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THE COAST GUARD AT WAR

PORT SECURITY XVIII



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ORIGINAL ESTABLISHMENT

AUTHORITY TO REGULATE ANCHORAGE OF SHIPS

To understand the development of what later became the Captain of the Port organization, which became one of the most important divisions of Coast Guard activity during World War II, it is desirable to go back to the Act of May 16, 1888, (25 Stat. L., 151), when Congress first gave authority to the Revenue Cutter Service to regulate the anchorage of ships in harbors and inland waterways of the United States. Under this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury was directed "to define and establish an anchorage ground for vessels in the bay and harbor of New York, and in the Hudson and East Rivers, to adopt suitable rules and regulations in relation thereto, and to take all necessary measures for the proper enforcement of such rules and regulations." It provided also that "for violation of such rules, a penalty of \$100 is imposed with the power to hold the vessel for its payment and to seize the vessel, and, if need be, to libel it for the recovery of the amount of the fine." Application of this Act was later extended to harbors of Chicago, waters of Lake Michigan adjacent thereto, Kill Van Kull, Newark Bay, Arthur Kill, and Raritan Bay, and to the Kennebec River at or near Bath, Maine. Application to other areas followed slowly. The officers of the Revenue Cutter Service were "empowered and directed, in case of necessity, or when proper notice has been disregarded, to use the force at their command to remove from channels or stop, any vessel violating the prescribed rules."

INSPECTION OF ANCHORAGE AREAS

The anchorage areas specified under the Act of May 16, 1888, were not regularly patrolled, but Revenue Cutters made occasional inspections, flying the proper anchorage flag, and enforcing the regulations as needed. Some areas in which traffic was considerable, were patrolled for various periods.

EXPANSION OF ANCHORAGE AND PATROLLING RESPONSIBILITY; THE ACT OF MARCH 4, 1915

Congress passed the Rivers and Harbors Act of March 4, 1915, under which were extended the areas in which the Revenue Cutter Service became responsible for the enforcement of anchorage rules and regulations, providing cutter service was available. The Act transferred jurisdiction over anchorages from the Department of Commerce to the War Department. The Revenue Cutter Service and the Life Saving Service were combined into a service renamed the Coast Guard. In addition to anchorage areas authorized by statute, there were added under this Act additional locations from time to time where the Coast Guard was employed in supervising the anchorage and movement of vessels. This called for a better-organized enforcement organization. In the larger ports, harbor tugs or launches of the Coast Guard, flying the prescribed anchorage flag, made regular patrols of the specified areas, assisting shipping in anchoring properly, giving information and advice on local port conditions and facilities, and enforcing the rules and regulations. Service was rendered marine commerce in every possible way. While jurisdiction over anchorages rested with the War Department, the Coast Guard continued as the enforcing agency, and continued supervision of anchorages and movement of vessels at New York, Chicago and on the Kennebec River under direct authorization of Congress. Officers

in charge of this enforcement activity were designated as Supervisors of Anchorages.

FIRST CAPTAIN OF THE PORT DESIGNATED DURING WORLD WAR I AT NEW YORK

In time of war, the Coast Guard becomes a part of the Navy, but maintains its identity. It operated as such during World War I, but it continued its enforcement of rules and regulations governing the anchorage and movement of vessels in various harbors. Due to the great increase in shipping at New York and the consequent expansion of anchorage activity there, as well as increase in shipments of ammunition and other explosives at that port, the operational officer in charge there was termed the Captain of the Port. He was charged with supervision of the loading of explosives to assure proper safeguards, and increased his personnel in order that this might be done.

ADDITIONAL CAPTAINS OF THE PORT DESIGNATED

Capt. Godfrey L. Cardem
In 1918, while the Coast Guard continued operations as part of the Navy, jurisdiction over the anchorage and movement of vessels in certain harbors passed from the War Department to the Treasury Department. The Secretary of the Treasury designated several Coast Guard officers as Captains of the Ports of New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk and Sault Ste. Marie. At the last-named port, a continuous day and night lookout was maintained along the St. Mary's River. After termination of the war, officers in charge of Coast Guard port activities at the principal ports continued to be known as Captains of the Port, and maintained organizations adequate for supervision of the movement of vessels in specified areas and the enforcement of anchorage rules and regulations, in waters under their jurisdiction. In all, 10 Captains of the Port were designated. Before March 10, 1941, the authority for designating an officer of the Coast Guard as Captain of the Port was vested in the Secretary of the Treasury. On that date, an amendment of the Rules and Regulations provided that the Captain of the Port was a Coast Guard officer designated by the Commandant of the Coast Guard.

SUMMARY OF EARLY RESPONSIBILITIES

From the foregoing, it is evident that from the establishment of the Coast Guard as such, through World War I, the duties of the Captains of the Port were largely restricted to the enforcement of anchorage rules, the control of the movement of vessels in designated harbors and waters, and supervision of the loading of explosives at certain ports.

DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO 1939

JURISDICTION REVERTS TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT

On March 3, 1921, the authority of the Treasury Department to promulgate vessel anchorage and movement rules and regulations was terminated, and jurisdiction was again assumed by the War Department. The Coast Guard, however, continued as the enforcement agency. Periodic inspections of anchorages were made during 1920 and later at points where there was no Captain of the Port. From time to time, additional specified anchorage areas were patrolled and inspected.

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INCREASING RESPONSIBILITY OF CAPTAINS OF THE PORT

During the period of increasing prosperity and foreign trade in 1928 and 1929, the work of supervising the anchorage and movement of vessels increased greatly, especially in the larger ports. The demands upon the Captains of the Port to perform the many functions connected with the smooth operation of shipping in the great ports constantly increased. To perform this work, additional tugs of the harbor type were urgently needed, particularly at New York. Additional supervised areas were designated, making a formidable array of ports where the Coast Guard had supervisory duties. From 1933 to 1939, while there were no marked changes in connection with Captain of the Port duties, the volume of work increased materially, and supervision was continued at all ports where Federal regulations had been promulgated.

SCOPE OF DUTY AT NEW YORK HARBOR IN 1935

Figures showing operations of the Captain of the Port of New York for the fiscal year ended 30 June, 1935, indicate how the responsibilities of the COTP had increased and broadened.

During that year, Coast Guardsmen under his direction inspected 9,219 vessels at anchorages; warned 327 vessels for violations; supervised transfer of 16,460,000 pounds of explosives; transported 2,261 aliens; furnished daily transportation to Customs Inspectors, and Public Health and other officials to Quarantine; patrolled three regattas and one launching; and engaged in extensive ice-breaking.

ANCHORAGE REGULATIONS OF 1939

By 1 April, 1939, the War Department (Corps of Engineers) had adopted anchorage regulations defining the specific areas in which vessels might anchor, and set forth separate rules and regulations for each. In only a few cases were these rules identical. These designated areas, where the Coast Guard was charged with responsibility for enforcing the rules, were:

- Kennebec River, at or near Bath, Maine
- New Bedford Outer Harbor, Buzzards Bay, Vineyard and Nantucket Sounds, Massachusetts
- Narragansett Bay (Newport and Bristol, Rhode Island)
- Randall Bay, Freeport, Long Island, New York
- The Port of New York
- Annapolis Harbor, Maryland
- Anacostia River, District of Columbia
- Hampton Roads, and Norfolk and Newport News Harbors, Virginia
- Port of Charleston, South Carolina
- *Wilmington River, Thunderbolt Harbor, Georgia
- *Turners Creek, Georgia
- *Atlantic Ocean, off Miami and Miami Beach, Florida
- Tampa Bay, Florida
- Waukegan Harbor, Illinois
- Chicago Harbor, Illinois
- San Diego Harbor, California
- Los Angeles and Long Beach Outer Harbor, California
- San Francisco Bay, San Pablo Bay, Carquinez Strait, Suisan Bay, New York Slough, and San Joaquin River, California

*Regulations enforced by Army Engineers.

THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF 1939

The six rules which were identical were basic. Briefly, they provided that, (1) no anchoring take place outside an anchorage area,

(2) no anchors, hull, or rigging be at any time out-

side the area, (3) vessels be anchored so as not to obstruct navigation when anchored outside an anchorage in emergency, (4) a vessel get under way at once when notified to shift anchorage, (5) Coast Guard has authority to shift position of any vessel anchored so as to obstruct traffic, and (6) no owner or person in charge is relieved from penalty for obstructing navigation, range lights, or non-compliance with navigation laws. Many of the twelve remaining areas, adopted some if not all of the above basic rules, had in addition rules that applied particularly to peculiar local conditions. In general, there was no conformity to a uniform, national pattern upon which effective Federal enforcement could be based during the emergency, because at this time, there was no "national pattern." In addition to the foregoing, War Department regulations, enforced by District Engineers, were issued on 20 April 1938, for "All Waterways tributary to the Gulf of Mexico (except the Mississippi River and its tributaries) from St. Marks, Florida, to the Rio Grande." These regulations were later reaffirmed and continued in force by Part II of the Treasury Department rules of 29 October, 1940.

POWERS OF COAST GUARD PERSONNEL

In order to enforce rules, orders and laws, certain powers were given the individual. In the Coast Guard, such general legal powers are conferred by the Act of 22 June, 1936, (C.705, Sec. 149 Stat. 1820; 44 U.S.C. 45) which defines the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard. The pertinent section of that Act is as follows:

"Commissioned, warrant, and petty officers of the Coast Guard are here empowered to make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas, and the navigable waters of the United States, its Territories, and possessions, except the Philippine Islands, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the United States; Provided that nothing herein contained shall apply to the inland waters of the United States, its Territories, and possessions, other than the Great Lakes and the connecting waters thereof. For such purposes, such officers are authorized at any time to go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction or to the operation of any law, of the United States, to address inquiries to those on board to examine the ship's documents and papers, and to examine, inspect and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance. When from such inquiries, examinations, inspection, or search it shall appear that a breach of the laws of the United States rendering a person liable to arrest is being, or has been committed, by any person, such person shall be arrested or, if escaping to shore, shall be immediately pursued and arrested on shore, or other lawful and appropriate action shall be taken; or, if it shall appear that a breach of the laws of the United States had been committed so as to render such vessel, or the merchandise, or any part thereof, on board of, or brought into the United States by such vessel, liable to forfeiture, or so as to render such vessel liable to a fine or penalty and if necessary to secure such fine or penalty, such vessel shall be seized."

THE GROWTH OF TRAFFIC AT COTP ANCHORAGES

The growth of commercial traffic supervised by Captains of the Port at the various designated anchor-

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age areas from 1915 to 1939 was affected primarily by the increasing number of areas supervised. It also represented, except during World War I days, the natural year-to-year increase in the traffic of each area which kept pace with the industrial and commercial growth of the country. With the improvements and deepening of the nation's waterways, larger vessels with greater cargoes per vessel made use of the anchorage areas and thus added not only to the volume of traffic under supervision, but also to the responsibilities of the Captains of the Port both for the safety of these larger units and of the other vessels using the channels, wharves, and anchorage grounds. Total tonnage in the supervised areas grew from 220,948,000 in 1915 to 623,911,000 in 1939. The largest figures were, of course, for the Port of New York, which grew from 149,154,000 to 187,130,000; the peak, however, was 200,840,000 in 1920.

ENFORCEMENT OF
EXPLOSIVES
REGULATIONS

The "Regulations for the Transportation of Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles on Freight and Freight-and-Passenger Vessels by Water" were formulated under the Act of Congress Approved March 4, 1921, and provided that the Interstate Commerce Commission formulate regulations for the safe transportation within limits of the jurisdiction of the United States, such articles as came within the above definition, and recommend methods of stowage, regulations for preparation of vessels and their compartments, lockers and magazines to handle explosives, methods for storage, loading and unloading, and other handling and equipment for handling explosives; stowage of explosives, dangerous articles and semi-hazardous articles; bulk shipments; leaking and defective packages; and the application of other laws and regulations. At the time of the emergency, there were two sets of regulations in effect governing the movement and anchorage of vessels carrying explosives. One was binding upon "all common carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce which transport explosives or other dangerous articles by land or water." These had been promulgated on 1 February, 1935, by the Interstate Commerce Commission (with amendments to 12 June, 1940). The other sets of regulations were applicable to 6 different areas in the United States, namely:

Charleston, South Carolina
Atlantic Ocean off Miami and Miami Beach,
Florida
The Port of New York
Hampton Roads and the Harbors of Norfolk and
Newport News, Virginia
Los Angeles and Long Beach Outer Harbors,
California
San Francisco Bay, San Pablo Bay, Carquinez
Strait, Suisun Bay, New York Slough, and
San Joaquin River, California

The types of explosives were specified for the different areas, and varied somewhat. Under both sets of regulations, the "Officer of the Coast Guard designated 'Captain of the Port'" supervised enforcement of the regulations on water, but such supervision (in the New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco regulations) "shall not be construed to diminish or affect the duties of other Federal officials as prescribed in Section 17 of the River and Harbors Act of March 3, 1899."

WAR DEPARTMENT
EXPLOSIVES
REGULATIONS - 1939

There were six sets of explosives anchorage area regulations promulgated and in force on 1 April, 1939. These were contained in

"Rules and Regulations Relating to the Navigable Waters of the United States," and applied to the above six areas. These regulations contained some or most of the following provisions:

1. Captain of the Port supervision
2. Red flag by day and red light by night (and at Hampton Roads, Norfolk and Newport News, in addition, specific equipment for attending barges)
3. No smoking or inebriation
4. Separation of explosives from inflammables and separate stowage 25 feet away for blasting caps, etc.
5. Fire prevention
6. Removal of litter, rubbish and loose metal before loading
7. Careful handling with avoidance of metal
8. Definition of "high explosives in bulk" (and in San Francisco Bay area, of "low explosives" - black powder)
9. Method of transfer by chute or mattress
10. Description of chutes
11. Method of handling damaged packages
12. Special inspectors, their duties and responsibilities
13. Removal of violators and stopping of loading or unloading by COTP
14. Frequent inspections by Master
15. Vessels with high explosives shall not anchor within 400 yards of each other except lighters transferring cargo
16. Explosives anchorages may be used for regular freight when no other space is available
17. Captain of the Port supervision with undiminished duties of other Federal officials concerned
18. Captain of the Port assignment of guards, limitation of cargo, requirement of permit
19. Competent person to be in charge and defining Masters' duties and responsibilities
20. Frequent inspections with owner or person in charge liable for violations
21. Compliance with applicable Interstate Commerce Commission regulations by all vessels not common carriers.

Strictest in rules and enforcement were the Port of New York, and Los Angeles and Long Beach Outer Harbors, with identical regulations; next were Hampton Roads and San Francisco, also with identical regulations; Charleston rated next, while the Atlantic Ocean off Miami rated lowest requiring only the display of a red flag or light and anchoring of vessels by written Army Engineer permit.

EFFICACY OF
THE REGULATIONS

Classes of ammunition and explosives exported between 1914 and 1940 were (a) smokeless powder, (b) dynamite, (c) other explosives, (d) safety fuses, (e) blasting caps, (f) shot, shells, (g) metallic cartridges, (h) explosive shells and projectiles, and (i) other ammunition, including fireworks. The value of such exports reached \$715,575,306 in 1916, declined to a low of \$2,452,000 in 1932, and rose to \$56,449,069 in 1940. Imports were relatively minor; the peak was in 1918 with value at \$15,302,156, and the low point was in 1933 at \$233,000; in 1940 the value was \$436,934, the bulk of which was represented by firecrackers. The efficacy of the regulations as applied to this traffic is evident from the record. Records submitted to the Coast Guard covering casualties to vessels in the years 1915-1919 reveal that .0085% of all casualties to vessels were on vessels carrying explosives, inflammables, or dangerous cargoes. In the period 1936-1940, the figure was .0102%. The volume of explosives handled in United States ports was affected

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more directly by exports and imports than by those manufactured and sold primarily for industrial purposes.

LIGHTHOUSE SERVICE
MERGED WITH
COAST GUARD

Under a directive (General Order No. 37) dated 20 June, 1939, and effective 1 July, 1939, the entire United States Lighthouse Establishment became merged with and a part of the Coast Guard. The personnel of the Lighthouse Service in the field and on vessels was consolidated with the Coast Guard personnel, and came under the direction of the Commandant of the Coast Guard. The whole purpose of the plan was:

- (a) To reduce expenditures
- (b) To increase efficiency
- (c) To consolidate agencies according to major purposes
- (d) To reduce the number of agencies by consolidating those having similar functions and by abolishing such as may not be necessary; and
- (e) To eliminate overlapping and duplication of effort

Eventually, this development affected Captains of the Port indirectly, for under war conditions lighthouses became an important part of the coastal network which furnished valuable information to the District Coast Guard Officers and Coast Guard and Navy Intelligence. A substantial part of this information concerned the Captains of the Port and their Port Security activities.

1939 DUTIES OF
CAPTAINS OF THE PORT
SUMMARIZED

Thus, at the time of the beginning of European hostilities in World War II (September, 1939) the Captain of the Port organization had expanded in the principal United States ports. Duties came very largely within two classifications, (a) enforcement of anchorage rules and regulations, and control of the movement of vessels, and (b) supervision of the loading and unloading of explosives in specified areas. The effect of the war in Europe was to increase tremendously the responsibilities of Captains of the Port both as to scope of duties and work-load as volume of shipping rapidly expanded. The entire Port Security activity was built around the Captain of the Port organization.

PART II

INFLUENCE OF THE WAR IN EUROPE

GROWTH IN PRE-WAR RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CAPTAIN OF THE PORT

PROCLAMATION OF A
NATIONAL EMERGENCY

As an immediate aftermath of the opening of hostilities in Europe, the President of the United States, on September 8, 1939, issued a proclamation that a national emergency existed in connection with and to the extent necessary for the proper observance, safeguarding and enforcing of the neutrality of the United States, and the strengthening of our national defense within the limits of peace-time authorizations. He also stated that specific directions and authorizations would be given from time to time for carrying out those two purposes.

AUTHORITY FOR FIRST
INCREASE IN PERSONNEL

Ten days, later, an Executive Order of 18 September,

1939, authorized additional personnel for the Coast Guard because of the state of national emergency, such personnel not to exceed 4,500 (exclusive of new lighthouse service personnel), and directed that the existing facilities of the Coast Guard be increased, repaired, modernized, enlarged and equipped to the extent determined by the Secretary of the Treasury for additional duties.

DAILY REPORT ON
MOVEMENT OF VESSELS

The first expansion of duties for Captains of the Port after this development came in September, 1939, pursuant to certain duties under the Neutrality Act. The Coast Guard was directed to furnish the White House, State, Treasury and Navy Departments and other interested agencies a daily report of the movement of all foreign merchant vessels and public vessels and aircraft within the ports of the United States. This was later expanded (by letter 18 September, 1941) to include domestic vessels with domestic cargo, and passenger vessels in coastwise and foreign trade, and also tugs, barges, and bay, sound or river vessels. The reports stated the name, location, nationality, rig, dates of arrival and departure, ports arrived from and ports of destination, type of cargo, and whether armed.

RADIO SEALING
AND ARMAMENT
INSPECTION

Beginning late in 1939, Captains of the Port were charged with the responsibility of sealing the radios and checking armaments of belligerent vessels arriving in their ports. In most ports, when such vessels were granted pratique at Quarantine, COTP personnel boarded them, sealed their radios, and incidentally gained much information of value. A form letter of instructions relating to the radio, repairs, alterations, installations of armaments, gun emplacements, degaussing, ammunition, explosives or other defensive or offensive equipment, was given to the Master of the vessel. A blank certificate requesting authority to have repairs, alterations or adjustments to the vessel's radio while in port, was left with the Master.

THE COAST GUARD
RESERVE ACT
OF JUNE 23, 1939

The Coast Guard Reserve Act of 23 June, 1939, established the United States Coast Guard Reserve as a voluntary, non-military organization of yacht and motorboat owners. The purpose was to further boating efficiency and safety at sea, and to have a group of boat owners available for assistance in emergency. This organization underwent several changes subsequently, and the members were of no immediate importance to the Captains of the Port. However, with the advent of war the ultimate organization, of which this was the original, became of inestimable value to Captains of the Port as the Temporary Reserve, and in many ports took over a very substantial portion of Port Security work.

INCREASING TRAFFIC

Waterborne and air traffic increased slowly during the latter part of 1939 and early 1940. Captain of the Port operations grew commensurately. This was the period of the "phony war." In the Spring of 1940, however, the terminology was found to be erroneous, and European hostilities grew very active. With the stepped-up tempo, shipping activity increased considerably, greater volumes of explosives were moved, anchorages became widely used. The development of large seaplanes made it necessary in June, 1940, to set aside for their use, areas in which the operation of surface water craft was restricted or prohibited, and Captains of

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the Port had the added responsibility of enforcing regulations in such areas. It was found that anchorage rules and rules relating to the movement of ships and explosives required elaboration, refinement, and broadening.

PRESIDENTIAL
PROCLAMATION
OF 27 JUNE, 1940

President Roosevelt issued a proclamation on 27 June, 1940, stating that continuation of the conditions set forth in his 8 September, 1939, Proclamation called for additional measures within the limits of peace-time authorizations, and quoted the following excerpt from the Act of Congress approved 15 June, 1917:

"Section 1. Whenever the President by proclamation or Executive Order declares a national emergency to exist by reason of actual or threatened war, insurrection, or invasion, of disturbance or threatened disturbance of the international relations of the United States the Secretary of the Treasury may make, subject to the approval of the President, rules and regulations governing the anchorage and movement of any vessel, foreign or domestic, in the territorial waters of the United States, may inspect such vessel at any time, place guards thereon, and, if necessary in his opinion in order to secure such vessels from damage or injury, or to prevent damage or injury to any harbors or waters of the United States, or to secure the observance of the rights and obligations of the United States, may take, by and with the consent of the President, for such purposes, full possession and control of such vessel and remove therefrom the officers and crew thereof and all other persons not specially authorized by him to go or remain on board thereof.

"Within the territory and waters of the Canal Zone the Governor of the Panama Canal, with the approval of the President, shall exercise all the powers conferred by this section on the Secretary of the Treasury."

The President then stated that it was essential, in order to carry out the provisions of the Act that the powers conferred by the Act be exercised, or be made available for exercise, with respect to foreign and domestic vessels, and thereby consented to such exercise.

ANCHORAGE REGULATIONS
FOLLOWING PROCLAMATION

In pursuance of this Proclamation, the Secretary of the Treasury on the same day, with the approval of

the President, issued the following "Anchorage Regulations," after quoting Section 1, Title II of the so-called Espionage Act, given above:

1. All existing rules and regulations of any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States governing anchorage and movements of vessels in the territorial waters of the United States are hereby reaffirmed and continued in force during the period of the present emergency, except as modified by these rules and regulations.

2. The rules and regulations governing the anchorage of vessels herein reaffirmed or promulgated shall be enforced by the Captain of the Port, or where the port has no such officer, by an officer of the Coast Guard or the Customs Service designated by the Secretary of the Treasury. In any case where there are no applicable rules or regulations governing the anchorage of

vessels, all anchorage shall be in accordance with the directions of the Captain of the Port or other officer designated by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to this section.

3. The movement of any vessel between points within the area of a port, and the movement, loading, and discharging of explosive or inflammable material or other dangerous cargo shall be under the supervision and control of the Captain of the Port, or other officer designated by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to section (2) hereof.

4. The Captain of the Port or other officer designated by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to section (2) hereof is hereby authorized to cause to be inspected and searched at any time any vessel, foreign or domestic, or any person or package thereon, within the territorial waters of the United States, to place guards upon such vessels, and to remove therefrom any or all persons not specially authorized by him to go or remain on board thereof.

5. The Collector of customs, through the Captain of the Port, or other agency, acting for the collector, is hereby directed subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, to take full possession and control of any vessel, foreign or domestic, in the territorial waters of the United States, whenever it appears that such action is necessary in order to secure such vessels from damage or injury, or to prevent damage or injury to any harbor or waters of the United States, or to secure the observance of the rights and obligations of the United States. Pending action by the Secretary of the Treasury, the collector of customs is authorized to detain any such vessel and is directed to communicate the facts by the most expeditious means available to the Secretary of the Treasury.

6. The Secretary of the Treasury may require all lighters, barges, ferries, tugs, motor boats, sailboats, and similar craft operating in the harbor or waters of any port of entry, to be especially licensed by the collector of customs for such purpose and may revoke any license so granted for any failure to comply with the anchorage or harbor regulations for such port, or to obey the orders issued thereunder by any duly authorized officer, or for any act inimical to the interests of the United States in the present emergency.

7. No vessel shall depart from any port or place in the United States, or from any port or place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, on a voyage on which clearance by customs officer of the United States is required, unless the principal customs officer in charge of the port of departure shall have been authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury to permit the departure.

CONFERENCE
AT WASHINGTON
1 AUGUST, 1940

Under the Proclamation of 27 June, 1940, the Treasury Department would necessarily assume certain functions previously vested in other agencies of the Government. Therefore, the Commandant of the Coast Guard called a conference for 1 August, 1940, of port authorities and others, to consider matters relating to control over the anchorage and movements of vessels, and the handling of explosives, inflammable material and other dangerous cargoes. Represented at the conference were the Departments of the Treasury, War, Navy, Commerce, the Interstate Commerce Commission, Association of American Railways Bureau of Explosives, American Association of Port Authorities, New York City Fire Department, American Petroleum Institute, and the Standard

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Oil Company of New York. At this conference, need was stressed for uniformity in general regulations throughout all United States ports where Federal regulations were in effect, and for elimination of the existing varying rules. Plans were made for supervision of the handling of inflammable cargoes, which was then receiving insufficient attention. There was desire to adhere as closely as practicable to procedures followed in normal times by the various regulatory agencies and receive their advice and assistance in adopting new or amending old regulations. Such agencies would be informed and their views obtained prior to promulgation.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION
OVER EXPLOSIVES

One important subject discussed at the conference was the existing extent of Federal jurisdiction over explosives. It was difficult to determine where responsibility of one agency left off and that of another began. The Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation, for instance, had regulations covering the accommodation and construction of vessels for the loading of explosives. Vessels certified by that Bureau were the only ones permitted to carry explosives (this included regulations for "tank vessels"). The Bureau, however, did not have personnel to enforce its tanker regulations. Federal jurisdiction over inflammable cargoes was questionable. If a tanker at New York were spilling gasoline on the water, Army Engineers might have jurisdiction as regarded pollution of the harbor, but the Coast Guard appeared to have jurisdiction over elimination of the resulting fire hazard during the national emergency. In such a case, Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation rules would be violated, but the question of who would prosecute the responsible party was considered, at that time, to be secondary to the matter of preventing fires. The "Anchorage Regulations" of the Treasury dated 27 June, 1940, clearly gave the Coast Guard complete supervision and control over "Lading and Discharging of explosives and inflammable material or other dangerous cargo," and it was determined that regardless of any remissness of other agencies in carrying out their part of the law, the Government would be sure to hold the Coast Guard responsible for any disaster resulting from gasoline spilling over the harbor of a United States port.

OTHER
CONFERENCE
MATTERS

Other matters discussed and worked out at this conference related to working out procedures where the Interstate Commerce Commission and Coast Guard were responsible for portions of the handling of dangerous cargoes and liquid in tankers where the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation was also concerned. Provisions were made for adjusting rules and regulations to conform with existing local rules, or for changing or adopting regulations, asking the local agencies to draw up the changed rules. There was much to be done in smoothing out the regulations for handling explosives and dangerous material, and this is covered in greater detail in the section on explosives, under operations. A great class of common and contract carriers was not subject to any regulations at all unless they carried passengers. It was thought that Interstate Commerce Commission Water Regulations could be applied for the emergency to contract carriers as a group, and thus could be extended to all those smaller craft that were not then covered by the regulations.

THE COAST GUARD
AS "FEDERAL POLICE"

It was pointed out at this conference that the functioning of the Coast Guard as "Federal Police" in the

United States harbor waters would continue to see that the various laws were properly enforced and additional regulations issued and enforced as needed. Very close cooperation with local police on shore was necessary to see that Coast Guard regulations dovetailed with the rules of the police in waterfront areas. With the waterfront as the Coast Guard's bailiwick and most of the power plants even in interior cities such as Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Cincinnati built on the waterfront for easier access to coal, oil and gasoline barges, the borderline between police and Coast Guard authority had to be worked out. Coast Guard responsibility for inflammable and dangerous cargoes was clear. The Coast Guard could not, however, at that time, take responsibility for policing piers except where explosives were being handled by vessels. Rules and regulations which would be drawn up by the Coast Guard would originate in the field. After consultation with local authorities and local people interested, regulations agreeable to those groups would be sent to Headquarters, reviewed and brought into uniformity, approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, and sent back to the field. In case of wide divergence with State or municipal regulations, the Coast Guard would still keep their rules and incorporate some, but not necessarily all, of the local rules as they thought necessary. Full cooperation was attempted and given, but in the final analysis the Coast Guard could make any rules felt necessary regardless of the local regulations.

PERMITS FOR
LONGSHOREMEN

At New York Harbor, a system had been inaugurated by mid-1940 of ascertaining the nationality, and obtaining fingerprints, of longshoremen and granting them permits. This had much to recommend it, and at the conference it was stated that there was intention to have the Coast Guard extend this to other ports and also to New York contract longshoremen who were not then issued permits. The thought of establishing identification of operators of local harbor craft also received favorable response.¹

FIGHTER CONTROL
OF EXPLOSIVES

On 20 September, 1940, Headquarters arranged with the State Department that licensed exporters of explosives be required to report to Coast Guard Headquarters all shipments for export. The report gave on each shipment a statement covering:

- (a) The kind and quantity of explosives
- (b) Export license number
- (c) Origin of shipment
- (d) Country of destination
- (e) Port of loading
- (f) Date of leaving point of origin
- (g) Routing
- (h) Means of transportation
- (i) The company making the shipment

Coast Guard District Commanders involved were then notified and they, in turn, notified appropriate municipal and State police and fire authorities in order that adequate protection might be afforded. Use of this form largely removed the hazard attending unknown arrivals and transfer of large shipments of explosives and dangerous cargo.

DANGEROUS CARGO ACT
9 OCTOBER, 1940

An Act approved 9 October, 1940 (the "Dangerous Cargo

1. Following this conference new rules and regulations were issued by the Secretary of the Treasury on Anchorage and Clearance, and on Handling of Explosives. Details are given under Operations, under those subdivisions.

DESCRIPTION



ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL LAWS AT SEA
HAS ALWAYS BEEN A COAST GUARD RESPONSIBILITY.
A PICKET BOAT PREPARES TO CHECK UP

~~RECORDED~~

Act") amended Section 4472 of the Revised Statutes (U.S.C. 1934 edition, Title 46, Sec. 465), and provided for the safe carriage of explosives or dangerous or semi-dangerous articles or substances on board vessels, and made more effective the provisions of the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea relating to the carriage of dangerous goods. Under this Act, the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation of the Department of Commerce and the Coast Guard were given primary joint enforcement jurisdiction. Every vessel, domestic or foreign, (except public vessels and tankers) regardless of character, tonnage, size, service or method or propulsion, on navigable waters of the United States, including its territories and possessions (except Canal Zone and Philippines) was brought under supervision. Tankers, however, were forbidden to carry fulminates, detonating compounds or explosives that ignited spontaneously. Vessels carrying 12 or more passengers were forbidden to transport or stow certain high explosives susceptible of detonation by a blasting cap or detonating fuse except ships' signal and emergency equipment. Transportation of such explosives on other than passenger vessels was permitted under regulation of the Secretary of Commerce, as well as other explosives and dangerous articles. Also regulated were containers giving off inflammable vapors which might be carried in passenger vessels. Some types of small vessel were excluded from this provision. The Secretary of Commerce regulated packing, marking, labeling and certification of such articles; accepted or adopted pertinent regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission insofar as they applied to shippers by common carriers; and regulated safe transportation, stowage, and such. Information on the true character of shipment before delivery to the vessel's agent was required. Gasoline or other inflammable or combustible liquid in tanks of motor vehicles or boats being transported in vessels was subject to regulation. Regulations under this Act, entitled "Explosives or other Dangerous Articles on Board Vessels," with 18 parts covered in great detail, were promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce on 9 April, 1941.

REVISED
ANCHORAGE REGULATIONS
29 OCTOBER, 1940

for Certain Ports of the United States and Rules and Regulations Relating Thereto." These expanded and refined previous regulations and contained additional provisions. Enforcement of these rules and supervision over the anchorages increased the responsibilities of the Captains of the Port. These rules and regulations are covered in detail in the Section on Clearance and Anchorage, Part VI.

CAPTAIN OF THE PORT
COVERAGE AUGMENTED

On 5 November, 1940, Captains of the Port were designated at the following 29 key ports of the United States and its non-contiguous territories. At each, the primary duties at that time were enforcement of the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury of 27 June and 29 October, 1940, and supervision relating to explosives under regulations previously promulgated.

Portland, Maine
Boston, Massachusetts
New York, New York
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Baltimore, Maryland
Norfolk, Virginia
Charleston, South Carolina

Jacksonville, Florida
Port Everglades, Florida
Miami, Florida
Key West, Florida
Mobile, Alabama
Gulfport, Mississippi
New Orleans, Louisiana
Galveston, Texas
San Juan, Puerto Rico
Charlotte Amalie, Virgin Is.
Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan
Detroit, Michigan
Cleveland, Ohio
Chicago, Illinois
Duluth, Minnesota
San Diego, California
San Pedro, California
San Francisco, California
Seattle, Washington
Astoria, Oregon
Ketchikan, Alaska
Honolulu, Hawaii

Thus, effective machinery for the enforcement of the various laws and regulations governing anchorage and movement of vessels at all the key ports was set up, without materially affecting any of the then-existing regulatory or enforcement procedures, but bringing about a higher degree of uniformity between procedures at the ports than had theretofore existed.

DESIGNATION OF
HEADQUARTERS PORTS

On 25 March, 1941, a further step was taken in consolidating the administration and enforcement of rules and regulations as they then stood, by designating "Headquarters Ports" under each Coast Guard District, and indicating the other ports (and territorial waters) under the jurisdiction of each. There were 37 of these "Headquarters Ports", which included all those listed in the preceding paragraph except Port Everglades (which came under Miami), Gulfport (under Mobile), San Diego (under Los Angeles), and San Pedro. Added, were the following:

Rockland, Maine
Portsmouth, New Hampshire
New London, Connecticut
Atlantic City, New Jersey
Tampa, Florida
Port Arthur, Texas
Los Angeles, California
Buffalo, New York
Marquette, Michigan
Oswego, New York
St. Louis, Missouri

Sub-ports coming under jurisdiction of the Headquarters Ports were also designated in accordance with their geographical locations, and most of these later were assigned Assistant Captains of the Port. The list conforms so closely that it is omitted here, and reference is made to the list of COTPs and ACOTPs given in Part IV, Organization. Jurisdiction of the Captains of the Port at these Headquarters Ports covered waters extending to those of adjacent COTPs, so that the entire navigable seacoast, lake shores and mid-western rivers, as well as the waters of Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands were the responsibility of these officers.

GROWTH IN TRAFFIC AT
HEADQUARTERS PORTS

In 1915, waterborne traffic in the 4 ports with Captains of the Port amounted to 220,948,000 tons. In 1939, traffic in the 37 ports which were later designated as Headquarters Ports was 1,271,850,000, showing the great increase in the responsibilities of these

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~~REPRODUCTION~~
officers. The additional supervisory load was effectively absorbed by the existing machinery of the Coast Guard organization, although efficient administration had always to depend upon the ultimate strength of the various enforcement units in relation to the size of each area, volume of traffic, and intensity of supervision which the exigencies of the existing emergency might dictate.

OFFICE OF MERCHANT SHIP CONTROL

The Office of Merchant Ship Control, established early in 1941, had charge of all matters relating to the move-

ment and anchorage of ships within the prescribed areas, the supervision over the movement and anchorage of vessels carrying explosives and, under the existing regulations, over the movement, lading and discharge of explosives. This improved control and coordination of such activities. The office acted as the agency of the Secretary of the Treasury in drafting rules and regulations governing such matters and in supervising their administration through the Captains of the Port.

REALIGNMENT OF THE CAPTAINS OF THE PORT

Between 21 July, 1941 and 3 September, 1941, a realignment of the Captains of the Port was made. Through

trial and error, it seemed best to designate a Captain of the Port for each Coast Guard District and place Aides under him. Orders dated 15 August, 1941, established this new line-up. A Captain of the Port was assigned to each District office, and 31 Aids were designated for duty under the COTPs at the more important "Headquarters Ports" not having a COTP under the new plan. Apparently the term "Headquarters Port" was not used thereafter.

THE AUXILIARY AND RESERVE ACT OF 19 FEBRUARY, 1941

The United States Coast Guard Auxiliary and Reserve Act of 19 February, 1941, repealed the Coast Guard Reserve Act of 1939, and established the

Coast Guard Reserve as a military component part of the United States Coast Guard. The former non-militarized civilian Reserve of boat owners was transferred to the Auxiliary, newly created by the Act. The Act provided for two broad classifications of Reservists, (a) regular, and (b) temporary. The regular Reservists later constituted that part of the Coast Guard personnel who served "for the duration" full time, with pay. Within the group classified as Temporary Reservists were several sub-classifications detailed in a later paragraph. This Act was amended in June, 1942. The purpose was to provide a trained force of officers and men which, added to regular personnel of the Coast Guard, would be adequate to enable that service to perform such extraordinary duties as might be necessitated by emergency conditions. Eligible were male citizens of the United States and of its territories and possessions except the Philippines, between the ages of 17 and 64, who were physically and otherwise qualified for duty, and who, through appointment or enlistment, obligated themselves to serve in the Coast Guard in time of war or during any period of national emergency declared by the President to exist. Temporary members of the Reserve were provided for in a pay status.

FOUNDATION FOR COMING RESPONSIBILITIES

During the period of national emergency, it was necessary to make a respectable increase in Coast Guard personnel in

order to carry out the new and growing responsibilities. This meant many untrained men both afloat and at shore stations. It was desirable to make every effort to train these men and to avoid transfer of key men used as instructors. Recruiting became more

~~REPRODUCTION~~

active. The additional personnel required was usually forthcoming, but personnel increases always seemed to lag behind the growing demands. The Captains of the Port laid down the basic structural plan for the organization and had established excellent relationships with all the interested Federal, State, municipal and private agencies, and through this basic foundation, the tremendously increased COTP organization which was to follow upon the outbreak of war was established.

THE SITUATION IN 1941

PRELIMINARY TO VESSEL SEIZURES

Upon declaration of World War I, in 1917, United States Customs officers took possession of the German ships

in United States ports. It was found that the captains of these vessels, doubtless acting under instructions from higher authorities, went to work with chisel and sledge to wreck and destroy machinery, fittings and equipment. The damage done to auxiliary machinery, piping and fittings by deterioration from lack of care was fully as great as that done willfully. However, the chief acts of sabotage had been directed against the main engines. With this experience in mind, as well as a desire to be fully informed with regard to vessels of belligerents, the New York District Commander, on 22 June, 1940, ordered the Captain of the Port of New York to keep a close check on the movements of Italian and German vessels in the waters under his jurisdiction. Thereafter, at regular intervals, the forces under his command compiled a list of all such vessels in the port, with the location, and data on the vessels' structures, fittings, armaments and crews which might have indicated suitability for employment as a naval auxiliary or other military unit. The list was carefully kept up to date, and any suspicious actions were noted. Later, similar care was exercised at other ports.

EVIDENCE OF SABOTAGE

In March, 1941, the Captain of the Port at Norfolk, Virginia, received information that there was evidence of

sabotage being committed on board Italian vessels at Wilmington, North Carolina and at Baltimore, Maryland. Thereupon, he dispatched two officers who boarded and inspected 3 Italian vessels at Hampton Roads. The examination developed that much damage had been done to the machinery of these vessels in that all propelling machinery and some of the boilers and auxiliary machinery of these steamers had been badly disabled by the Italian crews. To prevent further sabotage, immediate action was indicated.

INVESTIGATIONS ORDERED

On 29 March, 1941, orders were issued through the Merchant Ship Control Office of the Coast Guard to in-

vestigate, in cooperation with local customs officials, the sabotage of the machinery of Italian vessels in the various American ports. The actual work of investigation was detailed by the Coast Guard District Commanders to the Captains of the Port. The result of these investigations caused immediate action.

SEIZURE OF ALIEN VESSELS IN UNITED STATES PORTS

Under Section 1 of Title II of the Act of Congress (Espionage Act) approved 15 June, 1917, the Secretary

of the Treasury has authority (with the approval of the President and after he has declared a national emergency) to take full possession of vessels if necessary to secure such vessels from damage or injury. (See Proclamation of 27 June, 1940, page 9). Under this authority, on 30 March, 1941, Italian and German vessels were taken into protective custody in

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United States ports. Seizure was made at piers where such vessels were secured, and at anchorages where necessary, using Coast Guard vessels. The seizures were timed and executed, and the dispersion of the boarding and steaming crews was so complete, that no resistance or violence was possible. Many of the men in the boarding parties were steaming boilers and making such repairs as were possible for almost two days, especially at New York. At that port, 4 Italian and 15 Danish vessels were seized and their crews taken to Ellis Island, the District Commander having received orders to take over Danish vessels as well. These seizures were country-wide, one or more such vessels having been taken at New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Newport News, Norfolk, Wilmington (N.C.), Charleston, Jacksonville, New Orleans, Mobile, Galveston, Los Angeles, Astoria (Ore.) Seattle, and San Juan.

LATER SEIZURES

After capitulation of France to Germany, on 22 June, 1941, all French vessels in New York had guards placed on board. Some French vessels at other ports were taken over later. On 7 December and 26 December, 1941, several Finnish vessels were seized, 7 at New York, after having been under surveillance for some time. As a result of Coast Guard operations under the Espionage Act, through the Captains of the Port, from 29 March, 1941 to 5 April, 1941, 27 Italian vessels with 850 officers and crew were seized, and 35 Danish vessels with 470 officers and crew were taken into protective custody. Later, French vessels taken into protective custody totaled 15. The total gross tonnage of all these vessels was 479,249.

DISPOSITION OF VESSELS

The 53 foreign-flag vessels so seized were reconditioned for service and were furnished with defense gun crews by the Navy, under the provision of Public Law No. 101, approved 6 June, 1941. In July, the United States Maritime Commission took over the vessels and placed them under Panamanian registry for operation to trade in belligerent zones and in trans-Atlantic trade. The question of training gun crews arose, and this was delegated to the Coast Guard. On 17 September, 1941, the Captain of the Port of New York began accepting applications for such training, and made necessary arrangements with the Commanding Officer of the Maritime Service Training Station at Hoffman Island where the gun crews were trained.

IN ANTICIPATION OF HEAVIER EXPLOSIVES MOVEMENTS

Under the Act of 15 June, 1917 and the Treasury Regulations of 27 June, 1940, Coast Guard jurisdiction over explosives and dangerous cargoes was no longer limited to anchorage areas alone. It embraced terminals, wharves, docks and other places where loading of such materials might take place. On 22 January, 1941, the Commandant of the Coast Guard called attention to a possible obstruction in the flow of munitions. Limited quantities of high explosives were being shipped overseas. These left, for the most part, by way of New York and New Orleans. At New York, lend-lease ammunition was loaded at the Bayonne Port Terminal. This was well-located and clear of densely populated sections, and with deep water and good railroad facilities. At New Orleans, the explosives anchorage in the Mississippi River was used by vessels loading there. At practically all ports, large shipments of high explosives would have to be transferred to vessels at explosives anchorages, in the interests of safety, because docks with railroad facilities and sufficient water were not readily available at properly isolated localities to permit direct freight-car-to-vessel

loading. Loading from barges involved double handling with consequent increase in danger, cost, and time. Because shipments to Britain and leased bases were anticipated, here was a problem to be solved. The Commandant suggested that a survey be made of explosives-loading terminals throughout the United States, and that prompt action be taken to provide adequate isolated wharfage for the safe and expeditious handling of explosives. A survey was made which resulted in some relief of the situation.

RAPID INCREASE IN EXPLOSIVES TRAFFIC

During 1940, nearly 65% of the dollar value of explosives and ammunition exported passed through the New York Customs district, 9% through Philadelphia, 9% through Maryland, and 6% through New Orleans. In the first four months of 1941, the dollar value of explosives sent to the British Empire was about 17 times that of the corresponding period of 1940. Dollar value of firearms and ammunition sent to Britain during the same 1941 interval was 90 times that of a year earlier.

UNLIMITED NATIONAL EMERGENCY PROCLAIMED

By May, 1941, heavy shipments of lend-lease goods were going overseas, and an alarmingly large proportion of such shipments never reached their destinations due to war at sea. The Axis nations were meeting with increasing success in the fields of battle. The invasion of Britain was awaited. The situation had grown to very serious proportions, and the probable eventual involvement of the United States became more evident. On 27 May, 1941, the President proclaimed an Unlimited National Emergency.

THE 1939-1941 SITUATION AT PORT OF NEW YORK

As an example of personnel and equipment in use and available to Captains of the Port in the 1939-1941 period, New York may be cited. It should be borne in mind that New York was the largest United States port, and that heavy traffic began moving through the port during this time. In normal times, the Port averaged about 8,000 sailings a year in overseas or coastal trade. This increased tremendously with the stepping up of the war tempo. The Captain of the Port of New York had 29 vessels available for routine duties in and about New York Harbor. These ranged from 38-foot picket boats to 110 foot tugs. The personnel complement was 4 officers and 175 enlisted men, with an office staff of about 4 enlisted men. There were four 56-foot "anchorage and boarding type vessels," and eight 75-foot "six-bitter" patrol boats. A 30-foot crash boat was used at the LaGuardia Airport. Ice-breaking tugs numbered 4. Eleven COTP vessels were assigned to Customs duty only. There was, from time to time, some variation in the personnel and equipment, but this serves to show what, in general, the Captain of the Port at New York had to work with during this period of expanding workload and responsibilities. Personnel and equipment did not keep pace with the growth in activity, and pressed the COTP to properly discharge his duties.

FIRST AUXILIARY BOATS "TAKEN OVER"

During early 1941, following passage of the 19 February 1941 Act, operations due to the war in Europe grew rapidly, and came nearer and nearer to the Atlantic seaboard. Almost immediately after the President declared an Unlimited National Emergency on 27 May, 1941, he issued Executive Order No. 8767 on 3 June, 1941, directing that such number of commissioned, chief warrant and warrant officers and enlisted men of the Coast Guard as might be needed to man and operate certain naval vessels (as agreed

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between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Coast Guard) should operate as a part of the Navy, and while so serving would be subject to the laws enacted for the government of the Navy. Thereupon, the Coast Guard was called upon to provide 1,732 men to replace others withdrawn from the Coast Guard fleet to man 4 Navy transports. The "Neutrality Patrol" became a full-scale operation. Small patrol vessels and personnel to man them were needed with increasing urgency, many to augment fleets available for patrol duty under the Captains of the Port. As activity expanded, more shore stations were needed. On 8 July, 1941, the Commandant sent a letter to all District Commanders, stating that the Coast Guard was taking over about 280 boats from members of the Auxiliary to be employed in various District duties, and that the missions would require arming. Each District Commander was to report to Headquarters the armament desired, with proper justification, bearing in mind any limitation necessary on the power of armament in order to prevent injury to innocent persons in the vicinity.

COAST GUARD
IN 14TH DISTRICT
TRANSFERRED TO THE NAVY

Naval activity in the 14th Naval District, Hawaiian Islands, increased during mid-1941, and the President issued, on 16 August, 1941, Executive Order No. 8852 reading in part: "The United States Coast Guard for the District of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, together with its organization, personnel, and equipment, is hereby transferred from the service and jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury to the service and jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Navy, to operate as a part of the Navy and subject to the control thereof during the unlimited national emergency proclaimed by me on May 27, 1941." This was the forerunner of similar transfer of the entire Coast Guard which followed a few weeks later. Soon afterwards, on 11 September, 1941, Executive Order No. 8895 was issued, paving the way for future similar directives, and providing that certain vessels, personnel, and units could be transferred to the Navy as needed, but no specific units, vessels, or personnel were transferred under this order at that time.

PROTECTION OF
OIL PROPERTY
STILL A CIVIL
RESPONSIBILITY

As hostilities developed during 1941, and it became evident that danger of sabotage, or negligence or accident was growing considerably, concern for the safety of various waterfront oil properties in our ports was great. At that time, the Coast Guard had virtually no responsibility in that regard, and civil organizations took initiative in providing safety measures. There was an excellent example of this at Los Angeles in 1941. The citizenry and the military were cognizant of the importance of oil to the powers fighting the Axis, as well as to the dangers involved where concentrations of supply and transport existed. They knew that oil is the very life blood of the modern army and navy. From mid-1940 to mid-1941, well over a hundred million barrels of petroleum of various sorts were handled in the Los Angeles area - practically half of the entire California output. In this area were 15 terminals. In September, 1941, Mr. George Prussing, Safety Engineer and Pacific Coast Security Co-ordinator for the American Petroleum Industry, addressed the Propeller Club of America at Los Angeles. Protection at that time was still a civil responsibility, and possibly Los Angeles received more attention than any other oil transport center in the country. Said Mr. Prussing during his speech: "Some time ago the oil industry established defense committees in certain regional divisions of the country comparable to the Army's corps areas. Each of these five is headed by a ranking executive and they

in turn constitute a national committee to work with the government on the protection of the nation's oil storage against sabotage. Under the direction of the regional committee, studies have been made of the oil refining and transportation facilities and the storage plants serving them. They have been evaluated as to the effect their loss would mean to our present war effort and also what risk their destruction might impose on surrounding property. Technical experts, learning what they could from the destruction of oil properties abroad, have pretty well decided what can and what cannot be economically guarded against attack. Every facility essential to the operation of our business has been mapped by the industry and the maps turned over to the planning officers of the army and navy. The protection of the nation's oil storage by the military, if and when that becomes necessary, has thus been planned in advance."

CIVILIAN GROUPS
COOPERATE

Captain Coffman, Naval District Commandant, brought together groups of people and by appealing to their self-interest, as well as their patriotism, convinced them of their responsibility. The Captain of the Port, Los Angeles, had a group of engineers spend several nights in the harbor, checking on the lighting, fencing and guarding of the oil terminals and the surrounding properties from the waterside. Out of these surveys grew a written manual or set of standards, approved by the officers of the Navy and Coast Guard and adopted by the oil terminal operators for the conduct of their plants during the emergency. There was nothing compulsory at that time, and the operators could take or leave the set of standards, but actually, all adopted them. A great deal of effective work was done for port security by civilians and the various groups before port security became the responsibility of the Coast Guard. The Captain of the Port saw his duty in this regard, took the initiative, and forced into the consciousness of the civilian groups the fact that they must prepare and protect.

EVENTUAL
REGULATIONS
SUMMARIZED

Out of these efforts came war regulations for Protection of Waterfront Petroleum Terminals at Los Angeles and Long Beach Harbors, (dated September 1942) and the following summary preceded the detailed regulations:

1. Owners, agents, operators and lessees of waterfront oil terminals are requested to safeguard their premises in order to protect the storage and facilitate the transfer of petroleum products to the armed forces and the industries of the United States. The purposes of the following regulations are to:

- (a) Prevent access of persons to the terminals who do not exhibit the authorized credentials and who do not have necessity for entering.
- (b) Light and fence the terminals so efficiently that malicious persons will not venture attempts to break in or to enter by stealth.
- (c) Illuminate the terminals so that night operations may be conducted without mishap and for the detection of persons attempting to molest the terminal, or vessels at the dock.
- (d) Select and train competent men for the operation of the terminal facilities and for the guarding of the premises.
- (e) Fix the responsibility for the loading of tankships and tank barges, so that persons, facilities and vessels will not be needlessly jeopardized.

DEFINITIONS

(f) Minimize the accumulation of waterfront oil storage in order to decrease the danger to persons, vessels and harbor facilities, resultant from enemy attack.

THE LOS ANGELES PORT PROTECTION ORGANIZATION

For 7 months up to 26 September, 1941, there had been in existence at Los Angeles, "one of the most effective defense groups in the entire country." Under the leadership of the president of the Waterfront Employers' Association, about 30 men met 14 times around a table to report on what they were doing individually to promote security and to ask the assistance and cooperation of their neighbors. Membership was divided almost equally between representatives of industry and men in military, naval and civil positions of authority on the waterfront. Most industries on the waterfront joined. There was no formal organization, no records, no publicity. Fire, police, harbor departments and railroads, utilities and the Board of Fire Underwriters participated. However, there was little cooperation from lumberyards and shipyards, where conflagrations might easily have started, and which needed security almost more than other facilities.

GENERAL SECURITY OPERATIONS AT NEW YORK, FALL OF 1941

Security operations at the Port of New York had grown to fairly substantial proportions by the Fall of 1941. On 23 September, 1941, the Captain of the Port of New York promulgated regulations for the transportation and loading of explosives in areas within his jurisdiction, similar to those generally adopted by the Coast Guard. Explosives loading here was mostly of the lend-lease variety, and full cooperation was had from the various interested agencies. Up to March, 1941, most loading was done at the Bayonne Terminals, but thereafter this became a Naval terminal and all non-Navy activity ceased. Anchorage grounds were defined, and anchorage patrols with a daily check on the position of every vessel were being maintained. Coast Guard vessels were at the 3 entrances to the Port, at Throgs Neck, Perth Amboy, and The Narrows to check and report all outbound and inbound vessels. Supervision of anchorage and sailing prevented foreign agents from going on board illegally. Such a vessel, if clearing New York for another United States port, was reported by the Coast Guard to the Captain of the Port of the next scheduled destination, so that he might be on the lookout for her. In the case of armed vessels, photographs were taken at the time of inspection of the armaments on each vessel. If armaments were to be installed on vessels, Headquarters approval was required, and the permit then issued through the Captain of the Port. This was done also on neutral vessels, and all installation work was subject to inspection by COTP inspectors. Armed merchant carriers putting in to New York during the neutrality era were boarded by Captain of the Port personnel for an inspection of their guns. Disguised fighting ships and those vessels which might easily have been converted into raiders, received permission to dock providing they cleared within 24 hours. Otherwise, an offensively armed vessel was subject to internment. In the case of purely defensively armed vessels, regulations enforced by the boarding officers included securing the guns, stowing the ammunition, and sealing the radio. Carriers of belligerent nations taking on explosives at New York, found COTP personnel on the docks and in the holds enforcing safety measures and blocking possible sabotage.

LAXITY OF CIVILIAN GUARDS

While in many ports cooperation by civilian authorities and agencies was excellent by the latter part of 1941,

laxity cropped up here and there. The Captain of the Port of New York, aware that New York pier companies and ship operators and shipyard plants were, in many cases, lax in guarding their property, tested the civilian guard system. He landed on piers and walked about shipyards almost at will. He visited one shipyard where a British ship with her whole bow torn away was surrounded by curious people who had no business there, and some were taking pictures. Steps were immediately taken to remedy this dangerous situation.

TRANSFER OF THE COAST GUARD TO THE NAVY DEPARTMENT

By 1 November, 1941, the war situation had become critical, and it seemed only a matter of time before the United States would be involved in war. By Executive Order No. 8929, 1 November, 1941, the President directed the Coast Guard to operate as part of the Navy. The directive read:

"By virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 1 of the Act of Congress approved January 28, 1915, 38 Stat. 800 (U.S.C. title 14 sec. 1) as amended by sections 5 and 6 of the Act of June 11, 1941, Public Law 166, 77th Congress, 1st Session; it is hereby directed that the Coast Guard shall from this date, until further orders, operate as a part of the Navy, subject to the orders of the Secretary of the Navy.

"All Coast Guard personnel operating as a part of the Navy, subject to the orders of the Secretary of the Navy, pursuant to this order, shall, while so serving, be subject to the laws enacted for the government of the Navy; Provided, That in the initiation, prosecution, and completion of disciplinary action, including remission or mitigation of punishments for any offense committed by any officer or enlisted man of the Coast Guard, the jurisdiction shall depend upon and be in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Department having jurisdiction of the person of such offender at the various stages of such action; Provided further, That any punishment imposed and executed in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph shall not exceed that to which the offender was liable at the time of the commission of the offense."

CHANGES COINCIDENTAL WITH TRANSFER TO NAVY

The Acting Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard, on 3 November, 1941, issued Operations Memorandum No. 10 relating to transfer of the Coast Guard to the Navy, and informing District Commanders of the change. The title "District Commander" was thereby suspended for duration of operation under the Navy. The new designation was "Senior Coast Guard Officer," and each was in charge of his respective District. Geographical limits of the Districts were generally changed, where necessary, to conform with the limits of the Naval Districts wherein they were located. Although at that time, Alaska was part of the Thirteenth District (Seattle), there was designated a "Senior Coast Guard Officer, Ketchikan," distinct from the SCGO, Seattle. There were also Senior Coast Guard Officers in the Ninth District, at Chicago, Cleveland, and St. Louis. Headquarters of the Districts generally coincided with Naval District headquarters with regard to the city wherein located. The organization of Coast Guard Headquarters at Washington remained unchanged and continued to function in the same manner as before transfer to the Navy. One other change in title was made very soon afterwards, on 18 December, 1941. The title "Aide to the Captain of the Port" was changed to "Assistant Captain of the Port."

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF PREWAR STEPS IN 1941

Events during 1941 followed each other fairly rapidly, and reflected the growing

NOTICE

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tension and increasing tempo of prewar traffic, activity, and need for security. These are summarized briefly:

25 March, 1941 - Thirty-seven Headquarters Ports, under each District, were designated, following designation of 29 "key ports." Sub-ports under Headquarters Port jurisdiction were also specified.

29 March, 1941 - German, Italian, and Danish Merchant vessels taken into protective custody by the Coast Guard. (Also 5 April).

27 May, 1941 - Unlimited National Emergency proclaimed.

21 July, 1941 - Captains of the Port realigned, designating one for each of the Coast Guard Districts, together with 21 Aides.

1 November, 1941 - Coast Guard transferred to the Navy under the Organic Act creating the Coast Guard of 28 January, 1915.

15 November, 1941 - Public Law 292, approved by 77th Congress, gave Coast Guard authority to make regulations for the protection of Naval vessels.

8 December, 1941 - Congress passed and President approved joint resolutions declaring that a state of war existed with Japan.

11 December, 1941 - Similar declarations regarding Germany and Italy.

THE IMPACT OF PEARL HARBOR ON PORT SECURITY

PEARL HARBOR AND THE STATE OF WAR

The attack by Japanese air forces on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December, 1941, was followed on 8 December, 1941, by joint resolutions, passed by Congress and approved by the President, that a state of war existed with Japan. Soon after this, on 11 December, 1941, similar joint resolutions were passed and approved declaring that a state of war existed with Germany and Italy. The Coast Guard had already been transferred to the Navy, which is mandatory in time of war. That some overt act would be committed was a general expectation, but the time and place and the nature of the act had been merely considered a remote possibility. Throughout the period 1939 to 1941, inclusive, Coast Guard activity and responsibilities had increased, as outlined in the foregoing paragraphs, and the advent of war found the Coast Guard prepared in many respects to undertake the security measures which were bound to expand tremendously under actual war conditions. The principal need of the Service during the prewar period had been personnel and vessels, and though these had lagged behind the growing requirements, duties had been discharged in general with efficiency.

THE FIRST EXECUTIVE ORDER OF WAR AFFECTING COAST GUARD

Promptly after the state of war was declared, the President issued Executive Order No. 8972 (6 F.R. 6420) which empowered the Coast Guard to place guards upon waterfront installations whenever necessary to protect national defense premises, materials, and utilities. This was the forerunner of later directives and orders which eventually gave prime responsibility of waterfront security to the Coast Guard.

RAPID EXPANSION REQUISITE

The chief immediate result of the impact of Pearl Har-

bor on the Coast Guard was realization of the great expansion which would be needed to discharge responsibilities under war conditions. This meant a tremendous increase in personnel, vessels, bases, housing facilities, and equipment. With an increase in vessels, there would be need for far more extensive docking facilities. The need came suddenly, but many months were required for recruiting, vessel procurement and construction, and manufacture and distribution of essential equipment. Recruiting facilities were expanded and increased; the new recruits needed training and indoctrination, and schools and training camps had to be planned to keep pace with recruiting. New bases had to be acquired, barracks built or suitable quarters leased, offices for expanding administrative activities were required and, in most cases, leased. But this took many months, and the needs on the waterfronts of our ports, the harbors and inlet waters, and the explosives loading terminals, as well as clearance and anchorage activities grew much faster than it was possible to acquire and train men, obtain vessels, and procure housing facilities and urgently needed equipment. There was no peacetime Coast Guard Reserve which could be immediately drawn upon for trained men in substantial numbers. That was a great weakness which persists as this monograph is written.

IMPACT SUMMARIZED

The effect of the impact of Pearl Harbor on the Coast Guard can be summarized as the realization of the great increase in responsibility sure to result, and urgently laid plans for increasing personnel, vessels, equipment, housing and office facilities, bases, wharfage, and training. Adequate attainment of these took 15 months.

PART III

THE DUTIES OF THE CAPTAIN OF THE PORT

PORT SECURITY A COAST GUARD RESPONSIBILITY

GENERAL COPT DUTIES AT TIME OF WAR DECLARATION

It has become evident from the foregoing account of the development of prewar Captain of the Port activity, just what the duties of the officers so designated were by the time war was declared. Those duties were found in law, Presidential proclamations, and Department decisions. In time of national emergency, nearly all Federal supervision and guarding of port movements and activities within the various ports from the waterside were placed under the direction of the Captain of the Port. With the initial duties of neutrality enforcement, anchorage and explosives loading supervision, sealing of radios, checking of movements of all vessels in port, and the enforcement of navigation and customs laws, the Captain of the Port had detailed to his command personnel, vessels, and equipment which were designed to be adequate under the circumstances then existing. These, with the existing legal authority, made his command the logical one for conducting all port activities and details under the appropriate Coast Guard District Commander or, as he was designated at the end of 1941, the Senior Coast Guard Officer. To this end, it was desirable that the Captain of the Port maintain personal contacts with all parties, industries and interests having to do with port activities and developments. It was best to know all responsible persons connected with organizations having concern in maritime matters or working for the development of his port. It was well that he become favorably known for his interest and helpfulness, and cooperation in every way to advance the port's efficiency and to insure its safety and orderliness.

~~SECRET~~
PROTECTION OF HARBORS AND FACILITIES WAS VITAL

It had been noted in the United States during the national emergency, when European nations were being overrun by the Axis powers, that the keynote of the Axis success was a specialized army smuggled into a country before the actual invasion began. This army, once inside a country, would attack and disrupt lines of supply and communications by means of sabotage on unguarded installations and facilities, thereby weakening the country to the extent that, when armed invasion began, the aggressed country was comparatively helpless. This underground army was known as the Fifth Column. The United States was sending supplies to the beleaguered countries, and it was known that if attempts were made by unfriendly espionage agents to commit acts of sabotage in the United States, those acts would be directed at the waterfronts and installations where the vitally needed supplies were stored awaiting shipment. Therefore, it was deemed necessary to bend every effort toward the protection of harbors and facilities to prevent acts of sabotage and carelessness of individuals. In many ports, local Federal, civil and military groups had been formed into Waterfront Defense Committees, and they did much to coordinate efforts of all parties to a common good. However, in the face of actual war, their efforts could not be adequate, and soon this responsibility was placed upon the Coast Guard. Port Security was a relatively new task of great magnitude, and consequently it did not emerge as an organization overnight, but was the product of trial and error, experimentation, careful thought, and clever utilization of tools and organizations already in existence.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 9074 OF FEBRUARY, 1942

Obviously, waterfront security was essential to the successful prosecution of the Nation's war efforts, for through the ports and harbors were to flow almost undreamed-of amounts of men and materials and supplies to the fighting fronts overseas. The burdens of the Captains of the Port were bound to substantially increase. As the responsibility for protection of these facilities was largely placed upon the Captain of the Port, provision was made to increase the powers which could be delegated to him. On 25 February, 1942, the President, through Executive Order No. 9074, 7 F.R. 1587, directed the Secretary of the Navy to take all steps and issue all necessary regulations and orders for safeguarding waterfront facilities in the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands against injury from sabotage, subversive acts, accident or other causes. This responsibility was delegated by the Secretary of the Navy to the Commandant of the Coast Guard who, operating under the Chief of Naval Operations, was charged with the administration of all necessary protective measures. Through the Commandant of the Coast Guard this primary responsibility was passed on to the Captain of the Port, with a Coast Guard officer being assigned to coordinate protective activities on the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts. Thus, the executive burden and responsibility for the efficacy of the waterfront protective program was placed squarely upon the Captain of the Port organizations, which were the active agencies for its enforcement.

THE NEED FOR COOPERATION

The Executive Order conferring this duty upon the Secretary of the Navy further provided that all agencies in the Federal Government should give such assistance and support as their available facilities would permit. All state and local authorities were urged to lend all possible assistance and support. Every effort was made to insure the Captain of the Port the cooperation of all Government agencies which

might be of assistance to him. Private individuals and corporations developed, for the most part, excellent cooperation. In those few instances where cooperation or compliance was refused, the Captain of the Port had the authority to invoke statutory and regulatory authority to insure that nothing was left undone which might jeopardize the security program.

WATERFRONT GUARDS

The Executive Order No. 8972, of 12 December, 1941, had empowered the Coast Guard to place guards upon waterfront installations whenever necessary to protect national defense premises, materials and utilities. Personnel limitations, however, required that the Coast Guard, at that time, use its own personnel for guard duty only in cases of emergency or in exceptional situations where no other guard facilities could be secured. While the Captain of the Port organization was charged with the security of waterfront facilities in its jurisdiction, the primary burden was placed then upon the owners and operators of each individual installation to install guards and whatever other facilities were necessary for their proper protection. Owners and operators had a patriotic duty to insure that adequate safeguards were taken, and their burden could not, in those earlier days, be assumed by the Federal Government. However, supervision was furnished by the Captain of the Port. The Coast Guard had primary responsibility for protecting vessels and waterfront installations against sabotage from floating craft using the navigable waters of the United States, and thus it had both landside and waterside responsibility. Because of the joint efforts toward protection of facilities with owners and operators, and state and municipal agencies, the Captain of the Port conferred with all persons and agencies interested in the protection of waterfront property to insure close coordination of all forces responsible for the prevention of sabotage.

WATERSIDE PROTECTION

Within the limits of personnel and equipment available, the Coast Guard, through the Captain of the Port, insured that no suspicious boats were lurking in the vicinity of shipping and waterfront property, and prevented and attempted to detect any surreptitious landing of persons from boats, and took such other measures as might be practicable to safeguard property against sabotage or other dangers from the waterside.

