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THE COAST GUARD AT WAR

NORTH AFRICAN LANDINGS IX



PREPARED IN THE
HISTORICAL SECTION
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION
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It has been found, from past experience, that valuable material is sometimes received after a monograph has been carefully prepared in every detail and distributed. It is then too late to incorporate that new material into the story. This monograph is, therefore, submitted in first draft, for distribution to members of the Service in order that material still not at hand may be obtained from them or suggestions made by them as to what is still needed. Some parts are still in the form of notes, credit being indicated in the list of sources as well as in the main part of the story in some cases. Readers are requested to send in their material and suggestions at this time so that they may be incorporated into the final draft.

...."We know where our first lines of defense are: England, Australia, China, and the Middle East. We are intent on guarding these areas, their peoples and their institutions. These are our first lines of defense in that by protecting them, we can preserve ourselves and our American way of life."

Russell R. Waesche,
Vice Admiral,
Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard.

...."Our fighting men at the front know, as we know, that this war must be won, not just for the sake of ourselves and our families, but for the sake of all the 2,000,000,000 people who make up the earth's population. If we stop before we win on this world-wide scale, we will only face another terrible Armageddon a few years hence. The free world of which we speak so glibly is no idealistic dream. It is the sworn goal of your government and of all nations which are allied with us. Never before in history has such a formidable collection of forces moved in concert for one ultimate purpose."

Lloyd T. Chalker,
Rear Admiral,
Assistant Commandant,
U. S. Coast Guard.

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FOREWORD

CONDITIONS IN NORTH AFRICA

In the summer of 1942, every young man of twenty dreamed of rejoining the fight. They all attempted to do so. All the youth of Algiers, and other places in French North Africa, were thinking in terms of barges, of fishing smacks, false passports, trips across the Sahara. Above all places, they wanted to reach England, to reach General de Gaulle and his followers in the secret resistance movement. Police were on the watch for organizations that were helping people to reach England. The young men, however, were not discouraged. To leave North Africa secretly was by no means easy; but it was a great adventure. The day after Pearl Harbor there was an uninterrupted procession to the consulate of these young men who wished to join the American Army. Repression by the police was in full swing. Hundreds of young men whose only crime was their patriotism were arrested and tortured. And still the urge for escape, resistance, swept through North Africa. The spectacular success of one gave new heart to those who had failed. For instance, a pilot, later one of the aces of the Fighting French, took off for Gibraltar ten minutes after the ceremony in Rabat, where he had been given the Croix de Guerre.

The Legion des Combattants, played an important part in Algeria. Its members, ex-service men, embittered by defeat, fast became a political instrument, a single party dreamed of by Vichy and Hitler. Under cover of the Legion, much shady business was transacted. Small notices appeared on the walls of the Headquarters of the Legion: "If anyone listens to the Gaullists' radio, tell your leader. If you hear anyone speaking against the Marshal (Petain), tell your leader. If you know anyone who runs the Black Market, tell your leader. It is your duty to do so."

Spying, sneaking, denouncing, betraying became the system of government. Personal resentments could be settled with complete impunity. One well-meaning man, father of three children, was heard to say in an exasperated voice to some friends: "Petain is an old dodderer." The following day, this man was arrested. The lawyer whose advice he sought sighed and said, "I wish you had killed someone. It would be easier to defend you." A high government official was seen to tear in two a large portrait of the aged Petain and a week later was sent to an outpost of Morocco, in disgrace.

French military leaders who refused to cooperate with Petain were either arrested or at best deprived of their command. Thus, General Bouscat, though under fifty, had been forced to retire by Vichy. He was suspected of being a patriot, who in spite of orders, had organized

the mass departure to Africa of the remains of the French Air Force in June 1940, so that the fight might be continued. This was more than a black mark against him.... In 1944, General Bouscat was Commander-in-Chief of the French Air Force.

It was later said the guns fired blank cartridges.

Resistance groups, working secretly, cut communications lines on the night of the landings. The thick Admiralty cable was cut in several places. The last radio message that reached Vichy was worded, according to some reports, "Do not forget to send the sports bulletin tomorrow." Alas, the sport fans in Algeria were never to know the results of the French football matches that took place on November 8!

Thus on November 9, in Algiers, the situation remained inextricably confused. The town was trying to find its own balance without a leader, without any line of conduct to follow.

A subordinate of the prefect of Constantine, passing through Algiers, telephoned to ask for instructions: "But, sir, which is the enemy?" He got this magnificent reply: "Who the enemy is is a matter for the army. It does not concern civilians."

PART 1

NORTH AFRICAN LANDINGS

OPERATION TORCH

ARRIVAL IN NORTH AFRICA

COAST GUARD- MANNED TRANSPORTS ARRIVE IN AFRICA

In November 1942, the United States Coast Guard landed troops and supplies in North Africa, having transported them across the Atlantic for the invasion that proved to be the turning point in World War II. With the successful Allied conquest of French North Africa, the Germans were put on the defensive, and the Allies were able to follow through their plans for the liberation of the enslaved nations of Europe. The three Coast Guard manned transports that formed part of the huge fleet off the North African shores on that historic 8th of November were: the LEONARD WOOD, Commander (later Rear Admiral) Merlin O'Neill, USCG; the JOSEPH T. DICKMAN, Commander (later Captain) Charles W. Harwood, USCG; and the SAMUEL CHASE, Commander (later Captain) Roger C. Heimer, USCG. Personnel on the other vessels were from both the Navy and Coast Guard.

OBJECTIVES - NORTH AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

American troops, soldiers and sailors, from one of the greatest armadas ever put into a single military operation, swarmed ashore on the Vichy-controlled shores before dawn, striking to break Hitler's hold on the Mediterranean and free the French African colony. From tall, decisive Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of the huge forces, down to the youngest seaman in the Coast Guard, all had worked throughout the night for the first great American blow at the Axis. Included in the forces were crack combat troops, rangers, airborne units, and the cream of America's airmen. British naval and air force units supported the American landing forces, who were preceded by a snowstorm of leaflets and a radio barrage promising the French that the United States had no intention of seizing French possessions and only sought to prevent Axis infiltration.

OBJECTIVES AS STATED BY MARSHALL

Allied objectives in North Africa were expressed by General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, in his official report to the Secretary of War, as follows.¹ "-----the final decision was taken in July (1942) to launch an expedition into northwest Africa in conjunction with the preparations for the advance westward of the British Eighth Army then reorganizing on the El Alamein line. The opening of the Mediterranean would facilitate Allied global operations, and the removal of the constant threat of German activities in western Morocco and at Dakar would add immeasurably to the security of the Allied position while gathering strength to administer the final punishing blows. Furthermore, if our occupation of North Africa could be carried out without fatally embittering the French troops and authorities in that region it would provide a setting for the reconstitution of the French Army in preparation for its return in force to the homeland. The psychological effect of the conquest of North

1. See Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943.

U.S. COAST GUARD MANNED COMBAT TRANSPORT LEONARD WOOD
CARRIES FIGHTING MEN AND VITAL WAR MATERIALS TO THE ENEMY-HELD INVASION SHORES



Africa would be tremendous." Of the air units, General Marshall reported, "The combined air forces, other than carrier-borne and a few transports and heavy bombers, had to be funneled through the single restricted field at Gibraltar which could have been put out of action in less than an hour. There was no choice but to accept this hazard."

THREE
TASK FORCES
ORGANIZED

Three task forces were formed, to strike simultaneously. One, entirely American, sailed from the United States and carried out the landings along the west coast of Morocco, where the chief objective was Casablanca.

Serving with this force were the LEONARD WOOD and the JOSEPH T. DICKMAN. Another task force, consisting of American troops escorted by the British Navy, sailed from Great Britain and landed in the vicinity of Oran. There, two former Coast Guard Cutters, the PONTCHARTRAIN and the SEBAGO, transferred under Lend-Lease to the British, performed a mission that for heroism has been described as on par with the fabulous charge of the Light Brigade. The third task force, a combined British-American ground force escorted by the British Navy, sailed from the British Isles and landed at Algiers. In this task force was the SAMUEL CHASE, who alone of her Division escaped undamaged and won the nickname of "LUCKY CHASE." British and American naval covering forces and air units furnished protection for the task forces.

OPERATION WELL
SYNCHRONIZED

Observers reported that our big convoy arrived at its destination with the split-second timing of a subway train, despite storms for many days at sea and danger from planes and submarines. The entire operation was


carried out with the delicate synchronization of an expensive watch, justifying the months of careful planning and training. The vastness of the project, not only from the number of troops involved but from the distances covered and military problems overcome, far dwarfed the only similar operation of its kind in that theater of the war--the Nazi invasion of Norway. At the zero hour, khaki-clad soldiers stumbled into their square-nosed assault boats in the darkness under the protecting guns of shadowy warships, while, farther out to sea, planes roared over the speeding carriers and disappeared in the darkness.

LEONARD WOOD
HOLDS CROWDED
FIVE DEEP

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the SS WESTERN WORLD had been converted into an amphibious assault transport, the LEONARD WOOD, officially known as the APA-12, later dubbed "Sea-Going Taxi No. 1" because of her global activities. A fast, grim ship armed with dual-purpose

guns and four types of LC's slung on her davits, she was taken over by the Navy and promptly manned by the Coast Guard. Fighting men traveled five deep in her crowded quarters. The global war required fast tough ships that could get in and out--transports that could ride with a punch while skilled crews set the combat forces ashore. When, a month before Pearl Harbor, the Navy took over the Coast Guard for the duration of the war, the fourth armed service and the oldest seagoing service--founded by Alexander Hamilton in 1790--was just what the Admirals needed. Its crews were ready-made for assault transports. Captain O'Neill was quoted as

JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (APA-13)



saying, "They wanted men who could take barges right up on the beach through any kind of surf. So we fitted. Though going in under an all-out bombardment was hardly like the job we did in the Louisville flood, it worked out." It "worked out" so well that the WOOD participated gloriously in enough combat zones to make a One Ship's History of the War. Captain O'Neill was later awarded the Legion of Merit.

DICKMAN'S HOLDS
BULGED WITH
MEN AND EQUIPMENT


Also converted into an army transport, early in 1941, was the USS PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, renamed the JOSEPH T. DICKMAN, known officially as the APA-13, affectionately called "Old Joe." As a part of Task Force 34, the "Old Joe" had crossed 3,000 miles of ocean, with 1,370 men and 73 officers of the 2nd Battalion, 30th Infantry, 3rd Division, plus 43 naval officers and 80 enlisted personnel of the U. S. Navy Sea Frontier Unit and Western Task Force Headquarters. Her holds bulged with vehicles, gasoline, ammunition, and general army equipment and gear.¹ According to the ship's history, no record is available of her cargo on this first assault but it is safe to say that it was considerable. At 2355 on 7 November, 1942, the following entry was made in the log, "all engines stopped, all hands standby to lower boats." Operation TORCH was underway. Her trip across had been uneventful, her Commanding Officer reported, although there was at that time considerable enemy submarine activity. During the invasion, when enemy guns opened up, Captain Harwood was described by one of his men as "awfully cool under fire." Questioned about this later, the Captain quipped, "Yes, paralyzed with fright." He was said to have lost the least number of landing boats. For his heroic conduct and brilliant leadership, he was later decorated with the Legion of Merit.

"LUCKY CHASE"
CROWDED WITH
TROOPS AND
CARGO

Commissioned in June 1942, as the USS SAMUEL CHASE, the former SS AFRICAN METEOR became officially known as the AP-56, and earned the title of "LUCKY CHASE," due to her ability to get away undamaged from heavy enemy fire. She was the only transport of her Division that survived. Her Commanding Officer, Captain Heimer, praised all the personnel of the CHASE for outstanding devotion to duty and for their heroic conduct in their rescue operations of hundreds of survivors of the LEEDSTOWN, sunk by enemy action. As flagship of Transport Division 11, the CHASE sailed from New York, on September 26, 1942, with scarcely anybody knowing where he was going. "All we knew was that Army men aboard were in our charge for safe transportation and landing on a foreign shore," related Ensign Albert Heckman, USCG, some time later. "In addition to the usual scuttlebutt, all signs pointed to Africa. The newly sand-proofed jeeps, the light clothing, mosquito bars, sun and sand goggles, the inocu-

1. See Coast Guard publication "History of the USS JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (APA-13) 10 June, 1941 - 1 October, 1945," prepared by the vessel and forwarded by its Commanding Officer at that time, Captain F. A. Leamy, USCG.

SAMUEL CHASE (APA-26)



lations for malaria and sleeping sickness, and the salt tablets were fine indications that we were going some place in Africa.... Several days before the attack was to begin, the Commodore opened his orders and told his officers where they were going and briefly what was expected of them. We in turn informed our men that on the morning of 8 November, 1942, our transport division was going to force a landing at Algiers. Simultaneously, the British forces were to take Oran, and other American naval landings were to be effected in French Morocco."

ARMY
PLANS
LOGISTICS

At little desks in unimpressive offices with assistants who will forever be anonymous, the colonels and generals of the United States Army, early in the summer, began developing the campaign's "logistics" - the art of getting the right men with the right equipment to the right place at the right time. Fifteen weeks later, wonderfully equipped American troops from the United States and from the United Kingdom landed with split-second timing at a dozen different points in three separate areas of French North Africa.


ALL EXCEPT
NAVY TRANSPORTS
INSPECTED

The Merchant Marine Inspectors of the United States Coast Guard played a very important part in seeing that all ships, with the exception of transports operated by the Navy, carrying American troops and supplies, were in seaworthy condition and properly manned. In its capacity as Technical Adviser to the Water Transportation Corps of the United States Army, the Coast Guard inspected practically all ships, American and foreign, leaving United States ports with American troops on board. The purpose of this inspection was to make sure that vessels were in seaworthy condition and that the lifesaving, fire-fighting and safety equipment on board the vessel for the protection of the troops and crew were in good condition and ready for immediate use. Lifeboat and fire drills were conducted by the Coast Guard Marine Inspectors to make sure that the crew members were familiar with the use of the equipment on board. These inspectors also saw to it that each and every person on board was equipped with a life preserver of a type approved by the Coast Guard. Hence, practically all troop ships carrying American troops from United States ports, as well as all U. S. merchant vessels which took part in the invasion had been inspected and approved by the Coast Guard.

BIGGEST OVERSEAS
LANDING FORCE
IN HISTORY

It was the biggest overseas landing force in world history. Services of Supply had to provide 700,000 different items - 22,000,000 pounds of food, for example, and 38,000,000 pounds of clothing and equipage. There were 10,000,000 gallons of gasoline, and every gallon had to be scheduled - whether to go ashore in five-gallon cans carried by individual soldiers, or in 50-gallon drums, or landed in bulk from tankers. The Quartermaster Corps had to send seven pairs of shoes for every soldier - and schedule still more pairs to follow every 90 days. The quartermaster supply list for the African expedition was an amazing document. It included 100 alarm clocks and 580 rat traps, stepladders and rubber stamps, butchers' uniforms and steel safes.

RIGID TESTS BY THE U. S. COAST GUARD'S MERCHANT MARINE INSPECTION DIVISION
TO FIND PERFECTION IN LIFESAVING EQUIPMENT



WATER
PURIFIERS

Every American soldier went ashore with his own individual water-purifying equipment. If he filled his canteen from some questionable source he had simply to drop in a tablet about one-third the size of an aspirin. A million of these tablets were provided.

ALL DETAILS
THOUGHT OUT

Loading plans and techniques were meticulously developed and tested on this side long before ships were assembled at ports of embarkation. All types of equipment - beans to 32-ton tanks - were loaded. Some troops were reported landing with highway signs - 12 miles to Algiers - already painted presumably aboard ship. Stockades for expected prisoners were built in the United States and transported to be put ashore the moment the boats docked.

COAST GUARD
EXPERIENCE
IN SURF
CALLED UPON

In mapping plans for the amphibious warfare, our high command bore in mind that Coast Guardsmen knew more than anyone in either the Army or Navy about the business of handling small boats in surf. Now, the Coast Guard was operating under the jurisdiction of the Navy.¹ So in the joint operation of both Services, Army and Navy, as the Amphibious Force, the highest levels of command made the decision: All responsibility for getting the Army ashore was to be the Navy's and the Coast Guard's. The Army had to say when and where and in what order they wanted to be landed.

ORIGIN OF
AMPHIBIOUS
CRAFT

In the landing craft group, the Amphibious Force had boats of two types: LCP's (Landing Craft, Personnel) and LCM's (Landing Craft, Mechanized) and LCI's, LCT's, LCV's, and LST's.² These landing boats were developed in co-operation with the British Admiralty, who began planning the invasion of Europe while their troops were still being evacuated from Dunkerque. The LCT's were an outgrowth of the Continental river barges (the British version was considerably longer than the American). The LST, product of joint Anglo-American planning and study, evolved from the shallow-draft Lake Maracaibo tankers. The six types of landing craft described above composed the original landing craft group of the Amphibious Force, and represented all the main types used in the Atlantic and Mediterranean Amphibious Operations.

LANDING
TECHNIQUES

The difficulties that small boats had in finding their way in the dark led to the adoption of the Control Boat and the Line-of-Departure method of finding position,

1. See Appendix A - "Executive Order 8929, November 1, 1941."
2. See "Symbols of United States Navy Ships" for complete description of these craft, pp. 178-180.

MR. GEORGE S. MESSERSMITH, U. S. CONSUL GENERAL AT BERLIN, 1933



and the Scout and Raider technique of beachmarking. Problems of fire support were solved by the little LCSS's (Landing Craft Support, Small). The waves of small craft stood in greatest need of protection as they neared the beach and drew within range of light machine gun, mortar, and small-arm fire. But this was just the time the heavy ships furnishing the preliminary neutralizing bombardment would have to lift their fire for fear of hitting their own men. For this situation, the little support boats were devised, with banks of twelve rocket launching racks on each gunwale. This support craft had shallow draft, easy maneuverability and its rockets "packed a devastating punch."¹

WARNINGS OF DANGER BEFORE PEARL HARBOR

DANGEROUS SITUATION IN GERMANY, 1933

As far back as 1933, the United States Consul General at Berlin, Mr. George S. Messersmith, expressed the view, in a letter of June 26, of that year, to Under Secretary of State, Mr. William Phillips, that the United States would have to be exceedingly careful in its dealings with Germany as long as the existing government was in power, as that government had no spokesmen who could really be depended upon and those who held the highest positions were "capable of actions which really outlaw them from ordinary intercourse." The Consul General described some of the men who were running the German Government as "psychopathic cases," and said that others were in a state of exaltation and in a frame of mind that knew no reason. He reported that those men in the party and in responsible positions who were really worthwhile were powerless because they had to follow the orders of superiors who were suffering from the "abnormal psychology" prevailing in Germany. "There is a real revolution here and a dangerous situation," he warned.

MARTIAL SPIRIT DEVELOPED

A martial spirit was being developed in Germany, the Consul reported, and everywhere people were seen drilling. This included children from the age of five or six to persons well into middle age. A psychology was being developed, he said, that the whole world was against Germany, which was defenseless before the world. The people were being trained against gas and airplane attacks, and the idea of war from neighboring countries was constantly harped upon. He emphasized that Germany was headed toward ruin and a situation "dangerous to world peace." Five months later, in a letter of November 23, 1933, to Mr. Phillips, the Consul General reported that the military spirit in Germany was constantly growing and that innumerable measures were being taken to develop the German people into a hardy, sturdy race which would "be able to meet all comers."

DANGER FROM LOSS OF FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS

In an address on April 24, 1941, Secretary Hull warned, that it made a "fateful difference" to us who won the war. That difference would determine whether we would stand with our backs to the wall with the other four

1. According to Commander Walter Karig in "Battle Report II."

MR. CORDELL HULL



continents against us, and the high seas lost, alone defending the last free territories on earth, or whether we would keep our place in an orderly world.¹ Those who felt that a British defeat would not matter to us, Mr. Hull declared, overlooked the fact that the resulting delivery of the high seas to the invader would create colossal danger to our own national defense and security. The breadth of the sea might give us a little time but it did not give us safety. Safety could only come from our ability, in conjunction with other peace-loving nations, "to prevent any aggressor from attaining control of the high seas." When on October 17, 1941, the United States destroyer KEARNY was attacked and hit by a torpedo from a German submarine, eleven men of the Navy were killed and warnings of danger increased, President Roosevelt said in an address on October 27, that we had wished to avoid shooting but the shooting had begun and "history has recorded who fired the first shot." The forward march of Hitler and of Hitlerism could be stopped, the President said, and would be stopped. He concluded his address with the statement that in the face of this newest and greatest challenge "we Americans have cleared our decks and taken our battle stations." We stood ready, the President said, "in the defense of our nation and the faith of our fathers to do what God has given us the power to see as our full duty."

U. S. JOINS THE FRAY

A few weeks later, on December 7, 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, and the United States was finally drawn into the terrible armed world conflict.

On December 8, 1941, the United States declared war on Japan. On December 11, 1941, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. On that date, Congress passed, with no dissenting vote, and the President approved, resolutions formally declaring the existence of a state of war between the United States and Germany and between the United States and Italy.

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

THE FOUR FREEDOMS- OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt told Congress, on January 6, 1942, in his State of the Union message, "The militarists of Berlin and Tokyo started this war. But the massed, angered forces of common humanity will finish it....


Our own objectives are clear: the objective of smashing the militarism imposed by war lords upon their enslaved peoples; the objective of liberating the subjugated nations; the objective of establishing and securing freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom from fear everywhere in the world. We shall not stop short of these objectives.... This time we are determined not only to win the war but also to maintain the security of the peace that will follow.... We are fighting to cleanse the world of ancient evils, ancient ills." The speech was interrupted thirty-three times by applause.

AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE THREATENED

"We know where our first lines of defenses are: England, Australia, China, and the Middle East," declared Admiral Waesche, in June, 1942. "We are

1. See Appendix B. - "The War and Human Freedom."

SIX NEW LANDING BARGES LASHED INTO ONE MOVE DOWN THE
MISSISSIPPI WITH SOME FAR-OFF WAR ZONE AS THEIR DESTINATION



intent on guarding these areas," he continued, "their peoples, and their institutions. These are our first lines of defense in that by protecting them, we can preserve ourselves and our American way of life...."

PREPARATIONS
EN ROUTE

The week that followed the departure of the convoys for the African shores, brought to light the most intricate and large-scale planning for an amphibious attack in military and naval history. Army and Coast Guard officers held separate conferences, mulling over the particular problems allotted to each group; then combined conferences and discussions smoothed off the rough edges. Each officer mastered the operations as a whole and then studied his own special job until he was entirely familiar with every detail. There were hundreds of aerial photographs, French and English dictionaries of military and naval terms, performance reports of French tanks and guns, aircraft silhouettes, clay mosaics of beaches and interiors (showing the location of every tree, vineyard, and house) as well as notebooks full of intelligence reports covering every conceivable detail of our operation. Even special American dollars--invasion money--were supplied for our use ashore....

"DO OR DIE"
PROPOSITION

In general, the plan was to make a landing and capture an airport, certain villages, and hold road heads and bridges. We learned that it was a do or die proposition, for the airport had to be taken and thereafter held, since there would be Spitfires flown in from Gibraltar which had to land there. If the airfield was not in our hands by that time the fighter planes would have to crash when their small quantities of fuel were exhausted. In addition, it would be necessary to reduce a fort on Cape Matifou under whose big guns we had to land. As a precaution, an alternative landing was developed in case we absolutely could not force a beachhead at Ain Taya. The final stage called for a cessation and settlement of all hostilities in four days in order that the British portion of our convoy could move into Algiers docks and disembark the First British Army destined to push Rommel from the West.

DIPLOMATIC
HANDLING OF
FRENCH

"Vastly more important than all the preparations for the attack," Ensign Heckman said, "was the mental attitude we had to instill in our men. It was necessary to explain to them that the French were not our enemies, that it was necessary to land on and enter into French territory in order to get at the Boche. If the French fought, we would fight also, and show them that we would go to no end in order to reduce Hitler. The case of the Allies rested on the actions of our men in occupied territory, so each man and officer sewed a small American flag on the left shoulder of his coveralls in order that the old French who remembered the United States in the last war might rekindle the same feeling again. In fact, there were recorded incidents wherein French people wept at the sight of the Stars and Stripes on the shoulders of our boys."

GENERAL OF THE ARMIES, GEORGE S. MARSHALL



FRENCH SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA

PRECAUTION NEEDED IN SEEKING FRENCH COOPERATION

In an area teeming with German and Vichy agents, and agents provocateurs, always on the alert to intercept, confuse, and threaten, the success of the invasion depended, above all, on secrecy. This meant that Allied leaders had to use the utmost precaution in seeking cooperation of French leaders, lest a "collaborator," Vichy-controlled, be approached by mistake and the entire plan be divulged to the enemy. Secrecy had to be maintained, yet sympathetic French leaders had to be informed of Allied intentions in order to avoid French resistance. The big questions were whom to let in on the secret, and how and when.

MARSHALL STATES PROBLEM

"The problem of how to avoid fighting with the French forces in North Africa was difficult of approach," General Marshall wrote in his report of the operations. "In the first place, and most important of all," he said, "the hazard to the secrecy with which the operation must be prepared and launched presented an extremely delicate balance in the choice of methods to be followed. Should an approach be made to a single Frenchman who proved unsympathetic to our purpose we risked the slaughter of soldiers on the beaches of North Africa as well as decisive losses in shipping. The psychological impact from such a defeat at that particular moment in the war would have been little short of catastrophic. To a certain degree, however, this risk had to be accepted. Even so, the discussions regarding such an expedition had to be conducted on a more or less indefinite basis as to timing. Not until four days before the convoys would deploy off the beaches at Algiers, Oran, and Casablanca were the few Frenchmen we had contacted informed of the actual date for the operation. This, of course, made it extremely difficult, in cases impossible, for these French officials to take all the steps necessary to facilitate our landings. The consequences of disclosure of our purpose to the enemy, however, involved too great a peril to justify earlier notification."

PROBLEMS OF COOPERATION

Prior to the landings, we continued to recognize Vichy, "not because we loved them," as one State Department official explained, but because of certain tangible things we were getting out of them. Among these were the disposition of the French Fleet, lest it be handed over to the Germans. And, of course, in keeping in touch with the French people directly we were able to give them some support when the Germans tried to get things out of them over and above the terms of the Armistice. Admiral Leahy was the U. S. Ambassador to Vichy. Mr. Robert Murphy was in charge of the specialists sent by the United States to North Africa. Technically, Mr. Murphy was the Counsellor of the U. S. Embassy at Vichy, but actually he was travelling around in North Africa, and it was through him that contacts were made with those French who were to help in the Allied landings.

ORDERS WERE NOT TO SHOOT FIRST

Thus, while it was certain there would be no bitterly prolonged resistance, if any, once General Henri Giraud and other French leaders had spoken, it was still likely that not all French garrisons would get the word in time,

CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
AT HIS DESK IN WASHINGTON, D. C.



or believe it once it had been passed. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, our forces were given orders not to shoot first, but to be ready to shoot fast and plentifully if necessary. A code signal had been devised to flash throughout the Task Forces that our landings were being opposed, should there be resistance. That signal was "Play Ball."

ROOSEVELT'S
BROADCAST TO
NORTH AFRICA

Because resistance remained problematical, in spite of the negotiations with a few French leaders, steps were taken to insure cooperation just as the landings were about to begin. In a radio broadcast, General Eisenhower issued a proclamation of friendly intentions toward French North Africa, and he instructed French forces to indicate their non-resistance by displaying certain signals. At one o'clock in the morning on November 8, at the moment the landings in Algiers began, President Roosevelt spoke to the French people by short-wave radio, assuring them that the Allies sought no territory and asking for French cooperation against the Nazi regime. He assured the Spanish government also that the invasion was not directed against Spanish Morocco or other Spanish territory in Africa.

EISENHOWER'S BROADCAST TO FRENCH ARMY, NAVY

The text of General Dwight D. Eisenhower's proclamation broadcast to the French armies on the land, sea, and air in North Africa was as follows:

"Frenchmen of North Africa, the forces which I have the honor of commanding come to you as friends to make war against your enemies.

"This is a military operation directed against the Italian-German military forces in North Africa. Our only objective is to defeat the enemy and to free France. I need not tell you that we have no designs either on North Africa or on any part of the French Empire. We count on your friendship and we ask your aid.

"I have given formal orders that no offensive action shall be undertaken against you on condition that for your part you take the same attitude.

"To avoid any possible misunderstanding, make the following signals:
"By day, fly the French Tricolor and the American flag, one above the other.

"I repeat, by day, fly the French Tricolor and the American flag, one above the other, or two (I repeat two) Tricolors, one above the other.

"By night turn on a searchlight and direct it vertically towards the sky.

"I repeat, by night turn on a searchlight and direct it vertically towards the sky.

"Moreover, for reasons of military security, we are obliged to give you the following orders. Any refusal to follow them will be interpreted as a proof of hostile intention on your part.

PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT



"To all Naval and Merchant Marine units: First, stay where you are. Secondly, make no attempt to scuttle your vessels.

"To Coast Guard units: Withdraw from the neighborhood of your cannon and your stations.

"To aviation units: Do not take off. All airplanes must remain in their usual places.

"General Orders: In general, you must obey all orders given to you by my officers.

"We come, I repeat, as friends, not as enemies. We shall not be the first to fire. Follow exactly the orders which I have given you. Thus you will avoid any possibility of a conflict which could only be useful to our enemies. We summon you as comrades to the common fight against the invaders of France. The war has entered the phase of liberation."

PRESIDENT'S
BROADCAST TO
AMERICANS

To the people of the United States, President Roosevelt, on November 8, 1942, announced the landing of American troops in North Africa, in the following words: "In order to forestall an invasion of Africa by Germany and Italy, which, if successful, would constitute a direct threat to America across the comparatively narrow sea from western Africa, a powerful American force equipped with adequate weapons of modern warfare and under American command is today landing on the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts of the French colonies in Africa. The landing of this American army is being assisted by the British Navy and Air Forces, and it will in the immediate future be reinforced by a considerable number of divisions of the British Army. This combined Allied force, under American command, in conjunction with the British campaign in Egypt, is designed to prevent an occupation by the Axis armies of any part of northern or western Africa and to deny to the aggressor nations a starting point from which to launch an attack against the Atlantic coast of the Americas. In addition, it provides an effective second front assistance to our heroic Allies in Russia."

FRENCH LEADERS
BROADCAST PLEAS
FOR COOPERATION

Speedy cessation of French resistance was urged by French leaders. Both General Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Fighting French, and General Henri Giraud, in charge of the French Army in North Africa, broadcast pleas to their countrymen to cooperate with the Allies. "Arise, every one of you. Help our Allies!" General de Gaulle asked of all French armed forces. "Join them without reserve! France which fights calls on you!" General Giraud, over the Algiers radio appealed to the French forces in North Africa, exclaiming, "This is our chance of revival!"


