

# THE COAST GUARD AT WAR

## SICILY - ITALY LANDINGS

X



PREPARED IN THE  
HISTORICAL SECTION  
PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION  
U.S. COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS  
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It has been found, from past experience, that valuable material is received after a monograph has been carefully prepared in every detail and distributed, too late for the new material to be incorporated into the story. This monograph is, therefore, submitted in first draft, for distribution to members of the Service in order that material still not at hand may be obtained from them or suggestions made by them as to what is still needed. Some parts are still in the form of notes, credit being indicated in the list of sources as well as in the main part of the story in some cases. Readers are requested to send in their material and suggestions at this time so that they may be incorporated into the final draft.



".... To destroy Nazi tyranny and establish a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford insurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

Purpose of World War II, as expressed in the Atlantic Charter.

".... Nine months after the first landings in North Africa, the Allied Force had not merely cleared its shore of enemy force, but had wrested from him the Sicilian bridge to use as our own in an advance on to the Italian mainland."

/s/ General Eisenhower


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PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TALKING WITH PRIME MINISTER WINSTON CHURCHILL AS THEY SAT ON THE LAWN  
OF THE PRESIDENT'S VILLA AT CASABLANCA. WEEK OF JANUARY, 17, 1943



**PART I**

**THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT**

**As described in General Marshall's Report  
to the Secretary of War, in 1945**

**CASABLANCA  
MEETING IN  
JANUARY 1943**

In January 1943, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, met at Casablanca. "It was then apparent," General Marshall's Report to the Secretary of War stated, "that our North African operation was to be successful, even beyond original calculations. Tunisia was a lure into which the German command continued to pour great quantities of men and materiel, commitments that were certain to be disastrous for the enemy once the winter rains ceased and the low clouds over the Sicilian Strait cleared, in the face of overwhelming Allied superiority on the sea and in the air. At the conclusion of the North African campaign, enemy killed and captured numbered 349,206 Italian and German troops, and there had been captured or destroyed on land alone nearly 200,000 tons of enemy materiel."

**DECISION MADE  
TO ASSAULT  
SICILY--  
OPERATION HUSKY**

"The problem before the Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca was the next movement to be made following the completion of the Tunisian campaign," the Report continued. "It still would have been preferable to close immediately with the German enemy in Western Europe or even in Southern France had that been possible of achievement with the resources then available to General Eisenhower. It was not. Axis control of the Mediterranean islands and the entire reach of the southern coast of Europe from Franco's Spain to Turkey denied our communications also across the Mediterranean and forced our shipping into a 12,000-mile detour around the Cape of Good Hope. The United States was still involved in the process of a vast mobilization. The Chiefs of Staff therefore considered whether we had the strength to move directly to Italy or what might be the best intermediary steps. It was decided to assault Sicily (operation HUSKY) and, with the approval of the Heads of State, General Eisenhower was advised on 23 January: 'The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved that an attack against Sicily will be launched in 1943 with the target date as the period of the favorable July moon.'"

**TRIDENT CONFERENCE  
PLANS EXPENDED  
ALLIED CONTROL IN  
MEDITERRANEAN**

However, before the assault of Sicily was actually undertaken, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff met again in Washington, in May 1943, this meeting being designated the TRIDENT conference. "It was at this Conference," General Marshall's Report stated, "that the Combined Chiefs.





of Staff decided to extend Allied influence in the Mediterranean to the point where Italy would be forced to withdraw from the war."

#### INVASION OF EUROPE BEGINS

The invasion of Europe began the night of July 9, 1943. Following a crescendo of bombing attacks which knocked out several of the more important enemy airfields, destroyed substantial numbers of Axis aircraft either on the ground or in the air, and disrupted local transport and communications, a force of American and British airborne troops descended on the southeast corner of Sicily. In the early morning of Saturday, July 10, strong Allied forces, made up of American, British, and Canadian troops, under the command of General Eisenhower, began landing operations in southern Sicily. Intensive air attacks by Allied air forces preceded and accompanied the invasion, and supplied widespread fighter cover for the landings, which continued throughout the day.

#### BEGINNING OF THE END

Geographically speaking, the mountainous, vineyard-covered island of Sicily was not an integral part of Hitler's "Festung Europe," but strategically, economically, and politically it was. President Roosevelt, in telling the news late on the evening of the 9th to a group at the White House who were attending a dinner in honor of General Giraud, recalled that Prime Minister Churchill had called the Allied invasion of North Africa the preceding November "the end of the beginning." Said the President, "I think you can almost say that this action tonight is the beginning of the end."

#### RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS TO BE SPARED

President Roosevelt addressed a communication to Pope Pius XII in which he said that during the struggles ahead, "churches and religious institutions will, to the extent that is within our power, be spared the devastations of war." He also stated that "throughout the period of operations the neutral status of Vatican City, as well as of the papal domains throughout Italy, will be respected."

#### FIRST STEP IN LIBERATION

On the day of the invasion, a message from General Eisenhower to the French people in France was broadcast in which he warned the French people to keep calm, not to be deceived by false rumors and not to expose themselves to reprisals through premature action. Calling the invasion of Sicily "the first step in the liberation of the European continent," he promised that "when the hour of action strikes, we will let you know."

#### SICILY LANDINGS A BIG AFFAIR

The invasion of Sicily was a very big affair. The British landed on the east side, the Americans on the west side. The American area was divided into three sections. In the center portion, the SAMUEL CHASE and the JOSEPH T. DICKMAN, both Coast Guard manned, had a considerable role in the landings. The LEONARD WOOD, Coast Guard manned, was in the southern section, having come directly from the

VICE ADMIRAL R. R. WAESCHE, COMMANDANT OF THE U. S. COAST GUARD  
PINS THE LEGION OF MERIT ON CAPTAIN CHARLES W. HARWOOD





States with the 45th Army Division. In the northern section were many LCI's, making their first appearance. They had been organized in the States and formed a large part of the northern force. On those vessels were very able crews. In addition, there were a few LST's, Coast Guard manned.

"WENT OFF  
LIKE CLOCK  
WORK"

The invasion of Sicily was looked upon with considerable dread. "Everybody was pretty scared," Captain Charles W. Harwood, USCG, Commanding Officer of the DICKMAN, later related. "We thought—I mean the higher authority—that we might take a shellacking.

As a result, everything was planned in detail. We had full dress rehearsals. We had experienced ships and experienced men. The thing went off like clockwork. We ran into some opposition, but there were no submarines involved at this time. Sometimes our own planes and sometimes the enemy were overhead. I regretted that they never seemed to tangle when they were in our vicinity. They did strafe the beaches and they dropped bombs occasionally. They had been flying around and hadn't really hurt us any, and one afternoon I was dissertating to the rest of the officers on how foolish this high altitude bombing was - they couldn't hit us. In the middle of that I heard one of the yeomen say, 'They are dropping leaflets on us!' The leaflets turned out to make a lot of noise. They knocked a lot of holes in us and wounded a few men. It was only a close miss, but close enough to make the boys realize they had been around."

A DISTINGUISHED  
COAST GUARD  
LEADER

In Sicily, as in North Africa, Commander (later Captain) Harwood was one of the most able leaders, distinguishing himself for sound judgment in planning, thorough indoctrination of his forces, and by his cool and skillful leadership under fire. In addition to his duty as

Commanding Officer of the Transport, JOSEPH T. DICKMAN, he commanded the Naval Task Group which landed assault battalions directly on the beaches fronting Gela, Sicily. How he came through unscathed while close beside him men were wounded and killed, is a saga of dauntless courage, confidence and faith. As if covered by a shield and buckler, he seemed oblivious of the terror by night and the arrow that flew by day. A thousand fell at his side, but it did not come near him. One of his men reported, "Captain Harwood is awfully cool under fire."

BRAVERY  
REWARDED

Discussing bravery in battle, some time later, the Captain told of an enlisted man who became excited and lifted his hands high above his head, as if to protect himself, as a shell whizzed by. The fear-

less officer stood absolutely still, and he remained unhurt, the shell passing harmlessly by above his head. On the other hand, the man who raised his hands was struck! Feeling some blood on his neck, he thought he was hurt there, but later discovered the blood came from a wound in his hand. Captain Harwood, a kindly, understanding person, observed that of course the man had raised his hands in a sort of reflex act to ward off danger, and then added with a smile that if that man had kept his hands down the shell would have passed harmlessly by above him.

COMMANDER (NOW CAPTAIN) ROGER C. HEIMER



CAPTAIN HARWOOD'S  
CITATION

Captain Harwood was awarded the Legion of Merit for outstanding service while commanding this Naval Task Group during the assault on Sicily. The award was made by Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt, Commander of the U. S. Naval Forces in Northwest African Waters, in the name of the President of the United States, and was presented by Admiral Waesche. The citation awarding the Legion of Merit to Captain Harwood reads: "For exceptionally meritorious performance of outstanding service as Commander of a Naval Task Group during the amphibious assault on the Island of Sicily. In addition to his duty as commanding officer of a U. S. transport, Captain Harwood commanded the Naval Task Group which landed assault battalions directly on the beaches fronting Gela, Sicily. By his sound judgment in planning, thorough indoctrination of his forces, and by his cool and skillful leadership under fire the assault battalions were expeditiously landed and supported, thereby greatly contributing to the success of the invasion. The able leadership and outstanding professional skill displayed by Captain Harwood reflected great credit upon himself and the Naval Service."

JOINT  
PLANS

D-day was fixed for July 10, 1943. H-hour was set at 0245. In broad terms, the attack against Sicily was to be made by two attack forces--the American, the Western Task Force; and the British, the Eastern Task Force. The plan was to sever Sicily from its mainland connection and force it to fall of its own weight. Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, USN, was in command of the naval strength of the Western Task Force. Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., was in command of the Western Task Force Army Troops. Over-all naval command was under Admiral Cunningham of the Royal Navy.

PLAN OF OPERATION

The Western Naval Task Force, under Vice Admiral Hewitt was divided into three main attack forces - Joss, Dime, and Cent. Joss Attack Force, under the Commander Landing Craft and Bases, Northwest African Waters, Rear Admiral Richard L. Connolly, USN, had as its first objective the port and airfield at Licata. Aboard its flagship was Major General Lucien Truscott, Commander of the 3rd Division. Operating as part of the Joss Force was LCI(L) FLOTILLA FOUR, in command of Commander Miles H. Inlay, USCG. Its landing position would be on the left flank of the beach area.

Dime Attack Force, under the Commander Amphibious Force, Northwest African Waters, Rear Admiral John L. Hall, Jr., USN, had as its initial objective the capture of Gela and the airfield at Ponte Olivo. Aboard the Dime flagship was Major General Terry Allen, commanding the 1st Division. Two Coast Guard manned transports formed part of Dime Attack Force: the USS SAMUEL CHASE, flagship, (Commander Roger C. Heimer, USCG), and the JOSEPH T. DICKMAN, (Commander Charles W. Harwood, USCG). This group would strike at the center of the beach area.

REAR ADMIRAL MERLIN O'NEILL, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD  
PICTURED ON BOARD THE ASSAULT TRANSPORT, LEONARD WOOD, WHICH HE  
COMMANDED (IN THE RANK OF CAPTAIN) DURING OPERATIONS AGAINST  
NORTH AFRICA, SICILY, AND IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC



Cent Attack Force, under the Commander Sixth Amphibious Force, Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk, USN, had as its objective the capture of Scoglitti, and the airfields of Corniso and Biscari. Cent Force would land the 45th Division troops under the command of Major General Troy H. Middleton. In Cent Attack Force was the Coast Guard manned transport LEONARD WOOD, (Commander Merlin O'Neill, USCG). This group would strike on the right flank.

In addition, there were minesweeping and minelaying groups, destroyer divisions and squadrons, light cruisers and destroyers for shore bombardment prior to troop landings, PT squadrons, smaller auxiliary patrol craft and landing craft, all of whose duties were to be part of the HUSKY Naval Operation Plan, which involved roughly: 2,500 vessels; 4,000 aircraft; and 250,000 troops.<sup>1</sup>

The operation at Scoglitti was to be ship-to-shore, that is, troops would land from transports in small craft; that at Licata was to be shore-to-shore, that is, troops would come all the way in larger landing craft; and that at Gela was to be mixed. In all three areas, the initial assault troops were landed in LCVP's, whether they had been brought to the area in transports or in the larger types of landing craft.

Eisenhower's first orders posted to the Force were as follows.

"We are about to engage in the second phase of the Operations which began with the invasion of North Africa.

"We have defeated the enemy's forces on the south shore of the Mediterranean and captured his Army intact.

"The French in North Africa, from whom the yoke of Axis domination has been lifted, are now our loyal Allies.

"However, this is not enough. Our untiring pressure on the enemy must be maintained, and we are about to pursue the invasion and occupation of enemy territory.


"The successful conclusion of these operations will not only strike closer to the heart of the Axis, but also will remove the last threat to the free sea lanes of the Mediterranean.

"Remember that this time it is indeed enemy territory which we are attacking, and as such we must expect extremely difficult fighting.

1. See Appendix B for complete list of Coast Guard and Coast Guard manned vessels in this operation.



DOWN COME THE RAMPS AS COAST GUARD LANDING CRAFT HIT THE BEACH DURING THE INVASION OF SICILY



"But we have learned to work smoothly alongside one another as a team, and many of you who will be in the first ranks of this force know full well the meaning of air and naval superiority.

"The task is difficult but your skill, courage, and devotion to duty will be successful in driving our enemies closer to disaster and leading us towards victory and the liberation of Europe and Asia."

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
General, U. S. Army  
Commander-in-Chief

LANDINGS  
SUCCESSFUL

The American forces landed between east of Licata and east of Gela, the Canadians around Pachino, and the British units south of Syracuse. The initial landings of the main assault force on July 10, made before dawn at points along the southeastern and southern coast, extended one hundred miles from south of Syracuse to east of Porto Empedocle. In spite of heavy swells and unfavorable weather conditions, the landings proceeded according to plan and by 0600 enemy resistance had been neutralized by the heavy firing of our covering naval force, and the success of all the landings was assured. By 0730, our troops were advancing inland and artillery was being put ashore. Enemy air opposition to the landings was notably light.


ENEMY  
SURPRISED

Long-anticipated as the attack had been both by us and by the enemy, its actual materialization seemed to have surprised the foe. Most of the enemy forces were concentrated in the western and northern parts of the island, and, for the first few days at least, the enemy was unable to move his forces in any great strength to block our advances from the southeast. As the week ended, our troops seemed to be securely established on the Sicilian shore from Licata on the south to Augusta on the east, a distance of about one hundred fifty miles. Several airfields were already in our hands, while our command of the area enabled us to maintain a constant flow of reinforcements from Tunisia and Libya.

HEAVIEST  
RESISTANCE  
IN GELA AREA

Apparently the heaviest resistance was met in the Gela area, where some German units supported by tanks and a considerable force of Italian infantry were beaten back by American troops. Opposing the landings was an estimated Axis force of from 200,000 to 300,000 men under nominal command of Italian General Alfredo Guzzoni but actually controlled by German General Hans Hube. The first Axis counter-attack came on July 11, when the 4th Italian Division, supported by a hundred German tanks, struck the American beachhead at Gela. The attack penetrated to within a half a mile of the beach at one point but was finally

AN LCM IS LAUNCHED FROM A COAST GUARD MANNED TRANSPORT





driven off by artillery and naval gunfire. After this attack, Axis resistance in the southern area diminished rapidly. Coastal fighting was said to have revealed poor enemy fighting qualities and to have indicated that Italian morale was extremely low. The civilian inhabitants were in the main friendly and cooperative towards our forces.

BRITISH  
SUBMARINES  
GUIDE CONVOY

As the Attack Forces of the Western Task Force separated for their rendezvous stations, three British submarines that had reached their positions much earlier, waiting quietly in the enemy waters for this moment, surfaced and guided the silent transports into their anchorage. It was past midnight, July 10, D-Day. The ships were close to shore, close enough for the men to see the fires burning from the bombs that had been dropping all day long. On every ship, battle stations were manned. Troops and boat crews were ready.

BOMBARDMENT  
BEGINS

By 0030, most of the Western Task Force vessels were anchored in their assigned positions. The shore bombardment groups of cruisers and destroyers were ready. The anti-submarine screens of destroyers and patrol craft were sweeping like silent sentries to the seaward and on the flanks.

LAUNCHING  
AMPHIBIOUS  
CRAFT

Getting the small craft overside was risky, tricky work. Tackle parted, boats were stove in. On the FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE, for example, a 25-ton LCM broke loose as it was being hoisted outboard, and began to swing like a pendulum with the roll of the ship, banging up against the ship, now up by the bridge, now by the fantail. And every time she struck the ship's side something gave, with a booming crash that could be heard through the entire transport area. Little rocket boats were smashed and sank as soon as they hit the water. It was a nasty, dangerous business to be carried on in pitch darkness, under the guns of a waiting enemy.


CASUALTIES  
LIGHT

But the job was done, with surprisingly few casualties. The small boats formed their circles, came alongside; the soldiers clambered down the cargo nets into the heaving, bobbing craft. And at 0215 - right on time - the boats of the Dime and Joss forces headed for the beaches of Sicily. There was an hour's delay in the Cent Area, caused by the weather, then the boats of that force, too, raced in for the assault.

LANDINGS AT GELA

The following eye-witness account by Captain Harwood gives an all-over picture of what operation HUSKY looked like as the assault got underway.

U. S. COAST GUARD MANNED COMBAT TRANSPORT JOSEPH T. DICKMAN



### CAPTAIN HARWOOD'S ACCOUNT<sup>1</sup>

The JOSEPH T. DICKMAN, APA No. 13, was manned for the greater part by men and officers from the Coast Guard; with some Navy boats' crews, other ratings, and Navy Officers. The ship was commissioned June 10, 1941 and went immediately to Onslow Bay to train and conduct exercises with units of the First Division (Army). Some of these same troops came back aboard a little over two years later in the Mediterranean and made the landings at Gela, Sicily, with us.

The DICKMAN had been ordered to the Pacific but received orders, after making a convoy trip to Brisbane, Australia, to report to the Atlantic Amphibious Force. We were then assigned to the Mediterranean Area and enroute took a consignment of colored troops, about twenty-five hundred of them, from Norfolk to Oran. We were part of an Attack Transport Division under Captain Edgar, USN.

Upon arrival at Oran the Division reported to Admiral Hall, to become part of the Amphibious Force of the Northwest African Waters. For about a month, there, we trained units of the First Division and, in company with the other ships, held a full dress rehearsal at Andaluses Bay. Here actual conditions were simulated as nearly as possible. However, a change in plans was made and the DICKMAN was assigned as a task group leader to land a special force consisting of Rangers, combat engineers, and a chemical war service battalion which was to provide artillery support. This unit was equipped with 4.2 mortars. A unit of the RAF, which was complete with trucks, bombs, lubricating oil, gasoline, and mats for the field was also attached. We moved up to Algiers for the final staging.

The landings at Sicily were to be made by three task forces of American units. The one to the northward near Licata, was to be composed of small craft carrying an Army division which was mounted at Bizerte. The central force, which was called the "Dime" force was to land at Gela, and on the beaches below Gela. A third unit, the "Cent," made up of transports under Admiral Kirk, was to come directly from the States and land new troops about twelve miles below Gela.

The task group to which the DICKMAN was assigned was made up, in addition to the DICKMAN, of two British transports, the PRINCE CHARLES and the PRINCE LEOPOLD, some LCI's and LST, one PC boat assigned as the boat group control, and two SC's assigned for secondary control and close fire support. During the rehearsal at Andaluses, the two British boats were not present,

1. See Official Report in Appendix E

U. S. COAST GUARD GUNNERS TENSELY STUDY THE LOWERING SKIES FOR ENEMY PLANES  
AS THE COAST GUARD-MANNED TRANSPORT NEARS SICILY



but appeared after we arrived at Algiers. There was time available at Algiers to hold joint exercises, and these were held both in the day time and the night. The principal desire was to indoctrinate the boat crews and the wave commanders, and to see that the technique of both services and all phases of the plans were understood, by every man in the unit. We loaded troops in Algiers and sailed about four days before the assumed date for landing. The Southern Task Force, which had rendezvoused at Oran, fell in behind us, the second day out. The ships sailed down through the Tunisian war channel and headed to the eastward, then turned up and took a departure off Malta. The column of LST's and LCI's, which had stayed at Bizerte and Tunis, joined us that afternoon, that is on D-1 day.

Very heavy weather was encountered. This did not particularly affect the larger ships but made very rough going for the LCI's and the patrol craft. They were able to pull through, however, and were in their assigned positions when we arrived off the beaches. A British submarine, the SHAKESPEARE, had been assigned to reconnoiter the area prior to our arrival and take a definite position off the approach. During the last few hours the sea moderated considerably and the visibility became excellent. We were able to pick up the signals from the SHAKESPEARE from some distance off and made the approach on her without any difficulty. The ships were in column at this time with the cruiser SAVANNAH acting as tactical command and leading the column. The DICKMAN was next in line, followed by the units of her task group. We had been warned that the planes carrying airborne troops would probably pass over us as we approached. The landings were scheduled to occur shortly after the moon had set. This was arranged so the paratroops could have some light to effect their landings and then the shipborne units could land at the darkest period. Shortly after we rounded the turn where the submarine beacon was located, the returning planes passed over us, flying about masthead height. In fact they looked so close that I thought they would carry away our barrage balloon. We could see the firing on the island, particularly tracers firing at the planes and some lights. Bonfires were burning. These were visible eight or ten miles distant. After we rounded the submarine, whose position we were able to check and determine as fairly close, a run was made at a definite speed and course and we stopped at what was very nearly the exact position we had determined on for lowering our boats.

This was a very critical phase of the operation, from the transport view-point, because of the difficulty the small boats have in running into the beach, which was unmarked at the time they started. The distance of around six miles, with unreliable compasses, could cause the boats to get off as much as a mile or two. During the final



COAST GUARDSMEN ON GUN WATCH OFF THE SHORES OF SICILY.  
THEIR TRANSPORT CARRIES U. S. ARMY CONTINGENTS



approach, activities ashore subsided somewhat, as though they had thought the show was over for the evening. When we arrived in that area we stopped and gave some predetermined signals to the ships astern of us so that the entire force would be in its prescribed positions. A boat was lowered immediately for the use of the beach-marking crew. They went immediately in toward the beaches that had been assigned to the force. These beaches lay one on each side of a mole which extended out from Gela about a thousand feet. It had been hoped to seize this mole and use it for unloading of vessels, particularly the LST's. We had considerable time in which to lower our troops and I had intended to wait awhile after we got there in order to prevent the troops from having too long a lay in the boat, pending the run into the beach. However, there was still some activity ashore and a searchlight from the beach began to swing around. It was a rather peculiar thing about the light that each time it swung over us it was lifted. It looked almost as though it was intentional and a rumor (that some of our casualties came back with) was that the Italians thought that their own ships had come in to protect them. They said that they expected the landing and thought that their own Navy had come down to thwart it. Seeing these lights, and knowing the position of the Italian batteries, it seemed that they might start to work on us at any moment so we put our troops in the water and had them ready to go.

The DICKMAN could land a complete unit, that is lower them and have them ready to start into the beach, in about twenty minutes. In this case about an hour and a half was available, but it was necessary to get them clear so that if shells started landing the casualties would be very much lighter, and we would be sure of having at least the major part of the men ready to go and carry out their mission. It was also desirable to let the boat-control vessels arrive in position so that the landing boats could form and go on with them. The patrol craft had had some difficulty, due to the heavy weather, and were somewhat late in arriving. So it was necessary to start the boats in on their own. But fortunately, the patrol craft arrived just after they had started and were able to catch up with them. We sent the boats in, kept track of them in our radar screens, and were able to assist them in arriving at the right place on the beach. The scout boat had found the beach and properly marked it. His lights were visible some distance, so the boats were all able to find the correct beach and the correct part of it.

The boats went in in waves. We had two battalions of Rangers, one was divided between the boats of the two British transports, and one in the boats of the DICKMAN. These boats

COAST GUARDSMAN CHARLES SHERIS HAS A BIG GRIN DESPITE SHRAPNEL WOUNDS RECEIVED WHEN GERMAN BOMBERS  
ATTACKED A COAST GUARD-MANNED TRANSPORT CARRYING SOLDIERS FOR THE INVASION OF GELA, SICILY





formed a line abreast and landed simultaneously on the beach. One battalion on one side of the mole and one on the other. They were followed at an interval of twenty-five minutes by a battalion of combat engineers, these being used as shock troops on this occasion. They were then followed by the LCI's carrying the chemical warfare unit with their mortars and immediate ammunition. Behind them we sent in some Army "DUKWS" loaded with ammunition for the immediate support of the troops. The boats ran into some fire on the way in but the troops were able to get off successfully with the exception of one Army Lieutenant who was killed by machine gun fire from shore before he could land. The heaviest fire was received by the boats just after they retracted. Fortunately, however, the crews escaped with the loss of only one man killed and five wounded. Most of the wounded were able to return to their boats after receiving first-aid aboard the ship.

The loading of equipment continued after the first troops went off. Boats were assigned from the OBERON, which is an AKA, and some were also available from the LST, which did not require them for her own immediate use. These were loaded with ammunition and stood by awaiting word from the beach as to the proper place to land, and that the beachhead was secured.

The troops were an unusually able unit. Most of them had been seasoned in the actions at Tunis and in the landings at Oran and were composed largely of specially selected men from the Army. The Commanding Officer of the troops was Colonel Darby of the Rangers, who went in with our boat group commander. He checked the position of his troops on the beach and then landed himself. The troops then immediately went in and around the town, caught the Italian Staff still in their beds, and captured 600 prisoners before daylight. They had so firmly secured the town that the Colonel was able to come back to the ship for a visit at noon time.

There were numerous casualties on the beaches due to the fact that it was heavily mined. Vehicles mines were planted very thickly and there were many personnel mines. Most of the casualties to the troops were caused by the personnel mines. A few were hit by machine guns and there were some small calibre high explosives, possibly 40 mm. type.

Lt. Tyler:

Captain Harwood, how accurate was the advance information given you?

U. S. COAST GUARDSMEN TAKE A PARTY OF NAVY MEN ASHORE TO SET UP A NAVAL OPERATING BASE ON THE SICILIAN SHORE



Captain Harwood:

The information was quite complete and very accurate. There was some doubt, however, from the Intelligence as to just how closely the beaches at Gela were controlled by enemy artillery fire, and as to just where the troops were located there. We had fairly definite information of the location of their batteries, and we knew that the beach patrol was assigned for every seventy-five yards of the beach. This information came down through a series of plans. The major plan was made, staging all the units, by Admiral Cunningham, who headed the Naval Forces in the Mediterranean. A further plan made out by Admiral Hewitt, who was head of the United States Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters. This was the plan which gave us our immediate instructions. Detailed plans for the task force were made out by Admiral Hall and his staff, and a further plan was made out by the task group itself, which in this case was the DICKMAN.

Lt. Tyler:


How well did the small boats operate? I presume you used Higgins boats to get your men ashore. You mentioned Army "DUWKS," I wonder how efficient they were. You also mentioned patrol craft.

Captain Harwood:

These small boats worked unusually well on this occasion. We carried thirty-seven on the DICKMAN, and used about 25 others from the other units in the force. These boats were of the latest types, equipped with diesel engines and had some armor-plating on the side. The crews were well trained. Of those from the DICKMAN, about half had participated in the landings at Fedela, French Morocco, and the other half had been received to replace some crews that we had left in New Caledonia. These new men had not had actual landing against opposition but had had considerable training, at their school in the Pacific coast. We were also fortunate in having a number of reserve crews.

The beach on which they had to land was quite uneven and it was rather difficult from their smallboat viewpoint. They got in successfully, however. On the initial landing two boats were lost. One had landed its troops and had retracted, was just about to turn when a shell landed alongside the stern and swung the boat around, causing it to broach and swamp on the beach. The other boat was a little more unfortunate. Upon approaching the beach the engineer had a little too much zeal and left the lock on the ramp

U. S. COAST GUARDSMEN UNLOAD THE SUPPLIES THAT BACK UP THE INFANTRY AS THE INVASION OF SICILY CONTINUES





unguarded so that he could man his machine gun. The men had been informed, and it was the general impression that everybody had, that the landing would be very difficult. It was expected that the enemy would give us a warm welcome and our men were to force their way in regardless of the opposition met. This boat, which was in the first wave, would have been able to use its machine guns effectively in case there were local machine-gun nests close to the beach. The ramp was held by the brake and when it was unguarded. Unfortunately, one of the troops brushed against it and released the ramp which caused the boat to flood and sink. There were no casualties, but the troops, of course, were wet and this particular unit of about 35 men were disorganized for some fifteen or twenty minutes after they landed. The others got back safely.

The Army "ducks" were carried on an LST. These were able to launch themselves right over the ramp from the LST and were guided in by boats of the LCVP type assigned for that purpose. A distance of six miles was a rather long run for them as they had no navigational equipment. It was necessary to herd them in very much as you would any barges or other units that have no navigational facilities. The "ducks" landed and were extremely useful on the beach. It had been intended to have them come out and load equipment directly from the ships. Their special function was to approach the beach, continue right up, and take the equipment that they were carrying directly to the place where it was needed. This saved a great amount of labor in handling at the beach. Actual unloading from the ship, however, was not accomplished, as the ducks were kept continuously in use at the beach unloading the small craft, the LCI's, and other units that arrived.


Lt. Tyler:

Captain Harwood, how much activity was there from German planes?

Captain Harwood:

There was not any activity from the German planes during the initial assault, but they came over the next day and, of course, some came over that same day. There was a constant succession of our own planes and enemy planes and it seemed for a while as though they never got there together. We were not bothered on our own ship during the day of the 10th and our landing proceeded with considerable dispatch. The men needed very little incentive to unload because a ship hit by a bomb when it is loaded with ammunition and gasoline, as we were, has very

BCMB POKED WATERS OFF SICILY DURING THE INVASION



little chance of surviving. The weather was fairly good and we got off about 90% of our material before dark of the 10th. This was quite fortunate as on the 11th German bombers started to work on us. They dropped bombs fairly close to us in the morning of the 11th, and some very close to the BARNETT, which was three or four ships down in the column from us. Although they did not make a direct hit, they struck close enough to flood her hold and her ammunition magazines. They hit one or two of the LST's, causing their complete loss, and strafed the beaches and some of the boats at fairly frequent intervals.

In the afternoon, quite a large group of German bombers, probably Junkers 88's, flew over and sprinkled the DICKLAN. There were no direct hits, however, the closest being about 25 feet on our port bow. Fragments from this caused a large number of holes in the ship's side and in the superstructure. None of them were over four inches in diameter and all were above the water line so that we were not in any great jeopardy. Small pieces came up through the bridge, through the signal lockers, out some of the rigging-wire on the boat davits.


The casualties occurred in rather widely separated areas and were quite different in their effect. One signalman up in the signal bridge lifted his hands above his head, as a sort of reflex reaction to the explosion, and a piece of fragment went between his two hands just close enough to take the skin off the palms of his hands. He was hardly aware that he had been hurt, scratched his neck and when his hand came down he saw the blood on it and he thought he had been hit in the neck. Another man was lying in his bunk and got a piece of fragment through his shoulder. Another one was sitting in the ship's head and a piece of fragment hit him, took a piece of skin out of his neck. Two soldiers were working ammunition down in the hold and were more seriously wounded by a piece of fragment that came through the ship's side and hit them.

One German fighter plane came over and gave us a little more pleasant experience. He came down fast over the ships and received some fire but it wasn't effective. For some reason or other the fellow turned around and repeated his run and we had the pleasure of watching him make a vertical dive with smoke coming out. He crashed close to the beach.

There was a great deal of difficulty in recognizing planes due to the fact our own units were flying over and when the Germans came in it was a question of whether they



AN AMERICAN CARGO SHIP HIT BY NAZI DIVE BOMBERS DURING THE INVASION OF SICILY





were our own or the enemy's. Small craft partly solved this problem by firing at everything that came by. During the night time we received some attention from German dive bombers. They came in, dropped their flares around, and you could hear noises of the bomb-drops sometimes of the planes, but the planes themselves were difficult to see.


There was a great deal of fire. The ships all laid down barrages and for some time the air was full of tracer lines. This was quite a hazard to the ships, largely due to the danger of being hit by ammunition from other ships. We had one 20-mm shell that came up and landed on the bridge of the DICKMAN. Fortunately it slowed down or was a dud and didn't explode. Some of the other ships had similar difficulty.

We had one unfortunate incident. While these night bombers were around one of them came down, probably to get out of the barrage, and dropped down right between the ships. I could see him plainly from the wing of the bridge, thought he was crashing, but he leveled off at the water, put on his red tail light, which was not our recognition signal at the time, and managed to get away. The unfortunate part of it was I was about the only one that saw him and before I could get any word to the guns to work on him, why, he was away.

The afternoon bombers managed to drop one bomb right down through the hatch of a merchant vessel that had come in that morning. This vessel loaded with ammunition and gasoline, went in close to the beach. The Germans had counteracked that morning and came very close to the beach, the beach head, where our equipment was being landed. They fired on this vessel, managed to hit it, and killed one of the crew. The vessel, the ROBERT ROWAN, then got its anchor up and moved out and anchored very close to the DICKMAN, probably two or three hundred yards away. When this pattern of bombs landed around us, the ROWAN happened to be there and caught one of them. She started to burn and I could see the smoke coming out of her hold. The bridge remained manned on the ROWAN.

I sent a signal asking him if he needed assistance. He replied that he did. But there was little we could do for him. We had some portable fire pumps, which we loaded into boats and sent over, but they could not be used effectively. About this time his men started to leave. He had about a hundred troops on board for unloading detail, plus his own crew. We picked up ninety-two of them in boats from the DICKMAN, and others were picked up by some of the Army "ducks" that came out from the beach. In addition, he had one or two boats of his own and some few boats came over

FLAME, STAINED BY BOMBS DROPPED ALLIANCE SHIPS, SPREAD RAPIDLY TO THE SHIP'S MUNITIONS SUPPLY,  
WHICH EXPLODED TO FORM DANGEROUS THOUGH PICTURESQUE PATTERN ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN




from other units. It was apparent that he was going to blow up, so we moved up wind away from him about a thousand yards. I had a close view of him as he blew up. It made a grand spectacle and, fortunately, there was not a single man from the ship that was lost; they were able to get off before the explosion occurred. The whole front end of the ship was demolished, but the stern from the bridge aft remained intact even after the explosion and fire. One of the destroyers fired into her below the waterline to make her settle. This was of little help, however, because while the vessel settled on the bottom, the oil and gasoline continued to burn and it was still burning up to the time that we left. This was rather precarious during the night because we had to anchor alongside and it gave a silhouette for the planes from the light of the burning ship. Oil and gasoline spread out on the water which also was burning. We had some compensation, however, in that a good deal of smoke arose which gave us a little screen and I had a little consolation thinking that the planes coming over us would also have to pass over the rest of the force. We were on the left flank of the force and in order to properly get us in the silhouette the planes would have to pass over the whole task force first.

We were not bothered by submarines while we were there. A minefield had been laid around to give us some protection and we had quite an effective destroyer screen. The fire support came principally from the two cruisers, the SAVANNAH and BOISE. Two destroyers were assigned for close fire support and were relieved at one time or another. The British fire support vessel was there, the ABERCROMBIE, I think was the name of it. She mounted one large, probably a 14-inch, gun. All during the day these ships passed up and down giving fire support to the Army. The SAVANNAH was particularly useful upon our end of the line. The German counter attack was very nearly successful. They came down the road with large tanks and the Army hardly had enough equipment on hand to stop them. Reports back from the beach indicated that the SAVANNAH had knocked out fourteen of these tanks and that was enough to decide the question for the Germans. The rest of the tanks turned back. One of the bad effects of this attack, this counter attack at this area, was that it slowed down the unloading operations somewhat.

Information on the beach indicated that the Army shore party had been called up to assist in the defense of the beach. We sent in a party from the ship and, inasmuch as our loading had proceeded quite rapidly, we were able to put quite a large unit ashore to assist in the unloading. Due to the experience of the crew we were able to continue our unloading during the air attacks. About the only time lost was the period of ten or fifteen minutes after the close misses when we had to shift anchorage and clear a boat



AN AMERICAN CARGO SHIP HIT BY NAZI DIVE BOMBERS IN AN AIR RAID ON A CONVOY IN THE INVASION OF SICILY





loaded with ammunition from alongside. Later our unloading was rather slow. It consisted mostly of ammunition, about 250 tons were carried in one hold, and quite a bit of this consisted of bombs for the RAF. It took us until the afternoon of the 11th to complete unloading everything. We were able to get all our troops off by early morning of the 10th, that is, the last of the reserve units.

The RAF unit was rather unfortunate, according to the reports received back from the beach. They had two officers and 178 men when they went ashore. The two officers went up to assist a wounded man and, according to the story, the man had been wired up as a booby trap and the two officers were killed. This was quite a misfortune as they were particularly assigned to set up a fire control unit at the airfield.

Lt. Tyler:

Captain Harwood, you mentioned that you had RAF men aboard and also that you worked with some British ships and also, I believe, that at one time you carried British troops. Can you say something about the general success of operating with the British?

Captain Harwood:

During the past two years we had an unusual amount of contact with the British. Late in the Fall of 1941, the DICKMAN was assigned to transport British troops to Suez. We picked the troops up in Halifax and took them around the Cape of Good Hope, stopping at Capetown. While we were there, the war broke out or rather the attack by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor occurred. The troops were then diverted and we took them up to Bombay. These were all Army men and were very easy to get along with. The troops were well disciplined and had very agreeable interrelationships with the crew of the ship. We put them off at Bombay because it was uncertain then whether they would go up to Suez or go down to Singapore. It was decided to have us go down to Capetown and pick up some strategic material, principally mica and graphite, so that our troops were unloaded and picked up and carried the rest of the way by the British. They were landed at Singapore, according to the story, got there just a day or two before the surrender. Other units of the task force, principally the WEST POINT, MOUNT VERNON, and WAKEFIELD continued down to Singapore.

In the Mediterranean there was, of course, a large number of British ships. We received considerable

AMERICAN SOLDIER GIVES INFORMATION TO COAST GUARDSMAN EARL SAUTER (LEFT), CHIEF PHARMACIST'S MATE,  
OF MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN, AFTER HE HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM THE ITALIAN BEACHES  
ABOARD A COAST GUARD-MANNED ASSAULT TRANSPORT



assistance and offers of assistance from them there, and had units of British destroyers tied up alongside of us. We were able to act very much as a mothership to them. While they did not require very much--small items such as moving pictures and ships stores--these facilities were very much appreciated by them. The RAF troops that we carried up were rather quiet. They were, of course, a small part of our total, but they went ashore with alacrity, perhaps even earlier than was necessary in view of the difficulty they ran into in seizing the airfield.

A big part of the resistance to the Italian convoys occurred in the vicinity of Gela. It appeared that the Italians had been holding some maneuvers a few days before and had withdrawn into the interior so as to be ready to counter-attack the landing where ever it might occur. It appeared that they picked out our spot for their counter-attack.

All the vessels of the task force completed their unloading on the 12th, and we left the area early that evening. The return to Algiers was without mishap. The task force below us continued on down to Oran, but we stopped at Algiers until the harbor at Oran was cleared and then proceeded down there. Upon arrival there I found that my relief had arrived, having come over from the States on the LEONARD WOOD, and had accompanied them for indoctrination purposes as part of that task force. We effected the relief on the 28th of July, 1943 and I returned to the States on the cruiser BIRMINGHAM. We arrived at Norfolk on the 8th of August, which terminated my connection with the amphibious forces.



COAST GUARDSMAN MILTON EILER, SIGNALMAN FIRST CLASS, WAS STRUCK BY SHRAPNEL FROM GERMAN BOMBERS WHILE MANNING A MACHINE GUN ON THE SIGNAL BRIDGE OF A COAST GUARD-MANNED TRANSPORT PARTICIPATING IN THE INVASION OF SICILY





PRAISE FOR  
PERSONNEL  
OF DICKMAN

Captain Harwood praised the personnel of the JOSEPH T. DICKMAN for their splendid performance during landing operations at Gela, Sicily, on July 10, 11, and 12, during the initial invasion of Sicily. "Again this vessel has accomplished successfully a difficult task assigned, and I wish to express my appreciation for the expeditious, efficient, and effective work done by the officers and crew prior to and during the recent invasion," he said. "This type of operation, consisting of a surprise landing at night, in a strange and hostile shore, is the most difficult that a ship can be called upon to perform. Our troops were the first assault groups to land on the beaches and much depended on their success in taking assigned key objectives. All objectives were successfully taken and held, due, not only to the excellent work of our boat crews but to the efficient and capable functioning of all departments of the ship. We all know that this was a job Well Done. Every officer and man demonstrated his skill and endurance most satisfactorily."

ALL ARE  
COMMENDED

"The landing was so efficiently performed that it appeared to be almost routine and instead of a few individual performances almost 100 per cent of the complement were commendable. As a Task Unit Commander, I have been authorized to commend personnel of the unit and I am having service records endorsed with these commendations. There will be many more hazardous jobs for every one before this war is over. We have a good ship, and to keep it so requires the unrelaxed efforts of every one. Your accomplishments and safety are dependent upon your skill and discipline."


DICKMAN  
EN ROUTE

Describing operations aboard the DICKMAN, Lieutenant (jg) Fletcher W. Brown, USCG, later wrote: "Passing Gibraltar gave me quite a thrill but it was disappointing not to see that big Prudential Life sign painted all over it like the ads show. Routine drills, practice, and maneuvers kept us busy until we finally got started on the 'push.' We didn't know exactly where we were going to land, but we had seen and studied maps and pictures of the town emplacements, and surroundings before we got underway. At sea the news was disseminated that our goal was Gela, Sicily-- to be attacked early Saturday morning, 10 July. Excitement and anxiety were at a high pitch which mounted each day of the five that we were cruising around waiting for the correct moment. Friday noon we finally set our course to bring us 'on target.'"

AIR SUPPORT  
FLIES LOW--  
LARGE FIRES  
STARTED

About midnight, July 9-10, the DICKMAN took over formation guide and started to lead the other transports and smaller landing craft to the debarkation area. Coincident with this, Allied bombers from Africa and Malta were paving the way with their aerial barrage. Hearing them go over was quite a thrill, as wave after wave flashed by, quite low. They started large fires which at first looked like tiny dots in the distance, but as the DICKMAN and the other vessels neared shore the

U. S. AMPHIBIOUS "DUCK TRUCKS" ROLL ASHORE IN SICILY AS A COAST GUARD-MANNED TRANSPORT  
DISGORGES MEN AND MATERIEL FOR THE INVASION



conflagrations lit up the coast like day. "Getting our 'Fix' was thus simplified," said Lt. Brown. "Several times star shells were thrown up--trying to light us up--for we were expected--but they never caught us. Planes returning from their missions barely missed us in their low flight, but winged away without harm."

