intense fire and suffered heavy casualties.

CONFUSION
AT THE
BEACHHEADS

Because no suitable beachheads had been established on any of the beaches, no beach parties were able to land. The LVT's of the first three waves, after leaving the beaches, were apparently more or less leaderless. Some proceeded back to the transport area, others stopped on the reef northwest of Bititu Island where it was difficult to signal them and others stopped just outside enemy fire with complaints of mechanical trouble. Later in the day nearly 200 other landing craft, most of them loaded with either troops or supplies were still floating around in the lagoon. It was not until early next morning that order was restored. By noon on the 21st several beach parties had established themselves ashore.

FIGHTING
ASHORE
BITTER

The fighting ashore was bitter and became a matter of destroying the enemy in small groups entrenched in pill boxes, machine gun nests, and other strong fortifications. By nightfall of D-day 5 battalion landing teams had established a fair beachhead on the western beach but the two beaches to the eastward had practically no beachheads.

By noon of the 21st the situation ashore showed marked improvement. Late in the afternoon troops were landed on Bairiki Island, adjacent to Bititu, with no opposition, and also on Green Beach on the western side of Bititu. Mopping up operations on the western end of the island proceeded on the 22nd and 23rd, assisted by air and naval gunfire and artillery ashore, with the enemy pushed to the east. By the 23rd, Bititu Island was completely in our hands. The total number of troops in the 9 Marine Battalion Landing Teams used in the attack was about 15,545. Of these 913 were killed or were missing and 2037 were wounded. Of Navy personnel 26 were killed and 48 wounded. Of the probable 4800 Japanese and Koreans on the Atoll all were killed except 146 prisoners taken, including 17 Japanese and 129 Korean laborers.


OCCUPATION
OF MAKIN
AND APAMAMA

As at Tarawa, there was only one island in the Makin Atoll which was defended. This was Butaritari, which was a lone narrow anchor shaped island, on the northern part of which the enemy concentrated his defenses and made his stand. Landings were made on two beaches on the south and one on the western end of the island. The coral reef at the south beaches had from 12-18 inches of water at low tide and the water was never deep enough to allow boats to get into the beach over the reef. This necessitated the use of LVT's entirely to unload boats onto the beach. On 20 November there was a concentrated aerial bombing from carrier planes between 0615 and 0630 followed by ship's bombardment between 0640 and 0825. The first wave was landed at 0833 on the west beach. There followed 8 waves of landing boats most of which were directed to one of the beaches as coral conditions on the other necessitated its abandonment, causing confusion, delay and damage to the landing craft. Fortunately there was only slight enemy resistance. Between 0850 and 1025 the south beaches were bombarded and the first landings were made at 1041 from the transports and LST's which had moved inside the lagoon. Enemy resistance consisted chiefly of machine gun fire and casualties were light. By the 22nd a total of 409 officers and 6,098 men had been landed to engage an estimated 600-800 of the enemy. Our casualties were 56 killed and 131 wounded, with 104 prisoners taken. The remainder of the enemy were either killed or committed suicide. Apamama Atoll, in the Gilberts, was occupied on the 20th of November with only negligible resistance. There were no fortifications and only a small group of about 24 Japanese were found on the island. These were eliminated by a small force of 78 men landed from a submarine. Construction of an air field began on the 26th.

COAST GUARD
AT MAKIN

Following some of the heaviest naval bombardment in Pacific history, Coast Guardsmen, acting as coxswains of the landing craft, steered their craft thru the surfs and coral reefs of the Gilbert Islands to land assault troops on enemy beaches on 20 November, 1943. They shuttled their boats between the transport and the shore to take supplies and munitions to the fighting troops when and where they were needed, dodging and twisting their small craft under Japanese fire from coconut trees and taro holes. They swept the enemy held beach with machine guns, then

LST-18 LANDING AT ARAWE-NEW BRITAIN



with wide open throttles rammed the bows onto the beach. The boat crews waited under fire of Japanese snipers while the soldiers plunged out across the strip of coral sand. With the troops safely landed, their boats skimmed back through treacherous reefs and pinnacles for another load. In the invasion of Makin Island some Coast Guard coxswains and their crews worked for four straight days never leaving their boats. Men and engines were halted only when sharp coral reefs tore the propellers off the boat or coral pinnacles gouged holes in their hulls. Sandwiches and coffee were lowered to them on a line from the transport. When night fell they anchored their small boats out on the lagoon and snatched a few minutes sleep on top of their cargo, their sleep being frequently interrupted by random fire from Japanese patrols and snipers. Fully Coast Guard manned vessels engaged in the Gilbert Islands operations were the LEONARD WOOD (APA-12), ARTHUR MIDDLETON (APA-25) and LST's 19, 20, 23, 69, 169, and 205.

NEW BRITAIN - ARAWE, CAPE GLOUCESTER

LANDING AT ARAWE

Allied troops landed on the Arawe Peninsula of New Britain on 15 December, 1943. Although beachheads and landing craft were heavily bombed by Japanese planes no ships were lost. On 13 December, 29 LVT(I)'s (unarmoured amphibious tractors) and 10 LVT(A) (2)'s (armoured amphibious tractors) were loaded with troops, equipment, and supplies at Goodenough Island and embarked on the CARTER HALL (LSD-3) in inverse order of disembarkation. On 15 December the Task Force arrived at a point about 5 miles off Cape Merkus. Disembarkation began at 0445. The plan called for all the amphibious tractors to be governed by the limit of visibility until daybreak, when they were to form five waves, the first to reach Beach White at 0630, the others to follow at 3 minute intervals. Instead of proceeding to Beach White the LVT(I)'s were halted about 2 miles from Cape Merkus and ordered to lay to until further notice. The LVT(A) (2)'s in assault formation had reached a point 2,000 yards off Beach White at about 0614, when they were ordered to return and rendezvous with the LVT (I)'s. At about 0700 all but one tractor again proceeded, travelling in column until about 600 yards off the old jetty on Beach White, where each wave executed in turn a right flank. One LVT(I) had drowned out upon leaving ship and subsequently sank while being towed. At 0728 the first wave crossed the beach followed by succeeding waves at about 3 minute intervals. The troops disembarked under cover and immediately advanced toward the 3 mile objective. By noon of D-day the front line was established at the neck of the peninsula after two LCT(A) (2)'s with picked crews were used to wipe out enemy machine gun positions. Of the 3,000 troops of the 112th U. S. Cavalry Regiment who went ashore on the first day, there were 13 killed, 29 missing, and 25 wounded. The enemy lost at least 60 killed. Allied troops reached the town of Arawe but were driven back on the 25th of December.

U. S. COAST GUARDSMEN AND MARINES BUILD A TEMPORARY CAUSEWAY FOR UNLOADING AS THE INVASION OF
CAPT. GLoucester, NEW BRITAIN, GETS UNDERWAY



CAPE GLOUCESTER
NATURAL DEFENSE
FEATURES

The major landing on New Britain was that of the 1st Marine Division on 26 December, 1943 at Cape Gloucester. Preceding this the Southwest Pacific air force had attacked the area on 21 out of 31 days with an aggregate of 4,500 tons of bombs. The air strategy was unusual in that nearly all offensive strength was sent against enemy defensive ground positions rather than first against enemy air strength. While this lessened ground opposition to our landing it did permit the Japanese to mount an intense air offensive against our operations. The Japanese had occupied Cape Gloucester in December, 1942 and by December, 1943 were estimated to have about 10,000 troops in the area. These were not concentrated in strength along the coastal flat but principally in two rear areas. Fingers leading from Mt. Talawe, with streams and steep gullies between them, formed natural positions for defense against a combat team advancing northwest up the coast. The coastal flat, narrowing to 300 yards northeast of these fingers, became a treacherous corridor for advancing troops, threatened on the left flank and left front by high ground, abounding in strategic and covered locations for static defensive positions. High ground also provided the Japanese with advantageous jumping-off points and natural corridors for sharp flanking thrusts at our forces. Once in possession of our forces, however, this high ground would give us strategic advantage over the enemy.


LANDING
AT CAPE
GLOUCESTER

Following a 53 minute naval bombardment, coupled with air bombings, the Cape Gloucester landing took place at 0745 on 26 December. The Marines came ashore from landing craft at points 6 miles east and west of the Japanese airstrip. Although the landing itself was unopposed, and our fighters turned back a Japanese air attack during the morning, an afternoon attack sank the destroyer BROWNSON and damaged the destroyers LAMSON, MUGFORD and SHAW, the Coast Guard manned LST-66, and the APC-15, by near misses. On the first day 12,500 troops and 7,600 tons of equipment were landed and next day 2,400 additional troops and 3,500 tons of cargo came ashore. At noon on the 30th the Marines occupied the airstrip. Enemy air opposition was vigorous, coming entirely from Japanese Naval air forces at Rabaul, although there were also large Japanese Army air forces on New Guinea within range. Most of these attacks were by dive bombing and strafing and were concentrated in the first few days after the landing and then quickly faded, due to pressure on Rabaul by South Pacific air forces.

COAST GUARD LST
22 DOWNS JAP
DIVE BOMBER

On 26 December, at about 1330, the Coast Guard manned LST-22, was entering the approaches to Borgen Bay, New Britain, preparing to beach on the eastern shore of Cape Gloucester according to plan. At 1418 she beached along with the LST-465 and LST-26 and unloading began at 1428. At 1440 some fifteen Japanese "Val" dive bombers attacked the first LST echelon, which was at that time standing out thru the reefs, and many bombs appeared to be striking the water near these ships. At 1445 one Japanese "Val" dive bomber, which apparently had been driven off from the group attacking the first echelon, came in

OUT OF THE JAWS OF A U.S. COAST GUARD-MANNED LST AT CAPE GLOUCESTER, NEW BRITAIN, COME THE MARINES



from astern of the LST-22 straffing the stern and after deck house. As the plane swung slightly to the southwest and began to parallel the ship, it came within the range of the LST's guns. When directly on the starboard beam the plane burst into flames. It was seen to pass close over the trees fringing the beach and did not reappear. It was reported to have crashed a short distance inland.

COAST GUARD LST
204 SHOOTS DOWN
PLANES

The Coast Guard manned LST-204 was off Cape Gloucester on the 26th at 1430 when an alert was sounded with a report of dive bombers in the vicinity. At 1435 a dive bomber attack was observed on the destroyers dead ahead about 2 miles, and at 1436 three Japanese dive bombers attacked the LST. The first bomb hit dead ahead 200 feet. The second hit 150 feet ahead and the third hit close aboard (75 feet) starboard amidships. All guns were firing and fatal hits were scored on the second "Val" which subsequently crashed into the sea. Damaging hits were observed on two other Val type planes as they were pulling away from the LST and one was seen to fall off her port quarter, crashing into the sea. The attack ended at 1450, with no casualties or direct damage to the LST-204. A near miss was observed on the LST-66.

COAST GUARD
LST's LAND
MARINES

The above were included in an Echelon, completely Coast Guard manned except the flagship (LST-466), consisting in addition of LST's 18, 66, 67, 68, 202, and 204 which had departed Cape Sudest on 24 December and Buna on the 25th.¹ The first LST beached at Cape Gloucester at 0840 on 26 December. This was the flagship and it was the first American LST to touch the soil of New Britain. The Coast Guard manned LST's had on board the following:

| | <u>LST-18</u> | <u>LST-66</u> | <u>LST-67</u> | <u>LST-68</u> | <u>LST-202</u> | <u>LST-204</u> |
|---------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|
| Marine Corps Officers | 39 | 28 | 34 | 33 | 41 | 32 |
| Marine Corps Enlisted Men | 610 | 516 | 562 | 611 | 585 | 531 |
| Tons of Bulk Stores | 100 | 112 | 122 | 150 | 240 | 237 |
| Vehicles | 93 | 98 | 108 | 104 | 85 | 117 |

In addition the LST-66 carried 4 Navy officers, 3 Navy enlisted men, 16 Army enlisted men, and 1 Australian war correspondent.

MANY ENEMY
PLANES SHOT
DOWN

After unloading and taking on half a dozen casualty cases, the LST's retracted and proceeded at slow speed waiting to be joined by the flagship LST-466. It was then that they were informed by escort that an enemy aircraft attack was imminent. They were in position with Borgen Bay entrance buoy off the starboard hand. They proceeded at full speed to clear the reefs. From 1445 to 1510 they were attacked by "Val" dive bombers. Three bombers were observed diving from dead ahead, two passing over the Echelon and the third driven off and possibly

1. For complete list of Coast Guard manned vessels in this operation, see Appendix A.



CAPTAIN C.H. PETERSON, USCG

destroyed by anti-aircraft fire from LST-18. The LST-67 scored hits on one "Val" and the plane was observed in flames 2 miles off the starboard quarters. Attacked by 4 planes and strafed by one, the LST-68 possibly destroyed one plane. The LST-202 observed nine bombers and seven bombs hit from 25 to 50 yards from the ship. Two enemy planes were destroyed with no damage or casualties to the LST. Besides the two planes the LST-204 shot down, the LST-66 shot down three enemy planes, after a near miss had inflicted damage and killed one enlisted Coastguardsman and one enlisted Navy man. At 1710 while in convoy, a formation of enemy planes was observed, identified as "Wells." These were driven off by escorts "Thunderbolts" and "Lightnings" and fighting ceased about 1730. The LST-67 reported a direct hit on one enemy plane which exploded and crashed in flames.

MORALE GOOD
DESPITE LONG
COMBAT DUTY

Captain C. H. Peterson, USCG, Commander of this almost completely Coast Guard manned LST group was asked about the morale of the men. "It was good," he said, "and I couldn't ask for more, but 'war fatigue' is beginning to appear. These men have been out here for eight months. They are continually giving all they have, continually in forward position, subject to attack at all times. Due to the nature of our work from advance bases, recreation or leave is impossible. They just have to 'sweat it out.' This duty, I believe, should be limited to eight months at the most, but some of the men feel the strain before that time."

LST IMPORTANT
DEVELOPMENT
OF THIS WAR

"The LST," Captain Peterson continued, "is one of the most important developments of this war and it plays a part which cannot be ignored. The Air Corps, however, makes their success possible and words cannot express the gratitude and respect our men have for the Army and Allied fliers." Prior to his appointment as commander of the LST Group Captain Peterson served as Assistant Communications officer at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington. His twenty years of service had included destroyer and cutter duty, as well as three years at the Coast Guard Academy, between 1929 and 1932, as mathematics instructor.

NEW GUINEA - SAIDOR

LANDING AT
SAIDOR,
NEW GUINEA

On the morning of 2 January, 1944, there was an Allied landing from high speed transports (APD's), LCI's, and LST's, at Saidor, New Guinea. Four Coast Guard manned LST's were in the D-day landing and five others came later. Air and surface bombardment preceded the landing, which was practically unopposed. American sixth Army troops, including elements of the Thirty-second Division swept ashore on both sides of Sau'i Point, meeting only light resistance which was quickly overcome, and moved a mile inland to capture the airstrip. On the first day 7,200 troops and 3,000 tons of supplies were put ashore and only 3 American soldiers were reported killed and 4 wounded in the landing operation. So sudden was the

attack that the Japanese garrison fled from its breakfast tables, leaving food half consumed. The landing at Saidor, about 55 miles southeast of the key Japanese base at Madang represented an advance of about 110 miles from Finschhafen and placed American forces some 75 miles beyond Australian units driving up the Huon peninsula coast in the vicinity of Cape King William. Between the two Allied forces many Japanese troops were trapped in the narrow coastal plain, hemmed in by the sea and the rugged Finisterre Mountains.

MARSHALL ISLANDS - KWAJALEIN

GENERAL PLAN OF OPERATION

The general plan of operation against the Marshall Islands was to capture three key points, Roi and Kwajalein Islands, about 45 miles apart on the Kwajalein Atoll, which was believed to be the key defense point of the Marshall Islands, and the lightly defended Majuro Atoll, 250 miles to the southwest, and to establish air and naval bases at these three points from which to dominate the rest of the Marshall group. To guard against any attempt by the Japanese Fleet to interfere with this plan, the main combatant strength of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in fast carriers, fast battleships, cruisers and destroyers was to be interposed as a shield in what was called the "Carrier Group." Since the 3 main objectives were surrounded by enemy air and naval bases within easy flight range, the early neutralization and denial of these enemy bases was essential to the success of the operation. Land based aircraft (Task Force 57) would prevent such operation from Mille and Jaluit, and reduce them to minor proportions from Nauru and Kusaie, and carrier based aircraft (Task Force 58) would restrict enemy operations from Eniwetok, Wake, Roi, Kwajalein and Wotje. This would be accomplished by bombings and bombardments of these objectives by Task Force 57 thru several preceding weeks, with increasing intensity up to D-day (31 January, 1944) augmented on D-2 day by the carrier based aircraft of Task Force 58, increased on D-1 day by bombardments from the battleships and cruisers of Task Forces 58 and 51. The land-based airforces, basing in the newly acquired Gilbert Islands to the south, formed Task Force 57. The actual attacks, landings and seizures of all 3 objectives were carried out by the "Joint Expeditionary Force," Task Force 51, which comprised some 277 vessels and carried 84,415 troops. This was organized into a northern group for the attack on Roi-Namur, a southern group for the attack on Kwajalein and a third group for the attack on Majuro.

LANDING ON MAJURO ATOLL

The assault plans against Majuro were based on intelligence information that there were three or four hundred Japanese in the atoll concentrated on Darrit Island. The Fifth Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company of the 1st Marine Defense Battalion landed on the entrance islands without incident at 2100 on D-1 day, and after more men had been put ashore on Dalap and Uliga Islands and had found no enemy, it was learned that there were no Japanese on Darrit Island and only 4 in the whole atoll. On D-day the Task Group entered the lagoon, among


them the Coast Guard manned assault transport CAMBRIA. There were extensive Japanese installations which apparently had been abandoned in November, 1943 when the 300 Japanese had been removed to Mille Island for construction of an airfield there.

LANDINGS ON
SURROUNDING
ISLANDS TO ROI

The initial attacks on Ennuebing and Meliu Islands, about 2 and 4 miles respectively, along the reef from Roi was carried out by a Landing Team of the Fourth Marine Division. The first wave for each island consisted of 18 Amphibious Tanks followed by successive waves of troops embarked in Amphibious Vehicles. The first wave landed on Ennuebing at 0952. The tractor waves proceeding to Meliu found heavy surf on the reef. By 1200 both islands had been secured against very light opposition. Boats and amphibious vehicles were then reassembled for the attack from inside the lagoon against Ennumennet and Ennubirr Islands, located respectively 1 to 1½ miles southeast from Namur on the other side of the atoll. The first waves struck the beaches about 1515 with support of destroyer and LCI(L) fire, including rockets and smoke screening. By 1645 both islands were secured with 34 enemy killed. At 1820 a shore to shore assault was launched from Ennumennet against Ennugarret, half a mile away, and at 2000 the island was in our hands. Thus all islands immediately adjacent to Roi-Namur were secured with very little opposition. Throughout D-day, Roi and Namur were subjected to accurate and deliberate bombing and bombardment by various air and surface groups. Batteries of the 14th Marine Artillery were emplaced on adjacent islands on both sides of Roi-Namur. Transport Division 26, which included the Coast Guard manned attack transport CALLAWAY, lay to outside the lagoon, disembarking supplies and artillery on the islands already taken, while other units proceeded to sea for the night.

LANDING ON
ROI-NAMUR
ISLAND

During the afternoon of D-day the troops of Combat Teams 23 and 24, which were to make the assault on Roi-Namur next day, were transferred to LST's in the LST area outside the lagoon, preparatory to embarking next morning in the amphibious LVT's. These LVT's, which had been used on D-day, should have re-assembled on their own LST's during the night for refueling, but due to wide dispersion, many of them being out of fuel at various islands, much of this preparation had to be done on the morning of D-day. The LST's carrying Combat Team 23 had their assigned LVT's on board, but those of Combat Team 24 had considerable shortage making necessary substituting troops of the reserve battalion already embarked in LCVP's. W-hour, originally scheduled for 1000 on D+1 day was accordingly changed to 1100. Actually the first waves of Combat Team 24 landed just prior to 1200 on Namur. Combat Team 23 was meanwhile attacking Roi, on which was located the air field and which appeared completely deserted when the regiment landed. It was later found that half of some 600 Japanese there had been killed by the bombardment prior to our landing. A coordinated attack at 1500 quickly overcame organized resistance, except for a small "V" shaped sector on the north coast. Mopping up operations were completed next morning. On Namur Combat Team 24 had little trouble at the beach, but strong opposition



ATF 17-D

TARGET DETAIL MAP-KWAJALEIN

JULY 1, 1943

developed from an intricate network of defenses as soon as the enemy recovered somewhat from the effects of the preliminary naval gunfire, air bombing, artillery shelling, and rocket firing incident to the actual landing. The regiment did not complete the capture of the island that day. The attack was resumed at 0915 on D+2 day (2 February) by all available units of Combat Team 34 supported by tanks brought over from Roi. All organized resistance ceased at 1215. There still remained the mopping up of all islands within some 13 miles of Roi and Namur. As little opposition developed, landings were effected with reconnaissance units, there being adequate reserve in case opposition developed. On 7 February, Burie, the last of some 55 such islands was occupied.

LANDING ON
KWAJALEIN

Before dawn on D-day, 31 January, elements of the 111th Infantry were landed in rubber boats on Gea Island, other units landing at the same time on Gehh Island, thought at the time to be Ninni Island. Gea Island was at the southeast entrance to Gea Pass, one of the few entrances into the lagoon. On Gea Island opposition was light but on Gehh Island, about 130 Japanese had gone ashore armed with machine guns and rifles and a number were killed that day and the remainder the next. At 1134 Ninni Island was secured without resistance, thus securing islands on both sides of Gea Pass, thru which the Mine Sweeper Group then entered the lagoon. At 0915 the first waves landed on the seaward beaches of Ennylabagan and Enubuj Islands, followed by 3 other waves, advancing southeast on both islands against light resistance, and reporting them secured at 1310 and 1122 respectively with no U.S. casualties. Artillery was immediately landed on Enubuj, nearest Kwajalein and prepared to support the landing there next day. In the late afternoon, Transport Divisions 6 and 18, the former containing the Coast Guard manned attack cargo vessel, CENTAURUS, transferred to LST's the troops of Regimental Combat Teams 184 and 32 that were to make the assault on Kwajalein next day. At 0615 on 1 February the final Naval gunfire preparation against Kwajalein Island had commenced and continued until 0930 when the first wave reached the beach, followed in short succession by other waves. Resistance was light and scattered as the bombardment had destroyed all organized positions for 300 yards inland. The effect of the naval gunfire was devastating. The terrific blasting effect of the continuous bombardment had terrorized the defending forces and reduced their effectiveness. It was largely responsible for the speedy capture of the islands with the relatively small number of casualties. As the advance continued the enemy's resistance stiffened. By 1700 our troops had reached a line about one third of the way up the island. By 1530 4 February, all organized resistance had ceased. Meanwhile, the occupation of the chain of smaller islands extending north along the eastern reef of the atoll was started. Ebeye was secured on 3 February and by the 6th the last island in the southern half of the atoll had been occupied. Out of a total enemy strength of 8,600, 8,122 were killed and 437 (including 290 Koreans) were made prisoners. Of our total strength of 42,546, 286 were killed, 1,148 were wounded and 82 were missing.

CAPTURED JAPS, ALL THEIR FIGHT GONE, CROUCH ON LANDING BARGE WHICH HEADS FOR COAST GUARD TRANSPORT




COAST GUARDSMEN
CAPTURE JAPS

"We had been ferrying Marines to the little islands near Roi and Namur, which were to be our objectives the next day," related Zabe P. Truesdale, seaman first class, USCG, "so that they could set up artillery pieces. We had discharged troops and were returning to the CALLAWAY when the rudder broke. Then our clutch burned out and we barely managed to beach our boat on a tiny sand spit." It was half a mile from the nearest island and there two of them came across nine Japanese soldiers. "We thought all of them were dead when we first came across them lying in one large foxhole," he continued. "They were almost entirely covered with sand. Then one of them moved his arms and we knew we had a problem." The Coast Guardsmen had no guns with them. When their boat broached they had climbed out on the beach to stretch their legs. "We dropped out of sight, hoping that we hadn't been seen, then we sprinted from our boat 150 feet away and grabbed up two machine guns. Our two shipmates joined us and we went back. The Japs were still playing possum. I pointed at the one who had moved his arm and motioned for him to get up. They broke out of the sand like gophers and raised their hands. Just then I realized that my gun wasn't loaded. Quinn was just behind and he had ammunition. If they had rushed us, I would have been in a hell of a fix, altho I guess Charlie, who is our boat coxswain, would have taken care of things. He's a good shot. We marched them to the water's edge and made them wade into the boat. Not until they got soaked to the skin was I certain they packed no weapons." An hour later the party was rescued from the mounting surf by another Coast Guard manned landing craft.

COAST GUARDSMEN
WITNESS BLAST-
ING OF KWAJALEIN

Coast Guardsmen aboard the transport CENTAURUS were treated to an exciting and satisfying sight. The transport was a part of the largest task force in the history of the Navy, which carried out one of the greatest coups of the Pacific War. On the second day many U.S. vessels were already inside Kwajalein Atoll's lagoon. Two nights after D-day huge fires were burning on Kwajalein Island, as battleships and cruisers, under the flaring light of star shells, pounded the eastern tip of the base where the remaining Japanese were cornered. As the battleships and airplanes unloaded their fiery destruction, Marine and Coast Guard Officers and men had a blow by blow description of the battle over the radio broadcast circuit of the transport. The coordinated orders and reports between spotting planes, ground troops and tank columns could be heard clearly. "100 right --- up 15." When the fire was right on the target came the exclamation "No change, No change... Bang, Bang!" And then more shells would leave the muzzles of the battleship batteries and describe a fiery, and it seemed incredibly slow, arc towards the beach. From time to time an ammunition dump, oil dump or gas storage position would get a direct hit, and smoke and flame would tower thousands of feet into the air. Planes could be heard talking to artillery officers on the ground, reporting Japanese resistance in a pillbox, near a hangar, or in a clump of trees. Then a tank would clatter across the island, zig-zagging between tank traps and trenches, and knock out its objective. When a plane was needed, it was simply called for, and in a few minutes,

USS ARTHUR MIDDLETON (APA-25) (FORMERLY AP-55)



would be strafing or bombing the desired location. No enemy planes got thru to the transport groups and air opposition was almost non-existent on Kwajalein. The carrier-based fighters had had mastery of the air since D-day and were still on constant patrol over the ships and shore parties. Sixteen inch Naval rifles and precision bombings quickly put most of the heavy guns out of action, although landing troops were fired upon many times before coming in close to the island. One heavy bomb hit a main seaplane hangar squarely. The entire building, airplanes, and gasoline drums shattered into a million pieces. The entire structure disappeared. There was not a single part of that hangar left. The AQUARIUS (AKA-16), LEONARD WOOD (APA-12), and ARTHUR MIDDLETON (APA-25) were other fully Coast Guard manned craft participating in these operations.

AIR ATTACKS
COORDINATED

Preceding the amphibious landings on Kwajalein Atoll, the principal shore installations, including the runways at Roi and Kwajalein and coastal batteries, pillboxes, blockhouses, and bivouac areas on all the major islands, were subjected to an extremely heavy bombing by our carrier-based aircraft. Carrier-based planes were also active throughout the landing operations in support of our ground forces. Wotje and Maloe-lap Atolls, east of Kwajalein, and other Japanese bases in the Marshalls were under continued air attacks all during the operations at Kwajalein. The bases appeared very badly damaged and no planes were seen on their airfields. There was no report of either naval or air opposition on the part of the Japanese. It is doubtful if any of the Japanese bases in the Marshalls were operational, following the intense bombardments they received. Many enemy planes were destroyed at Roi airfield during the early stages of the attack, 18 were shot down by our fighters, and another 51 were badly damaged on the ground. Our losses were small. Two squadrons of coronado seaplanes of Fleet Air Wing Two made a strong attack on Wake Island during the night of January 31, for the purpose of pinning down Japanese aircraft based there at a time when the Japanese would be calling on every available plane for operations in the Marshalls. United States medium bombers raided Nauru twice during the week, six B-25's attacking on the 27th and an equal number attacking the island the following afternoon.

GREEN ISLANDS- NISSAN

STRATEGY OF
GREEN ISLANDS
OCCUPATION


After the occupation of the Torokina Area on Bougainville Island, future plans contemplated the capture or neutralization of Kavieng, New Ireland. This move could not be accomplished at once, however, because of the engagement of the major part of our forces in the Marshall Islands operation. Moreover, it was desirable to acquire a base from which fighter cover could be operated and large air strikes on Kavieng could be made. After considering Borpop and Numatani on New Ireland, and the Island of Boang in the Tanga Group, the Green (Nissan)

Islands were chosen as the most suitable for the end in view. The Green Islands consist of an atoll 4 miles in diameter, surrounding a lagoon of ample depth, but with only two navigable entrances on the west side. Composing the atoll are Green (Nissan), Barahun, and Sirot Islands. Lying very close to the NW is Pinipel Island. The Green Islands are 125 miles from Cape Torokina, 117 miles from Rabaul, and 235 miles from Kavieng. They form the northernmost extremity of the Solomons Chain and offered not only an advantageous base for operations to the northwest, but also a point from which Japanese barge traffic between Rabaul and Buka could be interrupted. They served the enemy as a staging point for this service up to the time of their capture. Green Islands would also be of value if the seizure of Emirau were adopted as an alternative to Kavieng. The Green Islands could provide a field near enough to Kavieng and could be covered by Torokina fighting planes during the landing and construction phases. It was also considered desirable to undertake intermediate operations before the seizure of Kavieng (or Emirau) in order to retain initiative and provoke enemy reactions, enabling us to engage his forces. February 15, 1944 was, therefore, selected as target date for seizure and occupation of the Green Islands.

LANDING ON
GREEN ISLANDS

Because of the character of the lagoon entrances, the attack forces included no capital ships. In it were 8 high speed transports (APD's) 12 LCI's, 7 LST's, and 6 LCT's, screened by 17 destroyers accompanied by numerous smaller craft. Task Force 39 consisting of 3 light cruisers and 5 destroyers covered the operation to the east and north. Task Force 38, composed of 2 light cruisers and 5 destroyers, operated in the area between Green Islands and St. George's channel. The attack and garrison forces were units of the 3rd New Zealand Division. The attack group left the northern coast of Bougainville during the night of the 14-15 February. Task Force 38 was attacked at dusk by 6 "Vals," one of which made a hit on the ST. LOUIS killing 23 men and wounding 30. The high speed transports arrived at their assigned area off the lagoon entrance at 0620 on the 15th. Their landing craft put troops ashore on Green (Nissan) Island at 0655. There were no mines or obstructions and no opposition on the beach developed. At 0645 there was an attack by 15 "Vals" which concentrated on the LCI and LST groups off the entrance channel. Fighter planes of Task Force 33 and vigorous anti-aircraft fire from landing craft and destroyers eliminated 6 "Vals" with no damage except a near miss on LST-486. The barrage balloons flown by the LST's may have prevented a more successful attack. Fire support from destroyers and aircraft was not to be used unless opposition developed in order to avoid endangering the large, friendly native population. The troops landed at Pokonean Plantation just south of the southern entrance channel and at Tangalan Plantation on the eastern side of the lagoon. LCI's followed the waves of assault boats from the high speed transports and the LST's arrived and beached at 0835. The LCT group arrived at 1335. There was no opposition from the small enemy garrison of about 500 on the island or from enemy planes. The last of the LCI's and LST's had retired at 1730 after landing 5,806 men with

A COAST GUARD-MANNED TANK LANDING SHIP LOADS FOR THE INVASION OF GREEN ISLAND



4,344 tons of supplies and equipment. Next day the troops moved southward on both sides of the atoll against the principal enemy garrison at the south end of Green Island, and by the 19th had wiped out this group. A small group of the enemy was eradicated on Sirot Island on the 17th and on the 19th, 14 Japanese were found and killed on Sau Island, adjacent to Pinipel. Due to the simultaneous bombing of enemy bases and the heavy combat air patrols enemy air opposition was negligible.

SUPPORTING
ECHELONS

The Second Echelon of 8 high speed transports, 11 LST's and 2 LCI's brought 4,715 more troops on the 18th and took 1,147 friendly natives to Guadalcanal. The Third Echelon of 10 LST's, 3 LCI's brought 2,577 more troops on the 25th and altogether 4 more Echelons arrived until the total of 16,448 personnel and 43,088 tons of supplies had been landed. From the first day construction battalions prosecuted work on airfields, a tank farm, roads and base installations. By the end of February the fighter strip was nearly complete and surveys for a bomber strip were well advanced. An emergency landing was successfully made on 4 March and the strip was ready to stage fighter aircraft on the 7th.

COAST GUARD
MANNED LST's
AT GREEN ISLAND

The Coast Guard manned LST-166 on the 17th of February loaded 260 tons of organization equipment, 200 tons of vehicles, 3 officers and 250 enlisted men of the 33rd Naval Construction Battalion at Renard Sound, Russell Islands for transportation to Green Island. On the 19th the 2nd Green Island Echelon (31.5) was formed consisting of an APD unit of 8 high speed transports and 10 LST's, of which the LST's 166 and 71 were Coast Guard manned, and 2 LCI's. They were escorted by seven destroyers and a tug and beached on Green Island on the 20th. At 1115 they completed unloading troops and cargo and reloaded for trailers for return to Guadalcanal. At 1205 they retracted from the beach and stood out of the Green Island Lagoon. On the 21st while en route Guadalcanal anti-aircraft fire and flares were observed on the port beam of the LST-166 in the vicinity of Bougainville. On the 12th of February the Coast Guard manned LST-207 beached at the south shore of Ondonga Island in the New Georgia's to load personnel and cargo of the 37th Special Battalion Naval Construction Battalion for transportation to Green Islands. Enemy planes on the 13th were bombing an airstrip half a mile away as the LST completed loading 690 tons of cargo and 250 Navy Seabees and the LST retracted and joined the destroyer TERRY off Munda Bar. At 1750 Task Force 31.4.3 consisting of six more LST's, including the Coast Guard manned LST-70 and screened by 6 destroyers, got under way. Anti-aircraft firing and flares were observed during the night of 14-15 February and at 0650 on the 15th convoy escorts were in action against enemy planes. At 0849, the LST-207 passed into Nissan Island Lagoon and then put bulldozers ashore for road work. By 1422 all cargo was unloaded and six empty trailers were back on board. The convoy formed at 1800 and proceeded.

LST FIRES
ON PLANES

During the early morning action two bombers were seen attacking one of the screening destroyers and after dropping bombs one of the planes circled and headed toward the convoy, flying low and passing ahead of

[illegible]

columns from port to starboard. Some of the LST-207's guns opened fire. The plane turned away from the convoy and, flying low, headed toward a destroyer. At 0705 the same morning a plane approached from astern, about three miles distant and 12,000 feet in altitude. It gradually decreased altitude but could not be identified until abeam of the ship at 3,000 feet. The LST's starboard guns opened fire when the plane was about 200 yards to starboard. The plane dropped two small bombs which struck the water about 200 yards out and 200 yards forward of the vessel and then veered upward and away from the convoy. During both attacks the LST's were flying barrage balloons. On the second attack the plane was running above and along the line of balloons, using them to sight on, but due to the brisk breeze from port, the balloons were some distance out to starboard instead of directly over the vessels. This was believed to have caused the bombs to miss the vessel. The LST-207 made two other trips from Guadalcanal to Green Island in the succeeding Echelons on the 6th and 16th of March, 1944.

EFFECT OF
OCCUPATION

Allied occupation of these low and thickly wooded islands effectively blocked the barge supply route from Rabaul and Kavieng to the beleaguered garrisons in the northern Solomons which were estimated at about 20,000 men. This left the enemy on Choiseul, Bougainville, and Buka Islands virtually isolated from the principal Japanese bases to the north. For all strategic military purposes this completed the campaign for the Solomon Islands begun at Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942 and continued throughout 1943 with the conquest of the New Georgia group and the establishment of the beachhead on Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville Island.

MARSHALL ISLANDS - ENIWETOK ATOLL

PLANS FOR
ENIWETOK
ADVANCED

The success of the operations against Kwajalein and the expeditious manner in which they were realized made it possible to advance the date for the attack on Eniwetok Atoll by nearly 3 months. With D-day for this operation originally set for 10 May, it was now advanced to 17 February, 1944. The ships were ready and the troops of the Reserve Group which had not been used at Kwajalein were available. Basic plans for the attack had already been made and it remained only necessary to complete the details. Strong supporting operations were scheduled to take place simultaneously with the amphibious assault on Eniwetok by both carrier and land based aircraft and the first of these was made on Truk by a powerful Carrier-Battleship Task Force on the 16th and 17th of February. On 22 February part of the same force struck at enemy bases in the Mariannas, and land based air forces continued strikes against Ponape, Kusaie and Wake. These operations deterred the enemy from making a single counter attack against our forces in the assault on Eniwetok.

COAST GUARD-MANNED COMBAT TRANSPORT LEONARD WOOD (APA-12)



THREE
PRINCIPAL
ISLANDS

Eniwetok Atoll lies 330 miles NW of Kwajalein and is the westernmost atoll of the Marshall Group. It is roughly circular in shape, 21 miles long, in the NW-SE direction and 17 miles across on the NE-SW direction. There are 30 small islands on the coral rim none of which attain a height of more than 21 feet. Nevertheless they are the highest in the Marshall Group, permitting a defense system of comparatively deep trenches and foxholes. The 3 principal islands used by the Japanese were Engebi in the north and Eniwetok and Parry in the southern part of the atoll. The Japanese air strip was on Engebi, shaped like an equilateral triangle with each side a mile long. Eniwetok is about 3 miles long ranging in width from 500 to 2,000 feet, covered with coconut trees and with a sandy beach encircling the island. Parry Island is two miles long with the northern part 2,000 feet wide tapering gradually to the southern tip. There are 3 passages into Eniwetok Lagoon, two of which were the ones used by our forces. It is estimated that there were 1,200 Japanese troops on Engebi, 900 on Eniwetok and 1,300 on Parry Island, most of them having arrived less than 6 weeks before the attack. Engebi was the most heavily defended with earthworks and coastal defense guns. The defenses on Eniwetok consisted of deep foxholes and trench systems and those on Parry were similar. Smoke generating equipment was found on Engebi and land mines were encountered on Eniwetok and Parry.

ORGANIZATION
OF EXPEDITION

The Task Group assembled for the amphibious assault consisted of 89 vessels including the flagship APA CAMBRIA, Coast Guard manned, ten transports including the Coast Guard manned APA's LEONARD WOOD, CENTAURUS, and ARTHUR MIDDLETON, 9 LST's and 6 LCI's, a fire support group of battleships, cruisers and destroyers, an escort carrier group of three carrier escorts and 3 destroyers, a carrier task group consisting of a carrier, two small carriers, 3 cruisers and 7 destroyers, a minesweeping group, a service group and a tug group. Altogether the force carried 7,997 assault troops mainly of the 22nd Marines and 106th Infantry. These forces were finally assembled in Kwajalein Atoll on 15 February. The Northern Group, consisting of transports and most of the combatant vessels, proceeded by a northern route and the Southern Group of LST's, LCI's, service and other small vessels, with a screen of destroyers, proceeded by a southern route.

THE
ATTACK

The same pattern of attack was made on all 3 islands, the islands being assaulted one at a time. First each island was subjected to a continuous bombardment from the time of the arrival of the Task Group until the troops were landed. Landings were made on the lagoon beaches, most of the troops being transported in the large transports and prior to each landing, troops designated to embark in LVT's were transported to LST's in which the LVT's were loaded. D-day, 17 February, was primarily one of preparation for the assault on Engebi Island. Action began at 0700 with counter-battery fire on the main islands flanking the lagoon entrances. No return fire was encountered. Minesweeping vessels preceded all other vessels into the lagoon. Vessels of the Southern Group (LST's, LCI's, etc.) then entered via Wide

AN AMERICAN MARINE, IN FOREGROUND, STILL CLUTCHES THE KNIFE WITH WHICH HE KILLED THE JAP,
IN BACKGROUND, IN A DUEL ON ENGEBI ISLAND, ENITWEEK ATOLL. A MOMENT AFTER FINISHING OFF HIS ADVERSARY
A SNIPER'S BULLET KILLED THE MARINE



Passage and those of the Northern Group (battleships, transports and destroyers) entered via Deep Entrance. It was later learned that Japanese on both Parry and Eniwetok Islands had orders not to fire on ships entering the lagoon so that their presence on these islands would not be disclosed.

CAPTURE OF ENGEBI

Bombardment of Engebi, the first island selected for capture, commenced early on the morning of 17 February and continued without interruption until our troops landed the following day. Landings were made on two small islands along the reef about 4 miles eastward of Engebi at about 1318 without opposition. Landings via the reef were then made without opposition on several more of the next adjacent islands. On these islands howitzers were landed and began harassing fire against Engebi at 1950. The main event of D plus 1 day, 18 February, was the seizure of Engebi Island. The first wave of assault troops landed at 0843 and enemy resistance was quickly overcome, the island being reported secure at 1600, except for isolated positions. While this attack was in progress other forces were methodically occupying and securing the smaller islands along the reefs. The initial assault on Engebi consisted of 5 waves, followed shortly afterwards by 3 more waves in LCVP's loaded directly from the APA's HEYWOOD and ARTHUR MIDDLETON. Shortly after 1100 the transports moved closer to the beach in order to facilitate unloading and delivery of the desired types of ammunition and water to the troops ashore. Approximately 1400 long tons of shells and bombs were expended on the island during the 17th and 18th of February and the effect was one of devastation. Practically all structures above ground were demolished and about half the defenders were killed or wounded prior to the landing. Only light scattered fire was received by our troops on landing. Our losses on Engebi were 78 killed, 166 wounded and 7 missing. 934 Japanese dead were buried.