PRINCIPAL DUTIES OF CAPTAIN OF THE PORT

The authority of the Captain of the Port to perform his principal duties is contained in specific statutes, executive orders, and regulations. The principal duties and functions, as they were in 1942 are listed briefly below. While activity expanded with the increasing war activity, there was little change after this year in the duties performed.

- (a) Protection of ports, harbors, vessels, piers, docks and other waterfront facilities against sabotage, accidents, and negligence.
- (b) Control of the anchorage and movement of vessels.
- (c) Issuance of identification cards.
- (d) Control of the loading and shipment of explosives and other dangerous cargoes.
- (e) Promulgation of local rules within the authority of the COTP.
- (f) Control of traffic in harbors and channels (special conditions).

~~RESTRICTED~~



EARLY WATERSIDE PATROLS WERE CONDUCTED IN COAST GUARD RESERVE BOATS
FORMERLY PRIVATE PLEASURE CRAFT



A COAST GUARD SENTRY WITH MACHINE GUN
PROTECTS THE WATERFRONT AND DOCKS
AGAINST ENEMY SABOTEURS OR SPIES

~~RESTRICTED~~

- (g) Control of traffic from inlets and isolated harbors.
- (h) Provision for boarding and examining parties.
- (i) Enforcement of Federal laws on navigable waters within the jurisdiction of the Captain of the Port.
- (j) Miscellaneous duties.

PROTECTION OF PORTS, ETC.

The protection of ports, harbors, vessels, piers, docks, and other waterfront facilities consisted largely

of patrols from the waterside and, where necessary, from the landside. These patrols were coordinated with and supplemented, rather than replaced, municipal and private facilities and personnel used for protective work, especially in the earlier days when personnel were short. On land, particularly, Coast Guard guards were provided only where necessary to insure adequate protection of war facilities or shipments. The most important responsibility of the Captain of the Port was to insure that all necessary precautions were taken to prevent waterfront fires resulting from negligence or other causes. This type of protection was conducted in coordination with military, naval and Department of Justice intelligence organizations, state and municipal public safety organizations, and commercial organizations such as underwriters associations. Headquarters emphasized the importance of securing the cooperation of Federal, State, municipal, commercial and labor organizations in all plans affecting port security. The extent to which such cooperation was formally organized or was informally obtained by personal contacts varied and was left, except in special instances, to the discretion of the COTP. Advice and assistance was sought from municipal and State public safety departments, insurance associations, and waterfront organizations in addition to such Federal agencies as Army, Navy, F.B.I., Maritime Commission, Customs, Office of Civilian Defense, Lend-lease, Federal Works Agency, and the U. S. Attorney. Where inspections revealed conditions which might jeopardize waterfront security, the Captain of the Port endeavored, first by persuasion and then by pressure, to correct such conditions. The extent to which pressure was applied in any specific instance depended upon local conditions; if the Captain of the Port were in doubt as to proper procedure, the case was referred to the District Coast Guard Officer (formerly Senior Coast Guard Officer) or to Headquarters.

CONTROL OF ANCHORAGE AND MOVEMENT OF VESSELS

The Captain of the Port could, in an emergency, prescribe local anchorage regulations, under the authority of Public Law 292 -

77th Congress, when necessary to protect naval vessels, but in such a case he made immediate recommendations to Headquarters in order that formal regulations might be promulgated. Where congestion of anchorages was likely, the COTP made regular inspections and required any movements which he deemed necessary. General licenses for the departure and movement of vessels were issued only by the Commandant, but special licenses controlling the movement of many small craft were under the direct control of the Captain of the Port. It will be noted that the Commandant and the Captain of the Port controlled the departure and movement of all non-public vessels except those requiring a clearance from a collector of customs and departure permits issued by the Commandants of Naval Districts.

THE ISSUANCE OF IDENTIFICATION CARDS

The Anchorage Regulations provided that the Captain of the Port was authorized to inspect and search any vessel,

or any persons on any vessel, within the territorial waters of the United States and to remove therefrom any person not specifically authorized by him to go or remain on board. In addition, this section required that every person on board any vessel within the territorial waters of the United States should carry identifying papers satisfactory to the Captain of the Port consisting of identification card containing specified data or such other means of identification as the Captain of the Port might accept in lieu thereof. Identification cards were not issued in quantity until the latter part of 1941. All persons having reason to frequent or be in the vicinity of waterfronts in our ports were required to carry identification cards, and the issuance of these required a large force of COTP personnel, considerable equipment, and much time. The cards finally issued numbered several million. These cards were not permits, and Captains of the Port discouraged their use as passes. They were, however, prerequisite to the issuance of passes by the operators of vessels or waterfront facilities.

LOADING OF EXPLOSIVES AND OTHER DANGEROUS CARGOES

Explosives anchorages were prescribed in the regulations. Where additional explosives anchorages were required, the Captain of the Port made

appropriate recommendations for Headquarters action. The designation of the explosives-loading terminals and the conditions under which they might be used were, by the regulations, under the control of the Captain of the Port and he was the responsible officer. While he was charged with this responsibility, he had to consider the necessity for the flow of wartime munitions as well as the safety of the port, and not seek absolute security by imposing restrictions inimical to the national war effort. The explosives-loading terminals were usually isolated, and explosives laden vessels were not permitted to remain in port any longer than necessary, and were escorted to sea. Movements during darkness or periods of low visibility were restricted. The rules for handling such shipments as laid down in specific regulations were strictly enforced and the handling of explosives was restricted to persons approved by the Captain of the Port. Where explosives shipments were being handled from Army or Navy facilities, the Captain of the Port withheld his approval if he deemed conditions unsafe, but took no steps to stop activities in connection with such loadings as long as they were wholly under the control of military officials. He did, however, immediately inform the Commandant of the Coast Guard by dispatch of the conditions which he deemed hazardous to the security of the port.

DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL EXPLOSIVES LOADING AREAS

Section 12 (b) of the regulations of 29 October, 1940, authorized the Captain of the Port to designate places

outside regular explosives areas in which vessels might load and discharge explosives. Such designation was to be made in the interest of the commerce of the United States, in such a manner as would not damage or injure any vessel in the harbors or waters of the United States. This designation was subject to such conditions as the Captain of the Port felt necessary. In considering the designation of such loading terminals the COTP was required, of course, to give serious thought to the potential dangers to shipping and the surrounding harbor area. All of the elements entering into the loading terminals were weighed, having in mind the degree of isolation of the proposed terminal from populated areas,

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accessibility to shipping, and the attending obstacles surrounding the movement of vessels to, from and near such terminals.

LOADING AND UNLOADING OF INFLAMMABLES

The Anchorage Regulations contained no specific provisions regarding the loading or unloading of oil, gasoline, or other inflammables, excepting paragraph 26, which pertained only to the transfer of inflammable materials from one vessel to another in an anchorage area. Nor was any jurisdiction over this subject granted by the regulations of the Secretary of Commerce effective 9 April, 1941, governing the handling of explosives or other dangerous articles on board ship. The Anchorage Regulations, however, stated that:

"Whenever the Captain of the Port finds that the maritime or commercial interests of the United States or the safety of any vessel or harbor so require, he is empowered to shift the position of any vessel anchored or moored outside an anchorage area, including any vessel anchored or moored in such a manner that the Captain of the Port finds that it endangers the passage of vessels in transit by, or to or from adjacent wharf property or impedes the movement of vessels entering or leaving adjacent slips..... A vessel upon being notified to move or shift its position in accordance with these regulations shall get under way at once or signal for a tug, and shall change position as directed with reasonable promptness."

Thus, if the Captain of the Port found that the loading of oil or gasoline or other inflammables by an individual vessel because of its condition, or for any other reason, endangered the safety of other vessels or of the harbor, he might suspend the loading operations and order the position of the vessel shifted to a safer location under the authority granted. If such action were taken by the COTP, he immediately submitted a report to the Commandant of the attending circumstances.

PROMULGATION OF LOCAL RULES

The authority of the Captain of the Port to promulgate local rules was limited. Anchorage Regulations provided that the movement of any vessel between points within the area of a port was under the supervision of the COTP. Accordingly, local rules to govern the movement of vessels, within such an area only, were promulgated by the COTP. Additional authority to make regulations was contained in Public Law 292 - 77th Congress, approved 15 November, 1941, but this was limited to measures necessary for the protection of naval vessels.

CONTROL OF TRAFFIC IN HARBORS AND CHANNELS

The Captain of the Port controlled as strictly as conditions reasonably required, through specific regulations for special conditions, traffic in rivers and narrow waters. Such control pertained chiefly to the launchings of new vessels, movement of vessels loaded with explosives or inflammables, and vessels near naval units and national defense facilities.

INLETS AND ISOLATED HARBORS

The prevention of all illicit and unauthorized communications between shore and vessels at sea was a function of the District Coast Guard Officer (the new title for "Senior Coast Guard Officer" adopted the end of 1941). The District Coast Guard Officer designated the inlets, isolated harbors, and other outlying areas to be included within the responsi-

lity and activity of the Captains of the Port within his District. Surveillance of such areas was usually accomplished by small patrol craft operating under the COTP, and supplemented by beach patrolmen.

BOARDING AND EXAMINING PARTIES

The Captain of the Port provided boarding and examining parties to identify and inspect vessels, check personnel for identification, handle crew difficulties and remove disloyal and subversive seamen. Where necessary, guards were maintained on non-public vessels. The providing of such boarding and examining parties and guards was in the discretion of the Captain of the Port, who gave due weight to the reasonable requirements of the responsible officials.

ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL LAWS ON NAVIGABLE WATERS

In addition to the normal peacetime law enforcement activity, the Captain of the Port acted under his authority as a Coast Guard officer to enforce all Federal laws on the navigable waters of the United States which might be useful in aiding the nation's war efforts.

MISCELLANEOUS DUTIES

In addition to the above well-defined duties, the Captains of the Port provided information to intelligence services, assisted vessels in distress, kept channels open to navigation, provided boarding facilities for customs and immigration officers, enforced regulations for the sealing of ship's radios, and cooperated with Federal, State, municipal, commercial and labor organizations. Full cooperation was, of course, required with the Naval Districts, Sea Frontiers, and Fleets upon occasion. To the greatest extent possible and practicable without interference with his specific duties, the Captain of the Port rendered miscellaneous useful services to waterfront and shipping interests.

THE IMPORTANCE OF PORT SECURITY

The importance of Port Security as an activity may be gathered from the fact that Port Security absorbed about 25% of the total manpower of the Coast Guard, even aside from the Temporary Reservists who became a vitally important factor as the war wore on. At a Headquarters Conference of Port Security Officers held at Washington, D. C. in June, 1943, Admiral Woesche, the Commandant, said in his opening address: "Port Security and the safety of shipping is a responsibility which rests wholly on the Coast Guard as an organization and, as a result of that responsibility, you people are very much on the spot." He pointed out a special complication in that, regardless of the great need for security, it had to be administered in such a way as not to delay movement of materials to the fighting areas. At the same conference, Rear Admiral Park, Assistant Commandant, said: "I think it may be truly said that, of all these many activities in which the Coast Guard is directly engaged, the most important is the Port Security function." He added that it brought the Coast Guard closer, perhaps, than any other Coast Guard activity, to the people and to various agencies with which cooperation and understanding were essential.

EXPANSION AND INTEGRATION OF PORT SECURITY ACTIVITIES

THE SITUATION AT SEA IN 1942

By the Spring of 1942, the situation in the Atlantic and along the United States Atlantic coast, and later the Gulf coast, became extremely critical. German submarines operated almost at will, and tankers were favorite targets. It was recognized by the Axis powers as well

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as by ourselves that modern warfare in all its phases would cease the instant that oil ceased to be available. However, operations were by no means confined to tankers, and vessels of all kinds were being sunk in alarming numbers. Survivors by the thousands were being brought to East Coast ports. The Navy assigned to coast patrol all of the smaller craft which it could spare, but the United States found itself in a two-ocean war with hardly a one-ocean Navy, and the number of craft which could be spared was woefully inadequate. Every day, survivors of the torpedoings brought into port were testimony on the urgency of prompt and efficient counter-methods. They were evidence of the closeness of the war to our shores and ports. The failure of cargo vessels by the score to reach their destinations with urgently needed oil, supplies and munitions, further emphasized the great need of action and the crucial requirement that nothing should occur in our ports to hinder in the slightest degree the flow of oil, munitions and materials which were being funneled through the ports. The scope of Captain of the Port activity was growing fast, and while personnel were being rapidly increased, the men available still lagged far behind the requirements. Even in the Gulf of Mexico, the mid-1942 situation was critical. During the two-week period from 6 to 20 May, there were 18 attacks on merchant vessels by submarines in the waters of the Eighth Naval District. Ten of the vessels were sunk, and it was thought that there were 8 submarines in the Gulf at that time. On 30 June, alone, survivors of 7 torpedoed vessels were landed at New Orleans. Thus, the urgency of security of our ports and the safety of material stored awaiting shipment, and of the waterfront facilities and ships, was crystal clear.

NEED OF SMALL CRAFT FOR PATROL DUTY

Security of harbor waters required systematic and thorough patrol under the Captain of the Port, and defense of shipping against submarines offshore called for picket patrol vessels. The Coast Guard was very short of vessels of this type. On 10 March, 1942, Admiral Stark, then Chief of Naval Operations, wrote to all Naval District Commandants: "The situation on our coasts with regard to scarcity of patrol vessels is well known.... District Commandants should leave no stones unturned in the search to acquire vessels which may be useful for work against submarines, for use as rescue boats, or for use as listening posts in spots where needed. To this end, it is directed that additional surveys be made to find any useful vessels which may have been previously overlooked. In this connection, the local knowledge of Coast Guard officers and of officials of yacht clubs should be utilized to the limit." The Coast Guard Auxiliary had been organized quite generally along our coasts, and the members' craft formed a large pool from which eventually a great number of suitable inshore and offshore patrol craft were procured. Due to offshore urgency, most of the vessels procured at first went on picket duty, as Coast Guard Reserve boats, but many were taken over by Captains of the Port for harbor patrol to augment their inadequate fleets, and by early 1943, enough vessels were available and in use to provide proper waterside patrol of harbors, inlets and bays.

METHODS OF PROCUREMENT OF SMALL VESSELS

The small vessels acquired by the Coast Guard in these earlier days were manned by Coast Guard personnel, and the Coast Guard assumed all operating expenses. There were five methods by which these craft were procured:

- * (a) By induction into the Coast Guard Reserve
- * (b) By induction into the Coast Guard Reserve for part time duty
- * (c) By gift, or by purchase for a nominal consideration
- (d) By requisition on a charter basis
- (e) By requisition and purchase

*Preferable

Operating expenses of vessels in the Coast Guard Reserve on part time duty consisted of cost of fuel, supplies, and day-to-day maintenance while in active status. Boats taken over were equipped with two-way radios and machine guns. Some of the larger, offshore type carried depth charges.

THE "NORMANDIE" FIRE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON PORT SECURITY

The 83,000 ton French luxury liner NORMANDIE had remained in an idle status at Pier 88, North River, New York City, from August, 1939, to February, 1942. In January, 1942, work of conversion into a transport began, and during this process, on 9 February, 1942, fire broke out and spread rapidly through the vessel. After several hours of fire-fighting the flames were extinguished, but so many tons of water had been poured into her that she capsized at her pier. It took 9 months to raise her. Details of this disaster are given in Part IX, under Third Naval District. Suffice it to point out here that this incident is chiefly of value in this history on Port Security in that it showed up early inadequate methods and divisions of authority, and other factors which brought about a great determination that there should not be "another NORMANDIE." This determination underlay the Coast Guard's great fire prevention effort which acquired its aggressiveness as an indirect result of this fire. It was also an important factor in bringing about the Executive Order No. 9074 of 25 February, 1942, placing responsibility for the security of our ports.

EXPANSION DURING THE LAST HALF OF 1942

The period from mid-1942 to mid-1943 was that of greatest expansion in the Port Security forces of the Coast Guard. The peak in activity, personnel, equipment and training was reached about March, 1943. The following figures show how great was expansion in the four months from 20 August, 1942 to 31 December, 1942. These figures relate only to Port Security personnel, and exclude Temporary Reservists.

	20 Aug. 1942	31 Dec. 1942
Commissioned Officers	675*	723
Enlisted Men Ashore	13,429	27,446*
Shore Personnel primarily engaged in Patrol, Guard, Vessel Inspection, Fire Prevention, Ordnance and Similar Duties	(a)	18,030
Warrant Officers and Enlisted Personnel Assigned to Floating Units	(a)	9,232
Specially Trained Police, Guard, Fire Prevention, and anti-sabotage Men	3,313	5,109
Men Specially Trained to Super-vice Loading of Explosives and Military Ammunition	667	1,167
Fire Boats in Operation	32	153
Patrol and Picket Boats	1,338	1,917
Fire Pump Trailer Units	96	229

(a) Figure not reported on until 15 December, 1942
* Figure includes Warrant Officers



DURING THE CRUCIAL DAYS OF 1942,
COAST GUARD RESCUES SUCH AS THIS WERE ALMOST COMMONPLACE
HERE, SURVIVORS OF A TORPEDOED U. S. TRANSPORT ARE RESCUED BY THE CUTTER BIBB



A COAST GUARD 83-FOOTER
ESCORTS A CARGO VESSEL THROUGH DANGEROUS WATERS

REMOVED

	20 Aug. 1942	31 Dec, 1942
Motor Vehicles Attached	339	717
Housing Facilities (in men)	13,856	27,617
Office Space (square feet)	144,413	249,717
Wharfage Facilities (linear feet)	56,492	98,108

EXPANSION FROM
20 AUGUST, 1942
TO MID-1943

The number of men and the amount of available equipment showed tremendous expansion by mid-1943. From 20 August, 1942 to 1 July, 1943, the number of commissioned officers on Port Security duty increased from 675 to 978, and on 15 January, 1944, the number was 1,136. Port Security enlisted personnel on shore on 20 August, 1942, numbered 13,429; it had increased to 28,482 by 7 July, 1943, but declined to 23,291 on 15 January, 1944. This was due to other demands upon manpower. Enlisted personnel assigned to floating units on 15 December, 1942, was 9,232, and this remained fairly static. On 1 July, 1943, it was 10,404; on 15 January, 1944, it had been reduced to 8,724 because of other manpower needs, but where patrols were being kept up, the deficiency was made up by use of Temporary Reservists.

INCREASE AND DECLINE
IN NUMBER OF
CAPTAINS OF THE PORT

The increased tempo of war activities was reflected in increased responsibilities at various ports, which made it necessary to establish additional units. At certain ports, Assistant Captain of the Port units were replaced by Captains of the Port, and the number of Assistant Captains of the Port was augmented. Originally, only an organizational framework had existed. By the beginning of 1943, there were 75 Captains of the Port and about 90 Assistant COPTs. At the end of the fiscal year 1943, there were 99 Captains of the Port and 146 Assistants. However, about this time a great demand arose for Coast Guardsmen at sea, and the shore establishment suffered as manpower was withdrawn from Port Security activities. This was, however, largely made up through the use of Temporary Reservists. Some units were discontinued, and as of 25 February, 1944, Captains of the Port had been reduced in number to 75, and Assistants to 91. A list of Captains of the Port and Assistant Captains of the Port at the time of ultimate development as well as a map showing the location of such units in the United States and its possessions will be found in Part IV, on Organization.

GROWTH IN NUMBER
OF TRAILER PUMPS;
FLOATING UNITS

At the inception of the Port Security program, no fireboats were available to the Coast Guard, and the total number of fireboats operated by the various ports was less than 40. As of 25 February, 1944, the Coast Guard manned and operated a fleet of 253 fireboats, each having a pumping capacity of at least 2,000 gallons per minute. In addition, some patrol craft had been equipped with pumps, though capacity did not usually exceed 500 gallons. Patrol and picket boats assigned to Port Security functions totaled 1,872 as of 1 July, 1943. On that date, the Coast Guard also manned and operated 260 trailer fire pump units especially adapted to combat waterfront fires.

THE VOLUNTEER PORT
SECURITY FORCES

To make additional Coast Guard personnel available for sea duty, Volunteer Port Security Forces were organized in 22 ports, (17 as of 25 February, 1944). These organizations were composed of men not subject

to other military duties who volunteered their services on a part time basis. They were trained in Port Security duties and served under the Captains of the Port. As the number of hours which the members of these forces worked each week was limited, it was variously estimated that from 5 to 7 volunteers were necessary to replace one full time Coast Guardsman. These forces and other units of the Temporary Reserve are treated in later sections of the monograph.

AN INTEGRATED AND
UNIFORM SYSTEM

Substantial success was achieved in integrating this far-flung Port Security organization into a coordinated and relatively uniform system for port protection. The Captains of the Port were carefully instructed as to Headquarters policies. To keep Headquarters informed, all Captains of the Port were required to submit complete Port Security plans describing all conditions in their ports, including statements concerning equipment, all security measures being taken, any special problems, other relevant information, and charts sufficient to give Headquarters a complete view of the situation at each port. All COPTs were further required to submit monthly form reports setting forth all changes during the period covered, as well as reports of all agreements entered into with other Government agencies. In order to further coordinate Port Security activities, a District Port Security Officer was appointed in each District. These officers were called to Headquarters at intervals for conferences to report on Port Security conditions in their Districts and to receive and exchange information concerning new methods and procedures.

PORT SECURITY
TRAINING

One of the great difficulties in the Port Security program was lack of properly trained personnel. Therefore, it was necessary to establish schools for the training of personnel assigned to this duty. The Fort McHenry School at Baltimore was acquired for this purpose, and was an excellent means of educating field personnel in the more modern Port Security methods. An officer of the Port Security Division presented a short course of lectures to all reserve officer candidates at the Coast Guard Academy. A training course for officers engaged in supervising the loading of explosives was also conducted.

PROVISIONS FOR
AIR RAIDS
AND BLACKOUTS

With the expanded Port Security organization, it was necessary to insure proper compliance on the part of everyone with air raid regulations. The War Department and the Office of Civilian Defense had issued regulations for air raids and blackouts providing that measures to be taken by vessels would be prescribed by the Navy Department. Accordingly, "Air Raid and Blackout Regulations for Vessels, Harbors, Ports, and Waterfront Facilities" were issued by the Coast Guard on 2 February, 1943, and distributed in pamphlet form. These provided a complete code of measures to be taken by owners, operators and masters of vessels in cases of such emergency. This was integrated with War Department and Office of Civilian Defense regulations, and dealt with all vessels in navigable waters within the Eastern and Southern Defense Commands, and contained special rules for vessels under way, anchored, or at dock, and general rules for measures to be taken upon piers and wharves.

PUBLICATION OF
COAST GUARD REGULATIONS

It was, of course, highly desirable that all directly concerned were familiar

with the Coast Guard Regulations relating to security of the port. Every effort was made, therefore, to publicize the regulations. They were printed in small pocket-size pamphlets for distribution to ships' officers, operators, and other interested parties. Posters were placed upon waterfront structures and vessels in large numbers. They were translated into 9 languages for distribution to foreign crews, and enlisted men proficient in various foreign languages were assigned to this detail in leading ports.

CODIFICATION OF REGULATIONS

Beginning about August, 1942, all existing regulations for the security of vessels and waterfront facilities were recodified and consolidated in the Anchorage Regulations. Included were basic uniform regulations governing such matters as movement licenses for vessels operating within and beyond local waters, identification requirements for persons going on vessels or waterfront facilities, rules controlling the handling of explosives and inflammable liquids, anchorage descriptions and regulations for port, as well as general security provisions. These were issued by the Secretary of the Navy and approved by the President. In November, 1942, a 150-page bound volume of these regulations was furnished to all District Coast Guard Officers and Captains of the Port, as well as to other interested persons. Subsequently, there were over 50 amendments to the anchorage regulations. The most important constituted an entire new body of law and was designed to afford continuous protection for vessels while in port. Revisions were based on hearings before the Merchant Marine Council, comments submitted in writing by representatives of governmental agencies, ship operators, and such, and by a special committee of personnel attached to the Port Security Division, the Marine Inspection Division, and the Legal Division of the Coast Guard. A redescription of anchorages in all ports was another major amendment. Previous anchorage descriptions had not been corrected or revised for many years.

PENALTIES AND PROSECUTIONS: LEGAL PROBLEMS

The first legal problem of the Port Security program was the legal authority for the entire operation. Legal authority was based upon the Espionage Act, Section I, Title II, and also Executive Order No. 9074. The Espionage Act authorized issuance of regulations for the anchorage and movement of vessels. The Executive Order directed the Secretary of the Navy to provide orders and regulations for the safeguarding of ports and waterfront facilities. The Espionage Act and the regulations issued under it carried criminal penalties, and a violator could be jailed, fined, or both. A vessel involved in a violation could be seized and forfeited to the United States. The Executive Order, however, carried no criminal penalties. A guard could be posted or a patrol boat assigned to keep persons or vessels out of certain areas by the use of force; violators could be fired upon. But it was not possible to compel persons to clean up a pier which constituted a fire hazard, or was otherwise dangerous. About all that could be done was seizure of the pier for use of the United States, or prevention of vessels using it, yet all piers were needed. However, legal authority on which the Port Security program was based, was very broad, and control of the "anchorage and movement of vessels" under the Espionage Act permitted legal regulations under which almost anything needed could be done. Under the anchorage regulations there were a good many successful prosecutions. The lack of force to require compliance under Executive Order No. 9074 was remedied by law enacted 7 July, 1943, which provided criminal penalties for violations.

BUMBOAT SUPERVISION

A minor, but nevertheless important activity which came under the COTP was supervision of boats carrying passengers and crew members to and from ships in the harbors. This was in the nature of intelligence duties, in cooperation with the District Coast Guard Intelligence Officers. Where this was done, work commenced for the most part in 1942. Men were stationed at landings used by these bumboats. They checked identification of the men being transported and their business on board, it having been found early in the war that many solicitors and unauthorized persons were boarding these vessels. Bumboat operators furnished the Captains of the Port with lists of persons carried, and these were checked against suspect lists of the District Intelligence Office. Landings were allowed only at specified places.

REMARKABLE UNIFORMITY

Considering the wide variety of duties performed by Captains of the Port, in the ports all over the United States coasts, each with its own varying problems and local conditions, a remarkable degree of uniformity in operations was achieved. Cooperation with fire and police departments and other agencies was almost uniformly good.

ULTIMATE SCOPE OF PORT SECURITY

TWO YEARS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

During the two years following assumption of Port Security responsibilities by the Coast Guard, a program of broad scope had been placed in operation. The outstanding developments in this program during these two years were:

- (a) The codification of uniform regulations of national scope for the protection of all ports and vessels in port.
- (b) The development of a broad fire prevention and fire-fighting program.
- (c) The development of a system of liaison and cooperation with other Government agencies concerned with security problems and the delineation of responsibility and jurisdiction between them.
- (d) The development of the Coast Guard Port Security activities into a coordinated and uniform national plan rather than one of local cognizance.

Regulations governing the security of ports, the control of vessels, the security of vessels in port, the transportation and loading of military explosives on vessels, and the blackout and air raid measures to be taken by vessels and waterfront facilities had been promulgated and covered all American ports. The regulations had been printed in pamphlet form and distributed to the public interested, and the enforcement of these regulations in all ports had resulted in a substantially uniform Port Security program. Statutes had provided criminal penalties for violations. It is difficult to list the accomplishments of this program, because its success is evidenced by the absence of injury rather than by any concrete physical results which can be seen and counted. The entire program was PREVENTIVE, and it is impossible to set down any comprehensive record of what was prevented. Its success may be indicated by what did not happen. During this two-year period when Coast Guard

expansion took place and Captain of the Port activities reached their peak virtually no injury or damage of great importance occurred to any vessel or facility for which the Coast Guard was responsible.

OBJECTIVE OF THE PROGRAM

The objective of the Port Security program was, of course, to protect all ports, harbors, vessels, and waterfront facilities from injuries from any cause. To attain this, all COTPs instituted the following:

- (a) Control of the anchorage and movement of all vessels in port.
- (b) Issuance of Coast Guard identification cards and supervision of ingress and egress to vessels and waterfront facilities.
- (c) Fire prevention measures, including inspections, recommendations, and enforcement.
- (d) Fire-fighting activities, including use of fireboats, trailer pumps, and other extinguishing agents.
- (e) Supervision of the loading and stowage of explosives and military ammunition.
- (f) Boarding and examination of vessels in port.
- (g) Sealing of vessels' radios.
- (h) Licensing of vessels for movement in local waters and departure therefrom.
- (i) Guarding of important facilities.
- (j) Enforcement of all regulations governing vessels and waterfront security.
- (k) Maintenance of water patrols.
- (l) General enforcement of Federal laws on navigable waters, and other miscellaneous duties.

Despite the desire for uniformity, local conditions sometimes dictated a departure from customary regulations or procedure, and any necessary variations received approval from Headquarters.

COLLABORATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES

As has been pointed out, the Coast Guard worked in collaboration with other Government agencies concerned with shipping and security activities to assure maximum efficiency of operations. Close liaison and mutual assistance were developed with the Navy, War, Justice, State and Interior Departments, Office of Civilian Defense, Petroleum Administrator for War, War Shipping Administration, Federal Power Commission, Office of Price Administration, Office of War Information, and others. In addition, port security programs were prepared by the Coast Guard for Brazil and Canada, and a basic program developed which was adopted by the Committee on Political Defense at Montivideo, Uruguay and distributed to all Latin American Governments with the recommendation that it be put into operation.

FIRE PREVENTION ACTIVITIES

During the two-year period to February, 1944, the fireboat fleet under Captains of the Port grew from 52 to 253, and comprised the largest organization of its kind in the world. A large number of trailer pumps and other fire-fighting apparatus were distributed to the ports. In each port a fire prevention program was instituted, and these alleviated a large propor-

tion of existing fire hazards. Coast Guard personnel and fire apparatus responded to 75% of all waterfront alarms and extinguished or assisted in extinguishing 41% of all actual waterfront fires. This program averted substantial waterfront and vessel losses.

IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE PORT SECURITY MEASURES

The security of the Nation's ports against normal hazards to which shipping and waterfronts are exposed is an economic requirement in times of peace. In wartime, Port Security becomes a strategic necessity. The "bridge of ships," extending from the homeland to distant fronts is supported by the war ports that are an essential element in the military service of supply. Through these channels must pass the bulk of personnel, munitions, and equipment destined for offensive action. Since the safeguarding of United States ports against sabotage and the results of carelessness and negligence is a primary component of offensive operations overseas, any interruption to the steady flow of troops and war materials or the destruction of port facilities from any cause is, in effect, an attack from the rear that might seriously hamper frontline action.

MAGNITUDE OF THE JOB

The periodic revision of Coast Guard Headquarters' plans for Port Security was governed by military considerations that demanded complete flexibility and readjustments to changing strategic situations. As shifts in offensive operations occurred the Coast Guard, in its role of coordinator of port activities, had to be ready well in advance to provide the means of expediting an accelerated movement of men and war materials through the Nation's vital outlets, its major war ports. The size of the Port Security job is indicated by the fact that within the continental United States alone there were more than 21,000 miles of port waterfront with approximately 8,000 waterfront facilities and millions of square feet of docks, piers, and other storage and loading space. Eventually, there were about 100 Captains of the Port and about 150 Assistant Captains of the Port established at our ports. From one-fifth to one-quarter of the entire Coast Guard personnel was required to safeguard these littoral establishments. These heavy responsibilities required more men than the Coast Guard was able to muster from its regular ranks and yet, those whom it did have were urgently needed in combat areas and at sea. It was into this picture that the growing numbers of Temporary Reservists began to fit so well, releasing men for duty elsewhere, and taking over, gradually, the various Port Security responsibilities without the slightest loss of efficiency.

THE TEMPORARY RESERVE

Establishment of the Coast Guard Reserve, and provisions for Reserves (Temporary) have been mentioned on page 4. Although the first "Temporary Reservists" were enrolled chiefly for Coastal Picket duty for periods of specified numbers of months on a full time, full pay basis, in mid-1942 enrollment began of civilian members of the Coast Guard Auxiliary on a part time, no pay basis (Class E). These were all "boat men." Soon thereafter, the "Philadelphia Plan" for Volunteer Port Security Forces" got under way (covered in detail in later paragraphs) drawing personnel from civilians having no connections with the Auxiliary, and serving on a part time, no pay basis. These men, Auxiliary and non-Auxiliary, were drawn from all walks of life. They were volunteers in the strictest sense, but on enrollment became subject to Rules and Regulations for the Government of the Navy, and subject to court martial and military discipline while on duty. While on duty, they were an integral part of the Coast Guard,

and under rules and regulations were no different from regular or full-time Reserve members. They had the same authority in accordance with rating or rank as the others. They were patriotic men wishing to do their utmost for their country at war. Most were, for some reason, ineligible for service with the "regulars." Average age was 40 or more. Virtually all were employed in civilian jobs, and contributed a minimum of 12 hours of duty each week. They underwent rigid training. Eventually, Temporary Reservists on a volunteer basis numbered over 50,000, released an estimated 8,200 regular Coast Guardsmen for sea and combat duty, assumed the major portion of pier guard and harbor patrol duties, performed a wide range of other duties, and became an extremely important factor in the security of our ports. They became an integral part of the Port Security forces under the Captains of the Port.

SUBDIVISION OF
PORT SECURITY WORK
IN WHICH
TEMPORARY RESERVISTS
WERE ACTIVE

The various subdivisions of Port Security activity in which Temporary Reservists were used may be summarized. While in each particular District, all these Port Security activities were not necessarily covered by Temporary Reservists, taken as a whole, Temporary Reserve functions did cover the entire field of Port Security. There was no phase of this activity in which, in one District or another, the Temporary Reservists did not function.

- (a) Clearance and Anchorage
- (b) Explosives Loading Supervision
- (c) Fire Division
- (d) Identification Division
- (e) Communications (COTF)
- (f) Boarding
- (g) Harbor Patrol
- (h) Plant Guards (C. G. Police)
- (i) Guard Details, pier, ship, etc.
- (j) Pilots
- (k) Miscellaneous

Probably the broadest coverage by "TRs" (as they were called) in any one District was that of the First Naval District wherein TRs contributed service to every Port Security activity.

AUXILIARY MEMBERS
AND THEIR VESSELS


Auxiliary members were almost entirely concerned with water patrols, although members of the Auxiliary Districts served also in guard detail duty. Not all members of the Auxiliary shifted to the Temporary Reserve, but for the most part such members found themselves inactive after 1 January, 1943. Water patrols by Auxiliarists continued for a while in the Third and Thirteenth Districts. Those who shifted, (and who formed the major portion of the Temporary Reservists aside from the Volunteer Port Security Forces) retained their Auxiliary membership. Statistics on the number of Auxiliary members, and Auxiliary vessels, in relation to the value of waterfront property, linear feet of wharfage and tons of waterborne traffic are illuminating.

NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF THE AUXILIARY AS OF MARCH, 1943, PER:

District	\$1 Million of 1942 Value of Waterfront Property	Linear Feet of Wharfage (in Thousands)	Million Tons of Waterborne Traffic	Average
Boston (1)	16.8	11.9	96.3	41.7
New York (3)	4.4	4.2	23.4	10.7
Philadelphia (4)	8.1	3.8	12.2	8.0
Norfolk (5)	10.5	2.6	15.1	9.4
Charleston (6)	5.4	8.1	50.0	21.2
Miami (7)	3.4	12.0	7.5	7.6
New Orleans (8)	1.6	2.5	5.2	3.1
Cleveland (9-C1)	12.1	7.8	19.0	13.0
Chicago (9Ch)	4.9	3.4	24.1	10.8
St. Louis (9-SL)	2.5	3.6	14.3	6.8
Long Beach - L. A. (11)	15.6	9.7	59.3	28.2
San Francisco (12)	4.5	2.0	16.2	7.6
Seattle (13)	5.3	6.8	43.0	18.4
Honolulu (14)	1.5	0.7	37.2	13.1



HOT WORK!
STANDING FIRE WATCH WHEN WELDING AND CUTTING WERE BEING DONE
WAS ONE OF MANY DUTIES PERFORMED BY TEMPORARY RESERVISTS



SPARS RELIEVED MANY MEN FOR SEA DUTY
MISS MARJORIE G. TAYLOR, SECRETARY TO A WASHINGTON D. C. UTILITIES EXECUTIVE
IS WELCOMED INTO THE WOMEN'S RESERVE BY CHIEF BOATSWAIN'S MATE HUNTER WOOD, ARTIST,
AND WARRANT MACHINIST JAMES D. FOX OF UNIONTOWN, PENNSYLVANIA

NUMBER OF AUXILIARY VESSELS AS OF MARCH, 1943, PER:

District	\$1 Million of 1942 Value of Waterfront Property	Linear Feet of Wharfage (in Thousands)	Million Tons of Waterborne Traffic	Average	Combined Average Members and Vessels
Boston (1)	8.9	6.2	52.3	22.5	32.1
New York (3)	1.9	2.0	10.7	4.9	7.5
Philadelphia (4)	4.8	2.7	8.0	5.2	6.6
Norfolk (5)	6.6	2.3	11.1	6.7	8.1
Charleston (6)	3.3	5.7	40.0	16.3	18.8
Miami (7)	2.6	7.0	69.2	26.3	16.9
New Orleans (8)	1.1	1.8	3.5	2.1	2.6
Cleveland (9-Cl)	2.9	2.2	5.1	3.4	8.2
Chicago (9-Ch)	8.8	6.0	42.7	19.2	15.0
St. Louis (9-SL)	1.9	3.0	11.2	5.4	6.1
Long Beach - L. A. (11)	9.3	6.6	40.0	18.6	23.4
San Francisco (12)	2.3	1.8	9.0	4.4	6.0
Seattle (13)	1.9	2.8	17.3	7.3	12.3
Honolulu (14)	0.8	1.4	20.0	7.4	10.2

While the above figures give an excellent idea of the relative Auxiliary activity in men and vessels in the various Districts, the significance of the averages may be questioned, since these averages might indicate a small port in relation to Auxiliary numbers, or a large or small number of Auxiliaries for a large port. Yet, it is evident that Boston lead regarding Auxiliary activity, while New Orleans was by far the least active, even less active relatively, than Honolulu. The above figures should not be confused with those relating to Temporary Reserve activity, which was distinct.

A PROBLEM FOR ORGANIZATION

The varied nature of the Captain of the Port duties in each of the many Naval Districts and the need for as great uniformity as possible in the conduct of operations, called for careful organization from the Commandant down to each branch of activity in each port. Organization was not accomplished over night; it required months of careful, tedious planning, much trial and error, many revisions, and adjustments to local conditions. The organization of the Port Security establishment is discussed in Part IV, which follows.

PART IV

ORGANIZATION

ORGANIZATION MATTERS DURING PERIOD OF GROWTH

GENERAL SET-UP AT TIME OF PEARL HARBOR

It will be remembered that considerable expansion in Coast Guard activity had occurred during the prewar era from 1939 to late 1941. In order properly to discharge the new and increasing duties of the Captains of the Port, certain organizational changes were necessary. It was a period of trial and error. After World War I, there were 10 Captains of the Port. There was relatively little change in these until war clouds gathered in the late 1930's. Traffic incidental to the war in Europe increased use of anchorages and the movement of explosives, and by November, 1940, the number of COTPs had grown; on the fifth of that month, 29 were designated at key ports. (See Page 8). The next step in expansion of the activity took place on 25 March, 1941, when 37 "Headquarters ports" were designated including most of the 29 "key ports." Sub-ports under the Headquarters ports were specified.

As of 15 August, 1941, this was changed, and a Captain of the Port was designated for each Coast Guard District, and Aides to the Captain of the Port were established in the other important ports. The next change came on 3 November, 1941, immediately on transfer of the Coast Guard to the Navy. The District Commanders assumed title of "Senior Coast Guard Officer," and this was soon changed to "District Coast Guard Officer." Geographical limits of the Coast Guard Districts were altered to conform with the respective Naval Districts. For the administration and operation of the Coast Guard, the United States, including its territories and insular possessions (except the Philippines) and the waters adjacent, became a single Coast Guard Division, and previous divisions and sections were abolished. Headquarters organization at Washington, D. C., remained as before. In December, 1941, the title "Aide to Captain of the Port" became "Assistant Captain of the Port." The geographic subdivisions of the Coast Guard at the time of Pearl Harbor were:

United States (including territories, possessions, etc.)

A single Division, under the Commandant

Boston District Under

Boston District	"Senior Coast Guard Officer"
New York District	"
Philadelphia District	"
Norfolk District	"
Jacksonville District	"
New Orleans District	"
San Juan (PR)	"
Cleveland District	"
Chicago District	"
St. Louis District	"
San Francisco District	"
(Los Angeles under San Francisco)	"
Seattle District	"
Juneau District	"
(Later Ketchikan)	"
Honolulu District	"

On 7 December, 1941, there was one Captain of the Port in each District, with his Aides in the more important ports of his District carrying out operations having to do with anchorage matters and explosives loading. A commissioned officer, warrant officer, or chief petty officer usually was designated in charge of each of these divisions of activity, depending

upon personnel available and the importance of the activity at the particular port.

SUBSEQUENT DISTRICT CHANGES

With the advent of war, and transfer of the Coast Guard to the Navy, together with the realignment of the Districts, use of the term "Coast Guard Districts" ceased, and the term "Naval Districts" was used throughout the war with respect to Coast Guard operations. Until 1 December, 1940, the Third District (New York) included Philadelphia. Then, however, that area broke away and became the Fourth Naval District, with its own District Coast Guard Officer. The Sixth District, with headquarters at Charleston, South Carolina, and its own District Coast Guard Officer, became a reality. Alaska continued for a while as part of the Seattle (Thirteenth) District, but with its own "Senior Coast Guard Officer;" this eventually broke away and became the Seventeenth Naval District with its District Coast Guard Officer and headquarters at Ketchikan. There were no further changes in the Districts themselves, although the Ninth Naval District, including the Great Lakes and mid-western rivers, had three subdivisions, St. Louis, Cleveland and Chicago, each with a District Coast Guard Officer. The "Ninth Chicago District" was merged into the Ninth Cleveland District on 31 December, 1943.

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

As has been indicated, in time of war the Commandant of the Coast Guard receives his directives and orders from the Secretary of the Navy, through the Chief of Naval Operations. From here, the chain of command ordinarily runs from the Commandant to the District Coast Guard Officer, and in turn from the District Coast Guard Officer to the Commanding Officer of a particular operating or logistics unit. In the matter of Port Security, there were some variations as between the Districts, due to the fact that some Districts established Sections (mentioned later). Where there were no Sections, the chain of command ran from the District Coast Guard Officer direct to the Captains of the Port, and through them to the Assistant Captains of the Port. In Districts where there were Sections, the chain ran from District Coast Guard Officer to Section Coast Guard Officer and from him to the Captains of the Port in his jurisdiction. Subsequently, District Port Security Officers were designated who came between the District Coast Guard Officer and the Captains of the Port or Section Coast Guard Officers, as the case might be, though the Port Security Officer was more of a coordinator than a commanding officer of a unit, and, to all intents and purposes, the chain of command did not change with his advent. The District Coast Guard Officer also came under the military control of the corresponding Naval District Commandant, although on the detailed administration of his District he reported directly to the Commandant.

CHAIN OF COMMAND FROM COTP DOWN

The Captain of the Port, as has been seen, was the chief operational officer in his port and in the waters coming under his jurisdiction. All matters of Coast Guard Port Security were his responsibility in his area. It is evident from the foregoing account that his duties were many and varied, and of such a nature that each separate activity was worthy of a specialist in charge. Especially in the earlier days, available officers and chief petty officers were scarce, and it was difficult to obtain entirely qualified personnel. This, however, was corrected as time went on and as training programs were instituted. In virtually all ports having Captains of the Port or Assistant Captains of the Port, the subdivisions of

activity were the same. Each division of activity had in charge a commissioned officer, warrant officer or chief petty officer, depending upon the importance of the port and its activities, and such officer-in-charge was directly responsible to the Captain of the Port, or the Assistant. These activities, or divisions, were as follows:

Harbor and/or Inlet Patrol
Law Division
Explosives Division
Fire Division
Pier Division
Ship Inspection; Guards
Ship Clearance Division
Ship Anchorage Division
Communications Division
Identification Division
Pilots

In some of the smaller ports, because of limited officer personnel or because of limited operations, it was practicable to have a single officer in charge of two or more divisions. In some ports, the Captain of the Port or the Assistant directed one or more divisions. In the Third Naval District, the Captain of the Port of New York handled an ordnance division through an appropriate officer for a period, and this division related only to ordnance connected with COTP activities. The Captains of the Port at Seattle and Honolulu had, for a time, an Intelligence Division concerned only with intelligence matters relating to COTP activity, but these were later transferred to the regular Coast Guard Intelligence offices when they were established. Pilots, in most cases, operated directly under the Captain of the Port, but in close cooperation with the Navy Port Director. In some ports, however, the pilots came directly under the District Coast Guard Officer, and were not responsible to the Captain of the Port. This distinction was dictated usually by local circumstances, and it seemed to make little difference which chain of command was adopted.

THE ULTIMATE IN CAPTAIN OF THE PORT UNITS

Not only in organization, but in the establishment of COTP units at various ports, trial and error was the rule throughout most of the war. The earlier Captain of the Port units have been mentioned, but as the war tempo increased, and traffic in the many ports changed, additional units were established. In still others, traffic diminished, and units were discontinued. Some, originally established as Assistant Captains of the Port became Captains of the Port, and vice versa. There was nothing static about this organization. It varied according to local needs, and according to the ideas of new COTPs relieving previous commands. For instance, in the Thirteenth (Seattle) District, there was originally one "floating" COTP on board the CGC ONONDAGA; this was expanded to 2, then to 3, then to a maximum of 10, then contracted to 6, later to 2, finally to one. However, in that District COTPs or ACOTPs were established at 20 places at one time or another, though 10 was the maximum existing at any one time. The greatest concentrations of COTPs or ACOTPs were in the First Naval District and the Thirteenth. Following is a complete list of Captain of the Port and Assistant Captain of the Port units, by Districts. Some were established and discontinued before others were established, and all were not in existence at any one time. Dates of discontinuance are given in cases where the dates are known. In all cases, Assistant Captains of the Port came under jurisdiction of some Captain of the Port. This is indicated where jurisdiction has been determined from available records.

FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT

<u>Name of Unit</u>	<u>Date of Discontinuance</u>
COTP Rockland, Maine (Rockland Section)	31 Oct. 1944
ACOTP Lubec, Maine	30 Sept. 1944
ACOTP Bangor, Maine	30 Sept. 1944
ACOTP Southwest Harbor, Maine	30 Sept. 1944
COTP Portland, Maine (Portland Section)	15 June, 1945
ACOTP Bath, Maine	1 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Biddeford, Maine	1 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Boothbay Harbor, Maine	1 Feb. 1944
* COTP Portsmouth, New Hampshire (Portsmouth Section)	30 Sept. 1944
ACOTP York Harbor, Maine	20 Jan. 1944
COTP Boston, Massachusetts (Boston Section)	
** COTP Cape Cod Canal, Mass. (Provincetown Section)	15 Oct. 1945
ACOTP Provincetown, Mass.	30 Sept. 1944
ACOTP Chatham, Mass.	1 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Plymouth, Mass.	1 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Scituate, Mass.	1 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Hyannis, Mass.	15 Sept. 1943
ACOTP Harwichport, Mass.	30 Sept. 1944
ACOTP Buzzards Bay, Mass.	30 Sept. 1944
COTP Gloucester, Mass (Gloucester Section)	30 Sept. 1944
ACOTP Salem, Mass.	30 Sept. 1944
ACOTP Newburyport, Mass.	31 Oct. 1944
*** COTP Newport, R. I. (Newport Section)	30 Sept. 1944
ACOTP New Bedford, Mass.	30 Sept. 1944
ACOTP Providence, R. I.	30 Sept. 1944
ACOTP Sakonnet, R. I.	9 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Cuttyhunk, Mass.	9 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Vineyard Haven, Mass.	9 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Nantucket, Mass.	9 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Woods Hole, Mass.	9 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Block Island, R. I.	9 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Narragansett, R. I.	9 Feb. 1944

- * On 21 April, 1944, Section consolidated with Gloucester Section
- ** On 1 November, 1944, name changed to Woods Hole Section
- *** On 1 October, 1944, name changed to Cape Cod Section

THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT

COTP New London, Connecticut
COTP New York, New York
ACOTP Bridgeport, Connecticut
ACOTP New Haven, Connecticut
ACOTP Lake Champlain, New York (Burlington, VT.)

FOURTH NAVAL DISTRICT

COTP Philadelphia, Pa.	8 Dec. 1944
COTP Atlantic City, N. J.	8 Dec. 1944
COTP Lewes, Del.	8 Dec. 1944
COTP Wildwood, N. J.	8 Dec. 1944

FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT

COTP Baltimore, Maryland	
COTP Norfolk, Virginia	
COTP Morehead City, N. C.	15 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Elizabeth City, N. C.	Dec. 1943

SIXTH NAVAL DISTRICT

<u>Name of Unit</u>	<u>Date of Discontinuance</u>
COTP Wilmington, N. C.	Sept. 1945
ACOTP Wrightsville Beach, N.C.	
ACOTP Southport, N. C.	
COTP Charleston, S. C.	
COTP Savannah, Ga.	
ACOTP Beaufort, S. C.	25 Oct. 1944
ACOTP Georgetown, S. C.	24 Oct. 1944
ACOTP Brunswick, Ga.	
COTP Jacksonville, Fla.	
ACOTP Fernandina, Fla.	

SEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

COTP St. Augustine, Fla. (St. Augustine Section(a))	Oct. 1944
ACOTP New Smyrna, Fla. (New Smyrna Section)	Oct. 1944
ACOTP Banana River, Fla. (Canaveral Section) (b)	Oct. 1944
ACOTP Fort Pierce, Fla. (Fort Pierce Section)	Oct. 1944
ACOTP West Palm Beach, Fla. (Palm Beach Section) (c)	Oct. 1944
ACOTP Port Everglades, Fla. (Pt. Everglades Section)	8 June, 1945
COTP Miami, Florida (Miami Section)	Oct. 1944
COTP Key West, Fla. (Key West Section)	Oct. 1944
ACOTP Everglades, Fla. (Cape Romano Section)(d)	Oct. 1944
ACOTP Fort Myers, Fla. (Fort Myers Section) (e)	Oct. 1944
COTP Tampa, Fla. (Tampa Section)	8 June, 1945
ACOTP Tarpon Springs, Fla. (Tarpon Spr. Sec.)(e)(f)	Oct. 1944
ACOTP Cedar Keys, Fla. (Cedar Keys Section) (f) (e)	Oct. 1944
ACOTP St. Marks, Fla. (St. Marks Section) (e)	Oct. 1944

- (a) Merged with New Smyrna Section Dec. 1943
- (b) Merged with Fort Pierce Section Fall of 1943
- (c) Merged with Ft. Everglades Sec. Dec. 1943
- (d) Merged with Miami Section Dec. 1943
- (e) Merged with Tampa Section Dec. 1943
- (f) Merged with St. Marks Section Fall of 1943

NOTE: Original Sections were: Tampa
Key West
Miami
St. Augustine

A Section Coast Guard Officer was in charge of these four areas after late summer, 1942.

EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICT

COTP New Orleans, La.	Late 1945
ACOTP Pass a Loutre, La.	29 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Houma, La.	15 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Grande Isle, La.	11 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Morgan City, La.	15 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Buras, La. *	15 Feb. 1944
COTP Panama City, Fla.	Early 1944
ACOTP Port St. Joe, Fla.	7 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Appalachicola, Fla.	Early 1944
COTP Mobile, Ala.	Late 1945
ACOTP Pensacola, Fla.	29 Feb. 1944
COTP Pascagoula, Miss.	Early 1944

* Mostly for river patrol in boats

EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICT (CONT.)

<u>Name of Unit</u>	<u>Date of Discontinuance</u>
ACOTP Biloxi, Miss	29 Feb. 1944
ACOTP Gulfport, Miss.	29 Feb. 1944
COTP Baton Rouge, La.	Early 1944
ACOTP Vicksburg, Miss.	Early 1944
COTP Port Arthur, Texas	Late 1945
ACOTP Beaumont, Texas	Before Early 1944
ACOTP Orange, Texas	Before Early 1944
ACOTP Lake Charles, La.	Before Early 1944
COTP Houston, Texas	Late 1945
COTP Galveston, Texas	Late 1945
ACOTP Texas City, Texas	Before Early 1944
ACOTP Freeport, Texas	15 Feb. 1944
COTP Corpus Christi, Texas	Late 1945
ACOTP Port Aransas, Texas	Before Early 1944
ACOTP Port O'Connor, Texas	29 Feb. 1944
COTP Brownsville, Texas	Before Early 1944

NINTH NAVAL DISTRICTSt. Louis District

COTP St. Louis, Mo.	
COTP Cairo, Ill.	June, 1944
COTP Memphis, Tenn.	
COTP Cincinnati, Ohio	
COTP Pittsburgh, Pa.	
COTP Rock Island, Ill.	June, 1944
COTP St. Paul, Minn.	
COTP Sheffield, Ala.	
COTP Chattanooga, Tenn.	
COTP Peoria, Ill.	
COTP Nashville, Tenn.	June, 1944
ACOTP Paducah, Ken.	15 Nov. 1944

Chicago District

COTP Chicago, Ill.	
COTP Milwaukee, Wis.	15 Oct. 1944
COTP Manitowoc, Wis.	15 Oct. 1944
COTP Sturgeon Bay, Wis.	15 Oct. 1944
COTP Green Bay, Wis.	15 Oct. 1944
COTP Escanaba, Mich.	15 Oct. 1944
COTP Charlevoix, Mich.	15 Oct. 1944
COTP Ludington, Mich.	15 Oct. 1944
COTP Muskegon, Mich.	15 Oct. 1944
COTP St. Joseph, Mich.	15 Oct. 1944

Cleveland District

COTP Cleveland, Ohio	
COTP Duluth, Minn.	15 Oct. 1944
COTP Marquette, Mich.	15 Oct. 1944
COTP Sault Ste. Marie, Mich.	15 Oct. 1944
COTP Detroit, Mich.	15 Oct. 1944
COTP Erie, Pennsylvania	15 Oct. 1944
COTP Buffalo, New York	15 Oct. 1944
COTP Oswego, New York	15 Oct. 1944
COTP Bay City, Mich.	15 Oct. 1944
COTP Grand Haven, Mich.	15 Oct. 1944
ACOTP Ogdensburg, New York	
ACOTP Clayton, New York	
ACOTP Sandusky, Ohio	
ACOTP Toledo, Ohio	
ACOTP Lorain, Ohio	
ACOTP Port Huron, Mich.	

TENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

<u>Name of Unit</u>	<u>Date of Discontinuance</u>
COTP San Juan, Puerto Rico	
COTP Charlotte Amalie, Virgin Islands	
ACOTP Christiansted, Virgin Islands	
ACOTP Isabella Segunda	
ACOTP Culebra	
ACOTP Ensenada Honda, Puerto Rico	
ACOTP Pajardo, Puerto Rico	
ACOTP Jobos, Puerto Rico	
ACOTP Guanica, Puerto Rico	
ACOTP Guayanilla, Puerto Rico	
ACOTP Arecibo, Puerto Rico	
ACOTP Central Aguirre, Puerto Rico	
ACOTP Ponce, Puerto Rico	

ELEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

COTP Los Angeles, California	
ACOTP Santa Barbara, California	
ACOTP Port Hueneque, California	
ACOTP Newport Beach, California	
ACOTP Santa Monica, California	
ACOTP Avalon, (Santa Catalina) California	
COTP San Diego, California	

TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT

COTP San Francisco, California	
COTP Monterey, California	8 Sept. 1945
COTP Eureka, California	8 Sept. 1945
COTP Morro Bay, California	8 Sept. 1945

THIRTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

COTP Seattle, Washington	
COTP Bellingham, Washington	Aug. 1945
COTP Tacoma, Washington	Aug. 1945
COTP Everett, Washington	Aug. 1945
COTP Astoria, Oregon	Aug. 1945
COTP Port Angeles, Washington	Feb. 1944
COTP Aberdeen, Washington	Aug. 1945
COTP Mason City, (Grand Coulee), Washington	Feb. 1944
COTP Portland, Oregon	
(Consolidated with Seattle)	1 October 1944
COTP Marshfield, Oregon	17 June, 1944
ACOTP Friday Harbor, Washington	Feb. 1944
ACOTP South Bend, Oregon	17 June, 1944
ACOTP Anacortes, Washington	17 June, 1944
ACOTP Vancouver, Washington	17 June, 1944
ACOTP Olympia, Washington	Feb. 1944
ACOTP Bonnaville, Washington	Feb. 1944
ACOTP Longview, Washington	Aug. 1945
ACOTP Bremerton, Washington	Feb. 1944
ACOTP Bayview, Washington	Feb. 1944
ACOTP Bayview, Idaho	Feb. 1944

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

COTP Honolulu, Oahu (Established March, 1942)	
COTP Hilo, Hawaii (Established 9 Sept. 1942)	
COTP Kauai (and Nihoa) (Established 7 Oct. 1942)	
COTP Maui (and Molokai, Lanai, and Kaloolowe (Established 6 Jan. 1943)	

SEVENTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

<u>Name of Unit</u>	<u>Date of Discontinuance</u>
COTP Ketchikan, Alaska	
ACOTP Kodiak, Alaska (*)	
ACOTP Whittier, Alaska	
ACOTP Anchorage, Alaska (*)	
ACOTP Juneau, Alaska	
ACOTP Sitka, Alaska	
ACOTP Wrangell, Alaska (*)	
ACOTP Craig, Alaska (*)	
ACOTP Excursion Inlet, Alaska	1 June, 1944
ACOTP Cordova, and Dutch Harbor, Alaska	
ACOTP Skagway, Alaska (*)	
ACOTP Seward, Alaska (*)	
ACOTP Nome, Alaska	
ACOTP Petersburg, Alaska (*)	

(*) Indicated, but not verified.

MISCELLANEOUS

Potomac River Command (Under Fifth Naval District Coast Guard Officer)

COTP Washington, D. C. 31 May, 1945

Seyvern River Naval Command (Under Fifth Naval District Coast Guard Officer)

COTP Baltimore, Maryland (duplicates)
ACOTP Annapolis, Maryland (Naval Academy)

CHARTS ON LOCATIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF CAPTAINS OF THE PORT

Following this page are two charts relating to Captain of the Port organization. The first is a map of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, showing the locations of Captains of the Port and Assistant Captains of the Port as outlined in the preceding paragraph. The former are shown with solid circles, the latter with open circles. The map gives an excellent idea of the complete coverage of ports of importance, and shows how thoroughly the coasts were covered since jurisdiction of each COTP extended to the areas under jurisdiction of the adjacent COTPs. Naval District limits are shown by a straight line across the coast-line. It shows clearly the concentrations in the First (Boston) and Thirteenth (Seattle) Districts. The second chart shows the chain of command and interrelationships between the Secretary of the Navy and the Assistant Captains of the Port. It lists the COTPs and ACOTPs in each District and, at the bottom, indicates the subdivisions of Captain of the Port activity each of which had a commissioned, warrant, or chief petty officer as its officer-in-charge.

GENERAL OUTLINE OF ORGANIZATION

The functions performed by the Coast Guard were, in most instances, actually carried out by individuals operating units such as ships, and air, light, radio, beach patrol, lifeboat and coastal lookout stations, Captain of the Port offices, and marine inspection offices and by individual logistics units such as recruiting, receiving and training stations, repair yards and telephone office systems, and the finance and supply office. The District offices provided central direction and coordination of the performances of activities by individual field units situated within certain prescribed geographical limits. Headquarters planned and coordinated the activities of the several Districts and gave immediate direction to

specific units in the field where such units reported directly to Headquarters, although located within the geographical limits of a particular District. It was the Headquarters policy to keep such units to a minimum. In view of the numerous types of units in the Districts, no standard pattern was provided for the detailed organization and functions of individual units in the Districts. The commanding officers of the individual units were directly responsible to the District Coast Guard Officer (as, for instance, the Captain of the Port), for the performance of the functions assigned to them, except where intermediate levels of command had been established.

RELATIONSHIP OF OFFICE OF OPERATIONS TO PORT SECURITY

The Chief Operations Officer, as head of the Office of Operations and subject to the general direction of the Assistant Commandant, planned

and followed through on administration of the basic operations of the Coast Guard, including the protection of port facilities and vessels within harbors. His was the responsibility for determining operating requirements and the general distribution of personnel, material, and other facilities required for the activities of the Aids to Navigation, Allowance, Aviation, Beach Patrol, Communications, Merchant Marine Inspection, Merchant Marine Personnel, Ordnance and Gunnery, and Port Security Divisions.

THE CHIEF OF THE PORT SECURITY DIVISION

The Chief of the Port Security Division, functioning as a member of the staff of the Chief Operations


Officer, planned and followed through on administration of the program for the protection of the port and harbor facilities and vessels within harbors, including:

- (a) The control of anchorage and movement of merchant vessels within territorial waters of the United States.
- (b) The supervision of the loading and discharge of explosives and other dangerous cargo.
- (c) The development and enforcement of suitable fire prevention measures.
- (d) The provision of fire-fighting facilities supplementing those already available.
- (e) The issuance of identification cards in order to control access to waterfront facilities.
- (f) The operation of shore and harbor patrols in connection with the foregoing activities.

SPECIFIC DUTIES OF THE CHIEF OF THE PORT SECURITY DIVISION

The Chief of the Port Security Division had specific duties which are outlined; They were to:

- (a) Propose for consideration by the Merchant Marine Council rules and regulations governing anchorage and movement of vessels in port, security regulations for the protection of vessels in port and waterfront facilities, and regulations governing the loading, storage, and unloading of explosives and other dangerous cargo and supplies.
- (b) Review operating plans submitted by the District Coast Guard Officers for the carrying out of Port Security responsibilities in the several Districts.



- (c) Formulate plans and procedures designed to coordinate and insure efficiency in the execution of Port Security functions in the several Districts.
- (d) Prepare such directives as might be necessary or appropriate to the effective performance of Port Security activities.
- (e) Certify dangerous articles of ships' stores and supplies for use on board vessels.
- (f) Keep informed, by means of field contacts and otherwise, as to the manner in which Port Security work was being conducted.
- (g) Consider all communications received at Headquarters relating to Port Security matters and prepare replies thereto.
- (h) Review as to operations aspects and make recommendations on requests for personnel, equipment, funds, and facilities for Port Security purposes, anticipate future needs therefor, and prepare data with respect thereto for submission through the Chief Operations Officer to the Chief Personnel Officer, the Engineer in Chief, and the Chief Finance and Supply Officer.
- (i) Establish and maintain liaison with appropriate officers or officials of the Navy, Army, and other public and private agencies interested in or affected by Port Security activities.
- (j) Maintain close working relationships with the heads of other divisions of the Office of Operations to insure coordination of effort and make necessary contacts with other offices and divisions at Headquarters.
- (k) Report from time to time on the status of the Port Security program.

THE DISTRICT PORT SECURITY OFFICERS

After the Captains of the Port had been operating directly under their District Coast Guard Officers for some time, District Port Security Officers were designated. These officers came between the District Coast Guard Officers and the Captains of the Port but, as has been pointed out, were more coordinating officers than officers in command of units. Actually, they relieved the DCOOs of much detail relating to Port Security, and coordinated COTP operations. It is doubtful if, due to their advent, the actual chain of command was altered. These officers were under the direction and supervision of the Assistant District Coast Guard Officers, and in the Coast Guard Organization Manual, it was specified that the Port Security Officer shall:

- (a) Assist the Assistant District Coast Guard Officer in the general direction and supervision of all Coast Guard activities in the District relating to the program for the protection of port and harbor facilities and vessels within harbors, including: (a) the control of anchorage and movement of merchant vessels; (b) the supervision of the loading and discharge of explosives and other dangerous cargo; (c) the development and enforcement of suitable fire-prevention measures; (d) provision of fire-fighting facilities supplementing those already available; (e) issuance of identification cards in order to control access to waterfront facilities; and (f) the operation of shore and harbor patrols in connection with the foregoing activities.

- (b) Consult with and assist individual Captains of the Port in the preparation of operating plan for maintaining security of their respective ports and assemble and analyze these plans.
- (c) Prepare appropriate orders and instructions for the individual Captains of the Port.
- (d) Coordinate the efforts of the several Captains of the Port and assist them in putting into effect rules, regulations, instructions, and other directives involving Port Security activities.
- (e) Keep completely informed by means of field visits, records, and reports of all Port Security activities in the District and of complements, vessels and their equipment, and other facilities employed by each Captain of the Port.
- (f) Advise the District Coast Guard Officer as to the adequacy of pilotage in the District and recommend adjustments that are required.
- (g) Review or initiate requests for personnel, equipment, supplies, and facilities for Port Security purposes, and indicate operating justification for required funds.
- (h) Assist the Captains of the Port in securing the most effective utilization of temporary members of the Reserve.
- (i) Maintain contact with other officers in the District, particularly with the Vessels Operations Officer on procurement and disenrollment of Reserve vessels, the Marine Engineer on vessel repair, the Supply Officer on procurement, the Law Officer on legal problems, the Marine Inspection Officer on the use of marine inspection personnel on Port Security work, and the Temporary Reserve Personnel Officer on matters relating to pilots, Volunteer Port Security Forces, and other temporary members of the Reserve.
- (j) Advise the Personnel Officer as to training needs and assignment of Port Security personnel.
- (k) Be generally informed of the activities and interests of the Army, Navy, Bureau of Customs, Petroleum Coordinator, Office of Civilian Defense, municipal fire and police departments, and other public and private agencies relating to Port Security, and maintain such liaison with these agencies as may be delegated to him.
- (l) Review and recommend action to be taken on local regulations proposed for promulgation by individual Captains of the Port and on suggestions of individual Captains of the Port for formal revision of other rules, regulations, and directives relating to Port Security.
- (m) Review and recommend disposition to be made of appeals on actions taken by individual Captains of the Port.
- (n) Make appropriate reports and recommendations to or through the Assistant Coast Guard Officer.