LANDINGS A
SURPRISE TO
GERMAN HIGH
COMMAND

Allied landings in North Africa came as a surprise to the German High Command. General Marshall sent the following report to the Secretary of War, in 1945. "Field Marshal Kesselring, who, at the time, was commanding all German forces in the Mediterranean except Rommel's desert task force, states that his headquarters

FRENCH NORTHWEST AFRICA

FRENCH NORTHWEST AFRICA

—— RAILROAD Standard Gauge ——— RAILROAD Narrow Gauge



did expect a landing and had requested reinforcement by a division. However, Kesselring's fears were not heeded by Hitler and Goering. Allied security and deception measures for the landing operations were found to have been highly effective. Only when the Allied fleets and convoys were streaming through the Straits of Gibraltar did the Germans realize that something very special was under way, and even then false conclusions were drawn: either that the Allies intended to land in rear of Rommel in the Middle East, or that these were British reinforcements en route to the Far East, or supplies for starving Malta. Since no advance preparations had been made by the Germans to repel such an Allied invasion of North Africa, all subsequent efforts to counter the Allies suffered from hasty improvisation. Defense continued, however, because, as Field Marshal Keitel now states, since evacuation was impossible, the Germans had only the choice of resisting or surrendering." As American GI's later reported, the Germans in North Africa surrendered in droves.

STRATEGICAL
PURPOSES

The strategical purposes of the operations were stated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to be as follows:

"1. Establishment of firm and mutually supported lodgments in the Oran-Algiers-Tunis area on the north coast, and in the Casablanca area on the northwest coast, in order that appropriate bases for continued and intensified air, ground and sea operations might be readily available.

2. Vigorous and rapid exploitation from lodgments obtained in order to acquire complete control of the entire area, including French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis, to facilitate effective air and ground operations against the enemy, and to create favorable conditions for extension of offensive operations to the east through Libya against the rear of Axis forces in the Western Desert.

3. Complete annihilation of the Axis forces opposing the British forces in the Western Desert and intensification of air and sea operations against the Axis on the European continent."

AMERICAN
ROLE

The Joint United States Chiefs of Staff issued the following "concept of United States participation," calling for military and naval forces as follows:

"1. A Joint Expeditionary Force to seize and occupy the Atlantic coast of French Morocco.

2. United States forces required in conjunction with the British forces to seize and occupy the Mediterranean coast of French North Africa.

3. Additional Army forces as required to complete the occupation of Northwest Africa.

4. Naval local defense forces and sea frontier forces for the Atlantic coast of French Morocco and naval personnel for naval base maintenance and harbor control at Oran.

CRIMEAN CONFERENCE: PRIME MINISTER WINSTON CHURCHILL, PRESIDENT F. D. ROOSEVELT, AND
PREMIER JOSEPH STALIN, IN THE PATIO, AT THE PALACE IN MALTA, WHERE THE "BIG THREE" MET.
REAR, ARE ADMIRAL SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, ADMIRAL ERNEST KING, AIR MARSHAL PORTAL, AND
ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY, WITH OTHER HIGH-RANKING ALLIED OFFICERS. FEBRUARY, 1945.



5. The United States to be responsible for logistic support and requirements of all United States Forces."

THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

AS DESCRIBED IN GENERAL MARSHALL'S REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR, IN 1945

U. S. GAINS TIME BY HEROISM OF HER ALLIES

In the early months of World War II, the element on which the security of the United States most depended was time - time to organize her tremendous resources and time to send them overseas in a global war. As General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, expressed it, in his official report to the Secretary of War, "We were given this time through the heroic refusal of the Soviet and British peoples to collapse under the smashing blows of the Axis forces. They bought this time for us with the currency of blood and courage." By 1943, our margin of safety was still precarious, but, as the Report stated, "the moment was rapidly approaching when we would be prepared to deal with our enemies on the only terms they understood - overwhelming power."

JOINT CONFERENCE OF DECEMBER, 1941 IN WASHINGTON

In a series of joint conferences, the Allies met to plan the decisions that launched the vast campaigns to crush Germany, Italy, and Japan. The Forces of the United States and Great Britain were deployed under a single strategic control exercised by the group known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This structure of Allied control was conceived at the conference of December 1941, when Prime Minister Churchill, accompanied by the chiefs of the British Navy, Army, and Air Forces, came to Washington and met with the President and the American Chiefs of Staff. It was the most complete unification of military effort ever achieved by two Allied nations. Strategic direction of all the forces of both nations, the allocation of manpower and munitions, the coordination of communications, the control of military intelligence, and the administration of captured areas all were accepted as joint responsibilities. The President and the Prime Minister, with the advice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, made the decision at this first conference that our resources would be concentrated first to defeat Germany, the greater and closer enemy, and then Japan.

APRIL 1942 IN LONDON

In April 1942, General Marshall, accompanied by Mr. Harry Hopkins, met in London in conference with Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the War Cabinet, and the British Chiefs of Staff to make a tentative plan for the invasion of the European continent in a cross-Channel operation. "At that time the Red Army was slowly falling back under the full fury of the German assault," said the General in his Report, "and it was accepted at the London Conference that everything practicable must be done to reduce the pressure on the Soviet lest she collapse and the door be opened wide for a complete conquest of Europe and a probable juncture with the Japanese in the Indian Ocean. In



the discussions at this conference, a tentative target date for the cross-Channel operations, designated by the code name ROUNDUP, was set for the summer of 1943. However, the immediate necessity for an emergency plan was recognized. It was given the code name SLEDGEHAMMER and was to provide for a diversionary assault on the French coast at a much earlier date if such a desperate measure became necessary to lend a hand toward saving the situation on the Soviet front.

LACK OF SHIPS
AND EQUIPMENT
DELAY OPERATIONS

"Here the Western Allies faced a shortage which was to plague us to the final day of the war in Europe - the shortage of assault craft, LST's, LCI's, and smaller vessels," the Marshall Report continues. "At least six divisions would be required for a diversionary action


in order to be of any assistance to the Red Army, and all the resources of England and the United States were searched for vessels or barges that could be employed in the Channel. Outboard motors and marine engines in pleasure craft in the United States were appropriated for this purpose. An extensive building program for landing craft was agreed upon, which necessitated a heavy cut-back or delay in the construction then under way of certain major combat ships for the Pacific Fleet. Also there were added to the production program in the United States, a great many items which would be required for build-up - engineering and railroad equipment and rolling stock, pipelines, hospital set-ups, communication materiel, and a multitude of items to be required for airfields, camps, docks, and depots in the British Isles for the actual Channel crossing and for the support of our troops once they were in France."

JUNE 1942
IN WASHINGTON


In June 1942, Winston Churchill and General Sir Alan F. Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, returned to Washington for a conference to further discuss SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP, and the possibility of an operation in the Mediterranean. While these discussions were in progress, the Allied situation in North Africa "took a more serious turn, culminating in the loss of Tobruk. The discussions thereafter were devoted almost exclusively to the measures to be taken to meet the threat facing Cairo, Rommel's forces having been checked with difficulty on the El Alamein line. Further advances by his Afrika Korps, with its Italian reinforcements, and German success along the southeastern portion of the Soviet front threatened a complete collapse in the Middle East, the loss of the Suez Canal and the vital oil supply in the vicinity of Abadan. It was a very black hour," General Marshall commented of that time.

JULY 1942
IN LONDON

In July 1942, General Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, went to London for further conferences with the British Chiefs of Staff, "to determine if there were not something that could be done immediately to lessen the pressure on the Soviet, whose armies were facing a crisis. Poverty of equipment, especially in landing craft, and the short period remaining when the weather would permit cross-Channel movement of small craft, ruled out the diversionary operation SLEDGEHAMMER for 1942. After prolonged discussions, it became evident that the only operation that could be undertaken with a fair prospect of success that year was TORCH, the assault on North Africa.



Castroville Harbor



Landings there would be a long way from Germany, but should serve to divert at least some German pressure from the Red Army, and would materially improve the critical situation in the Middle East."

OPERATION
"TORCH"
DECIDED ON

The decision was made to launch the North African invasion at the earliest possible moment, "accepting the fact that this would mean not only the abandonment of the possibility for any operation in Western Europe that year, but that the necessary build-up for the cross-Channel assault could not be completed in 1943. TORCH would bleed most of our resources in the Atlantic, and would confine us in the Pacific to the holding of the Hawaii-Midway line and the preservation of communications to Australia. General Eisenhower, who was then established with his headquarters in London, directing the planning and assembling of American resources, was, with the generous acceptance of the British Government, appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British and American Forces which were to carry out the landings in North Africa. On 13 August he received the formal directive to proceed with the operation. The target date was fixed for early November."



GERMAN PLAN
OF "PINCERS"
UPSET

"We have since learned," the Marshall Report stated, "that the German plan at that time was to attempt the defeat of Britain by aerial bombardment and by destruction of her army and resources in the Middle East. Colonel General Jodl, Chief of the German Armed Forces Operations Staff, has disclosed that it was Hitler's plan to break through Stalingrad and Egypt, and join these two salients in the Middle East. The heroic defense of Stalingrad and General Montgomery's crushing defeat of Rommel at El Alamein dislocated these gigantic pincers. The further development of the operations in North Africa from the east and the west, and the Soviet offensive from the Volga proved to be the turning points at which the Axis was forced on the strategic defensive."¹


TWO MAJOR
EXPEDITIONS

The landings which accomplished the occupation of French North Africa were carried out in accordance with plans and with a boldness and efficiency which secured the initial objectives, the major air fields and ports in North Africa, within a period of forty-eight hours. Geographically, the three operations fell into two regions based on the seas to which they were related: the Moroccan Expedition and the Algerian Expedition.

1. For full account, see "Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War."



El Hank lighthouse



Naval battery at Mendia

PART II

OPERATIONS

A - MOROCCAN EXPEDITION

THREE LANDING PLACES

Operations in French Morocco, organized as the Western Task Force, were conducted by United States forces under the unified command of Rear Admiral H. K. Hewitt, until General G. S. Patton's headquarters were established on shore and he was ready to assume command. The plan called for a main landing to be made at Fedala, 14 miles north of Casablanca; and secondary landings at Port Lyautey (Mehdia Harbor), 65 miles north of Casablanca, and at Safi, 125 miles south of Casablanca. The objectives were: to capture Casablanca from the land side; to capture the airfield near Port Lyautey; and to capture the port of Safi by direct assault and then to assist in the reduction of Casablanca. The Moroccan campaign, an entirely American undertaking as regards military and naval forces, involved a total of more than 37,000 officers and men in the land forces and 99 vessels of all categories. The principal objective, the harbor of Casablanca, is a modern seaport on the Atlantic, protected by an adequate breakwater and possessing docks and other facilities useful for military and naval operations. In order to capture Casablanca, it was considered advisable to occupy simultaneously the other three harbors, of which the most important was Fedala.

TWO COLUMNS HEADED BY COAST GUARD AT FEDALA


To make the landings, the Transport Force was divided into three parts. The main force - which was to land on four separate beaches near the small town of Fedala - was divided into four columns. Two of those four columns were headed by Coast Guard manned ships: the LEONARD WOOD, Captain

Merlin O'Neill, USCG; and the JOSEPH T. DICKMAN, Captain Charles William Harwood, USCG.

HEAVY NAVAL SUPPORT FOR TROOPS

The attack on Fedala was the principal one of the expedition, having as its object a landing in force at that point, to be followed by a rapid advance on Casablanca and an ultimate junction with forces converging from the north (Mehdia) and from the south (Safi). The United States force engaged was the Center Attack Group (Task Group HOW-9), Captain R. R. M. Emmet, consisting of the following units: Fire support - AUGUSTA, flagship, BROOKLYN, ROWAN, WILKES, SWANSON, LUDLOW; Transports - LEONARD WOOD, flagship, ANCON, ARCTURUS, WILLIAM P. BIDDLE, TASKER H. BLISS, CHARLES CARROLL, JOSEPH T. DICKMAN, JOSEPH HEWES, THOMAS JEFFERSON, OBERON, PROCYON, EDWARD RUTLEDGE, HUGH L. SCOTT, ELIZABETH C. STANTON, THURSTON; A/S screen and minesweepers - WOOLSEY, EDISON, BRISTOL, BOYLE, MURPHY, TILLMAN, MIANTONOMAH, HOGAN, PALMER, STANSBURY, AUK. The oiler WINOOSKI, with two specially constructed fire support craft on board, was attached to the Center Attack Group. The Army contingent (Task Group YOKE) forming part of the Center Attack Group, under the command of Major General Jonathan W. Anderson, totaled: 1,067 officers; 18,716 enlisted men; 77 light tanks.

DESIGNED FOR INVASION USE, THIS COAST GUARD MANNED LST PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE
IN PUTTING MEN AND MATERIAL ASHORE TO INVADE HITLER'S FESTA EUROPE



DARKNESS
HAMPERED
LANDINGS

At 0012 on November 8, the LEONARD WOOD rounded into the transport area, followed by the other transports, and commenced loading boats. At 0145, special beach-marking boats from the LEONARD WOOD, CHARLES CARROLL, and JOSEPH T. DICKMAN left their rendezvous off the bow of the LEONARD WOOD and proceeded to designated points to mark beaches. The debarkations of the landing force was to prove extremely difficult. Considerable confusion was caused by the darkness, which hampered the boats from the combatant ships and those from the transports in effecting their rendezvous. The boat waves from the LEONARD WOOD were directed towards the beach southwest of Cape Fedala. The waves from the THOMAS JEFFERSON, the CHARLES CARROLL, and the JOSEPH T. DICKMAN were directed to the beaches between Fedala and the Neffifikh River.

MULTITUDE
OF PROBLEMS

The mission of the Western Task Force involved a multitude of problems, including geography, high surf, and bad coastal weather. The coast of Morocco is rocky, with long sloping beaches. This meant that transports would have to lie a considerable distance from shore to discharge troops. The small assault boats carrying the fighting men to the enemy shore had to face the hazard of the jagged, rocky beaches. Thus, a great problem was to locate the few beach areas where landing craft could come ashore with reasonable safety. Intelligence reports and photographic reconnaissance helped find strategic areas where landings were feasible.


HEAVY
GROUND
SWELLS

Africa's heavy ground swells, high surf and great tides were a constant problem of vital importance in planning the amphibious landing. Swells towering 16 to 20 feet were not uncommon along the coast of Morocco. High surf from these swells was found too frequently in fair weather. Low atmospheric pressure moving from the Azores toward Spain would cause a heavy surf off Morocco in the space of a day. Scientists reported that a similar atmospheric condition moving south from Iceland would not be felt for two or three days. The worst surf condition along the Moroccan coast was caused by depression between Bermuda and Newfoundland. It was reported that after a lapse of about thirty-six hours high surf and gale winds could be expected in Morocco.

BAD
WEATHER

As winter approached, bad coastal weather increased. In November, weather predictions and meteorological information had to be absolutely accurate. Submarines were ordered to the Moroccan coast two days in advance of the main convoy to act as weather stations. The meteorologists' reports were so accurate and closely timed that the troops of the Western Task Force had been ashore only a few hours when the surf along the coast built up so high that landing on the exposed beaches would have been disastrous had the operation been delayed or the weather miscalculated. Some experts believe that it may have been because of these beach and weather conditions that the landings were met with such light opposition. It is thought that the defenders did not think a landing through the surf was possible, and were expecting attacks on more sheltered areas.

THIS U. S. COAST GUARD MANNED COMBAT TRANSPORT JOSEPH T. DICKMAN
CARRIES FIGHTING MEN AND VITAL WAR MATERIALS TO THE ENEMY HELD INVASION SHORES



ENEMY
DEFENSES

Military problems facing the advancing armada were the fixed defenses along the Moroccan coast, supplemented by the mobile strength drawn from the French Army, Vichy planes, both Army and Navy, and the fleet strength at Casablanca. The toughest opposition, in case Vichy forces decided to resist, was the French fleet--one battleship, two light cruisers, three flotilla leaders, six destroyers, twelve submarines, and one sloop.

TASK FORCE
IN THREE PARTS

The task force organization was in three parts: the Assault Force of transports and landing craft to make the landings at Mehdia, Fedala, and Safi; the Covering Group of warships, which would protect the landing forces against the defending fleet at Casablanca; and the Air Group.

CAPTAIN HARWOOD'S ACCOUNT
OF THE PARTICIPATION OF
THE U.S.S. JOSEPH T. DICKMAN
IN THE NORTH AFRICAN INVASION, NOVEMBER 8, 1942

Prior to the African invasion, training exercises for the amphibious landings were held in the Chesapeake Bay area by the JOSEPH T. DICKMAN and other vessels. These exercises simulated the planned maneuvers as far as possible, although no information to that effect was made a matter of general knowledge. The entire operation, which was to be designated "Operation Torch" was shrouded in such effective secrecy that its objective was unknown to the Axis powers until the actual landings were made. Most of the vessels were assembled and loaded in the Norfolk area, and the day before sailing a conference of commanding officers was held by Admiral Hewitt and General Patton at which information regarding the proposed operation was disseminated. Detailed plans were distributed to the ships immediately before the departure, but the destination was made known to only a small number until a short time before the arrival.

The general plan for the invasion was to seize control of the French colony of Morocco, securing the cooperation of the inhabitants, if possible, by a United States Task Force. The principal objective was the Port of Casablanca. Its capture was to be effected by securing a beachhead at Fedala, about 15 miles above it, and from this place using troops to envelope the city from the land side. Large supporting forces were to be landed near Port Lyautey to the northward, and near Safi to the southward. About half the forces were assigned to the central unit and the remainder divided between the Port Lyautey and Safi areas. The major obstacles in executing the plan were the scarcity of landing beaches and harbors, and the difficulty of

VICE ADMIRAL R. R. WAESCHE, COMMANDANT OF THE U. S. COAST GUARD,
PINS THE LEGION OF MERIT ON CAPTAIN CHARLES W. HARWOOD



maintaining logistic support at such a distance from home bases.

Troops and cargo had been taken aboard at Newport News, Va., and on the morning of 24 October, 1942, the JOSEPH T. DICKMAN led the transports out to sea. After a long period of arduous training and drills, we were to play for keeps and there was a feeling of exhilaration in completing the sortie by passing the point of departure on the exact minute and in knowing the ship and the crew were ready and able to do the task assigned. We had on board about 1,450 officers and men of the 2nd Battalion of the 30th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Division, plus a Navy Sea Frontier Unit and part of the Army Western Task Force Headquarters. The number of troops carried was somewhat less than our full capacity, but the cargo holds were crammed to capacity. In addition to the regular components of combat equipment and supplies, the cargo was topped off with extra ammunition and provisions.

Shortly after leaving the coast of the United States we were joined by additional units and the task force became one of the largest armadas ever assembled by the United States. The task force commander (Admiral Hewitt) was embarked on the Cruiser AUGUSTA, which maintained station immediately ahead of the transport group. The Commander, Transport Group (Captain Emmet) was on the LEONARD WOOD, like the DICKMAN, a Coast Guard manned vessel. Good weather was enjoyed in crossing the Atlantic and opportunity was taken to study the plans and acquaint all hands with their specific duties. Courses were steered to conceal the destination from enemy tracking; and no submarine attacks were received, although they were anticipated. The day before the arrival off the Coast of North Africa, the northern and southern task groups left the formation for their assignments at Port Lyautey and Safi. The central group of transports, with their supporting forces, continued on to seize the beachhead at Fedala. This group was formed in four columns with the initial assault vessels leading the columns. The JOSEPH T. DICKMAN headed the north or left column, the LEONARD WOOD the south or right column, and the CARROLL and JEFFERSON the two inside columns.

The troops from the DICKMAN were to be landed on a beach identified as the "Wadi Nefiffik." This was a small indentation of the coast into which a small creek emptied. The troops were to seize a small fort (Pont Blondin) on the north side of the Wadi, a bridge crossing it, and other points designated as necessary for defense of the beachhead. This beach was not considered suitable for landing large quantities of cargo, and the adjoining beach

WAR SUPPLIES ARE LOADED ABOARD A MERCHANT SHIP UNDER
THE WATCHFUL EYES OF COAST GUARD SENTRIES





to the southward was designated for this purpose. In view of the expected difficulties of retracting the boats from the beach, the first five waves, or boat groups, carrying the assault troops from the DICKMAN were to hit the beach nearly simultaneously and trust to skill and good fortune to get back. This beach, lying between two fortified headlands, had the potentialities of a disastrous enemy trap, as well as many natural disadvantages; but the **results** to be gained by its successful use justified its selection.

The transport area about 6 miles off Fedala was reached a few minutes before midnight November 7, and the lowering of boats commenced at once. The first boat over was the "Scout Boat," which successfully found and maintained a designated position off the beach. Its function was to show a light to seaward which would guide the landing boats to its position and enable them to go the rest of the way with a minimum of risk of missing the exact spot selected. The accomplishment of this boat was a great factor in the outstanding success of the initial landing of the DICKMAN's boats.




A short time later one of the many difficulties which had to be overcome in this operation became manifest. The plans called for 20 boats to be furnished by other vessels to the DICKMAN, but these vessels had become detached from the formation during the maneuvers into the area and only one arrived as scheduled. About half of our 35 boats were designed to carry vehicles and personnel, and the remainder personnel only. This required a revision of the complicated boat loading schedule under considerable pressure. Fortunately, the Commanding Officer of Troops (Major Bernard) was not a man easily flustered; and a new schedule was quickly arranged with him which permitted 27 of the ship's boats to make up four and a half of the first five waves and to reach the assembly area ahead of time. The destroyer MURPHY, acting as control vessel for the DICKMAN, escorted these boats to the line of departure and started them into the beach on signal from the flagship. The MURPHY was hit by a shell from the battery on Pont Blondin but was not disabled, and her return fire was instrumental in silencing the battery.

These 27 boats reached their beach just before the fort was alerted and unloaded their troops and equipment. Although their return trip was made under fire, not a boat was lost, and all 27 returned for another load. Two boats which had followed a few minutes later encountered the searchlight beam and fire from (and at) the fort and landed on the northeast side of Pont Blondin Battery. These two boats were stranded on the rocks, but the troops and crew got ashore without mishap.



The unloading was continued vigorously and the troops and combat vehicles and equipment landed in good time. About noon of the first day we moved in closer to the beach, but this advantage was offset by the high surf which had developed on the beaches. Due to the high losses of boats suffered by most of the vessels, it was necessary for the DICKMAN's boats to assist them in unloading. While this was being done we facilitated our own unloading by putting the cargo gasoline, consisting of 5-gallon cans, on life floats and towing them in. The beaches continued to get more difficult until their use was suspended, and many boats were lost. When the fort at Fedala capitulated, the harbor became available, but it was too small to accommodate the large amount of supplies being sent in.

While the unloading was going on, a general action took place which was interesting and of many types. No planes attacked the ships, although they were taken under fire at a hopelessly long range. Planes did strafe the beaches, however, and shot up one of our boats. Two members of the crew, Donald LaRue and R. L. Bucheit, were severely wounded; and the engineman in the boat, Paul Clark, took charge, placed the wounded men aboard a destroyer, and completed the mission of the boat. He was awarded a Navy Cross, for his heroic action. C. C. Curry, a Navy hospital apprentice attached to the DICKMAN, was awarded a Silver Star Medal for his courageous treatment of wounded men along the beach while these plane attacks were going on. Fire from the shore batteries at the ships was in plain view and most interesting to watch, especially as it was not directed at us. The beaches were also bombarded by the shore batteries for a short period. French naval vessels which sortied out of Casablanca to attack us were intercepted by our Naval vessels, and the resulting ship battle was another interesting sight. Another variety of action was the turning off of an approaching convoy of French merchant vessels which were imbued with the theory of the "freedom of the seas" and required gunfire to persuade them to keep clear. To complete the variety of action, a night submarine attack resulted in torpedo hits on the destroyer HAMBLETON, the tanker WINOOSKI, and the transport HEWES. The HEWES sank quickly, but most of the crew were rescued. These vessels were anchored nearby, and assistance was sent to the HAMBLETON from the DICKMAN. The next afternoon, about 1720, another torpedo attack, apparently from a submarine which had worked its way inshore of the transports, hit the transports SCOTT, RUTLEDGE, and BLISS. The RUTLEDGE sank quickly, but the SCOTT and BLISS, sister ships of the DICKMAN, were still afloat when we left the area, although the BLISS was burning fiercely. They both sank within a few hours. All boats available from the DICKMAN were sent to the assistance of the SCOTT.



About 60 of the survivors were brought aboard. Many others were taken to the shore; and when the DICKMAN departed on signal with the other vessels, all the boats were left behind to carry on the rescue work.

After clearing the Fedala area we cruised up and down off shore waiting for the port of Casablanca to be opened up. The USS ELECTRA was hit by a torpedo while we were out there and the DICKMAN missed contact with a floating mine by a narrow margin. On the morning of the 15th, we entered the harbor, which was cluttered up with sunken vessels, and completed unloading supplies, consisting of ship's provisions, ammunition, and gasoline--about 10% of our total tonnage carried for the operation. We departed from Casablanca on the 17th of November and on the return cruise to Norfolk the principal activity was preparing the vessel for further activities by stripping more of the woodwork from the quarters and increasing the troop capacity.

SOME FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT THE DICKMAN

THE DICKMAN COMMISSIONED IN 1941

Early in 1941, the Army Transport Service had taken over the TSS PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT as an army transport, renaming her the USAT JOSEPH T. DICKMAN.* The ship -- a steel twin screw vessel of 13,869 gross tons, with a full load displacement of 21,325 tons, measuring 535 feet 2 1/8 inches in overall length -- was given the new name in honor of the late Lieutenant General, Joseph T. Dickman, who had commanded American troops in France and later in Germany at the close of the last war, and had also participated in earlier wars. On June 10, 1941, the DICKMAN was placed in commission in the Navy Yard, New York, and the then Lieutenant Commander Harwood assumed command of the vessel.

TRAINING EXERCISES IN 1941

Then followed months of training in methods of amphibious warfare. The first of many landing exercises were carried out by the DICKMAN, in company with other naval transports (she having joined up with Transport Division Three of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet), on June 28, 1941, off New River Inlet, Onslow Bay, North Carolina. There from July 1 until July 5, 1941, and again later that month, the DICKMAN together with other ships in Transport Division Seven, of which she was then a part, carried on landing exercises. While these exercises, in the light of later operations, were crude and full of errors, they laid the groundwork for the Transport Doctrine which proved of great value in amphibious assaults under wartime conditions. For the first twelve days in August, 1941, extensive ship maneuvers in addition to landing exercises were carried out in the region of Onslow Bay.

* See the Coast Guard publication "History of the USS JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (APA-13), 10 June, 1941 - 1 October, 1945" prepared by the vessel, and forwarded by its CO, Captain F. A. Leamy.

ABOARD A COAST GUARD-MANNED TROOP TRANSPORT CARRYING
REINFORCEMENTS TO THE ALLIED LINES



HARDSHIPS
ENCOUNTERED
IN EARLY
EXERCISES

During those early exercises, under the direction of COMCARIBFOR, not only jeeps and trucks were put ashore but also tanks. This was no mean feat considering the boats and equipment then in use, plus the lack of experience of all hands in that type of modern warfare. The troops suffered from sunburn, the early landing craft were continuously breaking down, fresh water was portioned out in quart quantities three times a day, surf conditions were hazardous, and communications were bad. More experience was acquired in the course of the next twelve months, when the DICKMAN, having undergone conversion changes, made many long trips, including one to Bombay, India, giving many men their first extended voyage at sea.

PREPARATIONS
IN THE
SUMMER OF 1942

From late in June to early in August, 1942, maneuvers and landing exercises were carried out in the upper Chesapeake Bay at Solomons Island, Maryland, in company with other ships of the Atlantic Amphibious Force. These were extensive in nature and simulated the storming of protected beaches. Vehicles, bulldozers, and heavy equipment were all landed under true battle conditions and without the realization that these maneuvers and landings were in preparation for the initial North African invasion. In August, during a short period of availability and dry docking in the Norfolk Navy Yard, an examination of the ship's characteristics data showed that an additional six 20mm guns had been added, giving a total of fourteen. The ship at that time was equipped to carry sixteen LCV's, fourteen LCP(R)'s, two LCS(S)'s, one LCP(L), and two LCM(3)'s. All of these boats were aboard except two LCS(S)'s, which had not yet been issued. The ship was loaded with food, clothing, and all supplies needed for many months to come.


WELL STOCKED
WITH FOOD
AND AMMUNITION

The History of the DICKMAN, prepared by that vessel, gives the following facts and figures, "She carried clothing stores for 47.3 days, general stores for 257.2 days, dry provisions for 93.2 days, refrigerated meats for 64.5 days, butter for 116.2 days, fresh vegetables for 32.7 days, and fruits for 64.9 days, all stores being figured on a combat-loaded complement of 2,000. Her total capacity amounted to 254,429 cubic feet, of which 46,650 cubic feet was utilized for ship's stores and provisions. After each period of overhaul the DICKMAN took on more and more the features which distinguished her as an amphibious assault transport. This period of availability terminated on 10 September, 1942."

TROOPS EMBARK
ON OCTOBER, 1942

"Following this period of availability, anti-aircraft practice and fueling-at-sea exercises were carried out in the Chesapeake Bay, in addition to landing exercises during early October.... On October 17, 1942, the vessel moved to and moored at the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad docks at Newport News, Virginia. Here army supplies were loaded and an advance detail of seven officers and 183 enlisted men reported aboard on 18 October, 1942. Total embarkation was completed on 24 October, 1942, and the DICKMAN proceeded to sea from Norfolk to play her part in the initial amphibious invasion of North Africa. Her trip across the ATLANTIC was uneventful."

A TROOP LADEN COAST GUARD-MANNED TRANSPORT ON THE LONG TRIP OVER



TROOPS AND
SUPPLIES ARRIVE
FOR OPERATION
"TORCH"

"As a part of Task Force 34, the 'Old Joe' had crossed 3,000 miles of ocean, with 1,370 men and 73 officers of the 2nd Bn., 30th Infantry, 3rd Division, plus 43 naval officers and 80 enlisted personnel of the U. S. Navy Sea Frontier Unit and Western Task Force Headquarters. Her holds bulged with vehicles, gasoline, ammunition, and general army equipment and gear. No record is available of her cargo on this first assault but it is safe to say it was considerable. At 2355, on 7 November, 1942, the following entry was made in the Log, 'all engines stopped, all hands standby to lower boats.' Operation Torch was underway." An official report stated that on November 7, at 2320, the USS JOSEPH T. DICKMAN, underway since October 24 from Newport News, Virginia, as a member of Western Task Force 34, reached the transport area at Fedala, French Morocco. At 2355, all engines stopped and all hands stood by to lower boats. She commenced lowering boats at 0009 on November 8 and disembarking troops at 0048. All waves departed for the rendezvous area at 0330. All boats departed for the beach at 0355. By 0630, boats began to return to the ship to be reloaded for their next run to the beach. At this time Fort Fedala opened fire. American cruisers returned the fire, ceasing at 0705, when Fort Fedala was silenced. However, at 0815, enemy shore batteries shelled the beaches and, at 0830, our cruisers engaged two enemy destroyers in a running battle. The cruisers ceased firing at 1145.