CAPTURE OF ENIWETOK

During the afternoon of 18 February, as the operations on Engebi were proceeding satisfactorily, advance preparations were made for the landing on Eniwetok Island the following day. All ships involved, except LEONARD WOOD and ASHLAND who shifted anchorage the following morning, moved from the Engebi area to the Eniwetok area. On the morning of 19 February, Eniwetok Island was subjected to the usual heavy and destructive gunfire just prior to the landing of the assault troops. Yoke Hour, previously set for 0900 was delayed until 0922. The landings were made with formations similar to those used in the assault on Engebi. Waves were supported by 6 flanking LCI(L)'s 3 on each flank and LVT(A)'s. The first 5 waves consisted of LVT's averaging 18 to 20 to the wave. The 6th and 7th waves consisted of LCM's with tanks, the 8th and 9th waves were LCVP's. Some sniper and mortar fire was directed at the boat waves. This increased after the first wave landed and appeared to reach its maximum at the time the 9th wave landed at 1030. Only light losses were sustained by the troops as they landed on the beaches and very little resistance was offered for the first several hundred yards; thereafter the enemy conducted a stubborn defense, with rifle and mortar fire. Within an hour our troops had cut a path across the island and divided the enemy

LANDED BY COAST GUARDSMEN
AMERICAN MARINES MOVE IN FROM THE BEACH TO MAKE QUICK WORK OF THE CONQUEST OF PARRY ISLAND, ENIWETOK ATOLL



into two areas of resistance. At 1800 about half the island was in our hands. It was not entirely secured, however, until 1740 on the 21st. About 204 tons of shells were fired by naval gunfire prior to the landing and 52 tons of air bombs. Our losses on Eniwetok were 34 killed, 94 wounded and 3 missing, a total of 131. Japanese dead numbered 704.


CAPTURE OF
PARRY ISLAND

Due to the slow progress on Eniwetok and the nature of the deep trench system found on that island, as well as information that Parry Island was even more strongly held, it was decided to postpone the assault on that island until D plus 5 day, 22 February. Accordingly, Parry Island was held under continuous harassing bombardment from the late afternoon of D-day until the morning of the 22nd. Four ships were constantly firing at Parry Island during this period from close range to obtain the necessary plunging fire to destroy the deep trench systems. On the 21st the Pack Howitzer Battalion landed on Japton Island just north of Parry and set up its battery and this battery along with that set up on Eniwetok Island pounded Parry Island throughout the night of 21 and 22 February. At 0710 on the morning of the 22nd the intense pre-landing phase of the bombardment commenced. Aerial bombing commenced when the boats left the Line of Departure. The first wave landed as scheduled at 0900 and consisted of 20 LVT's and flanking LVT(A)'s. 2 more waves followed with 24 and 30 LVT's respectively. The 4th wave contained 10 LCM's with medium tanks and the 5th wave 24 LVT's. Succeeding waves were of LCVP's. The first wave met some opposition at the beach from rifle and mortar fire but casualties were small. After an advance of about 100 yards the progress was slower but by 1315 the north end of the islands was in our hands. At 1924 the island was declared secure but mopping up operations continued until about 1000 on the 23rd. Naval gunfire delivered 944 long tons of shells prior to the landing, artillery 244 tons and bombing 98 tons. Our losses on Parry Island were 57 killed, 261 wounded and 16 missing and 1,027 dead Japanese were buried.

COAST GUARD
AT PARRY ISLAND

Landing boat Coast Guard coxswains, toughened by months of battling heavy seas, tricky beaches and murderous Jap fire, again demonstrated at Parry Island the prowess which had given them almost legendary reputation. Here they were put to the toughest test of all. Leaving their attack transport motherships in the pre-dawn gloom, they found their way thru rough seas and smoke filled air to one particular bit of beachhead. They braved Jap fire, standing up to steer their tiny ramp-boats into the rugged coral beaches, unload their cargoes of men, ammunition, food, water or TNT and then back off the beach, splash their way thru more heavy gunfire and get out of the area and back to their ships for another load. One of these Coast Guard coxswains was Clyde Brien of Alameda, California. He was first to spot the shellfire that was creeping closer to them as they sped toward the beach. "I first noticed black puffs of smoke, followed by a sharp crack when we passed an LCI which was being used as a gun support vessel on Parry

THE MARINES LANDED BY COAST GUARD ON ENIWETOK ATOLL PEPPERED THE JAPS SMOKING NO-MAN'S LAND



Island," he said. "Then as we passed close by the LCI another sharp crack made us all hit the deck. When we looked up again smoke was pouring from the LCI's stern." As they tied up alongside the LCI, flames were shooting from the stern and they noticed bodies, badly burned and grotesquely sprawled on the blackened fantail of the ship. "We clambered aboard and saw a horrible sight," Brien continued. "One man had been decapitated by the explosion which had apparently hit their powder magazines. The flames we saw were coming from the magazine itself, where hundreds of rounds of 40 mm ammunition were stored." They worked desperately to get a firehose into the flaming stern while tossing red hot shells and rockets into the water. "Luckily the magazine fire was put out finally," Brien continued, "and we went on our way, dropping the wounded men at the hospital ship."

OBSERVER'S
COMMENT

The following is quoted from the report of an observer who accompanied the expedition to the Marshalls. In regard to the transports and their landing craft crews he says: "Their boat crews take a terrific beating.

There is no lying at the boom for them or resting on board between scheduled trips, even after the troops have been landed. They get put into the water before daylight, are under way until dark, and are lucky if they get hoisted in then, instead of beaching for the nights to get such sleep as the mosquitoes and the Japanese will let them. They have to be highly skilled at (a) hoisting out, lowering, hoisting in, often at night and in a seaway, (b) handling boats alongside, under any and all conditions, while embarking troops and cargo, and (c) carrying out the highly specialized technique of forming assault waves, beaching, debarking troops, retracting (perhaps under fire) etc."

MOBILE FORCES
VERSUS BASES

"Our successful seizure of Majuro, Kwajalein and Eniwetok Atolls and our resulting domination not only of the Marshalls Group but of considerable areas beyond them, is an excellent illustration of strength in mobile forces winning over strength in bases and fixed positions. xxxxxx The weakness of this reliance on bases, as representing strength in themselves, rather than being merely contributory factors, lay in the fact that any base can be neutralized or captured if sufficient force is brought against it, and if it is cut off from supply, support, and reinforcement. In land warfare this has been proven time and again, but in overseas warfare it was more uncertain. It had not yet been demonstrated that with strong enough air forces, based on carriers, plus a superiority in battleships, cruisers and destroyers, aided by one or two hastily advanced landing fields, it would be possible to isolate and dominate a wide area where the enemy's strength lay in the number of his bases rather than in the size and effectiveness of his mobile forces. It still remained for us to show that troops, trained for amphibious warfare and made mobile by air and surface support and transportation, could then assault and occupy key points within this area, from which the remainder could then be throttled into impotence or more readily captured."


ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, PACIFIC FLEET, WELCOMED ABOARD THE COAST GUARD-MANNED
TRANSPORT USS LEONARD WOOD BY ITS COMMANDING OFFICER, CAPTAIN (NOW ADMIRAL) MERLIN O'NEILL



THE
UNPREDICTABILITY
OF THE
JAPANESE MIND

Admiral Merlin O'Neill, now Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard, who was then serving as commanding officer (with rank of Captain) of the Coast Guard manned transport USS LEONARD WOOD in the Pacific tells of one interesting incident in regard to the occupation of three islands at the Eniwetok Atoll. A

Task Force under the command of Admiral Harry W. Hill, USN, entered the lagoon at Eniwetok on February 17, 1944, through the eastern passage known as "Deep Entrance." The Task Force was preceded by minesweepers, destroyers, and battleships, followed by transports. As the Task Force entered the passage, a white flag apparently hoisted by natives was observed flying from Japtan Island at the north side of the entrance. This entrance is comparatively narrow, a circumstance which caused the ships to pass within easy range of the island at the southern entrance known as Parry Island. Information available at the time was insufficient to prove that Parry Island was occupied in any force by Japanese. It was strongly suspected that there were Japanese on that island and all Allied ships had orders to be at general quarters to return any fire. The entire Task Force passed close by the island and entered the lagoon without sighting any Japanese or being fired on. The island of Engebi at the north of the Atoll was captured that day. Certain units of the Task Force proceeded to the southern island of Eniwetok which was captured the following day. After preliminary bombing, shelling by surface ships, and strafing by American planes, there was an assault on Parry Island on February 22nd. A surprising amount of enemy resistance was encountered on this island and at that time it was estimated that approximately 800 Japanese occupied the island. Enemy resistance was broken the afternoon of the 22nd and the island was formally occupied by Americans the evening of that day. It appeared strange and somewhat puzzling as to why the Japanese did not fire on the transports as they passed within easy range (the entrance passage was about a mile wide) of rifles and mortars on their entrance into the lagoon on February 17th. This incident and the attendant circumstances constitute a remarkable example of the unpredictability of the Japanese mind. The fact that they did not fire on such an inviting enemy target which passed within ideal range for effective fire is also an interesting commentary on the order and discipline of these 800 Japanese troops.



ATF 17-G

GENERAL AREA MAP - MARSHALL - GILBERT ISLANDS

OCCUPATION OF
THE LESSER
MARSHALLS

Shortly after the occupation of the Marshall Islands in February, 1944, there were at the beginning of March some 28 islands and atolls in the Marshalls Group which had not been reconnoitered or occupied by our forces.

Starting with the expedition to WOTHO, UJAE and LAE on 7 March, there began a systematic and methodical occupation of the Lesser Marshalls. This campaign continued through 23 April, 1944, until only four atolls, WOTJE, MALOELAP, MILLE and JALUIT remained in the enemy's possession. The position of the enemy on these islands, however, had been rendered quite hopeless by repeated bombings and bombardments, plus sea and air blockade, which were gradually destroying the defenders and their facilities and installations. The force which operated against the remaining Lesser Marshall Atolls were elements of the 22nd Marines (until relieved by the Army in April), a Civil Affairs Unit, and an Epidemiology Unit. They were transported in landing craft (LCT, LCI(L), or LST) and screened by AM's and DD's. Native scouts were also present. Upon approach to the objective, the scouts would be dispatched to the shore to contact the local natives, explain the purpose of the operation, and ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy, if any. After cessation of enemy hostilities (frequently through suicide) the civil affairs units would read and post the prescribed proclamation and raise the U.S. Flag. These atolls were then revisited twice monthly for periodic inspection, administration and medical survey, usually by one platoon of infantry, a civil affairs party, and a medical party in an LCI(L). The first such inspection commenced in mid-April, 1944. In a period of about 12 weeks the U.S. captured some 90% of the enemy possessions in the Marshalls and completely dominated the 330,000 square miles of sea and air in their environs. The islands and atolls occupied in these operations included LEB Island, AILINGLAPALAP, NAMU, EBON, and NAMORIK Atolls and KILI Island, BIKINI, RONGELAP, AILINGINAE and RONGERIK Atolls (the latter two uninhabited); AILUK and MEJIT Atolls and JEMO Island (uninhabited); LIKIEP and UTIRIK Atolls; BIKI and TAKA Atolls (uninhabited); also ERIKUB and AUR Atolls and UJELANG Atoll (uninhabited). Total American casualties in all these operations were 17 and Japanese 118, while 16 enemy prisoners of war were taken. There is no record of downed American fliers found in these islands.


ADMIRALTY ISLANDS - LOS NEGROS

LANDING ON
LOS NEGROS

After a three day aerial attack on Momote and Loren-gau airfields and other shore installations, American troops landed on Los Negros Island, in the Admiralties, early in the morning of the 29th of February, 1944.

Units of the First Cavalry Division went ashore at Hyane Harbor at 0815 after a preliminary bombardment of enemy defenses by naval and air units covering the operation. No opposition was encountered on the beaches. Light resistance was offered at Momote airfield, which was quickly seized. Our patrols moved north and southwest from the airstrip, establishing contact with Japanese troops, who counter-attacked during the night but were repulsed with heavy losses.

FROM A COAST GUARD-MANNED ASSAULT TRANSPORT, COAST GUARDSMEN UNLOAD TRUCKS AND OTHER SUPPLIES BY
LANDING BARGES TO THE BEACHES OF LOS NEGROS ISLAND IN THE ADMIRALTY GROUP




CONTROL OF
BISMARCK SEA

Los Negros Island lies off the southeastern tip of Manus Island, largest of the Admiralty group, and is separated from Manus by a very narrow strip of water. At the eastern end of Manus, at Lorengau, is another airfield and a large anchorage and seaplane base. This field, with the one at Momote, were probably used as staging centers by the Japanese in getting aerial reinforcements to Kavieng and Rabaul. They had been attacked intermittently by Allied bombers since the latter part of January and were reported unserviceable. Momote airfield, however, was in good condition when captured. These air facilities gave the Allies almost complete control of the Bismarck Sea and virtually completed the blockade of Kavieng, Rabaul and the northeastern coast of New Guinea, whose supply routes were already seriously impaired. Air reconnaissance during the week preceding the landing had shown no signs of occupation but on the evening of D-2 day, information was received from Army scouts, who had gone ashore on Los Negros Island, that the area southwest of Momote airstrip was heavily occupied by the enemy. Subsequent events proved the scouts correct. The estimated enemy garrison was between 4,000 and 5,000.

THE
ATTACK

The attack group consisted of 3 high speed transports (APD's) and 3 destroyers. Units of the 1st Cavalry Division made landings in LCP(R)'s, which proceeded into Hyane Harbor through its entrance and landed on beaches on the south side and inside the harbor itself, in an area very close to the Momote Airstrip. Considerable cross fire was encountered by most of the boats as they passed between the headlands at the entrance to the harbor. The entire landing force of 1,026 men had to be landed in 12 LCP(R)'s. If evacuation had become necessary, it is doubtful if many of these boats would have survived the enemy opposition forcing evacuation, and most of the landing force would have been wiped out. Close support was rendered by destroyers, which moved in to within less than a mile of the shore as the landings progressed. Combined air and surface bombardment enabled the first three waves to round the southern point of the harbor and reach the beach. The fire support problem was difficult as Hyane is a landlocked harbor and the enemy gun positions were located on the northern and southern arms of the outer shore and on the center beach north of the airdrome. It was frequently necessary to hold fire to avoid endangering our own boats as they entered the harbor and proceeded around the southern arm to the landing beach. The enemy apparently dug in during shelling or bombing, then resumed fire as soon as our fire was checked. Heavy rain commenced at H / 1 hour, 45 minutes and continued throughout the remainder of the landing operations. This was a definite tactical factor for if high visibility had obtained, enemy fire on our boats would have been more effective. The mission was accomplished at 1729 and the attack group left the area to return to Sudest, two destroyers remaining to furnish fire support to the ground troops.

COAST GUARD LANDING CRAFT MET BY GROUP OF POLYNESIAN NATIVES AT EMIRAU ISLAND, SEIZED BY MARINES WITHOUT A FIGHT



SECOND
ECHOLON


A second echelon of 6 LCT's, 6 LST's, 3 destroyers and 2 minesweepers arrived at 0900 on 2 March, 1944. The LST's, besides carrying material, had embarked troops which included 1,300 combat and 1,000 constructional corps. On arrival off Hyane Harbor the LST's were met by a barge from shore. The LCM's which they each were towing, slipped tow and all proceeded into the harbor without incident. During the day six Jap Zero fighters attacked two Flying Fortresses that were circling the destroyers, but the attacks were frustrated. An attempt to sweep Seeadler Harbor was abandoned after minesweepers were opposed by fire from 3" guns as they were closing the harbor entrance. The LST's began leaving the harbor late in the afternoon and were all clear and formed up by 1815. The Coast Guard manned LST-22 was not completely unloaded owing to lack of time. On leaving the harbor the LST's experienced machine gun opposition. In the succeeding days cruisers and destroyers bombarded Seeadler Harbor entrance, together with the 5th Air Force. On D + 8 day two minesweepers entered the harbor without opposition and swept a channel to the eastern end off Salami Plantation and on D + 9 day Liberty ships started unloading at anchor in the eastern part of the Harbor.

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS - MANUS ISLAND

LANDING ON
MANUS ISLAND

Opposition, which had been light on the first day of the amphibious landings on Los Negros Island on 29 February, quickly intensified. It is thought that a considerable number of enemy reinforcements were landed on Manus Island shortly before our initial attack. Fighting continued throughout March, 1944. On 15 March units of the 1st Cavalry Division landed on Manus Island and quickly seized the Lorengau airfield. The landing was made against little opposition at Lugos Mission, on the northeast coast of Manus, west of Lorengau. The area had previously been shelled by naval vessels and by artillery and had been bombed by 18 Mitchells in a low level attack. Our troops moved east along the coast and by afternoon were within half a mile of the airfield, encountering some enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. The airfield was captured during the night. Stubborn resistance was met the 16th, but assisted by shelling from destroyers and artillery our forces crossed to the east bank of the Lorengau River and on the 18th captured the town of Lorengau. A second force moved inland from the beachhead to flank the airfield and town and cut off Japanese troops who might attempt to flee into the hills south of the Lorengau area. Overcoming considerable opposition they moved in on the town from the southwest as the other force advanced from the west. The remnants of the enemy force retreated into the hills. By the 29th of March all major Japanese resistance had been overcome, with probably not more than 900 effective enemy troops remaining on the islands. At least 2,594 Japanese were known to have been killed in the fighting up to that time.

ANOTHER JEEP IS DELIVERED FROM THE COAST GUARD-MANNED ASSAULT TRANSPORT CALLAWAY
VIA A LANDING BARGE TO AMERICAN FORCES AT EMIRAU





COAST GUARD
MANNED LST
AT MANUS ISLAND

The Coast Guard manned LST 67 was named flagship for the assault on Manus Island. At 0700 on D-day, a misty tropical rain had cut visibility to almost nothing. Though the LST was still 12 miles from its landing position, belching smoke from navy destroyers could be seen as the pre-landing barrage got under way. Guns of our task force were answered by Japanese shore installations and the officers and crew of the LST found themselves between the shells of the opposing forces. For more than an hour the projectiles from the U.S. warships ripped into the island. Then the LCM's, LCT's, rocket and flak boats came up to join the destroyers. At 0815 the LST began to put forth her LVT's and they started for the beach along with the LCM's. As the barrage ended, the silence was broken by the drone of motors and from the south B-25 bombers were coming in, heading straight for the beach. Flying at tree top level, they unloosed their loads, and men on the LST's could see the sticks of bombs hurtling from the bomb-bay doors. Palm trees, gun emplacements and Japs were blown high in the air. After making their runs the bombers returned to strafe the beaches. Shortly after 1000 the LST grounded on the beach. The jungle was a thick fringe coming almost to the water, making fire possible from all sides. The troops wasted little time on the beach, dashing forward to seek cover. Disembarking was systematic. Bulldozers were first off, dragging heavy equipment behind them. An hour later the LST rode high and light in the water, completely unloaded. Nine Coast Guard officers and enlisted men were on a supply ship which also participated in the invasion of Manus Island. While the beachhead was being established they were setting up markers to guide the larger ships to the beach and performing other vital beachmaster duties.

ST. MATHIAS ISLANDS - EMIRAU

LANDING ON
EMIRAU UN-
OPPOSED

On 20 March, 1944 a landing force composed of the 4th Marines landed on Emirau Island, the second largest of the St. Mathias group. They encountered no enemy opposition and after the landing it was possible to begin the construction of airfields from which Truk and the central Carolines could be attacked. With the capture of Emirau the enemy's bases at Kavieng and Rabaul were completely surrounded. Emirau Island is 75 miles northwest of Kavieng and 15 miles southeast of Mussau, the largest of the St. Mathias group. The Attack Group, was composed of one APA, the Coast Guard manned CALLAWAY, 3 LSD's, 9 APD's, 2 AT's, and 9 destroyers. It departed Guadalcanal in two sections on 17 March and effected a rendezvous at sea on the 19th. The Group arrived at the Transport Area at 0600 on the 20th. As no opposition on shore was anticipated, no preliminary bombardment, bombing or strafing was scheduled, but the cruisers in the supporting Task Force were in position to deliver supporting fire on call. The 66 LVT's were launched from the GUNSTON HALL (LSD), and 2 assault battalions embarked in the APD's were transferred to them. The CALLAWAY then debarked its Reserve Battalion in its own boats for landing on call. The landing on Beach



HOLLANDIA AIRFIELD DURING AN AIR ATTACK PRECEDING OUR LANDING ON APRIL 22, 1944

Green, was over a coral reef 50-100 feet wide, but no difficulty was encountered by the LVT's. Beach Red landing was on sand. Landing of supplies and equipment commenced about 1100. The CALLAWAY carried 789 tons of cargo and had discharged all but 30 tons of this prior to 1930. Total personnel landed was 3,727. At 1930 the entire Group withdrew to return to Guadalcanal. No enemy contact, - air, surface, underwater, or ground - was made during the entire period. No lives were lost. From 20 March to 8 April, 1944 five more echelons delivered troops, supplies, and equipment to Emirau and the 147th U.S. Army Infantry Regiment relieved the 4th Marines to become the permanent garrison of the island.

COAST GUARD
AT EMIRAU

Manning the CALLAWAY (APA-35), the largest and only conventional type assault transport employed in the operation, the Coast Guardsmen put ashore the majority of men and equipment used in the landing. Within an hour of landing on the southern shore of two beachheads on either side of Eleona Village, hard-working Navy Seabees were blasting stump and clearing brush for an airfield. Bombers and fighting planes continuously pounded enemy airfields in the Kavieng area and at Rabaul, while several enemy submarines, reported to be operating in the area, were kept at bay by a ring of fighting ships. For more than 72 hours the APA CALLAWAY, Captain D.C. McNeil, USCG, Commanding Officer, was in an area alive with Japanese submarines and planes, a large and tempting target with her huge cargo of precious lives, munitions, and war machines. A few minutes after the first wave was loaded into small boats and approached the beach, a chatter of machine gun fire broke out. It seemed to come from the tiny islet of Elomusao, a few hundred yards off the beach, but all the firing was from our side, owing to a suspicion that the enemy was lying in ambush there. This proved to be untrue. The landing on Emirau was said to have accomplished as much as a direct assault on Kavieng or Rabaul and it saved many American lives.


NEW GUINEA - HOLLANDIA, AITAPE

LANDING AT
HOLLANDIA

In order to complete the reconquest of New Guinea, it was decided to push far to the northwest, seize the coastal area in the vicinity of Aitape and Hollandia, and thereby by-pass and neutralize the enemy's holdings in the Hansa Bay and Wewak areas. American and Australian surface units were organized to carry out the amphibious landings. In the attack group were 161 ships. Reinforcement groups totalled 50 ships among which were two Coast Guard manned frigates, the PF USS GLENDALE and the PF USS CORONADO.¹ Altogether all U.S. ships embarked 25,430 army personnel for landing in the assault phase of the operation, while it was planned that 44,960 troops should be ashore at the objectives at the end of D plus 2 day. This powerful force was landed on 22 April, 1944, at Hollandia and Aitape. The attack force of cruisers and destroyers raked the landing beaches for more than an hour, with a smothering fire. This was followed by heavy bombing and strafing of gun positions by dive bombers and fighters from carriers. Then in every type of landing craft gathered from the entire Pacific, the

1. Other Coast Guard manned vessels are listed in Appendix A.

COAST GUARD-MANNED LST-68 DROPS ITS RAMP AT THE END OF AN IMPROVISED WHARF
AND TRUCKS ROLLED OUT INTO THE THICK GOING TO CARRY SUPPLIES TO THE INVADERS



first waves of infantry were carried ashore from transports and destroyer transports. Landings were made at two points in the Hollandia area, one on the shores of Humboldt Bay, east of the airfields, and the other in Tanah Merah Bay, northwest of the fields. Numerous beachheads were quickly secured against virtually no opposition from the surprised Japanese, many of whom fled into the mountainous interior. Against negligible opposition our forces continued to advance and captured Hollandia airfield on the 25th. Hollandia Town, virtually in ruins after the heavy bombing and shelling, was captured on the 23rd. The important airdromes of Cyclops, Hollandia, and Sentani were seized on the 26th. Conquest of these fields put our planes within 700 miles of the Japanese naval base in the Palau Islands. Hollandia Bay is the best anchorage in this part of New Guinea.

LANDING AT
AITAPE

The landing of U.S. troops at Aitape, over 125 miles east of Hollandia also took place at dawn on the 22nd of April, 1944, after a heavy preliminary shelling and bombing of the beach and coastal installations. Combat teams quickly established lines, after overcoming slight opposition on the beaches and within 2 hours after landing, LST's were unloading on the beach. Pushing rapidly inland our troops were in possession of Tadji airfield shortly after noon. On the 23rd following naval and air bombardments, units of our amphibious force landed on Tumleo and Seleco Islands, just off the coast and opposite the beachhead. Seleco was quickly overrun but more stubborn resistance was encountered on Tumleo. There was little reaction by the enemy's air force. Aside from two minor attacks, the landings were unchallenged by the Japanese air forces. This was because all enemy airfields in western New Guinea were under heavy air attack for several days before the landings and during the actual operations. The night before, surface units shelled airfields on Wakde Island and at Sawar on the mainland, a few miles away. Our naval aircraft, covering the operations destroyed 101 enemy aircraft, 13 in air combat and 88 on the ground, most of them at Hollandia. These landings virtually isolated an estimated 60,000 troops of the enemy caught between our forces at Madang and those at Hollandia and Aitape. One possible reason for the completeness of the surprise may be found in the tactics used. Vessels making up the three task forces steamed in the direction of Palau from a rendezvous north of the Admiralties, and at the last moment the huge convoy swung south at 0900 on the 21st and at 0500 on the 22nd were standing off the various landing beaches.

COAST GUARD
AT AITAPE

The night before the landing at Aitape a Coast Guard manned supply ship, USS ETAMIN (AK) was part of a convoy which broke off from the main body for the Aitape assault. Lt. Comdr. George Stedman, USCG, told his men exactly where they were headed and what might be in store for them. A hit on the ship, with her 6,000 tons of high explosives would probably be fatal. Next morning when general quarters was sounded, the atmosphere was strained. Certain men had already been picked to man the winches, put the heavy LCM's over the side and disembark the combat troops, all in complete darkness. Extra men had been assigned to both guns and powder magazines. Men groped their way to gun position, deck winch, or deck

STRETCHER BEARERS PLUNGING THROUGH THE SURF
IN THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WHICH RESULTED IN THE CAPTURE OF WAKDE ISLAND AND SARMI



house. The ship entered Aitape Harbor at 0545. In the mist ahead mine-sweepers were clearing a path. LSD's, LST's, destroyers and SC's were somewhere on each beam. All bridge personnel had been ordered to the wheelhouse below, in case of attack. The mist lifted slowly. The dark island of Tumbleo and Seleo took form on either side. Suddenly, the first destroyer shattered the dawn with a yellow belch of flame and then the ship's five inch gun began rhythmically to pound target "B" on Tumbleo Island. Up forward the three inch fifty was throwing its shells on target "A." These guns got credit for knocking out a Japanese barge with some eighty troops and two pillboxes. The first indication that the landing craft were over, the side and troops disembarking was the soft purr of their diesel engines at 0620. The naval barrage ceased at 0630 and carrier based planes took over the job of pounding the beach and island. An ammunition dump on Seleo Island went up with a gigantic roar. The combat team from the Coast Guard manned ship hit the beach at about 0800 and 40 minutes later deck hatches were off, winches rigged and cargo was going over the side. Twelve hours later the winches were still **whinning** and supply dumps were growing on the beach. The initial waves had encountered little opposition and had pushed 800 yards toward Todji airstrip, lying parallel to the beach, before any organized resistance was met. This resistance was blasted by tanks and the airstrips secured. Ashore it was easy to see the Japanese had been taken by surprise. Crumpled bodies, clad in underwear and lying in slit trenches indicated that the enemy had taken the initial shelling for an air raid.


NEW GUINEA - WAKDE ISLANDS

LANDING MADE FROM ARARA

On 17 May, 1944, allied forces from Hollandia moved nearly 125 miles west on the northern coast of New Guinea to capture Wakde airfield and gain a new bridgehead on New Guinea opposite the Wakde Islands.

In an amphibious operation which was supported by allied fleet units and aircraft, our troops landed near the village of Arara on New Guinea, opposite the Wakde Islands. In an amphibious operation which was supported by allied fleet units and aircraft, our troops landed near the Wakde Group. There was a heavy bombardment of the landing beach by U.S. and Australian cruisers and U.S. destroyers. The landing was supported by allied aircraft which bombed and strafed enemy positions at Wakde, Sawar and Sarimi, as well as the landing beach itself. There was no opposition to our landing at Arara and a beachhead was gained without casualties. By evening of the 17th our forces controlled a beachhead 8 miles wide. A small group also landed on Insoemanai Island, just off Insoemear Island on which Wakde airfield is located. Supported by heavy shelling by destroyers and by rocket fire from LCI's at close range, allied forces landed on Insoemear Island early on the morning of the 18th without opposition. By the middle of the morning our troops were advancing across the airfield, meeting considerable mortar and sniper fire from scattered units of enemy troops and by the middle of the afternoon the airstrip was occupied and Japanese resistance reduced to a small area in

FROM A COAST GUARD-MANNED LST,
NEGRO TROOPS ROLL OUT THE BARRELS OF OIL FOR AMERICAN PLANES AND MECHANIZED LAND EQUIPMENT ON THE BIAK ISLAND



the northeast corner of the island. Next morning mopping up operations were begun and the Japanese put up a bitter fight, making a number of counter-attacks. Unlike the Japanese at Hollandia, the enemy troops at Wakde fought furiously until they were wiped out. By evening of the 19th, however, all resistance had ceased. 759 Japanese were killed with very few prisoners taken. Our losses were 41 killed, 135 wounded, and 1 missing in the entire operation, including that at Arara. Within less than 48 hours allied transport planes began landing at Wakde. The Transport Task Unit assaulting Wakde Island on D-day was composed of Navy and Coast Guard manned LST's all under the command of Captain F.D. Higbee, USCG, regularly in command of LST Squadron 21. The flagship was LST-18. The Task Force was commanded by Rear Admiral Barbee, USN. The ships were struck by sporadic enemy fire on D-day and reinforcements landing several days later sustained injuries to men in the ships from sniper fire.

COAST GUARD
LST AS HOSPITAL
SHIP

The first waves which began landing on Isoemoeear Island at 0905 on the 18th were under small arms fire coming almost entirely from a well concealed machine gun position close to the water's edge. This flank position placed each wave in enfilade. When called upon to knock out the machine gun the reply from the destroyer WILKES was that no further gunfire would be delivered except as specifically requested by the army, and that the planes would probably take care of the machine gun nest. It was finally silenced by tanks. Crews of some of the landing craft received a high percentage of wounds and were accompanied back to the beach near Toem. On arrival there the medical facilities were found to be so limited that all other casualties were taken to the medical LST (#18), which was Coast Guard manned. Some of them were taken from there to the destroyers. Other Coast Guard manned vessels included the MORRIS, VAN BUREN, EL PASO, and OGDEN and LST's 22, 26, 66, 67, 170, 202, and 206.

SCHOUTEN ISLANDS - BIAK ISLAND

HEAVY RESISTANCE
AFTER BIAK
LANDING

Because of the urgent need for a forward base from which to operate heavy bombers, an amphibious assault was made on Biak Island beginning on 27 May, 1944. The landing followed a series of almost daily aerial attacks on Biak's three airfields at Borokoe, Sorido, and Mokmer. These raids began soon after our occupation of the Hollandia area and increased in weight and frequency throughout the attack on Wakde. Nearly 1,300 tons of bombs had been dropped on Biak's installations during the months preceding the invasion and reached a climax on the day of landing. The amphibious landing was made near Bosnek village, about 8 miles east of Mokmer airfield, easternmost of the three fields strung along the south coast of Biak all within a distance of 4 miles. Cruisers and destroyers heavily bombarded the beaches and shelled inland positions for about 20 minutes just before dawn. This was followed by bombers and rocket ships before the assault boats moved in. Because of the fringing reefs offshore, transports and LST's were forced to unload troops and supplies some distance

MILES

(Scale true along equator)




from the beach and send them in in small landing craft. These were stopped by coral about 100 yards from the beach and the troops had to wade in through water nearly waist deep. Fortunately no opposition was met on the beach or casualties would have been heavy. Enemy troops had been driven from the Bosnek beaches by the preliminary bombardments and had retired to prepared positions on high ground overlooking the narrow coastal flat. Here they offered determined resistance and had to be blasted from hillside dugouts and natural caves. On the 28th our troops reached Soriari, a village 2 miles east of Bosnek, while other units pushed westward toward the airfields encountering some of the stiffest resistance met in any of the previous New Guinea operations. Harassed with sniping from bluffs overlooking the coastal road all the way, we reached the vicinity of Mokmer village the same day, but extremely bitter fighting took place on the 29th and 30th. Three counter-attacks, spearheaded by medium tanks and 75 mm guns, were launched by the Japanese on the 29th and ground east of Mokmer changed hands several times. On the same day our positions were raided by 9 enemy fighter planes, while our planes were constantly attacking enemy positions on high ground dominating the coastal terrace. On the 30th our forces from Bosnek moved into the hills north of the village encountering sniper and mortar fire. It was not until 6 June that Mokmer airfield was captured. Total Japanese casualties for the first four days of fighting were 679 dead and 2 captured. Control of the Biak airfields gave us forward bases only 900 miles from Davao and less than 600 miles from Palau, putting the latter within easy range of land based bombers. Coast Guard manned MORRIS, (PC) and VAN BUREN, CORONADO and SAN PEDRO (PF's) and LST's 18, 22, 26, 66, 67, 68, 170, 204, 205, and 206 participated on D-day or later in this operation.

THE MARIANAS - SAIPAN

STRATEGY OF THE ASSAULT

By the late spring of 1944, our forces had established bases and airfields in the Marshalls, Admiralties, and north central New Guinea. These positions threatened enemy bases in the Carolines, eastern Netherland East Indies, and the southern Philippines. Because of our attacks by land and carrier based aircraft, Japanese communications to the Carolines had become insecure, and the enemy air strength in that area was deteriorating. Severe losses had been inflicted on their shipping by our submarine, air, and surface forces. The enemy, however, was rapidly strengthening his position in the Marianas. In order to continue pressure on the Japanese, and to extend our control to the westward, further amphibious operations were planned. The Southern Marianas were selected as the objective. Because of the location of these islands, 1,000 miles to the west of our most advanced base at Eniwetok, with the route to them flanked on both sides by enemy land bases, their capture presented a difficult problem. June 15, 1944 was designated as the day on which the initial landings on the island of Saipan would take place. Following this, landings were to be made on Guam on D plus 3 and on Tinian on D plus 20. Due to the strong resistance encountered on Saipan these subsequent attacks were considerably delayed.




THE GEOGRAPHY OF SAIPAN

The Marianas form part of an almost continuous chain of islands, extending 1,350 miles nearly due south from Tokyo. The Marianas group itself, composed of about 15 islands, covers a distance of about 450 miles from north to south. The northern islands, with the exception of Pagan, are of little military significance. In the south, the larger islands of Saipan, Tinian, Rota, and Guam were important bases in the inner line of the Japanese island defenses and communications. They are raised coral formations with volcanic cores; and are fringed with coral reefs, behind which cliffs, 50 to 500 feet high, frequently rise sharply to tablelands above. Saipan is approximately 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles long with a maximum width of 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and covers an area of about 72 square miles. Although mountainous in character, a considerable portion of the island is arable and was under sugar cane cultivation. In 1941 the civilian population was estimated to be between 30,000 and 35,000, the greatest part being Japanese, with the remainder mostly Chamorros, Koreans, and Kanaka natives. The one important harbor was Tanapag Harbor on the west coast, with reasonable facilities and able to accommodate 12 or more ships. Magicienne Bay, on the east coast, had little practical value due to its exposed position to the prevailing winds and the depth of water close to its shores. There were three airfields on Saipan. Of these Aslito Field (since renamed Isely Field) in the south, was the largest and most important with many hangars and repair facilities. There were two other strips, one near Charan-Kanoa, a small sugar mill town on the west coast, and the other in the north near Marpi Point. A seaplane base was located in Tanapag Harbor. Saipan has about 40 miles of coast line, the north, east, and south coasts being dominated by steep, rocky cliffs, with only occasional breaks and stretches of short sandy beaches. Few, if any, suitable landing beaches exist on these coasts. Along the western side of the island, there are sandy beaches for most of the island's length, behind which the slopes are gentle for a distance of 500 to 5,000 yards. A barrier reef lies along all the western coast, extending a distance of 3 miles in the center and forming the northern and western sides of Tanapag Harbor. Elsewhere the reef is 350 to 1,700 yards off the shore. The lagoon behind is very shallow with depths generally less than 6 feet. South of Tanapag Harbor, at Charan-Kanoa, one shallow and narrow entrance breaches the reef into the lagoon. The assault beaches selected were on the southern part of the western coast.

DEFENSES INCOMPLETE

The prepared defenses of Saipan were amazingly inadequate and incomplete. Apparently only after our campaign was under way was there much activity in constructing fortification on the island. Not a single battery position or fortification was entirely complete. In many instances casemates, emplacements, and magazines were less than half finished. Much equipment was found still loaded on railway cars or lying on the ground near partially excavated gun positions. Evidently the effectiveness of our submarine warfare had contributed much to the delay in the shipment of construction material vitally needed for fortification work. Of 89 coastal defense and dual purpose guns found on the island only 32 were



MARIANAS OPERATION
MAP TO ILLUSTRATE ADVANCE OF
UNITED STATES FORCES ASHORE
ON SAIPAN, 15 JUNE—9 JULY 1944.

emplaced and ready to fire. The beachline defenses consisted of pill-boxes, machine guns, anti-boat guns, fire trenches, anti-tank trenches, and other minor defenses. Heavy mobile artillery and mortar fire was used for the main defense of the beaches. Some 54 pieces of heavy artillery were located on the first high ground and on the reverse slopes of this ground, about 3,000 yards inland and back of the landing beaches. These were responsible for much of the prolonged and effective fire on the landing beaches and their approaches.

ENEMY CARRIER
AND LAND-BASED
AIR STRENGTH

A considerable part of the Japanese fleet had been based in the Singapore-Philippine area for sometime, with indications that most of these units were now based on the Tarwitawi-Davao Gulf area and organized as a Fleet Striking Force. The Japanese had a large carrier force in the area of some 9 carriers with a total of 450 planes. All aircraft based in the Marianas and Carolines were believed to be naval aircraft and were estimated at 353 planes based in the Marianas, 99 on Palau and Yap, 66 in other Caroline Islands, 217 in the Philippines, and 550 in Japan or a total of 1,295. Late in May or June part of the Marianas air force was believed moved to the Palau-Yap area. It was not thought that army aircraft based either in the Philippines - East Indies area or Japan would be used in defense of the Marianas.

ENEMY GARRISON
STRENGTH


The Japanese were believed to be rapidly strengthening their forces in the Southern Marianas and on the first of June there were estimated to be between 15,000 and 17,000 enemy troops on Saipan, from 10,000 to 11,000 on Tinian and from 10,000 to 12,000 on Guam. Actually encountered on Saipan were 4,000 naval and 20,000 army troops.

ORGANIZATION OF
OUR FORCES

Due to the large number of ships and vessels required for the Marianas operation, the many complex operations which had to be coordinated, and the necessity for different organizations for various phases of the whole operation, the organization of our forces was not simple. The Fifth Fleet (Task Force 50) was commanded by Admiral R.A. Spruance. The various Task Forces were the Joint Expeditionary Force (T.F. 51), the Northern Attack Force (T.F. 52), the Southern Attack Force (T.F. 53), the Expeditionary Troops and Landing Force (T.F. 56), the Forward area, Central Pacific (T.F. 57), the Fast Carrier Task Force (T.F. 58) and Land Based Air of Forward Area (T.F. 59). A total of 486 vessels, ranging from older type battleships to small craft such as PC, LCI(G), and YMS type was assigned to Task Force 51, and this Task Force embraced many elements of other Task Forces such as 52, 53, and 56. It was in this group that the following Coast Guard manned vessels were to be found:

| Ship | Type and hull number | Task Organization |
|------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| AQUARIUS | AKA 16 | 53.1, 53.3 |
| ARTHUR MIDDLETON | APA 25 | 52.3 |
| CALLAWAY | APA 35 | 52.4 |
| CAMBRIA | APA 36 | 52.2, 52.3 |

U.S. COAST GUARD-MANNED TRANSPORT CAMBRIA (APA-36)




| | | | |
|--------------|-----|-----|-------------------|
| CAVALIER | APA | 37 | 51.1 |
| CENTAURUS | AKA | 17 | 53.2 |
| LEONARD WOOD | APA | 12 | 52.4 |
| | LST | 19 | 51.3, 52.5 |
| | LST | 23 | 52.5 |
| | LST | 70 | 53.1, 53.3, 53.16 |
| | LST | 71 | 51.3 |
| | LST | 166 | 52.5 |
| | LST | 169 | 52.5 |
| | LST | 205 | 51.2 |
| | LST | 207 | 53.1, 53.3, 53.16 |

Altogether 67,545 troops were used in the capture of Saipan including 6,693 corps troops of the V Amphibious Corps, 22,830 troops of the 2nd Marine Division, 21,618 troops of the 4th Marine Division and 16,404 troops of the 27th Army Division.