BOATS  
LOWERED

About 0200, on July 10, came the long-awaited order, "All hands take debarkation stations." The DICKMAN stopped, and drifted. Boats were lowered and troops disembarked according to plan. As the boats formed and left for the beach, searchlights from shore began probing the area. Twice the invasion units were silhouetted but for some unexplainable reason the light passed by without pause. The biggest worry was from the shore batteries until the Rangers silenced them.

SUPPORT BOAT  
EXPLODES  
PILL BOX  
EMPLACEMENT

"About the time that the boats started hitting the beach," said Lt. Brown, "cruisers, battlegroups and destroyers were opening up with everything that they had upon shore installations of guns and lights. The tracer streams are weird but very beautiful. Watching the 4-gun salvos from the Limey 15 inchers was quite a sight. Each shell was tracer and the flight from start to finish--and I do mean 'finish'--was rather amusing. The things seemed to float and float and float--quite slowly, too, so it seemed. Our support boat near the beach let go with her barrage which lit upon a pill box emplacement. The explosion of that emplacement was almost beyond imagination--a column of flame shooting upwards about a thousand feet and all of sixty feet in diameter. Later reports said that that blast cleared out many machine-gun nests, enabling our boys to advance into the town."

ALL BOATS  
MAKE  
LANDINGS

According to Lieutenant Brown, the DICKMAN again held the honor spot as at Fedala. "Our job, as left flank ship, was to land our troops frontally against the town of Gela, while other vessels put their troops to the eastward to flank and encircle the town and to advance toward an airport a short ways inland. These latter troops were to be aided by paratroopers dropped in the vicinity of the airfield. Dawn came finally and with it anxiety for the safety and return of our boats and crews. Later we learned that all boats made their landing on the spot and though opposed by intense machine-gun fire, only experienced one casualty."

FIRST INVASION  
OF AXIS SOIL

As they approached the Sicilian shores, the urgency and dramatic quality of their mission became manifest. They were invading the continent of Europe. For the first time they were about to set foot on Axis territory, Europe itself. The area was jammed with shipping. Every kind of craft was busy rushing to shore unloading, returning, reloading. One could count more than a hundred ships. From the small LCI's to huge two-stack liners they lay or shuttled back and forth in droves. Throughout the



U. S. COAST GUARDSMAN MORTIMER R. SPITALNY OF ELIZABETH, N. J., AND  
PARATROOPER H. BRONES OF INDEPENDENCE, IOWA, LOOK OVER A SICILIAN NEWSPAPER  
ABOARD A COAST GUARD-MANIED TRANSPORT PARTICIPATING IN THE INVASION





first day, July 10, the shuttling continued. All that day and for the succeeding days, American cruisers did a most wonderful job in knocking out enemy panzer units as they attempted to take our troops holding the town. From the DICKMAN, the troops could be seen crawling across the coastal plains towards the town. Much of the credit for saving that sector must go to the cruisers, for without them the troops would have been in a bad way, having gotten little artillery ashore at that time. Barrages continued incessantly day and night. Enemy fighters and light bombers attacked the beaches, but most were shot down. The invasion craft had fine air coverage with few exceptions.

ENEMY PLANES  
ATTACK AND  
ARE DRIVEN OFF

"Sunday morning I took over Fire Control at 0500, in a rather drowsy condition but primed with coffee to keep awake," the Lieutenant related. "About 0630, a sky lookout forward reported a group of planes on the port bow and one quick look told me all I needed to know. In five seconds our guns were brought to bear and their shells were going home -- one had a half a wind knocked off, but continued on. Some reported that he fell over the beach, but this was not verified. Overhead their eggs came down in sheets, giving off an eerie sound which made our stomachs sink to our toes and our hearts jump to our mouths. They were JU-88's and disappeared as fast as they had come. We missed becoming a casualty by scant margin."


LANDING BOAT  
SHOOTS DOWN  
ENEMY PLANE

One landing boat, the LMC PA13-1, surprised Army men ashore by shooting down into the sea a German Messerschmitt that had appeared over a dune to strafe our troops on the beach. The boat was stuck on a sandbar and was trying to free itself when the plane was sighted. This landing craft, one of the DICKMAN's boats, had been sent to Yellow Beach to unload an LST. (Beaches were designated by color, and the DICKMAN had red and green). Units were required to make reports of their operations to their Executive Officer. Following is a report describing the anti-aircraft action of the PA13-1, executed on Yellow Beach, situated east of Gela, on the evening of July 11, 1943, during unloading operations attendant with assault on that territory.

GERMAN  
PLANE  
HIT

As tanklighter and crew discharged their load, at approximately 2100 Sunday evening, a German fighter plane identified as an Me-109F approached from a westerly direction and executed a strafing attack upon Yellow Beach. The tanklighter had just retracted and gone aground on a sand bar when the plane in question approached from a very low altitude from over the top of the sand dunes on our starboard quarter. It flew very low and on an easterly course parallel to the beach. At about 100 yards from our boat we opened fire with both .50 caliber guns until it was well past our stern, when we could see smoke and fire coming from the vicinity of the aircraft's engine. The plane attempted to climb over a knoll on our port quarter but was unable to do so, hitting it hard and crashing on the other side.

TWO ARMY MEN AND A COAST GUARDSMAN COMPARE NOTES ON THE INVASION AT GELA, SICILY. FRANCIS MCGUNNIFF, LEFT, WAS STRUCK BY A BULLET WHEN LANDING ON THE BEACH WITH THE FIRST WAVE. WILLIAM KILPATRICK WAS WOUNDED IN THE EXPLOSION OF A LANDING MINE WHILE ADVANCING UPON THE TOWN OF GELA. WILLIAM FORSYTHE, SHOWN AT THE RIGHT, IS A COAST GUARD COMBAT PHOTOGRAPHER AND FORMER WASHINGTON, D. C. NEWSPAPERMAN.



PLANE  
CRASHES

Soldiers on the beach who had taken cover during the firing, ran up on the hill and waved to us when they saw that the plane had crashed. The plane crashed about 1,000 yards on the port quarter of the tank-lighter. During this attack no other boats or guns were seen firing at the aircraft in question. This boat expended approximately one hundred rounds of ammunition. Members of the tanklighter crew who participated in the action were T. J. Miller, gunner; R. G. Ward, gunner; B. G. Dannison, coxswain of the boat, R. N. Brown, bow hook; and R. L. McDougal, bow hook. The report was signed by Byron G. Dannison, B.M. 1st class.

EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNT

We made the landing at Gela, Sicily, on July 10th, related Bill Forsythe, Chief Photographer's Mate, USCGR.

With snipers and enemy planes on the loose, I did not have time to write just after the invasion happened; or I might have been too excited; so here goes now, three days after the invasion.


I landed on the beach at 12:45 AM with some combat engineers. Coming into the beach in the dark, we hit a sandbar about fifty yards from the beach. The LCI boat I was in, operated by Coast Guardsmen, got stuck on it; so we bailed out. Luckily, I had enough foresight to waterproof my equipment. With a .45 in one hand and a camera in the other I started for the beach. Our Coast Guard gunners opened fire with two .30 caliber machine guns to give us a covering fire in order that we might have a chance to make it. The surf was so heavy that I was knocked under; when I came up the .45 was full of sand and unable to fire.

I was completely soaked and cold as hell but I ran up on the beach. I never ran so fast in all my life, but it seemed very slow -- water-soaked clothing certainly drags one down. The enemy fire was intense. On my right about 300 yards, an LCI was on the beach and was unable to get off; and on my left, at a distance of about 500 yards was an Italian fort that kept firing on the LCI and shelling the landing boats and keeping the beach under fire, with me in the middle. The beach was mined, but this was unknown to us at the time and there we were digging for dear life - and I do mean life.

Dawn was just breaking, so I got my bearings and made for some fishing shacks on the beach to get away from the cross fire of the LCI and the fort. Wet clothes



MEN AND THEIR AMPHIBIOUS TRUCKS RUSH THE UNLOADING OF A COAST GUARD MANNED TRANSPORT ON A WAVE SWEPT SICILIAN SHORE





and cold grey dawn, with snipers getting the range, is very demoralizing. U. S. Rangers, who made the first assault at 2:50 A. M., were bringing in the first prisoners and the wounded. Then came daylight, and our cruisers got the range on enemy emplacements and commenced shelling, which was a relief. Invasion barges manned by Coast Guardsmen brought additional equipment and troops ashore. It was then light enough to get some shots of the beach, scenes of troops in the town of Gela, and Axis prisoners guarded by American Rangers and Coast Guardsmen.


It was now about 7:00 A.M., and the sun was warm enough for me to dry some clothes and look around a bit. The town of Gela is principally a fishing town. It is located on a high bluff and levels off on a plateau. Two and three story houses make up the dwellings. On top are several five-story buildings, and the snipers lodged themselves in a number of these houses. They really made it hot and kept everybody out of the middle of the streets and close to the buildings. An Italian civilian walked over and offered me a dry pair of socks which I gladly accepted. He offered to wash my clothes, but I told him I did not expect to stay, and I gave him some sugar and coffee from my canned rations. I don't think I could have given him anything else that would have pleased him more.

More wounded and prisoners were coming in so I started on the move again. German tanks attacked the town, and all hands took cover. The cruiser and destroyer kept them bottled up in one sector so it wasn't too bad. We met a couple of Italians coming in so we relieved them of their rifles and helmets. It is now about 11:00 A.M., and I am about whipped, so back to the ship for some hot coffee and fresh clothes. We waded out to the sandbar and got wet all over again and had one hell of a rough ride back as the sea was quite heavy.

The Coast Guardsmen who manned the boats certainly did a wonderful job, especially the coxswains who were unable to take cover while making the approach. So back aboard, on checking my equipment, I found I lost two packs of film - to say I was upset is putting it mildly. After risking my life, that topped it all; and now the reaction was setting in. Nervous as a cat, tired as could be, and yet I couldn't rest. I got a sedative from Sick Bay that quieted me for an hour, then back on deck again.

Everyone on the DICKMAN did a wonderful job, from Captain Harwood down. There was no rest for anyone all during the operation. Everybody really put out; they had a job to do and they did it better than well. It

ABOARD A COAST GUARD MANNED ASSAULT TRANSPORT, TWO SOLDIERS, WOUNDED IN THE ITALIAN INVASION, ARE TREATED BY A NAVY PHARMACIST'S MATE



certainly makes a man proud to be able to say that he shipped with these boys. The Army men who were with us certainly have high praise for the Coast Guard.

So that is the way Saturday passed - the first day of the invasion, - but dates and days didn't matter while the work went on nonstop. It was just a change from light to dark. When anyone was able to take a nap their clothes remained on and they slept right at their station.


Sunday at 6:30 A.M., when in ordinary times I would be picking up the paper at the front door, two Italian high altitude bombers laid their eggs on our starboard bow and port quarter. I was on the well deck aft and could see two bombs. They looked to be about two hundred pounders. Over and over like duck-pins they fell, silvery and shining. They hit the water about a hundred yards from us but didn't explode.

This was just the beginning. Later, at about 11:00 A.M., another enemy plane came over so high he was out of sight, but you could see the white exhaust from his motor. Then at 3:50 P.M., twenty-five J-88's came over in a "V" formation, very high. They dropped a pattern of bombs all around us. The Good Lord was certainly with the Transport this Sunday. The bombs made a circle around us; but, with the exception of minor shrapnel damage, we were untouched. It was a miracle. I was on the Sun Deck aft at the time and shooting toward the stern showing Coast Guardsmen at battle stations, manning their guns while the bombs were bursting and all hell was breaking loose.

During all this time our boats which took supplies ashore were returning with wounded soldiers for treatment by the ship's doctors and pharmacist mates.

At 4:41 P.M., Stukas came over and dived on us. Jerry missed, dropped his bombs 300 yards off our starboard quarter and strafing other ships as he leveled off. The nervous tension that is acquired during these dive bombing attacks is the most nerve wracking thing a person can think of. The Inquisition was mild compared with this. Again at 9:50 P.M. Stukas or ME-109's dropped flares and attacked us again. And that was the way we passed Sunday off Sunny Italy. If heroes go through this I don't want to be a hero, because I was scared and no foolin'.

U. S. COAST GUARD-MANNED ASSAULT TRANSPORT SAMUEL CHASE





There was no sleep Sunday night and everyone was working in the darkness repairing landing boats and unloading supplies. Daylight again and by the middle of the day unloading was about completed. At 5:15 P.M., an ME-109 strafed our decks and shot away our barrage balloon. I was on the Sun Deck and that Messerschmidt looked like silver lightning. I made a shot at his tail but I doubt if a 400 will stop him. With 20 and 40 mm bullets chasing him, one of our Spitfires got on his tail and knocked him off about five miles from us over on the beach. Just about dark we pulled anchor and shoved off. That's about all that happened during our three day stay on the shores of Sicily in the blue Mediterranean.

These three days have aged me considerably."

### THE SAMUEL CHASE

A signal from the USS CHASE went out: "Good luck, gang. Do it again." It was signed "Terry Allen," (Commanding General of the 1st Division, Reinforced).

#### SAMUEL CHASE AGAIN LUCKY IN SICILY

When the invasion force departed for Sicily, the SAMUEL CHASE was given a key assignment in landing important segments of the Seventh Army in the vicinity of Gela. Once again it accomplished its mission without loss of a man despite an amazing series of adventures, which Captain Heimer's officers and men later revealed. Lieut. Comdr. James S. Hunt gave credit to luck and good preparation, saying, "Guess we are mighty lucky, but I really believe part of the success is due to our ability to handle small boats as a result of long periods of training."

#### SOME NARROW ESCAPES

"When I went in with the first wave," said Philip Kearney, Boatswain's Mate 1st class, USCG, "enemy fire pinged off the sides of the boat all the way but none of it pierced the armor plating and none of the personnel was hurt. I always seemed to hit the beach about the time the Jerries came over bombing and strafing. But three such attacks didn't scratch my boat or wound my crew. We always got back." Coxswain Leonard W. Ruehle, USCG, steered a tank lighter carrying a bulldozer ashore, and just as the equipment made a successful landing on the beach, he saw its driver killed by enemy fire. A 20-mm enemy shell missed Calvin Cooper, Seaman 1st class, by four inches. It struck the side of the engine box of his boat, but didn't explode. If Richard Dunton, Fireman 3rd class, had been standing normally instead of crouching at his post a 50-calibre bullet would have struck him in the head instead of hitting the stern of the boat. "I didn't know when it hit," Dunton said, "because a lot of stuff was flying around--we really knew the enemy was shooting." Several other men had similar experiences.

A RELAXING U. S. PARATROOPER, TELLS TWO U. S. COAST GUARDSMEN WHAT HAPPENED WHEN HIS UNIT  
DROPPED ON SICILIAN SOIL, ABOARD A COAST GUARD-MANNED TRANSPORT



SOLDIERS  
AND CREWMEN  
RESCUED

Robert MacCaulley, Boatswain's Mate 2nd class, USCG, and Frank Freeman, Fireman 1st class, also of the Coast Guard, stopped landing work long enough to rescue soldiers and crewmen from another transport, which received a direct hit from an enemy bomber. Thomas A. Sheridan, Seaman 1st class, shed his clothes and dived into the pitching surf in the dead of night to rescue nine soldiers. He hauled them ashore one at a time, together with their 90-pound packs. They were being carried out by an undertow after trying to wade ashore when their boat ran aground on a sandbar. Sheridan also picked up thirty-three men of the same group in his boat and landed them. By then he and his crew had worked steadily for twenty or more hours without rest, landing additional personnel and supplies.

PERFECT  
LANDINGS

Lieutenant John F. Summer, who was commander of the first wave, said the landings went better in Sicily than they ever did in practice. "The boys came through 100 per cent. Always some little things went wrong in practice, but they did everything right that night," he reported. He said that his wave drew only machine gun fire, but later ones had artillery fire and aerial bombardment to contend with.


PACE OF  
UNLOADING  
STAGGERS FOR

The unloading operations at Gela, chalked up a new record for amphibious warfare, said Lieutenant Blair Walliser, USCGR, who served aboard the CHASE. The giant fleet of ships which launched the invasion of Sicily were successful from the start, due to the skill and persistence of the Coast Guardsmen and Navy personnel who landed the troops and supplies in the face of enemy fire and kept them moving at a pace that staggered the Axis defenders. Despite the fact that some landing craft were damaged, supplies and troops kept pouring onto the beaches. Damaged landing craft were hauled out of the water and repaired as quickly as they were hit. William G. Lawrence, Chief Boatswain's Mate, USCG, in charge of a repair group, alone put many landing boats back in action after they had been damaged by enemy shell fire or bombs. He used a salvage boat invented by Captain Heimer.

LANDING CRAFT  
SWIFTLY REPAIRED

In commenting upon the swiftness with which landing craft were repaired after being hit by the enemy, Lieutenant Walliser said that all craft carried ready-made plugs to be put in bullet holes. The boat repair crew of this unit were under the charge of Lieutenant (jg) Ivet L. Logan. The average time for repairing a boat that had to be taken out of the water was only an hour and five minutes. Then the repaired boats were pressed back into immediate service. Captain Heimer coined a motto which became a working formula for all Coast Guardsmen participating in the landing, when he gave the standing order: "Pull them up, patch them up, pump them out, put them back, keep them running." And the men faithfully did. Lieutenant Walliser said that it was impossible to get the Coast Guard crews out of their landing boats, many of the men even sleeping in their boats at night and refusing to leave them for meals.

CAPTURED IN THE INVASION OF SICILY, A GROUP OF NAZI SOLDIERS OF THE AFRIKA KORPS, AWAIT TRANSFER  
TO A COAST GUARD MANNED ASSAULT TRANSPORT WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE ALPHIBIOUS ATTACK





HARDSHIPS OF  
LANDING  
PARTIES

The boats first went in under cover of total darkness, but were soon lighted up by enemy searchlights on shore and picked out as gun targets. However, a cruiser sent some shells into the searchlights and shore gun crews, and the invasion craft went on. As soon as the first wave landed, they sent up flares. Ensign Bernard B. Blahut, was on command of the first wave. Landing parties that went in after the initial attack were seriously hampered by booby-traps set by the enemy, who even mined the bodies of their own dead and Allied dead. The Germans also mined the wounded. As a Scotchman lay dying, he managed to warn a party of rescuers not to approach any closer, for the enemy had put a booby-trap under him.

ITALIANS  
FRIGHTENED  
BY SIZE OF  
ALLIED FLEET

Italian prisoners, taken during the engagements along the Sicily shores, were literally frightened by the size of the Allied fleet. One prisoner was scared to death when the Coast Guard and Navy first sent in waves of landing craft, he told Lieutenant Walliser. "It was like a tidal wave," he said, referring to the dreaded "marrubbio of the Mediterranean." A more loquacious Italian engaged the Lieutenant in talk about the Brooklyn Dodgers, saying that he had worked one summer in Brooklyn and become a Dodger rooter. His first question was: "How are the Dodgers doing?" When Lieutenant Walliser assured him that they were doing better than the Axis, the Italian quickly changed the subject, saying, "What a war! I'm going to New York, and you fellows are going to Rome."


ACCOUNT OF LIEUT. COMMANDER BLAIR WALLISER, USCGR

"Even before the rolling black line of transports swung into invasion line off Gela, we knew we were close in under the shores of Sicily. High up on the hillsides before us, orange explosions shattered the black silhouette of the land. There was a smell of pine and gunpowder over the sea long before we could even hear the distant bloomp of the bombs hitting.

"All that evening, above the swash and hiss of the ship's going, there had been the rumble of bombers in the sky. Now our problem lay not in finding a light but in picking out the light among the flickering flames along the Gela shore.

"We surged in closer, and a red neon rectangle took shape up in the hills. The Junior O.D. regarded it studiously through the binoculars. 'Maybe it says, Eat at Joe's.' The navigator shrugged wryly. 'More likely it says, This airport has taken one helluva pasting.' That's the field up there all right, and down the coast to starboard is Scoglitti Light.' We all turned and stared at Scoglitti Light: three drowsy blinks every fifteen seconds. There had been no call to battle stations yet, but every station was manned.

U. S. COASTGUARDSEN LOAD AN AMBULANCE ABOARD THEIR TRANSPORT AT A NORTH AFRICAN PORT  
AS THEY PREPARE TO SAIL FOR SICILY



"Ashore, fountains of light were streaming into the air, and new red flares were glowing all around the town. Gela was taking it again. An electric sign, flashing 'This is Gela,' could hardly have been more explicit. The ship ahead was an island of blackness in the dark, and so was the ship behind, as the convoy slipped into place in regular columns.


"Captain Heimer moved to the P.A. microphone on the bridge. 'All hands take stations for launching boats!' The Coast Guard coxswains and crews that were to drive the assault and landing boats onto the hostile beaches, grimly took their stations. They had waited eternities for this moment. All hands were ready. We watched the indolent seconds trickle through our watches. 'Lower the first wave!' The winches hummed as the boats slid down on the slick, greased wires. 'Away the boats!'

"The Diesels started up, rumbling in the stillness like a basso coughing into his handkerchief in church. The higher-pitched matter of the gasoline engines marked the whiter wakes of the speedier boats. There were fading white streaks in the waters -- and then nothing. Thirty minutes to H-Hour. Still nothing. Some of the shore fires were dying down now. Twenty minutes to H-Hour. Nothing. A PC boat passed by close aboard, requesting a bearing on the beach. Oriented, she sped off again. Ten minutes to H-Hour. Nothing. Scoglitti Light winked wearily. The middle of the mid-watch. Nothing ever happens on the mid-watch. Five minutes to H-Hour. Nothing. Where were the boats? We scanned the waters close in uneasily.

"There was a crash of light through the blackness--light so bright it carried the impact of sound. Straight out--and around--then up, leaping over our ships--then out--then around sweeping the waters as it went. We saw the landing boats silhouetted in every slightest outline. We knew the Italians, or whatever enemy sat behind that shrill beam of light saw more than we saw. We knew the sights of unknown scores of guns must at that instant be leveling to those boats. In any second, the beam of light would be supplemented with deadlier beams of lead.

"Then the light lifted and stared out to sea. And in that instant there was a blast to starboard, and three red tracers, like a V of planes flying wing to wing, arched gracefully across the sky. The red tracers were lost. There was an instant of complete suspension everywhere--and then the searchlight and its men and the battery beside it, and its crew, and all other living things on that patch of hill mushroomed in a single yellow blast. A general in one of the landing boats sighed deeply and eloquently. He turned to the Coast Guard officer beside him. 'I've followed artillery for thirty years and never saw prettier shooting than that!' These words were echoed by every ship of the fleet that night.

-WHILE WOUNDED ARE BROUGHT BACK TO A COAST GUARD-MANNED TRANSPORT,  
OTHER SOLDIERS ABOARD THE SHIP ARE READY TO TAKE THEIR TURN TO JOIN  
THE INVADERS OF SICILY





"Now --H-Hour! Rockets on the beach. The first wave was in. Then flashes all along the beach...grenades bursting... machine guns spluttering...mortar bursts...support ships pouring their new self-propelled projectiles in onto the shore! The second wave and the third wave were in. Rockets all along the beaches now. The cruisers were lofting their shells over with deadly regularity. The destroyers had moved in close and were ghosting down the shore line, slicing their five-inch shells into the enemy wherever his guns flashed against the black hills.


"And Scoglitti Light still flashed--no longer drowsily, it seemed, but in open-eyed, blinking wonderment. Scoglitti Light sitting on a rock watching Americans land on those shores with men, tanks, ammunition, fuel, food, and freedom. 'Overcome and destroy the enemy wherever he is encountered,' was the way the operations order read. Well--he was certainly being encountered now--and destroyed, we hoped.

"On deck, the reserve waves and specialists were going in now. Over the P.A., the boat teams were being called to their stations. Numbers called--like signals for a football team--and the boat formations. On all decks were the singing hum of cables and the impatient click of winches. The thump of feet as men jumped into the boats at deck level... men crouching down in the boats... keep low--keep aft...the click of rifle bolts as men nervously opened and closed the breech...a colored mess attendant in the bow of one boat, very black against the shadows...chewing gum furiously.

"Now it was dawn--dawn striding over the hills of Sicily--dawn unfurling its banners in the sky. The waves of boats were coming back from the beach now--some carrying the first wounded. They'd come alongside under the wing of the bridge, and the Coast Guardsmen manning them would shout up: 'We've got six wounded aboard!' Then we'd pass the word over the P.A.: 'Stand by to hoist casualties!' The hoisting crews would go to their stations then, and the medical department would send a stretcher party, and we'd haul the casualties aboard and rush them off to the sick bay.

"Daylight brought the first enemy planes. Two of them came by in a hurry, spied the scout plane from one of the cruisers busy spotting gunfire, and closed in on it. The battle was short and had an unhappy ending. What chance could a slow-flying scout biplane have against two Focke-Wulf fighters? The scout plane dove desperately, but the fighters swarmed all over it. There was something sickeningly unequal about it, like two wolves chasing a chicken. Wounded and smoking, she tumbled to the water. There was hardly time for her crew to get over the side before she sank, but a Coast Guardsman in a nearby landing boat picked up her men.

A WOUNDED MAN IS HOISTED ABOARD A COAST GUARD MANNED TRANSPORT DURING THE INVASION OF SICILY



"The wind had returned, and the seas were building all the time. Loading the landing boats was becoming an increasingly severe problem. On the long, high swells, they'd ride up the side of the ship maybe ten feet or more and then slide down an equal amount. Some of our vehicles, according to measurements, had less than three inches clearance on either side in the landing boats. They hung and they swayed and they banged, over the side of the ship--but they landed in the boats right side up, and we men of the Coast Guard hustled them off to shore.

"The dive bombers were over the beaches now, skimming the rampboats and the tank lighters and the various landing ships. and we saw 'skip-bombing,' where the plane lays a few sticks in the water at low altitude, and then watches them ricochet as the bombs leapfrog among the ships on the beach, ending up in a mountainous splash.


"In the broad light of day, we surveyed the waters around us. To one side, the invasion of Licata was proceeding according to schedule. To the other, the coast from Scoglitti to Cape Scaramia was under fierce attack. The horizon was saw-toothed with ships. One officer, counting, got up to 105 and gave up--and he had only just started to swing around the half-moon that centered at Gela.

"Ashore, troubles began piling up. The engineers cleared the land mines efficiently for the infantry. But spotting and disarming vehicle mines is another matter. Buried four or more feet deep, a man can walk across them without difficulty. But the first jeep we rolled out caught it, and three bulldozers in a row got blasted by the big Teller mines. That hurt. We needed those 'dozers for building roads back from the beach, and for salvage work on the boats. Not having them, supplies piled up on the beaches, unloading was slow, and, as a consequence, the boats spent more time than they should have with their ramps down. This increased the danger of broaching, and, of course, once a boat broaches, on the beach, it's useless until pulled off or straightened out.

"It all added up to terrific congestion, and, in the midst of it, one bomber scored a lucky hit, and we had to evacuate two of the beaches. Then came an urgent call from the Army. Unload all possible anti-tank equipment at once. Other cargoes were hastily shoved aside; boats already loading were unloaded and full priority was given the howitzer equipment. We didn't know why the urgency then. We found out later.

"What we did know was that a good part of the Army unloading crews had been called back into the defense areas, and now our Navy and Coast Guard landing boat crews had to drop

IN A NORTH AFRICAN PORT AMERICANS WOUNDED IN THE FIRST DAYS OF THE INVASION OF SICILY  
ARE UNLOADED FROM A COAST GUARD-MANNED TRANSPORT





their ramps, strip off their coveralls or dungarees, and do their own unloading. This took longer, of course, because the Coast Guard coxswain had to jump back to his controls every so often and turn the boat stern on into the waves to keep her from broaching.

XXXXXXXXXX

"Incidentally, it wasn't all fun," wrote Captain Heimer to a brother officer at Headquarters. "Had two simultaneous 500-pounders dropped close aboard on the port bow, which sprinkled water on the bridge plus many others. Our boats were superb. There was not a single miss cue or error in the whole engagement. It was truly magnificent. By God, I'm proud."<sup>1</sup>

For surmounting numerous obstacles, despite enemy air raids, for outstanding skill, and for exceptionally outstanding performance of duty in Sicily, Captain Heimer received the Legion of Merit. The citation was as follows: "For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the Government of the United States as Commanding Officer of the USS SAMUEL CHASE during the amphibious assault on Sicily, July 10-12, 1943. Surmounting numerous obstacles which confronted him throughout this important operation, Captain Heimer, despite subjection to persistent and accurate raids by hostile planes, enabled his ship to disembark assault troops and unload vehicles and equipment on the assigned beach. Through his outstanding skill, expert supervision of the men under his command, and unwavering attention to a vital and difficult task, Captain Heimer contributed materially to the success of our forces in the Sicilian invasion."

Rear Admiral Lloyd T. Chalker, USCG, Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard, in a letter dated September 23, 1943, praised William G. Lawrence, Chief Boatswain's Mate, USCG, and his crew for their splendid accomplishment in salvaging small boats on the beaches of Sicily.


"Dear Lawrence:

The Commanding Officer of the CHASE in his letter of 15 August, 1943, to the Commander, U. S. Amphibious Force, Northwest African Waters, gives an account of the salvage operations of the CHASE salvage boat, 9 July to 26 July, 1943.<sup>2</sup> This letter for the most part contains a quotation from your letter to the Commanding Officer of the CHASE.

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1. From a letter written by Captain Roger C. Heimer, to Commodore Ellis Reed-Hill, September 14, 1943.
2. See Appendix G for this account.

SAFELY OUT OF THE COMBAT ZONE, A COAST GUARD MANNED LST UNLOADS ITS WOUNDED ON STRETCHERS TO AMBULANCES WHICH WILL RUSH THEM TO A BASE HOSPITAL. COAST GUARDSMAN MERLE B. JEWELL (FOREGROUND), ELECTRICIAN'S MATE SECOND CLASS, OF SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, HELPS WITH A STRETCHER



The account is most interestingly written and gives a very clear picture of the operations and what was accomplished by the CHASE salvage boat. After reading the account I felt that I wanted to congratulate you and your boat's crew on the salvage work that you did. Please accept my congratulations for your splendid accomplishment and also best wishes for the future.

Sincerely,

L. T. CHALKER  
Rear Admiral, USCG  
Assistant Commandant"

#### LANDING CRAFT

Besides the big-ship Navy, there was the little-ship Navy, and also the flat-bottom Navy. Numerically, the greatest was the flat-bottom Navy. It was also the newest, having been developed in World War II. The United States and Great Britain had been spared the horror of waging war on their own soil, but were thereby put at the military disadvantage of being obliged to land their armies upon a hostile shore in order to engage the enemy's land power. The purpose of all landing craft--and of the larger landing ships and the smaller landing vehicles--was the same: to deliver men and supplies over shoals, reefs, mines, and various artificial obstacles to navigation, directly upon the enemy's shore without benefit of harbor, dock, or wharf.

Landing craft differed in two respects: what they were designed to carry--whether men or vehicles or other materials,--and in cruising capacity. A landing ship could cross an ocean under its own power. A landing craft might do so but was usually transported to the theatre of war aboard a ship, and relaunched there for voyaging in narrow seas. A landing vehicle traveled only from a ship or craft lying offshore to the nearby beach.


Following are the principal types of landing ships and craft:

LST - (Landing Ship, Tank) - About 325 feet long; 5,000 tons at full load; delivers tanks, trucks, bulldozers, etc., through a bow ramp.

LCI - (Landing Craft, Infantry) - About 158 feet long; weighs 400 tons. Has quarters aboard for 25 crew men and 210 troops. Has a bridge that looks like the conning tower of an old-fashioned submarine. Disembarks troops over two fretted ramps at either side of her bow. These ramps are thrust forward and downward from the



U. S. COAST GUARD-MANNED LANDING BARGES AND HEAVILY LOADED AMPHIBIOUS TRUCKS RUSH SUPPLIES TO A SICILIAN SHORE





shell of the craft "like turtle limbs." There are guns on her deck. She has been described as not pretty but as having personality. Most of their crews were far from experienced seafaring men. On one occasion, before their long training, one of these little landing barges, so the story goes, was skidding through a winter storm, without a pilot and with no one on board who knew the channels, when her quartermaster cheerfully called up the command tube: "How'm I doin', Captain?" Gradually, many flotillas of LCI's took shape, after long-scale training operations, and played a leading part in the invasion.

LCT - (Landing Craft, Tank) - About 100 feet long; can carry a few tanks, many smaller vehicles; often used like the LCI to carry troops.

LCM - (Landing Craft, Medium) - Used primarily from large ships to shore -- although it can cross narrow waters -- to land tanks.

LCVP - (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel) - About 36 feet long; also used mainly from ship to shore, for landing infantry and light vehicles.

LCC - (Landing Craft, Control) - Sheepdog of the landing craft, used by the naval control officer in directing the others to shore.

LCS - (Landing Craft, Support) - A lightly armored craft mounting machine guns from .50 caliber to 40 mm., also rockets, to boost the landing fleet's fire power.

LVT - (Landing Vehicle, Tracked) - An amphibious tractor, whose treads can swim or climb beaches; known as the "Alligator." Later armored.

LVT(A) - (Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Armored) - The "Water Buffalo," really an amphibious tank, developed from the "Alligator."

LCR - (Landing Craft, Rubber) - The 1944 edition of the coracle.

COAST GUARD CAPTAIN MILES H. IMLAY  
COMMANDER OF COAST GUARD LCI(L) FLOTILLA IN THE INVASIONS OF SICILY AND ITALY



## LANDINGS AT LICATA

Another outstanding leader of the Italian campaign was Commander (later Captain) Miles H. Imlay, USCG, commander of LCI(L) FLOTILLA FOUR. His record was magnificent--in Sicily, and later in the assault on the mainland of Italy, as well as in the initial invasion of Normandy. In Sicily, he brought his force of ships and landing craft to the scene of action under withering enemy fire, and speedily sent them to their designated beaches. After the initial attack, he skillfully assisted in the support and maintenance of the Army at the port of Licata. There he labored tirelessly supervising the clearance of mines from the port and speedily prepared it, in spite of continuous enemy fire, for handling the important equipment and supplies. His leadership was brilliant.

For his services in Sicily, he received the Legion of Merit with the following citation: "For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the Government of the United States as Commander of the Reserve Attack Group during the assault on the Island of Sicily. Courageously bringing his force of ships and landing craft to the scene of action, Commander Imlay dispatched them with speed and precision to the designation beaches and later, following the initial attack, skillfully assisted in the support and maintenance of the Army at the Port of Licata. Serving temporarily as Commander of the Advance Base at Porto Empedocle, he labored tirelessly supervising the clearance of mines from the port despite heavy enemy gunfire and speedily prepared it for the unloading and handling of important equipment and supplies. Commander Imlay's brilliant leadership and tenacious devotion to duty contributed immeasurably to the success of our forces in the Sicilian campaign."

A letter to Admiral R. R. Waesche, Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, written on July 30, 1943, by Commander Imlay, gives an idea of how the small boats of that group carried out their assigned tasks in the face of enemy fire.<sup>1</sup>


### OFFICIAL REPORT OF OPERATIONS; JOSS TASK FORCE - RESERVE GROUP

1. The LCI(L) Reserve Group, consisting of seventeen vessels, was detached from JTF Convoy at 1430 July 9, 1943, and steered various courses at various speeds to take positions on flanks of the three reserve group LST's when they were detached from JTM Convoy. At 1700, formed cruising disposition with LST's making good course 270 degrees True at eight knots. At 1759 changed course to make good a course of 360 degrees True. At 1840 sighted reserve group LCT's consisting of six British and twelve American vessels and their escorts from JTS Convoy bearing approximately 240 degrees True, distance three miles. Slowed reserve group to two knots to allow LCT's and escorts

1. See Appendix H.



A FLOTILLA OF COAST GUARD MANNED LCI(L)'S MAKES ITS TRIUMPHANT HOMECOMING





to take convoy cruising disposition. All LCT's except LCT-215 seemed unable to join formation due to very heavy head seas. Two escorts were detached to standby and guide these vessels to the rendezvous. At 2000 increased speed to five knots as it was believed advisable to have as many vessels of the reserve group who could maintain speed at the rendezvous on time.

2. Considerable difficulty was encountered during the dark hours of D morning endeavoring not to run down LCT's of the Joss Advance Force who had fallen behind. No enemy flares were dropped in the immediate vicinity of the reserve group, but a number were observed dropping ahead and on the flanks. A celestial fix was obtained at 0500 and the reserve group, consisting of three LST's, seventeen LCI's and three LCT's anchored in the rendezvous area at 0600. The remainder of the LCT's arrived in groups, the last three vessels arriving at approximately 1045.

3. Six LST's from Green Beach and six LST's from Yellow Beach joined the reserve group at approximately 0800. These vessels and the late arriving LCT's did not anchor in their designated positions as given by the Commander Task Group's Operation Plan. Some of these vessels anchored as far as two miles away from their designated position, and although this may have presented a more difficult target for enemy aircraft, it did complicate the communication problem and decrease the speed and efficiency of despatching vessels and groups of vessels to their respective beaches. No aircraft attacks occurred during the anchorage period.

4. At 1130 all vessels had been despatched to their various beaches.

M. H. Imlay  
Commander, USCG

### THE 85


#### COAST GUARD LCI(L) FLOTILLA FOUR

#### LCI'S ROLL ABOUT LIKE CORKS ON HIGH WAVES

Lieutenant (jg) Arthur Farrar, USCGR, assigned as Executive Officer to the newly-completed LCI(L) 85, in Commander Imlay's Coast Guard LCI(L) Flotilla 4, gave the following description of the trans-Atlantic crossing and operations in the Sicilian invasion.

"We were ordered to Norfolk for outfitting. As the ships filed down the channel on the way out to the Gulf, two red flags were seen flying from the Coast Guard station. The warnings were right. A gale met us before the convoy was well out of sight of land. To most of us Ensigns and a large part of the crew, this was to be the first sea duty. It was a rugged initiation. Some say an LCI will roll on a heavy dew. In this gale they did everything. They rolled and pitched and shuddered. Sometimes they hit a wave with a jolt like running into a

THESE 155-FOOTERS (LCI(L)'S) LANDED AMERICAN FIGHTERS ON THE BEACHES OF SICILY, SALERNO, AND NORMANDY



brick wall. The storm lasted four days. When we arrived at Key West, land had never looked so beautiful.... Fine weather prevailed at Key West, but when we were a half day's journey on the waves began kicking up again. By night, gaint rollers were tossing the ships around like fishing corks."

ALMOST  
EVERYBODY  
SEASICK

"All the cooks were sick," the Ensign said, "but it didn't make such difference because no one felt well enough to eat and even old salts became violently ill." "As for myself," he continued, "I didn't feel so bad but I just couldn't control my stomach. I didn't need any time-piece for watch standing because my stomach would take on a fit of convulsions every twenty minutes. After eleven of these it would be time to call my relief and at the twelfth one he would take over the watch. Waves got to be about thirty feet high and were coming at such an angle that many times the ship three hundred yards away would be completely hidden. I found that I could eat in the fresh air so I took my dinner to the conning station and sat down on the deck to eat. The bulkheads were five feet high. The ships rolled over to the right and I could see all the LCI's in the starboard column. It recovered and rolled back to the left and the port column came into view." Everybody felt so miserable, said the Ensign, that a colored steward's mate spoke what many of them were thinking when he asked, in all seriousness: "Suh, do you know any way ah can git into the awmy?"


GOOD TRIP  
ACROSS AND  
TIME FOR  
TRAINING

On April 1, 1943, the flotilla said good-bye to the United States and started the journey across to Europe. The weather was excellent. A stop was made at Bermuda, where everybody had a good time. Then the start was made for the war zones. The trip across was slow, taking nineteen more days. However, the weather was good, there were few submarine scares and no action. Upon arrival at a Northwest African port intensive training was begun for the invasion. Rangers wanted lots of practice at landing. In a typical practice a division of LCI's went to the docks and took on about 150 Rangers each. Rangers did not feel their way down the ramps. They ran. In a few seconds each was flattened out behind a rock, bush, or ledge and shooting at objectives. Plane identification classes were added to the training program, everybody receiving the training, and in addition one officer and three men were selected from each ship for an intensive course. As a result of this careful preparation, all planes used in that area could be easily recognized before they came in range of the guns.

AIR RAID  
OVER TROOP-  
LADEN SHIPS

"Our first action was in the Sicilian invasion," related the Ensign. "LCI's from Flotilla Four were assigned different beaches and consequently went across with different sections of the convoy. The loading of soldiers was a big day.... The convoy of loaded ships of every description gathered here was enormous. An air raid was expected and came the night before we left. The raid was

INTO AN UNDISCLOSED HARBOR ON THE ATLANTIC COAST FILES A FLOTILLA  
OF COAST GUARD-MANNED LCI'S. THEY RETURN TO HOME WATERS AS VICTORS  
CARRYING MOST OF THE COAST GUARDSMEN WHO PUT OUT WITH THEM FROM  
A TEXAS PORT NEARLY TWO YEARS BEFORE





made by from fifty to seventy German planes. To get to the ships they had to come in range of land anti-aircraft defense which was terrific. Dozens of large searchlights picked out the planes and there probably will never be a more intense curtain of fire than was put up to these Nazi raiders. Almost all of the thousand or so ships fired, and this, added to the land AA defense, made it a suicide bomb run. As a result, most bombs dropped far out in the fields and no damage was suffered by the convoy. Five planes were seen to fall. Some of the Nazi flyers were picked up out of the water and carried to the invasion."

DIFFICULT TRIP  
ACROSS IN HEAVY  
SEAS TO SICILY

A fifty-mile-an-hour gale made the trip across the Mediterranean very difficult. Troops were very sick. In the daytime it was extremely hard to keep position in the heavy seas, and at night a four-hour O. D. watch was a "killer." Because of the cross-seas, a course could not be held but changes were rapidly and constantly made to keep in the general direction of the guide. "When considering that the LCI upon which we were guiding was doing the same thing, it is easier to see why, while on the same convoy course, the helmsman would receive orders to steer courses ranging from 80 to 150 degrees," said Ensign Farrar. "The heading would be perfect one instant, and the next a huge roller would come along, pick up the bow and toss it 15 to 30 degrees off."

RENDEZVOUS  
AREA IS  
REACHED

When they reached the rendezvous area, however, the seas quieted down like magic. It was then about 0200. Searchlights swept over the sea in their direction. "More joined and there was a distinctly uneasy and eerie feeling as those lights, evenly spaced along the shore, swept back and forth across our ships," the Ensign said. "Each moment we expected the big guns of the fighting ships to blast out, but the stillness was unbroken. Far in the distance we could see a lot of shooting where other landings were being made. Finally came the time to run for the beach. The first wave was delayed for some reason, so that when it came time to go the guide started off at full speed. Those who didn't catch on quickly had to run at flank to catch up."