EYE WITNESS ACCOUNTS AND EXPERIENCES


CAUGHT IN
SEARCHLIGHT

Lieutenant Bernard E. Scalan, USCG, in charge of landing waves from the DICKMAN, led the operations at the north end of the beach. "It was the darkest night I've ever seen," said the Lieutenant, some time later, in reviewing the operation. "We knew of some shore batteries and a fortress atop which was a huge searchlight, but we had instructions to withhold all fire unless that searchlight was turned on, in which case we should extinguish it. Well, the light did come on and immediately Navy and Coast Guard support boats started hammering away, extinguishing it almost immediately. Then the shore batteries opened up on us and lead and shrapnel came down like rain."

BEACH PARTY
STRAFED

"We stayed offshore in our boat directing several waves of landing parties into the best spots along the beach and doing our best to protect them from the fire," Lieutenant Scalan continued. "As daylight came, we pushed in to shore and, as we beached, some enemy planes came over, their machine guns wide open. Most of the party made cover, but my Chief Boatswain's Mate, Lloyd M. Morris, was still by the boat as the planes came overhead. Waist deep in water he was strafed as he tried to make shore, and undoubtedly would have drowned had not William W. Martini, Seaman 1/c, and another man disregarded the planes and bullets and plunged into the surf, dragging Morris ashore. Then, with the planes still strafing, they carried him up the bullet-ridden beach to a shelter where a doctor had set up a first aid station. Morris was later removed to an eastern port hospital and recovered."

LT. COMDR. BERNARD E. SCALAN, USCG, STANDS AT ATTENTION AS CAPTAIN
FRANK A. LEAMY READS HIS COMMENDATION ABOARD THE COAST GUARD-MANNED
INVASION TRANSPORT ON WHICH THEY SERVED DURING THE INITIAL INVASION
OF FRANCE



DANGEROUS
HIDING PLACE

After completing the first landing operations, Lieutenant Scalan in compliance with previous orders, returned to his ship where he and his men had dinner. Later they started for shore to locate a landing party, search for Ensign Harry A Storts, USCGR, who was missing, and establish a new landing place. They reached shore without incident, but had advanced only about a hundred yards when several enemy planes swooped down at them, machine guns ablaze. "We of the shore party all made for cover, naturally," said the Lieutenant. "I spotted a bulldozer--a small tractor used for towing purposes--leaped behind it for protection, but found two soldiers already there. It was a tight squeeze but I managed to burrow in between them. After the strafing we learned that the bulldozer was connected with a wagon-load of ammunition. Imagine our embarrassment if the ammunition had been hit and exploded! Our secure shelter wouldn't have been so cozy."

TWO MEN
ASSIST
WOUNDED
COMRADES

"After quite some time and considerable hiking, we located the beach party and were then told that the two men who had been detailed to attend to the boat while we were ashore had been wounded. On returning to our ship I learned the details. Richard L. **Bucheit**, Boatswain's Mate 2/c, and Donald LaRue, Seaman 2/c. had been strafed by enemy planes. Seeing this, two of our shore party under cover rushed to the boat where they found LaRue, wounded and curled up on a bed he'd improvised for himself, and **Bucheit**, hit in the shoulders and legs. The men who had gone to the rescue of their comrades were Leonard A Goldstein and Paul L. Clark. As firemen their basic duties didn't call for the handling of small boats, but they'd been prepared for such an emergency through the instructions we'd given all hands on our way over. So these two took the wounded men to the nearest ship and it was their promptness in doing this that saved **Bucheit**'s life. He was operated on immediately. LaRue, unfortunately, had been much more seriously wounded and died soon after." Lieutenant Scalan searched for Ensign Storts, who was long overdue, but could not find a trace of him and finally had to return, giving up the Ensign for lost.

ISOLATED IN
ENEMY TERRITORY

Three days later, Ensign Storts turned up and related that he and his men had become isolated in hostile territory and were taken prisoner. His story follows. "I was in command of a tank lighter. We left the ship according to schedule but on the way in we developed engine trouble. We had just about got that fixed in good order when an enemy plane that looked like a Messerschmitt came down and strafed us. We lost one man and the boat filled with water. We were able to make an emergency landing and get the rest of the men ashore, but we were forced to land several miles up the beach from the main landing operation. This meant that we were isolated in hostile territory."

ONE OF A NEW TYPE (NAVY'S LCI) OPERATING UNDER THE NAVY AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
NAVY AND COAST GUARD PERSONNEL MAN THE BARGES



ATTACKED BY
PLANES AND BY
SNIPERS INLAND

"Shortly after we landed, eight planes came over after us and we lost several men. Everybody, including Coast Guardsmen and soldiers, dug themselves into shallow pits and fox holes. This was about noon, and every half hour during the rest of the day planes came over and strafed us. In the meantime, we were forced to keep up an intermittent duel with snipers who were trying to pick us off from concealed positions inland. We thought it would never get dark, but it finally did. By this time we had lost another man and had three wounded and we decided to send for help."

AMERICANS TAKE
FRENCH PRISONERS




"Five men salvaged a rubber raft and started for a destroyer anchored off shore. Four others and myself started to walk to the town of Fedala. We took enough rations for one meal and three canteens of water. We walked all Sunday night and all day Monday, and after dark Monday we arrived at an Army Command Post. The officer in command detached a force to relieve our men on the beach. I went with them to show them the way. Early Tuesday morning as we came around a bend in the road, we surprised a group of French soldiers eating breakfast. We quickly made them prisoners and took them along with us. However, our trip was in vain. When we reached the beach we found that the men we had left there were gone. They themselves had been captured by the French. This information was given to us at this point by one of our French prisoners." There seemed to be nothing to do but to return to the Army Command Post, so they started back on the route they had already been over twice. Before leaving, they "booby-trapped" the equipment they had originally left on the beach.

ARE IN TURN
TAKEN PRISONER

"The country was flat, but occasionally we had to detour around ravines or heavy brush," Ensign Storts continued. "We were getting along well when suddenly native soldiers appeared all around us as if by magic and opened fire. Their sand-colored clothing had camouflaged them and they seemed to emerge from the ground. There were between 150 and 200 of them led by French officers. In the first burst of fire they killed several of our men and eight of the French soldiers that we had originally captured. Every other member of our party was wounded." They were then taken to the first aid station at Bouznika, en route noticing several other ambushes similar to the one into which they had fallen. The French treated their wounds and sent them on in a truck, which was attacked and put out of commission by an American plane.

CONFUSING EVENTS
BEFORE RELEASE

"By this time we were very tired and somewhat confused," the Ensign said. "In one day, we had captured a force of Frenchmen, been captured ourselves by other French who had fired on their own men in doing so. Then one of our own planes had fired on us. At any rate, we walked back to Boulhaut and spent Tuesday night there. The French treated us as well as they could, but there was only enough food for those seriously wounded and only two glasses of water per man. The next morning, Wednesday, we heard that Casablanca had fallen. We got hold of a French priest who could speak English and demanded that we be released." In a short time the Americans were allowed to leave, although only Ensign Storts and another



man were able to walk. They were driven to Fedala, where the transport JOSEPH T. DICKMAN was lying offshore about one and a half miles, and got aboard at noon, exactly four days after they had left in the landing boat.

JCOIN AN
ARMY GROUP

In the confusion of the battle, the lighter of James Berardi, Seaman 1/c, USCGR, and three other lighters took a wrong turn and landed in the heavy surf 15 miles north of their objective, the little town of Fedala. After landing troops and equipment, Berardi's lighter, leaking badly, was unable to get off the beach. When, after repeated efforts to break out of the sand, the boat finally churned its propellers off, Berardi, another Coast Guardsman Guston E. Eckman, and some sailors decided to throw in their lot with the Army troops, for the other boats had already left the beach. Shortly after landing, about 8:30 a.m., the little party was strafed by 13 French planes, which killed one soldier and wounded two others. "I took two bullets from the leg of one of the soldiers," Berardi said, in reviewing the landing, some time later. "Then we attempted to fire the guns of the half-tracks which the Army had, but they were jammed. Lieutenant Victor (in command of the Army group) asked for volunteers to carry the wounded to a hospital. We commandeered a French wagon which was going by and two of our party started off with the wounded to find a hospital. In the meantime we began camouflaging the half-tracks."

TAKE UP A
POSITION
IN A PIG PEN

The little party, consisting of about 35 men, began to search in the early afternoon for a place to camp during the night. After a brush with French infantry and armored cars, which lasted several hours, the Americans took up a position in a pig pen, which, with walls a foot thick and seven feet high, seemed to offer the best protection available at the time. "That pen sure looked good," said Berardi. "We crowded right in with the pigs and didn't mind the company at all." The party, continually peppered by the small calibre machine guns of the French armored cars, held their pig pen against assault for two days, until their ammunition ran low. With only six rounds of ammunition left for their lone "tommy gun", the men finally decided to surrender, for they reasoned, accurately as it turned out later, that the French would soon start using mortars and grenades. If one grenade had been thrown into the pig pen all the Americans would probably have been killed. Berardi and two others volunteered to walk out to the French and surrender.

FRENCH
"VERY NICE"
TO AMERICAN
PRISONERS

"That's the only time I was really frightened," Berardi related. "'Shorty,' our sharpshooter, covered us with the tommy gun as we walked out with our hands in the air. We knew that if the French fired on us, Shorty would get some of them. He had picked off three officers just before we walked out." It was a lucky thing that the Americans gave up when they did, for thirty minutes later the mortars which the French had sent for finally arrived. The prisoners, taken to Rabat, 65 miles away, were interviewed by French officers. "They were very nice to us," said Berardi. "We answered all their questions with 'maybe' and 'could be' and after a while they gave up. One of them said, 'I knew you Americans wouldn't talk, but we had to ask the questions.'"


LEGEND

TRANSPORTS

- | | |
|--------------------|------------------------|
| 1 SUSAN B. ANTHONY | 5 FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE |
| 2 GEORGE CLYMER | 6 JOHN PENN |
| 3 HENRY T. ALLEN | 7 ALGOFAB |
| 4 ANNE ARUNDEL | 8 ELECTRA |

INITIAL CONTROL VESSELS

- A OSPREY
B EBERLE
C RAVEN



FRENCH GUARDS
ASK AMERICANS
TO HOLD
THEIR RIFLES

While the Americans were at Rabat, they were kept in an old French fort where they ate and slept in one large room which was cold and damp. The party was shuttled back and forth from then on between French headquarters and various small towns in French Morocco. They made one trip in charcoal-burning buses which had to stop at frequent intervals while the Frenchmen got out to gather wood for fuel. "When the French guards would go to gather wood," Berardi said, "they would ask us to hold their rifles." At one place the Americans were kept in a dark room. It was so dark that they couldn't tell what they were eating. "We thought it was beef until someone lit a match and we found it was raw horsemeat. We couldn't blame the French for the food, however. It was all they had to eat, themselves. Then too, they didn't make us work. As a matter of fact, any time we helped them, we got extra wine."

RELEASED
SIX DAYS
AFTER LANDING

Berardi struck up a friendship with a French officer, who, it turned out, was born in New Jersey. This officer said that the French did not want to fight the Americans and that if the French were given weapons and food they would fight on the Allied side. Six days after they had landed, Berardi and the others were released and taken by an American truck convoy to Casablanca. Their ship had already left for the United States so the Coast Guardsmen and sailors rejoined it at a U. S. port.


TROOPS
WADE
ASHORE

Abraham L. Jessen, Coast Guard Surfman, in charge of a landing boat, left his transport, the JOSEPH T. DICKMAN, with three other Coast Guardsmen and a number of Army troops. "We headed toward shore in the dark," Jessen related, "setting our course by a marker boat. As it began to get light, we saw we were practically on the reef due to the marker boat having been temporarily off station. It was too late to avoid going on the rocks. By this time the enemy had seen us and shells were falling all around. We got through the worst part of the rocks without anyone getting hurt and when the boat finally hit the reef the soldiers waded ashore. We saved our machine gun by dismounting it and followed the troops. Once ashore we climbed up over some rocks and came to a railroad track. We followed the track for about six miles and finally got to the beach."

ARRIVE IN
HEAVIEST
SHELLFIRE

"This part of the beach was getting the heaviest shellfire of the whole operation. Inland batteries were shelling the landing parties and enemy planes were strafing them. Our boats were a mile and a half away across the exposed sands. The four of us began an obstacle race to get to them. When we heard a shell whistling toward us we fell flat on our faces. Then we would get up and run a few yards. When the planes came over with all machine guns wide open, we would dive into the nearest shell hole. Then we would climb out and run some more. We finally made it and got aboard a tank lighter which took us back to the ship."

AN INJURED AMERICAN FIGHTING MAN, UNDER TREATMENT
ABOARD A COAST GUARD-MANNED INVASION TRANSPORT



SCENES ABOARD

THE

JOSEPH T. DICKMAN

As senior deck petty officer, Harry E. Meekins, Chief Boatswain's Mate, USCG, sweated out the invasion of Fedala from the deck of the DICKMAN, six or eight miles off the coast. His task was as tough as landing a boat on the shore under fire, for he had the responsibility of seeing that all the barges got into the water safely with their loads of fighting men. On the night of November 7, and in the small hours of November 8, Meekins started his boats over the side, without a light showing in the blacked-out convoy. While landing nets were lowered from the big transport, the small boats circled, and then they came alongside in fours and fives to receive the soldiers in full combat equipment as they clambered down the nets. The troop-laden barges then rendezvoused and made for the shore. Each coxswain had instructions in detail concerning courses and speeds. Meekins would have liked to be out there with his men but he had to stay on the big ship to superintend the debarkations and after them the unloading. The difficult task of unloading would begin as soon as a foothold had been established on the beach.

TRIP AFTER TRIP

IS MADE

BY BARGES



The minutes dragged by slowly after the first group had started for the shore. The Chief and the others left on the DICKMAN peered into the darkness. Suddenly somebody yelled, "There she goes!" and a brilliant light flashed on the beach and surrounding waters. The United States destroyers and landing boats, caught in the dazzling beams, immediately opened fire and after a few shots knocked the searchlight into darkness. Trip after trip was made in the small barges, under fire and through treacherous surf. Endless strafing from the air and firing from behind the hills gave the landings forces plenty to think about besides the rocks and surf. When morning came, all but one of the machine gun nests were destroyed and the Americans got that one in the early afternoon. The firing, however, continued from the interior. While the fighting was in progress, the Coast Guard teams started the work of transporting food, ammunition, and supplies to the beach, and of bringing back the wounded for medical care aboard the big ships. For the next fifty hours without a break, Coast Guardsmen made steady relays of round trips from ship to shore and back. They only stopped when their boats were shot away from under them. Then they took the places left vacant in other boats by men who had been wounded or killed. Many boats were lost in the high, turbulent surf. But as the soldiers gained territory and pressed inland, the supplies were kept moving in for the maintenance of successful operations. "It's lucky that most of us were surfmen from Coast Guard stations along the beaches at home where we learned how to handle boats in all kinds of weather," Meekins commented.

CIGARETTES

SOLVE

LANDING PROBLEM

American cigarettes and ingenuity solved many problems of getting supplies ashore after the Coast Guardsmen had successfully ferried the troops from the transports to the shore. Ensign Stephen L. R. McNichols, USCGR, noticed that the crew of his transport, exhausted by hours of driving their landing barges through enemy gunfire and around hidden reefs, were making a slow job of it.



In sharp contrast, the Ensign noticed that the scores of Arabs who appeared from all directions to beg for cigarettes, were the most active people on the beach. So he organized a labor battalion, after a few minutes of dickering, with a fixed wage of one cigarette per hour. The smoke-starved Arabs were glad to get the cigarettes and the weary crew got a well-earned rest.


MEETING IN A FOXHOLE

Ensign McNichols missed death by forty feet as he directed a repair party attempting to float a stranded boat, and found himself dramatically reunited with a friend he had not seen for many months. McNichols and his men were in the boat, close to shore, when enemy bombers swooped down. Making a dash for the beach, they dived into foxholes as the bombers scored a direct hit on the boat, blowing it to bits. The Ensign scarcely had time to flatten himself out in his shelter when a heavy weight struck him and turning he looked into the familiar, grimy face of his fellow officer, Lt. Bernard E. Scalan. When they had last seen each other at a training base months earlier, their sole topic of conversation had been Stalingrad's resistance. Now as enemy bombs hurtled by, Lt. Scalan exclaimed, "McNichols! How is Stalingrad holding out?" In relating the incident, McNichols said that his remark was, "Have you got anything to eat?" Scalan produced some malted milk tablets and as they munched they reminisced a few minutes. They then left to rejoin their respective units and did not meet again until both were back in the United States.

NAVAL ACTION IN CASABLANCA AREA

Shortly after our troops had been landed, early in the morning of November 8, shore batteries opened fire on the naval forces supporting the landings at Fedala. The AUGUSTA, the BROOKLYN, and accompanying destroyers engaged these shore batteries at intervals that morning, and early in the afternoon the shore batteries on Point Fedala were captured. Several naval actions took place on November 8, between Fedala and Casablanca. Soon after daylight, eight submarines left Casablanca. Three others were sunk at their moorings. Two French destroyer-leaders and five destroyers sortied, early in the afternoon, and stood toward Fedala. They were forced to retire. Shortly afterward, the French light cruiser PRIMAGUET sortied and joined the French destroyers outside the harbor. This group, which stood toward Fedala, was promptly engaged by the AUGUSTA and BROOKLYN and vessels of the covering forces. With the exception of one destroyer which managed to get back to the harbor, all the French ships were either sunk or beached. In the meanwhile, the covering force--consisting of the MASSACHUSETTS, WICHITA, TUSCALOOSA, and four destroyers--engaged the shore batteries at El Hank, the French battleship JEAN BART, which was moored in the harbor, and the French forces that had sortied from Casablanca. Late in the forenoon on November 10, two enemy vessels outside of the harbor of Casablanca opened fire on our troops ashore. Thereupon, the AUGUSTA and four destroyers stood toward Casablanca and engaged the two enemy ships. In this action, the JEAN BART fired upon the AUGUSTA, which immediately retired with her accompanying destroyers. The JEAN BART was sunk at her moorings sometime between November 8 and November 10, but was able to continue to fire.

JEAN BART-DAMAGED FRENCH WAR VESSEL. - CASABLANCA



DAMAGED VESSEL
CONTINUES FIGHT

The JEAN BART was hit several times by 16" shells from the MASSACHUSETTS, that severely damaged the big French warship in her forward area. Dive bombers scored a direct hit on the starboard side aft, causing considerable damage in that area. Although injured, she was able to continue action because she was moored in shallow water, Commander Gifford explained. "The JEAN BART was flooded to her moorings," said he, "but due to shallow water in which she was moored she was still able to continue action with her forward main batteries. Because she was moored with her bow pointing out to sea, she was unable to use her after main batteries." After the surrender of the city, Commander Gifford was a member of the force that inspected all vessels in the harbor. This inspection was upon direct orders from Admiral Hewitt, with a view toward surveying all ships and their cargoes as to their adaptability for Allied use.


LANDINGS AT
SAFI AND
PORT LYAUTEY
SUPPORTED BY
NAVAL ACTION

Two destroyers, the BERNADOU and the COLE, were principally responsible for the attack on Safi. They were supported by gunfire from a covering group, consisting of the battleship NEW YORK, the cruiser PHILADELPHIA, and the destroyer MERVINE. The BERNADOU, carrying Army troops, and the MERVINE, with naval personnel, made a daring entry into the harbor of Safi early in the morning of November 8, and there landed their troops without serious difficulty. Landing operations at Port Lyautey proceeded with comparatively little difficulty. However, stiff resistance was later encountered south of the mouth of the Oued Sebou River, and shore batteries were not silenced until November 9. Naval gunfire and naval aircraft support were furnished by many ships, including the TEXAS, the SAVANNAH, and a number of destroyers.

LASSITUDE
OF FRENCH

The rank and file of the French Navy fought doggedly, courageously, and skillfully against heavy odds. While their motive for so doing was not obvious, experts believed it was probably to be found in the high sense of professional honor that has always characterized the French naval service. French losses were unofficially placed at about 500 killed and 800 wounded. One high ranking officer summed up the morale of the French naval forces as follows: "Honesty demands that the lassitude, notwithstanding their bravery, of the French, and the providential good luck attending the United States forces, be recognized as heavy contributing factors. No other enemy would have failed to lay mines and prepare beaches at least in the vicinity of strategic points. No other enemy equipped with air craft and submarines, would have failed to detect the approaching force by or before dark the day before their appearance offshore, or failing that, could have been alerted six hours before daylight by the presence of enemy ships 16 miles from his principal base, and failed to use his 11 submarines before daylight and his air force by or before daylight."

CASABLANCA - INSPECTION OF CAPTURED FRENCH VESSELS



PRAISE FOR
FIRE AND
ENGINE ROOM
CREWS

Lieutenant David Parker, USCG, discussing action in the North African landings, where he served on the DICKMAN, praised the boys below decks aboard the transports and fighting ships. "The boys in the fire and engine rooms have as tough assignments as anyone, but they don't get any of the glory. Down there they keep things moving, feel the concussions of nearby depth charges and bombs bursts. Then they get the vibrations of the ship's guns as they go off. But they just stick to their posts, kidding one another and making funny cracks about the bomb bursts they feel but can't see."

HIGH
MORALE

Morale aboard the Coast Guard ships, he said, was extremely high. "The boys below decks are always in good spirits," he stated, "wise cracking and singing at the height of battle, but always filling their jobs. Then when they're relieved, they'll dash topside and volunteer for extra duty at the guns or aboard landing boats. The young fellows all over the ships are the ones who do the real fighting. It's remarkable how they race to get into action. They can't wait to man those landing boats." After the landing duties were completed, Coast Guardsmen followed the American troops inland and even while the shooting was going on visited curio shops, buying souvenirs to take home.


SOME INCIDENTS
UNDER GUNFIRE

Lieutenant Parker recalled some incidents that occurred under gunfire. "There was a fireman named Philip Labriola, who helped man one of the landing boats. Sometime later, while on the beach, Labriola saw an enemy plane flying low in his direction. He dug a hole in the sand with his helmet; carried the machine gun from the boat and then, while he fired at the plane with his right hand, nonchalantly ate a sandwich which he held in his left. James Youngblood, another Coast Guard fireman, was ashore when some strafing started. Nearby were large 'haystacks' which were being used to camouflage enemy guns. Not knowing their purpose, Youngblood dove into a 'haystack' when the plane's guns swept the beach. When the strafing had ended, he emerged from his haven, and from various parts of it came several Arabs. He didn't know they'd been in there with him until he saw them come out. After the action, while at general quarters, Edward Manly, a 19-year old Coast Guardsman, was told by an officer, 'Well, Manly, you'll have some swell stories to tell the kids back home.' Manly shrugged and answered, 'Aw, they won't believe me.' They don't care whether people believed them or not -- or even hear about it," Lieutenant Parker said. "Those kids just go in there and perform all kinds of heroic acts with no thoughts of glory or recognition. They want to win this war."

THE LEONARD WOOD

Commander Merlin O'Neill, commanding officer of the LEONARD WOOD, in his official report of operations to Commander Transports, Amphibious Force U. S. Atlantic Fleet, dated 11 December, 1942, had high praise for his

CAPTAIN (NOW REAR ADMIRAL) MERLIN O'NEILL



officers and men, although not mentioning any by name. "In connection with the operations in which this vessel was engaged, between November 8 and November 15, 1942," said he, "the officers and enlisted men performed all their duties in a most commendable manner. During the action against the enemy, their enthusiasm, courage, and morale were of the highest order."

COMMANDER O'NEILL's OFFICIAL REPORT

Prior to departure there were embarked aboard this vessel the following Army personnel, supplies and equipment:

- (a) Major General J. W. Anderson, U.S.A., and Staff.
- (b) Regimental Landing Group 7, Third Infantry Division and supporting units.
- (c) Approximately 3000 tons of vehicles, supplies and equipment.

Personnel on board at time of sailing:

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>COAST GUARD</u>	<u>TOTAL OFFICERS</u>
Officers	92	28*	41	161
				<u>TOTAL ENLISTED</u>
Enlisted Men	<u>1693</u>	<u>122</u>	<u>541</u>	<u>2356</u>
Total	1785	150	582	
*Total includes 1 MC officer			<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>	2517

The LEONARD WOOD unmoored from Pier 2, Army Base, Norfolk, Va., at 0609, October 24, 1942. Stood out of the harbor and through the mine field channel and swept channel at various speeds. Upon clearing swept channel took station in convoy. Convoy then stood to Eastward on the mission assigned.

Good weather prevailed during the voyage. Various drills were held frequently to acquaint ship personnel and embarked troops with their stations and duties. These drills included -- abandon ship, fire, collision, general quarters and rehearsals for disembarkation (during daylight and at night). Machine guns installed in the landing boats were tested and the boat crews instructed and exercised in the operation and firing of these guns. Frequent conferences were held between ship officers and Army officers in command of various troop units in order to insure close cooperation and a complete understanding in connection with the landing operation. Embarked troops were utilized to augment sky and surface lookouts, gun crews, guards and special watchmen. All officers regularly assigned to this vessel were required to make an exhaustive study of the various operation plans and to instruct the

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
TRANSPORTS, AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

File No:
A16-3 (T)
Serial 003233

December 19, 1942

FIRST ENDORSEMENT TO:
C.O. LEONARD WOOD Ltr.
AP25/Ser. 2141 of 12/11/42

From: The Commander Transports, Amphibious Force,
U. S. Atlantic Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet
Via: The Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
The Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet
Subject: U.S.S. LEONARD WOOD (AP25) - Report of Operations,
October 24, 1942 to November 30, 1942.

1. Forwarded.
2. The report of the Boat Group Commander (Enclosure (A) of basic letter)¹ merits the careful attention of superior authority. It gives a clear picture of Beach Red-2 (LEONARD WOOD) during and after the Assault. Most of Lieutenant Keidel's recommendations are sound and should receive the careful consideration of Commander Amphibious Force and of Commander Transports in planning and preparing for future Combat Operations.
3. The report of the Beach Master (Enclosure (B) of basic letter) also merits the careful attention of superior authority. It gives a clear picture of conditions on the Beaches on D-day. Most of Lieutenant Hagglove's recommendations are sound and should receive the careful consideration of Commander Amphibious Force and of Commander Transports in planning and preparing for future Combat Operations.
4. The performance of duty of the LEONARD WOOD, Coast Guard manned during the TORCH Operation was highly satisfactory to Commander Transports.
5. The transmission of this letter via registered mail within the continental limits of the UNITED STATES is authorized.

R. R. M. EMMET

(Copy furnished by ComAmphForLant to CominCh)

1. See Appendix C

enlisted personnel concerned in the details of the landing operations.

There were no casualties or accidents involving ship or personnel during the voyage. No enemy craft were sighted.

The LEONARD WOOD arrived on assigned Debarkation Point off Fedala, French Morocco, at 0005, November 8, 1942. Having received orders to execute Plan Two, relative to lowering of boats, backed down to take way off vessel and lay to. 0009 began lowering boats. 0010 first boat waterborne. 0021 Beach Marking boat departed to locate and mark the landing beach Red 2. 0140 all boats water-borne. Some delay was encountered in lowering the tank lighters due to fowling of block on the boom. Disembarkation of Army personnel and equipment, in accordance with the boat employment plan, was begun when all boats on starboard side had been lowered. The first three waves of assault boats departed at 0350 for the landing on designated beach. H-hour was delayed from 0400 to 0445 by Commander Task Group Thirty Four Point Nine. The fourth wave departed at 0400 and the fifth wave at 0540. Some time was lost in loading the first wave because of failure of six boats (LCP(L)'s to arrive from the USS PROCYON. Boats of succeeding waves were loaded and dispatched to the beach singly or in groups of two or three in order to expedite the disembarkation.


As boats of the first wave approached the shore, they were illuminated by a searchlight from the direction of Cherugi. Support boats immediately opened fire on the light. Shortly thereafter firing was observed between land batteries at Cherugi and Fedala and control vessels (destroyers) near the lines of departure.

Twenty-one boats from this vessel were lost in making the initial landing due to striking rocks at the shore line and to the surf conditions. Eight additional boats were lost during the day in landing through the surf. Casualties to personnel as a result of this as well as the firing were very light. Continued to transfer troops and equipment between ship and shore as boats became available. Due to the loss of so many boats this method of unloading was extremely slow. A few boats from other transports were used from time to time.

Shortly after daylight a small force of French cruisers and destroyers stood out of Casablanca toward Fedala. They were immediately engaged by the AUGUSTA and the BROOKLYN and either destroyed or forced them to return to Casablanca. Enemy planes, believed to be French, bombed and strafed the landing beaches at intervals throughout the day. These attacks were light and did not seriously interfere with the disembarkation of troops and equipment from the transports anchored off Fedala. No attacks were made on the transports. Heavy gunfire could be heard occasionally through the day from the direction of Casablanca.

Sporadic firing ashore near Fedala and from the direction of Casablanca continued until the morning of November 11, 1942, when an agreement was reached with the French Forces and American land and naval forces entered the city and harbor of Casablanca.

STRANDED LANDING CRAFT (FEDALA)



At 1951, November 11, 1942, while this vessel lay at anchor off Fedala, two explosions were heard about one mile distant, bearing about 30° true. A report was received that the USS HAMBLETON and the USS WINOOSKI had been torpedoed. Although severely damaged these vessels did not sink and later made port (Casablanca). At 1954, another explosion was heard about one thousand yards distant, bearing about 340° true. Called all hands to general quarters. Received a signal from the USS JOSEPH HEWEW that she had been torpedoed and was sinking. Sent all available boats to rescue survivors. At 2045, JOSEPH HEWES sank.

On November 12, 1942, between 1730 and 1737, the EDWARD RUTLEDGE, HUGH L. SCOTT, and TASKER H. BLISS were torpedoed in succession while anchored off Fedala. Sounded general quarters and made immediate preparations to get underway. Sent all available boats to rescue survivors. Got underway at 1758 and stood out to sea with the remaining transports and vessels from the anchorage off Fedala.

At 0813, November 13, 1943, shaped course for Casablanca and stood into the lee of the breakwater at that port where anchored at 1720. The THOMAS JEFFERSON, CHARLES CARROLL, ELIZABETH C. STANTON, and THURSTON preceded this vessel into the harbor. The remaining vessels of this Force kept at sea until berthing space could be made available.

At 2127 got underway. Stood inside harbor and moored to the Transversal Jetty at 2245. Immediately began unloading remaining supplies and equipment.

Finished unloading at 0330, November 15, 1942. Shifted berth to Delure Jetty where moored at 0720. Then the transports that entered the harbor with the LEONARD WOOD departed and the remaining partially loaded transports stood into the harbor and began unloading.


Unmoored at 0710, November 17, 1942, and stood out through submarine net gate anchored in lee of Delure Jetty to await departure of other transports. Got underway at 0848 and took station in accordance with sortie plan. Stood toward entrance to mine field at various speeds to enable vessels of the convoy to take stations assigned. After passing through opening in mine field stood to westward as directed by the Task Group Commander.