PREPARATORY OPERATIONS

Operations which took place prior to D-day included mounting of the amphibious forces, rehearsal exercises, preliminary aerial and submarine reconnaissance of the objectives, bombing of enemy bases in the strategic area, movement of various groups of vessels to the combat area, preliminary air strikes by carrier based aircraft on enemy bases in the southern Marianas, bombardment of Saipan by surface ships, minesweeping of mineable areas off Saipan and demolition of underwater obstructions and mines found there. The land-based air forces, by their prolonged operations, destroyed or damaged enemy aircraft, aircraft facilities, and shipping to such an extent that the Japanese were unable to use effectively their extensive system of air bases in the Carolines; and thus the enemy land-based air forces in these areas were unable to interfere seriously with our amphibious operations. The photographic coverage of objectives was the most satisfactory yet obtained in the central Pacific area, but because of the high altitude from which they were taken and the continual clouded areas obscuring most of the highlands, mortars, mountain guns, and other mobile weapons were difficult to identify. At about 1300 on 11 June, while 200 miles east of the Marianas, all task groups commenced launching the initial fighter sweep, consisting of 16 from each large and 12 from each light carrier, plus 2 TBF or SB2C from each task group. The fighter sweep evidently achieved surprise and a total of 150 enemy planes was destroyed at all objectives, about 75% of which were in the air at the time of destruction. Our combat losses were 11 fighter planes and 8 pilots, with one plane as an operational loss. On 12 June the scheduled bombing strikes on Guam, Rota, Tinian, Saipan, and Pagan began but only a small number of enemy planes were encountered. However, the enemy managed for sometime to keep a small number of planes available for dusk and night operations in the area. Our bombing strikes damaged aircraft facilities, cratered runways, destroyed coastal guns and anti-aircraft positions, and sunk or damaged a considerable amount of shipping, including 2 sizeable convoys encountered on 12 June in the vicinity of the Marianas.

COAST GUARD LANDS THE MARINES AT SAIPAN



APPROACH OF
AMPHIBIOUS
FORCES


The amphibious forces left their embarkation areas late in May and early June, the Northern Attack Force and the Joint Expeditionary Force Reserve being assembled in the Hawaiian area and the Southern Attack Force in the Solomons.

They proceeded in various groups to staging bases in the Marshall Islands. Eniwetok Atoll was used as a staging base for most of the groups of the Northern Attack Force and Kwajalein Atoll for the Southern. All troops assigned to the initial assault waves were here transferred from transports to LST's. Task Force 58 was the first to approach the Marianas having sortied from Majuro on 6 June. The advance Minesweeping group was due to arrive on D minus 2 day and two bombardment groups arrived in the area on D minus 1 day. On D-day the two transport and two tractor groups of Northern Attack Force arrived, while various groups of the Southern Attack Force and the Joint Expeditionary Force Reserve followed. The bombardment of the west coast of Saipan and Tinian took place on 13 June by Task Force 58, with minesweeping of the outer shelf of the west coast and night harassment of Saipan and Tinian by destroyers, following air strikes by T.F. 58. Numerous large fires were started, indicating that quantities of enemy munitions, fuel, and supplies had been destroyed or damaged. The bombardment ships encountered no opposition and received no damage from enemy action. Commencing on 14 June and for a number of days thereafter, fire support units operated generally in seven sectors completely embracing the islands of Saipan and Tinian. Bombardment by all units commenced shortly after 0530 on 14 June and continued throughout the day until about 1840. The bombardment and aerial strikes in general, were effective in damaging or silencing most of the enemy's shore batteries.

LANDING ON
SAIPAN

At dawn on the morning of 15 June, fire support vessels took their stations, and soon thereafter commenced firing at Saipan and Tinian. In the meantime the transport and tractor groups, carrying the troops, artillery, tanks, ammunition, supplies and other equipment, arrived off the western coast of Saipan. A heavy air strike along the landing beaches was made between 0700 and 0730, and intense pre-assault close range naval bombardment of the landing beaches commenced at 0800. A diversionary demonstration by two divisions was made in the north, while the actual landing occurred on the southern part of Saipan's west coast. H-hour was finally set at 0840. The assault was carried out without difficulty despite heavy mortar and other fire from the enemy which resulted in the loss of a number of LVT's. Some were overturned in the heavy surf but casualties, during the approach to the beaches, were light. Between 0840 and 0910 about 8,000 troops, with nearly 150 LVT(A)'s operating as light tanks in support, were landed on the shores of Saipan. A beachhead was established, but casualties soon became heavy because of the effective and concentrated enemy mortar and artillery fire. Throughout the remainder of the day, reserve troops, emergency supplies, ammunition, tanks and artillery were landed and by 1800 nearly 20,000 troops had been landed on Saipan. In the evening most of our ships retired from the area, leaving designated fire support vessels, the majority of the LST's, the Coast Guard manned CAMERIA (Admiral Hill's flagship) and various small craft. About dusk a small scale enemy air attack was made on the naval forces present, but no damage was done.

THIS IS THE DISCONCERTING SIGHT WHICH MET THE EYES OF JAPANESE DEFENDERS FO SAIPAN WHEN THEY LOOKED
SEAWARD ON THAT D-DAY MORNING



FIRST STAGE
IN CONQUEST
OF SAIPAN

In the 25 days which followed the landing of our troops on Saipan, the Japanese defenders of the island were defeated, and all organized resistance came to an end. The military conquest of Saipan was divided into three distinct stages: first, the establishment of a beachhead which gave control to the southern portion of the island; second, the fight for control of the central mountainous area; and third, the defeat of remnants of the enemy in the northern part of Saipan. The first stage lasted until 20 June, with the most severe fighting occurring during the first two days when the forces of the enemy were best organized and could bring to bear the bulk of his heavy artillery and armor. Once the beachhead had been seized and adequate support could be given the landing forces, the ultimate success of the battle ashore was assured. The basic movement of this stage was across the southern part of Saipan, to the coast of Magicienne Bay. Just **after noon** on the 16th the 4th Marine Division "jumped off" for the capture of Aslito Field. There was a vigorous enemy counter-attack early on the 17th which forced a withdrawal, but before the day was over, the ground had been regained. A coordinate corps attack to the eastward had begun with the two Marine Divisions abreast and the 165th Infantry on the right. Elements of the 165th reached Aslito Field that day and its capture was completed next morning. Progress of the troops across the island was continuously opposed by artillery fire and enemy counter-attacks. After the coast of Magicienne Bay was reached on the 19th, the control of the southern part of the island was completed on the 20th, except for a pocket of enemy troops on Nafutan point. Our losses in this stage were 673 killed, 4,415 wounded and 1,120 missing.


SECOND STAGE
IN CENTRAL
SECTION

The second stage involved the seizure of the central section of the island, an area of rough terrain around Mount Tapotchau, the highest point on Saipan. It was the longest and most difficult stage for the troops and was the most critical for the enemy. It was conducted over cane fields and into the cliffs and caves which were admirably adapted to the guerrilla-type delaying action fought by the enemy. They resisted mainly with machine guns, small arms, and light mortars in the daytime from well concealed and almost inaccessible positions, reserving their remaining artillery for use at night. On the 25th elements of the 8th Marines, 2nd Marine Division, reached the crest of Mount Tapotchau, while the 4th Marine Division occupied Kagman Peninsula and by the 30th this stage was completed. During this stage the Army and Marines lost 988 killed and 3,591 wounded.

THIRD STAGE
FINISHES
CONQUEST

The last stage was characterized by isolated, sporadic, and desperate resistance by the enemy, with little semblance of organized opposition. The 2nd Marine Division advanced rapidly into the ruins of Garapan and reached Mutcho point on 3 July. On the 4th the 27th Infantry Division seized the seaplane base at Flores Point. The enemy's complete restriction of movement, loss of organization, and inability to offer effective opposition was indicated by his desperate final counter-attack on 7 July. This pene-

COAST GUARD AND NAVY-MANNED LANDING BARGES AND AMTRACS
LAUNCH THE INVASION WHICH GAVE AMERICAN FORCES DOMINATION OF THE STRATEGIC MARIANAS



trated the left flank of the 27th Infantry Division to a depth of about 1,500 yards, but a counter-attack by the reserves of the 27th Infantry at noon succeeded in restoring the continuity of the front by nightfall. The 27th Infantry suffered heavy casualties in this move and was relieved in the area by the 2nd Marine Division on 8 July. Enemy forces which had not been destroyed during the attack were now isolated and eliminated. Our losses in this stage were 636 killed and 3,212 wounded. On 9 July the 4th Marine Division reached and secured Marpi Point airstrip at the northern tip of the island and at 1615 it was announced that all organized enemy resistance on Saipan had ceased. Our total casualties had been 3,100 killed, 13,099 wounded, and 326 missing in action or 16,525 in all. By 13 July 15,978 enemy dead had been buried and 1,010 prisoners taken, of whom 446 were Japanese and 564 Koreans. By 9 September Japanese dead had reached 25,559 and 501 Japanese had been captured.

COAST GUARD
OFFICERS FIND
CHANNEL TO
LAGOON


It was in the Saipan operation while probing about a shallow lagoon, as bullets whizzed overhead and enemy shells spattered coral rock against the sides of their boat, that two youthful Coast Guard officers found the channel through the coral reef along the western coast of Saipan which led to the sugar refinery pier at Charan-

Kanoa. Through it they brought sorely needed supplies and reinforcements at a crucial point in the battle for the beachhead. The officers were Lieutenants (j.g.) Clifford L. Benson of Maspeth, Long Island and Truman C. Hardin of Springfield, Missouri. The Japanese had made a living hell out of the pass leading into the lagoon off Garapan, 5 miles to the north. Americans died as they tried to negotiate this narrow passage. Benson and Hardin located a narrow channel through the reef into Charan-Kanoa. The Coast Guard officers and their crews crouched on the bottom of their boat as bullets nicked it and mortar shells exploded nearby sending up geysers of water and debris. The use of this channel saved the day for the beleaguered Marines in the vicinity. One of the first boats to use it delivered 30,000 rounds of desperately needed ammunition. Another brought in blood plasma and medical supplies. Three tanks were delivered within half an hour through the channel. Troop reinforcements splashed down the ramps and crawled up the beach to the firing line. As scores of small craft began filling the lagoon, the intensity of the enemy fire and mortar bombardment increased. It was soon no longer safe to use the shattered pier and boats risked running right up to the beach to unload. At dusk the enemy began a counter-attack. Rifle and machine gun bullets flecked the water with vicious zings. Boat coxswains bent down and steered on bended knee, popping up occasionally for a quick glance at their course. But the supplies already landed gave the Americans the necessary superiority to defeat the attack and when the action ended the Marines were in possession of the refinery and the ground surrounding it.

COAST GUARD
MANNED APA'S
AT SAIPAN

The USS CALLAWAY (APA-35) was manned by Coast Guardsmen as she proceeded to Saipan with other ships of Task Group 52.4.2. She arrived at Transport Area # 2 off Saipan at 0530 on the 15th and began unloading troops. At 1930 she was retiring from the transport

CHURNING BEACHWARD THROUGH A HAZE OF DAWN BOMBARDMENT, TROOP--JAMMED ALLIGATORS SPEARHEAD
THE INVASION OF NOEMFOOR ISLAND




area when she was alerted for an enemy air attack. No damage was suffered by the CALLAWAY and she returned to her assigned position off Saipan again on the 16th and 17th. On the 17th the CALLAWAY closed the beach to take casualties directly aboard and at 1800 she departed the transport area and proceeded eastward. After steaming in the general vicinity of 16° N and 147° E for a few days, she returned to Saipan on the 23rd and resumed unloading. On the 24th she departed for Eniwetok. The USS CAVALIER (APA-36), also Coast Guard manned, arrived at the transport area off Saipan at 1645 on the 16th and began dispatching LCVP's to other ships of Transport Division 7 to assist in their unloading. All boats were lowered and some 23 that did not return to the ship were ordered to spend the night at the Line of Departure off Blue Beach # 1, while the CAVALIER retired from the transport area to cruise for the night. On the 17th at 1907 while Saipan was under enemy air attack, considerable anti-aircraft fire was seen, but the nearest approach of enemy planes was within four miles of the retiring groups of transports. For the next several days the CAVALIER was under way in the retirement area northeast of Saipan. On the 19th there was a concentration of enemy planes 30 miles west of her course. On the 25th she again anchored off Saipan to resume unloading. There had been no casualties to personnel on boats which had remained at Saipan. Taking aboard casualties the transport next day proceeded to Eniwetok. The LEONARD WOOD arrived on 15 June and completed discharge of all troops and cargo on the 24th when she departed for Eniwetok. 356 casualties from shore had been received, treated, and disposed of prior to departure.

COAST GUARD
MANNED LST-166
AT SAIPAN

From the 9th until the 15th of June the Coast Guard manned LST-166 was en route from the Marshall Islands to Saipan. She zig-zagged during daylight and conducted tactical maneuvers but no enemy contacts were had. On the evening of the 14th the bombardment of Saipan Island was visible as the LST approached to take part on the next day's invasion. At 0650 on the 15th the LST was 5 miles off the southwest coast of Saipan. 11 Marine officers and 133 enlisted men were taken aboard from the USS FUNSTON and a little later an LSVP minesweeping unit was lowered and departed. At 1608 Marine personnel in LVT's were discharged at a point $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles off Green Beach, with the ship's LCVP being used to lead them. 16 LVT's had been launched within 13 minutes and an hour later they returned to load ammunition, rations, and water, and debark more troops. LVT's continued unloading during the rest of the 15th and on the 16th as well, when the LST got under way and retired for the night. This was again the operation on the 17th. From then until the 19th the LST stood off Saipan Island, undergoing an air raid in the interim. Anchored off Yellow Beach # 2 on the 19th the LST continued to unload cargo and debark Marine personnel in LVT's and on the 20th LCT-993 was launched from her main deck and fueled, watered, and provisioned before departing. Mooring to the USS CUSTER on that date she loaded a palletized cargo of ammunition, rations, and water and on the 21st proceeded to beach at Yellow Beach # 3. The palletized cargo was unloaded during the 22nd. Getting under way on the 23rd she proceeded in convoy to the Marshall Islands.

COAST GUARD BRINGS TANKS TO NOEMFOOR ISLAND




LST-207, COAST
GUARD MANNED
FIRES ON PLANE

On 17 June, while in convoy, the LST-207 observed three planes and at the same instant received warning from Flagship, USS STEMBEL. When first sighted the planes were less than 5 miles distant. Shortly afterward they separated, two attacking forward and one the after part of the convoy. The LST opened fire on the plane which launched a torpedo. This, however, passed well forward of the vessel. Firing was continued and numerous hits were observed. A few minutes later the LST opened fire on a second plane making its torpedo run. This plane launched a torpedo when 400 yards from LCI-468, which was 600 yards distant. Upon launching its torpedo, the plane, attempting to gain altitude rapidly, stalled and momentarily presented a broad, stationary target. Numerous hits were observed and the plane burst into flames, hitting the water at a distance of 3,000 yards broad on the port beam. The torpedo the plane had launched hit the LCI-468 on the starboard bow and the resulting explosion enveloped the vessel in smoke and threw debris far into the air, one of the missiles wounding a Marine aboard LST-207, who later died.

NEW GUINEA - NOEMFOOR

SURPRISE LANDING
WITH FEW
CASUALTIES

Shortly after dawn on 2 July, 1944 a landing force built around the 158th U.S. Infantry Regimental Combat Team, reinforced by artillery, anti-aircraft, tank, engineer, and service units totaling 7,078 men, landed on Noemfoor Island which lies about 60 miles west of Biak Island. The Japanese had developed three major airfields on the island, - Kornasoren, on the north coast, Kamiri, 2½ miles to the west; and Namber, seven miles south of Kamiri on the west coast. Our troops landed at the east end of Kamiri runway and before noon had captured the entire field. Since we went ashore at points where reefs and other natural conditions made such operations hazardous, by-passing the enemy's prepared positions along the beaches, the landing apparently took the enemy by surprise. We suffered extremely few casualties and before evening had established a curving beach-head protected on two sides by the sea and on a third by the Kamiri River. Reinforced by paratroops we advanced toward Kornasoren airfield on the 3rd, supported by tanks, Naval guns and aircraft, and captured it on the 4th. Our planes, had spent nearly three weeks softening up the island by a series of daily raids, climaxed on the day before the landing by a very heavy attack in which 230 tons of bombs were dropped. Yellow Beach was selected as the landing point because the coral reef at that point is relatively smooth, level, and free of deep water areas inside the reef. Deep water on both sides of the boat lane, inside the reef, limited the lane to a width of 400 yards, opening to 800 yards at the beach after clearing deep water. The landing plan provided for landing two battalions abreast in 7 assault waves at three minute intervals. Assault battalions with amphibian vehicles which were to land them, were embarked in 8 LST's. The first 3 waves were composed of a total of 39 LVT(2)'s and the following four waves totaled 52 DUKW's. The reserve battalion embarked in LCI's were to be landed



in a second trip of the LVT's and DUKW's or, if practicable, directly on the coral ledge from ramps of the LCI's. The artillery battalion embarked in LST's, was to be landed ashore by means of DUKW's equipped with "A" frames. Tanks, tractors, and bulldozers were to be carried forward in L3 LCT's and, beginning with the 8th wave, to be landed across the coral reef. 40 LCM's, carrying shore party personnel, vehicles and supplies, were to remain in LCM assembly area until called into the beach by the control officer. Either suitable beaching points would be found for them at the edge of the reef, where, at low water, vehicles could be discharged across the reef, or they would remain loaded until demolition parties could blast channels thru the reef. Bulk stores in LST's were to be unloaded in shuttle trips of amphibious vehicles. Seizure of the three fields on Noemfoor Island gave us seven air bases at the mouth of Geelvink Bay all within about 800 miles of the Philippines and within bombing range of important Netherlands East India enemy bases.

COAST GUARD
MANNED LST'S
AT NOEMFOOR


On 2 July, 4 Coast Guard manned LST's, Nos. 18, 66, 67, and 204, were among those that crept slowly through blue water toward the patch of green water which indicated the coral reef that extends entirely around the perimeter of Noemfoor Island. The reef, less than a foot below the surface of the water at most points, had made for an arduous unloading operation. On most beaches, LST's can nudge in close enough to shore to disembark their cargoes directly onto the beach. At Noemfoor, it was necessary to transfer cargoes to the smaller, shallower draft LCT's which can successfully drop their ramps on the jagged ends of the reef. Transfer of heavy army equipment between the ships was a delicate operation requiring the greatest skill. Coast Guard LST skippers demonstrated the "know-how" gained from months of amphibious operations in the New Guinea theatre. A Navy LST skipper who was present at the initial landings described the operation as "mild." One reason why the Japanese had not made any retaliatory air attacks may have been the terrific toll of Japanese planes by our carrier task force the week before. Despite the mild landing, the landing of the paratroopers on July 3rd and 4th turned out to be as spectacular as anyone could have wished. Dozens of DC4's came in low over the island and dropped hundreds of paratroopers while above them A20's and P38's swooped and darted to keep at bay any prowling zeros. The only casualties were leg and ankle injuries from the rocky terrain.

THE MARIANAS - GUAM

PREPARATION FOR
THE ATTACK


Guam is the southernmost of the Marianas Group and is also the largest, being 34 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles long and ranging from 5 to 9 miles in width, with an area of 228 square miles. The shore line varies from high cliffs to coral beaches, with the northern half a high plateau and the southern half sloping east and west from a mountain ridge running north and south along its western side. The island is entirely surrounded by a reef formed of limestone, except for a number of small harbors and bays, making landings by tracked

CLOSE AFTER A TERRIFIC NAVAL BOMBARDMENT THAT SMASHED JAP SHORE POSITIONS,
MARINE AND COAST GUARDSMEN HIT THE BEACHES OF GUAM



vehicles practicable only along the western coast. Apra Harbor is the only sheltered anchorage of any size. The native population in 1940 was 22,290 mostly chamorros, with Agana the largest town. After its capture by the Japanese in 1941 the beach areas from Tumon Bay to Taipei Point had been fortified, and two airfields had been built on Orote Point. Japanese army personnel numbered 13,000 and naval units totaled 5,000. Task Force 53, one of the components of Task Force 51, was assigned to the capture of Guam and consisted of some 207 vessels ranging from battleships to tugs, many of which had participated in the assault on Saipan. In the assault on Guam 56,537 troops were employed, 19,423 being army and 37,292 Marines. Task Force 53 originally assembled and trained for the Marianas operation in the Guadalcanal areas. After staging at Kwajalein, the Task Force sailed for the Marianas between 9 and 12 June. It was originally planned that Task Force 53 would act as a floating reserve during the Saipan landing and would land on Guam on 18 June, but the unexpectedly severe resistance on Saipan required the landing of part of its forces there, so that 18 June was cancelled as William Day. For the next ten days, until the conclusion of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, and the end of the Japanese threat to our amphibious forces, Task Force 53 retired and advanced in an area 150 to 300 miles east of Saipan, acting as a reserve for the troops ashore on Saipan, and yet in a position to clear the area should an enemy attack develop. As the campaign ashore on Saipan drew to a successful close, the reserve units of Task Force 53 returned to Eniwetok for additional preparation and planning. The new William Day was then set for 21 July. The delay resulted in keeping troops aboard ship for as many as 50 days with only brief times ashore so that their combat efficiency suffered somewhat as a result. Surface bombardment had begun on 16 June when it was anticipated that the landing would take place on 18 June but was discontinued after an hour on receipt of orders cancelling W-day. It is doubtful whether this firing was of any material assistance to our forces when they landed over a month later, but having made our intentions clear, it was necessary to see to that the Japanese on Guam had no opportunity to capitalize on this knowledge. Our ships first neutralized and then knocked out practically all the enemy anti-aircraft batteries on Guam and as the tempo of our air activity rose, practically all enemy artillery on the island was destroyed. The total results were much better than could have been achieved by the two day bombardment originally planned. Not a single piece of enemy artillery was brought to bear on the transports when the landing finally took place. After two anti-shipping sweeps, one on 27 June and one of 30 June - 1 July, Guam was under constant surface bombardment until the landing on 21 July. This was coordinated with air strikes from Task Force 58, the carrier planes striking one end of the island while the cruisers fired on the other. This bombardment soon had its effect. The surface ships encountered no return fire at any time, and anti-aircraft fire was silenced after the second day. LCI(G)'s furnished close-in support, approaching within a few yards of the reef and raking enemy trenches, pillboxes and possible machine gun emplacements, thus keeping down enemy fire on the underwater demolition teams and at the same time pointing out enemy positions for the fire of heavier ships. The underwater demolition teams began their work on the night of the 17th,

COAST GUARD-MANNED LANDING BARGES STRIKE AT THE BEACHES NEAR GUAM



destroying natural and artificial obstacles on the landing beaches. These were mainly palm log cribs filled with coral, or wire cages filled with cemented coral and spaced about 5 feet apart. Over 640 of these obstacles were destroyed on Asan Beach and 300 removed from Agat Beach, all of them being blown up with hand-placed charges. The fact that the June bombardment of Guam had revealed the beaches on which we proposed to land, left no advantage in trying to conceal these operations and it was therefore possible to do much work by daylight. The delay in the date of our landing gave the enemy time to improve his beach defenses, but also provided additional time for underwater demolitions.


CONDITION OF BEACHES

The Guam beaches were less suited to unloading than those at Saipan. The reef edge was 200 to 500 yards offshore, and there were no passages through to the beach. All landing craft had to be unloaded at the outer edge of the reef. The Agat beaches were especially difficult as the water over the reef was too deep for trucks to operate even at low tide. The reef at the Asan Beaches was dry at low tide, and trucks could then run out to its edge, reducing the burden on the tracked vehicles. Later, as the troops advanced on Crote Peninsula, the underwater demolition teams prepared Dadi Beach to the north of Agat and it became the chief unloading beach, and after the assault phase, the only point outside Apra Harbor used for unloading. Troops and supplies were brought to the edge of the reef in landing craft for transfer. Moorings were placed off the reef to which pontoon barges and causeways could be secured. When on the 29th, it became possible to use Apra Harbor for unloading, LCVP shallow-water minesweepers entered and began to sweep for mines. They were supplemented by YMS's on the 30th and that afternoon the APPALACHIAN entered the harbor. She was followed next day by the INDIANAPOLIS. Two units of garrison shipping entered the harbor and began unloading on 31 July. Artillery for the support of troop movements was put ashore with remarkable rapidity, that of the 3rd Marine Division reaching the Asan Beaches by 1300 of the 21st and by the end of the 22nd a total of three battalions of 155 mm howitzers, one battalion of 155 mm guns, and two battalions of 105 mm guns were ashore, in addition to the 3rd Division and Brigade Artillery.

PRE-LANDING AIR ATTACK

The pre-landing air attack took place from 0715 to 0815 on 21 July. During this time, 312 planes dropped 124 tons of bombs on the landing and flanking beaches. These attacks were made simultaneously with naval gunfire for the first time in Pacific amphibious operations. As the ships approached the beaches 32 F6F's from Carrier Divisions 22 and 24 went into action dropping depth charges and strafing along the beaches. These were followed by more fighters which strafed directly behind the beaches. Immediately following the troop landings, another strike was made by 24 fighters armed with rockets and by 24 torpedo planes with 100 pound G.P. bombs covering the area from 1,500 to 2,500 yards inland, where enemy mortar and artillery positions were to be expected. This assisted the first wave to obtain cover. Throughout the morning, repeated air strikes continued on assigned areas away from the landing beaches in attempts to immobilize

USS STERROPE (AK-96)



the enemy. In order that attacks should be directed effectively at most worthwhile targets, much advance preparation was required. A large proportion of the pilots were thoroughly briefed before the operation on the entire air support plan, the methods of close support of troops, and the ground plan of attack.


ASSAULT AND CAPTURE OF GUAM

While the bombardment was under way the assault ships were making their second voyage from Eniwetok to Guam. The tractor groups sailed for Guam on 15 July and the transports two days later. By the afternoon of 20 July the various components of the landing force were in position and approaching the island on schedule. During the night of 20-21 July, the transports steamed around the southern tip and moved into their assigned positions off the landing beaches. The operations on 21 July took place almost wholly as planned. The 3rd Marine Division, the Northern Transport Group, (T.G. 53.3) was to go ashore on Red, Green, and Blue Beaches at Asan, north of Apra Harbor. Beaches Yellow and White, at Agat, were designated for the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and the 77th Infantry in the Southern Transport Group (T.G. 53.4). Two Coast Guard manned LST's (Nos. 70 and 207) were included in Tractor Group Three (T.G. 53.3.6) and LST-71 flagship of Defense Group Two of the Southern Attack Group under Lt. Comdr. F. E. Miner, USCGR, was also Coast Guard manned. The AK COR CAROLI (AK-91) of Garrison Group Four of the Southern Group had a Coast Guard complement. Other wholly Coast Guard manned ships were AQUARIUS (AK-16), CENTAURUS (AKA-17) STEROPHE (AK-96) and TUPELO (AN-56). With fire support ships already at work, the LST's moved into their initial areas off the beaches and, to seaward of them, the transports began debarking troops. The LST's began launching LVT's at 0730 and they were dispatched from the line of departure at 0800. H-hour was set for 0830 and the first wave landed on the Asan Beaches at 0829 and at Agat at 0832. After landing the first wave, the LVT's returned to the edge of the reef where troops and supplies were transferred from landing craft, the troops wading ashore from the edge of the reef at some places with supplies being floated on improvised rafts. By 1130 the entire 3rd Marine Division was ashore with all essential equipment, having landed in 24 waves. On the southern beaches the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was landed by 1100 and the 305th Combat Team of the 77th came ashore in the afternoon. Due to the heavy preparatory bombardment enemy opposition was relatively light, with mortar fire causing some casualties but not greatly hindering the landings.

GROUND OPERATIONS

The most serious opposition was encountered in the area around Apra Harbor, where enemy mortar and artillery fire from the high ground commanding the beaches, was neutralized by air and naval support and aggressive action on the part of the troops. The basic movement of the first stage was one of encircling Apra Harbor, the 3rd Marine Division in the north holding its initial beachhead against determined counter-attacks, with little advance until the capture of Cabras Island on the 23rd which brought the northern side of Apra Harbor under our


AMERICAN INVADERS WADE THROUGH A GOLDEN, SHALLOW SUPP TO HIT A BEACH NEAR GUAM



control. The ground commanding the beachhead in the Agat sector was rapidly secured and the Marine Brigade launched a vigorous attack on Orate Peninsula on the 26th. This attack went on against stubborn resistance through dense undergrowth and jungle for 3 days until the capture of the Peninsula on the 29th. This gave us control of Apra Harbor and completed the first period of the assault operation. In the second stage our forces pushed across Guam to the eastern coast, and then northward where the Japanese continued to retire, after leaving the beachhead, until organized enemy resistance finally ceased. The 3rd Marine and 77th Army Division began the northward attack on the 31st, securing the Agana—Pago Road that day and cutting the island in two. Only scattered enemy opposition was encountered in the advance to the north. The enemy employed road blocks, and isolated strong defensive positions were also encountered, but by 9 August, the northern coast was reached and all organized resistance was declared at an end next day. The elimination of the remaining pockets of Japanese resistance was a long and difficult task because of the tenacity and stubbornness of the defenders and the exceedingly rough terrain. This is indicated by the fact that on 10 August, the total enemy dead was 10,971 with 86 prisoners, whereas by 9 September, a total of 15,651 had been killed and 194 prisoners taken. Through 14 November, the total had grown to 17,238 killed and 463 captured. During this period LCI(G)'s carried parties along the coasts and operated against small bodies of the enemy hidden in caves and on beaches. The casualties suffered by our forces were 1,289 killed, 5,648 wounded, and 148 missing in action or a total of 7,085.

COAST GUARD
MANNED LST
UNDER FIRE

One Coast Guard manned LST (No. 24) arrived off Guam after the island had been under heavy air and naval bombardment for many days. A part of our LST flotilla had carried assault units which were unloaded for the first wave. Later came other LST's loaded with trucks and bulldozers which sat a few miles off the beachhead at Agat and waited. Within a few days, when the Marines had things well in hand as far as the beachhead was concerned, these were ordered in. The big bow doors were opened at the edge of the reef, a quarter of a mile from shore, and there was a steady parade of vehicles into the shallow water. Suddenly there was a tremendous explosion to the immediate left, followed by four more explosions each closer to the ship. Someone shouted "We are under fire." General quarters was sounded and the LST started withdrawing, but the Japanese had established their range and began to lay down a steady barrage of fire. The shells were passing immediately overhead and it would be only a matter of minutes when they would land right on the LST. It took 17 minutes to get off the reef and all the time the Jap shells were landing just astern. One LST to the right, which moved out a little faster actually backed into the stream of fire. The Coast Guard manned LST finally got out with one casualty, a Seabee who was wounded by shrapnel. Much of the credit for the escape goes to the LCI gunboats, some of them moving in at top speed and pouring a terrific stream of automatic gunfire onto the shore. This drew the Jap fire away from the LST and the




LCI then followed in the withdrawal. Later cruisers and destroyers knocked out the Jap batteries. With the unloading done the LST took a survey party around to the other side of the island. Here they contacted some 2,000 natives who had escaped from a Japanese Concentration camp after their guards had fled. Many were sick and wounded and they took about 200 of the worst cases aboard.

LST-207 IN
ASSAULT ON
GUAM

The Coast Guard manned LST-207 departed Eniwetok Atoll on 15 July, 1944 with Tractor Group Three and proceeded uneventfully until the 21st. Approaching the LVT launching area at 0651 on that date the LST's boats departed to assist in forming assault waves and directing LVT's to the beach. The LST arrived in the launching area at 0731, 4,000 yards from Asan Beach, and discharged all 17 LVT's within six minutes. These included 4 armored amphibious tanks (LVT)(A) assigned to cover Adelup Point, 1 amphibious tractor (LVT-1) to be used as repair tractor and wrecker, and 12 amphibious tractors (LVT-2), each carrying 20 Marine assault troops of the Third Battalion, Third Marines. Six of these 12 tractors were armored and formed part of the first assault wave on Beach Red One, assigned to proceed inland 100 yards through Japanese beach defenses and disembark troops; three of the remaining six tractors, being unarmored were in the second assault wave assigned to disembark troops at the beach's edge and to liquidate beach defenses; and the three unarmored tractors, or LVT-2's formed a portion of the third assault wave assigned to disembark troops 100 yards inland and support troops disembarked in the first wave. All the Marine troops were disembarked under cover of heavy naval bombardment and no enemy air resistance was encountered. Shortly afterward LST-207 got under way in convoy, returning to stand off Asan Beach on the 23rd while the Seabee unit launched 4 pontoon barges for duty with the USS CRESCENT. On the 24th she beached on Asan Beach and began unloading vehicles. On the 25th a Marine working party unloaded the ship's cargo. On the next day as unloading continued, four bursts of Japanese mortar fire landed in the water about 800 yards distant but no damage was done. On the 28th the LST proceeded toward the Marshall Islands after unloading was completed.

COR CAROLI
OFF OROTE
PENINSULA
DURING BATTLE

The Coast Guard manned COR CAROLI (AK-91) arrived at 0725 on the 28th in the outer transport area of Agat Bay, Guam, and at 1140 proceeded to the inner transport area where she stood by to discharge cargo. While the vessel was hove to, about 1,000 yards south of Orote Peninsula and Noyo Island, the battle of Orote Peninsula was taking place. The bombardment of the peninsula by our battleships, cruisers, and aircraft continued throughout the afternoon and night of both the 28th and 29th. The COR CAROLI was exposed to possible sniper and battery fire of the Japanese on Orote Peninsula, but suffered no damage, although a splash from a medium caliber shell landed 200 yards from the ship's bow. On the second day of the battle the vessel moved to an anchorage 3/4 mile from Apoaca Point, Agat Bay, and discharged cargo from that time through the rest of the month. On the 1st of August she had to vacate the anchorage for a vessel with a higher priority cargo



EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS, TASK FORCE 56
DAILY PROGRESS — TINIAN PHASE.

when only half discharged and after cruising in the inner transport area off Agat Bay until the 9th, she moored to two buoys in Apra Harbor and resumed discharging until the 12th when unloading was completed. On the 15th she got under way as part of T.U. 53.18.8 bound for Eniwetok.

THE MARIANAS - TINIAN

DECLINING ENEMY STRENGTH

On 12 July, 1944 the commander of the Joint Expeditionary Force directed Rear Admiral H. W. Hill, commander of Group Two, Amphibious Forces Pacific, to assume command of the Tinian Attack Force, Task Force 52 (new) and J-day, the day for the assault on Tinian, was designated as 24 July. The Battle of the Philippine Sea had resulted in such damage to the Japanese Fleet, that the possibility of further threats from major enemy surface forces during the period of assault was considered negligible and Task Force 58 was adequate to prevent a serious attack. No worthwhile attacks by enemy planes had been made in the Marianas area since 8 July. Enemy air bases at Guam, Rota and Pagan, had been effectively neutralized. Further planned strikes on enemy bases to the north and south were expected to curtail long range air strikes on our forces. The Japanese defense forces on Tinian itself had been subjected to aerial and naval bombardment since 11 June and their effectiveness had been impaired. Tinian Island lies 2 3/4 miles southwest of Saipan and is 10 1/2 miles long and a maximum of 5 miles wide, with an area of 48 square miles. The island is a basaltic plateau, broken into a number of terraces, separated by sharp, steep drops. A ridge extends north and south near its east side and the eastern slopes are steep, while the western slopes are moderate and gentle. In the southern part are many caves and ravines. A fringing reef, which extends a short distance from the shoreline, runs along most of the coast. There is only one small harbor at Tinian Town on the southern part of the west coast. In the north end of the island, near Ushi Point, was located a large air field with considerable repair facilities, while two new airstrips were under construction near Gurguan Point on the west. There were about 18,000 civilians on the island and military forces totaling 8,950 men, with a Home Guard unit of about 3,500 in addition. While Tinian had been heavily fortified with coastal defense, anti-aircraft and machine guns, nearly all the coastal defense and many anti-aircraft guns had been destroyed before the landing. The strongest defenses were in the vicinity of Tinian Town where the best landing beaches existed.

PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK

Task Force 52 consisted of 214 vessels of which 174 were in the amphibious groups, 16 in the Carrier Support Group and 24 in the Fire Support Group. Most of the features of the assault on Tinian followed the general pattern of previous amphibious operations. However, its proximity to newly won Saipan made the operation principally a shore to shore movement. The artillery support available from Saipan made a landing on the northern

MARINES UNLOAD-OIL DRUMS FROM A COAST GUARD-MANNED TANK LIGHTER AND ROLL THEM THROUGH
THE SURF AND ONTO THE BEACH OF TINIAN ISLAND, MARIANAS



part of Tinian desirable, and though the choice was very limited, Beaches White-1 and White-2 on the northwest coast were finally selected. Preparations to cover the possibility of bad weather included about 30 tons of varied supplies for delivery by parachute drop and the possible employment of aircraft for delivery of some 100 tons of supplies daily after capture of the Ushi Point airfield. Because of the small area of mineable waters adjacent to the coast, minesweeping operations were of a minor nature and the only mines discovered were in Asiga Bay off Yellow Beaches on the east coast. Prior to the operations for the capture of Tinian, continuous air bombardment of that island had been conducted through the Saipan operation, all aircraft not required at Saipan being diverted to Tinian. Beginning about 15 July the intensity of the daily airstrikes was steadily increased. The XXIV Corps Artillery began a deliberate long range bombardment from Saipan, intensified after 8 July when Saipan was secured. The preparatory bombardment, including naval and aerial, delivered prior to the landings on Tinian exceeded in duration and destructiveness any previous assault preparation of the war in the Pacific. The island was divided into a northern and southern half with aerial bombing and naval gunfire alternating daily. The results were not as complete as had been hoped for because most defenses were dug in. Heavy bombardment by ships of the Fire Support Group, aerial strikes and a continuation of artillery fire were made on J minus one day (23 July). The area around Tinian was divided into five fire support sectors and counter battery and neutralization fires were conducted on the high ground north of Tinian Town and also during beach reconnaissance and minesweeping operations. Because of a squall which scattered the boats carrying the explosives, an attempt to conduct demolition work on White Beach-2, during the night of 23-24 July, in order to destroy anti-boat mines and blast boulders flanking the beach, was unsuccessful.

LANDING ON TINIAN

Movements of all vessels and craft from Saipan to Tinian on J-day, 24 July, were executed without incident. LVT's loaded with the assault troops, 75 mm howitzer artillery, and equipment were launched from LST's and the assault waves were formed. H-hour scheduled at 0730 was delayed ten minutes but otherwise the assault troops landed as planned, and by afternoon all troops of the 4th Marine Division were ashore and the landing of the 2nd Marine Division had commenced. By nightfall a secure beachhead had been won, with very light casualties to the assault troops. The COLORADO and NORMAN SCOTT suffered severe personnel casualties when they were taken under fire earlier on J-day by an enemy shore battery which had not previously been detected. At this same time the first wave was about 2,000 yards from the beach off Tinian Town when intense enemy mortar and artillery fire broke out. The waves continued shoreward for about 1,000 yards more, then, on a pre-arranged signal, counter marched and returned seaward. No casualties were reported. Another approach was made about 0900 and reversed when about 4,000 to 5,000 yards from the beach. At 1105 troops from the area off Tinian Town proceeded to the transport areas off White Beaches and commenced to land late that afternoon. It was evident that surprise as to the location of the assault had been achieved as a captured battle plan revealed

THE YANKS HIT CAPE SANSAPOR FROM COAST GUARD-MANNED LST



that the Japanese had expected our main landing on the Tinian Town beaches, with the Asiga Bay beaches a second choice and White-2 a third choice. The Coast Guard manned APA's CAMBRIA and CAVALIER were among the vessels of the Assault Transport Group to arrive off White Beaches at 0600 and immediately commence preparations for landing. The first wave of assault craft landed on White Beach-1 at 0742 and on White Beach-2 at 0750. A total of 17 LVT(A)'s and 26 LVT's was used in the initial assault. The landings were opposed by sporadic rifle and some machine gun fire and numerous land mines and booby traps were encountered. By 1000 the Marines had advanced inland 500 yards and closed the gap between the two beaches. Efforts were made to prepare the beaches for the earliest possible landing of maximum quantities of supplies and equipment during the existing good weather, as even a moderate swell would seriously interfere with unloading on the exposed beaches. The large boulders and other obstructions on Beach White-2 were blasted and anti-boat mines cleared. Two pontoon causeway piers were towed from Saipan. Early in the morning the CAMBRIA moved in close to the landing beaches to evacuate some 255 wounded.

CAPTURE
OF TINIAN

On the 25th the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions expanded their beachhead and on the following days swept rapidly down the island. Mount Lasso and Wihi Point airfield were captured on the third day and by the evening of the 27th the airfield had been reconditioned and was operational for our own planes. Tinian Town was captured on the seventh day. The enemy made his last stand in the cliffs and high ground in the extreme southeastern portion of the island. On 1 August, nine days after the landing, the island was declared secure. Our casualties were 290 killed, 1,515 wounded and 24 missing. 5,546 Japanese had been buried and 404 prisoners taken, 254 Japanese and 150 Koreans. 13,262 civilians had been interned of whom 5,297 were Japanese, 2,694 Koreans and 4,471 unclassified. The capture of Tinian was an eminently satisfactory amphibious operation, despite the limited time for preparation of detailed plans after their issue. The assault troops were expeditiously landed on narrow beaches and the vital supply situation coped with under difficult circumstances.