ENEMY FIRE  
MISTAKEN  
FOR FLARES  
MOMENTARILY

"On approaching the beach, single shots of tracer fire could be seen at regular intervals of time. They were going parallel to the beach and looked like balls of fire looping through the air. They traveled so slowly we thought someone was shooting flares along the beach to show us where to land.

The error was soon realized, though, upon arriving close enough to hear the shells whine as they hit the water and bounced off. The firing was coming from behind a knoll and was not accurate. We beached in the darkness before dawn, amid a number of LCI's and LCVP's. All three of the first waves had reached the shore almost at the same time."

BATTLE-SCARRED BUT VICTORIOUS, A FLOTILLA OF COAST GUARD MANNED  
LCI(L)'S REACHES HOME WATERS AFTER CROSSING THE ATLANTIC FROM  
THE EUROPEAN WAR THEATER



TENSENESS  
DURING  
FIRST LANDING

"On my ship we were so scared our voices sounded strange," the Ensign continued. "While the skipper was giving necessary orders, the signalman and I were assisting by reporting everything going on.

Upon sighting a tracer coming our way, we would yell 'Duck,' and the skipper always believed us. Finally while the troops were going off I saw a shell headed directly at the conning station just waist high. I yelled something quick and ducked behind the compass stand. The others ducked, too, but nothing else happened. The skipper began to laugh and it was catching. He still claims I yelled, 'Duck, here comes a pink one!' Witnesses say that shell exploded just before reaching the ship. Anyway, we have never had the same feeling in hitting the beach. Even later, when strong opposition was certain, all of the officers and crew were rid of the tenseness felt on that first landing."

VARIOUS DUTIES  
OF THE LCI's

After disembarking the troops, the LCI's went back to the transport area, and there had to do more shooting as another air raid was on. This raid did not prove very heavy, and the LCI's were ordered back to their home port for more troops. They maintained full speed there and back, and two days later, in the early hours of morning, were hovering over the same beach awaiting landing orders. In their absence the fight had gone well and the LCI's were instructed to take troops to the port of Licata instead of beaching again. Some of the LCI's were assigned as salvage vessels, some were used as messenger ships, some as decoys, and others continued to bring reinforcements. That work continued off and on until the next invasion. Between times, the regular training program continued.


Among those receiving decorations was Lieutenant Farrar, who was awarded the Bronze Medal.

LIEUTENANT ROLAND J. JOHNSON'S ACCOUNT

The invasion barges dumfounded their crews by crossing the Atlantic, according to Lieutenant Roland J. Johnson of the Coast Guard, who commanded one of the vessels. A flotilla of 76 flat-bottomed landing boats made a 4600-mile, 32-day trans-Atlantic trip under their own power and later landed Allied troops in Sicily, winning the respect and admiration of their doubting crews. The boats went through rough weather with capacity cargoes of munitions.

At the end of the trip across, which included a 10-day stop at a British possession, practice landings were made with the 76 LCI's (landing craft, infantry) and the LCT's (landing craft, tanks) along the North African coast. Lieutenant Johnson participated in these but was prevented

A COAST GUARD MANNED LCI(L) IS HOME FROM THREE INVASIONS IN THE EUROPEAN WAR THEATER





by illness from taking part in the Sicilian invasion where the barges proved their practicability for the first time in invasion warfare. He had to be rushed home by airplane.

One group of naval experts had believed that it was impossible for small flat-bottomed boats of such light draft as the invasion barges to make the trans-Atlantic trip. The designers, however, were confident as to how the barges would perform on the rough seas, and to prove the worth of the boats loaded each one to capacity with war materials and men.

"We were aware of the lousy reputation these boats had before we left," Lieutenant Johnson said. "The crews had no faith in them, but when the time came to leave all hands were at their stations. Twenty-four of the boats in our flotilla had been assigned to the Coast Guard....

"We were just getting the feel of our small ship, when the barometer suddenly indicated bad weather ahead. Before we were in the blow long we knew the naval designers had done a good job.

"It certainly beats hell how this damn box with everything on top and nothing on the bottom keeps right side up," an old Coast Guard hand said. She fooled everybody. She took the seas on the starboard bow and tossed them off as any good ship does, in a rough seaway....

"By the time we reached Africa, we were ashamed of our distrust of her, and the boys who had given her the appellation of 'coffin,' 'one-way ticket,' 'good-by forever,' and 'trolley car' were calling her 'swell gal.'"

PC LOCATES  
LANDING  
POINTS

Many hours before the invasion began, the Coast Guard units quietly located landing points. One of the 173-foot PC boats, a Coast Guard boat, located one of these landing points and lay at anchor for six hours carrying out its assigned task. "No mine sweeps swept a channel for us, no one went with us; we went alone," Lieutenant L. W. A. Renshaw, USCG, reported. "Everyone is well aware of the enormous success of our initial Sicilian operation," he continued. "Few people are aware of the smaller landings made behind the enemy lines in Northern Sicily, thereby contributing to the advances of the 7th Army along the North Coast of Sicily towards Messina." Under gunfire and aerial bombardment for eight days this PC carried out its amphibious tasks.

LT. W. D. STRAUCH, USCG



## THE LST 331

### LST DOWNS ENEMY PLANES

While the LST-331 was engaged in towing, beaching, and unloading operations in Sicily, she had several occasions to down enemy planes, which were overhead a good portion of the time. For the most part, they were kept fairly high by the AA fire from her guns, fire from destroyers and cruisers and also by Allied planes. General quarters aboard the 331 were sounded at an average of once an hour during this period. The position of the LST on the beach made her less liable to attack than the transports. For she was at right angles to the shore line and high sand dunes, thus presenting a very small target. This condition enabled her to surprise several bomber pilots who were apparently too intent on getting at the transports.

### TWO ENEMY PLANES SEEN TO CRASH

"We held our fire until two light bombers passed our port side, flying low, heading for the transports," related Lieutenant (jg) W. D. Strauch, Jr., Executive Officer aboard the LST, which was operating as the flagship for a flotilla group with Lt. Comdr. F. H. Newton, Jr., and his staff aboard. "The planes presented us with a fine target," the Lieutenant continued. "We opened up with all available guns. When last seen one of those planes was on fire and losing altitude. Another plane flew past our starboard side parallel to the ship, flying at about forty feet altitude. The MM's opened up with all available guns. About 75% hits were observed. Sparks started to fly from this plane and it lost altitude and crashed into the sea. Still another plane approached at a 45-degree angle to the bow of the LST, starboard to port. We opened fire and obtained 90% hits. The plane burst into flames and crashed ashore."

### LIEUTENANT W. D. STRAUCH'S ACCOUNT


Lieutenant W. D. Strauch, Jr., USCG, Executive Officer aboard the Coast Guard manned LST (Landing Ship, Tanks) 331 sent in, as a factual report to Headquarters, the following actual epic story of the U. S. Coast Guard's role in the invasion of Sicily.

The LST-331 was the flagship of a flotilla group and had on board Lieutenant Commander F. H. Newton, Jr., and his staff. This flotilla group had been assigned to a task force commanded by F. M. Adams, U.S.N., in the organization set up for invading Sicily.

"The ship was loaded with R.A.F. personnel, trucks and other vehicles to be used on Comiso Airport after its capture.

"The wind had been very moderate. However, it suddenly rose to a high velocity and continued to increase.

COAST GUARD-MANNED TANK LANDING SHIPS





+

The seas started to build up as a result of this wind. The size of the seas and the fact that they were on the beam made it exceedingly rough going for the LST's and smaller craft. Finally, we reached the assigned area and our ship was the first LST to arrive on the scene.

"While anchored here we were in a position to observe the activities in progress. Waves of small landing craft were proceeding shoreward and there was considerable gunfire from the destroyers and cruisers farther out to sea. This gunfire was apparently directed at enemy shore installations which showed signs of resistance.

"A very heavy surf was running although the wind had moderated. Considerable skill was necessary to prevent broaching of these small boats. A number of boats were laying along the beach, abandoned.


"Further orders were not long in forthcoming and we were directed to take in tow two pontoons which were alongside of a Navy tug. We were further directed to beach these pontoons at a point 5 or 6 miles northwest of the transport area. The pontoons were made fast alongside by a Sea Bee crew who were assigned for this purpose.

"We commenced towing and noticed immediately that the motions imparted to the pontoons by the heavy seas were placing a severe strain on the towing lines and cables. This strain proved to be too great for the lines and cables to withstand and the forward lines parted. Before the ship's headway could be stopped, the pontoons swung broadside and parted the other lines holding it fast. Both pontoons started drifting towards the beach, travelling with wind and sea.

"The LST was turned and maneuvered so as to pass a line to the Sea Bees still aboard the pontoons. The wind, sea and light draft of the ship made maneuvering difficult; nevertheless a heaving line was passed, but before a hawser could be run out and made fast the wind carried it away. The pontoons had drifted very close to the surf by this time and it was considered too great a risk to the ship to continue the chase. A nearby invasion craft was contacted and the craft made several unsuccessful attempts to place a line on the pontoons.

"The pontoons finally drifted into the surf but the invasion craft at last got a line fast and started towing them to a deeper water. While towing them out the tow line parted several times. The connecting links and chains holding the pontoons together, started breaking

A COAST GUARD-MANNED LST (LANDING SHIP, TANK) THRUSTS ITS SNUB NCSE THROUGH A CALM SEA



from the motion of the heavy swells. "When the pontoons had finally been towed into deeper water the LST was maneuvered close to the pontoons under difficulty. A part of this difficulty was due to the fact that the aiding invasion craft and the pontoons had separated and were drifting in different directions. Contributory factors were the wind and the sea and the close proximity of shoal water. At last the pontoons were secured and the long runback to the landing beach was started.

"The wind abated slightly and it was possible to take advantage of this lull and bring the LST around into the wind so as to maintain a course farther off shore. But it was impossible to beach the pontoons properly so the LST was anchored and the pontoons moored astern.


"Later the pontoons were brought alongside and rigged for beaching. At last we were underway and approached the beach at standard speed. When the LST grounded, the pontoons surged forward and grounded at the proper location. We then proceeded unloading vehicles.

"The last vehicle went off and we were ready to start unloading other cargo. Unloading this cargo was made difficult because at the inshore end of the pontoons the water was two feet deep. It was decided to construct a rough pier running from the end of the pontoons to the beach. Plenty of rough lumber had been carried for dunnage and some of it was used to construct the pier. The pier was soon completed and material commenced flowing across it immediately. R. A. F. personnel, assisted by various members of the ship's crew, unloaded the entire cargo without any outside assistance.

"While engaged in the towing, beaching and unloading operations, enemy planes were overhead a good portion of the time. For the most part they were kept fairly high by the AA fire from our own guns, fire from destroyers and cruisers and also by Allied fighting planes. General quarters were sounded at an average of once an hour during this period.

"One Axis medium bomber, recognized as a JU-88 was sighted approaching our port bow quarter--altitude about 3000 feet. We opened fire immediately. No hits were scored but the anti-aircraft fire caused this plane to alter course to our port. This bomber dropped a stick of bombs which landed nearby. No damage was done to the ship and no casualties resulted.

RAIL CARS ROLL INTO BOW OF COAST GUARD-MANNED LST





"The position of our ship on the beach made us less liable to attack than the transports. Our ship's position was at right angles to the shore line and high sanddunes, thus presenting a very small target. This condition enabled us to surprise several bomber pilots who were apparently too intent on getting at the transports.

"We held our fire until two light bombers passed our port side flying low, heading for the transports. The planes presented us with a fine target. We opened up with all available guns. When last seen, one of those planes was on fire and losing altitude. Another plane flew past our starboard side parallel to the ship, flying at about forty foot altitude. The MM's opened fire on this one. About 75% hits were observed. Sparks started flying from this plane and it lost altitude and crashed into the sea.

"Still another plane approached at a 45 degree angle to the bow of the LST, starboard to port. We opened fire and obtained 90% hits. The plane burst into flames and crashed ashore. During this period, ship's personnel were hazarded by anti-aircraft shells bursting close aboard and sending shrapnel about the decks.


"After unloading, we received orders to come alongside of another transport. As soon as the lines were made fast the transport started loading us with howitzer shells and small caliber ammunition. Then we were ordered to the beach again.

"About five minutes after we cleared the beach we heard a low-flying plane approaching. This plane came from inland, apparently using the road as a guide. The plane dropped four bombs in the water at the exact spot where the LST had been beached but five minutes earlier. The pilot evidently became enraged when he found his target had disappeared. He turned, strafed the beach and pontoons, and disappeared into the night.

"While this attack was in progress the steering engine on the LST developed trouble. We proceeded as quickly as possible, using the main engine to steer the ship, in order to place as much distance as possible between us and the spot being bombed. The anchor was let go ten minutes later. We unloaded our cargo, and the LST backed off the beach and assumed guide for a convoy of LST's.

"Prior to and during the invasion a fine spirit of cooperation was displayed by all officers and men attached to the LST-331. Working long hours, day after

U. S. COAST GUARD-MANNED TRANSPORT LEONARD WOOD



day, with very little rest, the seamanship, gunnery, navigation, and ship handling, together with routine work was carried on in a highly efficient and praiseworthy manner.

"The engineer division also performed its share of the duties connected with this operation in a very commendable way. The main engines and various additional mechanical units were operated very efficiently by the Engineer Division in spite of extremely trying conditions."

### LEONARD WOOD

#### LANDINGS AT SCOGLITTI

##### FIRST TO ARRIVE, DESPITE HIGH SEAS

The LEONARD WOOD was the first transport in the Scoglitti area to get her boats ashore, despite heavy seas. They arrived on Beach Yellow at 0345, H-Hour having been postponed in that area one hour. She experienced great difficulty in swinging the tank lighters. It was particularly difficult to load the vehicles with the boats surging alongside the rolling ship. However, all handicaps were met, and the boats sped on to the shore. The troops left the boats as fast as the surge of the craft and the surf allowed, and moved rapidly across the beach.

##### UNLOADING UNDER DIFFICULTIES


Some of the unloading was done under trying conditions. For instance, one lighter broached when partially unloaded, and the men were unable to do anything about it. To make up for that handicap, however, another tank lighter came in and was unloaded rapidly, and then towed off the one that had broached. Another boat, loaded with a 40-mm gun and heavy ammunition, and also the gun's crew, broached due to lack of proper equipment for removing its cargo expeditiously. Numerous attempts were made to save the boat. All removable gear worth salvaging was removed and placed in a designated location. Then during the day as other boats broached to, coxswains brought their gear to the designated place and left two men to watch over their boats constantly. On the other hand, some boats did not seem to have too much trouble. They made their run to the beach, unloaded, backed off, and were successful in returning to the big ship for more troops and supplies.

##### UNHURT BY GUNFIRE

Many of the little boats, either because they were little or because they were lucky, escaped unhurt even when pursued steadily by enemy gunfire. A beach marking boat, from the LEONARD WOOD, set out to mark channels for the LST's, LCI's, and other small craft that were to land in that area. The beach-marking crew marked their first channel with buoys. This channel was deep enough for the LST's.



MEMBERS OF THE AFRICA KORPS OF THE GERMAN ARMY ARE MARCHED ALONG THE SICILIAN WATERFRONT  
FOR TRANSFER AS PRISONERS OF WAR TO A COAST GUARD-MANNED ASSAULT TRANSPORT OFF SHORE





Another channel was good only for the LCI's and smaller craft. The little party had completed their assignment there and were leaving when they encountered gunfire. At first it was not too close, so they continued their soundings. They had to withdraw eventually because the attack became too heavy to permit work. A shore battery opened up on them later, so they immediately headed out to sea. For fifteen minutes the gunfire continued to follow the little beach-marking boat, but never seemed to fall any closer to it than 35 yards.

#### HIS BIG MOMENT

Chief Machinist's Mate George Drega, a veteran of many years in the Coast Guard, later told in a husky voice of his big moment of the war. It came at Gela, Sicily. Off Sicily, the WOOD was under constant bombardment for four days. LC's surged back and forth, day and night, drawing fire with each new load of reserves and the wounded as they hurried back. "Boy, we were getting it!" Drega said. "Bomb misses, evasive tactics, the Navy doctors topside operating eighty-two hours at a crack. This ship's had more operations than anything afloat, barring hospital ships."

#### OCCASIONAL MISTAKES

Drega's prize memory was of the admiral on a nearby cruiser who yelled over the intership phone, "Cease fire! Friendly planes overhead!" The enlisted man at the transport's fire-control station cried back, "Friendly planes, hell! They're bombing us!" And the admiral, a reasonable man, said hurriedly, "Sorry, my mistake!" "Brother," Drega reminisced dreamily, "that was something!"

#### GERMAN REACTION TO DEFEAT

How the Germans reacted to defeat was described by both officers and men of the WOOD as something right out of Mein Kampf. Young officers of the Afirka Korps and the elite Hermann Goering Division marched aboard in desert caps and shorts, Nazi eagles and full decorations, down to the last shoulder patch, gleaming in the African sun. From the moment they hit the deck, they spent every waking moment quoting their rights under the Geneva conventions. Ignoring senior officers, the Nazi Party members chose their own representatives to make never-ending demands. "They didn't look like the public's conception of them," said Lt. Comdr. Edward Allen, Jr., acting executive officer. "No, sir, the Nordic superman was missing. No Heidelberg scars. But there was no satisfying them. They were even trying to tell me what part of the deck they should be allowed to exercise on. When I told them Sicily had been captured, they screamed, 'It's a lie! It's a lie!'"

### OFFICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES<sup>1</sup>

#### PREPARATIONS

Upon her return to the United States in November, 1942, and until June, 1943, the WOOD was engaged

1. From the Ship's History, 30 September, 1945, transmitted by H. C. Perkins, Commanding Officer, to the Secretary of the Navy.

COMMANDER BLAIR WALLISER, USCGR



in the training of embarked troops in the technique of amphibious landing attack operations conducted with Army troops in Chesapeake Bay. During this period major alterations and repairs were made at the Norfolk Navy Yard, Portsmouth, Virginia.

#### OPERATIONS

On 3 June, 1943, approximately 2,300 officers and men of the 179th Regiment, 45th Division, U. S. Army, were embarked at Newport News, Virginia, and the ship sailed in convoy as part of Task Force 65, arriving on 22 June, at Mers-el-Kebir, Algeria. Preparations were made for the amphibious attack on the island of Sicily. On 9 July, the WOOD took her assigned position off Scoglitti, Sicily, and on 10 July, she began unloading her assault group and equipment. The unloading was completed on 12 July, and although bombs from enemy aircraft landed near the ship, she was not damaged during the operation. From the landing operations at Sicily the WOOD returned to the United States arriving at Newport News, Virginia, on 4 August, 1943, with 766 German prisoners of war and 145 American casualties.

#### ACCOUNT OF LT. BLAIR WALLISER, USCGR

Lieutenant Walliser was on the Coast Guard Transport SAMUEL CHASE during the landing at Gela, Sicily. He discusses many details of the operation, particularly the difficulties encountered by the small boats.<sup>1</sup>

#### PRAISE FOR PERSONNEL

Officers were unanimous in voicing praise for the personnel of the support boats which were successful in providing gunfire, and also acted as control and patrol vessels. For instance, the officer in charge of the PA-12 expressed special commendation for the members of the crew of that boat. Coxswain Martin E. Cranston and Engineer James L. Nickel, he reported, were especially deserving of mention and credit for their diligent work, initiative in action, and loyalty to duty. They spent much extra time and effort in preparing the boat for service and kept it in operation in spite of difficulties. Nickel worked diligently on the trip to the line of departure to keep the boat running, when it threatened to break down due to shipping water, water in the oil, and a bent screw. Radarman Henry Levine was very conscientious and made a valuable contribution. Gunners Mate Elbert Smelser and Seamen Andrew deGomar and Maurice Williams were also deserving of praise for their work. This officer voiced what many others thought about their personnel. Commander O'Neill praised the courage and devotion to duty throughout the operation of all the officers and men as being "the highest order."

#### LEGION OF MERIT FOR COMMANDER O'NEILL

For valiantly fighting his ship during severe enemy bombings, and successfully landing troops and equipment, Commander O'Neill was awarded the Legion of Merit. His citation reads: "For exceptionally



COAST GUARDSMAN JOSEPH EDWARDS, CHIEF SIGNALMAN, HAD A CLOSE SHAVE WHEN A PIECE OF SHRAPNEL  
FROM A GERMAN BOMB WENT THROUGH HIS CAP





meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the Government of the United States as Commanding Officer of the USS LEONARD WOOD during the amphibious invasion of the Island of Sicily. Valiantly fighting his ship during severe enemy bombings, Captain O'Neill successfully landed troops and equipment and brought the LEONARD WOOD through this engagement unscathed. By his expert seamanship, fine tactical skill and heroic devotion to duty, he contributed materially to our success in this vital operation."

FINE SEAMANSHIP  
PRAISED

General Eisenhower, on July 17, reported to General Marshall: "----All the initial invasion moves were carried out smoothly, and an astonishing lack of resistance was encountered on the shoreline. Captured Italian generals say we secured complete surprise. The airborne operations, which were executed about three hours ahead of the landing, were apparently the first real notice the defenders had of what was coming. Our parachutists and the British glider troops got fairly well into their positions in spite of very high winds and bad navigating conditions. The landings on the east coast were not greatly troubled by the weather, but the 45th and 1st Divisions had an extremely bad surf. Admiral Cunningham told me that he considered the United States Navy landing operations, under Admiral Kirk (with the 45th Division), to be one of the finest examples of seamanship he had ever witnessed." (See Marshall Report, 1945).


EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNT BY FRED STOUT, SEAMAN 1/C

"I was a member of a crew of Coast Guardsmen which spent three days shuttling back and forth from the LEONARD WOOD to the Sicilian Beach under almost constant fire. We brought troops and supplies ashore and we brought prisoners back. We operated a two way service. And I spent two days on the island because my barge was in no condition, after one of the trips, to take me back to my ship. In fact, it just wasn't.

"The night we hit the Sicilian coast was a black one. Most of the crew of the LEONARD WOOD, were in good spirits. We had been through fire before and knew just about what to expect. We had been among the first to unload troops in Africa. And now we were to have one of the spots of honor off Sicily.

"The enemy was caught flatfooted at first. It wasn't until our soldiers had advanced a full two hundred yards onto the island that action started. But then the shells came. The night wasn't so dark after that. Flares and tracers lit up the beach like Times Square in the old days. I could have read a magazine--if I had been interested

WOUNDED SOLDIERS ARE HOISTED ABOARD A COAST GUARD TRANSPORT OFF A SICILIAN BEACH



in reading a magazine at the time. American ships were shelling the German and Italian lines and they in turn were dropping mortars on ours. And, to make it even more cozy, Nazi planes were strafing from all directions.

"The American soldiers were wonderful. I was damned proud to be on the same team with them. They were scared alright. But they weren't yellow. They didn't want to fight--but they fought. They hit that beach guts first and scattered the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. The Germans ran and the Italians surrendered. One of my shipmates, Abby Meyer, is of Italian descent and he was able to converse with the Italian prisoners fairly well. He had a heck of a time convincing them that Norfolk and New York hadn't been bombed to rubble. They certainly had been told some pretty fancy tales.

"The two days I spent on the beach was fun. I was with Abby and two soldiers. We were entertained by the natives and shot at by Nazi snipers. The Italians were glad to see us and gave us wine and food. We borrowed a horse and buggy and made a round of the rendezvous. In Chicago we called them saloons. As we were about to enter one place, snipers shot at us and we ran like the devil. We ran into a party of well armed American soldiers and together we wiped out the hidden Nazis.

"Abby and I finally got a lift back to our ship and were assigned to another barge. Our ship, of all the fleet, had the most barges return and we were scuttling all over the Mediterranean Sea unloading ships which hadn't been as fortunate."


#### MEDICAL FACILITIES

Medical plans for the Sicilian operations were most elaborately drawn up. As a matter of fact, the facilities proved to be much greater than needed. For the seriously wounded, 17 base hospitals in the Mateur-Tunis-Bizerte region were provided, with a capacity of 8,250 beds. On the spot were two United States and three British hospital ships and four British hospital carriers, with a total capacity of 1,445 stretcher and 1,140 ambulatory cases.

Transports were equipped to handle casualties. The Scoglitti transports could accommodate 1,945 stretcher and 4,820 ambulatory cases, having on board 95 medical and 13 dental officers and 429 corpsmen. The Gela transports, with 49 medical, seven dental officers and 211 corpsmen, could handle 817 stretcher and 2,055 ambulatory cases. At Licata, the IST's were equipped to accommodate casualties.



COAST GUARDSMAN EARL SAUTER TALKS TO A WISTFUL PAIR OF YOUNG GERMAN PRISONERS  
ABOARD A COAST GUARD MANNED TRANSPORT ENROUTE TO A NORTH AFRICAN PORT





Ordinarily there would be one officer to every four or six LST's, with a corpsman on each. A pool of 52 medical officers and 250 corpsmen were organized from which one medical officer and five medical corpsmen were assigned to each LST not already having a medical officer. Thus, 72 LST's were equipped to handle emergency casualties and to transport them to more suitable quarters. Only the more serious cases were transferred to base hospitals at Bizerte and Oran.

#### RESULTS ACHIEVED

During the first ten days of July 1943, Allied Air Forces subjected Sicily and Italy to continuous and devastating raids. On July 10, British, Canadian, and American troops landed along a 100-mile front in Sicily and began a swift advance up both coasts. Having secured their bridgeheads, Allied forces made good progress on the 10th and 11th. On the 12th, a communique revealed, the following towns were captured: Syracuse, Avola, Noto, Pachino, Rosolini, Ispica, Pozzallo, Scoglitti, Gela, and Licata. The occupation of Syracuse by the British gave the Allies one of the best harbors in the Mediterranean. In spite of bitter opposition, they succeeded in placing more than half of the island under Allied control before the end of the month. The Allies took large numbers of Axis prisoners, mostly Italians. Thirteen days after the invasion began, they captured Palermo, capital of Sicily, Mussolini resigned on July 25, and Marshal Badoglio became Prime Minister.

Between 5,000 and 6,000 prisoners were taken through July 12.. Among those reported captured was General Achilles D'Avet, commander of the 206th Italian Coastal Division, and his entire headquarters. The Division was said to have been almost entirely eliminated. Reported killed in action on the 11th was Lt. General Enrico Franciscisci of the Fascist Militia. Allied casualties were reported to be light to that date.

Naval operations in the invasion of Sicily were carried out by more than 3,000 warships, merchantmen, shipping vessels and craft of all types - the largest armada ever assembled. Participating in the operations, in addition to the United States and the Royal British Navy were units of the Royal Indian and of the Dutch, Polish, and Greek Navies. Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey was Naval Commander, with Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt as Commander, United States Naval Forces. Both were under the command of Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham, Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean.

According to press reports, the enemy general in titular command of Sicily was General Alfredo Guzzoni, Commander in Chief of the 6th Italian Army. Guzzoni, a veteran officer, aged 63, had led the Italian invasion of Albania in 1939. In 1941 he was dismissed, when

TWO COAST GUARDSMEN HOLD A DISCUSSION WITH A WOUNDED PARATROOPER DURING HIS REMOVAL  
BY LANDING CRAFT TO A COAST GUARD MANNED ASSAULT TRANSPORT OFF THE SHORES OF SICILY



the Fascists shook up the high command, and returned shortly before the invasion of Sicily.

In the early stages of the invasion, no contact was made with enemy surface forces. On the night of the 12th, however, one of our flotillas of MTB's operating in the Strait of Messina engaged two enemy E-boats, which were set ablaze and driven ashore. Signs of increased U-boat activity were reported on the 14th, but it was said that "counter measures had been highly successful and disheartening to the enemy." Throughout the operations, our ships were subjected to bombing attacks by Axis aircraft.

Allied ships did not confine their activities to the intricate and complicated task of transporting and landing troops, vehicles, guns and other equipment. Cruisers and destroyers silenced many coastal batteries that opened fire on our assault boats as they went into the beaches. The surrender of Pozallo was accepted by the commanding officer of a destroyer during the early afternoon of the 11th. American warships supported the troops by shelling tank formations behind Gela, the airfield at Ponte Olivo, and enemy divisions at Porto Empedocle. Naval guns also fired on the port of Augusta and bombarded Catania airfield in the early hours of July 13th.

The Allied air forces played a vital part in preparing the way for the invasion and in providing a fighter umbrella for the landings, and continued to give close support to the ground troops and to bomb enemy airfields, communications and truck transport. On July 3, air operations in preparation for the invasion were intensified, and on the 6th activity on an even greater scale began. The main weight of bombs were directed at strategic enemy airfields in Sicily, although communication and supply targets were also heavily attacked. At least once a day, from July 6 to 9, the important airdromes at Gerbini, Biscari, Comiso, and Sciacca were thoroughly bombed from the air. Gerbini and its satellite fields were hit with the heaviest weight of bombs, approximately 1,000 tons being dropped in the course of the four days' operations. Also heavily hit during that period were the airdromes at Milo, Borizzo, and targets at Palermo, Lucca, Caltanissetta, Marsala, Porto Empedocle, Pozzallo, Avola, Noto, San Paolo, and Palazzola. During daylight on the 9th, about 15 Liberators of the Ninth United States Air Force dropped more than 50 tons of bombs on the Axis command headquarters at the resort of Taormina on the east coast of Sicily. The San Domenico Hotel, in which the enemy headquarters was housed, and the general post office, in which were concentrated all communication facilities, were reported demolished by a series of direct hits.

Preliminary figures showed that 52 Axis planes were destroyed in air operations over and around Sicily from the night of July 5th through the day of July 9th, while 32 Allied planes were lost. During a daylight raid on the 8th, enemy planes machine-gunned our crews who

HIS LANDING CRAFT SWEEPED BY FIRE FROM TWO GERMAN MACHINE GUN NESTS IN A BEACH INVASION AT GELA, SICILY,  
COAST GUARDSMAN ARTHUR A. ARNOLD, SEAMAN FIRST CLASS, OF NEW ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA,  
WAS AWARDED THE SILVER STAR MEDAL





had parachuted from their planes. On the 10th, bombers attacked enemy airdromes still in operation, communication points and transport concentrations. Preliminary figures indicated that during the course of the day Allied planes flew approximately 2,000 sorties over the island.

On the 12th, Allied fighters continued their protective sweeps over our shipping and troops. Two enemy merchant vessels were sunk by our aircraft and two destroyers were left burning in the Tyrrhenian Sea on the same day. Fighter-bombers continued their attacks on troop columns, truck transports and lines of communication. The principal Allied bombing activity on the 12th was directed against airfields and ports on the Italian mainland which were strategically important to the operations in Sicily. Approximately 100 Liberators of the Ninth United States Air Force dropped more than 350 tons of bombs on the ferry slips and marshalling yards at Reggio Calabria and San Giovanni, the Italian terminal of the supply ferry to Messina. No fighter opposition was offered but anti-aircraft fire was heavy.

Also on the 12th, Liberators for the third successive day attacked the important mainland airfield at Vibo Valentia, on the toe of Italy. The Montecervino airfield, southeast of Naples, was also raided on the 12th. Preliminary estimates showed that during the period from the night of the 9th through the day of the 12th, 118 Axis planes were destroyed over Sicily and Italy as against 50 Allied planes lost. Photo reconnaissance showed that the enemy had slightly more than 300 fighters in Sicily. Seven of the 25 airdromes still in enemy possession were not serviceable. The Allies had captured approximately 12 airdromes, including the important fields at Ponte Olivo and Comiso.

On July 16, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, in a joint statement, told the Italian people that they would have to decide whether they would make an "honorable capitulation" to superior military forces, or suffer the consequences of the "tragic devastation of war." Emphasizing the armed might of the United Nations and their determination to destroy the principles and leaders of Nazism and Fascism the message concluded: "The time had come for you to decide whether Italians shall die for Mussolini and Hitler--or live for Italy and for civilization." Millions of leaflets bearing the message were dropped over the Italian mainland, and United Nations' radio transmitters broadcast the message to Italy.

The Battle of Sicily had two major phases. The first ended July 23rd, with the Americans' capture of Palermo and the sudden collapse of Italian resistance in the western part of the island. With Mussolini's resignation as Premier of Italy, on July 25, there followed a brief period of reduced activity while Italy's immediate surrender to the Allies seemed possible. By the end of July the campaign had been resumed in full force against the three German divisions remaining in the northeast corner.

COAST GUARDSMAN CARL SOLOMON, GM3c, OF 15 ABEEL ST., NEW BURNSWICK, N. J.,  
WOULD HAVE BEEN A CASUALTY IF HE HAD BEEN IN HIS SACK. HERE HE SHOWS THE  
HOLES MADE IN HIS BLANKET BY ENEMY BOMB FRAGMENTS



The enemy resisted stubbornly almost to the end, exploiting every advantage of the terrain and every tactical device to impede our progress. After three weeks he yielded to the pressure achieved by our combined ground, sea, and air forces. On August 17, 38 days after the initial landings in Sicily, Messina was occupied, and the Battle of Sicily drew to a close with the Allies' conquest of the island complete.

#### ATTITUDE OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

As soon as the word had spread around that the Americans were in, the Italian people started showing up from cellars all over the place. Those who couldn't walk were carried out. American doctors would arrive and start ministering to the wounded. Everywhere scenes were enacted, both dramatic and poignant. One woman was wounded in the leg and also had a nasty gash on her face. Another woman showed up with a baby about four or five months old or younger that was badly burned on its arms. Everybody was talking at once, trying to show thanks that the Americans had driven out the Germans.

One American combat photographer was starting to leave after having taken pictures when some little boys gave him the Fascist salute. "I turned to them," he related, "imitating the Fascist salute, said, 'not cum sa,' and then giving the old American 'hy-ya, babe' salute, said 'cum sa!' The people around me applauded actually and there was more kissing of my hands. It was touching indeed if anything ever was."


There is good reason to believe (unfortunately the complete story cannot yet be told because of military security) that Anglo-American pamphlets, spread among the German-Italian troops in Tunisia and Sicily by the millions, contributed not a little to the quick Allied victories in those two campaigns. For instance, one captured Italian general threw up his hands and said: "I could do nothing to maintain morale of my men when they were plastered with hundreds of your leaflets every day." What made the leaflets so effective, he admitted, was that his men believed them.

Thousands of Italian soldiers in Tunisia and Sicily came over to our lines, bearing an Allied leaflet, on one side of which was printed a safe-conduct. The leaflet warfare, to be sure, was more successful with the war-weary Italian troops than with the Germans. Yet, surprisingly enough, some of the Germans also were far from immune. In one sector, 65 of the first 100 German prisoners taken had copies of our leaflets on them, even though the German command severely punished any soldier who did not immediately surrender them to his superior officer. Germans, however, were hard to win over. The leaflets were aimed mostly at the Italians.

The success of the leaflets, of course, depended on how they were worded. Various appeals were made in the Italian-language



SICILIAN FISHERMEN, GOING BACK TO SEA AGAIN, EXPLAIN THEIR PROBLEMS TO LIEUTENANT CLAIBORNE PELL,  
U. S. COAST GUARD, OF NEW YORK CITY, ONE OF THE COAST GUARD OFFICERS ASSISTING IN THE RESTORATION  
OF THE ISLAND'S FISHING INDUSTRY





pamphlets. The most successful undoubtedly was to drum it into the Italian soldiers that they had a choice of "dying with the Germans or living with us." One of the most successful leaflets began: "ITALIANS! You must choose now--TO DIE FOR THE GERMANS or COME OVER TO US." There followed a few lines telling of how many Italians were arriving in our lines, that they would be sent to America, and that after the war they would be returned to their "fiances, wives, and children." This leaflet ended: "Put an end to the Comedy. Throw down your arms, and COME OVER TO US."

Another effective pamphlet emphasized the same appeal from a somewhat different angle. It began: "DO YOU WANT TO DIE WITH THE GERMANS OR LIVE WITH US?" There then followed a list of Italians "who have joined our lines." The leaflet went on to ask: "Do you recognize some friends among these Italians?" It then explained: "Several of these have found parents and friends who had emigrated to America. Private de Santis Giuseppe of Via Caco Monte, Cicerale, Salerno, was actually captured by his father. Bersagliere Monaco Carmelo of Via Vontano 49, Valverde, Catania, was taken prisoner by his brother. More than 3,000 Italians have come over to us Americans .... They have preferred life with us to death with the Germans. DO AS THEY DO!"

One leaflet was addressed to Italian sailors manning ships carrying German reinforcements for North Africa or preparing to evacuate German personnel. It asked why the Italian sailors should sacrifice themselves and their ships for the Germans. It was a time when one out of every two ships that crossed the Sicilian Straits was being lost. Those leaflets must have struck a very responsive chord in the heart of many Italian sailors.

Kind treatment, radio and leaflet barrages all did their share in winning the Italians, who apparently didn't ask for anything better than to be on our side. In one town the Americans saw nobody but one old woman who had come out of a house cellar to watch them. There was a ravine there that led out of the town and there was a small opening in the side of the hill. A little boy came out of the opening and in a few minutes he was followed by several others. It went on that way until there were about 250 people along a path that led from the small hole. They had been living in caves all together to get out of the terrific pounding it had been necessary to give the town in order to get the Germans out. When the Americans arrived, it was the first time the Italians had dared to venture out into the daylight for days. There were tears in their eyes as they recognized the men as Americans. Old men kissed the hands of the service men. Old women hung on the boys' arms and cried. Some of the Americans felt helpless, for there was nothing they could do at the moment. However, medical treatment was an immediate benefit. And later, the Italian people were to have more food when their fisheries were reopened. Three Coast Guard officers had charge of the program to aid in feeding the Italians by restoring the fishing industry.

ONE OF THE U. S. COAST GUARD OFFICERS ASSISTING IN THE RESTORATION OF THE SICILIAN FISHING INDUSTRY,  
COMMANDER WILLIAM H. LABROT OF ANNAPOLIS, MD., EXPLAINS THE NEW REGULATIONS TO ONE OF THE  
MEDITERRANEAN ISLAND'S PICTURESQUE FISHERMEN.



## COAST GUARD OFFICERS RE-ESTABLISH SICILY FISHERIES

The task of reactivating fishing was entrusted to three American Coast Guard officers who composed the fisheries division of the Agricultural sub-commission of the Allied Control Commission in Italy. The trio were Commander William H. Labrot of Annapolis, Maryland; Lieutenant B. C. F. Mulieri, Charleston, South Carolina; and Lieutenant Claiborne Pell, of New York.

With United States Naval authorities at Palermo, who were aware of the critical food shortage and wanted to be of help, the Coast Guardsmen drafted a new set of regulations patterned after the control measures exercised by the Port Captains in the States. As a matter of fact the issuance of licenses, permits, identification cards, etc. was left to the Capitano Di Porto, the Italian Captain of the Port.

The rehabilitation of the Italian fishing industry was a complex problem for like any other industry it is dependent on others. War had either completely or partially destroyed facilities or it was currently doing so, but everything possible was done to increase the food supply.


In that sense improvising became an art. When an anchor was lacking, a huge stone was never out of reach as a substitute. A dock barricaded by barb wire became a busy fish market, and multi-colored push carts took the place of trucks in delivery of fish to the retail trade.

The restoration of commercial fishing in practically all Sicilian waters went a long way toward changing the diet of the people of this Mediterranean Island. Once again the Pescivendoli sang their wares in the streets of Palermo, where the United States Coast Guard officers re-established fisheries.

Pane and Pasta -- bread and spaghetti -- the principal components of the Sicilian menu, were too costly and too scarce. A kilogram of bread sold for twice as much as a soda jerker was able to earn in a day, and pasta was dearer still. Fish, too, had been beyond the average reach, but with a greater influx of the product, the price came tumbling downward.

The news concerning the resumption of commercial fishing spread rapidly. Motor craft, not unlike the shrimp boats of the Atlantic Coast of the United States, put to sea on the same day the new regulations went into effect and returned the next morning heavily loaded with a variety of piscatorial food.

Awaiting them were more than 200 fish vendors. They stampeded the dock and the decks of the boats. Characteristically--a la Siciliana--the auctioning of the fish reached a tumultuous symphony





of voices accompanied by the expressive motions of hand and face. On the scene was a colorful auctioneer who could have put to shame his counterpart of the tobacco markets in North Carolina, but his services were of no value. The pescivendoli, in fighting their way to the boats, did all but push him overboard. Such scenes repeated themselves daily and the number of motor craft which put to sea for a day and a night of fishing steadily increased.

For hundreds and hundreds of Sicilians in the industry--from Princes with a dozen or so of names to the lowly pescatore, who couldn't even write their one and only given name--the resumption of fishing activities was a double barreled event: more food and a job. And for the housewife and her entire family it became somewhat of a salvation if the high cost of pane and pasta were to remain at the high level.

The three Coast Guard officers also completed a survey of certain parts of Continental Italy to recommend, where possible, the partial or complete resumption of commercial fishing to help reduce the bread lines which were ever present every evening at dusk.


MERCHANT MARINE  
INSPECTION  
PLAYS PART

The Merchant Marine Inspectors of the United States Coast Guard played a very important part in seeing that all ships, with the exception of transports operated by the Navy, carrying American troops and supplies, were in seaworthy condition and properly manned. In its capacity of Technical Adviser to the Water Transportation Corps of the United States Army, the Coast Guard inspected practically all ships, American and foreign, leaving United States ports with American troops on board. The purpose of this inspection was to make sure that vessels were in seaworthy condition and that the lifesaving, fire-fighting and safety equipment on board the vessel for the protection of the troops and crew were in good condition and ready for immediate use. Lifeboat and fire drills were conducted by the Coast Guard Marine Inspectors to make sure that the crew members were familiar with the use of the equipment on board. These inspectors also saw to it that each and every person on board was equipped with a life preserver of a type approved by the Coast Guard. Hence, practically all troop ships carrying American troops from the United States ports, as well as all United States merchant vessels which took part in the invasion had been inspected and approved by the Coast Guard.

PATHWAY TO  
EUROPE  
AHEAD

The end of the Sicilian campaign came with the fall of Messina on August 17, 1943. The same day, the islands of Lipari, 35 miles north of Messina, and Stromboli, 50 miles north, surrendered to a United States Naval expedition, and with them went control of the Aeolian

AN LST (LANDING SHIP, TANKS), DURING UNLOADING OPERATIONS ON THE BEACH AT PAESTUM



Islands. Now the pathway to Europe led up the long leg of Italy, with only the narrow Strait of Messina to cross.

----- On September 3, 1943, the Allies landed on the toe of the Italian mainland. These were the first Allied forces to invade the continent of Europe. "History will always remember this day as the beginning of the answer to the prayer of the millions of liberty-loving human beings not only in these conquered lands but all over the world," said President Roosevelt.