THE SECTION ORGANIZATION

In certain Districts in accordance with standards prescribed by the Commandant, the District Coast Guard Officer, in order to provide the more effective administration of District activities, appointed Section Coast Guard Officers who were responsible for the over-all supervision of District activities performed within

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specific geographical areas. Where Section organizations were established, the Section Coast Guard Officer operated as the direct representative, within his Section, of the District Coast Guard Officer, and he was responsible for seeing that operations were carried out in the most effective manner in accordance with District plans, and that logistics units were adequately serving the operations activities. Commanding officers of individual units retained their command responsibilities, but the Section Coast Guard Officer was in the chain of command between the District Coast Guard Officer and the commanding officers of individual units in the Section. The Section Coast Guard Officer was not responsible for the technical work being carried out by logistics units. The emphasis throughout was placed on the supervision and coordination of the operating activities of the District units in his area. Specifically, the following basic principals of the Section organization were prescribed:

- (a) The following basic principles will be adhered to by all Coast Guard Districts where the Section plan is established. These principles are prescribed in order to assure uniformity as to the manner in which such Sections function and as to the responsibilities of the Section Coast Guard Officers.
- (b) Except when specifically required by Headquarters, the establishment of Sections within the District is left to the judgment of the District Coast Guard Officer. However, where Sections are established, the principles set forth herein shall be followed.
- (c) The Section organization of a Coast Guard District shall be predicated upon:

1. The division of the District into geographical areas with due regard to operating relations with the Army and Navy; and

2. Placing all District units within such geographical areas under a Section Coast Guard Officer responsible for the over-all supervision of all District activities in his area.

It is contemplated that Sections will ordinarily not be applied to the municipal area of the city in which the District headquarters is located. Moreover, there may be situations where it will be desirable to establish Sections for particular segments of a District and not apply them to other areas.

- (d) It should be noted that Section Coast Guard Officers are expected to concentrate their attention upon the major operational problems in their respective areas. While they should maintain sufficiently close working relationships with the commanding officers of the units in their Sections, to keep apprised as to the general adequacy with which they function, it is not intended that they concern themselves with administrative details or with the technical phases of logistic activities, or that they give detailed supervision to the several units under their command. Similarly, it is not contemplated that Section offices maintain elaborate records or that they absorb from the various units in the Section the preparation of necessary reports and forms or the handling of routine administrative transactions. Thus, such officers should require only nominal staff and office facilities for discharging their responsibilities as Section heads.

- (e) A Section Coast Guard Officer shall be the sen-

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ior Coast Guard Officer in the Section, shall be the direct representative of the District Coast Guard Officer in carrying out the Coast Guard responsibilities of the Sections, and shall have military control over all District personnel in his Section. The responsibilities of the Section Coast Guard Officer, as respecting different types of units under his jurisdiction, will vary according to whether their principal function is operational or logistic in character. With respect to units whose principal function is operational, such as Captain of the Port offices, marine inspection officer, beach patrol stations, coastal lookout stations, lifeboat stations, radio stations, and light stations, the Section Coast Guard Officer shall be responsible for seeing that all operational activities assigned to these units are carried out in the most effective manner; and he shall assist commanding officers of these units in establishing procedures to be followed in carrying out such activities. With respect to units whose principal function is logistic in nature, such as District training stations, receiving stations, recruiting stations, repair yards, telephons system offices, and radio repair shops, the Section Coast Guard Officer shall be responsible for seeing that these units adequately serve the operational activities. He shall not, however, be responsible for the technical work being carried out by any of such units but shall keep informed regarding the general nature and scope of the work carried on.

- (f) In the administration of affairs in the Section, the command responsibilities of the commanding officers of units in the Section shall be maintained. The Section Coast Guard Officer shall, however, be in the line of command between the District Coast Guard Officer and the commanding officer of any individual unit in the Section.

- (g) Routine administrative correspondence and reports and communications on the technical aspects of logistic activities will normally pass directly between the individual units and the District Coast Guard Officer. The Section Coast Guard Officer may direct that copies of certain classes of such communications be submitted to him for information. He should not, however, concern himself with routine administrative reports and correspondence except to the extent necessary to enable adequate over-all supervision of the activities within the Section. Communications relating to operations will ordinarily pass via the Section Coast Guard Officer.

- (h) The commanding officer of a unit will ordinarily look to the District Coast Guard Officer for instructions relating to personnel, pay, mess, equipment, and other administrative matters and will look to the Section Coast Guard Officer for instructions relating to patrol schedules, boat movements, rescue activities, and other operations.

- (i) The duties of a Section Coast Guard may be summarized as follows:

1. Supervise and coordinate the activities of all District units in his area with particular reference to major operating problems.

2. Check on the adequacy with which logistic Units are serving operations.

3. Inspect units as representative of the District Coast Guard Officer.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 4. Submit to District Coast Guard Officer recommendations for increasing efficiency.
 - 5. Report instances of outstanding efficiency.
 - 6. Represent District Coast Guard Officer in conferences with representatives of other public and private agencies.
- (j) The Section Coast Guard Office will be recognized as a distinct unit in the Shore Establishment Operating Plan.

THE EXTENT TO WHICH SECTIONS WERE USED

It has been pointed out that the establishment of Sections was left to the judgment of the District Coast Guard Officer. If he felt operations and his District organization would be aided by such establishment, he could place the Section system in effect throughout his District, or in any portion of it, or if he felt it was not needed, there was no requirement that he establish Sections. Thus the Section system was not at all uniform, and was used only in those Districts or sections of Districts where the DCOG felt it would improve his operations. In the list of Captains of the Port, beginning on page 27, Sections are indicated in cases where records show that they were established. They were used throughout the First Naval District and the Seventh Naval District. In the latter, Sections were set up in November, 1942, and corresponded geographically with the areas under Captains of the Port, and the Captain of the Port were, themselves, the Section Coast Guard Officers. In the First District, Section Coast Guard Officers were, for the most part, officers distinct from the COTPs. In the Third Naval District there were the "Northern New Jersey Section" and the "Long Island Section," but the geographical limits of these are not clear from the records. In the Fourth Naval District the "Atlantic City Section" on the New Jersey coast was the only one established, and this may have included a portion of the Delaware coast. In the Eighth Naval District were the Mobile, Pascagoula, Gulfport, Pensacola, Port Arthur, Galveston and Corpus Christi Sections, and possibly others. In the Ninth St. Louis District, there was the Cincinnati Section, and the Pittsburgh Section was mentioned in reports. There may have been others. Also, Sections were mentioned in connection with the Thirteenth Naval District (Seattle) but no details on geographical limits, Section headquarters, and such, are available.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

One of the policies stressed by the Administrative Management Division was integration of merchant marine inspection activities with other functions of the Coast Guard, particularly Port Security. The Commandant was emphatic about tying in the Captain of the Port units with the District more than seemed to have been the case. There had been a tendency for Captain of the Port units and others to become self-sufficient, and to establish their own intelligence, legal, and other logistics facilities. For instance, in the Fifth Naval District, at Norfolk, a separate pay office had been maintained as part of the Captain of the Port offices from about January, 1943 to March, 1944. This was distinct from the District pay office. About 10 enlisted men and one officer were engaged in this work, and handled all pay accounts, allotment checks, etc. for Captain of the Port personnel. In some cases, however, there had been the opposite tendency for Captain of the Port units to divest themselves of all logistics, including housing of personnel. The use of Volunteer Port Security Forces was also a concern of the Administrative Management Division. This had to do with the establishment of VPSF units in various ports to relieve regular Coast Guardsmen, and this was pushed and

encouraged. The organization of these units was under control of Headquarters, but when efficient, they were turned over to the Districts.

ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT AND THE SECTIONS

This Division favored and encouraged the establishment of Section organizations, though the District Coast Guard Officer could do as he pleased about their establishment. They were not used in the majority of Districts, for many DCOGs apparently feared Section Coast Guard Officers would freeze personnel or transfer them, since they had complete command of their Sections, and generally interfere with things which were the responsibility of the District Coast Guard Officer. The system was satisfactory in the Seventh Naval District and worked well in the First Naval District. The Captain of the Port of Boston was also the Section Coast Guard Officer of Boston, as well as the District Port Security Officer. In referring to this at the Headquarters Conference in June, 1943, he said he liked the system and found it rather handy. He continued; "For instance, as Port Security Officer of the First Naval District, Section Officer, and Captain of the Port, I can write the Security Officer of the Boston District a nasty letter; I can then jump on the Captain of the Port, — because they are all myself!" Of course, under this set-up, this officer had complete control over all officers and men in the Boston Section which was virtually the same as the area coming under jurisdiction of the Captain of the Port.

GROWTH AND DECLINE OF COFF ACTIVITY AT SAN FRANCISCO

Figures for the Twelfth Naval District are a good indication of the growth and gradual decline in Captain of the Port activity, although operations there declined less than on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts in 1944 and 1945, due to the war effort becoming more important in the Pacific. The organization in the District was adjusted in accordance with the change in activity.

Date	Officers	Men	Vehicles	Patrol Boats	Fireboats
Dec. 1941	3	250	2	12	0
March, 1942	8	500	6	17	0
June, 1942	18	700	10	32	3
Sept. 1942	26	985	18	47	3
Dec. 1942	36	1661	31	43	9
March, 1943	35	1870	33	50	13
June, 1943	41	1736	22	33	14
Sept. 1943	40	1545	40	36	14
Dec. 1943	56	1372	45	53	14
March, 1944	62	1366	45	53	15
June, 1944	75	1326	52	51	16
Sept. 1944	67	1266	53	51	16
Dec. 1944	77	1388	68	54	17
March, 1945	74	1370	72	51	16
June 1945	87	1600	77	51	19
Sept. 1945	74	1174	69	29	16

GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF PORT SECURITY ACTIVITY AT BOSTON AND NEW YORK


New York, as the major United States port in the volume of wartime shipping, and Boston as the second port, had probably the most intricate and complicated problems relating to Port Security of any of the United States ports. Therefore, their Port Security organizations stand as excellent examples of what was needed in the way of organization to discharge efficiently the responsibilities of the Captains of the Port during World War II. In general, the other lesser ports had about the same type of organization as Boston, but in smaller ports, one officer sometimes headed up two or three activities. At

RESOURCES

greenwood



A BOARDING DETAIL CHECKS IDENTIFICATION CARDS
OF FISHING BOAT PASSENGERS



THE EARLY DUTY OF TEMPORARY RESERVISTS WAS ALMOST WHOLLY HARBOR PATROL
HERE A TR-MANNED PATROL BOAT CHECKS UP ON A FREIGHTER IN BOSTON HARBOR

PERSONNEL
Boston, and at many other ports, the Temporary Reserve assumed eventually a very substantial part of Port Security work, mostly operational. This was not so at New York, where the Temporary Reserve was used to a very limited extent. At New York, the work-load on the Captain of the Port was extremely heavy, and from an organizational standpoint, the activities were broken down far more than at any other port. The organizational set-up at these ports represents a good basic study for any future consideration of similar problems, and can be shown more clearly and concisely by means of charts than in this text. Follow is a chart showing the organizations at both of these ports.

CAPTAIN OF THE PORT ORGANIZATION AT SEATTLE

The Captain of the Port at Seattle had heavy responsibilities, and a sound organization was required in order to discharge them properly. It is interesting to compare the organization at Seattle with that at Boston and New York, at opposite ends of the United States, and many thousands of miles apart. Responsibilities and duties were about the same, and there was no fundamental difference in the organization. The chart which follows, showing the organization at Seattle, gives added information as to the operational details of the various units. It also breaks down into considerable detail, the communications organization at Seattle related to the Captain of the Port activity. Very similar communications organizations were maintained by most Captains of the Port at the more important locations, so that this chart may be considered representative.

THE ACUTE PERSONNEL SHORTAGE

Throughout virtually the entire period of the war, the Coast Guard was short of personnel. Active recruiting brought in many tens of thousands who had to be trained before they were of value, and though Port Security, greatly expanding, needed more and more men, so did the fleets at sea, the invasion forces, and other units operating far from continental United States. The demand for men at sea was urgent and constant, and the importance of using men at sea was so great as to continually draw down men trained in and engaged in Port Security. Captains of the Port trained men and placed them on duty as soon as they could be of value, only to have these men transferred and replaced by others needing training. Yet the volume and importance of Port Security work were increasing rapidly, and duties had to be performed efficiently, man or no men. This troublesome problem was largely solved by use of two new classes of personnel, the Women's Reserve, and the Temporary Reserve.

THE WOMEN'S RESERVE

An Act approved 23 November, 1942, amending the Coast Guard Auxiliary and Reserve Act of 1941, authorized the establishment of a Women's Reserve as a branch of the Coast Guard Reserve. This was to "expedite the war effort by providing for releasing officers and men for duty at sea and their replacement by women in the shore establishment of the Coast Guard and for other purposes." The military authority of Women's Reserve officers was confined to women of the Reserve only, and limited to the administration of the Women's Reserve. Women were enlisted and enrolled, trained, and given appropriate ratings and ranks. Upon becoming available for duty, a large number gradually worked into the Captain of the Port organizations, serving for the most part as typists, stenographers, clerks, bookkeepers, telephone and teletype operators, cooks, and in some cases radio operators. They relieved to a considerable extent the shortage of office personnel and released innumerable men for sea duty, and for the most part their work was efficient and satisfactory.

THE TEMPORARY RESERVE RELIEVES PERSONNEL PRESSURE

During the latter part of 1942, aggressive enrolling of Auxiliary members as temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve began, and by early 1943 their assistance had reached the point where it was of definite value and relieved certain personnel shortages. At about the same time, temporary members of the Reserve were being enrolled from general civilian sources (not Auxiliary) at Philadelphia for service in the newly created Volunteer Port Security Force. The latter group began operations before the end of 1942. As time went on, and more men were enrolled and trained, the Temporary Reserve took over post after post and one water patrol after another until, by 1944, 50,000 were on duty and doing the major portion of pier guard duty, harbor patrols, and many miscellaneous activities, in the principal ports of the United States (except New York). Since these men served on a part time, no pay basis, were available at widely varying times, and presented organizational and operational problems peculiar to themselves, the work of organization and administration was a huge undertaking. The Temporary Reserve organization is treated separately in the following paragraphs.

ORGANIZATION OF THE TEMPORARY RESERVE

STEPS IN ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TEMPORARY RESERVE

It will be remembered that the Coast Guard Reserve Act of 23 June, 1939, which created the Reserve as a voluntary, non-military organization of yacht and motorboat owners was the forerunner of the Temporary Reserve. The United States Coast Guard Auxiliary and Reserve Act of 19 February, 1941, replaced that Act and established the Coast Guard Reserve as a military component part of the Coast Guard. The 1941 Act provided for two general classifications of Reservists (a) regular, and (b) temporary. The former non-militarized Reserve became the Auxiliary. Temporary members were provided for on a full pay basis. This Act of 1941 was amended in June, 1942, to provide for enrollment of temporary members of the Reserve for intermittent, part time duty. Thus, there was considerable flexibility, and duty could be performed on the following basis:

- (a) Full time without pay from any source
- (b) Part time or intermittent duty without military pay
- (c) Full time with military pay
- (d) Full time without military pay

An Act of 23 November, 1942, further amended the Coast Guard Auxiliary and Reserve Act of 19 February, 1941, and provided for the establishment of a Women's Reserve just as the existing Act authorized use of men as temporary members of the Reserve in various categories, so was the use of women authorized on the same basis. This was the final step in the establishment of the "Temporary Reserve", enabling the organization to function efficiently throughout the remaining major portion of World War II.

ORIGINAL USE OF TEMPORARY RESERVISTS

Originally, a program for Temporary Reservists on full time duty with pay was established to facilitate the acquisition of Reserve boats from the Auxiliary by the Coast Guard. The need for small craft for patrol duty was crucial. Many boat owners felt they would like to accompany their boats into the Coast Guard for full time duty. These men were allowed to enroll for specified short periods of full time duty, such as three or five months, with one month as a minimum. Thus, the logic in the term "Temporary Reserve."

They were not to be transferred from their particular boat, or from the District. For the most part, they went on duty with the Coastal Pickets in offshore submarine patrol, and they stood rugged duty. These men began duty in the early summer of 1942, and served in this service until Personnel Bulletin No. 104-42, 29 October, 1942, ordered the reclassification or disenrollment of temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve serving full time with military pay, to be effected not later than 30 November, 1942. Actual termination was 15 December 1942. They were given the option of transferring to one of the other classifications of Reserve.

TEMPORARY RESERVE CATEGORIES SUMMARIZED

There were several categories of Temporary Reservists when the organization finally settled down on a stable basis. About five

months after authority was granted to enroll temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve, Personnel Bulletin of 29 October, 1942, had made the final change.

- (a) Temporary Reservists (from Auxiliary) in a part time voluntary capacity and in a no-pay status. (Usually units afloat).
- (b) Temporary Reservists (Volunteer Port Security Force) in a part time voluntary capacity and in a no-pay status. (Usually guard details on piers, wharves, and other harbor facilities).
- (c) Temporary Reservists (from Pilot Associations) on a non-military pay basis, but receiving usual pay from the Particular Pilot Association by whom they were employed.
- (d) Temporary Reservists (Civil Service Employees) on full time non-military pay basis, but receiving regular pay from Coast Guard Civil Service appropriations.
- (e) Temporary Reservists (Merchant Marine Inspectors) on a full time basis without military pay, but with pay from Coast Guard Civil Service appropriations.
- (f) Temporary Reservists (Coast Guard Police) on a full time basis without military pay but receiving regular pay from the particular shipyard or war plant by which they were employed.

There were a very few exceptions where Temporary Reservists received military pay, where special qualifications made the men of particular value to the Coast Guard. A few men served full time without any pay from any source. All of the above categories were directly concerned with Port Security except some in classification (d) such as engineering officers, Weather Bureau men of the First Naval District on weather patrol in the North Atlantic and certain staff men concerned with logistics. The Temporary Reservists with whom we are chiefly concerned, and who formed the vast majority, came within (a) enrolled from the Auxiliary and served chiefly in floating units, (b) enrolled generally for Volunteer Port Security Forces, and (c) pilots enrolled from Pilot Associations. However, though Coast Guard Police (f) guarded war plants, they operated under the Navy and not under the Captain of the Port except in the Thirteenth Naval District.

ENROLLMENT FROM THE AUXILIARY

In late 1941 and early 1942, the Coast Guard Auxiliary established water patrols in a great many harbors, inlets, and bays, on a civilian basis, working in collaboration with the Captains of the Port. The Temporary

Reserve, as a military component, provided better control over these men and gave them greater authority. The Auxiliarists, most of whom were trained in small boat handling, formed an excellent nucleus for Temporary Reserve boatmen, and that group was naturally drawn upon. Transfer from the Auxiliary to the Temporary Reserve began in mid-1942, progressed very slowly at first, then gathered momentum. By the latter part of 1942, recruiting for this type of service had gone far, and Auxiliary-Temporary Reservists were becoming an effective unit, taking over many CGR patrol craft on a 24-hour, 7-day basis. These men, for the most part, took special assignments on a part time basis serving 12 hours a week. They, like all Temporary Reservists, had full military status while on duty. When so engaged, they were vested with all the rights, privileges, powers, and duties of a regular member of the Coast Guard Reserve of the same rank or rating, were subject to all laws and regulations of the Government and the Coast Guard and its Reserve, and were subject to court-martial. The units afloat, in all Districts, were enrolled from Auxiliary membership, although after the early days, most of those enrolling in the Temporary Reserve first enrolled in the Auxiliary merely as a necessary step toward TR membership. The men were all screened by Coast Guard Intelligence and the FBI to determine loyalty to the United States.

ENROLLMENT FOR VOLUNTEER PORT SECURITY FORCES

On 11 May, 1942, realizing that the Port of Philadelphia needed greater protection, Dimitri F. White and Donald F. Jenks of Philadelphia formulated a plan to establish a regiment of volunteers to serve part time guarding vessels, wharves, piers, and other waterfront facilities as a precaution against sabotage and fire, unauthorized persons in restricted areas, and anything else which might endanger waterfront properties and personnel. Men for the force would be inducted into the Temporary Reserve directly without recourse to the Auxiliary, and would be entirely apart from the Auxiliary in every respect. After consideration by various agencies at Washington, the Commandant of the Coast Guard finally accepted the plan in July, 1942, and authorized enrollment of volunteers. Organization of the Philadelphia Regiment began on 29 July, 1942. The plan, in operation, was so successful at Philadelphia that similar Volunteer Port Security Forces were later organized in 22 ports as follows:

<u>District and Port</u>	<u>Date Organized</u>	<u>Original Quota</u>	<u>Date of First Active Duty</u>
4th District Philadelphia*	29 July, 1942	3,500	23 Dec. 1942
5th District Baltimore	15 Mar. 1943	2,000	—
Washington, D.C.	Jan. 1942	250	—
6th District Charleston	25 July, 1943	500	1 Nov. 1943
Savannah*	3 May, 1944	500	12 June, 1944
Jacksonville	14 April, 1943	500	1 Oct. 1943
7th District Miami	April, 1943	400	—
Tampa	April, 1943	600	28 June, 1943
Port Everglades	—	—	—
8th District Mobile	Oct. 1943	250	16 Jan. 1944
New Orleans*	June, 1943	2,000	7 Nov. 1943
Galveston	1 Sept. 1943	400	19 Nov. 1943
Houston	1 Sept. 1943	400	Feb. 1944
Corpus Christi	—	—	—

<u>District and Port</u>	<u>Date Organized</u>	<u>Original Quota</u>	<u>Date of First Active Duty</u>
9th District Duluth	Apr. 1943	400	—
10th District San Juan, P. R.	15 Sept. 1943	500	4 Nov. 1943
11th District Los Angeles San Diego	Oct. 1943 15 Feb. 1943	3,400 1,000	26 Apr. 1944** 23 June, 1944**
12th District San Francisco* Oakland*	17 July, 1943 July, 1943	2,500 1,000	16 Jan. 1944** 23 Jan. 1944**
13th District Seattle Portland, Ore.	1 May, 1944 Aug. 1944	500 1,000	Aug. 1944 18 Oct. 1944

*Figures on ultimate known active personnel

Philadelphia	3,200
Baltimore	1,500
Washington, D.C.	400
Savannah	400
New Orleans	1,200
San Juan	455
Los Angeles	2,400
San Francisco	2,100
Oakland	1,000

**Turned over to the DCGO.

NOTE: In the First and Third Districts, Guard Details doing exactly the same duty as the Volunteer Port Security Forces were organized from the Auxiliary and operated as a detail rather than as a separate regimental organization. In the Eleventh and Thirteenth Districts the Volunteer Port Security Forces were enrolled from the Auxiliary, and not direct from non-Auxiliary affiliates.

ENROLLMENT OF THE PILOTS

the Commandant authorized the commissioning of pilots as temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve. This resulted in almost immediate enrollment of harbor pilots throughout ports of importance in the United States. It gave the Coast Guard operational control, served to hold the units intact for the duration, and gave the pilots military authority. These officers were enrolled as lieutenant commanders, lieutenants, or lieutenants (junior grade) for the most part, depending upon their ages and length of service. They received no military pay, but continued to collect piloting fees exactly the same as in civilian status.

GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE FLOATING UNITS

Temporary Reserve floating units were all enrolled from the Auxiliary and, for the most part, the Auxiliary organization was retained as the basis for the Temporary Reserve activities. The basic unit of the Auxiliary was the flotilla — a group of men under their commander who operated one or more boats and formed their own schedules in collaboration and cooperation with, and under the orders of, the Captain of the Port's officer in charge of harbor and other waterside patrols. There were one or more flotillas in the various ports as, for example, at Boston, where there were 20 flotillas. District coastal waters were divided into geographical subdivisions and the flotillas within each belonged to their particular Division. The entire floating unit organization of the

District headed up to the Director of Auxiliary-Temporary Reserve, who had his staff of District officers in charge of such District Temporary Reserve activities as Personnel, Training, Operations, Floating Equipment, and such. Directly responsible to the Director were the Division "Captains" who headed up the geographical Divisions and were responsible for all matters concerning their Divisions.* These Division Captains had their staffs with officers in charge of Division activities which also included training, equipment, personnel, etc. Responsible to the Division Captains were the Flotilla Commanders in charge of the operating units, who had their flotilla staffs overseeing the various flotilla activities. It can be seen that cooperation with the Captains of the Port where flotillas operated their vessels was of the utmost importance, for all operations were conducted under orders of that officer. Excellent coordination with other Captain of the Port operations was also essential. The Director of Auxiliary-Temporary Reserve was subject to orders of the District Coast Guard Officer, but all of these Directors headed up to the Chief of the Temporary Reserve Division at Headquarters.

GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUNTARY PORT SECURITY FORCES

Much groundwork was necessary before a Volunteer Port Security Force unit could be actually organized. Officers from Headquarters looked over the field in prospective VPSF ports, interviewed the Captain of the Port, inspected possible sites for a headquarters and training school, and made a preliminary study of the waterfront. They reported results to the District Coast Guard Officer, who requested authority for a VPSF unit, and this was usually forthcoming. These officers often addressed the Rotary Club, meetings of various civic organizations, and others to acquaint civic leaders with the needs and nature of Port Security and how the Temporary Reserve, through the VPSF, could be an important factor in the security of their port. Key officers were selected and enrolled, then others were enrolled and trained or, in many ports, trained first and then enrolled. There were no "sudden results" in any port, and much time and effort went into the organization of these units. Most Volunteer Port Security Forces were recruited directly and not from the Auxiliary. The Eleventh and Thirteenth Naval Districts were exceptions. The VPSF units, however, were entirely distinct and separate, with their own organization from top to bottom, and the administrative organization virtually duplicated that of the other Temporary Reserve units. Notably in the First District, such duplication was avoided since guard detail, floating units, and all other volunteer Temporary Reserve activities were successfully conducted as divisions under one Temporary Reserve District organization, enrolled from the Auxiliary, and there was no VPSF, as such.

REGIMENTAL ORGANIZATION

The Philadelphia Regiment was the first and largest Volunteer Port Security Force, and since the others were patterned after it with only slight variations due to local conditions, its structure may be presented as an example. The original plan called for six hours of duty once each week. This was later changed to six hours each six days to provide rotation. At the outset, there were 152 officers and 1,000 men, the latter to be increased. Each platoon had an ensign, two boatswains, four chief boatswain's mates, four boatswain's mates, first class, and sixteen seamen; two watches of two squads of six men each, and a boatswain for each watch. Thirty-six platoons were built up and

*Division set-up was not used in St. Louis, 9th District.

than the size of the platoons increased. Squads were increased to ten men. This method avoided placing complete inexperienced squads on duty, and the officer proportion was reduced to the proper figure. The waterfront was divided into 6 Areas (at Philadelphia), each including contiguous facilities comprising all war piers in a given territory. Platoons were assigned in cycles and rotated until the men were familiar with all, and then assignments became permanent. The units were then placed under Area Command, comparable to a battalion organization. As of 1 July, 1944, the Regiment at Philadelphia was organized into 24 companies providing more effective control for the Area Commander and his Staff. This was due to the size of the Regiment, and was not followed in other ports. Later, increased coverage was gained by increasing the length of each watch to 8 hours, 0000 to 0800 to 1600 to 2400. Watches were rotated so that each man need lose only one day in 18 from his business, not counting Saturdays and Sundays. Further coverage was later obtained by accelerating rotation to one watch in 5 days.

REFERENCE TO ORGANIZATION CHART VOLUNTARY PORT SECURITY FORCE

Following is a chart showing the organization of the Volunteer Port Security Forces at Philadelphia, relationship with the Temporary Reserve floating units, the division of the Regiment into operational and training sections, the division of staff operations, and the organization of the companies. With the foregoing discussion, the chart makes clear the entire organization of the VPSF at Philadelphia. This pattern was followed in other ports, in a general way, but on a smaller scale, and with desirable variations because of peculiar local circumstances.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STAFF

Behind the men "on the line" actually performing the Port Security duties, was a staff of men and women who worked hard to support the work of guarding the waterfront. Many rendered extraordinary service. Staff duties in most VPSF ports were about the same, and sometimes one officer would be in charge of several of the Staff activities. At Philadelphia, the Regiment had officers heading up each of the following activities:

- Personnel
- Operations
- Fire Drill
- Public Relations
- Legal
- Transportation
- Security
- Regimental
- Training and
- Military Inspection
- Military Training
- Finance
- Enrollment
- Supply
- Recruiting
- Women's Transportation
- Women's Office Detail

PERSONNEL VARIATIONS IN ORGANIZATION AS BETWEEN DISTRICTS

Temporary Reservists serving as pilots, civil service employees, and Coast Guard Police were uniformly organized in all Districts. There was however, some variation in the types of enrollment of voluntary Temporary Reservists between the Districts. This has been indicated. Expediency sometimes varied with different localities. The following summary will show the variations.

District	Units Afloat	Guard Detail Ashore
1st ND)	Enrolled from	Enrolled from
3rd ND)	Auxiliary Flotillas	Auxiliary Flotillas
11th ND *)	(No organizational distinction)	
4th ND)	Enrolled from	Direct Enrollment
5th ND)	Auxiliary Flotillas	VPSF Regiments
6th ND)		
7th ND)		
8th ND)		
12th ND)		
9th ND	Enrolled from Auxiliary Flotillas	Enrolled from Auxiliary Flotillas VPSF Regiment, Duluth only
10th ND	None	Direct Enrollment VPSF Regiment
13th ND	Enrolled from Auxiliary Flotillas	Enrolled from Auxiliary VPSF Regiments

*(In the 11th District, Floating Units came under VPSF)

DESIGNATION OF TEMPORARY RESERVE PERSONNEL OFFICERS

Until the latter part of 1943, the Temporary Reserve grew and was administered by Headquarters, through the District Coast Guard Officers and the Auxiliary-Temporary Reserve District Directors, or the Commanding Officers of the VPSF Regiments. By Commandant's Circular No. 64, dated 9 November, 1943, a Temporary Reserve Division was established in the Office of Personnel at Headquarters with over-all responsibility for personnel aspects of the Temporary Reserve program. The program in the various Districts was to be administered by the District Coast Guard Officer who designated an officer on his Staff as the Temporary Reserve Personnel Officer immediately responsible to the District Personnel Officer. In the selection of this officer, the following qualifications were considered: he should (a) understand and appreciate the potential services of the TRs, and be able to stimulate their continued interests; (b) be able to deal effectively with other Coast Guard officers and be thoroughly conversant with basic Coast Guard practices and procedures; (c) be an officer not qualified for sea duty so that there might be reasonable continuity of his assignment; and (d) preferably be an officer other than the District Director of Auxiliary in order to avoid any confusion between membership in the Auxiliary and status as a Temporary Reservist. Inclosure A, forwarded with this circular, read:

"Under the direction and supervision of the Personnel Officer, the Temporary Reserve Personnel Officer shall:

1. Be responsible: (a) for developing, in conjunction with the Operations Officers, a program for utilizing temporary membership in the Reserve; and (b) for the enrollment and other matters affecting the status of individuals as temporary members of the Reserve, including Coast Guard Police, pilots, officers of Great Lakes vessels, members of the Auxiliary, members of the Volunteer Port Security Forces, civil service employees of the Coast Guard and other groups.
2. Maintain liaison with the Navy Security Officer relative to matters pertaining to the enrollment of Coast Guard police.
3. Maintain such personnel records for temporary members of the Reserve as are centralized in the District Office.

4. Prepare basic orders and forms involved in the assignment of temporary members of the Reserve.
5. Review the proficiency and conduct of temporary members of the Reserve in performing duties to which they are assigned and make recommendations thereon.
6. Keep the Operations and Personnel Officers informed of the progress of the program and of actual activities being performed by temporary members of the Reserve.
7. Consult with the District Director of the Auxiliary in the utilization of members of the Auxiliary as temporary members of the Reserve.
8. Approve, within prescribed limits, advances in ratings, changes in ratings, and other changes affecting personnel enrolled in the enlisted status.
9. Keep thoroughly informed of all regulations and directives pertaining to temporary members of the Reserve.

VARIATION IN GUARD DUTY ORGANIZATION IN FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT

It has been pointed out that in the First Naval District there was only one Temporary Reserve organization, and no VPSF as such. Yet, exactly the same duty as that performed by the VPSF in most ports was carried out by Auxiliary-Temporary Reserve members. All activities came under the Director of Auxiliary-Temporary Reserve, and the District Administrative officers, and "guard detail" (same duty as VPSF) was merely a subdivision of the activity under their supervision. Some boat flotillas established guard units when the need for shore guards became evident, and some new flotillas were organized solely for guard duty. The Portland (Maine) and Providence units merely shifted from boat duty to guard detail. At Boston, where both harbor and shore patrol were conducted a regular guard regiment was formed with Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, and other administration and operations officers, the flotillas merely furnishing the men. There was no administrative duplication anywhere. The organization of the Boston guard unit was as follows:

- Commanding Officer
- Executive Officer
- Guard Detail Operations Officer
- Group of Commissioned Officers for Base Duty Officers
- 21 Chief Specialists for Base Guard Detail Duty Chiefs
- 21 Chief Specialists, Scout Car Riders
- Approximately 1,000 variously rated watch standers

This organization took complete charge of all assignments to posts. Watches were set up in the Temporary Reserve Division Office and the men sent out on the waterfront by Temporary Reserve supervisory personnel. Posts were designated by the regular duty chiefs and from then on the operation was entirely Temporary Reserve, including supervision of posts.

HEADQUARTERS CONFERENCES

In an effort to bring about a more closely-knit Temporary Reserve organization, and better acquaintance between key officers of Headquarters and the various Districts, a Headquarters Conference for Commanding Officers of the Volunteer Port Security units was held at Headquarters in Washington on 27, 28 and 29 March, 1944. Another for officers of the Women's Units was held in like manner on 26, 27 and 28 September, 1944. A third, for Temporary Reserve Commanding Officers was held on 6 and 7 December, 1944. Reports were read on

activities and problems, addresses were given by the Commandant and other high-ranking officers, and discussions and question periods were conducted. These did much to alleviate many burdens, clarify issues, and solve mutual problems. These conferences contributed immensely to the smooth functioning of administrative and organizational activities in the Districts, and promoted uniformity and understanding.

THE MEN WHO COMPRISED THE UNPAID VOLUNTEERS

The bulk of the volunteer unpaid Temporary Reservists were men who, for some reason, could not at the time enter full time service in the armed forces but who, nevertheless, because of their patriotism, abilities and desire to do their bit, were willing to guarantee at least 12 hours of duty each week. Many gave considerably more time, often as much as 40 to 50 hours a week over an extended period. Ages varied from 17 to 70. While in some areas, men subject to draft were denied enrollment, they were accepted in others. All were subject to physical examination, but due to the type of service to be performed, some physical handicaps were overlooked. Most gave willingly of their time, assuming their duties with the understanding that there would be no pay, no benefits, no ribbons, and no veteran status. Transportation to and from duty would be largely at their own expense. A great number had sons or brothers in the armed forces overseas, and felt that by their duty in the Temporary Reserve they were lending moral and practical support as, indeed, they were.

FROM ALL WALKS OF LIFE

They came from all walks of life. A boat crew or a dock watch made up of such men as a grocer, a business executive, an automobile mechanic, a school teacher, a pressman, an apartment house janitor was entirely typical. Bank presidents stood watches on coal docks with their office boys. An ex-Governor of Maine was a seaman on Boston Harbor patrol; a seaman on guard detail at Portland, Maine, became Governor of that State while still on active duty; Arthur Fiedler, famous conductor of the Boston Pops Orchestra was a seaman in one of the Boston floating units; a retired colonel from Santa Barbara was a seaman, as were Humphrey Bogart and several judges of the Los Angeles Superior Court. A retired Navy captain served as a seaman. These were typical of all Districts. Literally, about every business and profession was represented in the Temporary Reserve. World War I veterans loomed large in the rosters. It is interesting that in June, 1943, in the Philadelphia VPSF Regiment, 27% of the personnel were junior executives in corporations, 19% were senior executives, 11% were lawyers, 9% were small business men operating their own establishments, 8% were real estate brokers, accountants and insurance men, 20% were clerks and salesmen, 4% were laborers and mechanics, and 2% miscellaneous. Of the total, 54% had had some college training! The great majority of Temporary Reservists the country over served well, for which their only recompense was a calm conscience, and the comradeship of men pulling together with a common purpose. These men set up a wholly new, practical application of patriotism.

IMPORTANCE OF EFFICIENT LIAISON

The growth in the Captain of the Port activity, the increasing responsibilities, the far-flung organization of Port Security with regulars, regular Reservists, and Temporary Reservists intermingled in similar duty, and the similarity in many respects of some Coast Guard duty with that performed by local police, fire, and other civilian agencies has been indicated in the preceding pages. In order that all the various divisions of Coast Guard activity might work smoothly together and with other military and civilian agencies interested in the security of our ports, the closest and most efficient liaison was prerequisite. Liaison and relationships with other agencies are treated in Part V, which follows.

PART V

LIAISON AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER AGENCIES

COORDINATION AND COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT
SHIPPING AND SECURITY AGENCIES

The extent to which the Coast Guard Port Security activities impinged on those of other agencies and the cooperation developed, is summarized from a Special Report on Coast Guard Port Security activities covering the period 25 February, 1942 to 25 February, 1944:

WAR DEPARTMENT

The Coast Guard worked with the Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, in the promulgation of Anchorage Regulations which supplemented and implemented those issued by the War Department under the Rivers and Harbors Act. These enabled applications of the penalties provided by the Espionage Act for any violation of restricted areas deemed necessary by the Army. Descriptions of all port facilities and terminals were prepared, including photographs, for distribution to the Captains of the Port. A representative and liaison officer of the Coast Guard maintained a desk in the office of the Provost Marshal General. Activities of the Army for the safeguarding of facilities were coordinated with those of the Coast Guard and there was interchange of assistance. An example was the waterside protection of vital bridges which the Coast Guard provided at the request of the War Department. Copies of the War Department Master Responsibility List with names and locations of all important war facilities and the agency responsible for their protection were forwarded to all District Coast Guard Officers. In June, 1943, a comprehensive agreement was entered into between the Commandant and the Chief of Transportation, U. S. Army, clearly defining the respective jurisdictions and responsibilities of the Captains of the Port and the Commanding Generals of the Ports of Embarkation. The agreement provided:

- (a) The Commanding Generals shall be responsible for the protection of waterfront facilities directly operated by the War Department, whereas the Captains of the Port shall be responsible for all other waterfront facilities.
- (b) The Commanding Generals shall be responsible for vessels operated by or for the War Department when moored to facilities operated by the War Department, but they will enforce the Coast Guard Regulations for the Security of Vessels in Port upon all such vessels. The Captains of the Port shall be responsible for the protection of all other vessels.
- (c) The loading of explosives and military ammunition shall be under the supervision of the Coast Guard subject to specified exceptions. The explosives loading regulations adopted by the War Department were substantially similar to those of the Coast Guard.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Close relations were maintained with the Base Maintenance Section of the Navy which was responsible for the protection of shipyards and other installations under Navy cognizance. A liaison officer was maintained in that Section and there was close cooperation in developing the respective programs. It was under the supervision of the Base Maintenance Section that the Coast Guard Police were developed and their activities carried out. On several occasions, the Bureau of Ordnance requested assistance of the Coast Guard in establishing restricted areas, target ranges, torpedo ranges, restricted areas and for similar purposes. Such requests were complied with,

and shipping was prohibited from going in such areas except in accordance with the regulations deemed necessary. The Office of the Inspector General requested and received cooperation of the Coast Guard in the investigation of representatives of the Bureau of Ships concerning the application of Coast Guard Regulations to vessels being constructed, converted or repaired by that Bureau, and with the Central Division of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations on several matters of a varied nature. At the request of the Pan American Section of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Coast Guard formulated a comprehensive Port Security program to be instituted in Brazil, which program was forwarded to the Naval Mission in that country along with the Coast Guard Regulations for the Security of Vessels in Port, and these were used in Brazilian ports.

PETROLEUM
ADMINISTRATOR
FOR WAR

The Petroleum Administrator for War was responsible for the protection of petroleum facilities. The Coast Guard entered into an agreement whereby the facilities and personnel of the two organizations were jointly utilized for the maximum security of waterfront petroleum facilities. Trained inspection personnel of that office forwarded recommendations to the Captains of the Port and coordinated protective efforts at such facilities. The Coast Guard was represented at meetings of the Committee for the protection of Petroleum Facilities of the Petroleum Industry War Council, at which an interchange of views concerning protective measures and the coordination of efforts of private agencies with those of Government security agencies was developed.

OFFICE OF
CIVILIAN DEFENSE

Under blackout and air regulations, the Coast Guard prescribed action to be taken by vessels in port. In February, 1943, the Coast Guard published air raid and blackout regulations for vessels in port, integrating the regulations with those of the Army and Office of Civilian Defense.

WAR SHIPPING
ADMINISTRATION

The Coast Guard maintained contact with War Shipping Administration representatives on problems concerning enforcement of Coast Guard Regulations on WSA vessels. That agency lent its assistance and advice in drafting Port Security regulations. There was also cooperation in attempting a solution of problems caused by oil pollution in harbors without unduly delaying movement of WSA vessels. That agency also prepared contracts with operators of tugs in various port, designating COTPs as agents of the WSA for determining when services of tugs were necessary, and providing that services of such tugs would be available in times of emergency.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
AND
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

These Departments prepared material for the Committee on Political Defense, composed of representatives from each Western Hemisphere Nation. One of the subjects dealt with by the Committee was Port Security. The Coast Guard prepared the basic Port Security program which was adopted by the Committee and forwarded for action to all countries of South and Central America. The Coast Guard worked with the Department of Justice in matters involving enforcement of Port Security regulations, Oil Pollution Act. All regulations requiring prosecution under Public Law 127 - 78th Congress, were cleared through the Attorney General.

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION This Commission operated large dams and waterside electric

generating plants supplying necessary power to many industries which were engaged in war production. At the request of the Commission, restricted areas were established and waterside patrols maintained by the Coast Guard for protection of these facilities.

OFFICE OF PRICE ADMINISTRATION

The Office of Price Administration requested the Coast Guard to assist in the enforcement of the gasoline rationing program as applied to pleasure boating. Accordingly, Captains of the Port maintained rigid control over licensing of all pleasure craft.

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

This office prepared several security posters for distribution by the Coast Guard upon vessels and waterfront facilities. The Coast Guard, in turn, supervised the protection of several short wave radio broadcasting stations of that agency.

ASSISTANCE TO OTHER NATIONS

At the request of Canadian authorities, the Coast Guard prepared a basic Port Security program for use in Canadian ports. In 1943, a representative of the Port Security Division conferred in Canada with representatives of that Government regarding this problem and inspected important Canadian port installations for the purpose of rendering advice concerning their better security. Coast Guard fireboats and crews were loaned to the Canadian Government for the protection of the port of Halifax. The Coast Guard prepared, at the request of the Naval Mission to Brazil, a basic Port Security program for Brazilian ports, and furnished copies of Coast Guard Regulations for the Security of Vessels in Ports. These were adopted for use in Brazilian ports. Through the Departments of Justice and State, and the Committee for Political Defense, the Coast Guard's basic Port Security program of Latin American countries was incorporated into pamphlet form and distributed to all South and Central American countries for their action. Information, suggestions, and assistance were rendered to the Inter-American Defense Board on Port Security problems. Continued meetings were held with representatives of the British Security Co-Ordination concerning security of British vessels in United States ports. Inspections of their Consular Security Officers were furnished to Captains of the Port and accepted and relied upon by them.

SETTING UP GUARDS IN WATERFRONT AREAS

In the early days of Port Security, there was much confusion in the matter of jurisdiction. Complete and satisfactory cooperation between the Coast Guard, Army and Navy was requisite, in setting up guards in waterfront areas, as well as at plants. There was a great deal of conferring all over the country in establishing workable units, and in settling jurisdictional matters. Limits of responsibility were always uncertain in these earlier times until they were cleared up in conference.

INTELLIGENCE

Cooperation between the Captains of the Port and Navy and Coast Guard Intelligence was essential to proper discharge of the functions of the Port Security program. Navy Intelligence was well-developed early in all Districts. Coast Guard Intelligence was slow to develop, and in some cases Captains of the Port established their own intelligence divisions temporarily. Close liaison was always maintained with both Intelligence organizations. The function of intelligence was to receive promptly all information obtainable from all possible

sources concerning activities in or near coastal areas; to evaluate such information in the light of existing military conditions and all other information relative to the subject; and to disseminate information to all action agencies which should be cognizant. It operated as a clearing house and repository for information and afforded a constant influx and outflow of information. Often, the COTP organization was an action agency when incidents involved security of the port, either actual or threatened. Broadly, speaking, the services performed by Intelligence involved the task of maintaining liaison with the Office of Naval Intelligence and other Governmental agencies; planning and conducting investigations of Coast Guard personnel (except those enrolled as temporary members of the Coast Guard Plant Security - C. G. Police), maintaining fingerprint identification and other Intelligence records, and providing for security measures at Headquarters and in the District offices. Among other things, the Intelligence Division at Headquarters processed matters relating to Port Security Intelligence. Intelligence lent assistance to District Coast Guard Officers, Captains of the Port and District Coast Guard Intelligence Officers by furnishing, through appropriate channels, information in response to their requests regarding individuals and organizations, vessels, policy and advice. The activities of Intelligence and Captains of the Port were interrelated, and certainly the services of each were interdependent in maintaining the security of waterfront areas. Many Intelligence investigations were made as a result of information gathered and passed on by COTP personnel and details.

EARLY COOPERATION EFFORTS

Even before war actually started, the need for cooperation and coordination was recognized in the various ports. The Los Angeles Port Protection Organization, mentioned on page E, was an outstanding case in point. Thirty men from various agencies interested in protection of the port met many times to promote cooperation in safety measures for the Port of Los Angeles. Closest to the Captain of the Port, San Francisco, was the Bay Area Waterfront Security Committee, officially formed after many unofficial meetings in February, 1942. It consisted of members of the security divisions of the Army, Navy, Coast Guard, California State Guard, Federal and civilian officers, representatives of the Board of State Harbor Commissioners and of the Waterfront Employers Association, terminal operators, various Federal investigative agencies, and representatives from municipal fire and police departments. Most meetings were prompted by problems brought up by the Captain of the Port. One of the most useful functions of the Committee was that it made the various governmental agencies accessible to the private agencies and to each other. Many matters were thrashed out and agreements reached promptly that would have taken much valuable time had it been necessary to resort to formal correspondence.

THE COORDINATOR OF PORT SECURITY AT NEW YORK

Probably the most highly organized coordination was that developed at the Port of New York, the leading port of the United States in volume of wartime shipping. On 9 June, 1942, Admiral Parker, District Coast Guard Officer, Third Naval District, pointed out that the Army had certain authority in Port Security. It could go ahead on its own initiative, waive regulations, and act independently. The Navy could do the same. Under certain conditions other agencies could do likewise. A certain amount of authority rested in the State and municipal agencies, and so on down the line. He emphasized that, in order to have real Port Security, it was necessary that all these groups work together.


Consequently, the Coast Guard, being primarily responsible for Port Security, had to see that all of these who were vitally interested in the safety of our ships and harbors functioned as a team. In order to further such teamwork, a coordination system was inaugurated which resulted in drawing together the military, naval, and civilian elements of Federal, State and private agencies, which made possible rapid progress in acquainting the agencies with matters requiring their action, and it usually resulted in prompt handling of the matter. The atmosphere was that of friendly security. The Office of the Coordinator of Port Security was established in the early summer of 1942, and this office cleared a considerable volume of telephone and written communication with a minimum of red tape, and with an almost complete elimination of the "through channels" technique.

ORGANIZATION AND DUTIES
OF THE COORDINATOR OF
PORT SECURITY


The Coordinator, Mr. J. J. Flynn, served in a civilian capacity for nearly a year and a half, but on 13 October, 1943, he was sworn into the Coast Guard as a Commander. It was his responsibility to correct any unsatisfactory conditions existing on the waterfront facilities in New York Harbor which came within the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard. To aid in serving this purpose, all marine fire-fighting facilities in the Port of New York had been coordinated. This involved understanding between the Coast Guard, the waterfront municipalities in New Jersey, towboat operators, and the New York Fire Department. Especially close liaison was maintained with the fire departments, and some officers and men worked to gain working knowledge of the methods of operation. The Coordinator held regularly scheduled meetings with representatives of the following agencies:

- U. S. Coast Guard
- U. S. Army
- U. S. Navy
- U. S. Customs
- War Shipping Administration
- New York City Department of Marine and Aviation
- New York City Police Department
- Fire Underwriters' Association
- and other municipal and private groups

These comprised the Port Coordinator's Security Group. In addition to weekly meetings of this group, the Coordinator held weekly meetings with representatives of commands of the Army, Navy Petroleum Administrator for War, and Office of Civilian Defense, for evaluation of the security of waterfront facilities and vessels, and this resulted in a military buttoning-up of loop-holes in security measures. Occasional meetings were also held with committees and representatives of the Maritime Association of the Port of New York, New York Shipping Association, Towboat Exchange, Harbor Carriers Association, International Labor organizations, Educational agencies, Watchmen's Agencies, Industrial Operations, etc., to iron out specific problems. The Coordinator met weekly with the DCGO and COTP (one and the same) for consideration and coordination of security measures. These various meetings led to elimination or avoidance of unrelated action between various agencies which might have led to cross purposes and confusion. Under Executive Order No. 9047, Federal agencies were directed to assist in port security, others were requested to do so. Through the Coordinator, the various agencies were joined together for harmonious action for the accomplishment of a particular mission. These agencies could be coordinated, but none could be subordinated.




AT NEW YORK, THE PORT COORDINATOR'S SECURITY GROUP
DISCUSSES WATERFRONT SAFETY



TRANSPORTATION OF CUSTOMS OFFICERS
WAS CARRIED OUT BY COAST GUARD PATROL CRAFT

The organization of the Office of the Coordinator of Port Security at New York was:



COORDINATOR HAD NO POWER OF COMPELSION

This extremely difficult, exacting and vitally important task of coordination of the various activities of these groups required friendly methods and cooperative and persuasive effort. No power of compulsion was vested in the Coordinator. Compulsion was vested in the Captain of the Port. When the Port Security Force observed negligence or carelessness in the observance of safety precautions on waterfront facilities, it reported them through proper channels to the Coordinator and it was his responsibility to correct any unsatisfactory conditions.

CERTAIN OPERATIONS

During 1943, the Office of Coordinator issued, over the signature of the COTP, general safety and precautionary instructions to the various agencies and operators concerned with Port Security. The Coordinator's force inspected all waterfront facilities including piers and wharves in the district under Coast Guard jurisdiction for security and fire protection, maintained a record file of the facilities, with record of security and fire preventive conditions relating thereto. If action by COTP was needed, a letter over his signature was issued requesting correction of the defects and forwarded to the responsible party. If, in the very few cases which developed, COTP was unable to secure compliance, such conditions were referred to the local government agencies for penal enforcement. The launch control unit was chiefly engaged in coordinating operation of the water taxis. A staff of three civilians was maintained for this work. In February, 1943, the Coordinator's Office prepared a visual demonstration program covering about 90 minutes on "How to Handle Fire Emergencies." It was available to Coast Guard fire watch and fire brigade personnel, but was later made available to management

of the facilities. Over 25,000 persons, in all, received this instruction. About 35,000 "No Smoking" and other safety signs were posted at waterfront facilities other than shipyards or those under jurisdiction of the Army and Navy. As operations progressed, there appeared to be some duplication of inspections by the Port Security Force and the Coordinator, and some friction developed due to uncertainty where functions of one ended and the other began. Actually, the Port Security Force was a patrol organization, whereas the Coordinator's force was an inspecting and corrective agency chiefly through persuasion. These matters of jurisdiction and duplication were resolved through lengthy discussions.

EXAMPLE OF COORDINATOR'S WORK FOR ONE MONTH

During December, 1943, two investigators of the Office of the Coordinator inspected 169 vessels on which some 959 welding machines, 926 welders, 197 burners and 1,125 fire watchers were in operation. The investigators discovered and corrected on the spot 21 minor violations and investigated one complaint received from an interested agency. Twelve new welding concerns were contacted and Coast Guard Regulations discussed and a copy left with each concern. This was, of course, in addition to the regular meetings.

PROBLEM OF CENSORSHIP

At the meeting of the Port Coordinator's Security Group on 16 February, 1945, a letter was received from the War Shipping Administration, one part of which brought out one problem needing attention. It stated that one of the biggest problems at that time in the security program was the constant violation of censorship regulations, particularly on the part of merchant seaman. Despite attempts at indoctrination, many individuals were writing letters giving details on convoys,

sailing and arrival dates, destinations, the number of escort vessels, and such. One of the best ways for combatting this danger was through posters, and War Shipping Administration officials were always on the lookout for effective posters on the subject. The Coordinator's Office aided whenever possible.

AWARDS BY THE PORT COORDINATOR

After the Port Coordinator's Office had been in operation for some time, it was felt that some system of awards for good security cooperation should be established. Thus, on 9 July, 1943, this office endorsed the "Security S" program, which provided for the award of a burgee with a large S in the middle with the words "Safety" and "Security," and the Coordinator's Security Group acted as a committee to consider and evaluate recommendations for the award to private pier management. Cooperative management, good house-keeping, adequate inshore and outshore guarding, fire brigade maintenance, and structural maintenance were minimum requirements for consideration of the award. The award certificate was revocable in cases where security maintenance later was reduced below the required standards. The first "Security S" award was made to nine companies on 4 October, 1943, at a brief ceremony held on the steps of the New York Custom House by the Collector of Customs. Thereafter, awards were made about every ten weeks. However, the standard Coast Guard Security Shield of Honor came into general use in April, 1944, and this apparently replaced the "Security S" award at New York. The Coordinator's office was discontinued in June, 1945.

PART VI

OVER-ALL OPERATIONS OF THE PORT SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT

SECTION I

PART PLAYED BY TEMPORARY RESERVE

TEMPORARY RESERVE AN INTEGRAL PART OF PORT SECURITY FORCES

The creation, establishment, and organization of the Temporary Reserve have been recounted under appropriate subdivisions of the foregoing chapters. It will have been realized that the unique organization was a distinct subdivision of the Coast Guard with its own top administration coming under direction of the District Coast Guard Officer in each District, and operating under and in close cooperation with the Captains of the Port. It should also be realized that, so far as operations were concerned, the Temporary Reserve was an integral part of the Coast Guard Port Security Forces, without distinction from regular and regular Reserve personnel while on duty. These men had the same authority, rights and privileges, ranks and ratings, as men of the regular service. While in some Districts, Temporary Reservists wore the shore patrol uniform on duty and were thus obviously TRs, in others the undress blue uniform was worn on duty (notably First District) and there was no distinction, even in uniform, from men of the regular service. In the latter instance, however, the shore patrol uniform was worn while traveling to and from duty. The Captains of the Port had specific duties to perform and all of these were, at first, carried out by regulars and regular Reservists. As the Temporary Reservists were enrolled, trained, and available for duty, they took over many of these duties, relieving regulars for sea and combat duty, and finally a very large portion of Port Security operations, especially harbor patrol in small craft, guarding of piers and other facilities, and ship inspection and security, was actually undertaken and efficiently prosecuted by the part-time, unpaid volunteers. In Part VI, on Port Security Operations, there

will be no effort to single out those carried on by the TRs as against those by regulars, except in special cases, for both groups were working together to accomplish the same thing and usually working under identical circumstances.

SPECIAL TEMPORARY RESERVE ACTIVITIES

There were certain duties performed by the Captains of the Port in which Temporary Reservists were not generally employed, although they were so employed to a limited extent in one or two Districts. The nature of Coast Guard work in the several Districts varied in accordance with local conditions, and this had a bearing on the local use of temporary members of the Reserve. For example, the only Temporary Reserve unit in the United States which took over the entire Boarding Officer duties in a port was in the Sixth Naval District, at Charleston, South Carolina. Eventually, Temporary Reserve officers became the official Boarding Officers and, for a considerable period, boarded all incoming vessels, checked crew lists, cargo, fuel, arms, papers, and did all the work done elsewhere by regular or regular Reserve Boarding Officers of the Coast Guard. At Boston, an "Artisan's Flotilla" of over 125 members, with special skills, handled Base duty including painting, refrigeration, plumbing, driving Coast Guard vehicles, quartermaster watches, and work in carpenter shops, electrical and machine shops, tin-shop, and at the Armory and Infirmary. Boston was the only port in the United States where TRs were used in the supervision of explosives loading. From the middle of 1943 until the end of the war in Europe, TRs who were trained in this specialty comprised 40% of all explosives loading details at the Boston Port of Embarkation. It was also the only port having the Radio Sealing Unit manned wholly by Temporary Reservists. Twenty-six men made up this unit which operated continuously from June, 1943 to 9 June, 1945. They boarded ships at docks and at anchorages in all kinds of weather, winter and summer, and undertook the entire activity. The only signal station in the United States manned by Temporary Reservists was maintained 100% by them at the Coast Guard Base, Boston, from 6 July, 1943 to 15 June, 1945. This was a 72-man unit with 4 to 5 men on each 12-hour watch. They served not only as signalmen, but maintained constant watch over the waters of upper Boston Harbor where shipping and piers were most congested. They handled 7,000 visual messages, discovered several fires, corrected or reported about 500 hoist and nameboard violations, and acted as Junior Anchorage Office. The Coast Guard Auxiliary Press, established in New York in 1942, was operated by TRs until October, 1945. It printed most of the material required for training and indoctrination of TRs throughout the country, and also much regular printed material for the Third Naval District.

OTHER SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

An organization as widespread as the Temporary Reserve was bound to find useful fields of endeavor in which special aid could be given the Captains of the Port, because of particular talents of the members. While eight bands, formed in various ports, and "house organs" of many flotillas and VPSF units could be of little use to COTPs, except indirectly as morale boosters, men of linguistic talents were especially helpful as interpreters, especially at Boston, and to a considerable extent at Seattle. Artisan specialists were in demand generally. A Temporary Reserve officer of the Philadelphia Volunteer Port Security Force prepared a thorough-going manual for training VPSF men which served as a model for other Port Security forces and became generally used by such units. A temporary member of the Reserve at Boston compiled a 250-page operating manual for the use of boatmen in the First Naval District under direction of the Captain of the Port. Another prepared

a boarding mammal for boatmen engaged in handling craft on boarding duty as a result of his extensive experience in this field. Other miscellaneous activities, such as recruiting of 17-year old boys in 1944-1945, blood bank donations, bond-selling drives, etc., were of no particular benefit to Captains of the Port, and need only be mentioned. One officer served outstandingly as Anchorage and Ship's Movement Officer of the Captain of the Port of New York, receiving a decoration for his efficient service. Another, as Marine Inspection Officer of the Third District, was charged with the administration of the laws and regulations relating to the safe operation, maintenance, and manning of the United States merchant vessels at New York and other Third District ports, and also received a decoration.

PILOTS

An extremely important activity coming under the jurisdiction of the Captains of the Port was pilotage. Full-time pilots in major ports of the United States were enrolled in the Temporary Reserve and most were given commissions. They continued on a pay basis, the same as in their civilian piloting occupation, but they were a highly important group of Temporary Reservists integrated with the Port Security activity. Details are given in Part VI, Section X.

ULTIMATE SIZE OF TEMPORARY RESERVE ENROLLMENT

That the Temporary Reserve became a sizeable factor in Port Security is evident from the enrollment figures. On 7 December, 1941, Coast Guard personnel totaled about 23,000. The peak was reached about 30 June, 1944, with 175,000, including Spars. In addition, Temporary Reserve personnel had grown to 51,173 actively enrolled, of which 44,307 were serving without pay, (about 20,000 were in Volunteer Port Security Forces, and most of the others were in floating units), and it was estimated that this number had released 8,250 full time Coast Guardsmen for other duty.

WOMEN IN THE TEMPORARY RESERVE

The Temporary Reserve units afloat and ashore grew rapidly, and the burden of "paper work" and transportation grew commensurately. Men who could well be used in patrol boats, on guard duty, and in administrative activities found themselves spending their duty hours at typewriters, working on records, and doing all the office detail necessary in the staff operations of a military organization. These men could be used to greater advantage, and much of the work done better, if the aid of women volunteers could be enlisted. Women were particularly well-fitted to do this work. When provision was made for the enrollment of women in the Temporary Reserve, a large number joined and as Temporary Reserve Spars did valuable work, serving their required time each week along with the men. Their duties, however, were by no means confined to those of a clerical nature, though the majority were so engaged. Many served as jeep or automobile drivers, canteen attendants, and quartermasters, and some became proficient in small arms. Several women's units provided transportation for men going to and returning from duty where regular means were lacking, and in many places took chow to men on watch along the various waterfronts. Many were capable automobile mechanics. In the 11th Naval District, they were used in the identification offices. The women of the Temporary Reserve deserved and received the fullest appreciation of their work from the men with whom they served. The women carried successfully a heavy load and, through release of men for more arduous duties, contributed as much toward the war effort as the men they released. Their work was truly invaluable.

TRAINING WAS A MAJOR TEMPORARY RESERVE ACTIVITY

In order to take from civilian life the 50,000-odd Temporary Reservists who performed active duty, and organize them into an effective, efficient body of men, it was necessary to undertake intensive and thorough training, for most had had no experience in the duties which they were to be called upon to perform. Earlier training was entirely in seamanship, small boat handling, and allied fields, but training for dock watches was soon added. Training for special activities followed shortly thereafter. Most Districts designated a District Temporary Reserve Training Officer, supervising instruction of floating units, VPSF units, or both, and he worked with Training Officers of Divisions or VPSF Regiments who, in turn, were responsible for training within their jurisdictions, and worked with Training Officers serving operating units. Most VPSF training was done before enrollment, thus simplifying elimination of the inefficient. Most floating unit training was carried on after enrollment and assignment to duty, thus affording "on the job" training with more experienced personnel, as well as class training. Schools and colleges made classrooms available, police and other agencies provided ranges for small arms firing. Because of the urgency of fire prevention and control in all port security work the nation over, and the desirability of having Temporary Reserve personnel trained in the latest methods, the Coast Guard Fire School at Fort McHenry, near Baltimore, was made available to Temporary Reservists in addition to regular personnel. This was a school of experimentation and scientific fire-fighting. Those who took this course, for the most part, went back to their units and became fire training personnel, and headed various fire prevention and fire-fighting forces. Even men from San Juan attended. Over 400 officers and men completed this course. Branch fire schools for local training were established, and staffed chiefly by Fort McHenry "graduates." An important one was at Philadelphia, and another at Alameda, California. Training of Temporary Reservists never ceased during the period of operation. There were fire schools on a smaller scale in most of the Districts.


GENERAL DUTIES OF THE FLOATING UNITS

Patrol boats were provided by the Coast Guard, replacing Auxiliary boats furnished in the early days by yachtsmen. These were CGR boats, mostly converted pleasure craft, but later many of these were replaced by regular 38-foot picket boats. The crews usually numbered four to six men, who took their assigned areas in storm and sunshine, summer heat and wintry gales, taking everything that came as part of the job they were proud to be doing. There was an assignment which required expert boat handling under all conditions, and an alert watch for everything of a suspicious nature. As these patrols cruised over their assigned courses, passing piers, electric plants, coal wharves, ammunition docks, Navy yards, shipyards, outlying islands, etc., a close watch was kept for fires, accidents, unauthorized persons, floating menaces to navigation, men overboard, suspicious persons and possible saboteurs. These crews figured in many rescues, discovered a large number of fires which they attended, controlled or extinguished, examined papers of all pleasure craft in their areas, policed launchings and channels for convoy movements, and generally performed all police duty expected of Coast Guard harbor craft in time of war. Most patrol boats were on duty for 12-hour stretches, being relieved only to return to their bases for supplies and new crews, or for necessary overhaul and repair.


GENERAL DUTIES OF THE VOLUNTEER PORT SECURITY FORCE

Volunteer Port Security Force duties in various

REFLECTED



WOMEN TEMPORARY RESERVISTS RELIEVED MEN OF MUCH OFFICE WORK TO ALLOW THEIR TIME TO BE SPENT IN GUARDING PORT FACILITIES



THE NATION'S SEAPORTS WERE VITAL DEFENSE AREAS AND WERE CAREFULLY GUARDED BY PORT SECURITY DETAIL A STRANGER IS REQUIRED TO IDENTIFY HIMSELF BEFORE BEING ALLOWED TO GO ON BOARD

REFLECTED

ports differed in certain details, depending upon local conditions and requirements, but generally, they were similar in all ports. The main part of duty ashore consisted of controlling the entrances to piers. All persons were required to present proper identification and to show they had legitimate business on the pier. This was especially important where persons wished to visit ships. Neutral sailors were not permitted in any restricted areas, except under guard. They were checked by the Customs Officer or other responsible officer in company with the VPSF man, and then turned over to the guard on board ship. Usually, pier guards roved the piers at regular intervals. They had to know everything about the pier, its cargo, its equipment, and the location of all emergency equipment such as fire extinguishers, hoses, telephones, and alarm boxes. In case of fire, they were required to know exactly what to do in the promptest manner, sound the alarm, direct apparatus, remove obstacles, and lend assistance in extinguishing the blaze. They observed, and corrected if possible, any violations on their premises. The ideal pier watch for this exacting assignment was three men rotating their posts.

SECURITY OF VESSELS

Usually, responsibility was assumed for the security of vessels moored at controlled facilities. Details assigned to ships usually consisted of gangway guard, a roving guard, and one man on call. All important facts were recorded on a card, at Philadelphia, for instance, including location of all hazards, nature of cargo, location of fire-fighting equipment, names of officers, and other facts. Each man going on duty inspected the ship carefully, including the engine room. Persons jumping between the ship and the pier had to be guarded against. The Senior Officer Present, with a detachment, inspected each ship thoroughly, especially when she docked, to make certain that her crew were familiar with regulations. Inspections were made of all emptied holds. All posts were toured by a petty officer of the Senior Officer Present. One of the most important duties of the VPSF was to guard against fire. The Coast Guard furnished in many ports fire watchers whose duty it was to attend all jobs where welding or cutting were being done on board ship, to have extinguishers available, and to see that hoses with running water were always handy to such operations. In many ports, welding and cutting were forbidden unless attended by a Coast Guard fire watcher.

THE FOCAL POINT OF GUARD OPERATIONS

The focal point of guard operations was the Officer of the Day, Duty Officer, or officer with other designation depending upon the port, who functioned continuously. He received reports from all Area Command Posts or other VPSF operating units "on the line," and acted and reported upon special incidents such as fires, accidents, sabotage, riot and similar emergencies, maintained close liaison with the Duty Officer of the Captain of the Port and between various operating and staff units of the VPSF, and often maintained a record of ships in port and the number of guards assigned. In general, this officer served as a clearing house for all VPSF and Captain of the Port information and transmitted it to the regimental departments involved.