Prior to departure from Casablanca, this vessel received on board 187 additional persons for transportation to Base Hypo. Of these, 26 were Army casualties, 19 were Navy casualties and the remainder, 142, were survivors and passengers from other vessels.

During the westward passage, the crew was employed in cleaning and maintenance work and exercised at various drills. On November 19, 1942, STARKEY, Paul R., Yeoman, first class, USN., survivor from the JOSEPH HEWES died as result of second degree burns sustained when that vessel was torpedoed on November 11, 1942. Body was buried at sea, with appropriate ceremonies, at 1715 in Lat. 32° - 30'N; Long. 21° - 17'W.

Arrived Norfolk, Va., at 1720, November 30, 1942, where moored at Berth 25, Army Base.

BROACHED LANDING CRAFT (FEDALA)



OPERATIONS OFF FEDALA

The Executive Officer - the ship's general manager, so to speak, who made direct contact with the officers and men of the crew, who issued the daily plan, who established the manner in which the ship would be run and fed and entertained - Commander Joseph D. Conway, USCG, sent Commander O'Neill the following report, dated 12 December, 1942, of operations off Fedala and Casablanca.

The conduct of the crew was, with one exception, entirely satisfactory and commendable. The conduct of Lieutenant Albert Kiedel, United States Coast Guard Reserve, is worthy of special commendation for his repeated and successful efforts in maintaining transportation facilities between the ship and shore and for his work as Boat Group Commander. In the one case of unsatisfactory conduct proper disciplinary action has been initiated.

The Condition Four Battle Bill for this ship was predicated upon a seventy-two hour period of operation; however, the loss of a large percentage of our ship's boats delayed operations and greatly increased the time for maintaining Condition Four. The crew in Condition Four from 2230, 7 November until 0500, 14 November, excepting the time of our hurried departure from Fedala and our arrival at Casablanca. Although the crew of this vessel had been augmented by additional medical personnel and various other ratings before our departure from Base Hypo, it was found that the physical endurance of this larger crew was severely taxed by the long periods of activity in Condition Four. This operation showed that the bill for Battle Condition Four must be planned to allow limited clerical, cleaning, policing and maintenance work to be carried on in addition to the handling of boats and personnel if the Condition Four is to be maintained more than seventy-two hours.

Considerable difficulty was experienced on 8 and 9 November in communicating with our shore party. The reasons for the difficulty were never fully obtained but appear to be a combination of the defective type SCR-511 Transmitter Receiver Unit and the beach party's preoccupation with other more urgent matter (strafing, etc.).

During the passage from Base Hypo to Fedala, Army field telephone sets were installed to provide communication between troop compartments and other key points throughout the ship. This communication system supplemented the ship's I.C. system and proved to be quite effective in controlling the movement of troops to their debarkation stations.

The loss of a large percentage of our ship's boats necessitated the improvising of other means of getting materials ashore. Two of the means developed were the transportation of packaged ammunition, gasoline and water in life rafts and the commandeering of Moroccan fishing vessels for hauling cargo.

GERES, Henry V., (203-691), S2c., USCG, was not aboard ship when we sailed from Casablanca. He was apparently in good health when last seen on the beach at Casablanca late on 16 November. His whereabouts are unknown. He is listed as missing, pending receipt of further information.

A COAST GUARD ORCHESTRA PROVIDES THE RHYTHM AS A PAINT-UP DETAIL
SLAPS A BEAUTY TREATMENT ON THE HULL OF A COAST GUARD-MANNED TROOP TRANSPORT



The surveys for damaged or lost equipment and the requisitions for replacing that equipment have been prepared and submitted.

On the completion of certain repairs previously reported the LEONARD WOOD will be ready to resume active operation.

For tables listing the number of persons embarked in the LEONARD WOOD during the operations see appendix J.

SOME FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT THE LEONARD WOOD

In 1941, the USS LEONARD WOOD (APA-12) was taken over by the Navy from the Army Transport Service, being placed in commission at the Brooklyn Navy Yard on 10 June, 1941, with Commander H. G. Bradbury, U. S. Coast Guard, commanding. Since that time to date, the WOOD has been manned by Coast Guard personnel.

From June to November, 1941, the ship was engaged in various training exercises off the coast of North Carolina. In November, 1941, the ship embarked British troops at Halifax, Nova Scotia, and transported them by way of Cape Town, South Africa, to Bombay, India. Returning to the United States in March, 1942, the LEONARD WOOD was converted into an amphibious attack transport at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, the alterations being completed about 26 April, 1942.


On 26 April, 1942, Commander E. Zoole, USCG, relieved Commander Bradbury as Commanding Officer of the WOOD.

From April until about 26 October, 1942, with Captain R.R.M. Emmet, USN, Commander, Transports Amphibious Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, aboard the WOOD, along with other amphibious ships, engaged in training exercises and amphibious warfare exercises in Chesapeake Bay in conjunction with Army troops.

On 1 October, 1942, Captain Merlin O'Neill, USCG, relieved Commander Zoole as Commanding Officer of the WOOD.

On 23 October, 1942, 92 officers and 1800 enlisted men from the 3rd Division, U. S. Army, were embarked and supplies loaded at Norfolk, Virginia. On 24 October, 1942, the ship sailed in convoy and arrived off Fedala, French Morocco, Northwest Africa, on 7 November, 1942. Troops and supplies were unloaded in the face of enemy fire, and Army, Navy, and Coast Guard casualties were evacuated. On 11 November, 1942, in the transport area off Fedala the USS JOSEPH HEWES was sunk by enemy action and the LEONARD WOOD aided in rescue work and in picking up survivors. On 12 November, 1942, the ship departed Fedala and arrived at Casablanca on 13 November, 1942, where unloading operations were completed.

LCS WITH ROCKET RACKS



On 17 November, 1942, the ship departed from Casablanca and arrived at Norfolk, Virginia, on 30 November, 1942.

During the period from 1 November, 1942, to 17 November, 1942, the LEONARD WOOD was Flagship for Commander, Task Group 34.4 and 34.9 of Task Force 34. From 17 November, until 30 November, 1942, the WOOD was Flagship for Commander, Task Group 34.9.

EYE WITNESS ACCOUNTS AND EXPERIENCES

COAST GUARD ASSISTS IN GIVING SIGNAL

Six Coast Guardsmen, of an advanced unit from the LEONARD WOOD, were reported to have assisted in paving the way for the mass landing of American troops at Fedala. They manned the boat used by a party of Army officers, who had been detailed from the transport, to reconnoiter the beaches and mark them for the landings that were to follow. One of their jobs was to find out if the Vichy French had discovered the presence of the troopships that lay offshore. The little group spent an hour on the Moroccan beach, a few hundred yards from heavy guns that guarded the coastline. As the men crept silently about to reconnoiter the place, they kept as close as possible to the French garrisons to learn their approximate strength. At the end of the hour, a signal was made with a signaling light to the troopships that all was well. In another hour, the ships returned the signal with the information that the landings were about to begin.


MANY BARGES LOST BUT FIGHTING SPOTTY

"We were scared when the enemy opened fire on us, but it's a cinch we couldn't turn around and go back," is the way Fred Bullock, Seaman 2nd class, attached to the LEONARD WOOD, expressed himself in relating his feelings about the landing. Before being able to take up his position as a landing barge machine-gunner, Bullock had to swim ashore because his boat was sunk. The majority of the barges lost were capsized due to heavy surf. "We suffered casualties, of course," he observed, "but all that happened to me was that I got wet. Although some transport units were sunk, we managed to land all of the soldiers. I'm glad of just one thing -- that I learned how to swim." When his landing barge was smashed on a reef, Douglas M. Pierpont, Jr., Seaman 1st class, from the LEONARD WOOD, joined the soldiers he had brought ashore and fought alongside of them all the way to Casablanca, a distance of 17 miles. "My only close shave," he said, "came when a piece of shrapnel hit my helmet a glancing blow. The opposition was spotty. They'd fire at us until we got near them, and then the French would surrender. It was obvious they didn't want to fight us."

AMERICANS WELCOMED IN CASABLANCA

Commenting on the natives of Casablanca, Pierpont said, "All over the town were signs on the sides of buildings that said, 'U.S.A. Forever' with French and American flags. The civilians in that section were a funny lot. We were fighting outside of Casablanca and they would wander around, getting in the way, just to see what was going on. You'd think they were part of the gallery at

NAZI PRISONER OF WAR GETS DENTAL TREATMENT
ABOARD A COAST GUARD-MANNED TROOP TRANSPORT



a golf match. However, casualties among the civilian population were very light."

EXPERIENCES
IN A BARGE
EN ROUTE FROM
THE LEONARD WOOD

Ensign Robert D. Buckalew, USCGR, in command of the fifth wave to leave the LEONARD WOOD, carried an Army jeep and anti-tank gun, as well as soldiers. As the troop-filled boat drove to shore, the conning tower of a submarine loomed up 300 yards off the port bow. The boat's machine guns were

trained on the enemy craft but Ensign Buckalew scarcely had time to challenge it before it submerged silently and disappeared. Soon afterwards the steering wheel, which had become loose and which the coxswain was holding in place by pressing his body against it, came off entirely. The boat was stopped and an emergency tiller was rigged. Then the trip was resumed. A landing was made, and the jeep and the anti-tank gun were driven ashore. The troops followed. Later, the support boat in which Ensign Buckalew returned to his ship was sighted by the crew of an enemy gun on the tip of Cape Fedala. By zigzagging rapidly whenever the flash of the gun was seen, he was able to dodge 18 shells and finally reached his transport, ready for further operations.

THEY LEARNED
THE HARD WAY

Amphibious landings became as split second as the Notre Dame shift. The LEONARD WOOD boys became experts the hard way. They knew how to hit the beach on the nose — not too early, when they

would run into an attack from their own ships and planes; nor too late, when the enemy had had a chance to poke his head aboveground. They learned that cold precision the Coast Guard demanded in all assault transports during operations, when too little and too late could mean countless casualties.

LAST LETTERS
WRITTEN TO
HOME FOLKS


One day, the crew suddenly appeared in battle haircuts, shorn to a maximum of one inch, in case of head injuries and hurried surgery. When the troops saw that, they wrote their last letters home. The ships tightened up. The landing-craft

coxswains listened quietly as their boat group commander told them where and when. The bombardment, bursting the eardrums, started before daylight. The LC's, circling offshore, caught the signal and suddenly darted for the beach. "It's all flames, and dive bombers, and red explosions," as one coxswain put it.

FLOATING HOSPITAL

Next to Captain O'Neill, the six doctors, dentist, and enlisted medical corpsmen were the transport's favorite people. Aboard, beginning with the African invasion, and through many others, the hospital unit remained intact, and probably performed more major operations than any other ship in combat service. Lt. Richard Campbell, USNR, his eyes bright behind steel-rimmed glasses on a tanned, pleasant face, chuckled as he later told of his experiences. "Nobody knows how many operations

COAST GUARDSMEN IN THE LANDING CRAFT CAREFULLY PREPARE THE WOUNDED,
LASHED TO THEIR STRETCHERS, FOR HOISTING ABOARD THE COAST GUARD MANNED TRANSPORT



we've done -- somewhere up in the hundreds. Numbers don't matter, anyhow, it's how many boys you can save." The medical unit, operating almost continuously got along on black coffee and a quick wink whenever a table was vacant.

When the WOOD hit the invasion front, the doctors scrubbed and ready, were at their topside station. After the troops had left for the beach, the transport became a floating hospital. The day before, the doctors had taken twenty-five to thirty pints of whole blood from crew donors. In response to calls for volunteers, so many boys eagerly had come forward, that as one doctor commented, "It makes you proud to be an American to see those young fellows wanting to do their all even at the moment of going in to face death." Whole blood was needed in instances of great loss, as in amputation. Plasma, the great lifesaver, was used in the treatment of wound shock. Besides their battle haircuts, the whole crew was in clean clothes, and shaven against the chance that shrapnel might make them patients also.


Dressing stations were set up all over the ship, accommodating 250 casualties. The medical unit rotated at these posts, one doctor and eight corpsmen going in with each beach party. In a foxhole, they set themselves up as a rough-and-ready hospital unit. "That," Doctor Campbell is reported to have said, "was where it's really the quick or the dead. On a beachhead, you can only give elementary aid -- tourniquets, first treatments of burns, fast dressing to hold a man's insides together. If they're hit bad, you slug them with a half grain of morphine. The LC's bring them back to the ship as fast as we can turn them over. It's not uncommon for a man to go down the landing net into an LC, hit the beach, and be back aboard, wounded in half an hour.

"I've never gotten over being surprised at their sheer courage," said the doctor. "I've seen a boy propped up against a bulkhead, his leg blown off below the knee, take a cigarette and a glass of grapefruit juice while waiting his turn inside. They never complained. They just sat there, propped up, waiting."

MACHINE-GUNNED
WHILE LANDING
EQUIPMENT

While his unit was delivering half-ton trucks and soldiers to the shores of Fedala, George Paaajanen, Machinist's Mate 1st class, from the LEONARD WOOD, was badly wounded on the second trip. The men had landed the first truck and boat-load of service men without incident and gone back to the transport, where they loaded up with another truck and the soldiers to man it. That time, a German plane began a strafing attack against them. "We were about a mile from the beach," related Pajaanen, "and by this time the sea had become really heavy. When we landed, the soldier driving the truck said he couldn't get it off the boat because the water was too deep. Waves were breaking over the boat. It seemed the best thing to do was to leave the truck and get ashore." Paaajanen then took it upon himself to get the truck ashore. However, it was a hopeless task, so the boat crew gave it up and left the landing barge to get to shore themselves. Just as Paaajanen was getting out of the water, a coxswain shouted, "Hit the ground, here comes a plane!" Paaajanen turned to look and fell flat on the ground at the same time.

FIGHTING COAST GUARDSMEN BRING A PLUCKY LOAD OF WOUNDED INVADERS ALONGSIDE THEIR TRANSPORT



The plane let go with a burst of machine-gun fire. "I realized that I'd been hit," said PaaJanen, "but I felt no pain at first. I couldn't walk and my hand was bleeding. The coxswain put a tourniquet on me. Then he went to the First Aid Station and came back with three other Coast Guardsmen and a stretcher. They carried me to the station where a doctor gave me some brandy and morphine shots and put sulfanilamide on my wounds. I was then put on a stretcher again and taken back to the ship's operating room where Dr. Fox went to work on me." Aboard the transport, Pajaanen was given two pints of plasma. It was found that he had a bone broken right above the ankle and one in the thumb. Two bullets had gone through his thighs but missed any bones. Incidentally, the plane that shot him was brought down two minutes later by the Americans.

PRECAUTIONARY
SAFETY MEASURES
SUCCESSFUL

Some of the measures taken to insure secrecy and their success were revealed some time later by Lieutenant Commander, Harry C. Gifford, USCG, Assistant Engineering Officer of the LEONARD WOOD.

"The troops were issued the heaviest of clothing just before leaving the dock at Norfolk," he said. "That was just a blind. It was done because the ship was being loaded by stevedores -- civilians whose integrity we had no reason to doubt, but whose non-military status made this precautionary measure advisable." The success of the measures taken was attested to by the fact that Casablanca was in no way blacked-out when the Task Force approached on the night previous to the landings. "They even had a lighthouse lighted," the Commander said.

LIGHTS ON
OUR VESSELS
INDICATE
ARRIVAL

According to Commander Gifford, the necessity for making emergency turns and the use of the emergency turn lights installed on the vessels probably gave the French the first indication that the Task Force was there. Vessels steaming in a convoy in the early days of the war, when

short-range radio communication was not developed, used vari-colored lights as signals for the turn desired. "On the night of our arrival," related Commander Gifford, "immediately upon seeing those lights, the enemy blacked out the entire city within a period of five minutes. The moment that blackout began we knew that we had been discovered. It was about 10 P.M." Lieutenant Robert Emerson, a group boat commander, from the LEONARD WOOD, had already taken his barges in, when a German submarine started to play havoc with the invading fleet. Torpedo tracks broke all around the WOOD, sinking the vessel ahead. Enemy planes put on a strafing attack, scarring the paint on the WOOD, and nothing else. "It was the first landing for all of us," the Lieutenant said, "and nothing quite worked out as it does in maneuvers. Landing craft gunboats circled around, protecting us, and we dashed in under destroyers' protecting fire. It was pretty hectic as we laid down our ramps, and soldiers swarmed in under fire. One of the crews couldn't get off in time. They had to get set behind rocks when they heard an enemy platoon approaching. It turned out to be made up of huge black Senegalese with scarred faces and fezzes -- Vichy troops. The boys were so surprised at fighting them, -just like in an African picture,- all they could think of was to yell, 'Stick 'em up!' You should have heard them brag about their fancy prisoners"

ALGIERS

and Environs

LEGEND

▲ SHORE BATTERIES AND AA. PIECES

— RAILROADS

— ROADS

— LANDING BEACHES

TRANSPORT AREA FOR
TRANSDIV. 11
FAGELLER
SAMUEL CHASE
LEEDSTOWN
ALMAACK

① LANDING BEACHES
SAMUEL CHASE AT 0118

② OCCUPIED AT 0300 NOV. 8

③ MASON BLANCHE
ARMED AND OCCUPIED
AT 0100 NOV. 8

④ WITHIN 12 HOURS
OCCUPATION OF BEIDA
ARMED AND OCCUPIED
BEHIND 2 MILES WEST
OF ALGIERS COMPLEX

⑤ ARMISTICE AND
OCCUPATION OF
ALGIERS AT 2300 NOV. 8

⑥



B - ALGERIAN EXPEDITION

PLAN OF ATTACK

At Algiers, the plan of attack was typical of that carried out by the United States forces wherever they landed. Barges from the convoys went not to a port itself but to beaches a few miles away. There they landed Rangers for the initial assault. Then followed the infantry, artillery, and tanks. The American troops marched quickly inland. Allied airmen, fighters and bombers, landed on captured airdromes. Soon the invaders held all the approaches to Algiers--rail, highway, and air. French troops put up little more than token resistance as gunfire neared the town. Sixteen hours after the Americans had landed, Algiers surrendered.

ALGIERS - CAPITAL OF FIGHTING FRENCH

As the unofficial capital of France, seat of government of the "Fighting French," the political importance of Algiers was considerable and its occupation was certain to affect the international situation in Europe as well as the strategic situation in the Mediterranean. Located on the southwestern edge of a deep bay extending from Pointe Rescade on the west, to Cape Matifou on the east, Algiers, with the exception of its picturesque old Arab quarters, is a modern city of about 200,000 inhabitants and a well-equipped harbor. The area had been garrisoned and fortified so that its capture in the face of resistance seemed likely to be a major operation.

FOUR AMERICAN SHIPS IN JOINT CAMPAIGN

In this joint campaign, the British furnished the naval force, with the exception of four United States transports constituting Transport Division Eleven. This Division consisted of: the USS SAMUEL CHASE, flagship commanded by Commander Roger C. Heimer, USCG; the USS THOMAS STONE, commanded by Captain Olten B. Bennehoof, USN; the LEEDSTOWN, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Duncan Cook, USN; and the USS ALMAACK, commanded by Captain Chester L. Nichols, USN. These four ships carried the United States contingent of troops in the Eastern Assault Force of which Major General Charles R. Ryder, USA, was in command. Transport Division Eleven left Clyde on October 14, in company with a fast convoy which included 37 vessels. Of the 72,000 officers and men put ashore in Algeria, 23,000 were furnished by the British Army and 49,000 by the United States Army.

TWO AMERICAN TRANSPORTS TORPEDOED

Two of the transports were hit. Late in the afternoon of November 7, the THOMAS STONE was torpedoed. Her troops were put into landing boats about 160 miles from Algiers, and after a hazardous trip, during which several of the landing craft were lost, succeeded in reaching the Algerian coast, but by that time hostilities had ceased. The transport LEEDSTOWN was attacked by German aircraft on the evening of November 8, and again on the following afternoon, and was sunk by torpedoes. Loss of personnel was light. As it happened, a similarity in the names of two beaches took a small Coast

POSITIONS OF TRANSPORTS ALGERS

FIRST POSITION OF TRANSPORTS

LEEDSTOWN
CHASE
EXCELLEN
ALMAACK



Banc de Matifou

POSITION OF TRANSPORTS FOR DEBARKATION

LEEDSTOWN
CHASE
EXCELLEN
ALMAACK

I. Agueli

Sutout

Ain Beida
Ain Taya

Jean Bart

Fort D'Estress

Cape Matifou

C-48556

Guard patrol to an unspecified beach position and led to the rescue of the majority of the crew members and some of the soldiers from the torpedoed troop transport LEEDSTOWN. Hunter Wood, Chief Boatswain's Mate, USCG, on the CHASE, later described his dual role on this tour of combat duty which included a job of lifesaving.

WOOD
DESCRIPTION
OF ARRIVAL

"Our transport was bringing men and supplies and we had charge of the landing operations. We arrived at ten o'clock in the evening on November 7, right in the midst of an enemy attack. The soldiers from our transport, the SAMUEL CHASE, and others in the convoy were to land on what appeared in the charts as a certain beach. A little farther to the west there was another beach. The Axis bombers were making it hot for the transports. We hid in fox holes on the beach. All the ships got away except the LEEDSTOWN. Some planes dropped flares and the place lit up like daylight. It gave us a dreadfully helpless feeling, for we wanted to do something about it and couldn't. We just had to wait until the light died down, in the meantime making a perfect target for the enemy. A torpedo plane went directly for our ship. I was on shore at the time and had just come from my fox hole after a bombing and strafing attack. The plane fired two torpedoes directly at the ship, then swerved off in one of the most beautiful pieces of maneuvering I've ever seen. The torpedoes just missed the bow, one passing on the starboard side, missing by 20 yards, the other missing the port bow by 3 feet. The men stood watching the torpedo coming for them and all thought the ship was a goner. But she came through unscathed. The next morning we made firewood out of the tail of a German bomber that had been shot down, and built a fire to cook our coffee. Our ship shot down three of the attacking planes. Meanwhile, the invasion forces were being landed.


LANDING A
BIG OPERATION

"A landing of that kind is a big operation, with landing boats shuttling back and forth to the transports. That shore was treacherous, with lots of rocks, and my division under Ensign McLin was keeping the lanes open for the incoming rush of troops and supplies. Some of the boats were disabled and we had to haul them ashore for repairs. The water was cold and the wind was colder. We were wading out up to our necks. After the landing was completed, my men and I left to go to a nearby beach as ordered, to meet my senior officer and the remainder of the division. We arrived at the beach just in time to see the LEEDSTOWN hit by a torpedo. But we didn't see the rest of our division.

SURVIVORS
RESCUED

"The men of the torpedoed vessel abandoned the ship and took to life rafts which floated directly toward the beach. But a heavy surf was running and the survivors were thrown from their rafts into the sea a mile and a half from shore. There was bound to be trouble when those rafts hit the rocks offshore. We tried to get the survivors to steer the rafts before they hit the surf so as to avoid being battered. Stripped to the hide, we dived into the icy water and swam out with line

ALGERS HARBOR



to tie to the rafts which we could then pull to shore with the survivors clinging to the sides. The rafts had to be pulled, for the men on them could not steer them clear of the rocks. The surf was throwing the rafts into the air, dumping their human cargoes into the water to be crushed as the rafts were tossed about on top. We worked for five hours, fighting against a terrific undertow, and finally pulled the survivors to safety. It was a struggle to keep afloat in spite of broken bones, concussions, and shock. Soldiers from a nearby town, and also some French and Arab natives came to assist in the rescue.

ARABS AND
FRENCH ASSIST

"The Arabs would cut down large reeds, about 15 feet long, then wade into the water, extend them to the men and pull them ashore. All in all, it was a tough job for everybody. The surf was extremely rough, the undertow was strong, and the wind was cold. The French were very cooperative and hospitable. Even the children were down by the waterfront, armed with bottles of wine and brandy which they'd offer the men as they were dragged ashore. Then the survivors were taken to a little movie theatre in the village, straw was spread all around the floor, and they were left there to rest." It was not until the next day that Hunter Wood discovered that he had gone to the wrong beach and because of the misunderstanding had been on the spot to rescue the survivors of the torpedoed transport.


FOUR
LANDINGS

Transport Division Eleven took part in four landings. All vehicles were to be landed on two beaches, extending from Surcouf to the Oued Reghaia. Personnel were to be landed at a third beach, about 800 yards wide, situated halfway between Jean Bart and Ain Taya, and at a fourth beach, of about half that size, in front of Ain Taya. At a transport area chosen about seven miles northeast of the debarkation points, the SAMUEL CHASE, LEEDSTOWN, ALMAACK, and the cargo vessel USS EXCELLER stopped at 2201, on November 7. Boats were lowered at once and by 2256, the SAMUEL CHASE had all her boats in the water. The first wave left the SAMUEL CHASE at 0015, on November 8, and arrived at the designated beach at 0118. From then on the debarkation continued uninterruptedly. After the last wave had departed, the transports approached to approximately a mile offshore, preparatory to unloading equipment.

HECKMAN DESCRIBES
ARRIVAL AT
ALGIERS

Describing the landing, Ensign Heckman said, "Hearts began to beat faster and perspiration flowed more freely as Algiers, the North African Paris, lit up like Coney Island in peacetime, came into view. We drew into position, and then came the word, 'Take stations for boat lowering. Away all boats.' Our boats were lowered, the troops disembarked, and the boats vanished into darkness on their way to the beach. The division then moved into a new position closer to the shore, and the fort surprised us by a searchlight barrage. Caught in the pencils of intense white light, the transports slid along. Suddenly there was a belch of orange flame from shoreward--the fort had opened fire. A British destroyer, close in, diverted their attention and a battle royal ensued. The fort shelled the tin can and the cocky

USS LEEDSTOWN APA-56



little can defiantly stood off and answered every salvo. By this time we had successfully rounded the cape and took up a position about three miles from the beach. The boats started to return and we began sending equipment to the army on shore. With each vehicle went a certain amount of ammunition as our combat-loaded cargo began to come out of the holds in priority as needed on shore. By daybreak our boats were making steady rounds to the beach. The same doughty little destroyer, endeared to us by the previous night's action, closed in and again bombarded the fort on the Point. About noon a British cruiser started to pour heavy shells into the fort. This remaining point of beach resistance was finally dive-bombed by carrier planes, and toward evening American troops marched in and found Admiral Darlan inside."


LANDING BOATS
STRANDED
UNDER FIRE

"During the afternoon the surf became very high and treacherous," Ensign Heckman reported, "and consequently we began losing boats. At one time all of our 26 landing boats were stranded on the beach. Mechanics managed to get two in running condition, and a final total of six boats, including two tank lighters, unloaded our ship in the next five days. During this time we were under constant aircraft attack. Every day we would get shot at by high observation bombers, and every morning the Junkers 88's would precede our breakfasts and follow our dinner. Always it was the same: the high precision bombers, the torpedo plane attacks. The ship's complement fought gallantly. Our six salvaged boats ran constantly from the ship to the beach, even under aircraft attack. The unloading continued under fire.... So continued six days at Algiers. When we departed, our official credit was three German bombers. Our crew had unloaded the ship under fire with a few salvaged boats. Living up to the lifesaving traditions of the Coast Guard, the beach party had heroically hauled through the surf the survivors of the American transport LEEDSTOWN, sunk by aircraft bombing and enemy torpedoes. We had all weathered so many near bomb misses that they became a joke. Proud of the fact that we received commendation from the British Admiralty for gallantry in action, our transport and one other remaining American ship started back to England for more troops. Still in our minds was the message sent in to us from the British battle fleet outside the harbor and just over the horizon. They wanted to know which American battleship had slipped into Algiers, so intense was our anti-aircraft fire. Thereafter we were dubbed the 'battleship.'"

DANGEROUS
MISSION

"The dangerousness of the mission," said Commander Heimer, in a report to Admiral Waesche, dated December 1, 1942, "can be ascertained from the fact that these ships were assigned to the mission farthest east of all the task forces; that is, east of Algiers, Algeria. We were, therefore, given most ardent attention by the enemy. The hazards of this ship are also indicated by the fact that the other three ships were torpedoed on this first invasion movement, and one of the three sunk. As a result, the SAMUEL CHASE is the remaining ship of Division Eleven."

COMMANDER (NOW CAPTAIN) ROGER HELMER, USCG



BATTERY OFFICER
DESCRIBES ATTACK

According to Edward Pearson, Chief Boatswain's Mate, USCG, the convoy was under almost constant fire. He also describes the attack on the CHASE which appeared almost certain to end in disaster.

"It was the closest shave we had," he said. "The torpedoes came head-on for our bow. I was assistant battery officer on the forward battery, and while all of us were too occupied firing at the planes to watch the 'fish' I knew they were coming at us. It was plenty tense awaiting the shock that would knock us into kingdom come. Then as one torpedo neared our bow, it suddenly veered off and passed astern. The other kept on coming right at us. But it, too, turned at the last minute, just enough to pass between the bow of our ship and the anchor chain."

SAW THE
"AVENGER"
TORPEDOED

Pearson was at his gun station on the after deck when the British aircraft carrier HMS AVENGER was torpedoed and sunk. "She followed us in the convoy," he said, "and was only a few hundred yards off our stern when she got it. I didn't mind

all those shelling we went through, but seeing that explosion gave me a shaking I won't get over for a long time." Officers said it was one of the fastest sinkings on record. The AVENGER went down in about two minutes, and more than 500 men on board perished.

FIRST
TO LAND
IN ALGIERS

Actually, the first American service man to land on the beach at Algiers was said to be Eugene Lowry, Machinist's Mate 2nd class, of the Coast Guard. He went ashore soon after a British destroyer wrecked a huge searchlight which the

enemy was using to illumine the oncoming vessels bringing the United States invasion forces. "That destroyer really turned the tables," Lowry declared. "Although it was sunk in the attack, it helped the landing parties. The beach was bare when we landed. I jumped off and was followed by soldiers and other Coast Guardsmen. When we had completed our unloading, we returned to the ship for more. Quite a few landing barges were damaged in the heavy surf and it took longer to transfer supplies and men ashore than we had anticipated. But everything ran off pretty smoothly. There were only a few casualties."


COMMANDER HEIMER'S ACCOUNT

BEST BOAT
LOWERING DETAIL

When the officers and crew of the SAMUEL CHASE sailed from New York on September 26, 1942, for the United Kingdom, with 1431 army enlisted men and 71 army officers and all the attendant combat

cargo, they were sailing on their shakedown cruise and their first training cruise. "I am positive," Commander Heimer reported in a letter to Admiral Waesche, dated December 4, 1942, "that by comparison with any other transport, the record of the ship as a unit and of the personnel will look very good indeed." The rest of his report on the conduct of the CHASE personnel under fire follows. "By meticulous training under

LCP(L) WITH ARMAMENT



ideal conditions our boat lowering detail was the best. Naturally, on the night of the invasion the personnel was directed to be careful and deliberate, and the boat lowering was conducted without incident.