On September 8, an armistice was signed with Italy and put into effect with the first landings in the Naples area. Italian leaders appealed to the Army, and Navy chiefs to cease hostilities against the Allied nations. Under the terms of the unconditional surrender that followed, the Italian Fleet went over to the Allies.

By sundown of Wednesday, September 8, the Salerno invasion fleet passed Cap d'Orlando, Sicily, and headed straight for the Gulf of Salerno. H-hour was 0330 on the morning of September 9.

Ahead of the invasion fleet moved the minesweepers, pathfinders of the invasion. With supreme impudence they entered Salerno Gulf an hour after midnight to begin their dangerous task of clearing the water of the extensive minefields. An hour later the transports and waiting warships received the signal that the bay was swept, the water clear. (In the northern area the sweepers swept up or exploded 20 mines during the assault and 135 in the first four days).

The night was oppressive. Not a breeze rippled the still water. The landing craft loaded with hot, sweating men, circled while waiting for the signal to go in.


And then, fifteen minutes before H-hour, the silence was ripped to tatters as the bombardment destroyers opened fire on the beaches in concentrated salvos. With that, the waiting German artillery ashore screamed back in fiery defiance as it loosed heavy-shelled 88s over the water. The destroyers and gunboats moved in closer and stepped up their fire. Five minutes before H-hour the rocket boats flared their whistling projectiles, newest addition to modern warfare. Small craft added mortar fire. It was as if all the fires of Vesuvius had been freed. Now, a minute and half before the landing craft were due to touch beach, every craft within range doubled the fiery bedlam with small rockets, machine gun and rifle fire to clear the beaches for the seaborne troops.

On split-second timing the assault wave went in. The bows of the landing craft grated on sand, jolted and stopped. Down crashed the ramps and over them charged the first of Lieutenant General Mark Clark's Fifth Army.

To those first waves of first assault troops, the beaches seemed clear of the enemy. Some areas were not even marred by the black web



A FORCED LANDING ON THE BEACH AT PAESTUM. BEING EXAMINED BY A U. S. COAST GUARDSMAN AND SOLDIER





of barbed wire. Mine-detecting squads felt their way ahead with their round, flat, lily-pad detectors, like humped, biped anteaters, clearing paths through the mines and marking them with white tape. In came the DUKW's, the amphibious trucks, light artillery; more landing craft grated to a stop on the steep beaches. For five minutes after the first soldier stepped ashore the landing was unopposed.

Then the Germans in their well-hidden pillboxes and gun positions opened up. They had been waiting. They weren't surprised by this invasion. They had simply been waiting for the moment when the beaches were full, when it was unnecessary to aim to find a target.

Machine guns and rifles chattered, spit and snarled from positions 150 yards behind the waterline, and, beyond these, belched 88-mm. and larger shells from German tanks and pillboxes. One shell struck a landing craft and it sank in a geyser of splinters, gray paint and water. The troops dug in, balked by the mobile artillery of the tanks. Then, instead of the blast of guns, there were louder explosions where the tanks had been wheeling and firing. Their position had been relayed to the destroyers three miles out in the bay; salvo after salvo shattered the steel monsters.


More troops came in under the covering fire of the destroyers. The beachhead widened; in some places the assault thrust inland as deep as a mile. The cruisers' guns joined the destroyer fire, reaching out ahead of the driving infantrymen.

In four hours the troops had pushed in to Paestum, behind the creeping naval barrage. They held a length of the coastal highway and were forcing the Germans into the hills of Mount Soprano. Dawn arrived, concealed by the glare of shell fire, until suddenly it was daylight, and with it the German shell fire from the heights inland began blasting the beaches. Three German tanks came within 200 yards of the foxholes into which the beach parties and shore engineers had driven and started shelling the transport area. Casualties began to mount. An urgent signal was sent to one of the other beaches for a boat to evacuate the wounded, but it was sunk by enemy fire before it could reach the beach. Seaman 1st Class Andrew Allardi, USN, took off his clothes and swam out to the shelled boat to help the wounded crew ashore.

Now the Luftwaffe appeared to make the agony supreme, sweeping in from the sea in lightning attacks to aim heavy bombloads on the ships at anchor, and blasting the beaches with loads of light fragmentation bombs that exploded a rain of needle pointed steel on the men and the stacks of equipment that lined the beaches.

News that Italy had surrendered unconditionally seemed somehow terribly unimportant.<sup>1</sup>

1. See "Battle Report II - The Atlantic War."



### SALERNO LANDINGS

The Naval operations were composed of two main forces: the Western Task Force and Force "H."

The Western Task Force was divided into two: the Northern Attack Force and the Southern Attack Force.

Force "H" consisted of a large covering force of battle ships, aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers.

Map by George Sista, SP-(P)2C, in Magazine "Shipmate," February, 1944.

## LANDINGS OF SALERNO

### STRONG GERMAN RESISTANCE DESPITE ITALIAN SURRENDER

When the Allies landed at Salerno, on September 9, 1943, the Germans were there awaiting the invasion forces. This was not due to any prescience on Marshal Kesselring's part. He knew that the beachhead at Salerno was at the effective limit of Allied fighter range from Sicilian bases and had made plans accordingly. The result was a bitter and bloody battle, which, as it happened, the Allies won only by the skin of their teeth. The Italian battlefield was of our choosing. But once the fighting in Italy began, the Germans gave every indication that Italy was too great a strategic and political prize to be allowed to go by default. The surrender of Marshal Badoglio's government, the day before, did not prevent the Germans from offering strong resistance to our troops in the Salerno area of Italy.


### LANDINGS ARE MADE IN HOTLY CONTESTED AREA

At about 0400, on September 9, units of the United States Fifth Army together with British and Canadian forces, under the protection and cover of the Royal Navy and the United States Navy, landed on the Italian mainland in the Naples area. The landings were made along the rim of Salerno Bay, some forty miles southeast of Naples. United States forces disembarked south of the Sele River, seventeen miles south of Salerno. British units disembarked north of the river. Rangers and Commandos also landed between Amalfi and Maiori, west of Salerno. Troops, guns, and vehicles were disembarked according to schedule despite enemy air attacks on the convoys. Movement inshore at some points was delayed by a large number of mines, which had to be cleared by minesweepers, and on some beaches considerable opposition was encountered. Coast artillery also opposed the landings. In opposing the landings around Salerno, the Germans had the advantage of strongly prepared positions and artillery emplacements. Secretary of Navy Knox described the establishment of the beachhead as the most hotly contested which landing American troops had ever made. In addition to the prepared positions on the beaches, the Germans were entrenched in hills overlooking the coastal plain area in which the fighting took place.

### PRE-INVASION PREPARATIONS BY ALLIED AIR FORCES

For several weeks before the Fifth Army invasion, Allied air forces had pounded road and rail communications in the Naples area. On the night before the invasion, the rail yards at Battapaglia and Eboli were hit with a total of about 170 tons, and 160 tons were dropped on the roads leading to the beaches at Salerno. On the day of the invasion and every day thereafter, Allied bombers of all types continued their efforts to tie up the rail and road system supplying enemy troops in the Naples area. Among the targets were Sapri, the Lagonegro-Auletta road, Potenza, the Corletto-Auletta road, the Benevento-Ariano area, Formia, Mignano, and Isernia. In contrast to Axis air activity over the Salerno bridgehead, fighter opposition to these Allied attacks was light. Allied planes also continued to attack enemy

U. S. COAST GUARDSMEN SWING AN ARMY TRUCK OVERSIDE AS THEIR COMBAT TRANSPORT LIES OFF A BRIDGEHEAD ESTABLISHED AT PAESTERNUM





communications, troop movements, and gun positions in the southern part of Italy. No enemy opposition was encountered in these operations.

COMBINED  
OPERATION

The Battle of Salerno was a combined operation, in which the Allied armies gained their final victory through the exceptionally heavy support given them by the Allied Navies from the sea and in the air. The task of the Allied Navies did not end with transporting the Army safely to its destination. The entire force had to be covered against possible attack from surface vessels and submarines and most of the fighter protection in the air had to be given by the Fleet Air Arm from aircraft carriers at sea. The assault was ordered to be "pressed home, regardless of loss or difficulty," and it was emphasized that the attack did not end with the arrival of the assault wave and the capture of the beaches. It was upon the rapid follow up of reserves and the swift landing of supplies by the Allied Navies that the Army relied to sustain the attack and give it complete success.

THE JOSEPH T. DICKMAN AT SALERNO


ARRIVAL AT BEACHES  
IN GOOD WEATHER

On the morning of September 9, the JOSEPH T. DICKMAN, commanded by Captain Richard J. Mauerman, USCG, landed assault troops on the 2nd Battalion Combat Team, 142nd Infantry, 56th Division, U. S. Army and attached units, on Green Beach, Salerno Bay. In all, there were 81 officers and 1,623 enlisted men in the Army group. Weather conditions were excellent for lowering boats and ease of holding boats alongside. Little seasickness occurred among the troops on the trip from ship to beach.

LOWERING  
OF BOATS  
COMPLETED  
IN ONE HOUR

Following the ships ahead in to the transport area, the DICKMAN passed the submarine beacon SHAKESPEARE at 2333 on the 8th, at the departure point. At 0002 on the 9th, the DICKMAN stopped and drifted in her designated transport area. An LCS(S) boat, with a scout officer, was lowered into the water at 0020 and departed for shore to locate Green Beach. The beach was found and marked as planned without difficulty. The lowering of boats commenced at 0015 and was completed in an hour, with the exception of two boats that were damaged. However, the boat teams that should have been rail loaded in these two boats were expeditiously loaded at the White net and arrived in the rendezvous area in time to go in with their wave. (The two boats, in #1 starboard davit, upper and lower inside cradles, were damaged and wedged in by the strong-back that fell across the upper boat when the after davit arm dropped down, due to the breaking of the wire cable. This davit was repaired and in working order prior to 1660 on D plus 1 day). The third rail loading boat at #2 davit port side was delayed due to the cable becoming jammed on the drum. This boat was loaded at Yellow net port side. No delay at the rendezvous area was caused by this boat. Twenty-one LCVP's and two DUKW's were pre-loaded with boat team equipment and rail loaded with troops. Eleven LCVP's were pre-loaded with equipment and net loaded with personnel.

AT PAESTUM, SOUTH OF SALERNO, BULLDOZERS, AMPHIBIOUS "DUCK TRUCKS," AND OTHER HEAVY EQUIPMENT BEING UNLOADED



PC-625  
LEADS

The primary control vessel, PC-625, led the first, three waves of boats from the rendezvous area, passed the restricted area marker boat PC-542, and proceeded on to the line of departure. All boats landed on the correct beach in excellent line and well spaced, but were ten minutes late in the scheduled time. This delay was due to the fact that the primary control boat was held up behind by the minesweepers. When the ramps of the first wave were lowered and troops crossed the beach, heavy machine-gun and HE shell fire opened up.

ENEMY FIRE  
DRIVEN OFF

Quick action by the DICKMAN's LCS(S) scout beach marker boat in firing a barrage of 34 rockets caused a decided lull in the enemy's fire and drew fire on the boat itself. This factor was believed to have contributed much to the safe landing and retraction of all boats in the assault waves. The secondary control boat PC-624 departed from the rendezvous area on time with the fourth wave, but for some unknown reason delayed going into the line of departure sufficiently to make this wave one hour and fifty minutes late in scheduled time. When this wave retracted, and while proceeding away from the beach, a medium calibre HE shell struck the starboard side of the ramp of a DICKMAN LMC(3) and exploded. Three of the boat's crew were wounded. The boat returned to the DICKMAN but could not be used for the remainder of the operation. A total of seven members of the crew were wounded.

CONGESTION  
ON BEACHES  
SOLVED

Later waves of boats carrying vehicles were not allowed to land immediately on the beaches by the beachmasters because of machine-gun and artillery fire. As a result there was much congestion outside the line of departure by boats from all the transports. The support boats acted as traffic boats and when the beaches became tenable directed the boats to the proper beaches. Captain Mauerman reported that a faster and larger boat, about the size of an SC-boat, would be better adapted for traffic control boats. At about 0100, on the 9th, Captain P. D. Matterson, British Royal Engineers, Combined Operation Police Patrol 5, had arrived alongside from the HMS M. SHAKESPEARE to act as beach pilot with a scout boat. That boat departed and the beach pilot was placed aboard the Boat Group Commander's boat, where he most ably gave advice and assistance in the guidance of boats along the shore line and into the beaches. Three LCVP's and four LCM(3)'s from the OBERON, two LCM(3)'s from the PROCYON, and eight LCM(2)'s from the HMS DERWENTDALE, arrived alongside on time and were used to carry priority vehicles into the beach, going in as the 6th, 7th, and 8th waves. All boats from other ships worked smoothly and without interruption.

UNLOADING HINDERED  
BY ENEMY FIRE  
IN HILLS PROCEEDS

Unloading of vehicles and cargo proceeded expeditiously on September 9 and 10, and all unloading was completed by 1600 on the second day. Much of the unloading from boats was done by boats' crews. Thirty men from the Port Battalion were sent to the beach prior to noon on the 10th. The unloading on the beaches seemed to be held up principally by the continuous shelling of the beaches from artillery well hidden in the hills behind the beaches.



U. S. COAST GUARDSMEN HELP SLIGHTLY WOUNDED SOLDIERS, COME ABOARD THE COMBAT TRANSPORT  
LYING OFF PAESTERNUM. JUST SOUTH OF SALERNO





Vehicles were again carried in #7 hold and lowered between decks, and gasoline was placed in them at the time of the unloading. This caused no delay and proved to be a great safety factor. The two LCVP's which had been damaged and trapped in #1 starboard davit, were out of operation entirely. But seven rudders and five propellers which had been damaged were replaced. Boat handling by boat crews was excellent throughout the operation.

#### SALVAGE WORK

The DICKMAN's salvage boat, operating in the vicinity of Green Beach, assisted and floated many boats and was able to keep the beach clear of stranded boats. One unidentified sunken boat was marked by an obstruction buoy. The salvage boat worked under artillery fire from shore most of the time. Five DICKMAN boats were stranded on the beach during the entire operation and all were recovered and immediately placed in operation.

#### COMMUNICATIONS

Communications in general were good. No contact between Green Beach and the DICKMAN was established on the TBY because of damaged equipment on the beach. The FM 609 between ship and shore worked very well, but was jammed with too much traffic due to there being so many stations on the one frequency. The TBY worked well on the shore-to-boat circuits, but the distance was too great and contact could not be made.

#### AREA REPEATEDLY BOMBED

Three enemy bombers made an attack in the area at 0743 on the 9th, and at 2140 enemy bombers made another attack, but due to the heavy smoke screen made by all the vessels and boats no bombs fell in the vicinity of the DICKMAN. At 0445 on the 10th, enemy planes attacked again and a smoke screen was laid by the Allied ships. From 2240 to 2312 on that night, as transports were preparing to depart, a large formation of enemy bombers lighted up the transport area with vari-colored flares that apparently marked the limits of the area. The transports were subjected to heavy bombing. Apparently no vessel was hit. One bomb fell 600 yards astern of the DICKMAN. All vessels delivered a heavy barrage of anti-aircraft gunfire. Fire discipline on the DICKMAN was good. During this operation friendly fighter protection of the area was excellent. The DICKMAN's support boats patrolling the beach area fired at enemy planes over the beach, but there were no indications that any hits were made.


#### CASUALTIES TREATED ABOARD THE DICKMAN

Fifty-seven casualties were evacuated from the beach and received treatment on board the DICKMAN. That number was well within the capacity of the ship.

#### TWO MAIN FORCES

The Naval operations were composed of two main forces -- the Western Task Force, and Force "H". The Western Task Force was divided into two -- the Northern Attack Force and the Southern Attack Force. Force "H" consisted of a large covering force of battle ships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. The Northern Attack Force was under

U. S. TROOPS MARCHING UP TO JOIN IN THE ATTACK ON THE GERMANS ON THE SAALERNO SHORE.  
COAST GUARD MANNED LANDING CRAFT THAT BROUGHT THEM ASHORE ARE VISIBLE IN THE BACKGROUND



Commodore G. N. Oliver, R. N., in HMS HILARY. The Southern Attack Force was under Rear Admiral John L. Hall, Jr., U. S. N., in the USS SAMUEL CHASE. Commander Roger C. Heimer, USCG, Force "H" was under Vice Admiral Sir Algernon Willis, R. N., in HMS NELSON. Rear Admiral Sir Philip Vian, R. N., in Force "H" commanded the carriers which gave most of the fighter cover over ships and beaches at the beginning of the assault. Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly, USN, in the USS BISCAYNE, volunteered to serve under Commodore Oliver as a Task Group Commander though actually his senior in rank.

NAPLES  
THE MAIN  
OBJECTIVE

The object of the Western Task Force was to land enough forces in the Gulf of Salerno to capture a bridgehead for Naples and to secure the neighboring airdromes. Between Salerno and Agropoli, about twenty miles south, the ground is fairly flat and the river Sele runs roughly half way between the two. The Northern Attack Force landed British troops and supplies from the north bank of the River Sele to a point ten miles further north and about three miles southeast of Salerno. The Southern Attack Force landed United States troops and supplies along the beaches from the south bank of the River Sele as far as Agropoli, eight miles further south. Concurrently with these two main landings, two smaller landings were made along the coast west of Salerno for the purpose of seizing important military objectives. A Task Group, partly United States, partly British, and including the gunboats SOEMBA and FLORES of the Royal Netherlands Navy, was assigned the duty of occupying the islands off the Gulf of Naples — Ventotene, Ponza, Prociga, Ischia, and Capri. This Task Group was under Captain Andrews, USN, in the US Destroyer KNIGHT. A Picket Group of sixteen United States PT's under Lieutenant Commander Barnes, USN, was assigned the duty of screening the vessels of the Western Task Force against attack by enemy "E" boats and other surface craft.

MINESWEEPERS  
PRECEDING  
LANDING  
CRAFT

In both the Northern and Southern Attack Force areas, the first waves of landing craft, preceded by minesweepers escorted by destroyers, touched down on the beaches before 4.00 a.m. on September 9th. Extensive minefields had been laid in both areas, and we incurred casualties. Many mines exploded in the sweeps. Frequently under heavy gunfire, the minesweepers did their work with their habitual skill and gallantry. In the Northern area, the sweepers swept or exploded twenty mines during the assault and 135 in the first four days.

BEACHHEADS  
ESTABLISHED  
FIRST DAY

In spite of enemy activity in the air and on all the beaches, the work of disembarkation continued. There were casualties in ships, landing craft and personnel. The orders that the assault was "to be pressed home with relentless vigor, regardless of loss or difficulty" was obeyed to the letter. The beaches were seized and held, in spite of enemy gunfire and counter-attacks. Contact had been made almost immediately with Germans, but despite strong opposition, the Allied troops successfully established bridgeheads on the 9th. A diversionary force captured Ventotene Island, about forty miles west of Naples, during the morning. The Italian garrison surrendered but, according to press reports,



U. S. OFFICERS AND TROOPS DISCUSS LAST MINUTE DETAILS OF THEIR JOB IN THE INVASION  
ABOARD A COAST GUARD MANNED COMBAT TRANSPORT SAILING FOR THE ITALIAN MAINLAND



about ninety German troops put up resistance before they were overcome. By 1530 on the 9th, the airfield at Monte Corvino, east of Salerno, was in Allied hands.

PORT OF  
SALERNO  
CAPTURED

On the 10th, Fifth Army troops continued to establish themselves ashore, beating off several German counter-attacks. The port of Salerno about thirty-five miles southeast of Naples, was captured and steady progress was made inland.

According to press reports, German tanks were in action near Salerno. Other reports said that the German counter-attacks were broken up with the assistance of naval vessels offshore, which poured shells into the German ranks at close range.

CHASE  
ARRIVES

As the SAMUEL CHASE approached her destination, the weather was fine and visibility was good, with the moon high on her starboard quarter. The sea was running Force 1, ideal for small-boat operations.

At 2315, HMS SHAKESPEARE was passed to starboard at point KING, and course was changed to take position in the transport area. The CHASE stopped her engines at 2350 and went to Condition Four at 0000 September 9, 1943. Huge fires and severe explosions could be seen in the vicinity of Salerno. An intercepted German message read "Night reconnaissance aircraft reported Allied shipping off Salerno at 0035B."

COMMANDER HEIMER SENT TO HEADQUARTERS THE FOLLOWING DETAILS OF THE  
TRANSPORT'S OPERATIONS AT SALERNO

LANDING  
CRAFT  
DEPART

At 0035, LCM #1 departed for the USS CARROLL to become part of their fourth assault wave. At 0130, LCS's 13 and 31, and LCVP's 21 and 26 left the CHASE to escort 59 DUKW's to Red, Yellow, and Blue beaches of the Casale Greco beach designated for this force.

To avoid losing any DUKW's, boards with luminous letters to indicate the beaches were mounted on the stern of the escort lead boats and a simple set of signals arranged.

ARRIVE  
AMIDST  
ENEMY

At 0345, as heavy gunfire of small and large caliber was observed on the beaches assigned to her force, the CHASE received word that the first wave of boats had landed at 0340. At 0400, Wave-3 boats were lowered to proceed to the USS STANTON to become their fourth wave. At 0500, heavy explosions were observed near the beaches, presumably from mines. The Sweeper Group which had swept the transport area had then proceeded to sweep the boat lanes but was forced to discontinue until daylight because of the many small boats going back and forth. Between 0500 and 0530, an attack in the traditional manner was made on ships to the north. Much AA fire was observed.

U. S. SOLDIERS INVADING ITALY LINE THE RAIL OF A COAST GUARD-MANNED  
COMBAT TRANSPORT, WAITING THEIR TURN TO CLAMBER DOWN THE SIDE INTO  
THE LANDING BOATS THAT WILL TAKE THEM ASHORE





TROOP  
DISSEMBARKATION  
COMPLETED

Troop disembarkation was completed by mid-morning. At 0545, 0552, and 0600, the CHASE rail-loaded and lowered boats of Waves 1, 2, and 4 respectively. Major General Walker, with 96 officers and 1,168 enlisted men, disembarked. Although light artillery was shelling the beach and boat lanes, and boats had to proceed with caution due to floating mines, our boats landed at 0752, 0800, and 0805. A dozen minutes before this, the ship had fired at a lone JU-88 reconnaissance plane. However, troops were all landed with the exception of port platoon and communication personnel, by 1005, September 9.

CARGO  
UNLOADING  
PROCEEDS  
UNDER FIRE

Cargo unloading was begun at 0745, with but very few boats available. Because of the lack of boats, unloading had to stop for an hour at noon. At this time, the CHASE was fifteen miles from the beach, the vessel having drifted with the others from its position in the transport area. In the morning, machine-gun fire, floating mines, and light artillery fire on the beaches and boat lanes delayed landing of LCT's, IST's, and small boats. As the enemy tanks on shore opposed the assault, they were taken under fire with shore gun emplacements by the fire support group. That evening, at 1701, the monitor HMS ABERCROMBIE was observed to hit a mine and settle somewhat by the stern. Late in the afternoon, the CHASE began moving in through the swept area and dropped anchor inshore, at 1948, in the Gulf of Salerno.

CASUALTIES AND  
PRISONERS  
BROUGHT ABOARD

As the boats returned from the beach, they usually brought back casualties and prisoners of war. These were brought aboard and placed in charge of the medical department.

NO HELP  
AVAILABLE  
ON BEACHES

As the boats became available and unloading could continue more rapidly, another factor interfered to slow the operation. There was no one on the beach to help the boat crews in unloading their boats. Rather, the crews had to manhandle each case or can, carrying it from where they beached to a point well up on dry shore. It was not until the morning of September 10 that they again received assistance. This condition was a repetition of what had happened at Gela. At 0400, on September 10, unloading operations had to cease due to the congested beaches. All other ships had stopped before the CHASE. At that time vehicles, gas, and oil were 100% unloaded, and ammunition was 90% unloaded.


UNLOADING IS  
RESUMED

The CHASE resumed unloading at 0700, this time with aid on the beach. The total cargo unloading time was 25 hours. The ship's cargo was completely unloaded by 1330. The CHASE began to take boats aboard, with the exception of those kept in the water for despatch and possible smoke-lying purposes.

ENEMY PLANES  
TRY TO INTERFERE

Throughout landing operations, enemy planes were active, but unable to stop our unloading. During the morning, about six FW-190's bombed and strafed the beaches. These were first taken under fire

THESE FOUR CREW MEMBERS OF A TANK LIGHTER ATTACHED TO A U. S. COAST GUARD-MANNED TRANSPORT HELPED PUSH THE GERMANS BACK FROM THE BEACHES AT PAESTUM, NEAR SALERNO. FROM LEFT TO RIGHT, THE INVADERS ARE: COAST GUARDSMAN LEONARD RUEHLE, 1249 - 15TH ST., DETROIT, MICH.; COAST GUARDSMAN COOK, KELLOGG ROAD, DERBY, N. Y.; A. E. LESSARD, U. S. NAVY, 27 BALCOM ST., NASHUA, N. H.; AND HARRY W. LESSON, U. S. NAVY, EAST STREET, SCHAGHTICOKE, N. Y.





by the CHASE. Fighter bombers returned again about 1435. Meanwhile, our landing craft succeeded in carrying enormous amounts of cargo to the beaches.

"WELL DONE"  
FROM CTF AT  
COMPLETION

Cargo unloaded consisted of 88 vehicles, all combat loaded, including thirteen 2½-ton trucks and four half tracks; 251 tons of mixed ammunition plus two tons of pyrotechnics; 44 tons of gasoline and oil; and 125 tons of general cargo (water, rations, and engineers' supplies). Total trips made by CHASE LCVP's were 35 for personnel, 172 for cargo, 15 miscellaneous; by CHASE LCM, 17 with vehicles and personnel gear; by ANDROMEDA LCVP's, 2 personnel and 5 cargo; and two LCT trips, one with vehicles and one with general cargo. CTF 81's message, replying to CHASE's report of completion of unloading was "Well done."

CHASE LEAVES  
AREA UNDER FIRE

At 2215, on September 10, the CHASE was underway, proceeding through swept channel to form a convoy leaving the area. Nine minutes later, enemy planes began dropping flares, and heavy AA fire was observed astern. The CHASE went to General Quarters. Multi-colored flares were dropped all around, illuminating the ships and landing craft. A concerted bombing attack was then made by both medium altitude and dive bombers. Six bombs were dropped close aboard the CHASE: two estimated 500# delayed-action bombs, 125-150 yards on the port bow, which splattered the forecastle with water and jarred the ship; an estimated 250# delayed-action bomb, which landed about 125 yards, one point on the starboard quarter; another pattern of two 250# bombs landed an estimated distance of 500 yards away on the starboard bow; and the sixth bomb of about the same size, landed one point abaft the starboard beam at a distance of several hundred yards. All air activity had ceased by 2315, so the CHASE secured from General Quarters at 2320. At the time the transport had been traveling at a speed of 10 knots in the northernmost column, with the moon on its south or port side. It is believed that rather than expose themselves against the moon to AA fire the enemy planes contented themselves with attacking the northernmost ships.

VESSEL  
TORPEDOED

As the CHASE was forming a convoy out of the Gulf of Salerno, Italy, with the ANDROMEDA on the port beam, STANTON astern, and CARROLL on the starboard beam, there was an explosion, on September 11, at 0030, believed to be a depth charge. At 0125, the screen contacted some "E" boats and fired at them. At 0130 the ROWAN was torpedoed by an "E" boat. The BRISTOL, which continued to stand by and search for the attacker picked up 70 survivors. The CHASE continued with the convoy, and on September 14 moored at Mers-el-Kebir, Algeria.


FLOTILLA AT SALERNO

LCI'S UNDER  
HEAVY FIRE

"Some found the landing tough," related Lieutenant (jg) Arthur Farrar, USCGR, whose LCI was part of the



THROUGH THE GAPING DOORS OF LANDING CRAFT, MOTORIZED INVASION EQUIPMENT HURRIEDLY ROLLS ASHORE AT PAESTUM



large invasion force at Salerno. "We found no opposition," he said, with masterly understatement, "except for occasional dive-bombing and strafing planes that kept sneaking in. The one-plane attacks came on an average of one every hour. Night raids were something else. They were terrific and would occur around 2300 and 0400. The Germans lit up the entire area with so many flares it was possible to read a paper by the light. Several LCI's got very close calls but none were destroyed. The 319 received the most serious damage when a plane that was falling strafed on the way down, causing casualties to some of the gun crew. The follow-up work was about the same as for the other invasion. We were based in Sicily for the operation and spent some time ashore. The flotilla was commended for its work and ordered to England. We were told it was because ours was the best LCI group in the Mediterranean."

ASSIST VESSELS  
UNDER ENEMY FIRE

"The real work of the large LCI's began when the going was the roughest and toughest, said Lieutenant (jg) Charles Greene, of the Coast Guard, in reviewing operations in the Salerno area, "for their work was to tow and assist vessels aground, under enemy fire! Our vessel, Landing Craft, Infantry (large) was assigned as a part of four of such vessels in our group, including the flagship, to proceed in one of the very first convoys, with approximately thirty other navy landing craft, consisting of LCT's and a few British craft. Our duties were to carry troops, supplies, and fuel for the smaller LCT's and to discharge same upon landing in Italy, then stand by in the battle area and act as salvage vessels, to assist those craft which were aground, hit by enemy fire, or stranded on the beach.

REFUEL  
SMALLER  
CRAFT

"We departed from our North African base in the early afternoon, a couple of days before the actual landings took place, and we proceeded through the swept channels and mined areas en route to a pre-designated harbor in northern Sicily (then Allied-occupied) for a short overnight stop to refuel the smaller craft which could not carry sufficient fuel or supplies. Our escorts consisted of one British destroyer-corvette, and a few PC's and SC's — small protection when one considers the final destination, with no rendezvous planned till we reached that area, right in the enemy's front yard!...We arrived at our first overnight stop right on schedule, and the refueling process was completed in four or five hours. The LCT's and SC's came alongside our LCI's, while we were at anchor, and moored for the time required to get fuel lines laid out, and the Diesel oil pumped over to them...."

SPOTTED  
BY ENEMY  
PLANE

That night they lay at anchor, in cruising formation, each ship maintaining a full sea and gun watch, for they expected trouble from enemy bombers. But nothing happened that evening. Early the next morning, about 0530, on September 7th, all the vessels got underway upon orders from their flotilla flagship, and sailed on the final leg of their mission. They cruised without disturbance from any enemy action until 1300 o'clock on the 8th, when their small convoy was spotted by an enemy reconnaissance plane heading for his home grounds. "He took one quick turn around us, at very high altitude, out of range of our small 20 mm's and

U. S. COAST GUARDSMEN AND NAVY BEACH BATTALION MEN ARE SHOWN HUGGING THE SHAKING BEACH AT PAESTERNUM,  
JUST SOUTH OF SALERNO, AS A NAZI BOFBER UNLOADS ON THEM.





departed for his airfield with the news of our coming," said Lieutenant Greene. "Our British destroyer escort had the only large calibre guns capable of reaching the plane, and he fired a few rounds at the enemy, with no result except to bring home to all that here we were, discovered, and in enemy waters -- thirty miles from his own bases and only one large vessel for any protection which might be deemed adequate."

FLOTILLA  
ATTACKED  
BY PLANE

On the afternoon of the second day, the flotilla was suddenly attacked and strafed by a German ME-109F. Describing the battle that ensued, Lieutenant Greene said that his ship was in Battle Condition No. 2 when General Quarters rang. "All guns were manned as the plane approached but we were forced to hold our fire because a sister ship was abeam to port, about 150 yards distant, and the approaching aircraft made its approach from that bearing, thus presenting us with the situation of killing our own friends in the nearby vessel. We held our fire as he dove, watching for a chance to give him a few bursts, but as he came down, a Flak ship and destroyer fired at him, from long range. The Flak ship scored a hit, but as the enemy plane came down at terrific speed, all his guns were blazing at us. The other LCI(L) commenced firing and later claimed several hits also, but the Messerschmitt's guns never ceased till he crashed between our two LCI's, showering us with shrapnel and debris. His aim was good, unfortunately, for we received numerous bullet holes in our vessel, and had five men hit. One of the wounded was our No. 2 gunner, who was shot above the heart. The other four men received shrapnel wounds, one in his eyes, causing permanent blindness, and the others minor wounds in face, legs, and arms."

WORK IS  
CONTINUED  
SHORTHANDED

Through that enemy action, Lieutenant Greene's vessel lost one fourth of its crew and had to continue work shorthanded. The wounded were taken to a British hospital ship and cared for, while their shipmates carried on the fight even more intensely. As the Lieutenant remarked, "When your men are hit -- or you -- then it is all seen in a different light." Not a man complained of overwork, loss of sleep, or bad food, considering those discomforts as inconsequential. The work had to be done, and it was done, regardless. Two days later, they were ordered to stand by Salerno harbor to await a rendezvous for a return to Africa, where they were to be refueled, reprovisioned, and pick up reinforcements for our troops. When they left Salerno Bay that afternoon, every man was worn out from lack of rest, dirty, and practically "out on his feet," but their faces were smiling and it was thumbs up for victory.

LCI'S ATTACKED  
EN ROUTE TO  
SALERNO AREA -  
FIRE ON ENEMY

"All was quiet for another hour," Lieutenant Greene continued, "then at 1400, we were subjected to a dive bombing attack out in the sun, by four Italian fighter planes. Our first warning of danger came when the destroyer opened fire, startling everyone; his guns had no sooner barked than a group of bombs fell into the sea, astern of him; one of these missed our flagship, which was in the lead, and about seven hundred yards distant, by a very close margin. Estimates ran as low as ten to fifteen feet, abeam to port. The entire vessel was hidden by the water geyser thrown up by the explosion."

THESE TWO BROTHERS MET FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THEY ENLISTED WHEN  
THEY BOTH PARTICIPATED IN THE INVASION OF SLAERNO, ITALY. THEY ARE  
COAST GUARDSMAN JOSEPH H. BLUE, LEFT, AND ALOYSIUS BLUE, U. S. NAVY



and we later discovered that four of her gyro repeaters and magnetic compasses had been put out of commission by the near-miss. At this time all crews were at general quarters, in full war gear. One plane, identified as a Macchi 2001 fighter had the audacity to dive right over the stern of our convoy and fly up its second column, at a height of not more than 100 feet! No ships opened fire on him as they feared hitting their own men, but he came so close to our craft that we felt our fellow-men to be safe enough from our fire to open up. Guns No. 1, 2, and 3 tracked him to within 400 yards, then all commenced firing; at this time I was stationed up forward on our No. 1 gun, and observed the tracers to miss the plane by a wide margin -- trouble; too much lead angle and that is unusual. The No. 2 gunner was a cool boy; he waited and saw his chance to fire just at the right time, with the result that he placed at least a dozen 20 mm shells into the enemy plane, each striking it just abaft the cockpit on the port side. Evidently the plane was armored, as the only noticeable effect was his wobbling antics in flight, and a loss of about 50 feet of altitude, this bringing him down to about our height above the water. He gunned his engine and zoomed away -- headed for home."

ONE LCT  
IN FLAMES

The flotilla did not escape unscathed, however, for one of the LCT's, the 624, was hit squarely by a bomb and burst into flames. The survivors were picked up and the craft sank in a few minutes. The oil slick on the surface burned for hours. "Miraculously, we were not attacked again that afternoon or evening," Lieutenant Greene reported, "for by that evening our large convoys with bigger ships had arrived, and were a few miles astern of us. The enemy bombers went after them and let us go." That evening, just after dusk, the convoys astern were subjected to an air attack, but they defended themselves well and men in the flotilla observed three flaming airplanes streak out of the sky in as many minutes and crash into the sea, burning and illuminating the horizon where they fell.

RAGING  
INFERNO  
ON D-DAY

"It was D-day (9th September) and H-hour (0330) a few minutes away; we could see Lt. Vesuvius sputtering and flaring up on our port side, every minute or so," the Lieutenant went on, giving a vivid description of the battle scene. "Though the night was dark, there were all kinds of lights to be seen -- flares, gun flashes, and the colored signal lights: red lights, green lights, white lights, flashing and steady. We stared at our watches, awaiting H-hour. -- Suddenly we knew it had arrived. Countless gun flashes and explosions rent the air, both from ship to shore and vice versa. Tracer streams criss-crossed everywhere, and in several places we could see lines of fire running parallel to each other, but from opposite directions. The heavy batteries on the cruisers and destroyers opened up and displayed a beautiful yet awe-inspiring sight. You could see, following the yellow gun flashes, the path of the large projectiles as they took flight, not rapidly in a breath-taking ruse, but slowly. The shells appeared as red-hot rivets, easily recognized that rose slowly in a curving path till they levelled off, moved on a few more seconds, then dipped, fell slowly to earth, and exploded in a glaring flash. There was so much to see that



COMPARING CLOSE CALLS WITH DEATH WAS A FAVORITE CONVERSATIONAL SUBJECT AMONG SOLDIERS AND COAST GUARDSMEN  
ABOARD A COAST GUARD-MANNED TRANSPORT RETURNING FROM SALERNO



it was difficult to watch and grasp the immensity of the whole operation. It was tremendous. And it appeared more so when we realized that here, before our eyes, an alien force was present, and with its power and military might was seeking to destroy the defenders of a whole nation so that it might conquer that nation!"

LANDINGS  
HEAVILY  
REPELLED

The invasion craft were due to go off that beach -- a raging inferno of exploding shells and smoke -- at H-hour plus 30 minutes, and stand by there for further orders. And when the time came, they were there. Landings by LCT's with their tanks, and LCI's with their troops were to take place at H-hour plus 50-60 minutes, but this was not possible with any degree of success, because enemy resistance was unusually strong. However, small craft were able to sneak in under the barrage of fire and discharge enough infantrymen to keep the enemy busy ashore, temporarily. Meanwhile, the large cruisers and destroyers were fighting it out with shore batteries and German tanks. Tanks had been brought to the beaches at Salerno by the Germans to repel the invasion. Our large ships had to fight off the tanks for we had none of our armored vehicles ashore to speak of.

ENEMY FORCED  
TO RETREAT

Fighting had not diminished noticeably by 1030 the next morning, D-day, but our planes came over and spotted and bombed every enemy shore installation. Our larger ships then fought a duel with the enemy forcing them to retreat and permit the landing of tanks, trucks, men, and supplies. British destroyers and cruisers moved near shore and shelled German tanks, which were entrenched in the hills and firing down into Salerno Bay at the Allied vessels. Destroyers laid smoke screens to shield the landing barges and small craft from enemy view. One small boat was struck by an 88 mm tank shell on his starboard quarter and began to belch smoke before he raced away out of gun range at full speed. But the landings proceeded according to plans.

ALLIED  
SUPERIORITY  
IN THE AIR  
MAINTAINED

During daylight, German planes made only quick, hit-run attacks. They made lightning fast strafing or bombing raids and then zoomed away into the hills, flying close to the ground. The Allies had air superiority, and were using P-38 fighters and Spitfires for air coverage. Although a few dog-fights did take place, the Germans seemed to have great respect for the P-38, not staying long once they were seen and chased by the Allied airmen.

ENEMY  
ATTACKS  
AT NIGHT

The worst hours were during the night. The enemy bombers struck just after dusk, their raids lasting from a few minutes to an hour and a half. Men rushed to battle stations as General Quarters was sounded as many as four times during one sea watch -- four hours. "These attacks presented the worst aspect of the whole operation, for we, on the small craft, could not see the planes or shoot at

COAST GUARDSMAN STEPHEN G. FERKO, SEAMAN FIRST CLASS, OF ASHLEY, PA.,  
ASHORE AT AN ITALIAN PORT POSES WITH A NEW CHUM





them, our guns being of too small a caliber, but we could hear the roar of engines as they dove, dropped flares, then came back to lay their eggs," Lieutenant Greene reported. "Very discernible above the noise of anti-aircraft gunfire were the high-pitched whine and whistle of bombs which fell and struck nearby. Close ones always detonated with a terrific roar, and small craft like ours would vibrate from the concussion."

MEN AWAKE  
PRACTICALLY  
ALL DAY  
AND NIGHT

"The raids forced the officers and men to stay awake practically all night long," the Lieutenant continued, "and when you remember that our work of unloading transports of their troops and supplies took all the daylight hours, then you may well realize how much sleep was gotten. No one, I am sure got more than one hour's unbroken rest at any one time. Men would be relieved from gun stations, but would fall to the deck where they were and try to catch a few minutes' sleep. Chow was carried to the men at their gun stations by mess cooks. After three days and nights of this, human nerves became taut. Men would jump, startled at noises caused by the slamming of a hatch or the clatter of a falling helmet."

OFFICIAL REPORT  
OF FLOTILLA BY  
CAPTAIN IMLAY

Captain Miles H. Imlay, USCG, Commander of LCI(L) FLOTILLA FOUR, of the U. S. Amphibious Force, sent an official report, dated September 14, 1943, to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.\* The report rich with detail, includes suggestions of great value in future amphibious combat operations, as regards the handling of LCT convoys.

IMLAY AGAIN  
DECORATED

As in the Sicilian landings, so in the landings on the Italian mainland, Captain Imlay played a leading role, and was decorated. His citation follows: "For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the Government of the United States as Commander of the 1ST Convoy of a Major Task Force during the amphibious assault upon Italy in September 1943. Charged with the difficult assignment of bringing the vessels under his command safely through the hazardous course between Biserte, Tunisia and the Gulf of Salerno, Italy. Captain (then Commander) Imlay performed his essential duties with outstanding skill, successfully reaching the designated assault beaches at the assigned time despite extremely adverse weather conditions and fierce enemy aerial opposition. By his keen judgment, brilliant leadership and tenacious devotion to duty, units containing vehicles and equipment necessary for the accomplishment of the attack were unloaded in accordance with previous landing plans, thereby contributing materially to the success of our forces in this vital war area."

\* See Appendix M.

THIS U. S. COAST GUARDSMAN HAS A USEFUL SOUVENIR OF THE FIGHTING  
IN THE NAPLES AREA - AN ITALIAN MAIL BAG



## THE COMMUNICATIONS ASPECT

Lieutenant (later Lt. Comdr.) Ed C. Phillips, USCGR, Communications Officer aboard the USS BIBB from April 23, 1943, to June 2, 1944, sent in the following account of Coast Guard operations in the Italian campaign, from the Communications angle:

It may be of general interest in considering Coast Guard participation in the late war for a general report from the communications aspect in connection with convoy operations between this country and the Mediterranean,

Most of the UGS GUS (U.S.-Gibraltar-Mediterranean) convoy task forces were headed by Coast Guard cutters as flag ships, carrying a U. S. Navy officer aboard as the task force commander. The task forces themselves were made up of both Navy and Coast Guard destroyers and destroyer escorts. Convoy operations in the Atlantic were conducted under a command arrangement with the British Admiralty which divided operational control between American and British authorities at a CHOP line located at approximately 30 degrees west longitude. Communication requirements, therefore, necessitated considerable experience in both American and British operations.