COAST GUARDSMAN'S
DESCRIPTION OF
TINIAN LANDING

The following is a description of the Tinian landing by a Coast Guardsman: "On 24 July, 1944 about five a.m. two battlegroups and a cruiser began laying down a heavy barrage on the island of Tinian. For the Japs the 39 day death watch had ended. As fighter and bomber planes followed the naval shelling dark rings of anti-aircraft fire puffed up from the squared-off fields. All during the previous day, LST's had been loaded at Saipan with Marines from the Second and Fourth Divisions. At six o'clock on J-day, the LST's moved in from the outer harbor and prepared to disgorge their load of amphibious tanks and tractors. A half an hour later all hell broke loose. As the warships poured broadside after broadside into Tinian, heavy artillery from Saipan opened up, looped over the narrow channel into the heart of her sister island. LCI's moved in ahead of the churning amphibious tanks. Like a line of indestructible infantry, the LCI's moved steadily into the beach side by side, firing

LINE OF ADVANCE ASHORE

AREA OCCUPIED BY 1800

- | | | |
|-------|--|----------|
| D-DAY | | 15 SEPT. |
| D+1 | | 16 SEPT. |
| D+3 | | 18 SEPT. |
| D+6 | | 21 SEPT. |
| D+10 | | 25 SEPT. |
| D+13 | | 28 SEPT. |



WESTERN CAROLINES OPERATION

**PELELIU
ISLAND**

13° 15'

every second of the way. Over the deafening barrage, you could hear the sharp rip of their rockets, like the sound of tearing canvas.

"By H-hour the island, rocking now on its very foundations, was completely wrapped in the gray haze of shell fire. But even under this crushing bombardment, there were Japs still very much alive to meet the invaders. Snipers crouched in the grey, jagged coral reef. Machine gunners peered out from heavily barricaded dugouts. The beaches were mined. Most of the casualties occurred from snipers and machine gun fire or from land mines. Off shore in a Coast Guard landing barge acting as a control vessel, rifle fire pinged all around us, but we saw only one shell splash within a hundred yards.

"By eight o'clock, all the first waves of assault troop had landed, and when we came ashore in the early afternoon bulldozers were already making clearings above the beaches. Men were beginning to dig in back of the coral for the night. Typical of the tenacity of the Jap is the fact that eight hours after H-hour, one line had been secured, about 1,000 yards inland, yet only a few feet to the left of the beachhead, Marines were still routing Japs out of coral caves and dugouts with carbines and flame throwers. The enemy dead who sprawled over the coral that fringed the beach, wore gloves and had their ears stuffed with cotton.


"During the late afternoon and evening, additional supplies and personnel were brought ashore. Throughout the night warships shelled inland. The expected counter-attack, upon which the Japs were counting heavily, started after dark and lasted until July 25th. Jap mortar and artillery fire was heavy but the beachheads held."

NEW GUINEA - CAPE SANSAPOR

LANDING EFFECTED WITH NO RESISTANCE

In an amphibious leap of nearly 200 miles from their previous advanced position on Noemfoor Island, U.S. troops on 30 July, 1944, seized the coastal area at Cape Sansapor and Cape Opmarai on the northwest coast of Netherlands New Guinea. Amsterdam and Middleburg Islands, off Cape Opmarai, were also occupied during the day. This placed our forces between the only two major bases remaining to the Japanese in New Guinea, - Sorong, 60 miles to the southwest on the western tip of New Guinea and Manokwari, 150 miles to the east. The landings were achieved without opposition early in the morning and within a few hours the objectives had been attained. Coast Guard manned LST's Nos. 18, 22, 26, 66, 67, 68, 170, 202, and 206 participated. No preliminary bombardment of the landing beaches by the supporting cruisers and destroyers of the Seventh Fleet was necessary. The only enemy contact reported was with a small force of Japanese about 6 miles east of the beachhead. These were shelled by naval units but did not fight back. By the seizure of Sansapor and the adjacent

WESTERN CAROLINES OPERATION
ANGAUR ISLAND
LINE OF ADVANCE ASHORE
 17 SEPTEMBER - 22 OCTOBER




area, our troops by-passed Manokwari and isolated about 15,000 Japanese. We were now within 300 miles of the center of Halmahera Island, key point in the eastern defenses of the Netherland East Indies, and barely more than 600 miles from the southern tip of Mindanao in the Philippines. Airfields in the Sansapor area, whose construction was immediately begun, brought into effective bombing range the Manado district in northeastern Celebes and the east coast of Borneo, regions bordering two of Japan's principal routes to the East Indies through the Straits of Macassar and the Molucca Sea. The Sansapor landings closed a campaign which had its inception just 13 months before. Successive amphibious operations had advanced our lines more than 1,200 miles along the New Guinea coast, while landings in the Northern Solomons, New Britain and the Admiralties had given us control of the waters north and east of New Guinea. Large numbers of the enemy had been cut off and trapped behind our advancing front in such areas as Bougainville, Rabaul, New Ireland, Wewak and Manokwari.

THE CAROLINES - PELELIU AND ANGAUR

PELELIU DEFENSES STRONGEST SO FAR

The operations against the Palau Island group of the Caroline Islands began on 6 September, 1944 with a carrier based fighter sweep of Japanese installations on the islands, followed next day by a heavy bombing attack as U.S. cruisers and destroyers moved in to shell selected targets. On the 10th, aircraft and surface vessels, including battleships, renewed their attacks on shore installations and beach defenses mainly on Peleliu and Angaur Islands. For five successive days the bombardment continued. At 0830 on the 15th, Marines of the First Division went ashore on the southwest coast of Peleliu landing just opposite the airfield against considerable opposition. Though Japanese mortar and artillery fire was heavy at the beachhead our landing casualties were under 200. Peleliu being surrounded by reefs, the Marines were landed in tracked landing craft which had little difficulty with the offshore obstacles and a wide beachhead was quickly established. Late in the afternoon a strong Japanese counter-attack against our center, which was driving across the airfield was repulsed with the aid of naval gunfire and aerial bombing. Two other attacks an hour later were broken up, and early in the morning of the 16th the Marines attacked along the entire front after heavy bombardment of enemy positions by sea and air units. By noon the airfield had been captured and most of the southern part of the island was occupied during the day. On the 17th we launched a general attack against stubborn Japanese resistance, though many enemy gun positions were destroyed by our air cover. On the left flank the Japanese fought from well prepared positions along the low coral ridge nicknamed "Bloody Nose Ridge." Our forces in the south captured the easternmost of two small peninsulas. By afternoon of the 18th the village Asias north of the airfield, was in our hands, as well as all of Southern Peleliu, including Ngarmoked Island and the enemy dead numbered 5,495. On the 19th we captured most of "Bloody Nose Ridge," after bitter resistance by enemy troops fighting from pillboxes, caves and trenches. The enemy's defenses on Peleliu were reported to be stronger than on any island our forces had attacked in the Pacific. The capture of

COAST GUARD-MANNED INVASION TRANSPORT AQUARIUS (AKA-16)



the ridge, northwest of the airfield, silenced much of the artillery and mortar fire directed against the airfield on which the Seabees were already at work. By the 26th enemy forces on Peleliu had been surrounded although it was not until the middle of October that the assault phase of the operation was completed.

COAST GUARD
MANNED LST's
AT PELELIU

On D-day at Peleliu the LST's, including LST's 19 and 23 Coast Guard manned, had swept in a column seven miles long and a mile wide. They hesitated a moment to lower their boats, then moved on parallel to the shore and turned sharply into the beach. The huge steel doors at the bows opened and out of them came the stream of amtracks. First the armored tracks with the turret and cannon to lead the way, then the troop carriers packed with assault troops. Then the LST's swung off and away to each side and let others take their places on the debarking line. Back behind the activity alongshore they dropped their pontoons and barges, carried on their sides like packs on a packhorse. The LCT's riding their decks half way round the world from some Atlantic port were dropped by listing the ship and sliding them overside. Other LST's turned out to be repair ships giving first aid to disabled amtracks and landing boats, while some flew the medical flag with their tank decks turned into first aid and emergency operation stations. From the beach boats came to other LST's hunting for water, ammunition and rations, for they were mother ships to the smaller craft. The reefs off Peleliu Island were strewn with coral heads and boulders and were too shallow for smaller landing craft to pass over even at high water. The coral heads were too deep for causeways to be built quickly to the reef edge, so that cargo had to be transferred from the transports to the small boats and from them to amtracks before it could reach dry land. When the weather changed, shortly after the first landing on 15 September and the wind rose, swells from the southwest made it impossible to beach these smaller craft. The only type of craft remaining that could work through the rolling seas and pounding surf between reef and beach was the LST. During the blow that followed, three of the six LST's being used as lighters to carry food and ammunition the last critical hundred yards to the shore were caught aground at low water on the beaches. Here the seas broached them, pounding them up back against the ragged edge of the reef, tearing their bottoms out. All the surrounding harbors were in Japanese hands, and small boats and barges with no place to go were helplessly washed ashore. The three remaining LST's had to finish the job. Day and night the work went on, while at sea the Coast Guard manned AQUARIUS (AKA-16) and CENTAURUS (AKA-17) and other ships worked ablaze with cargo lights despite danger from planes and submarines. Ashore the trucks rushed their loads to the dumps, often to the whine of snipers bullets as they roared through the darkness. The island was fed, armed, clothed, and sheltered by the cargoes brought in by the LST's.

ANGAUR CAPTURE
PROVIDES SUPPLY
BASE

On 17 September, 1944, also, troops of the 81st Army Division were landed on Angaur Island, six miles south of Peleliu, from the Coast Guard manned APA CALLAWAY and other transports. Like Peleliu, Angaur had been subjected to a series of heavy preliminary bombardments by ships and aircraft. The troops landed on the northeast and east coasts with light opposi-

ULITHI ISLANDS



Nautical Miles

tion and before noon tanks had been landed and our forces were 400 yards inland. By nightfall the two beachheads had been joined and we were 1,000 yards inland with the right flank about halfway across the island. On the 18th the Japanese launched three counter attacks, all of which were thrown back, and before the end of the day we controlled more than half the island. Saipan, the principal town was captured on the afternoon of the 19th when two-thirds of the island had been occupied. Beach defenses along the east coast slowed up advances in that sector but the capture of Saipan on the west coast, split the island in two, isolating enemy troops in the northwestern and southern portions. The island was reported secured on the 20th with 173 Japanese killed and two captured. Our casualties had been very light. Possession of the island gave us a useful supply base as the pier at Saipan, which was used for loading products of the phosphate mines, was capable of accomodating large cargo vessels.

COAST GUARD
LANDS ARMY
AT ANGAUR


Coast Guard manned landing craft from the Coast Guard manned attack transport LEONARD WOOD approached the beach at Angaur in an early wave. Navy ships and planes had just laid down a magnificent barrage and a few minutes later the landing craft ground to a stop on top of a coral ledge in the surf. Everyone sought cover behind a stone barricade atop a tank trap as not many of our men were on the beach yet. Soon they were coming in by the hundreds, with bulldozers arriving, and demolition squads blasting holes through the coral ledge so that tanks and bulldozers could get to the tangled upland. The beach was rocky and covered with debris from the shelling. There was little enemy fire except from occasional snipers. Planes were bombing and strafing a cliff 100 yards away across a gorge, where Japs were thought concealed, when a Coast Guard landing craft moved in close to the beach and the Lieutenant spotted his fire into the mouth of the cave. As the Japs counter-attacked, some of them came out of that cave. We used starshells that night as they tried to infiltrate but it was hard to see them, though they could be heard knocking grenades against helmets to break the pins before they tossed them. The island was an incredible tangle of brush and caves, some of them with passages 200 yards long. The Japanese scurried from one end to the other and might pop out at any one of half a dozen outlets. Soldiers tossed in hand grenades and bulldozers were sent up to hole up the openings, just to be sure that no "dead" Japs crawled out during the night.

THE HALMAHERAS - MOROTAI

JAPANESE FLEE
TO THE HILLS ON
MOROTAI

Coordinated with the attack on the Palaus, 500 miles to the northeast, U.S. troops landed on the southwestern coast of Morotai Island, northernmost of the Halmaheras Group on 15 September, 1944. The landings were preceded and supported by heavy air and naval bombardments of the landing area and of enemy airfields on nearby Halmahera Island. Units of the Seventh Fleet and of the Pacific Fleet, including carrier-based aircraft, convoyed the armada of transports, landing craft and other ships and participated in the landing operations. The first wave of

COMPOSITE TRACK CHART BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT 25 OCTOBER 1944



assault troops went ashore at 0830, landing from almost every type of amphibious craft. In less than half an hour we had established two beach-heads, one at the base of Cape Gila peninsula, and another a mile to the south. Both forces pushed inland and established a perimeter around the base of the peninsula and gained possession of Pitoe airfield, without opposition. The small enemy garrison on the island, probably not numbering over 200, fled without offering any resistance, either on the beaches or later, and scattered into the rugged jungle covered mountains. Despite a fringing reef, with shoals and coral heads, all landings were made without incident, the amphibious tracks being followed to the beaches by LCT's and LST's, while offshore, converted destroyers and transports unloaded more troops and engineering equipment. Our losses were very light with no fatalities and only three wounded. During the night of the 16th two enemy planes unsuccessfully attacked our positions and on the following day there was an unsuccessful attack by 2 enemy dive bombers, one of which was shot down. On the 17th three more unopposed landings were made on Morotai. This landing carried our Southwest Pacific ground forces north of the equator for the first time and deepened our penetration of the Netherlands East Indies. Establishment of airfields on the island brought all the southern Philippines within easy range of even our light bombers and permitted fighters regularly to escort bombers in attacks on Mindanao and the islands to the north. The range of heavy bombers was greatly extended and they were now able to reach the central Philippines.

COAST GUARD
VETERANS AT
MOROTAI


The Coast Guardsmen manning the LST's at Morotai were the veterans of campaigns as far back as Lae and Finschhafen, of the initial landings at Cape Gloucester and of resupply from Saidor to Biak. They had helped secure the Green Beach at Sansapor. A large Task Unit of LST's and miscellaneous cargo vessels under CG Command, Captain Frank D. Higbee, were first to land at Pitoe Beach on the east shore of Morotai. This beach proved so superior to Red Beach on the west shore that landings elsewhere were discontinued. It is the steepest beach used in the whole campaign - so deep near shore that stern anchors could not be used. As the Task Force hove into sight of Red and White beaches on Morotai, an even larger force of ships approached from the south, using the same time table, but one day later. They were the First Reinforcement Group, under way to initiate the resupply phase of the operation. Now the Elsie Items (LCI) and Elsie Tares (LCT) were nuzzling against the shore discharging men and machines to reinforce the assault troops already on the island. The task of resupply had begun, one which would take weeks and would keep life blood flowing to our forces both by air and sea.

THE CAROLINES - NGESEBUS - ULITHI, NGULU

NGESEBUS
OCCUPATION
REMOVES
THREAT

Against only light and scattered opposition U.S. Marines on 28 September, 1944 landed on Ngesebus and Kongauru Islands, inside the lagoon north of Peleliu. The landings were preceded by a heavy naval and air bombardment, the latter by both carrier and land-based aircraft. By evening our troops had secured all of Ngesebus, site of a 3,000 foot airstrip. Resistance on Kongauru was reduced to a small pocket in the northeast tip of the tiny island and was eliminated the following day. Another smaller island to the east of Kongauru was also occupied.

THRONGS OF PHILIPPINE CIVILIANS, HALF-STARVED, WAR-TORN BUT JOYOUS
SWARM FROM CELLARS AND HILLS TO WELCOME AMERICAN LIBERATION FORCES TO LEYTE ISLAND



There was thus removed the threat of artillery and mortar fire against our position on Feleliu.

ULITHI ATOLL
FOUND
ABANDONED

As soon as it became clear that the entire 81st Division would not be needed for the capture of Angaur, a regimental combat team was dispatched to Ulithi Atoll. Minesweepers, under cover of light surface ships, began work in the lagoon on 21 September, 1944 and in two days cleared the entrance and anchorage inside for the attack force. The Japanese had abandoned Ulithi and the landing of troops on the 23rd was without opposition. Although Ulithi was not an ideal anchorage it was the best available shelter for large surface forces in the Western Carolines, and steps were taken at once to develop it.

SEIZURE OF
NGULU NEUTRAL-
IZES YAP


Ngulu Atoll, less than 100 miles southwest of Yap Island, was occupied by U.S. forces without opposition on 16 October, 1944. By seizing Ulithi and Ngulu Atolls, our forces now flanked Yap Island at one time an important enemy air base and supply center.

LEYTE - PHILIPPINES

LANDINGS AT
LEYTE LIGHTLY
OPPOSED

When the plan to capture Yap was abandoned all the forces which had been prepared for this operation were made available for the landing at Leyte in the Philippines. 738 vessels of the Seventh Fleet participated, of which 157 were combat ships, 420 amphibious types, 84 patrol, minesweeping and hydrographic vessels and 73 service ships. General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area was in command while Vice Admiral T.C. Kinkaid (Commander Seventh Fleet) was in charge of naval operations. The 6th U.S. Army, commanded by Lt. General W. Krueger, comprised the landing forces, which assembled at Hollandia and Manus. Landings on Dinagat and Suluan Islands, commanding the approaches to Leyte Gulf were made on 17 October, 1944, and on the 18th on Homonhon Island. Minesweepers then removed mines in Leyte Gulf and demolition teams investigated landing beaches. These were followed by bombardment ships which entered the Gulf on the 18th, firing on shore installations, while Third Fleet carrier planes and Seventh Fleet CVE's neutralized Japanese airfields. At 1000 on the 20th landings were made at four points along the western side of Leyte Gulf and a fifth landing occupied both sides of Panaon Strait to the south. The landings were lightly opposed, with some mortar fire on the beaches which were secured on the 20th. By the 30th, troops pushing in and against growing enemy resistance, had captured Japanese airfields and controlled practically all of Leyte Valley. Landings on the northern side of Leyte Island and on Bacol and Samar Islands were made on the 24th. By the end of the month enemy troops were being ferried from Cebu to the Ormoc Peninsula of Leyte and were slowing up our advance. By this time our casualties were 835 killed, 2,779 wounded and

CAPTAIN HIGGEE GUIDES COAST GUARD LST'S TO THE BEACHHEADS



345 missing, while 9,345 Japanese were reported killed and 179 captured. While no large scale attacks by Japanese planes occurred during the unloading period that followed, small numbers of planes attacked the transport area frequently and suicide tactics damaged some vessels. Between 24-26 October the Japanese fleet attempted to destroy our naval forces in the area and three battles at Surigao Strait, off Samar and off Cape Engano resulted in their defeat and rout.

COAST GUARD
AMONG FIRST
TO LAND

An advance beach party of four Coastguardsmen, who landed on Red Beach at 1010 on 20 October, were the first Naval or Coast Guard personnel to land on Leyte after the bombardment. They were in an LCVP attached to the USS AQUARIUS and under command of Captain F.D. Higbee, USCG. Another

Coast Guard invasion barge took its boatload of soldiers ashore shortly afterwards. "We weren't more than two hundred yards offshore when the first Jap shell fire splashed in front of us," wrote one correspondent. "The soldiers dropped to a crouch as one man. There was another splash to our right and then another to our left. All you could see now across the straight line of twelve boats were the tips of brown helmets and erect figures of twelve coxswains standing erect behind their wheels. Then, over the deafening roar of the bombardment behind us, we heard the singing whine of a mortar shell. It came within a few feet of our hands. We could see the geyser shoot up just behind us. Seconds later the barge jarred its flat nose, up on the sandy beach. In seconds more the ramps were down and the soldiers were running out, crouched low, their rifles ready. The invasion had begun."


A COAST GUARD
OFFICER'S
ACCOUNT

"Even before our Coast Guard manned transport had reached its assigned position in the anchorage area Jap planes came over." An officer of a Coast Guard manned transport related, "It was daylight on the 20th when we finally dropped the hook after the haul to the Philippines. We were some five

or six miles from the Leyte Island beaches where our landing forces would first strike. All around us ships were throwing ack-ack at unwelcome Nip visitors. My first job was to lead a wave of six LCM's, each carrying a light tank and its army crew. The beach was located about five hundred yards south of the town of Dulag. The tanks had to be put ashore as quickly as possible to back up the infantrymen who were hitting the beach just ahead of us.

"Exactly one hour and fifteen minutes before H-hour (1000), I signalled the five other loaded tanklighters (LCM's) to follow me. We quickly approached the smoke and noise that hovered over Leyte. Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers were pumping shell after shell into the island's defenses. The noise was deafening. As we drew closer, we could make out the dim outlines of our LCI gunboats, moving in for the final kill. Close behind them came the first waves of LVT's carrying the assault troops. We maneuvered into our assigned position behind them. Suddenly, through the smoke and dust, we could see the first Americans hitting the beach. The Japs were lobbing mortar shells which were dropping harmlessly in the water to our left. The

VETERAN OF SEVERAL AMPHIBIOUS INVASIONS ALONG THE LONG ROAD FROM THE SOLOMONS TO THE PHILIPPINES,
THE COAST GUARD MANNED LST-18. UNLOADS ITS FIGHTING MEN AND MACHINES ON THE BEACHES OF LEYTE ISLAND



waves of armored alligators ahead of us did not stop at the water's edge, but climbed right up onto the beach and headed for the clumps of palm trees some thirty or forty yards inland.

"Amid the ruin of the debris strewn beach, a tall coconut tree had old glory flying proudly from its topmost branches. It was the first to be raised in the liberation of the Philippines. One of the LST's skippers had given his ship's flag to a young Army Lieutenant who solemnly promised to run it up when he got ashore. Along with the flag, the skipper had contributed a heaving line. The flag was secured to one end of it, and when the boys landed, they promptly heaved the line over the tallest palm tree nearby, and the stars and stripes were hauled up in short order.


"As our six tanklighters dropped their ramps, and the tanks rumbled out, a proud feeling ran through us. Here we were in the Philippines. At last we were back. Already our lines were some thirty or forty yards inland. There was plenty of small arms fire, but the little beachhead seemed secure enough. Mortar shells were still falling on our left, but they hadn't hit any of our boats. After unloading and backing off the beach, a Jap 37 mm gun opened up on us. We accelerated the engines and headed back to our ship for another load.

"All next morning, -the 21st- we were pestered by a few enemy planes. Unloading continued nonetheless. We worked all day and night of the 20th and all morning of the 21st to get unloaded as soon as possible. Some of the Jap planes dropped bombs. Two or three were shot down. Since we never knew just how many were coming, all ships lay a smoke screen when word of their approach was sounded. The smoke slowed things up a bit. Unloading became more difficult and dangerous for the ship's crew because of reduced visibility. While for the boats' crews it was considerably more difficult to find their way about.

"There was a bee-hive of activity, on the beach. Some LST's had already pushed their bows well up onto the beach and supplies were moving out of their huge jaws. Hundreds of small landing craft were squeezed onto the beach side by side, ramps down and bulldozers busily engaged in unloading them. The Coast Guard beach party from our own ship got to work unloading us. These boys were tired. They had been working under constant pressure, and the Jap counter-attacks on Yellow Beach had given them some anxious moments. Snipers were close by, and so far they had killed two.

"Native Filipinos, clothed in rags, were everywhere. An estimated two thousand had already come through the battle lines to safety. Most looked haggard and undernourished, but their high spirits were reflected by their smiles of approval as they watched us at work. GI's and sailors were feeding them everything they had. K-rations were achieving a new kind of popularity. Doctors had set up first aid stations where medical treatment was given to all in need of it. Some of the wounded children presented an especially pathetic sight. What amazed us most was the high percentage

LOADED TROOP TRANSPORTS LIE IN HARBOR AT MANUS, AWAITING ORDERS FOR ANOTHER THRUST INTO THE PHILIPPINES



of natives who had not been harmed in any way by the terrific air and naval bombardment which preceded our landings. Their homes, however, were shambles. Hardly a building or shack in the entire town of Dulag had escaped damage. But the courage with which these Filipinos faced their losses was inspiring. Young men and boys who met any of our forces on the beach would jump to a stiff attention, salute smartly, and then break into an ear-to-ear grin."

USS CALLAWAY,
LEONARD WOOD,
CAMBRIA AND
CAVALIER AT
LEYTE


During the invasion of Leyte the Coast Guard manned attack transport CALLAWAY came in under one air raid to discharge her Army personnel and left at dusk under another. The USS LEONARD WOOD sailed from Guam on 3 November, 1944. Embarked were troops and equipment of the 77th Division, U.S. Army. The WOOD arrived at Leyte Gulf on 23 November and debarked all troops and supplies. En route to Leyte and at Leyte Gulf, Transport Division Twenty of which the WOOD was part, was under enemy air attack. The WOOD sailed for Hollandia on the 24th. Carrying 75 officers and 1,102 enlisted men of the 96th Division, U.S. Army, the USS CAMBRIA (APA-36) left Manus Island to become part of Task Group 79.2 for the Leyte operation. The landings on Leyte were made 20 October. The CAMBRIA's beach party remained on shore after the ship departed for Manus three days following the initial landing. Seventy casualties were taken care of by the medical staff. Another trip was made to Leyte to transport 59 officers and 1,026 enlisted men of the 187th Paraglider Infantry Regiment, U.S. Army, who had been embarked at New Guinea.

The approach to Leyte by the Coast Guard manned USS CAVALIER (APA-37) in a transport task force from Manus Island was made with grave caution. For the first time the ship streamed her paravanes to protect her against mines. An anticipated strong Japanese air opposition did not materialize and only a few enemy planes appeared over the beaches on D-day, 20 October, 1944. The CAVALIER completed her unloading quickly despite frequent air alerts and protracted intervals of making smoke screens. Unscathed, the vessel sailed for Manus two days prior to the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea on 25 October, 1944, in the three phases of which the Japanese fleet was decisively defeated. She again arrived at Leyte on 18 November, 1944 with army troops from Oro Bay, British New Guinea.

LST-207
DOWNS ENEMY
PLANES AT
LEYTE

The Coast Guard manned LST-207 left Manus Island, Admiralty Islands on 4 October, 1944 as part of Task Group 79.1 and on the 20th entered Surigao Strait and Leyte Gulf anchoring in the LST Reserve Area at 0554. At 1445, she launched four pontoon barges and on the morning of the 21st beached at Vilot Beach #2 to unload cargo and disembark troops. This mission was completed at 1425 and the LST retracted, got under way and moored alongside the PRESIDENT HAYES to load cargo. All during the evening she made smoke. Next morning, the 22nd she beached at Yellow Beach #2 to unload. Later, she moored to USS

COAST GUARD-MANNED PATROL FRIGATE



MERCURY (AK-42) in the harbor where she loaded cargo until 2257 on the 23rd. Then she moved to Yellow Beach #1 for unloading. While returning to LST standby area on the morning of the 25th, a plane was sighted dead ahead. The plane went into a dive, releasing a bomb which landed 100 yards to starboard beam. Later shortly after noon a plane was observed diving from the clouds. All starboard guns fired until the plane disappeared smoking into the clouds. A third attack occurred at 1057 while the LST was under way to a new anchorage. Guns opened fire at 800 yards and numerous hits were made, the plane disappearing in a trail of smoke. A bomb dropped by the plane landed 300 yards on the port beam. Again at 1810 an enemy medium bomber was observed diving. The LST opened fire at a range of 1800 yards and scored immediate numerous hits. The plane banked sharply and ran parallel with the LST at a range of 1000 yards, bursting into flames as shots from the LST's guns repeatedly struck engines and fuselage. Next morning, the 26th, enemy planes were seen approaching from various directions, consisting of 12 "Sallys," "Tonys" and "Vals." At 0847 an enemy "Val" approached the LST from the starboard quarter, coming in low and fast, apparently just having completed a dive-bombing attack on another ship and attempting to climb to an area clear of the ship's firing. As this plane passed along the starboard side, all of the LST's guns which could bear, opened fire and hits were observed on wings and cockpit. The plane swerved sharply to port, lost altitude, made a complete circle, crashed on the beach and burst into flames. Two hours later three enemy dive bombers were observed along the LST's starboard side about 1500 yards distant. The planes dropped three bombs, one a near miss on a nearby LST. One plane crashed into the water about two miles astern of the 207, and another circled the LST's port quarter and crashed into the water about 500 yards away, after trying to crash dive the LST-693. All of the 207's guns which could be brought to bear fired on these targets and hits were observed. At 1145 the 207 left Leyte for Humboldt Bay, New Guinea.

USS CORONADO
ESCORTS LST's
TO LEYTE

The Coast Guard manned USS CORONADO (PF-38) departed Humboldt Bay, New Guinea on 10 October, 1944 to supervise the forming up of Echelon L-5, consisting of three Army Y-Oilers, nine Army LT tugs and tows, five Army TP class tugs and one Army F-boat, all towing various equipment, including the dredge RAYMOND. They were joined by other Army units en route and changed course on the 24th to keep clear of convoys sortieing from Leyte Gulf. On the 25th the CORONADO entered San Pedro Bay and arrived at the northern transport area at 0900. Tugs and tows were directed to anchor in the area between the northern transport area and the line of departure to Red Beach. On the 26th the CORONADO fired with all guns that could be brought to bear on a Japanese Val at about 5,000 feet and later opened fire on enemy aircraft passing

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC NAVAL OPERATIONS DECEMBER 1944

LEGEND:

US ships
 ORmoc Bay landing
 Mindoro landing
 T-6, T-7, T-8
 Mindoro resupply echelon
 Jap airfields
 Jap ships
 Jap airfields
 Jap ships



to northward on the eastern side of San Pedro Bay. She later joined Task Unit 78.2.21 standing out of Leyte Gulf. At 1915 she opened fire on a plane at a range of 1,000 to 1,500 yards on the radar screen. The plane was not seen but while the ship was swinging to the right a splash, believed to be a bomb which failed to detonate, was observed a little abaft of the starboard beam. Later the plane crossed the ship's bow about 100 yards distance and at least one hit was observed. The CORONADO anchored in Humboldt Bay on November 4, 1944.


ENEMY
PLANE
DOWNED

Again on 12 November, 1944 she was under way as a member of Echelon L-13 which included 22 LST's besides LST-1015 (flag); APC-18; AK-102 and 11 merchant ships. Two more LST's joined on the 13th and 17 LST's and AF-16 joined on the 14th. The disposition was known as Task Group 76.5. On 19 November, the vessels arrived off Catmon Hill, Leyte Gulf, where the convoy stopped and began breaking up to proceed to assigned beaches. Later the CORONADO proceeded to a point 8 miles from Catmon Hill to rendezvous with an outbound convoy. While escorting the LST-741 to the main body of the convoy at 0948 on 21 November, a splash was observed near the leading LST in column three. At the same time a low flying twin-engined Japanese bomber streaked the length of the convoy from van to rear, went out on the starboard quarter and was not fired upon, as there were numerous friendly carrier planes in the area at the time. At 1001 another "Lilly" came in low on the starboard bow of the same LST and dropped a bomb which missed, but this plane was almost completely destroyed by AA fire from LST's. The convoy reached Humboldt Bay on the 25th without further incident. On 12 November, 1944 a Japanese suicidal plane crashed on the boat deck of LST-66, killing eight and wounding 14 men of the gun crew.

SS ANTOINE
SAUGRAIN
TORPEDOED

On 5 December, 1944, while the CORONADO was escorting a convoy consisting of 1 AP, 3 AK's, 5 LST's, 21 merchant ships, and 9 army vessels to Leyte, it was observed that the starboard side of the convoy was under attack by an enemy bomber. The bombs dropped did no damage and the enemy plane escaped. Another enemy plane was sighted at 1216 heading in on the port side of the convoy, flying very low. The CORONADO went to general quarters and began firing her port weapons. As the plane passed ahead it launched a torpedo which hit the SS ANTOINE SAUGRAIN's stern. "Cease firing" was ordered as the plane crossed the CORONADO's bow, but a few rounds were fired from forward starboard automatic weapons and one of these killed a Coast Guard officer who had placed himself in the line of fire and was not observed by the crew. The SAUGRAIN, by this time dead in the water, was again hit by a torpedo from another "Oscar" and began settling slowly forward. She was quickly abandoned by all hands. The CORONADO, LT-454 and SAN PEDRO put boats over to pick up survivors. The CORONADO received on board 223

AN LST BURNS UNDER A CLOUD OF BLACK SMOKE RISING FROM ANOTHER LST HIT BY THE ENEMY ATTACKERS DURING
THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS ON MINDORO IN THE PHILIPPINES




Army troops, 8 Navy gun crew members and 31 merchant seamen, including the SAUGRAIN's master, who later went back to the damaged ship with the troops's commanding officer. By 1600, when she had settled to the point of drawing 27 feet and had taken a 12-15 degree starboard list, the settling and listing stopped. About that time 7 enemy planes were seen in a group 12 miles southward. At 1630 one enemy bomber started to make a run in, starting in low from about 6,000 yards. The plane was fired on by the CORONADO, hits being observed when it was about 1,000 yards from the SAUGRAIN. The right wing of the bomber started smoking as it dropped a bomb 300 yards on the SAUGRAIN's starboard beam. It was hit again, began to lose altitude, and was last seen as it passed into a rain squall. It was tracked by surface radar until it disappeared suddenly from the screen at about 6 miles. The SAUGRAIN refused to sink and was taken in tow by the LT-454. At daylight on the 6th she looked about the same and seemed to have a good chance of making port. At 0741, a "Betty" arrived in the vicinity furiously chased by four P-38's and was shot down in flames, before it could approach the SAUGRAIN. At 0800, the CORONADO was released and proceeded to San Pedro Bay. At 1600 it was learned that the SAUGRAIN had sunk after receiving a third torpedo. There had been no loss of life among the personnel originally on board.

ORMOC - PHILIPPINES

OCCUPATION OF ORMOC

At the beginning of December, 1944, our forces had cleared the Japanese from most of eastern Leyte and were moving westward through the central mountain range. The enemy still held the western part of the island, including all of the Ormoc corridor, except Limon at the north, with about 35,000 troops. They were being supplied through the port of Ormoc. On 6 December, a Task Group left Leyte Gulf and proceeded without incident to Ormoc Bay. The beaches selected for landing extended from three to four miles to the southwest of the town of Ormoc. The mine-sweepers preceded the rest of the group and cleared a channel in Canigat West Pass on the 6th. After a 20 minute bombardment by destroyers and rocket craft, the troops of the 77th Division were landed beginning at 0707 and by 0900 all vessels were unloaded except one LSM and one LCI which had been stranded on a reef. Enemy air attacks began at 0940 and the MAHAN (DD) and WARD (APD) were damaged by suicide attacks and had to be sunk by our own gunfire. Suicide attacks continued while the attack group was forming up for return to Leyte Gulf. On 7 and 11 December the Japanese made efforts to reinforce their troops on Leyte but both convoys were intercepted by Marine and Army aircraft and several enemy vessels were sunk, although some enemy craft succeeded in landing troops and supplies at west coast ports on Leyte. A re-supply echelon arrived off Ormoc about 2300 on the 11th. It was attacked by suicide aircraft and the REID (DD) was sunk. There was heavy machine gun and light artillery fire after the landing craft had neared the beaches but no damage was done. As the convoy was retiring on the 12th it was attacked by some 30 enemy aircraft, 16 of which were shot down by combat air patrols and ship's gunfire.



MINDORO - PHILIPPINES

EARLY OPPOSITION NEGLECTIBLE

Because of adverse weather conditions at Leyte airfields and unexpectedly strong enemy air reaction, control of the air over Leyte was not complete on 5 December, the date set for the original Mindoro landings. The date was, therefore, advanced to 15 December. The objective was to provide dry-weather airfields to support future large scale landings on Luzon. Heavy forces of assault troops were not necessary as only about 200 enemy troops were thought to be in the landing area and not more than 500 on the entire island. During passage to the beaches there was much enemy air opposition and more air attacks developed during unloading at the beaches, when two LST's were hit and set afire, and HOWORTH (DD) damaged by suicide attacks. Altogether 33 enemy planes were shot down in these attacks. No mines were found by the minesweepers and opposition at the beaches was negligible. Objectives ashore were quickly taken and construction of airfields and roads begun immediately. By 22 December the San Jose field was in operation for P-38's and B-24's. On the 26th Japanese naval units bombarded shore positions on Mindoro for an hour and then retired to the west. Several of our merchant ships off the beachhead were damaged. Air attacks on the positions at Mindoro were made repeatedly during the rest of December and ten enemy planes attacked a convoy on the 28th, blowing up an ammunition ship and damaging another vessel. By the end of the month about 373 enemy aircraft had attacked our Mindoro positions, of which some 145 were reported destroyed.

FS-367 TAKES SURVIVORS FROM USS MARIROSA

At about 1530 on 30 December, 1944, Japanese planes began a sudden and devastating attack on shipping in San Jose harbor sinking or damaging four ships. One enemy plane crash-dived the USS ARCTURUS, a PT tender, which sank. A second made a low-level strafing and bombing attack on a group of LST's unloading at White Beach, blowing the stern off one LST and sinking it. The same plane then turned to seaward in the direction of the USS MARIROSA, a Liberty type converted oil tanker. The Coast Guard manned FS-367 was anchored some three hundred yards away. Despite heavy fire from ships and shore batteries the Japanese plane succeeded in crash diving the MARIROSA, striking it amidships from the port side and penetrating the cargo of high-octane gasoline. The ship burst instantly into flame. A number of the ship's crew were blown or jumped into the water and the FS-367 weighed anchor preparatory to going to her assistance. As they were beginning to get under way, a third Japanese plane came in for a low-level attack on destroyers patrolling outside the harbor. This plane received a hit which set it afire and it crashed into the USS GANESVOORT, which immediately began to burn and settle into the water. The FS-367 proceeded to the assistance of the MARIROSA and began taking on survivors. She stayed alongside until all survivors had been taken off and was then signalled to stand off at a safer distance. At 2130 the USS GANESVOORT launched two torpedoes into the MARIROSA. The FS-367 was preparing to move in order to avoid burning gasoline from the MARIROSA which was spreading over the bay, when the GANESVOORT, which was much nearer the fire, requested the 367 to come alongside to take off its crew. By the time they reached the GANESVOORT the gasoline had spread to such an extent that the latter was in immediate danger of being engulfed so instead of taking off personnel the FS-367 warped alongside and began towing

INVASION OF LUZON
9 JANUARY 1945

21ST BOMBER COMMAND
STRIKES JAPAN.

3-22 JAN. FAST CARRIER FORCES
STRIKE ON ARC FROM OKINAWA
THROUGH FORMOSA, HONG KONG,
HAINAN, TO SAIGON, HITTING
LUZON AIRFIELDS 6, 7 JAN.

LEGEND

[illegible]

6 JAN Fire Support, Escort Carrier, Minesweeper Groups begin operations in Lingayen G, also orb brunt of last major Japanese air effort from Philippines.
9 JAN 4th CG Groups enter Gulf, complete Landing operations with light opposition.

General route, Leyte to
Lingayen, selected for
directness, best weather,
best air cover.

Advance Group through
Sungoo St. daylight/3.
Leading Carney through
Leyte 6. evening /4.
Second Carney through.
Leyte 5. morning /6.

FAR EASTERN AIRFORCE
FROM MINDORO, LEYTE,
MOROTAI, STRIKES ENEMY
COMMUNICATIONS AND AIR
FIELDS IN PHILIPPINES,
AUGMENTS COVER FOR
CONVOYS FROM LEYTE TO
LINGAYEN.

CHINA-BASED MTH-20TH
BOMBER COMMANDS STRIKE
COLLECTIVES WITHIN RANGE
SCOUT CHINA SEAS AND
SINGAPORE AREAS BEFORE
AND DURING OPERATIONS.

BORNEO

NEW GUINEA

CHINA

Indo-Chin

-162-

them to safer anchorage. At this time another alert was sounded and shortly thereafter a Japanese plane was shot down almost directly overhead. The GANESVOORT finally dropped anchor in seven fathoms of water several hundred yards off White Beach. Next day she was abandoned by her crew in a sinking condition. No casualties were suffered aboard the FS-367.

PALOMPON - PHILIPPINES

CHIEF PORT REMAINING ON LEYTE OCCUPIED

Palompon, the chief remaining port in Japanese possession on Leyte was occupied by our ground forces on 25 December. Kanaga, terminus of the road from Palompon on the Ormoc-Penampoan highway, was also occupied. We further sent a few sorties against enemy installations and barge hide-outs on Samar and the Camotes Islands. We suffered no losses on these missions.

MARINDUQUE - PHILIPPINES

A STEP TOWARD LUZON

Our landing on Marinduque Islands east of Northern Mindoro on the morning of 3 January 1945, was in preparation for Luzon operations. The island itself is of little value, being mountainous and wooded, but it commands the eastern entrance to the Verde Island Passage between Mindoro and the Batangas area of Luzon, as well as the Sibuyan Sea.

FAIS ISLAND - CAROLINES

FAIS ISLAND NOT USED AS AN ENEMY BASE

Suspecting that Fais Island, located a short distance south and east of Ulithi might be a base for enemy midget submarines or a communications center, a landing was made on the southeast beach on 1 January, 1945. The western half of the island was searched on the same day but no Japanese were found. A more intense search on the 3rd brought contact with the enemy in a cave in that part of the island and eight Japanese were killed together with three of our men. When six Japanese civilians surrendered later it was ascertained that only three of the enemy remained in the island. The radio station and hospital were destroyed after removing all valuable equipment. The American flag was raised on the 4th and the task force returned to Ulithi after restoring the native king to his rule over the 280 natives. The island had never been used as a submarine base, but the radio station had remained operative until 24 December when the transmitter had gone out of commission.