IMPORTANCE OF JOB AS VOICED BY HIGH-RANKING OFFICERS

One of the most important things in connection with the morale of Temporary Reserve volunteers was realization of the fact that they were performing a vitally necessary function. It was also necessary that they be considered an integral part of the Coast Guard, and not a group apart. This second consideration received too little attention in

the earlier days in many ports. It was also desirable that these volunteers be taken on no other basis but that of the stiffest form of discipline. As long as the TRs were sold on themselves as an inherent part of the Coast Guard, doing work of great importance, they showed a faithfulness and loyalty based upon intelligence and a desire to give, and they could not and would not be paid with money. Addressing one VPSF Regiment, Admiral Waesche said: "It is important that we keep our ports open and safe 24 hours a day, every day of the year. This, the Coast Guard can do only with the help of the Volunteer Port Security Force." And Rear Admiral Chalker, Assistant Commandant, said: "We of the regular Coast Guard need every able-bodied man we can lay our hands on. Since many of them are in Port Security duty, we are putting it up squarely to the volunteers to make them available for combat duties at sea." He told the members of the Regiment that they were "guarding Allied supply lines just as surely as our men battling at sea on cutters, destroyer escorts, and frigates. You are insuring that the products of our tremendous agricultural and industrial efforts are safely passed through this port to ships ready to transport them all over the world. We, who are regular members of the Coast Guard and its Reserve are glad that you have joined us in the fight and can share with us the traditions of our service and its sense of high purpose." Three years after the issuance of Executive Order No. 9074 on 25 February, 1942, which placed port responsibility upon the Coast Guard, Admiral Chalker made the following comment in a bulletin released to all Port Security personnel: "As the Coast Guard enters upon the fourth year of its port protection program, I welcome this opportunity of paying well deserved tribute to all Port Security personnel for the magnificent job which they are doing in preventing fires and other injury to our ports and vessels therein. I wish to pay special tribute to the thousands of Temporary Reservists whose fine patriotism and many personal sacrifices have not only contributed materially to the success of our Port Security efforts, but have facilitated the release of a considerable number of men for participation in the Coast Guard's combat activities."

TEMPORARY RESERVISTS A REAL SECURITY FACTOR

From the foregoing, it is evident that the Temporary Reservists became a real and important factor in the security of our ports, both afloat and ashore. They went right into their jobs alongside the regulars and regular Reservists, all pulling toward the same end, - the safety of our ports and the vessels therein, and the defeat of our enemies. In addition to the special activities relating directly or indirectly to Port Security which the volunteers performed, they also were engaged in certain localities in duties not specifically under Captains of the Port, although closely allied with them. In the First and Eleventh Naval Districts, Temporary Reservists were occupied in beach patrol, in many Districts in coastal lookout work, and, of course, the earliest Temporary Reservists, on a short enrollment and pay basis, served in the coastal picket fleet patrolling offshore. While these were not Captain of the Port activities, and in some cases came under Section Coast Guard Officers, the activities were related with the COTP on a cooperative basis, and some account of these functions, whether Temporary Reserve or regular, is appropriate at this point.

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closely allied to the security of our ports, and the two divisions worked closely together and cooperated for the common good. Boat patrol of harbors, inlets, and rivers had much the same object as beach patrol, and the two coordinated their efforts wherever possible. Further at sea, also protecting our shores and ports were the coastal pickets detecting and reporting submarines and keeping them submerged. It is evident that, with the offshore patrols, the inshore patrols, and the Coast Guard Harbor craft and beach patrols, all concentrating on the safety of coastal waters, shores, and ports, and observation of all that was not well, there was the closest tie in their operations, and each activity supplemented the others.

NEED FOR ORGANIZATION
AND A COASTAL
INFORMATION SYSTEM

Spurred on by the three enemy agent landings at Long Island, New York; Ponte Vedra, Florida and Machias, Maine; the FBI re-

commended that a beach patrol system be organized. On 25 July, 1942, Headquarters authorized the institution in all Naval Districts adjacent to the coast, of an organized beach patrol system. Patrols were to be integrated with the regular Army and Navy defense forces operating in the Districts. The Army defended the land areas, the Navy maintained inshore and offshore patrols, and the Coast Guard was assigned the task of operating an "information system" by means of beach patrols and lookout watches to effectively guard against surprise landings or saboteur activity of the enemy. Thus, the coastal information system of the Coast Guard was built around the existing lifeboat stations and lighthouses for continuous observation of the waters adjacent to our shores, and the reporting of all activity of unusual nature in those waters, in the air, and on the shores. Communications between the lifeboat stations, lighthouses and District headquarters were improved to a point of high efficiency, old stations were reopened, personnel were greatly increased, and an intricate coastal information system became a reality. To increase coverage, many coastal lookouts were built to enable watch over areas not visible from established stations. Information reported by lookouts or patrols was speedily dispatched through intermediate channels to the headquarters of the Naval District, the Sea Frontier, and the Defense Command. Coordination for complete coastal defense was the keystone of the plan of organization. Much of this was of direct interest to Captains of the Port in connection with security of the waters within their jurisdiction. After beach patrol was separated from Port Security in July, 1942, each District set up its beach patrol organization as it desired, under direction of a Beach Patrol Officer responsible directly to the District Coast Guard Officer. The specific function was to guard the coast, provide information, but not to repel military invasion. Actually, it was the eyes and ears of the Navy, Army, and Coast Guard.

THE GROWTH OF
BEACH PATROL

When beach patrol was fully organized, ten Districts maintained an organization for this purpose which, at

the peak of its manpower, employed approximately 24,000 officers and men including an undetermined number of Temporary Reservists. Extended beach patrol coverage totaled about 3,700 miles, exclusive of areas covered by strategically located lookout towers. By boat, jeep, truck, on foot sometimes with dogs, and on horseback, Coast Guardsmen tirelessly patrolled the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific coasts, observing everything possible and reporting untoward events or suspicious actions that Army, Navy and Coast Guard, as action agencies, might be prepared for and handle effectively.

SCOPE AND NATURE OF
THE ACTIVITY

Most of the coast, including concentrated coverage for

SECTION II

CORRELATION WITH BEACH PATROL: COASTAL PICKETS

BEACH PATROL A NORMAL
COAST GUARD FUNCTION

The long-established chain of lifeboat stations manned and operated by the Coast Guard observed during peacetime everything within range of vision, and protected life and property at sea. Rescue and observation were the primary functions of these stations, and continuous lookouts were maintained at most stations. Upon declaration of war in December, 1941, patrols were doubled at most of these posts, and security became an added function.

A SUPPLEMENT TO
PORT SECURITY

Beach patrol became a security force for the protection of our coasts and inland waterways. As a supplement to Port Security, a beach patrol organization was established a few months after the outbreak of hostilities with Japan. During the critical period 1942 and 1943, when our shores were constantly endangered by saboteurs and possible enemy attack, beach patrol was one of the most important phases of national defense. The new beach patrol organization had three basic functions:

- (a) To detect and observe enemy vessels operating in coastal waters and to transmit information thus obtained to the appropriate Navy and Army commands as a basis for naval action against the enemy;
- (b) To report attempts of landing by the enemy and to assist in preventing such activity;
- (c) To prevent communication between persons on shore and the enemy at sea.

Subsidiary, but not incidental, objectives were numerous. Two were of fundamental importance - (a) rescue of survivors of our own and friendly vessels sunk by the enemy; (b) action as a unified guard force in policing the prohibited or restricted areas of the coast. In innumerable rescues of ships' crews and grounded aviators, beach patrol more than justified its operation. Originally, beach patrol was a part of the Port Security organization, but it was soon set up as a separate activity. Yet, the security of our shores was

~~SECRET~~

OPERATIONS

the more vulnerable areas, was under constant surveillance by the close of 1943. Night patrols operated from a continuous chain of stations from Maine to Corpus Christi and from southern California to Vancouver. Vulnerable regions operated 24-hour patrols. Lookout watches were operated on a 24-hour basis. The undertaking involved not only the easy patrolling of long stretches of open, sandy beach, but also sand dunes, inlets, rivers and rocky cliffs, the rugged and heavily forested areas of the Pacific Northwest, the treacherous shore of New England with its wild, indented coast of Maine, the isolated keys of Florida, and the swampy, mosquito-infested regions of the Gulf coast. In many sections, patrols were impossible. The most that could be accomplished was a series of lookout posts on continuous duty. Supplementary were innumerable inlet boat patrols which operated from beach patrol, lighthouse, lookout and surf stations. Especially during the period from mid-1942 to early 1944, this coastal information system was of vital importance in many ways, and greatly assisted the Captains of the Port in efficiently prosecuting Port Security.

TEMPORARY RESERVISTS
IN BEACH PATROL

As was true in all Port Security activity, there was a continual shortage of men due to the great demands for men at sea which became critical early in 1943. To relieve this situation as much as possible, the Temporary Reserve was greatly expanded, and in some areas these volunteers, assigned by Captains of the Port, went into the beach stations and coastal lookouts and carried on these functions after regular and regular Reserve personnel had been transferred to sea. In most areas, the use of these volunteers was impracticable in actual beach patrol activity because the men, being employed in civilian occupations and devoting 12 hours a week to the Coast Guard, could not work far from their homes. Rugged, isolated Oregon coast areas could not be reached by these men for intermittent, temporary duty, nor areas such as the isolated beaches of South Carolina, the Florida keys, and the bayous of the Gulf coast. However, where beach patrol was being conducted in areas in reasonable proximity to centers of population, they were used to excellent advantage. Their use was notable in the First Naval District where upward of 1,500 Temporary Reservists were engaged in patrolling the beaches, often with dogs, manning coastal lookout towers, maintaining sentry watches or telephone watches at beach stations, and performing station base duties. In the Third District, a smaller number was used in this activity, chiefly in the lookouts of the north Jersey shore. The Fourth District employed many in coastal lookouts, especially along the south Jersey coast and at Capes May and Henlopen. About 15% of the TRs in the Lake Michigan area served in life-boat stations, many on lookout duty. Some were used on beach patrol in the Eleventh District.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES
ON BEACH PATROL

Occasionally, there were special problems or unusual events. In August, 1942, while beach patrol was still under Captains of the Port, it was evidenced that the Germans had acquired property at Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts, and submarines had been observed hovering in the vicinity. Admiral Brown expressed grave concern as to the adequacy of the existing patrols there, and requested their extension. This was at about the time the beach patrol organization, as such, had been authorized. There was a problem in the densely populated areas near New York where great care had to be exercised and tact used in checking, questioning and, in some cases, detaining people frequenting the shore areas. Some thought they owned the beaches. The public, generally, however, did not mind the close supervision. An interesting plan was followed in the Eleventh District whereby all beach patrol personnel

were rotated periodically with floating units in order that a broader training and experience for future duties might be provided. On the west coast of Florida, regular patrols were never established, since innumerable small islands and dense mangrove jungles constituted an excellent natural defense. There were only 8 stations there, and these had a short life.

MANPOWER SURVEY
AND CURTAILMENT

At about the end of 1943 and early 1944, the Navy and Coast Guard conducted a manpower survey to determine how personnel were being used, from which duties men could be spared, and which activities were undermanned. At that time, danger, of enemy landings had greatly diminished, and it was felt that full coverage of the beaches was no longer necessary. In the Gulf and southern Atlantic areas, reductions had been made in beach patrol and some stations eliminated. Greater emphasis was placed on coastal lookouts. A 40% reduction in personnel was ordered at a large number of stations. Shortly afterward, it was decided virtually to discontinue beach patrols about the first of March, 1944, especially along the Atlantic coast, though mounted and dog patrols were continued. Able-bodied men were withdrawn and trained for sea duty. Patrols on the Pacific coast, however, continued until the Fall of 1944, though they had effected a 50% reduction in personnel. Finally, beach stations reverted to their normal peacetime function of saving life and property at sea.

ACHIEVEMENT


The success of beach patrol was measurable in part by what did not happen, as was typical of most Port Security activities. It is impossible to estimate what would have been the results had our shores remained unguarded. The negative achievements were the real criteria of success. That nothing spectacular could be recorded was a lasting tribute to every beach patrolman on the American coast. The great assistance to the Captain of the Port by the beach patrol organization was through the coastal information system, and this proved invaluable.

SECTION III


CLEARANCE AND ANCHORAGE

ANCHORAGE DUTIES
UNDER LAW OF
4 MARCH, 1915

In the preceding parts of this monograph, the origin of Coast Guard Anchorage duties and the growth in anchorage responsibilities have been recounted. However, in taking up anchorage operations, it is well to review the anchorage duties of the Coast Guard based upon the law of 4 March, 1915, Section 7, (33 U.S.C. 471). "The Secretary of War is hereby authorized, empowered, and directed to define and establish anchorage grounds for vessels in all harbors, rivers, bays, and other navigable waters of the United States whenever it is manifest to the said Secretary that the maritime or commercial interests of the United States require such anchorage grounds for safe navigation and the establishment of such anchorage grounds shall have been recommended by the Chief of Engineers, to adopt suitable rules and regulations in relation thereto; and such rules and regulations shall be enforced by the Coast Guard under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury; Provided, That at ports or places where there is no Coast Guard cutter available such rules and regulations may be enforced by the Chief of Engineers under the direction of the Secretary of War. In the event of violation of any such rules and regulations by the owner, master, or person in charge of any vessel, such owner, master or person in charge of such vessel shall be liable to a penalty of \$100; and the said vessel may be holden for the payment of such penalty, and



COASTAL PICKETS AND OFFSHORE PATROL CRAFT
COOPERATED CLOSELY WITH PORT SECURITY UNITS



COAST GUARDSMEN KEPT A VIGILANT LOOKOUT FOR ENEMY LANDINGS
BY TROOPS OR SABOTEURS AS WELL AS FOR SHIPS IN DISTRESS
AS PART OF THE COASTAL INFORMATION SYSTEM
THEY COOPERATED EFFECTIVELY WITH CAPTAINS OF THE PORT

~~RESTRICTED~~

may be seized and proceeded against summarily by libel for the recovery of the same in any United States District Court for the district within which such vessel may be and in the name of the officer designated by the Secretary of War."

ANCHORAGE REGULATIONS
AMENDED - MARCH, 1942

An amendment to the Anchorage Regulations, placed in force in March, 1942, provided that, except with respect to the departure of a vessel for which a departure permit was required, or in case of emergency missions to save life or property in distress; no vessel shall depart from the local waters of the United States, its territories or possessions to a point or place outside the said waters or on the high seas unless the owner, agent, or master of such vessel shall first obtain from the Captain of the Port in whose jurisdiction the vessel is to depart a license authorizing such departure. The Captain of the Port will issue a license only in the following cases:

- (a) Where the vessel is regularly (or seasonably) employed as a means of livelihood outside the local waters, or on the high seas, such as for fishing, transporting passengers or freight for hire, or for any other legitimate business; Provided, that the master, operator, or person in charge of such vessel is a citizen of the United States, or at least 50% of the personnel complement of said vessel are not aliens: Provided further, that no departure license shall be granted to any vessel having an alien enemy on board, either in the capacity of master, operator, person in charge, or member of the crew or passenger.
- (b) Where necessary to depart under its own power to a permanent location within local waters at some distant point; Provided, that if such transportation will involve passage through, or arrival within, waters under jurisdiction of another Captain, or other Captains of the Port, the Captain of the Port issuing the license shall send appropriate notification thereof to the Captains of the Port in each of whose jurisdictions the vessel will proceed and arrive at final destination. Then followed the same enemy alien provision given in (a).

It was required that every person on board meet identification standards, and that each vessel be inspected. It was provided that, except in the above enumerated cases and in the case of a vessel included in a general license issued by the Commandant, no vessel was to move in local waters unless the owner, agent or master first obtained from the Captain of the Port where the vessel was located, a license authorizing such movement. The Captain of the Port could, in his discretion, issue one license covering all these things.

RULES FOR ANCHORAGE
AND MOVEMENT OF VESSELS

Because of the importance of anchorage and the movement of vessels, in Captain of the Port activity, the Commandant called a conference at Washington on 1 August, 1940, following which the Secretary of the Treasury issued, on 29 October, 1940, "Anchorage Grounds for Certain Ports of the United States and Rules and Regulations Relating Thereto." These rules, with only minor alterations, held throughout the war period. Sources of authority were quoted, and the regulations were divided into three parts, (a) "General Rules and Regulations," (b) "Anchorage Regulations for Certain Ports of the United States, and (c), "General Provisions." These regulations are covered in some detail because of their importance.

~~RESTRICTED~~

General Rules Governing Anchorage and Movement of Vessels

Providing that they shall be enforced by the Captain of the Port or other officer designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, the rules and regulations are to be in addition to and in no manner a substitution for the Regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury on June 27, 1940. The rules are:

Anchorage in General

The eleven rules under this heading may be summarized as follows:

1. Prohibiting anchorage (a) outside areas established or affirmed by the Secretary of the Treasury except in great emergency or without hindrance to shipping, or (b) within a cable or pipe line area or to a pier obstructing another vessel in transit.
2. Limiting occupancy of anchorage to 30 days without permit and prohibiting anchorage of vessels likely to sink or menace navigation except for permissible period.
3. Mooring with two or more anchors when necessary.
4. Anchoring with a mooring swivel when reduced crew makes weighing of anchor impossible.
5. No anchors, hull or rigging to be outside anchorage areas.
6. Permitting anchoring outside area in great emergency, not obstructing channel or approach to any pier or impeding any vessel's movement and moving after emergency, if vessel safety or commerce movement requires.
7. Assignment of available anchorage berth to any vessel, with revokable permit for its habitual use.
8. Permits, with approval of District Engineer, to wrecking, salvaging, dredging, pipe or cable laying or repairing plants or vessels, provided those operating under his supervision will require no permits.
9. Authority to shift position of any vessel anchored outside designated areas so as to obstruct (a) vessel movements in the channel, (b) range lights, (c) vessels in transit to or from adjacent wharves, (d) vessels entering or leaving adjacent slips, or whenever maritime or commercial interests of the United States or vessel or harbor safety so require.
10. Prompt shifting of position, when notified.
11. Communicating fact that vessel is on fire promptly to Captain of the Port who shall designate most suitable available anchorage.

Anchorage of Vessels Carrying Explosives

12. "Prohibiting anchoring of vessels carrying explosives outside explosive anchorage areas except (a) vessels engaged in Federal Improvements, or (b) when Captain of the Port designates loading terminals outside such areas. Such areas may, when not in use, be used by vessels carrying inflammables or dangerous cargoes if anchored at least 1,000 yards from those carrying explosives.
13. Revokable permits to anchor in such areas may be issued by Captain of the Port.
14. Prohibiting tugs or stevedore boats, loading or unloading explosives, entering such areas without permit.

15. Requiring tug in attendance for every vessel, at anchor in such areas and carrying explosives as cargo and not fitted with mechanical power, unless deemed unnecessary by Captain of the Port.

16. Rules I and II apply to vessels carrying explosives, when applicable.

17. Paragraphs 12 and 16 inapplicable to explosives, when applicable, engaged in Federal Improvements where explosives are handled in manner prescribed by District Engineer.

Movement, Lading and Discharge of Explosives, Inflammables, or Other Dangerous Cargo

18. "Supervision over handling explosives in ports by, and prohibiting movement of explosives-carrying vessels through any channel or waterway without permit of Captain of the Port, with no responsibility on his part for their navigation.

19. Display of red flag by day and red light by night, by vessels lading, unloading, transporting or containing explosives as cargo.

20. Supervision by competent person in charge of explosives cargo-carrying vessels in U. S. territorial waters and by master, where handling or movement is involved, so as to reduce same to a minimum.

21. Applies to all vessels in waters of the United States including non-common carriers, ICC Regulations (Part V) except as inconsistent and until effective date of Act of October 9, 1942 (Dangerous Cargo Act).

22. Prohibiting, without permit, loading or discharge of explosives from any vessel lying at a wharf.

23. Placing inspectors and guards on vessels loading or discharging inflammables or dangerous cargo.

24. Prompt reporting to Captain of the Port by master or person in charge of vessel concerned of all violations, accidents, fires, explosions, and leakage or breakage while in port.

25. Prohibiting anchoring without permit within 12 hours of any vessel with cargo of gasoline or inflammable liquid.

26. Prohibiting, without permit, transfer of more than 1,000 barrels of gasoline or any inflammable liquid (flash point below 80°F) from one vessel to another in anchorage area.

27. In case of any violation of any section from 18 to 26, removal of the violator from, or stopping loading or unloading of explosives on or from, vessel concerned.

Part III defined anchorage grounds and areas in principal U. S. tide water and fresh water ports, and in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, and San Juan, Puerto Rico. It reaffirmed and continued in force anchorage areas and grounds established by the Secretary of War, and affirmed and adopted two amendments of war Department regulations relating to Tampa Bay and the Mississippi River. It also reaffirmed and continued in force Secretary of Commerce regulations relating to movement and anchorage of vessels and rafts in the St. Mary's River, except waters of the St. Mary's Falls Canal. General Provisions dealt with definitions, and pointed out that there was no relief from violating any other law or regulations and no repeal of other law or regulations except where there was conflict. These regulations were not uniformly in effect in 1940 and early 1941, but applied only to a number of specific ports at that time.

ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

It was later provided that whenever a Captain of the Port found that the operation, navigation, anchoring, or mooring of any vessel within the waters proximate to any bridge crossing navigable waters of the United States might endanger such a bridge, vessel or other vessel or waterfront facility, or might be inimical to the national war effort or to the maritime interests, he might, on approval of the District Coast Guard Officer, establish restricted and prohibited areas in the waters proximate to such bridge, covering such distances as he might consider necessary. The movement or anchorage in such areas were prohibited except with the approval of the District Coast Guard Officer. It was stipulated, however, that such areas should be appropriately marked. In the enforcement of such restrictions, the help of local agencies could be enlisted if necessary. Except in cases of great emergency, vessels were prohibited from anchoring within cable or pipe line areas designated on Government charts, or to moor so as to obstruct traffic. Anchorage outside areas was permitted in emergency, but only for the duration of the emergency, or until ordered to move by the Captain of the Port. The COTP was empowered to prevent the mooring of any vessel at a dock, pier, wharf or other waterfront facility if security measures were inadequate, or if it involved danger to the vessel or the property. It was also eventually provided that "no vessel shall approach within one hundred yards of any of the obstructions placed near harbor entrances, except for the purpose of transiting the regularly prescribed gate opening, unless specifically authorized by the Captain of the Port or proper Naval authority."

POLICY ON VIOLATIONS

In Headquarters Law Bulletin of August, 1943, there was a constructive statement of policy with regard to violations. In part, it read: "It should be the policy of the Coast Guard officers to place emphasis on the prevention of violations of the regulations in question, rather than on prosecution of mere technical violation. This may be accomplished through adequate publicity of the provisions of the regulations, contact with vessel operators, the warning of operators prior to commission of violations, etc. Headquarters does not believe that innocent technical violations of the regulations warrant the consumption of time and effort on the part of the United States Attorneys and the Coast Guard which would be involved in the prosecutions. The issuance of warnings that future violations will result in the prosecutions should be sufficient in cases of first offenders."

CONFUSION OVER REGULATIONS

Especially in the earlier days of the war, rules and regulations were put into effect by various agencies, many of which conflicted and caused no end of confusion in some areas. Often these were promulgated without consultation with other agencies also empowered to make rules. This was particularly troublesome in the Thirteenth Naval District, and brought about a report on the situation in November, 1943. This preliminary report on restricted, danger, and prohibited anchorage and examination areas on the navigable waters of the District, disclosed that there was no central clearing unit in the Army, Navy or Coast Guard, with such information on hand. It was shown that areas were declared at will by the commanding officers of small units in all services, many without legal foundation. The establishment of such areas was not sufficiently publicized, and non-military and military areas overlapped with conflicting regulations. Confusion was such that a vessel innocent of the various regulations was actually directed into an area where she was

fired upon by a different military unit. It was realized that the whole matter needed clarification, and steps were taken to eliminate this confusion.

NEW YORK AS AN EXAMPLE OF ANCHORAGE AND SHIP MOVEMENT OPERATIONS

The Port of New York was the largest port in the United States in volume of wartime shipping. From before the Neutrality Act to the height of war traffic, the number of ships entering and leaving New York Harbor increased from about 900 a month to about 3,000. Intra-harbor traffic increased commensurately. Most of the smaller number of vessels could be docked, whereas most of the larger number had to use the anchorages. These anchorage areas were occasionally revised as needs grew, and Army Engineers deepened channels as needed. At the peak, as many as 195 ships were recorded passing in and out of this harbor. New York was a veritable "powder keg." The surrounding densely populated area was a beehive of production, finance and dwellings. A well-timed incident at the right place, touched off either by the carelessness of a worker or the shrewd cunning of a saboteur, could have caused a bottleneck in the flow of vital war materials, destroyed millions of dollars worth of property, and imposed untold hardships upon the residents of the metropolitan area. About 60 % of the country's shipping was handled at New York. It was a munitions loading terminal, an oil refining center, a port of embarkation, a great shipbuilding port, and the home of a Navy Yard and Navy supply and repair depot. It was an important Army base. Every activity was vitally important and every article was desperately needed. There could be no bottlenecks here, and smooth operation of the entire anchorage and ship's movement activity was a vital necessity to the war effort. Because New York's anchorage and ship's movement division had the most complicated and highly developed system of any port, due to the heavy requirements, some account of the New York activity is given as an example. In other ports, with less traffic, the activity was the same on a smaller scale, with variations depending upon local requirements and conditions.

NEW YORK ORGANIZATION OF ANCHORAGE AND SHIP'S MOVEMENT

In the prewar days, anchorage, not only at New York but at other ports, was not a separate function, but fitted into the day's work of the Captain of the Port. In 1942, an independent anchorage office under the Captain of the Port was established under its own department head, and with its specific functions. Of course, anchorage activity increased with the progress of the war. As activity grew, efficient organization of the activity became requisite, and as of 10 January, 1945, it was set up as follows:

EARLY PROBLEM WITH INCREASING DEMANDS

when every available harbor facility was bulging with the implements of war, the military logistics agencies decided that in order to have the right things in the right places at the right times, New York would have to do the impossible. The port became the terminus of coastal and United Kingdom convoys. The transition was very rapid. It was soon apparent that, though the Anchorage Office struggled valiantly, it failed consistently to carry the burden which had been imposed upon it with the limited personnel and the one full time patrol boat and two part time patrol boats assigned to it. Appeals to Headquarters for better facilities were constant, and the Ship Movement and Anchorage Office, as such, was established on 21 April, 1943. The broad scope and purpose of this organization and the manifold responsibilities invested therein, required careful planning, intimate knowledge of the harbor, and liaison and cooperation with and between all concerned. The person most competent to head such an organization was found among the pilots, as being most intimate with the problems, so one of these was made commanding officer of the Ship Movement and Anchorage Office. This officer was Captain William Hilton Lowe, a temporary officer of the Coast Guard Reserve, who was finally awarded the Commendation Ribbon for his efficient conduct of his office.

In the Fall of 1942, when the Port of New York began to feel the full impact of the war load, at a time

LIAISON AND COOPERATION


It was vitally important that the Ship Movement and Anchorage Office be cognizant of the needs of each agency such as Port Director, Eastern Sea Frontier, Army, Coast Guard, Navy Army Engineers, War Shipping Administration, Customs, and Public Health Service and liaison was maintained with these and other agencies. It was necessary that the office be able and willing to give counsel and render opinions, be constantly on the alert, prevent traffic snags, and be ready to render assistance in any and all emergencies.

It was vitally important that the Ship Movement and Anchorage Office be cognizant of the needs of each

ANCHORAGE PATROLS

One of the first controls the new office put into operation was to establish 24-hour patrols of all anchorage areas. These patrols enforced regulations, provided information, and assisted in emergencies. They warned masters of the approach of bad weather, cautioned of dangers which might not have been observed, conveyed necessary messages between ships and agents, kept lookout for fires or acts of sabotage, and reported and towed to safety obstructions or drifting derelicts, and were generally useful. During movements of convoys they patrolled channels and diverted traffic which might interfere with the movement. In the event of collision or other disaster,

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AN ACCURATE CHECK OF SHIPS' MOVEMENTS IN NEW YORK HARBOR
WAS MAINTAINED IN THIS ELABORATE CHART ROOM AT THE BARGE OFFICE

RESTRICTED

they were prepared to survey the situation, adopt any necessary course of action, and warn other vessels.

SMALL BOAT ANCHORAGE

Because small boat anchorage involved a special treatment peculiar to that type of boating, and to enable the main office to concentrate on the important ship business, a special section was established for handling small boat anchorage. This had its office adjoining, but separate from, the principal office at the Barge Office where the Port Security was quartered.

THE CHART ROOM

To keep posted on the locations of ships in the Port of New York, an unused storeroom was converted into a Chart Room. This was efficiently staffed and operated on a 24-hour basis. By means of telephone, command phone, teletype, teleautograph, and messenger, this room was in direct communication with the Port Director, Navy District Service, Anchorage Office, Pier 18 Staten Island Lookout Tower, Hell Gate Tower, U. S. Customs, Harbor Entrance Control Post at Fort Wadsworth, Ambrose Lightship, Pilot Command, the U. S. Public Health Service, Timogg's Neck, Perth Amboy, and City Island. In addition, two daily "sweeps" by boat provided a check on every vessel in the harbor. This information was assimilated and catalogued for immediate reference. On the wall was a full wall-sized chart of the harbor showing the location of all vessels, and kept up to date with every movement. Numerous charts and graphs provided means of solving anchorage problems, and showed the velocity and direction of currents at various points and stages of the tide. Speed and distance graphs simplified questions concerning arrival or converging of traffic originating at widely separated parts of the port. The big magnetized chart, measuring 15 feet by 20 feet, had plotted on it the location, type, kind of load and classification of every vessel in the harbor.

SHIP BULLETIN AND RADIO SEALING

The Ship Bulletin and Radio Sealing Division was also a separate unit. It gathered, compiled, and assimilated information for the publication of a Ship Bulletin to be used by various agencies in performing their assigned duties. It was published at 1700 seven days a week and contained the name, location, date of arrival, last port, whether armed and degaussed, of all merchant vessels over 1,000 gross tons entering the port. A card record was kept of all American and foreign merchant vessels which had entered or departed the port. Vessel movement and location information was kept up to date. The Bulletin was picked up daily by about 50 agencies, or delivered by messenger. This office was the focal point for ship information. The Radio Sealing division was incorporated with this office. Twenty-five enlisted men boarded ships on arrival and inspected and sealed the radios on board merchant vessels. Two picket boats provided transportation. A third covered Hudson River anchorages. Four jeeps covered the piers. This detail worked 7 days a week on a 16-hour basis, and sealed radios within about 24 hours after the ship arrived. In one working day, radios on 99 vessels had been sealed. Another group, boarding with these men, inspected the guns and magazines of all foreign merchant vessels. They made sure all guns were unloaded, and filed reports on the condition of the magazines and on the types of ammunition.

FLAG HOIST

The flag hoist detail operated 24 hours a day, issued hoists to coastwise

shipping, small boats and fishing craft. This division operated at first independently for about 6 months, and was then incorporated into the Ship Movement and Anchorage Office.

RELOCATION OF THE SHIP MOVEMENT OFFICE

The Ship Movement and Anchorage Office was finally shifted from the Barge Office to the office of the Navy Port Director for closer coordination and added facilities, and for greater ease in handling highly secret convoy schedules and identification signals. It facilitated preparation of these schedules which involved the most careful selection of coded instructions prior to their safe and swift delivery to pilots at secret rendezvous on shore and at sea. It also facilitated planning with the Port Director for control of inbound and outbound convoy movements, questions concerning anchorages for large Naval units or clearing anchorage areas to expedite sailing of troop transports, carriers, and other Naval units,

ANCHORAGE OFFICERS FOR MUNITION SHIPS

In the later days of the Ship Movement and Anchorage Office, three officers were selected to act as anchorage officers for munition ships. They could relieve the regular pilot in an emergency. They practically took over the anchorage control for explosives vessels, specializing in this field, with the result that 18 ships with 80,000 tons of explosives could be anchored simultaneously.

SECTION IV

IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

BEGINNING AND GROWTH OF PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION

Even before the outbreak of hostilities there was recognition of the desirability of a means of identifying persons frequenting the waterfronts of our ports. Fear of sabotage or subversive acts was strong. Identification cards to be issued to such persons were considered early, and in the Third Naval District, the first such card was issued 23 October, 1940. They were not generally issued in quantity, however, until the latter part of 1941. With the outbreak of war, identification rapidly became a very important activity for the Captains of the Port. Personal identifications of all persons working at or visiting the waterfronts became the immediate concern of these officers. Wartime regulations required that each individual have a Coast Guard card issued by the Captain of the Port, as a prerequisite to his admission to the waterfront. In almost all ports, waterfront industrial activities and shipyard operations had increased greatly when the processing of this vast number of persons was undertaken. Captains of the Port set up offices and performed most of the identification work there, and the larger offices took care of around 200 applicants a day. However, this meant that those on vitally essential jobs lost valuable time from work. Many Captains of the Ports established mobile units of four to eight trained enlisted men including a photographer, who went directly to the plants or shipyards and processed the applicants there, issuing necessary temporary identification cards. In many ports, this was also done at large buildings adjacent to the water. Good cooperation from owners and employers was usually received.

PURPOSE OF THE IDENTIFICATION CARD

The Coast Guard identification card was intended for identification purposes — to be good evidence of who the holder actually was. It was not intended to be used as a pass, evidence of good character, or other

REMARKS

indication of approval by the Coast Guard. Distribution eventually was so wide, and possession of an identification was made a necessity to so many people that the Coast Guard could not possibly pass on the qualifications of card holders other than to establish their true identities. Headquarters instructions did not contemplate that an identification card would be denied to an enemy alien or to a person with a criminal record, although some distinction was afforded in the color of cards used. There was no approval of the use of cards except purely for identification purposes. Nevertheless, many persons referred to the cards as fishing permits, hunting permits, Coast Guard passes, waterfront passes, and such, and felt that the card permitted its possessor complete freedom of waterfront facilities. Captain of the Port Identification personnel spent considerable time in educating the public as to the purpose of the cards.

PERSONS TO WHOM IDENTIFICATION CARDS WERE ISSUED

A directive dated 23 April, 1942, from the Commandant to all District Coast Guard Officers specified the

classes of persons for whom the cards were intended. These were:

- (a) Men employed on United States ships such as seamen, bargemen, and fishermen;
- (b) Employees working on ships or at waterfront facilities in connection therewith such as longshoremen, checkers, watchmen, and public servants;
- (c) Men having incidental business on ship such as reporters, craftsmen, laborers, tradesmen, and supervisors;
- (d) Employees of waterfront industries such as shipyard, power plants, and railways;
- (e) Men making occasional or incidental use of vessels or waterfront facilities such as recreationists, sport fishermen, and visitors;
- (f) Persons desiring entry to vessels or waterfront areas whose identity is not established to the satisfaction of the issuing officer, or whose photographs or fingerprints are not available;
- (g) Seamen on foreign ships, citizens of enemy countries or countries cooperating with enemy countries (Norway, Belgium, Holland, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Poland shall not be regarded as cooperating countries).

FOUR TYPES OF IDENTIFICATION CARDS ISSUED BY THE COTP

Identification cards issued by the Captain of the Port came within four classifications.

Each was distinguished

by a particular color. In applying for these cards, applicants were required to submit photographs, or be photographed, and be fingerprinted. The four types of card are summarized:

WHITE CARDS were issued only to United States citizens or citizens of allied or friendly neutral countries such as Great Britain, Russia, China, Brazil, or Mexico, who could identify themselves to the satisfaction of the issuing officer and who were sponsored by reputable persons, corporations, or organizations. White cards were granted only to persons whose presence on vessels or waterfront facilities was required in connection with their livelihood. (a and b in the preceding paragraph). Such cards were not issued to alien seamen of any nationality or to persons having only temporary or occasional business aboard vessels or waterfront facilities.

REMARKS

BUFF CARDS were issued to persons not engaged in the loading or operation of ships as a means of livelihood, but who had occasional business on board vessels and facilities. These included employees of shipyards, contractors, and ship chandlers, and other persons whose work required their presence on ships at irregular intervals or their employment at waterfront facilities. Buff cards were also issued to persons desiring to go on board vessels or waterfront facilities for recreational purposes. They were issued only to United States citizens and to citizens of friendly countries. (Classifications (c), (d), and (e) of the preceding paragraph).

GREEN CARDS were intended for temporary use, and were issued to persons who could not meet the requirements for a permanent white or buff card, or who were in need of an identification card while awaiting the issuance of a white or buff card. They were also issued to persons having need of an identification card for a single visit or trip or for the duration of a particular job. All green cards had the word "Expires" stamped diagonally across the face by a rubber stamp in one-half inch letters, and the date of expiration written in ink immediately thereafter. A green card issued to an enemy alien was stamped "Enemy Alien," with a hole punched through the card. These cards were never pressed in laminated plastic. (Classification (f)).

PINK CARDS were issued to enemy aliens, seamen on foreign vessels, and to citizens of countries hostile to the United States, or associated with or dominated by such hostile countries, including but not limited to Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland, France, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Spain and Thailand. The term "enemy alien" included all citizens of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and stateless persons whose last citizenship was German, Italian, or Japanese. A pink card issued to an enemy alien had the word "Enemy Alien" stamped diagonally across the face of the card by a rubber stamp in half-inch letters, and a hole punched in the card immediately after the name of the holder. If a pink card were required for only a limited period, the word "Expires" was stamped across its face and the expiration date inserted. (Classification (g)).

Each Captain of the Port kept a record of all identification cards issued under his authority, arranged numerically and alphabetically.

IN CASE OF EXCLUSION FROM THE WATERFRONT


Whenever the Captain of the Port formally notified a person that he was denied entrance to waterfront facilities,

he stamped the face of such person's identification card with the words "Excluded from Waterfront." If the card were laminated, it was recalled and a new card, suitably stamped, was issued in its place. However, before reaching a decision to remove or exclude from a merchant vessel or waterfront facility any individual, either as an employee or in any other status, the District Coast Guard Officer was to be certain that he had found reasonable grounds to believe that the person was one:

- (a) who would engage in sabotage of the vessel or waterfront facility, or
- (b) who would engage in espionage, or
- (c) who had subversive inclinations indicated by pro-Axis statements or actions, or
- (d) who had a criminal record of such nature as would indicate that his presence in a vessel or on a waterfront facility would lead to serious hazard, or
- (e) who was habitually unfit for duty on board by reason of drunkenness, or



IDENTIFICATION PERSONNEL
CAREFULLY CHECKED CREDENTIALS OF APPLICANTS FOR I. D. CARDS



WORKMEN HAVING FINISHED STOWING A CARGO OF 2,000-POUND AERIAL BOMBS
LEAVE AN ALLIED AMMUNITION SHIP
AS A WATCHFUL COAST GUARDSMAN STANDS BY THE GANGPLANK

- (f) who was mentally incapacitated, or
 (g) whose presence on board a vessel or on a waterfront facility would, for any reason not listed above, constitute a menace to the national security or to the safety of life or property.

Captains of the Port were not required to honor identification cards issued by other Captains of the Port, but were permitted to do so in their discretion. In cases where they were not accepted, the COTP issued a new card. In the case of persons denied access to waterfronts and vessels, however, notice of such exclusion was sent to all Districts to forestall issuance of cards to the persons denied, should they apply in such Districts.

PROCESSING OF APPLICANTS

In the issuance of identification cards, there was a clear line of demarcation between the function of issuance, which was under the Captain of the Port, and the function of screening of applicants, which was under Coast Guard Intelligence. Fingerprints of each applicant were submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, resulting in the quick return of any criminal information in a person's record. In cases of individuals whose records showed conviction for crimes of arson or willful destruction of property, the identification card was not issued, and an order for the subject's exclusion from the waterfront was approved by Headquarters. The Office of Naval Intelligence received each application for a final check and returned a report of its findings to the Coast Guard Intelligence Officer. This check was helpful in revealing instances of military or naval offenses or shipping infractions. In most Districts, the following agencies had occasion to refer to Coast Guard Identification files: the FBI, Army and Navy Intelligence, Postal Department, Internal Revenue Department, and local and State police departments.

DIFFICULTIES IN IDENTIFICATION

Many applicants for cards experienced difficulty in furnishing the necessary proof as to date and place of their birth. In numerous instances, births were not recorded or official records had been destroyed. This made it impossible for the individual to offer satisfactory evidence of citizenship. The denial of a card to such a person often imposed a burden in that it prevented his employment with firms doing government work which were located on the waterfront. As this condition became apparent, Headquarters authorized the use of an affidavit (form 2658B) in cases where the applicant was unable to prove citizenship by other means. This recorded the place and date of birth, and an affidavit was administered by a commissioned officer in the presence of another witness. This procedure operated very satisfactorily, and solved a troublesome problem. However, birth certificates were not always needed as proof of citizenship; other means of proof acceptable to Captains of the Port were baptismal records, contemporaneous Bible entries, certificates of naturalization, and honorable discharges from the Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps. Affidavits from two responsible persons having personal knowledge of the applicant's American birth were also acceptable.

THE SCOPE OF IDENTIFICATION

It can be appreciated that identification of all persons having legitimate business on the waterfront of the entire United States was a huge job. Every possible means had to be employed to take shortcuts both in point of work and time without affecting efficiency in doing the work. Time was required for processing and screening, and temporary cards were issued the applicants pending completion of the permanent cards. As an example of how great numbers of applicants

at a large plant were handled, an experience in the Thirteenth Naval District may be cited. During the earlier period of the Identification program, checks were made at the gates of various shipyards, and it was found that the majority of workers had not then obtained their cards, because they had had little time to go to the office and apply for them. The cooperation of the personnel departments was solicited and gained. Personal history forms were left in these departments for distribution to the workers not having cards. When the forms had all been completed, the Identification Office was notified. In the meantime, several portable cameras had been made up by the Coast Guard, and sufficient personnel were taken into the yard and set up in a convenient location. The workers were then called off the job and brought to the unit for photographing and, if necessary, fingerprinting. The whole process consumed five to eight minutes per man for a large yard, and the workers lost only this amount of time. After lamination at the Identification Office, the cards were sent to the personnel office of the plant for distribution. The effectiveness of this plan was soundly proved when a check at the gate of one of the yards showed that of 45,000 workers, only 398 were without cards. The total number of cards issued in the United States is not available, but some idea of the magnitude of the task may be had from the fact that, at Boston, the files contained applications and personal records of about 150,000 persons to whom cards had been issued, of which, 10,000 were issued permits for the handling of explosives. At the peak, a force of 48 men was assigned at Boston to the Identification office. At the Port of New York, the Identification Detail, which reached a peak personnel of 228 officers and men, fingerprinted and issued credentials to more than 2,500,000 persons.

SECTION V

EXPLOSIVES LOADING AND SUPERVISION

PREWAR GROWTH IN THE LOADING OF EXPLOSIVES

In previous parts of this monograph, some account has been given of the growth in the loading and shipment in the period before this Nation became involved in World War II. Such activity increased rapidly, and the Coast Guard, in its role as supervisor of the loading of explosives, was hard-pressed to provide the needed supervisory personnel. At the time of the Headquarters Conference of 1 August, 1940, there were various uncoordinated rules and regulations regarding the shipment and loading of explosives, with considerable confusion as to jurisdiction and responsibility. At the Conference, it was pointed out that the Interstate Commerce Commission had made regulations covering the packing of dangerous cargo and its handling and storage in common carriers, for handling such articles from rail head to vessel, and for determining in what part of the vessel they should be placed. However, it had no personnel for enforcement of its regulations. Local authorities were usually relied upon to carry out enforcement. The responsibility for handling dangerous cargoes on vessels in the harbors of the United States had been temporarily transferred to the Coast Guard. The Interstate Commerce Commission had no rules applying to tankers or with respect to loading or handling of liquid in tankers. The Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation had established rules for foreign and domestic tankers as to the type of equipment, but made inspections only if a question had arisen as to proper equipment. It was stated that it was the policy of the Coast Guard to follow rules and regulations which had already been promulgated. However, if changes in the rules were needed, the Coast Guard would consult with other agencies involved, thus easing eventual transition of responsibility to the original agencies. If the Treasury Department, through the Coast Guard, felt that dangerous cargo safeguards

were insufficient, the Secretary of the Treasury had the authority to change or adopt regulations. The Coast Guard, in such a case, would ask for the change and the agency draw it up, except in cases of emergency when provisional regulations would be made.

NEED OF AMENDMENT TO PEACETIME REGULATIONS

explosives on board vessels would require amendment to facilitate the transportation of military explosives in accordance with the tempo of our war efforts. The British introduced this question before the Combined Chiefs of Staff on military transportation. Following discussion, the Chairman referred the entire question to the Coast Guard for such solution as could properly be developed. The Coast Guard invited a committee consisting of representatives of the Navy Ordnance and Transportation Divisions, to meet for the purpose of considering the extent of the necessity and the methods that could be applied in effecting an increase in the handling, stowage and transportation of explosives and military ammunition on board merchant vessels for delivery overseas. In addition, the Inspector General's office, U. S. Navy, called a meeting to discuss the need for accelerating the handling, stowage and transportation of explosives on board merchant vessels, including the possibility of "combat loading."

CHANGE IN EARLY 1942

War Powers Act, many functions of the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation of the Department of Commerce, were transferred to the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation was merged with the Coast Guard. Authority to control the shipment of explosives aboard ship had been granted to the Department of Commerce by an Act of 9 October, 1940 (R.S. 4472). This statute and Section 116.02 - 6 of the regulations issued by that Department pursuant thereto and effective 9 April, 1941, provided that the regulations were to be enforced by the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation and by the Coast Guard. As Executive Order No 9083 transferred the functions to the Coast Guard, the enforcement of these regulations was then solely a function of the Coast Guard, and enforcement was part of the duties of the Captain of the Port. This helped measurably to simplify matters and eliminated some confusion.

VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS AND GAPS IN AUTHORITY

It took considerable time to work out a smoothly working explosives supervision system. It seems that, in the shipment of explosives and dangerous material, there was a gap in responsibility between the Interstate Commerce Commission, the local fire departments, and Coast Guard jurisdiction. This was particularly true at New York. For instance, Interstate Commerce Commission regulations for explosives stopped when the shipment left the railroad car, and Coast Guard responsibility did not begin until it was loaded on the vessel. The hazard was greatest in the case of uncontrolled truckers. This all needed correction. It was suggested that all shippers of munitions for abroad give advance notice to the Coast Guard and local fire departments at the Port of Embarkation before the arrival of shipments of explosives, inflammables and gases at the port, with other identifying information. The existing controls left many loopholes and many shipments could be placed on piers without adequate information or control. It was felt that the Coast Guard should take the complete Federal jurisdiction in this "no man's land" not only for explosives but also for inflammables and dangerous cargoes. It was

proposed that when tankers docked and discharged gasoline into the tank, the Coast Guard be responsible for seeing that safety measures were properly observed. Without such regulations, embracing the storage plant itself, one end of the hose would be under the police and the other under Coast Guard — obviously a peculiar arrangement. It was desirable to draw up regulations governing explosives and then extend them to inflammables at certain ports where large volumes were handled. Otherwise, responsibility would be on local authorities where Coast Guard regulations were not applied.

COVERAGE OF EXPLOSIVES VESSELS UNDER ANCHORAGE RULES

— the so-called Anchorage Regulations — contained various provisions having to do with the control exercised in the loading and transportation of explosives by vessels. The regulations provided for the use of established explosives areas; the designation of explosives loading terminals; the assignment of anchorage berths for vessels carrying explosives; the authority to load or unload explosives on or from vessels; supervision of the handling, loading, and unloading of explosives; safety measures covering permit to move a vessel carrying explosives through a waterway or channel; the assignment of guards to supervise handling, loading, stowing and the limitation of quantity of explosives that might be carried on board a vessel; the control of personnel engaged in loading explosives and the issuance of red explosives-loading permits to such personnel, and the removal from vessels of persons violating the explosives regulations. It was provided that enforcement of these regulations should be by the Captain of the Port under the supervision and general direction of the District Coast Guard Officer. This seems simple and clear, but there were regulations which involved various departments in the movement of explosives, such as Interstate Commerce Commission, State Department, Department of the Interior, Department of Commerce, and cross-references to these merely added to confusion.

EXPLOSIVES ANCHORAGES

Explosives anchorages, reserved for vessels carrying explosives as cargo, were established in the various ports. It was provided that other vessels might not use such areas except under great emergency or by direction of the Captain of the Port. In the interests of Port Security, the Captain of the Port might designate loading terminals for explosives outside the explosives anchorage where vessels might load or discharge explosives directly between vessel and shore, or between vessels. Vessels carrying inflammable liquid cargo were required to be 1,000 yards away from vessels with explosives. Those carrying, or to carry, explosives as cargo had first to notify the COTP before proceeding to an explosives anchorage. The COTP might then issue a revocable permit, without which no vessel might anchor in an explosives anchorage. All berths were assigned. Tugs in attendance were required for vessels in the area not self-propelled, unless the COTP declared it unnecessary.

SPECIAL REGULATIONS RELATING TO VESSELS ON RIVERS EMPTYING INTO GULF OF MEXICO

Special regulations were promulgated for vessels with explosives of dangerous cargoes navigating rivers emptying into the Gulf of Mexico. Such vessels had to conform to the Commandant's regulations in order to accept or transport such cargoes. The location where the materials were to be handled was designated by the Captain of the Port, and no other might be used. A COTP

"Regulations governing Security of Ports and the Control of Vessels in the Navigable Waters of the United States," of 5 October, 1942

permit was required. It was required that vessels without effective motive power must be attended by a tug or other vessel capable of towing and maneuvering. Citizens of the United States only were allowed to engage in handling and then only with the proper permit and a COTP identification card. Security measures were to be maintained by the owners and operators in a manner satisfactory to the Captain of the Port, and proper guards had to be posted. Only authorized persons were permitted to enter the area where handling was being done. No "dumb" barges were allowed to be intermingled with those carrying explosives or dangerous cargoes while being towed. It was provided that shipments of explosives totaling 4,000 long tons or more constituted an independent tow, and no others were to be in the tow. Single tows were limited to 8,000 long tons, and could never be so large as to make handling by the towboat difficult or impossible. Regulations covered transfer of barges from one tow to another. Assignment of guards to such vessels in transit was left to the COTP's discretion.

EARLY RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN COTP AND
WAR DEPARTMENT
WATERFRONT FACILITIES

In a letter dated 29 April, 1942, from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, the former pointed out that conditions on waterfront facilities operated by the War Department, such as loading of explosives, might imperil adjacent waterfront facilities and vessels for whose security the Navy Department was responsible. He recommended, therefore, that the Captains of the Port, as local representatives of the Secretary of the Navy, be given access to all such War Department facilities and be kept informed as to all loadings and shipments of explosives in order that they might report hazardous conditions to the proper War Department authorities and take all possible steps to protect shipping and other waterfront facilities. It was not contemplated that the Captain of the Port should interfere with or endeavor to control operations on War Department property, but rather that they would secure information which would enable them to discharge their responsibilities relative to property not under War Department control, and would be in a position to make appropriate representations to proper military authorities when the location or operation of War Department facilities was such as to endanger other port facilities or shipping.

PROMULGATION OF THE
CODE OF REGULATIONS
FOR EXPLOSIVES

Following a series of meetings of the joint Navy, Army and Coast Guard committee to which were invited representatives of the British Ministry of Underwriters, there was prepared and transmitted to the Commandant for promulgation a code of regulations providing for the transportation of military explosives and ammunition on board vessels in a manner consistent with the needs of the war effort. This code represented as near 100% agreement as could be secured with the number of interests involved. This code of regulations governing explosives as cargo on board merchant vessels was designed to expedite the movement of military explosives and military ammunition in keeping with the necessary demands of our armed forces in the field. There were varying interests that had to be reconciled. However, the Coast Guard believed it had resolved all of the varying viewpoints to a considerable degree, although not entirely, and that the code of regulations as issued was a satisfactory one commensurate with the calculated risk necessitated in this particular function.

REVISED ARMY
REGULATIONS

Following the promulgation by the Coast Guard of the code of regulations governing the handling, stowage and transportation of military explosives on board

merchant vessels, the Army undertook a complete revision of its regulations governing the transportation of explosives and other dangerous articles on board Army transports. This move followed preliminary conversations with the Coast Guard and had for its purpose the modernizing of the Army regulations affecting its own transportation. These War Department Regulations No. 55-470, 30 December, 1942, represented parallel regulations identical in many of their provisions with regulations of the Coast Guard governing transportation of such articles on board merchant vessels. This further simplified the problem.

CAPTAINS OF THE PORT
SUPERVISION

The various Captains of the Port supervised the loading on board vessels of other dangerous articles of cargo, and constantly offered the services of trained details for this purpose to both the Navy and the Army when loading merchant vessels. The value of this supervision was proven upon many occasions. In some ports, services of these details were constantly sought. In others, they were not utilized to the fullest extent, and apparently in such ports the Army and Navy felt competent to carry on without these Coast Guard details. The Coast Guard constantly checked and improved the procedures and the supervision rendered by its field forces in the various ports where explosives were being loaded on board merchant vessels.

COOPERATION WITH
OTHER AGENCIES

To assist the Services of Supply of both the Navy and the Army, insofar as responsibility of the Coast Guard for the security of our ports bore upon such services, the Coast Guard invited port and civic authorities to conferences assembled for the purpose of discussing the question of the handling of military ammunition through the ports bordering their communities. By this method of approach it was able to evaluate the objections of those authorities. Many objections were, as a result of these conferences, resolved in favor of the war effort. The Coast Guard maintained close contacts with the Army, Navy, Transportation Corps and Ordnance Divisions, constantly clearing matters of policy and differences arising between the District Coast Guard Officers and the field officers of these Services. Relationships existing between the Coast Guard and the Navy and Army Transportation and Ordnance Divisions were exceedingly cordial, and a full measure of cooperation operated between these branches of the Service and the Coast Guard. These agencies continually sought the advice and counsel of the Coast Guard relative to safe practices in the transportation, loading and stowage of dangerous cargo.

OTHER
COOPERATIVE EFFORTS

Numerous conferences were held with representatives of the Navy Department concerning matters of collateral interest such as the hazard in departing merchant vessels loading with dangerous cargo at Navy departing stations, the classification of small arms ammunition, including small caliber ammunition with explosive bullets, the needs of the Navy Department for additional port facilities for handling explosives, and how such proposed facilities would dovetail with the Port Security control exercised by the Coast Guard and the work of the joint Committee of the Army and Navy relative to palletizing shipments of explosives. In a number of instances, the Coast Guard was able, in a liaison capacity, to arrange necessary procedures for vessels of allied nations to load explosives at facilities controlled and operated solely by the Army. The Coast Guard also developed and forwarded to the Canadian Wartime Administrator of Canadian ports information relative to fire protection explosives handling on board and the training and use of Army port battalions in the loading of cargoes on board merchant vessels.

COMMERCIAL PIERS FOR HANDLING OF AMMUNITION

For the purpose of effectuating the authorization of commercial piers for use in handling military ammunition and the loading of such ammunition on board vessels at such piers in accordance with authority granted in the code of regulations, Coast Guard Headquarters recommended that the Captains of the Port evaluate such locations in accordance with specified factors. The Coast Guard assisted to the extent of surveying piers requested to be authorized as ammunition-loading piers, and reported through the District Coast Guard Officers relative to the desirability of the requested piers for explosives use.

INSURANCE COMPANIES REASSURED REGARDING THEIR RISKS

Uniform procedures were developed for the authorization and supervision of the handling and stowage of munitions for defensively armed merchant vessels. In this connection, it became necessary during 1942 to assure insurance companies that their insurance risks were not being unduly jeopardized by such munitions moving into and through shipbuilding plants. The solution of this phase of handling and transportation that had been effectuated by the Navy in the establishment of stowage magazines greatly limited this cause for concern by these interests.

TRAINING FOR THE SUPERVISION OF EXPLOSIVES

The Coast Guard conducted classes in handling, stowage and transportation of explosives and other dangerous articles on board merchant vessels, in order to increase the efficiency and the number of capable officers and enlisted men in this highly specialized field. Classes were held for officers and officer candidates and other personnel, and there were prepared comprehensive training films for dissemination among Coast Guard, Army, Navy and private personnel connected with such work.

PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING EXPLOSIVES SHIPS

Probably the best method of bringing all of the foregoing to a focal point and making clear the general procedure for handling explosives vessels, is to cite in some detail the procedure employed by the Captain of the Port, Norfolk, Virginia, for handling explosives ships. Details of procedure at Norfolk naturally differ in some respects from those at other ports, but only to a minor extent, and in general this procedure may be accepted as being typical of the activity.

(a) The owners, agents or master of the ship desiring to load explosives submitted Form "A" directly to the Officer-in-Charge of explosives loading at either the Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation, Newport News, Virginia, or the Army Base, Norfolk, Virginia, as the case might be.

(b) Upon arrival of the ship at the explosives loading pier, the explosives loading officer made an initial inspection of the ship, filling out at the time an original of Form "B" - "Inspection Report." This inspection covered the entire ship in general. An inspection was again made each night watch during the entire time that the ship was at the pier. A further detailed inspection was made of the ship's gear that would be used in the actual loading of explosives, and the results of this inspection were recorded on Form "C". A detailed inspection was then made once daily of all the ship's gear for the entire time that the ship was engaged in loading. One officer especially qualified in this field was assigned to make this inspection. At that time a signed statement was obtained from the ship's master to the effect that the ship's

cargo gear was in good condition and suitable to handle the explosive cargo. This was obtained on Form "D".

(c) Should any repair work be necessary on the ship, instructions were immediately given that such repair work, if it included hot work, must be completed before loading was commenced. If hot work were involved, the explosives officer made an inspection of the proposed job and, if it was approved, issued a welding permit on Form "E". A close check was kept on this to insure that all hot work was entirely completed before any loading operations were started.

(d) At the time of the initial inspection of the ship, a copy of the basic requirements (Form "F") was given to the master of the vessel. He signed for these instructions, indicating his understanding of them, and that compliance would be effected.

(e) The Explosives Loading Supervisor then worked out, in collaboration with the Marine Superintendent of the Army or in some cases with the agents for the vessel, a tentative plan for the stowage of the ammunition aboard the ship, (Form "G"). Six copies of this plan were made and distributed as follows:

- 1 - to be on file at the explosives loading pier office
- 1 - for the supervisor aboard the ship
- 1 - for the carpenter building magazines
- 1 - for the Marine Superintendent
- 1 - for the stevedoring foreman
- 1 - sent in for the completed file


This plan served as the basis for loading the ship and all exceptions that might become necessary had to be submitted by the Army or the agents to the Coast Guard for approval, either verbally or in writing. If any changes were made and approved by the Coast Guard, all persons holding copies of the plan were notified so that everyone concerned had at all times a current copy of the stowage plan.

(f) When all of the above had been completed and the Explosives Loading Supervisor was satisfied with all details relative to the ship, a permit to load was issued to the Marine Superintendent for the Army or the agents on Form "H". In those cases where ships were loaded at the Naval Operating Base, a permit to load was issued on Form "I". Following the issuance of the permit to load, the Army took the necessary steps to commence loading the vessel.


(g) Upon commencing the loading, a commissioned loading officer and a detail of enlisted men were assigned to the vessel. This watch was maintained on a continuous 24-hour basis for the entire time that the vessel was at the pier. If a ship were loading all five hatches, a total of one officer and 11 men was assigned to the ship. This provided for one man in each hold, one man roving the weather deck on each end of the vessel, one man on the gangway checking the identification of all persons boarding, two men on the pier - one at each end of the vessel - plus a petty officer in charge of the watch. This detail was decreased proportionately in accordance with the number of holds being worked. At all times, however, a man was kept in each hold being loaded.

(h) At the end of his watch on board the vessel each explosives loading officer submitted to the Officer-in-Charge of the Explosives Loading Detail a copy of the cargo stowage plan, on which was shown by holds the actual amount and type of ammunition or explosives loaded during his watch. This copy of the cargo stowage plan was maintained on the above basis during the entire time the ship was loading, each officer indi-

RESTRICTED



CAREFUL SUPERVISION IN THE LOADING OF EXPLOSIVES WAS ESSENTIAL TO INSURE OBSERVATION OF ALL SAFETY RULES AND REGULATIONS



A SLING OF AERIAL BOMBS SOON TO BE SLUNG AGAINST THE AXIS IS BEING LOWERED DOWN THE HATCH OF A MERCHANT SHIP UNDER THE PROTECTIVE GAZE OF A COAST GUARDSMAN

RESTRICTED

██████████
cating thereon the amount and type of ammunition and explosives loaded during his watch. Upon completion of the loading of the vessel this information became a part of the permanent record on the loading of the ship and was filed in the Explosives Office on Form "J" for future reference.

(i) At the completion of the loading of the vessel, explosives loading report Form "K" was executed, giving weights, class and liquid measure of the commodities loaded. This form became part of the permanent file on the vessel and served as a basis for compiling the monthly figures of classes and types of ammunition, inflammable liquids, and other hazardous cargo loaded during the month.

(j) The temporary record of stowage by holds as kept on Form "J" was then prepared in final form by the pier explosives loading supervisor showing complete stowage of the vessel and was then placed in the permanent file on record at the Captain of the Port's Office.

(k) A certification Form "L" was then prepared in triplicate; one copy for the permanent COTP record, one for the Port Director, U. S. Navy, and the third to the master of the vessel to be kept on board the vessel. This completed the loading procedures.

(l) After the hatches were closed, a commissioned officer, two roving guards and a gangway guard were kept on the ship until it actually departed from the explosives loading pier.

(m) The procedure for handling ships in for the purpose of discharging explosives, ammunition or other dangerous cargo was essentially the same as that of loading except, of course, that the procedure was the reverse. In the case of ships discharging ammunition, one additional form was prepared known as explosive-discharge "Form M". This form became a part of the permanent record in the COTP Office. In the event of any violations in stowage or segregation found during the discharging operation a complete report, together with pictures of the violations, was submitted to the Commandant, Fifth Naval District via the District Coast Guard Officer, Fifth Naval District, in accordance with directive of 13 February, 1945, from the Commandant, Fifth Naval District.

(n) In accordance with Headquarters policy, in those isolated cases where waivers were necessary, forms No. 37 and 40 were used.

SPECIAL ORDERS TO EXPLOSIVES PERSONNEL

To further clarify explosives supervision as generally practiced, a summary of instructions, orders, and such, issued to Captain of the Port (Norfolk) personnel engaged in handling and stowing explosives is given below. These instructions were dated 19 February, 1945, but varied in no essential particular from those previously in force. Some minor details differ from those pertaining to other ports, but in general, these may be accepted as being representative.

SPECIAL ORDERS FOR FIRE WATCH

1. To allow no burning or welding on any vessel, until a written permit from the Captain of the Port has authorized such work.

2. To permit burning and welding only in such locations as are specified in the permit.

3. To see that a fire watch (provided by the contractor) equipped with a fire extinguisher, is stationed on the opposite side of any deck or bulkhead

which is subjected to artificial heat by torch or electrode. (Note: Many COTPs provided their own fire watch from their personnel).

4. To allow no burning or welding to be started until a fire hose (with valve cracked and the water running) has been "run out" in the vicinity of the above operations.

5. If in doubt as to enforcement of the above Special Orders, to comply with General Order (i).

SPECIAL ORDERS FOR GANGWAY GUARD

1. To check identification of all persons intending to board the vessel to which I am assigned, and to pass on the following:

- (a) All persons having the Coast Guard Explosive Handling Permit.
(Permanent, red; Temporary, white).
- (b) All uniformed personnel having Army Identification Badges.
- (c) Any person having an Army Identification Badge who has necessary or legitimate business aboard ship after such business has been satisfactorily stated.

2. To permit no longshoremen, carpenters, laborers, checkers, etc., to carry any packages, lunch boxes, etc., aboard ship.

3. If in doubt as to the enforcement of the above orders, to contact the Explosives Officer assigned to the ship.

SPECIAL ORDERS FOR HATCH GUARD

1. To allow no person to enter the hatch to which I am assigned, without proper identification.

2. To allow no one to carry packages, lunches, matches, bale hooks, firearms, etc., into the hold.

3. To allow no smoking by anyone in the hold or hatch to which I am assigned.

4. To see that all drafts of explosives or ammunition are landed on landing mats. Same to be placed in the square of the hatch.

5. To allow no broken or damaged packages of ammunition or explosives to be stowed in the hatch and to allow no repairing or reworking of the packages while in the vessel.

6. To allow no stowage of dangerous cargoes (red, white, green or yellow labeled) in a hold containing explosives or ammunition.

7. If in doubt as to enforcement of the above Special Orders, to comply with General Order (i).

SPECIAL ORDERS FOR ROVING GUARD

1. To patrol the weather deck and companionways of the vessel to which I am assigned.

2. To warn all unauthorized vessels to stay clear of the ship's sides.

3. To permit no smoking by anyone in the area which I am assigned to patrol.

4. To see that the fire hoses which are "run out" are clear of the ship's gear, hatch covers, etc.

- REMARKS**
5. To see that no fire hazards such as paper, trash, or inflammable liquids are placed on the deck.
 6. To observe the handling and slinging of dangerous cargoes on the part of the winchman and to report any carelessness on their part to the supervisor in charge.
 7. If in doubt as to enforcement of the above Special Orders, to comply with General Order (1).

SPECIAL ORDERS FOR PETTY OFFICER OF THE WATCH

1. To be acquainted at all times with the duties and places of assignment of all men on my watch.
2. To inform the supervisor of the vessel or pier concerned of the violation of any order which they or myself are instructed to enforce.
3. To allow no member of my watch to enter the Galley, Mess Rooms, or Living Quarters of the vessels assigned.
4. In any case not covered by instructions to call the supervisor of the vessel or area concerned.

FIRE PROTECTION AND DISASTER PLAN

In order to obtain the maximum of security while explosives and ammunition, the Captain of the Port of Norfolk, Virginia, requested the cooperation of masters of explosives vessels and their crews. He provided masters with written instructions known as the Fire Protection and Disaster Plan, primarily for use at the Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation at Newport News. While, in general, it followed the regular instructions for explosives vessels, certain details were emphasized, some were added, and the Plan is set forth below as further clarifying procedures. The Captain of the Port called the attention of masters of explosives loading ships to the importance of the requirements, and pointed out that they did not supersede or cancel any previous instructions which might have been issued at that port.