During the early days of the war there were marked differences in the communication methods of these two allied services. Such differences were considerably lessened in later operations due to combined communication agreements and the combined use of certain of our coding devices. Most of the early convoys destined for the Mediterranean and beyond were turned over to British task forces at Gibraltar for escort beyond that point. Communications during the early operations were in many cases carried out under considerable confusion. New code books were called for and familiarity with British operations was essential.

In later operations the U.S. task forces continued their convoy escort duties into the Mediterranean as far as Bizerte. Because the Mediterranean area was an active war theater, and because theater operations called for communication activities of a different type than those experienced in the purely Atlantic operations, the theater command evolved a plan for the use of liaison communication officers within the Mediterranean area in an effort to smooth over the difficulties resulting from the differences in operating methods, etc. This plan in practice was very successful and, in this writer's opinion, was a most desirable and farsighted move on the part of the authorities responsible.

In actual practice the plan worked as follows: As a convoy approached Gibraltar one of the escorts was sent ahead to enter the port and there pick up an American liaison officer who had previously been trained in British communications operations. This officer was supplied with all the latest communication



A COAST GUARDSMAN GUARDS TWO SLIGHTLY WOUNDED NAZI PRISONERS ABOARD A  
U. S. COAST GUARD-MANNED COMBAT TRANSPORT OFF SALERNO, ITALY



operational information, code books, routing information, and other matters of vital interest to the task force commander. Upon boarding the task force flag ship, he served on the staff of the task force commander throughout the period that the task force was in the Mediterranean waters and was placed ashore at Gibraltar as the task force departed from the area.

During the days of the war covering this period, this writer made seven or eight round trips as the Communications Officer aboard one of the C. G. flag ships of the type mentioned and had an adequate opportunity to observe the remarkable progress and improvements made in naval communications, both within the U. S. Naval service and as they were applied jointly to combined operations. In retrospect, it seems hardly possible that what was done could have been done in the time available. The Communications organization of the Navy became geared in a very short time to a pitch of activity which allowed a task force of naval vessels to shepherd large convoys, in some cases amounting to 100 vessels at a time across the Atlantic and into the actual war theater with a minimum of uncertainty and lack of information.


Reports of other convoys, their positions, courses and speeds, the reports of enemy submarine movements, the reports of movements of our own and allied naval units, and the reports of neutral shipping were regularly received over the U.S. and British fox schedules. Such information, of course, enabled the escort vessels to maintain a continuous plot of the movements of all surface and under-water vessels, both friendly and enemy, at all times. One must have been on actual convoy operations to appreciate the utter confusion which can be caused by the unexpected appearance in the path of a large convoy of even a friendly vessel, to say nothing of the havoc that can be caused by an enemy unit.

It is doubtful whether any other service played a greater part in the remarkable record of convoy operations than that of the naval communications service. Aside from the fact that a large portion of the actual convoy operations were conducted by Coast Guard vessels and Coast Guard personnel, who became most proficient in naval communications matters, no special credit in this phase of the operations can be claimed by Coast Guard Communications, as such.

#### ACCOUNT OF CHARLES P. GIAMMONA, COX., USCGR

It was a dark, misty morning when we started in for Salerno. We heard the night before that Italy had given up, but we were taking no chances. Our control boats gave us the O.K. signal and the first wave started in before sun-up. As soon as the first boats hit the beach the Germans started to open up from the hills. I was in the fourth group going in, and it was like walking into a sheet of fire. We had swell air support, but the shells were splashing all about us.

AN AMERICAN CARGO SHIP HIT BY NAZI DIVE BOMBERS DURING THE INVASION OF SICILY.  
FIRE STARTED BY BOMBS DROPPED AMIDSHIPS SPREAD RAPIDLY TO THE SHIP'S MUNITIONS SUPPLY





We call them "whistling death." You can hear them whistle, then splash. I had learned from Sicily that it is the ones you don't hear that you have to watch out for.

The beach was wide and flat and as we hit the sand and unloaded the troops they seemed to concentrate on us. Those boys had plenty of guts. They couldn't see the enemy but they went right in and they were plenty sore, too.

After our troops were unloaded we pulled up the ramp and started back. We were congratulating each other on getting the guys in safely. All you think about is getting the boys in. Once the men are on the beach you know your job is done - for a while. We hoisted the ramp and started back to get another load when all of a sudden something happened. I didn't hear anything, but I felt as if I was hit by a sledge hammer and was numb all over. We were hit on the starboard side by a shell. I figured the boat was done for and I tried to get up. My lifebelt was blown off completely and my trouser legs were in shreds. My medal and dog chain were blown off my neck. Fortunately, my water canteen and jacket absorbed plenty of the shrapnel and they probably saved me. My buddies picked me up and laid me across the engine hatch and the coxswain gave me some morphine, but I still hurt all over.

We ran into a PC boat on the way back to the ship and they put me on board. A pharmacist's mate fixed me up with some sulfa drugs and while I was lying on the deck the PC kept firing, and I jumped every time a shell was ejected.

Finally I was transferred to a transport and a doc dug out some of the shrapnel. Later they gave me two pints of blood plasma, and I think I owe somebody a pint because I gave a pint to the blood bank when I was a civilian in Chicago, and the first chance I'll pay it back, too.

#### FIRST HAND ACCOUNT OF SALERNO INVASION

William F. Forsythe, Coast Guard Combat Cameraman sent in the following description of the invasion of Italy at Salerno:

These amphibious landings are getting monotonous in a ghastly sort of way. They're getting tougher as we go along, and don't let anybody kid you that the United States isn't paying a price for such places as Sicily and Salerno. Of course the radio reports and newspaper headlines sound very encouraging to the folks back home, but there's a lot of American boys getting killed, but I suppose that's the price of war.

I was stationed aboard a Coast Guard-manned assault transport for the attack on the Italian mainland. Just before we arrived at

U. S. SOLDIERS WITH A SURRENDERED ITALIAN FLAG AT A VILLA A FEW MILES FROM THE BEACH AT PAESTUM, ITALY



the rendezvous one section of our convoy was attacked heavily by enemy bombers. The ack-ack looked like about a thousand roman candles together. They finally went away and we proceeded to our rendezvous area.

There was some heavy firing north of us about 10 miles but, none in our immediate vicinity. When the first few assault waves went in it was comparatively quiet, but when they landed and the ramps went down the bottom dropped out. The Germans had concealed machine gun nests that did a lot of damage to our first few waves. After daylight the Germans were pushed back from the beach about a mile and started laying it in with mortars and 88's. I was leaving the ship about 2 hours after daylight when two high altitude bombers dropped their load near us. After they left I proceeded in to the beach. The shelling was so heavy there that we had to wait out about a mile until it lifted.

Coast Guardsmen ran LCVP's in to the shore and the soldiers unloaded them. (An LCVP is a landing craft for vehicles and personnel). The Army engineers removed the mines on the beach. These engineers, incidentally, are all veterans of the Sicily and Africa campaigns. The Coast Guardsmen meanwhile took temporary charge of German prisoners.


All this time the Germans had fallen back to their prepared positions about three miles from the beach and were continually laying in on the beach and in the water their mortar shells and 88's. We had excellent aircraft protection but once in a while a Messerschmitt would sneak through and strafe the beach. Incidentally, those 88's sure make a noise and for some reason they certainly do spread the shrapnel. Upon returning to the ship I made shots of unloading and wounded coming aboard. There was very little enemy activity during daylight near our ship but that night I think everybody in the German airforce, even Goering himself, must have been flying over us. We had the misfortune of a full moon until about midnight. I hate to say that the Germans are lousy bombers cause my remarks might bounce back on me but anyhow they didn't hit anything that night -- but they sure scared most people.

The next morning things were fairly quiet and unloading went on in great haste. Then nightfall again, and the same old routine. Those Germans were certainly anxious for us to taste those bombs. We expended on this ship alone thousands of rounds of ammunition in a few hours. Then about midnight we shoved off. There must have been somebody tickling the stern of this ship because she really did get up the speed.

I have covered a great many stories in my 15 years as a news-photographer but I have never yet seen anything to equal the grit and courage of the soldier from Texas who had to have his leg amputated as a result of machine gun bullets. A young Coast Guardsman gave blood to help this boy through his operation. It's little incidents like this that make this world not a bad place to live in after all. The last thing the soldier said as I left him was "How about getting



INVADING AMERICAN COAST GUARDSMEN AND SOLDIERS MAKE FRIENDS WITH AN ITALIAN FAMILY NEAR THE BEACH AT PAESTUM



some pictures of my of my operation?"

The boat crews that manned the invasion boats certainly deserve the credit for continually running back and forth into the beach in the face of heavy enemy fire.

Coast Guardsman Bernard J. Miller, BM2/C, attached to the DICKMAN, acted as wave commander for a unit of British boats. When the first 88 hit his boat, he attempted to run it out of the line of fire but evidently the British engineer of the boat must have been wounded, and when the second one hit they had to bail out. Both 88's hit the boat amidship and killed approximately 20 soldiers. After remaining in the water for about an hour, he was picked up by a British support boat and taken aboard a British transport.

Ensign Walter R. Samuelson, USCG, also of the DICKMAN, silenced two machine gun nests long enough for the troops to leave the boat safely. Meanwhile, Coast Guard Coxswain, Jack N. Miller, of the DICKMAN, stayed at the wheel of the landing craft in spite of enemy machine gun fire, which knocked off part of the steering wheel and threw splinters in his hands and face. He brought the boat in to the shore.

Coast Guardsman Philip E. Barnard, CBM, of the DICKMAN, headed the crew of a landing craft which was hit by one of the German 88's. After the ramp of their boat was hit while they were returning from the beach following the unloading, two of the crew members were seriously wounded and taken off by a support boat. Barnard and one other Coast Guardsman brought the boat back to their transport alone after a hard struggle.

#### ITALIANS COOPERATIVE

A gratifying feature of the Mediterranean campaign was the attitude of the Italian people. After momentary and quite understandable confusion, the Italian civilians welcomed our troops. They regarded the Americans not as invaders but as liberators who were freeing Italy from the twin tyrannies of Fascist misrule and Nazi domination. Most of the Italian troops were in German-occupied areas and for the most part were unable to offer effective resistance to the Germans, who were disarming them. However, some Italian units fought bravely against the Germans, and Italian civilians rendered very effective aid in sabotaging German installations and communications, and in guerrilla operations. The Italian Fleet was placed at the disposal of the Allies. Marshal Badoglio urged the Italian people to give us the fullest cooperation in attacking the enemy.

#### ARMISTICE SIGNED WITH ITALY

Political events of that period far outran the military program. On September 3, 1943, Italian commissioners signed an armistice with representatives of the Allied headquarters in Sicily. This agreement provided for the surrender of the Italian Navy, for placing all Italian resources and facilities at the disposal of the Allies, and anticipated Italy's ultimate participation in the war on the Allied side. Because large German forces were known to be in Italy,

TWO CAPTURED MEMBERS OF A GERMAN PANZER DIVISION THAT MADE IT HOT FOR THE AMERICANS AT SALERNO  
TELL AN AMERICAN ARMY OFFICER AND A COAST GUARDSMAN WHAT THE BATTLE LOOKED LIKE FROM THE GERMAN SIDE





the announcement of the armistice was withheld until September 8th. As early as August 18, 1943, Allied leaders at the Quebec conference were said to have asked General Eisenhower to advance the date of an invasion of Italy in view of the collapse of the Fascist regime and the pending armistice negotiations.

ONLY GERMAN  
OPPOSITION MET

On September 3, the same date on which the armistice was signed, the British Eighth Army under General Montgomery, landed on the eastern coast of the Straits of Messina between Villa San Giovanni and Reggio Calabria. This landing was opposed only by the German 1st Parachute Division, and General Montgomery's forces made rapid progress. The important Italian naval base at Taranto was occupied by a British landing force on September 9th. On the same day units of the United States Fifth Army, under command of Lieutenant General Mark Clark, together with British forces, landed on the Gulf of Salerno in a bold attempt to cut off German forces in southern Italy. General Eisenhower, realizing the hazardous nature of this attempt, used a familiar baseball expression to describe it: "It is now time to step up to the plate and try for a home run."

BITTER  
FIGHTING


John Folk, Chief Photographer's Mate of the Coast Guard, in giving the following account, said that the invasion of Gela, in Sicily, was a "pink tea" compared with the invasion of the Italian mainland. Far from being able to cut off the Germans in the south, General Clark's army was forced to fight for its life from the very outset. For seven days, from September 9 to September 15, bitter fighting raged on the Salerno beachhead. "I went in with the first wave from our ship, the DICKMAN," said Folk. "Our task force landed near the town of Pasternum, south of Salerno. We were flanked on the left by British forces and on the right by Germans. The enemy was prepared for us. The beach where we landed contained hundreds of mines. Heavy artillery up in the hills dropped a constant rain of shells on us."

FOXHOLES  
NO PROTECTION

"Immediately upon hitting the beach, I made for some sparse cover about seventy-five yards from the water's edge and proceeded to dig in," Folk continued. "Unfortunately, I had picked out the hottest spot for my foxhole. For about an hour I was forced to stay there. Shells were screaming over my head and landing on the beach. They actually clipped the grass above me. Two of them hit extremely close to me. One hit the ground just a few yards away, and the concussion kicked me in the chest like a mule.... Those foxholes were a very good place to be when the enemy had the range. I picked a piece of hot shrapnel out of my life jacket which was lying on the ground. A souvenir!"

DIVINE HELP  
SEEN

"As soon as our forces got the guns that were giving us such a hot reception, I ventured out to begin making a few pictures," said the photographer. "Enemy guns up in the hills were very well hidden and difficult to erase; much more so than in Sicily. My stuff this time probably won't be so spectacular as at Gela. There



won't be any bombing shots, as we had marvelous air cover for this job. In one day, before noon, our fighter planes knocked down twenty enemy aircraft of their way to attack us, and repelled forty attempted raids.... God rode the bridge with us again on this trip, and after my cruise to date. I am certainly humble in His presence. Please inform Headquarters that there are no Atheists on board this ship."

### EXPERIENCES ON A PATROL CRAFT

Two U. S. Coast Guardsmen, whose dauntless little Patrol Craft led the invasion into Licata, Sicily and the Gulf of Salerno, Italy, then stood by as a reference ship doing highly important work for the protection and direction of the invasion fleets while the shooting war broke loose all about it, later gave vivid descriptions of their experiences.


John Raymond Herdt, USCG, Soundman 3/C, and Arthur Robert Davison, USCG, Fireman 1/C, were among the casualties of the Italian campaign, who later fully recovered due to excellent medical attention both in the war zone and later at the Naval Hospital in the Charleston Navy Yard. They were wounded in the legs by shrapnel from shells shot at them by a German plane. Davison was manning a 20-mm machine gun while Herdt was about five feet behind him passing the ammunition as fast as the gun could take it when the shell struck the deck and exploded between them. Six of their gun crew were splattered with shrapnel from the same shell. Four others later returned to duty.

Their little craft was patrolling the beach at Salerno early on the morning of the invasion, September 9, when the enemy plane dropped a flare over the ship and then strafed its decks unmercifully. This scrappy little Coast Guard craft was in the vanguard of the invasion fleets on reconnoitering duty in both the landings on Sicily and Italy. Then it stood by to direct the invasion barges into the harbor, its guns bristling in anticipation of the enemy aerial attacks, which came.

It went through similar operations at Licata in Sicily where, as a reference vessel, it approached the Sicilian shore about two or three hours ahead of the fleet, and anchored 1,500 yards off shore to direct the invasion barges into the harbor. Three searchlights played on the ship from behind the enemy shore batteries for hours, but nothing happened. "Talk about suspense," said fireman Davison, "I always heard about that in books and movies, now I know what suspense really means. Did you ever figure what it would be like sitting in the electric chair waiting for them to turn on the juice? Well, that's what it was like, I'm glad they didn't turn it on, though."



A COAST GUARD-MANNED PATROL CRAFT



Soundman Herdt's description of the approach to Salerno follows: "We drifted in toward the shore and cut off our motors. We'd start up one of our motors every once in a while trying to keep our position in the swells. We had left the convoy about 6 o'clock on the evening of the 8th and had gone ahead of it at increased speed. When we got close to Salerno, several miles off shore, it was about midnight. The Germans started bombing our convoy about that time. We heard the German planes come over and saw them bombing the convoy off in the distance. Our ships were about three miles behind us at the time.

"Our ships were firing their anti-aircraft guns. We could see their tracers. The sky was just red with them. We heard a big explosion and a big flash. That was when they got one of our Navy tugs. A German bomber came over us and our forward gunner, firing thirteen rounds of the 20MM gun, caught it in the right motor and brought it down. It flared into flames, hit the water and disappeared. This occurred just off the Isle of Capri.

"At the zero hour, early on the morning of the ninth, we were in our position and could see the convoy coming up slowly. Our skipper hollered to the LSTs and the LCIs, giving them their position and they went into the beach. The enemy gun positions on the shore began firing at us at this time.


"When our troops began making their landings, there were big explosions, fires and we could see some of our smaller barges get blown to bits. Our cruisers and British cruisers and destroyers opened up on the beach and shelled the h--- out of them. Then there really were some big explosions. It looked like the whole beach was on fire.

"That's about all I remember of the actual landing before I got hit.

"You know," Herdt continued, "we didn't really worry about anything while we were going into the beach. You don't have time. Everybody is excited, of course. But we all stuck together pretty close on our ship.

"Davison was manning a gun and I was standing right by the hatch of the after magazine, passing ammunition, and we were caught in the flares when the planes came over. There was a lot of gun firing and something hit the deck. It was a shell that splattered us all. It was early in the morning and dark shortly before the planes came. But when they dropped flares, the whole scene was lit up like a Christmas tree.

COAST GUARD MANNED PATROL CRAFT



"From what I've seen of invasions, they aren't very pleasant. Shells and bombs and flares are exploding everywhere, lighting up the sky all around you. I wasn't really scared. It was kind of exciting and I was just excited until afterward.

"Yes, you just sweat it out," chimed in Davison. "And I don't mind admitting that I was awfully nervous, especially when I knew the ship's anchor was down as it was at one time in the Sicily invasion."

"That was the time we anchored right off the shore of Licata," Herdt said. "We weren't attacked and never could figure that out. We were a good two hours ahead of the convoy and all the time we anchored there, there were three searchlights from the beach practically on us all the time. Everybody was worried about the searchlights. We didn't worry about anything else. We thought we were going to get it all the time and the popular remark after the lights were shot out was: 'I've aged about ten years tonight even if we get out of this.'"

Both Herdt and Davison were awarded the Purple Heart Medal in the Naval Hospital at Oran by Commodore C. M. Yates, Commanding Officer, U. S. Navy Operating Base, Oran, Algeria.

#### RESULTS ACHIEVED

##### AMERICAN- BRITISH JOINT PLANNING SUCCESSFUL


The landings at Salerno called for the same joint and meticulous planning as the assault upon Sicily. Above all, with Americans commanding British, and British commanding Americans, the operations provided one of the finest examples of the complete cooperation and unity of purpose of the British and United States Navies fighting side by side in action. It was the first occasion in which the American and British Navies were in action together against the enemy in full force and in a new type of warfare. The perfect cooperation and harmony of the Allied Navies in that very severe test augured well for the Allied cause in the Pacific as well as in the other theatres of war. Without the support of the Allied Navies, experts agreed, Salerno would never have fallen into our hands, and it was more than likely that the Fifth and Eighth Armies would have remained in the heel of Italy. As it was, the Army landed successfully on the mainland of Italy in the face of determined opposition by superior forces of the enemy.

##### CRISIS SUCCESSFULLY PASSED

After the failure of the Fifth Army to break out of the Salerno beachhead, everything depended on the rate of advance of the British Eighth Army, which now assumed the role of a relief force. On September 10, General Montgomery's army reached Pizzo, 45 miles north of Reggio Calabria. Two days later, part of his



LT. GRADY R. GALLOWAY



army occupied the important port of Brindisi; and on September 17, advance elements of the British Eighth Army made contact with patrols of the American Fifth Army outside Salerno. The first great crisis of the Italian campaign was successfully passed.

NAPLES AND  
FOGGIA CAPTURED

After the first failure to entrap German forces in the south, the immediate Allied objectives were the great Italian air base at Foggia, and the port of Naples. With Naples and Foggia in Allied hands,

General Eisenhower's troops would have both a first-class port of supply and a first class air base at their disposal. Foggia was occupied by the British Eighth Army on September 28, and on October 1, advance patrols of the Fifth Army entered the outskirts of Naples. Before retreating from Naples and Foggia, the Germans had systematically destroyed these bases, and an immense amount of work was required to put them into shape for use.

GERMAN  
DIVISIONS  
PINNED DOWN

Bitter fighting in the next months, although disappointing from the territorial or political view, were not without important bearing on the over-all picture of the war. Approximately twenty German divisions were pinned down in Italy that could not


be used against the Red Army or against the main Allied invasion of Europe. Considerable enemy resources were being expended in a non-decisive theatre. A steady attrition cut down the effectiveness of German units, though they fought in Italy with all their veteran skill and accustomed tenacity.

MANY OFFICERS AND MEN WERE DECORATED

Lieutenant (jg) Grady R. Galloway was awarded the Silver Star for action in the initial assault at Salerno, Italy, where he played a conspicuous part in the invasions of Africa and Italy. His citation, issued in the name of the President, reads: "For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action while serving as Amphibious Scout and Beach Marking Officer during the amphibious assault at Salerno, Italy, on September 9, 1943. Displaying great daring and outstanding skill, Lieutenant (then Lieutenant, Junior Grade) Galloway placed his craft in the center of the landing beach within two-hundred yards of enemy machine-gun emplacements. When intense hostile fire swept the area as the first wave of boats attempted to land, he coolly directed the firing of a rocket barrage, overcoming immediate enemy resistance and enabling our forces to beach successfully. Lieutenant Galloway's inspiring leadership and tenacious devotion to duty in the face of grave peril were in keeping with the highest tradition of the United States Naval Service."

James Edward Hasburgh, was promoted to Chief Boatswain's Mate for shepherding 24 landing boats from his Coast Guard manned transport into the shell-torn beach at Salerno, without losing a single craft. It was a small-boat journey of more than twenty miles. Two days after the Salerno landings, Hasburgh escaped with his life by a quick dive into a

CAPTAIN RAYMOND J. MAURMAN, U. S. COAST GUARD, PRESENTS THE PURPLE HEART TO FIVE MEN WOUNDED DURING THE SALERNO ACTION. FROM LEFT TO RIGHT THE COAST GUARDSMEN ARE: JAMES M. HAMBLIN, POTOMAC MILLS, VIRGINIA; CLARENCE W. HOLLON, 2216 ARLINGTON AVE., MIDDLETON, OHIO; STEPHEN A. SPRINGSTEEN, GARDEN AVENUE, GREENLAWN, LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK; JACK N. MILLER, ROUTE 2, EUSTACE, TEXAS; AND CHESTER WITOWSKI, 8344 MAXWELL, DETROIT, MICHIGAN



foxhole. His landing boat had broached to on the beach after a heavy swell, and he had received permission to have a bulldozer give his stalled craft a shove into the surf. Just then a Nazi bomber suddenly swept down. Hasburgh jumped in one direction and landed in a foxhole. Two Army officers in charge of the bulldozer jumped for another spot. They were found dead without a mark on their bodies. This was attributed to concussion caused by the bombs when they exploded.

Other citations were as follows:

Lieutenant Commander Bernard Edward Scalan, United States Coast Guard: "For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action while serving as a Boat Group Commander during the amphibious assault at Salerno, Italy, on September 9, 1943. Braving intense fire from enemy shore emplacements, Lieutenant Commander Scalan skillfully marshalled and led the first and succeeding boat waves to the assigned assault beach, maintaining effective control of landings in spite of fierce enemy opposition. Lieutenant Commander Scalan's brilliant leadership and tenacious devotion to duty contributed immeasurably to the success of our assault operations in a vital area and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Philip E. Barnard, Chief Boatswain's Mate, United States Coast Guard: "For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service to the Government of the United States while attached to the U. S. S. JOSEPH T. DICKMAN during the amphibious assault at Salerno, Italy, on September 9, 1943. In the face of intense, accurate enemy gunfire, Barnard skillfully maneuvered his heavy landing craft to a successful landing on the correct beach and expeditiously unloaded the assault troops and vehicles. Although his boat was badly damaged and three crew members seriously wounded as he withdrew from the beach, he steadfastly maintained control of the craft, transferred two of the wounded to a nearby patrol boat and, with dauntless courage and untiring effort, guided the crippled boat over eight miles of mined waters for a period of six hours and returned it to the DICKMAN. By his expert seamanship and unwavering devotion to duty throughout this perilous mission, Barnard was directly responsible for saving the valuable tank lighter and contributed materially to the success of the landings."

Jack Neil Miller, Boatswain's Mate Second Class, United States Coast Guard Reserve: "For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action while serving as Coxswain of a Landing Craft during the amphibious assault in Salerno Bay, Italy, on September 9, 1943. Courageously maneuvering his boat in the face of intense enemy gunfire, Miller skillfully effected a successful landing and, although painfully wounded when hostile machine-gun fire shattered the steering wheel in his hands, continued to carry out his important duties throughout the unloading operations, subsequently retracting his craft and returning it safe to the ship. Miller's expert seamanship and unwavering devotion to duty under extremely difficult conditions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."



LIEUTENANT ROGER H. BANNER, U. S. COAST GUARD, OF FAIRLINGTON, VIRGINIA WAS  
AWARDED THE LEGION OF MERIT FOR EXCEPTIONALLY MERITORIOUS CONDUCT DURING THE  
AMPHIBIOUS INVASION OF ITALY ON SEPTEMBER 9, 1943



John F. String, Lieutenant, United States Coast Guard Reserve; "For conspicuous gallantry in action while serving as commanding officer of the USS PC-545 off Anzio, Italy, on March 18, 1944. When an enemy motor torpedo boat was sighted at night Lieut. String immediately ordered the attack. With an expert display of seamanship, he so skillfully maneuvered the ship that the first shots scored hits on the enemy craft before it was able to maneuver into position to effectively use its torpedoes, and the resulting fire caused it to disintegrate in an explosion. This successful action against the enemy contributed materially to the protection of shipping in the Anzio area, and to the successful maintenance of forces ashore."

The Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters, awarded the Legion of Merit to Lieut. (j.g.) Roger H. Banner, ('43), for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding duty; as Officer in Charge of a support boat he exercised great skill and courage in escorting fifty-nine amphibious trucks from the transport anchorage to the assigned beaches during darkness; he continued to navigate his support boat by the stars in traversing this distance of 12 miles through enemy mine fields and concentrated shell and mortar fire from shore defenses; his excellent judgment accountable for the rapid discharge of assault cargo without casualty and this contributed materially to the success of the invasion of Italy, the action occurring off Salerno on 9 September, 1943.

Lieutenant Commander James S. Hunt, USCGR, who served aboard the USS SAMUEL CHASE during the invasion of Italy was awarded the Silver Star for bravery in that action by Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt, Commander United States Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters. The citation with the Silver Star identifies Lieutenant Commander Hunt as being responsible for the efficiency with which assault boats of the CHASE were enabled to search their designated beaches in the Gulf of Salerno. On September 10, 1943, as boat group commander of the Coast Guard manned transport, he made an extended reconnaissance of the beaches under heavy enemy fire. Information obtained on this reconnaissance materially assisted in the effective landings of the assaulting forces on strongly defended enemy positions. His citation reads: "For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action while serving as Boat Group Commander of the assault craft of the USS SAMUEL CHASE during the amphibious invasion of Italy on 9 September, 1943. Lieutenant Commander Hunt was responsible for the high degree of training and efficiency which enabled the assault boats of the USS SAMUEL CHASE to properly reach the designated beaches in the Gulf of Salerno and expeditiously discharge the embarked troops and equipment against strong enemy opposition. On 10 September, 1943, he made an extended reconnaissance in an assault boat under heavy enemy artillery fire beyond the established beaches. It was almost entirely through his great skill and determination that this mission was successfully

ADMIRAL R. R. WAESCHE, COMMANDANT OF THE U. S. COAST GUARD, IS SHOWN AT THE LEFT,  
PINNING THE SILVER STAR ON COMMANDER JAMES S. HUNT FOR BRAVERY IN HANDLING OF  
COAST GUARD ASSAULT BOATS AT SALERNO



accomplished and information obtained which materially assisted in the effective employment of the assaulting forces on strongly defended enemy positions. The exceptional courage, fearless leadership under enemy fire, and outstanding devotion to duty displayed by Lieutenant Commander Hunt were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Naval Service."

Bloody Salerno was a complete victory for the Allies. They put troops ashore in spite of the worst the enemy could throw at them.



**From Italian, French and British surveys to 1932**

**BOUNDING IN PAYMENTS - EIGHTY IN 1927**

What is your favorite song or album and why?

**Apakah Anda sudah pernah mengalami demam yang disertai dengan sakit kepala, nyeri otot, dan nyeri sendi?**

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD :**

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Only the principal or certified legal  
agent can appear in this court

1. The first group of people who are interested in the results of the study are the researchers themselves. They want to know if the intervention was effective and if it can be used in other settings.

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# IFTA

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# I T A L Y

L A T I O 00 L A T I U M

CAMPANA - A

EN I A N S E A  
T I O R E N O

## ANZIO LANDINGS

### THE SLUGGING BATTLE FOR ROME

#### AMERICANS ON ITALIAN MAINLAND

By November 1943, the Americans had moved from Sicily to the mainland of Italy. The Germans, destroying every bridge and culvert en route, withdrew to their "winter line," which they had been preparing feverishly since the Allied landings on the mainland. According to the Marshall Report,<sup>1</sup> this defensive position "stretched across the peninsula, following generally the lines of the Carigliano and Sangro Rivers, about 75 miles south of Rome." The Report continues: "Winter had arrived. Heavy rains were falling and streams were in constant flood. The resources of our engineers were taxed to keep in place the temporary bridges on the vital supply routes. Vehicles and men mired deep in mud. Despite the difficulties there was no relaxation of pressure."

#### HARD FIGHTING FOR ROME

"The purpose was to seize Rome as quickly as possible and engage the maximum number of German divisions. The offensive was a series of attacks and pauses, the immediate objectives being key terrain features. It was the hardest kind of fighting. The Germans had mined the roads, trails, natural cross-country routes of advance, and even the stream beds. To reinforce terrain barriers, the enemy constructed strongpoints in which he skillfully employed mine fields, wire entanglements, log-and-earth emplacements, and automatic weapons. Machine gun and mortar emplacements, many of them dug four or five feet into solid rock, covered every approach. To deal with them, the artillery was heavily reinforced by batteries of the heaviest field pieces we had produced. The 240-mm Howitzer and the 8-inch gun were rushed from the United States."

#### AMERICANS AT CASSINO


In December 1943, the U. S. Fifth Army arrived before the entrance to the Cassino corridor to Rome. The Report continues: "The 2nd Moroccan Infantry Division arrived in Italy at this time and was assigned to it. The United States had agreed to equip eight French infantry and armored divisions including supporting troops. The Moroccan division was the forerunner of the Corps Expeditionnaire Francais which, under the leadership of General Alphonse Juin, greatly distinguished itself in the hard fighting of the months that followed."

#### AMERICAN LANDINGS NEAR ANZIO

"Early in January 1944, the French Corps, under General Juin, took over the right sector of the Fifth Army Front from the United States Sixth Corps, which was withdrawn to prepare for the Anzio landings. The Fifth Army then launched its attack against the line of the Carigliano River. To disrupt communications in the rear of German forces in the Cassino area, the Sixth Corps landed on the beaches near Anzio, 25 miles south of Rome, on 22 January." Months of bitter fighting followed, accompanied by heavy casualties. Rome fell to the Fifth Army on June 4, 1944, two days before Allied forces began the invasion of France.

1. See Marshall Report, 1945.

COAST GUARD MANNED LST-326



## ANZIO LANDINGS

One of the advantages of amphibious warfare, perfected to the extent that it was by the Allies in January 1944, was the ability to move great quantities of men and fighting equipment in a surprise strike from the sea faster than the enemy could bring his reserve ground troops overland to meet the invasion.

Such an operation was planned for execution on the early morning of January 22. The landing area selected was a stretch of coastline that ran from the Nettuno bathing beach, about 30 miles south of Rome, and north through the little port city of Anzio toward the estuary of the River Tiber. The code name for this operation was SHINGLE.

The object of the Anzio landings was to outflank the German Gustav and Adolph Hitler lines by effecting a landing 55 miles to their rear. The amphibious operation was timed to coincide with a general Fifth Army offensive calculated to tie up the German Tenth Army, thirteen divisions strong. At the same time, Allied air power would hit the German lines of communication around Rome and between the beachhead and the German land front.

The United States naval forces were under Rear Admiral Frank J. Lowry, USN, Commander Moroccan Sea Frontier; Rear Admiral Thomas Troubridge, RN, who had participated in the Oran landings, had charge of the Royal Navy ships. Working with the two Admirals were French, Dutch, and Greek ships.

After dark on January 21, the ships in formation turned in for their target--the beaches north and south of Anzio, the little town where Nero is said to have fiddled while Rome burned.

Most of the men on these ships were veterans of at least one amphibious landing. They were expecting a fight and were ready for it.

There were four Coast Guard LST's at Anzio--the 16, 326, 327, and 381. With them was also one PC boat, the 545.

### RENDEZVOUS WITH GROUP "A" CONVOY FOR ANZIO OPERATION


The next day LST-326 got underway in convoy, proceeding out swept channel with USS LST's 351, 381, 327, 1; British LST's 361 (Flag), 303 304, 402, 430, 324, and 320. At 1430, they rendezvoused with Group "A" convoy on schedule, and the convoy was reformed.

### TROOPS AND DUKW'S DISCHARGED - LST UNDER FIRE

On 22 January - "D" day - the LST, operating with Task Force Shingle Peter, anchored at 0010-A. All troops and DUKW's were discharged according to schedule and the small boats returned, reporting that troops had landed with no casualties. Throughout "D" day, the LST was under fire from enemy batteries with shells falling



COMMANDER JACK DEMPSEY AND CREW OF COAST GUARD MANNED LST-327



as close as 30 feet. At 1324, during the height of the attack, batteries were spotted and estimated to be in range of the 3"-50 gun. LST's 326 and 351 requested permission to open fire, but the request was denied, so the former vessel was moored to outer anchorage as shelling continued. At 1600, she was ordered to proceed to Sector X-ray, where she arrived with LST-1 at 1830 and anchored. The next day, LST-326 was signalled by SNOL to discharge remainder of vehicles via pontoons causeway. The vessel was beached at 1130, by 1340 all vehicles were safely ashore, at 1430 she was ordered to proceed to convoy assembly area off Anzio, Italy, and at 1800 she arrived there. At 2355A, the LST was signalled to form astern of LST-320. Order executed. Early on the 24th the convoy was formed to return to Naples, at 1850A arrived off Nisida, and anchored. On the 25th, the LST-326 moved to Baia, Italy, where she received 6 officers and 168 enlisted men of 1st Armored Division, with tanks and vehicles. Later that day a convoy, including LST-326, was formed, and the vessels proceeded toward Anzio.

LST-327 UNDER  
ENEMY FIRE

At 0025 on the 22nd, the LST-327 let go stern anchor in designated anchorage off Peter beach, and at 0145 rocket ships began shelling the beach. The LST received word via radio at 0226 that the first wave of LCVP's had landed troops on the beach. Six DUKW's were in the water, heading for the beach, at 0330, and the LST closed ramp and bow doors. One LCVP was hoisted at 0830 from LST-326. LST-327 moved to the unloading anchorage early in the afternoon, but immediately afterwards enemy shell fire from the beach started in that area and became so heavy that the vessel was ordered by SNOL (P) to return to previous anchorage, where she let go stern anchor at 1408. There was a red alert from 1448 to 1508 and again from 1605 to 1615, during which times AA fire was aimed at enemy planes. The LST departed for X-ray sector at 1627 and let go stern anchor at 1935.


ITALIANS AID THE ALLIES\*

When the Anzio landings were made, the Italians thought that the German resistance in Cassino would end immediately, and Rome could be liberated, but the struggle was to be bitterly contested. All the hopes and longings of the many Italians in the resistance groups that had seemed about to be quickly realized had to wait. For the Germans rushed so many divisions to the Anzio beachhead that the Allies were not able to advance sufficiently inland and the Cassino front remained for several months the scene of bloody fighting. The Anzio beachhead was confined to a small area, where the life of the American and English troops was very hard, with practically every inch of the place hit by German artillery.

The Italians were already fighting side by side with the 5th American Army and the 8th British Army. As for the Italian underground, its members were in contact with the American and English commands, and were

\*From information in an interview with Dr. Pansa, of the Italian Embassy, 27 May, 1946.

SHELLS BURST IN GERMAN HELD CASSINO, RAPIDO RIVER AREA, ITALY. REMAINS OF CASTLE  
CAN BE SEEN IN THE BACKGROUND. NOTE THE FLOODED AREA AT THE BASE OF TOWN TO  
PREVENT A MACHANIZED ADVANCE. FEBRUARY 24, 1944



struggling fiercely against the supply lines of the advancing Germans. Thousands upon thousands of Italian youths were said to be up in the mountains to molest the Germans and cut off their supplies.

NO LOSS -  
BUT NO EXTENSION

Bitter fighting continued, meanwhile in the streets of Cassino on the main Fifth Army front to the east, with the Germans pouring in even more men and weapons. There was also thick fighting in the mountains northwest of Cassino with the Germans counterattacking. Heavy fighting continued along the perimeter of the invasion beachhead, especially in the northern part, headquarters said. No loss of terrain there was announced, but no extension of the Allied holdings was claimed.

FIRST PHASE  
COMPLETED

Headquarters said, however, that the first phase of the Anzio operations had been completed with the beachhead successfully established and an adequate base for a fighting force set up there. The immediate task of the beachhead force was to hold and strengthen its territory against attacks by strong forces the Germans sent therein an attempt to drive the Allies out.

YANKS EDGE UP ROCKY HILLS ABOVE CASSINO

FIGHTING FROM ABBEY  
ON HILLTOP

Weary, mud-stained American doughboys inched their way up the rocky hills above Cassino on February 11, carrying out their attack in rain, sleet and hail in a gallant effort to bring a quick end to the bloody house-to-house fighting in shambles of Cassino below. Progress was slow and painful among the rocky crags, especially on Monte Cassino, where the Germans have built their defensive system around the historic Benedictine Abbey, lacing the hillsides with steel fortifications.

ALLIES AVOID  
FIRING ON MONASTERY


Allied artillerymen carefully avoided the abbey with artillery fire, though officers said the old monastery was definitely being used as an observation post. Many soldiers were bitter that it was left unmolested while their comrades died below it.

BITTEREST FIGHTING  
OF ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

In the town itself, American troops moved forward a few houses from the north end of the community, where they clung to a slender toe-hold for 10 days. The rain turned the area into a sticky, muddy mess. Water ran down the mountains in torrents to plague tired but willing doughboys. Some of the trails up to the front lines could be negotiated only by pack mules. The fight for Cassino turned into one of the bitterest of the entire Italian campaign, with losses on both sides heavy.



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BENEDICTINE MONASTERY AT CASSINO WAS TERMED A  
"MILITARY NECESSITY" BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT



BEACHHEAD  
SITUATION  
TENSE

On February 11, the Battle of the Beachhead in Italy was a very tense situation, marked by heavy fighting. Mr. Roosevelt, at a news conference, said that the Anglo-American forces controlled the sea and the skies, but that we were praying for good weather. The weather, he added, was a very important factor, since it affected the landing of reinforcements and troops on the beachhead and determined whether we could use our air superiority.

ROOSEVELT CALLS DESTRUCTION OF ABBEY "A MILITARY NECESSITY"

On February 15, President Roosevelt announced that the Fifth Army's plane and artillery attack on the centuries-old Benedictine Monastery in Italy was a military necessity.

He then read from an order issued by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander in chief of the Allied Forces, on December 29, concerning famous buildings and monuments in Italy. The gist of this was that these shrines were to be respected so far as the war allowed. However, if it came to a choice between a famous building and sacrificing Allied soldiers, then the building would have to go.

This, it was made clear at the White House, was the choice that faced Gen. Mark Clark in the case of the monastery founded by St. Benedict.

General Eisenhower's order concerning the protection of historic monuments follows:


"Today we are fighting in a country which has contributed a great deal to our cultural inheritance, a country rich in monuments which by their creation helped and now in their old age illustrate the growth of the civilization which is ours. We are bound to respect those monuments so far as war allows.

"If we have to choose between destroying a famous building and sacrificing our own men, then our men's live count infinitely more and the building must go.

"But the choice is not always as clear-cut as that. In many cases the mountains can be spared without any detriment to operational needs. Nothing can stand against the argument of military necessity. That is an accepted principle. But the phrase 'military necessity' is sometimes used where it would be more truthful to speak of military convenience. I do not want it to cloak slackness or indifference.

"It is a responsibility of higher commanders to determine through AMG officers the locations of historical monuments whether they be immediately ahead of our front lines or in areas occupied by us. This information passed to lower echelons through normal channels places the responsibility on all commanders of complying with the spirit of this letter."

15 FEBRUARY, 1944, CASSINO AREA ITALY, BENEDICTINE MONASTERY BEING BOMBED BY ALLIED AIR FORCE TO FORCE  
THE ENEMY FROM THE MONASTERY AND SURROUNDING AREA



## U. S. PRINTING INVASION MONEY, PRESIDENT HINTS

President Roosevelt said that he wouldn't be surprised if the Bureau of Engraving and Printing were now turning out German currency for the use of our invasion armies.

He smiled broadly when he said this, and reporters were not able to decide whether or not he was pulling their collective leg. It all started when a reporter asked about the report that the Bureau was printing French currency. He wanted to know when it would be used in France.

The President said to leave the time element out of it. Then he disclosed that this country had been printing currency for a good many countries in Europe. Some was for countries that had been occupied, some for countries that were being occupied, and some for countries that would be occupied.

The Chief Executive said that the list was a long one. Here a reporter wanted to know if it would include Germany, and Mr. Roosevelt chuckling, said he wouldn't be surprised.

### LIKE RATS IN A TRAP

American bombers blasted German troops from the ancient Benedictine Monastery atop Mount Cassino and attacked the Tiburtina and Ostiense railway yards of Rome in two operations with the single aim of speeding the Fifth Army's rush north.

Aerial explosives and incendiaries and artillery shells turned the Mount Cassino Monastery into a smoke-shrouded ruins and about 300 gray-uniformed German soldiers were sent racing like rats from the stronghold they had fortified to obstruct an Allied drive for the relief of the Anzio bridgehead.