LINGAYEN GULF - PHILIPPINES

OBJECTIVES OF LINGAYEN OPERATION

The prompt seizure of the Central Luzon area, destruction of its defense forces, thus depriving the enemy of the northern entrance to the South China Sea, as well as the securing of bases for further operations against the Japanese were the main objectives of the Lingayen Gulf operations. Establishment of a beachhead was to be followed by an advance through

U.S. PROGRESS ASHORE LUZON AND MINDORO

31 JANUARY 1945


Legend:



AMPHIBIOUS LANDING,
DATE.



AREA OCCUPIED BY U.S. FORCES
TO 31 JANUARY 1945.



the central plains to Manila. S-day was set for 9 January, 1945. The presence of the Third Fleet in the waters east of the Philippines, following the victory in the Battle for Leyte Gulf, as well as that of our submarines in the waters west of Luzon, made any sortie of Japanese Navy units in this region very hazardous. In the air, our land-based planes from Mindoro, Leyte, Morotai and Angaur along with carrier-based planes of the Third and Seventh Fleet gave us a preponderance of air superiority. While enemy strength on Luzon was estimated at 150,000 on 1 January, the 35,000 troops in the immediate vicinity of Lingayen Gulf were found to be mostly in the hills of the north and east. We were to land 68,500 troops on S-day, bringing the total to 162,250 by the end of January. Cooperating with these would be numerous guerrilla forces on Luzon.


NATURE OF
TERRAIN

The entire inner end of Lingayen Gulf is bordered by sandy beaches, within a rectangular gulf area 20 miles wide and 30 miles long. The beaches have such a gradual slope that pontoon causeways are usually necessary for LST's to unload. Certain beaches at San Fabian, however, were suitable for dry-ramp beaching of LST's and this speeded up unloading. Beach defenses were weak and very few mines were found. The January season was the driest of the year and the flooding which would have been met in the rainy season from the many lagoons running parallel to the landing beaches was reduced to a minimum. The landing beaches were located on the south and southeast shores of Lingayen Gulf, one group being opposite the town of Lingayen and others on both sides of San Fabian.

THE
APPROACH

Task Force 77 under the command of Vice Admiral T. C. Kinkaid (Commander Seventh Fleet) was organized into 10 groups including Flag Bombardment and Fire Support, Close Covering, Escort Carrier, CVE-DE Hunter Killer, Mine-sweeping and Hydrographic, Screening, Salvage and Rescue, Reinforcement, and Service. Task Force 78 under Vice Admiral D. E. Barbey constituted the San Fabian Attack Force, while the Lingayen Attack Force (Task Force 79) was under Vice Admiral T. S. Wilkinson. All groups used the same general route of approach, through Surigao Strait, the Mindanao Sea, and the Sulu Sea, passing west of Negros, Panay and Mindoro, thence well off-shore to the west of Luzon, entering Lingayen Gulf on southeasterly courses. Advanced forces were divided into two main groups, each comprising 6 carriers, with an equal proportion of heavy ships and screen. They made a daylight passage of Surigao Strait on 3 January and an unsuccessful suicide attack was made that evening on the carrier MAKIN ISLAND. Next day the carrier OMMANEY BAY was hit by a suicide plane in the Sulu Sea, while its planes were fully gassed and armed. Explosions and fires followed and the ship had to be abandoned and sunk. On the 5th, during a raid outside Mindoro Strait, six suicide planes hit and damaged six of our vessels including two carriers. On the morning of the 6th all advanced groups reached the Lingayen Gulf area. The Attack Forces (Task Forces 78 and 79) were divided into two main convoys each covered by two carriers, as well as land-based fighter cover and also by anti-submarine patrols until after passage through Mindoro Strait. During the afternoon of the 5th a Japanese midget submarine missing BOISE (CL) with two torpedoes, was rammed and probably sunk. Another submarine fired at an LST unit. Suicide dives in the Sulu Sea were made on an LST on the 7th.

COAST GUARD MANNED INVASION TRANSPORT CALLAWAY (APA-35)



COAST GUARD MANNED
USS CALLAWAY HIT

At dawn on the 8th another enemy attack developed and the carrier KADASHAN BAY and the transport CALLAWAY (Coast Guard manned) were hit. Both ships continued in formation. The attack took place about 35 miles from shore and 60 miles from Manila off the West Coast of Luzon. Two Japanese planes had previously fallen before the guns of the CALLAWAY. It was the third that now was downed but in falling scored a searing blow in the super-structure of the transport. The attack killed several members of the crew instantly and started a blaze on the starboard side of the super-structure which turned men into human torches. Flames leaped to the top of the stack and shot down toward the engine room through a ragged hole in the upper fiddley. Men jumped up, others jumped down, they ran and they rolled on the deck trying to escape the flames and put out the fire on their own clothes and skin. The blaze was quickly brought under control. There were nearly 50 casualties.

LEONARD WOOD
AT LINGAYEN

On 30 December, 1944 the Coast Guard manned USS LEONARD WOOD sailed from Sansapor, New Guinea in company with Task Group 78.5 for the capture and occupation of Lingayen Gulf Area. Embarked were 6th Division units and other Army elements totaling 95 Army officers and 992 enlisted men together with 457 short tons of cargo. The convoy was attacked several times and the WOOD assisted in the destruction of one Japanese plane. Arriving at Lingayen on 9 January, the transport unloaded all troops and supplies and departed on the same day in Task Group 79.14.1 for Leyte.


USS CAMBRIA
UNDER ATTACK

As flagship of ComTransRon 12, the Coast Guard manned USS CAMBRIA (APA-36) carried 52 officers and 545 enlisted men of Headquarters Company, 108 Infantry Regiment and other units of the 40th Division, to Lingayen Gulf as a member of Task Group 79.2. On the trip to Lingayen Gulf the crew had their first experience with suicide plane attacks, and witnessed the successful Japanese attack on the CVE KITKUN BAY and USS COLUMBIA. It was practically a continuous air raid alert during January 9 and 10 when the CAMBRIA was engaged in landing troops at Lingayen. Early the first day a single bomb was dropped 100 yards astern and an hour later three bombs fell in the vicinity of the ship. An assist was scored by the 1.1's in the latter instance. Early the following day the 1.1's scored another assist on an enemy plane which dropped bombs off the starboard quarter, and astern. Personnel performance of the crew was excellent and upon completion of the mission the CAMBRIA departed for Leyte. She arrived again at San Fabian with the 1st Lingayen Reinforcement Group on the 27th. En route the LSD SHADWELL had been hit by a torpedo from a Japanese plane and sent back to Leyte.

THE LANDING

After their arrival on schedule at the selected transport areas in lower Lingayen Gulf, ships of the Attack Force began debarkation of troops in LVT's and other landing craft at 0715 on 9 January. The first waves landed under cover of a heavy bombardment at 0930. The beach positions were not manned by the enemy at Lingayen. Opposition was negligible. At San Fabian beaches sporadic mortar and artillery fire began at about 1000 and caused some damage and casualties to landing craft until they were silenced. LVT's, DUKW's and self-propelled

COAST GUARD MANNED LST'S ARE AMONG THE FIRST TO DROP THEIR RAMPS AT MANILA AFTER AMERICAN FORCES
HAD DRIVEN THE JAPS FROM THE CAPITAL CITY OF THE PHILIPPINES



pontoon barges were used to unload the larger transports and many were ready to leave at the end of S-day in a fast convoy. From then until 12 January, a fast and a slow convoy left each day as the rest of the ships were unloaded. Despite smoke screens laid at sunrise and sunset to protect transports, suicide planes damaged several screening vessels on the 10th and 12th and sunk an LCI(M) in the transport area, damaging seven others including a transport, two destroyers, three LST's and an LCI(G) which had to be abandoned. No ships were lost during the return trip to Leyte though three were damaged by suicide planes, one LST seriously.

SUBIC BAY - PHILIPPINES


SAN ANTONIO
AND GRANDE ISLAND About 35,000 troops were landed on 29 January, near San Antonio, fifteen miles northwest of Subic Bay to support the drive towards Manila. There was no opposition as guerillas were already in control of the area. Next day a battalion landed on Grande Island, a fortified island at the mouth of Subic Bay. Beach mechanisms from the heavy guns had been removed by our troops in 1942 and never replaced by the enemy. The troops which had landed at San Antonio the previous day had already reached Olongapo. The new beachhead was one of the few points where our troops could cross the Zambales Mountains, a formidable barrier between the west coast of Luzon and interior provinces. The entire Subic Bay area was under our control by 1700 of 30 January.

CG MANNED
CAVALIER
TORPEDOED On the morning of 30 January, the Coast Guard manned USS CAVALIER, an auxiliary attack transport, in a return convoy from the San Antonio area was torpedoed at position 14°-48'N., 119°-18'E. off Subic Bay by a submarine. She was struck on the port side in the vicinity of the shaft alley. The transport did not sink and was towed to Leyte.

NASUGBU - PHILIPPINES

OUTFLANKS
MANILA DEFENSE On 31 January, a separate Attack Group landed troops off the 11th Air-borne Division at Nasugbu, south of the entrance to Manila Bay. The landings were made to outflank the troops defending Manila. There was no return fire after a short preliminary bombardment and the troops landed with light opposition which was quickly wiped out. The Attack Group consisted of CGC SPENCER, 4 APD's, 35 LCI's, 8 LSM's, 6 DD's, 3 DE's and 27 miscellaneous small craft. After a 35 mile dash these troops reached the southern limits of Manila on 5 February. Meanwhile, units of the 37th Infantry Division continued their advance on Manila from the Northwest, as units of the First Cavalry Division of the Sixth Army entered the city from the northeast on the 3rd. The fall of Manila was formally announced on the 6th. In hailing the fall of Manila, General Douglas MacArthur spoke of it as "the end of one great phase of the Pacific struggle. We are well on our way, but Japan itself is our final goal."

THE USS SERPENS, A CARGO SHIP MANNED BY A COAST GUARD CREW, LOST AS THE RESULT OF ENEMY ACTION



JAPANESE Q-BOAT
DESTROYS ITSELF
IN ATTACK ON
FS-309

The Coast Guard manned FS-309 was moored to the Wawa River Wharf, Nasugbu Bay on 14 February 1945, when at 0335 the stern gun watch observed a small boat approaching from astern. Shortly after mooring to the wharf on 8 February, a low-lying protective raft, improvised from heavy timbers, had been moved alongside on the port quarters to protect the vessel from possible attack by surface or sub-surface craft. The craft was seen to turn to port, possibly to avoid the FS-309's kedge anchor line. Then it turned to starboard until headed directly for the FS-309. The blinker light was turned on the small boat and it was seen to contain three helmeted, green-uniformed Japanese soldiers. General quarters was immediately sounded, but before this state was reached, a terrific explosion took place. The smaller boat disappeared and a large quantity of water and sand was blown aboard the FS-309. The small boat was a Q-boat which looked much like a Chris Craft pleasure boat but carried two depth charges, and attacked with suicidal intent. The fact that the boat unaccountably swung stern to the FS-309 and exploded before reaching its objectives, indicated that the attacking boat ^{hit} one of the underwater projections at the after outside corner of the raft. All personnel on the FS-309 was found to be safe. The water was pumped out of the after-crew's quarters and lazarette.

SINKING OF THE USS SERPENS


CG MANNED
AMMUNITION
SHIP LOST

The USS SERPENS, a cargo ship manned by Coast Guard personnel, was sunk by an explosion on 29 January, 1945 while anchored off Lunga Beach, Guadalcanal. The explosion was possibly due to an enemy attack. The SERPENS, a 14,250 ton ammunition ship, was loading depth bombs at the time. A number of other ships nearby were damaged in the explosion, which also caused some damage ashore. Thirteen officers and 193 crewmen, representing nearly the whole of the SERPENS complement, were reported killed. The only survivors were 2 officers and 8 of the crew members, who were ashore at the time of the explosion. In addition, 57 Army personnel including one officer, were killed. "As we headed our personnel boat shoreward" an eye-witness reported "the sound and concussion of the explosion suddenly reached us, and as we turned, we witnessed the awe-inspiring death drama unfold before us. As the report of screeching shells filled the air and the flash of tracers continued, the water splashed throughout the harbor as the shells hit. We headed our boat in the direction of the smoke and as we came into closer view of what had once been a ship, the water was filled only with floating debris, dead fish, torn life jackets, lumber and other unidentifiable objects. The smell of death, and fire, and gasoline, and oil was evident and nauseating. This was sudden death, and horror, unwanted and unasked for, but complete."

MARIVELES - CORREGIDOR - PHILIPPINES

CGC INGHAM
AT MARIVELES

An amphibious operation staged from Olongapo landed elements of the 38th Division at Mariveles Harbor on the southern tip of Bataan Peninsula on 15 February, 1945. The landing was preceded by extensive minesweeping



MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR OPERATION February 1945

operations in which some 452 mines were cleared from a number of mine fields, the largest extending south from Caballo Island. A bombardment of enemy gun positions on Corregidor and on the mainland was laid down by five light cruisers and nine destroyers and the area was also heavily hit by Liberators and Bostons of the Far Eastern Air Force. The assault craft (Task Group 78.3) included CGC INGHAM, 6 LCI(L)'s, 5 LST's, 6 LCT's, 20 LSM's and 25 LCM's, while 2 PC's, 6 LCI(R)'s, and 6 LCS(L)'s provided inshore support. The convoy was escorted by six destroyers. The CGC INGHAM served as flagship for the Task Group. Fire was received from the north coast of Corregidor four rounds landing in the water in the transport area and causing several casualties to personnel in LCP(R), embarked from APD's. The enemy batteries were silenced by our light cruisers and destroyers. The INGHAM maintained a position during daylight hours at the entrance to Mariveles Harbor directing operations. The first waves hit the beach at the head of the harbor at 1000 and later waves unloaded at several other points along the shores of the harbor. Our troops quickly seized the Mariveles airstrip and fanned out north, east and west. On the 16th we secured the Mariveles Harbor by capturing Cochinos Point, dominating the western entrance.

CORREGIDOR
TAKEN BY
AIR AND SEA

On the 16th the INGHAM again took her station at the entrance to Mariveles Harbor, after having stood to seaward during the night. During the night enemy suicide boats had sunk three LSI(G)'s guarding the harbor entrance. At 0835 the INGHAM commenced standing for Black (San Jose) beach, on the south side of Corregidor in the van of the Corregidor Attack Group. Paratroops commenced dropping on Corregidor at 0840, after an hour of heavy air strikes. At 1005 the INGHAM took station about 3,500 yards off San Jose Beach and commenced directing landing operations. The first wave landed at 1039 with light opposition. By 1150 the beachhead had been established and secured. Within 24 hours our troops had split the island in two from north to south against resistance that, while still effective, showed signs of stiffening. The Japanese defenders, broken up into isolated pockets, and with all means of escape cut off, fought desperately with automatic weapons and small arms. The east entrance of the tunnel under Malinta Hill was blocked ^{by} landslides caused by the pre-invasion bombardment with many Japanese thought to be trapped inside. A tunnel and several bunkers south-east of Rock Point were captured on the 19th. A Japanese suicide attack on the same day penetrated to the command post of the rocky plateau known as "Topside." Resistance continued until the end of February when more than 4,000 enemy dead had been counted.

IWO JIMA - VOLCANO ISLANDS

REASONS FOR
SELECTION OF
IWO JIMA

A number of small volcanic islands lay on the direct line of flight from the Marianas bases of our heavy bombers attacking Tokyo and other industrial cities of Japan Proper. Our long-range B-29's could make the flight to Tokyo and return but they could not be given fighter cover for that entire distance. Iwo Jima was about 640 miles from Tokyo on the north and an equal distance from Saipan on the south. The island had no barrier reefs and the beach slopes seemed to promise a "dry ramp" for landing craft. Being only 4.5 miles long and 2.3 miles wide, the entire island

ISLAND SECURED
16 MARCH

KITANO PT.

KANGOKU ROCK

HANARE ROCK

HIRAIWA BAY
1 MARCH

MOTOYAMA AIRFIELD NO 3
(UNDER CONSTRUCTION)

ORANGE 1

ORANGE 2

KAMA ROCK

WHITE 1

BOAT YARD AND
LANDING

WHITE 2

BROWN 1

BROWN 2

PURPLE 1

ALTERNATE BEACHES
(NOT USED)

5th MAR DIV.

MOTOYAMA AIRFIELD NO 1

MOTOYAMA AIRFIELD NO 2

4th MAR DIV.

BLUE 2

BLUE 1

YELLOW 2

YELLOW 1

RED 2

FUTATSU ROCK

RED 1

GREEN 1

LANDINGS MADE
19 FEBRUARY

SURIBACHI MT.
540 FT

TOBIISHI PT.

IWO JIMA

LANDING BEACHES AND DAY-BY-DAY
FRONT LINE POSITIONS

0 500 1000 2000 yards

141°17'

141°18'

141°19'

141°20'

141°21'

could be brought within easy range of naval gunfire. It had three airfields, two of which were operational and a third under construction. Iwo was one of the few islands of the Volcano or Bonin group that had enough flat land on its 8 square miles for the construction of airstrips. The Japanese had heavily fortified Iwo and garrisoned the island with some 21,000 men. Mount Suribachi rises to a height of 550 feet at the southern end of Iwo Jima and is joined to the rest of the island by a somewhat narrow but progressively widening isthmus of volcanic sand, along the southeast coast of which our landings were made.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ATTACK

Some nine hundred vessels were included in the various Task Groups of the Fifth Fleet and other forces supporting it. Under Task Force 50 were the special groups such as Fleet Flagship (50.1), Relief Fleet Flagship (50.2), Search and Reconnaissance Group (50.3), Anti-submarine Warfare Group (50.7), Logistic Support Group (50.8) and Service Squadron 10 (50.9). Task Force 51 was the Joint Expeditionary Force, Task Force 52 the Amphibious Support Force, Task Force 53 the Attack Force, Task Force 54 the Gunfire and Covering Force, Task Force 56 the Expeditionary Troops, Task Force 58 the Fast Carrier Force and Task Force 94 was Forward Area, Central Pacific. Under Fleet Admiral Nimitz and supporting the operations were the Submarine Force of the Pacific Fleet, the Strategic Air Forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas, the North Pacific Force, the Forward Area Force, the South Pacific Force, the Marshalls-Gilberts Force, the Service Force of the Pacific Fleet, the Air Force of the Pacific Fleet, and the Army Forces of Pacific Ocean Areas.

COAST GUARD MANNED VESSELS

Coast Guard manned vessels were included in Task Forces 53 (Attack Force) and Task Force 51 (Miscellaneous Task Groups of the Joint Expeditionary Force). Thus the USS BAYFIELD was part of Task Group 53.2 (Transport Group Baker). In Task Group 53.3 (Tractor Flotilla) were Coast Guard manned LST's 70, 758, 761, 787, 789, 760, 763, 764, 792, 784, 782, 785, and 795. Under Task Group 51.1 (Joint Expeditionary Force Reserves) was the Coast Guard manned USS CALLAWAY (APA) and in Task Group 51.3 (Service and Salvage Group) was the Coast Guard manned LST-766. In the Tractor Flotilla were the ships which carried troops, equipment and supplies to the objective and put them ashore during the assault phase. Their total was 30 APA's, 12 AKA's, 3 LSD's, 1 LSV, 46 LST's, and 30 LSM's plus appropriate flagships and escorts. The Joint Expeditionary Force Reserve comprised some 13 APA's, 1 AP, 4 AKA's, 2 AK's with 5 DD's, and 3 DE's screening. Embarked was the Landing Force Reserve (Third Marine Division) which was kept in areas removed from the objective until after D-day. There were 75,144 Landing Force employed in the Iwo Operation of which 570 were Army Assault Troops, 70,647 Marine Assault Troops and 3,927 Navy Assault Personnel. There were 36,164 Garrison Troops which were kept intact to take over the defense and development of the island after its capture. These included 23,830 Army, 492 Marine and 11,842 Navy. The Expeditionary Troops employed in the operations thus totaled 111,308. The Fourth and Fifth Marine Divisions executed the assault.

PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS

The minesweepers and the Underwater Demolition Group arrived at Iwo Jima on 16 February, 1945 as part of the Amphibious Support Group. The minesweepers swept the adjacent waters to within 6,000 yards of the shore with

OFF THE FIRE-SWEPT BEACHES OF IWO JIMA, AMTRACKS LOADED WITH MARINES EMERGE FROM THE DEPTHS OF THE
COAST GUARD-MANNED LST-787. AT RIGHT. AND SURGE TOWARD SHORE



negative results. Fire support ships delivered almost continuous fire at ranges from 1,800 to 3,000 yards, on pill-boxes, blockhouses, etc., on the eastern beach area and defenses behind it. This bombardment continued throughout the 16th, 17th, and 18th. Underwater demolition operations disclosed no underwater obstacles in the beach approaches and that surf and beach conditions were suitable for landing. Two batteries of Coast defense guns were silenced, one on the 17th and one on the 18th. These had been well concealed and had they not been silenced there might have been disastrous consequences on D-Day.

THE
LANDING

Just before daylight on D-Day, 19 February, 1945, the Attack Force (TF-53) arrived off the Southeastern beaches of Iwo Jima. The two Transport Groups reached the Transport Areas off the Southwestern beaches about the same time and lowering their LCM's and LCVP's, debarked their troops into them. The LST's and LSM's put their LVT's, LVT (A)'s, and DUKW's into the water and the initial waves formed up at the Line of Departure off the Southeast beaches. The first waves struck the beaches at 0900 on a front of about 3,000 yards, receiving only a small amount of gunfire. Heavy mortar and artillery fire soon developed on the beaches. Beach conditions were bad. The surf broke directly on the beach, broaching some of the landing craft. Picked up and thrown broadside on the beach, they were swamped and wrecked by succeeding waves, sinking deeply into the sand. Wreckage piled higher and higher, extending seaward to damage propellers of landing ships. Troops from the landing craft struggled up the slopes of coarse, dry, volcanic sand. The sand bogged down wheeled vehicles and tracked vehicles moved with difficulty. As soon as the beachhead was secured LST's and LSM's were sent in to the beaches, but they also had difficulty in keeping from broaching. Tugs were being constantly employed to tow them clear when their anchors failed to hold because of the steep gradient of the beach. Attempts to launch pontoon causeways were unsuccessful because of the difficulty in anchoring the seaward ends. They broached, were damaged and sank, or ran adrift, becoming a menace to navigation. The beaches had finally to be closed to craft smaller than LCT's. Amphibious vehicles were used quite successfully in evacuating casualties. The beaches were finally cleared of accumulated wreckage, boats and pontoons were salvaged, and damaged ships repaired by the Service and Salvage Group. By the end of D-Day a total of 30,000 from both Marine Divisions had been landed. Heavy opposition had developed from the high ground in both flanks, but the Fifth Marines on the left had advanced rapidly across the narrow part of the island, capturing the SW end of Airfield No. 1, then pivoting SW against Mount Suribachi. The Fourth Marines on the right advanced across the steep and open slopes leading up to Airfield No. 1. They suffered heavy casualties from machine gun and mortar fire and from mines placed inland from the beaches.

MOUNT SURIBACHI
CAPTURED

Our troops gained from 100 to 500 yards during D plus 1 day (20 February), and captured Airfield No. 1. Some progress was made against Mount Surabachi and the beach-head was enlarged, making it less vulnerable to counter attack. The beaches were continually under heavy fire from both flanks



UNDER THE MENACING WALLS OF MOUNT SURIBACHI
LANDING CRAFT UNLOAD SUPPLIES ON THE BEACHES OF EMBATTLED IWO JIMA

and this hampered unloading, causing many casualties and the loss of considerable equipment, ammunition, and supplies. Foxholes or trenches dug in the volcanic sand, had to be completely revetted with boards, or other material to keep them from caving in. During the night enemy tanks and infantry pressed against our left flank but were repulsed. On D plus 2 and 3, Regimental Combat Team 28, employing flame throwers and demolitions, advanced against stubborn opposition and succeeded in surrounding the base of Mount Suribachi. On the morning of D plus 4, February 23, two battalions climbed to the rim and surrounded the crater. At 1035 the American flag was raised to its summit. Its capture eliminated enemy observation and fire from our rear and permitted freer use of the southern beaches. By the end of D plus 7, all of Airfield No. 2 was under control and the Third Marine's position in the center enabled it to support the advance of the Fourth and Fifth Marines through the more difficult terrain sloping to the sea on either flank. The attack now continued toward the village of Motoyama and Airfield No. 3. The Fifth Marines advanced more rapidly than the Fourth, against whom heavy opposition and difficult terrain held the gain to 1,500 yards in 25 days. The whole advance therefore, developed into a wheeling movement pivoting on the extreme right. The result was a general expansion of the beach-head in all directions on the Motoyama plateau in the center of the island. From here the flanks could be supported. By D plus 11 (2 March) a 4,000 foot runway had been completed on No. 1 Airfield ready for fighter plane operation and the receiving of transport planes. By D plus 12 (3 March) the Motoyama tableland and the last of the three airfields was under our control.

B-29 MAKES
FORCED LANDING

The first B-29 to make a successful forced landing on 4 March, demonstrated the value of the newly acquired Airfield No. 1. Two days later the first land-based fighters came in and relieved carrier aircraft in effective close support of troops three days later. The attack was now concentrated on the eastern shore of the northern plateau but little progress was made until 8-9 March, when a major infiltration of 500 to 1,000 enemy troops was wiped out. After this, resistance to our attack towards the beaches greatly diminished and in the next three days all the eastern coast to within 4,000 yards of Kitano Point, at the extreme north was secured. From 13 March, all supporting forces were engaged in reducing the defenses of Kitano Point and by 16 March (D plus 25) all organized resistance was declared at an end on Iwo Jima. Total U. S. casualties between 19 February and 23 March were 4,590 killed, 15,954 wounded, and 301 missing or a total of 20,845. The total enemy dead were 21,304 including 13,234 officially counted and buried and 8,070 estimated sealed in caves or buried by the enemy. Prisoners totaled 212, including 154 Japanese and 58 Korean.

USS BAYFIELD
AT IWO JIMA

The landing boats from the Coast Guard manned assault transport USS BAYFIELD (APA-33) and those from all the other transports, trying to put men on Iwo Jima beaches on D Day, took a terrific punishment which far exceeded anything their boat crewmen had experienced the previous summer in Normandy or Southern France. The entire beach area was littered with wrecked boats

OUT OF GAPING MOUTHS OF COAST GUARD-MANNED AND NAVY LANDING CRAFT ROSE THE GREAT FLOW OF INVASION
SUPPLIES TO THE BLACKENED SANDS OF IWO JIMA



and wreckage was so thick along some parts of the beach that the boats were finding difficulty in spotting a space clear enough to hit land. Japanese mortar emplacements concealed in the sides of Mount Suribachi and in the high wooded area looking down on the beach from the northeast, were laying a constant barrage right at the water's edge. Many of the boats were hit by this barrage. Others had broached and swung sideways so that the crews couldn't get them into deep water. Salvage boats, which ordinarily kept the beach clear by refloating or towing out and sinking wrecked craft, were unable to get into the beach long enough to work. Mortar fire drove them off. Nevertheless, the young Coast Guard boat crewman, most of them of teen-age, went into the beach time and again. As they approached the shore the water became dotted with shell splashes. The Japanese mortars controlled the beach. When the landing boats came to a halt at the water's edge, no longer a moving target, they had to lay there, completely exposed, for the time it took their cargo of men to run out. Other craft, loaded with jeeps, communication equipment and other material were on the beach for a much longer time. Some of the Coast Guardsmen manning these boats, did not get back to their ships. Those who did get back were soon off again with another load.

NO BEACHMASTERS
COULD REMAIN
ON BEACH

On other assault beaches in previous operations there had been beachmasters, salvage parties, and beach parties to keep the landing area clear. There was none of that on D Day at Iwo Jima because no one could remain on the beach. The Marine assault forces could only keep alive by moving inland. As a result the landing boats were operating pretty much on the initiative of their youthful coxswains. When a boat was wrecked it remained on the beach, a swashing, shifting menace to whatever came in next. Boats going back to the transport carried casualties, as many as could be brought down to the water's edge and taken aboard before the fire made it necessary to shove off. In spite of this the wounded were lying helplessly in shellholes a few yards in along the entire beach area. The fire was so heavy they could not be carried down to the boats even when the boats were available. Many of the hospital corpsmen themselves were wounded. Those of the assault forces who were alive had to keep moving forward.

NO SAFETY
ANYWHERE

A bare, completely vegetationless hillside rising in terraces, from three to ten feet in height was the beach area. It looked like a fine gravel dump. Our ships and planes had shelled and bombed the Japanese mortar emplacements on Mount Suribachi and in the high wooded areas, but the mortar shells continued to rain down on the beach relentlessly. At the water's edge were wrecked amphibious tanks, amphibious tractors and a few jeeps. Beside and under this wreckage was a scattering of dead and wounded. A few uninjured were trying to salvage a bit of radio or other equipment. The men lying there were the men who got it the moment they set foot on the beach. To run, even to crawl, in the soft gravelly volcanic sand was like trying to move through foot-deep mud. It was impossible to move at much more than a fast shuffle. Yet to remain near the water's edge any length of time was inviting certain death from the mortars. It was not much better in from the beach, except that here the deep holes and ridges dug by gunfire offered some protection. From time to time, even when



COAST GUARD LIEUT. (JG) TRUMAN C. HARDIN
PICTURED ABOARD THE COAST GUARD MANNED LST
ON WHICH HE PARTICIPATED IN THE INVASION OF IWO JIMA

not spurred into movement as the constantly shifting line of fire traced and retraced its path, some of the men crawled cautiously forward up the slope and into another hole. There was nothing to do but go forward. There was no safety anywhere. The Marines were trying to inch their way up to the point where they could come to hand to hand grips with the enemy. It was the only way they could fight. They had nothing at first but rifles and hand grenades. As yet they had no artillery, no mortars. They had no choice but to keep going until they could get to the enemy mortars and silence them with direct assault.

THE LST'S
MOVE IN

"The coffee-ground black dirt of Iwo island is on the decks of this LST tonight" wrote a Coast Guard correspondent a few nights later. "It was tramped in by thousands of rain-drenched, unshaven, dog-tired, U. S.

Marines. Ever since the LST beached they have been moving along a galley line, carrying trays of steak or hot spaghetti and gravy, cornbread, and paper cups of coffee.

"The battle for Iwo is only a few hundred yards away. The ship lies in the brightness of star shells overhead. Beneath her bow explosive flashes come from a Marine artillery position. A short time ago a man was hit there by sniper fire. Occasionally the rifles of sentries aboard ship crack. They are looking for Jap swimmers.

"The Marines are still coming out of the blackness of Iwo. You hear comments like 'This is the first hot chow I've had since D-Day' and 'Boy, What a meal!

"Coast Guardsmen are pulling dry clothes from their lockers. One man is wearing a white jumper and trousers,--he had given everything else away. The Marines have left behind their soaking wet battle-dirty clothing. Some of the crew are washing it and hanging it to dry under blowers, 'You can get it when you come back aboard' they say.


"Tired men are lying in bunks vacated by Coast Guardsmen. The wounded are here, too. They lie under blankets in every available place, on mess tables, in the crew's quarters and in the wardroom, tended by the ship's doctor.

"My buddy next to me was hit' one Marine relates. He said to me 'I think I'm hit.' He was. I said, 'Your're darned right you are.' He told me 'Isn't this a heck of a way to make a living?' Gee, that guy had courage.

"Below on the tank deck sweating men are loading howitzer shells into the amtracks which can make the grade in Iwo's loose coarse black dirt. With each load go ration cans of hot coffee and sandwiches for the men at the guns.

"Aboard, the Chief Commissary Steward said at last count he had fed 'at least three thousand men. But they're still coming.' They're still coming out of the blackness and the grit and the fighting."

AMTRACKS FROM COAST GUARD-MANNED LST'S CARRYING FOURTH DIVISION MARINES POKE THROUGH THE WRECKAGE TO
CRAWL UP ON THE BLACKENED SANDS OF IWO JIMA



LST-761 UNDER
FIRE FROM
MT. SURIBACHI

The Coast Guard manned LST-761 arrived off the southeast coast of Iwo Jima at 0730 on 19 February, 1945 as part of Task Group 51.13. By 0750 all LVT's had been launched with their assault personnel and the LST remained on station until evening, loading and repairing LVT's. At 2305 she proceeded to a point 300 yards off Yellow Beach and loaded all LVT's with ammunition, being under continuous shell from Mt. Suribachi. At 0600 on the 20th she stood out to her original position off the beach. On the afternoon of the 21st she proceeded shoreward launching causeways and anchoring them 8,000 yards off Yellow Beach. These were to be used as fuel barges for LVT's and DUKW's. On the 23rd at 1922 all battle stations were manned in preparation for an enemy air raid and at 1730 she fired for two minutes at enemy aircraft overhead. On the 24th the LST beached, transferring ashore CB's and their maintenance equipment, as well as Marines with their LST repair equipment and incidental gear. On the 25th and 26th, due to the heavy seas and wind, the LST was damaged while loading alongside an AKA and on the 27th while beached she received a near miss on her starboard side amidship from enemy mortar fire.


LST-782 LANDS
DUKW's AT
IWO JIMA

The LST-782, Coast Guard manned, was flagship of LST Unit Six (53.3.9) under Commander W. G. Millington, USCG. This was included in Tractor Group CHARLIE (53.3.7) under Captain Peterson, USCG, which in turn was part of Tractor Flotilla (53.3) Captain Brereton, USN. The LST arrived on station in LST area off Iwo Jima at 0755 on 19th February, 1945 and at 1250 commenced moving toward the Line of Departure to launch her DUKW's. The last of the 21 DUKW's was disembarked at 1620 and an hour later the first DUKW returned for reloading. At 1918 she retired to the Inner Transport area for the night. The bombardment of Iwo Jima by our ships was evident at all times from the moment the island hove into view. Battleship, cruiser, and destroyer bombardment continued at all times. Plane bombardment was almost continuous during daylight hours but in varying degrees of intensity. The crew witnessed bombing, rocket assaults and strafing. No air opposition was seen and there was very little anti-aircraft fire. On the 20th unloading at the Line of Departure was resumed via DUKW's and LVT's. The LCT-1030 was launched without difficulty. By 1800, 60% of the cargo, 95% of the rations and 30% of the ammunition had been unloaded. By the 21st the casualties among the DUKW's was quite high with fewer returning. LCVP's were loaded over the side in response to urgent appeal for artillery, ammunition, and white phosphorous. On the 22nd the LST began taking aboard casualties and then beached and completed unloading. While beached every effort was made to feed all comers. 5,500 cups of coffee with an undetermined amount of hot food was handed out in twelve hours. The engines had to be kept going to maintain the LST's position on the unusually steep beach and strong current parallel to it. There were 7 fathoms of water at the stern. On the 24th the LST rendezvoused with Task Unit 51.16.3 and departed for Guam.

LST-790
IN KAMIKAZE
ATTACK

The LST-790, which was Coast Guard manned arrived off Iwo Jima on the morning of 20 February, 1945 and about noon headed for the retirement area southeast of the island and north of Minami Iwo Jima where she cruised for the night. On the 21st while about 46 miles south-

COAST GUARD-MANNED LST UNLOADS AT TWO JIMA



east of Iwo Jima with Task Group 51.5, an enemy plane dove into the starboard side of LST-477, setting her afire forward with a loud explosion. About a minute later a second plane dove into the AKN-4 (KEOKUK) and a fire ensued with a loud explosion. Three Japanese planes were now observed coming from 300° in a shallow glide for the middle of the convoy with motors out. All ships were already at general quarters and put up considerable AA fire. One plane came in very low over the stern of LST-809, making firing difficult except by that ship and was splashed about 300 yards, on the port side of LST-790. The two planes pulled out of their dive and out of range, circled the convoy and seemed to deliberate another attack. Upon closing in they were once more repelled by AA fire from all ships and faded out of sight, heading north. The fires on the stricken ships looked very serious at first but they were extinguished rather rapidly. The LST was again attacked on the 22nd about 2 miles southeast of Iwo Jima, while in company with two other LST's and DE-750. At 1510 four planes were sighted coming in abreast, with two more astern of them. All guns of the LST-790, bearing to starboard, opened fire and all four planes appeared to be hit almost immediately after all our ships had opened fire. Two turned to their right and splashed ahead of the LST, one exploding in the air and the other going down after running out about 2½ miles. The third and fourth planes turned to their left, the third splashing ahead and the fourth to starboard. Observers claimed that fire from the LST-790 definitely accounted for three of the four planes. On the 24th the LST beached and unloaded 31 trucks in 32 minutes. She then commenced unloading pallets of food and water but this proceeded slowly due to lack of trucks from the beach. On the 26th she retracted and prepared to take in tow LST-42, which had a damaged rudder, with orders to beach her at Blue or Yellow Beach. Before this could be accomplished a sea going tug took over LST-42. The LST-790, unable to find a suitable anchorage, lay to and cruised for the balance of the day and at night took station with other LST's to the north of the big ship anchorage. On the 28th the LST sortied for departure, as part of the TU 51.16.8 for Saipan.


LST-792
HIT BY
MORTARS

The Coast Guard manned LST-792 arrived off Iwo Jima on 19 February, 1945 after an uneventful trip from Hawaii carrying 70 Army troops and 360 Marines with their equipment. A tremendous bombardment was followed by the landing of the first waves. On 24 February she beached at dusk to unload cargo and shortly after dark underwent one of the first air raids on the island. The crew opened fire and soon after received thirteen mortar hits and had to retract from the beach to prevent further damage to ship and personnel. Five men were wounded, and two were recommended for the Purple Heart. While beached at Iwo Jima, Mr. Rosenthal, the A.P. photographer who snapped the now immortal picture of the flag raising on Mt. Suribachi came aboard for a meal, having been on the beach since early in the landing. On the 28th the LST returned to Saipan.

LST-784
DUKW'S DO
NOT RETURN

The crew of the Coast Guard manned LST-784 saw the battle for Iwo Jima early on the dark morning of 19 February, 1945 as star shells were dropped over the island by bombarding fighting ships. At 0800 on D-Day the LST swung into position off the beach and maneuvered all day to avoid the projectiles which were detonating in the water in the tractor area. On the 20th she moved in to a position 500 yards off Blue

COAST GUARD MANNED COMBAT TRANSPORT BAYFIELD (APA-33)



Beach and released five Army DUKW's. They did not come back to the Line of Departure as planned and the ship waited for them most of the night. It was later discovered that all the DUKW's had been hit or had capsized in the heavy surf. The LST then proceeded to launch all of the pontoon barges. There was a strong offshore wind and two of the barges would not start and could be towed only by proceeding at one-third speed on one engine. All barges had to be serviced and by the time the 784 started back to the Line of Departure she was 22 miles offshore, out with the destroyer pickets. Two barges started in under their own power and the 784 managed to tow one of the remaining barges to the Line of Departure but was forced to abandon the other. On the 23rd, two boatloads of Marines were sent in to the beach and next day beached at "Red One" beach. That night an air raid interrupted unloading. Having finished unloading on the 25th the LST moored alongside AK-91 to transfer cargo to the beach. On the 28th, the LST took on post office personnel and equipment and became "Fleet Post Office, IWO JIMA." This duty continued until 5 March when she went alongside a merchant vessel to take more cargo to the beach. Air raids occurred on the first and second of March. On the 15th of March the LST got underway for Saipan.


LST-760
IS HIT

During the first three days of the assault on Iwo Jima, the Coast Guard manned LST-760 remained in the LST area, save for one night of retirement and several runs close to the beach to launch and retrieve DUKW's manned by reconnaissance parties. In the midafternoon of "D" plus three, the LST landed on Green Beach, a littered waste of black, volcanic ash at the foot of Mt. Suribachi. Unloading continued for two days. During the first night, sixteen casualties, an overflow from a nearby crowded field hospital unit, were taken aboard and treated by the ships pharmacists' mates. Occasional mortar shells burst on the beach close to the bow. On the morning of the 23rd, those on deck watched the scaling of Suribachi and the raising of the first American flag on its summit. During midmorning of the 25th the ship received its only serious hit, a heavy mortar shell which crashed on the main deck forward, scattering shrapnel and wounding two men in the compartment beneath. That afternoon the LST joined a convoy bound for Saipan.

BAYFIELD TAKES
ABOARD
CASUALTIES

It was the doctors and pharmacists' mates who had probably the toughest job aboard the BAYFIELD. They took aboard between 250 and 300 Marine casualties. They began coming aboard at night, brought to the ship on the small amphibious craft from the beach 2,000 yards away. Then they were transferred to the transport's landing boats and hoisted up to the deck in them. Some of the wounded, who were able to stand, clutched the gunwales. Others lay on stretchers on the floor boards. Blood-soaked bandages covered hands and arms and feet and legs and faces and showed through ragged holes in the dirt-caked uniforms. In the background was the incessant pounding of the artillery, the burst of mortar shells and rockets, the chattering of machine guns, and the crack of rifles. One by one they were gently helped and carried from the landing boats to the deck of the transport then taken below to the tiered bunks in sick bay and the crew's quarters.

THE COAST GUARD COMBAT CUTTER SPENCER




Here in the cramped, overcrowded compartments the ship's medical staff went to work. Pharmacists' mates went quietly from bunk to bunk with hypos and morphine. Bottles of whole blood and blood plasma hung from over-head pipes. In the ship's tiny operating room the powerful lights were focused on the bare abdomen of a young Marine. Three surgeons in white gowns and masks and rubber gloves bent over the boy deftly removing jagged pieces of shrapnel. Just outside the operating room, other men lay on blood-soaked stretchers waiting for surgery. At the end of the corridor was another compartment packed with the less seriously wounded: minor shrapnel and bullet wounds and concussion and shock cases, men who seemed to be physically whole but who had fought day after day until they had reached a point of physical and nervous exhaustion. One of the men in the first row of bunks was the only survivor of an entire platoon. In the next compartment, one man already had died and others were dying.