FINEST
BOATING
RECORD

"The training of boat coxswains had been under show-window conditions on an ideal beach. On the night of the invasion the conditions were not bad, nor were they ideal, and in the pitch darkness the crews under the leadership of the Boat Wave Commanders, found their beaches. Those coxswains who operated their boats continuously without loss of their boats are to be especially congratulated. About half of the coxswains were navy men who came with their boats. Their performance was by any measure as good on the average as that of Coast Guard personnel. The record of the USS SAMUEL CHASE boating was definitely better than the other ships of the Division; we concluded with seven boats remaining out of twenty-six, the other ships had none remaining.

HEROISM
IN RESCUE
OF COMRADES

"The Beach Party, comprising one Coast Guard officer in charge, one medical officer and 42 men of many different ratings, carried out its assigned mission with a large quantity of hard work. They handled cargo and performed other tasks without rest for long periods. It was the USS SAMUEL CHASE Beach Party which was on the Beach when the USS LEEDSTOWN personnel abandoned their ship about 750 yards from the beach in a moderate swell and rather rough on-shore sea. They rushed out into the surf to help their comrades-in-arms without regard for their own safety. The heroism in assisting in the bringing of 480 survivors through the surf (the LEEDSTOWN had lost all of its boats previously) was general and no specific instances are commented upon for this reason.


AMAZING SPEED
OF UNLOADING CARGO
AND AMMUNITION

"The hatch crews and other who handled cargo on board did so with a constant attention to duty and without relief in many cases. The final unloading, during which operations many men from all departments joined in, was done at a most amazing speed and in a period of time under the most optimistic expectations. The vessel was completely unloaded by boat and barge by our own personnel and every vehicle was taken ashore on our own boats. Also all the ammunition was unloaded by means of our own boats.

SHOT DOWN
THREE ENEMY
PLANES

"The guns' crew of the ship laid down a volume of fire against attacking planes which made up in part for its lack of accuracy. This was the first action and the guns' crew performed with credit to themselves and to their ship. Attention is invited to the fact that the USS SAMUEL CHASE is credited with having accounted for three enemy planes. The Gunnery Department had the equipment in excellent conditions and under a constant state of readiness.

MERCY MACHINES ARE LOWERED FROM A COAST GUARD-MANNED TRANSPORT
INTO AN INVASION CRAFT FOR TRANSPORTATION TO SHORE



MULTIPLICITY
OF TASKS
COURAGEOUSLY
PERFORMED

"The Engineer's force is usually a forgotten outfit in action, but they 'take' more mentally in not knowing what is going to happen than most others in the complement. The sounds of depth charges and torpedoes and guns are augmented it seems. They received from me an

acknowledgement of their courage and of their job well done as usual. On any large ship there are a multiplicity of assignments in battle; some are manned by few, some by an individual. It would be impossible to pick them out and mention them individually by task. Suffice it to say they acted coolly and courageously, and they stuck to their posts unflinchingly. It will be noted that no names are mentioned. This is intentional as fully 95% of them could be praised. However, during the period November 1 to December 1, 1942, inclusive, 204 men have been advanced in ratings."

"LUCKY CHASE"
ONLY SURVIVING
TRANSPORT

In a letter to Admiral Waesche, dated 10 December, 1942, Commander Heimer states that his ship, the SAMUEL CHASE, was easily the most formidable looking of the transports and drew much enemy fire. Due to her ability to get away undamaged

she was referred to as the "LUCKY CHASE." His letter in full follows: "Dear Admiral: To give you an idea of how great a part the USCG on the USS SAMUEL CHASE played in the party - on December fifth the allies gave out the information that in the North African campaign, the Americans had lost five ships, and the British lost one aircraft carrier, three destroyers, and six miscellaneous craft. This is how we tie into the story. (Our Division of Americans was the only transport division in the Mediterranean, in fact the only American ships; and we were farthest east of the entire parade). The USS THOMAS STONE of our Division was torpedoed en route to our beach east of Cape Matifou (this encounter was not admitted, in fact the ship was towed in, unloaded and is now beached). The USS LEEDSTOWN of our Division was torpedoed within 400 yards of us at anchor on D-day, and sank in that position subsequently. One of the British escorts, the destroyer HMS CORDAY was blasted by bombs and was beached in Algiers Bay. (This destroyer was bombed and strafed while close to our Division 11 and screening us). Another destroyer was hit at the time, damage unknown, and is reported to have sunk en route to Gibraltar. Then on the convoy out, the USS ALMAAK of our Division was torpedoed but made Gibraltar safely, in tow. A British ship of the convoy, the ETTERICK was torpedoed and sank in a few hours; and astern of us 600 yards, at night the HMS AVENGER, a carrier, was torpedoed and blew up in a most terrifying spectacle, which will ever remain in the conscious foreground of this war. I can guarantee that on that night, when they got three of the convoy, the ship's complement was 100% scared as hell. Colonel P. C. Bettenberg, USA, who took passage in the original invasion on the HMS BULOLO, as a part of Major General Ryder's staff, stated that on the way from Gibraltar to Algiers, these two officers remarked that the American ships stood out for their trimness and looked the smartest, and for that reason would be singled out. Also Colonel Bettenberg stated that the CHASE easily was the most formidable

COAST GUARDSMEN, OFF WATCH, AND YANKEE SOLDIERS
GATHER IN THEIR JAMMED QUARTERS TO "BAT THE BREEZE"
ABOARD A COAST GUARD MANNED TROOP TRANSPORT



looking of the transports and due to being a lead ship naturally would draw fire. He certainly was right. On our contact with the U. S. Army officers and men whom we brought over to Algiers we were most warmly received on our return trip. It is interesting to state that we are customarily referred to as the 'LUCKY CHASE' and not as the 'SAMUEL CHASE'....."

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE SAMUEL CHASE

THOMAS STONE IS HIT

At about 0545 on November 5, as the convoy was underway, an enemy plane glided in from the port quarter of the CHASE, dropping a torpedo which hit the USS THOMAS STONE aft. A torpedo was dropped off the quarter of the CHASE but missed by about fifty yards. When on the port beam, the plane gunned its motors and pulled away, showing a red light. A message received from the THOMAS STONE said, "Hit in the steering room believe rudder and propeller gone. Steering compartment and after magazine flooded. Bulkheads holding. Request tow." The Commanding Officer of the CHASE advised the Commander of Division 11 that he was prepared to tow the STONE and believed the absence of the STONE's wheel would make possible a towing speed of 11 knots. Shortly afterwards, the Commanding Officer suggested that the CHASE go alongside and take off the Army personnel. This suggestion was promptly denied. The STONE was left behind with a destroyer escort.


ALL BOATS LOWERED AND AWAY

At 2055 on November 7, Cape Maxine light was sighted bearing 1 point forward of the starboard beam. The CHASE called Condition 4 at 2109-- prepare to lower boats. At 2138, a signal light believed to be a submarine, was sighted. The CHASE swung her boats over the side at 2155, and began lowering them at 2201. All boats were over at 2256. Debarkation had begun at 2242. Other ships present included: USS LEEDSTOWN, USS ALMAAK, the MACHARDA, MV DEMPO, the MARON, and the EXCELLER. At 0105 on November 8, all boats were reported loaded. Word was received at 0133 that the first wave had reached the beach at 0118. Reports indicated there was very little resistance and very little surf. There was at the time a Force 1 breeze, no chop, slight ground swell which did not cause a motion of more than one foot from crest to trough. Debarkation of troops and their equipment continued during the day.

HEAVY AIR ATTACK BY ENEMY

Enemy planes were active over the landing area. At 0225 a low-flying plane was overhead. The CHASE opened fire and the enemy plane was driven off. At 0349, gunfire was observed on the beach and at Cape Matifou. British ships shelled the fort on Cape Matifou at 1520, and planes dive-bombed it, when less than two hours later at about 1700, a concerted bombing attack was carried out by Axis bombers and torpedo planes. Bombs of one attack fell 75 yards off the starboard bow of the CHASE, while in another attack a

TWO COAST GUARDSMEN WATCH THE LONG LINE OF MERCHANT SHIPS
MOVING IN CONVOY EASTWARD TO THE EUROPEAN WAR ZONE



two hours later at about 1700, a concerted bombing attack was carried
out by Axis bombers and torpedo planes at one attack left the
-98- C-48556
parts off the starboard bow of the ship, while in another attack

stick of bombs fell 100 yards off the transport's stern. Torpedo planes which approached over a nearby ledge of rocks released two torpedoes simultaneously, one of which missed the starboard quarter of the CHASE by about twenty yards, the other passing between the ship's bow and the anchor chain. The enemy plane then banked to the left and flew behind an anchored British AK, by this excellent maneuver escaped being shot down by our gunners. In this attack, the LEEDSTOWN was damaged in the stern by an aerial torpedo, the damages including a probable bent shaft and rudder post which immobilized the ship. One destroyer escort, the HMS CAWDREY was bombed and strafed by a dive bomber, several casualties resulting. By good luck, Captain Richie, Supply Corps, RN, who had been a passenger on the CAWDREY had left her earlier that day to come aboard the CHASE, for further transportation. Hostilities came to an end later that night when word was received of the agreement between the U. S. Army and the French to unconditionally cease fire in the Algerian area.

AIR ATTACKS CONTINUE

However, at 0321, the following day, parachute flares were dropped overhead and the CHASE sounded General Alarm. At 0410, flares were again dropped. The vessel got underway at about 0507 at various courses and speeds. A plane was sighted at 0559, which dropped bombs near the EXCELLER, probably intended for the CHASE. The crippled LEEDSTOWN was left with a destroyer escort. The CHASE anchored in the open roadstead south of Cape Matifou. She established a beach and began unloading troops and troop equipment. Bombers were sighted at 1300 and the CHASE opened fire on them. At 1531, General Alarm was sounded upon the sighting of bombers. Bombs were dropped between the EXCELLER and the CHASE. One bomb, a near miss, buckled the EXCELLER's plates. One of the enemy planes was shot down by a Spitfire. The USS LEEDSTOWN was reported to have been bombed and torpedoed at 1220.


THREE PLANES SHOT DOWN

The CHASE sighted a bomber flight and called Condition 4B at 1629. A heavy attack on the ships present ensued. Three planes were shot down nearby. The USS SAMUEL CHASE was underway and maneuvering during the attack. Two torpedo planes about one hour after sunset released two torpedoes while the CHASE was at full speed. According to a British officer on the stern, both torpedoes missed by about 100 yards.

SURVIVORS BROUGHT ABOARD

The CHASE anchored at 1801, on November 9, and took aboard the survivors of the HMS CAWDREY, which had been bombed the day before. Also brought aboard were twenty-nine U. S. Coast Guardsmen from the EXCELLER. At about 1900, the CHASE knocked off boat operations due to force 6 wind and swells coming around the point, two boats having been broached during the day. Either because the CHASE had the appearance of a larger vessel with greater fire power, or because she was known to be the flagship of the Division, she was the objective of most of the bombing and submarine attacks. Unloading continued for several days and was completed in the early afternoon of November 12. The CHASE unmoored at about 1800 and left the breakwater at Algiers, her part of the mission having been completed.

COAST GUARD AND NAVY MANNED LCIs (LANDING CRAFT, INFANTRY) PRESS TOWARD A BEACH IN INVASION MANEUVERS



MANY BOATS
FOUNDERED
AND SANK

Twenty-three boats from the CHASE were used in the initial waves to land troops. Of these boats, about half shipped large quantities of water over the stern and seven foundered and sank. Five were permanently lost. In the estimation of the Commanding Officer, these boats were absolutely unsuited for beach landings except in ideal conditions or in such places as for instance Solomon Island, where the beach seems to have been selected with a view to proving the effectiveness of these retracting boats.

SMALL
EXPENDABLE BOAT
DESIGNED


The necessity of an expendable small capacity personnel boat which was light and because of that capable of being handled under paddles was conclusive. The Commanding Officer designed such a personnel boat and it was suggested to the Amphibious Forces. These boats could be suspended overhead in the holds by "C" clamps. They would occupy a then vacant space. When approaching the transport area they would be brought on deck. These boats would be strong enough to be lowered with the men in the boats.

ALGIERS
SURRENDER

In the evening of November 8, the mighty American Expeditionary Force, which stormed ashore along 1000 miles of the African coast, swiftly consolidated positions in the French colonies. The city of Algiers surrendered at 7 P.M. (3 P.M. E.W.T.) to the attacking American Forces, paving the way for occupation of surrounding defense areas. Admiral Darlan, commander-in-chief of all Vichy French armed forces, himself was reported to be in Algiers, probably to be a war prisoner. Hitler was reported to have screamed "I'll never quit like the Kaiser did." When the time came, he wasn't even asked. The French General Juin, who negotiated for the surrender of Algiers, was one of the officers sent to Africa by the Vichy government with Admiral Darlan to "fight to the last." But with the exception of resistance in the harbor there was little fighting. The American planes under command of Brigadier General Doolittle operated from captured airfields.

TWO FORMER U. S. COAST GUARD CUTTERS, WHICH WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE BRITISH AND RENAMED HMS HARTLAND (FORMERLY CGC PONTCHARTRAIN) AND HMS WALNEY (FORMERLY CGC SEBAGO) ARE SHOWN RAMMING THE BOOM AT ORAN DURING THE ALLIED LANDINGS ON THE NORTH AFRICAN COAST

IN THIS PAINTING BY THE ENGLISH MARINE ARTIST, C. E. TURNER
BOTH SHIPS WERE SUNK AFTER CARRYING OUT THEIR MISSION



ORAN HARBOR OPERATION

FORMER CUTTERS ON SUICIDAL ASSIGNMENT


Two former United States Coast Guard cutters, the PONTCHARTRAIN and the SEBAGO, transferred to Great Britain under the Lend-Lease Act and renamed the HARTLAND and the WALNEY, met the only determined resistance to the Allied landing in North Africa, on November 8, 1942, at Oran Harbor. Naval support for the landings at Oran was furnished by British naval forces, assisted by the two former cutters. Aboard the cutters were American shock troops as well as British Commando units and a number of specially trained British Navy men. Their mission was threefold: (1) To capture Fort Lamoune and the battery near Cape Blanc; (2) to capture and hold the wharves; (3) to board and hold the merchant ships in the harbor in order to prevent sabotage. The cutters were flying the Stars and Stripes because this was an American operation although directed by Great Britain. The harbor of Oran is a mile and a half long, rather unusual in shape, the town of Oran being situated on a high cliff. The narrow entrance had been blocked by a boom. The two cutters serving as escort craft of the Royal British Navy found their way into the harbor of Oran at 3:15 A.M.

BOTH CUTTERS SUNK

The shore batteries and the warships in the harbor opened heavy fire. The American ships kept to their course although caught in the blinding light of searchlights and repeatedly hit by shellfire. The SEBAGO led, and cut through the boom. The PONTCHARTRAIN hit the breakwater but backed clear and followed through. She had only about one hundred fifty yards more to travel beyond the boom, but as she passed it her main steam-pipe was cut by a shell. Her boiler room became an inferno of cordite fumes and steam escaping under pressure. The PONTCHARTRAIN's stokers, mostly youngsters, managed to keep going, in spite of the havoc, for that distance. Orders were given to abandon ship at 0410. In the meanwhile, the SEBAGO was going at top speed the full length of the harbor, past destroyers and a cruiser firing at her at a few yards range. Into her bridge poured streams of tracer and her quarterdeck was sprayed with machine-gun fire. Only one person survived on the SEBAGO's bridge. The men on the quarterdeck, busy with grappling lines, were all killed. The cutter reached her destination but her captain was dead and she was a mass of flames. Both cutters had sunk by daylight. The PONTCHARTRAIN burned until 1016 when she exploded and sank. The SEBAGO exploded at 0445.

AMERICAN FLAG NOT SEEN IN DARKNESS

In view of the recent British attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir, the landing in Oran Harbor had been entrusted to American troops and to the two former American vessels. To increase the possibility of only pro forma resistance both vessels flew United States colors at the fore, the



British ensign being flown from a signal hoist. The darkness, however, prevented the French from recognizing the American complexion of the force. In spite of this unfortunate episode, the operations against Oran progressed. In order to facilitate the capture of Oran, plans called for the seizure of Arzeu harbor, about 25 miles east of Oran. On the morning of November 8, a small raiding party captured the harbor. The final assault on Oran was planned for November 10. Firing was renewed in the morning but by 1416 all firing ceased. Armistice negotiations were under way. In due course of time Oran was occupied by United States forces and a naval operating base was established.



SIGNIFICANCE OF ORAN

The city of Oran, second largest in Algeria, slopes upward from the harbor to the side of an inactive volcanic mountain. Though this is sheer coincidence, the city has always given visitors in more peaceful times the impression that a spark would explode the whole place.... Oran's history begins with cave dwellers who cut homes for themselves in the volcanic rock of the mountain, Djebel Murdjadjo which in later years has been surmounted by French forts. The town has been ruled by Arabs, Spaniards, and Turks and has been laid waste a half-dozen times by attacking forces, and once by earthquake.... The French have occupied the town since 1830, when the last of the Beys appealed to them for protection against the Turks. They used it briefly as a convict settlement but then, after a census 110 years ago, which disclosed the population to be precisely 388, determined to build it up as a center of colonial trade.

Oran is about 200 miles west of Algiers and is linked with that metropolis by one of the world's finest highways. There is no single key to all North Africa, but Oran, northern terminal of the railroad line through the desert to Dakar, and at a junction a short journey to Rabat and Casablanca, is one of the few needed to unlock that colonial empire. Among the larger cities, it is closest to the old Africa of the Arabs.

Oran's resistance to the American forces could not have been unexpected. This, of all French colonial cities, had been sullenly suspicious of the Allies since the day in early June, 1940, when the French fleet at anchor there was bombarded by the British and lost three or more of its ships. Over 500 Frenchmen, Allies of the British, were killed.

Whoever decided to encircle the place before forcing its fall knew precisely how tough Oran could be.



Airplane view of Arzeu

SCUTTling OF THE FRENCH FLEET AT TOULON

On November 27, 1942, the French scuttled their fleet in the port of Toulon, in Southern France, rather than turn it over to the Germans. Commander Victor Bernard Marchal of the French Naval Mission to the United States, in 1945, supplied the following account of how the French lost their ships but helped win the battle.

"This was the background. Though Hitler's forces defeated the French armies in 1940, the French Fleet--third largest in the world--was still very much afloat. Hitler desperately wanted that fleet. With that addition to his own navy, he might well put up a tough battle for the Atlantic. But he feared that the French fleet might mutiny, and so promised not to molest it. Throughout 1941 and 1942, the Vichy Government kept over half the French fleet floating at anchor in Toulon harbor, but without sufficient fuel to leave. Meanwhile Hitler secretly made plans to have the Vichy Government surrender the fleet to him for the good of 'the common destiny of Europe.'

"By 26 November, 1942, his plan was ready. The Germans had sowed mines across the harbor entrance, effectively sealing it. Great German siege guns were brought up on the railroads. Nazi planes and boats were in readiness. Armoured columns approached the city. Should the French sailors chose to fight, they would have no chance of saving their ships.

"The action was quick and dramatic. On 27 November, 1942, Field Marshal von Runstedt ordered immediate surrender of the fleet in the name of Der Fuehrer. (Marshal Petain sent the same order, though it never arrived). Admiral de Laborde, in charge of the fleet, gave the order to fire one shot. That was his answer. It was the pre-arranged signal to scuttle the fleet!

"The officers and men of the French Fleet knew what their duty was.

"The apparently sleeping ships suddenly came to life. Acting on a prearranged plan, the commander of every vessel -- from the huge battleships to the smallest patrol boat -- went into action. Explosives stored in the ships' hold were touched off. French ship fired on French ship to speed the sinkings. On shore, factories were destroyed, guns of the coastal batteries were crippled, arsenals were blown up. Soon the whole harbor and surrounding installations were no more than ruins. The mass of the French fleet -- France's pride and Hitler's hope -- was a smoking wreckage.

"The French sailors, their work done, were marched off to concentration camps. But they marched with honor. They had won for the Allies one of the strangest naval battles in history. Some of the vessels scuttled at Toulon were later reconditioned and joined the rest of the French Fleet in the battle for the Atlantic."

COAST GUARDSMAN ACTS AS A MEMBER OF A SEARCHING PARTY AT ORAN, NORTH AFRICA,
GIVING THE NAZI SUPERMEN A THOROUGH YANK GOING OVER



According to one account, the way to Algerian success was "well greased." The French Fort yielded without a shot. The American success in Algeria was "clinched" within a half-hour of the zero hour in the early hours of Sunday morning. It was made possible by the well greased capitulation of Fort Sidi Ferruch, a strong point commanding our principal landing beaches on the coast, 15 miles west of the city of Algiers. An American newspaper correspondent reported: "Four of us - two Commando officers, a friendly French officer, whom we had encountered in the darkness, and myself - walked right into the main gate of the fort 20 minutes after we had scrambled ashore with the first assault force."

Still dripping from the surf, we shook hands with the commander of the garrison, which far outnumbered our own force, and were assured he did not wish to resist us.

He showed us the order he had received the previous evening instructing the local commanders to "facilitate the debarkation and the establishment ashore of the American troops."

If we had had to fight for it we might not have taken it, and we certainly would not have taken it within the 30 minutes allowed us."


"A HOUSE DIVIDED"

Generally speaking, it may be said that in North Africa, France was a "house divided," reflecting the political situation in European France. The unfortunate relationships existing between the Vichy government and Berlin, and with the French provinces in North Africa, together with the differences in religion and race and the deep-rooted hatreds of the heterogeneous populations of Algiers and Morocco, imposed a political problem of great complexity for the Allies. A peculiar situation prevailed in the French Navy. Since the Petain government of France had bowed to Adolph Hitler and deserted its British Ally, the officers and men of the French Navy had been approached secretly and otherwise by agents threatening them and their families in France with all manner of sufferings should they fail to knuckle down to Germany's terms. The only opposition came from Naval units. In marked contrast, resistance offered by the land forces was pro forma. Especially junior officers and enlisted men in the French Army were inclined to look favorable on the United States. The civil population was neutral, the natives apathetic.

ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

On November 10, 1942, land operations at Algiers ceased and Armistice negotiations began. American troops received a friendly welcome in the city. French workers and the general population gave enthusiastic cooperation. Royal Air Force Fighters were active in giving cover over Algiers Bay, where many German units were operating. The following day, the order reached Casablanca, a few minutes before the assault on the city was to be launched. The North African Government was brought into close collaboration with the United Nations under

FIGHTING U. S. COAST GUARDSMEN IN THE INVASION BARGE TENDERLY HELP THIS WOUNDED WARRIOR ABOARD
A COAST GUARD MANNED TRANSPORT



a provisional government headed by Admiral Darlan, with General Giraud as commander-in-chief of the French ground and air units. (When Darlan was assassinated, Giraud took his place). French West Africa, under Governor Pierre Boisson, soon joined the Allied cause, bringing additional naval power and trained ground units and making immediately possible a short air route from the United States to the North African battle fronts. The lack of resistance encountered at most of the beaches showed that the French armed forces in North Africa had no desire to oppose the entry of American troops into that territory.

FIGHTING CEASES ON LAND

Fighting at Oran, as elsewhere, stopped with the official orders to cease fire. A War Department Communique dated November 11, 1942, announced:

1. "Admiral Jean Darlan has issued to all Commanders in French North Africa, including Morocco, an order to cease hostilities. The order was issued after a conference at Algiers between Major General Mark W. Clark, representing Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief Allied Forces, and Admiral Darlan. 2. In the Casablanca area French Army forces have capitulated. 3. The residents of the city of Oran have welcomed our troops enthusiastically. All prisoners have been exchanged."

ALLIED SHIPS LOST

Following the elimination of French resistance at Casablanca, the landings at Fedala were successfully completed, but with heavy loss. On November 11, the transport JOSEPH HEWES, the oiler WINOOSKI, and the destroyer HAMBLETON were torpedoed. The HEWES sank in an hour. The other two ships were later taken to Casablanca for repairs. The following day the transports HUGH L. SCOTT, the EDWARD RUTLEDGE, and the TASKER H. BLISS were hit by torpedoes and all three sank. The SCOTT sank without burning, the RUTLEDGE sank fairly quickly, but the BLISS burned furiously before going down. All these attacks were assumed to be from Axis submarines.


MANY SURVIVORS RESCUED

"Our boats went out to pick up survivors and brought about one hundred aboard the DICKMAN," said Captain Harwood. "We don't know the total number that were saved by our boats, however, because our men took many survivors to shore." The majority were rescued. Commander Gifford of the LEONARD WOOD reported, "It was a display of real seamanship to see boat crews picking up survivors without showing any lights. The RUTLEDGE and the SCOTT were attacked almost simultaneously. Landing boats came from shore and brought the survivors to the beach. Many others were taken aboard the WOOD. All the transports then left in a hurry. The next day we docked at Casablanca and our crews unloaded the remainder of the cargo. Our crew was wonderful, working tirelessly."

RESULTS FOR THE DICKMAN

The History of the DICKMAN, prepared by that vessel, gives the following facts: "During the whole operation, ten LCV's and seven LCP(R) boats were stranded or wrecked. No boats were lost because of enemy fire. The coxswain of one boat was severely wounded by strafing

AN AMERICAN INVADER, WOUNDED IN A BEACHHEAD BATTLE, IS CAREFULLY MOVED ABOARD A COAST GUARD LANDING CRAFT FOR A QUICK RUN TO A COAST GUARD MANNED ASSAULT TRANSPORT STANDING OFF SHORE



and the bowman killed. Two members of the ship's beach party were wounded by strafing and one man in a support boat was wounded by the gunfire from a shore battery at Fedala. The return passage to Norfolk began on 17 November, 1942, and was uneventful except for some heavy weather. Sixty survivors from the USS SCOTT and 129 British released prisoners of war made the return trip with this vessel. Norfolk was reached on 30 November, 1942. Confidence of success was manifest throughout the whole operation. The following from the signal log of 27 October, 1942 gives evidence of this feeling. 'LZ X 24 271930 ZZZ GR 28 BT FOLLOWING FROM COMMANDANT GENERAL WESTERN TASK FORCE: QUOTE THE COMMANDING GENERAL CONGRATULATES ALL MEN AND OFFICERS ON THEIR MAGNIFICENT SPIRIT X JOINED WITH NAVY VICTORY IS ASSURED UNQUOTE.'"

SPECIAL RECOGNITION OF PERSONNEL

As a group, all the officers and men were outstanding in performance of duty over and beyond the call to duty. Since almost all were worthy of commendation, many officers did not mention any by name. However, some cases of individual heroism were reported. Captain Harwood, for instance, mentioned the following for awards in the North African campaign.

SCALAN, Bernard E., Lieut., USCG

This officer was assigned duty as Boat Group Commander during the landing operation. He successfully accomplished the marshalling of the boats to the beach and fully carried out the prepared plans. During the following day he continued to carry out missions connected with the landing beaches.

LEUPOLD, Clarence, Lieut., USCGR

This officer was boat division officer of the 5th Wave. He successfully guided his division to assigned part of the beach, where they landed in precise order. After the troops had departed he had his crews unload a large amount of material left behind by the heavy weapons company transported. This was done although hostilities were indicated by the searchlight displayed from the control battery nearby and the sound of rifle fire.


BROWN, Fletcher W., Ensign, USCG

This officer was boat division officer of the 1st Wave. He successfully guided his division to the assigned part of his beach and landed them in precise order. He later guided, at his own request, an additional unit to the beach.

SCHARFF, Charles W., Ensign, USCG

This officer was boat division officer of the 2nd Wave. He successfully guided his division to the assigned part of his beach and landed them in precise order. He then remained at the beach in one of the boats as the Salvage Control and later at the beach with the shore party.

BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE S. PATTON LANDING IN NORTH AFRICA



McKINLOCK, George J., C.B.M. (a) (208-567) USCG

This man was in charge of unloading and debarkation at #4 hatch. Throughout the exercise he displayed indefatigable energy and drive which contributed much to the success of the debarkation.

MORRIS, Lloyd M., C.B.M. (a) (208-477) USCG

This man was temporarily in charge of beach party detail. He was active in salvage work at the beach and continued in prosecuting this work until severely wounded by machine gunfire from hostile plane.

PAENY, William, C.M.M. (a) (108-082) USCG

This man was in charge of the boat repair crew during the operation. His untiring energy and skill was largely responsible for the continuous operation of all the ship's boats.

BYROM, Jack A., C.S.P. (a) (616-45-02) USNR

This man was assigned as officer in charge of the beach marking boat. He successfully located his position off the beach and held it until the assault waves had landed. He then assisted in boat operations during the day, showing a high devotion to duty throughout.

FULCHER, Sterling, B.M. 1st Class (211-166) USCG

This man was in charge of a tank lighter. During the entire unloading exercise his boat ran continuously and his endurance, skill and devotion to duty were outstanding.

McDONOUGH, Edward J., Mo.M.M. 1st Class (106-993) USCG

This man was a member of a crew of a tank lighter which operated with marked success throughout the operation. His devotion to duty, endurance and skill were largely responsible for its excellent record.

O'NEAL, Orville W., Mo.M.M. 2nd Class (107-994) USCG

This man was a member of a crew of a tank lighter which operated with marked success throughout the operation. His devotion to duty, endurance and skill were largely responsible for its excellent record.


BARNARD, Philip B., Surfman (214-509) USCG

This man was in charge of a tank lighter. During the entire unloading exercise his boat ran continuously and his endurance, skill and devotion to duty were outstanding.

DOYLE, Arnold W., Surfman (201-387) USCG

This man was coxswain of a landing boat. He showed a high devotion to duty throughout. After landing on the original assault he stood by the other boats of his division until all had cleared and on the way out he took in tow a boat which was disabled under the searchlight of the Pont Blondin Battery, towing it out of the area.

COMMODORE GORDON T. FINLAY (RIGHT), DISTRICT COAST GUARD OFFICER
OF THE FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT
PINNING THE LEGION OF MERIT MEDAL ON COAST GUARDSMAN JOHN V. GOLENIECKI,
BOATSWAIN MATR. FIRST CLASS



CLARK, Paul L., F. 2nd Class (224-616) USCG

This man was assigned as engineer of a landing boat. While his boat was on the beach it was strafed by a hostile plane with machine gun fire. The bowman was mortally wounded and the coxswain severely wounded by a bullet through the chest. The boat was riddled by machine gun fire but not disabled. Clark successfully retracted the boat from the beach, placed the wounded men aboard the USS PALMER, and returned to the beach. He continued to show a high devotion to duty throughout the exercise.

CURRY, Charles C., Jr., H.A. 1st Class (646-29-21) USNR

This man was a member of the beach party. His boat landed on the east side of the Pont Blondin Battery and the boat was wrecked on the rocks. Then a small party, including himself, were isolated there through the day of November 8th and were subjected to hostile plane action several times. Throughout this time he gave an untiring single handed attention to five wounded men, who were widely separated at the beach, without regard to his personal safety. His devotion to duty was in the highest tradition of Naval Medical Corps.