1. **SMOKING** No smoking will be permitted on your ship.
2. **FIRES** In case of fire on your ship and the alarm has been given by telephones or fire alarm box, give continuous blast on your whistle and sound the general alarm.
3. **MOBILITY** Your ship must be in a mobile state at all times during operations, with sufficient steam up to move immediately. If your ship becomes immobile, a tug is required to stand by and the Captain of the Port notified prior to immobility.
4. **CLEANLINESS** Decks, holds, and passageways must be cleared of all rubbish, trash, garbage, oily rags, empty gasoline drums, and other hazardous conditions. Sand and not sawdust, must be used in cleaning oil spills.
5. **SCREENS** Smokestacks and galley stacks shall have erected suitable screens in place. (Request one of Army if one is not available on ship.)

6. **LOADING EQUIPMENT** ... Master or other person in charge of vessel shall see that all loading equipment is in perfect condition; if defective or damaged, stop the loading operations until repaired or replaced.
7. **FIRE-FIGHTING EQUIPMENT** All ship's fire-fighting equipment shall be in perfect condition. A minimum of two lines shall be "run out", one forward and one aft, with sufficient length to reach lower holds, valve cracked on one, with a minimum of 25 pounds pressure.
8. **IDENTIFICATION** The "Baker" shall be flown by day and a red light, at the mast, shall be burning at night.
9. **REPAIRS** Welding, burning, or other hot work shall not be undertaken unless permit to do so has been issued by the Captain of the Port.
10. **LIGHTS, PROTECTION OF** ... Lights used in loading operations shall be protected against accidental breakage by metal guards.
11. **LIGHTING SYSTEM** Ship's lighting system must be functioning properly at all times during operations. Passageways must be sufficiently lighted, light over stern and sufficient lighting offshore to detect approach of other craft.
12. **LINES-AXES** Mooring lines shall be hove taut - emergency hawsers fore and aft. Eye of hawsers shall be extended beyond and outboard five feet of check. Fire axes readily accessible for and aft.
13. **SHIP'S KEYS** Wheel house, chart room, radio room, peaks, store rooms, magazines, and spaces containing gyro compass and radio direction finder shall be under lock when not in use. Ship's keys shall be readily accessible to the deck and engineering officers on duty.
14. **CREW REQUIREMENTS** .. The absolute minimum crew requirements shall be a crew of officers and men equivalent to the regular deck and engine room sea watches.
15. **SECURITY** At the end of the work shift, the ship's officers shall see that all means of access to partially loaded

holds are closed off to provide the maximum of safety and protection for the explosives stowed within the hold.

No person permitted on board shall have or carry on their persons any firearms, matches, knives, bale hooks, metallic tools or personal packages of any description. Additionally, the Master may establish such other security measures deemed necessary, in his opinion, for the adequate protection of his ship from fires, sabotage, or other conditions.

These instructions were issued over the signature of the Captain of the Port of Norfolk, Commander C. H. Dalby, USCGR.

VARIATION IN PROCEDURE AT PORT OF PHILADELPHIA

Almost exactly the same procedure as that given above was followed at most ports, including Philadelphia.

Some variation due to local conditions was natural, and in one or two respects there were variations at Philadelphia. For instance, the construction of explosives stowage magazines was supervised and the magazines measured for maximum permissible weights allowed in each hatch in the Port of Philadelphia. Upon completion, the ship moved to the Hog Island Terminal, which was opened in June, 1943. This avoided delay which would have been caused by construction of the magazines at Hog Island, and the time saved spent in actual loading, thus speeding the entire operation. Also, inflammables and other dangerous cargo not classified as explosives were usually loaded in the Port of Philadelphia under the supervision of a roving patrol of explosives men on duty on the waterfront. All ships at Philadelphia carrying explosives also carried general cargo, and up to February, 1944, the latter was loaded in the port prior to departure for the Explosives loading pier at Hog Island. After taking explosives on board, these vessels departed directly for sea. The Pennsylvania State Statutes prohibit vessels carrying explosives to moor at piers located within the City of Philadelphia. However, because of the military urgency of this cargo, Army authorities were directed to ignore this statute by loading explosives first, and then returning to top off with general cargo. On instructions from Coast Guard Headquarters, the Captain of the Port refused to grant licenses for this movement, so the Army assumed full responsibility for each vessel upon its departure from Hog Island. Headquarters instructed the Captain of the Port to take no action which would place the Coast Guard in a position of condoning this practice. The Coast Guard was powerless in the matter. In that year there was similar difficulty at Seattle, Army operated vessels first loading explosives, and then general cargo. The practice was allowed, but frowned upon. In June, 1944, however, the Port Security Officer of the Thirteenth District was unofficially informed that instructions had been passed to the Army loading officers for all vessels to be loaded with general cargo first, then move to Mukilteo for explosives, and then to sea. Doubtless the same situation arose in other ports. Explosives and dangerous cargoes were handled and supervised in virtually all ports of any importance in the United States.

RESPONSIBILITY AT PORTS OF EMBARKATION

Although the Coast Guard and Army generally cooperated well, the question always

seemed unsettled as to Coast Guard responsibility for security at Army Ports of Embarkation. The matter was never fully and uniformly settled, and much was left to the units involved. At the Headquarters Conference of Port Security Officers the opinion was expressed that one could not supervise properly the loading of ships and safely load explosives if one had no say on who had the right to go on board while loading was under way, or what other activities might take place during loading. Rules and regulations were clear, generally, but the Army could override them if it chose, thus virtually nullifying them. Divided and questionable authority at Port of Embarkation produced some confusion and frustration, and should never be permitted in any future emergency. Cases of conflict existed, also, in Army, Navy and Coast Guard regulations, which necessitated "clarification" at times, on joint policy, but which was rarely satisfactory.

EXPLOSIVES ANCHORAGE PROBLEM AT BOSTON

The explosives anchorage at Boston constituted a problem which was never fully solved.

This anchorage, in the outer harbor, was very exposed. It was common practice for a vessel to leave New York after a statement had been signed that she was fit for sea and needed no repairs. Upon arrival at the Boston explosives anchorage, a long list of "needed repairs" would develop. The shipyards would not send boats outside the net to the explosives anchorage, claiming it would void their insurance. Thus, if repairs were necessary, the vessel in question had to be brought inside the net, where it should not have been. To check on the situation the Marine Inspectors were sent to the vessel at the explosives anchorage to look the vessel over to determine whether repairs were necessary, if the vessel could proceed without them, or if it was merely a move to kill time. In cases of actual need, the vessel was brought inside, repairs effected as rapidly as possible and the vessel returned to anchorage.

PERSONNEL PROBLEMS WITH PERSONS ENGAGED IN LOADING

In most ports, in the earlier days of the handling of explosives, there was much to be done in

educating the steamship company operators, and operators of privately owned facilities and the Army and Navy who, in many instances, were ignorant of regulations regarding the handling and shipment of explosives cargoes. As the activity grew, and explosives loading became an old story to handlers, familiarity seemed to breed contempt among the longshoremen, and the Coast Guard had to be especially alert to insure gentle and careful handling. The movements of explosives in the Thirteenth Naval District during 1944 developed another problem which either had not been foreseen by stevedoring companies and unions, or which they thought might easily be circumvented. This problem involved the exhaustion in Tacoma, Washington, of the red card permit holders (red card permits were given those qualified to handle explosives) and the necessity for the Navy asking for a waiver in order to use longshoremen without such cards. Regulations required that only citizens of the United States be permitted to engage in the loading and handling of explosives on board vessels, and all were required to have an explosives permit issued by the Captain of the Port. However, in Bellingham, Washington, it was necessary to allow the use of a small number of aliens, by waiver granted on the Army Transportation Officer's assumption of responsibility for the loyalty of these men. At Gray's Harbor, Washington, apparently no effort was made until very late to provide men with red cards or to arrange for the processing of those who were non-citizens. About 50% of the stevedores at Gray's Harbor were aliens. At the "last minute" the list of stevedores was presented to the District Coast

Guard Officer and he permitted, by waiver, the employment of those citizens without red cards but denied the Navy's application for waiver on the aliens. This denial was overruled by the Navy and the aliens were permitted to work. This was another example of the futility of regulations where the Army and Navy could overrule at will.

STRIKE BY EXPLOSIVES
LOADING STEVEDORES

On 14 July, 1945, after VE-day but before VJ-day, stevedores engaged in loading Army explosives on board a merchant vessel at Concord Explosives Docks went on strike in protest to an Army ruling regarding carrying of lunch boxes onto the dock and on board the vessel. Coast Guard regulations forbade carrying them on board ship. The Commanding General, New Orleans Port of Embarkation, ordered stevedore troops to the vessel to complete the loading. The Coast Guard Explosives Loading Detail cooperated to the fullest extent with this Army personnel. The loading was completed without further incident.

SEATTLE LONGSHOREMEN
REQUEST WRITTEN RECORD

About the first of March, 1945, the longshoremen's union at Seattle made an unusual request. It asked that the Coast Guard keep a written record of all longshoremen boarding or leaving the vessels on which explosives were being loaded or discharged at the Blake Island and Kingston, Washington, anchorages. This was a complete change of attitude, for formerly, the union had wanted no such records for fear the Coast Guard would use them as proof of the amount of time wasted. This change had its foundation in the great disaster at Port Chicago, California, (covered in detail in Part IX, Section XI) and the more recent explosion at Vancouver, British Columbia. Because the longshoremen's union had had a great deal of difficulty in proving the death of some of its members in such explosions, it wanted an official record in the event of future catastrophes.

SCOPE OF LOADING
OPERATIONS AT MUKILTEO

Tremendous volumes of explosives were loaded and discharged at the various major ports in the United States. Activity continued heavy in 1945. As an example of explosives loading, the following summary is given of 1945 operations for the first two months at the Mukilteo Explosives Loading Terminal in inner Puget Sound.

	January	February	Total
Number of Ships	14	5	19
Number Loaded for U.S. Army	13	4	17
Number Loaded for U.S. Navy	1	0	1
Number Loaded for U.S.S.R.	0	1	1
Waivers Issued	6	5	11
Average Tonnage per Ship (short tons)	2,659	2,680	2,665
Total Tonnage Loaded	37,228	13,401	50,629

ARRIVALS OF IMPROPERLY
SCREENED SCRAP METAL

As the war progressed, there were return shipments to the United States from battle areas of scrap metal, and various types of ammunition, and this movement increased. This was a growing problem for the Captain of the Port Explosives Details. In the case of such shipments, it was essential that the safety and shipping regulations of the Bureau of Ordnance, Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Explosives, and the United States Coast Guard be observed within all practicable limits. These shipments included (a) scrap metal, which might consist of fired brass or steel cartridge cases, tanks, or other expended ammunition components or details, (b) unserviceable ammunition or explosives of any type

which might have been withdrawn from service issue for various reasons, (c) serviceable ammunition or explosives which, for logistics reasons was no longer required in advanced areas, and (d) captured enemy ammunition of any type or explosives to be returned to the United States for examination, inspection, or other purposes. Detailed loading or manifest lists had to be prepared and forwarded so that advance information would allow proper disposition in U. S. ports. In cases where (as happens) lists did not precede arrival of shipments, or did not reach the proper authorities, unloading became the concern of the Coast Guard, Bomb Disposal Squads, and Naval Ammunition Depot inspectors. The growing scope of the problem required close and active cooperation between the advanced areas, the Service Forces, the Naval Districts, the Port Directors, the Naval Ammunition Depots, the Coast Guard, and liaison with the United States Army. There was, in particular, some difficulty in the case of arrivals of improperly screened scrap metal containing some explosive shells. This was a troublesome hazard, for scrap metal normally would not be handled with any great amount of care, and this possibility required alertness in handling. A policy had to be adopted calling for inspection of scrap. There was an interesting jurisdictional point in the treatment of a vessel, for instance, arriving at New York carrying scrap metal which might have as a cargo explosives, though no advance proof of such explosives was available. As early as November, 1943, a conference was held at New York at the Port Security Command to formulate working plans to reduce this obvious hazard which showed every possibility of growing with progress in the war. General, country-wide directives followed from Headquarters in May, 1944.

SECTION VI

THE FIRE DIVISION

FIRE WAS PARAMOUNT CONCERN
OF THE COAST GUARD

With the coming of war, fire prevention and fire protection problems throughout the nation multiplied many times, and were particularly acute in our port cities because of their vulnerability to fires from acts of saboteurs, incendiary bombings, and acts of carelessness. The lifeblood of the fighting forces, as the war tempo increased, was the ever-increasing flow of men, ammunition and supplies. Piers, wharves, and other port facilities from which these moved were very vital links between the home front and the fighting front. The destruction of such links by fire or sabotage would not only have destroyed greatly needed supplies, but would have seriously delayed the further transfer of supplies from the transportation systems on land to the supply line ships, to say nothing of the loss of storage and handling facilities. One of the greatest problems in Port Security was that of safeguarding our extensive waterfront facilities against destruction by fire or other causes. This task of affording fire protection and security to waterfront installations in the all important coastal and interior port cities was part of the Port Security responsibility that devolved upon the Coast Guard. It consisted broadly of four programs:

- (a) Fire-fighting
- (b) Fire Prevention
- (c) Fire Training
- (d) Reports and Statistics

In normal times, of course, the fire protection of ports is a function of the municipalities concerned. The city is supposed to provide fire protection for properties within its city limits. However, in time of war, when shipping, use of facilities and goods to be transported increase many-fold, the whole picture

changes and greater emphasis falls on the ports, on the waterfront facilities, and in general, the municipality has neither the men nor the money to take care of the situation adequately. Thus, augmentation of fire-fighting equipment and men by the Coast Guard was requisite for port safety.

SCOPE OF THE FIREBOAT PROGRAM

With large concentrations of vital war materials, hazardous cargoes, explosives, and vast quantities of gasoline and oils stored, loaded and unloaded on the piers and wharves, it was essential that adequate marine fire-fighting equipment be provided in the various ports. This was one of the first matters to receive attention in the fire-fighting program. Following a comprehensive study of our waterfronts relative to occupied frontage, congestion of facilities, structural characteristics and degree of port activities, an extensive fireboat program was established. At the outset, municipal fire departments throughout the United States had in service only 44 fireboats in 20 major cities. The need for additional fireboats was so great that time did not permit building regular craft by the Coast Guard. Instead, conversions of existing vessels were undertaken, although 103 small boats were built on order. A regular building program would have greatly delayed getting vessels into operation. By 25 February, 1944, the existing municipal fireboats had been augmented by 253 Coast Guard fireboats built or converted and placed in service in 132 port cities. These included two municipal fireboats chartered by the Coast Guard and operated by Coast Guard personnel, and 8 fireboats assigned to foreign service.

THE COAST GUARD FIREBOAT FLEET

The Coast Guard Fireboat Fleet ultimately comprised 103 Hanley boats (built on order), 6 Bass boats, 22 fire barges, and 122 converted boats. The Hanley fireboat was designed and built by the Hanley Engineering Service, Prospect, Ohio. It was 30' 6" in length, waterjet propelled, and equipped with four gasoline-driven 500-gallon fire pumps. Under favorable conditions its speed was about 7 miles per hour. The Bass fireboat was designed and built by Perry R. Bass Boat Works, Rockport, Texas. It was 36' in length and equipped with separate propulsion engine and four gasoline-driven 500-gallon fire pumps. It was capable of a speed of 10 miles per hour. On the Pacific coast, 22 fire barges were built and fitted out for fire service. These fire barges were 50 or 60 feet in length, had a beam of 18 feet, and drew about 19 inches of water. They were powered by outboard marine tractors, each barge having a pair of 150-h.p. tractors bolted to the stern which provided a speed of 8 or 9 miles per hour. On the main deck were mounted 8 gasoline-driven fire pumps of 500-gallon capacity each. Living quarters and a galley were provided for the crew on board each barge. Converted boats comprised a variety of types such as tug boats, luggers, fishing and party vessels, small freighters, ferry and work boats and such, acquired from private owners and especially fitted out. These ranged from 45 feet to 100 feet in length, with gasoline or diesel-driven propulsion engines and having speeds varying from 6 to 14 miles an hour. The usual 500-gallon pumps were installed in each with 4, 6 or 8 units depending upon available deck space, and providing total pumping capacities of 2,000, 3,000 and 4,000 gallons or water per minute respectively. Some of the larger boats were equipped with quarters and mess facilities. The Coast Guard fireboats were well-equipped with those and minor fire-fighting appliances, including new types of fog nozzles developed by the Navy, foam proportioners, liquid foam and other fire-fighting equipment particularly adapted to attacking vessel fires and pier and wharf fires.

DISPOSITION OF FIREBOAT STATIONS

In order to provide thorough coverage of waterfront facilities by these fireboats, despite their usual lack of speed, the fireboats were generally stationed at strategic points within the harbors, usually within a mile of the docks under their protection. At extremely hazardous locations, such as where explosives were being handled, or barreled gasoline loading operations were in progress onto or from a vessel, or where other dangerous articles of cargo were being handled, a Coast Guard fireboat was stationed at the scene of the operation and remained there until its completion. In many ports, the city fire alarm system went right in to Captain of the Port headquarters, and fireboats were dispatched from there, but in some cases, if circumstances permitted, the system went into the fireboat station and fireboats responded from there on their own initiative and responsibility. Eight fireboats were, at times, also assigned to ports in Canada, Cuba and Trinidad.

COOPERATION WITH OTHER FIRE UNITS

All Coast Guard fire-fighting activities were carried on in close cooperation with the municipal fire departments of each city concerned. It is clear that fireboat activity really supplemented the activity of the municipal departments, making protection far more extensive and efficient. A great many crewmen for fireboats were recruited from the ranks of municipal fire departments. In several of the ports, Coast Guard fireboat stations had alarm recording devices installed and directly connected with the municipal fire alarm system, or a direct private telephone line from the fire alarm headquarters switchboard. In most other ports, transmission of fire alarms to fireboat stations was through the Captain of the Port communication center, alarms being received at that point from the municipal fire alarm headquarters and relayed to the fireboats by telephone, radio, teletype or other available means. Early in January, 1945, the Army, in the Thirteenth Naval District, informally requested the Coast Guard to man its fireboats there which had previously been ineffectually manned by civilians.

LAND FIRE-FIGHTING EQUIPMENT

Temporary Reservists were not used in fireboats to any great extent in the First Naval District, though fireboat watches were stood at times at Portland, Maine, and Providence, Rhode Island. TRs served in fireboats at Washington, D. C., and to some extent in the Fourth District, at Cleveland and at Galveston. At St. Louis, TRs manned one fireboat 24 hours a day for an undetermined period. Directives were issued at COTPs at St. Paul, Rock Island, and Memphis to man fireboats at their ports entirely with Temporary Reservists, but records do not indicate whether this was done. TRs served in fireboats at Los Angeles, California and at Olympia, Washington, but possibly not fully manning them. In June, 1944, Temporary Reservists at Seattle towed and operated the fire barge and rendered expert assistance at a waterfront fire which was beyond the reach of the city fire apparatus. In January, 1945, TRs at Olympia and Bremerton helped to man the fireboats there, and after recruiting additional men for day duty, these fireboats were manned almost entirely by Temporary Reservists.

FIRE PUMPS IN PATROL BOATS

A large number of small fire pumps were placed on board picket and patrol boats operating within harbors, to permit extinguishment of small fires which might be discovered during patrols. In addition to the regular fireboats, some of the Districts converted

small boats such as Lundeen or Jane lifeboats for fire fighting duty by mounting a fire pump on them.

CCTF INSPECTIONS FOR FIRE PREVENTION

Structural conditions along the average waterfront were such that a fire well under way before discovery could readily assume serious proportions. For this reason, a great deal of emphasis was placed on fire prevention work. In each Captain of the Port organization, men trained in this type of work made periodic inspections of all waterfront facilities which were the responsibility of the Coast Guard, searching for fire hazards, checking the condition of fire extinguishing appliances and alarm devices, and enforcing rules of good practice in handling and storing cargo. In most ports, complete original inspections or surveys were made of all piers and wharves covering pertinent structural conditions; fire protection appliances, fire hazards, alarm facilities, guard and watch service, type of cargo handled and similar items. In these analyses, advantage was taken of reports and data from the files of insurance boards and bureaus, fire departments and local fire marshals. In some cases, the inspection program was a joint activity. On the strength of these findings, recommendations for necessary improvements were prepared and submitted to owners and operators with a request for compliance. This work was largely on a salesmanship basis, since clear-cut statutory authority to compel compliance with recommendations of the Captain of the Port had been lacking.

REINSPECTIONS

These complete surveys were followed up by periodic re-inspections as often as time permitted, by especially qualified men who checked on operating conditions, maintenance, cleanliness, and methods of handling cargo and other factors which might change from day to day. Unsatisfactory operating conditions were followed up promptly and fire hazards abated without delay. The loading and stowage of hazardous or especially valuable cargo was given much attention, and where it appeared that protective measures taken by the owner were insufficient, a detail of Coast Guardsmen with fire-fighting equipment was frequently stationed on the pier. In all ports there were bad structural conditions which should not have been permitted in the original design and construction. In such cases, every opportunity was taken to urge upon the owners such improvements and modifications as could be accomplished. Critical shortages of materials and labor handicapped the achievement of the desired results. But much was done. The matter of abandoned piers, squatters' shacks and other dilapidated structures was given attention. In many ports, there was success in securing the elimination of such hazards.

CONTRACT WITH NATIONAL BOARD OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS

Beginning 21 April, 1942, the Coast Guard had a contract with the National Board of Fire Underwriters whereby the services of certain of their engineers and of their affiliated local inspection boards and bureaus were available to the Coast Guard. Two of those engineers were assigned to Coast Guard Headquarters and others were detailed to assist various Captains of the Port in fire protection matters. In some ports they were actively engaged in making inspections of waterfront facilities for the Coast Guard and in other ports they were on call to assist in special problems.

EXAMPLE OF INSPECTION PROCEDURE AT CHARLESTON

In the interests of fire prevention, it was necessary to insure good cooperation between various agencies, as

in most Port Security matters. This was generally secured, and the following is an example regarding fire prevention inspections at Charleston, South Carolina. The procedure used with regard to waterfront facilities in most instances was to make a thorough inspection of the facility and then advise the owner or operator of suggested improvements. The defects were discussed with the owner or operator, and the latter either agreed to make the necessary correction or voiced his objections. If the improvement was of a costly or technical nature, estimates were obtained and the questions submitted to experts in the particular field and also submitted to the insurance company for comment. Meanwhile, the Port Security Officer made an inspection of the facility, together with the fire inspector and the owner or his particular representative. Advice and information were sought from the National Board of Fire Underwriters, the Fire Prevention Inspector of Charleston, the South Eastern Underwriters Association, the Cotton Engineering and Inspection Service, and the National Fire Protection Association and other Authorities. If the owner or operator did not voluntarily comply with the request of the inspectors, the Captain of the Port requested compliance. All problems were discussed with the Port Security Officer, who checked the reports and made periodic inspections of waterfront facilities with the inspectors.

TRAINING PROGRAM VITAL

No program of port protection against fire could have been successful without properly trained personnel. Although the Coast Guard had enrolled in its ranks a great many men with years of previous experience in fire-fighting, fire prevention, investigating or police work, many were specialists in a very narrow field. While making the best of their past experience and training, it was still found necessary to instruct them in the newer and broader aspects of Port Security work.


THE FORT McHENRY TRAINING STATION

A training Station was established at Fort McHenry, Baltimore, Maryland, for this purpose in June, 1942. The full course at this station was of six weeks duration, and trainees were given instruction in fire-fighting, fire prevention, anti-sabotage work, legal aspects of Port Security work, vessel security, guarding, handling of explosives and hazardous cargo, ship construction, seamanship and small boat handling, as well as close order drill and physical training. The instruction staff consisted of officers who were experts in their particular fields. This station improved steadily, and was finally equipped with facilities which enabled men to be given training in all phases of fire extinguishment by actually handling the fire-fighting appliances. Facilities included a fire-test building in which fires could be built and extinguishment demonstrated by various methods in which trainees could undergo practice in the use of oxygen breathing apparatus. A Liberty ship, sunk at the end of the pier, was used experimentally in fire-fighting. Engine room and bilge fires occasionally were lighted and later extinguished, using carbon dioxide and fog. A large tank was provided for practice in the extinguishment of oil fires, and a miniature pier was adapted for training in handling fires in that type of structure. Fort McHenry offered a course of instruction in fire-fighting which was second to none.

ADDITIONAL LOCAL TRAINING

Training in fire prevention and fire-fighting did not stop at Fort McHenry for Port Security personnel, however. In each District and port the same training and instruction was continued locally as far as

~~RESTRICTED~~



COAST GUARDSMEN AT THE FORT McHENRY FIRE SCHOOL
FOUGHT REAL OIL FIRES IN A LIBERTY SHIP NEARBY
AS PART OF THEIR TRAINING COURSE



A TRAINING GROUP ATTACK A FIRE WITH FOG NOZZLES AND SPRAY
AS PREPARATION FOR THE REAL THING

~~RESTRICTED~~

as facilities and equipment permitted. Most such fire training was carried on in collaboration with the local fire department. Cooperation between such departments and the Coast Guard was excellent, and there was much operational mutual assistance. Advantage was also taken of Navy fire-fighting schools operated by the Bureau of Ships, which were primarily designed to teach the extinguishment of fire on board naval vessels. Though this type of training was somewhat limited in scope, the principles could be applied to fires on board any type of vessel.

HEADQUARTERS ASSISTANCE FOR THE FIRE UNITS

Headquarters kept in close touch with conditions in the field through reports from Captains of the Port, and by visits to the Districts by Headquarters personnel. In October, 1942, complete operating plans of each Captain of the Port were submitted to Headquarters for analysis and study. These helped to balance the Port Security program, to focus attention upon major hazards, and served as a means for passing constructive ideas developed by one District to all other Districts. Efforts were made to furnish the field with all information and literature that would be helpful. Various books, pamphlets, bulletins and brochures on fire-fighting and fire prevention were distributed to Captains of the Port. These included such publications as fire-fighting manuals issued by the Bureau of Yards and Docks and by the Bureau of Ships, a similar manual on ship fire-fighting prepared by the Coast Guard, a pamphlet on safeguarding waterfront properties prepared by the National Board of Fire Underwriters, numerous bulletins issued by the Fort McHenry Training School, and circular letters of general interest such as reports on significant fires.

REPORTS AND STATISTICS

Each Captain of the Port was required to keep a record of all fires occurring along the waterfront, containing information as to date, time, location, and facility involved, cause, method of alarm transmission, method of extinguishment, loss, extent of Coast Guard participation, and other appropriate data. Except in the case of serious fires or other disaster where immediate preliminary reports were required, the reports were made weekly.

REPORTS OF SERIOUS FIRES

For serious fires, complete supplementary reports were submitted in such detail as necessary for a full understanding of circumstances contributing to the origin, spread, and extinguishment of the fire. These supplementary reports discussed:

- (a) Cause of fire and point of origin;
- (b) Circumstances contributing to its spread;
- (c) How alarm was transmitted, reasons for delay in alarm;
- (d) Apparatus (municipal, Coast Guard or other) responding;
- (e) Equipment used and method of attacking and extinguishing fire;
- (f) If fire were on board a vessel, nature of cargo involved, especially explosives;
- (g) Construction of the facility, private fire protection provided, security measures in effect;
- (h) Conclusion drawn from this information.

Suitable detailed reports on certain fires were also requested and submitted even though resulting in small monetary loss, which illustrated weaknesses in the Port Security program, but which might point to hazards not generally recognized, and which indicated ways in which fire prevention activities could be made more effective. Considerable time was spent in reviewing these various reports and when they contained information of general interest or value to the whole Port Security Protection Program, the information was disseminated to all Captains of the Port.

SUMMARY OF PERTINENT INFORMATION ON FIRES

A summary of pertinent information compiled from the waterfront fire reports submitted to Headquarters during the period 1 October, 1942 to 30 September, 1943, inclusive (one year) is as follows:

Waterfront Fires	Total	Percentage
Total number of fire alarms	3,112	100.00
False or unnecessary alarms	280	9.00
Actual fires	2,832	91.00
Fires discovered by Coast Guard personnel	721	25.46
Coast Guard personnel or apparatus responded to	2,852	91.65
Coast Guard extinguished or assisted others	1,167	41.21
Undetermined	683	24.12
Welding and Cutting	447	15.78
Heating appliances, including ovens, dryers, etc.	370	13.06
Smoking, careless use of matches.	307	10.84
Electric wiring and equipment ...	305	10.77
Spontaneous ignition	134	4.73
Sparks from combustion	126	4.45
Miscellaneous, including static electricity, hot coals and rivets, friction, sparks from tools, etc.	120	4.24
Rubbish or brush fires, no cause stated	115	4.06
Explosion, gas or volatile vapors	63	2.22
Internal combustion engines - motor vehicles, boats, etc. ...	61	2.15
Flash ignition of flammable liquids	48	1.69
Chemical reaction	12	.42
Open flame	16	.57
Rekindling	16	.57
Lighting	5	.18
Aircraft accident	3	.11
Explosion, detonation of explosives	1	.04
Vessel	901	31.81
Miscellaneous	582	20.55
Industrial establishment	503	17.76
Pier or wharf	352	12.43
Shipyards	282	9.96
Military or naval establishment .	148	5.23
Automobile, truck, etc.	56	1.98
Material storage only, in open ..	8	.28

Some of these figures are worthy of special attention, as reflecting the results obtained by the Coast Guard Port Security forces in their efforts to control waterfront fire hazards. Even with thousands of private watchmen, guards or fire watchers on duty, Coast Guardsmen on patrol or guard duty discovered and sounded alarms for 25% of the fires - a good indication that they were well instructed and alert. Coast Guard personnel or apparatus responded to over 91% of all fires, indicating that liaison with municipal fire departments was good, and that alarms were, as a rule, transmitted to Coast Guard fire-fighting units. Most

fires are naturally of small size when discovered, and even though an alarm may be sounded, are frequently extinguished by plant fire brigades or workmen before the arrival of outside fire-fighting units. The figure of 41% of the total in which the Coast Guard extinguished fires or assisted others should, therefore, not be construed to mean that Coast Guard units were not available at other fires and prepared to assist if necessary.

CAUSES OF FIRE

The most prevalent cause of fire was welding and cutting, as would be expected in view of the immense shipbuilding activity on our waterfronts. The number of fires caused by smoking or careless use of matches was lower than the national average (19.5%) indicating that enforcement of no-smoking regulations on waterfront properties had its effect. Vessel fires constituted nearly one-third of the total. Their prevalence emphasized the importance of Coast Guard regulations on security of vessels in port, on handling of hazardous cargo, and of enforcement of such regulations, as well as the measures taken toward providing equipment and personnel for extinguishing fires. Fires on piers and wharves, establishments to which the Coast Guard paid a great deal of attention, amounted to only 12% of the total. This was evidence that fire prevention measures put into effect on such properties were especially worth-while.

SIX MONTHS' EXPERIENCE IN THIRTEENTH DISTRICT

Fires and their causes and the number responded to varied, of course, between the different Districts. A record of fires in the Thirteenth (Seattle) District for the period 4 June, 1944 to 23 December, 1944, shows that heating appliances, including chimneys, ovens, etc., caused the greatest number, undetermined causes next, and third smoking or careless use of matches. Total loss in this interval was \$773,325, involving 186 fires of which 92 were participated in by the Coast Guard.

FIRE LOSS STATISTICS

The fire prevention program had been made effective during 1942, though men and available equipment increased in 1943 and 1944 and resulted in greater efficiency. Yet, fire loss figures for 1942 in relation to Coast Guard fire-fighting units are interesting and instructive. In the tabulation which follows, fire losses (\$10,000 and over) in thousands of dollars on waterfronts per Coast Guard fire-fighting unit are given for each District, together with the number of such units, and the number of units which would have been justified by the losses on the basis of the actual average of one unit per \$65,500 loss.

<u>District</u>	<u>1942 Fire Loss</u>	<u>Actual Units</u>	<u>Number Justified</u>
	(000 Omitted)		
Boston	\$3,282	35	50
New York	2,314	30	35
Philadelphia	1,246	25	19
Norfolk	1,783	35	27
Charleston	241	12	3
Miami	683	17	10
New Orleans	732	52	11
Cleveland	3,840	49	58
Chicago	693	14	10
St. Louis	2,554	30	39
San Juan, P. R.	75	9	1
Long Beach	193	13	3
San Francisco	1,680	14	25
Seattle	4,417	35	67
Ketchikan	715	3	11

Serious fires are suffered to a greater proportional extent in some places than in others during any given year. Therefore, the above figures are of value only in a general way, and unusual visitations of fires should be allowed for. For instance, it is obvious that Charleston was lucky, and under ordinary circumstances, 3 fire-fighting units would have been insufficient. On the other hand, 11 fire-fighting units at Ketchikan would have seemed high. In general, however, these figures show about what was needed, where equipment was short and where excessive.

COMMENTS ON FIREBOATS

Fireboats were generally efficient. However, experience with some types brought out adverse factors which should be overcome in any future establishment of a large fireboat fleet. Under favorable conditions Hanleys (waterjet propelled) were satisfactory and especially useful in shallow water and under piers. In many Districts there was the opinion that for all-around use, the Hanleys were not impressive. They did not maneuver well in a wind or under adverse current conditions, and were slow. Due to the relatively long distances between the various properties under protection of the Assistant Captain of the Port at Elizabeth City, North Carolina, arrangements were made whereby the fast crash boat at the Air Station was used to tow the Hanley fireboat to all fires at much greater speed than it was capable of itself. Fire barges used in the Thirteenth District were of very shallow draft, and in most ports of that District tidal or river current problems hampered the efficient operation of the barges. Fireboat crew quarters were sometimes very poor. At Baltimore, the health problem regarding fireboats was serious during inclement weather due to lack of proper shore facilities such as had been requested. The "solution" rested with the possible acquisition of two condemned streetcar bodies. There were similar conditions at the Seaport, Maine, explosives loading pier, where a fireboat stood by continuously. The fireboat crew built its own shack on shore to provide living quarters. In New England, where winters are rugged, fireboat pumps often had no protection against the weather and sub-zero temperatures. Pumps should not be operated without water running through, and with temperatures often 30 to 40 degrees below zero, the pumps would not operate efficiently.

TYPICAL EXAMPLES OF FIRE DIVISION ACTIVITY

The situations in which the Coast Guard fire-fighters found themselves at times of emergency were varied. There was wide range of experience, and much of this is mentioned in Part IX, under the various Districts. However, a few of these experiences are recounted here to indicate the variety of situations and types of action required.

SMOKING PROBLEM

There was much confusion and little uniformity in smoking rules in the Port of New York. Something had to be done about it. For instance, a shack had been constructed for stevedores on Pier 39, North River, which was heated by a kerosene heater. As a 5-gallon can of kerosene was kept in the office, the Fire Department had requested that something be done about the matter. An inspection was made and the hazard eliminated. The hazard caused by smokers was important, and was the subject of considerable discussion at the Port Coordinator's meetings. It was suggested that there should be designated areas in all ships and piers where smoking would be permitted, instead of permitting smoking in some areas on some piers and prohibiting smoking on other piers. Under the New York City "No Smoking Ordinance," areas could be designated, but under the stringent New Jersey rules there were no designated areas,

though men were allowed to go off the pier at intervals. To stop this loss in man-hours, it was suggested that the New Jersey rules be amended. An inspector reported an increase of sneak smoking/in toilets, boiler rooms, carpenter shops and paint shops. It was suggested that, if the then law could not be enforced, smoking should be allowed under proper supervision. It was stated that, although the New York Smoking Law permitted smoking in designated areas, only 6 permits had been issued for such areas out of the entire waterfront, and that none of those was on piers proper. This matter came up about the end of February, 1944.

FIRES FROM WELDING

As has been shown, fires from welding constituted the greatest number from any one cause. For example, during the first two weeks of September, 1943, there were eight fires in the Los Angeles Harbor area including one in hull 139, the USS BANGUST at the Western Pipe and Steel Company. The CG-30060-F and Trailer unit #3 were dispatched to the fire which was centered in the Radar and Intercommunications Control Room, which was completely equipped. Bulkhead welding caused the plastic instrument board to ignite from heat. The room was locked and gas masks had to be used because of the dense, acrid smoke. The loss was estimated at \$100,000. One of the most outstanding examples was, of course, the NORMANDIE fire at New York, covered in detail in Part IX, Section II. The Russian steamer DJURMA at Portland, Oregon, on 27 April, 1943, had been inspected prior to welding operations. The contractor had been informed that welding could not be performed in certain places on board the vessel until it was cleared of highly combustible cargo. Recommendations were disregarded and welding started after the Coast Guard inspecting force had departed. Sparks from the welding torch ignited paper used for lining, dunnage and cargo by penetrating through a steel bulkhead. Welding was performed on a bulkhead on the other side of which flour was being loaded amid clouds of highly explosive dust. The fire watchman was found smoking some distance from his post. All this merely indicates the indifference of some of the shipyards towards the rules and regulations when they were not constantly being enforced and called to their attention by Coast Guard personnel.

COLLISION BETWEEN TWO OIL BARGES

During the latter part of October, 1943, there was a collision between two oil barges near New Orleans. One of these was full, the other empty. The contact occurred in such a way that the empty barge rested on top of the full one, practically submerging it. It was decided, because of fear of explosion, not to separate them except under the supervision of the Coast Guard. The CG-48006-F was dispatched, and she pumped 70 tons of water into one rake of the empty barge, reducing the weight on the full barge, and the vessels were finally parted while the fireboat pumped a stream of water over the contact points between the barges to eliminate the possibility of sparking. Fireboats and patrol boats equipped with pumps also were very useful in cases of leaking craft, in practically all Districts. In such cases, pumping served to keep the vessels afloat until they could be moved to safety. Streams from fireboats were also useful in washing away oil concentrations to prevent fire.

CASES OF EXPLOSION

A good example of fireboat action is that at Galveston, Texas, on 3 October, 1943, when, at 0935, an explosion, believed caused by failure to check and clean bilges, occurred in a vessel moored at the Houston Boat Company, Kemah, Texas. A trailer pumping unit from Captain of the Port, Galveston, arrived at 1017, was placed on the dock, connected


and laid hose to the fire, and in a short time the fire was under control. A planing mill was saved by the quick action of the Coast Guard. The estimated damage to small craft and boat house was about \$200,000. The quick control of the fire saved additional property valued at \$325,000. Also, in the Eighth Naval District, on 27 October, 1944, an explosion and fire of dangerous proportions occurred at 0100 at the Magnolia Petroleum Company refinery at Beaumont, Texas. The entire extensive tank area was endangered. A Captain of the Port fire detail was dispatched to the scene with equipment. Various oil line breaks fed the fire, but all, excepting one, were shut off by company employees. One break in a valve which was feeding an enormous quantity of fuel to the fire could not be reached due to the intense heat in the fire area. Coast Guardsmen, assisted by refinery workers, put four 2½" hose lines in service and within five minutes the area in which the valve was located was cooled-down sufficiently so that the Port Security Officer of the COTP, Port Arthur, equipped with an asbestos suit and protected by a water shield, was able to cut off the valve at the base of the butane-pentane tank. Immediate abating of the flames followed.

FIRES FOUGHT OUTSIDE OF WATERFRONT AREAS

Many Captain of the Port fire-fighting units participated in fires outside of the areas of Coast Guard responsibility. Just one example is that at Atlantic City, New Jersey, when on 27 February, 1944, the Atlantic City Fire Department requested assistance from the ACOTP office in fighting a general alarm apartment house fire. Thirty men, two trailer fire pumps, and two reconnaissance cars were dispatched and helped fight for two hours until it was extinguished. The Coast Guard detail covered valuable property in the building with tarpaulins; laid out and manned 500 feet of hose lines; manned the Fire Department deluge wagon; assisted in putting up ladders; ascended to the roofs of adjacent buildings to extinguish burning embers, and helped firemen reload their trucks. Such cooperative effort was expended numerous times in various Districts. However, there were cases where this seemed carried too far. In the Thirteenth Naval District, in June, 1945, participation by COTP units off the waterfront was limited by a directive which specified that any such activity must be only at the request of a municipal authority and must be approved by the ranking Coast Guard officer at the unit. This move seemed timely, as there had apparently been a tendency on the part of fire departments to expect assistance from the Coast Guard because of the acute shortage of municipal firemen.

SOME FIRES IN WHICH SHIPS WERE INVOLVED

During the two weeks ended 31 December, 1944, the Captain of the Port fireboat unit at Norfolk received a total of 19 alarms. Five fireboats and 19 patrol boats responded to a large fire at Pier 8, Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation at Newport News. The fire originated on the pier and spread to a Liberty ship, the WILLIAM T. SMITH, which was docked at the pier. The fire was extremely difficult to fight due to the entire pier being enveloped in flames. The U. S. Army Base Fire Department and the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Fire Department also rendered assistance. Fireboats and patrol boats performed standby duty at this pier after the fire was under control. On 30 January, 1944, the CG-38461 rendered conspicuous assistance at a lime plant fire at Norfolk, and also extinguished a fire on board the CG-64010 on the same date. Fireboats were called twice on 31 January due to the rekindling of the lime plant fire. Captain of the Port patrol boats towed boats moored near the fire across the river out of danger from flying sparks and embers. In early July, 1944, the CGR-1235, operating



COAST GUARDSMEN ON THE PACIFIC COAST
MANNED FIRE BARGES OF THIS TYPE



VICE ADMIRAL WAESCHE (RIGHT), COMMANDANT,
AND CAPTAIN N. B. HALL, CHIEF OF THE PORT SECURITY DIVISION
INSPECT WASHINGTON, D. C. WATERFRONT
AND OBSERVE OPERATION OF A HANLEY WATER-JET PROPELLED FIREBOAT

under Captain of the Port, Baltimore, rendered assistance at a fire on board a Navy barge at Solomons, Maryland, loaded with high explosives. On 28 February, 1945, a fire occurred in the tug W. W. WERNER while moored alongside two barges at the Standard Oil Company docks at Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The CG-36028-F stationed at this facility responded to an alarm, made fast to the burning tug which had been abandoned by its crew, cast off the mooring lines, and towed the tug across the Mississippi River fighting the fire en route. The fire was brought under control in 45 minutes. It was caused by gasoline spill vapors in the engine room which had become ignited by a backfire. On 16 June, 1945, a fire in between decks of the number 2 hold of the Navy-manned USS CASWELL was reported in the Thirteenth Naval District, in response to which two fire barges and a fire and rescue party were dispatched by the ACOTP. With the ship's stores, cargo nets, tires, and supplies burning, both Navy and Coast Guard personnel entered the smoking hold with type A-1 gas masks and battled the stubborn blaze with fog and straight streams for three hours. The Seattle Fire Department gave its usual first alarm response, but the Coast Guard fire-fighting detail and the Navy men attached to the vessel put forth the principal effort. Several men were partially overcome by smoke, but only one man required medical assistance.

A FEW PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

In August, 1944, an accident occurred on a ferryboat near Philadelphia. This was when a discharge valve on a trailer tank truck carrying gasoline broke, and the contents poured onto the deck of the ferryboat. Investigation disclosed that, to avoid certain delays, the operator of the truck had presented to the boat's ticket agent a certificate of cargo listing the contents of the truck as fuel oil, although the trailer had been loaded with 5020 gallons of high octane gasoline. The ferryboat had not been declared a "freighter" under which conditions a trailer containing gasoline would be permitted on board. The owner knew of this evasion. Investigation revealed 82 violations of this sort, and the matter was turned over to the law officer. Occasionally, apparent sabotage attempts were uncovered, such as tampering with fire equipment on piers. In August, 1944, it was discovered, for instance, that fire hoses on board the CAPE FLORIDA, a cargo vessel at Berth 145 at Los Angeles had been cut, and fire equipment tampered with. As in most such cases, Coast Guard Intelligence received a report and indicated suspicion of sabotage, and the FBI was notified. In some West Coast ports, especially during hot, dry weather, fire danger on piers increased. It became the custom in some Twelfth and Thirteenth District ports to wash down the piers after dry, hot days, partly to extinguish any smoldering cigarette butts and lessen the fire hazard. Fires which started after work had ceased for the night, were not easy to discover in their incipient stages. There were virtually no night fires after this practice was adopted. One problem in the Fifth Naval District is worthy of mention. Fireboats were often taken off station or standby duty at piers where vessels were loading or unloading hazardous cargo. At such times, fire protection for the port was seriously affected. Although a Headquarters letter had directed that, under those conditions, standby duty should be performed by Coast Guard Trailer fire pumpers, lack of personnel for properly manning the pumps prevented this being carried out. Other examples of fire experience and problems are mentioned under specific Districts in Part IX.

SECTION VII

HARBOR PATROL

THE EARLIEST WATERSIDE PATROLS

RESERVED

One of the earliest activities relating to Port Security

was patrol of harbor waters in our ports by such vessels as the Captains of the Port had at their disposal. Patrols were carried out by regular personnel, but the number of available vessels was wholly inadequate as were those available to man them. Yet, with the advent of war, the necessity for surveillance of harbor waters to prevent and detect acts of sabotage and activities of subversive agents was of great importance. By calling upon members of the Coast Guard Auxiliary to undertake periodic patrols in their own vessels, the coverage of harbor waters was increased considerably, and Auxiliary members responded to the call in gratifying manner. Working in conjunction with augmented beach patrols, these civilians made it possible to patrol channels and inlets which limited personnel among the regulars were unable to cover. Coverage, however, still left much to be desired. There was need for more vessels and more men. Early in 1942 a campaign was inaugurated for the acquisition by the Coast Guard of vessels of Auxiliary members and a large number of vessels was taken over and enrolled in the Coast Guard Reserve as "CGR" vessels. These came under complete control of the Coast Guard. While patrols were being carried out as facilities allowed, in mid-1942 the Temporary Reserve was authorized and aggressive enrollment from members of the Auxiliary was begun. As these Temporary Reservists became available, and were trained, they were placed in CGR boats and assigned patrols, thus greatly increasing the coverage of harbor waters. Auxiliarists continued their assignments, with many Temporary Reservists coming into their crews and taking over additional vessels. Regulars continued patrols where possible, but after the first of 1943, Auxiliarists had been largely replaced by TRs, except in the Third and Thirteenth Districts, where Auxiliarists continued patrolling for a good many months. As 1943 progressed, most water patrols in our major ports were taken over by Temporary Reservists, and regulars were released for other duties.

THE VITAL NECESSITY FOR HARBOR PATROLS

The necessity for patrol of the offshore lanes was met by the Coastal Pickets.

Beach patrols performed admirably in keeping watch over a large portion of our Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific shores. The Volunteer Port Security Forces covered the wharf areas in the important shipping ports. But the harbor waters where shipping was active, and where ships of all kinds were being built for the "bridge of ships" and for the coming Naval offensives, the harbor entrances where all water traffic had to be carefully checked and identified, the inlets on sandy shores leading to large salt water bays and sounds, and the rivers, had to be equally well-guarded and watched if proper security was to be achieved. No person or vessel without proper identification or legitimate business should roam these important waters. This was a type of security work which could be done only by floating units.

DUTIES OF THE PATROL BOAT UNITS

While the duties of harbor (inlet, river) patrol crews differed slightly depending upon local circumstances,

basically the purposes of harbor patrol were the same everywhere. It was the duty of the men who served in patrol craft winter and summer, in all weathers, to watch constantly for fire, unauthorized persons, pleasure craft with improper papers or none at all, to check or report unidentified vessels, remove menaces to navigation, watch for accidents and render assistance to persons or craft in difficulty, assist at plane crashes, recover bodies and wreckage, and observe and report anything which did not appear "right." Duties also included policing and clearing channels for the movement of troopships, patrolling ammunition ships and anchorages, keeping vessels away from the location of diving operations, preventing craft from entering restricted areas, and various special

assignments such as transporting custom officers, Coast Guard pilots, load line inspectors and Boarding Officers.

THE BOATS USED FOR HARBOR PATROL

The manner of taking over small craft for patrol duties from Auxiliary members and other sources has been mentioned. These "CGR" boats replaced Auxiliary craft as rapidly as they became available, and for most of the period of patrol, CGR boats were used. However, in early 1943 Headquarters desired that CGR boats be returned to their owners whenever possible and those which proved least useful were so returned. By middle or late 1944, such patrols as were then operating were shifted from CGR boats to regular Coast Guard 38-foot picket boats of standard design, many having been built and become available. The CGR boats were mostly converted pleasure craft given a coat of grey paint, large white numbers on bows and stern, and equipped with coal stoves for cooking and heating purposes and radiotelephones. They were also equipped with small arms such as .38 caliber revolvers, rifles and sub-machine guns. Many were equipped with fire pumps and hose. Sizes ranged from 26 feet to 60 feet and designs were numerous, of course. Seagoing qualities varied greatly.

PATROL CRAFT TOOK PLENTY OF PUNISHMENT

Some harbor patrols were carried out by regulars in regular Coast Guard craft, but all craft on patrol duty, regular or Reserve, were run hard, operating under all weather conditions, winter and summer. The vessels operated by Temporary Reservists were handled by 14 different crews each week, and this was a bit hard on the boats and the motors. Most were on a full time basis, and operated an average of 21 hours a day, cruising at around 4 knots. Thus each traveled about 80 miles a day, or around 25,000 miles a year allowing for normal lay-up for repairs. This was about as much use as the summertime yachtsmen would have given their craft in 12 to 15 years! This punishment resulted in mechanical troubles, causing frequent lay-up of the boats, but there were usually enough in operation to cover patrols. Finally, Coast Guard 38-foot picket boats became available, and as this occurred, the converted pleasure craft were returned to their owners. Being of one-design with one type of motor in most cases, complications due to varieties of motors and fittings to be repaired or replaced experienced with the CGR boats became a thing of the past. The picket boats had unheated whelphouses, which was bad in the winter in the northern latitudes, but the boats handled well, had speed when needed (usually not true of the CGR boats), and they served their purpose well.

PATROLS IN OUTLYING LOCALITIES

Practically every harbor of importance in the United States was patrolled as indicated. However, numerous patrols were conducted in outlying areas under Captains of the Port, duties of which were somewhat similar to those of the harbor boats. The nature of the locations of these patrols (rivers, inlets, bays, and near-shore coastal waters), the type of shipping, the larger areas to be covered by one patrol boat and other points of dissimilarity gave these other boatmen many problems different from those in the principal harbors. Watch for fires was very important, but these crews usually had only one or two tinderbox piers to concern them, rather than dozens. There was constant watch for floating mines. Possibly there were fewer opportunities for rescues, but the outlying men usually had to cover greater distances in rendering assistance and often in much livelier water than that of the harbors. In thick fogs, and often at night, harbor men had navigation and traffic problems for relatively short distances. In the outer waters there were far more numerous occasions

when navigating ability and "local knowledge" were of paramount importance. In the majority of outlying patrols, the boats cruised slowly in their assigned areas. Certain inlet patrols, however, whose duty was to watch everything transiting the inlet waters, could maintain adequate patrol by anchoring or mooring in the inlet, and maintaining watch from that position.

BOATS AND SHORE PERSONNEL IN 1942 IN RELATION TO WATERFRONT PROPERTY VALUE

There was, of course, a definite relationship between shore personnel and the number of boats in the various Districts in comparison with the value of waterfront property being protected. This varied as between Districts. Figures in this regard as of 31 December, 1942, are interesting even though numbers of boats and personnel increased during 1943, (later figures not available). The first column of figures below (A) shows the number of shore personnel for each million dollars worth of property on the waterfront, and the second (B) shows the number of patrol and picket boats for each million dollars worth of waterfront property as of that date.

District		A	B
Boston	1st District	9.1	0.74
New York	3rd District	1.8	.13
Philadelphia	4th District	14.0	.92
Norfolk	5th District	11.7	1.52
Charleston	6th District	6.4	1.00
Miami	7th District	3.1	.58
San Juan	10th District	-	-
New Orleans	8th District	6.3	.37
Cleveland	9th District	1.3	.40
Chicago	9th District	2.1	.27
St. Louis	9th District	1.5	.37
Long Beach	11th District	15.2	1.00
San Francisco	12th District	12.9	.19
Seattle	13th District	3.5	.29
Honolulu	14th District	41.0	1.40
Average		3.8	.29

ASSISTANCE AND SALVAGE

One of the primary peacetime duties of the Coast Guard is assistance and salvage. While, in wartime, the chief responsibilities with patrol craft lay in all phases of protection to shipping and port facilities, saving of life and property remained very important. In virtually every port of the United States, the patrol boats participated in rescues of persons from precarious situations and in the recovery of property. There were many rescues of victims of plane crashes sighted from the beaches, the coastal lookouts, or the patrol craft themselves. Innumerable small craft grounded, waterlogged, or overturned, or broken away from moorings, were recovered and towed to safety. Seaworthy craft in dangerous situations were assisted. Patrol boats equipped with fire pumps gave valuable assistance at waterfront fires in practically all areas. Navy planes on the water and out of control were towed to safety. During the whole period of these patrols, cases of assistance and salvage became almost routine. Each required alertness, attention to duty, good seamanship and a keen intuition as to the right thing to do in emergency, and many required an exact administration of first aid.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF PATROL BOATS IN BOSTON HARBOR

Experience in the various ports differed very little, as a general rule. The impressive record of accomplishment by the patrol boats covering Boston Harbor may be cited as an example. While activity was chiefly quiet patrol without spectacular happenings, the very presence of the patrol boats doubtless had an important

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influence on the security of the port. In general, the achievements of the Boston harbor patrol may be summarized:

1. Rendered assistance in 1,350 cases for the fiscal year ended 30 June, 1945;
2. Removed innumerable floating obstructions and menaces to harbor navigation;
3. Made two daily sweeps of the harbor for Ships' Position data;
4. Expedited medical aid to personnel on board vessels outside the continental limits;
5. Cared for an estimated 12 cases of burning material which was prevented from floating under piers;
6. Gave assistance to numerous small craft in distress;
7. Rescued many persons from the water, usually resulting from overturned pleasure craft;
8. Assisted in several instances of planes forced to land in the water;
9. Apprehended 3 deserters from merchant vessels who were found on or in the water;
10. Investigated many cases with intent to rescue or recover property;
11. Discovered and apprehended several persons taking photographs;
12. Discovered many fires which were promptly reported and controlled in their early stages.

The record of this activity shows that in the patrolled areas there were no serious fires, no explosions, and no large-scale sabotage which might have hindered the war effort or caused serious threat to security of the port.

OTHER DUTIES

In addition to the foregoing duties, patrol boats were very useful in patrolling new ship launchings. In many ports, as many as four or five launchings a week would be patrolled, vessels warned away from the area and properly controlled. Especially at New York, organization of patrol craft at launchings was highly developed. This is covered in some detail in Part IX, Section II. It was unnecessary to organize it to that extent in most Districts, but there was much launching patrol activity in the Eleventh District, and organization there was well-developed. Patrol craft in practically all areas were charged with the responsibility of boarding, examining and checking small vessels moving in their areas, and to identify the persons found on board such vessels, in order to determine that all was right with these vessels and persons. Papers were checked, permits examined, identification cards were looked over. Usually, if all was not in order, the vessel concerned was directed and escorted to the Coast Guard base and the matter referred to the Duty Officer, who took any necessary action and, if desirable, notified Coast Guard Intelligence.

THE RETURN OF "CGR VESSELS"


At the end of 1942 and in early 1943, all District Coast Guard Officers were directed to return to owners all Reserve vessels not then actively used, "but do not incur expense without specific authority of HQ." A large number of CGR vessels had been procured by

the end of 1942, and most needs for small craft had been satisfied. Patrols off shore and near shore were better organized, and the Coast Guard was building a substantial number of small vessels, principally 38-foot picket boats and 83-footers. The result was the beginning of a surplus in small craft. A policy was then inaugurated of returning Reserve vessels to their owners if unsuitable or not needed; or if requested by the owner except where such craft were badly needed and especially suitable for the duty performed. Reassignment of vessels followed, with transfers from one District with a surplus to another with a shortage from duty for which they were unsuited to other duty more appropriate, and some from coastal picket work to Port Security waterside patrols and vice versa. It was pointed out that effective performance of Port Security vessels must be maintained. The result of this reshuffling was a surplus of suitable craft, and steps were taken to dispose of them. District Coast Guard Officers designated boards of three officers to survey surplus CGR vessels. Surveys were completed and forwarded to Headquarters, indicating needed repairs or rebuilding to place the vessels in a condition satisfactory to the owners, an estimate of the cost, a statement from the owner as to work or restoration he considered fair and his estimate of the cost. Return of these vessels began about the first of 1943, and continued until 1945.


INSTANCES OF ASSISTANCE

While many cases of assistance rendered are given in Part IX, under the respective District headings, a few examples of work by patrol craft will be appropriate here. During the first half of April, 1944, the Seventh (Miami) District reported that 7 Coast Guardsmen assisted at a fire at the "Little Gasparilla Inn" at Boca Grande, and helped in saving "Big Gasparilla Inn" and cottage property worth over half a million dollars, as well as numerous cars parked in the vicinity. During the same period, 20 Coast Guard vessels stood by, or assisted 16 disabled vessels, 8 Coast Guard vessels assisted 8 vessels which had grounded and 3 Coast Guard vessels picked up 7 occupants of capsized sailboats and towed the boats to port. One Coast Guard vessel assisted in the removal of bodies of two soldiers from an Army car which had crashed through a bridge, and another Coast Guard craft later recovered the body of another victim of the same crash. Another vessel recovered parts of a plane which had crashed and aided in the search for survivors. On 7 February, 1944, there was a high wind storm in the Thirteenth District. During this storm, two 90-foot Army Air Corps barges broke their mooring lines at Seattle and, after crossing considerable water area, were drifting only a few yards away from the 15th Avenue Bridge and about to drift into it. The picket boat CG-38753 entered the city waterway on regular patrol and noticed the barges. By running the engine at full speed after putting a line on the barges, this boat was able to hold the barges until a tug arrived. No doubt considerable damage would have resulted to the bridge and barges had it not been for the prompt action of the boatswain's mate in charge of the picket boat. An unusual type of salvage operation was undertaken on and for a few days after 13 March, 1945, in San Francisco Bay. On that day a Navy barge loaded with a cargo of 1,738 oil drums filled with oil capsized. The drums went adrift. The CG-65301 assisted Navy and commercial craft in recovering the drums most of which were drifting in the area north of the San Mateo Bridge. By 31 March, 1,647 of the drums had been recovered. On 23 July, 1943, a sudden squall hit Fernandina, Florida, in the Sixth District, and assistance was rendered to the shrimp boat ANNIE JANET which had spread its seams. Two patrol boats applied portable gasoline engine pumps to the sinking vessel and then towed it to Fernandina. On the same date assistance

REF ID: A66666



PATROL BASE OF THE CAPTAIN OF THE PORT
PORTLAND, OREGON



THREE 38-FOOT PICKET BOATS ROAR OUT ON A SPECIAL MISSION
THESE BOATS PROVED THE MOST SATISFACTORY FOR ALL-AROUND PATROL
AND WATERSIDE SECURITY DUTY

REF ID: A66666

was rendered the SEA MULLET which had extreme difficulty due to the anchor line in the propeller, and this craft was also towed to Fernandina. Another patrol boat towed a third disabled boat to the same port. On 27 July, a patrol vessel was first to reach the scene of a naval aircraft crash near Plum Orchard in the Intra-coastal waterway at Cumberland Island, Georgia. This vessel, operating under Captain of the Port, Jacksonville, located the wreckage and bodies of three Naval Air Corps men, assisting Naval Salvage vessels in the operation.

PATROL BOAT COMMUNICATIONS

The great majority of patrol boats operating under Captains of the Port were equipped with two-way radio-telephones in order that they might keep in touch with their base or be reached easily through the Captain of the Port Communications System. In some areas, continuous stand by radio watches were maintained, but for the most part, patrol boats could not keep batteries charged sufficiently to maintain a 24-hour watch. Instead, a system of half-hourly five-minute radio watches made contact with patrol boats possible in emergencies. Blinker communication with patrol boats was also used where practicable, but trained signal personnel for patrol boats were scarce. Use of blinker at Boston was quite successful, since patrols were manned almost wholly by Temporary Reservists many of whom were specially trained and the Captain of the Port Signal Station at the Boston Base was manned wholly by Temporary Reserve rated signalmen or others training for that rating.

PATROL COVERAGE

Captains of the Port set up in the waters under their jurisdiction patrol areas with specific limits, and assigned vessels to cover those areas, with particular emphasis on patrol of vital portions. These areas generally included all piers of importance, navy yards, war industries on the waterfront, power plants on tidewater, coal and lumber yards, bridge areas, anchorages both regular and for explosives, and important channels. It was customary to direct that patrol boats would not leave their assigned areas during their period of patrol except under specific orders of the Captain of the Port. In case of emergency, patrols usually contacted their operations officer at the base by radio-telephones and received special instructions.

CURTAILMENT IN PATROL ACTIVITY

As has been mentioned, patrols grew rapidly in number during 1942, as Coast Guard regulars became available, and as Auxiliaries were obtained for the work. The Temporary Reserve largely took over this work beginning in the Fall of 1942 and early 1943, and increased further the coverage of harbor, river and inlet patrols through 1943 and into 1944. As the situation off our coasts improved, and the submarine menace came under better control, the necessity for some of the inlet and river patrols declined and where possible, these were discontinued. Some of the smaller ports where water patrols had been carried out became less important, and Captains of the Port at many were discontinued, beginning early in 1944. Patrols at such places ceased. With further progress of the war, a great many of the less important and COTPs and ACOTPs were abolished, especially late in 1944. In the winter of 1944-1945, water patrols were being carried out only in the more important ports where, however, no curtailment or relaxation had been permitted. At such ports, full-scale patrol was continued until June, 1945, after VE-Day, when practically all harbor patrolling ceased.

RESERVED

SECTION VIII

SECURITY OF VESSELS IN PORTS - GUARD DETAILS

RESPONSIBILITY FOR WATERFRONT SECURITY

It has been shown that, as a result of Executive Order No. 9074 of 25 February, 1942, the Coast Guard was charged with safeguarding vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities except such facilities as might be operated by the Army and Navy. The term "waterfront facilities" was construed to include all piers, wharves, floating structures, and similar installations to which ships might be moored, or serviced, and structures physically connected with such installations. It did not include shipyards, dry docks other than floating docks, power plants, factories, bridges or similar structures in ports or harbors except such portions thereof as extended into the water. Originally, waterside protection for such facilities was afforded, as well as protection for all floating vessels. Later, "waterfront facilities" was defined to mean not only the land with buildings fronting or abutting on a body of water, and the vessels, wharves, piers, and docks used in the shipment or transshipment of goods, but also the warehouses, elevators, railroad terminals, and other storage, terminals or transfer facilities adjacent to or operated in connection with such wharves, piers, and docks. (Definition used in Sixth District). At New York, the "bulkhead line" was not always established. Allowing for certain variations in interpretation at different ports, it is obvious that there was some continuing confusion as to just where Coast Guard responsibility for guarding facilities began and ended.

EARLY PERSONNEL INADEQUATE

The two most vulnerable parts of our Nation's war effort were its ports and its supply line of ships. An injury which would impair the efficiency of the ports or the vessels while in port, would have resulted in holding up vital war materials from places where they were greatly needed. Thus, protection was essential even in the earliest days when the Coast Guard was given responsibility. However, though personnel were growing rapidly in numbers, men had to be trained, and there were not enough available at first, to make it possible to afford proper guard protection. Pending sufficient personnel, State and municipal agencies were reminded that their forces were primarily responsible for affording protection to life and property within their jurisdictions, using police, state guards, private guards, and such. Eventually, Coast Guard guards were provided and, when the Temporary Reserve Volunteer Port Security Forces became organized and men were trained and available for duty, these forces took over the greater part of the guarding of piers, wharves, docks, and other facilities.

GUARD DUTIES SUMMARIZED

In the foregoing pages, details have been given on the general operations of the regular, regular Reserve and Temporary Reserve men whose responsibility it was to serve on "the line" in protecting the waterfront properties under Coast Guard jurisdiction. These operations were concerned with the identification of all persons in guarded areas, precautions against and control of fires, enforcement of regulations, inspections, and general patrol of the areas. It was vitally important that these men know precisely what to do in emergencies, and that was largely a matter of training and native judgement. Examples of emergencies and actions taken are presented in Part IX under various District sub-heads. There was, however one responsibility to the men engaged in guard duty which has not been covered in detail, and that was

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an extremely important activity. One of the heaviest responsibilities of the Captain of the Port was the security of vessels in port, and the work of the guards was in great measure concerned with that responsibility. Obviously, guard activity thus far mentioned was directly and indirectly identified with the security of vessels.

REGULATIONS FOR SECURITY OF VESSELS IN PORT

Regulations for the security of vessels in port were approved by the President on 31 December, 1942, and signed by the Commandant of the Coast Guard on 1 January, 1943. They were promulgated to provide the necessary security for vessels in port, to promote cooperation between all groups responsible for vessel security, and to insure the basis for uniform administration in the interest of greater port security. These regulations, addressed to owners and officers of merchant vessels, owners of waterfront facilities, and all other interested persons, began with this statement: "In time of war merchant vessels become vital auxiliaries to the armed forces. The safety of a merchant vessel in port in wartime depends on the effort and the cooperation of those groups responsible for safety and they are: the officers and crew; guards; the terminal organization; those handling cargo; the terminal owners; the local municipal authorities; and the Coast Guard." It was pointed out that while greater ship security might be provided by regulations which required additional facilities, inspections, and drill, full security against accidents, carelessness and the saboteur would never prevail unless there were also present that devotion to duty which was characterized by constant vigilance and thoroughness.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

The purpose of the regulations was to insure the safety of all vessels in port while anchored or while moored to docks, piers, wharves, or other waterfront facilities. In case of special circumstances, Captains of the Port were authorized to issue special orders not inconsistent with the regulations, if they were necessitated by special circumstances for the proper safeguarding of vessels or facilities. Nothing in the regulations was to be construed as relieving masters, owners or operators and agents of the vessel from their primary responsibility for the security of their vessels. The regulations pertained to all vessels in a disabled status were to be reported to the Captain of the Port, who would then issued special instructions to safeguard them, waiving any regulations which might be inconsistent with the situation. The Captain of the Port was empowered to waive any provisions if facilities, conditions or services for protection were unavailable. In the case of an emergency in which the safety of a vessel was threatened, the senior ship's officer on board such vessel might depart from the regulations and pursue the most effective action in his judgment for the safety of his vessel. It was provided that any evidence of sabotage or subversive activity involving any vessel or facility must be reported immediately to the FBI and the Captain of the Port, or to their respective representatives. Naturally, the master, owner, and operator of a vessel were expected to take all necessary precautions to protect the ship, cargo, and personnel from sabotage. Notes in the pamphlet for general distribution elaborated upon this, pointing out that there were certain forms of sabotage cunningly conceived, which could not be detected by ordinary inspection or by those unfamiliar with the ship's machinery and equipment. Detailed suggestions were made for checking into and caring for the following situations;

- (a) Contamination of ship's lubricating oil
- (b) Contamination of fuel
- (c) Contamination of fresh water
- (d) Contamination of food
- (e) Introduction of foreign substances into bearings
- (f) Incendiaries and explosives
- (g) Protection of critical spaces

THE MANNING OF VESSELS

Vessels "out of service" were defined; the Captain of the Port could require men in addition to those of the regular manning schedule in an emergency. He could, however, waive the schedule, if, in his judgment, it could be done with safety to the vessel. It was specified that vessels out of service, when anchored or moored to a dock, pier, wharf, or other facility, should have no fewer than the specified number of officers and men subject to duty as required by the master. The numbers required were stated in the regulations, as well as the requirement that a state of alertness should prevail at all times.