Fifty A-36 Invaders dive-bombed the Rome railway yards and left them burning and covered with smoke, United States Twelfth Air Force headquarters announced. All the Rome raiders returned safely.


Waves of four-engined Flying Fortress first blasted the closely-knit group of buildings atop the 1800-foot peak with tons of explosives, and as the smoke from this bombardment billowed skyward, big guns from the valley below sent hundreds of shells screaming into the monastery buildings.

### SOLDIERS CHEER AS MONASTERY IS DESTROYED

On a hilltop five thousand yards from Mount Cassino, Italy, on February 15, 1944, to the cheers of dough-boys who for two weeks had watched their buddies die under artillery fire directed from the Mount Cassino



REMINISCENT OF DANTE'S INFERNO, THIS PARTIAL VIEW OF CASSINO  
THROUGH A BREAK IN THE SMOKE SHOWS THAT NOT ONE STRUCTURE REMAINED UNTOUCHED BY ALLIED BOMBS



50160 AC

Benedictine Abbey, that vantage point was knocked out by waves of American Fortress and Mitchell bombers, as well as fire from howitzers. By night there was little left of the square-shaped structure. The monastery's chapel steeple—principle observation post for the Germans—and the east-wall of the abbey lay in ruins, while not a window remained intact under the blasting that blanketed the whole mountain with a precise pattern of bombs and artillery projectiles. Doughboys loudly hailed each parade of bombers as it swept overhead toward Mount Cassino.

#### NO JOY - ONLY RELIEF

But it wasn't the kind of cheering these boys used to do from the rooters' stands of a college football stadium or a baseball park. There was no joy lighting up the mud-splattered faces of the doughboys.

They waved and sheered only out of a great feeling of relief, knowing that at last the Nazi transgressors atop that hill to the west would no longer be able to abuse the sanctity of the venerable monastery for the purpose of killing American soldiers. Among the doughboys, there was not a man, of whatever religious belief, who did not express the deepest regret over the necessity of attacking the shrine. Their reaction was summed up by one of them who observed: "The Huns wanted it that way."

On May 17, Cassino, the scene of fierce fighting on the Italian front since January, was evacuated by the Germans. And on May 18, the Allies reported the so-called Gustav Line in Italy had ceased to exist. On May 23, the Fifth U. S. Army launched a terrific assault against the German lines surrounding the Anzio beachhead. Under air and naval cover, the British drove north in the direction of Rome while American troops attacked in an easterly direction. Fighting continued throughout May and early June. On June 4, the Allies occupied Rome.

#### ITALIAN WAR BEGUN AFTER SURRENDER


The Italian war taught the Allies many lessons. Experience gained in the grim campaign helped speed victory over the European Axis. After twenty solid months of the grimmest and most heart-rendering fighting of World War II, the battle for Italy was not

to end until VE day. Never before in the history of warfare had so many men and machines been thrown into a struggle for such a forbidding terrain as Italy's mountains. Never before in modern warfare did the real fighting for a country begin only after the country itself had surrendered. Perhaps never before did such a battle begin after the man who was in a considerable degree responsible for its planning conceded that "we are trying one of the biggest bluffs in history." Major General Walter Bedel Smith, General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, uttered those words in Algiers to a group of war correspondents on the night of September 8, 1943, a few hours after the reporters had flashed to the world the news of Italy's surrender. Even as he spoke, a gigantic landing fleet, already under enemy air attack, was nearing Salerno.

#### SALERNO INVASION A BIG GAMBLE

It was more than a bluff; it was a gamble. For the invasion fleet had sailed for Salerno before Eisenhower and his staff were certain the Italians would carry out the surrender terms and refuse to fight.

UNLOADS ITS CARGO AT THE BEACH, SALERNO, MANEUVERS ON JULY 22, 1944





Moreover, the Germans had a fair idea where the landing would come. They needed only to look for the best piece of landing beach well up the coast from the toe of Italy—where a small Eighth Army force had gone ashore September 3, 1943—which would still be within range of Allied fighter planes based in Sicily. During the next eight days there was opportunity to learn just how big a gamble it was. The Nazi command quickly threw a ring of steel around the shallow beachhead and began a series of tank counter-attacks which several times threatened to hurl the invading American and British troops into the sea. The winning of Italy and the destruction of the German armies that tried to hold it was a heroic achievement.

#### BENEFITS OF SUCCESS IN ITALY

The Italian campaign compelled the enemy to divert to the south hundreds of thousands of troops, tanks, and guns, that he would have preferred to hold in the west to meet the invasion from Britain. Italy provided a springboard from which the American Seventh Army's landing in southern France was launched. It supplied a base from which hundreds of American and British bombers were able to operate in a great arc from Bulgaria, Greece, and Rumania, through Hungary, Austria, and Germany to southern France. From Italy, the Allies were able to speed really effective help across the Adriatic to Tito's Yugoslav warriors, send troops to aid the Greeks, and drop scores of tons of ruffles, ammunition, and other supplies to northern Italian patriots. Italy was the Allies' foremost testing ground of war. Experience gained in converting Naples' harbor from a tangled mass of wreckage and scuttled ships into the world's busiest port in a few months was in a great degree responsible for the speed with which ports in France were made usable after the Normandy invasion.

#### PREPARATIONS FOR INVASIONS OF FRANCE

When Eisenhower's men swarmed onto the Normandy beaches and the immense flow of supplies followed, the Allies cashed in on the tricks learned at Anzio beachhead, where for four months every cartridge and every can of food for the American and British divisions had to be landed from small craft, usually under enemy shellfire and air attack. The comparatively green Allied divisions gained battle experience fighting Germany's seasoned troops. The achievements of the Allied troops can be really appreciated when it is realized that they fought—and beat—such units as the German First Parachute Division or the Fifteenth Panzers or the Ninetieth Panzer Grenadiers. The Allies spent the winter and spring months of 1944 in preparations for the invasion of Europe on the beaches of northern France, to be followed up by landings in southern France.



## APPENDIX A

Following are some items given in the histories of six landing crafts.

### USS LCI(L) 87

2 February, 1943

This vessel was placed in commission at Brown Shipbuilding Corporation, Orange, Texas.

February--April, 1943

Outfitted in Houston, Texas, proceeded to Norfolk, Virginia for further outfitting and provisioning, prior to departure for North Africa.

April--May, 1943

Enroute to Tunisia, North Africa as flotilla flagship for LCI(L) Flotilla Ten.

June, 1943

Arrived in North Africa. Participated in final stages of North African campaign. Flagship for LCI(L) Flotilla Ten.

July--August, 1943

Participated in assault on Sicily. Flagship for LCI(L) Flotilla Ten.

September--October, 1943

Participated in assault on Salerno, Italy. Flagship for LCI(L) Flotilla Ten.

November, 1943

Proceeded from Salerno, Italy, to England. Flagship for LCI(L) Flotilla Ten.

### USS LCI(L) 89

3 February, 1943

Vessel placed in commission at Brown Shipbuilding Co. Yard, Orange, Texas.

February--April, 1943

Outfitted in Houston, Texas, proceeded to Norfolk, Va. for further outfitting and provisioning prior to departure for North Africa.

April--May, 1943

Enroute to Tunisia, North Africa, as flagship for LCI(L) group 29, LCI(L) Flotilla 10.

June, 1943

Arrived in North Africa, took part in final stages of North African Campaign as flagship of LCI(L) group 29, LCI(L) Flotilla Ten.

July--August, 1943

Participated in assault on Sicily. Flagship for LCI(L) group 29.

September---October, 1943

Participated in assault on Italy at Salerno. Flagship for LCI(L) group 29.

November, 1943

Proceeded from Salerno, Italy to England. Flagship for LCI(L) group 29.

#### USS LST 261

1. Built: American Bridge Company  
Ambridge Plant, Ambridge, Pennsylvania
2. Commissioned: 13 May, 1943
3. Sailed 27 July, 1943, for North Africa with supplies, troops and equipment. Used Ports of Oran, Algiers and Bizerte.
4. Operated under British for Italian invasion, carrying tanks and troops from Sicily to Taranto and East Coast of Italy. In mixed company of British and American LST's made farthest North landing on East Coast of Italy at Manfredonia, near Foggia. (This landing later written up in the National Geographic Magazine).

#### USS LCI(L) 322

The USS LCI(L) 322, built by the Brown Shipbuilding Corporation at Houston, Texas, was placed in commission on 15 February, 1943.

Manned by Coast Guard personnel, this vessel departed Norfolk, Virginia, the latter part of March, 1943. Leaving Bermuda April 1st, the 322 arrived 18 days later at Rabat, Morocco, North Africa, soon thereafter sailing for Lake Bizerte, Tunisia, where, as a member of LCI(L) Flotilla Four landing operations were conducted in preparation for the forthcoming invasion of Sicily. On the morning of 10 July, 1943, this vessel successfully disembarked troops at Licata. Two months later (9 September), as part of Green Reserve Section of Uncle Attack Group the LCI(L) 322 proceeded to Italy, landing troops at Salerno.

#### USS LCI(L) 324

The USS LCI(L) 324 was built by the Brown Shipbuilding Corporation at Orange, Texas and placed in commission approximately 1 February, 1943.

Manned by Coast Guard personnel, this vessel departed Orange, Texas after outfitting for Norfolk, Virginia, during the latter part of March, 1943. Leaving Bermuda 1 April, 1943, this ship arrived 18 days later at Rabat, Morocco, North Africa and proceeded from there to Lake Bizerte, Tunisia where in June, 1943 it prepared for the forthcoming invasion of Sicily. On 10 July, 1943, as a member of LCI(L) Flotilla Four this vessel participated in the invasion of Sicily, landing troops there. Approximately two months later on 9 September, 1943, the LCI(L) 324 landed troops at Salerno, during the Italian campaign.

#### USS LCI(L) 349

USS LCI(L) 349 was commissioned at Brown Shipbuilding Corporation, Houston, Texas on 31 January, 1943 and became a unit of LCI(L) Flotilla 4. After completion of preparations this vessel departed Norfolk, Virginia, in late March and arrived Rabat, Morocco, North Africa on 19 April. Shortly after she sailed for Lake Bizerte, Tunisia, where landing operations were conducted in preparation for the Sicilian invasion.

On July 10, 1943 the LCI(L) 349 carried troops to the beach at Licata, Sicily. On September 9th she proceeded to Salerno, Italy landing troops under enemy shore bombardment and taking part in salvage operations until September 11th. During this period a Messerschmitt (ME-109) was shot down while attacking.

APPENDIX B

OPERATIONS IN WHICH COAST GUARD

FULLY OR PARTIALLY MANNED

VESSELS PARTICIPATED

SICILY

Assault Phase, 9 July to 15 July, 1943

ARCTURUS (AKA-1)\*  
BARNETT (APA-5)\*  
BELLATRIX (AKA-3)\*  
BETELGEUSE (AKA-11)\*  
CHARLES CARROLL (APA-28)\*  
DOROTHEA L. DIX (AP-67)\*  
JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (APA-13)  
LEONARD WOOD (APA-12)  
SAMUEL CHASE (APA-26)  
WILLIAM P. BIDDLE (APA-8)\*  
PC-545  
PC-556  
LST-16  
LST-326  
LST-327  
LST-331  
LST-381  
LCI(L)-83  
LCI(L)-84  
LCI(L)-85  
LCI(L)-86  
LCI(L)-87  
LCI(L)-88  
LCI(L)-89  
LCI(L)-90  
LCI(L)-91  
LCI(L)-92  
LCI(L)-93  
LCI(L)-94  
LCI(L)-95  
LCI(L)-96  
LCI(L)-319  
LCI(L)-320  
LCI(L)-321

-185-

Note: Vessels not listed in the Floating Units Plan as being Coast Guard ships or Coast Guard manned (that is, vessels having only a few Coast Guardsmen aboard) are starred thus \*.



LCI(L)-322  
LCI(L)-323  
LCI(L)-324  
LCI(L)-325  
LCI(L)-326  
LCI(L)-349  
LCI(L)-350

#### SICILIAN OCCUPATION

Landings on North Coast of Sicily, 28 July to 17 August, 1943

PC-545

#### ITALY

Salerno Landings, 9-21 September, 1943

ARCTURUS (AKA-1)\*  
CHARLES CARROLL (APA-28) (AP-58)\*  
JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (APA-13)  
SAMUEL CHASE (APA-26) (56)  
PC-545  
PC-556  
LST-16  
LST-327  
LST-331  
LCI(L)-83  
LCI(L)-84  
LCI(L)-85  
LCI(L)-86  
LCI(L)-87  
LCI(L)-88  
LCI(L)-89  
LCI(L)-90  
LCI(L)-91  
LCI(L)-92  
LCI(L)-93  
LCI(L)-94  
LCI(L)-96  
LCI(L)-319  
LCI(L)-320  
LCI(L)-321  
LCI(L)-322  
LCI(L)-323  
LCI(L)-324  
LCI(L)-325  
LCI(L)-326  
LCI(L)-349  
LCI(L)-350

Anzio-Nettuno Landings, 22 January to 1 March, 1944

PC-545  
PC-556  
LST-16  
LST-326  
LST-327  
LST-381

COAST GUARD MANNED SHIPS

ENTITLED TO OPERATION AND ENGAGEMENT STARS

SICILY - ITALY AREA

SICILY (E2)

SAMUEL CHASE (APA-26)  
JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (APA-13)  
LEONARD WOOD (APA-12)  
LCI(L)-83  
LCI(L)-84  
LCI(L)-85  
LCI(L)-86  
LCI(L)-87  
LCI(L)-88  
LCI(L)-89  
LCI(L)-90  
LCI(L)-91  
LCI(L)-92  
LCI(L)-93  
LCI(L)-94  
LCI(L)-95  
LCI(L)-96  
LCI(L)-319  
LCI(L)-320  
LCI(L)-321  
LCI(L)-322  
LCI(L)-323  
LCI(L)-324  
LCI(L)-325  
LCI(L)-326  
LCI(L)-349  
LCI(L)-350  
LST-16  
LST-326  
LST-327  
LST-331  
LST-381  
PC-545  
PC-556

SALERNO (E3)

SAMUEL CHASE (APA-26)  
JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (APA-13)  
LCI(L)-83  
LCI(L)-84  
LCI(L)-85

LCI(L)-86  
LCI(L)-87  
LCI(L)-88  
LCI(L)-89  
LCI(L)-90  
LCI(L)-91  
LCI(L)-92  
LCI(L)-93  
LCI(L)-94  
LCI(L)-96  
LCI(L)-319  
LCI(L)-320  
LCI(L)-321  
LCI(L)-322  
LCI(L)-323  
LCI(L)-324  
LCI(L)-325  
LCI(L)-326  
LCI(L)-349  
LCI(L)-350  
LST-16  
LST-327  
LST-331  
PC-545  
PC-556

ANZIO-NETTUNO ADVANCE LANDINGS (E4-1)

LST-16  
LST-326  
LST-327  
LST-381  
PC-545  
PC-556



## APPENDIX D

### MEDITERRANEAN IN 1944

An Account as given in the C. G. Association Bulletin of August, 1945.

The USS MENGES, torpedoed in May, 1944, while on convoy duty in the Mediterranean, was saved by the prompt and determined efforts of her officers and men. Under the direction of Lieutenant Commander Frank M. McCabe, she rescued more than one hundred survivors of the USS LANSDALE, when that ship went down under the bombing attack of fifteen German planes. Two of the bombers were shot down; guns of the MENGES accounted for one of them. Among the survivors picked up from the oily, debris-littered water was Lieut. Robert Morgenthau, USNR, son of the then Secretary of the Treasury. In the same action the MENGES captured two German airmen, survivors of the plane her guns had hit.

In May, 1944, just a short time after the LANSDALE was sunk, the MENGES was on convoy duty in the Mediterranean. A German submarine attacked with acoustic torpedoes. Smashing through the ship's propellers, two torpedoes blasted off the stern section and blew the jagged ends skyward. Hurling all the ship's depth charges into the sea, and even tossing a washing machine 150 feet forward and upward until it smashed against an anti-aircraft gun on the upper deck, the explosion demolished the after third of the ship, killed 29 men and two officers, and wounded 20 more.

Although the ship was listing badly and taking in water fast, Lieut. Comdr. McCabe gave no "Abandon Ship" order. The officers and men who were uninjured went to work. The explosion had started the engines of the MENGES' torpedoes; crewmen rendered them harmless. Others of the crew freed their shipmates from a compartment in which they were trapped by wreckage. Two men, blown over the side, were rescued by a radioman who lowered the ship's small boat. Damage control parties secured broken water lines and shut off electricity to oil soaked cabins. By the time a British tug reached the MENGES, watertight integrity had been established.

The submarine crew did not have long to gloat over what they must have considered a certain "kill." Less than 26 hours after they hit the MENGES, Coast Guard-manned USS PRIDE and the Navy DE JOSEPH E. CAMPBELL depth-charged the German craft to the surface and disabled her. French and British ships joined the action, the submarine was destroyed, and many of her crew were captured.

The MENGES was first towed to an African port where temporary repairs were made, and then to the Navy Yard, New York. Shortly afterwards, the USS HOLDER, DE-401, which had been hit amidship by an aircraft torpedo was docked alongside. The Bureau of Ships determined that one complete ship could be salvaged from the wreckage of the two vessels. Accordingly a 94-foot section of the HOLDER's stern was cut off and moved into position behind the MENGES. When the keels were aligned, in no place in the two hulls was there a difference of more than an inch and a half. Slight

differences were corrected and the two sections were welded together to form the new MENGES, that name being adopted because the old MENGES formed the greater part of the new vessel.

In commenting upon this work, Captain K. B. Lank, Jr., USCG, said, "We were aware of the excellent job accomplished on the MENGES, but as the responsibility for keeping this type vessel in repair rested with the Bureau of Ships, the Coast Guard had no part in the matter. It appears to have been an excellent job, and I think present high development of welding technique permits this type job being accomplished rapidly and in a satisfactory manner."

The repair work was not in vain. Several months after being torpedoed, the MENGES and another Coast Guard-manned DE sank a German submarine, the entire crew of which went down with their ship. In that action the MENGES found her revenge, and the difficult repair job undertaken by the Bureau of Ships was amply justified.

In August, 1945, Lieut. Comdr. McCabe still commanded the MENGES but of the other survivors of the torpedoing only four petty officers were still aboard the "ship that was doomed but lived to fight again."

## APPENDIX E

### JOSEPH T. DICKMAN, Report of Operations, Sicily, July 10-12, 1943

From: Commanding Officer, USS JOSEPH T. DICKMAN  
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet

- "1. This unit landed troops of the Special Force, 1st Division on beaches alongside the mole at Gela, Sicily on the morning of 10 July in accordance with reference orders.
- "2. Heavy weather was encountered during the day of July 9, 1943, which moderated sufficiently for good small boat operations at H-hour. This adverse weather had no adverse effect on the DICKMAN and the LCI's and the LST-381 made good their runs; but it may have been responsible for the delay in arrival of the control boats PC-624 and SC-676.
- "3. The approach was accurately made using the submarine beacon HMS SHAKESPEARE as a departure point. The shore-line was ringed by intermittent flares and search-lights but neither these nor the SH radar gave positive data for close position findings. Soundings were a useful check. A beach marking boat was placed in the water at 0044 and it found and marked the center of the beach without difficulty. Lowering of landing boats commenced at 0045 and was completed at 0125. Twenty-six boats were preloaded with troops and four with equipment only, receiving their troops via the nets.
- "4. The primary and secondary control vessels were not in the rendezvous area and the boats were held off the bow to await their arrival. At 0155 they were directed to proceed without the control vessels. As they were leaving the SC-676 arrived and was directed to lead the boats in. About ten minutes later the PC-624 arrived and was sent in to the line of departure. All boats landed on the correct beach but were 30 minutes late in scheduled time. Boats encountered some machine-gun and small calibre HE shell-fire. The later waves and the LCI's received most of the HE fire. Casualties were light. Six members of the boat crews were wounded, one mortally. One Army officer was killed before he could disembark at the beach. The LCT-17 was stranded for some time and hit by shell-fire but managed to unload and return to the DICKMAN for a cargo load. The DICKMAN lost one boat when the ramp dropped and the boat sank. Another empty boat was broached by an explosion close aboard when retracting from the beach. The troops crossed the beach fairly free from fire and suffered few immediate casualties. Most of the fire appeared to be directed at the boats. Rockets fired from the support boats are believed to have been instrumental in silencing several machine-guns on the beach.

"5. Unloading proceeded expeditiously on D-day. The mole at Gela was found to have been breached and unusable for the LST vessels. The LST-381 was finally unloaded at beach Green 2 which had a more favorable gradient. LCM's from the DICKMAN were used for this purpose. Unloading lagged during the evening due to lack of labor on the beach (Red-Green). Most of the unloading from boats on the morning of the 11th was done by the boat crews and a party sent in by the DICKMAN. Fifty Army men from the Port Battalion were sent to the beach at noon of the 11th. All unloading was completed by 2000 of D plus 1 day. The beaches were thickly mined and several of the first vehicles landed were destroyed.

"6. Enemy bombers dropped bombs close aboard on the morning of the 11th but no damage was sustained. About 1550 of the 11th a large formation dropped bombs around the ship but no direct hits were received. Minor damage was sustained and six men were wounded by fragments. The damage consisted of numerous holes through the side ranging up to four inches in diameter and many dents and small holes in superstructure. Two boat davit wire ropes were cut. A second attack occurred about 1640 by a few planes but no bombs fell close to the DICKMAN. The SS ROBERT ROWAN was observed to have been hit during the afternoon attack and to have smoke coming out of her hold. Boats with portable fire pumps were dispatched to her assistance. It was too late to use the pumps but the boats picked up 92 survivors and brought them aboard. The DICKMAN weighed anchor to clear SS ROBERT ROWAN and was about 1,000 yards off when she blew up.

"7. Probable hits were scored on three enemy planes by the DICKMAN but there is no definite way to substantiate the claims. An enemy fighter plane was shot down near the beach by .50 calibre fire from a DICKMAN LCM(3) boat. Fire discipline on the DICKMAN was good as far as firing on friendly planes is concerned but with conditions prevailing it is unlikely that a determined enemy plane assault could have been beaten off.

"8. Communications were generally satisfactory. The signal light furnished the beach platoon was not strong enough for effective use. The TBY sets in the boat circuit functioned better than they have on previous occasions.

"9. Ninety-nine casualties were evacuated from the beach and received treatment on board. The number was well within the capacity of the ship.

"10. Vehicles were carried on #7 hold as general cargo and gasoline and ammunition placed in them at the time of unloading. This method caused no delay and was a great safety factor during the time of transit.

"11. Eighteen boats were stranded or sunk during the operation. Eight of these were recovered by the DICKMAN and repaired. It is believed



that eight or nine of the ten lost could be or have been salvaged by the beach platoons. Three LCA's from the British LSI's were also stranded. Damaged rudders and steering gear comprised most of the boat damage. Boat handling was very good throughout."

/s/ C. W. HARWOOD

Task Organization

(81.2.1) Section 1 -- Capt. Harwood, USCG (DICKMAN)  
USS JOSEPH T. DICKMAN (F)  
HMS PRINCE CHARLES  
HMS PRINCE LEOPOLD

(81.2.11) LCI Div. 1 -- Capt. Leppert, USN(17)  
USS LCI-17(F)  
USS LCI-188  
USS LCI-189

(81.2.12) Control Group 1 -- Lt. Comdr. Lauther, USN  
USS PC-624  
USS SC-676  
USS SC-690

## APPENDIX F

### Official Facts About the CHASE

The USS SAMUEL CHASE, Commanding Officer, Commander Roger C. Heimer, was attached to the command of the Commander U.S. Amphibious Force, Rear Admiral John L. Hall, Jr., USN, who had his headquarters aboard the ship.

#### CHASE PROCEEDS

On July 6, at 1657, the CHASE, moored since July 1, at Bassin de Vieux, Algiers, combat loaded, started heaving around to take position in cruising disposition 1 for NCFL convoy proceeding in accordance with ComAmphforNAW Operation Order 2-43 in Operation "HUSKY"--the invasion of the Italian Island of Sicily on "D" Day, July 10, at "H" hour 0245. Aboard at the time of sailing were 157 officers of the U. S. Army and U.S. Navy and 1102 enlisted personnel of both services who would be landed at our objective.

#### UNITS IN TRANSPORT GROUP

Other units in the Transport Group (81.2) were: Section (81.2.1), with Captain Harwood, USCG, aboard the DICKLAN, HMS PRINCE LEOPOLD, and HMS PRINCE CHARLES; Section (81.2.2) with Captain Edgar, ComdrTransDivThree in the BARNETT, with the LYON, OBERON, and MONROVIA aboard which was the Commander of the Western Naval Task Force, ViceAdmiral Hewitt, USN; and Section (81.2.3) under Captain Cierdorff aboard the STANTON, with the THURSTON, BETELGEUSE, and CHASE.

#### SMALL CRAFT AND OTHERS

Additionally there were the LST Group (81.3) of fifteen LST's under Commander Wright; the LCI Group (81.4) of twenty LCI's under Captain Leppert; the Support Group (81.5) under Captain Thebaud in the BOISE, with the SAVANNAH. The screen under Captain Madeira comprised the NELSON (F), MCLANAHAN, MURPHY, GLENNON, MADLOX, SHUBRICK, GHERARDI, BUTLER, HERNDON, JEFFERS, DALLAS, BERNADOU and COLE. The Control Group (81.7) under Lt. Comdr. Lowther; the Salvage Group (81.9) under Lieutenant Huff; the Sweeper Group (81.6) under Lt. Comdr. Harris; and the Reserve transports (80.6.1) the ORIZABA and CHATEAU THIERRY under Captain Reed.

#### APPROACH IS BEGUN

On July 9, at 1912, after zigzagging at various speeds, the convoy began an approach disposition. The approach disposition was led by the SAVANNAH and then the ships in the order in which they would face the beaches. Ahead of the CHASE was the LYON, while astern followed the BETELGEUSE, THURSTON, and STANTON.

PARATROOPS  
FLY OVERHEAD —  
TO TAKE  
AIRFIELD

While in the approach formation heading toward Sicily, flares were observed dead ahead, at about 2230, approximately 25 miles away. Radar reported IFF reception from planes in this area. Following this, ack-ack fire and bomb bursts were observed.

The bombing caused fires inland which silhouetted the outer shore line. At midnight, while the CHASE was at General Quarters, planes carrying previously arranged recognition lights passed low on her port side. These planes were bearing paratroops which were to take Ponte Olivio airfield, five and one-half miles to the north of Gela.

BOATS  
LOWERED

The CHASE, arrived in the "Dime" Transport area at 0037, July 10, stopped engines, and after setting Condition Four, lowered her boats.

Twenty-one boats of the first three boat divisions were lowered by 0115, eight scheduled to the THURSTON and thirteen to the STANTON. Several of the CHASE boats were to land with the fourth wave of these two ships, while the balance were delayed due to the condition of the sea and other difficulties. As a result, they were forced to proceed without a control vessel to the beach. The wave commanders recorded their waves landing on Green-2 at 0420 and 0515. The transports in the area were illuminated several times by searchlight prior to H hour or 0245. Heavy gunfire was observed at H hour and after, including machine-gun fire and medium artillery, most of it being concentrated near Gela. Shortly after H hour, the SAVANNAH and the BOISE combined to knock out at least one searchlight. The remainder of the CHASE boats were placed in the water at 0430 and the unloading of Army personnel and equipment was begun. The unloading was continued as boats became available on their return from the beach.

ENEMY PLANES  
SINK SHIP

At 0430, enemy planes began dropping light bombs and flares in the transport area. The USS MADDOX was sunk at this time far out in the patrolling area, its commander and executive officer being reported missing. At 0545, friendly planes began patrolling the area. It was reported that the MADDOX had been hit by a dive bomber. The CHASE maintained its position in the transport area while unloading. By 0848 the disembarkation of U.S. Army officers and enlisted men and beach party — who were not members of vehicles or unloading crews — had been completed.

ENEMY PLANES  
STRAFE BEACH

During the late morning and early afternoon, the two U. S. cruisers and the monitor HMS ABERCROMBIE shelled shore installations. At 1345 and again at about 1530, FW190's and Me109's dropped light bombs and strafed the beach in "Tip and Run" raids coming from low and to the NW of Gela, attacking and then shooting away close to the hills. One LST was hit in another raid at 1835 and burned continuously during the night. It had been beached to unload equipment but had not made rapid progress. Its ammunition, exploding while burning endangered small boats and their personnel at the beach while they were unloading.

OUR PLANES  
ENDANGERED

Friendly craft patrolled the skies till dusk, but drew much anti-aircraft fire from 2000 to dark from LCI's, LST's, and from Shore Installations. At about 2210, a dive glide bomber dropped a string of five 50# bombs from bow to stern of the CHASE and was away before a shot could be fired. The last of the stick was 50 feet away from the starboard side of the fantail.

GLUT OF SUPPLIES  
ON BEACH --  
OFFER TARGET

By 0130 on the morning of July 11, there was a glut of supplies on the beach, necessitating CHASE boats -- 22 of them -- to tie up alongside loaded until the beach was cleared, at 0600. Our boats crews were being forced to unload their own boats at the beach because there were no members of the shore party establishment to assist them, and apparently none to make proper disposition of supplies. Considerable delay was likewise caused by the beaches being mined forcing boats to concentrate their landing at only two of the beaches. Such concentration of supplies consequently offered a good target for divebombers and for strafing.

UNLOADING  
UNDER FIRE

At 0655, four JU88's flew over the transport area, dropping sticks of bombs in a medium level attack. The nearest of these to the CHASE was 75 yards off the port quarter. The USS BARNETT was hit by a skip bomb which ended up in her partially unloaded No. 1 hold. A fire was started which was rapidly brought under control. Several casualties resulted.

NAVAL GUNS  
BOMBARD SHORE

All during the morning of July 11, the cruisers, and at times U. S. destroyers, bombarded shore targets. It was understood that of an assault force of 60 Axis tanks, the naval gunfire accounted for 43. This bombardment kept up until the LST's could unload their tanks and other vehicles via pontoon piers. LST's and reserve LST's of the "Dime" attack force were unloaded by 2400 of July 11. On the morning of the 11th, at 0745, warning had been received that Axis planes were headed for the area, so the CHASE got underway preparatory to maneuvering. However, information was received that Allied planes had intercepted the enemy mission and turned it back. So the CHASE anchored again. That afternoon, at 1450, a JU88 that was on reconnaissance at very high altitude, was fired upon. And at 1547, General Quarters was sounded when a flight of thirteen JU88's flew over the transport area, without radar warning, and dropped bombs in a medium level attack. One 10,000-ton liberty ship, with its cargo still intact, was hit abaft the foremast. A fire started and was not brought under control so the ship was abandoned at 1610. All available boats were despatched to pick up survivors of that vessel, the SS ROBERT ROWAN. At 1645, four other JU88's dropped bombs about a mile to the north of the transport area. At 1702, the ROWAN exploded with terrific force and concussion, flame rising in a huge mass several hundred feet high and dense black smoke at least a thousand feet into the air. The oil then caught fire and burned fiercely, feeding a continual column of smoke into the air. This spread like a ceiling over the transport



area. The remaining ammunition continued to explode as the ship burned, leaving the mast and part of the superstructure above water. Then the destroyer MCLANAHAN, in an effort to hasten the flames, began to fire into the bulk at 1915. A lone JU88 chose this time to come over the area but on being taken under fire reversed its course and left only to be engaged by Spitfires. At 2130, the CHASE began heaving around and got underway. As dark closed in, enemy planes began dropping flares, which were followed by light bombs dropped by dive-bombing and low-flying planes. The combined flares and the still blazing liberty ship silhouetted the ships in the area. Presumably, the transports were the chief targets, for three sticks of bombs were observed to drop close to the CHASE, the closest being 75 yards astern. At least one of the planes was identified as a MELLO when seen against the fire. One stick of bombs was right in line with the BOISE but short and astern by 25 yards. A near miss on the ORIZABA caused her to take water.

"CHASE"  
UNLOADED  
FOR TWO DAYS

The CHASE started unloading at 0430 on July 10, and completed unloading at 0445 on July 12th. All the CHASE cargo was unloaded by her boats in about 247 trips, in addition to two trips by LCI's and 21 trips by DUKWs. Between 2330 on July 11, and 0545 on July 12, the small craft unloaded for transfer from the CHASE to the Army, twenty-six tons of flour. "During the unloading period," the official report states, "we unloaded 18 trips for the OBERON and several LCI's. Additional unloading was stopped for four hours on the morning of July 11, at the request of the beach-master, due to the fact that it was necessary to clear the beach."

CRAFT LOST  
AND SALVAGED

On the first day the CHASE lost one LCVP, even though during most of this time the cargo was removed by her own boats crews while at the beach. During the entire operation only five boats were lost. On the other hand, thirty-one boats were salvaged by the CHASE crew in the specially equipped salvage boat (a converted LCM). Boats in need of repair were brought aboard immediately on their return and after repair again placed in the water. LCVP's from LST's were likewise repaired and serviced. Refueling was done from either side as boats were free, thus keeping tanks practically full.

CASUALTIES  
BROUGHT ABOARD

Beginning at dawn of D day, the boats began bringing back wounded from the beach. As such boats came back they were hoisted to the rail and there the hospital corpsmen took the casualties to the sick bay for treatment. Boats were then lowered to continue unloading.

AN MELLO  
SHOT DOWN

At 1740 on July 12, and again at 1745, an MELLO flew low into the transport area (at about deck level), headed into the beach, there dropping light bombs. On the second trip he was shot down, skidding and bursting into flames on the beach.

AIR BATTLES  
IN THREE DAYS

Actually enemy planes were over the transport area for a very little while during the three days, offering few targets. Total ammunition expended was 100 rounds of 3"/50, 330 rounds of 40MM, and 2000 rounds of 20MM. In locating aircraft, the proximity to shore for SC radar and the drifting of the ship made it difficult to pick up aircraft echoes as against land echoes. As for IFF, this device did not work so well as it might have, since few of the friendly aircraft -- fighters particularly -- were so equipped. CINCMED D/T 111654 reported that 31 enemy aircraft were shot down by sorties flown from Malta, while Flying Fortresses did heavy damage at Catania and airdromes.

CONGRATULATIONS  
FROM CHIEFS

In his 141000 of July, ComEightFleet, addressed ComAmphForNaw, saying: "General Eisenhower desires me to express his sincere congratulations and deep appreciation of the splendid manner in which the operation carried out." ComPhibNaw in his 141300 July, said to ComTransDivThree and the ships in his command: "I gratefully commend you, your commanding officers, officers and men for outstanding achievements in the attack on Sicily. The success and spread of your operations amply demonstrated fine leadership, sound organization and training, and loyal performance of duty by all hands."

"WELL DONE.  
CARRY ON."

ComEightFleet, in his 141541B of July, said to all ships and units of the Western Task Force: "Due to careful planning excellent seamanship, gunfire and engineering and a high standard of proficiency and devotion to duty by all hands, the most difficult and complicated task of landing our troops on hostile shores has been successfully accomplished. Informed reports of specially meritorious acts and accomplishments have been many. I consider that all from the task force commanders to the lowest rating have performed splendidly and are deserving of the highest praise. Well done. It is now our duty to support, maintain, and build up the forces which have been landed. Carry on."

SEA CONDITIONS  
FAR FROM IDEAL

Sea conditions were far from ideal for an amphibious operation. On the afternoon of the 9th, a strong westerly wind had been blowing, creating a choppy and heavy sea. It was not until 2000 that the sea began to lose its chop as the wind quieted down. However, swells remained which continued through three p.m. of July 10. At this time, the wind again picked up from the west, quieting down somewhat after dark. The CHASE completed hoisting all boats at 1835, on July 12, and at 1837 was underway. At 0545, on July 15, the convoy began forming a single column approaching Algiers, and entered swept channel at 0600. Transferred 89 casualties to the U. S. Army Hospital Ship ACADIA, these including 6 Italian prisoners of war. Moored at Algiers at 2134, July 16. A violent explosion of ammunition occurred at 1519 near Mole Louis Billiard and involved two liberty ships. At 1700, one burning ship which had not sunk was towed clear of the dock and harbor. Towards the end of the month, the CHASE was moored at Mers-el-Kebir.

## APPENDIX G

The following is quoted from a letter written by William G. LAWRENCE, Chief Boatswain's Mate, to the Commanding Officer of the CHASE

Friday the 9th was a day of apprehension, not as much for the invasion, which was certainly enough, but for the weather. The wind blew all day, whipping itself into a frenzy - the seas building up more and more as the day wore on. Around dusk, we passed Malta, while approaching a rendezvous area where hundreds of ships, all kinds and sizes, were converging. Those who were to be on the small boats kept watching the wind, hoping it would haul up into the northward a little more, as then we would have had a lee on the invasion shore. However, the wind held steady, which meant a sweep along the beach making cross seas. We knew what that meant for us. Last minute instructions being over, we tried to get some sleep around 2200 - only to be shaken out by general quarters at midnight. Coming on deck, it was quite a sight to see - a dark starry night, our own ships silhouetted against continuous firing ahead.

From then on we lost all track of time and what time meant, until after the night of the 12th. It was a period of night running into day, and day into night as though they were one. What little sleep we did get during those three days was very spasmodic.

At the call of condition four, the different members of my crew came aboard. They were Thomas SHEPPARD, CMlc., George KNIPPLE, SF2c, David LIGHT, Cox., Edwin CARSON, Flc, Martin BOTHERAM, RM3c, Claude JENKINS, SMlc, Wm. JOHNSTON, Slc, J. BOBBITT, S2c, myself, and Lieutenant (jg) BANKS, who was in charge of the invasion craft from our ship.

By this time the wind had abated somewhat, but the seas were still running. Looking in toward the beach where the boats were to land, we saw fires from one end to the other. Afterwards, we saw no indication of what those fires were. Suddenly, off shore there appeared a great burst of flame, which turned out to be the fate of an Allied destroyer. We were acting as an escort and information boat for the different waves, sending them to their proper ships as they got off their course or rendezvous area.

At 0245, the first wave hit hit. Explosions started going off, one after the other, along the beach. The same with the next wave. It looked bad for them from where we watched off shore. Our support ships were throwing salvos ashore. The shells, in groups of three, made perfect fiery arcs across the sky. Search lights were causing trouble, which had to be taken care of. Some cruiser fired one shot at a particular light, that seemed to travel forever through space, and when it finally did drop in, the light went out as though you had pushed a button. The next morning we saw the evidence of that shot; there was a gaping hole right through the center of the light.

At dawn, we were at the beach, where we started our salvage operations. The beach was a mess, broached boats all over the place. A plane came down in flames to the west of us, and as it sank, it sent up two large smoke rings from each end.

A surf was breaking over a bar just off the beach. The boats would come in heavily loaded and many were swamped before being unloaded. The boats would beach, the surf would run beyond them, the ramps would be lowered and the out-going water from the beach would fill them up. We kept pulling boats off as we came to them, taking only the ones that would run. At that time, it seemed to us more important to keep as many in operation as we could, than to waste time on a boat that would not run without a great deal of repair.

We tried to keep in contact with the Beach Master, so he could direct us to the next boat in difficulty. However, due to poor radio reception, we had no success with him.

At one time, there were three of my men on the beach - CARSON, SHEPPARD, and JOHNSTON, checking on the most easily salvaged boats. They were forced to take cover in fox holes during a plane attack. It was later that they realized, to do so, they had run across a mined area marked with white tape.

Then, we began to get it hot from artillery fire, strafing and bombing from enemy planes. We kept working along the beach, starting at one end and working up to the other, taking the best boats we came to. An LST ran in to the beach, and forgot to drop her stern anchor. Her commanding officer hailed us, requesting we carry it out for them which we did. It was no mean job with the heavy swells running as they were. But, my coxswain, LIGHT, one of the best, can do everything with that boat but make her talk. We had just completed this and were moving back in when CARSON yelled "Here they come!" Three enemy planes were winging in low in line with three LST's. The outside plane dropped her bomb first and then swung as to strafe us just as we opened up. Thank God we had these guns then as that plane changed course at once. We were convinced that the fire power of our one 50 cal. and three 30 cal. guns decided that Jerry not to fly directly into us. The other two planes dropped their bombs consecutively on the next two ships, and followed the first away. As luck had it, none of the bombs hit anything but water. One of my men who was watching said that the first bomb dropped, hit the water a short distance from one side of the first LST, skipped completely over the ship and landed on the other side before going off. One of those bombs was pretty close to us, making spray that gave us a salt water shower. Unknown to us at the time, it opened up two seams on the after run of the bottom starboard side. We continued operations that afternoon, watching one LST hit by a similar attack. We salvaged one boat that had a broken rudder and towed it out to its ship. Being near the CHASE, we decided to try our luck again withchow. The request to the bridge, "Permission to come aboard for chow." The answer came back. "Tie up astern, and come aboard." That was good.



After eating, I reported to the bridge for further orders, which were, "Carry on at the beach." That we did, until well into the night, as the moon gave us sufficient light to work for a considerable time. We then lay off the beach, directing boats coming in (mostly LCI's) to their right location. I set a watch of three men with two hour watches, giving each man almost four hours sleep on top of ammunition boxes, gear, etc.

Then came the dawn and back to the beach, only to be greeted by morning strafing. We salvaged one of the OBERON boats that would run, but had no crew. I sent it out to the CHASE by Johnstown. The ship put a crew aboard, and he reported back after they had taken in a load. One of our own boats was lost through no ones fault, as we watched the entire thing. She came in loaded with an ambulance which made her very low and she got hung up on her first attempt. The surf being heavy, the coxswain had considerable trouble, but managed to back off and try again. On lowering his ramp, the ambulance started out and the boat filled up almost immediately. Nothing could be done about it. The ambulance reached shore safely.

We returned to the ship around noon for chow and further orders. We were told to stand by, and the entire crew fell asleep on deck while waiting. Ensign Tellier and Robert Sargent, Photographer's Mate Second Class, came aboard for the next trip and we left the ship at 1400 to continue operations. We salvaged some boats that could run, but had no crews, and anchored several off the beach. One of our boats, No. 5, with no crew, had the ramp down. We raised the ramp and Carson ran it out to the CHASE. The entire beach was being heavily covered by enemy artillery fire, and at one point we had a close one. There was an LST unloading, while just to the west of her was an LCM that seemed in good shape, but was not quite unloaded. So, after moving on down the beach to work, we came back to her. Having made our cable fast in the usual fashion, we turned around, and started pulling. On the beach behind us, near the dune line, there was a burst from artillery fire; then another nearer and in direct line for us. They were undoubtedly trying for the LST, but their aim was a little to the west. The OBERON's LCM was just beginning to move when there was another burst nearer and still in line. If there hadn't been three men on that boat we would have slipped our cable, but we hung on, and she began to move out faster and faster. As we pulled away from the shore, the bursts kept moving down to the water, and then into the water. We cut to the west down the beach, and the next few bursts hit where we had been. It was just a case of being lucky enough to be one jump ahead of them. Sargent received a minor cut on his arm from shrapnel. The lighter would not run, so we were forced to tow her to the OBERON. Meanwhile, the beach had an attack by planes, just as a formation of heavy bombers hit at the ships offshore, dropping eggs all around them.