GIVES HIS LIFE
BELT TO
SHIPMATE

Rex G. Meeker, Fireman 1st class, USCG, was awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medal for the prompt and courageous action which saved the life of a comrade who otherwise might have perished. The citation states: "For heroic conduct as engineer of a tank lighter while attached to the USS PENN during the assault on and occupation of French Morocco from November 8 to 11, 1942. When the boat in which he was stationed swamped in the high surf near Mehdia, Meeker risked his life to help a member of the crew who was in danger of drowning when his life belt failed to inflate. Without hesitation, Meeker took off his own life belt, placed it around his exhausted shipmate and brought him safely to shore...."


POSTHUMOUS
AWARD FOR
TRANSPORTING
WOUNDED

The Navy and Marine Corps Medal was awarded posthumously to Oran D. Ragan, Boatswain's Mate 2nd Class, USCG, who gave his life that others might live. The citation, which praises his cool courage and fearless devotion to duty, states: "For heroic conduct as coxswain of a tank lighter attached to the transport USS PENN during the assault on and occupation of French Morocco from November 8 to 11, 1942. On the night of November 9-10, when mountainous waves pounded the beach near Mehdia, keeping all other boats at their moorings, Ragan, at great risk of his life, dauntlessly put out from shore with the senior medical officer and twelve wounded comrades. With expert seamanship and grim determination he brought his lighter through the dangerous surf and finally transferred the injured to safety...." Greater love hath no man.

BRINGS AID TO
BELEAGUERED
GROUP BY DARING
ESCAPE

For a daring escape in a rubber boat, under heavy enemy fire, to bring aid for his stranded comrades, John V. Goleniecki, Boatswain's Mate 1st Class, USCG, was given the Legion of Merit. The citation follows: "For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the Government

CAPTAIN C. W. HARWOOD, LEFT, U. S. COAST GUARD
CONGRATULATES COAST GUARDSMAN P. L. CLARK, CENTER, FIREMAN L/C
FOLLOWING HIS DECORATION FOR GALLANTRY IN ACTION DURING THE NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN



of the United States while attached to the USS CHARLES CARROLL during the assault on and occupation of French Morocco, November 8-11, 1942. When the members of his support boat, landing northeast of Fedala, were attacked by hostile planes and ground forces, consequently being cut off from the other landing groups, Goleniecki volunteered to man a rubber boat in order to contact our forces and obtain assistance. Completely disregarding his own personal safety, Goleniecki, with the aid of a shipmate, courageously effected a daring escape, despite difficult conditions and hostile fire, and, reaching his objective the same evening, furnished the Attack Force Commander with the first information of the beleaguered group."

HEROICALLY
REMAINS AT POST
TO SALVAGE
LANDING BOAT

For heroically remaining at his post to salvage a boat at a time when landing barges were critically scarce, Willard L. Durgin, Motor Machinist's Mate 1st Class, USCGR, engineer of a landing boat from the USS CHARLES CARROLL during the operations at French Morocco, was awarded the Legion of Merit. "Under extremely hazardous and difficult conditions," the citation states, "Durgin heroically remained at his post in a stranded boat for two and a half days, keeping the craft bailed out and free from sand, despite gruelling hardships and exposure to hostile bombing and strafing. Through his tireless efforts and dauntless courage, Durgin enabled our forces to salvage the boat for further service in transporting troops and supplies to the beaches, at a time when boats were urgently needed for vital landing operations."

NAVY CROSS
FOR SPEEDING
WOUNDED TO SAFETY
UNDER HEAVY FIRE

"I have noted with great pride," wrote Admiral Waesche to Paul L. Clark, in a letter dated December 15, 1943, "that the Secretary of the Navy has awarded you the Navy Cross in recognition of your extraordinary heroism while serving as engineer of a landing boat attached to a United States transport during the assault on and occupation of French Morocco. I take this opportunity to congratulate you for this well-deserved recognition of your skill, resourcefulness, and unselfish devotion to duty...." Clark, a Fireman 1st Class in the United States Coast Guard, received the following citation. "For extraordinary heroism while serving as engineer of a landing boat attached to the USS JOSEPH T. DICKMAN during the assault and occupation of French Morocco.... When a hostile plane strafed his boat with machine-gun fire, mortally wounding the bowman and severely injuring the coxswain, Clark, with quick initiative, immediately withdrew from the beach. Speeding toward the USS PALMER, he placed the wounded men aboard and, although his craft was riddled by enemy bullets, courageously returned to his station at the beach...."

FIRST TO WIN
PURPLE HEART

Lloyd M. Morris, Chief Boatswain's Mate, serving on the DICKMAN, was the first member of the Coast Guard to receive the Purple Heart for wounds received in action during landing operations in North Africa. The Purple Heart, traditional Army award for men wounded in action, was authorized in December 1942, by President Roosevelt, for other branches of the service.

CHIEF BOATSWAIN'S MATE, LLOYD M. MORRIS, WOUNDED IN ACTION IN NORTH AFRICA
RECEIVES THE PURPLE HEART FROM
VICE ADMIRAL RUSSELL R. WAESCHE, COAST GUARD COMMANDANT



The citation accompanying Morris' award reads: "This decoration is in recognition of the wounds which you received in action when strafed with machine gunfire from an enemy plane while you were landing with the Ship's Beach Party on 8 November, 1942 at Fedala, French Morocco."

GERMAN PRISONERS COME ABOARD A U. S. COAST GUARD MANNED TRANSPORT IN A NORTH AFRICAN PORT



PART III

RESULTS AND SIGNIFICANCE

COAST GUARD HELPS FORMULATE PLANS FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Italy, and France.

As a result of their experiences on the North African beaches, Coast Guard officers were able to send to Washington Headquarters reports and recommendations that were of great value in future amphibious operations. The advice given in those reports helped in the plans and preparation for the landings in Sicily,

HEIMER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Commander Roger C. Heimer, USCG, pointed out that troops landing wet to the skin on an enemy shore are not at their best. He set to work to design a boat to get them, if not high on the beach, at least dry on the beach. Preparing for the second invasion, he created a new type of landing boat said to be lighter, more seaworthy and more maneuverable than any other of its type. During an extended tour of duty commanding a Coast Guard cutter in Alaska, Commander Heimer had observed the extreme lightness and maneuverability of the Eskimo's oomiak boat. Combining certain details of this construction with those of an extremely successful Coast Guard life boat known as the "otter" type, he designed a craft that won him congratulations from high-ranking Naval sources. He also developed another type of craft to be used in salvage work. Suitable for rescuing beached and immobilized boats from the beach, this vessel was capable of performing the work of several craft of the type formerly used for salvage. A specially trained crew, veterans of the North African invasion, instructed other units in the secret lore of rescue and salvage--knowledge which few men on earth other than officers with years of rescue and beach patrol work behind them could acquire.

HAGGLOVE'S REPORT

Beach Master, Lieutenant J. T. Hagglove, USCG, another veteran of many years experience with small boats in high surf, wrote in his official report: "In landing the first assault wave, if during darkness, the boats should feel their way to the beach and should not do so in one single line abreast. The wave commanders should be in communication with each other so that if a wave ran into trouble, the waves behind could be warned."

KEIDEL'S REPORT

Boat Group Commander, Lieutenant A. Keidel, USCG, reported: "Soldiers were too heavily loaded and some had great difficulty picking themselves up in the water after leaving the landing boats.... The army must provide more bulldozers and sleds for unloading boats on the beach. Supplies must be loaded on sleds into the landing boats ready to be pulled out by bulldozers as soon as the boat hits the beach."

U. S. COAST GUARDSMEN AND GERMAN PRISONERS MINGLE ON A NORTH AFRICAN WHARF AS
A COAST GUARD MANNED TRANSPORT PREPARES TO SAIL WITH THE GERMANS FOR AMERICA



CAREFUL ATTENTION
GIVEN THE
COAST GUARD
RECOMMENDATIONS

These and many more recommendations were especially called to the attention of the superior command by Captain R. R. M. Emmet, USN, Commander Transports, Amphibious Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, who in a letter dated December 19, 1942, wrote: "The report of the Boat Group Commander merits the careful attention of superior authority. It gives a clear picture of Beach Red-2 (LEONARD WOOD) during and after the assault. Most of Lieutenant Keidel's recommendations are sound and should receive the careful attention of Commander Amphibious Force and of Commander Transports in planning and preparing for future Combat Operations. The report of the Beach Master also merits the careful attention of superior authority," Captain Emmet continued. "It gives a clear picture of conditions on the beaches on D-Day." Most of Lieutenant Hagglove's recommendations were also judged to be sound and worthy of the same careful consideration in preparing for future Combat Operations.

SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ALLIES

AMERICAN-
FRENCH
COOPERATION

As soon as hostilities ceased in Morocco and Algeria, the United States took immediate steps to cooperate with the French forces in Western Tunisia. As a first step, General Eisenhower sent British and American parachute units by air to occupy strategic positions in Western Tunisia and to cooperate with the French forces in that area. The splendid cooperation there was taken as one of the important good symptoms of the attitude of the French population. Soon afterward these parachute units were reinforced by light motorized troops which were sent forward by road. Troops from the British First Army, under General Anderson, with American Army and French units built up a strong assault force in Tunisia. During the last week of November, American parachutists and light armored units with French detachments combined their forces in carrying out a vigorous offensive against all scattered groups of Germans and Italians throughout the center of Tunisia, quite a long distance from the two big cities on the coast, Bizerte and Tunis. The Germans occupied strong positions, supported by aircraft from well-established bases, and offered strong resistance.

FRENCH DOCK
LABOR UNLOAD
U. S. SUPPLY
SHIPS

Reports from General Eisenhower indicated that American troops received excellent cooperation from the civil authorities and from all elements of the civil population in Northern Africa. French dock labor unloaded our supply ships with remarkable speed, and railway workers assisted greatly in the movement of supplies and troops to the forward areas. The arrangements made by General Eisenhower with the French authorities greatly simplified our problems in that region.

THESE GERMANS ARE EN ROUTE TO THE COAST GUARD MANNED TRANSPORT THAT WILL TAKE THEM TO THE
UNITED STATES FROM NORTH AFRICA



SUCCESS DUE
TO LUCK AND
DARLAN

The North African operation was in its essence and by necessity a surprise operation as contrasted with the step-by-step attack against the Japanese in the South Pacific. By very careful and successful planning, coupled with extraordinary luck and good fortune, we achieved a wonderful attack on a stormy coast, where there were very few days when such a landing could have been possible on the west coast of Northwest Africa. There were even a few hours of flat calm. By the action of Darlan, which could not have been anticipated, there was a sudden laying down of the arms of the French forces long before that could have been compelled. That put us a month ahead of any schedule we could have made. Our action might have been impossible if that had not occurred. The chance for cooperation with the French in the development of the French forces, which was very hearty, was the means of developing the cooperative spirit between the Allies and the French, upon which so much depended.

AMERICAN
LIVES SAVED

Ambassador-at-large Robert D. Murphy defended United States dealings with French "Vichyites" in the early stages of the African invasion on the ground that thousands of American lives were saved. President Roosevelt's envoy in North Africa, bitterly attacked by "left wing" quarters for negotiating with Admiral Darlan and others, declared, "When you're working inside a cage with a tiger your technique has to be quite different from that of the independent and carefree critic standing safely outside." Murphy said the association with pro-Vichy French did not mean Americans approved of certain schools of French thought. He pointed out that Darlan controlled 300,000 French troops at the time the Yanks swarmed ashore in November 1942, while General de Gaulle had only a handful. "That's why we worked with Admiral Darlan," he explained. "And I can tell you he rendered very practical assistance to the Allied cause. Perhaps the best proof of that is the fact that, whereas our Army leaders expected the casualty list of the North African landing to run to 15,000, it actually was well under 2,000, including the Army and Navy."

DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS
ESTABLISHED
LATER

Murphy said, furthermore in an interview, that as soon as American power was established, the United States would cooperate with the French in the establishment of democratic institutions. "But first things come first," he told reporters. "I knew I could not face the mothers and wives of our soldiers who might be killed by reason of any reluctance on our part which would have prevented the practical arrangements under which our soldiers were protected."

UNOFFICIAL
GOOD WILL
AMONG THE
NATIVES

Doing unofficial good will work among the natives was George Haboush, Seaman 1st Class, USCG, who took them completely by surprise speaking their native tongue. Haboush, born in this country of Syrian parents, became familiar with the Arabic language as a boy. After bringing his landing boat ashore several times, he further contributed to the success of the North African conquest by serving

FINDING IT HOT IN THE NORTH AFRICAN SUN, THIS SUAVE GERMAN OFFICER
LOOSENS HIS COLLAR AS HE WAITS TO BOARD A COAST GUARD MANNED TRANSPORT
THAT WILL BRING HIM -- AND HUNDREDS MORE -- TO THE UNITED STATES



as an interpreter. When seriously wounded natives were brought aboard his transport, the USS HEWES, for treatment, they refused to cooperate, bewildered by what had taken place, uncertain of the Americans, and believing themselves to be prisoners. They would not eat for fear of being poisoned, and objected to being treated for their wounds. So the Commanding Officer sent for Haboush, who struck up conversations with the patients in their own language and persuaded them to change their attitudes. They readily agreed to everything he suggested and he had them practically eating out of his hands. After the armistice at Casablanca he continued his good will work ashore answering questions about the invasion and the intentions of the Americans. Haboush assured the natives of the friendliness of United States forces and also served as a middle man for his shipmates in their souvenir bargain hunting. "They became so cordial that some even invited me to their homes," said Haboush, speaking of the natives. "One invitation was particularly tempting--the man had a very lovely daughter--but we shoved off before I could accept the invitation." He came in for some good-natured teasing when his shipmates learned that in the Arabic language Haboush means "Great lover."

RESISTANCE CEASES

With the successful negotiation of the armistice on November 11, resistance from the French forces ceased, and in so far as the immediate participation of United States naval forces was concerned, the operation ended.

Meanwhile, however, a naval unit on the east coast of French Morocco was established as a Sea Frontier, under the command of Rear Admiral John L. Hall, Jr., U. S. Navy, and a Naval Operating Base at Oran, under the command of Rear Admiral A. C. Bennett, U. S. Navy, was also established. The United States naval forces participating in these operations were taken from the United States Atlantic Fleet. By May 1943, German forces had been driven from Tunisia, and by that time our fighting strength was such that we were able to make definite plans for a major offensive move against the enemy in his own territory. At the Casablanca Conference, in January 1943, the decision was made to capture Sicily.

FRENCH HAIL AMERICAN SUCCESS


The American success in North Africa threw the Vichy regime into a state of panic. While the followers of Petain and Laval were filled with fear and anger, however, the majority of the French people, who hated both the Nazis and their French collaborators, joyfully

hailed the Allied occupation of North Africa as a further guarantee of the eventual liberation of France. While Marshal Petain ordered his African garrisons to resist, Hitler's troops rushing south carefully by-passed Toulon, where the officers of the French fleet announced their intention to fight the Germans if molested. These officers later destroyed their ships and died rather than turn the French Navy over to the enemy.

RESULTS OF NORTH AFRICAN CONQUEST

As a result of the successful landings in North Africa, General Marshall was able to report that about 252,415 German and Italian troops and a large amount of equipment were surrendered. The Mediterranean was re-opened to the Allies, resulting in an immediate increase of

A SWARM OF U. S. ARMY DUCKS RUSHES TOWARD THE BEACH IN LAST MINUTE
AMPHIBIOUS INVASION MANEUVERS SOMEWHERE ALONG ENGLAND'S COAST



shipping equivalent to some 240 vessels. A French Army was reborn, celebrating its birthday by the capture of 48,719 prisoners, following a deep penetration into the enemy's position. United States forces proved their ability to wage modern war and acquired a wealth of experience which could be disseminated throughout the Army. Effective coordination of Allied air forces with ground forces was successfully achieved. Unity of Allied effort, command, and staff was demonstrated in a most convincing manner as evidence of the growing concentration of power which would sweep the enemy out of control of the European continent.

SIGNIFICANCE
TO ALLIES

The Allied occupation of Morocco prevented the Axis from acquiring a port facing the South Atlantic, where Dakar in the eastern bulge of South America might have been used by the enemy as a springboard to launch an attack on the Western Hemisphere. The conquest of Algeria greatly facilitated the westward advance of the British Eighth Army and led to the eventual rout of the enemy in North Africa. Not only was this part of the world prevented from becoming a starting point from which the Axis could initiate an attack on the Atlantic coast of the Americas, but once in Allied hands, northern and western Africa became a springboard from which the Allied powerful attack was launched against Sicily and on to the mainland of Europe. "Operation TORCH" had accomplished its mission.

APPENDIX A

EXECUTIVE ORDER 8929, NOVEMBER 1, 1941

DIRECTING THE COAST GUARD TO OPERATE
AS A PART OF THE NAVY

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 1 of the act of Congress approved January 28, 1915, (38 Stat. 800) (U. S. C., title 14, sec. 1), as amended by sections 5 and 6 of the act of July 11, 1941, Public Law 166, 77th Congress, 1st Session, it is hereby directed that the Coast Guard shall from this date, until further orders, operate as a part of the Navy, subject to the orders of the Secretary of the Navy.

All Coast Guard personnel operating as a part of the Navy, subject to the orders of the Secretary of the Navy, pursuant to this order, shall, while so serving, be subject to the laws enacted for the government of the Navy: Provided, That in the initiation, prosecution, and completion of disciplinary action, including remission or mitigation of punishments for any offense committed by any officer or enlisted man of the Coast Guard, the jurisdiction shall depend upon and be in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Department having jurisdiction of the person of such offender at the various stages of such action: Provided further, That any punishment imposed and executed in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph shall not exceed that to which the offender was liable at the time of the commission of the offense.

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE

November 1, 1941

APPENDIX B

THE WAR AND HUMAN FREEDOM

On the historic date of July 23, 1942, while in London the Americans and British leaders at combined staff Headquarters had finally decided to launch the North African campaign, Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, in Washington, broadcast over all national radio networks his momentous address on "The War and Human Freedom." The following extracts sum up the causes of war and show clearly the cause of the United States' participation in the North African landings:

"From Berlin and Tokyo the assault on human freedom has spread in ever-widening circles.... In all cases the invaders, before armed attack, set into motion every conceivable device of deceit, subversion, treachery, and corruption within the borders of the intended victim.

"As country after country, in Europe and in Asia, was attacked in this way, it became clear that no nation anywhere was immune, that for none was safety to be found in mere desire for peace, in avoidance of provocation, in neutrality, or in distance from the centers of assault....

"Today twenty-eight United Nations are fighting against the would-be conquerors and enslavers of the human race. We know what is at stake. By the barbarian invaders of today nothing is spared - neither life, nor morals, nor honor, nor virtue, nor pledges, nor the customs, the national institutions, even the religion of any people. Their aim is to sweep away every vestige of individual and national rights; to substitute, the world over, their unspeakable tyranny for the ways of life developed each for itself by the various nations; to make all mankind subservient to their will; to convert the two billions of the earth's inhabitants into abject victims and tools of their insatiable lust for power and dominion.

"We have seen their work in the countries they have invaded - murder of defenseless men, women, and children; rape, torture, and pillage, mass terrorization; the black system of hostages; starvation and deprivations that beggar description; the most thorough-going bondage the world has ever seen.

"This is the so-called "New Order" of Hitler and the Japanese war lords - an order as old as slavery - new only in the calculated thoroughness of its cruelty; in the depth of the degradation to which it subjects its victims; in the degree to which it has revived the worst practices of the darkest ages in history....

"In the plans of the new tyrants of the East and of the West, there is no freedom or hope for anyone. If there be some people who believe that they can expect from Hitler or the Japanese war lords greater measure of freedom than they now possess, they need only look at the firing squads in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, France, Yugoslavia, at the concentration camps in Germany and Austria. They need only see the degradation of the

forced laborers torn from every occupied country. They can learn the fraudulent quality of that brand of "freedom" from the Chinese in Nanking, from the Filipinos in Manila, from the inhabitants of the East Indies.

"There is no chance for liberty for any people anywhere save through the victory of the free peoples. Never did a plainer duty to fight against its foes devolve upon all peoples who prize liberty and all who aspire it....

"We Americans are fighting today because we have been attacked. We are fighting, as I have said, to preserve our very existence.... We are forced to fight because we ignored the simple but fundamental fact that the price of peace and of the preservation of right and freedom among nations is the acceptance of international responsibilities.... (War began in 1931 when Japan invaded China....)

"Our enemies confront us with armed might in every part of the globe. We cannot win this war by standing at our borders and limiting ourselves to beating off attacks. Air, submarine, and other forms of assault can be effectively defeated only if those attacked seek out and destroy the sources of attack. We shall send all the aid that we can to our gallant allies. And we shall seek out our enemies and attack them at any and every point of the globe at which the destruction of the Axis forces can be accomplished most effectively, most speedily, and most certainly.

"We know the magnitude of the task before us. We know that its accomplishment will exact unlimited effort and unfaltering courage. However long the road we shall press on to the final victory....

"International desperadoes like individual bandits will not abandon outlawry voluntarily. They will only be stopped by force....

"A bitter armed attack on human freedom has aroused mankind to new heights of courage, determination, and moral strength. It has evoked a spirit of work, sacrifice, and cooperative effort. With that strength and with that spirit we shall win."

U. S. STATE DEPARTMENT BULLETIN,
July 25, 1942

APPENDIX C

U. S. S. LEONARD WOOD

23 November, 1942

From: Boat Group Commander
To: Commanding Officer
Subject: Report of Landing Operations at Fedala, French Morocco, November 8, 1942.

1. The U.S.S. Leonard Wood arrived at designated position in transport area at 0005 and immediately began lowering boats:

- 0010 First boat waterborne.
- 0021 Scout boat in water.
- 0035 All boats in water, except tanklighters and last boat on #5 davit. The delay in these cases was due to a fouling up of the hoisting gear.
- 0100 All boats in water, except tanklighters.
- 0130 Tanklighters in water.
- 0140 Started loading assault personnel in boats. This operation was retarded over an hour because of failure of U.S.S. PROCYON to arrive in the transport area. All but two of the boats in the first wave, (LCP(L)'s), were among those to be furnished by that vessel for the assault landing. The Procyon boats finally arrived just as a decision had been reached to use LCP(R) boats from this ship for the first wave.
- 0350 First three waves departed for line of departure following the destroyer WILKES, H-hour having been delayed one-half hour. The support boat division one, minus one boat, left at the same time.
- 0400 Fourth wave left for the line of departure.
- 0450 Arrived at line of departure. Here there was some further delay caused by boats of the several waves becoming inter-mingled.
- 0505 First wave departed for Beach Red 2.
- 0520 First wave hit rocks to left of beach.
- 0525 Second wave hit right behind first wave.
- 0530 Third wave hit right behind second wave.
- 0540 Fourth wave hit right behind third wave.

NAVIGATION - Transport Area to Beach.

There was no difficulty picking up the destroyer stationed 1000 yards due south of the ship even though the night was very black. The first three waves which left with the destroyer, likewise, had no difficulty following her to the line of departure. The fourth wave was delayed about ten minutes waiting for its last few boats and got lost for a short time, arriving, however, at the destroyer in time to leave for the beach at the proper time interval.

NAVIGATION - Transport Area to Beach (Continued).

In my opinion, it is essential that all boats which have to find the lines of departure in the dark go together in a group with the Control Vessel.

On a dark night with no land marks it is extremely difficult not to get lost. In my boat the same difficulty was experienced. In rounding up the boats and starting them off as the destroyer was getting underway for the Line of Departure, I came across a broken down boat belonging to the first wave, and transferred the occupants to my boat. By the time they were all aboard, the destroyer had disappeared and we followed on a southerly course guiding by occasional glimpses on Polaris astern. After a run of nearly an hour we sighted a destroyer which turned out to be that one marking the Line of Departure for Beach Blue. This would indicate that the transports were to the eastward of the Transport Area. We ran west for about fifteen minutes and found the WILKES off Cape Fedala. Subsequent events lead us to believe that the WILKES was slightly to the westward of her correct position.

The scout boats marking all four beaches by prearranged lights were plainly visible long before arriving at the Line of Departure. These lights were unnecessarily bright and it is questionable whether a white light signal from beach marking boats is desirable. By the time our boat waves approached the Scout boat the latter was several hundred yards east of Beach Red 2. This coupled with the fact that the destroyer marking the Line of Departure was too far to the westward, brought out boats in on a line which was oblique to the shore line and which carried them on to the reef to the east of the beach.

Some of the boats which hit the rocks backed off and found the correct beach and landed there. The majority of coxswains held their boats on the rocks while troops disembarked. Those boats that were not then too badly damaged backed off and returned to the ship. A great many of them, however, were in a sinking condition and were abandoned.

The fifth wave, minus two boats, departed for the beach at 0540, by which time dawn was breaking, and landed on Beach Red 2. Some of the boats of each of these two waves were caught on the beach by the falling tide and subjected to enemy fire. Tanklighters of the seventh wave carrying bulldozers, tanks and one-half ton trucks went in singly or in pairs to Beach Red 2 throughout the first part of the morning.

I would estimate that 60% of the ship's boats were lost in the initial assault (first four waves). The remainder of those lost, about eight boats, were destroyed by shell fire on the morning of D day while on the beach, or were broached by the surf on beaching Red 3 and Blue.

NAVIGATION - Transport Area to Beach (Continued).

After leaving the line of departure, the first search light was observed about 0520 in the vicinity of Cape Fedala and was pointed vertically skyward for a brief moment. It was then trained on the first wave of boats approaching the beach.

This light was turned off before the firing began. A few minutes later, about 0523, a much more powerful light on Cape Chergui was turned on and directed westward along the Shore Line after the first wave hit the rocks east of Beach Red 2. Boats in the second wave were lighted up very distinctly. At about this time, 0524, our support boats opened fire on the searchlight as did also some of the machine guns in the landing boats. After about ten to fifteen minutes of firing the light was extinguished either by our firing or, as I believe more likely, voluntarily, by the enemy. No firing on Cape Chergui searchlight by other support boat divisions was observed. Firing on the boat waves and the scout boats by enemy machine guns and anti-aircraft batteries on Cape Fedala started a few minutes after our boats opened fire on the searchlights, about 0256. Fortunately this fire was ineffective and I have not learned of any casualties to army or navy personnel in the boats from enemy fire, even though the second, third and fourth waves all crossed the path of light. Shortly after the boats were illuminated by enemy searchlight, that is about 0525, white, red and green signal flares were observed on Cape Fedala and Cape Chergui, apparently "alert" signals of the enemy.

My boat, loaded with first wave troops, arrived at the line of departure just in time to leave with the third wave. We did not discover the rocks until about a boat length away and the coxswain just had time to throttle down, when we crashed, along with the other boats in the wave. Not knowing whether the boat would float, I instructed the coxswain to hold the bow on the rocks, which he did while all the troops disembarked safely over the bow. Three members of the boats crew and several soldiers were thrown out of the boat when it hit, but managed to scramble out on the rocks. When all troops had landed, we backed off and floated, but the boat could not be steered. As we were making water, I hailed another boat and was towed around to Beach Red 2, abandoning the boat on a falling tide, hoping to salvage it later, and returned to the ship in the other boat. Shortly afterwards my boat was hit by shell fire from Cape Fedala. While approaching the transport area, we passed the first assault waves from the USS JOSEPH HEWES, it then being about 0700, and I put my coxswain aboard the HEWES' Boat Group Commander's boat to help find Beach Red 2.

I arrived at the ship in time to return to Beach Red 2 with the first two tanks of wave seven. I remained on the beach to investigate the damage to our boats. The tide was then low and most boats, destroyed or otherwise, were stranded. I walked eastward to Beaches Red 3 and Blue, stopping to attempt the salvage of various of our boats along the way, with little success, however, due to the surf, the lack

NAVIGATION - Transport Area to Beach (Continued).

of proper equipment and interruption by shell fire in the morning and strafing planes in the afternoon. I left Beach Red 3 in a boat from some other ship about the middle of the afternoon and transferred to a support boat which was patrolling off the beach firing on enemy planes.

It was during this time that several enemy planes dropped bombs on the beach and in the vicinity of the boats off the beach. I was searching for our own support boats, but they must have been to the westward off Beach Red 2. Toward sundown I transferred again to crash boat No. 71 and returned to the ship. There, following instructions from the bridge, I directed the crash boat back to Fedala Harbor and picked up three pilots and Captain Marshall, U.S.A., interpreter, and returned again to the LEONARD WOOD.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That ships be provided with boats that can be loaded with troops and personnel at the rail. (Davits & falls strengthened if necessary).
2. If loading personnel at the rail is not feasible, that all equipment such as ammunition carriers, ammunition, mortars, machine guns, etc., be loaded in the boats before D-day and each coxswain be assigned to a wave and landing team number in advance.
3. That boats be then called alongside by bull horn or other loud speaker system, calling specific landing team boats to respective nets, as per pre-loading scheme, to receive assault personnel. This would completely eliminate all that time consumed in lowering the equipment mentioned in (2) above into the boats by lines and nets, and troops would not be so heavily burdened going down nets.
4. That the disembarking plan be sufficiently flexible to permit unloading troops from both sides of the ship, if weather is calm (as it happened to be at Fedala).
5. That assault transports carry all the boats needed for the first four or five waves, and that each transport furnish its own boats and not be dependent on others for boats.
6. That assault transports carry no tank-lighters.
7. That the assault transports should only load the first four, or at the most, five waves, during which time the reserve or supply transports could load the remaining two or three waves to report to the assault transport or its control vessel. The assault transports could still carry the weapons be used in the event that the supply ship was lost or damaged. Reserve tanklighters and boats for these waves could be furnished by other reserve ships by pre-arranged signal.
8. Boats should be silenced.
9. There should be twonscout boats for each beach.

RECOMMENDATIONS (Continued).

10. Assault waves should sneak in and feel their way to the beach. The difficulty of finding a strange beach with no landmarks in the dark from seaward is extreme. Going in with throttle wide open at Fedala it was not possible to stop the boat waves by the time the rocks were discovered. Had the landing been attempted on any of the other mornings during our stay at Fedala, the boats would have been very quickly destroyed by the surf on the rocks and it is doubtful whether 50% of the troops could have been saved. It is possible that with more surf the reef would have been discovered sooner and the boat waves diverted. The chances of finding the right spot, however, and of landing undetected would seem to be much better using silenced boats sneaking in at half throttle.
11. Wave commanders should be permitted to carry dimmed colored flashlights to distinguish their waves. There was considerable confusion by waves becoming inter-mingled at the destroyer rendezvous and at the Line of Departure due to the wave commanders not being able to make themselves known to their own boats.
12. Efforts should be made to get better boat compasses.
13. Soldiers' eyes had not been accommodated to the darkness causing delay in disembarking.
14. Speed up boat davits and study possibility of automatic releasing hooks.
15. Soldiers were much too heavily loaded and some had great difficulty picking themselves up in the water after leaving the landing boats.
16. Owens boats (LCV Diesels) not sturdy enough.
17. Landing boats should be lightened by removing all unnecessary gear such as extra water breakers, emergency rations, boat box equipment, vehicle tow lines, etc.
18. Considerable trouble with failure of ramp hoisting gear and lost ramp crank handles was experienced.
19. There should be at least two regular traffic control boats and each should be equipped with special towing bits well forward of the rudder post. If possible neither of these two boats should be used in the first assault waves.
20. The army must provide more bull-dozers and sleds for unloading boats on the beach. Supplies must be loaded on sleds into the landing boats ready to be pulled out by bull-dozers as soon as boat hits the beach.