REQUIREMENTS FOR GUARDING OF VESSELS

Vessels were required to have "Ship Guards," "Cargo Guards," and "Fire Guards." These were in addition to the crew requirements for manning. Requirements for self-propelled vessels were as follows for ship guards:

1. Such vessels of from 2,000 to 5,000 gross tons, when moored to a dock, pier, wharf or other facility, shall maintain a guard continuously on duty at each gangway.
2. Such vessels of over 5,000 gross tons shall, when moored as above, maintain a guard continuously on duty at each gangway and, in addition thereto, a guard continuously on roving duty.
3. Such passenger vessels of over 5,000 gross tons shall, when moored as above maintain the above guards and, in addition thereto, sufficient roving guards to patrol all parts of the vessel accessible to passengers and crew, at intervals of not over 20 minutes.

It was provided that in all vessels, regardless of tonnage or whether self-propelled or not, cargo guards shall be maintained continuously on duty in each cargo space when working cargo consisting of explosives or other dangerous articles except inflammable or combustible liquid cargo in bulk. The Captain of the Port may require cargo guards for any vessel when, in his discretion, such are necessary for security of the vessel or the port. On self-propelled vessels of over 1,000 gross tons or over when under repair, a fire guard shall be maintained in each compartment or place in which there is in use portable apparatus such as welding, burning, or riveting, or in which sparks or sufficient heat to cause combustion may be transmitted if such space or adjacent spaces contain combustible materials likely to become ignited, from the time such work is started until after it is completed. All guards were to be provided by the master, owner, operator or agent, except where guards were provided by military authority.

PERSONS WHO MIGHT BE GUARDS

- It was specified in the regulations that guards be drawn from the following categories:
- (a) Members of military or Naval forces of the United States when approved by proper authority;
 - (b) Members of militarized plant guard forces;

~~RESTRICTED~~

(c) Members of the crew when approved by the master or senior deck officer on board;

(d) Male civilian United States citizens qualifying physically and as to character when approved by the Captain of the Port;

(e) Members of the crew of United Nations vessels of foreign registry or citizens of any United Nation, if approved by the Captain of the Port and by the master.

It was provided that the Coast Guard identification cards of all civilian guards should be endorsed "GUARD." On any vessel with more than one guard, one was to be the chief guard to whom the others were responsible. Such guards were subject to the orders of the master or senior deck officer on watch. However, when the vessel was loading explosives, all guards were to be subject to the orders of the senior member of the Coast Guard Explosives-Loading detail.

DUTIES OF THE GUARDS

The following duties of the guards under the regulations for the security of vessels

in port are not to be confused with the duties of members of the explosives loading details, which in many respects were similar. The duties of the guards were specified as follows:

(a) Standing orders for all guards:

1. To take charge of your post or beat and the security of life and property which it covers, informing yourself of the location and use of nearest fire, safety, and alarm apparatus.
2. To cover your post in an efficient manner keeping always on the alert and observing everything that takes place within sight of hearing.
3. To report to your superior all violations of orders you are instructed to enforce and to submit written reports on occurrences or violations of consequence.
4. To receive and transmit, as required, all messages of calls relating to the ship's security.
5. To quit your post only when properly relieved.
6. To receive, obey and pass on to your relief all orders from those to whom you report.
7. To maintain a courteous and dignified bearing, refraining from conversation with others except as required by your duties.
8. To give the alarm in case of fire or disorder.
9. To notify immediately those to whom you report in cases not covered by your instructions.
10. To be especially watchful at night and during periods of alarm and blackout and to challenge and hold for the Coast Guard, shore guard, or other authorities, all of those whose appearance and actions you suspect and to deny entrance and to put ashore in safe hands, any who attempt to board without proper identification and pass.

(b) Duties of Gangway Guard

1. To stay on duty on the ship in the close vicinity and view of the gangway.
2. To deny entrance to the ship to all those not having in their possession valid passes, credentials or Coast Guard identification cards as required (under the following paragraph on Identification and passes).

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3. To examine all personal baggage and packages brought aboard by, or for, ship's officers or men, to hold for examination by the senior deck officer present or those he may designate, the personal baggage and packages of persons other than the crew who have been or are to be transported, provided; that such baggage and packages have not been examined by competent authority on the dock.

4. To bar members of the crew when under the influence of liquor from boarding the vessel when explosives as cargo is being worked. At other times to hold those members of the crew boarding under the influence of liquor until safe escort to their quarters can be secured for them.

5. To receive from the foreman stovedore a list of his longshoremen and together with him check them on board when starting and ashore when concluding the day's work.

(c) Duties of Roving Guard

1. To patrol continuously from one end of the ship to the other or, within the confines of the area prescribed by the chief guard, and to observe on these rounds the security of accessible spaces for the detection of fire, disorder, violation of security regulations, and the presence of unauthorized persons. To require that those suspected of being aboard without authority properly identify themselves and show, in addition, a pass or its equivalent and give the reason for their presence.
2. To warn away vessels not having permission to come alongside.
3. To maintain contact from time to time with personnel on barges, lighters, and tugs lying alongside.
4. To patrol the passages of spaces in which the crew is berthed.
5. To inspect spaces in which workmen are engaged or from which they have recently departed.

(d) Duties of Cargo Guard

1. To establish the identity of all men working in cargo spaces and all who may, from time to time, come in.
2. To see that fire hose, with sufficient slack to reach the bottom of hold is run out and that there is available nearby a 2½-gallon foam fire extinguisher, a 15-pound carbon dioxide fire extinguisher, two 1-quart carbon tetrachloride, or other equivalent approved fire extinguishers.
3. To see that portable fire-fighting apparatus is in accordance with safety requirements and is properly placed.
4. To maintain close watch for leading, broken, or damaged cargo containers and to see that they are removed for cooerage in accordance with regulations.
5. To maintain close watch for any evidence of fire or gas fumes.
6. To enforce smoking and other security regulations.
7. To prohibit the carriage of clothing, lunch boxes, or other packages into cargo spaces and to prevent the eating of meals there and the visiting of men between such spaces. To maintain special vigilance of cargo spaces during meal times.

8. To assist the ship's officers in inspecting the cargo spaces prior to loading and after discharging the cargo and to be present at the final closing of the hatch or cargo space.

(e) Duties of Fire Guard

1. To have removed portable combustibles from the work area and to have protection provided for combustible materials which cannot be moved, giving particular attention to the passage of heat through bulkheads and decks and the protection of hatches, ducts, ports and other openings through which flame, sparks and hot metal may pass.
2. To see that fire hose with sufficient slack to reach all parts of the compartment is run out and that there is available nearby suitable approved fire extinguishers as required.
3. To make a thorough fire inspection before, during, and after the working period and not to conclude this inspection until it is certain that no hazard from fire exists.

WELDING AND BURNING A CONCERN OF THE FIRE GUARDS

Welding and burning constituted the most common cause of fires on ships undergoing construction, repair or conversion, and

the need for constant vigilance could not be over-emphasized. It was particularly impressed upon the fire guards that the under side of a deck or the opposite side of a bulkhead from that being worked on must be inspected. Stripping of combustible insulation might be warranted. Hollow concealed spaces were a potential source of trouble from fires which might smoulder and break out some hours later. The fact that a room or space was locked and therefore not easily accessible for inspection was not to be accepted as a valid reason for not inspecting it; it was up to the fire guard to secure the keys to enter any and all rooms concerned. The wetting down of combustible debris was a precautionary measure which was always in order. The welding of deck fittings to which the deck load was lashed was a procedure to be watched carefully since ordinarily cargo holds were full at that time and the under deck space not accessible for inspection. Such measures as the situation dictated were to be adopted in such instances. It was especially important that fire guards should be thoroughly familiar with the location of fire alarm boxes, and telephones, and with the procedure to be followed in sending in alarms of fire. It was essential that they be instructed that, in case of doubt, an alarm must be sounded immediately before a man working alone attempted to extinguish a fire.

IDENTIFICATION AND PASSES

Persons boarding vessels were required to have acceptable means of identification, preferably a Coast

Guard Identification Card, an acceptable pass, and a legitimate reason for boarding. Enemy aliens were excluded from vessels unless especially permitted by the Captain of the Port, as well as any persons excluded by the master of the vessel or the Captain of the Port.

ADDITIONAL REGULATIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF VESSELS

Among the regulations laid down was the requirement that vessels maintain their engines in readiness. Vessels at anchor, or moored

to piers or other facilities were required to have sufficient steam pressure in at least one main boiler to operate the engines and essential auxiliary engines to move unless safety or necessary repairs

required otherwise. Where power to operate the vessel's fire pumps or electric system was lacking in the vessel, connection by hose or electric line with shore power was required where available. Self-propelled vessels of 1,000 gross tons or over when anchored, or moored to such facilities, were not permitted to be without means of propulsion for more than 24 hours (except when loading inflammable cargo) without permission of the Captain of the Port. The maintenance of boiler fires in tank vessels when loading or unloading liquid inflammable cargo of grades A, B, or C in bulk, was a matter left to the discretion of the master or terminal superintendent depending upon all extenuating circumstances. There were many variables to consider. There was a discussion of the relative merits of manila and wire mooring lines in case of fire. Moored vessels were required to have emergency towing hawsers extending outboard, ready for quick towing. The use of anchors at dock was not favored without good reason. Tank vessels, when loading grade A, B, or C cargo in bulk, were prohibited from having fires or open flame on deck or in any compartment located on, facing, open, and adjacent to that part of the deck on which cargo hose was connected. The trimming and securing (dogging) of ventilators and ports while at dock were covered in the regulations for tankers and all other craft both for vessel safety and to prevent means of entrance to the ship when unguarded. Specific regulations were given for lighting the ships in port, the dock, the ship's main deck, the offshore side, stern, (over the stern), for barges alongside, cargo hatches, and ship's alleyways. Permission for any vessel to come alongside and remain alongside after completing its business was required from the senior deck officer on duty. A reasonable latitude was allowed lighters and barges not completing work until well into the night.

CARGO HANDLING

Cargo spaces were not to be opened until the cargo was ready to be worked, or


to perform necessary work in such spaces. When the work was completed, the cargo spaces were to be closed and secured. To prevent unlawful access to the ship, save-alls, cargo nets, stagings and side ladders, other than gangways, were to be removed or triced up, meal time excepted, as soon as the working of the cargo was concluded. Because of the importance of petroleum and its products to the war effort, special notes were included covering care of hose and terminal loading and discharge procedures. It should be noted that, of all the freight and supplies moving during most of the war for the Army, including guns, ammunition, food stores, raw material, etc., over 50% was oil.

MATTERS PERTAINING TO PERSONNEL


Masters, owners, agents and operators were charged with the responsibility of acquainting the crews with

the regulations, and to see that they were not violated. Violations were to be called to the attention of the Captain of the Port. In emergency, officers and men ashore were to return to the ship with all possible speed if circumstances allowed. The ship's business was not to be discussed within hearing of those not officially involved. Binoculars and telescopes on vessels were to be in possession of the master, officers, and lookouts only. Sailing time and future movement of the ship was to be held strictly secret. Masters were to designate places and times for smoking; there would be no smoking on weather decks when moored to a dock, pier, wharf, or other facility, or when loading or discharging explosives, or in cargo spaces, and there were special provisions for smoking in vessels when gas-freeing ship's tanks or loading inflammable liquids.

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A 24-HOUR PATROL OF ALL PIERS WAS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR
IN THE SECURITY OF VESSELS IN PORT



THE SECURITY OF VESSELS IN PORT
REQUIRED FREQUENT CHECK-UPS BY THE JEEP PATROL

RESTRICTED

INSPECTION,
INSTRUCTION
AND DRILLS

It was specified in the regulations that, upon arrival at the dock the master was to designate officers to inspect its facilities for furnishing fire-fighting assistance, fresh water, steam, electricity and floodlighting, availability of fire apparatus, guard, and pass service, and the location of fire alarm boxes and telephones. The chief engineer or assistant was responsible for connecting the shore fire hydrant to the ship's fire line, and for checking water pressure. Frequent general inspections of the engine and deck departments were stipulated for the daytime as well as nighttime, and sundown inspections were required of the deck officer covering moorings and the offshore side of the vessel including security of barges and lighters alongside. Prior to the loading of general cargo, the mate or deck officer on watch was required to make a thorough inspection of the cargo spaces involved, assuring himself that they had been properly cleaned, that no unnecessary inflammable or combustible materials remained, and that the lighting was safely arranged. He was to inspect also the handling gear and to be present when the longshoremen started work. There was to be, in addition, a final inspection when the cargo space was to be closed and secured, as well as a general final inspection before departure. To top off these security measures, it was provided that there should be instruction by the master or a designated officer in ship security, together with special drills, blackout drills at night, and air raid drills.

SECURITY OF
CANADIAN VESSELS

The Commandant of the Coast Guard, in a directive to all District Coast Guard Officers, dated 7 December, 1943, stated that an agreement had been entered into between the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Shipping Board, and the British Security Co-Ordination, whereby the latter organization would extend its inspection to Canadian vessels in United States ports. Accordingly, the inspection of Canadian vessels made by British Consular Security Officers would be accepted by the Captains of the Port in the absence of unusual circumstances. This continued without change until May, 1944. Following a conference in Vancouver, which was attended by the Consular Security Officer, Seattle, and the representatives in that port of the Canadian Shipping Board, and Canadian owners and agents, the following rules for Canadian ships at West Coast ports were agreed upon:

1. Vessels 2,000 tons gross and under (which will include tugs and barges); no guards will be required provided the vessel is protected by crew members actually on watch at gangways, on decks and in engine rooms whilst in United States ports, the responsibility resting on owners, agents and masters to see that such watches are carried out in accordance with the provisions of Section 6.322 of "U. S. Regulations for the Security of Vessels in Port."
2. It is desired that the above protection be efficiently maintained in all cases, as repeated failure will undoubtedly result in the U. S. Captains of Ports requiring employment of Shore Guards at Owner's expense.
3. In this and in all other respects, it is requested that your Puget Sound representatives cooperate as closely as possible with the British Consular Security Officer at Seattle.
4. Vessels 2,000 to 5,000 gross tons are required to have 1 Shore Guard by day and 2 by night.

5. Vessels 5,000 gross tons and upwards to have 2 Shore Guards by day and 3 by night.

6. Cargo guards equipped with fire extinguishers to be stationed on all working hatches on vessels of 5,000 tons gross and over, irrespective of nature of cargo.

It was pointed out that, with reference to vessels of 2,000 gross tons and under, it would not be necessary for the Consular Security Officer to make as frequent inspections as would be the case with ordinary cargo vessels. Every effort would be made, however, to make sure one way or another that the regulations as agreed were being carried out. Somewhat later, Headquarters was informed by the Canadian Shipping Board in Ottawa that the above arrangements were to be applied to Canadian vessels visiting all United States ports. This met with the approval of Coast Guard Headquarters, and Admiral Chalker, Acting Commandant, so wrote to Commander W. L. Bates, RNVR, British Security Co-Ordination, at New York on 25 May, 1944.

VOLUNTEER FOR
SPECIAL DUTY
AT BOSTON

British transports often were at Boston for repair and overhaul. There was special need to stand watches in these vessels to detect, prevent, or control fire, to stand fire watches when welding or cutting were being done, and generally to look after the security of the vessel in order that there might be no "Normandie" incident at Boston. These watches were undertaken by Temporary Reservists as extra duty. In one typical 10-day emergency in the Fall of 1943, TRs furnished 2,795 men of whom 1,600 were guard detail men and the rest boatmen. Many fires were discovered in these vessels, but none reached more than very minor proportions. It was only in the First District that TRs were so utilized, and the results were gratifying. In writing of this activity, the District Coast Guard Officer, First Naval District wrote: "When the Temporary Reservists became available for duty, officers of the regular service adopted a policy of using them interchangeably with regulars on duties for which they were qualified. Thus, a guard detail on the QUEEN MARY might consist of varying proportions of regulars and temporaries — and how the temporaries did turn out when we called on them for extra duty."

THE PROBLEM OF
OIL POLLUTION

One of the most serious hazards to the security of vessels in port, as well as to piers and other waterfront facilities was oil pollution. The most serious pollution, so far as Port Security was concerned, was gasoline, usually from spills. But it was very difficult to determine whether water ballast contained pollution. There were three categories for ballast water; (a) that carried in clean tanks which had been cleaned at sea (could be run into harbor and logged); (b) that from uncleaned tanks — must run water down to within 2 feet of bottom of the tank, collected in other tanks and disposed of either to dock facilities, or barges; and (c) that polluted by oil which must be run directly into harbors — this might cause emergency conditions. When concentrations of oil occurred, the greatest hazard was from nearby ships or downstream bridges from which cigarettes might be dropped. The most important things which could be done by the Port Security Officers with regard to port hazards created by oil, was to maintain close contact with the leading oil people in the various ports. The greatest talent and skill in safety and fire-fighting was to be found at the refineries, and not the storage areas. It was suggested that refinery managers put Port Security Officers in touch with their fire chiefs; if action

was taken in advance of trouble, it would be the best possible assurance that when trouble did come, they would be prepared for it.

EXPERIENCE WITH OIL SPILLS

Most spills that occurred on the waterfronts were caused by breakage of cargo hoses when tank vessels were unloading or pumping. The prompt shut-down of pumping operations and closure of control valves usually limited the spills of this type to small amounts. However, these spills could cause fires which might involve other situations. It was noticed that the spill of oil on the water from a tank ship that had been torpedoed usually caused a fire which seldom extended very far from the ship, and practically never in excess of the ship's length. The theory was that oil spread fast and thin, and was burned up before it had a chance to go very far. However, oil concentrations could be carried far before being ignited in our ports, and where ignition occurred it would almost surely be in a spot where vessels or facilities would be endangered. Pier guards and crews of patrol craft kept a keen lookout for oil in dangerous quantities, and reported it promptly. The usual remedy was to send a fireboat to the concentration, and play streams of water into the oil to disperse it; this was especially effective where the concentrations had collected under piers and in slips. In one or two cases where oil was burning in an open area, picket boats ran at full speed through the burning oil, and the wash and wake extinguished the flames.

DIFFICULTY WITH RUSSIAN SHIPS

Russian merchant vessels used most United States ports of importance, but Seattle had a greater traffic in Russian vessels than other ports. Many Temporary Reservists took special courses in Russian to help them in guard duty in these vessels, and regular Coast Guardsmen with a knowledge of Russian were used to advantage. Russian vessels frequently violated the Oil Pollution Act and other Federal regulations at will even after having had the matter called to their attention in the best Russian that Coast Guardsmen would muster.

SITUATION ON GREAT LAKES

Prevention of oil pollution on the Great Lakes was more a matter of co-operation than regulation. In March, 1945, the Assistant District Coast Guard Officer, Ninth Cleveland District, issued a memorandum stating that the Oil Pollution Act had not been extended to include the Great Lakes, and that no regulations had been issued under the Espionage Act specifically prohibiting oil pollution in those waters. There had been some attempt to apply the Refuse Act to the matter of oil pollution, but the War Department regarded that act as inapplicable. Mutual safety required observance of normal precautions and this was done generally, but there could be no compulsion or legal remedy.

OIL POLLUTION RECORD AT SEATTLE, 1944

A total of 75 oil pollution cases was reported in the Thirteenth Naval District for the year 1944. Of this, 25 occurred during the first 6 months. Bunkering operations accounted for 4% of the pollution cases in the first half of the year, 30% in the last half. In transferring oil to and from vessels, pollutions increased from 8% in the first period to 14% in the second. This increase was accounted for almost entirely by Navy spills at the Tine Oil Company dock. Pollutions resulting from bilge pumping and other discharges from vessels decreased from 16% in the first period to 10% in the second. The improvement

was the direct result of an educational program carried on by the Assistant Captain of the Port at Seattle, and follow-up by regular and comprehensive inspection. Of the above 75 cases, 17 were recommended for further action. In the first 7 days of 1945, 10 cases were reported, mostly involving Navy oil barges.

INSPECTIONS OF WATERFRONT OIL PROPERTIES

Pollutions frequently occurred at oil docks and terminals where vessels were moored, or taking on or discharging oil. It was especially necessary to be vigilant at such docks, oil terminals and oil farms not only for the protection of the vessels but also the shore facilities themselves. At the outbreak of war, the oil industry had probably progressed further along the lines of security and protection than any other major business. It has been said that the expectancy of fire in the usual type of waterfront oil terminal or marketing property was one fire per plant every 5,860 years. The Army decided that oil farms were a Coast Guard responsibility, and so the latter set up systems of inspection. However, various agencies assumed some responsibility, with the result that, in the earlier days and through much of 1943, at least, many oil plants were "inspected to death" by the different agencies. This created a great deal of confusion. For instance, at Boston, oil terminals and farms were a Coast Guard responsibility. The Captain of the Port inspectors checked these properties daily. But then Army inspectors arrived and wondered what the Coast Guard was doing on the properties. The solution seemed to be in joint inspections, which were arranged and carried out, to avoid bothering the oil people too often. Then a third group of inspectors arrived, from the Department of the Interior, and triple inspections were arranged when the third group wished to inspect. Inspections by all these authorities seemed foolish to the authorities themselves, the overlapping of "jurisdiction" appeared inexcusable and confusing to the property owners and agents. The result was such annoyance at being inspected every few days by these people that the owners would have thrown them all out if they could have done so.

BRITISH REGULATIONS

Some British regulations were more stringent than ours, and the Captains of the Port and the British Security Officers cooperated well. Though the British regulations were really recommendations which probably could not have been enforced, Captains of the Port helped the Britishers by exerting influence to have the recommendations acted upon. They carried out their inspections as soon as possible after the British ships entered port.

MARINE INSPECTION AND THE SECURITY OF VESSELS

There were probably no two divisions of the Coast Guard whose functions and problems so closely paralleled each other in many respects as did Port Security and Marine Inspection activities. After all, the primary purpose of Marine Inspection was the security of the ship, its equipment and personnel, but from the standpoint of itself, its equipment and personnel, rather than from outside agents, saboteurs, etc. The Port Security Division existed because it was recognized that the merchant ship was especially vulnerable to damage from accident, carelessness, and sabotage while in port, and the very nature of its wartime cargo in most cases increased the port hazard. In the field of shipping, the regulations for the security of vessels in port represented a major contribution to the war effort. There was close correlation between work of the Marine Inspection Division and the

Port Security forces in the security of ships, especially tankers. The tanker regulations had many provisions pertaining to the construction of the ship itself, to its personnel, and to its operation that were promulgated solely for the safety of the port. The technical considerations remained largely in the Marine Inspection Division as well as some enforcement, but assurance that many of the regulations were observed properly was certainly a part of the responsibility of the Port Security inspectors, Port Security guards, and other personnel. It was desirable that the two divisions avoid duplication, and while there was some, this was largely eliminated as operations progressed.

THE GUARD DETAILS

The principal medium of the Captains of the Port for the checking of factors relating to the security of vessels in port was the inspection program; for the enforcement of the regulations, it was the guard detail. As already stated, these guard details at first were regular Coast Guardsmen, but as time progressed and the Temporary Reservists became an effective factor, they took over the major portion of guard work in most of the ports. It was found that those with linguistic abilities were doubly useful. For instance, at Boston, there were guardsmen who could speak in all 19 different languages, and where possible these were placed in vessels of nationalities where they could speak the sailor's language. This worked well, and it was found that it was much easier to make the regulations known where this was done. The organization of these details, and how they functioned have been covered in Part IV. Some instances of guard detail experience, however, will be of interest.

A COLORED COMPANY AT PORT OF BOSTON

There was one colored company at Boston, with colored officers in charge. Colored boys in some Districts presented a problem. It seemed they were not especially welcome on board ship. If a colored seaman or boatswain's mate were transferred to a ship, he came right back. The Captain of the Port at Boston said to the District Coast Guard Officer, "Give them to me." The COTP had been bothered as almost all were, by the constant transfer of trained men from his District. He felt if nobody wanted the colored boys, his chance of keeping them was good. He organized a company of them, and it turned out to be the best company he had among the regulars. He had fewer disciplinary cases than with the white boys. There was less trouble on the waterfront where they stood their watches. In a peculiar position of telling white men what to do, the COTP told them it was how they told them that counted. He had not one complaint on the attitude of these colored boys, and the plan worked finely.

PICTURES AND SKETCHES

On 25 November, 1943, a man was arrested by the Coast Guard security guard on duty on board the PF-23 tied to the river bank at Memphis, Tennessee. The man was making a sketch of the vessel from the bank. A search of the suspect resulted in finding military ship movement remarks in a notebook. The man was turned over to the FBI. On 27 November, 1943, an alien and native of Argentina was intercepted at Alton Lock and Dam #26 by the security patrol at Alton, Illinois, while taking a photograph of the Lock and Dam. He was taken to St. Louis, and also turned over to the FBI.

EMERGENCY SECURITY GUARD

The Commandant of the Eighth Naval District, having been notified on 22 December, 1943, of a strike at the Houma Boat Works at Houma, Louisiana, headed a request for guards at that Navy

responsibility. Because of a strike of workmen and plant guards at the works, he sent, through the Assistant Captain of the Port, an adequate security guard which remained on duty until 30 December, 1943, when the plant resumed operations. No difficulty developed.

RIOT UPON RESTRICTION OF FRENCH TANKER CREW

On 9 April, 1944, Customs guards stationed at the Shell Oil dock at Sewarn, New Jersey, requested assistance from the Perth Amboy Patrol Base of the Coast Guard to prevent crew members of the French armed tanker BOURGOGNE from leaving the vessel in violation of restrictions. A small Coast Guard detail was thereupon assigned to the area, but was unsuccessful in holding the crew on board. Reinforcements, however, arriving shortly afterward, succeeded in reestablishing control of the situation. The riot, according to the master, was precipitated when crew members who had not been ashore for several months were denied permission to leave the vessel after having completed all necessary work. Their resentment at the restrictions was intensified when crew members of a British ship tied up nearby were permitted to leave their ship almost immediately after docking.

ADMIRAL CHALKER STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY

The importance of security of vessels in port and of waterfront facilities was stressed by Admiral Chalker in February, 1945, when he gave some interesting figures. He said: "I am sure that all of you are keenly aware of how tremendously important it is to prevent catastrophes in American ports which would impede the steady flow of men and supplies abroad — so essential to the war effort. Some conception of the magnitude of our task may be gained by analyzing the fact that to launch the invasion against the tiny island of Iwo there passed through our ports enough fuel oil to make a 238-mile long train of tank cars of 20,000 gallons each, enough gasoline to run 30,730 automobiles for a full year; enough lubricating oil for one complete oil change for 466,000 automobiles; enough food to feed a city the size of Columbus, Ohio, for 30 days; and enough ammunition, bombs, shells, rockets, torpedoes, and cartridges to fill 480 cars." These figures, imposing as they are, were for only one operation, and some conception of the total amount of traffic for the entire war effort can be had, with this as a basis. One of the most important duties of the Captain of the Port was safety of the vessels which transported these tremendous amounts of material, and the record of this activity throughout or ports is mute testimony of the efficiency with which this was carried out.

SECTION IX

PLANT GUARDS

A SPECIAL NEED ARISES

The Navy recognized a special need for military control of plant guards employed at shipyards and other facilities having Navy and Coast Guard contracts. There was great danger of sabotage and the activity of subversive agents in virtually every shipyard and other facility in waterfront areas devoted to such contracts. Under the ordinary system it would have been relatively simple for enemy agents to effect destruction of such plants which were vital to the war effort. Closer military control and authority for the plant guards at these facilities became urgent. At first, it was planned to have plant guards made Federal Deputy Marshals, but this was turned down by the Attorney General. The Army counterpart of these guards was Auxiliary Military Police. It was decided to tie these men in with the Coast Guard, but possibly it is accurate to

say that, of all Coast Guardsmen, these plant guards who became known as Coast Guard Police, were the least closely identified with the Coast Guard of any Coast Guard personnel. To obtain control, the Navy utilized the provisions of the Auxiliary Act as amended by Congress June, 1942, permitting temporary enrollment in the Coast Guard Reserve on a full or part time basis without military pay. At first, the Attorney General's office refused to consider Coast Guard Police as members of the Coast Guard and afforded them no legal backing. This was later remedied.

NO PART OF
PORT SECURITY FORCES

It should be understood that these Coast Guard Police did not operate under the Captain of the Port, nor were they

part of the regular Port Security forces. Their work was distinct, yet because of their primary duty of protecting certain properties in our ports, and sometimes inland, Port Security can hardly be adequately covered without including mention of this unusual branch of the Coast Guard.

ENROLLMENT OF
COAST GUARD POLICE

On August 4, 1942, only two or three weeks after enrollment for the Temporary Reserve began, the Commandant,

with approval of the Secretary of the Navy, authorized enrollment of Coast Guard Police into the Temporary Reserve. This authorized enrollment of the civilian protective forces at shipyards and other manufacturing plants with Navy and Coast Guard contracts to the extent considered necessary to provide adequate military protection. These men were not required to take the usual physical examination, but were required to be physically fit and qualified for their duties. They were enrolled for the duration, or for such lesser periods as might be agreed upon. They were enrolled as Chief Boatswain's Mates (CBM), except for supervisory officers who sometimes were enrolled as Boatswains and Chief Boatswains, to give them proper supervisory authority. They were not subject to transfer, and were disenrolled upon changing the place of their employment. They continued to perform the duties for which they were employed by the yard or plant, and continued to receive compensation as usual from their firms, but no pay or allowance from the Coast Guard other than uniforms.

ADMINISTRATION OF
COAST GUARD POLICE
UNDER THE NAVY

The administration of Coast Guard Police was entirely under the Navy. This was logical, for this cooperative relationship was at

plants primarily having Navy contracts, and the guards were chiefly concerned in guarding Navy property or property vitally needed by the Navy. Thus, the Coast Guard acted simply as the enrolling agency, all actual control and jurisdiction being vested in the Naval District Security Officer. The Navy assumed investigative jurisdiction for guards engaged in plant security work.

TRAINING OF GUARDS

The enrolled plant guards took a short but intensive training course, usually

running for about 9 weeks. Training was done by the Navy except in the Thirteenth District where it was done by the Coast Guard until 20 November, 1943, when the Navy took it over. Subjects included Americanism, safety, duty and conduct of guards and watchmen, and military etiquette.

PROGRESS IN
ENROLLMENT

Enrollment of plant guards got under way in August, 1942, but it progressed faster in some Districts

than in others. For instance, there was no apparent

move to utilize this force at New Orleans until 25 May, 1944. Guards shifted their places and type of employment frequently, requiring a considerable turnover of men in all Districts, since disenrollment was required upon a guard being separated from his original place of employment. After guards reached a certain number, this turnover, with disenrollment and enrollment, kept the total enrollment about static. In all Districts, the number of Temporary Reserve plant guards reached the peak about 30 June, 1943, when there were the following:

Commissioned Officers	80
Chief Warrant and Warrant Officers	842
Enlisted Men	<u>23,911</u>
	24,863

As plants completed their contracts, and were dropped from the Navy Responsibility Lists, the plant guards were disenrolled, and most of this was accomplished by mid-1944.

DISENROLLMENT OF ALL
COAST GUARD POLICE

The number of plants completing Navy and Coast Guard contracts accelerated rapidly in the early part of 1944.

In March, 1944, the Chief of Naval Operations directed the abandonment of the Coast Guard Police Temporary Reserve program, and as each plant was examined and found satisfactory, the District Coast Guard Officer was requested to disenroll the guards at the respective plants. In most Districts, this was followed by mass disenrollments. By 30 June, 1944, the number of Coast Guard Police had been reduced to 2,736. It was found that, in most cases, the plant managements were reluctant to dispense with a system which had functioned so admirably.

SECTION I
COAST GUARD PILOTS

FIRST DIRECTIVE ON
CONTROL OF PILOTS

On 18 August, 1942, the Secretary of the Navy wrote the Commandant of the Coast Guard as follows on the control of coastal and State Pilots, and pilotage fees;

"1. The Navy Department is now primarily responsible for the safety of merchant shipping and in consequence thereof requires vessels, foreign and domestic, to use interior waters to a greater extent than is the practice in peacetime. Such action requires the vessels involved to avail themselves of the services of coastal and State pilots, with consequent increased pilotage fees, a greater need for additional pilots, increased responsibility and greater efficiency on the part of pilots, and more strict federal control of pilots and piloting.

"2. Complaints have been filed with the Navy Department involving increased pilotage fees, delays in movement of vessels, and other matters which embrace the general subject of pilots and pilotage in relation to the war effort. Recently, the Cape Cod Canal and the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal were blocked by vessels sunk while in charge of pilots, thus seriously interfering with the safe and expeditious movement of ships and cargoes.

"3. There apparently is no uniform plan or procedure for attempting the solution of these problems in the various ports, harbors, and connecting waters along the coasts of the United States. It is therefore directed, in the interest of obtaining the maximum war effort, that the Commandant of the Coast Guard undertake a study of such problems, determine proper procedures, and take appropriate action to control, direct and supervise the piloting of vessels, the fixing of rates where desirable, and the handling of all other matters necessary for a uniform and efficient procedure in the piloting of vessels along the coasts of continental United States and the interior waters thereof. In conducting such study, the Commandant of the Coast Guard is authorized to confer with appropriate federal and non-federal agencies.

"4. If legislation or an Executive Order is necessary to obtain these ends, the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall initiate action to secure the same."

The Commandant initiated a careful and comprehensive study on which a report was prepared, presenting a summary of the principal features of pilotage in the territorial waters of the United States and indicating measures necessary to bring about a uniform and efficient control of pilotage. This was dated November, 1942.

SIX DISTINCT
CLASSES OF PILOTS

The report brought out that there were six distinct classes of pilots operating in the United States.

- (a) Pilots operating under State laws.
(Members of 32 pilot groups forming the American Pilots Association; State-licensed pilots not members of the association who operated at small ports. Most of the above held Federal as well as State licenses).

- (b) Federally licensed pilots not members of vessels crews operating in coastal waters.
- (c) Federally licensed pilots who were members of vessels' crews - Coastwise.
- (d) Federally licensed pilots who were members of vessels' crews - Great Lakes, Bays, Sounds and Rivers.
(Usually part of vessels' complement).
- (e) Docking pilots
(More ship-handling than piloting; usually master of one of the tugs, but acted as an employee of the piloted vessel rather than of the towboat company).
- (f) Accredited Pilots
(As a war measure it was necessary for the Coast Guard to insist that in certain important areas vessels move only under the direction of an "accredited pilot." Cape Cod Canal was an example. The accrediting of a pilot by the Coast Guard went a step beyond the issuance of a pilot's license and indicated that the holder was not only professionally capable, but also that his background had been investigated and that he was physically qualified and within certain age limits).

The agencies of the Federal Government concerned directly or indirectly with pilotage, through employment of or furnishing of pilots, were;

Navy Department
Convoy and Routing Section
Naval Transportation Service
Naval vessels
Coast Guard vessels
Department of Justice
Department of the Interior
War Department
Army Transportation Service
Corps of Engineers, Panama Canal
War Shipping Administration
Maritime Commission
Office of Defense Transportation
Inland Waterways Corporation

STATE PILOT ASSOCIATIONS After summarizing Federal and state legislation on pilotage, the report went on to describe the State pilot associations. It was pointed out that 90% of state pilots belonged to pilot associations. Each of these associations maintained a central office which was in constant touch with the pilot boat and arranged for the rotation of pilots. An agent was usually employed to care for office routine. With a limited membership, the associations enjoyed what might be called monopoly rights in return for service to the State, which was usually maintained at a high standard. The property of the associations such as pilot vessels, tenders, supplies, etc., was owned jointly by the members each of whom subscribed his share of stock. New members were generally recruited through the apprentice system, except on the West Coast. The American Pilots Association was founded in 1884 as a governing body to conduct negotiations between groups, to effect uniformity and for mutual protection. Nearly all state pilot associations were members. In 1942, there were 32 member associations, with a total of 545 pilots and 33 apprentices. The State pilot system had stood the test of time, but it was found that the rotation system was a weakness in wartime.

FEDERALLY
LICENSED PILOTS

The Federally licensed pilots also operated in

groups, and in 1942 the total number of such pilots was 942. While the States controlled pilotage of American and foreign vessels under registry, every coastwise seagoing vessel (with few exceptions such as fishing vessels) on inland waters and every commercial vessel above 15 gross tons on the Great Lakes, Bays, Sounds, and Rivers were required to be under control of a Federally licensed pilot licensed for the waters in which his vessel ran. Requirements physically and professionally were strict. Most coastwise and intercoastal steamship lines required their masters and mates to hold pilotage endorsements on their licenses, and during the war emergency, many went ashore and joined pilot groups of Federally licensed pilots. This system was also time tested and satisfactory.

ADMIRAL LAND'S
RECOMMENDATIONS

Admiral E. S. Land of the War Shipping Administration was conferred with on the matter of pilotage, and in

a letter dated 30 October, 1942, he made these recommendations:

1. That all pilots, except ships' officers actually serving aboard a vessel, who may from such service be assumed to be accredited, be accredited by the Coast Guard.
2. Existing rates (except as noted in letter) be accepted for the present.
3. Rates of 50% of commercial rate to be established for pilotage of all vessels entering port for shelter (chiefly from enemy action).
4. Periodical report of earnings of each association to be submitted to the Coast Guard and pilotage fees to be reviewed periodically.
5. That rates for pilotage by independent Federally-licensed pilots who are not serving as officers of vessels, be subject to review by an appropriate Government agency or representative, with the idea of keeping these rates at a reasonable level.
6. A pool of pilots for Alaskan service to be established and means for relief, if practicable, provided at Cape Spencer so as to eliminate through or complete round trips by pilots.
7. Every effort to be made to preserve existing pilotage associations to the end that they may resume after the war their operations as at present, and that so far as practicable in any control exercised by the Navy and the Coast Guard, the services of various qualified officers and members of the pilots' organization be utilized.
8. Should it be decided to enroll pilots as members of the Navy or Coast Guard, that it be made clear that such members in rendering pilot service do not supersede the authority of the Master who remains always in command of and responsible for the vessel.

OTHER MATTERS LEADING
TO MILITARY CONTROL

These serious considerations of the pilotage problem were influenced by several occurrences which emphasized the necessity for gearing pilotage to the machinery of war. On 1 May, 1942, a large, heavily laden motor vessel collided with the Pennsylvania Railroad bridge on the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal and had to be grounded. This canal probably offered more hazards to the navigation of seagoing vessels than any other in the United States. The interaction between vessels and bank suction was erratic in effect, there was a series of bridges with bridge piers close to the

channel, and all bridges but one were at bends in the channel. The vessel which collided had failed to respond to the helm in time to avoid trouble. Traffic in the canal was delayed for several hours. There followed, on 28 June, 1942, another serious accident. The large collier STEPHEN JONES grounded in the Cape Cod Canal, blocking the passageway for large vessels for a number of days. The vessel split and sank, and the wreckage was finally dynamited to clear the channel. The final event came on 28 July, 1942, when a large steam vessel in the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal collided with the Chesapeake City bridge doing \$230,000 damage to the vessel and the \$469,000 bridge was completely destroyed. The blocking of the canal this time caused immediate steps to be taken to provide safer and better facilities for ship movements in the canal. The Coast Guard, under the Navy, had authority to control movements of vessels in territorial waters, and this authority was invoked in waters of the Cape Cod Canal. It was then mandatory that all United States vessels of over 100 tons and all foreign vessels carry accredited pilots while in these waters. This was a definite step toward military control of pilots. By 1 October, 1942, there were about 150 Federally licensed accredited pilots for the Cape Cod Canal. Most were on regular canal runs, but about 30 were ashore for use as needed.

PILOTAGE IN WARTIME

Pilots are charged with responsibility for safe navigation of vessels requiring pilotage from the time of leaving the open waters off a port until the vessel has returned to those open waters. Most associations owned one or more pilot boats, generally schooners, which lay off the entrances with pilots available for those who might need them. During wartime, pilot assignments are something of a cross between duties of their peacetime profession and those imposed upon them by the stresses and needs of war. In earlier wars there were fewer involvements with foreign powers, less complicated logistics, and considerably more freedom of action than developed in World War II. In the recent emergency, the mechanics of war became more technical and created a situation far more complicated than ever before. Practically all lines of action, and particularly piloting, had to adhere more strictly to military procedures.

COMMANDANT'S DIRECTIVE
OF 4 DECEMBER, 1942

It has been shown that the Secretary of the Navy, on 18 August, 1942, authorized the Coast Guard to assume complete military control of the State pilots of America. The original report on pilotage was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on 27 November, 1942, and had been previously approved by those government agencies concerned with pilotage and accepted by all the State pilot associations. The first directive was dated 4 December, 1942, signed by the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and directed to all District Coast Guard Officers. It read in part: "It is intended that each association of state-licensed pilots operate as a group of temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve with the present president of the group acting for the duration as the Senior Coast Guard Officer attached, and who will be directly responsible to the District Coast Guard Officer for the efficient operation of that pilot group." In some cases geographical location made it desirable for the Senior Coast Guard Officer of the pilot group to work directly under the Captain of the Port. It was not expected that any radical changes in the piloting procedure would be indicated in most cases. It was decided that the rotary system of assignment would not be rigidly adhered to, and that the Senior Pilot should assign to the most competent officers the most difficult tasks. This plan provided a means of operational control, keeping

the units intact for the duration, and giving them military authority. It provided assurance that the pilots would arrive without delay on board the vessel to be piloted, and that he was militarily responsible for the vital war information daily entrusted to him.

PILOTS ENROLLED IN TEMPORARY RESERVE

As a result of the above directive, pilots were sworn into the Temporary Reserve at Boston on 11 December, 1942, at New York on 15 December, and enrollments in other ports where State pilots operated were made about simultaneously. They were commissioned lieutenant commanders, lieutenants, and lieutenants junior grade, for the most part. The president of each Pilots Association was enrolled one day earlier than the others in his group to resolve any question of seniority. The president of the American Pilots Association, upon enrollment in the Temporary Reserve, was assigned to Headquarters to head the entire piloting activity.

THE FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT DIRECTIVE

In a directive issued 23 December, 1942, and immediately published through Notice to Mariners, by the District Coast Guard Officer, First Naval District, the following was stated:

"PORTS OF PORTLAND, BOSTON, AND CAPE COD CANAL PILOTAGE

"State pilots for the ports of Portland, Maine, Boston and Cape Cod Canal, Massachusetts, respectively, are now members of the Coast Guard Reserve without pay from the United States. This step is in the interest of port security, the safeguarding of vital war information, and the coordination of the existing state pilot system in accordance with wartime requirements.

"Pilotage will continue as before. While actually piloting the vessel, the pilot is still acting as a state pilot, rather than as a Coast Guard officer. The state pilot's relationship to the master or commanding officer, the vessel and the owner remains as established in maritime law. There is no substitution of command by reason of the membership of the pilot in the Coast Guard Reserve. Masters and commanding officers are still responsible for the navigation of their vessels and may relieve or supersede the pilot whenever in their judgment it is necessary, as heretofore. The United States is still not responsible for any negligence of the pilot.

"The pilot is still entitled to his fees as prescribed by the State and these fees will be collected in the usual manner."

The same applied to all Districts, so that pilots were uniformly operating in the United States territorial waters.

COORDINATION WITH OTHER OFFICES

Because of the pilots' knowledge of their harbor areas and their special skills in handling vessels in such waters, much responsibility for the safety of vessels and the security of the ports was placed in their hands. Due to statutory and wartime regulations, security measures were, in the main, entrusted to three coordinated offices, (a) the Captain of the Port, (b) the Port Director (Navy), and (c) the Pilot Command. The Pilot Command worked in close coordination with the other offices and maintained special liaison with the Port Director's office, obtained convoy lists, and sat in at convoy conferences.

GENERAL OPERATIONS BY THE PILOTS


The story of the pilots in one port might be the story of all, except insofar as local conditions and problems altered the details of their operations. At some East Coast and Gulf ports, vessels entering or leaving were exposed to submarine attack while lying to to take aboard or drop a pilot. Coast Guard picket boats were placed on duty at certain of those points to put on board or take off pilots, and the transfer was accomplished while the vessel was making full speed, thus decreasing the danger of attack. Most piloting in our wartime shipping ports was "run-of the mill" business for these officers, and there were very few outstanding incidents in which they were involved. Possibly the greatest problems were at New York and Boston, the first and second wartime shipping ports of the United States, respectively, in volume of such shipping. Piloting at Cape Cod Canal, where sometimes as many as a hundred ships transited the waters in a day, also presented special problems. A brief resume of pilot activities at those places will serve to indicate general pilot experience, which was similar but on a smaller scale in other ports of the United States.

THE GENERAL SCOPE OF PILOT OPERATIONS


In general, it may be said that the activities of the pilots included the following, or slight variations as local conditions demanded.

- (a) General pilot service for vessels entering and leaving port.
 - (b) Free pilot service to public vessels of certain classifications.
 - (c) Transported; (1) personnel between examination vessels, (2) coastwise pilots from anchorage to dock, (3) coastwise pilots requiring removal and transportation, and (4) compass adjusters.
 - (d) Handled vessels for compass adjusters, and for degaussing range tests of new or overhauled merchant ships.
 - (e) Piloted ships seeking shelter on Navy or Coast Guard orders due to enemy action or other causes off-shore.
 - (f) Informed pleasure and fishing craft of rules, regulations and procedures on leaving or entering port.
 - (g) Kept informed of Army and Navy underwater installations, and protected them by keeping to swept channels.
 - (h) Carried convoy instructions from Port Director's office to designated ships due to sail, and to some vessels in transit. Carried degaussing sheets for testing degaussing system of each vessel entering or leaving port, and delivered sheets as necessary to the degaussing range. Picked up crew lists for the Captain of the Port when vessels sailed unexpectedly, as well as papers relating to changes in crew.
- The pilot boats, enrolled in the Coast Guard Reserve, were manned by the Coast Guard, and transportation to and from vessels was provided. As an example of piloting activity, 4 regular pilots at Portland, Maine, handled 1,407 piloting assignments during their period of enrollment; 24 pilots at Boston (aided by a few others for a short period) completed an estimated 15,000 assignments, representing about 231,000,000 tons of shipping involving about 7,000 convoy vessels; 16 pilots at Cape Cod Canal often piloted 100 vessels

RESTRICTED



A COAST GUARD PILOT
BOARDS A VESSEL FROM AN ICE COVERED DECK
TO TAKE THE SHIP INTO NEW YORK



THE PILOT GUIDES HIS VESSEL SAFELY TO HER ANCHORAGE
IN UPPER NEW YORK HARBOR

a day through the waterway; and 14 Hell Gate pilots at New York (increased for a part of the time to 20) from January, 1942 to May, 1945, took 14,539 vessels through the treacherous Hell Gate.

TWENTY-FOUR PILOTS
FOR FORTY VESSELS

In the Port of Boston, the pilot complement was 24 in peacetime. Despite the fact that Boston became the second port of the United States in volume of wartime shipping, this number operated for the duration except for a very short period when 7 additional pilots were "borrowed." One of the outstanding achievements of these pilots was the efficient handling of convoys leaving the harbor. While at times, more than 24 pilots would have been convenient, a surplus at other times would have been undesirable. Except for the brief period mentioned, the number remained 24, and they carried any extra load that was required. These officers at times were faced with the necessity of piloting 40 vessels making up in convoy. The problem was solved in the following manner. Twenty-four vessels moving first each had a pilot. When the first vessel had been taken to a point where a pilot was no longer necessary, a Coast Guard picket boat removed him, picked up the second and third pilots, and took them back to the 25th, 26th and 27th ships which had not, at that time, been called upon to move. This process was followed until all vessels had been provided with pilots. Vessels at Boston were moved under all kinds of tide, current, and wind conditions, which was not true in many major ports.

PILOTAGE AT
CAPE COD CANAL

Use of the 8-mile Cape Cod Canal at the base of Cape Cod avoided steaming an additional 75 miles around the cape in waters which presented many dangers. Currents through the Canal usually average at strength $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 knots and the local knowledge of pilots is essential in transiting this waterway. During the period of active wartime shipping, it was not unusual for a convoy of 100 vessels to pass through the Canal. There were 16 Coast Guard pilots at the Canal, whose duties differed somewhat from those at regular ports in that their sole duty was piloting vessels through the Canal. They had no other responsibilities.

TWO PILOT GROUPS
AT NEW YORK

New York, the leading wartime shipping port, provided great activity for the Coast Guard pilots. Two pilot groups (a) the New York pilots numbering 108, and (b) the Hell Gate pilots totaling 14 (later 20), handled pilotage in the New York area. Work of the Hell Gate pilots was specialized and is specially mentioned.

THE NEW YORK
PILOT COMMAND

The New York Pilot Command Office was set up at State Street, New York, with a subsidiary office under the Navy Port Director as an aid to the main office. The subsidiary office acted as liaison between the Port Director and the central office of the Command on one hand, and the District Coast Guard Officer on the other. This aided efficient handling of inbound and outgoing convoys and independent ships. Duties included compiling and forwarding information on ship movements to other interested military agencies in the area. It also handled matters pertaining to identification of inbound craft including setting up of secret signals and harbor entrance hoists for all vessels. The New York (Sandy Hook) pilots rotated assignments generally, through pilots with special skills in handling vessels laden with high explosives or troops were given those assignments. Pilots were allotted to the pilot station at least 12 hours in advance of expected convoy arrivals

and departures. These pilots owned and operated 3 large pilot boats and 5 launches, all CGR vessels. One pilot boat was always stationed a few miles off Sandy Hook where it could command a clear view of all vessels approaching New York Lower Bay. The station was in exposed water, and boarding and removal of pilots was often accomplished under the most adverse conditions of weather and sea.

COOPERATION WITH OTHER
OFFICES AND ACTIVITIES

In order to promote the smooth movement of all vessels in and out of convoy, and prevent as far as possible waste time and motion, the Pilot Command cooperated fully with other agencies. Such cooperation is indicated briefly:

(a) The Pilot Command maintained a secret schedule of estimated time of convoy arrivals and departures for the ensuing 4 days. The Plotting Room kept close check on convoy positions. Conflicts in movements were cleared and corrected with the office of Commander Eastern Sea Frontier.

(b) The Merchant Marine Hearing Unit received a similar listing to enable boarding well in advance of convoy sailings.

(c) The DCGO was notified of expected arrivals of Coast Guard transports and escorts operating for the Navy Transportation Service, and Coast Guard personnel arriving from overseas as passengers for hospitalization or redistribution.

(d) Navy Operations, Overseas Transportation, the pilot coordinator at Ambrose, and Army Port of Embarkation were contacted when troop transports were to arrive, to facilitate safe and rapid berthing.

(e) Army and Navy officers in transports were given debarkation orders for casualties, troops, and prisoners of war through pilots at Ambrose.

(f) Information on independent vessels arriving or leaving on short notice was given the Harbor Entrance Control Post for prompt and safe clearance.

(g) Coast Guard Communications was given reference calls and line numbers for all Coast Guard vessels arriving or leaving, thus enabling the Code Board to inform Operations of ship movements where operations were under Navy.

(h) The Port Director Petroleum Coordinator and the Ships Arrival offices were advised of permitted movements of tankers on basis of tidal conditions, draft, and availability of special pilots and tugs. Port Director Convoy and Routing was assisted in planning instruction of arriving vessels to turn back to sea without entering, thus saving time in port awaiting another convoy. Some masters traveling overland for instructions were placed in pilot boats where they could meet their vessels and go immediately to sea.

(i) The Pilot Command cooperated with the Advance Base Training School, allowing officers to accompany pilots and observe convoy conditions and operation.

GENERAL PROCEDURE
AT NEW YORK

Three or four days before arrival of an inbound convoy, the Pilot Command listed all vessels and escorts from code dispatches from overseas, and assigned identification signals. The master of each vessel was the only other person with this information, having received it at his foreign port of departure. A "48-hour sheet" with this information, made out in triplicate, was cut into slips which were placed in three envelopes

for each vessel to be carried by each of the three launches transporting pilots. Thus, each pilot was sure to have complete information for every vessel in convoy, which expedited identification, boarding, and berthing or anchoring. Instructions from the Ships Arrival Office for berthing and anchoring were handled the same way. When the Pilot Command received information on convoy arrivals, pilots were notified, given the necessary information, and transported to the Pilot Station to await arrivals. To meet unexpected needs, an excess of 10 pilots was always maintained. Armed with all required information, the pilots were taken by launch to their vessels which they boarded and directed up the channel to quarantine, and eventually to berth or anchorage. Information on coastal arrivals was assembled daily, and handled in the same manner. The Command received information on outgoing convoys the day before departure. The time schedule informed the pilots where each ship was located, its time to get under way, and the time for passing through the gate and various points in the channel. A Pilot Command representative attended the Convoy Conference. Two hours before sailing time the pilot arrived, checked identification signals and hoist, and saw that all was ready. The ship got underway strictly on time, and the pilot directed the vessel and regulated speed to conform with time schedules, reaching convoy stations about 2 hours after leaving.

HELL GATE

The second group of pilots at New York, who remained an entity because of their highly specialized work, consisted of those making a specialty of piloting through Hell Gate, East River. The 16-mile-long East River is really a tidal channel. This treacherous passage, and Hell Gate which is its most dangerous part, have long been recognized as the biggest water traffic problem in New York waters. It is complicated by a series of several abrupt turns which, added together, result in some of the worst tidal currents navigators and pilots have to face anywhere. Currents at places reach 4.6 to 5.2 knots, there are two turns of about 90° each in less than a mile, Hell Gate at its narrowest is but 500 feet from bank to bank, and there are boilers, and blind spots due to limited visibility. At ebb tide, currents from the Harlem River join those from Long Island Sound to form whirlpools and suction points that can spin a good-sized vessel out of control and carry her onto jagged rocks that abound in the area. Yet, in the interest of saving ships and lives, the Navy decided that the river was a must as a connecting link along the inland waterways to the east. The maneuvering of a heavy ship through these waters demanded exacting skill and steel-steady nerves. The tremendous volume of waterborne traffic to come was to tax the abilities of these Hell Gate Pilots to the utmost as they made their 22 changes of course in the 16-mile run.

THE HELL GATE PILOT COMMAND

The burden of responsibility for this gigantic task was assumed by the 14 Hell Gate pilots who had spent their lives studying and mastering the waters of the East River and Hell Gate. However, eventually, the great amount of shipping required the addition, for the duration of the war, of 6 other men who held East River pilot licenses. Infrequently, some Sandy Hook pilots were borrowed at times of unusually heavy traffic. The pilots operated from the City Island Coast Guard Base, working day and night to expedite the movement of ships and materials of war to the fighting fronts. This smooth functioning, efficient organization with two pilot boats maintained an administrative force for logistical support with other Coast Guard activities, the Navy Port Director, and other associated organizations.

THE HELL GATE WARNING SYSTEM

The swirling currents and restricted visibility together with heavy traffic created a serious hazard at Hell Gate. To facilitate safe pilotage through these waters a traffic warning system was established. The principal components were a lookout on Triborough Bridge and a light control tower on the Hell Gate Bridge with flashing warning lights visible from both the east and west approaches to Hell Gate. There was also a loud-speaker system, and patrol boats of the Harbor Patrol Fleet were radio-equipped for communication with the control tower. The flashing lights in the control tower, operated by Coast Guard personnel, provided approaching vessels with an initial warning in the event of heavy traffic ahead barred from vision by abrupt turns. The loud-speaker system enabled pilots to know the exact type, speed and position of unseen approaching vessels, and they relied upon this information for formulating and executing a course without endangering their ships. Supplementing this were two patrol boats about two miles each side of the gate. In case of accident or traffic tie-up, these boats warned approaching craft and harbor shipping authorities via radio through the Captain of the Port, thus preventing large vessels from continuing into the narrow, dangerous waters and finding the passage blocked, with consequent danger of collision.

OTHER MATTERS CONCERNING OPERATION

Pilots boarded innumerable vessels in which they had never before set foot, with no previous knowledge of their particular crankiness of helm, or sluggishness in response to engine signals, and often language barriers preventing conversation. Many vessels of over 20,000 tons displacement transited Hell Gate. Had these grounded or sunk, the passage would have been effectively blocked, forcing vessels to use the outside submarine-infested waters. At one time, during a peak of traffic, 37 ships passed through Hell Gate in 30 minutes. With slack water lasting four to eight minutes, the first ship through experienced a head tide while the last ship had a fair tide. The average number of ships moving through the Gate on any given tide was about 20. Between 1 January, 1942 and 31 May, 1945, the Hell Gate pilots took 14,539 vessels through these waters without loss of a single ship, only a very few minor accidents, and no serious accident. A large number of vessels carried sufficient ammunition to completely destroy the metropolis and its millions of people. The successful accomplishment of the wartime assignments of these temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve is a highlight in Coast Guard wartime annals, and these officers deserve the highest credit for their contribution toward winning the war.

PILOTING IN OTHER DISTRICTS

Pilot activity in most other Naval Districts followed, in general, the organization and operation already outlined, and a detailed account of the specific activities would accomplish little. However, the Ninth District experience varied somewhat. Pilots were enrolled in the Temporary Reserve in the Great Lakes area earlier than in other Districts. This was due to the general practice, begun in the summer of 1942, of enrolling officers of Great Lakes vessels, including pilots. By November, 1942, letters of commendation had been sent to 10 Great Lakes pilots who had piloted many special Navy boats from Chicago to the Straits of Mackinac. Their competent work prevented accidents, loss of time, and expedited the transfer of these vessels. The wartime work of the Lakes pilots was vital but, as in most areas, unspectacular. Their success lay in the lack of incidents, which was true of most activities related to Port Security. The most important duty of the District Coast Guard Officer at

St. Louis was the safe and expeditious delivery of 2,388 Navy and Army vessels to tide water. These were built on the various navigable rivers of the District, and upon the Great Lakes. Total tonnage of these vessels was 2,053,752. The distance transited on the District's rivers was 3,359,216 vessel-miles. Pilotage was highly important, and 49 licensed river pilots were commissioned and 43 assistant river pilots enlisted in the Coast Guard Temporary Reserve. Some of these craft traveled 2,600 miles from their builders' yards to salt water, indicating the magnitude of the task of these officers. Pilots operated as members of the Temporary Reserve in all principal West Coast ports. No special data are on record, nor accounts of unusual incidents or problems. In the Thirteenth Naval District there was some difficulty in December, 1942, when the Coast Guard enrolled the pilots, over contracts between the pilots and the Army Transport Service, and delays resulted.

TERMINATION

As of 30 June, 1945, there were 657 State pilots enrolled in the Temporary Reserve, and 60 pilot boats were serving as CGR vessels. These pilots, in the fiscal year ended on that date, handled approximately 120,000 piloting assignments in the 39 ports and pilot routes along the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific coasts, without an accident of serious proportions, and with only a negligible number of minor groundings, notwithstanding the large volume of shipping involved. Pilots continued on duty throughout the Fall of 1945, but disenrollments began on 14 November, and on 30 November all pilots were or had been disenrolled, and resumed their piloting on a civilian basis. Disenrollment usually was accompanied by a mastering out ceremony, with presentation of letters of appreciation and certificates. This ended active duty for a colorful division of the wartime Coast Guard which had performed its duties with marked efficiency and loyalty.

APPRECIATION BY THE CHIEF PERSONNEL OFFICER

Shortly after disenrollment of the pilots, the Chief Personnel Officer of the Coast Guard sent on 19 December, 1945, a letter of appreciation to Captain John Snyder Delano, USCGR(T), Special Assistant on Pilot Control, and in charge of the entire pilot activity in United States ports. Not only was it a tribute to Captain Delano, but also an indirect tribute to the pilots and their entire wartime activity. It read, in part: "Upon the conclusion of your tour of duty with the United States Coast Guard, I would like to express to you my personal appreciation for the outstanding manner in which you discharged the duties associated with the multifarious tasks assigned you. The whole-hearted cooperation which you inspired on the parts of the pilots in all the ports of this country stands as a testimonial to your ability as an organizer and leader among men. Your knowledge of the problems of the pilots as well as your understanding of the military necessities imposed by a state of war enabled you to perform a unique function in your assignment as Special Assistant on Pilot Control. The outstanding record of the pilots and their great contribution to the victory of the Allies in World War II is in keeping with the highest traditions of loyalty and duty upheld by the United States Coast Guard." For this part in the Coast Guard's war effort, Captain Delano was awarded the Legion of Merit, the only temporary member of the Coast Guard Reserve to be so honored.

SECTION XI

BOARDING

THE BOARDING ON INCOMING VESSELS

Vessels other than Naval vessels entering our major

ports were identified, boarded, and examined by Coast Guard Boarding Officers or boarding parties in order to be satisfied of the innocent character of all inbound vessels. These boarding officers were alert for any and all violations, regardless of the specific purposes for which the vessel was boarded. Boarding of vessels for the enforcement of the Navigation, Steamboat Inspection and Motorboat Laws and the enforcement of Customs Laws is a regular peacetime function of the Coast Guard. In wartime, there were additional duties concerning the security of the port and vessels therein, and the necessity of close examination of ships, cargo, crew and equipment.

WHAT THE BOARDING OFFICERS LOOKED FOR

Because violations of traffic and navigation laws, or other regulations directed by the Captain of the Port or the Navy Department, tended to jeopardize the safety of the port and the shipping therein, it was necessary for the Boarding Officer to call the master's attention to such situations, and to report serious violations and cases of non-compliance. The Boarding Officer paid particular attention to observing anything of a suspicious nature, especially in incoming vessels, such as the appearance of the ship being more heavily loaded than the alleged cargo would seem to call for, an unusually large crew, suspicious actions of officers and crew, or men of nationality apparently different from that called for by the ship's papers. Any suspicions were immediately reported. Obviously, these Boarding Officers and accompanying men were required to be dignified, courteous, self-restrained, observant and tactful. All vessels were carefully identified by their four-flag international call, monthly three-flag hoist, or special numeral hoist, or by blinker or voice. Recorded also, were the nationality of the vessel, the rig, name or other identifying information. Upon boarding, the Boarding officer checked the vessel's documents and informed the master of traffic regulations, gate signal, and other special orders. Boarding Officers were usually accompanied by a detail for radio sealing, since all radio transmitters had to be properly sealed while in port, and for armament inspection. Excepted from regular examination were incoming vessels of a coastwise nature on a regular coastwise run, or local vessels with which the Boarding Officers were familiar. However, boarding was done if the Boarding Officer knew of any reason to make that advisable. Unboarded vessels, however, had special instructions communicated to them.

FISHING VESSELS

Fishing vessels habitually using the port were recognized and, except in the event of something suspicious, Boarding Officers were not required to board them in outer waters, but all fishing vessels incoming and outgoing were boarded inside by a detail under direction of the Boarding Officer. The vessel was inspected thoroughly as to cargo, fuel and crew as well as for radio sealing. The detail was required to examine identification cards of the master and crew, and to prepare a list of the crew to be signed by the master. The amount of food and fuel on board the vessel was also determined and recorded, and compared with similar records made at the time the vessel departed from port to discover whether any fishing vessels were allegedly using excessive quantities of such items. This check was made to prevent, or to detect the possibility of, transfer of such fuel and food to enemy ships. Reports on all boardings were prepared daily and submitted to the Captain of the Port. In outlying harbors and small ports, fishing vessels were checked by harbor patrol craft, since maintenance of boarding officers at such places was impracticable.

BOARDING STATIONS

Boarding Officers were on duty at all times at the principal ports. In most cases, they used Examination Vessels as headquarters, since such vessels were moored off the outer entrances to the ports, and in a convenient location for intercepting all incoming ships. In some ports, an inner station was used in addition. For instance, at Boston, boarding operations were conducted from the Outer Examination Vessel (lightship 106) moored offshore, and also from the Boston Lifeboat Station (floating) moored inside the gate. Personnel of the latter station boarded such outgoing vessels as directed by the Captain of the Port and the Harbor Entrance Control Post, and also such incoming vessels as, for one reason or another, were not boarded from the first position. Transportation to vessels to be boarded was provided by picket or patrol boats attached to the Boarding Stations.

SKILL NEEDED IN HANDLING THE BOARDING CRAFT

Boarding duty was at times interesting, usually monotonous, and very often hazardous. Fishing vessels, while being boarded, usually lay to, and in calm waters boarding presented virtually no problem. In high winds and choppy seas, with pitching, rolling, spray, and often icy decks, it required good seamanship, agile men and great care. In boarding larger vessels, an added specialized knowledge of boat handling was necessary. These larger vessels were boarded while under way, usually at five knots, but often at higher speeds. To come up in a patrol or picket boat, place the bow against or just under the Jacob's ladder, hold it there while the Boarding Officer and others in the detail got on board the steamer without mishap; to keep the boat under full control and handle her so that damage is avoided; and repeat when the Boarding party left, required a high degree of expert knowledge and ability. Accidents did occur occasionally. As an example, on 24 January, 1943, at 0450, the Captain of the Port at Cape Cod Canal received an SOS from a boarding boat CG-70003, which had been struck by the steamer MIEBRE while on boarding duty. At 0640, the CG-38525 was dispatched to render assistance if necessary. At 0730 she returned with the crew of the CG-70003 which had sunk in 10 to 12 minutes after being struck amidship. The crew had put out in a dory until picked up by the CG-38525. Fortunately, there were no casualties.

PROBLEM AT GLOUCESTER

There was much shipping activity at Gloucester, Massachusetts, mostly small craft and fishing vessels of all types. The crews of the patrol boats, all Temporary Reservists, conscientiously checked all these vessels for papers, and the usual list of items. They had a peculiar problem which, however, was also experienced at some other similar ports. Many of the Temporary Reservists had known all their lives the skippers whom they had to check and question, and therefore, felt somewhat "on the spot." But eventually the authority of the Coast Guard was very generally respected, despite this fact. Boarding duty was complicated by the poor English of many fishermen of Italian and Portuguese birth since none of the TRs was familiar with those languages.