One Liberty ship was hit. Shortly afterwards, she went up in a terrific explosion. Leaving the LCM, we ran over to the burning ship to pick up any survivors, but found all hands had abandoned ship some minutes before she went up.

We returned to the CHASE about 1730, and were told to stand by. We were aboard about an hour and a half, when orders came to proceed to the beach until nightfall. Upon returning to the ship, the word was passed to tie up astern for the night, leaving one man on watch. As it happened, it was Johnston's turn for the watch and he had a night of it. We were just getting settled down aboard, when the planes began to come in, and the order was given, "Cast off all boats astern." The order was executed before any of us could get aft to help out Johnston. He started the engines and began cruising around. Torpedo planes started coming in low between the ships, and all ships began crossfire horizontal to the water. Johnston was right in the middle. He said afterward that he saw tracers that streaked across the deck right between the engine box and the winch. After that night, we let Johnston sleep the next morning on top of our soft beds of ammunition boxes.

Lieutenant Donovan and Ensign Tellier reported aboard on the morning of the 12th at 0500. After a hasty check along the beach of the stranded boats, we began operations as before. After pulling off a number of boats, we came to one that was still one half loaded with ammunition, the ramp down and quite a bit of water in her. After pulling up the ramp, she came off easily enough. Off shore a short distance, we hailed an Army duck, and transferred the ammunition to it. The boat began to take on considerable water, having a hole we could not find. After unloading her, we ran to an LST to hoist her before she sank. The slings were for boom hoisting, but after some manipulating, we made them do for davits. She was hoisted out and freed of water by letting the ramp down. We found a hole just over her screw. Sheppard patched it with lead sheeting. We then took her to the ship she belonged to. This operation took quite some time, and, as it was about noon, we reported back to the CHASE. Up to this time, we had pulled off thirty-five boats. Then came orders from the bridge for five of us - Knipple, Light, Carson, Johnston, and myself to report with the salvage boat to the HOPI on verbal orders. We needed some repairs, so I requested permission to be hoisted aboard. It was then we discovered where our leak was. We had two seams sprung by bombs. The ramp gasket and our stuffing boxes needed fixing, as well as the two seams. After repairs, we gathered together our personal gear, and were ready to go overboard at 1700. The orders were to drop back to the port quarter and have a fire pump put aboard. In the midst of that, there was an air-raid which held things up for a bit. Next came an order to take several British officers over to the "MONITOR" while we were standing by. Sometime around 1800 the CHASE shoved off, and from the bridge the Commander called down "Report to the HOPI - good luck." Answering "Aye-Aye, Sir," we all felt as though we were deserted. To see our ship pull out, leaving us on desolate, war torn shores, was heart-breaking.

We reported to the U. S. S. HOPI. We were met by Lieutenant Commander Anderson, in charge of salvage operations in that area, who came aboard and asked to be taken on a round of the Liberty ships. About dusk, we learned he was going to send us out again for salvage work. I requested sleep for my men and myself and we needed it badly. That was agreed to. As they had no quarters aboard for us, we were

forced to live on our own boat from then on, making out as best we could.

The fire pump we had from the CHASE was put aboard the HOPI on Commander Anderson's order. It was later given to the advanced base at Gela by order. That was all right with us as it would have made us so heavy, we wouldn't have been able to work the beach. As it was, we had to unload a lot of things to help make us lighter.

July 13th, we started out without chow, which didn't help our dispositions. We reported to the beach at Gela to carry lines for the tugs, so they could pull boats from the beach. They were working on the boats with a tug and a bulldozer when we arrived and had two tugs standing by. Running lines for them seemed a waste of time to us as we moved in and pulled off two boats while the tug was still working on one. When their boat finally did come off it sank and had to be salvaged again. Lieutenant Commander Anderson did not ask us to run lines for the small tugs again. He came aboard our boat and stayed with us that day and part of the next. That day we salvaged fourteen boats. Most of them we had to pump out as well as pull off. We had a three inch pump aboard belonging to the HOPI. This pump was not too heavy and worked quite well. Several of Lieutenant Commander Anderson's men were aboard helping us with the pump.

Knipple received a bad cut over his eye from being thrown to the deck when we hit one of those unexpected sandbars well off the beach. One of the HOPI's men, named Murphy, was thrown overboard but was picked up immediately.

Before reporting in that night, we evacuated casualties from the beach to the U. S. S. LEXICO. We began the day of July 14th by taking a load of TNT into the beach for the HOPI. We salvaged five boats and then ran down to Victoria with the U. S. S. NAUSETT. We handled 600 fathoms of  $1\frac{1}{2}$ " cable, running from an LCT on the beach to the NAUSETT. We secured that night at 2330. We stood by most of July 15th waiting for someone to make up their mind. We finally received orders to return to Gela and continue salvage operations. We salvaged four boats in the time that was left. On July 16th, we continued work as before. The HOPI sent men to the beach to pump out and repair boats with minor holes while we used the 3" pump as in the past. As we took the boats off the beach, we turned them over to one of the smaller tugs of the salvage party. Our score for that day was twelve boats.

The morning of July 17th, we ran to Victoria with the HOPI, and handled their cable for a pontoon bridge. We returned to Gela the same day and salvaged six boats. On July 18th we salvaged ten boats. By this time we had salvaged an LCM that was in good condition and some of Lieutenant Commander Anderson's men started working with it using the same principle that they had seen us use. On July 19th we salvaged ten boats which finished up our work of pulling boats off the beach. This gave us a total of ninety-six boats altogether. These ninety-six boats were taken from the beach stretching from Gela to four miles east of Gela.

During the past days we often came across bodies of soldiers drifting near the beach. We reported them to the Army, which always took quick action.

From July 20th to July 24th, inclusive, we stood by, and towed boats to different Liberty ships and LST's to be hoisted aboard and brought back for repairs. On the 21st, we were near the dock at Gela where there was a minesweeper stuck on a sandbar. He passed us his hauser, and we had him off in no time at all.

On the morning of the 25th, Lieutenant Commander Anderson told me that if we could get transportation he would give me orders to return to our ship. That was all we wanted to hear, so we started making rounds of the Liberty ships. One didn't have enough food, another no water, another had a jumbo that was not working, and yet another was filled up, and so on down the line, until the S. S. JAMES WOODROW. They treated us with respect and we certainly appreciated it. We were hoisted aboard on the 26th, and from then on, we did nothing but eat and sleep - except for getting some of our gear in order.

At 1800 on the 29th, we landed in Algiers, and found the CHASE had left for Oran. We stayed aboard the WOODROW for further transportation. We left Algiers on August 2nd and arrived in Oran on the 3rd. We reported aboard the CHASE immediately.

There were several points we found to be absolutely necessary for one of these boats used in salvage work:

1. Have your towing bit in the center and as far forward as possible.
2. Keep your cable handy. In our case we used our deck winch.
3. Don't load the boat down with excess weight when you expect to do quick work,



APPENDIX H

LCI(L) FLOTILLA FOUR  
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, ATLANTIC FLEET  
C/O FLEET POSTOFFICE, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Bizerte, Tunisia  
30 July, 1943

Dear Admiral Waesche,

Knowing that you are very interested in the activities of the Coast Guard on the fighting fronts, particularly with LCI(L) Flotilla Four, and also realizing the length of time involved in getting through official reports, I am, therefore, writing this as a semi-official letter on the activities of this Coast Guard Group. I did not think it plausible to mail information prior to the engagement as the secrecy of the movements of the vessels was vital and the difficulty of forwarding mail of this type was rather involved.

The Flotilla arrived in Bizerte, in two groups, Group Eleven arriving about the 1st of June and Group Ten arriving about 11 June. From the time of arrival until the actual invasion all personnel were busily engaged in a very active training program which included the cooperation and training with army units. A base unit was set-up within the Naval Base here, and consisted of two quonset hut barracks, a machine shop, storerooms, warehouse, a barber shop, and offices.

I was somewhat disappointed that the Flotilla could not act as a unit in the invasion, but there were two alternatives, either the Flotilla could act as a complete unit and be entirely in the reserve force or it could be split-up, partly in the reserve and partly in the active assault group. I naturally decided that the latter was much preferable from the service standpoint if not from the Flotilla's point of view.

The Task Force to which we were attached had five Task Group Commanders, four of these commanders operating Headquarter's ships in conjunction with Army Headquarters for the four beaches that were to be assaulted. The fifth Headquarter's ship was in command of the Reserve Force which was held at a central rendezvous five miles off the beaches to be used to strike at the most opportune time and at the most favorable spot. As I was the junior commander of the five commanders attached to this Task Force, the command of the reserve unit fell to me. Each Task Group Commander had command of LST's, LCI's and various other small landing craft assigned to his group.

As I was intensely interested in the salvaging of our boats, I requested permission to be salvage officer of this Task Force and was assigned that additional duty. This assignment was to commence after my duties in connection with the reserve force had been completed. One fleet tug, two harbor tugs and the LCI-87 were assigned to operate as the offshore salvage group.

Fifteen of our vessels were assigned to one of the flanking beaches and fifteen naval vessels were assigned to the other flanking beaches. The two central beaches had no LCI operations. Three of our vessels were converted into Regimental Headquarters ships and, therefore, were not expected to beach. The remainder of our group and the remainder of the navy group were assigned to the reserve force. The attack on the beach in which the Coast Guard was chiefly interested was led by smaller craft and followed up by two waves of LCI's. The first LCI wave of six vessels was under the command of Lieutenant Commander A. C. Unger, and the second wave of nine vessels was under the command of Lieutenant Commander J. A. Bresnan.

The task of moving three Task Forces through the Straits of Sicily so that all the groups would arrive on their proper beaches at the same H Hour was a tremendous problem and was accomplished in the face of a strong northwest breeze. The element of surprise which we had hoped for was apparently lacking as enemy flares and searchlights picked up the force well at sea. The waves which Lieutenant Commanders Unger and Bresnan were operating found very little opposition on their beach. There was, however, some machine gun and mortar fire and two of our vessels were struck by the latter, namely, the LCI's 88 and 349. Casualties amounted to one officer, namely, Lieutenant (junior grade) Frank Cankar, executive officer of the LCI-349, who was struck in the chest and leg by shrapnel and although seriously wounded he is expected to pull through. The LCI-88 lost her stern anchor going into the beach and broached. She was unable to get off under her own power having picked up a line in a wheel on the way in. Although the LCI-92 made two attempts to pull her off, under mortar fire, these were unsuccessful. The remainder of the LCI's on retracting from the beach immediately returned to the base for reinforcements.

The Coast Guard LCI's in the Reserve Group were sent directly into the harbor at Licata, Sicily, and discharged their troops at the quay. These vessels along with the navy vessels which were with them suffered severe bombing attacks but no casualties were inflicted.

After completing duties as Reserve Group Commander and despatching vessels to their proper beaches, the LCI-87, on which I was embarked, proceeded to carry out the salvage work outlined briefly below:

We pulled the LCI-35 from the beach after approximately one hours work. The following day we assisted in the harbor during a strong wind where four LST's had blown sidewise onto the dock. On D plus two day the LCI-88 was pulled from the beach in conjunction

with the fleet tug MORENO which had previously made two unsuccessful attempts, her large draft keeping her too far offshore to permit a proper angle of pull. On D plus three day the LCI-1 was pulled off the beach where she had jammed among the rocks. This was accomplished by the LCI-87, without the help of the MORENO, after washing out the channel and blasting away holding rocks. It should be noted here that assistance of the bulldozers on the beach was of tremendous importance in getting these vessels clear. They scooped away a channel on the shoreside, while LCVP's scoured away a channel on the seaward side. Then pressure pumps were used to free the sand from under the bottom of the vessel. The bulldozers then assisted by pushing on the bow while the LCI-87 pulled on the stern. One advantage in using an LCI for this type of shallow water salvage work is since they can work in six feet of water almost any angle of pull desired may be obtained. Following the removal of three LCI's from the Task Force beaches, the salvage group assisted in salvaging small landing craft and retrieving lost LCI ramps. The Task Force Commander was very pleased with the results of the salvage work.

With the fall of Porto Empedocle in sight I was ordered to proceed with a company and a half of beach battalion engineers and sufficient staff to open up that port for unloading purposes. We proceeded overland by jeep, arriving the same day the infantry captured the town. We surveyed the harbor, inspected it for mines, and opened the net. On subsequent days, landing places for DUKW's, LCI's and LST's were established. The fleet tug MORENO cleared the harbor of two sunken wrecks and, when the minefields had been swept outside the harbor, the port was turned over to Army and Navy authorities who had previously been designated to operate it as an established port. After fourteen days of this type of work in Sicily, the LCI-87 returned to its base. In the meantime the other LCI's were engaged in ferrying troops and supplies to Sicily.

Although enemy activity on the beach during the landing operations was comparatively light, during the subsequent four days all ships in the area were subjected to heavy air attacks. It is my understanding that three of our ships are submitting reports claiming the destruction of an enemy aircraft each. An item of interest occurred when an enemy plane bombed the LCI-87 first from the air and then from the bottom. The plane bombed and strafed the ship in the harbor of Licata and was shot down by shore batteries, falling into the sea not far from the harbor entrance. Later the ship passed over this spot and was subjected to a violent explosion which lifted the vessel, knocked the azimuth circle from the compass, and capsized articles on the deck. We probably disturbed the plane on the bottom setting off a small bomb.

It is my belief that the personnel of the Coast Guard, with the exception of one warrant officer who fainted during the assault,

showed excellent morale under fire and carried out their duties in a most commendable manner. There were no outstanding acts of heroism but every man did his job and did it well.

Respectfully,

M. H. IMLAY,  
Commander, U. S. Coast Guard  
Commander LCI(L) FLOTILLA FOUR.

Vice-Admiral R. R. Waesche, Commandant  
United States Coast Guard  
Washington, D. C.



## APPENDIX I

### DIFFICULTIES OF SMALL BOATS

Described by Lt. Blair Wallister, USCGR

I was on duty aboard the Coast Guard Transport SAMUEL CHASE during the preparations in North Africa for the invasion of Sicily. The convoy left North Africa on the 6th of July, Tuesday, and headed east in the Mediterranean along the shores, the north shores of Africa, around the coast, zig zagging, of course, from time to time, down through the Tunisian war channel and then gradually up and around again in a very zig zag pattern past Malta and past Gozo, in the direction of Sicily.

Up until the last day of the convoy before making attack on Sicily, we could have attacked probably any one of five different places. In the trip through the Mediterranean the sea in all directions seemed to be filled with other convoys. Practically any direction in which the eye turned there was another convoy proceeding either in our direction or in a direction approximately the same as ours toward the same goal. The enemy undoubtedly knew we were in the Mediterranean and were headed toward an invasion but judging from the number and direction of the ships, he could not have identified the invasion point accurately up until the night of Friday, July 9.

On that night we headed directly north toward Sicily. The weather had been fair up until Friday July 9, but on that day the winds picked up and the seas built up and there were heavy, fairly heavy seas and a good deal of sea sickness among the assault troops. The convoy continued through the heavy seas, and there was considerable trepidation felt about getting the landing boats ashore in the surf that would undoubtedly be found along the coast.

Our meteorological data was complete and upon consulting this data we discovered that seas of five feet or higher, that is a surf of five feet or higher along the beaches, was probably to be expected not more than one percent of the time and this turned out to be one of the one percent days. Admiral Kirk later described the conditions as a terrible surf. The ships came in sight of Sicily shortly after midnight. Our first sight of Sicily consisted of heavy fires glowing along the shores near Gela, fires started by the strong bombardment which had been given by air force during the day. As we closed in we needed no sign posts and in fact navigation was facilitated by the fires that were to be seen burning on the Sicilian mainland. To the east of Gela, which was our invasion point, the Scoglitti light could still be seen burning. Evidently the Italians were not worried about an invasion at the time, or if they were they were more concerned about maintaining their own aids to navigation than they were about blacking them out against us.

We dropped our anchors at the appointed time and place about six miles off shore and at about 1 a.m. in the morning of Saturday, 10 July. The landing boats were dropped over the side and headed toward the rendezvous areas where they were to proceed into the attack with the PCs and the SCs as guide and control ships.

Aboard our own ships all was in complete blackness, of course, and we had no indication of the progress that the attack waves were making until about five minutes before H-hour, H-hour being 0245 on 10 July. About five minutes before H-hour we saw the searchlights sweeping the seas. The first waves of the attack were all caught and sharply silhouetted from our position in the light of the searchlights. We expected immediately, of course, that machine guns and shore batteries would open on the landing waves going in. However, the shore batteries did not open up. The searchlights then executed a peculiar maneuver. They rose into the air, dipped again to another position, rose again and dipped and did this several times, scanning back and forth in apparently attempting to pick up outlines of ships at sea without paying any attention to the landing boats coming in shore. Later on we received various reports from the Italians. One report that we received was that they believed their own fleet was maneuvering off shore. Another report was that they wanted to see what the big ships were and weren't paying any attention to what they believed to be scouting boats in shore.

At H-hour practically all of the first waves hit the shore. Our first indication of that came when red rockets, signal rockets were fired and we knew that our boats were ashore. In the meantime one of the cruisers was closing in and picked out the most offensive of the large searchlights the Italians were using and lobbed over three shells and watched them arch through the sky with their tracers gleaming red as they floated slowly in a perfect V formation into the shore and drop squarely on this searchlight position and completely blasting out the searchlight, the gun, the gun crew and every living thing in that immediate vicinity.

The cruisers then continued to fire on other searchlights. An artillery general who was making a landing in one of the LCV boats from our ship, turned to the Coast Guard officer, who was in charge of that particular wave, and said that he had never in his life seen such fine gun fire, either on land or sea, which was an excellent testimonial to the fire of the cruisers on that particular occasion.

The PCs and SCs in some cases had difficulty lining up the waves and leading them in. On one occasion a PC had trouble with her compass and the wave which she was supposed to have led in was led in by a support boat which was commanded by Lt. Comdr. Bernard Scalan, Coast Guard officer, and he took the position which the PC would have otherwise had taken in leading his wave in. As he came in shore another scout boat which had already taken an assigned position near the pier at Gela proved to be of great help. This scout boat put under the command of Ensign Darnell, U. S. Naval Reserve, had lain off the main jetty at Gela for about a half hour preceding the arrival of the support boat and its wave and showing lights out to sea enabled them to

fix their positions and approach the beach accurately in exactly the position that they had planned. As they approached at Gela, some of the shore batteries opened up. Some of the guns, some of the landing boats were raked with gun fire from machine guns. Shell fire, also, landed among the landing boats. One boat was swamped through a shell which landed alongside of it and the coxswain of the boat told the soldiers that they would have to jump overboard and helped to cut packs off their backs and then directed them to a nearby LCI and most of the men in that particular boat were saved. Another boat which was swamped lost most of its crew as well as the soldiers who were being transported ashore.

Most of the landings were made good in the first wave and the soldiers quickly proceeded up the beach and took the machine gun emplacements under fire from their own machine guns and they managed to cut down resistance within several hours. Later we learned that most of the beaches, the coastal defenses, were manned by native Sicilian troops and the story that some of these Sicilians told us was that they were very anxious to keep us off the beach if they could, to defend their beaches, but once they saw that the Americans had gained beachheads their desire to fight was dampened considerably because they didn't want their cities, their homes, their villages and their farms fought over and they didn't want their families subjected to danger of shell fire and lead flying through the air and, consequently, after our beachheads were made good the opposition from the Italians along the coast line largely dissipated and we took many prisoners even before daylight. The town of Gela was shortly surrounded and on early morning of Saturday the entire town fell into our hands. In the original landings, in the landing boats, the transport to which I was attached found it a valuable idea to mount the 30-caliber machine guns forward in the boats.

Later, talking to the boat crews from other boats I discovered that they ran into a difficulty which our transport had previously ran into in North Africa, namely that with the machine guns mounted on the scarfrings in the gun scuttles the danger of raking your own boat was not to be ignored and consequently the setting of the guns forward gave the gunners a clearer range and didn't endanger lives of those in the boats to which the gunners were attached.

With the dawn of Saturday, the German air force came over, two Messerschmits knocked down an observation plane which was scouting gun fire from one of our cruisers and fortunately the crew of the plane were rescued by the landing boats which were nearby. The German planes then proceeded to rake the beaches, strafing, dive bombing, skip bombing and even laying mines. One of the beaches during the course of the morning had to be closed because German planes had laid mines on the beach and we had to proceed to disarm and pick up these mines before our boats could be allowed to proceed inshore again.

The chief difficulties encountered on the beach were the heavy surf, which blew up again on Saturday morning, after calming down for the original landings on Saturday, very early right after midnight the winds flattened out. The original landings were made in a very flat sea, but on Saturday morning, with the coming of daylight, the seas did continue to build up so that there was considerable broaching and swamping of all sorts of boats on Saturday morning. Also, on Saturday morning an LST which was carrying half tracks and 105 mm. anti-tank equipment and anti-aircraft guns, all priority equipment, the LST in making its landing grounded on a sand bar which turned out to be about 100 yards off shore and while trying to rig pontoons suffered a direct hit from German aircraft and blew up with considerable loss of personnel and complete loss of all equipment aboard. The beach on which she had been trying to make her landing had to be evacuated and new beaches set up.

On the transport to which I was attached one of the LCM's had been reconstructed for use as a salvage boat. The after end of the ship, the LCM, or tank lighter had been decked over and extra heavy towing bits had been installed. The control box had been moved forward about six feet to allow the after end to be decked over according to plans which had been laid and originated by Captain Roger Heimer, who was in command of the USS CHASE. The forward ramp had been arranged with an "A" frame on it so that it could be used for lifting up the after ends of boats that broached and the tank lighter, salvage boat, had also been equipped with a bulldozer for the use in handling wire cables from the stranded boats and getting them off the beaches.

The salvage boat as thus described performed very valuable service in this connection, hauling off swamped landing craft. The craft carried very strong, long ground tackle which was used whenever necessary and four special purchases to seaward and special rigs had been devised for utilizing both shore and sea purchases. The boats that had suffered damage were brought back to the ship and hauled out of the water, repair crews stood by and were ready with all sorts of repair gear.

Plugs had been prepared in advance, 30 caliber, 50 caliber plugs, tapered plugs ready to pop into holes from gun fire and the average time out of boats that had suffered damage in making landings was about one hour and 20 minutes.

An interesting factor in this invasion as different from the North African invasion, the chief damage to the LCV(P) or Higgins boats was in the matter of propellers. That was due to the fact that there were rocks along the coast. In this invasion the chief damage was due to jammed rudders, evidently due to the fact that it was a sandy bottom and in backing off from the beaches in many cases the boats rammed their rudders against the sand bar and when they were still astern to the waves, because of the heavy surf they had to back out a considerable distance before they could turn around without danger of broaching. The LCM's were very successful in this operation because they came up fairly high on the beach, but probably in most successful of all were the LCT barges. The LCT's came higher



on the beach than any other landing vessel and proved their worth again and again. One LCT could hold as much gear as perhaps twenty of twenty five of the LCV(P)s and was able to get higher on the beach with it with less danger of swamping or broaching. The LCIs were able to get close enough in that troops were able to debark for the most part in water not deeper than their arm pits.

In some occasions where they were not able to get in the close, LCV(P)s and even ducks were used as a bridge to get the soldiers into shallower water before they came down and waded in the rest of distances. In many cases of course, lines were rigged between the LCIs and the shore to assist the soldiers in getting ashore. The LST's had considerable difficulty getting close enough to shore to debark their mechanized equipment. The pontoons were rigged in some cases but were not entirely successful, apparently due to the fact that the heavy surf continually disturbed them on the beaches near Gela, most of the LST's had to be unloaded with LCV(P)'s Army ducks and LCT's. One LCT in particular which was quite useful had had part of the side cut away and the ramp of the LST's was lowered right onto the deck of the LCT. The Army ducks proved their worth in this operation. They are very successful because of the fact that they were able to proceed up the beaches and in scattering the supplies which they brought ashore, they were able to disburse them, carry them up into the dunes and disburse them so that they didn't block the beaches with tremendous supplies of material which were vulnerable to enemy air attack.

During the day, Saturday, enemy planes came over, not in large quantities, usually one, two or three at a time and continued to strafe and skip bomb along the beaches. The American planes for the most part were engaged in supporting the infantry and attacking the enemy and consequently there were very few dog fights. We would see formations of American planes fly over and disappear inland or fly along the beaches, disappear and presently they'd be followed by one, two, or three of the German planes coming over and doing their strafing or else bombing the transports. The Italian planes were notably absent in this operation. We saw none whatever. The types of German planes which were most encountered were Messerschmitts, Focke-Wolfs, Junkers 88's, and early on Saturday a couple of Stukas, thereafter we saw no more Stuka's.

The heavy seas caused many of the landing boats to broach or swamp on Saturday and the salvage boats were busy all day long along with salvage tugs which were used in this operation, I believe, for the first time in an invasion operation, but were very successful in hauling off LCI's which broached and LST's which were grounded on the sand bars.

Late Saturday we received an urgent call from the shore asking that we give immediate priority to all anti-tank 105 mm. equipment. Boats which were half loaded were unloaded and other equipment which was on deck or in the hatches ready to be brought up was pushed

aside and immediate priority was given to this equipment as requested. Later the Army unloading crews which had been helping to unload the landing boats on the beaches were withdrawn to the defense areas and it was necessary for the boat crews of the Higgins boats and tank lighters, the LCV(P)'s and the LCM's to do their own unloading. Because of the fact that this took three and four times as long, the landing boats were subjected to additional danger from air attacks and also were much more liable to swamping and broaching, swamping largely being due to waves which came around the bow and rolled back down the ramp causing the after end of the boats to settle and the next few surfs might roll over the stern of the boat and swamp it from the rear.

During the night we supplemented our boat crews with additional men to assist in the unloading. At this time we did not know why the Army unloading crews had disappeared. We found that out later on. We suffered several air attacks during the night with German planes coming over dropping flares and then bombing us after their flares had lit up the transport area. Sometimes there were as many as 10 to 15 flares in the air at one time and anti-aircraft fire against these flares was in some cases effective and in most cases seemed an unfortunate waste of ammunition.

German planes in these night attacks both on Saturday night and on Sunday night used siren or screaming bombs and we were able to understand the demoralizing effect that these bombs had had on the Poles, and on the French, because of the fact that during the night the screaming bombs made a lot of noise as they came down, first the roar of the engines of the dive bombers, then the screaming bombs and by virtue of the fact that the bombs grew to a crescendo as they approached the surface of the sea, they seemed to be directed toward your ship. During the day time, of course, you are not aware of the bombs until they land and then you see the explosion and the splash and if you are still alive there is nothing to worry about. But at night you hear these things coming toward you and because of the fact that they grow louder they do seem to be coming directly at you and they tend to be rather nerve racking and we could sympathize with the people of Poland and France for that reason. Numerous bomb straddles were recorded on the American destroyers that night. In fact every destroyer but one was reported as having been straddled by bombs, but none of our ships were hit during the night attacks.

On Sunday morning we found out for the first time what the necessity for anti-tank equipment had been. Splashes were seen on all sides among the transports along the beaches, no aircraft were overhead. Our first surmise was that enemy coastal batteries had suddenly been revitalized. This proved not to be the case when we were able to observe the fire coming from German tanks. We learned that some 60 German tanks had outflanked our infantry, come around their lines and during the night had disposed themselves on the second ridge beyond the beaches. There was some slight cover here and these German tanks in coming up on this ridge took vantage points and

during the day with 75 mm. equipment apparently proceed to bombard both the beaches and the transport area. Several of our transports were hit at this time, but fortunately no serious damage resulted although it necessitated all of the transports weighing anchor and proceeding out to a safer position a little farther to seaward.

At this point one of our large cruisers moved inshore and engaged in a duel with the tanks. After knocking out 14 of the German tanks the other tanks turned tail and headed back toward their own lines. At this time the anti-tank equipment which had been sent ashore from the various transports came into its own and an additional 15 or 16 tanks were knocked out on the way back, so that out of the original German force probably not more than 50 percent returned to their own lines according to reports which reached us aboard ship.

The enemy evidently made a major tactical error in allowing the tanks to remain on the second ridge, had the tanks come down to the beaches they undoubtedly would have been able to destroy most of our equipment, completely disrupt our landings and our own shell fire from the cruisers in attacking them could have ruined what would have ever remained on the beaches of our gear, our supplies, so that it was fortunate for us that the tanks did not come down to the beaches but stayed on the second ridges.

Sunday afternoon we were attacked by a force of 21 Junkers 88's, flying a perfect V formation. Echelons of three flew directly over the transport area and at this time a liberty ship was struck directly by what was probably a 200 pound bomb, the bomb landing on loaded gasoline and ammunition trucks on the forward deck. The Captain of the ship, observing that it would undoubtedly be hopeless to try and save the ship, immediately gave the order for abandoning ship and several score of landing boats which were on transports nearby were rushed over to the liberty ship and to our knowledge, virtually the entire crew was picked up before she later exploded and burned with great volume of smoke and detonation of explosives in all directions.

During these operations also, one of our transports was hit on Saturday morning just after she had opened her number one hatch. The bomb fell directly down the hatch into the number 1 hold, but fortunately the fire was brought under control within three hours and what appeared at first might be a ship loss turned out to interfere in no wise with the unloading of the ships, except that her forward magazines had to be flooded. This spoke for excellent damage control aboard this particular vessel.

On Sunday night the vessels in the transport group were again attacked by enemy aircraft in much the same fashion as previously and for the first time we have sure knowledge that on this night we knocked down at least one of the enemy fliers.

In general it may be remarked that the anti-aircraft fire on the



part of the transports, landing ships, LCI's, LST's, LCT's, was definitely disappointing, particularly on the part of the landing ships themselves. Apparently aircraft identification had not been sufficiently indoctrinated in crews so that there were many cases of the crews of these vessels firing on our own planes with as much readiness as they fired on enemy planes. In all, during the entire invasion, there were probably less than a half dozen enemy planes destroyed. The number of friendly planes destroyed was regrettably large.

On Monday morning the transports, the SAMUEL CHASE among them, completed unloading for the major part. Sixty-five hours was the total time required for unloading our vessel. We stood by during the hours of Monday while other transports completed unloading. Late on the afternoon of Monday, German planes came over again and this time tried a new tactic, namely strafing the barrage balloons. About a half-dozen barrage balloons were shot down, evidently with the intent of sending over torpedo planes about sundown to attack the ships, or else dive bombers. However, by sundown the ships of the convoy had weighed anchor and the convoy had sailed out of the Gulf of Gela and back into the Mediterranean. We had been well-protected during this entire time from seaward by a destroyer screen and also by mines layed by our own minelayers, which protected the transport area. Whether the German torpedo planes actually came over that night or not and whether they were disappointed, we'll never know because our convoy was safely at sea by that time and returned to its home port in North Africa without further difficulty.

In connection with German and Italian prisoners taken, it may be interesting to compare the psychological attitude of the prisoners. Among the Italians, mainly Sicilians whom we interrogated, we found a thorough and genuine hatred for the Germans. Part of this may be assumed, was put on in order to bring some favor with us because the men were prisoners, but the sincerity of it in many cases could not be doubted. The Italians claim that the Germans had planted mine fields behind their coastal defense areas and before the secondary defense areas which the Germans manned. The Italians were not advised of the paths through these mine fields and many Italians were lost in attempting to retreat from the coastal defense areas because they didn't know where the mine fields were. The Italians also said that the German troops who came into their cities were gruff, were unfriendly and supercilious. As a consequence the population by and large disliked them thoroughly, and as one prisoner expressed it, after dark whenever people could they threw rocks at the Germans.

On the Natale de Roma, the birthday of the Fascist party, the 21st of April, we were told that on this festival the natives of Gela, the inhabitants of Gela made it a point wherever possible to get out in the country, to pack whatever kind of lunches they could get together and get out of the city so that they would not be compelled to give the Fascist salute and contribute to the Fascist party on this particular anniversary. The prisoners frequently uttered im-  
plications against Mussolini, claiming to dislike him thoroughly and



pointed out that Sicily being an island people had no great interest in Mussolini's dreams of colonial empire and to them the Italian expansion only represented loss of lives of their loved ones, where they would have preferred to stay in their native lands on their native soil and live in a peaceful quiet way. The welcome accorded so many Americans in Sicily is probably due to the fact that Sicily has provided a great source of immigration for Americans of Italian descent in this country and it seemed that hardly any Sicilian family did not have at least one or two relatives living in America.

In contrast, the German prisoners were unfriendly, for the most part proud and in many cases actually haughty in their demeanor. When questioned as to the conditions at home they said that the conditions were very good. And when asked if they believed that Germany might collapse internally as she did in the last war due to American attack, they rather sneeringly pointed to the fact that Germany controlled Holland, Denmark, Norway, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Albania, and a large part of Russia. In consequence they considered that their part of the war was well won, whereas we had only conquered a part of North Africa and made landings on one island in the Mediterranean at that time and so they felt that we had no right to talk about an impending allied victory, that Germany had already won her victory and it was only a case now of holding on to what she already had. It was a proud attitude and one the truth of which can only be ascertained by events that are happening and will continue to happen.

Lieutenant Porter:

Lt. Walliser, what was your particular job in this operation?

Lieutenant Walliser:

I was the senior deck officer and during debarkation stood watches with the navigator of the ship, as senior OD six hours on and six hours off.

APPENDIX J

Interview with Frank Cankar, Lieut. (jg) USCGR

(Questions by L. Thompson, Lieut. USNR)

This recording of an interview with Lieutenant (jg) Frank Cankar, U. S. Coast Guard was made at Headquarters Eastern Sea Frontier, November 2, 1943. Lieutenant Cankar was assigned to Headquarters Eastern Sea Frontier for many months in 1942; then was given orders which took him to North Africa as Executive Officer aboard a landing barge and was a part of the Sicilian invasion.

Lieutenant Cankar, when you left here how did you get your orders which sent you across?

I got them by dispatch from Washington.

And where did they tell you to go? How did you get your preliminary training?

Well, I was to proceed to Houston, Texas, via commercial airplane, and to report there within 46 hours of receipt of my orders.

What kind of training did you get in Texas?

At Houston we had no training whatsoever. We put the ship in commission and two days after commissioning left for Galveston, Texas, where we stayed about a month going through a period of training which was really an experiment because no one seemed to know anything about these boats before that time. They were an innovation and I don't think they had any background of experience at the time that we took them over.

What kind of boats were they, Mr. Cankar?

They were LCI(L) which translated means "Landing Craft Infantry (Large.)" They're 153 feet long and carry a crew of from 21 to 25 and from three to four officers and are capable of carrying about 188 men. That is—sleeping them. They can actually carry as many as five or six hundred if necessary if they don't have to berth them. As a matter of fact, after the Sicilian invasion one ship brought back, as I understand it, some 750 prisoners.

Did you cross the Atlantic in one of these landing barges?

Yes we did. After we left Galveston—we left Galveston, incidentally, on March 1st—we proceeded to Key West, Florida, across the Gulf of Mexico—that was a five day trip. From there we went to Norfolk, Virginia, another five day trip and stayed there from about March 11th to April 1st, at which time we proceeded to Bermuda.

Incidentally on the run from Galveston to Key West we had some rather bad weather and inasmuch as a good percentage of the men were green (having had no sea experience whatsoever) we had a great deal of seasickness and some actual illness. On our way from Key West to Norfolk, one of the men fell over backwards from the conning station and suffered a very severe head injury.

How long did it take to cross from Bermuda?

It took us about—well it took us sixteen days and we made a landfall at Port Lyautey which is about 75 miles to the north of Casablanca.

How many LCI's were there in the convoy?

I'm not exactly sure how many there were. There were approximately 48.

How much escort protection did you have?

The entire convoy consisted actually of about 90 ships of which I believe there were some 8 to 10 escort vessels. I'm not too sure of the exact number now.

I should think that must have been one of the largest convoys to cross to Gibraltar at that date. Do you know how it stacked up—?

No I don't. As a matter of fact, outside of our own convoy, I don't think anyone knows very much about any other convoy. Although I do know that it was one of the larger ones.

How long were you in North Africa before the Sicilian invasion?

Well you see we were at Port Lyautey for about two weeks of training in the surf which runs pretty heavy and really gives you a good background of experience for handling ships on the beaches but from Port Lyautey we went to Gibraltar, spent the night there and then went into a little town near Oran called Arzew. From whence we went to different towns around Oran such as Beni Saf and Nemours. Then we went back to Arzew and on June 1st we left for Bizerte arriving there five days later.

How much advance warning did you have that you were going to participate in the Sicilian invasion?

Actual warning, we probably had about six days when we began getting our orders, our secret charts and aerial photographs. But there was little doubt in the minds of most of us after we arrived at Bizerte as to what we were going to attack.

Did you have a good deal of training in terms of the final action? Did you know for instance exactly what group you were going to join many days before the invasion?



Yes. You see each ship was given a designated color. For example a blue color, green color or a red color and that indicated the beach on which you were to land. We made a complete practice with the ships of our own particular blue beach, oh, some two weeks before the actual invasion. As a matter of fact we made a run almost all the way to Tunis—to the Bay there—and came all the way back again completely loaded with troops. It could have been an actual invasion. As a matter of fact some of us thought it was. The only hitch in the whole plan was the fact that we didn't have as much ammunition as most of us thought would be necessary in an invasion and as it turned out it was nothing but a dry run.

How long were you aboard your ship after you had left for the actual invasion before you landed?

We left Bizerte on the morning of July 6th and made a run to Sousse which is to the south of Tunis. We arrived there on the night of the 6th and went into the city on the day of the 7th—that is into Sousse—and that afternoon got final absolution and that night we went out in the Bay and on the 8th we spent the entire day swimming and making various plans and discussing our proposed invasion. Of course by that time we were very definite that we were going there and all the soldiers also knew inasmuch as they had been handed then the "Soldiers' Guide to Sicily." We left Sousse on the night of the 8th and made a rendezvous point off of Malta and then headed due north on the 14th meridian, which ends up across Sicily about four miles to the east of Licata.

Did you have any sense of the size of the invasion fleet? You couldn't have seen very many of them because they would have been over the horizon on each side of you I suppose. Did it seem like an enormous fleet?

Well we were on the starboard flank of our group—more to the starboard I should say than we were to the port—and we all knew just about how many ships were in our group which was tremendous but as far as the actual size of it, you couldn't tell. But you could sense it was enormous and you could see these cruisers dashing back and forth every so often. Of course on that last day, that is, the day of the 9th, we had one of the worst seas we had had on any day since we left Galveston some three months before. Most of the soldiers were quite sea sick and a lot of our men were also; but our men had learned how to control themselves pretty well. But at times you could see sky under one-third of our LCI.

That's pretty hard. How long did it take you to complete the final run?

We arrived off of our point of attack about 2330 that night and fortunately the seas had died down a great deal. We were in the lee of the land at the time but we had to hang around about three hours while the Italian search light tried to pick us up. "H" hour was at 0245 and the bombardment started about that time from our own cruisers and other ships off, oh, some eight miles. I'm not sure about that distance.



Were the cruisers back of you so that the shells went over; so that you could hear them?

Yes, that's right.

And did the sound seem to build up or was it a steady action in that bombardment?

Well I would say that it was more or less steady and you could see the fire works on the beach; but I don't think the Italians had anything that was too huge to fire back with. As a matter of fact, if I recall the aerial photographs, there was a big gun emplacement some twelve miles inland but I don't think that that could have affected us very much. And if I recall correctly we weren't bothered by it at all. Possibly our own paratroopers or our own artillery, naval artillery, had already blasted that one out.

How did the soldiers behave during that period of waiting when they had to stand by for the bombardment?

That's rather a difficult question to answer because every case is different. Now some of the men were quite nervous and others were very calm. But I think, generally speaking, you might say that they were all thinking about whether or not they were going to be the boy that was going to get it next. And I know talking to some people (I won't mention rank or name) who had been in the battle at Fedala and were quite certain that they were going to get it that time; yet were very calm about it. All in all I would say that you can't make a general conclusion. You have to take the condition of the men. Our group happened to be composed of men who were in the battle of Fedala and quite a large number of new boys. And I think the new boys were probably the ones who were more nervous although the older fellows knowing what they were getting into weren't too happy about it. But there were very few of them that were shirking their duty, that is trying to hide. There were only a few that I had to shoo back who were trying to sit down inside the bulkhead and as far as panic—I think there was only one.

When you finally started in, how did you get your orders? What gave you your orders to start into shore?

We knew the exact time we were to start which happened to be "H" plus 75. You just go in automatically. You know where your point is and you should be off it some hours before as we were. It is all done on a time basis. You don't get any orders over the phone or anything else. You just do it, hoping that every one else is going in with you. And as we went in, we noticed all the little Higgins boats coming out from their initial run so we knew that we were right on time.

Then you were among the first to land?

No, the Higgins boats always go in first.

7.  
And they are from the larger transports?

That's right; that's correct.

You couldn't tell that the Higgins boats had gone in until you started your run in?

That's right. They evidently were off to one side of us and they didn't go by us at any time.

The seas had moderated enough so that the Higgins boats didn't have any trouble as you saw them?

As I saw them, they didn't. However, they evidently had had some trouble because when we came in we lost one of our ramps immediately from the surf and the other ramp, no sooner did we have it down than about six men--sailors--tried to come up that lone remaining ramp, they having lost their own boats. Now how they lost them I don't know. I don't recall whether or not they said they were blown up or they had been turned over in the surf because at that time I had been hit myself.

As you came in, how near in did you get before you noticed any shore gun fire?

We probably were only a few hundred yards off the beach at that time. We noticed gun fire going on but before we were aware of the fact that we were in it, it was only a few hundred yards and unfortunately we dropped our anchor too quickly and backed out all the way again on the winch. Picking up our anchor and coming in again so that we could make our landing. You see if you drop your anchor too quickly, you pay out all your anchor cable and you lose your length; that is, your distance to get into the beach and you're out there at the end of the cable and still you're not on land. There are one or two things you can do. You can (which I think we should have done at the time) cut the cable and have gone in and then hope to back the ship off with power rather than pull it off with the anchor. That way we lost a little time. But that's one of the things you learn about after you have been in one.

When the ramp went down how did the men disembark?

Well at that time we had a little trouble. The problem there was that the six boys tried to come up while the other men were trying to get off. But, first, let me tell you. We had two burros aboard for the purpose of carrying ammunition to the shore. The only way we could get these burros off (inasmuch as they were awfully frightened and we had a practice with them) was to tie them on the ramp and then pull the ramp out and drop the ramp--that causing the burros to be on an incline--then cut the line and let the burros fall into the water. That was the only way we could do it and we did get the burros off before the six sailors, or five sailors, tried to come up the ramp. We had a little traffic problem there and I finally got them off the ramp by telling them I would have to bump them off or shoot them if they didn't get off.