PALAWAN - PHILIPPINES

CGC SPENCER AT PALAWAN

The operation against Palawan was staged from Mindoro, the Attack Force departing there on 26 February, 1945, CGC SPENCER, with Brigadier General Harold H. Haney, Commanding General, 41st Infantry Division on board, acted as flagship and fleet guide for Task Group 78.2. The amphibious landing to seize the Puerto Princessa area was made on 28 February. This port possesses a good harbor, suitable for a seaplane base. The Airdrome, about one mile east of the town, included two runways of 4,300 and 4,500 feet, respectively. There were estimated to be 3,500 enemy troops on Palawan of which 2,000 were thought to be in the Puerto Princessa area. Only 600 of these however, were combat troops. Beach- ing conditions were generally undesirable due to fringing reefs, coral heads, and mangrove swamps backing some beaches. The plan was to land the first waves in LVT's and LCM's, later finding suitable places for beaching LST's and LSM's. We landed 5,322 combat troops and 2,094 service troops. Extensive bombing and strafing by the 5th and 13th Air Forces was effected for two days before the landing. No return fire was received when Covering and Support Group delivered scheduled bombardment fire for one and one-half hours before the landing. The initial landings, starting at 0845, were completed with no opposition encountered by the troops, who advanced rapidly inland, securing both of the nearby airfields by 1300. During the afternoon, one infantry company was transported in LVT's and LCM's to the mouth of the Iwahig River, where they were landed with only a few rounds of small-arms fire in opposition. At 1849 the SPENCER was underway patrolling off Puerto Princessa in company with combatant units of Task Group 78.2. Occupation of Puerto Princessa harbor area assured practical control of Palawan Island and extended our domination of the sea approaches to Southeastern Asia and Netherland East Indies, along a 500 mile stretch of the western Philippines from Lingayen Gulf to Puerto Princessa. The successful operation not only assured safe passage of our shipping throughout the Sulu Sea but rendered hazardous that of the enemy along his lifeline from the south which passes through the narrowest part of the South China Sea just opposite Palawan. The cremated remains of more than 150 American Soldiers and Marines were discovered at Puerto Princessa. They had been captured and been held prisoners of war until the invasion was about to begin. The Japanese then marched the prisoners into dugout air raid shelters, and after barricading

HIT BY JAP FIRE AT THE HEIGHT OF IWO JIMA'S D-DAY, AN AMERICAN AMMUNITION DUMP FLOWS SKYWARD, AS
COAST GUARD-MANNED AND NAVY LST'S MOVE IN



the entrances, poured gasoline in on helpless victims. They then set fire to the gasoline. Several managed to escape into the jungle and remained there until the American troops landed.

ZAMBOANGA - PHILIPPINES

ENEMY WITHDRAWS TO HILLS AT ZAMBOANGA

Guerrilla forces already occupied most of Zamboanga Peninsula, on the island of Mindanao except for a defensive area established by the Japanese north of Zamboanga City and at the airfield nearby. Here about 4,000 enemy troops were believed to be present. These had established very extensive positions for defense, including strong machine gun nests and pillboxes near Zamboanga City. Most of these were found unmanned. The Japanese were caught off guard and fled to the hills which rise fairly steeply from the narrow coastal plain on which Zamboanga is located. The first wave of LVT's beached on schedule at 0915 on 10 March, 1945, at the village of San Mateo, just west of Zamboanga. There was moderate enemy machine gun, artillery, and mortar fire, which was not entirely suppressed by naval gunfire and air strikes. These commenced about one-half hour after the first wave landed. Assault LVT's could not mount the steep bank of loose rubble near the water's edge and moved off toward the flanks. Waves of LSM's and LCI's, which followed, brought in bulldozers, which cut exits through the bank to allow vehicles to pass. After the beach had been cleared, LST's beached in previously selected slots. Offshore coral heads and obstructions limited the number of landing slots these could use. Within the first hour, despite these difficulties, about 6,200 troops and one company of medium tanks were landed. There were but 99 casualties for the Army and Navy combined.

COAST GUARD MANNED LST-66 PARTICIPATES

The Coast Guard manned LST-66, in her 14th Amphibious Assault operation, was under command of Lt. Wendell J. Holbert, USCGR. Over her side two small landing craft were put into the water. These had been designated to guide the first assault waves from the Line of Departure to the invasion beach. At 0800 they approached the rendezvous area. Alligator tanks, which would blaze the way inland, were moving on station. Two cruisers had been pounding away at the beach since dawn. They were followed by destroyers who closed the beach to bombardment. The assault waves were reported in position. They went in. LCI's moved to within 400 yards of the beach and while maintaining their way unleashed a rocket and artillery barrage. Beside them were the new LCS's,--invasion gunboats. From over Basilan Island flights of Liberators swung over the beachhead. Our ships and landing craft were only 200 yards offshore but the bombardiers were exactly on target. The job of the Coast Guard manned LVT's was to make certain that the first three waves of alligators hit their mark. Great palls of smoke shrouded the beach. The first wave was on line and the guides swung back to pick up the second, then the third. The three waves landed with slight opposition.

EQUIPMENT FROM LCI's AND LSM's PUSHED ASHORE

The beach was now ready for the LCI's and LSM's laden with troops and equipment which had to be pushed ashore immediately behind the initial attack elements. Now from

the dark green hills of Zamboanga came mortar and artillery fire. The Japanese were after these landing craft. Onto the beach the ships jarred as spouts of water continued to kick up on all sides. The unloading began and as soon as a ship had retracted another had filled its slot on the beach.


LST's COME
INTO THE BEACH

Toward noon the first LST's were called into the beach as the mortar fire increased. One of them was hit on the way in. They were big targets with big invasion pay loads. On the LST that was hit casualties were light. However, a fire had to be brought under control in the steering engine room. The Coast Guard manned LST-66 had her top deck loaded with bombs and there were plenty of "eggs" on her tank deck. She also carried drums of hi-octane gas and hundreds of boxes of 50 caliber ammunition. This was a load which must wait until the last to go in. It was not until noon of the 11th that they were ordered in. As they got underway an ominous spout of water shot up off their port bow. Shells continued to crack the water to port and starboard. There was no turning back. They must hit their slot on the nose since there was danger of coral. The ship was finally on the beach with bow doors open and ramp down. Then the first truck was rolling off followed by another and another. A third of the tank deck was bulk cargo, ammunition, and gas. Hour after hour the crew heaved the ammunition boxes, each of which weighed 95 pounds. Truck after truck was backed through the bow doors, loaded by hand and sent on its way. Finally word came that they would have an hour and a half to catch their convoy. All hands responded to the race against time. Progress reports were flashed to the skipper. Three more truckloads. Now two. The last truck was loaded and moving toward the bow. The LST moved off the beach. The convoy was already underway on the horizon as the LST swung into a turn that put her parallel to the shore. Again the Japs spotted her. A shell "whooshed" over the conning tower and our men flattened out on deck. Another shell burst less than 50 yards off the stern. The mortars and shells continued to hit the water around them, but were falling wider and wider off target as the ship moved off at flank speed to join the convoy. The Japs had had their last crack at the LST-66. There had not been a single casualty.

BASILAN - PHILIPPINES

NO OPPOSITION
ON BASILAN

On 16 March, 1945, a reinforced company of infantry, transported from Zamboanga in 20 LSM's and one SC landed on Malamaui Island just off the coast of the Island of Basilan and opposite Isabela on the northwest coast. A regimental combat team landed at Lamitan, on the northeast coast of Basilan, on the 17th and in two days drove across the island virtually unopposed to capture Isabela in coordination with the amphibious attack from Malamaui. There were 500 enemy troops on Basilan Island but no opposition was made to the landings. It was not until the 22nd that a small number of the enemy were encountered by guerrillas. The island had been used as a base by small enemy submarines. U. S. casualties in both Zamboanga and Basilan were 130 U. S. Army killed, 527 wounded and 2 missing, as compared with 2,015 enemy killed and 71 captured.



ILOILO - PHILIPPINES

CGC INGHAM AT ILOILO

The island of Panay had been practically cleared of the enemy by guerrilla forces except for a concentration in and near the city of Iloilo on the southeast coast.


This is the third largest city in the Philippines with a population of more than 90,000. The city is built on a low sandy flat at the mouth of the Iloilo River and has a very good harbor with extensive wharfage facilities. Many of the modern buildings had been destroyed at the time of the Japanese invasion in 1942. The beaches selected for the landing were near Tigbauan, about 14 miles west of Iloilo. Only token opposition to the landing was made and extensive naval gunfire was withheld. The Assault Group (Task Group 78.3) was commanded by Rear Admiral A. D. Struble in the USS INGHAM (CGC) and was staged from Lingayen Gulf. The INGHAM stood into the transport at 0600 on 18 March, 1945 and DD's commenced firing at preselected shore targets. The INGHAM hove to and maintained a position near the Line of Departure for Red Beach. Many natives were observed on the beach. A boat was dispatched and returned with one of them, a guerrilla. He reported that all Japanese in the immediate vicinity were in the church at Tigbauan, surrounded by guerrilla forces. The landing was commenced according to plan except that the preliminary rocket bombardment by LCI (R)'s was omitted. The first wave of 16 LVT's landed at 0906. No opposition was encountered on the beach. Due to a sand bar off Red Beach the subsequent landings were shifted to Blue Beach immediately west of the Sibalon River. Here LST's made dry ramp landings, the beachhead was established and unloading operations continued during daylight. The LST's, LSM's, and LCI's retracted at twilight and the INGHAM stood to seaward as flag and guide of the group. While unloading continued during the next two days, the 14,000 troops of the 40th Division ashore advanced rapidly against only scattered resistance. Iloilo City was secured on 20 March and found about 70% destroyed from the 1942 invasion, although the docks were undamaged and the harbor area was clear. By 22 March organized resistance was considered to have ceased with 238 enemy dead and 5 captured. On 21 March patrols landing on Guimaras Island across Iloilo Strait, found it clear of the enemy, and on 22 March, another patrol landed on Inampuluguan Island in Guimaras Strait and destroyed an enemy mine control station, eliminating the small garrison.

NEGROS ISLAND - PHILIPPINES

NO OPPOSITION ON NEGROS ISLAND LANDING

Between 21 and 26 March the INGHAM was anchored off Iloilo City to facilitate communications with the 40th Division Headquarters. Returning to Blue Beach area on the 26th of March, the Coast Guard cutter supervised and coordinated the loading of ships for carrying out a shore-to-shore movement to Pulupandan Point on northern Negros Island. Proceeding across Panay Gulf as flag and guide of the Attack Group, the INGHAM arrived off Green Beach, Pulupandan at 0800 on 29 March, 1945. The first wave landed at 0859 with no opposition on the beach and the INGHAM anchored off Green Beach directing operations throughout the day. Bacolod Town and airstrip were captured on the 30th and Talisay airfield

COAST GUARD COMBAT CUTTER INGHAM READY FOR BATTLE



secured on the 31st. Our casualties for March during the whole operation on Panay and Negros were 18 killed and 84 wounded as compared with 872 enemy killed and 66 captured.

CEBU - PHILIPPINES

ENEMY FLEES TO HILLS BEHIND CEBU

About 14,000 combat and service troops of the Americal Division, attached to the Eighth Army, which were staged from Leyte, landed at Talisay Beach, 472 miles southwest of Cebu City, on 26 March, 1945. The assault followed a bombardment of the beaches by cruisers and destroyers (Task Group 74.3) and after nearly two weeks of heavy aerial attacks which had severely damaged enemy defenses and other installations. Except for numerous land mines, and mortar fire on the left flank, no opposition was met at the beaches. Underwater log obstructions hampered unloading of the larger landing craft. Pontoon causeways were used to overcome the low beach gradient. Several midget submarines were attacked south of the city during the afternoon. Cebu City was occupied on the day after the landing and the docks were found essentially undamaged. The rest of the city, however, was largely in ruins, Japanese demolition squads beginning a systematic destruction of all major installations almost simultaneously with our landings at Talisay. Extensive land mines, booby traps, and demolitions fired by electric contact, impeded the progress from the beaches to the city. Enemy forces which had escaped being trapped in the city, entrenched themselves in a very elaborate defensive system in the hills behind it. 73 U.S. Army men were killed, 393 wounded and 28 missing as against 576 enemy killed and 55 captured.

CGC SPENCER AT CEBU INVASION


On 21 March, Major General Wm H. Arnold, Commanding General, of the Americal Division, U. S. 8th Army and staff had reported aboard the CGC SPENCER then anchored off Tolosa Beach, Leyte. On the 23rd the SPENCER participated in a rehearsal for a V-2 operation with other units of Task Group 78.2. Standing out of Hinuangan Bay on the 24th the SPENCER proceeded as flagship and Fleet guide of Task Group 78.2 under Captain Albert T. Sprague, Jr., USN who was aboard. On the 26th at 0752, the SPENCER anchored in Bohol Strait off Talisay, Cebu, and directed the V-2 operation against the enemy occupied territory. At 1555 Major General Arnold departed the SPENCER to take command of operations ashore and the SPENCER got underway patrolling in Bohol Strait. On the 27th at 1931 there was an air alert and a single Japanese plane, probably a Val, dropped two or three bombs harmlessly on the beachhead and in the water off Talisay. At 1800 on the 28th, the SPENCER departed Talisay, anchoring in San Pedro Bay, Leyte, on the evening of the 29th.

CEBU CITY, CEBU - PHILIPPINES

COAST GUARD DIVERS SALVAGE NAVY TUG

While carrying out her mission of retracting LST's that had become stuck on the beach, a Navy salvage tug fouled her propeller on the anchor cable of one of the LST's. No salvage men being on the tug who were familiar with shallow-water diving equipment, the tug sent out a general dispatch to CTG 78.2 requesting volunteer divers who would try to

1ST BEACHED IN THE MIDST OF A LITTLE FISHING VILLAGE ON CEBU




clear her screw. Commander J. R. Hinnant, Commanding Officer of the SPENCER, along with Lieut. Comdr. J. L. Lathrop (then Lieutenant), CBM George M. Boutilier (then BM lc), and Lowell P. "Tiny" Sather BM lc, a 240-pounder and formerly a guard at Wisconsin, personally answered the call. The two officers and two men went down in shifts, experiencing some difficulty in taking the multiple turns of stiff half-inch cable from around the propeller and propeller shaft. A few minutes after sunset a Jap air raid dropped several sticks of bombs on the beach-head and among the LST's, one of the bombs exploding in shallow water near the tug. Boutilier, who was down at the time, was blown to the surface by the concussion. In a few minutes he had recovered his breath and went down again. About an hour after sunset the volunteer team of Coast Guard divers finally by cutting the turns of cable with a hammer and chisel succeeded in clearing the propeller of the tug, which was then able to continue its mission.

KERAMA GROUP - RYUKYU ISLANDS

JAPANESE SUICIDE Troops of the U. S. 77th Infantry Division were put
CRASH BOATS ashore on the small islands of the Kerama Group, 15 to
SEIZED IN THE 20 miles off Okinawa's southwestern tip on 26 March, 1945.
KERAMAS Successful landings were made on Geruma, Aka, Kuba, Amuro, Tokashiki, Zamami, Hokaji, and Yakabi Islands, well supported by ship's gunfire and carrier aircraft. There was light opposition. Geruma and Hokaji were secured by noon and Yakabi, Kuba, and Amuro occupied by evening. Tokashiki was under control by noon of the 27th but sniper fire continued on Aka and Zamami until the 28th. At Zamami and Tokashiki we captured, among a great quantity of supplies, a large number of Japanese small suicide, crash boats which had been based on the Keramas. These boats were 18 feet long, with 4 cylinder engines and equipped with a depth charge at the stern and a "torpedo bomb" at the bow. 331 of the enemy were killed and 100 captured, while some 140 more were sealed in caves on the various islands. Many Japanese civilians were found dead or dying as the result of mass suicide attempts.

COAST GUARD From Coast Guard manned LST's assault waves of American
LST's IN infantrymen, had swarmed ashore on Geruma, Hokaji and
KERAMA ASSAULT Tokashiki islands to open the invasion of the Ryukyus. Landing on the beaches of the small rugged islands, the troops encountered only sporadic resistance, except in scattered instances. American casualties, both on the beach and inland, were extremely light. On the fifth day after the initial landings, except for garrison troops which remained on the islands, the assault troops returned to their LST's. They brought stories of Japanese civilians who had to be coaxed out of caves, of children who smiled and bowed as they accepted candy from American soldiers, of men and women gazing in awe at the tanks, ships, and planes which were everywhere. Soldiers vividly described the construction of the Japanese homes, the dress of the natives, the weirdness of the Japanese burial vaults and the general ruggedness of the islands. They described the raising of the first American flag in the Ryukyus.



THE STRATEGIC AREA FEBRUARY 1945

LST-24
AT KERAMA

On 21 March, 1945, the Coast Guard manned LST-24 sailed from Ulithi bound for Kerama Islands where she arrived 28 March. That evening the LST, which was loaded with about 1,300 tons of ammunition, put to sea in convoy for night retirement during which the convoy underwent several air attacks. Returning to the anchorage on the 29th the LST remained until 24 June, servicing units of the Fifth Fleet. During this time the LST was frequently under attack from enemy aircraft, including many suicide planes, in some cases even while loading or unloading ammunition. On several occasions the LST fired all guns at enemy aircraft but no positive kills were noted. Many vessels about the LST were hit by bombs and suicide planes, in some instances resulting in the sinking and loss of the hit vessel, but no damage or casualties were sustained by the LST-24.


LST-830
IN KAMIKAZE
ATTACK

The Coast Guard manned LST-830 departed Saipan on 26 March, 1945, as part of a convoy of landing craft and merchant ships under the command of CTG 51.13.4. On 2 April the LST-830 in company with LST-799 and two merchant ships proceeded to Kerama Rhetto. By the morning of the 6th only two LST's and three LSM's remained at anchor from what had originally been a large number of ships. Believing her position to be vulnerable, the LST shifted anchorage that morning, with the LST-647 anchored 750 yards from her. During the early afternoon three Victory ships and an LST entered the anchorage. At about 1620 the LST-447 entered the harbor and was still underway when a Japanese plane was seen making a long, slow gliding approach on her. All ships opened fire on the plane but it succeeded in crashing into LST-447. The entire ship was enveloped in a sheet of flame which subsided immediately into a steady fire at the point of impact. At 1631 a second Japanese plane appeared heading for the three remaining LST's which opened fire and the plane disappeared behind a hill. Reappearing it glided for a Victory ship and splashed under heavy fire. At 1638 a third plane appeared and the LST-830 opened fire being the only ship to which the plane was visible until it appeared to the others from behind Mt. Koba. The plane changed course abruptly and glided into LOGAN VICTORY. That ship was enveloped in flames which subsided to steady fire. At 1644 a plane appeared over Mt. Fukashi flying low and at slow speed heading for the LST-830. All ships opened fire but when the plane was identified as a Hellcat, the LST-830 ceased fire. The plane burst into flames, however, and crashed into the water. The pilot was seen to parachute and was quickly picked up by an LCVP from the LST-334. At 1837 a Japanese torpedo plane made a long, fast run on ships anchored in the Western anchorage. He missed with his torpedo and crashed into the hills behind the anchorage. At 1845 a Victory ship was approached by an enemy plane. The run began two miles away about 125 feet above the surface of the water. The Victory ship opened fire but a solid hit was not scored until the plane was 500 yards off. Then a flame burst from the plane. It did not deviate however, and crashed the Victory ship amidship as a terrific flame shot into the sky.

LST-829 LANDS
FIRST TROOPS ON
JAPANESE
COLONIAL SOIL
AT GERUMA

The Coast Guard manned LST-829 has the special distinction of landing the first troops in World War II to invade and secure Japanese colonial soil (Iwo Jima being a Japanese mandate.) In the early morning of 26 March, 1945, the LST landed Company A. Btl I, 306 Infantry, 77th Army

TROOPS OF 306TH INFANTRY STALKING SNIPERS IN THE VILLAGE OF GERUMA SHIMA, KERAMA RETTO, PRIOR TO
OKINAWA LANDINGS



Division on Geruma Shima in the Kerama Retto. Swiftly overrunning the island and smothering Japanese resistance, these troops raised the American flag over Geruma Heights. The flag symbolizing the first conquest is now at Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D. C. That afternoon our troops were reloaded and on the 27th were sent against Tokashiki Shima. Anchored close to the projecting coral shelf the crew of the 829 watched 25 waves of Corsairs, Helldivers, and TBF's from Navy carriers fire their rockets at possible machine gun and mortar emplacements on the beach and in the surrounding cliffs and strafe the hills. Simultaneously three destroyers threw hundreds of rounds of shells into the beach and back country. As the waves of LVT's slowly rumbled toward the beach, LCI's, LCS's, and LST's opened up with 40 MM to cover their approach. Once ashore the 77th met stubborn opposition in the hills. Troops from the 829 uncovered and destroyed scores of Japanese suicide power boats, hidden in caves and under brush all over the island, and captured charts and intelligence papers which showed the proposed use of these craft to combat the invasion of Okinawa. The attack routes to the probable American anchorages had been carefully planned. Apparently, the Japs overlooked the fact that the Kerama Retto might be invaded first. It is difficult to estimate the importance of these boats and plans on the outcome of the entire Okinawa campaign, but their success in the Philippines when used on a small scale testifies as to what might have happened.

OKINAWA - RYUKYUS

RESISTANCE LIGHT After nine days of intensive bombing and shelling by
ON BEACHES carrier aircraft and surface vessels of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, troops of the Tenth Army landed on the Southwest coast of Okinawa, largest and most important island of the Ryukyus Group, at 0830 on 1 April, 1945. The two corps which invaded Okinawa were the Marine Third Amphibious Corps under Major General Roy S. Geiger and the Twenty-fourth Army Corps commanded by Major General John R. Hodge. The Tenth Army was commanded by Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner, Jr. The troops landed on an 8 mile stretch of beach opposite Yontan and Katena airfields, about 20 miles north of Naha, the capital. Before noon the two airfields had been seized. Resistance on the beaches was unexpectedly light. Within 48 hours our forces had driven across to the east coast. Many enemy troops, whose total number on the island was eventually disclosed as nearly 120,000 remained to the south of our beachhead where most of the major military and naval installations were located; others retired to the rugged northern part of the island. There was no enemy fire against our ships offshore and very little against the landing boats. Some artillery and mortar fire was received on the beaches later in the morning. The area south of the landing beaches contained numerous tombs, caves, and pillboxes which had all been abandoned. By 1800 our troops controlled about 7 miles of the main north-south highway, and in some places the beachhead was two and a half miles deep. There was little enemy activity during the night and on the 2nd good progress was made against light resistance. The Marines, to the north, cleared the Zampa Peninsula and the 7th Division of the Twenty-fourth Army Corps made extensive advances to the east and south, reaching the east coast, just south of Katchin Peninsula, near the village of Tabaro, early in the afternoon.

On the west coast more difficult terrain and stiffening resistance was met about 7 miles north of Naha, with heavy enemy concentration and much activity observed from the air southeast of Naha airfields. On the 3rd the Marines moved northeast along the coast beyond Nagahama and reached Nakadomari, on the 2 mile isthmus forming the narrowest part of the island. Other Marine units sealed off the Katchin Peninsula by reaching the east coast in the vicinity of Sunan. The 7th Division cleared the whole area to Awase and moved along the shores of Nakagusuku Bay to the village of Kuba.


JAPANESE AIR
ATTACK DEVELOPS

On 6 April, Japanese aircraft began strong counter-attacks against our surface units off Okinawa in a series of strikes as intense as those of the first days of the Philippines invasion. Our fighter patrol and anti-aircraft guns shot down at least 245 enemy planes on the 6th and the number may have reached 400. Three U. S. destroyers were sunk and several others, together with a number of smaller vessels were damaged. On the following day 12 out of a force of 20 enemy planes were shot down approaching our ships, while on the night of the 8th, eight more planes were downed and six were destroyed on the night of the 9th. As resistance increased in the southern part of the island, stronger support was furnished in that area by our ships and carrier aircraft.

JAPANESE
RESISTANCE
STIFFENS

The Japanese had set up their defense line across the island from a point just north of Machinato to the vicinity of the Yonabaru airstrip on the east coast, with a secondary defense line just to the south running from Naha, through Shuri to the village of Yonabaru. Troops of the Twenty-fourth Corps reached the first line about the 4th and were thenceforth subjected to heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire. As the week ended violent artillery barrages were being laid down by both sides. To the north, however, the Marines made wide gains against little opposition, and by the 9th had cleared the enemy from practically all the narrow peninsula joining the northern and southern sections of the island and had advanced more than halfway across the Motobu Peninsula. To the east, other Marine units pushed into the wooded hills of northern Okinawa against little opposition. In southern Okinawa, meanwhile, more determined resistance was being met as our troops moved into the enemy's prepared defenses. By nightfall of the 8th our right flank was within 2,500 yards of the Machinato airstrip, while the 7th Division on the east was within 1,500 yards of the incomplete Yonabaru strip. By the 10th, Kakazu Ridge, near the west coast, had been taken and lost three times, witnessing the heaviest Japanese mortar and artillery fire ever encountered in the Pacific, except possibly at Iwo. Marine units landed on the inshore beaches of the islands at the mouth of Kinmu Bay on the 7th and secured all the islands without opposition. On the 10th, elements of the 24th Corps went ashore on Tsugen Island where initial light opposition increased as our troops neared Tsugen town in the northern part of the island. This opposition was knocked out by late afternoon and the island secured. During the first nine days of the Okinawa operation our total casualties were 432 killed, 2,103 wounded and 160 missing while Japanese casualties through the 8th included 5,009 known dead and 222 prisoners of war.

COAST GUARD MANNED AND NAVY LANDING CRAFT OF ALL KINDS BLACKEN THE SEA OUT TO THE HORIZON, WHERE STAND
THE BATTLEWAGONS, CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS AT OKINAWA




OFFENSIVE
LAUNCHED

The Marines reached the northern tip of Okinawa on the afternoon of the 14th and also occupied Motobu Peninsula completely, except for an area south of the Manna River. On the 16th, Army troops landed on Ie Island, off the northwestern tip of the peninsula, secured the airfield and moved against the remnants of the enemy garrison preparing for a last stand on Mt. Iegusu. It was on Ie that Ernie Pyle, noted war correspondent, was killed on the 18th. On the 12th and 16th the enemy launched furious air assaults, and by the 17th we had destroyed 368 of their aircraft, the total mounting to at least 600 for the week. More than 500 enemy caves were cleared before the Army in Southern Okinawa launched an offensive on the 19th. Though we captured the village of Machinato and entered Kakazu, resistance increased as we penetrated the enemy's defense system, organized in great depth to exploit the defensive value of the terrain. Enemy resistance continued, determined and strong, but on the 23rd we captured an important position on high ground west of Ishin and by the end of the week the initial Japanese defense zone had been captured and an attack begun on the second zone. Meanwhile, the pocket on the Manna River had been eliminated and organized resistance on Motobu Peninsula had come to an end. Likewise, by the 21st the garrison on Ie Island had been completely destroyed with 2,062 enemy dead and 21 prisoners. Occupation of Sesoko, Kouri and Yagachi Islands, off the Motobu Peninsula was accomplished during the week as well as that of Taka and Heanza Islands on the east coast. Through the 22nd of April, Tenth Army casualties totaled 7,424, including 1,446 killed, 5,982 wounded and 296 missing. 21,269 Japanese had been killed and 399 prisoners taken.

ENEMY
COUNTER-ATTACKS

Machinato airfield was captured on the 29th of April by troops of the 27th Division while units of the 7th Division took Kuhazu. At the end of the week the First Marine Division relieved the 27th Army Division on the right flank, while the 77th Army Division moved into the center of the line to replace the 96th Division. More than 29 small suicide crash boats were destroyed by our ships and many others were believed damaged by bombardment on pens at Naha by our Fleet units. On the night of the 27th some 75 enemy aircraft attacked our ships and shore positions and all but 8 were accounted for. The following afternoon about 200 Japanese planes made 44 separate raids on our forces. Most of these were intercepted by combat air patrols. One of our auxiliary vessels was sunk in the earlier raid and some damage was done our ships in the later raids. 137 enemy planes were shot down on the 28th, but the raids continued through the 29th and 30th, when 40 more enemy planes were eliminated. Beginning on the 3rd of May, the Japanese counter-attacked furiously all along the line in Southern Okinawa, but were limited to small gains. At the end of the week our troops began to advance on the right and in the center and by the 7th our positions had been consolidated along an irregular line from the mouth of the Awa River to the northern end of the Yonabaru airstrip. The 77th Division, scaling heights with cargo nets and rope ladders, was nearing the fortified city of Shuri, while the Marines reached the village of Dakeshi, a mile from Naha's outskirts. By the morning of the 7th, 36,535 Japanese had been killed, 13,202 wounded and 539 missing. Our naval losses were 1,131 killed, 2,816 wounded and 1,604 missing. On the

THE JAPS TALK BACK ON OKINAWA



3rd two of our vessels were sunk and three others damaged in an enemy air attack south of Kume Island. Again on the morning of the 4th, 70 Japanese planes attacked our ships near Okinawa and sunk five light surface units and damaged a number of others, but 54 enemy planes were destroyed. Three enemy counter-landings, one west of Machinato airfield, one near the village of Chiyunna and one in Nakagasuku Bay were effected on the 3rd but all were broken up and the enemy forces eliminated.


NAHA IS
ENTERED

Marines of the Sixth Division entered the line on the 9th of May on the extreme right flank and fought their way into the northern suburbs of Naha across the Asato River and into the city itself. On the 11th we launched a general assault along the entire Tenth Army front. The First Marines drove into the village of Dakeshi eliminating a strong enemy position and reducing a salient which had been causing difficulty for more than a week. This put our troops on high ground overlooking Shuri, the main Japanese resistance center. On the 12th troops of the 96th Division cleared the town of Kibara and on the 13th its 383rd Regiment drove nearly to the summit of Conical Hill, a strong point protecting both Shuri and Yonabaru. Our patrols inside Naha picked their way among blasted buildings and along streets littered with rubble and the bodies of hundreds of enemy soldiers and civilians. On the 17th the 77th Division entered Ishimmi. The Sixth Marines after withdrawing from "Sugar Loaf Hill" that night occupied the summit for the fifth time next day. Japanese resistance remained extremely strong before the fortress town of Shuri while the enemy launched several unsuccessful counter-attacks at Naha. "Sugar Loaf Hill" was finally secured on the 21st after changing hands 11 times. There were increasing indications that the enemy's supply lines south of Shuri were being sealed off and that when they lost their communications, their forces would probably disintegrate and break into small pockets. By midnight of the 21st, 53,458 Japanese had been killed and 1,014 prisoners taken, while our killed or missing totaled 8,310 with 22,216 wounded. More than 60 Japanese planes had been destroyed during the week, as the enemy continued to harass our shipping and shore positions in daily attacks. 51 of these had been destroyed while five of our light surface units were damaged.

JAPANESE
DEFENSES
CRUMBLE

In spite of a ten day period of heavy rainfall ending on the 30th of May, big gains were made in every sector. Shuri, the heavily fortified keystone of the enemy's main defense line, fell to the Marines First Division and the 77th Infantry on the 30th and all of Naha north of the harbor was cleared by the Sixth Marines, who crossed the Oroku Peninsula to seize the Naha airfield. The 7th Division of the Army, on the extreme left flank broke the crumbling Japanese defenses below Yonabaru and cleared all of Chinen Peninsula, at the southern end of Nakagasuku Bay, reaching the south coast of Okinawa at several points. A general drive southward was begun by the Tenth Army with the major handicap to their progress being the deep mud and intermittent rains. It was thought that the Japanese might attempt last-ditch stands in the three peninsulas forming the points of the triangle which comprise Southern Okinawa, but it was pointed out that artillery and naval gunfire had so depleted the enemy's supply of heavy weapons that he lacked the firepower to support any defense line across

IN FOREGROUND, AN ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN ON A COAST GUARD-MANNED LST IS ALERTED FOR POSSIBLE JAPANESE
AIR ATTACKS AGAINST THE INVADERS AT OKINAWA



the island. Japanese aerial activity had dwindled to the smallest since the very early days of the Okinawa campaign. Since the beginning of the Okinawa operations, 1,442 Japanese planes, including Kamikaze, had been destroyed by our planes and AA batteries, both afloat and ashore.

ENEMY REFUSES
TO SURRENDER

On the 10th of June, messages were dropped behind the enemy's line on Southern Okinawa requesting the Japanese commander to open negotiations by 1800 on the 11th. The message offered "honorable cessation of hostilities" and a promise of humane treatment to surrendering troops. No signal, as arranged, that the Japanese were willing to negotiate was seen at the designated hour. Apparently the Japanese intended to continue the bitter Okinawa battle to the last man. This offer came after a week of swift thrusts into the enemy's shattered defenses and substantial gains in all parts of southern Okinawa, during which our troops compressed the remnants of the 15,000-20,000 enemy troops remaining on the island into two small isolated pockets. Most of them were dug in on the formidable Yaeju escarpment, which curves across the southern tip of Okinawa from a point below Itoman on the west coast, to the town of Hanagusuku, on the south coast. A second much smaller area along the south shore of Naha harbor was still under Japanese control but by the 13th had been so reduced, in spite of bitter opposition, that organized resistance was virtually at an end. A general assault on the Yaeju escarpment was under way at that time, with all three U.S. Divisions moving along its approaches and receiving heavy supporting fire from ship's guns, artillery, and aircraft. On the 11th, the top of the escarpment was reached at a point just south of Yunagusuku.

OKINAWA
FINALLY
SECURED

On the 21st of June, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz announced that organized resistance on Okinawa had ended. Remnants of the once powerful Japanese garrison, however, continued to fight with unabated fury from small pockets in the extreme southern part of the island. By this date our troops were so intermingled with the last bitterly resisting Japanese that U. S. Commanders called off all artillery and naval gunfire support, leaving the destruction of the dispersed enemy force to individual units in the field. The remaining enemy forces, virtually surrounded by our troops, continued fighting from strongly-constructed fortifications which had evidently been built to guard against landings on the southern beaches. Many Japanese jumped off the cliffs into the sea near the village of Udo. Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner, Jr., U.S.A., commanding general of the U.S. Tenth Army and Ryukyu Forces was killed in action on the afternoon of the 18th of June and the command was assumed by Major General Roy S. Geiger, USMC, commander of the Third Amphibious Corps, his nomination to be Lieutenant General being confirmed by the U. S. Senate on the 19th. The flag of the United States was formally raised over Okinawa on the 22nd. Some Japanese were still holding out but a great many were surrendering. Japanese casualties in the Okinawa campaign to the 26th of June totaled 111,351 and prisoners of war totaled 9,398. Total U. S. casualties were 46,319 including 11,897 dead or missing and 34,422 wounded. Included were 4,907 Navy dead and 4,824 Navy wounded.

OVER THE MIGHTY AMERICAN ARMADA OFF OKINAWA'S SHORES DROPS THE GLORIOUS GOLDEN DISK OF THE SUN. TO LOSE
ITSELF IN THE EAST CHINA SEA



ENEMY AIR
ATTACKS ON
SHIPPING
CONTINUE

Japanese planes heavily attacked our shipping off Okinawa during the evening of 21 June and the morning of the 22nd, with more than 30 raids. Only a few stragglers were able to get through the screen and those that did were knocked down by anti-aircraft fire.

During the period 59 enemy planes were destroyed. An attack on the Keramas on the 21st sunk two light Fleet units. The carrier BUNKER HILL, Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's flagship, was announced to have been badly damaged off Okinawa on May 11th, with 373 killed, 19 missing and 264 wounded.

COAST GUARD
BEACH PARTIES
WAGE BLOODLESS
BATTLE

"On the bloodless beachhead of Okinawa" wrote a Coast Guard correspondent, "the toughest fight was waged by beachmaster crews, who fought the worst shore conditions of the battle of the Pacific, to keep up with troops that were marching virtually unopposed on L day across the Jap-held island. The jagged offshore coral, pot-

holes, and sea walls could be passed only at high tides, making unloading operations from LCVP's and LCM's possible but six hours each day. Working parties constantly blasted coral reefs, sending up gigantic geysers of water among the 1,400 ships of the convoy. A crane and a bulldozer transferred cargo from landing craft to DUKW's and amtracks, which carried it inland. During high tides, cargo was piled high on the beaches, being moved off during low tide periods when boats couldn't get in. The medical section of the beach party treated only 14 minor casualties who had been wounded by snipers."

NO ACTION
SEEN

"On L day we had expected a lot of action, we didn't see any" wrote another correspondent. "There were no planes in the sky, and outside of two machine gun nests on the beach, we received no land opposition. Assault troops


pushed inland several miles before encountering Jap snipers." The absence of aerial opposition was very surprising. Some thought that landing so close to the main island of Japan may have caught the Japanese completely by surprise. Others surmized that the pre-invasion shelling was too terrific and must have driven the defender into the hills. Okinawa was not to be taken without a terrific struggle, however, involving the greatest loss of American lives of any of the Pacific invasions.

ATTACK FROM
AIR BEGINS

On the eve of L plus five, nine Japanese dive bombers broke through the outer rim of defense and attempted to strafe and bomb Coast Guard and Navy ships in the vicinity of Okinawa. The ack-ack put up by our ships was terrific

and proved very effective, for after fifteen minutes of action, not a plane was left in the sky. One of the planes dove for a Coast Guard manned LST, but accurate fire from 40 mm's turned him away, and a moment later he hit the water just astern of it. As targets for hit and run Japanese bombing and strafing attacks, for many days after that, the Coast Guardsmen stopped their duties of getting supplies ashore only long enough to fight off the fanatical enemy attacks. Sleep was out of the question. "The most determined Japanese attack took place this afternoon" wrote one correspondent, "when low flying aircraft tried to sneak through the anti-aircraft screen of the night invasion force. This transport became the center of fire.

USS JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (APA-13)



American and Japanese machine gun bullets filled the air. Tracer fire smashed into an ammunition dump inland and caused an island shaking explosion. Meanwhile the gun crew stood ready waiting tensely for the planes to come within their range. Fire from the other ships in the armada downed the enemy before our gunners could open up. By nightfall, the attack had been beaten off. "Eight planes had been shot down within sight of this ship. The crew went back to its job of unloading and waiting for the next attack."

USS CAMBRIA
APA-36
AT OKINAWA

Easter morning, April 1, 1945, the Coast Guard manned USS CAMBRIA (APA-36) arrived at the outer transport area off the southwest coast of Okinawa and experienced four air raid alerts before 0700; there were seven alerts in all on the first day. The first three days were spent unloading troops and cargo, and on April 3 the beach party of 3 officers and 43 enlisted men went ashore to assist in the unloading. CIC and gun crews were constantly alerted and proved themselves to be a well coordinated team. This, together with the use of smoke screens, served to good advantage in the protection from enemy aircraft. On the 6th, over 100 Japanese suicide planes were shot down by surface and air support within 30 miles of the CAMBRIA, four reaching the transport area, all of which were destroyed. Instead of leaving the area after unloading, the CAMBRIA, as Flagship of ComTransRon 12, remained and assisted in the unloading of other transports, LST's, and cargo ships. When she left the scene of action on the 10th there were only two minor casualties among the personnel.


DICKMAN AT
OKINAWA

The USS JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (APA-13) under the command of Captain Frank A. Leamy, USCG, was part of the TRANSDIV 12 (temporary) which trained at Guadalcanal for a month before the Okinawa invasion. Other Coast Guard manned vessels in this division were USS CEPHEUS (AKA-18) and USS THEENIM (AKA-63). TRANSDIV 12 remained in the transport area off the beachhead from 1 April to 9 April except for a night withdrawal on "L" day, during which time the formation was subjected to many air attacks. Unloading of both troops and cargo was slow, not because of enemy action or adverse weather conditions but due, primarily, to the heterogeneous troops and miscellaneous cargo carried. Some of the troop passengers were not to debark until L plus seven. The same was true of some of the cargo. The prolonged stay offered the enemy numerous targets of which he took good advantage. Besides air attacks, midget submarines, suicide boats and swimmers were a constant menace. No battle damage was received by the DICKMAN and during the entire operation only two LCVP's were lost, neither the result of enemy action. During the entire action there were no casualties to the personnel of the vessel or its attached landing craft. The DICKMAN departed the transport area on the 9th of April and proceeded to Saipan.

LST-782 IN
OKINAWA
INVASION

The Joint Expeditionary Force for Phase One of the Okinawa operation consisted of Task Force 51. This comprised Task Force 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, and 56 under Vice Admiral Turner, USN, with Rear Admiral Blandy, USN, as second in command for the amphibious features of the operation. LST Group 85 included Coast Guard manned LST's 758, 759, 760, 782, 762, and 785 operating at Okinawa.