RESUME OF BOARDING PARTIES

The actual duties of the Boarding Officers were several. The following is a resume of these duties as they concerned incoming merchant vessels and newly constructed ships in the Twelfth Naval District. In detail, they varied very little from duties in all Districts at the principal ports.

(a) Obtain ship data required by the Vessel Control Section of the Captain of the Port;

1. Nationality
2. Name of Vessel
3. Type
4. Time of arrival
5. Last port
6. Owners of vessel
7. By whom chartered
8. Agents
9. Operators
10. Number in crew
11. Place of docking
12. Radio call

(b) Deliver violation of radio security regulations directive

(c) Deliver radio directives to radio operator

(d) Deliver anti-aircraft directives to armed guard officer

(e) Deliver Port Security directives to master

(f) Deliver radio directives to master

(g) Deliver Port Director's publication to master

(h) Check all radio equipment

(i) Supervise testing of radio equipment and keep operator from violating silent period regulations*

(j) Check equipment for restricted types*

(k) Seal transmitters of any foreign ships when in doubt of security of radio rooms, or any other ship that cannot comply with provisions of directive 3001020, para. 32.*

(l) Obtain data for Form "A" from master of vessel.

*Done by radio sealing unit in ports where such units were maintained.

TEMPORARY RESERVE BOARDING OFFICERS AT CHARLESTON


Virtually all Boarding Officers everywhere were regulars or regular Reservists. However, as has been mentioned, a unique unit existed at Charleston, South Carolina. A shortage of Coast Guard Boarding Officers at Charleston was relieved by the Temporary Reserve. Several officers from the units afloat, and the Volunteer Port Security Force, formed a group which took over entirely the duty of boarding merchant ships entering the port. It was the only port in the United States where volunteers assumed the duties of Boarding Officers. Seven officers covered the assignment on a 24-hour basis. They performed boarding duty at any hour of the 24 and in all kinds of weather, being transported by picket boat and boarding the ships in the usual manner already described.

EXAMPLE OF MAGNITUDE OF BOARDING OPERATIONS

At Boston, Temporary Reservists were active in the boarding operations, although the Boarding Officers themselves were not TRs. However, the Temporary Reservists, operating from the Inner Examination Vessel (Boston Lifeboat Station, - floating) handled the boarding craft attached to the station, accompanied Boarding Officers and transported them, and checked armament and sealed radios on the larger vessels. They did practically all of the boarding of smaller craft and fishing vessels. Some idea of the magnitude



A COAST GUARDSMAN ON BOARDING DUTY
ASCENDS THE JACOB'S LADDER OF A MERCHANTMAN



A PATROL BOAT COMES ALONGSIDE A FISHERMAN
FOR ROUTINE CHECK OF CARGO,
FUEL, PAPERS, CREW LIST, AND OTHER ITEMS.

of this work in the Nation's second wartime shipping port can be had when it is realized that between 1 January, 1943, and 31 March, 1945, these Temporary Reservists put Boarding Officers on board some 5,000 vessels. In addition, they boarded a total of 21,526 vessels, which included freighters, tankers, colliers, and a very large number of fishing vessels. Many of other types were boarded, mostly transports. During the same period, TRs from the Boston Lifeboat Station sealed about 1,000 radios and turned in some 2,000 armament reports. Boston was only one of many major ports, so that the amount of work involved on a country-wide basis may be surmised. In most ports, however, boarding was done by regulars or regular Reservists, and not by temporary members of the Reserve.

SECTION XIII

CAPTAIN OF THE PORT COMMUNICATIONS

IMPORTANCE OF COTP COMMUNICATIONS

The nature of the work of the Captains of the Port was such that it was essential that COTP headquarters be enabled to communicate promptly and efficiently with any and every unit under jurisdiction in the event of emergency or need for special action. Therefore, in the principal ports, Captains of the Port established their own communications systems. Emergencies involving possibly the fire division, patrol boats, pier guards, explosives details and others might occur at any time, and prompt action was requisite at such times. It was particularly important to reach radio-equipped scout and patrol cars and jeeps. The entire object of Captain of the Port communications was to give him positive and speedy control of his unit.

THE COMMUNICATIONS INSTRUCTIONS OF 1943

Chapter IV of the Communications Instructions of 1943 streamlined procedure so that it was similar to that used by police. It provided for the use of numbers to designate units in lieu of h-letter calls, and provided for the use of a code in the form of signal numbers. This new procedure reduced transmission time to about 20% of the time required for normal procedure. Whenever possible, it was desirable to locate transmitters and receivers in the dispatcher's or duty officer station; however, in some cases where local interference and noise level impeded reception, remote control receivers were furnished and installed. This brought satisfactory results. Security in such a system was important to avoid disclosure in ships movements. Such transmissions could be readily intercepted by enemy submarines lying offshore. Cautioning of personnel, and adequate training were essential. Radiotelephones in small craft were rather generally operated by men without prior training, but it was necessary that these men receive instruction. This was provided in a comprehensive manual entitled Communications Instructions, mentioned above.

RADIO EQUIPMENT

Patrol and other boats were generally equipped with five or ten-watt transmitter-receivers capable of communication on a maximum of four frequencies. It was necessary for the Captain of the Port to have communication with the examination vessels at the larger ports. This was had by radiotelephone, but in some cases, "landlines" were tried and used to some extent. However, there were complications such as were experienced by the examination vessels at the entrance to Chesapeake Bay. The telephone line was found impracticable because of difficulty in maintaining the cable.

PILOT BOAT COMMUNICATIONS

Pilot vessels were Reserve boats, as has been mentioned, but the Coast Guard determined not to pay for services normally carried out by the Pilot Associations. Thus, most pilot boats were equipped with commercial radio transmitter-receiver sets, and communications continued to be handled through commercial harbor radiotelephone stations. However, those pilot boats desiring to communicate direct with the Captain of the Port were furnished an additional set. At ports where pilots operated under exclusive control of the Captain of the Port, the Coast Guard installed its equipment and commercial sets were removed.

DIRECTIVE ON THE SEALING OF RADIOS

On 7 January, 1942, Secretary of the Navy Dispatch 061605 to all Naval District Commandants stated in part that "all vessels of the United States Code, Domestic or Foreign except public vessels of either, shall, while in the harbors, ports, roadsteads or waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, be sealed by Naval authority and such seals shall not be broken within the jurisdiction of the United States except when authorized by local Naval authority." The Commander, Inshore Patrol, U.S.N., also on the same date issued a dispatch for action of the Captain of the Port, Boston, and certain Assistant Captains of the Port, quoting the above and investing in the Captain of the Port the authority to seal radios. Also on the same day, the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier, issued a pamphlet entitled "Radio Regulation" which stated in part: "All vessels arriving from sea of 1,000 tons or larger, will be sealed by the Captain of the Port after entering inland waters.... In case of vessels less than 1,000 tons, the sealing of the apparatus is at the discretion of the Captain of the Port." While the above orders as given related finally to Boston, similar orders were general and the rulings applied in virtually all ports.

RADIO SEALING

Generally, the radio sealing activity of the Captain of the Port was under the jurisdiction of the COTP Communications Division. Especially in 1943, there was an acute shortage of radiomen in the Coast Guard, and it had not been possible to assign regular radiomen to COTP radio stations. Most of such men had been allocated for radio sealing. Yet, men for that activity were inadequate in many places. At Boston, the problem was solved through the establishment of a radio sealing unit of Temporary Reservists. The field was combed for capable radio "hams," and a unit of 26 men was organized which did all the radio sealing at Boston between June 1943 and June 1945. In general, duties of the radio sealing units were to:

1. Maintain a 24-hour watch.
2. Supervise testing of all radio equipment on all merchant vessels, domestic and foreign:
 - (a) Familiarize new operators with equipment
 - (b) Give information pertaining to BAMS schedule
 - (c) Test all transmitters and lifeboat sets
 - (d) Inform operator regarding checking all "sp" batteries before departing from port
 - (e) Report all inoperative equipment to service companies
 - (f) Pass judgment on proficiency of radio operator and report same to communications office
 - (g) Test fishboats, see that all proper crystals are installed, and seal transmitter.

THE RADIO SEALING OPERATION

While procedure varied somewhat in the different ports, the following summarized the usual experience. Before going out, each sealer reported personally to the COTP office, got his assignment and sealing kit, and reported back on completion of the work. A certificate of inspection was prepared for each ship boarded, a copy posted in the radio room, and the original filed with the Captain of the Port. Inspection and sealing work fell into several main categories. Radio apparatus was inspected and sealed on vessels just entering the harbor and on vessels where service work had been done on radio equipment under Coast Guard authority to break the seal for repairs. Many jobs taxed the sealers' ingenuity at sealing, in foolproof manner, equipments of various nationalities. When tests of apparatus were required, the sealers boarded the vessel, broke the seal, and either made the tests or stood by while the operator did the testing. This type of work came thick and fast when convoys were making up and operators wished to assure themselves of the efficiency of their equipment. This was usually a last-minute job, for security reasons, and required much rushing from ship to ship. On a number of occasions, ships were under way before the sealers could leave.

SIGNAL STATIONS

In order to facilitate communication between the Captain of the Port units ashore and afloat and between shore units and merchant or other vessels, several signal stations were established by Captains of the Port. At New York there were several strategically located, covering most of the harbor waters in the upper bay, and at Boston a station was established at the Coast Guard Base, covering, by no more than single relay, all of the harbor waters. These were usually connected with the Captain of the Port headquarters by telephone or command phone. The stations usually were equipped also with 12-inch signal searchlights, battery hand sets, and yardarm blinkers. The station at Boston was 100% manned for its two-year existence by Temporary Reservists especially trained for this duty.

AMERICAN DISTRICT TELEGRAPH SYSTEM AT NEW ORLEANS

In addition to the usual communications system between the Captain of the Port and the fire and police departments of the City of New Orleans, fire alarms from the American District Telegraph office were transmitted directly to the Captain of the Port. Municipal authorities installed police short-wave radios at the fireboat stations, and both of these methods were different from those used in most ports. American District Telegraph, and municipal installations may have been used at other ports, but records do not make this clear.

THIRTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT COTP COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

In most Districts, Captain of the Port Communications was highly developed. As was true with most COTP activities, details varied considerably in the different ports due to local conditions, but basically it was about the same in most ports and Districts. Possibly the Thirteenth Naval District developed its communications more than the others, and so some detail is presented regarding the functions of communications in that northwesternmost area of the United States. As in most Districts, with the establishment of Captains of the Port, and the protection of waterfront facilities, an issue of major importance, fast and reliable communications along the entire coast of Washington and Oregon had to be provided in the most efficient manner possible

by the Telephone Communications Section. The achievement of this goal required the clearing of rights-of-way through forests of a wild and rugged territory, and the setting of pole lines under the most adverse weather conditions and in the most obstinate terrain. This brought about the most commendable cooperation between the Coast Guard, the Army and the Navy.

COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT


The Captain of the Port offices were provided with tie-line telephones and two-way radio telephone equipment; the radio telephone equipment utilized by this organization was assigned exclusive use of the 3410 kilocycle frequency. A constant guard on that frequency and a loud-speaker watch on 2670 kilocycles was maintained by the harbor patrol radio stations, the communications control stations of the more active Captains of the Port. Radio-telephone equipment was also made available, tuned to 3410 kilocycles, to patrol boats, fire barges, patrol cars and trucks. An Army tug assigned to the Port of Embarkation was also assigned to this frequency since it was equipped for fire-fighting and could thus communicate with the Captain of the Port organization at Portland, Oregon. All alarms on fire barges were transmitted by telephone and as soon as a barge left its mooring it depended entirely upon radio communication.

PROCEDURES USED BY COTP COMMUNICATIONS

The area of the Thirteenth Naval District was a veritable network of telephone and radio communications facilities. About everything was tied in with everything else. The accompanying chart shows the scope of the communications system. The Captain of the Port at Seattle received direct all alarms sounded from any box in Seattle. The communications watch then checked to see if it was a waterfront fire, and if so informed the Officer of the Day. He, in turn, spotted the fire on the map and from the location determined which equipment should respond. Orders were dispatched by radio, telephone, or both. Patrol boats or cars also responded, and reported to the dispatchers, or both. Patrol boats or cars also responded, and reported to the dispatcher on the condition and position of the fire and if any additional equipment were needed. This information was relayed to the Officer of the Day for decision. The Communications system of the Captain of the Port was in the hands of dispatchers. These were originally all regulars or regular Reservists, but as time progressed and members of the Volunteer Port Security Forces became available, these men replaced regulars who went to sea. An over-all knowledge of Captain of the Port operations and personnel was found a prime requisite for an efficient dispatcher. Thus, training trips in patrol boats, nearby military installations, telephone offices, and meeting other communications personnel aided greatly in giving dispatchers knowledge which helped their efficiency in actual operations. The dispatchers served on 8-hour watches which were maintained 24 hours a day. One standby was always available. The COTP communications were controlled from the Harbor Patrol Radio Stations. Landlines were preferred whenever possible. The boats on waterside patrol called in to the dispatcher every half hour to check equipment and be assured that the patrol was on the alert. Conversely, the dispatcher called the various units occasionally as a check. In some ports, however, in other Districts, such check calls were prohibited in order to keep the channels clear.

NOT WITHOUT MANY PROBLEMS

Operations of the Port Security activity have been summarized in this Part, and it may be said



COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
AT THE ASSISTANT CAPTAIN OF THE PORT
ANACORTES, WASHINGTON



COAST GUARDSMAN SEALS A RADIO
ON BOARD AN OUTGOING MERCHANT VESSEL

that, for the most part, these operations were conducted with efficiency and with only the normal operational problems which would be expected when many new fields were entered without a great fund of experience, and where developments depended much upon trial and error. These were accompanied by certain personnel and other problems which need not be detailed, although some value will be had from mentioning a few in Part VII, which follows.

PART VII

GENERAL PERSONNEL MATTERS

HOUSING AN EARLY AND TROUBLESOME PROBLEM

During the period of great expansion of the Coast Guard and its Port Security activity, from late 1941 to mid-1943, large numbers of recruits were going into training and coming out shortly with assignments to Port Security units. Facilities for housing these men lagged far behind recruiting and training, and this posed a very serious problem in practically all places where Port Security activities were established and growing. It meant overcrowding many facilities, using make-shift accommodations at awkward distances from points of duty, sometimes difficulty of control, and an adverse effect on efficiency and morale. Yet, Captains of the Port did their best to relieve the situation, and finally the problem was overcome. Existing buildings near scenes of activity were surveyed, and as suitable properties were located efforts were made to lease, rent, acquire or, if necessary, to build if suitable land could be found. Even civilian housing and industrial properties were procured in many places. When building was necessary, portable structures were used as much as possible. This matter of accommodations was extremely important and difficult in setting up a unit where there had been none before. In numerous places, hotels were taken over, usually accommodating from 200 to 400 men, and these were generally satisfactory. Sometimes auditoriums were available, but without toilet facilities or kitchens; sometimes the latter were installed by the Coast Guard.

COOPERATION FROM SUPPLY DIVISION

In the matter of supply and quarters, the Captains of the Port worked in close cooperation with and from the Supply Division. The needs for housing and office space and bases in order to carry out efficiently the COTP duties was great, and for many months kept well ahead of facilities which could be made available. First Naval District experience was about the same as that in other areas. As the leasing and rental of space was a peacetime responsibility of the Supply Section, the start of the war increased tremendously the load in this activity. Captains of the Port and Assistant Captains of the Port were being established in coastal towns and cities. Leases were necessary in 90% of the cases, as privately owned property was rented. All of the newly established units needing bases, barracks, and warehouses were supplied as fast as property could be procured, and adapted to its new uses, and even old vessels useless for anything else were used temporarily as barrack ships. Leasing of properties for COTPs also involved a good deal of legal work by the District Law Officers. The Captain of the Port of New York, in the Spring of 1942, found himself about to receive 3,000 Port Security personnel with no housing facilities for them. His office and the Supply Section made survey after survey before it was even possible to begin the actual work of procurement.

PROBLEM OF UNIFORMS

The uniform of enlisted men in the Coast Guard was

the same as that in the Navy, except for the shield worn on the right sleeve. Shortly after the beginning of 1943, a new "shore patrol" uniform was adopted for the use of Temporary Reservists and other Coast Guard personnel who might wish to use it. There is some question just how this uniform originated. In the early days of the Volunteer Port Security Force at Philadelphia, the men were not uniformed, and it was the Spring of 1943 before this was done. A uniform had to be worked out, for bell-bottom trousers and jumpers did not particularly suit middle-aged stomachs and other physical appurtenances. It is claimed that what became the shore patrol uniform was developed there, and made available to all Coast Guard enlisted personnel as well as the Temporary Reservists. But at about the same time, the Port Security Officer of the Fifth Naval District proposed a "shore establishment" uniform because he felt it was not good psychology to send a blue-jacket out to do business with ship masters, terminal operators and the public. The blue-jacket was a sailor in their eyes, and they wanted to do business with an officer. The uniform finally adopted probably was a combination of the ideas of these two sources. However, there was a supply problem, and not only in Philadelphia but in other Districts, there were trying delays in obtaining the uniforms in sufficient quantity. They were generally worn by TRs, but there was difficulty in the Fifth Naval District for, after the uniform became available, the regulars and regular Reservists "couldn't be hired to wear them." They were available for purchase by the men who had also to have their regular blues and whites. These men might be transferred to sea within ten days and then have to dispose of the shore uniforms, but there was no arrangement to buy them back. While Temporary Reservists in most Districts wore the shore patrol uniform on duty, this was not uniformly so. In the First District, for instance, the uniform was worn to and from duty, but on duty the regular undress blues were the prescribed uniform. Thus, on duty, there was no uniform distinction between the TRs and regulars, and this contributed to morale and efficiency.

EARLY SHORTAGE OF PERSONNEL AT THE GREAT LAKES

In the earlier days of 1942, there was a serious shortage of personnel at the Great Lakes ports. Yet, the lake vessels were required to have guards on board, which depleted the men needed for Port Security duties. This situation was relieved considerably by the commissioning of licensed officers on the lake vessels, thus making it possible to remove the guards, who had made a heavy drain on the personnel ashore.

THE ALMOST UNIVERSAL PROBLEM OF TRANSFER OF NEEDED PERSONNEL

Probably the most troublesome problem relating to Captain of the Port personnel was that of transfer. This problem existed in every District throughout the war, although possibly the Twelfth District was least bothered. New men kept pouring into the Coast Guard during 1942 and 1943 and part of 1944. All had to be trained. New men were placed at the disposal of Port Security Officers and Captains of the Port. Usually they knew little about the duties they were to perform. Training was essential, but it took several months to accomplish this and bring the men to the point of efficiency. These men would then be transferred out of the District to other types of duty, or sent to sea. One reason for the value of Temporary Reserve forces was that, after training, they were not transferred, and could not be. Trained enlisted men who were specialists were taken away for service schools, and then sent to Alaska or to sea, or to beach patrol in a different District. There were guard classes in specialized

subjects. For greater efficiency, Captains of the Port detailed fire personnel to train with local fire departments and municipal harbor boat patrol units. This background and training, together with their service experience made the Port Security organization, at its peak, an efficient and smooth working outfit. But in later months, a number of officers so trained were sent away to train for sea duty for which they had no particular background. The young ensigns sent in from the special training course at the Academy to take over this work had neither the background, experience or training for the duty, and their efforts met with mediocre success. At the Port Security Officers' Conference at Washington, the PSO of the Fifth Naval District, in commenting upon this turnover, said: "I have studied a little bit about sabotage and how to carry it on, and if I wanted to effectively sabotage Port Security efforts, I know of no better way than to keep transferring trained men as my people are being transferred now." At the same conference, the Port Security Officer of the First Naval District pointed out that, in a year's time, he had exactly 11 different commanding officers for the Boston Harbor Patrol Base, and remarked that it did not make sense.

TREND REACHED
CRITICAL POINT

Late in 1944, this trend of transfer of competent Port Security personnel had reached a critical stage in many Districts. It was pointed out that, in the Fourth Naval District, transfer from Captain of the Port activities had reduced personnel so that it was about 200 less than the number deemed sufficient to perform the necessary functions assigned throughout the District and so included in the recommended complement. In most ports, reductions were drastic. Temporary Reservists took over more and more of the COTP functions, but as additional men were needed for the Volunteer Port Security Forces, it was very difficult to find personnel able to stand daytime watches. Throughout the entire period of the war, this matter of transfer was troublesome, and there was a growing conviction on the part of Captains of the Port and Port Security Officers that the relative importance of Port Security should be clarified, its trained specialists not disturbed, and that it should be given necessary statutory authority, personnel, and equipment.

METHODS OF PARTIALLY
MEETING THE PROBLEM

The problem of transfer of men seemed far from solution, but responsible officers did what they could to meet the situation. In the Fifth Naval District, there was a shortage of men for the fire detail, and longshoremen were trained in "first aid fire fighting," starting with how to turn in a fire alarm, how to connect hose, and how to operate extinguishing apparatus. Good cooperation was received from the unions and stevedores. The shortage of municipal firemen was almost universal over the United States. At Norfolk, Virginia, two Coast Guardsmen were assigned to duty at the fire stations of the city for training and to lend assistance. Men were rotated. This helped the city, the men got to know each other, and this all contributed to good cooperation at actual fires. San Francisco was a congested port, and there were many operational problems. To meet the turnover problem, the Captain of the Port froze personnel in three companies and the District Personnel Officer could not "put his hands on them." They could not be transferred between units without the OK of the units and the Captain of the Port, and could not be transferred out of the District without the signature of the District Coast Guard Officer. This seemed the answer to the problem there. Of the 1,800 men assigned, they turned over about 300 a week as a receiving ship function, and others were assigned to all manner of duty not

connected with Port Security. The COTP did not want 1,800 men, but a moderate-sized compact crew, which was stabilized.

THE HEADQUARTERS SIDE
OF THE STORY

There was, of course, another side to this story. The view of the Chief Personnel Officer at Headquarters was that most Coast Guardsmen enlisted for action, on foreign shores, at sea, and elsewhere, and that these men on Port Security duty were stuck for months on end on dock watch, merely walking up and down, while possibly brothers were in the thick of it in Africa, and in the South Pacific. This created an acknowledged morale problem and bad morale must be avoided. The viewpoint of the Captain of the Port, who must have an effective unit, and that of the enlisted man who must pace piers, were not always alike. With the great need for men at sea, it was only natural to transfer there men who had been stuck ashore, both to bolster morale and fill a vital need. The total authorized complement for the Coast Guard was eventually about 164,000. About the first of 1943, it was estimated that 26,000 men were needed ashore on Port Security work. Later, this figure was raised to 41,000. There were about 15,000 men on patrol boats, fireboats, small harbor craft, etc. The demand for men at sea was terrific, and there were not 16,000 extra men to put ashore under COTPs. The answer toward filling out this gap was the Temporary Reserve, both VPSF and afloat. It required a large number of Temporary Reservists, but it was demonstrated that by going ashore for such men enough could be found who were capable of doing Captain of the Port work. There was never any feeling at Headquarters that 41,000 men could be called experts at one thing or another and say that no one else could do their jobs. Without being too sincere about it, the Captain of the Port at Norfolk said: "Send the fellows to sea, and get in some one-legged men." The Chief Personnel Officer pointed out that it was part of his job to be told how many men the Commandant needed to dispatch for any function, and then, without any question, get them for him, officers and men alike.

THE PROBLEM OF
TRANSPORTATION FOR TRS

In many ports, the transportation of Temporary Reservists to and from duty, when gasoline for any purpose was almost unobtainable, confronted the Transportation Officers of the various units late in 1942 and for the two ensuing years. Sometimes, trucks were furnished by the Coast Guard. Ration Boards gave the fullest cooperation in most cases, and allowances of gasoline were made to enable a large number of men to use their own cars. Identification cards for personally owned vehicles were issued at many ports, and Transportation Officers processed many thousands of gasoline ration applications for Temporary Reservists.

EARLY SKEPTICISM ABOUT
TEMPORARY RESERVISTS

The Temporary Reserve was a new venture, and it was natural that District Coast Guard Officers and others should be skeptical about the usefulness of these men on a purely voluntary, no-pay basis. Many were very polite about the whole thing and withheld judgment. Others politely expressed their doubts. The Captain of the Port of Norfolk said he guessed his personnel problem was all right, since the important COTP work was to be taken over by unpaid volunteers. Official comment from the First Naval District, made on 9 January, 1943, was: "The Auxiliary and Temporary Reserve present quite a problem. There are lots of them and they are full of pep and would like to participate in the war effort. Opportunity for their useful employment at odd times is very limited, and I suspect that they feel that the Coast Guard does not



TEMPORARY RESERVISTS RELIEVED PORT SECURITY PERSONNEL
ENABLING THE LATTER TO MAN COMBAT VESSELS
SUCH AS THE USS MFNGES, COAST GUARD MANNED, PICTURED ABOVE

appreciate their worth.... I am concerned about the large number of officers in the Temporary Reserve who do not come under close supervision of regular Coast Guard officers, pilots, plant guards, and Coast Guard Auxiliary officers in particular. They know little of the ways of the service and are not in regular contact with service activities. Yet they wear the uniform, feel authorized to exercise authority, and in general may bring credit or discredit to the Coast Guard. In taking over the pilots, we acquire more officers with the rank of lieutenant commander than we had in the District organization, excluding officers of the fleet." (In 1945, this same officer wrote: "From beginning to end, the quality of service rendered by the Temporary Reserves secured the full respect of the regulars with whom they served, and of the citizens of the communities they protected. The unpaid volunteers were a credit to the Coast Guard uniforms they wore, and I am proud of them and their record.") In the earliest days when the volunteers began to function around St. Louis, oldtime rivermen laughed at the idea of "amateur boatmen" doing a serious job. "They're just a bunch of playboys," the riverman scoffed, "and they couldn't tell a bilge from a barnacle." Later, the rivermen came to have a very wholesome respect for the "playboys" and their abilities.

ACCEPTANCE OF TEMPORARY RESERVISTS BY REGULARS

Throughout the early period there was strong reluctance on the part of many officers and men of the regular service to accept the TRs on anything approaching an equal basis. It was particularly true in some Districts with units enrolled from the Auxiliary and serving afloat. This was probably due to prejudices, a lack of understanding, and failure to correctly estimate abilities. It was so noticeable at times, that the Commander of the Philadelphia Regiment, VPSF, said: "Nothing is worse for the morale of a Temporary Reservist than to be ignored or ridiculed or made to feel he is a child who cannot be trusted to discharge responsibilities for which he was enrolled and trained. Open arms acceptance of the Temporary Reservist as a brother-in-arms is an essential to morale and to delivery of his best value to the Coast Guard." Contact, education, and the exemplary performance of duty by the TRs contributed to eventual acceptance, and finally there was high esteem in virtually all areas. In February, 1944, the Temporary Reserve Personnel Officer of the Fourth Naval District wrote in the war diary: "the most noticeable trend is the disposition of the Regular Service to accept more readily the volunteer efforts of the TRs. This changeover has been pronounced and definite." In the later days the regulars praised the TRs for their work and their conscientiousness.

TEMPORARY RESERVISTS' DEVOTION TO DUTY

There were cases of devotion to duty by Temporary Reservists far too numerous to mention. Brief comment on a few will suffice. Although seaman first class Barney Feldman of the San Francisco VPSF Regiment worked for a company engaged 100% in war work, he wanted to do all he could, so had joined the Regiment. On one of his first watches, while waiting for an ambulance, he administered first aid to a merchant seaman who had been stricken with appendicitis, thereby probably saving the man's life. Feldman, afflicted with a stomach disorder, always stood his watches regardless of how ill he might feel. He protested so strongly when attempts were made to relieve him and send him back to the "bulkhead" that he was usually allowed to stay on duty. One night, while standing watch, he collapsed and was sent to the "bulkhead," applied for leave of absence, and was sent to the hospital. He died shortly after undergoing an operation. Roy E. Nizmann of St. Louis, carried on for his son. Twenty-four hours before he was to report for his first

assignment, he received a telegram that his son had been killed in action. But he reported for duty, nevertheless, and served as a sentry at Coast Guard District Headquarters in the old Custom House. Asked about having performed his duty, he said: "There was nothing to do except report as I had promised. I had to carry on for my son. He was my only child. I have to take up where he left off. If he could take it, I can." Men often made considerable sacrifice to serve in the VPSF. One Reservist in the Thirtieth Naval District whose sons were in the armed forces sold his business in Spokane, leased his ranch, and joined the Seattle VPSF for full time. Several small shops in Seattle closed their doors one day a week to enable their men to stand their watches. A Seattle trucking firm was closed every Thursday, and eight of the nine drivers spent their day off with the VPSF. Former Corporal Carlton Proctor Sturgell, age 32, went to New Orleans from Pass Christian, Mississippi, and enrolled in the VPSF Regiment. He had been a member of a tank crew in the Second Armored Division and had participated in the North African, Sicilian and Italian campaigns, but had been discharged from the Army because of wounds. He could have retired to civilian life, having fully done his part, but acts of brutality by the Germans in Sicily and Italy haunted him like a hideous nightmare. He said: "When I was discharged after having been hospitalized as a result of injuries received when a German railway gun shell exploded nearby, causing the right side of my face to be blown open, I felt I couldn't stand idly by and watch others carry on the fight. I had to continue to be part of the struggle. So I enlisted in the Port Security Force, and now feel I am aiding in the defeat of the enemies." In practically all Districts, there were men who had lost immediate members of their families, but stood their regular watches within 3 hours to 24 hours after the death of the relative, without saying a word about it at the time.

THE MANPOWER SURVEY BOARD

Toward the end of 1943, the Navy Manpower Survey Board was created. On 14 December, 1943, the Commandant of the Coast Guard wrote all District Coast Guard Officers regarding the activities of this newly appointed board. He stated that these activities were of considerable significance to the Coast Guard not only because they might involve adjustments in the officer and enlisted personnel of the service, but also because of possible recommendations by the Board as to the elimination, consolidation, or curtailment of Coast Guard units. The District Coast Guard Officers were directed to appoint in their Districts staff specialists to the Manpower Survey Committees to assist in the local work of the Board. This Board, established by the Secretary of the Navy on 12 November, 1943, was charged with the responsibility for making surveys of all Naval Shore Establishments in all Naval Districts for the purpose of determining whether they were overmanned or undermanned, and whether the Navy's manpower was being utilized to the best advantage. The reduction of shore establishment personnel (including Port Security personnel) to a minimum was important. Commandants and Commanding Officers of all Naval, Marine Corps and Coast Guard shore establishments were to submit a confidential report not later than 15 January, 1944, on information as to officer personnel within their respective commands. The work was expected to take until March, 1944. Closely identified with this effort was a letter from Headquarters to District Coast Guard Officers, dated 23 December, 1943, stating that, as a result of the decrease in the submarine menace in coastal waters as well as the favorable developments in the air, it was thought advisable to discontinue various Captain of the Port and Assistant Captain of the Port units, possibly limiting the operation of Port Security units during the following fiscal year 1945 to 80 COTP and 80 ACOTP units.

WORK BY THE DISTRICT
SURVEY COMMITTEES

ter from the Commandant to DCGOs dated 7 January, 1944, requested that he be informed promptly of any recommendations or comments made by the DCGOs to the Survey Committees, or concerning the recommendations of the Committees. It was stated that the Commandant would be consulted by the Board prior to submission of the Board's final recommendations. The surveys were made, covering navy yards, hospitals, training stations, ammunition depots, air stations, and numerous other shore establishments. Time was a factor, and the work had to be decentralized so that the large number of shore activities might be properly surveyed almost simultaneously. These surveys resulted finally in considerable change in shore establishment personnel, one of the most important of which was the general curtailment of beach patrol, and fuller utilization of men qualified for sea duty in other than shore establishment assignments.

USE OF PERSONNEL UNFIT
FOR DUTY AFLOAT

use of officer and enlisted personnel physically unfit for duty afloat and of members of the Women's Reserve. Pointing out the critical shortage of able-bodied manpower for the Armed Services under Selective Service Rules, he stated that the Navy was looking to the Coast Guard from time to time to man more of its ships. The Army also needed men to serve in its vessels in the Southwest Pacific. Thus the Coast Guard must make available for duty afloat as many personnel as possible, and that SPARS and male personnel physically unfit for sea duty, should be fully utilized ashore to make qualified men available for assignment at sea. Therefore, SPARS were to replace male personnel on shore to the greatest extent possible. Ten thousand SPARS were authorized. Men physically unqualified for sea duty would also replace as fully as possible those so qualified, wherever practicable. Reduction of personnel on beach patrol, Port Security, and other shore activities would be made by withdrawing able-bodied men and placing them in training for sea duty, and the unqualified would carry on. Even by so doing, and employing Temporary Reservists to the fullest possible extent, there would still be ample assignments on shore and in non-combat areas to relieve men in combat areas as might be necessary.

HEADQUARTERS POLICY ON
REDUCTION OF COTP FORCES

reduction in Captain of the Port forces. It was the opinion of Headquarters that it was unnecessary to continue the maintenance of Port Security activities at ports where the protection of waterfront facilities was no longer vitally essential to the prosecution of the war effort but that it should be borne in mind that the discontinuance of a Port Security unit should not be recommended if such action would result in the improper or inadequate discharge of the Coast Guard's responsibilities under Executive Order No. 9074. Under this policy, some drastic reductions in Port Security activities at smaller ports had already been made either through eliminating certain units completely, or reclassifying former COTP units to ACOTP units. Substantial savings in personnel, facilities and equipment had been effected as a result of such action. It was the opinion of Headquarters that curtailment of security measures which might be made because of the then remote possibility of invasion, bore no relationship to the need for keeping our ports open and operating at the peak of efficiency. Survey Committees had

To assist in the work of the Board, District Survey Committees were organized, and surveys began. A letter

from the Commandant to DCGOs dated 7 January, 1944, requested that he be informed promptly of any recommendations or comments made by the DCGOs to the Survey Committees, or concerning the recommendations of the Committees. It was stated that the Commandant would be consulted by the Board prior to submission of the Board's final recommendations. The surveys were made, covering navy yards, hospitals, training stations, ammunition depots, air stations, and numerous other shore establishments. Time was a factor, and the work had to be decentralized so that the large number of shore activities might be properly surveyed almost simultaneously. These surveys resulted finally in considerable change in shore establishment personnel, one of the most important of which was the general curtailment of beach patrol, and fuller utilization of men qualified for sea duty in other than shore establishment assignments.

Based upon this matter of shore personnel, the Commandant, on 9 March, 1944, outlined his policy on the

use of officer and enlisted personnel physically unfit for duty afloat and of members of the Women's Reserve. Pointing out the critical shortage of able-bodied manpower for the Armed Services under Selective Service Rules, he stated that the Navy was looking to the Coast Guard from time to time to man more of its ships. The Army also needed men to serve in its vessels in the Southwest Pacific. Thus the Coast Guard must make available for duty afloat as many personnel as possible, and that SPARS and male personnel physically unfit for sea duty, should be fully utilized ashore to make qualified men available for assignment at sea. Therefore, SPARS were to replace male personnel on shore to the greatest extent possible. Ten thousand SPARS were authorized. Men physically unqualified for sea duty would also replace as fully as possible those so qualified, wherever practicable. Reduction of personnel on beach patrol, Port Security, and other shore activities would be made by withdrawing able-bodied men and placing them in training for sea duty, and the unqualified would carry on. Even by so doing, and employing Temporary Reservists to the fullest possible extent, there would still be ample assignments on shore and in non-combat areas to relieve men in combat areas as might be necessary.

On 31 March, 1944, the Commandant wrote a letter qualifying Headquarters policy with respect to reduction

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had some misconceptions on that point. Any drastic action to relax port protective measures at that time beyond those necessary for safeguarding vital war activities, would be exceedingly dangerous and in direct contravention of the President's Executive Order. In fact, it was the opinion of Headquarters, that, with the ever-increasing velocity of tonnage going through our ports, the need for Port Security — in ports having facilities essential to the war effort — was greater then than at any time since the Executive Order was issued. Ships still needed safeguarding in port as much as after leaving port. While constant studies were being made to eliminate all unnecessary Port Security functions, a drastic reduction in COTP forces was not foreseen as long as the Executive Order remained in effect. Not all Port Security forces at that time were necessary, but there could be no relaxation in the protection of waterfront facilities and vessels in ports considered vitally essential to the war effort.

HEROISM AT SCENE
OF AN EXPLOSION

explosion which occurred on Army Boat Number 234 on 21 September, 1943, at Pier 5, Army Port of Embarkation, Charleston, South Carolina. After the explosion, the CG-30041-F went into immediate action. A civilian who had been thrown into the water by the explosion was rescued by a Coast Guardsman. The fire was still burning but under control when Cariens went below to repair a damaged gas line through which gasoline was running into the engine room and bilges. Overcome by gas fumes on the first attempt, he went below a second time with a gas mask and stopped the flow of gas in two breaks. Coast Guard details removed explosives from the deck and secured the codes and confidential papers. For his heroism in this emergency, Cariens received the Navy-Marine Corps Medal, which was presented by General James T. Duke at a general muster.

OUTSTANDING HERO OF
THE NEW YORK COTP UNIT

the war. At 0215, on 21 September, 1945, he was on roving patrol checking the security of piers and other vital spots. He discovered flames licking their way from beneath one of several tank cars on a siding of the Central Railroad of New Jersey yard. He turned in alarms and then checked the contents of the cars. He discovered the dripping tank car was filled with an acid used as a basis for high explosives and was likely to blow up at any minute; one of the next two cars contained high test gasoline and the other liquid chlorine. Regardless of this, he procured a shovel and began fighting the fire. The ground area surrounding the cars was aflame and the exposed gas mixture gave off noxious, suffocating and irritating vapors. In his citation awarding him the Navy and Marine Corps Medal of Honor it was said: "Rogers, with this knowledge, shoveling sand and dirt on the fire, worked his way beneath the tank car, without gas mask, in an attempt to shut off the flow. The soles of his shoes were burned badly as a result of those efforts. Rogers persuaded the brakemen and the locomotive engineer, against their fear of explosion, to uncouple and detach the flaming and leaking tank car from the tank cars of chlorine and gasoline and move them away from the fire. The hazard of explosion was thus lessened." Port Security Force men and the municipal fire department then joined in the fight, and more than 50 men had to have burned off shoes replaced by the Commanding Officer of the Port Security Force. The acid gave off a deadly gas, so that if it had got out of control and the wind had been just so, a large part of the nearby population might have been wiped out.

Richard L. Cariens, Motor Machinists Mate First Class received an award for heroism in connection with an

explosion which occurred on Army Boat Number 234 on 21 September, 1943, at Pier 5, Army Port of Embarkation, Charleston, South Carolina. After the explosion, the CG-30041-F went into immediate action. A civilian who had been thrown into the water by the explosion was rescued by a Coast Guardsman. The fire was still burning but under control when Cariens went below to repair a damaged gas line through which gasoline was running into the engine room and bilges. Overcome by gas fumes on the first attempt, he went below a second time with a gas mask and stopped the flow of gas in two breaks. Coast Guard details removed explosives from the deck and secured the codes and confidential papers. For his heroism in this emergency, Cariens received the Navy-Marine Corps Medal, which was presented by General James T. Duke at a general muster.

Charles D. Rogers, Specialist, First Class, was the outstanding COTP New York Port Security hero during

the war. At 0215, on 21 September, 1945, he was on roving patrol checking the security of piers and other vital spots. He discovered flames licking their way from beneath one of several tank cars on a siding of the Central Railroad of New Jersey yard. He turned in alarms and then checked the contents of the cars. He discovered the dripping tank car was filled with an acid used as a basis for high explosives and was likely to blow up at any minute; one of the next two cars contained high test gasoline and the other liquid chlorine. Regardless of this, he procured a shovel and began fighting the fire. The ground area surrounding the cars was aflame and the exposed gas mixture gave off noxious, suffocating and irritating vapors. In his citation awarding him the Navy and Marine Corps Medal of Honor it was said: "Rogers, with this knowledge, shoveling sand and dirt on the fire, worked his way beneath the tank car, without gas mask, in an attempt to shut off the flow. The soles of his shoes were burned badly as a result of those efforts. Rogers persuaded the brakemen and the locomotive engineer, against their fear of explosion, to uncouple and detach the flaming and leaking tank car from the tank cars of chlorine and gasoline and move them away from the fire. The hazard of explosion was thus lessened." Port Security Force men and the municipal fire department then joined in the fight, and more than 50 men had to have burned off shoes replaced by the Commanding Officer of the Port Security Force. The acid gave off a deadly gas, so that if it had got out of control and the wind had been just so, a large part of the nearby population might have been wiped out.

PREPAREDNESS

There was also the danger of explosion. A blast from such ingredients, compounded by acid and gas, might have caused a major catastrophe. Although gas masks had been rushed to the scene, the men did not wait to use them before attacking the fire.

APPREHENSION OF
A MURDERER

On 24 August, 1943, while on Port Security duty on the Charleston, South Carolina, waterfront, Arthur E. Oltman, seaman second class, (R) was witness to a murder. He apprehended the armed perpetrator, disarmed him and held him until he was taken to jail.

THREAT OF EXPLOSION AT
HOG ISLAND TERMINAL

On 15 June, 1944, a fire was started by the ignition of a smoke float in #4 'tween deck hatch on board the SS R. F. PECKHAM berthed at Hog Island, Philadelphia. Upon discovery of the fire, the stevedores and longshoremen immediately left the ship, and it was only because of the efforts of the Coast Guardsmen on duty at Hog Island Terminal that the fire was immediately extinguished and a serious explosion averted. Lt. (jg) Balthasar D. Greenberg, USCGR, Ensign Fred R. Miller, USCGR, Ralph C. Scott, Slc, USCGR, Dominic Sisto, Slc, USCGR, Leo Stasica, Slc, USCGR, the officers and enlisted men on duty at Hog Island at the time of the fire, received Commandant's Commendations for their actions. Two stevedores also received certificates of commendation from the Captain of the Port for remaining in the hatch and aiding in extinguishing the fire.

HEROISM AT
"EL ESTERO" FIRE

Another case of outstanding heroism is that of the steamer EL ESTERO at New York, on 24 April, 1943. An account of this incident is given in some detail in Part IX under Third Naval District, to which reference is made.

PART VIII

SPECIAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS BY TEMPORARY RESERVISTS

TEMPORARY RESERVISTS
UPHELD TRADITIONS

Much has been said in the foregoing pages about the Temporary Reserve and its members and how they fitted into the entire Port Security program. The work of many of the Temporary Reserve units was thoroughly integrated with that of the regulars and regular Reservists, but there were ports where parts of Port Security work were so completely taken over by this group that many important incidents along our waterfronts involved the TRs alone. It may be said that, generally, the Temporary Reservists fully upheld the finest traditions of the Coast Guard and performed their work in a most commendable manner. This organization had personnel problems of its own and they varied somewhat from those of the regular service because of the different type of enrollment and the fact that service was performed on a part time, and no-pay basis. This was to be expected. And incidents which occurred during tours of duty brought forth many examples of extreme devotion to duty, alertness, ability to do the right thing at the right time, and even real heroism. While there is no attempt here to outline all outstanding examples, a few are mentioned to illustrate the singleness of purpose and action between the TRs and regulars, and the similarity of devotion to duty in emergencies.

A BRIEF PERIOD
OF COMPLACENCY

While many Temporary Reserve units and Districts had personnel problems

peculiar to themselves, some were very general. The Districts greatest in size and enthusiasm were the First, Third, Fourth, Ninth, Eleventh and Thirteenth. The Tenth was small, but there was no lack of enthusiasm. However, in England there had been a noticeable falling off in interest by certain English volunteer bodies after four years of gruelling warfare. There was some apprehension that a similar development might be inevitable in the Volunteer Port Security Forces. This feeling was justified when, following two years of monotonous dock duty, false optimism developed after Allied victories in Normandy and Belgium. The actual patrolling of waterfront facilities and harbors and the other Port Security activities were usually unutterably dull. Toward the end of 1944, extra efforts were necessary in most Districts to keep up morale and the spirit of carrying on full blast until final victory.

TURNOVER IN
TR PERSONNEL

In the early days of the VPSF, uniforms were difficult to obtain. The Philadelphia unit was not uniformed until the Spring of 1943. This caused hardship and was not helpful to morale. Turnover in personnel was sometimes very disturbing. Great care was usually taken to enroll, as far as possible, men who were not plainly subject to draft. Yet, many men from most units were drafted, meaning replacement and more training. Some men in business found it necessary to discontinue because of business pressures, and there were always those whose health became impaired sufficiently to make discontinuance mandatory. Some changed their businesses and moved to other parts of the country. And in most units there were some who simply lost interest. There was, therefore, a continuing disenrollment and replacement. An idea of this may be had from the records of the Philadelphia Regiment where, in all, there were about 5,400 enrollments and 2,000 disenrollments during a period of two years, with approximately 3,200 being the highest figure for men on active duty at one time. In the later days this called for strict scrutinizing of applications for disenrollment, and such applications were then acceded to only when meritorious cause could be shown. This problem existed, of course, in all phases of Temporary Reserve work. While applicants were sworn in for the duration and could be disenrolled only with the consent of the Regimental Commander, it was usually expedient, for the sake of morale, to release those who had lost heart in their work. Actually, very few were released for this reason, and most stuck tenaciously to their duty. But there were times when, in various units, recruiting hardly kept pace with losses.

DIFFICULTY
IN MANNING
DAYTIME WATCHES

One of the most troublesome problems was that of manning daytime watches. In most Districts there was no difficulty in obtaining night men because most had daytime employment. However, men who could forego a day's work each week, or who worked at night or were otherwise situated so that they could serve in daylight hours were scarce in all Districts throughout the existence of the Volunteer Port Security Forces, except for Saturdays and Sundays. This was a continuing problem in all areas. Finally, in many ports, enough of these men were enrolled so that the VPSF could take over the entire waterfront watches on a 24-hour basis, but in others this was never accomplished. Throughout the emergency, great efforts were put forward to obtain daytime men, but there were almost never enough.

PHARMACISTS MATES IN
THE THIRTEENTH DISTRICT

In the Thirteenth District there was a Temporary Reserve unit which was unique. In September, 1944, the

RESERVE

Seattle King Retail Drug Association was called upon to provide men to assist on waterfront patrol, but the Pharmacy Association pointed out that the VPSF Regiment could use the men to better advantage in lines similar to their professions. Accordingly, it was proposed that such men be trained to man the Captain of the Port Sick Bay. Thus, experienced registered pharmacists were recruited among the owners and professional prescription stores. After a few weeks of training for Sick Bay duties, these men assumed, on 15 November, 1944, sick bay duties from 1900 to 0700, and starting 1 December, the day shift assumed duties from 0700 to 1900. These TR pharmacists mates carried out all routine duties from scrubbing the deck to making urinalyses, blood tests, blood counts, physical examinations, and diagnosing and treating patients. First aid squads attended all fire school classes and other classes where medical attention might be needed. They also made all regular fire and emergency calls, as well as regular fire barge calls to inspect first aid kits, and administer medical attention as required by fire barge personnel. A Chief Warrant Officer was in charge; two warrant officers, one in charge of night personnel, the other the day group, and 37 pharmacists mates second class, many of whom had served as pharmacists mates in World War I, made up this complement. At least two were on board at the sick bay at all times.

SEVERAL INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS WORTHY OF NOTE

Although most watches were dull and monotonous with no happenings of consequence, there were times when emergencies arose and individual actions were such as to draw special mention, commendation, or citation. A member of the Philadelphia VPSF Regiment, J. C. Thompson, Yeoman third class, stopped a vicious fight between two crew members of the steamer MANUEL CALVOS without resorting to use of weapons or threats, intervening at the request of the crew. Fred Graham, CBM, also at Philadelphia, noting that a carpenter working in the hold of a ship was pinned under a crate and one leg was almost severed, descended immediately to the scene. He applied a tourniquet to the injured man, disregarding his personal risk from overhanging cargo. His poise and presence of mind were especially commended. Carl Sterne, CBM, received a Commanding Officer's commendation for discovering an Army land mine in the hold of a Liberty ship, and for his prompt and efficient action, in clearing the scene and protecting it until Army Intelligence took over. John Paulding, BMC, received the following Commanding Officer's commendation:

"It is a pleasure to commend you for your prompt action and resourcefulness at possible risk of life or limb of yourself in leaping from Pier 82 to save the life of a seaman who fell overboard from a United Nations vessel at 1800 o'clock on 13 January, 1943. Your Commanding Officer regards this as tangible evidence of your devotion to duty which has in so many instances been demonstrated, although in no other single instance has it involved the risk of personal injury to save life."

OTHER MISCELLANEOUS ACTIONS

On 10 August, 1943, members of the VPSF at Philadelphia revived three firemen of the CASTILLO BELLVER who had been overcome by coal gas fumes in the engine room. On 6 October, 1943, a VPSF member of the same Regiment overheard a statement by a vessel's crew member that the MANUEL CALVOS (Spanish) was in port, ready to sail, and that her officers had been collecting all possible information of use to Fascist Spain. Naval Intelligence took over from there. On one

occasion, a dock guard extinguished a slight fire caused by sparks from a steamship stack falling on a canvas lifeboat cover. From a pier where valuable cargo was being loaded, the member on duty saw a blazing drum floating with the tide toward the wooden piling substructure of the pier. Prompt action on his part prevented what might have been the destruction of millions of dollars worth of war materials. On a cold, rainy night, a group of longshoremen made themselves a tent shelter of packing cases and paper, ran a mule into it and kept the engine on for warmth. The inflammable structure caught fire. But for prompt action by the Volunteer Coast Guard sentries, pier, ships and cargo might have been destroyed. On 11 November, 1944, a ship guard at Philadelphia, making his rounds on board the CASTILLO AMPUDIA discovered two German stowaways, and his prompt and efficient action resulted in their capture.

ASSISTANCE AT A FIRE IN ERIE, PA.

In December, 1943, a very serious fire at Erie, Pennsylvania, completely destroyed the Baker Building. Several city firemen were killed when the north wall fell. Temporary Reservists helped materially in removing debris to get at the bodies of the firemen, and helped to recover mail in the flooded basement of the neighboring Post Office Building. Several TRs ruined their uniforms and were faced by the fact that there was no recompense beyond the limit of their clothing allowance which, under the circumstances, was inadequate.

QUICK ACTION AT PORTLAND

At Portland, Maine, one day in January, 1944, a Temporary Reservist patrolling a pier noticed men running out of a companionway on board a vessel, suffering badly from ammonia fumes. Investigating on board, he found an ammonia line broken, and immediately called the fire department for rescue equipment. When the skipper of the vessel stepped ashore to seek aid the fire apparatus was already there on the pier.

SCOPE OF DUTY AT SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO

An efficient, enthusiastic VPSF Regiment was organized at San Juan, Puerto Rico, with about 80% of its personnel native Puerto Ricans. Probably nowhere else where Temporary Reservists operated could there have been such an interesting miscellaneous mixture of ship stevedoring and terminal personnel or various nationalities and languages. Besides the usual pier watches and sentry duty, the San Juan VPSF provided ship guards and shipboard inspections when irregular or potentially dangerous situations on board made it advisable. These men, though not used in fireboats, often handled hose lines and cleared work areas when fireboats were operating. Experiences ranged between waking up sleeping watchmen on piers and discovering the body of a dead man in the hold of a merchant ship; from stopping fights among stevedores and among crewmen at confiscating cameras and films, arrests for petty thievery, and removing dangerous cargoes from piers. Most nights were uneventful, but the following summary shows there was plenty of action at times.

- (a) Fires discovered and extinguished or fought (either alone or in conjunction with other military or civilian services): 27
- (b) Lives saved or first aid given to cases that might have cost a life (including stopping knife-fights and other fights): 45

- (c) Thefts prevented or successfully investigated, omitting cases of petty thievery: 22
- (d) Persons caught photographing waterfront or engaged in suspicious activities: 6

THE MOST SERIOUS FIRE AT SAN JUAN

On 13 July, 1944, at 0200, Ensign Mercado and a boatswain's mate met a policeman at the Pier 3 Gate who had noticed smoke issuing from a grill room across the street from important Piers 2 and 3. Investigation confirmed this. The Insular Fire Department and the Coast Guard were immediately notified, and the grill door broken down. The smoke inside was dense, and flames were coming through the east wall. The area was critical, with a warehouse next door storing tar roofing paper and paints, and the waterfront section included cafes and night clubs. Insular fire pump engines arrived and hose lines were laid, but there was no water in the hydrants. The pumpers went to the piers, but it was some time before sea water was actually pumped. Flames spread throughout the building. The VPSF Duty Officer and the petty officers arranged for a water screen in front of the burning areas directly facing the piers, and at no time were the latter menaced by the flames. Coast Guard, Navy and Army pumpers and fireboats arrived and finally completely smothered the fire. There were no casualties except for a civilian who received an electric shock from a fallen live wire. All available TRs helped with the hose lines and kept civilians away from the fire area. Without the assistance of the Coast Guard, Navy and Army personnel, damage would have been far greater, despite the fact that the fire had burned out half a block. The Temporary Reserve unit assisting at this fire received commendation from the Captain of the Port.

A POSSIBLE CATASTROPHE AVERTED AT BOSTON

On 16 January, 1945, at 0341, there was a serious fire on board a Norwegian steamship at a pier in upper Boston Harbor. Ensign (T) George H. Falvey arrived at the scene of the fire seven minutes after the alarm was received, and took charge of operations. In removing ammunition from the burning vessel, he was assisted by seven other Temporary Reservists who had been sleeping at the Coast Guard Base awaiting their regular watch. In commending these men, the District Coast Guard Officer wrote: "Ensign Falvey demonstrated excellent judgment and ability in handling the situation, and to the Temporary Reservists assisting him, I give thanks for the extra measure of service put forth by them to prevent what otherwise might have been a catastrophe."

EXPLOSION AND SINKING

On 23 April, 1945, the SS JOHN CARVER, at Philadelphia, suffered serious damage through an explosion in its tanks, and sank at the berth. The conduct of the Temporary Reservists on duty and of Boatswain Cassidy, the watch officer, was commended. The presence of mind of Coxswain A. S. Cuthbert, the action taken by him in the emergency, and his refusal to abandon his post on board the ship resulted in his receiving a citation from both the Regimental Commander and the Commandant of the Coast Guard.

THE VPSF SUPPLY COMPANY AT PHILADELPHIA

The men on the line were backed up by many on the staff, whose work was unspectacular to say the least, but nevertheless, extremely important. Handling supplies for 3,200 men on the Philadelphia VPSF was no small task. The Regimental Supply Company operated from 1 January, 1943 until 30 June, 1945, 24 hours a

day, 7 days a week, and was responsible for procuring and issuing all gear in connection with VPSF duties. Some members of the staff served from 20 to 50 hours a week throughout their entire period of enrollment. As of 30 June, 1945, the company numbered 180. Of these, 20 had served from January, 1943. Supply rooms were operated a total of more than 50,000 hours, and supply personnel man-hours totaled over 120,000. It is estimated that guns were issued and returned 188,000 times as well as about a million rounds of ammunition. Clubs were issued 170,000 times, sheepskin coats almost 100,000. At termination of duty in June, 1945, the problem of collecting and disposing of equipment, fixtures and supplies was tremendous. Some men were recalled to wind up this work. Experience in most ports was similar, varying only in the work load depending upon how many TRs were being served by the division.

DECORATIONS FOR TEMPORARY RESERVE OFFICERS

Only six Temporary Reservists in the United States received decorations of any kind during World War II. Three of these were connected with Port Security, and all were officers. The highest award was received by Captain John S. Delano, who received the Legion of Merit for his outstanding work as Special Assistant on Pilot Control, heading up the entire pilot activity. Captain William Hilton Lowe and Commander E. Budd Marter received the Commandation ribbon. Captain Lowe acted as Anchorage and Ship's Movement Officer of the Port of New York during the years 1943, 1944 and 1945. Commander Marter served as Fire Detail Officer, Volunteer Port Security Force, under the Captain of the Port of Philadelphia.

DISTRICT EXPERIENCES

There was much in the experience of the various Naval Districts which was of importance, both by reason of results depending upon peculiar circumstances in the Districts themselves, and from the standpoint of experience of value to any future operations which might be necessary in an emergency. These are covered in some detail in Part IX.

PART IX

SPECIAL SITUATIONS AND EXPERIENCES IN THE VARIOUS DISTRICTS

THE FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT

SPECIAL EXPERIENCES

In the following pages of Part IX, an effort is made to cover in some detail special experiences and situations in the various Districts which are of interest and value, but which do not duplicate data given in the account thus far. Many of these were due to special circumstances and local conditions. Activities and details which were similar in all Districts, and which have been commented upon, are omitted. Some statistics are given if likely to be of value.

SHIP MOVEMENT AND ANCHORAGE

The principal function of the Anchorage Officer at Boston was to maintain an exact record of the location and movement of all ships in Boston Harbor. This was done by checking the sweep reports received each day from the Navy and Coast Guard Operating Base, and communication with the Navy Port Director, the Boston Towboat Company, and the Boston pilots over command lines. This information was disseminated to all Captains of the Port and District offices concerned. A daily ship list and a graphic

ships position board were kept up to date at all times. From 12 December, 1941 to 12 June, 1945, about 25,000 clearance and departure permits were issued at Boston by the Clearance Office. To facilitate the movement of colliers and other vessels operating in the coal trade, the District Coast Guard Officer authorized the issuance of 30-day flag hoists good from Rockland, Maine, to Norfolk, Virginia for that period of time. This was later extended to include coastwise tankers, tugs, and oil barges. From 3 December, 1942 to 7 June, 1945, 406 monthly clearances for such vessels were issued. After 15 April, 1943, the COTP Clearance Officer attended Navy conferences and granted clearance to masters at the conferences; from then until 25 May, 1945, 173 such conferences were attended, and vessels averaging 15 per conference were cleared - mostly for convoy movements. Boston became a highly important assembly point for convoys, replacing Wood's Hole which was used for a time in the earliest days of the war. Anchorage areas were no more than adequate to handle peak traffic. On 12 June, 1945, the Captain of the Port of Boston discontinued issuing clearances.

IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

Identification duties in the First Naval District were similar to those elsewhere. Peak personnel in this division was reached in 1943, when 48 men were assigned to this duty. The number gradually declined until activity was transferred to the Merchant Marine Inspection Division, when 3 men were so engaged. About 150,000 identification cards were issued at Boston, and of this number about 10,000 were permits for the handling of explosives. Issuance of cards ceased on 15 June, 1945, except for persons engaged in loading explosives.

SUPERVISION OF THE LOADING OF EXPLOSIVES

In accordance with usual procedure, explosives loading was supervised in the early days by the Captain of the Port. However, on 29 June, 1942, objection was voiced by the Commanding General, Boston Port of Embarkation, to the presence of Coast Guard supervising personnel within his command. As a result, no further notification of the loading of military explosives as cargo on board vessels within such areas was given to the Captain of the Port until 15 December, 1942. In the meantime, the Explosives Section, COTP, Boston, was formally organized 5 July, 1942. The complement finally increased to 12 commissioned officers and 14 enlisted explosives loading supervisors, with additional enlisted personnel as needed. As has been mentioned, Temporary Reservists were generally employed in these explosives loading details, the maximum being 40% of the personnel in each detail. New regulations, which went into effect about the end of 1942 clarified the issue of supervision at the Port of Embarkation, and work there was resumed.

THE SEARSPORT (MAINE) CARGO PORT OF EMBARKATION

To relieve ammunition traffic and loading at Boston, the Searsport, Maine, Cargo Port of Embarkation was established as a sub-port of the Boston Port of Embarkation under Army command on 11 May, 1944. At the same time, the District Coast Guard Officer established the Assistant Captain of the Port, Searsport, under COTP, Rockland, Maine. His duties were primarily the supervision of explosives loading in accordance with Port Security regulations. The Bangor & Aroostook Railroad dock at Searsport, nearly 6,500 feet long, was altered and used as needed. Two fireboats were provided and manned by the Coast Guard. Since the more hazardous shipments of explosives were handled at Searsport after establishment of the station, the

strain on the Boston Port of Embarkation, Castle Island Docks, was considerably relieved. Temporary Reservists were not used at Searsport. From 11 May, 1944 to May, 1945, 71 explosive vessels were loaded there, and 431,270 long tons of ammunition consigned overseas was handled. From then until 14 August, 1945, ships were discharged, with a total of 103,398 long tons consigned from overseas. There were three minor fires on board ships there, and each was discovered and efficiently extinguished by Coast Guardsmen.

FIRE-FIGHTING AND FIRE PREVENTION

Fire-fighting and fire prevention procedures in the First Naval District followed the general pattern established in most ports. Personnel were largely recruited from local fire departments, and given additional training. There were 20 fireboats in the District, 7 at Boston, 2 at Searsport, and one each at other principal ports. They operated in conjunction with municipal fireboats where such existed. The Fire Prevention unit consisted of two groups, (a) Ship Inspectors, and (b) Pier Inspectors. The latter were trained by members of the New England Fire Insurance Rating Association. A 24-hour tapper service, tied in with the Boston Fire Department alarm system, was maintained by the Captain of the Port, and there was immediate response to all waterfront fires. Two-way radio permitted constant control over the fireboats. Not one ship was destroyed by fire in Boston Harbor, and the fire loss on the waterfront was almost negligible despite many wooden piers, sheds and warehouses and the vast amount of supplies and ammunition passing, through the port. The fire division maintained fire guards at all locations where welding, burning, or gasoline loading were being carried on. There were two fires on the Boston waterfront in 1942, before full organization of Coast Guard fire-fighting units, which threatened to be substantial. One at a Neponset lumber yard caused the loss of about \$250,000 in building material, and another at a coal pier caused loss of about \$500,000. The latter was discovered by a Coast Guard Auxiliary boat, and developed into a 4-alarm fire at which 2 city fireboats and 2 Coast Guard fireboats operated. It was the first real test of the latter, and they responded in a most satisfactory manner.

SECURITY WATCHES FOR BRITISH VESSELS

The first security watches on board a British vessel at Boston, occurred on 14 August, 1942. The RMS AQUITANIA was in Boston undergoing repairs and alterations. The Commandant of the First Naval District requested the Captain of the Port of Boston to assume responsibility for security of this vessel. Therefore, during the 24 days this vessel was in port, the Coast Guard Security Officer established a fire detail which extinguished 36 different fires on board this ship. Similar requests for security were made for 11 other British owned or operated vessels. The men on the majority of these watches were TRs who volunteered to perform this task in addition to other regular weekly duties. These watches proved highly effective in fire prevention.

BOSTON HARBOR PATROL

Waterside patrols were established at Boston early in December, 1941. In June, 1942, Auxiliary patrols started patrolling, chiefly in pleasure sailing areas. By January, 1943, Auxiliarists were barred from patrol, all being required to become Temporary Reservists if they stayed on duty. Patrols were set up to give maximum coverage to the harbor. At the height of the wartime harbor activity, 58 boats were operating out of the Boston Patrol Base. They were covering the Loop Patrol in Massachusetts

Bay, Security patrols, anchorage patrols, and patrols of foreign vessels and foreign transports. They transported Customs Inspectors, Merchant Marine Inspectors, Load Line Inspectors, and FBI investigators. An impressive record of accomplishment was made by the patrol boats. While activity was chiefly quiet patrol without spectacular happenings, the very presence of the patrol craft doubtless had an important influence on the security of the Port, as in all places where such patrols were conducted. (For summary of accomplishments, see page 80). One important task was clearing channels for the movement of troop ships and large Naval vessels built at Fore River. For instance, on the departure of the USS WASP from the Fore River Shipyard on 24 November, 1943, patrols from the Coast Guard Base at Fore River thoroughly searched the surrounding areas, placed all movements of ships and boats under close supervision, restricted traffic in the channel to tugs and vessels connected with the movement, and roped off the Fore River Bridge.

SMALL ARMS TRAINING FOR PORT SECURITY PERSONNEL

Small arms training was pursued in most Districts in order that all Port Security Personnel might be familiar with the care and handling of small arms. This applied to Temporary Reservists as well as regulars. Most training came in the years 1943 and 1944. Indoor ranges were used, especially police ranges in cooperation with local police departments. The rifle range at Camp Curtis Guild, Wakefield, Massachusetts was excellent for outdoor firing. The Section Coast Guard Officer at Portland, Maine, requested arrangements so that his men might be trained there, and 150 of his men were trained each week for some time. Up to May 1944, 661 had been trained there. Most Temporary Reservists at Boston were given instruction there, even though some sessions lasted only a day. By the end of August, 1944, 2035 men had fired the rifleman course, 1760 men fired the rifle sharpshooter course, 317 qualified as rifle sharpshooters. About 1,360 qualified as pistol marksmen, and 203 had fired the .30 caliber ground machine gun, of which 58 qualified as machine gunners. The average weekly firing complement was 92.5 men. A fine indoor range was built at Constitution Base, Boston, where a very large number of regulars and Temporary Reservists received effective training.

TEMPORARY RESERVISTS

Volunteer Temporary Reservists were very generally used for Port Security duties in the First Naval District. At the peak, there were about 10,000 on active duty, of which half were in the Boston area, operating directly under the Captain of the Port. As early as 1 November, 1942, Temporary Reservists were manning more than 50% of the harbor patrol boats operating from the Boston Harbor Patrol Base. This continued until the TRs were placed in inactive status on 15 June, 1945. Eventually, these volunteers took over virtually all of the pier and dock security watches, furnished 40% of the men on explosives loading supervision details, for more than two years manned, to the extent of 75%, the Boston Lifeboat Station (floating) which acted as the inner examination vessel for boarding duty, operated the boarding boats from that station, stood bridge watches up to 17 January, 1944, when all such watches were discontinued, handled all welding and burning watches and bunker watches, provided a standby detail for fires and other emergencies manned 100% the signal station at the Boston Coast Guard Base for two years, comprised the entire radio sealing unit, and provided duty officers at Boston and at various COTP and ACOTP offices throughout the District. They handled all security watches at Providence and Portland during most of 1944. Waterfront facilities guarded at Boston numbered 27.

A SPECIAL SITUATION AT CAPE COD CANAL

The Captain of the Port at Cape Cod Canal had certain problems which differed from those of most COTPs. The regulations effective at the beginning of the war governing the use, administration and navigation of the Canal had been compiled by the War Department, United States Engineer Office, in 1937. A Captain of the Port office was established at the Canal early in 1942. Its activities covered primarily the regulation of wartime procedures for transiting the Canal, expediting passage of ships through the waterway, and taking preventive measures for safeguarding the Canal. All vessels transiting the Canal, except those in convoy, were boarded by Captain of the Port boarding officers. Upon arrival at the entrance to the waterway, vessels proceeded to the examination area. Commodores of convoys furnished the COTP with names and hoists of their vessels. No vessel not in convoy could leave the examination area until it has been boarded. Each vessel was to be prepared to answer challenges and receive orders from the guardship, and signal station, and boarding boats at the eastern entrance, and from boarding boats and signal station at Cleveland Ledge Light at the western entrance. Some coastwise vessels and tugs with tows regularly transited the Canal with an accredited Cape Cod Canal pilot, having departed from a coast port directly to the Canal. The Captain of the Port had authority to direct these to enter the Canal if weather prevented boarding in the normal manner.