These were the six men that tried to come back aboard.

Not back aboard, They weren't our own men.

Right.

Now all of this particular part is a little confusing to me because it all happened so rapidly that I don't remember exactly what I said to the men or what they said back to me. Probably wasn't very complimentary either way.

Your assignment as exec aboard that ship was to handle at that stage the disembarking of the troops--that was your primary assignment?

Yes, that's right. We had four officers on our ship. The Executive Officer stayed forward and handled the disembarkation and the ramps. The Skipper stayed up in the conning station, the Engineering Officer stayed below in the Engine Room and the Watch Officer stayed aft and handled the anchor.

You had a certain amount of armament. You had machine guns aboard?

No, we didn't have any machine guns. We had four 20-mm AA guns.

Did you make any use of them?

No, we were under orders not to fire.

You were asked not to give away your position, was that the purpose of not firing--or was it not necessary?

In a case like that I'm not sure. I don't think that was ever decided. There was a great deal of discussion as to the merits or demerits of not firing and although we had orders not to, I think that in some cases it would have been a good idea if we could have when we hit the beach and we did see an enemy position we might have at least distracted him enough so that he couldn't have done as much damage as he did. However, the powers that be evidently had a definite reason for it--as they do in an air raid when we don't fire because that gives our position away.

Did the searchlights on the beach pick up your own ship before you put your ramp down?

No they didn't. And of course we landed just at dawn so that you can pick out a silhouette very easily.

It was pretty light, so that as you got ashore you could see how wide the beachhead was?

Yes, fairly well--and of course we had it all memorized anyway.

And how long did it take for the complete disembarking of the troops from your own ship?

Well, I'm no authority on that because I was hit before the last man got off. But I would say it wasn't much more than 20 minutes from the time we landed until we were off. And that is very slow because the ship made one at Salerno. Of course, it only had 54 men on then and I wasn't aboard, but the Exec tells me that they landed and disembarked the troops in about 4 minutes.

How long after the ramp had gone down was it before you were hit?

Well, after I got through getting these six boys or five boys straightened out, I'm not sure which it was—five or six—why I noticed this fellow lying down and kicking and screaming down by the Number Two booby hatch (which is just forward of the conning station). I took my earphones off and turned them over to my Gunner's Mate and went back to this fellow, got back there, looked him over and discovered there wasn't anything wrong with him. So I yelled over to one of the Army Lieutenants, "What do you want to do with this guy?" and he yelled back "Leave the bastard lay there." I was just in the process of doing that to this particular individual when I got hit. The strange part about it was that I still had his head in the crook of my left arm and he didn't have a helmet on, yet he didn't get hurt at all whereas I got it five times.

You haven't spoken about any shells landing near you before that shell that got you. Did you notice any fire, any splashes near your ship before that?

Yes. I noticed there was some ammunition being expended from the beach and it was coming at us from the starboard hand. There was some machine gun fire and I could also see the millimeter stuff. Now what it was, whether it was 40-mm. or 47, I don't know, but it was in that category. I felt just like someone who was at a tennis match watching it come over from the starboard and then watching it cross the ship to the port. It was quite interesting. Of course it looked like someone was throwing a red ball of fire across when tracers went over. But you're pretty busy; you don't have time to do too much thinking on it.

And then, when you were hit, did you have any idea that you were seriously wounded?

Not at the moment. Your first reaction outside of a good exhibition of vulgarity is to go to the side of the ship where there isn't any firing. When I did get there I sat down, thinking I had been hit by concussion. One of my men told me the first thing I said was that "The bastards have got me." After I sat there for awhile I noticed that there was a pool of blood so I thought I better lie down and one of my Chiefs got a crash basket.



Where were you hit?

I was hit twice in the left leg, twice in the left shoulder, and once in the left chest just below the arm pit. I also had a punctured left lung.

And then you don't have much memory of what happened, until when?

Oh no. I have a complete memory of the thing because of the fact that I never lost consciousness. Matter of fact, I remember telling one of our men what to do as far as fixing me up and giving me a morphine shot. Why I didn't pass out I don't know; but I think I was probably shocked so much that I didn't. It was about 20 minutes before I got inside the ship--and strangely enough with the practice we had had we never figured out how you could get a fellow (once he was in a crash basket) inside the superstructure of the ship. There just isn't any way of making the corners; the passage ways are too narrow. As a final expedient, there is a door leading from the outside of the ship right into the crew's head with the three toilet seats. I laid on top of those with the crash basket. I was very happy then that we had always made sure that the toilets were very clean.

Then how long did it take to make the run back?

Well, there is a little incident involved there. I was transferred to a second ship on which we had a little operating room and Lieutenant Commander Gentile of the U. S. Public Health Service--who, incidentally, is an awfully good surgeon. When I got over on this other ship, why to give you an idea of how little you feel when you get hit (I mean there isn't any pain at the time or the pain is so great that you don't feel it anyway; I don't know which), he told me that he'd have to sew me up a bit and he put a stitch or two in my left side without my even knowing that he had done the job. Then just about that time the engines on that ship broke down and I was transferred to a third ship and 24 hours later I landed in Bizerte.

There began a lot of confusion, in my opinion. I was taken over to the Naval Dispensary at Bizerte and after being interrogated about 20 minutes on the floor in this crash basket they decided that they couldn't do anything for me and put me in another one of these ambulances--meat wagons, as we called them--and I was taken to an evacuation hospital, the 56th, where I received very good treatment.

What did they mean--when they said they couldn't do anything for you? They didn't have the equipment there?

I believe that was probably it. Why they took me over there in the first place I don't know.

Were there quite a few others in the same circumstance?

No. As a matter of fact, from what I was told, I must have been the first Sicilian invasion patient back in Bizerte. I know I was the first one at the hospital anyway. I was there about five days and they had drawn out some 150 cc. of blood, which is about a pint, from my lung which had been collapsed. Then I was taken by ambulance to Mateur and flown from Mateur to Telergma Air Field which is near Constantine and taken to the 61st Station Hospital where I stayed for some ten days before being transferred to the 26th General.

What was the overall length of time before you were sewed up?

You mean from the time I got hit?

From the time you got hit.

It must have been, oh, probably half an hour to 40 minutes.

Then how long were you in the hospital, recovering?

A total of ten weeks to the day. During that time I had had three operations and had had four aspirations--which means they take this big needle and jab it in your back into your lung cavity and draw out blood. I think they took out about five pints altogether.

Then while you were in the hospital, there were others who were brought in from the same operation?

Oh yes. As a matter of fact, it was rather strange. Just about at the time I was getting around, so that I could walk, I walked over to one of the tents and discovered that one of the Army officers we had taken across to Sicily was a patient there. He had been in the fight from July 10th to August 4th. On his way up a hill to do reconnaissance a mortar shell lobbed over the hill and broke both of his legs right below the thigh. He had a hole which was big enough to put your fist in right above his left knee. Talk about the stink of human flesh, well that's about the best example I've had of it or smelled of it.

When they finally had you all patched up how much shrapnel did they leave in you?

Well, as I understand it, I have one left in my leg, and one in my lung they tell me. There are various numbers of small pieces in my lung but they are so minute you can barely see them.

Do you get any reaction from them now?

Yes I do. It's not anything to hinder my moving about, but it makes me tired. However, I'll soon be in good shape again.

How did you finally get back to the United States?

Well, when I was discharged from the hospital being the only Coast Guard or Navy patient there, they didn't know exactly what to do with me. So a Lieutenant Colonel who was in charge of the Airfield (but who was in the hospital at the same time I was) arranged it so that I got a B-17 plane ride from Constantine to Tunis and then from Tunis I hitch-hiked to Bizerte and was there a week when I got orders to return back to the States. Bizerte being our Flotilla Headquarters. From Bizerte I boarded a C-47 two engine transport plane and in that first day (which was on Tuesday, September 27,) went from Bizerte to Constantine to Algiers, then across the northwestern tip of Africa to Marrakech which is near Casablanca and is the home of one of the more or less well known and fabulous pashas. We stayed there over night and incidentally on this trip I met a man--my introduction was a pack of cigarettes. He happened to be a French officer who (after talking with him for awhile) I discovered was a Colonel, and I believe he said had charge of the Air Forces in the French African Army. He was a very interesting fellow and after we talked for awhile I asked him why they resisted us when we made our initial landings in Africa. He said "Well, it was just one of those things. It was regrettable but necessary." I gathered that he was trying to convey the impression he was saving face. A very fine man and thought a great deal of the Americans.

What kind of plane brought you back to the United States?

Well, different types of planes. From Marrakech I went to Rufisque which is near Dakar. It was a flight over the Sahara Desert and that was another C-47 plane I believe. There we had a little trouble. We lost one of our engines. That is, the engine had to be shut off due to lack of oil, I wasn't sure that we were going to make it. We had a lot of fellows on board who were pilots and who had completed all their 50 missions and were coming back. They were a little afraid not any more than I was, however, that they were going to lose their lives after they had gone through all this death and danger stuff over Naples. They felt that it was kind of sad they might not make it after coming that far. But we finally landed and we stayed in Dakar for about three days (or in Rufisque which is near there) and left there in a C-87, which is a converted B-24 job, and landed in Natal, Brazil, ten hours later.

How did you get up here?

From there we went in a C-46 type plane going from Natal to Belem which is also in Brazil on a Sunday. It took us about five hours. Belem is a very interesting place, well developed for an air field and will probably be used when the war is over on the basis of the permanency of their installations. From Belem we left very early on a Monday morning, five o'clock as a matter of fact. From Belem we went to Atkinson Field which is in British Guinea near Georgetown. From Atkinson Field we went to Trinidad, thence to Puerto Rivo. Borinquen Field to Miami arriving in Miami that same night about 11 o'clock.

From the time you left the hospital until you got to Miami what is your overall period? How long did it take you?

After I left the hospital I went back as you know to Bizerte and stayed there a week but I left the hospital on September 18th and arrived in Miami on October 3rd.

We're glad to have you back here, Frank, and all we ask now is that the Coast Guard reassign you to Headquarters Eastern Sea Frontier.

Well thank you, Larry, and I hope I'll have the pleasure of working with you once again.



## APPENDIX K

### Official ACTION REPORT of Salerno

By Captain R. J. Mauerman, USCG,  
Commanding Officer of the USS JOSEPH T. DICKMAN,  
to the Commander of Task Force 81.

This vessel landed assault troops of 2nd Battalion Combat Team, 142nd Infantry, 56th Division, U. S. Army and attached units, on Green beach, Salerno Bay, Italy, on the morning of 9 September, 1943, in accordance with reference orders, total of 81 officers and 1,623 enlisted men.

Weather conditions for this operation were excellent for lowering boats, ease of holding boats alongside, and little seasickness occurred among troops on the trip from ship to beach.

This vessel followed ships ahead into the transport area. The submarine beacon HMS SHAKESPEARE was passed at 2333 of the 8th, at the departure point. Stopped and drifted at 0002, of the 9th, in designated transport area. An LCS(S) boat with scout officer was lowered in the water at 0020 and departed for shore to locate Green beach. The beach was found and marked as planned without difficulty. The lowering of boats commenced at 0015 and was completed at 0115, with the exception of two boats in #1 starboard davit (upper and lower inside cradles) that were damaged and wedged in by the strong-back that fell across the upper boat when the after davit arm dropped down due to the wire cable breaking....This davit was repaired and in working order prior to 1660, on D plus 1 day. Boat teams that should have been rail loaded in these two boats were expeditiously loaded at the White net and arrived in the rendezvous area in time to go in with their wave. The third rail loading boat at #2 davit port side was delayed due to the cable becoming jammed on the drum. The boat team was loaded at Yellow net port side. No delay at rendezvous area was caused by this boat. Twenty-one LCVP's and two DUKW's were pre-loaded with boat team equipment and rail loaded with troops; eleven LCVP's were pre-loaded with equipment and net loaded with personnel.

The primary control vessel, PC-625, led the first three waves of boats from the rendezvous area, passed the restricted area marker boat PC-542, and proceeded on to the line of departure. All boats landed on the correct beach in excellent line and well spaced, but were ten minutes late in the scheduled time; this delay was due to the primary control boat being held up behind the minesweepers. When the ramps of the first wave were lowered and troops crossed the beach, heavy machine-gun and HE shell fire were encountered.

The quick action on the part of the DICKMAN's LCS(S) scout beach marker boat in firing a barrage of 34 rockets caused a decided lull in the enemy's fire and drew fire on the boat itself. It is believed that this factor contributed much to the safe landing and retraction of all boats in the assault waves.

The secondary control boat PC-624 departed from the rendezvous area on time with the fourth wave, but for some unknown reason delayed going into the line of departure, sufficiently to make this wave one hour and fifty minutes late in scheduled time. When this wave retracted and while proceeding away from the beach a medium calibre HE shell struck the starboard side of the ramp of a DICKMAN's LCM(3) and exploded. Three of the boat's crew were wounded. The boat returned to the DICKMAN but could not be used for the remainder of the operation. A total of seven members of the crews were wounded. Troops apparently suffered fairly heavy casualties while crossing the beach.

The later waves of boats carrying vehicles were not allowed to land immediately on the beaches by the beach-masters, because of machine-gun and artillery fire. As a result, there was much congestion outside the line of departure by boats from all the transports. The support boats acted as traffic boats and when the beaches became tenable directed the boats to the proper beaches. A faster and larger boat about the size of an SC-boat would be better adapted for traffic control boats.

Unloading of vehicles and cargo proceeded expeditiously on D-day and D plus 1 day. All unloading was completed by 1600 of D plus 1 day. Much of the unloading from boats was done by boats' crews. Thirty Army men from the Port Battalion were sent to the beach prior to noon on the 10th. The unloading on the beaches seemed to be held up principally by the continuous shelling of the beaches from artillery well hidden in the hills behind the beaches.

Three enemy bombers made an attack in the area at 0743 on the 9th, and at 2140 enemy bombers made an attack in the area, but due to the heavy smoke screen made by all the vessels and boats no bombs fell in our vicinity. At 0445 on the 10th, enemy planes attacked in the vicinity and smoke screen was laid by ships. From 2240 to 2312 on the night of the 10th, as transports were preparing to depart, a large formation of enemy bombers lighted up the transport area with varied-colored flares that apparently marked the limits of the area. The transports were subjected to heavy bombing. Apparently no vessels were hit. One bomb fell 600 yards astern of the DICKMAN. All vessels delivered a heavy barrage of anti-aircraft gunfire. Fire discipline on the DICKMAN was good. During this operation friendly fighter protection of the area was excellent. The DICKMAN's support boats patrolling the beach area fired at enemy planes over the beach, but there were no indications that any hits were made.

Three LCVP's and four LCM(3)'s from the OBERON, two LCM(3)'s from the PROCYON, and eight LCM(2)'s from the HMS DERWENTDALE, arrived alongside on time and were used to carry priority vehicles into the beach, consisting of the 6th, 7th, and 8th waves. All were dispatched on scheduled time. All boats from other ships worked smoothly and without interruption.

The officers and crew worked tirelessly throughout the operation and their devotion to duty was outstanding.

During this operation two signalmen from this vessel were temporarily attached to HMS BOXER and one commissioned officer served as liaison officer aboard the HMS DERWENTDALE.

On the return passage at 0135 on the 11th, a violent explosion was observed off the starboard beam, distance about 10 miles, that appeared to be a ship exploding.

/s/ R. J. MAUERMAN

## APPENDIX L

### LANDING CRAFT TECHNIQUE

At Anzio and Salerno the landing boats pounded back and forth through the heavy surf between the ships and beachhead bringing in the supplies that enabled the troops to hold their ground against the furious German counter-attacks.

The small craft became a familiar part of operations against the enemy in every theatre of war. Yet, still so new was this specialized branch of seamanship that the expert coxswains who operated the Higgins type landing craft were unable to give a clear discourse on the secrets of their trade. "I can't describe exactly how I run my landing craft. It's all in the feel of the thing," they usually said.

The boat coxswains aboard were good because they had a great personal feeling for their craft. They beefed continually about the dangers of their rugged naval assignment—amphibious warfare—but few of them would ever exchange their duty for a shore billet. Assault coxswains, some of them rated only as seaman second class, were skippers of their own boats, — boats which cost the Government approximately \$21,000. This independence and real sense of importance was what they liked.

One had to ride with an experienced coxswain and watch him at work to realize how much there was to this "sixth sense" technique. As the cargo net was lowered over the ship's side or as troops came aboard, it was his responsibility to keep his craft directly under the net. In smooth water this was fairly easy but in a heavy sea a boatman had a job on his hands keeping his bobbing craft in one position. He had to consider the placement of his load. If the loaded craft was too heavy forward he would not be able to ride onto the beach, and consequently his troops or supplies would get soaked in debarking.

In the midst of all this there were apt to be other distractions. At Sicily, after H-hour when the landing craft were loading alongside this transport, they were caught by sneak air raids. Boat coxswains lay helplessly in their craft as they watched the Germans lay a string of six bombs along their starboard quarter, missing them by only fifty yards. The men couldn't maneuver their boats, which was the advantage of a small craft under air attack, because they were in the process of loading. One boat, run by Philip B. Kearney, was tossed several feet into the air by the explosions. But all the boats came through with nothing more serious than a thorough drenching.

Before leaving his transport for a beach landing, a coxswain was as carefully briefed about his part in the operation, as a flier setting out to bomb Berlin. Army and Naval officers handed out intelligence sheets describing every detail of the beach, its grade, and hazards lying in approaching waters. Each boat was designated to a particular position in a certain wave of the assault. Coxswains were given sign



boards with their position and wave number painted on them. This was their number plate for the boat traffic officer.

The coxswain's next job was to proceed to the rendezvous area of his wave. Here practical navigation and knowledge of the stars came in, particularly when operating at night. A good man had an uncanny way of finding his group quickly. And once he had located it he had to stay in position. An invasion rendezvous area was no place for a person to assert his independence and play lone wolf, for one boat in the wrong slot in a split-second operation would throw everyone into confusion.

Handling these box-like scows in heavy sea called for real skill. Soldiers riding into the beach realized this better than anyone else. A skilled boatman always watched ahead and avoided hitting a wave too squarely, so that his already shivering troops wouldn't get any wetter than necessary. He aimed to keep his boat trimmed, arranging his load so that the craft traveled on an even keel. Trimming helped cut down violent rocking, which in turn reduced seasickness among the soldiers.

After they reached the rendezvous area just off the beach where their troops and cargo were designated, boatmen circled around anxiously--- waiting for the control officer's signal to "hit the beach." When word was given, the coxswains fanned out. They sped up their engines and moved into line for the assault just as trotting horse drivers start a race, all jockeying around so that they would hit the starting line together. These men, all on the same team but from different transports, had great competitive spirit among them. Each transport thought it had the best small boatmen. In practice men watched each other closely to see how the other coxswains made the landing.

They also had to be alert in picking their landing point. In combat smart judgment on a coxswain's part meant everything. At Salerno, however, one man, Calvin R. Cooper, had an experience which showed that ingenuity sometimes meant nothing. As he stood off shore ready to make his run in, a terrific explosion went off on the beach. He thought it was a land mine and therefore a landing there would be the safest place to debark his troops. Just as his ramp was lowered on the beach, he found himself facing a German 88 pillbox only one hundred yards away. Luckily it had been deserted except for three snipers who promptly opened up on them. Bullets commenced to whistle over their heads. "And they didn't sound the way they do in the movies, either," Cooper said. The boat crew went to work on the snipers with their 30 calibre machine guns. In the skirmish which lasted about ten minutes only one soldier was killed and two wounded.

Hitting the beach was the coxswains' crucial moment. There were all kinds of things he could do wrong. If he gunned his boat too fast, he would beach it so high and dry that he could not back off under his own power after his troops had been unloaded. He then had to wait for a salvage boat to pull him off, and in the meantime he was preventing another boat from landing there.

The most common danger in making a landing was broaching; that is, allowing a boat to swing broadside to the waves. In a heavy surf a broached craft smashed to bits in short order. Less experienced coxswains were continually getting themselves in this predicament. Men sometimes broached because, after unloading they started to turn around before they have backed into water deep enough to be clear of all sandbars and surf. When a beach was "hot" some coxswains became too anxious to swing around and head back to the transport anchorage area. When half turned around they found themselves in an awkward position, hung up on another submerged bar just off the beach.

One group of men will never forget the dangers of a broached craft. They were the crew of a converted salvage boat from the Coast Guard transport which salvaged ninety-six broached boats from the Gela, Sicily beachhead. In the first 48 hours this crew of five enlisted men saved approximately \$1,000,000 worth of equipment and cleared yards of congested beach for future landings, while under constant air attack.

Some boat coxswains, on the other hand, were too cautious. When a man brought in his craft too slowly, he lost his momentum as he churned through the sand. In that case he often stalled, perhaps fifty feet from shore. In action a coxswain could not back off and try again, so his troops and cargo had to be dumped off into the water.

Most of the coxswains and their crews were superb. They had been through three invasions and had lost but five boats. They lost no crew member in their last two operations at Sicily and Salerno. They have got the feel of it."

In smooth water the trained boatman did not race his engine full speed ahead as he neared the beach. (This was called "cowboying!") Instead he sized up the surf and timed his approach so that his craft would be pushed along by perhaps an extra large breaker. The idea was to ride in with the surf board rider. When he felt his bow go aground he sped his engine slightly, pushing ahead only as far as the craft would go easily. It was at this moment that crew teamwork entered. The bowman knew just when to throw the forward hooks, so that the ramp was lowered the second the craft comes to a stop. If the ramp was dropped while still moving forward, it would bury itself in the sand, bringing the boat to a premature stop before reaching dry land. Or the craft might even swamp if the ramp were lowered too soon.

In rough water landing craft technique was slightly different. It was much harder, for instance, for an assault wave to stick to any set formation when approaching the beach. Each coxswain was left more to his own discretion where and how he landed his boat. In heavy surf it was more difficult to judge the proper speed at which to land. A coxswain had to travel fast enough so that his bow would be lifted above the breakers. On the other hand, too much speed plus the extra boost given by heavy surf was apt to beach a craft high and dry.

After hitting the beach the coxswain left his engine in forward gear to keep his craft firmly lodged. He stood at the wheel during unloading, keeping his rudder amidship. This helped to prevent the stern from swinging either way as glancing waves hit it on the quarter. Keeping his beached craft always at right angles to incoming surf was how a coxswain avoided broaching.

Mastery of all these fine points in small-boat handling paid off at H-hour. Every man knew that one broach or a slip up in the loading process would greatly slow up the naval shuttle service from ship to shore. Time was the determining element in the success or failure of the amphibious operations.

At Salerno in a period of 25 hours, Coast Guardsman Leonard W. Ruehle, and his crew made 18 trips to the beach with Army vehicles and equipment in a tank lighter. Another fast performing boat during the Italian invasion was one run by Eugene C. Arndt, and George E. Betz, who carried fourteen loads of troops and ammunition ashore. Men who turned out combat records such as these were invaluable to the Allied Command.

APPENDIX M

REPORT OF CONVOY FSS1

1. The convoy, consisting of the following ships, departed Bizerte according to schedule, commencing at 1230, 4 September: DD BLANKNEY, SCs 508, 498, 676, 666, 639; YMS 43; LCIs 87, 319, 324, 349; RESOLUTE, INTENT (towing oil barge), YTs 165, 197, 186, 210; LCTs 218, 216, 209, 25, 20, 415, 200, 201, 33, 32, 30, 290, 413, 27, 35, 34, 125, 340, 29, 221, 152, 211, 342, 550, 624, 584, 578, 552, 15, 364, 195, 219, 244, 277; LCFs 3, 5, 8; LCGs 1, 5, 20, 6, 7; LCR 141, and two LCNs towed by YTs 197 and 210. The only interruption encountered during the departure was when a hospital ship insisted on breaking through the convoy; however, all vessels departed according to schedule and the convoy cruising disposition was formed at approximately 1615.

2. During the first night strong northwesterly winds were encountered which necessitated slowing the convoy to four knots and allowing for about ten degrees leeway going through the swept channel. The following day the convoy continued on expected courses arriving at scheduled points on time. During the night of 5 September, it was necessary to make three course changes during the dark of the moon. A northerly breeze sprang up which accelerated the expected speed of the convoy so that during a squall at the time of a change of course certain units became separated from the convoy as follows: LCTs 244, 125, 584, 364, 195, 624; LCGs 6, 7; LCFs 5, 8; YT 186; INTENT (with oil barge) and RESOLUTE.

3. The rest of the convoy arrived at Castellammare Bay at daylight and found conditions very unsatisfactory due to a strong northerly breeze which was blowing directly into the bay, and a ground swell in the anchor area which was exceedingly high making fueling at this point impossible. The YMS 43 reported that she had struck a submerged object during the night causing a hole in her hull and that immediate repairs should be effected. This vessel was ordered to Palermo to effect necessary repairs and return to the convoy. The Destroyer BLANKNEY and two SCs were dispatched to round-up the stragglers. It was decided that the convoy would probably fuel better at sea away from the ground swell, and perhaps, if necessary, find a lee off Palermo where fueling could be done throughout the night. For this reason the convoy got underway at 0800 and steamed out to sea. At the entrance of Castellammare Bay, the tug INTENT with the oil barge and the YT-186 joined the convoy reporting that the tow line had parted during the night and the Destroyer BLANKNEY reported that other vessels of the convoy were in Carini Bay. At 1230 the YMS-34 arrived with the oil tanker EMPIRE FAY and since it was necessary to fuel as soon as possible, and as the wind had started to abate, it was decided that the long trip back into Castellammare Bay would take too much time before fueling could be commenced and that an anchorage in Carini Bay from which the stragglers had just come would be more logical. The convoy therefore put into Carini Bay with the YMS-34 making a sweep ahead. Fueling commenced at 1545. At 2000 all LCTs had been refueled, the LCGs, LCFs, and LCR stating they did not require refueling.

4. The LCT Group Commander reported at 1600 that the LCT-244 had encountered engine difficulties and had proceeded to Palermo. The



vessel previously thought to be the LCT-244 was actually an LCT sent from Palermo to pick up gravel. At 1900, the YMS-34 was despatched to Palermo to bring back the LCT-244 and if necessary make arrangements for a relief for the YMS-43. The LCTs 551 and 549, who had departed from Palermo, joined the convoy at Carini Bay.

5. The following morning the YMS-36 arrived from Palermo as relief for the YMS-43 and brought back the LCT-244. At 0600, 7 September, the convoy made preparations for getting underway. Arrangements were made for the YMS-34 to convoy the oil tanker EMPIRE FAY and the oil barge back to Palermo. At 0700, the convoy cruising disposition was formed and a course was set to intercept the convoy route. About one hour out of Carini Bay the LCT-216 developed engine trouble caused by water in the fuel which she had taken on from the oil tanker EMPIRE FAY, and in order to maintain the speed of the convoy the RESOLUTE was detailed to tow the LCT-216 until repairs could be effected. At 1100 she proceeded under her own power.

6. The vessels remained in good formation throughout the day and night and arrived at the position to detach the LCTs destined for the southern task force without incidence. At the time of the detachment, at approximately 1400, 8 September, the convoy was attacked by three enemy aircraft (probably JU-88's) who attacked the convoy from a high altitude. Two bombs fell near the BLANKNEY, one on each side, and two bombs fell on the starboard side of the LCI-87, one striking so close that it deluged the bridge with water, broke water pipes, light bulbs, fixtures, threw the mercury out of the gyro and broke spring mountings in it rendering that compass useless. The force knocked the Magnesyn Compass from the mast, threw the standard compass out of its bowl and in general left the ship in a dazed condition. However, no serious internal damage could be discovered other than a probably slight bent rudder which made steering more difficult than usual. It is believed that the bomb caused less serious damage than might have been expected inasmuch as it probably fell at an angle away from the ship so that its path in the water was away from the hull rather than towards it. The BLANKNEY signalled that she had made a call for help. The attack lasted only a few minutes. The YMS-36 and the LCTs 15, 364, 195, 219, 244, and 277 were detached and given their position and instructions as to course, destination, and time of arrival.

7. At 1630, the convoy was again attacked by enemy aircraft. Bombs were dropped at the rear of the convoy and one plane attempted to strafe the convoy from a low altitude - approximately seventy-five feet. A call for help was sent out and the planes departed. One bomb struck alongside the LCT-624 (British) apparently exploding under the hull, - breaking the vessels back and throwing a large amount of the cargo, consisting of gasoline tins, into the sea. The tug RESOLUTE pulled alongside and took off officers and crew, all of whom had survived the explosion without injury except for minor scratches. Shortly after the crew had been taken off, fire broke out forward and quickly spread aft, and within one-half hour the vessel had sunk. The BLANKNEY signalled that she would report the loss of LCT-624 by visual signal when she joined Convoy FSS2.

8. Sextant angles taken on the Isles of Capri and D'Ischia showed that the convoy passed one-half mile north of the turning point set for the approach disposition at 1800. A careful plot of sextant angle positions indicated there was a northerly set of approximately one-half knot an hour in this vicinity. At 1800 the destroyer BLANKNEY departed to join Convoy FSS2, and the convoy took up the approach disposition.

9. The LCT-25 was experiencing engine difficulties and the tugs RESOLUTE and INTENT were ordered to be ready to take her in tow if it became necessary. The two LCTs astern of her were ordered to take positions ahead.

10. At approximately 2015, a low flying bomber was seen proceeding in an easterly direction, approximately two hundred feet above the water, well on the beam of the convoy. Machine gun fire from an SC or PC in that vicinity was seen to bring the plane down. Only five tracer shots were noticed before the plane caught fire. At 2030, the two LCNs were detached and proceeded on ahead to carry out their mission of establishing navigational reference points for the Southern Attack Force. At 2100, the convoy had another attack by a single bomber whose bombs exploded on the starboard side of the LCI-87 at approximately seventy-five yards. At approximately 2200, another single bomber attacked the convoy and two heavy bombs fell approximately one hundred yards on the port beam of the LCI-87, one of them appeared to have delayed action as it exploded at an appreciable instant after the splash of the bomb was seen on the water.

11. At 0100, when just north of "QUEEN" reference vessel LCGs 6 and 7, and LCTs 549 and 551 were detached and ordered to proceed one-half mile north and await arrival of the Ranger Convoy.

12. The convoy arrived on time and the fourth wave of LCTs and Salvage Group arrived at reference vessel "LOVE" according to schedule. From this point on the control of the vessels under the command of the Convoy Commander ceased, and were taken over by each Wave Commander.

13. For future reference the following suggestions are made with regard to handling LCT convoys;

(1) The speed advance should be estimated at about four knots since, although these vessels can make six knots without any great difficulty, there is usually one among the large number who is having engine difficulties and cannot make the higher speed. A strong breeze from ahead will slow the convoy down to approximately three to four knots, and, if great care is not taken, the convoy will become separated.

(2) Communication is one of the great problems in handling this type of convoy, particularly where radio silence is mandatory. Improvement has been made with the installation of sets of flags aboard some of these vessels, but it is recommended that each vessel should have at least one complete set. Signals for course changes have to be

sent down the line by semaphore and as happened on one night several vessels did not receive the course changes for the night even though these signals had been sent out two hours prior to sun-set. In order to make sure that every vessel has received the signals, the convoy commander should swing around the convoy before dark and check the stern vessels of each column to see that night changes of course have been received. Changes of course at night present a great difficulty in handling this type of vessel, particularly where the crew is small and the usual care in standing watches is probably not as strictly carried out as are on larger vessels. It is noted that during the night vessels are apt to lag behind and in case of a squall they become separated from the convoy. If possible no changes of course at night should be made. In mixed convoys extracts from MERSIGS should be used rather than extracts from Auxiliary Signal Book as the British are not familiar with the latter, nor are they acquainted with the significance of our flags.

(3) It is further believed that convoy commanders should have radar installed on headquarters ships in order that they can keep good track of their charges. Dependence upon SCs and other escort craft to do this work does not seem to prove satisfactory as in the case of this convoy off the northwest tip of Sicily. The two SCs specifically charged with the duties of keeping the stragglers checked and notifying the convoy commander in case of any flagrant straggling proved to be of little assistance.

14. In general the Convoy Commander was very much pleased with the excellent cooperation shown by the LCT personnel. They did a remarkably fine piece of work in having the whole convoy, with the exception of the sunk LCT-624, arrive intact at the transport area after a rather trying experience with the weather and enemy bombers. It is felt that they deserve great credit for their determination to make the operation a success.

M. H. DMLAY  
Commander, U. S. Coast Guard.

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## SYMBOLS OF U. S. NAVY SHIPS

AB	Crane ship.
AD	Destroyer tender.
AE	Ammunition ship.
AF	Provision store ship.
AG	Miscellaneous auxiliary.
AGC	Combined operations communications headquarters ship.
AGP	Motor torpedo boat tender.
AGS	Surveying ship.
AH	Hospital ship.
AK	Cargo vessel
AKA	Cargo vessel, attack.
AKN	Net cargo ship.
AKS	General stores issue ship.
AKV	Aircraft supply ship.
AM	Large minesweeper.
AMB	Base minesweeper.
AMc	Coastal minesweeper.
AN	Net layer.
AO	Oiler.
AOG	Gasoline tanker.
AP	Transport.
APA	Transport, attack.
APc	Coastal transport.
APD	Troop transport (high speed).
APH	Transport for wounded.
APL	Hotel barge (barracks ship).
APM	Mechanized artillery transport.
APS	Auxiliary cargo submarine.
APV	Aircraft transport.
AR	Repair ship.
ARB	Repair ship, battle damage.
ARD	Floating drydock.
ARG	Internal combustion engine tender.
ARH	Heavy hull repair ship.
ARL	Repair ship, landing craft.
ARS	Salvage vessel.
ARV	Aircraft engine overhaul and structural repair ship.
AS	Submarine tender.
ASR	Submarine rescue vessel.
AT	Oceangoing tug.
ATR	Rescue tug.
AV	Seaplane tender (large).
AVC	Catapult lighter.
AVD	Seaplane tender (converted DD).
AVP	Seaplane tender (small).
AW	Water distilling and storage ship.
AY	Auxiliary tender, small.
BB	Battleship.

CA	Heavy cruiser.
CAZ	Auxiliary unallocated as to type (conversion).
CB	Large cruiser.
CL	Light cruiser.
CM	Mine layer.
CMc	Coastal mine layer.
CV	Aircraft carrier.
CVB	Large aircraft carrier.
CVE	Aircraft carrier escort.
CVL	Small aircraft carrier.
DD	Destroyer.
DE	Destroyer escort.
DM	Light mine layer (high speed).
DMS	Minesweeper (high speed).
IX	Unclassified.
LCC	Landing craft, control.
LCI(L)	Landing craft, infantry (large).
LCM(2)	45' landing craft, mechanized, Mk. II.
LCM(3)	50' landing craft, mechanized, Mk. III.
LCM(6)	56' landing craft, mechanized, Mk. VI.
LCP(L)	36' landing craft, personnel, (large).
LCP(R)	36' landing craft, personnel, (with ramp).
LCP(N)	Landing craft, personnel (nested).
LCR(L)	Landing craft, rubber (large).
LCR(S)	Landing craft, rubber (small).
LCS(S)	Landing craft, support (small).
LCT(5)	Landing craft, tank, Mk. V.
LCT(6)	Landing craft, tank, Mk. VI.
LCV	Landing craft, vehicle.
LCVP	Landing craft, vehicle and personnel.
LSD	Landing ship, dock.
LSM	Landing ship, medium.
LST	Landing ship, tank.
LVT(1)	Landing vehicle, tracked (unarmored).
LVT(2)	Landing vehicle, tracked (unarmored).
LVT(3)	Landing vehicle, tracked (unarmored).
LVT(4)	Landing vehicle, tracked (unarmored).
LVT(A1)	Landing vehicle, tracked (armored).
LVT(A2)	Landing vehicle, tracked (armored).
LVT(A3)	Landing vehicle, tracked (armored).
PC	173' submarine chaser.
PCE	180' patrol craft escort vessel.
PCE(R)	180' patrol craft escort vessel, rescue.
PCS	136' submarine chaser.
PE	Eagle boat.
PF	Frigate.
PG	Gunboat.

PGM	Motor gunboat.
PR	River gunboat.
PT	Motor torpedo boat.
PY	Yacht.
PYc	Coastal Yacht.
SC	110' submarine chaser.
SS	Submarine.
YA	Ash lighter.
YAG	District auxiliary, miscellaneous.
YC	Open lighter.
YCF	Car float.
YCK	Open cargo lighter.
YCV	Aircraft transportation lighter.
YDG	Degaussing vessel.
YDT	Diving tender.
YF	Covered lighter; range tender; provision store lighter.
YFB	Ferryboat and launch.
YFD	Floating drydock.
YFT	Torpedo transportation lighter.
YG	Garbage lighter.
YHB	Ambulance boat.
YHB	Houseboat.
YHT	Heating scow.
YMS	Motor minesweeper.
YMT	Motor tug.
YN	Net tender.
YNg	Gate vessel.
YNI	Net tender (tug class).
YO	Fuel oil barge.
YOG	Gasoline barge.
YOS	Oil storage barge.
YP	District patrol vessel.
YPK	Pontoon stowage barge.
YR	Floating workshop.
YRD(H)	Floating workshop, drydock (hull).
YRD(M)	Floating workshop, drydock (machinery).
YS	Stevedore barge.
YSD	Seaplane wrecking derrick.
YSP	Salvage pontoon.
YSR	Sludge removal barge.
YT	Harbor tug.
YTT	Torpedo testing barge.
YW	Water barge.

# DESIGNATIONS OF U. S. NAVAL AIRCRAFT

Class of airplane	Model designation		U. S. name
	Navy	Army	
Fighter, 2-eng.....	F7F.....	.....	
	XF5U.....	.....	
Fighter, 1-eng.....	F2A.....	.....	Buffalo
	F3A.....	.....	Corsair
	F4U.....	.....	Corsair
	FM.....	.....	Wildcat
	FG.....	.....	Corsair
	F2G-1.....	.....	Corsair
	F4F.....	.....	Wildcat
	F6F.....	.....	Hellcat
	FR.....	.....	
	XF8B.....	.....	
	XF14C.....	.....	
	XFD.....	.....	
Scout Bomber, 1-eng....	SB2A.....	A-34.....	Bermuda
	SBW.....	A-25.....	Helldiver
	SBC.....	77-A.....	Helldiver
	SB2C.....	A-25.....	Helldiver
	BTC.....	.....	
	SED.....	A-24.....	Dauntless
	BTD.....	.....	
	SBF.....	A-25.....	Helldiver
	BTM.....	.....	
	SBN.....	.....	
	SB2U.....	.....	Vindicator
Torpedo Bomber, 1-eng..	TBY.....	.....	
	TBD.....	.....	Devastator
	TB2D.....	.....	
	TEM.....	.....	Avenger
	TBF.....	.....	Avenger
Patrol Bomber, boat,...	PB2Y.....	.....	Coronado
4-eng.			
Patrol Bomber, boat,...	PB2P.....	OA-10.....	Catalina
2-eng.			
	PBY-5, 5A....	OA-10.....	Catalina
	P4Y.....	.....	
	PEM.....	.....	Mariner
	PBN.....	OA-10.....	Catalina
	XPBB.....	.....	Sea Ranger
	CANSO "A"....	OA-10B.....	
Bomber, land, 4-eng....	PB4Y.....	B-24.....	Liberator
Bomber, land, 2-eng....	PBO.....	AT-18 (A-29)....	Hudson
	PBJ.....	B-25.....	Mitchell
	PV.....	B-34.....	Ventura
	XP2V.....	.....	



Class of airplane	Model designation		U. S. name
	Navy	Army	
Observation Scout..... 1-eng.	OY-1.....	L-5 (O-52).....	Sentinel
	SOC.....	.....	Seagull
	SO3C.....	.....	Seamew
	SC.....	.....	
	S2E-1.....	.....	
Utility, 2-eng.....	OS2N.....	.....	Kingfisher
	OS2U.....	.....	Kingfisher
	JRB.....	C-45.....	Expeditor
	JRC.....	C-78 (AT-17).....	Bobcat
	ED.....	A-20 (P-70).....	Havoc
Utility, 1-eng.....	JRF.....	CA-9.....	Goose
	J4F.....	CA-14.....	Widgeon
	JM-1.....	B-26.....	Marauder
	J2F.....	CA-12.....	Duck
	GB.....	C-43.....	Traveler
Transport, 1-eng.....	GK.....	UC-61.....	Forwarder
	GH.....	.....	Nightingale
	AE(HE).....	L-4.....	Grasshopper
	RY.....	C-87.....	Liberator
	R5D.....	C-54.....	Skymaster
Transport, 2-eng. land.	RB.....	C-93.....	
	R5C.....	C-46.....	Commando
	R3D.....	.....	
	R4D-1, 5....	C-47, 47A.....	Skytrain
	R4D-2, 4....	C-49, 49A.....	Skytrooper
Transport, 4-eng. Sea..	R4D-3.....	C-53.....	Skytrooper
	R50.....	C-56, 60.....	Lodestar
	PB2Y-3R.....	.....	
	JRM(XPB2M-1R)	.....	Mars
	JR2S-2.....	.....	Excalibur
Transport, 2-eng. Sea..	PBM-3R.....	.....	
	N3N.....	.....	
	NE.....	L-4 (O-59).....	Grasshopper
	NR.....	PT-21.....	Recruit
	NP.....	PT-21.....	
Training, 1-eng. pri-... mary.	N2S.....	PT-13, 17, 18, 27	Caydet
	N2T.....	.....	Tutor
	XN5N.....	.....	
	XNL.....	.....	
	SNB-1.....	AT-11.....	Kansas
Training, 2-eng. ad-... vanced	SNB-2.....	AT-7.....	Navigator
	SNV.....	BT-13.....	Valiant
	SNC.....	.....	Falcon
	NH.....	.....	
	SNJ.....	AT-6.....	Texan
Special Purpose, 2-eng.	TDR.....	.....	
	TD3R.....	.....	
	TD2R.....	.....	
	TD3R.....	.....	
	TD2R.....	.....	

Class of airplane	Model designation		U. S. name
	Navy	Army	
Special Purpose, 2-eng.	TD3R.....	.....	
(Continued)	TDN.....	.....	
Special Purpose, 1-eng.	TDN.....	.....	
	TDC.....	PQ-8.....	
	TD2C.....	PQ-14.....	
	TDR.....	.....	
	TDD.....	OQ-2A.....	
Helicopter, 1-eng.....	HNS-1.....	R-4B.....	
	HO2S-1.....	R-5.....	
	HOS-1.....	R-6.....	
	XHOS-1.....	XR-6.....	