A. KEIDEL, Lieut., U.S.C.G.

APPENDIX D

U. S. S. LEONARD WOOD
% Postmaster, New York, N. Y.
28 November, 1942

From: Beachmaster, U.S.S. LEONARD WOOD.
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LEONARD WOOD.
Subject: Report of operation at Fedala, French Morocco,
November 8, to November 14, 1942.

1. The Naval beach party left the transport in the second, third, fifth and sixth waves. This was done so as not to cripple any one section of the beach party if one of the landing boats in which the beach party was embarked became a casualty. Ensign E. C. Sturges, U.S.C.G.R., who was assigned as salvage and traffic control officer, together with the traffic boat crew, radioman and signalman were embarked in the second wave, and Ensign Sturges was serving as boat-wave commander for that wave. Ensign R. L. Emerson, U.S.C.G., who was assigned as assistant Beachmaster, was the wave commander for the third wave and about one-half of the beach party were embarked in various boats in that wave. The boat in which I was embarked, together with Lieut. S. L. Shick, U.S.N.R., the Medical Officer, and part of the medical section and six other members of the beach party were to have landed with the fifth wave. The Army had trouble in loading the boat due to some mixup in the way the equipment was loaded on the transport. We loaded a jeep first, then we went to another hatch and loaded a 37 MM gun. It took us about 3 hours to get loaded as other boats were using the same nets and while loading the gun, one of the soldiers got one of his legs broken, and it was necessary to have him hoisted on board. After the equipment was loaded, the Army personnel assigned to this boat embarked and I found that we had a total of 36 men in the boat, in addition to the jeep, the gun, and such equipment as the men carried. As the boat was overloaded, I returned to the net and ordered ten soldiers, exclusive of driver and gun crew to leave in order to lighten the boat.

2. At about 0700 we left the transport and proceeded to the rendezvous circle and found several other boats which had been left from preceeding waves and some boats from the U. S. S. JOSEPH HEWES. I contacted the various boats and made up a boat wave and lead them to the beach. The boat I was in was still overloaded and it was necessary to slow down to about half speed in order to keep from swamping. When about five miles away from Beach Red-2, the coastal battery at Fort Chergui opened fire on us and shells started dropping all around the boats, and after getting in a little closer the batteries at Fedala and one battery on Cape Fedala also opened fire on us. As we were unable to go at more than half speed, I motioned the other boats to go ahead, but they stayed with us until we were about one mile from

U. S. S. LEONARD WOOD

Report of operation at Fedala, French Morocco, November 8, to November 14, 1942 (continued).

the beach and they could see it without difficulty. They then preceded us to the beach. As we got closer to Fedala, the shelling became heavier, and although some were close enough to splash water into the boat, there were no direct hits until we stopped on the beach. As soon as we reached the beach the ramp was dropped, but we found the jeep had gotten wet and would not start. We attempted to push it out but most of the personnel had already taken cover on shore. The first shell went over the boat and hit the water about 30 feet away. The second was short and about ten feet away. I knew they would have the range for the next shot, so I ordered the remaining men to take cover on the beach. We had just left the boat when it was hit and the jeep caught afire. Two more shells hit and the boat was blown to pieces. The tide at this time was low and we had about 400 feet of flat beach to cross before we reached a steep bank about 15 feet high. A machine gun started strafing the beach and I yelled to the men to drop and crawl across the beach. Shots were hitting all around us and one of the soldiers was hit in the leg, but he was still crawling with us, but before we reached the bank, he was killed by additional hits in the chest and head. A coxswain from one of the other boats was hit by shrapnel, and died about an hour later at our first-aid station. We laid against the bank for awhile, waiting for a chance to get over. A soldier attempted to get over, but was killed when the ridge was sprayed with machine gun fire. After a short time, the Navy opened fire on the shore batteries and the firing let up for an instant and we had a chance to cross over the ridge where we could find cover in fox holes and trenches and where we joined the rest of the beach party under Ensigns Emerson and Sturges, who had already began setting up a command post, and the communication section was attempting to get in contact with the ship. An evacuating and first aid station was immediately set up under the direction of Dr. Shick. The wounded and dying were given first aid and cared for as good as possible. Stretcher bearers searched the beach and vicinity for casualties, which when found were taken to the first aid station we had set up just beyond the dune line.

3. After having landing on the beach, it was learned that all boats in the first three waves and about half of the boats in the fourth wave had landed on the rocky reef just off the left flank of the beach. It is my opinion that the beach marking boat manned with a special assigned crew in charge of Major Waver, U.S.A. and Chief Specialist Howe, U.S.N.R., were not on their proper station and instead of guiding the boat-waves clear of the shoal, they were leading them right on the rocky ledges and reef, where they were torn to pieces on the jagged rocks.

U. S. S. LEONARD WOOD

Report of operation at Fedala, French Morocco, November 8, to November 14, 1942 (continued).

4. All boats that landed on Beach Red-2 on the morning of D-day, that could not get off the beach right away, were destroyed by gun fire from the batteries at Cape Fedala. It was impossible to keep men on the beach to work on boats that were stranded due to shelling and machine gun fire. Despite the firing several boats were refloated and some of the boat crews managed to get away from the beach after being unloaded, despite the fact the enemy batteries concentrated their fire on the boats that were landing or had just landed. The crews in the landing boats from this vessel were outstanding in that they stuck with their boats and attempted to get them off the beach when grounded. I saw at least three boats that had broached and the coxswains took their boats off even though they were stuck on the beach from 10 to 15 minutes and the shore batteries tried their best to destroy them. George N. PaaJanen (225-869) MoMM2c., was wounded by a strafing plane and George W. Klemchuck (204-533) MoMM2c., was wounded by shrapnel. Both men served as engineers in landing boats and were wounded while unloading their boats at the beach. First aid was administered by the party medical section and they were later evacuated to the transport.

5. Communication with the ship could not be established until late in the afternoon of D-day. Due to the loss of boats there were very few supplies landed that day, even after the batteries at Fedala had been silenced. The beach was bombed by German bombers several times during the day and was strafed by low flying Italian planes throughout the afternoon, but few casualties were suffered during these raids due to personnel having had time to seek shelter in fox holes and trenches. The casualties were evacuated to the transports whenever boats were available. The medical section did a splendid job in caring for the injured both the ones suffered while landing as well as those brought to the evacuating station by the Army.

6. On the morning of D plus 1 day, the unloading of the transports were resumed but due to the high surf, it was impossible to land on the surf before they could be unloaded and could not be taken off. I saw an LCP(R) boat loaded with troops, turn end for end in the breakers off the beach. Several soldiers in that boat were drowned, several were revived by the beach party. Due to the condition of the surf, Commander J. W. Jamison, U.S.N., the Beach Commander, sent a message to the transports directing that no further landings on the beach be attempted and that the harbor of Fedala be used instead.

U. S. S. LEONARD WOOD

Report of operation at Fedala, French Morocco, November 8, to November 14, 1942 (continued).

7. While waiting for a decision as to where and when the unloading would resume, I went to Beach Red-3, and Beach Blue-2, to see what could be done in salvaging some of the boats there. As I arrived at this beach, it was attacked by German bombers and I jumped into the first empty fox hole. One of the bombs dropped in the middle of a square formed by three other fox-holes. A soldier in the one nearest to me was killed by bomb splinters. The other two fox holes were covered up completely and when the bombers had passed, the personnel nearby started digging out the two men. They were two pharmacist mates from the U.S.S. THOMAS JEFFERSON. One of them was revived by artificial respiration but the other had died from suffocation. I suffered no injuries, except my nose, eyes and ears were filled with dirt, and my machine gun barrel was filled with sand and rendered useless. There were over one hundred boats on the beach, but all of them except the engines were beyond salvage. They had been blown to bits by artillery fire. While on Beach Red-3, I saw a 50 foot tanklighter attempting to make a landing on the beach. It was loaded with equipment and men. As they were approaching the breakers, the coxswain allowed his boat to get ahead of the breaker too far and the tanklighter turned end for end, spilling out the men, guns and jeeps. Apparently the bow caught on the bottom, as the wave threw the stern over. This happened about 600 feet from the beach and only six men came out of it alive. While on Beach Blue, a message came through for all beach parties to move into Fedala and resume the unloading in Fedala Harbor. I then returned to Beach Red-2, where preparations were being made to move.

8. Upon arrival at Fedala Harbor on the afternoon of D plus 1 day, all hands, with the exception of the medical section were turned to for unloading supplies which had already begun to arrive from the various transports. Upon arrival of beach parties from other ships, the whole group was organized into a six on and six off shift, 24 hours a day, under the direct supervision of Commander Jamison. During the succeeding days, the beach parties did not only unload the equipment and supplies from the landing boats, but moved them from the docks and assisted the army to load trucks and other transportation for further removal inshore.

9. On the nights of November 11th and 12th, at the time of the torpedoing of the U.S.S. JOSEPH HEWES, HUGH L. SCOTT, EDWARD RUTLEDGE and TASKER H. BLISS, survivors were taken ashore by the beach parties and the injured were cared for by the medical sections. Dr. Shick and part of the medical section went to the Casino where most of the injured had been taken and worked there until they were returned to the transports.

U. S. S. LEONARD WOOD

Report of operation at Fedala, French Morocco, November 8, to November 14, 1942 (continued).

10. On 11 November, 1942, by direction of Commander Jamison, I was placed in charge of a salvaging detail and proceeded to Beach Red-2, where we succeeded in salvaging and refloating thirteen tank lighters and landing boats.

11. On 14 November, 1942, received orders to move all landing crafts at Fedala and rejoin the transports in Casablanca Harbor. One hundred and seventeen landing crafts were manned and taken to Casablanca where the various beach parties rejoined their own transports.

12. The officers and men of the beach party worked relentlessly throughout the week, with unceasing efforts, to unload landing boats and to move ammunition and explosives from the piers and warehouses as expeditiously as possible, as it was in a constant danger of destruction by bombing.

13. I desire especially to commend the following officers for their endurance and determined efforts to accomplish their assigned tasks:

Lieut. S. L. Shick, (MC), U.S.N.R.

Ensign R. L. Emerson, U.S.C.G.

Ensign E. C. Sturges, U.S.C.G.R.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That in the future closer supervision should be made to prevent army from overloading landing boats. In many cases these overloaded boats were nearly swamped by the time they reached the shore. The engines were wet and the vehicles had to be towed or pushed out of the boats, which caused delay and in most cases the boats were lost either by gun fire or broaching and later destruction.

2. During wet weather the Army should have the motor vehicles running while enroute to the beach to prevent stalling.

3. In future beachmarking boats, the crews should be selected from experienced personnel.

4. The naval beach party personnel should have a distinctive uniform from the Army. The present twill clothing used caused confusion and handicapped the officers in keeping track of the men.

5. Two boats should be set aside for exclusive use of the beach party and their equipment and should be landed one at a time in the waves selected by the Beachmaster.

RECOMMENDATIONS (Continued)

6. In landing the first assault wave, if during darkness, the boats should feel their way to the beach and should not do so in one single line abreast.

7. The wave commanders should be in communication with each other so that if a wave ran into trouble, the waves behind could be warned.

8. The communication system between ship and shore should be studied and improved. The present joint army and navy communication team does not function satisfactorily, and communications could not be established during the early part of the landing, when it was most urgently needed for the proper direction of the naval gunfire and for advising the transports regarding the conditions on the beach.

9. Short L-shaped trenches, not over 3 feet deep for use of beach parties are recommended. This type of trench offers maximum protection against strafing planes and occupants will not be buried alive when bombs or shells are exploded nearby.

J. T. HAGGLOVE,
Lieut., U.S.C.G.

APPENDIX E

DOCUMENT 192 (PEACE AND WAR -- UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1931-1941)

ROOSEVELT -- LEAHY CORRESPONDENCE

President Roosevelt to the Appointed Ambassador to France (Leahy)

Washington, (December 20, 1940)

My dear Admiral Leahy:

As Ambassador of the United States near the French Government, you will be serving the United States at a very critical time in the relations between the United States and France. I impose entire confidence in your ability and judgment to meet all situations which may arise. Nevertheless, for your general guidance I feel that I may properly outline some of the basic principles which at present govern the relations of the United States with France.

(1) Marshal Petain occupies a unique position both in the hearts of the French people and in the Government. Under the existing Constitution his word is law and nothing can be done against his opposition unless it is accomplished without his knowledge. In his decrees he uses the royal "we" and I have gathered that he intends to rule.

Accordingly, I desire that you endeavor to cultivate as close relations with Marshal Petain as may be possible. You should outline to him the position of the United States in the present conflict and you should stress our firm conviction that only by defeat of the powers now controlling the destiny of Germany and Italy can the world live in liberty, peace, and prosperity; that civilization cannot progress with a return to totalitarianism.

I have reason to believe that Marshal Petain was not cognizant of all the acts of his Vice Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Laval, in his relations with the Germans. There can be no assurance that a similar situation will not exist with the new Foreign Minister. Accordingly, you should endeavor to bring to Marshal Petain's attention such acts done or contemplated in the name of France which you deem to be inimical to the interests of the United States.

(2) I have made it abundantly clear that the policy of this administration is to support in every way practicable those countries which are defending themselves against aggression. In harmony with this principle this Government is affording and will continue to afford to the Government of Great Britain all possible assistance short of war. You may wish from time to time to bring to the attention of Marshal Petain and members of the Government concrete information regarding the American program to this end.

(3) I have been much perturbed by reports indicating that resources of France are being placed at the disposal of Germany in a measure beyond that positively required by the terms of the armistice agreement. I have reason to believe that aside from the selfish interests of individuals there is unrequired governmental cooperation with Germany motivated by a belief in the inevitableness of a German victory and ultimate benefit to France. I desire that you endeavor to inform yourself with relation to this question and report fully regarding it.

You should endeavor to persuade Marshal Petain, the members of his Government, and high ranking officers in the military forces with whom you come into contact, of the conviction of this Government that a German victory would inevitably result in the dismemberment of the French Empire and the maintenance at most of France as a vassal state.

(4) I believe that the maintenance of the French fleet free of German control is not only of prime importance to the defense of this hemisphere but is also vital to the preservation of the French Empire and the eventual restoration of French independence and autonomy.

Accordingly, from the moment we were confronted with the imminent collapse of French resistance it has been a cardinal principle of this administration to assure that the French fleet did not fall into German hands and was not used in the furtherance of German aims. I immediately informed the French Government, therefore, that should that Government permit the French fleet to be surrendered to Germany the French Government would permanently lose the friendship and good will of the Government of the United States.

Since that time I have received numerous assurances from those in control of the destiny of France that the French fleet would under no circumstances be surrendered.

On June 18, 1940, Monsieur Paul Baudoin, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, assured Ambassador Biddle "in the name of the French Government in the most solemn manner that the French fleet would never be surrendered to the enemy."

On July 1, 1940, President Le Brun informed Ambassador Bullitt that "France would under no conditions deliver the fleet to Germany." On the same day Marshal Petain assured Ambassador Bullitt that orders had been issued to every Captain of the French Fleet to sink his ship rather than to permit it to fall into German hands, and Admiral Darlan told Ambassador Bullitt that he had "given absolute orders to the officers of his fleet to sink immediately any ship that the Germans should attempt to seize."

When Marshal Petain came into power as Chief of the French State I received renewed and most solemn assurance that the French fleet would not be surrendered to Germany. Vice Premier Laval reiterated these assurances to Mr. Matthews on November 14 when he said that "the French fleet will never fall into the hands of a hostile power."

On November 16 Marshal Petain, when the subject was again raised, told Mr. Matthews: "I have given the most solemn assurances that the French fleet, including the JEAN BART and the RICHELIEU, should never fall into Germany's hands. I have given these assurances to your Government. I have given them to the British Government, and even to Churchill personally. I reiterate them now. They will be used to defend French territory and possessions. They will never be used against the British unless we are attacked by them." And most recently Marshal Petain, in a conversation with the present Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Mr. Murphy, said on December 12: "I hope your President understands that I have kept and will continue to keep the solemn promise I made that the French fleet will be scuttled before it is allowed to fall into German hands."

I feel most strongly that if the French Government after these repeated solemn assurances were to permit the use of the French fleet in hostile operations against the British, such action would constitute a flagrant and deliberate breach of faith to the Government of the United States.

You will undoubtedly associate with high officers of the French Navy. I desire, therefore, that in your relations with such officers, as well as in your conversations with French officials, you endeavor to convince them that to permit the use of the French fleet or naval bases by Germany or to attain German aims, would most certainly forfeit the friendship and good will of the United States and result in the destruction of the French fleet to the irreparable injury of France.

(5) You will undoubtedly be approached from numerous quarters regarding food for the French people.

There is no people on earth who have done more than the American people in relieving the suffering of humanity. The hearts of the American people go out to the people of France in their distress. As you are aware we are continuing our efforts to arrange for the forwarding through the Red Cross of medical supplies and also tinned or powdered milk for children in the unoccupied regions of France. Nevertheless, the primary interest of the American people, and an interest which overshadows all else at the moment, is to see a British victory. The American people are therefore unwilling to take any measure which in the slightest degree will prejudice such a victory. Before the American people would be willing to have influence exerted upon the British Government to permit the shipment of food through the British blockade to France, it would be necessary that the American people be convinced beyond peradventure that such action would not in the slightest assist Germany.

(6) In your discussions regarding the French West Indies and French Guiana you should point out that our sole desire is that region is to maintain the status quo and to be assured that neither those possessions nor their resources will ever be used to the detriment of the United States or the American republics. To accomplish this, we feel that it is essential that the naval vessels stationed in the ports of those islands or possessions be immobilized and that we have adequate guarantee

that the gold which is at present stored in Martinique be not used in any manner which could conceivably benefit Germany in the present struggle.

(7) I have noticed with sympathetic interest the efforts of France to maintain its authority in its North African possessions and to improve their economic status. In your discussions you may say that your Government is prepared to assist in this regard in any appropriate way.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

APPENDIX F

DOCUMENT 270 IN "PEACE AND WAR"

RADIO ADDRESS DELIVERED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FROM WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 9, 1941

"The sudden criminal attacks perpetrated by the Japanese in the Pacific provide the climax of a decade of international immorality.

"Powerful and resourceful gangsters have banded together to make war upon the whole human race. Their challenge has now been flung at the United States of America. The Japanese have treacherously violated the long-standing peace between us. Many American soldiers and sailors have been killed by enemy action. American ships have been sunk; American airplanes have been destroyed.

"The Congress and the people of the United States have accepted that challenge.

"Together with other free peoples, we are now fighting to maintain our right to live among our world neighbors in freedom and in common decency, without fear of assault.

"I have prepared the full record of our past relations with Japan, and it will be submitted to the Congress. It begins with the visit of Commodore Perry to Japan 88 years ago. It ends with the visit of two Japanese emissaries to the Secretary of State last Sunday, an hour after Japanese forces had loosed their bombs and machine guns against our flag, our forces, and our citizens....

"The course that Japan has followed for the past 10 years in Asia has paralleled the course of Hitler and Mussolini in Europe and Africa. Today, it has become far more than a parallel. It is collaboration so well calculated that all the continents of the world, and all the oceans, are now considered by the Axis strategists as one gigantic battlefield.

In 1931, Japan invaded Manchukuo - without warning.

In 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia - without warning.

In 1938, Hitler occupied Austria - without warning.

In 1939, Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia - without warning.

Later in 1939, Hitler invaded Poland - without warning.

In 1940, Hitler invaded Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg - without warning.

In 1940, Italy attacked France and later Greece - without warning.

In 1941, the Axis Powers attacked Yugoslavia and Greece and they dominated the Balkans - without warning.

In 1941, Hitler invaded Russia - without warning.

And now Japan has attacked Malaya and Thailand - and the United States - without warning.

It is all of one pattern.

We are now in this war. We are all in it - all the way....

"A year and a half has elapsed since the fall of France, when the whole world first realized the mechanized might which the Axis nations had been building for so many years. America has used that year and a half to great advantage. Knowing that the attack might reach us in all too short a time, we immediately began greatly to increase our industrial strength and our capacity to meet the demands of modern warfare.

"Precious months were gained by sending vast quantities of our war material to the nations of the world still able to resist Axis aggression. Our policy rested on the fundamental truth that the defense of any country resisting Hitler or Japan was in the long run the defense of our own country. That policy has been justified. It has given us time, invaluable time, to build our American assembly lines of production.

"Assembly lines are now in operation. Others are being rushed to completion. A steady stream of tanks and planes, of guns and ships, of shells and equipment--that is what these 18 months have given us.

"But it is all only a beginning of what has to be done. We must be set to face a long war against crafty and powerful bandits. The attack at Pearl Harbor can be repeated at any one of many points in both oceans and along both our coast lines and against all the rest of the hemisphere.

"It will not only be a long war, it will be a hard war. That is the basis on which we now lay all our plans....

"In these past few years--and, most violently, in the past few days--we have learned a terrible lesson.

"It is our obligation to our dead--it is our sacred obligation to their children and our children--that we must never forget what we have learned.

"And what we all have learned is this:

"There is no such thing as security for any nation - nor any individual - in a world ruled by the principles of gangsterism.

"There is no such thing as impregnable defense against powerful aggressors who sneak up in the dark and strike without warning.

"We have learned that our ocean-girt hemisphere is not immune from severe attack--that we cannot measure our safety in terms of miles on any map....

"Your Government knows that for weeks Germany has been telling Japan that if Japan did not attack the United States, Japan would not share in dividing the spoils with Germany when peace came. She was promised by Germany that if she came in she would receive the complete and perpetual control of the whole of the Pacific area - and that means not only the Far East, not only all of the islands in the Pacific, but also a strangle hold on the west coast of North, Central, and South America.

"We all know that Germany and Japan are conducting their military and naval operations in accordance with a joint plan. That plan considers all peoples and nations which are not helping the Axis Powers as common enemies of each and every one of the Axis Powers.

"That is their simple and obvious grand strategy. That is why the American people must realize that it can be matched only with similar grand strategy. We must realize, for example, that Japanese successes against the United States in the Pacific are helpful to German operations in Libya; that any German success against the Caucasus is inevitably an assistance to Japan in her operations against the Dutch East Indies; that a German attack against Algiers or Morocco opens the way to a German attack against South America.

"On the other side of the picture, we must learn that guerilla warfare against the Germans in Serbia helps us; that a successful Russian offensive against the Germans helps us; and that British successes on land or sea in any part of the world strengthens our hands...."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN,
Vol. V, p. 476

APPENDIX G

EXTRACTS FROM CAPTAIN BUTCHER'S DIARY

TRACING DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS FOR AFRICAN LANDINGS

General Eisenhower's aide, Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR, says in his diary,¹ dated July 10, 1942: "On Thursday, July 2, and after a siege of 25 days, Sevastopol, last Russian stronghold in the Crimea, fell to the Axis.

Rommel finally has been stopped by the British some 70 miles from the Nile Delta. Both the Russian and desert situations are causing grave concern.

President Roosevelt and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that we must help Russia stay in the war. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been considering a quick thrust across the Channel during the summer of 1942, on the assumption that if a toe hold can be obtained on the French coast, some of Germany's strength will be diverted from the Russian front.

This projected operation goes by the code word: **SLEDGEHAMMER**. But the main project in this theater is to plan, build up and execute a major all-out effort across the Channel in the spring or summer of 1943. This much larger projected operation goes by the code word: **ROUNDUP**.

After many conferences with the British during his first weeks as Theater Commander, General Ike reported to General Marshall in Washington that the British Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister had decided that the **SLEDGEHAMMER** operation could not be successfully executed in 1942 if our invading force was expected to retain its beachhead. British military authorities are fearful, in reaching this decision, that General Marshall may feel that they have let him down. General Ike has sought to deal with the British with all cards on the table. They have responded with enthusiasm.

The British appear to be favoring an attack in North Africa--'to get Rommel's tail.' In fact, the Prime Minister has said President Roosevelt suggested such an operation before the United States entered the war. Ike, however, feels that if he were ordered to conduct an offensive in 1942, he would prefer to cross the Channel rather than open a new front in North Africa, which he fears would not materially assist the Russians in time to save them.

London, Tuesday, July 14, 1942. Generals Marshall and Eisenhower exchanged cables reviewing the prospect of an agreement with the British for offensive operations this year. General Ike reported to Marshall that he had repeated the American view of the transcendent importance of keeping Russia in the war, and that British and Americans should do whatever may best assist to that end. The Commanding General had explained to the British--as a matter of personal opinion--that a collapse of Russia would force the United States to go on the defensive throughout the Atlantic and to build up offensive operations against Japan.

1. See his book, "My Three Years with Eisenhower."

London, Thursday, July 16, 1942. Big things today. Captain Lee came in before noon and said the General was canceling all appointments for a week. He was in the dark as to the reason.

For the first time since we have been here, Ike suggested we leave the office "early"---six o'clock. We had hardly sat down in Ike's apartment when Ike received a phone call from Brig. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, Chief of Staff, who came right over with an important message. It turned out to be from General Marshall and involved immediate consideration of a second front in Europe in 1942.

Important visitors are on their way from Washington tonight. General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins and others. It is obvious they are going to try to argue the British, particularly the Prime Minister, into making a quick move for a second front for at least a toe hold on the continent, with the hope of helping the Russians, who have been falling away fast in the last few days.

Ike immediately set me to calling for the senior generals. In short order came General Lee, head of the Service of Supply; Col. Ray Barker, Assistant Chief for Plans; Maj. Gen. Toosey Spaats, Air Force; and by ten o'clock from Salisbury, Maj. Gen. Mark Clark, driving himself at high speed.

Ike outlined the facts and views they are to assemble. The Washington visitors are due Friday afternoon, and General Marshall requested Ike by personal message to have all the dope ready.

London, Friday, July 17, 1942. In the party arriving at Prestwick were: General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, Steve (Early), Brig. Gen. Charles P. Gross, Brig. Gen. W. B. Smith, Col. Hoyt Vandenberg, Comdr. Ruthven Libby, Maj. Frank McCarthy and Comdr. J. R. Fulton, Harry Hopkins' doctor.

Steve and I had dinner in the Commanding General's apartment with Ike and General Clark, with much friendly and big talk. Since Thursday, Ike had been working night and day preparing reports for General Marshall's use, and had frequently been closeted with Marshall, Admiral King and others of the party. They were preparing the case for a second front this year to be presented to the British. Harry Hopkins had gone to Chequers for the week end.

London, Sunday, July 19, 1942; Late in the day, Ike finished the draft of the basic proposals for Marshall and King to present to the British. Presently, an officer came with the proposal, as slightly revised by Marshall and King. There had been no change in the meaning, but some of the fire of Ike's pungent language had been toned down. Ike phoned Marshall at 10:00 to say that he had no further suggestions. The proposal was for the second front in France by October of this year to help the Russians. These are momentous days!

London, Wednesday, July 22, 1942. Ike has been busy dictating various documents for the use of General Marshall and Admiral King.

The gist of his comment is that the British have repeatedly gone on record against the proposed SLEDGEHAMMER attack because they believe it will not relieve Russia's situation and will expose us to the risk of a tactical disaster--partly because of superior German strength in the west;

partly because of bad weather conditions.

The American point of view, expressed by the Commanding General and General Clark, is that the Russians' situation may become so desperate as to make even an unsuccessful attack worth while, especially if it could be launched soon. In any case, agreement at the military level should be reached today by General Marshall and Admiral King, for the United States, and the British Chiefs of Staff....

At dinner with me, Steve said the barometer had gone down, and the British had refused to go along on the American proposal for a second front this year, but had made alternative proposals. This I had known from Ike, but this job makes me tongue-tied.

London, Friday, July 24, 1942. Ike spent much of the day with Marshall, King, and Hopkins.

Indications of getting together with the British, not on a second front for '42, but with the prospect of substantial agreement.

Met Ike at his apartment later. We spent a quiet evening standing by for any calls from Marshall.

Actually the decision of the Combined Chiefs had been made this day, Friday, subject to approval of Churchill and Roosevelt. It was to clean up North Africa and Rommel. New code name selected--TORCH.

London, Friday, July 31, 1942. The Commanding General said that his discussions with General Marshall indicated that the Prime Minister looked upon the African assault as an American operation to or around Casablanca on the west coast, and as primarily a British operation on the north coast--but to be led, at the time of the landing operations, by American troops for such psychological advantages as might be expected amongst the French.

Brigadier Stewart said the essence of the North African operation in the Mediterranean is to take Tunisia in 28 days....

General Eisenhower, seeking to recapitulate, asked what the British now conceived as the primary military objectives to be attained by the TORCH operation. Brigadier Stewart and Captain Lambe discussed the objectives and concluded: (1) to open the Mediterranean; (2) to prevent the Italian and French fleets from becoming free to join as a large naval force, possibly at Casablanca or Dakar, which would require United States and British naval forces in comparable strength to be stationed possibly at the Shannon River in Eire--this to protect convoys, U. S. to Britain, and to fend the threat of the combined enemy navy, and (3) to pull German forces from Russia....

The British emphasized the key is Tunisia. Its seizure would disrupt Rommel's supply lines and make his situation difficult, if not intenable.

The big defects for the entire attack are shortage of naval support, the surf conditions on the west coast, where heavy swells from the Atlantic make landing difficult, if not impossible, in the late fall, and the shortage of landing craft.

London, Sunday, August 9, 1942. Had a call from General Patton, who is to lead the American forces into Casablanca. Ike invited him to come over to the apartment. General Patton joined us for a drink and dinner.

He and Ike agreed on various personnel assignments. Patton worried because G-2 indicates about 8,000 more enemy troops on the west coast, near landing place, than he will have. Also worried about heavy swells which sometimes run to 50 feet, and scarcity of suitable beaches for landings. He had an ironic note in his voice when he said someone had suggested he be sure to have a good second man because he might be drowned."

While the Combined Chiefs of Staff were plunged in these details and Eisenhower was carrying the heavy load of responsibility, the light touch was not lacking. On August 10, 1942, Captain Butcher records in his diary: "Social invitations still pouring in, Lady Astor phoned Lee a day or two ago to invite Ike down for dinner and an evening. None less than George Bernard Shaw was to be present, whom I would like very much to meet. But Ike said, 'T'hell with it; I've work to do!'"

APPENDIX H

OPERATIONS IN WHICH COAST GUARD

FULLY OR PARTIALLY MANNED

VESSELS PARTICIPATED

NORTH AFRICA

Algeria - Morocco Landings, 8-11 November, 1942

ARCTURUS (AK-18)*
CHARLES CARROLL (APA-28)*
JOSEPH HEWES (AP-50)*
JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (AP-26)
LEONARD WOOD (AP-25)
WILLIAM P. BIDDLE (AP-15)*

Tunisian Operations, 8 November, 1942 - 9 July, 1943

SAMUEL CHASE (AP-56)

Note: Vessels not listed in the Floating Units Plan as being Coast Guard ships or Coast Guard manned (that is, vessels having only a few Coast Guardsmen aboard) are starred thus *.