THE U.S. COAST GUARD CUTTER "BIRB"



The LST-782 was flagship for Commander W. B. Millington, USCG, of LST Unit 12 (55.3.8) which embarked Army troops of the Third Battalion, 381st and 383rd Infantry of the 96th Division at Leyte between 14 and 21 March, 1945. The LST then became flagship for Commander S. R. Sands, USCG, of LST Unit 11 (55.3.2) under Captain Peterson, USCG, as part of the Tractor Flotilla (55.3) Captain Brereton, USN, commanding. The LST-782 arrived on station in LST Area Two at Okinawa at 0701 on 1 April, 1945, and one minute later LCVP guide boats were water borne. By 0752 seventeen officers and 326 enlisted men out of a total of 576 personnel aboard were disembarked in 17 LVT's. At sunset two enemy planes were seen and at 1911 the LST-782 opened fire and probably hit one plane, which subsequently crashed into an attack transport about one mile on the starboard bow. The LST then participated in night retirement. Arriving on station off White Beach I, next morning at 0650, the LST launched four pontoon barges and continued unloading her 518 tons of vehicles, small arms, high explosives and other cargo. The 3rd was marked by five separate and distinct flashes RED. On the 4th the wind increased sharply in velocity and veered to the north and northwest, but did not cause any difficulty until early evening when an LST broached to the north as did an LSM, falling down on the LST-782 and causing some damage. All vessels concerned were beached with no more than 100 yards clearance. On the 6th about 6 hours were spent at General Quarters and a number of planes were observed shot down, just north of her position. On the 15th observers on the LST-782 watched a suicide plane attempt to crash into a liberty ship or an APA and at 2124 opened fire on a Betty which escaped apparently unharmed. One enemy plane probably a Zeke, was destroyed. On the 16th the LST sortied and departed Okinawa. The ship's log recorded 46 flash RED's in the fifteen days at Okinawa or an average of three per day. Orders to make smoke were received 29 times for a total of 22.6 hours.


LST-790
LAUNCHES
LVT's

The Coast Guard manned LST-790 sortied from Leyte Gulf on 25 March, 1945, as a part of Tractor Group Easy under Captain C. H. Peterson, USCG, and LST Unit 11 under Commander S. R. Sands, USCG. With the ship crowded and overloaded, moderate and fresh NE breezes, and frequent rain, made the trip uncomfortable but it was otherwise uneventful. On 1 April, 1945 the LST approached Okinawa landing beaches and at 0702 both LCVP's were lowered to serve as wave guides. Between 0715 and 0731 seventeen LVT's, loaded with the 5th and 6th assault waves, were launched. During the day mortar ammunition was transferred to LCI's alongside. At 1908 the LST fired 225 rounds, firing at 2 planes identified as Jap Oscars. Other air alerts were frequent but the other planes sighted were not within range and this was the only occasion the LST fired during the operation. After retiring on the nights of April 1st and 2nd the LST anchored off White III beach until the 8th, when she beached on the extreme southern flank of White I beach and completed unloading by the morning of the 11th. She then departed for Saipan.

CGC BIBB
SPLASHES
JAP PLANE

The Coast Guard cutter GEORGE M. BIBB spent most of her time during the Okinawa operation in a harbor at Kerama Retto and was an almost constant target for Japanese

JAP PLANES SHOT DOWN IN ATTACK ON OKINAWA INVASION FLEET



suicide planes. During the operation she was subjected to some 55 air raids. On 21 June shortly after 1830 two Japanese planes flying low entered a blind approach to the harbor. The first plane crashed into a ship anchored 300 yards off the port side of the PIBB. The other planes circling high, came in for a dive on a ship 600 yards off her port side. The gun crews on the cutter opened fire and downed the plane just before it crashed into its intended target.


LST-887 BRINGS
DOWN JAP PLANE

The Coast Guard manned LST-887 arrived at Okinawa on 2 April, 1945, and proceeded for the Hagushi Beaches on the west coast. The approach to the beaches was extremely congested with all types of craft but there were no enemy aircraft overhead and no fighting in the immediate beach area. Pontoons were launched and unloading commenced. On the night of the 3rd, retraction from the beach was being attempted but was prevented by low tide and heavy cargo still aboard. Suddenly a wave caused by a tremendous underwater blast, made by the engineers dynamiting a passage through the reef, lifted the ship bodily off the reef and set her down again directly in front of the pontoons. This is believed to be the only time that an LST retracted and beached with the assistance of explosives. On the 12th, the LST took credit for shooting down a Japanese plane. The plane approached at low altitude with no ships intervening. The fire from the LST was observed to score numerous hits causing the plane to burst into flames and sink 600 yards on the port quarter. During the period many other planes were fired at by the 887 but this was the only one that was close enough to definitely have been destroyed by its guns. On the 16th the LST departed Okinawa for Ulithi.

LST-884
HIT BY
SUICIDE PLANE

On the morning of 1 April, 1945, at about 0548, three planes were seen approaching the Coast Guard manned LST-884 which was part of Task Group 51.8 then off Okinawa. All port guns opened fire and one plane immediately burst into flames, nosed into a shallow dive and crashed into the port side of the LST, plunging through the ship fitter's shop, and into the tank deck, where it exploded with intense flame. The plane had crashed through the 81 MM and 60 MM mortar ammunition, causing it to explode. Three fire nozzles were placed down vents, as nearly as possible to the point of impact but the LST was repeatedly shaken by violent explosions. At 0554 the fire, which had started in the main engine room, was reported under control, but a heavy, acrid smoke had entered the engine room making it impossible for men on watch to remain and the engines were secured. The auxiliary engine room watch reported the plating getting red hot and the smoke unbearable and these men were also ordered out. It appeared that the ship would be blown to bits by exploding ammunition or fuel tanks and at 0555 the order was given to abandon ship. By 0605 all hands were reported out of living spaces and engine rooms. Men in the water were being picked up by the ship's boats and boats from other LST's and LSM's. At 0610 the Commanding Officer, after all hands had cleared ship, departed and was taken to a destroyer lying nearby. At 0731 it was determined that most of the heavier ammunition had already exploded and the commanding officer and four other officers returned aboard with two enlisted men, manned the pump and brought two streams to bear on the fire. At 0800 three other officers and 15 enlisted men voluntarily returned to assist in fire fighting and 4 LCS's secured alongside, putting enough water on deck to permit walking about. Several heavy explosions and numerous minor ones occurred during this time and it seemed for a while that it would be impossible to bring the fire under control. Cargo ammunition carried on the

LST-760 AT OKINAWA



main deck, starboard side, was jettisoned, but it was impossible to jettison TNT blocks and W.P. ammunition carried on the port side as the heat and flames had set it afire and the W.P. had begun to explode. At 1100, however, the fire was deemed under control, but as the tank deck and both engine rooms were flooded, it was suggested that the ship be beached. At 1400, the USS YUMA (AT-94) took the LST in tow and anchored in Kerama Retto Harbor at 1838. By the 13th the ship was reported ready for sea, after eleven days of cleaning and salvage work. As a 20 foot hole remained in the port side and the tank deck was open to the sea, plating was welded over these holes completely closing them. On the 14th, the LST was underway for Guam in tow of LST-940. Twenty bodies had been buried, some identified and others not. It was believed that all dead, with one exception, were Marines, as most of the bodies were taken from the tank deck. One member of the ship's company was wounded and one killed.

LST-784 AT
THEYA SHIMA
LANDING

The Coast Guard manned LST-784 departed Saipan for Okinawa on the 20th of April, 1945, and arrived at Katchin Wan on the 27th. All cargo had been unloaded by 2 May. During this period air raids were numerous and suicide craft attempted to enter Buckner Bay, one craft or swimmer managing to detonate a charge near the hull of an AK about 500 yards from the LST-784, though not sinking the cargo vessel. The 784 returned to Saipan on the 13th of May where she loaded supplies for the Second Marine Division returning to Okinawa on the 30th of May. On 6 June she participated in the capture and occupation of Iheya Shima, Ryukyus, and then returned to Okinawa.

LST-770 AT
RYUKYUS
OCCUPATION

On 19 March, 1945, the Coast Guard manned LST-770 was underway for Kerama Retto as part of Task Unit 51.1.2 with 16 officers and 326 enlisted men of the 77th Division. Participating in the invasion of Aka Shima and Yokan Jima, she arrived at Okinawa on 14 April. On the 17th she landed the 307th Infantry Battalion, 77th Division on Ie Shima, returning to Okinawa on 6 May. Next day she was underway for Ulithi.


LST-760
IN KAMIKAZE
ATTACKS

The Coast Guard manned LST-760 reached Okinawa in convoy on 1 April and anchored in the LST area in the vicinity of Hagushi. Late next day she nosed up on the coral reef at Purple beach and commenced unloading operations. Seven hectic days and nights followed, four on the beach, three at Kerama Retto, -exhausting days and nights of standing almost continuous general quarters on guard against fanatical suicide attacks, sleeping barely an hour at a time, eating cold food at your station, tensely watching and firing on the deadly planes winging in, some to crash headlong into nearby ships, others to go down in withering fire or to careen harmlessly into the sea. At last, the welcome end of the phase of the operation came on the 9th when the 760 departed for Guam.

LST-788
DOWNS TWO
PLANES

The Coast Guard manned LST-788 arrived at Okinawa on 2 April and proceeded to anchorage at Kerama Retto where she remained until the 5th. She then proceeded to the Western

LST-764 AT OKINAWA



Beaches at Okinawa and unloaded troops and equipment until the 16th of April. The ship saw considerable air activity during this operation and manned battle stations 47 times during the 15 days in the area, the longest being 7 hours and 35 minutes during one twelve hour period. Hits were scored on seven enemy planes and the ship was directly responsible for the downing of two planes. One plane was downed 250 yards off the port beam and another hit the water fifty feet off the starboard quarter, missing the ship's conn by twenty feet, with slight underwater damage to the LST. She departed the area in convoy for Ulithi on the 16th.


LST-789
DOWNS AN
"OSCAR"

Arriving at Okinawa on D-day the Coast Guard manned LST-789 immediately launched their LVT's loaded with Army assault forces. Their small boats acted as wave guides. On the same day they launched LCT-901 from their main deck. During the next week they unloaded all the Army vehicles and a small amount of bulk cargo by LVT. On the 9th they beached for about 5 hours when bad weather necessitated retracting all LST's from the beach. Beaching again on the 12th they had completed unloading by the 14th. On the 15th they shot down one enemy plane identified as an Oscar. They departed for Ulithi on the 16th. While at Okinawa they had 28 air alerts lasting for periods ranging from one to seven hours, during which their smoke generator was in operation. Their small boats acted as ship patrol during the night as a protection against the enemy swimmers and small boats.

LST-829
AT IE SHIMA

On the morning of 16 April, the Coast Guard manned LST-829 weighed anchor at Hagushi to take part in the initial assault on Ie Shima, a small island near the northern tip of Okinawa and of major importance for its fine air field. The 773rd Amtracks and Btl. 1, 306th Infantry were landed on Blue Beach One and though swiftly overrunning the western slopes and capturing the air field, were soon up against tough opposition around the base of the prominent Ie Shima "Sugar Loaf" hill, where the Japs had constructed a strong line and were holding out in tombs and caves. It was here that Ernie Pyle met his death. The Japs went after the shipping lying off Ie Shima that morning with a force of 35 planes, most of which were unable to pierce the destroyer and cruiser ring protecting the transports and landing operations. From the 829, it appeared that 12 got through and five of these were splashed within a mile or so of the ship by cruiser and destroyer fire. For a week the 829 followed a schedule which sent it up to Ie Shima early each morning and retired it to anchorages in Naga Wan or off Hagushi every evening. On the 26th the LST-829 reloaded the troops she had landed on Ie Shima. They had suffered losses in the hard fighting around the base of "Sugar Loaf" but had finally cracked the Japanese defenses. Now they were committed to the major fighting on the southern tip of Okinawa. The way in which the 77th distinguished themselves in the Shuri fighting is military history. Two months later the crew of the 829 learned that of the 250 troops who came aboard at Leyte in March, only 45 were not casualties in the Okinawa action. The last two nights of the 829 at Okinawa were spent under almost constant alerts. On the morning of the 29th the 829 departed for Ulithi.

IST-789 AT OKINAWA



PC-469
SINKS ENEMY
SUICIDE BOATS

The enemy was known to have many small suicide boats operating in and around Nagagusuku Bay. The possibility of attacks by large and midget enemy submarines was also great. Late on the 3rd of May, 1945, Coast Guard manned PC-469 was ordered on anti-sub patrol in this area. At 0035 on the 4th, three small craft were sighted bearing 250° T. about 1,000 yards distant. The PC's small boat challenge was not answered and when the craft were identified as Japanese suicide boats the "commence fire" order was given. One boat was sunk about 40 yards astern, with the PC observing and experiencing underwater concussion and explosion. The two remaining boats cleared to about 600 yards. Illumination was furnished by DD's in TG 51.19 and the PC succeeded in sinking another suicide boat at 0050 about 75 yards off the starboard quarter. The PC got underway at 0058, maneuvering with difficulty due to the inefficiency of the starboard generator which went out entirely at 0100. An unidentified LCI came to the PC's assistance and the PC maneuvered to prevent the enemy boat from getting between the two ships. The remaining suicide boat was 1,200 yards distant when at 0104 No. 1 gun was ordered to illuminate and AA batteries to fire. At 0130 sight was lost of the third suicide boat which may also have been sunk.

LSI(L) 90
ATTACKED


The Coast Guard manned LCI(L) Group 103 was under Group Commander, Lt. Comdr. B. A. Walliser, USCGR, and included Division 205 composed of LCI(L)'s 83, 84, 86, 88, (Group Flag) 90, and 40. Division 206 was composed of LCI(L)'s 96, 320, 323, 325, 326, and 350 (Division Flag). Division 205 (TU 32.25.3) was assigned general duties in Nakagusuku Bay. These duties consisted of making smoke at night to cover ships of the fire support group, at the same time keeping a lookout for suicide boats and swimmers. During the day they were grouped near merchant ships for AA support and to carry guard mail and staff officers to other harbors. Division 206 (TU 32.25.4) was assigned to general duties in Kerama Retto consisting of Harbor Entrance Control, making smoke at night and carrying guard mail, light freight, and staff officers. On the afternoon of 3 June, 1945, while acting as harbor control vessel in Chinmu Bay the LCI(L)-90 was attacked by two Japanese suicide planes, one of which, a "Val," crashed into the starboard side of the conning station, rolling to the deck below and then over the side. General Quarters had been sounded and members of the crew were on their way to their stations at the time. Serious injuries were sustained by six men and two officers consisting of burns in various degrees. One of the men later died of his burns. The others were evacuated to shore hospitals for treatment. Although the conn and pilot house had all radio and navigating equipment destroyed, the LCI(L)-90 was able to proceed under her own power using a trick wheel.

TAWI TAWI GROUP - PHILIPPINES

AIRFIELD SEIZED
WITHOUT
OPPOSITION

Troops of the 41st Division, U.S. Army landed on Sanga Sanga Island on the 2nd of April, 1945, in the Tawi Tawi Group southwest of Zamboanga and at the extreme southwestern end of the Sulu Archipelago. A bombardment of the beaches proceeded the landings and by 0900 three assault waves were ashore. There was no opposition and our troops quickly seized the airfield which was the primary objective of the invasion. Later in the day units of the division seized a beachhead on nearby Bongao Island

LST-829 AT IESHIMA



and on the 3rd, occupied Bongao town, against light resistance. Occupation of these two strategic islands, some 200 miles southwest of Zamboanga brought our forces within less than 50 miles of the northeastern tip of Borneo.

MORO GULF - MINDANAO - P. I.

CGC SPENCER LEADS ATTACK

Early on the morning of 17 April, 1945 elements of the U. S. 10th Corps landed unopposed along the eastern shores of Moro Gulf. Troops of the 24th Division and other units of the 10th Corps were put ashore at Parang, about 15 miles north of Cotabato, after a preliminary bombardment of the beachhead by cruisers and destroyers. By midday our troops had advanced more than 5 miles south of Parang, still meeting light opposition. Meanwhile farther to the north, other units of the 24th Division landed, at Malabang. As the Amphibious force, of which the CGC SPENCER served as flagship, approached Malabang, and a few minutes before the heavy naval bombardment of the beach and nearby airstrip was scheduled to begin, a small motor craft put out from shore. As she approached, the American ensign could be identified in the pre-dawn light. The craft was manned by native guerrillas and carried three U. S. Army fliers as passengers. They explained that the Japanese had fled the area and that the beachhead was unguarded. Troops of the 24th Army Division were landed and took up pursuit of the fleeing Japanese.

TARAKAN - DUTCH BORNEO


U. S. SHIPS AT BOMBARDMENT

Australian Army units landed on the islands of Tarakan and Sadau in Dutch East Borneo, about 185 miles southwest of Tawi Tawi on 30 April, in an amphibious operation supported by bombardments by Australian and American warships, which began shelling Tarakan on the 27th and were still at it on the 1st of May. The main landing was made on the southern coast of the Island of Tarakan, which has a good port and is an important oil-producing center. The landing was made near the town of Lingkas, two miles east of the island's airfield. Earlier in the day, Australian Commandos had gone ashore unopposed on Sadau, a small island lying between Borneo and Tarakan. The Borneo coast opposite the Island of Tarakan is swampy and there is no land connection between the two islands.

LST-67 AT TARAKAN

May 1st found the Coast Guard manned LST-67 anchored off Tarakan Island, Borneo with the original assault forces. Destroyers, gunboats, rocket ships, and mine sweepers came alongside to replenish their magazines and resume the devastating fire which made possible the steady advance of the attacking Australian forces. The LST-67 also acted as general logistics ship during the operation, furnishing dry stores, fuel, and fresh water to the various participating vessels.

COAST GUARD-MANNED LCI'S READIED FOR ACTION AGAINST THE JAPS



DAVAO - MINDANAO - P. I.

JAPANESE ARE DRIVEN TO THE HILLS

Units of the U. S. 24th Division, working overland from Parang had secured Kabacan, an important road junction in the center of the island of Mindanao, and moving swiftly through the hills to the east had reached the west coast of Davao Gulf at Digos on the 27th of April.

Here less than 30 miles southwest of Davao, they spread out along the coast, while units advancing to the north towards Davao reached the western outskirts of the city on the 1st of May. The same task force that had operated in the Moro Gulf, with CGC SPENCER as flagship, swept around the southern tip of Mindanao and landed additional troops and material near Digos where the 24th Division troops had already cleared the beachhead of the enemy. The city of Davao was captured on the 4th of May by troops of this Division. Little opposition had been met as our troops seized airfields at Darong and Daliao, near the coast southwest of Davao, and at Padada, south of Digos. They had to overrun extensive minefields and other beach obstacles and had found an elaborate system of abandoned AA batteries below Davao, as well as coast defense installations with many guns intact. After crossing the Davao River on the 2nd of May, increasing resistance was met in the outskirts of Davao and house to house fighting developed as our forces drove the enemy from the city and into the hills. Davao's seaport, Santa Ana, was taken on the 3rd when Matina and Libby airfields were also secured. Heavy resistance was met in the foothills two miles to the northwest of Davao.


BRUNEI BAY - BRITISH BORNEO

U. S. SEVENTH FLEET UNITS SUPPORT AUSTRALIAN LANDING

After a three day bombardment by units of the U. S. Seventh Fleet and an Australian Squadron, troops of the Ninth Australian Division landed at four points in the Brunei Bay area of British Borneo. On the 10th of June negligible losses were suffered as the Australians went ashore at two points on Labuan Island, on Muara Island and at Cape Polompong on the southwestern shores of

Brunei Bay. On Labuan they captured Victoria Town, secured the harbor, and overran a 4,300-foot airstrip. Muara was completely occupied in 48 hours. On the mainland they took the town of Brooketon and drove southward toward Brunei 13 miles distant. On the 12th a landing was made on the north shore of the Brunei River two miles east of Brunei. General Douglas MacArthur landed with the troops on Labuan. He pointed out that seizure of the Brunei Bay area would give us another base from which to intensify the blockade of the Japanese occupied regions of the Southwest Pacific and would enable us to strike at the enemy's overland communication routes in the Malay Peninsula and Indo-China. Brunei Bay offered 250 square miles of protected anchorage for vessels of any size and the area had important air bases and such strategic materials as oil, rubber, coal, lumber, and iron. On 17 June the Australians landed at Weston on the eastern shores of Brunei Bay and southern terminus of a 65-mile railway, longest in Borneo, which runs north to Jesselton. Two days later they landed at Mempakul on the northeast tip of the Bay. They had captured Brunei Town on the 13th and by the 16th had reached Tutong, 25 miles

COAST GUARD LST'S IN THE BALIKPAPAN INVASION CARRYING NOT ONLY TROOPS BUT ALSO HEAVY EQUIPMENT
NECESSARY TO PUT THE OIL RICH REGION INTO OPERATING CONDITION SOON AFTER THE ASSAULT



to the southwest of Brunei, without making any contact with the enemy. The drive continued southwest toward the Seria and Miri oilfields and on the 23rd, 50 of the Seria oilfields were seized, most of which could be placed in production within a short time. The destruction of pipelines and storage tanks at Miri, on the other hand, precluded their rapid restoration to operation.

COAST GUARD AT
BRUNEI BAY
LANDING

On the morning of 10 June, 1945, the SPENCER took her station as command ship for the staff of the 20th Australian Brigade about one mile from the mainland. Assigned mission of the 20th Brigade was to land troops on Red, White, and Yellow beaches, on the Southern side of the bay. Besides providing communications facilities for the 20th Brigade as her troops pushed on toward Brooketon, the SPENCER acted as radar guard against Jap planes coming in near the mouth of the bay. Preparations had been well made for the landings, and the SPENCER shifted anchorage farther inward by Yellow Beach when after two hours it became apparent that everything was going according to schedule at Red and White beaches. From 1000 on, the SPENCER's personnel enjoyed fishing, once they were secured from battle stations. The situation remained peaceful until an hour before sunset when all hands went to the routine battle stations. About 30 minutes before sunset a station in the aircraft warning net reported a bogey. SPENCER's plotting room dead reckoned the bogey until it appeared on the radar screen in a position that checked with the contact report. Lieut. Olen I. Kull, USNR, who was in radio contact with a P-61, Black Widow night-fighter in the vicinity, coached her on to the bogey. Over the air came the message "Now I see him straight down. I'm going in. Now I'll let him have it. That did it." And as the message came through the topside personnel of the SPENCER saw a plane catch fire at 120 degrees relative, distant six miles, and plunge in flames to the ground near the bay. The 11th of June, the part of the invasion for which the SPENCER's staff was responsible having been well established on land, the SPENCER upped anchor and returned to the staging area.

KUME - RYUKYU ISLANDS


AIR RAID WARNING
FACILITY SITES

Landings were made by a reconnaissance battalion of U.S. troops on Kume Island, 50 miles west of Okinawa on the morning of 26 June, 1945. The landings were without opposition, all but 30 natives having fled to the hills. These reported that there were 40-50 Japanese military personnel on the island, possibly as service personnel for the airstrip, which was a rough, sandy runway used for emergency landings. Kume afforded an additional air raid warning facility site for U. S. positions and forces at Okinawa. Theya Island, about 17 miles northwest of the northern tip of Okinawa's west coast, had been occupied without opposition by the Second Marines on 4 June and Aguni Island, 30 miles off Okinawa's west coast, was invaded and secured on the 9th, also without resistance. In addition to providing bases for radar installations, all three islands had possible airfield sites.

BALIKPAPAN - DUTCH BORNEO


IMPORTANT OIL
PORT CAPTURED

Infantry and armored units of the Australian Seventh Division landed east of the Klandasan district of the



oil port of Balikpapan, on the southeast coast of Borneo, on 1 July, 1945. The landings culminated three weeks of concentrated air assaults and a fortnight of naval bombardment. The troop met scattered small arms fire but little other early opposition. Opposition increased as the units advanced inland but by midafternoon they had taken Paramatta ridge in the southern outskirts of the city overlooking the ruined and still burning oil refineries. On the 2nd and 3rd they captured the Sepinggan medium bomber field outside Balikpapan and pressed on toward Manggar fighter field, 12 miles to the northeast, on the coast road. 300 ships of the U. S. Seventh Fleet and Royal Netherlands Navy put the landing craft ashore. General Douglas MacArthur came ashore with the fourth wave of assault troops personally to direct the operation. A ten foot anti-tank ditch and triple rows of barbed wire entanglements had to be penetrated before the troops could advance inland. The Japanese had been forced to abandon an elaborate network of pillboxes and tunnels behind the beach, but dual-purpose guns on the coast were manned and fought aggressively, though the enemy had lost most of their striking power because of constant pounding from allied planes and ships. Seventeen of twenty-eight known gun positions were knocked out by the 13th Air Force prior to the landings and 60 per cent of the town of Balikpapan had been leveled by air and naval attacks. Oil pipe lines paralleling the beach to be used as beach defenses, had never been fired because the tanks supplying them had been knocked out by the preparatory bombardment. In 18 days of intensive bombing prior to the landing 3,500 tons of bombs had been dropped on military installations in or near the city, while 1,250 tons of shells had been fired by naval vessels. By the 7th the infantry had driven to the northern edge of Balikpapan and crossed the Soember River against Japanese opposition. By the 9th the encirclement of the town was completed with the crossing of Balikpapan Bay on the 5th by Australian troops in landing craft and amphibious tanks supported by a bombardment by two American cruisers and four destroyers, to land near Penadjam point and by a landing by Dutch amphibious troops on the 9th at Djinabora on the north bank of the Riko River, 4 miles to the north. By the 18th of July advance units of the Seventh Australian Division had entered the oil field center and pumping station of Sambodja, 30 miles northeast of Balikpapan. The settlement was deserted except for two Japanese, who were killed. This placed the Australians in the middle of an oil producing area which was before the war, one of the richest sources of petroleum in the Netherlands East Indies. Although oil was pumped from Sambodja to Balikpapan for refining, much of the crude oil in this section could be used for fuel without refining. Like the Dutch, the Japanese attempted to destroy their oil stocks and equipment as they retreated and great fires were found roaring through the Sambodja field, which was the smallest of the three fields serving the Balikpapan refineries. The other two fields, about 30 miles north, at Louise and Moera-Angana had respectively double and triple the annual million barrel production of Sambodja. At the time of Japan's surrender on 14 August, 1945, the Australians were consolidating positions for a push into the latter two fields, where destruction was expected to be considerable lighter than at the Sambodja field or the Balikpapan refineries. Total enemy casualties in Borneo were reported on the 14th of August as 5,693 counted dead and 536 prisoners. Allied casualties were 436 killed, 1,460 wounded and 3 missing.

USS SAMUEL CHASE (APA-26)



LST-67
AT BALIKPAPAN

On 17 June, 1945, the Coast Guard manned LST-67 departed Morotai to take part in the operations against Balikpapan. Anchoring in Tawi Tawi until the 22nd, the LST headed south with a destroyer as escort. She passed through the Macassar Straits June 23rd, a full week before the invasion forces, thus becoming the first LST through this historic pass. On "D" minus seven, June 24th, the 67 anchored in Balikpapan Bay. Ammunition was speedily transferred to cruisers and destroyers who were reducing enemy defenses to rubble. Shortly after the 67 was underway on the night of the 25th, Japanese torpedo planes evaded the air patrol. Accurate fire routed the attackers, however, one plane being hit repeatedly by the 67's guns as it circled in to port, finally crashing in flames a few hundred yards off the beam. The LST-67 returned to Tawi Tawi where additional ammunition was taken aboard. On June 29th she rendezvoused with the main convoy bound for the Balikpapan landing. Invasion day (1 July, 1945) found her again at anchor in Balikpapan Bay, supplying destroyers and support ships with explosives as they blasted a path for the troops engaged in the last major amphibious operation of the war. The LST's 66 and 168 also participated in this latter operation.

LANDINGS IN JAPAN

LST-789
AT YOKOSUKA
AND KURE

After the surrender of Japan the Coast Guard manned LST-789 was assigned to carry one half of the 602 CBMU and NAB personnel together with their equipment and gear to Yokosuka, Japan. On 28 August, the LST anchored in Miyata Wan, Sagami Wan, off Yahagi, Honshu, Japan and proceeded to Tokyo Bay on the 30th, immediately beaching on the seaplane ramp at the airport at Yokosuka Naval Base. Unloading was completed on 2 September. They then retracted and anchored off the Yokosuka Breakwater. During the next 8 days they picked up 4 officers and 203 seamen for transportation to the United States and departed for Guam on the 10th. Again on the 26th of October they departed Leyte for Kure, Honshu, Japan with 4 officers and 145 men of the 731 Engineers and a cargo of motorized equipment. They arrived at Kure on 2 November and beached next day at the Hiro Airport. On the 9th they departed for Saipan.

USS SAMUEL CHASE
AT YOKOHAMA

On 1 September, 1945, the Coast Guard manned USS SAMUEL CHASE (AP-26) was anchored in the outer harbor at Cebu, P. I. At 0833 she was underway en route to Leyte Gulf where she anchored on the 2nd. A few hours later she was proceeding as unit of Task Group 33.3 en route to Japan. On the 3rd the ships zigzagged and exercised at tactical maneuvers. The CHASE anchored in the outer breakwater area, Yokohama, Japan, at 1206 on 8 September, 1945, and next day moored at the starboard side of Berth No. 4, Customs Wharf, Yokohama, Japan, and commenced unloading cargo and debarking troops. By the 10th all cargo and personnel of the Americal Division, U. S. Army was disembarked. At 1520 on that day the Task Group was headed for Leyte Gulf, P. I. Again on the 25th of September the CHASE was underway from Cebu, P. I. with 45 officers and 828 enlisted men of the 77th Division, U. S. Army and attached units, as a unit of the Hokkaido Transport Group.

COAST GUARDSMEN LAND AUSSIES IN BALIKPAPAN INVASION



LST-784
AT TOKYO

As soon as the war with Japan had ended on 14 August, 1945, the Coast Guard manned LST-784 found herself occupied in the roll-up movement of men and supplies from the Philippines to Japan. The first units carried were Counter-Intelligence Corps, Metropolitan Unit, No. 80 and 7 officers and 84 men of the 196th Ordnance Company, together with 383 tons of organizational gear, rations, and vehicles. Under the tactical command of Commander, LST Flotilla 14, the LST-784 left Batagas on 6 September. She anchored in Tokyo Kaiwan on the 15th and unloaded on the 17th. A wind of typhoon intensity built up during the morning of the 18th, estimated to be blowing at 70 knots. A number of small boats broke free and were wrecked and one LST was driven onto the sea wall. The blow lasted all day. On the 20th, the 784 set out for Manila. On the 8th of October she got underway again for Japan but put into Subic Bay for the night when a typhoon was supposed to pass close by. After a long, slow, rough-weathered trip she anchored in Tokyo Kaiwan on the 19th and the following day discharged a group of Army personnel to whom the life ashore had become more desirable than they would ever before have believed. On 29 October, she departed Tokyo for Saipan.

USS CAMBRIA
AT NAGASAKI

On 17 September, 1945, as flagship of Temporary Squadron 12, composed of 21 ships, the USS CAMBRIA (APA-36) left Saipan carrying Headquarters Company, 2nd Marine Division. As if in summation of all the landing the CAMBRIA had made, she led her squadron through the narrow channel of Nagasaki Ko, into Japan itself. On the afternoon of the 23rd September, the CAMBRIA wardroom was the scene of an impressive ceremony as the Japanese Governor of Nagasaki Prefecture and the Acting Mayor of Nagasaki received instructions from Major General LeRoy B. Hunt, USMC, Commanding General of the 2nd Marine Division Occupational Forces. Through the porthole one could see the effective results of precision bombing in the wreckage of the Mitsubishi shipyards, and a little farther away, the almost unbelievable destruction of the second atomic bomb. From the CAMBRIA could be seen results of action by all branches of the U. S. Armed Forces, land, sea and air, together with scientific production, and the ultimate outcome---Capitulation.

LST-829
AT NAGASAKI

On 17 September the Coast Guard manned LST-829, in a large landing ship convoy, set out from Saipan for Nagasaki with occupation troops of the 2nd Marine Division. Japan was first sighted at dawn on the 28th. It was a curious crew that lined the rails to get their first look at the country with which they had been at war for four years. The country side was green and more homelike from a distance than anything most of these men had seen in many months. As the ship proceeded into the large bay, it was plain that the damage was terrific. While at anchor in the outer harbor awaiting unloading orders, lookouts spotted several Japanese bodies floating in the water, apparently victims of the second atomic bomb. The smashed devastation of Nagasaki proper became visible when the LST-829 moored at the Custom House pier to unload. The stench was particularly unpleasant. Japanese waved strenuously, bowed and smiled, but no one was under any illusions as to how friendly they really were.

LST-788
BRINGS TROOPS
TO JAPAN

As a unit of the Southern Occupation Force, the Coast Guard manned LST-788 arrived at Nagasaki on 24 September, 1945. Unloading of troops and cargo in Nagasaki harbor was completed the same day. She departed for Leyte on the 26th. On 13 October she departed Leyte and arriving at Davao on the 15th loaded elements of the 34th Infantry Division and 63rd Field Artillery, U. S. Army for Mitsuhamma, Shikoku, Japan as a unit of the Central Occupation Group. Arriving on the 25th she unloaded on the beach without using the pontoon causeways and departed for Manila on the 29th.

LCI(L) GROUP
103 DESTROYS
MINES AT WAKAYAMA

LCI(L) Group 103, consisted of LCI(L)'s 83, 84, 86, 88, 94, 96, 320, 323, 325, 332, 350, and LCI(M) 810. All except 332 and the LCI(M) were Coast Guard manned. These were engaged in mine destruction from 11 September, 1945, until 1 October, 1945, operating in conjunction with Navy mine sweeping units. During this period, a channel was cleared through Kii Suido to Wakayama Anchorage. A task group of hospital ships and supporting war ships then evacuated allied prisoners from camps in the area and allied occupation forces to garrison the Kobe-Osaka-Wakayama area were landed. During the period the Kii Suido moored minefield was swept to a depth of 200 feet and a total of 312 mines were definitely known to be sunk or exploded by the mine destruction vessels. Many additional mines were destroyed by the mine-sweepers or exploded in their gear. During the operation the following were regularly or occasionally assigned to operate with the destruction unit: PGM's 27 and 27, PCE(R) 860, LCI(M)'s 808, 819, and 1090, YMS 236 and 331 and AM's 162 and 220. These ships, collectively designated during operations as T.U. 52.6.7, operated with sweep units designated as T.U.'s 52.6.1, 52.6.2, 52.6.3, and 52.6.4.


METHOD OF
OPERATION

The mission of the mine destruction vessels was to destroy promptly and completely all mines cut adrift by the four Navy mine sweep units. The main field consisted of 630 moored mines, reported by the Japanese to have been laid off the entrance to Kii Suido in three lines. Rifles, carbines, 30 calibre, 20 mm and 40 mm machine guns comprised the armament of the various ships, assigned destruction duties. An additional duty of the LCI's was to lay dan buoys to mark channels and swept areas. The normal disposition in operation with mine vessels in sweeping formation was for one destruction vessel to be abeam of one and astern of another sweeper. Thus there were approximately as many destruction vessels as sweepers. The following destruction vessels were assigned to the Sweep Units:

SWEEP UNIT
T.U. 52.6.1
T.U. 52.6.2
T.U. 52.6.3
T.U. 52.6.4

DESTRUCTION UNITS
LCI's 83, 84, and 86
LCI's 88, 94, and 96
LCI's 320, 323, and 3.0
LCI's 332, 325 and LCI(M) 810

Two types of enemy moored mines were encountered. In the main field near Kii Suido, the mines were approximately 48 inches in diameter with five horns six to eight inches in length. Inside Wakayama Wan, near Tomogoshima



Suido, the mines were smaller, approximately 40 inches in diameter, with four horns about three or four inches long. Except for the destructive typhoon which struck on the night of September 17-18, and the typhoon warnings of September 27-30, the weather did not seriously interfere with any of the sweeping operations. By the 27th of September the last of the mines which were obstructing the channel had been sunk and all drifting mines destroyed after visual search by the destruction vessels.

LST-768
IN "GUINEA
PIG" RUNS

Having beached at Sasebo on 19 October, 1945, the Coast Guard manned LST-768 was assigned to CoMinPac and ordered to prepare for "Guinea Pig" operations. These are the first runs made over newly swept channels. Excess fuel was transferred to another LST, together with all ammunition, 20 mm and larger. The main engine controls were moved out of the engine room to the wheel house so that no men need be below in case a mine were struck. On 23 November, 1945, forty men of the crew were transferred temporarily in order to skeletonize the crew for the "Guinea Pig" runs and on the 26th the LST sailed for Iki Shima, Japan; then to Fukuoka on the 28th, where the runs were to be made. Here the crew was further skeletonized and together with LST-553 began to make the "Guinea Pig" runs. No men were allowed below and all hands wore life jackets. The runs were completed on 4 December, 1945, without damage, except for burning out one auxiliary engine for lack of lubrication. The fortitude, cooperation, and cheerfulness of the crew during this hazardous duty was a credit to the men of the ship and to the service.

CONCLUSION

Thus the fighting Coast Guard, manning its own and Navy vessels, went the whole, hard blood stained road from Guadalcanal to Tokyo. Men taught to save life now had to take it. But this did not prevent them from performing the many acts of mercy even in the midst of combat which so richly emblazon the Coast Guard tradition. In seeing it through they knew that they were but once more fighting the nation's battles as they had in all its wars. And for the Peace that follows and the manifold duties which it brings they will be "Always Ready."

APPENDIX A

OPERATIONS IN WHICH COAST GUARD

FULLY OR PARTIALLY MANNED

VESSELS PARTICIPATED

PACIFIC AREA

Pearl Harbor - Midway, 7 December, 1941

WALNUT, USCG (at Midway)

CONDOR, USCG (AMC-14)

Guadalcanal - Tulagi landings, 7-9 August, 1942

ALCHIBA (AK-23) *

ALHENA (AK-26) *

AMERICAN LEGION (AP-35) *

BARNETT (AP-11) *

BELLATRIX (AK-20) *

BETHELGEUSE (AK-28) *

CRESCENT CITY (AP-40) *

FULLER (AP-14) *

GEORGE F. ELLIOTT (AP-13) *

GREGORY (APD-3) *

HEYWOOD (AP-12) *

HUNTER LIGGETT (AP-27)

LIBRA (AK-53) *

LITTLE (APD-4) *

MCCAWLEY (AP-10) *

NEVILLE (AP-16) *

PRESIDENT ADAMS (AP-38) *

PRESIDENT HAYES (AP-39) *

PRESIDENT JACKSON (AP-37) *

Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal, 10 Aug., 1942, - 8 Feb., 1943

ALCHIBA (AK-23) *

ALHENA (AK-26) *

BARNETT (AP-11) *

BELLATRIX (AKA-3) *

BETHELGEUSE (AKA-11) *

CRESCENT CITY (APA-21) *

FULLER (APA-7) *

GREGORY (APD-3) *

HUNTER LIGGETT (AP-27)

LIBRA (AKA-12) *

Note: Vessels not listed in the Floating Units Plan as being Coast Guard ships or Coast Guard manned (that is, vessels having only a few Coast Guardsmen aboard) are starred thus *.

LITTLE (APD-4)*
 McCawley (APA-4)*
 PRESIDENT ADAMS (APA-19)*
 PRESIDENT HAYES (APA-20)*
 PRESIDENT JACKSON (APA-18)*
 STRINGHAM (APD-6)*

Consolidation of Southern Solomons, 8 Feb. - 20 June, 1943

| | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| CRESCENT CITY (APA-21)* | } Enemy air attack on surface vessels northeast of San Cristobal Is., 17 February. |
| PRESIDENT ADAMS (APA-19)* | |
| PRESIDENT HAYES (APA-20)* | |
| PRESIDENT JACKSON (APA-18)* | |

(Vila-Stanmore and Kolombangara, enemy air attacks, 20 March)
 LIBRA (AKA-12)*

(Enemy air attack on Tulagi, Koli Point and shipping in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area, 7 April, 1943)

FULLER (APA-7)*
 HUNTER LIGGETT (APA-14)
 KANAWHA (AOG-31) (sunk)
 LIBRA (AKA-12)*

(Vila-Stanmore and Munda areas, enemy air attack, 13 May)
 CRESCENT CITY (APA-21)*

New Georgia Group Operation, 20 June - 16 October, 1943

(New Georgia-Rendova-Vangunu Occupation, 20 June - 31 Aug., 1943)

LIBRA (AKA-12)* (30 June)
 McCawley (APA-4)* (30 June)
 PRESIDENT ADAMS (APA-19)* (30 June)
 PRESIDENT HAYES (APA-20)* (30 June)
 PRESIDENT JACKSON (APA-18)* (30 June)

(Vella Lavella Occupation, 15 Aug. - 16 Oct., 1943)

LST-167 (25 Sept.)
 LST-334*
 STRINGHAM (APD-6)* (15 Aug.)

Treasury-Bougainville Operation, 27 Oct. - 15 Dec., 1943

(Treasury Islands Landing, 27 Oct. - 6 Nov., 1943)

CRESCENT CITY (APA-21)*
 LST-71 (1 Nov.)
 STRINGHAM (APD-6)*

Occupation and Defense of Cape Torokina, Bougainville, 1 Nov. - 15 Dec., 1943

ALCHIRA (AKA-6)* (1-13 Nov.)
 ALHENA (AKA-9)* (1-13 Nov.)
 AMERICAN LEGION (APA-17)* (1-13 Nov.)
 CRESCENT CITY (APA-21)* (1-13 Nov.)

FULLER (APA-7)* (1,8,9 Nov.)
 HUNTER LIGGETT (APA-14) (1,13 Nov.)
 LIBRA (AKA-12)* (1,8,9 Nov.)
 LST-70 (6,17 Nov.)
 LST-166 (15 Dec.)
 LST-207 (6,17 Nov.)
 LST-334*
 PRESIDENT ADAMS (APA-19)* (1,8,9 Nov.)
 PRESIDENT HAYES (APA-20)* (1,8,9 Nov.)
 PRESIDENT JACKSON (APA-18)* (1,8,9 Nov.)
 STRINGHAM (APD-6)* (6,11 Nov.)