COAST GUARD MANNED SHIPS

ENTITLED TO OPERATION AND ENGAGEMENT STARS

NORTH AFRICA - (E1)

Algeria - Morocco Landings (E1-1)

JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (APA-13)

LEONARD WOOD (APA-12)

Tunisian Operations (E1-3)

SAMUEL CHASE (APA-26)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONS ABOARD RETURNING FROM CASA BLANCA

DATE: _____

SHIP	OFFICERS						ENLISTED PERSONNEL					
	CIVILIANS	USCG	NAVY	ARMY	MARINES	OFFICERS	USCG	NAVY	ARMY	MARINES	TOTAL	TRANS
USS LEONARD WOOD		39 <u>1x</u> 40	8 <u>4x</u> 12	1x <u>—</u> 1		53	535 <u>4c</u> 539	59 <u>—</u> 59	—	—	598	651
USS LEONARD WOOD (STAFF)			16		1	17		47			47	64
USS HAMBLETON								30			3	3
USS WICHITA			1c			1					0	1
USS OBERON			2P			2	11P	62P			73	75
USS NEW YORK			3P			3		31P			31	34
USS BLISS			1c			1		13c 21S			34	35
USS SAVANNAH								3P			3	3
USS MURPHY								4P			4	4
USS HEWES			1c			1		1c 1P			2	3
U. S. ARMY				1c		1			26c		26	27
TOTAL		40	36	2	1	79	550	245	26		821	900

C - Casualties. P - Passengers. S - Survivors. X - Temporary duty.

LIST OF COAST GUARD WOUNDED

Name: PAAJANEN, George N.

Rate: MoMM2c

Service Number: 225-869

Diagnosis: Gun-shot wound left ankle, left and right thighs, and right hand.

Time: 0900, 8 November, 1942.

Place: Wounded when boat was beached and strafed by enemy plane, Fedala, French West Morocco.

Condition: Good.

Name: KLEMCHUK, George W:

Rate: MoMM2c

Service Number: 203-533

Diagnosis: Shrapnel wounds, right and left thighs.

Time: 1230, 8 November, 1942.

Place: Wounded on the beach while attempting to salvage a beached boat at Fedala, French West Morocco.

Condition: Good.

DEBARKATION AND APPROACH SCHEDULE

Time of arrival in transport area - X hour.

Start debarking personnel - X + 60.

All boats in water, hatches stripped. Start loading vehicles-X+95.

Wave No.	principal unit	Boat No.	Alongside	Clear By	Stowage	Loading time
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Red 1 (No. 2 Hatch)

3	$\frac{1}{4}$ ton truck	20	X+95	X+100	2D	
5	$\frac{1}{4}$ ton truck and 37 MM gun	35	X+102	X+113	2D	
5	$\frac{1}{4}$ ton truck and 37 MM gun	36	X+115	X+127	2D	32

Red 2 (No. 3 Hatch)

0	Amphibious jeep	32	X+95	X+100	3D	
0	Radio jeep	43	X+103	X+109	3D	
2	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck	8	X+111	X+119	3D	
5	Small angledozer	37	X+121	X+141	3E	
6	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck	38	X+143	X+151	3E	

Red 3 (No. 4 Hatch)

7	Bull dozer & $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck	44	X+153	X+183	3F & 4E	
7	Bull dozer & $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck	45	X+185	X+206	3F & 4E	
7	Tank & $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck	46	X+208	X+238	3 Hold, 4E	
7	Tank & $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck	47	X+240	X+256	3 Hold, 4F	
7	Tank & $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck	7	X+258	X+274	3 Hold, 4F	
8	$\frac{1}{4}$ ton jeep	48	X+276	X+281	4F	
8	$\frac{1}{4}$ ton jeep	49	X+283	X+290	4F	137

White

1	Assault personnel - Co.A	1	X+60	X+67		
1	Assault personnel - Co.C	2	X+68	X+75		
2	Assault personnel - Co.A	9	X+76	X+83		
2	Assault personnel - Co.C	10	X+84	X+91		
3	Assault personnel - Co.B	16	X+92	X+99		
3	Assault personnel - Co.B	17	X+100	X+107		
4	Assault personnel - Co.D	24	X+108	X+115		
4	Assault personnel - Co.D	25	X+116	X+123		63

Blue

1	Assault personnel - Co. A	3	X+60	X+67		
1	Assault personnel - Co.C	4	X+68	X+75		
2	Assault personnel - Co.A	11	X+76	X+83		
2	Assault personnel - Co.C	12	X+84	X+91		
3	Assault personnel - Co.B	18	X+92	X+99		
3	Assault personnel - Co.B	19	X+100	X+107		
4	Assault personnel - Co.D	26	X+108	X+115		
4	Assault personnel - Co.D	27	X+216	X+123		63

Red 3 (No. 4 Hatch)

6	155 MM Howitzer	39	X+95	X+105	4D	
6	155 MM Howitzer	40	X+107	X+117	4D	
6	155 MM Howitzer	41	X+119	X+129	4D	
6	155 MM Howitzer	42	X+131	X+141	4D	46

DEBARKATION AND APPROACH SCHEDULE

Wave No.	Principal Unit	Boat No.	Alongside By	Clear By	Stowage	Loading Time
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Yellow

3	Assault personnel - Co.B	21	X-60	X-67		
4	Assault personnel - Co.D	28	X-68	X-75		
4	Assault personnel - Co.D	29	X-76	X-83		23

Green 1 (No. 7 Hatch)

2	$\frac{1}{4}$ ton jeep & 37 MM gun	15	X-95	X-109	7E	
5	$\frac{1}{4}$ ton jeep & 37 MM gun	33	X-111	X-125	7E	
5	$\frac{1}{4}$ ton jeep & 37 MM gun	34	X-127	X-141	7E	46

Green 2 (No. 8 Hatch)

1	Assault personnel - Co.A	5	X-60	X-67		
1	Assault personnel - Co.C	6	X-68	X-75		
2	Assault personnel - Co.A	13	X-76	X-83		
2	Assault personnel - Co.C	14	X-84	X-91		
3	Assault personnel - Co.B	22	X-92	X-99		
3	Assault personnel - Co.B	23	X-100	X-107		
4	Assault personnel - Co.D	30	X-108	X-115		
4	Assault personnel - Co.D	31	X-116	X-123		63

APPENDIX K

NARRATIVE BY CHIEF HUNTER WOOD, USCG,

ON USS SAMUEL CHASE - ALGERIA - NORTH AFRICA

Hunter Wood, Chief Boatswain's Mate, USCG, was questioned at some length, on June 11, 1943, at Navy Headquarters in Washington, D. C., by Lieut. Comdr. Moran of the Combat Narrative Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence. The vivid description, given by Wood of the SAMUEL CHASE in Algeria, and also of the sinking of the HMS AVENGER close by, follows almost as he gave it:

I am Chief Boatswain Mate, Hunter Wood, USCG. I entered the Coast Guard December 17, 1941 and served aboard the Coast Guard Cutter ACTIVE. I also saw lifeboat training and various other details to which I was assigned.

My vessel, the USS SAMUEL CHASE, twenty-thousand ton Navy Transport to which I was assigned, was an amphibious force task vessel, heavily armed I might say, and put her in commission and served aboard her for nine months. We trained with the amphibious forces under Commander Jamison in Chesapeake Area (Ocean City) and operated out of N.O.B.

This period of training lasted about three months, I should say. I also went aboard the USS JOSEPH HEWES, for special training in landing operations. We operated with the Army ashore as to details in beach warfare, how to dig slit trenches, how to fall with a rifle, and seek cover as best one could under attack conditions.

We got underway from New York, I don't know the exact date, proceeded to Halifax and there joined convoy bound for Belfast, Ireland. Proceeded in convoy to Ireland, stayed in Belfast a little over a week, unloaded all our cargo, and restowed it, due to improper stowage in New York. The troops at this time were sent ashore for more extensive maneuvers in Ireland. When they returned, with us were the ships STONE, LEEDSTOWN, ALMAACK and my vessel the CHASE.

We maneuvered into the Perth of Clyde and anchored off the town of Inverary, Scotland and there proceeded with more maneuvers, with the Black Watch from Scotland. We stayed in Inverary for a little over a week. I being Chief Boatswain's Mate of the 9th Division; Division of which consisted of approximately forty-eight men, specially trained and picked for landing operations with the Army. Went ashore there in Inverary, went up into the hills with the Army and received instructions from Captain Lombardi, of the U. S. Army and Colonel Brown. There were long hikes and dummy runs, so to speak. As to landing operations, we made one complete landing

operation one evening, which lasted all night, our opposing enemy being the Black Watch. After this training period was over we proceeded in convoy to Greenock, Scotland, and there took on a few additional supplies and proceeded in convoy toward Algiers and the Mediterranean.

I was in the first invasion November 7th, at Cape Matifou, Algeria. My division, I operated under Ensigns McLyn and Banks who were assigned in charge of the 9th Division, landing operations beach party. We got mustered and received photographs, profiles of the sketches and charts, descriptions of the terrain to be expected, studied it so that we could readily visualize it, readily notice the, or recognize rather, the profile of the land which we were to land at. We went over the side at 10 o'clock at night, November 7th, with the Army.

The first encounter we had with the enemy, was about abeam of Oran, the day previous to our landing operation. Some aircraft, either reconnaissance or level bombers, were sighted at approximately 4,500 feet off our port bow. Our British screening fleet opened up on these planes, not hitting any. We all opened up. I might say there was no panic. We had been given pamphlets to read on what to expect of the dive bombing tactics. That is the crews reaction. However, I saw none of this. We proceeded on in and went on with our landing operations. We picked up a submarine who gave us the signal, as had been previously arranged for the exact spot we were to heave to. We were to lie approximately five miles off the beach. When the troops went over the sides we went over with them, the complete 9th Division. The Division was split up and put into various landing boats and proceeded to shore. There was a low-lying fog on the water at this time and it was quite dark. An unidentified bi-plane came in from overland, flew out toward our ships, did not identify itself, showed no recognition signals. She was opened up on by my ship the CHASE, didn't hit her. However, that seemed more or less to disclose activities out there where we were.

The fort at Algiers turned on a huge, a very powerful searchlight and commenced to sweep the area. This light was one of the most powerful I have ever seen. After that, as we proceeded on in during this time, the guns of this Fort at Algiers opened up. There were eight-inch guns there, at the time. Two of our destroyer screen opened up on the fort. The exchange of gunfire continued all the way into the beach, and well on into the early hours of the morning.

There was very little opposition on the beach, with the exception of some few rattled French or Sengalese and Arab snipers. They didn't do much harm to us, however. My beach party then went on with the regular beach party operations, which is establishing a beachhead keeping the traffic lanes open for incoming and outgoing landing boats, repairing damaged ones. There was very slight surf at this time, ideal weather conditions for landing. The spot had been well picked. We landed at RED Beach, that is Division.

The next morning two planes were sighted at approximately twenty-two hundred feet. They came in, they were fired on, and they got away. I might say there was no aerial support whatsoever during this first initial landing operation, due to the fact that our troops were to take over the airport at Algiers, the port, and the town itself, the City of Algiers proper. And until the airport was taken over, there would be no field, no spot for our British air arm support to come in and refuel. They used the fighter plane type, which was all we needed during the first few days. After those planes disappeared, the enemy came back about two hours later--approximately nine or ten bombers, Junkers 88 type--and commenced dive bombing tactics on our fleet. One or two vessels were hit at this time, though not seriously. My vessel, the SAMUEL CHASE, had two near misses. During this engagement several planes were shot down. My vessel was credited with four at the time, the LEEDSTOWN with one, I believe, and the ALMAACK several others. I might say that the gunfire was terrific, FLAK was thrown up into these planes, crews reacted in a splendid manner, like seasoned veterans. After all, taking into consideration that these men were from ages 18 to 24 or 26, had never been under gunfire before, it was really credible the manner in which they stuck to their post and handled their guns and the landing of boats under dive bombing attacks.

The Army on the beach, also, during these attacks, had their Buffers set up and opened up on the planes, scoring several direct hits on some. During the evening, a torpedo bomber attack occurred. About 17 torpedo bombers came in over the hills and out toward the fleet. They seemed intent on destroying or damaging the Army source of supply. They didn't seem to bother us much on the beach, except for an occasional strafing when they came over us, after having bombed the fleet lying a mile and a half off shore. By the way, the fleet had moved in within a mile and a half of our beachhead. That was in order to proceed in a more easy manner with landing operations and heavy tanks, jeeps, bulldozers, ammunition, food supplies, gas, oils and medical equipment and such. During the entire torpedo bombing attacks, I can relate one in particular, that was directed against my vessel. A torpedo bomber came in at 2 points on our starboard bow approximately, and dropped two torpedoes. The exact name or type of that plane, I don't know. It might have been a Heinkel type design. She dropped two torpedoes. One of them missed our bow, that is the stem, by three feet; the other one went down our starboard side. This torpedo that missed our stem went off the port, hit the stern of the troop transport LEEDSTOWN, and knocked the steering gear out of commission.

By the way, I might say of the troop transport STONE, her steering gear had been put out of commission prior to the landing operations. She was the third ship astern of us in convoy position. She was torpedoed by a torpedo bomber, which peeled off and banked right over our fantail. Nobody fired at this plane. It seemed that the STONE showed all her lights. We heard a dull thud back off but didn't realize she was the hit. It was more or less the first

time we had encountered this sort of attack. The STONE then went off into Gibraltar I believe, or was towed on in. That's right, she was towed on in to Algiers, so that she could proceed with her landing operations. She got all of her supplies and equipment off for the Army.

Lt. Comdr. C. Moran:

Q. As I understand it, the RED Beach No. 1 on which you landed is just south of Cape Matifou?

Wood:

A. That is correct.

Comdr. Moran:

Q. How many men do you recall being landed on that beach during the course of the morning?

Wood:

A. I should say approximately four or five thousand.

Comdr. Moran:

Q. Did you have any trouble coming in with compasses?

Wood:

A. There was a little difficulty with compasses continually. The exact cause was that the magnetism there conflicted with the compasses.

Comdr. Moran:

Q. Did the infra red signals, between the landing parties and the shore parties already established, seem to work?

Wood:

A. Well, they did on several occasions. The British WARLIONS which let our first wave in used infra red light to quite satisfactory effect.

Comdr. Moran:

Q. After the first wave had landed, did the boats immediately turn about and go back to the transports or did they wait until the second landing had been made?

Wood:

- A. There was no waiting at all. They immediately shoved off and proceeded back to the vessels.

Comdr. Moran:

- Q. As I understand it, you didn't get a surf until about the early morning of the next day.

Wood:

- A. That is correct. The surf built up there, until approximately the third day it was very heavy.

The landing operations were more or less completed by the third day and the ships with the exception of the LEEDSTOWN, that is the rest of the division, moved around to the northern tip of Cape Matifou.

Lt. Porter:

- Q. Do you want to talk about the losses of any ship during that landing operation?

Wood:

- A. Yes, the LEEDSTOWN, which I saw dive bombed and torpedoed, I can tell you exactly about her, as I witnessed the whole affair. She was completely a Navy-manned transport. I had half of my beach party underneath the cliffs of the town of Ayantags. We were undergoing salvaging operations. We were picking up gear that had been soaked in some of these swamped boats. By the way, there were quite a few boats lost during this landing operation not due entirely to the fault of the coxswains, but I should say more or less the inadequate boats for traffic control. The traffic control boat's duties are to take the landing boats which have broached to on the beach, lead a line to them, in the best manner possible and snake them off, get them out of the way so that you keep the beach clear for other incoming craft. On several occasions these plywood jobs, ramp boats, which I am not in favor of personally and a great many aren't either, were hit by or side-wiped by a heavy tank fighter coming in and crushed like eggshells.

Comdr. Moran:

- Q. As I understand it, your transports were about 5 miles off shore.

Wood:

- A. The transports were 5 miles off shore in the first landing, that

is the first invasion, the first wave. The next morning, they came in to within approximately a mile and a half off shore.

Comdr. Moran:

Q. How long did it take you to make the average run of 5 miles? What time did you leave the transport and what time did you land about?

Wood:

A. Well we went over the side at 10 and got in the beach at approximately, well I should say 2045. That was about the time going in. We went in under muffled exhausts and a regulated speed which instructions had been given the Coxswains.

Comdr. Moran:

Q. How long about, on the average did it take to load the boat, from the side of the transport?

Wood:

A. Well, I can tell you of my vessel alone. I think that as far as landing and loading boats both with a boom and with a whaling davit, it was done in exceptionally fast time. I should say when the order was given by Captain Heimer of my vessel to away the boats, everybody was at his station. Of course everybody knew what to do. We had trained over and over again on this job. Those boats were in the water in approximately twenty-six to twenty-seven minutes--all boats, including tank lighters.

Comdr. Moran:

Q. How long did it take the troops to go down the rope ladders? The nets?

Wood:

A. Well, I couldn't say exactly. The troops were already at the nets, the red, yellow, blue, green, and so forth. They had all been assigned to their nets. I think they went over the side as fast as the boats came up along side the vessel to pick them up, one after the other, the boat pools. I should say the troops from our vessel were all away by approximately $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 hours.

Lt. Porter:

Q. Going back to the plywood landing boats, when they were sunk, were there many casualties?

Wood:

A. There were no casualties during this occasion but there were several bruises. To go on with the LEEDSTOWN incident: It was approximately three in the afternoon, not using the sea-going term for time. At that time the planes were heard overhead. We looked up and saw a Junkers 88 come out and make a long shallow bank, to the starboard, and come in sort of a level dive--it could be expressed that way--toward the LEEDSTOWN. She dropped three bombs, as they all did at one time, and those bombs did not hit the LEEDSTOWN. They were a near miss, landing on her port side. Another Junkers came in to starboard and dropped three more on her. They were also a near miss. There was gunfire from the LEEDSTOWN and some from the British corvette which was lying off her port bow. About a minute later, there was a terrific explosion in her starboard side amidships, and we believe a submarine was in there and put two torpedoes into her. It was either a submarine or else this Junkers carried torpedoes with her and had dropped them. But I hadn't seen them drop from her. I saw the bombs. She rolled over and after settling she commenced to settle down to starboard, listing quite heavily to starboard.

Comdr. Moran:

Q. Was "H" hour at two?

Wood:

A. Yes, it was.

Comdr. Moran:

Q. Was there any postponement?

Wood:

A. No, not that I know of.

The crew of the LEEDSTOWN was seen to abandon ship, all in rafts about five men to a raft, and one ramp boat got away. In this ramp boat were stretcher cases and men taken from sick bay aboard. The rest of the rafts, I should say approximately 28, drifted directly down to my beach, where we were. The sea by this time was very heavy, and there was a very, very, strong undertow from the beach. I dispatched what men I had with me out along the beach over into the rocky section of it on both ends and some on the sandy place where we were. There was very little place there, or sandy stretch that is, for a raft to come in on. However, it seemed good luck or the fates that brought the sailors from the LEEDSTOWN in there. The majority of those rafts managed to get right in to the sandy area. The wind blew them directly on a

straight line from the stern of the LEEDSTOWN, directly to the town of Ayantayo, where our boys were. As they came in on these rafts, the sailors singing and trying to keep up the morale, the way they do, they didn't realize the treacherousness of the surf. The surf never looks as large as it really is from the seaward side. As they came in, we took off our clothes, took small lines of the bowline and went out into the surf as far as we dared go. We sang out to these sailors to get out of their rafts and hang on to the sides. Some of them heard, some didn't. The rafts, however, came in, and capsized right in the surf. There was a terrific look of shock and strain on the faces of the sailors as they came in from that abuse, after having been bombed and torpedoed.

They were floating around there in the Kapoks, faces down, rendered more or less unconscious, the rafts having come down on top of them after they had been capsized. Some rafts that had already been emptied were swept back by the undertow and banged right into them. All hands worked until they were nearly exhausted. The people from the town of Ayantayo came down to the beach afterwards and they also went into the water to snake these sailors out. The Army also gave us a hand there. The beach was quite a scene of activity there, for I should say $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 hours.

The sailors from the LEEDSTOWN were taken up into a theater, an old theater there in the town of Ayantayo where straw had been strewn all over the deck, and the sailors were made as comfortable as possible. They were shivering, of course, as it was quite chilly at the time there. They were given alcoholic beverages to straighten them out a little. The French people, I might say, were very fine towards the sailors, very friendly towards them, gave them shoes and clothing in a great many cases.

The LEEDSTOWN, however, didn't sink exactly that night. She kept. She just lay there and listed, and I went into the little villa that we have on the beach that night. I took a last look at her at dusk and saw she was all right. She still listed though. At 12 o'clock that night there was an explosion and the LEEDSTOWN sank. I don't know the exact cause of that explosion. The next morning at dawn when we looked over there all that could be seen was the truck of her mast in the water. She was sunk.

The crew of the LEEDSTOWN were brought back to lower Scotland aboard the USS SAMUEL CHASE. The sailors, of course, were nervous a little bit, as all hands were, for we were in a pretty hot zone there. Of course, they did not have many clothes, the men aboard ship. The stores were opened up to those sailors, and also the majority of the crew of the CHASE gave whatever clothes they could spare to these boys.

That is about all I can tell you on the LEEDSTOWN incident.

Going back to England, however, the British aircraft carrier AVENGER joined our convoy and took the position dead astern of my

ship, approximately 500 yards distance and that, well, we were well outside the Straits of Gibraltar when I was Chief Bos'n's Mate of the watch, from 12 to 4 and at approximately 0330 a.m. the general alarms sounded. I just finished making my rounds of the gun crews, and reported to the OD on the Deck "all secure on deck."

I went below for coffee and no sooner got there than general alarm sounded, and went to battle stations. My gun was forward. By the way, I was assistant battery officer then on the 3-inch 50 and 20 mm. I no sooner got up to the station than there was a terrific muffled explosion dead astern of us, and a sheet of flame approximately 200 feet high went straight up into the air, and dense black smoke and objects seemed to fly through the air on fire. These were bodies of the crew of the AVENGER. She was hit on her port side amidships and these torpedoes ignited her high octane gas tanks. She broke completely in half and her flight decks extended at terrific angle both fore and aft. She then warped out into a U shape towards starboard and disappeared and was engulfed in black smoke and the night. We could hear the cries of the men aboard the AVENGER and feel the heat of her. Our five-inch gun crew aft on the fantail had to hold their hands against their faces, for the heat of the nearness of the explosion. Two other vessels were hit at this time. A British corvette and the USS ALMAACK. The ALMAACK was hit amidships on the starboard side, I believe the fireroom. There were several casualties aboard her. By the way, we brought several of her crew back to the United States aboard our vessel from Gibraltar. When I last saw her, she was lying there alongside the quay, along the coal supply base.

The HMS AVENGER, sank in approximately seven minutes. I think I am quite safe in saying that out of a crew of approximately five hundred forty some odd men, only a handful of survivors were picked up by a British corvette. We proceeded back to Greenock, Scotland and took aboard British troops then returned to Algiers and on this return trip, however, we went right on into the city proper, alongside the docks and debarked the troops. There was very little activity during this second trip. From there we went into Gibraltar and lay there nineteen days waiting for a convoy back to the States. During that nineteen days, however, it might be interesting to mention they had sort of a suicide gang of people, I don't know whether they were Spanish or German, that used to swim out and attach a mine or torpedo to the vessels that were lying at anchor there. Four vessels, I understand, were sunk in this way right outside of Gibraltar lying in there near the town of Lalelie. However, we had our landing boats circling our vessel all night long and had a special watch set on deck to look out for anything that appeared to be a human torpedo, as they were referred to. We left Gibraltar for the United States on New Year's Day.

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SYMBOLS OF U. S. NAVY SHIPS

AB	Crane ship.
AD	Destroyer tender.
AE	Ammunition ship.
AF	Provision store ship.
AG	Miscellaneous auxiliary.
AGC	Combined operations communications headquarters ship.
AGP	Motor torpedo boat tender.
AGS	Surveying ship.
AH	Hospital ship.
AK	Cargo vessel.
AKA	Cargo vessel, attack.
AKN	Net cargo ship.
AKS	General stores issue ship.
AKV	Aircraft supply ship.
AM	Large minesweeper.
AMb	Base minesweeper.
AMc	Coastal minesweeper.
AN	Net layer.
AO	Oiler.
AOG	Gasoline tanker.
AP	Transport.
APA	Transport, attack.
APc	Coastal transport.
APD	Troop transport (high speed).
APH	Transport for wounded.
AFL	Hotel barge (barracks ship).
APM	Mechanized artillery transport.
APS	Auxiliary cargo submarine.
APV	Aircraft transport.
AR	Repair ship.
ARB	Repair ship, battle damage.
ARD	Floating drydock.
ARG	Internal combustion engine tender.
ARH	Heavy hull repair ship.
ARL	Repair ship, landing craft.
ARS	Salvage vessel.
ARV	Aircraft engine overhaul and structural repair ship.
AS	Submarine tender.
ASR	Submarine rescue vessel.
AT	Oceangoing tug.
ATR	Rescue tug.
AV	Seaplane tender (large).
AVC	Catapult lighter.
AVD	Seaplane tender (converted DD).
AVP	Seaplane tender (small).
AW	Water distilling and storage ship.
AY	Auxiliary tender, small.
BB	Battleship.

CA	Heavy cruiser.
CAZ	Auxiliary unallocated as to type (conversion).
CB	Large cruiser.
CL	Light cruiser.
CM	Mine layer.
CMc	Coastal mine layer.
CV	Aircraft carrier.
CVB	Large aircraft carrier.
CVE	Aircraft carrier escort.
CVL	Small aircraft carrier.
DD	Destroyer.
DE	Destroyer escort.
DM	Light mine layer (high speed).
DMS	Minesweeper (high speed).
IX	Unclassified.
LCC	Landing craft, control.
LCI(L)	Landing craft, infantry (large).
LCM(2)	45' landing craft, mechanized, Mk. II.
LCM(3)	50' landing craft, mechanized, Mk. III.
LCM(6)	56' landing craft, mechanized, Mk. VI.
LCP(L)	36' landing craft, personnel (large).
LCP(R)	36' landing craft, personnel (with ramp).
LCP(N)	Landing craft, personnel (nested).
LCR(L)	Landing craft, rubber (large).
LCR(S)	Landing craft, rubber (small).
LCS(S)	Landing craft, support (small).
LCT(5)	Landing craft, tank, Mk. V.
LCT(6)	Landing craft, tank, Mk. VI.
LCV	Landing craft, vehicle.
LCVP	Landing craft, vehicle and personnel.
LSD	Landing ship, dock.
LSM	Landing ship, medium.
LST	Landing ship, tank.
LVT(1)	Landing vehicle, tracked (unarmored).
LVT(2)	Landing vehicle, tracked (unarmored).
LVT(3)	Landing vehicle, tracked (unarmored).
LVT(4)	Landing vehicle, tracked (unarmored).
LVT(A1)	Landing vehicle, tracked (armored).
LVT(A2)	Landing vehicle, tracked (armored).
LVT(A3)	Landing vehicle, tracked (armored).
PC	173' submarine chaser.
PCE	180' patrol craft escort vessel.
PCE(R)	180' patrol craft escort vessel, rescue.
PCS	136' submarine chaser.
PE	Eagle boat.
PF	Frigate.
PG	Gunboat.

PGM	Motor gunboat.
PR	River gunboat.
PT	Motor torpedo boat.
PY	Yacht.
PYc	Coastal yacht.
SC	110' submarine chaser.
SS	Submarine.
YA	Ash lighter.
YAG	District auxiliary, miscellaneous.
YC	Open lighter.
YCF	Car float.
YCK	Open cargo lighter.
YCV	Aircraft transportation lighter.
YDG	Degaussing vessel.
YDT	Diving tender.
YF	Covered lighter; range tender; provision store lighter.
YFB	Ferryboat and launch.
YFD	Floating drydock.
YFT	Torpedo transportation lighter.
YG	Garbage lighter.
YHB	Ambulance boat.
YHB	Houseboat.
YHT	Heating scow.
YMS	Motor minesweeper.
YMT	Motor tug.
YN	Net tender.
YNg	Gate vessel.
YNT	Net tender (tug class).
YO	Fuel oil barge.
YOG	Gasoline barge.
YOS	Oil storage barge.
YP	District patrol vessel.
YPK	Pontoon stowage barge.
YR	Floating workshop.
YRD(H)	Floating workshop, drydock (hull).
YRD(M)	Floating workshop, drydock (machinery).
YS	Stevedore barge.
YSD	Seaplane wrecking derrick.
YSP	Salvage pontoon.
YSR	Sludge removal barge.
YT	Harbor tug.
YTT	Torpedo testing barge.
YW	Water barge.

DESIGNATIONS OF U. S. NAVAL AIRCRAFT

Class of airplane	Model designation		U. S. name
	Navy	Army	
Fighter, 2-eng.....	F7F.....	
	XF5U.....	
Fighter, 1-eng.....	F2A.....	Buffalo
	F3A.....	Corsair
	F4U.....	Corsair
	FM.....	Wildcat
	FG.....	Corsair
	F2G-1.....	Corsair
	F4F.....	Wildcat
	F6F.....	Hellcat
	FR.....	
	XF8B.....	
	XF14C.....	
	XFD.....	
Scout Bomber, 1-eng....	SB2A.....	A-34.....	Bermuda
	SBW.....	A-25.....	Helldiver
	SBC.....	77-A.....	Helldiver
	SB2C.....	A-25.....	Helldiver
	BTC.....	
	SBD.....	A-24.....	Dauntless
	BTD.....	
	SBF.....	A-25.....	Helldiver
	BTM.....	
	SBN.....	
	SB2U.....	Vindicator
Torpedo Bomber, 1-eng..	TBY.....	
	TBD.....	Devastator
	TB2D.....	
	TBM.....	Avenger
	TBF.....	Avenger
Patrol Bomber, boat,...	PB2Y.....	Coronado
4-eng.			
Patrol Bomber, boat,...	PB2P.....	OA-10.....	Catalina
2-eng.			
	PBY-5, 5A....	OA-10.....	Catalina
	P4Y.....	
	PBM.....	Mariner
	PBN.....	OA-10.....	Catalina
	XPBB.....	Sea Ranger
	GANSO "A"....	OA-10B.....	
Bomber, land, 4-eng....	PB4Y.....	B-24.....	Liberator
Bomber, land, 2-eng....	PBO.....	AT-18 (A-29)....	Hudson
	PBJ.....	B-25.....	Mitchell
	FV.....	B-34.....	Ventura
	XP2V.....	

Class of airplane	Model designation		U. S. name
	Navy	Army	
Special Purpose, 1-eng..	TDN.....	
	TDC.....	PQ-8.....	
	TD2C.....	PQ-14.....	
	TDR.....	
	TDD.....	OQ-2A.....	
Helicopter, 1-eng.....	HNS-1.....	R-4B.....	
	HO2S-1.....	R-5.....	
	HOS-1.....	R-6.....	
	XHOS-1.....	XR-6.....	