Gilbert Islands Operation, 13 Nov. - 8 Dec., 1943

BELLATRIX (AKA-3)* (20 Nov.-7 Dec.)
 HEYWOOD (APA-6)* (20 Nov.-4 Dec.)
 LEONARD WOOD (APA-12) (16 Nov.-2 Dec.)
 LST-19 (28 Nov.-8 Dec.)
 LST-20 (21 Nov.-8 Dec.)
 LST-23 (21 Nov.-5 Dec.)
 LST-69 (20 Nov.-8 Dec.)
 LST-169 (21 Nov.-8 Dec.)
 LST-205 (21 Nov.-8 Dec.)
 MIDDLETON (APA-25) (20-29 Nov.)
 NEVILLE (APA-9)* (20-24 Nov.)
 WILLIAM P. BIDDLE (APA-8)* (20-24 Nov.)

Marshall Islands Operation, 26 Nov., 1943 - 2 March, 1944

AQUARIUS (AKA-16) (Occupation of Kwajalein and Majuro Atolls, 31 Jan.-8 Feb.)
 BIDDLE (APA-8)* (Kwajalein and Majuro, 31 Jan.-8 Feb.)
 CALLAWAY (APA-35) (" " " " " " " ")
 GAMBRIA (APA-36) (" " " " " " " ") (Eniwetok, 17 Feb.-2 Mar.)
 CENTAURUS (APA-17) (" " " " " 5 Feb.) (Eniwetok) #
 HEYWOOD (APA-6)* (" " " " " 8 Feb.) (Eniwetok, 17 Feb.-25 Feb.)
 LEONARD WOOD (APA-12) (Kwajalein and Majuro, 31 Jan. - 8 Feb. and Eniwetok, 17-25 Feb.)
 LST-23 (Kwajalein and Majuro, 2-8 Feb.)
 ARTHUR MIDDLETON (APA-25) (Kwajalein and Majuro, 31 Jan. - 8 Feb. and Eniwetok, 17-25 Feb.)
 NEVILLE (APA-9)* (Kwajalein and Majuro, 31 Jan. - 8 Feb., Eniwetok, 17 Feb.-2 Mar.)

Green Islands Landing, 15-19 Feb., 1944

STRINGHAM (APD-6)*
 LST-70
 LST-71
 LST-166
 LST-207

St. Mathias Islands Landing, 20 March, 1944
CALLAWAY (APA-35) (Emirau)

Marianas Operation, 1944

ALHENA (AKA-9)* (Capture and Occupation of Saipan, 15-22 June)
AQUARIUS (AK-16) (Capture and Occupation, Guam, 21-26 July)
BELLATRIX (AKA-3)* (Capture and Occupation of Saipan, 16-22 June)
BIDDLE (APA-8)* (Capture and Occupation, Guam, 21-25 July)
CALLAWAY (APA-35) (Capture and Occupation of Saipan, 15-24 June)
CAMBRIA (APA-36) (Saipan, 15 June - 10 August)
(Capture and Occupation of Tinian, 24 July - 10 August)
CAVALIER (APA-37) (Saipan, 16 June - 28 July; Tinian 24-28 July)
CENTAURUS (AKA-17) (Capture and Occupation of Guam, 21-27 July)
COR CAROLI (AK-91) (Guam, 27 July - 15 August)
CRESCENT CITY (APA-21)* (Guam, 21-25 July)
GEORGE F. ELLIOTT (AP-105)* (15-22 June)
FULLER (APA-7)* (Saipan, 15 June - 28 July; Tinian 24-28 July)
HEYWOOD (APA-6)* (Saipan, 16 June - 28 July; Tinian 24-28 July)
LEONARD WOOD (APA-12) (Saipan, 15-24 June)
LIBRA (AKA-12)* (Guam, 21-25 July)
LST-19 (Saipan, 15 June - 28 July) (Tinian, 24-28 July)
LST-23 (" " " " ") (" " ")
LST-24 (Guam, 8-12 August)
LST-70 (Guam, 21-28 July)
LST-71 (Guam, 21 July - 5 August)
LST-166 (Saipan, 15-22 June)
LST-169 (Saipan, 15 June - 3 July)
LST-205 (Saipan, 17 June - 3 July)
LST-207 (Guam, 21-28 July)
LST-334* (Guam, 21 July - 5 August)
ARTHUR MIDDLETON (APA-25) (Saipan, 15-24 June)
NEVILLE (APA-9)* (Saipan, 15-24 June)
PRESIDENT ADAMS (APA-19)* (Guam, 21-26 July)
PRESIDENT JACKSON (APA-18)* (Guam, 21-26 July)
PRESIDENT HAYES (APA-20)* (Guam, 21-26 July)
STEROPE (AK-94) (Guam, 21 July - 9 August)
STRINGHAM (APD-6)* (Saipan, 15 June - 28 July; Tinian, 24-28 July)
TUPELO (AN-56) (Guam, 1-15 August)
WOODBINE (CGC) (Saipan, 24 July)

Bismarck Archipelago Operation (25 June, 1943 - 1 May, 1944) #
 Cape Gloucester, New Britain (24 Dec., 1943 - 1 March, 1944)
 LST-18 (25 Dec., 1943 - 27 Jan., 1944)
 LST-22 (24 Dec., 1943 - 25 Feb., 1944)
 LST-26 (24 Dec., 1943 - 14 Jan., 1944)
 LST-66 (25 Dec., 1943 - 29 Feb., 1944)
 LST-67 (25 Dec., 1943 - 14 Jan., 1944)
 LST-68 (25 Dec., 1943 - 16 Feb., 1944)
 LST-168 (25 Dec., 1943 - 1 Feb., 1944)
 LST-170 (25 - 28 Dec., 1943)
 LST-202 (Engaged in D-Day landing. 25 Dec., 1943 -
 25 Feb., 1944)
 LST-204 (Engaged in D-Day landing. 25 Dec., 1943 -
 1 March, 1944)
 LST-206 (25 Dec., 1943 - 1 March, 1944)
 MIZAR (AF-12)* (Supporting and Consolidation Operations,
 1 March - 31 July, 1944)
 STRINGHAM (APD-6)* (26-29 Dec., 1943)

Admiralty Islands, 28 Feb. - 17 April, 1944
 CORONADO (2-6 April)
 GLENDALE (16-18 March)
 LONG BEACH (16-18 March)
 LST-18 (28 March - 1 April)
 LST-22 (29 Feb. - 1 April) (Los Negros)
 LST-66 (7 March - 1 April) (Manus)
 LST-67 (7 - 18 March) (Manus)
 LST-68 (4 - 8 March) (Los Negros)
 LST-168 (14 - 18 March) (Los Negros)
 LST-170 (14 - 18 March) (Manus)
 LST-202 (29 Feb. - 11 March) (Los Negros)
 LST-206 (4 - 18 March) (Manus)
 ETAMIN (7 - 22 March)
 SAN PEDRO (2 - 4 April)

Eastern New Guinea Operation, 19 Dec., 1942 - 24 July, 1944
 LST-201 (Nov., 1943 - 30 April, 1944) (Along the
 Papuan and New Guinea coasts)
 MIZAR (AF-12)* (Supply runs to Buna, Manus, Hollandia,
 Woendi and Finschhafen, 1 March - 31 July,
 1944)

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Beginning at this point, dates given after the vessels sometimes represent intermittent action, that is, dates after LST-18 in detail are: 25-27 Dec., 28-30 Dec., 5-9 Jan., 15-19 Jan., and 23-27 Jan. but they are shown simply as 25 Dec. - 27 Jan.

Finschhafen

LST-18 (20-24 Sept., 1943)
LST-67 (20-24 Sept., 1943)
LST-168 (20-24 Sept., 1943)
LST-204 (20-23 Sept., 1943)

Saidor Occupation (31 Dec., 1943 - 1 March, 1944)

LST-22 (1 Jan., 1944 - 7 Feb., 1944)
LST-66 (20 Jan., 1944 - 14 Feb., 1944)
LST-67 (15-22 Jan.)
LST-68 (15 Jan. - 28 Feb.)
LST-168 (1-7 Jan.)
LST-170 (1 Jan. - 7 Feb.) (Engaged in D-Day landing)
LST-202 (15 Jan. - 7 Feb.)
LST-204 (15 Jan. - 14 Feb.)
LST-206 (1 Jan. - 14 Feb.)
STRINGHAM (APD-6)* (2 Jan.)

Western New Guinea Operation, 17 April - 15 Nov., 1944

LST-201 (1 May - 27 Sept.)
MIZAR (AF-12)* (Supporting and Consolidation Operation,
1 May - 31 July, 1944)

Hollandia Operation (Aitape, (British New Guinea), Humboldt Bay,
Tanahmerah Bay)

VAN BUREN (26 April - 2 May)
CORONADO (Engaged in D-Day landing) (18 April - 3 May)
EL PASO (2 May)
GLENDAL (Engaged in D-Day landing) (19 April - 10 May)
LONG BEACH (Engaged in D-Day landing) (19-27 April)
OGDEN (26 April - 3 May)
SAN PEDRO (Engaged in D-Day landing) (19 April - 10 May)
LST-18 (18 April - 7 May)
LST-22 (18 April - 7 May)
LST-26 (18 April - 7 May)
LST-66 (18 April - 7 May)
LST-67 (18 April - 7 May)
LST-68 (18 April - 27 April)
LST-168 (19 April - 28 April)
LST-170 (19 April - 15 May)
LST-201 (26 April - 30 April)
LST-202 (19 April - 14 May)
LST-204 (19 April - 14 May)
LST-206 (19 April - 7 May)
ETAMIN (In D-Day landing) (18 April - 1 May)
CENTAURUS (In D-Day landing) (19 April - 5 May)

Toem, Wakde, Sarmi Area Bombardment and Landing, 16 May -
21 June, 1944

VAN BUREN (14-21 June)
EL PASO (23-25 May)
OGDEN (20 May - 7 June)
LST-18 (17-23 May)
LST-22 (18-25 May)
LST-26 (17-25 May)
LST-66 (18-25 May)
LST-67 (17-23 May)
LST-170 (Engaged in D-Day landing) (16-25 May)
LST-202 (Engaged in D-Day landing) (16-23 May)
LST-206 (17-28 May)

Biak Island, 25 May - 24 June, 1944

VAN BUREN (3-10 June)
CORONADO (27 May - 7 June)
SAN PEDRO (6-22 June)
LST-18 (6-16 June)
LST-22 (26 May - 16 June)
LST-26 (26 May - 14 June)
LST-66 (6-16 June)
LST-67 (28 May - 16 June)
LST-68 (9-15 June)
LST-170 (28 May - 14 June)
LST-204 (9-20 June)
LST-205 (9-13 June)
LST-206 (6-20 June)

Noemfoor Island, 30 June - 23 July, 1944

EL PASO (21-25 July)
ORANGE (19-23 July)
SAN PEDRO (23-27 July)
LST-22 (10-15 July)
LST-26 (6-10 July)
LST-66 (2-14 July)
LST-67 (2-14 July)
LST-68 (8-14 July)
LST-202 (9-14 July)
LST-204 (2-15 July)
LST-18 (2-14 July)

Cape Sansapor, Middleburg Island, Amsterdam Island

BISBEE (12-31 Aug.)
CORONADO (6-18 Aug.)
EUGENE (6-31 Aug.)
GALLUP (12-31 Aug.)
GLENDALE (18-24 Aug.)
LONG BEACH (6-9 Aug.)
SAN PEDRO (6-31 Aug.)
VAN BUREN (1-22 Aug.)

LST-18 (27 July - 2 Aug.)
 LST-22 (27 July - 28 Aug.)
 LST-26 (Engaged in D-Day landing) (27 July - 10 Aug.)
 LST-66 (Engaged in D-Day landing) (27 July - 10 Aug.)
 LST-67 (27 July - 14 Aug.)
 LST-68 (Engaged in D-Day landing) (27 July - 26 Aug.)
 LST-170 (Engaged in D-Day landing) (27 July - 26 Aug.)
 LST-202 (Engaged in D-Day landing) (27 July - 26 Aug.)
 LST-204 (31 July - 22 Aug.)
 LST-206 (Engaged in D-Day landing) (27 July - 26 Aug.)

Western Caroline Islands Operation

Peleliu (6 September, 1944 - 14 October, 1944)

AQUARIUS (AKA-16)
 CENTAURUS (AKA-17)
 CRESCENT CITY (APA-21)*
 FULLER (APA-7)*
 GLENDALE (PF-36)*
 STRINGHAM (APD-6)*
 LST-19 (Raids on Volocano-Bonia and Yap)
 LST-23

Angaur (17 September, 1944 - 20 September, 1944)

CALLAWAY (APA-35)
 LEONARD WOOD (APA-12)

The Malmaheras

Morotai (15 September, 1944 - 17 September, 1944)

BURLINGTON (PF-51)
 CARSON CITY (PF-50)
 CORONADO (PF-38)
 LONG BEACH (PF-34)
 SAN PEDRO (PF-37)
 EL PASO (PF-41)
 GALLUP (PF-47)
 GLENDALE (PF-36)
 LST-18
 LST-22
 LST-24
 LST-26
 LST-66
 LST-67
 LST-68
 LST-168
 LST-170
 LST-202
 LST-204
 LST-206

The Philippines

Leyte (20 October - 29 November, 1944)

AQUARIUS (AK-16) (D-Day)
CAMBRIA (APA-36) (D-Day)
CALLAWAY (APA-35) (D-Day)
LEONARD WOOD (APA-12) (D + 33)
CORONADO (PF-38) (D + 5)
CAVALIER (APA-37) (D-Day)
ALLEN TOWN (PF-52) (D-Day)
ARTHUR MIDDLETON (APA-25) (D-Day)
BISBEE (PF-46) (D-Day)
BIDDLE (APA-8)* (D-Day)
BELLATRIX (AK-20)* (D-Day)
BURLINGTON (PF-51) (D-Day)
BUTTONWOOD (CGC) (D + 35)
CARSON CITY (PF-50) (D-Day)
CENTAURUS (AKA-17) (D-Day)
CRESCENT CITY (APA-21)* (D-Day)
FULLER (APA-7)* (D-Day)
GALLUP (PF-47)* (D-Day)
GEORGE F. ELLIOTT (AP-105)* (D-Day)
HEYWOOD (APA-6)* (D-Day)
HUTCHISON (PF-45) (D + 14)
MUSKOGEE (PF-49) (D-Day)
PRESIDENT HAYES (AP-20)* (D-Day)
SAN PEDRO (PF-37) (D + 2)
SPENCER (CGC) (D + 36)
LST-20 (D-Day)
LST-22 (D + 9)
LST-24 (D-Day)
LST-26 (D-Day)
LST-66 (D-Day)
LST-67 (D-Day)
LST-68 (D-Day)
LST-168 (D-Day)
LST-169 (D-Day)
LST-170 (D + 2)
LST-202 (D-Day)
LST-204 (D-Day)
LST-205 (D-Day)
LST-206 (D + 9)
LST-207 (D-Day)

Mindoro (12 - 18 December, 1944)

FS-367

Lingayen Gulf (9 - 18 January, 1945)

ARTHUR MIDDLETON (APA-25) (D-Day)
ALHENA (AKA-9)* (D-Day)
BIDDLE (APA-8)* (D-Day)
BELLATRIX (AK-20)* (D-Day)

AQUARIUS (AKA-16) (D-Day)
 CAMBRIA (APA-36) (D-Day)
 CALLAWAY (APA-35) (D-Day)
 LEONARD WOOD (APA-12) (D-Day)
 CAVALIER (APA-37) (D-Day)
 GEORGE F. ELLIOTT (AP-105)* (D-Day)
 LIBRA (AKA-12)* (D-Day)
 PRESIDENT ADAMS (APA-19)* (D-Day)
 PRESIDENT JACKSON (APA-18)* (D-Day)
 LST-18 (D-Day)
 LST-22 (D-Day)
 LST-23 (D-Day)
 LST-24 (D-Day)
 LST-66 (D-Day)
 LST-68 (D + 2)
 LST-168 (D-Day)
 LST-170 (D + 2)
 LST-202 (D + 8)
 LST-204 (D-Day)

Subic Bay (29 - 30 January, 1945)
 USS CAVALIER (APA-37)

Nasugbu (31 January, 1945)
 FS-309

Mariveles - Corregidor (13 - 18 February, 1945)
 CGC INGHAM

Volcano Islands - Assault and Occupation of Iwo Jima (19 February -
 16 March, 1945)

ALHENA (AKA-9)*
 BAYFIELD (APA-33)
 CALLAWAY (APA-35)
 GEORGE F. ELLIOTT (AP-105)*
 GREGORY (APD-3)*
 LIBRA (AK-12)*
 LITTLE (APD-4)*
 PRESIDENT ADAMS (APA-19)*
 PRESIDENT JACKSON (APA-18)*
 LST-70
 LST-758
 LST-760
 LST-761
 LST-763
 LST-766
 LST-768
 LST-782
 LST-784
 LST-785
 LST-787

LST-788
LST-789
LST-790
LST-792
LST-884

The Philippines

Palawan (26 - 28 February, 1945)
CGC SPENCER

Zamboanga (10 March, 1945)
LST-66

Ilocilo (Tigbauan) Panay (18 March, 1945)
CGC INGHAM
LST-67 (Initial landing)
LST-68 (Initial landing)

Negros Island (29 March, 1945)
CGC INGHAM
LST-67
LST-68

Cebu (26 March, 1945)
CGC SPENCER

Ryukyu Islands

Kerama Group (26 March, 1945)
CGC BIBB
LST-24
LST-770 (Aka Shima and Yakan Jima)
LST-785 (2 April, 1945)
LST-793
LST-829 (Geruma Shima and Tokashiki Shima)
LST-830 (2 April, 1945)

Okinawa (1 April - 30 June, 1945)
AQUARIUS (AK-16) (D-Day)
ARTHUR MIDDLETON (APA-25) (D-Day)
BAYFIELD (APA-33) (D-Day)
BARNETT (APA-5)* (D - 1)
BETELGEUSE (AKA-11)* (D-Day)
BIBB (CGC) (D + 21)
CAMBERIA (APA-36) (D-Day)
CENTAURUS (APA-17) (D-Day)
CRESCENT CITY (APA-21)* (D - 5)
FULLER (AP-14)* (D-Day)
JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (APA-13) (D-Day)

STERPOPE (AK-96) (D - 29)
 STRINGHAM (APD-6)* (D - 1)
 WOODBINE (CGC) (D - 78)
 LST-20 (D - 1)
 LST-24 (D - 7)
 LST-70 (D-Day)
 LST-71 (D-Day)
 LST-166 (D-Day)
 LST-207 (D - 31)
 LST-334* (D - 1)
 LST-758 (D - 1)
 LST-759 (D-Day)
 LST-760 (D-Day)
 LST-762 (D-Day)
 LST-763 (D-Day)
 LST-767 (D-Day)
 LST-768 (D-Day)
 LST-770 (Ie Shima)
 LST-782 (D-Day)
 LST-784 (D - 27)
 LST-785 (D - 4)
 LST-787 (D - 1)
 LST-788 (D - 1)
 LST-789 (D-Day)
 LST-790 (D-Day)
 LST-792 (D-Day)
 LST-793 (D-Day and Ie Shima)
 LST-794 (D-Day)
 LST-795 (D-Day)
 LST-829 (Ie Shima)
 LST-830 (D - 8)
 LST-884 (D-Day)
 LST-887 (D - 1)
 PC -469 (D-Day)
 LCI(L)
 (Div. 205) 40
 83
 84
 86
 88
 90
 (Div. 206) 96
 320
 323
 325
 326
 350

The Philippines
 Malabang (17 April, 1945)
 CGC SPENCER
 LST-168
 LST-170

Dutch Borneo

Tarakan (30 April, 1945)
LST-67

The Philippines

Davao (2 May, 1945)
CGC SPENCER

British Borneo

Brunei Bay (10 - 23 June, 1945)
CGC SPENCER

Dutch Borneo

Balikpapan (1 July, 1945)
LST-66
LST-67
LST-168

Japan (28 August - 4 November, 1945)

Yokosuka
LST-789 (28 Aug., 1945)

Ominato (from Adak, Kuriles)

MILLS (DE-383) (9 Sept., 1945)
RICHEY (DE-385) (8 Sept., 1945)
RAMSDEN (DE-382) (8 Sept., 1945)

Yokohama

SAMUEL CHASE (AP-26) (8 Sept., 1945)
HARVEYSON (DE-316) (31 Oct., 1945)
LST-168 (15 Sept., 1945)
LST-770 (23 Sept., 1945)
LST-781 (17 Sept., 1945)
LST-793 (19 Oct., 1945)

Aomori

BAYFIELD (APA-33) (25 Sept., 1945)

Tokyo

LST-760 (15 Sept., 1945)
LST-784 (15 Sept., 1945)
LST-790 (15 Sept., 1945)
LST-793 (15 Sept., 1945)

Nagasaki

CAMBRIA (APA-36) (23 Sept., 1945)
LST-166 (24 Sept., 1945)
LST-785 (24 Sept., 1945)
LST-788 (24 Sept., 1945)
LST-795 (14 Sept., 1945)
LST-829 (28 Sept., 1945)
LST-887 (24 Sept., 1945)

Wakayama (Kii Suido)

Mine Destruction Unit (11 September - 1 October, 1945)

LCI(L)'s

(Group 103) 83
84
86
88
94
96
320
323
325
350

Jinsen (Korea)

LST-786 (17 Sept., 1945)

LST-794 (17 Sept., 1945)

Wakayama

POOLE (DE-151) (27 Sept., 1945)

PETERSON (DE-152) (27 Sept., 1945)

LST-768 (25 Sept., 1945)

Hiro

LST-787 (7 Oct., 1945)

Sasebo

LST-768 (19 Oct., 1945)

LST-794 (31 Oct., 1945)

LST-830 (22 Sept., 1945)

Mitsuhamu

LST-787 (25 Oct., 1945)

LST-788 (25 Oct., 1945)

Matsuyama

LST-785 (25 Oct., 1945)

Kure

LST-789 (2 Nov., 1945)

Nagoya

LST-829 (4 Nov., 1945)

APPENDIX B

COAST GUARD MANNED SHIPS

ENTITLED TO OPERATION AND ENGAGEMENT STARS

ASIATIC - PACIFIC AREA

Pearl Harbor - Midway (P1)¹

USCG CONDOR (AMC-14)

USCG WALNUT

Guadalcanal - Tulagi Landings (P8)

HUNTER LIGGETT (APA-14)

Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal (P9)

HUNTER LIGGETT (APA-14)

Motor Boat Torpedo Operation, New Guinea (P17-1)

LST-201

Finschhafen Occupation (P17-3)

LST-18

LST-67

LST-168

LST-204

Saidor Occupation (P17-4)

LST-22

LST-66

LST-67

LST-68

LST-168

LST-170

LST-202

LST-204

LST-206

Consolidation of Southern Solomons (P19-1)

KANAWHA (AOG-31)

HUNTER LIGGETT (APA-14)

Vella Lavella Occupation (P21-5)

LST-167

1. Code numbers refer to operation noted in "Operation and Engagement Stars" Bureau of Navy Personnel, Navy Department (NAVPERS 15,632)

Cape Gloucester, New Britain (P22-5)

LST-18
LST-22
LST-26
LST-66
LST-67
LST-68
LST-168
LST-170
LST-202
LST-204
LST-206

Green Islands Landing (P22-8)

LST-70
LST-207

Admiralty Islands Landings (P22-12)

CORONADO (PF-38)
ETAMIN (IX-173)
GLENDALE (PF-36)
LONG BEACH (PF-34)
SAN PEDRO (PF-37)
LST-18
LST-22
LST-66
LST-67
LST-68
LST-168
LST-170
LST-202
LST-206

Treasury Island Landing (P24-2)

LST-71

Occupation and Defense of Cape Torokina (P24-4)

HUNTER LIGGETT (APA-14)
LST-70
LST-166
LST-207

Gilbert Island Operation (P25)

ARTHUR MIDDLETON (APA-25)
LEONARD WOOD (APA-12)
LST-19
LST-20
LST-23

LST-69
LST-169
LST-205

Occupation of Kwajalein and Majuro Atolls (P26-2)

AQUARIUS (AKA-16)
CALLAWAY (APA-35)
CAMBRIA (APA-36)
CENTAURUS (AKA-17)
ARTHUR MIDDLETON (APA-25)
LEONARD WOOD (APA-12)
LST-23

Occupation of Eniwetok Atoll (P26-3)

CAMBRIA (APA-36)
CENTAURUS (AKA-17)
ARTHUR MIDDLETON (APA-25)
LEONARD WOOD (APA-12)

Motor Boat Torpedo Operations, Western New Guinea (P28-1)

LST-201

Hollandia Operation (P28-2)

CENTAURUS (AKA-17)
CORONADO (PF-38)
EL PASO (PF-41)
ETAMIN (IX-173)
LONG BEACH (PF-34)
OGDEN (PF-39)
SAN PEDRO (PF-37)
VAN BUREN (PF-42)
GLENDALE (PF-36)

LST-18
LST-22
LST-26
LST-66
LST-67
LST-168
LST-170
LST-201
LST-202
LST-204
LST-206

Toem - Wakde - Sarimi Area Operations (P28-3)

EL PASO (PF-41)
OGDEN (PF-39)
VAN BUREN (PF-42)

LST-18
LST-22
LST-26
LST-66
LST-67
LST-170
LST-202
LST-206

Biak Island Operation (P28-4)

CORONADO (PF-38)
SAN PEDRO (PF-37)
VAN BUREN (PF-42)

LST-18
LST-22
LST-26
LST-66
LST-67
LST-68
LST-170
LST-204
LST-205
LST-206

Noemfoor Island Operation (P28-5)

EL PASO (PF-41)
ORANGE (PF-43)
SAN PEDRO (PF-37)

LST-18
LST-22
LST-26
LST-66
LST-67
LST-68
LST-202
LST-204

Cape Sansapor Operation (P28-6)

BISBEE (PF-46)
CORONADO (PF-26)
EUGENE (PF-40)
GALLUP (PF-47)
GLENDALE (PF-36)
LONG BEACH (PF-34)
SAN PEDRO (PF-37)
VAN BUREN (PF-42)

LST-18
LST-22
LST-26

LST-66
LST-67
LST-68
LST-170
LST-202
LST-204
LST-206

Western New Guinea Operation (P28-7) - Supply and Consolidation
Operations, 27 September, 1944 -
13 October, 1944

USCG-193 (Detachment "M")
USCG-194 (Detachment "M")
USCG-195 (Detachment "M")
USCG-196 (Detachment "M")
USCG-197 (Detachment "M")
USCG-198 (Detachment "M")

Morotai Landings (P28-8)

BURLINGTON (PF-51)
CARSON CITY (PF-50)
CORONADO (PF-38)
EL PASO (PF-41)
GALLUP (PF-47)
GLENDALE (PF-36)
LONG BEACH (PF-34)
SAN PEDRO (PF-37)
LST-18
LST-22
LST-24
LST-26
LST-66
LST-67
LST-68
LST-168
LST-170
LST-202
LST-204
LST-206

Capture and Occupation of Saipan (P29-2)

CALLAWAY (APA-35)
CAMBRIA (APA-36)
CAVALIER (APA-37)
LST-19
LST-23
LST-166
LST-169
LST-205

ARTHUR MIDDLETON (APA-25)
LEONARD WOOD (APA-12)

Capture and Occupation of Guam (P29-7)

AQUARIUS (AKA-16)
CENTAURUS (AKA-17)
COR CAROLI (AK-91)
LST-24
LST-70
LST-71
LST-207
STEROPE (AK-94)

Capture and Occupation of Tinian (P29-8)

CAMBRIA (APA-36)
CAVALIER (APA-37)
LST-19
LST-23

Capture and Occupation of Southern Palau Islands (P30-2)

AQUARIUS (AKA-16)
CALLAWAY (APA-35)
CENTAURUS (AKA-17)
GLENDAL (PF-36)
LST-19
LST-23
LEONARD WOOD (APA-12)

Leyte Landings (P31-1)

ALLENTOWN (PF-52)
AQUARIUS (AKA-16)
ARTHUR MIDDLETON (APA-25)
BISBEE (PF-46)
BURLINGTON (PF-51)
CALLAWAY (APA-35)
CAMBRIA (APA-36)
CAVALIER (APA-37)
GALLUP (PF-47)
LEONARD WOOD (APA-12)
MUSKOGEE (PF-49)
LST-20
LST-24
LST-26
LST-66
LST-68
LST-168
LST-169
LST-170
LST-202

LST-204
LST-205
LST-207
SPENCER (CGC)

Lingayen Gulf Landing (P32-2)
AQUARIUS (AKA-16)
ARTHUR MIDDLETON (APA-25)
CALLAWAY (APA-35)
CAMERIA (APA-36)
CAVALIER (APA-37)
LEONARD WOOD (APA-12)
LST-22
LST-23
LST-24
LST-66
LST-68
LST-168
LST-170
LST-202
LST-204

Bataan - Corregidor Landings (P32-7)
INGHAM (CGC)

Assault and Occupation of Iwo Jima (P33-1)
BAYFIELD (APA-33)
CALLAWAY (APA-35)
LST-70
LST-758
LST-760
LST-761
LST-763
LST-768
LST-782
LST-784
LST-787
LST-788
LST-789
LST-790
LST-792
LST-784
PC -469

Assault and Occupation of Okinawa (P34-1)
BAYFIELD (APA-33)
BIEB (CGC)
ARTHUR MIDDLETON (APA-25)
AQUARIUS (AK-16)
CAMERIA (APA-36)

CENTAURUS (AKA-17)
JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (APA-13)
STEROPE (AK-94)
WOODBINE (CGC)
LST-20
LST-24
LST-70
LST-71
LST-166
LST-207
LST-334
LST-758
LST-759
LST-760
LST-762
LST-763
LST-767
LST-768
LST-770
LST-782
LST-784
LST-787
LST-788
LST-789
LST-790
LST-792
LST-793
LST-829
LST-830
LST-884
LST-887
PC -469

SYMBOLS OF U. S. NAVY SHIPS

| | |
|-----|---|
| AB | Crane ship. |
| AD | Destroyer tender. |
| AE | Ammunition ship. |
| AF | Provision store ship. |
| AG | Miscellaneous auxiliary. |
| AGC | Combined operations communications headquarters ship. |
| AGP | Motor torpedo boat tender. |
| AGS | Surveying ship. |
| AH | Hospital ship. |
| AK | Cargo vessel. |
| AKA | Cargo vessel, attack. |
| AKN | Net cargo ship. |
| AKS | General stores issue ship. |
| AKV | Aircraft supply ship. |
| AM | Large minesweeper. |
| AMB | Base minesweeper. |
| AMC | Coastal minesweeper. |
| AN | Net layer. |
| AO | Oiler. |
| AOG | Gasoline tanker. |
| AP | Transport. |
| APA | Transport, attack. |
| APC | Coastal transport. |
| APD | Troop transport (high speed). |
| APH | Transport for wounded. |
| AFL | Hotel barge (barracks ship). |
| APM | Mechanized artillery transport. |
| APS | Auxiliary cargo submarine. |
| APV | Aircraft transport. |
| AR | Repair ship. |
| ARB | Repair ship, battle damage. |
| ARD | Floating drydock. |
| ARG | Internal combustion engine tender. |
| ARH | Heavy hull repair ship. |
| ARL | Repair ship, landing craft. |
| ARS | Salvage vessel. |
| ARV | Aircraft engine overhaul and structural repair ship. |
| AS | Submarine tender. |
| ASR | Submarine rescue vessel. |
| AT | Oceangoing tug. |
| ATR | Rescue tug. |
| AV | Seaplane tender (large). |
| AVC | Catapult lighter. |
| AVD | Seaplane tender (converted DD). |
| AVP | Seaplane tender (small). |
| AW | Water distilling and storage ship. |
| AY | Auxiliary tender, small. |
| BB | Battleship. |

| | |
|---------|---|
| CA | Heavy cruiser. |
| CAZ | Auxiliary unallocated as to type (conversion) |
| CB | Large cruiser. |
| CL | Light cruiser. |
| CM | Mine layer. |
| CMc | Coastal mine layer. |
| CV | Aircraft carrier. |
| CVB | Large aircraft carrier. |
| CVE | Aircraft carrier escort. |
| CVL | Small aircraft carrier. |
| | |
| DD | Destroyer. |
| DE | Destroyer escort. |
| DM | Light minelayer (high speed). |
| DMS | Minesweeper (high speed). |
| | |
| IX | Unclassified. |
| | |
| LCC | Landing craft, control. |
| LCI(L) | Landing craft, infantry (large). |
| LCM(2) | 45' landing craft, mechanized, Mk. II. |
| LCM(3) | 50' landing craft, mechanized, Mk. III. |
| LCM(6) | 56' landing craft, mechanized, Mk. VI. |
| LCP(L) | 36' landing craft, personnel (large). |
| LCP(R) | 36' landing craft, personnel (with ramp). |
| LCP(N) | Landing craft, personnel (nested). |
| LGR(L) | Landing craft, rubber (large). |
| LGR(S) | Landing craft, rubber (small). |
| LCS(S) | Landing craft, support (small). |
| LCT(5) | Landing craft, tank, Mk. V. |
| LCT(6) | Landing craft, tank, Mk. VI. |
| LCV | Landing craft, vehicle. |
| LCVP | Landing craft, vehicle and personnel. |
| LSD | Landing ship, dock. |
| LSM | Landing ship, medium. |
| LST | Landing ship, tank. |
| LVT(1) | Landing vehicle, tracked (unarmored). |
| LVT(2) | Landing vehicle, tracked (unarmored). |
| LVT(3) | Landing vehicle, tracked (unarmored). |
| LVT(4) | Landing vehicle, tracked (unarmored). |
| LVT(A1) | Landing vehicle, tracked (armored). |
| LVT(A2) | Landing vehicle, tracked (armored). |
| LVT(A3) | Landing vehicle, tracked (armored). |
| | |
| PC | 173' submarine chaser. |
| PCE | 180' patrol craft escort vessel. |
| PCE(R) | 180' patrol craft escort vessel, rescue. |
| PCS | 136' submarine chaser. |
| PE | Eagle boat. |
| PF | Frigate. |
| PG | Gunboat. |

| | |
|--------|---|
| PGM | Motor gunboat. |
| PR | River gunboat. |
| PT | Motor torpedo boat. |
| PY | Yacht. |
| PYc | Coastal yacht. |
| SC | 110' submarine chaser. |
| SS | Submarine. |
| YA | Ash lighter. |
| YAG | District auxiliary, miscellaneous. |
| YC | Open lighter. |
| YCF | Car float. |
| YCK | Open cargo lighter. |
| YCV | Aircraft transportation lighter. |
| YDG | Degaussing vessel. |
| YDT | Diving tender. |
| YF | Covered lighter; range tender; provision store lighter. |
| YFB | Ferryboat and launch. |
| YFD | Floating drydock. |
| YFT | Torpedo transportation lighter. |
| YG | Garbage lighter. |
| YHB | Ambulance boat. |
| YHB | Houseboat. |
| YHT | Heating scow. |
| YMS | Motor minesweeper. |
| YMT | Motor tug. |
| YN | Net tender. |
| YNg | Gate vessel. |
| YNT | Net tender (tug class). |
| YO | Fuel oil barge. |
| YOG | Gasoline barge. |
| YOS | Oil storage barge. |
| YP | District patrol vessel. |
| YPK | Pontoon stowage barge. |
| YR | Floating workshop. |
| YRD(H) | Floating workshop, drydock (hull). |
| YRD(M) | Floating workshop, drydock (machinery). |
| YS | Stevedore barge. |
| YSD | Seaplane wrecking derrick. |
| YSP | Salvage pontoon. |
| YSR | Sludge removal barge. |
| YT | Harbor tug. |
| YTT | Torpedo testing barge. |
| YW | Water barge. |

DESIGNATIONS OF U. S. NAVAL AIRCRAFT

| Class of airplane | Model designation | | U. S. name |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------|
| | Navy | Army | |
| Fighter, 2-eng..... | F7F..... | | |
| | XF5U..... | | |
| Fighter, 1-eng..... | F2A..... | | Buffalo |
| | F3A..... | | Corsair |
| | F4U..... | | Corsair |
| | FM..... | | Wildcat |
| | FG..... | | Corsair |
| | F2G-1..... | | Corsair |
| | F4F..... | | Wildcat |
| | F6F..... | | Hellcat |
| | FR..... | | |
| | XF8B..... | | |
| | XF14C..... | | |
| | XFD..... | | |
| Scout Bomber, 1-eng.... | SB2A..... | A-34..... | Bermuda |
| | SBW..... | A-25..... | Helldiver |
| | SBC..... | 77-A..... | Helldiver |
| | SB2C..... | A-25..... | Helldiver |
| | BTC..... | | |
| | SRD..... | A-24..... | Dauntless |
| | BTD..... | | |
| | SBF..... | A-25..... | Helldiver |
| | BTM..... | | |
| | SBN..... | | |
| | SB2U..... | | Vindicator |
| Torpedo Bomber, 1-eng.. | TBY..... | | |
| | TBD..... | | Devastator |
| | TB2D..... | | |
| | TM..... | | Avenger |
| | TBF..... | | Avenger |
| Patrol Bomber, boat,... | PB2Y..... | | Coronado |
| 4-eng. | | | |
| Patrol Bomber, boat,... | PB2P..... | OA-10..... | Catalina |
| 2-eng. | | | |
| | PBY-5, 5A..... | OA-10..... | Catalina |
| | P4Y..... | | |
| | PBM..... | | Mariner |
| | PBN..... | OA-10..... | Catalina |
| | XPBB..... | | Sea Ranger |
| | CANSO "A"..... | OA-10B..... | |
| Bomber, land, 4-eng.... | PB4Y..... | B-24..... | Liberator |
| Bomber, land, 2-eng.... | PBO..... | AT-18 (A-29)..... | Hudson |
| | PBJ..... | B-25..... | Mitchell |
| | PV..... | B-34..... | Venture |
| | XP2V..... | | |

| Class of airplane | Model designation | | U. S. name |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|
| | Navy | Army | |
| Observation Scout..... 1-eng. | OY-1..... | L-5 (O-62)..... | Sentinel |
| | SOC..... | | Seagull |
| | SO3C..... | | Seamew |
| | SC..... | | |
| | S2E-1..... | | |
| Utility, 2-eng..... | OS2N..... | | Kingfisher |
| | OS2U..... | | Kingfisher |
| | JRB..... | C-45..... | Expeditor |
| | JRC..... | C-78 (AT-17)..... | Bobcat |
| | BD..... | A-20 (P-70)..... | Havoc |
| Utility, 1-eng..... | JRF..... | OA-9..... | Goose |
| | J4F..... | OA-14..... | Widgeon |
| | JM-1..... | B-26..... | Marauder |
| | J2F..... | OA-12..... | Duck |
| | GB..... | C-43..... | Traveler |
| Transport, 1-eng..... | GK..... | UC-61..... | Forwarder |
| | GH..... | | Nightingale |
| | AE (HE)..... | L-4..... | Grasshopper |
| | RY..... | C-87..... | Liberator |
| | R5D..... | C-54..... | Skymaster |
| Transport, 2-eng. land. | RB..... | C-93..... | |
| | R5C..... | C-46..... | Commando |
| | R3D..... | | |
| | R4D-1, 5.... | C-47, 47A..... | Skytrain |
| | R4D-2, 4.... | C-49, 49A..... | Skytrooper |
| Transport, 4-eng. land. | R4D-3..... | C-53..... | Skytrooper |
| | R5O..... | C-56, 60..... | Lodestar |
| | PB2Y-3R..... | | |
| | JRM (XPB2M-1B) | | Mars |
| | JR2S-2..... | | Excalibur |
| Transport, 2-eng. Sea.. | PEM-3R..... | | |
| | N3N..... | | |
| | NE..... | L-4 (O-59)..... | Grasshopper |
| | NR..... | PT-21..... | Recruit |
| | NP..... | PT-21..... | |
| Training, 1-eng. primary. | N2S..... | PT-13, 17, 18, 27 | Caydet |
| | N2T..... | | Tutor |
| | KN5N..... | | |
| | KNL..... | | |
| | SNB-1..... | AT-11..... | Kansan |
| Training, 2-eng. advanced | SNB-2..... | AT-7..... | Navigator |
| | SNV..... | BT-13..... | Valiant |
| | SNC..... | | Falcon |
| | NH..... | | |
| | SNJ..... | AT-6..... | Texan |
| Training, 1-eng. advanced | TDR..... | | |
| | TD3R..... | | |
| | TD2R..... | | |
| | TD3R..... | | |
| | TD2R..... | | |
| Special Purpose, 2-eng. | TD3R..... | | |
| | TDH..... | | |
| | TDH..... | | |
| | TDH..... | | |
| | TDH..... | | |

| Class of airplane | Model designation | | U. S. name |
|---------------------------|-------------------|------------|------------|
| | Navy | Army | |
| Special Purpose, 1-eng... | TDN..... | | |
| | EDC..... | PQ-8..... | |
| | ED2C..... | PQ-14..... | |
| | TDR..... | | |
| | TDD..... | OQ-2A..... | |
| | HNS-1..... | R-4B..... | |
| Helicopter, 1-eng..... | HO2S-1..... | R-5..... | |
| | HOS-1..... | R-6..... | |
| | XHOS-1..... | XR-6..... | |
| | | | |