DUTIES OF CANAL BOARDING OFFICERS

Boarding officers operate under the Captain of the Port at Cape Cod Canal were responsible for the

following.


1. Challenging and identification of all approaching vessels.
2. Familiarity with instructions, and signals for alerting the battery.
3. Personnel sealing all ships' radios, except those of Naval craft.
4. Determining whether steering apparatus, engines, and anchor gear were in good condition and properly manned in accordance with COTP regulations.
5. Determining type of cargo, draft of all tows, and identification of master of all tows.
6. Advising Operations on arrival of all "pink" ships.

TRANSITING PROCEDURE

Priority for transiting the Canal was given by the Captain of the Port. If necessary, he could suspend traffic temporarily. On entering the Canal, all vessels maintained a time interval between vessels of not less than 8 minutes. An interval of 30 minutes was required for "pink" ships. All vessels maintained a signal watch alerted for any change in traffic signals due to closing of the railroad bridge or by reason of military necessity. Speed through the Canal was directed by the United States Engineers. No vessel was permitted to anchor within the Canal, Hog Island Channel, or Cleveland Ledge Channel at any time, except in emergency. For security reasons, no vessel was permitted to display its name except when passing the Coast Guard Station at Sandwich. As a precaution while transiting it was required that a licensed deck officer be at the wheel with the wheelman, and a licensed engineer at the steering engine.



A PATROL BOAT ESCORTS AN EXPLOSIVES VESSEL
DOWN THE CHANNEL TO THE OPEN SEA



JEEP PATROLS AND PIER GUARDS
EFFECTIVELY DISCOURAGED UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS
FROM FREQUENTLY VITAL WATERFRONT FACILITIES

SECURITY MEASURES

Specific measures to maintain the security of the Canal included the continuous availability of two patrol vessels to screen the convoy anchorage when necessary; examination vessels continuously patrolling both entrances of the Canal; armed guards placed on board all ships transiting the Canal as required by the operations plan (there was a time in mid-1942 when guards were not required on all vessels); accredited pilot placed on board all American vessels over 100 tons and all foreign ships using the Canal; boarding by a commissioned officer of all approaching vessels at the eastern and western entrances. All men-of-war were challenged from the signal station at the Sandwich Control Port which was manned at all times by a commissioned Coast Guard officer and an Army officer. The salvage tug KICKAPOO was maintained on duty at all times, though suffering in the earlier days from a lack of adequate rescue equipment. The Army maintained searchlight and anti-aircraft batteries at each end of the Canal. Beach patrol was performed continuously from sunset to sunrise.

THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT

THE PORT OF NEW YORK

The harbor area of New York contains 1,500 square miles, and the total length of the waterfront, including all piers and such, is 700 miles. There are about 900 piers, and a like number of bulkheads and shore wharves operated independently of the piers together with about 100 ferry landings, 96 carfloat bridges, and about 60 shipbuilding, drydock and repair plants. There are innumerable industrial plants on the waterfront, valued in 1942 at about \$650,000,000 and employing about 149,000 persons. In the Constable Hook area alone, there are huge tanks holding more than 7,500,000 gallons of oil and gasoline. Carfloats, tugs, scows, lighters, and barges numbered around 4,500. New York was the largest wartime shipping port in the United States, and at the peak of activity, there were about 380 vessels (exclusive of Navy craft) anchored or moored at New York at a given time. About 1,000 vessels were boarded and examined by the Coast Guard each month. It was obviously essential that Port Security measures be carried out as fully and forcefully as possible.

SHIP MOVEMENT AND ANCHORAGE

In the days before World War II, one of the important duties of the Captain of the Port of New York was enforcement of the anchorage rules and regulations. Five icebreaking tugs operating under his direction kept surveillance over anchorages. Frequent patrols were made, and a daily plot of all anchored ocean vessels, including barges, was submitted to the Captain of the Port. Under this jurisdiction, from Larchmont to Sandy Hook, roughly a distance of 84 miles, there were 49 anchorages. Local pilots cooperated well, and there were relatively few prewar anchorage problems. However, activity grew tremendously, and on 5 February, 1942, the Commandant of the Third Naval District (Navy) pointed out to all shipping operators, pier operators, towboat companies, marine associations, etc., that authority to regulate movements of vessels, protect the waterside of piers and waterfront property, and enforcement of security measures connected therewith was vested in the Secretary of the Navy, and that the Captain of the Port of New York had been directed to coordinate the activities of tugs, fireboats and other suitable vessels so as to render the maximum assistance in protecting Navy yards, shipyards, waterfront properties, important vessels, and the public in the case of air raids, fires, and other enemy activities. It was directed

that tugs and other vessels were to "proceed on sight" in emergencies such as fires, collisions, etc., as theretofore. All should report immediately by telephone to the Coast Guard any cases of fire, sabotage or other emergency including violation of Federal laws, and anything inimical to the interests of National Defense. Enforcement of regulations for water traffic became a major responsibility, and harbor patrols cooperated throughout the war in such enforcement.

ANCHORAGES

Anchorages were divided into four general types; (a) for vessels carrying, loading or unloading explosives; (b) quarantine; (c) Naval anchorages (commercial vessels might anchor with special permits); and (d) general anchorages. If no time limit were designated for an anchorage, then the limit was 30 days. Permits for small craft were good for one year, and were renewable. A Coast Guard plane from the New York Air Station at Floyd Bennett Field made a daily inspection of the anchorages and reported any irregularities. A written permit was required from the Captain of the Port for all vessels carrying or loading or unloading explosives before they might proceed to the anchorage or pier designated. A patrol or picket boat escorted such vessels while in movement. At New York, it was required that vessels expose their name boards; at Boston this was forbidden. Numerous vessels leaving New York and arriving at Boston exposed their name boards and had to be contacted by blinker from the signal station at the Boston Base and warned to cover them immediately, or be notified by patrol boats. This difference in board regulations caused much confusion and some indignation.

MOVEMENT CONTROL


As mentioned in the Section on Pilots, Hell Gate was utilized as fully as possible in order to avoid use of the open sea routes. On 3 February, 1943, the first outpost of Ship Movement and Anchorage was placed in operation. This was at Hell Gate. This post was equipped with a warning light and public address system connected to a battery of loud speakers remotely located in the approaches to Hell Gate, a telephone, radio transmitter, and receiving set. Hell Gate Tower, commanding an unobstructed view of all shipping in the danger area, situated on the Triborough Bridge, commenced its task of providing vessels with a description of all other activities which might interfere with their safe passage; this added security increased the number of vessels which could transit Hell Gate and the East River. This proved so successful that in time several lookout towers were set up throughout the harbor. Equipped with telautograph, visual signaling, telephones, field glasses, the men kept constant vigil over the principal Upper Bay anchorages, informed the chart room of arrivals, departures, and movements of vessels within the anchorages, and communicated with the vessels in emergencies. They recorded and reported all information of value.

LOOKOUT TOWERS

In order to provide more efficient harbor surveillance, the several COTP lookout towers established at strategic points numbered seven. They began functioning in 1943 and were primarily observation posts, but also acted as ship to shore and harbor communications towers. Messages were relayed through the Barge Office where they were acted upon or passed on to those officials interested. These stations were at the Barge Office, the Statue of Liberty, Starrett Lehigh Building (West 26th St.), Seamen's Church Institute (East River), Delaware, Lackawanna & Western tower at Hoboken, Pier 6 at Bush Docks, Brooklyn, and atop Borough Hall at St. George, Staten Island.



SIGNALMEN AT A LOOKOUT TOWER IN NEW YORK HARBOR
CHECK IDENTITY OF A PASSING VESSEL



A FAST PATROL BOAT KEEPS THE CHANNEL CLEAR
FOR AN EXPLOSIVES-LADEN VESSEL

RESTRICTED

VESSEL IDENTIFICATION
AND EXAMINATION

In early 1943, a system was established for the identification and examination of all water-borne traffic not routed by the Navy Port Director, departing from, or arriving at, the harbor entrances. This service worked in close conjunction with the net gate tenders, Naval Inshore Patrol, Ambrose Section and the Routing Officer of the Port Director. Two examination ships were moored at strategic locations in Lower New York Bay.

DETAILS IN
SECTION III
OF PART VI

Because of the importance and the high degree of development of Clearance, Ship Movement and Anchorage in the New York area, many details of operations were given in Section III of Part VI, preceding, to which reference is made.

IDENTIFICATION
AT NEW YORK

The identification activity at New York was, in general, the same as at other ports, except in the size and the work load. Throughout the entire activity, more than 2,500,000 persons received Coast Guard identification cards or were finger-printed and issued credentials. This was an Herculean task. As an additional security measure, persons with occupations of "special trust" such as civilian guards on vessels and piers, radio service men and compass adjusters were required to obtain Captain of the Port identifications cards bearing a special indorsement. The same applied to commercial and party fishermen. The entire identification detail consisted of 228 officers and enlisted men at the peak of operations, serving in 18 different units in the District. A ship detail boarded incoming vessels for issuance of cards to all crew members. This division issued photographers' permits, in which case a Coast Guard guard accompanied the photographer to be sure no unauthorized pictures were taken. A mobile unit covered areas not otherwise covered. Nine laminating machines, blowers and vises were used at the peak of the activity. A roving detail was maintained for spot-checking the validity of cards on vessels, piers and other waterfront facilities. The Identification Officer was furnished by passenger agents of various steamship lines with a list of the passengers who were scheduled to sail on a particular ship. The list gave each passenger's passport number. On the day the ship was to sail, a representative from the Identification Office went to the pier and as passengers arrived, he checked their names and passports against his list. Thus, visitors were weeded out from the actual passengers, and the pier was not over-run with persons of "unknown quality." On 20 June, 1945, the Identification Office became part of Intelligence, and on 25 August, 1945, all outlying units were discontinued.

AN EXAMPLE OF
THE EFFICACY OF THE
IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM

An interesting example of efficacy of this identification program is the case concerning an arsonist at New York who had perpetrated a hideous crime and then fled. He had gone into hiding until he felt he could safely reappear in another section of the country under an assumed identity. For a while, he led a seemingly exemplary life, without anyone being aware of his strange tendencies. A routine investigation by the Coast Guard Identification Office uncovered his past, and steps were taken to neutralize the hazard which existed by his employment on the waterfront facilities.

THE INFLUENCE OF HALIFAX

On 6 December, 1917, during World War I, a cargo of death and destruction was visited upon Halifax, Nova Scotia, when a munitions laden ves-

sel exploded in Halifax Harbor and burst into a burning inferno. About 4,000 persons were killed, and 3,000 injured. A tenth of the buildings in that city of 40,000 people were razed. This disaster was not forgotten in World War II. It was a potent influence in the extreme caution with which explosives were loaded and moved in all United States ports, and the safety of such loading and movement was a heavy responsibility for the Coast Guard. More ammunition and war supplies moved out of New York Harbor than in any other port in the world. Figuratively speaking the 13,000,000 residents packed into the New York area during the war were sitting on a powder keg with their feet dangling in eternity. Many times, death's hand had been poised, ready for a sweeping haul among this one-tenth of the nation's population, but standing in the way had been stalwart Coast Guardsmen operating under the Captain of the Port of New York.

GROWTH OF THE
MUNITIONS DETAIL
AT NEW YORK

The Munitions Detail at New York, in its infancy in 1941, consisted of one commissioned officer and 25 enlisted men. Trained men were needed, for there were many minute and intricate problems from the moment a ship began taking explosives until it sailed. Classes were held at the Barge Office three days a week. Soon these were extended and covered a broader field of appropriate subjects. As the detail grew, classes were held daily, and more subjects were added. They were attended occasionally by Navy and Army officers who were to carry on similar operations. By August, 1943, the office of the Munitions Detail consisted of 6 commissioned officers and 9 enlisted personnel. There were 44 Munitions Supervisors, all commissioned officers and especially trained. At the peak, there were about 450 enlisted men. A 24-hour watch was maintained throughout the war by the office detail.

EARLY REGULATIONS
AT NEW YORK

From 15 June, 1940 to March, 1941, lend-lease ammunition was loaded at the Bayonne Port Terminal under the Captain of the Port, New York, which was well located clear of densely populated sections and with deep water and good railroad facilities. On 10 March, 1941, the Navy took over and no non-Navy loading was done there after that. After the war began the following documents had to be submitted to the Captain of the Port before permission to load explosives on Army, Navy (except public vessels) lend-lease and commercial carriers could be granted:

1. Request for permit to load explosives, giving name and official number of vessel and proposed date and place of loading.
2. Manifest of explosives cargo.
3. Detailed proposed stowage plan of explosives.
4. List by tons and commodity of inflammables and other dangerous cargo, and where stowed.

If no violation of applicable regulations was apparent, a written permit was issued prior to movement of the vessel to the loading place. The Army claimed jurisdiction over their munitions ships when berthed at the Port of Embarkation. There was little or no conflict with the Coast Guard officers. But Coast Guard regulations almost prohibited loading certain types of ammunition in between decks. The Army and Navy wanted such loading. So a ridiculous procedure followed. Waivers were requested, Headquarters denied the waivers, the Army and Navy then invoked a waiver on their own initiative, and proper documents to this effect were placed on board the vessels. Small loadings were carried

on at non-ammunition loading piers which were not sanctioned by the Coast Guard, but the responsibility was assumed by the Army. These "formalities" would have been futile had any disasters resulted. As everywhere, magazines were inspected for cleanliness and construction, the engine room for fire hazards, the main decks and hose to be sure they were ready for use, and there was a general inspection for hazards such as rubbish on dock. If all was right, a certificate was given. The Munitions Detail also controlled certain patrol and escort duties of the Harbor Fleet. Escorts were assigned for all explosives movements within the harbor. A patrol boat was assigned if an explosives or gasoline laden vessel were adjusting compasses. While on such escort duty, the patrol boat was required to:

- (a) Maintain a continuous lookout for fires on board the vessel, barge, dock, or vicinity;
- (b) Stop all vessels approaching the area which they were guarding and direct them to change course in order to clear such area unless they were connected with loading or towing operations of such explosives cargo, and were recognized as such;
- (c) Prevent all vessels from passing near an explosives anchorage at a speed that endangered cargo of the barges or vessels;
- (d) See that proper day and night signals were displayed by explosives laden barges;
- (e) When escorting a loaded vessel to sea, proceed at a distance and see that no other vessel or craft made contact.

These or similar regulations applied in most Districts. A fire watch and munitions specialists were posted on board a vessel loading.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROPER HANDLING AND STOWAGE

The responsibility for the proper handling and stowage of explosives on board a particular vessel was possessed by the officer assigned as Munitions Supervisor. It was his duty to make certain that all regulations were observed, that the explosives were stowed according to the proposed stowage plan and the permit which had been granted, and that all gear was in order. At the larger facilities, a Senior Officer Present acted as coordinator of these various operations and acted as liaison between operators of the facilities and the Coast Guard details. It was especially important that no packages were broken during the loading operations, and supervisors had to be alert to be sure such breakage was prevented.

EARLY FEAR OF THE USE OF HELL GATE FOR EXPLOSIVES VESSELS

The desirability of routing ships through Hell Gate was recognized in view of the dangers on the outer route. However, in August, 1942, the Commanding Officer of the First Port Security Command forcefully stated his viewpoint on the undesirability of routing explosives laden vessels through the narrow confines of Hell Gate, and recommended that such vessels be routed outside. This was inspired by three collisions within two months between vessels carrying explosives. It was also suggested that the East River be made a one-way thoroughfare during such explosives movements, but this was not approved because of probable congestion around City Island. Eventually, the amount of ammunition that could be carried through Hell Gate was limited, but this reduced rather than eliminated the hazard.

SOME PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

There were certain problems everywhere connected with

explosives loading supervision, but some were especially notable at New York. Smoking was always a headache and a serious hazard. The problem was solved to quite an extent by having the Army erect fireproof huts on explosives loading piers equipped with electric lighters, since longshoremen were not permitted to carry matches. Though most cargo booms were rigged for 10,000 pound drafts, it was decided not to allow more than 2,400 pound drafts in order to set up a safety factor so high as to allow for age, wear and abuse of equipment. Some authorities thought that this limitation unduly slowed down loading. However, in 1943, the Army-Navy Materials Handling Board devised a system of palletizing various types of ammunition. This eliminated many hazards, and allowed loading of 4,000 pound drafts. There was no place on board explosives loading ships for fire-arms, and Coast Guardsmen were not armed. A nightstick was considered sufficient to take care of any situation which might arise. Inadvertent discharge of small arms in an ammunition area might have caused a detonation of serious implications.

ISSUANCE OF "RED CARDS"

The Munitions Detail also handled the issuance of explosives handling permits (red cards). This detail consisted of 4 enlisted men who handled issuance of these permits to members of the International Longshoremen's Association, personnel of stevedoring concerns and other companies authorized to:

- (a) Transport, load, transfer or directly or indirectly handle explosives;
- (b) Build, install, or alter facilities or spaces for stowing, loading or transferring explosives;
- (c) Guard explosives loading terminals or vessels and conduct business in connection with explosives.

The applications were filled out, and the recipients passed an examination covering their knowledge regarding the handling and stowing of explosives. Between the time of application and issuance of the "red card", the applicant was investigated by the Coast Guard and Naval Intelligence Offices. If he possessed a severe criminal record, had been arrested for arson, or was suspected of being involved in subversive activities, no card was issued. From July, 1941 to August, 1945, more than 20,000 of these permits were issued. If a longshoreman handled munitions roughly or committed some other offense, his card was taken from him, thus limiting him to general cargo, and he lost the extra pay received on the munitions job. Unless there was some other offense, the card was generally given back after a waiting period, but after two or three times, the card was taken permanently. This system was very successful. A permanent record of men working specific holds was kept at New York in case any sabotage was later discovered.

THE MUNITIONS DETAIL, NAVAL AMMUNITION DEPOT, EARLE, NEW JERSEY

Under the immediate supervision of the Munitions Officer was a section of the Munitions Detail which was assigned on 22 July, 1944, to supervise the loading of explosives at the Navy Ammunition Depot, Earle, New Jersey. It comprised 4 commissioned officers and 75 enlisted men. This depot was abreast of Sandy Hook and was a large naval installation where munitions were stowed in igloo-type magazines and Navy ammunition was repaired, renewed and exchanged. For servicing ships, three piers were constructed at adjacent Leonardo, New Jersey. Several barges and shallow-draft vessels, 2 naval combat vessels, and 4 merchant ships could be accommodated simultaneously. The first vessel to be loaded there was loaded by Navy personnel who took 20 days to load 6,756 tons

PROCESSES

of explosives. Thereafter, it was decided to use commercial stevedores under Coast Guard supervision. Eventually, at the peak, the Coast Guard detail consisted of 18 commissioned officers and 213 enlisted men.

TWO NOTEWORTHY INCIDENTS

There were no disasters at Earle, but two incidents could have had serious consequences. The first occurred on 6 November, 1944. While loading aircraft bomb fuses from the tray to a stowage magazine, one of the fuses detonated in the arms of the stevedore who was carrying it. There was much excitement. A pile of dunnage caught fire. The lives of everyone for miles around were seriously endangered. Although struck in the groin by flying fragments, a Coast Guardsman, Sandow Holdman, S2c, quickly extinguished the blaze with a fire extinguisher and a ship's hose. The second incident, which involved the near collision of a blazing tanker with ammunition-laden vessels, occurred 2 January, 1945. At 0045, the burning tanker was sighted about one mile off the pier where it had been anchored the previous night because of a dense fog. The vessel seemed to be headed directly for the pier. Without delay, all freight cars were ordered moved from the pier. Crews of the vessels berthed at the pier were alerted. Coast Guard munitions men stood by with fire axes ready to cut the mooring lines should that become necessary. The tanker continued its apparent "sail into oblivion" straight as an arrow towards the munitions pier. Then, seemingly out of nowhere, a gallant, rugged Navy tug appeared. It rammed against the fiercely blazing tanker just in time to prevent it smashing into the pier. Blazing benzol immediately encompassed the pier pilings and the two vessels in the outer berths. The tanker continued in the direction of E.N.E., and shortly grounded. Quick, expert and heroic action by Coast Guardsmen and Navy men extinguished the surface fire and pier piling blaze in short order, and another catastrophe had been averted.

SUMMARY OF MUNITIONS HANDLING AT NEW YORK

Until V-J Day, loading at Leonardo, was continuous on a 24-hour basis. Thereafter, work continued 16 hours a day six days a week, and the Coast Guard maintained a fire watch. Three fireboats of the Coast Guard were detailed there during all operations, one for each pier. From 1 January, 1941 to 15 August, 1945, the Munitions Detail at New York supervised the handling and stowage of over 4,500,000 tons of military explosives on board about 3,000 vessels. In addition, 5,104 permits for defense ammunition operations on board merchant vessels were issued for an average of about 10 tons of ammunition per permit. Also, during this period, an average of about 50,000 tons weekly of gasoline, other inflammables or dangerous cargoes were supervised.

NOTES ON THE NEW YORK PORT SECURITY COMMAND

In the days shortly preceding Pearl Harbor, the combination of Coast Guard identification cards and the vessel license system enabled the Captain of the Port at New York to maintain a fairly substantial control of the approaches of persons to vital facilities from the waterside as well as from the landside. "Regulations for the Security of Vessels in Port" furnished basic minimum requirements, but the Captain of the Port had authority to require additional measures or to waive any of the provisions in his discretion. In those earlier days, chief responsibility for complying with the regulations was placed on the master, owner, operator or agent of the vessel. The COTP assisted to be sure the responsibility was fulfilled, with inspections and reports. In late 1941, the 18 vessels of the Captain of the Port were attempting to


afford protection to an area of 1,500 square miles with 650 miles of waterfront, as well as keep an eye on the daily routine lighterage in the harbor departures and arrivals of vessels and ride herd over crowded anchorages, and still find time to accomplish the many routine and emergent duties normally performed. On 15 December, 1941, right after Pearl Harbor, the COTP had 784 men. A few days later, the Commandant of the Third Naval District issued notice that vessels entering the newly established Defense Area would make visual contact with patrol vessels in the area, that they would move under U. S. Naval or other authorized supervision, and that they would be alert to observe and obey signals made by patrol craft. On 22 April, 1942, the Coordinator of Port Security for the Port of New York was established. The Coordinator was authorized to confer or communicate on all matters affecting the security of the port. Any incidents, however, requiring action, were to be handled by the Captain of the Port. Duties and operations of the Coordinator have been given in some detail in Part V, page 46. In June, 1942, the COTP at New York was still woefully undermanned, while duties and responsibilities grew rapidly. Men were not conveniently quartered. Whereas some 3,000 men were then present for duty, the duties imposed required an estimated 16,900 officers and men distributed as follows:

Dock Security Detail	8,608
Night Patrol Detail (bomber security)	300
Shipyards Security Detail	1,540
Explosives Detail	350
Ship Security Detail	2,010
Identification Detail	350
Office Force	350
Emergency Detail	300
Fireboat Crews (33)	330
Patrol Boat Crews (289)	1,734
Officers	1,000

These early days of Port Security at New York saw organizational confusion due chiefly to the fact that responsibilities and duties grew far more rapidly than did the personnel, equipment and facilities for executing them. In mid-summer of 1942 a new Security Officer was appointed who patterned the Port Security Force along strictly military lines. The force was renamed the "First Port Security Regiment," with 5 battalions, the third of which included 8 fireboats, and the fifth, the harbor patrol craft. The Security Officer's duties were the organization, administration and direction of all COTP personnel, direction and operation of shore patrols and guards, and the direction of water patrols and port routine. Further reorganization occurred about 1 December, 1942. The Captain of the Port set up the "Port Security Command," Forces operating under his direction primarily on land and personnel and material pertaining thereto, comprised the "Port Security Force." Those forces operating primarily on water comprised the "Harbor Patrol Fleet." These two, and any Captain of the Port administrative units not attached solely to these, comprised the "Port Security Command." Closely cooperating was the Office of the Coordinator. This general organization remained in force throughout the balance of the war activity.

INSTRUCTION AND MORALE Port Security Forces at New York maintained several schools for the training of the members. One was a Harbor Patrol School at St. George for personnel serving afloat. Another was maintained for a while at Camp Smith, at Peekskill, New York, where New York State afforded, at no cost to the Coast Guard, its facilities for instruction in small arms. Throughout the war, a Port Security school was maintained at the Chelsea Barracks. Instruction was given in highly specialized duties.

WISCONSIN



WHAT PRICE CARELESSNESS?
COAST GUARD SUPERVISION OF THE LOADING OF EXPLOSIVES
WAS AN EVER PRESENT SAFEGUARD



LOADING MUNITIONS AT N. A. D., EARLE, NEW JERSEY PIER
WHICH WAS MORE THAN 1,200 FEET IN LENGTH

WISCONSIN

Many men in the COTP forces were excellent in their respective ratings, but in a broad sense were not security-minded. Many had been trained as seamen and wished duty on board ship rather than guarding a pier or other waterfront facilities. This was fully understood, but important work had to be done on shore. As a result, prior to the establishment of this school, the morale of many of the Port Security men had been exceedingly low. It was necessary, at the school, to impress these men with the importance of a seemingly important detail. They had to be awakened mentally to the possibility of an unseen enemy waiting to strike through sabotage once the bars of unceasing vigilance had been relaxed. They had failed to grasp the significance of a dreary patrol, hour after hour, day after day, and week after week on a pier that was swept by a biting cold wind in the winter and torrid heat in the summer. Nothing ever seemed to happen. This school brought about a better understanding and a sense of responsibility in this tedious type of duty.

THE USE OF TRs IN THE THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT

"Tamps," as they were called locally, were not utilized as fully in this District as in most others. They never seemed to become divorced from the civilian Auxiliary organization in the minds of Coast Guard officials and many, still yachtsmen, did not want to be. The District Coast Guard Officer apparently never became convinced of their value, and did not take the aggressive interest evidenced elsewhere in building up and utilizing the volunteer organization. This seems unusually odd because of the almost continuous personnel shortage in the District. A lead to the answer may be found in a letter from the Captain of the Port of New York, written at the end of 1943. When Headquarters indicated the possibility of reducing Port Security forces, the Captain of the Port said, in part: "To disband, or substantially reduce the Port Security Command, or to replace its personnel with older men, or part time men, or amateurs, may result in disaster." Apparently the complete success of Temporary Reservists in other ports had not been communicated to him. Certainly, performance of duty by Temporary Reservists was made difficult. Most were required to serve a stretch of 24 hours each week, which immediately eliminated a vast number of excellent potential members who had to earn a living. There was no general transfer from the Auxiliary to the Temporary Reserve as in most other Districts, possibly because the Auxiliaries were kept active well into 1943. On 30 June, 1945, active and inactive Auxiliary members totaled 9,084, of which only 3,084 were Temporary Reservists and of these 747 were inactive. Of the "active" members, only 1,901 were in active duty. In outlying areas, flotillas operated largely as units, but in the New York City section, all were pooled regardless of flotilla, and there were no unit operations. In March, 1944, in New York with its millions of people, there were 248 Temporary Reservists on Landside Port Security work, and by mid-1944 the "volunteer regiment" numbered some 1,200 men "who performed duties whenever requested by the Coast Guard." There were few, if any, regular security watches for the TRs. Of the 3,872 active Temporary Reservists in mid-1944, only 1,825 were assigned regular weekly watches in the entire District, and of these, many were serving in the Great Lakes area.

THE "NORMANDIE" INCIDENT: EFFECT ON PORT SECURITY

The 83,000 ton French luxury liner NORMANDIE, built in 1932, had crossed the Atlantic 64 times before she found herself threatened by the advent of war between France and Germany. From August, 1939, she remained in an idle status at Pier 86, North River, New York City. She had about 13 decks. Though never fireproof,

an effort had been made to have her so as nearly as possible and consistent with her purpose as a luxury ship. While at her pier, she caught fire and later capsized, and this incident probably had a greater influence upon subsequent Port Security measures for the prevention and fighting of fire than any other single factor. Executive Order No. 9074 of 25 February, 1942, was issued largely as a result of this incident, (mentioned on page 18). Because of its importance, the incident deserves more than passing comment. It brings out confusion and division of authority and responsibility which prevailed at that time, and forcefully emphasizes that such a situation should never again be allowed to exist, peacetime or wartime.

THE COAST GUARD DETAILED TO THE "NORMANDIE"

On 15 May, 1941, the Treasury Department, acting under International law, ordered a detail of about 150 Coast Guardsmen on board the NORMANDIE to insure her safety, guard against sabotage and eventually learn the maintenance and operation of her intricate engineering department, fire system, and electrical and piping systems. This detail continued into 1942. On 12 December, 1941, acting on directions authorized by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Coast Guard removed the French crew from the vessel and took complete possession and control. Up to then, the Coast Guard detail had merely stood guard, but thereafter maintained steam, stood fire watch, and performed all other tasks relating to maintenance of the ship in idle status.

CHANGES IN JURISDICTION

On 16 December, 1941, the United States Maritime Commission formally requisitioned the NORMANDIE and took legal title and possession, requesting the Coast Guard detail to remain, which it did. The Navy took over the vessel from the Maritime Commission on 24 December, 1941, as of 16 December, and accepted "full responsibility" for it. Also, on 24 December, contractors commenced reconversion work to make the vessel into a troop ship. Four Navy officers and 8 civilian Navy inspectors arrived to have direct charge of reconversion. There were no formal orders, and Lt. Comdr. Earl G. Brooks, USCG, who was in charge of the Coast Guard detail, failed in efforts to discover his status under the irregular and unusual procedure. On 9 January, 1942, a bit over two weeks later, the Navy offered the vessel to the Army, which accepted her on 14 January, 1942. The following day, marine engineers and naval architects went on board, and Army representatives inspected the ship and suggested changes to meet Army requirements. On 27 January, again, two weeks later, the Navy requested the Army to return the ship, which it did.


FIRE EXTINGUISHERS

The Coast Guard fire detail consisted of 4 petty officers and 36 men solely for fire protection. They stood four 9-man watches, and held fire drills every two days. In January, 1942, an inspection of fire extinguishers revealed that only 10 of the 666 then in the vessel were built according to American design, thus replacement parts would have to be made. About 3 or 4 extinguishers were tested, it was estimated that 50% were in good condition, and a recommendation was made that all be replaced by American extinguishers. A change from French hose couplings to American ones was under way, but this had not been completed at the time of the fire, nor had the extinguishers been replaced.


RUSH DEMANDED IN CONVERSION

The work of conversion was carried on urgently. Night and day, hundreds of different work operations were going

RESTRICTION



THE NORMANDIE BURNING AT HER PIER IN THE NORTH RIVER
MUCH WATER WENT OVER THE SIDE BUT LARGE QUANTITIES WENT BELOW



CAPSIZE THE NORMANDIE RESTS
ON THE MUDDY BOTTOM OF THE NORTH RIVER

RESTRICTION

on simultaneously. There was much overhaul of equipment to meet American standards. Burning and welding operations were being performed all over the 1,027-foot vessel above and below decks. On the day of the fire, about 2,500 civilian mechanics, artisans and laborers of all kinds in the employ of the general contractor and 30 subcontractors were engaged in the conversion work. The date for completion of conversion was set on 24 December, 1941, and completion date was given as 1 February, 1942. In the rush and changes in jurisdiction, there were present a condition of poorly defined responsibility, an absence of definite planning, and much indecision. On 6 February, 1942, the Bureau of Ships stated that the ship had to be ready to load on 28 February, 1942, and had to leave New York on 14 February for docking at Boston on 15 February. It was protested that conversion work could not be completed or the Navy crew become familiar with the ship in that short time, but the order had not been changed at the time of the fire. To speed things up, the contractor hired many more men, mostly inexperienced and relatively useless. The contract called for the highest possible degree of care to protect the vessel from fires, and specified various safety measures, but apparently no survey of the ship was made by the fire superintendent of the shipyard engaged in the conversion work. A "fire watch" of 50 unskilled men was provided, however.

KAPOK LIFE PRESERVERS

About the first of February, the Naval Inspector ordered 1,140 bales of kapok life preservers, made under Navy specifications. Kapok is highly inflammable. The preservers were delivered over a three-day period and stored in the main salon. The commanding officer of the Coast Guard unit noticed these and instructed his men to keep a careful lookout against smoking. He was assured either by the Naval Inspector or a representative of the contractor that no welding or burning operations were contemplated in the salon.

BURNING IN THE SALON

By 8 February, there were 6 commissioned officers and 275 enlisted men in the security detail on board the NORMANDIE, several increases in the complement having been made. On 8 February, the day before the fire, the prospective Navy commander ordered removal of the carpet in the salon and replacement with linoleum, and ordered that 4 large metal stantions there which held light fixtures, be removed. Cutting work was undertaken the next day under a foreman of welders, and two stantions removed without incident. Piled closely around the other two stantions were the kapok life preservers; these were moved so that men could walk around the stantions. When these last two stantions were cut, there were no fire watchers. When the last was practically cut down the foreman turned his back and walked away. This last burning was done without a shield or an asbestos board and without observation of the foreman.

FIRE!

In the final seconds of this operation, a small flame was observed darting upward from the bales of kapok life preservers nearest the base of the cut stantion. The frantic cry of "Fire!" echoed and re-echoed throughout the salon where 21 persons were assembled including the Senior Naval Inspector. The men attempted to put out the fire with their hands, and then tried to stop the rush of flames by throwing the bales into the center of the salon, merely spreading the flames. In the space of minutes the fire was beyond control and the dense, huge volume of smoke made it necessary for all hands to leave the salon. There were no extinguishers nearby, and one which was brought in failed to operate. A hose, connected soon afterward was inoperative because of lack of water.

Other hose, brought in from the starboard side, had no pressure. Valves open due to change-over from French to American couplings reduced pressure on the connected lines.

THE ALARM

A Coast Guard fire watcher, hearing the shout of "fire" promptly turned in an alarm to the fire control station by telephone, but a fire detail member had already reported it orally. The man at the fire-control station notified various people and instructed the man on the bridge to turn in a general fire alarm. Another man ran to the bridge to sound an alarm all over the ship. He threw the two fire alarm switches, but both had been disconnected for several days. Nothing happened! There had been a temporary fire alarm box from the bridge to the New York City Fire Department, but this had been removed at the request of the French Line three weeks earlier since the French were no longer responsible for the ship. No one had ever requested its replacement. The nearest fire alarm box was on the pier, and the man who threw the switches to no avail called to a piloceman on the pier who sounded the alarm at 2:49 p.m. Some delay was experienced in breaking out the Coast Guard fire brigade because its headquarters had recently been moved to two decks below the promenade deck, and there was no telephonic communication. The fire had started between 2:35 p.m. and 2:40 p.m., and during the time until the alarm was sounded at 2:49 p.m., the fire was spreading rapidly and gaining considerable headway.

FIRE FIGHTING OPERATIONS

Within two minutes of the alarm, the first New York City fire engine responded. The Coast Guard fire detail was helpless because of the dense smoke, ineffectiveness of gas masks, and the extinguishment of lights. Fire hose pressure of 120 pounds was maintained until 3:00 p.m., but due to smoke in the boiler rooms, it was necessary to secure the Scotch boilers. Fifteen minutes later, all light and power in the ship failed. Flames spread through the superstructure. The city fire-fighters had difficulty rigging hose lines because of the size and height of the ship, and unfamiliarity with the passageways. Darkness and smoke also hindered their efforts. By 4:15 p.m. there were about 36 pieces of city apparatus at the fire, including 3 fireboats. A number of privately owned tugs also attended and fought the fire. In the four hours of fire-fighting operations, the fire-boats poured about 839,420 gallons of water into the NORMANDIE. Even at 3:30 p.m. a slight port list was noticeable. This gradually increased. The fire, which never penetrated to the lower decks, was under control and largely out at 6:00 p.m., though small fires burned for two hours after that. Most of the fire apparatus left. However, because of the tons of water poured into the vessel, and the resulting list, the great danger of the vessel capsizing was fully realized. This was a problem left to the Naval authorities. When the fire was out, there were 255 persons, including enlisted personnel of the Coast Guard and Navy, workers in the ship, and city firemen, who received medical treatment for burns, smoke inhalation, exposure and other ills.

NORMANDIE TURNS OVER

The matter of possible capsizing received prompt and technical consideration from higher ranking Naval officers, and other officials. By 9:00 p.m., the list had increased to 20 degrees, and by 11:00 p.m., to 40 degrees. The Naval District Commandant gave orders to abandon the ship at midnight. The ship capsized at 2:45 p.m., on 10 February, 1942, despite efforts to find a quick solution to the problem. The huge vessel came to rest on her port side at an angle of 80 degrees. Regardless of causes, the vessel

was as conclusively out of service as though she had been torpedoed or bombed.

POST MORTEM

The immediate result of this incident was seen at Washington, D. C., where investigations were set in motion by the House Naval Affairs Committee of the 77th Congress, and by the Senate Naval Affairs Committee. These investigations were thorough and resulted in very constructive suggestions and regulations.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS BY THE HOUSE INVESTIGATION

From a report of the House Naval Affairs Committee of the 77th Congress, it appeared evident that, at the time of the fire, there were on board the NORMANDIE:

- 500 Navy men of the prospective crew unfamiliar with the ship, and without assigned duties, but under command of the prospective commanding officer
- 281 Coast Guardsmen of the regular detail
- 1,750 Employees of the contractor
- 675 Employees of subcontractors
- 1 Naval Inspector
- 9 Civilian assistants to the Naval Inspector

The Naval Inspector was the only Naval authority with jurisdiction over the contractors, and that was supervisory. He had no other authority nor did other officers present have authority over him. It was never definitely determined who was in command of the vessel when the fire occurred. Confusion and lack of authority and jurisdiction was brought out in the report; it was pointed out that:

- (a) Numerous high officials arrived at the fire;
- (b) The Navy Commandant considered the fire department to be in charge of the fire. He did not assume command, though orders were given from time to time in his name to Navy and Coast Guard officers who were under the impression he had assumed command by virtue of his rank and presence;
- (c) The District Materiel Officer issued orders only to members of his staff;
- (d) The Naval Inspector received no orders whatever;
- (e) The Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard detail looked to orders from the Captain of the Port. The Captain of the Port considered the Commandant in command.

Thus, it is evident there was no over-all command. The units acted independently, endeavoring to coordinate their efforts and those of the city firemen in an unofficial way, but with no one acting officially or otherwise as a coordinator. Results of this investigation went far beyond the Normandie incident itself; there was a valuable general survey and study of the manner and authority under which protection during wartime was afforded waterfront facility and ships in port. Many specific recommendations were made which underlay rules and regulations for Port Security later adopted and almost uniformly enforced by the Coast Guard in ports under its jurisdiction. An outline of these would in many respects duplicate the regulations, and is therefore omitted. Thus, the

incident had a greater and more far reaching effect on the protection and security of the Port of New York and all other maritime cities than any other single incident during World War II.

RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE

The Senate Naval Affairs Committee, after its investigation, made recommendations from which the following is quoted:

lowing is quoted:

"By Executive Order of the President, dated February 26, 1942, the Navy was vested with full responsibility for the protection of the New York waterfront

"The loss of the Lafayette (*). (NORMANDIE) proved beyond a doubt the need of clearly defined responsibility under a single head accompanied with adequate authority in military or naval undertakings. The protection of the security of the Port of New York and all other maritime cities, particularly of their ship facilities, piers, boats, yards, and other equipment and it is a most important undertaking, and the confusion of control and authority that now exists with respect to these agencies should be corrected.

"It appears that the United States Coast Guard is endeavoring to do an honest job of protecting the naval interests in New York Harbor, but under difficulties. We find on the piers and waterfront property not only Coast Guard personnel, but also United States Customs Guards, members of the New York Police Force, and other civilian guards employed by the several steamship companies through private detective agencies, each with their own jurisdiction and authority.

"Therefore, a branch of the naval service, such as the Coast Guard, should be given a most clearly defined directive for the full responsibility for the security of the above services in the Port of New York and other maritime cities forthwith. Their authority should be unquestioned and without limitation in matters of the physical security. The authority of the United States Coast Guard should be without limitation by reason of the appointment of any other type of administrator or co-executor, Federal, municipal, civilian or otherwise. The force of men assigned should be adequate to the task involved. Training rules of security should be published and given adequate sanctions. So timely and vital is this problem that the Commandant or Captain of the Port, United States Coast Guard, shall acquaint the Governor of the State and the Mayor of the City with his problem if the state or city government is involved.


"The United States Coast Guard's designated personnel should be augmented with adequate personnel to do the job."

Because of the obvious importance of this whole event to the ultimate scope of duty of the Coast Guard in Port Security and the great care exercised in security activities, as well as clarified jurisdictions and authorities which followed, this incident has been given special emphasis.


THE NORMANDIE RAISED

American skill and ingenuity later floated the NORMANDIE, after months of tedious effort and huge expense. During salvage operations, the Navy was provided with a ship on which thousands of divers were trained. Here was one constructive result, for with this training it was possible to raise, in an incredibly short time, all the ships sunk at

* The NORMANDIE was never officially re-named the LAFAYETTE which was a prospective name only.



THE NORMANDIE STRIPPED OF HER SUPERSTRUCTURE.
SALVAGE OPERATIONS CONTINUED DAY AND NIGHT.



A FAR CRY FROM THE PROUD OCEAN QUEEN SHE ONCE WAS
THE NORMANDIE, RAISED, IS TOWED TO THE BAYONNE DRY DOCK
UNDER COAST GUARD ESCORT

Pearl Harbor and salvage others by the hundreds of thousands of tons in the harbors of the liberated countries. On the morning of 3 November, 1943, 250 Coast Guardsmen climbed on board the refloated vessel at the request of the Commandant of the New York Navy Yard, as a security detail while the vessel was in transit and at drydock at Bayonne, New Jersey. The Coast Guard was made responsible for establishing safe passage for, and escorting the vessel to the Naval drydock, and this was provided by a fleet of picket and other boats. Soon, the Navy abandoned plans for further conversion, and the ship was then towed under similar circumstances to Gowanus Bay. The hull was over-run with thousands of rats, and it was necessary to arm the security guards with wooden clubs. Many men had to be removed from the detail due to mental strain under such conditions. Coast Guard responsibility for the security of the NORMANDIE ceased on 20 October, 1945.

NOTE: A report on the Coast Guard NORMANDIE Security Detail by Lt. Oliver Rahle, USCG, Security Officer at the time of the fire, is given in full in Appendix I.

FIRE FIGHTING AND
FIRE PREVENTION

After the NORMANDIE incident, the Captain of the Port at New York paid special attention to the matter of fire prevention and fire-fighting. An efficient organization was built up which, in most respects was similar to such organizations in other ports except for the amount of equipment and the scope of inspections which, in a port like New York, were naturally greater than in the other ports. Trailer pump units were strategically placed, properly manned and used effectively at waterfront fires. Coast Guard inspectors found much of the fire-fighting equipment on the piers to be in a deteriorated condition or otherwise useless and of no real protection. Steps were taken to have this corrected. However, due to the nature of the New York waterfront, special emphasis was placed upon organization of an effective fireboat fleet which, at the peak of the war, was the largest single fireboat fleet in the world.

THE FIREBOAT FLEET

While the date of the following figures is unavailable, the information relates to the fleet at its point of greatest development. By the end of 1942, there were 24 fireboats in the Third Naval District, a year later, 32, and at the end of 1944 there were 31 all of which remained on duty until September, 1945. Of these, 25 fireboats operated under direction of the Captain of the Port of New York. Of these 25, 8 were Diesel-driven, 16 were gasoline-driven, and one was steam-driven. Ten of these were the standard Hanley water-jet-propelled craft, and manned by crews of 10. Four were converted vessels with Chrysler pumps, and manned by crews of 14 or 15. One was a larger vessel manned by 18 men, and the one steamer was manned by 18. These vessels had the usual 500-gallon pumps ranging from four to eight in number depending upon the size of the craft. All except the Hanleys were outfitted with fire foam equipment. Most were stationed in New York Harbor.

ORGANIZATION
AND TRAINING

The two Coast Guard lieutenants who were assigned to organize the fleet in 1942 had served 20 to 25 years with the Marine Division of the New York City Fire Department. Their immediate task was to get trained crews for the boats and select strategic locations for the fireboat stations. The selected sites were about a mile apart. Training of fireboat crews included an extensive 6-week course of lectures and the performing of evolutions in fire-fighting practices. The New York City Fire Department aided in this training.

After crews were assigned to the fireboats, they were ordered to report to the U. S. Navy Fire Fighters School at Boston, and later to the Brooklyn School. By this time the Fort McHenry School at Baltimore was in operation and as many as possible were sent there. This was a 6-week course covering all phases of fire prevention and actual fire-fighting, using the most modern equipment such as fog and foam, nozzels, and their applications. (See page 73). The Bayonne, New Jersey Fire Department also helped in training fireboat crews. A 10-week course was attended by crew members on their liberty time. The Fireboat Fleet Officer had the assistance of three Division officers and three chief petty officers whose principal duty was to drill and instruct crew members with the fireboats and all their equipment. These officers supervised operations at fires, and on standby duty at dangerous cargo loadings.

OPERATIONS:
FIREBOATS

Crews worked on the starboard and port watch systems, half of the entire crew always being present. All but the Hanleys had two-way radios. Fireboats were dispatched to fires or emergencies by telephone, but responded on sight to any and all conditions observed; some were occasionally contacted by blinker from the lookout towers. The Operations Duty Officer was tied in with the municipal fire alarm system as well as the police and fire radio systems. Thus, all alarms in the City were received. Notice by telephone was given of emergencies outside of New York City proper. Fireboat duties included responding to fires, standing by while dangerous cargoes were being loaded or unloaded, aiding sinking vessels with pumps, and responding to airplanes forced down upon New York Harbor waters. The following is a summary of the activity of the fireboats during the period 5 September, 1942 to 31 December, 1944:

	1942	1943	1944
Performed Fire Duty Responded, but no Duty, or False Alarms	42	90	111
Standby, Hazardous Cargo Loading	67	399	425
Pumped Sinking Craft	56	205	182
Miscellaneous (Rescue, etc.).	17	42	34
	6	14	37
	189	750	789

Grand Total 1,728

The average of fire "runs" during World War II at New York was considerably less than in World War I, and the number of "working fires" was less, also. This was doubtless due to the Coast Guard fire prevention and fire-fighting program, despite the far greater activity in World War II. Even accidental injuries and loss of life were astonishingly low, in spite of the fact that tonnage moving through the harbor was many times that of prewar days, and much of it highly explosive and inflammable. It is interesting that the New York Fire Department reported that 10% to 25% of the fires on piers were caused by automobiles, tractors and trucks. As in most Districts, experience at New York was that most fireboats were of too light construction to be sturdy, and most were slow. They were not sufficiently seaworthy for offshore work or for full effectiveness under adverse conditions of weather. The great majority of waterfront fires were smuffed out without the aid of major fire-fighting equipment. The important thing is that they were discovered before they had made much headway. Three major fire incidents involving fireboats are worthy of special mention.

THE "EL ESTERO" FIRE

One of the most spectacular fires in the New York area involving a vessel and fireboats was that of the Panamanian steamship EL ESTERO. This vessel had completed loading about 1,500 tons of high explosives and was about to sail. At 1720 on 24 April, 1943, a fire started in her boiler room on a furnace front and in the bilges when an oil feed pipe was punctured. This fire, which involved fuel oil in bilges and around the wing fuel tanks was exceedingly difficult to attack because of inaccessibility. It spread rapidly. An alarm was sounded and the Coast Guard Munitions Supervisor on board immediately assumed command, and directed his men in a valiant attempt to extinguish the blaze. Flames were soon leaping to the ship's superstructure. Fire apparatus arrived, but all efforts were unavailing. To stay below decks for any appreciable time would have been suicide. The amount of explosives on board was about equal to that which wrecked Halifax in World War I. Coast Guard, Jersey City and New York fire-fighters worked courageously, but the great danger of explosion and attending disaster was such that the Captain of the Port (who was also District Coast Guard Officer) ordered the ship scuttled at 1820, one hour after the fire started. However, because of the fire, the sea cocks were inaccessible.

BLAZING VESSEL TOWED INTO THE STREAM

The EL ESTERO was then cut adrift and towed into the bay about 200 yards from the pier, while the fireboats stuck to the job of flooding her. Coast Guard, city, and privately-owned tugs hauled her out, fireboats alongside, and tugs ahead. At 1910 the Coast Guard gave a telephone alarm throughout the metropolitan area reporting the possibility of a blast from the burning ship, and asked local civil authorities to stand by under the same precautions taken with a "yellow" air raid alarm. At 2021 the Acting Police Commissioner of New York advised all police departments: "Large vessel afire containing explosives off Bayonne, New Jersey. Open windows and stay away from windows." All commercial radios broadcast the warning. In the New Jersey waterfront area, air raid mobilization of wardens, ambulances, doctors, nurses and reserve firemen and police was effected. Meanwhile, the EL ESTERO was being flooded and towed to a spacious area where damage would be less if she did "blow." For two hours of towing, Coast Guard and city fireboats pumped water into three cargo hatches with no one knowing who would win the unusual race with disaster. It was "Praise the Lord and sink the Ammunition!" At 2045, the EL ESTERO suddenly listed, threatening the safety of the city fireboat. The latter's hawsers were cut with axes as the ship's cargo booms swung outboard. Everything not battened down began to spill on the fireboat.

FINALLY SUNK OFF ROBBINS REEF

Finally, the ship began to settle. As she filled the blazing oil line rose, and the higher it went, the more oxygen it obtained and hence it burned more fiercely and expanded. There were some explosions of containers of powder on deck which, of course, intensified apprehension of a major explosion. Many of these containers were washed overboard and finally recovered by patrol boats. A half a mile northwest of Robbins Reef Lighthouse, all hands were ordered off the burning vessel, decks of which were then awash. At 2100 the vessel foundered in 35 feet of water. The only fire then remaining was blazing oil on the water which was promptly extinguished.

AWARD FOR HEROISM

Lt. Comdr. John T. Stanley, the Munitions Officer on board the EL ESTERO, was on

his first day of duty as Munitions Officer. For his heroic part in this incident he was later awarded the Legion of Merit. The citation read, in part: "For exceptionally meritorious conduct during fire fighting operations aboard a merchant vessel loaded with explosives..... Realizing the ever present danger of an explosion, Lt. Comdr. Stanley boarded the burning vessel and for three hours directed a large detail of men engaged in controlling and extinguishing the fire, by his calm and courageous leadership he inspired the personnel under his command and skillfully coordinated their activities, thereby preventing an explosion which might have done incalculable damage to other vessels and vital installations in the harbor." Seventeen months after the fire, the City of Bayonne honored the men who assisted in sinking the EL ESTERO in recognition of their bravery, The Mayor said: "We have gathered here tonight for the purpose of conferring upon 168 officers and men of the Coast Guard, medals in recognition of their devotion to duty in a situation that might well have resulted in a catastrophe for the City of Bayonne."

AFTERMATH

A lesson learned from this experience was that the inspection of holds should be extended to the fire room and galley, since they were the most probable sources of fire. The incident was clearly the outstanding one of the war for the Munitions Detail at New York. It took about a year from the date of the fire for the responsibilities of the Coast Guard, Army, New York Fire Department, and the Jersey City Fire Department with respect to fires at Caven Point-Clairemont Terminal to be clearly defined. In March, 1944, a plan of operation was formulated, for coordinated action with specific responsibilities. In case of the question whether a vessel should be moved, the senior officers of the fire-fighting agencies were to go into consultation, but the decision of any, if time did not permit consultation, was final. The Senior Coast Guard Officer present was permitted to proceed with the removal of a vessel by flooding, even though no such agreement could be reached if he believed it imperative, or when requested to do so by the Chief of the Jersey City Fire Department, or the commanding officer of the Terminal. Removal or sinking should be resorted to only as a last and carefully determined act. The Terminal commander could order removal regardless of the judgment of others.

FIRE AT PIER 4, HOBOKEN

One of the worst fires in the New York area occurred at Pier 4, Hoboken, one of the most modern large piers in the whole area. On 11 August, 1944, the cargo on the pier was considerable and varied, and included a quantity of Kolloxiline in drums, awaiting loading on the SS NATHANIEL ALEXANDER, berthed alongside. Kolloxiline is a pyroxylyn cotton material used in the manufacture of lacquers and plastics, and consists of nitrated cotton with 30%-35% ethyl alcohol. The material is said to be not explosive unless overheated, but is very inflammable. Movement of these drums on the pier was halted to permit loading of several large cases containing automobile cabs and wheels. One of these was towed along the concrete floor of the pier and past these drums by a chisel truck. Suddenly, the truck operator heard a hissing sound and immediately saw a tongue of flame at this side. He deserted the truck and ran away in time to avoid a moderate explosion of one drum, followed by more as other drums became involved. Several longshoremen tried to fight the fire at its start with hoses on the pier, but water pressure was insufficient. At 2000, an alarm was sent to the Hoboken Fire Department followed by two more in quick succession, calling all Hoboken apparatus; New York City firemen and Coast Guard fire details immediately went into action. At

REMARKS

2000, two Coast Guard lookout towers reported the fire and explosions, and in five minutes reported the entire sea end of the pier in flames. There were men in the water, with Coast Guard fireboats and tugs attempting rescue. At 2008, a fire was reported in the NATHANIEL ALEXANDER; she was towed to safety ten minutes later, with the fire extinguished. Another steamer was also towed away from the blazing pier.

A MASS OF EQUIPMENT
AND PERSONNEL
FOUGHT THIS FIRE

All commercial tugs in the area worked at the fire. A large fleet of Coast Guard fireboats pumped water on the blazing structure, and many other boats were used for messenger and transportation services. Most Coast Guard Division heads reached the fire, including the District Coast Guard Officer (who was also Captain of the Port). More and more Coast Guardsmen were called. During the evening several were injured. The fire was considered under control at 0045 on 12 August, but it burned well into the day. A final check on participation at this fire by men of the Port Security Command, showed Coast Guard assistance to have been a major element in subduing the disastrous fire. On the scene were 22 officers, 785 enlisted men, 32 patrol boats, 9 fireboats, 3 large tugs, 6 trailer pumps, 19 units of breathing apparatus, and a large variety of other small equipment.

CAUSES AND RESULTS

It was never learned how the drum of Kolloxiline became ignited. A spark from the exhaust of the chisel truck, or a spark caused by the movement of the metal-bound case over the concrete probably caused it. The drums had been at the pier about 5 hours, exposed to the sun in 96 degree temperature. Possibly the alcohol content had become volatilized; the truck drivers statement that he heard a hissing noise would indicate release of gas pressure. Except for the stringpieces, the entire substructure of the pier was destroyed, as well as one-third of the superstructure at the land end. Loss was estimated at \$1,500,000. Two stevedores and one Maritime Commission watchman lost their lives in this fire. Two Coast Guardsmen were overcome by smoke. The Captain of the Port received a letter of appreciation from the New York Fire Commissioner, and the commanding officer of the Port Security Command received one from the Captain of the Port. Lack of water pressure at the outset led to the recommendation of the commanding officer of the Port Security Command that where munitions were being handled, the munitions detail ascertain always that hoses were in order and water pressure adequate. Also, as a result, a special inspection group of nine officers, familiar with chemistry, was established to make daily inspections of hazardous cargoes throughout New York Harbor.

THE "SPRING HILL" FIRE

On 5 February, 1945, at 0857, the Port of New York suffered one of the worst wartime tragedies in its history, when two ships collided off Stapleton, Staten Island, and burst into raging infernos. At about 0855, the Panamanian freighter CLIO was outbound off Pier 18, Staten Island, with a cargo of water ballast. To maneuver between a U. S. Navy vessel, the KA-75 and the United States tanker SPRING HILL, both anchored, with the latter astern, the CLIO swung to port toward the main ship channel. Suddenly her master saw the opening blocked by several invasion barges being brought alongside the KA-75. The master frantically endeavored to swing his vessel hard to starboard, but momentum combined with a strong ebb current carried him toward the port side of the SPRING HILL. Collision was imminent. Port and starboard anchors were immediately dropped and the engines reversed, but the bow of the CLIO rammed the port side of


the SPRING HILL forward of the bridge and left a large gaping hole in the number three port wing tank. Laden with a cargo of high octane gasoline, the SPRING HILL was immediately enveloped in flames. The CLIO backed away. Flaming gasoline from the ruptured tank covered the surface of the water, spreading rapidly downstream with the current and enveloping a Norwegian tanker VIVI, loaded with diesel oil which, fortunately, did not burn. Many of the SPRING HILL's crew were trapped below decks; others, in life jackets as well as the Naval Armed Guard, jumped overboard into the icy waters. Attempts to release lifeboats were futile. Crew members of the VIVI did likewise, though a small detail remained. With steam already up, the VIVI proceeded through the blazing water, dragging both anchors.

FIRE-FIGHTING AND
DARING RESCUES


Coast Guardsmen at the Signal Tower, Pier 18, promptly reported the incident, and all available cutters, fireboats and small craft were dispatched to render assistance. Working with high efficiency, Coast Guard fireboats, New York City fireboats and commercial tugs extinguished the blaze in 2½ hours. Chemical foam used in combatting the blaze was very effective. There were several well-executed rescues. A Coast Guard Reserve vessel which had just finished ferrying several pilots to their ships was nearby when the fire started. John Zeigler, CEM, in charge, with his two men directed his craft toward the stricken SPRING HILL, and with almost superhuman strength, the three rescued more than 35 survivors who had jumped overboard and were in great danger from the flaming but icy water. During the process, his propeller was in danger from ice floes, and at one time a line fouled the propeller causing the boat to drift helplessly toward the flames. It was freed in the nick of time before the survivor-loaded wooden craft reached the fire. Lt. W. A. George, in the CGC 64309 on the way to his patrol area, by expert seamanship and utter disregard of hazards, saved about 23 seamen from certain death. With foresight and a wealth of fire-fighting knowledge, Lt. Comdr. Arthur F. Pfister, commanding officer of the Captain of the Port Fireboat Fleet, just prior to embarking from the Barge Office to the scene, ordered all available chemical powdered foam sent to Pier 18 for the city fireboats. When the foam arrived, the city boats had less than a minute and a half's supply remaining. This fire caused the death of more than 15 seamen, and in all about 85 survivors were brought in to Pier 18, where they received first aid treatment before being transported to the U. S. Marine Hospital at Staten Island. Three died soon after arrival.

EVOLUTION OF THE
HARBOR PATROL FLEET

In the earliest days, patrol was unorganized at New York, and was chiefly confined to anchorage duty. Few boats were available. With the advent of war, the vessel procurement program resulted in more boats which were sent out to patrol in general areas, but crews were sent out often without proper indoctrination or clear understanding of policies, authority, or Coast Guard activity. Up to mid-1942, supervision was indifferent and many patrols inefficient. Things improved when the boats were organized into divisions each under a commissioned officer to supervise appearance, upkeep and operations. A fleet school was organized at the St. George Base, training commenced, and a great improvement got under way. About September, 1942, the Commander, Coast Guard Patrol Force was directed to supervise, coordinate, and direct the Coast Guard Patrol Forces in the Third District except those of the Captain of the Port. In the first 8 months of the war, harbor patrol activity at New York mushroomed, but was neither efficient nor self-sustaining, and there was a great shortage of personnel and equipment,



WITH FIRE EXTINGUISHED, THE STEAMER EL ESTORO
RESTS ON THE HARBOR BOTTOM NEAR ROBBINS REEF



TEAMWORK!
COAST GUARD AND NEW YORK CITY FIREBOATS
BATTLING THE PIER 4, HOBOKEN, BLAZE TOGETHER

On 28 August, 1942, a Patrol Officer was appointed to supervise all patrol activities on the water. A night patrol officer was designated, who maintained a roving night patrol, checking other patrols, and being present at emergent incidents. On 18 June, 1943, definite lines of demarkation between the Inshore Patrol Force areas and Harbor Patrol areas were established. Prior to this, harbor patrol boats often extended the scope of their activities far beyond the harbor limits. Boundaries were flexible, however, in cases of emergency. During the period of growth, there was a troublesome lack of housing and docking facilities, junior officers were inexperienced, and mechanical breakdowns of Reserve boats were especially annoying. A Federal explosives anchorage was established eastward of the scope of activities of the Captain of the Port, New York, in Long Island Sound. Explosives vessels anchored off Hempstead Harbor. The commanding officer of the City Island Patrol Base was vested with the authority to provide adequate protection and security for all vessels in this area. Ultimately, a central control panel was set up, showing the location of all boats at all times. The various bases had no authority to dispatch a boat without consultation with the Dispatcher, except in emergencies of extreme nature.

ESTABLISHMENT OF ROVING PATROL

On 21 September, 1944, the commanding officer of the Harbor Patrol Fleet established a continuous roving patrol with an officer watch on board at all times. This functioned as a general operations patrol and harbor entrance examination patrol. Duties of the watch officers were:

- (a) To officiate as a floating examination unit which rendered decisions pertaining to examination and boarding problems;
- (b) To exercise direct supervision over all harbor patrols;
- (c) To enforce all navigation laws, motorboat act and marine inspection laws;
- (d) To enforce all Patrol Orders, Special Orders, COTP Orders and such additional orders as might have been assigned by the commanding officer of the Harbor Patrol Fleet;
- (e) To respond to emergency calls, fires, etc.;
- (f) To inspect water taxis;
- (g) To patrol launchings, dockings, etc., when so directed.

This was done by one vessel with 3 commissioned officers and 13 enlisted men. This duty was in addition to other regular duties of the officers. As a check on boats, patrols, etc., division officers were required to submit a monthly report of the vessels in their flotillas, their condition, a check on the knowledge of the crews, drills, and such. There were 33 questions to be answered to assure checks and inspections, and these enabled the Harbor Patrol Command to discover and correct weak spots.

HARBOR PATROL BASES

Harbor patrol headquarters were at the Barge Office, South Ferry, New York. In the early days, boats were based at St. George Repair Base, Barge Office and Ellis Island Receiving Station. Later Pier 18, Stapleton, Staten Island, was acquired for Harbor Patrol Fleet. Facilities were excellent, and accommodated 500 men. This developed into a complete, self-sustained unit. The Boarding Detail,

Ambrose Section, the Sandy Hook Pilots, and three motor vessels of the British Ministry of War Transport were also quartered there. The City Island Base furnished patrols to many shipyards between Hell Gate and the Sound, and boarding was done from that station. The barracks accommodated 250 men. The U. S. Customs Service and Immigration Service operated from offices there, and Hell Gate Pilots made it their headquarters. A crash boat for the LaGuardia Airport, operating from there, was instrumental in saving the lives of passengers and crew members of planes that crashed. One vessel maintained a 24-hour patrol of the degaussing area. The explosives anchorage at Hempstead Harbor was patrolled from there. All vessels were identified, and convoy vessels were intercepted east of Execution Rocks by visual signalling and informed of assigned anchorages. From the Perth Amboy Base, seven fixed patrols operated, and patrol craft escorted ammunition barges from the Raritan Arsenal.

VARIOUS PATROLS

The anchorage patrol used 12 Harbor Patrol Fleet craft for sweeps and general anchorage patrol duties. About 60 enlisted men were so engaged. They also participated in fighting fires, ice breaking, towing, etc. They informed masters and pilots of inbound convoy vessels what anchorage and what position each vessel was assigned. There were law enforcement patrols, which were especially active on summer week-ends. There were about 30 navigation, 30 Espionage Act and 10 Federal Use Tax violations a month during the war. There were 30 smaller, slower craft used on waterfront security patrols, including some 36-foot picket boats. About 170 men were engaged in these patrols. The usual monthly experience was 10 fires reported and 5 extinguished. Two boats patrolled Hell Gate, and at the peak escorted an average of 10 ships a day. There were 5 standby crash boats which answered an average of 50 emergency calls a month. About 22 boats with 130 enlisted men carried an average of about 2,000 passengers a month to ships at anchor (water transportation patrol). Two examination (inspection) vessels were stationed in Lower New York Bay each with a "chaser" (fast) boat, and a third was near the submarine net. Another was at the Narrows Net Gate. These craft and several patrol craft and their pilot boats were in communication with each other by radio to allow coordination of action when such was necessary. Vessels of the Fishing Vessels Detail totaling 13, with 8 officers and 100 men, identified and reported about 10,000 vessels a month to the Harbor Entrance Control Post, and about 1,000 were boarded and examined monthly.

HARBOR PATROL SCHOOL

To increase the efficiency of the personnel serving in the harbor patrols, a Harbor Patrol School was established at the St. George Base under supervision of the Harbor Patrol Officer. The school gave a three-week course covering practical marlinespike and general deck seamanship, visual signaling, piloting, rules of the road, Bluejacket's Manual, general communications including the International Code of Signals and radiotelephone procedure, and special regulations and their enforcement. The average of 10 men a week attended this school. Seven days of the three weeks were spent afloat including one night afloat. The school was discontinued in May, 1945.

THE MANUAL FOR THE HARBOR PATROL FLEET

A very fine "Manual for the Harbor Patrol Fleet, Port Security Command, Captain of the Port of New York, Third Naval District" was prepared by Lt. (jg) C. E. Seagren, USCGR, Harbor Patrol Officer, and edited by

Commander Etzweiler, USCG, commanding officer of the Harbor Patrol Fleet. It was printed by the Coast Guard Auxiliary Press. This work was a compilation of the laws, orders, rules, regulations, and miscellaneous information with which all persons attached to and serving with the Harbor Patrol Fleet were expected to be familiar. The manual contained detailed instructions on operations, and how to report on and submit various forms. This manual included anchorage charts of all the authorized areas, current charts, a list of water taxis, harbor tug boat companies and their locations, and miscellaneous data for small boats, a telephone directory, and various excerpts from Coast Guard regulations.

CONTROL OF MARINE TRAFFIC

To maintain an orderly procedure of marine traffic in New York Harbor, vessels of the Captain of the Port's Harbor Patrol Fleet were constantly on patrol. They watched, directed, corrected and protected. Their operations were closely identified with those of the shoreside Port Security personnel who went into piers and ships lying beside them looking for saboteurs and sabotage.

THE "TURNER" DISASTER

On the morning of 3 January, 1944, the U. S. destroyer TURNER was at anchor about three miles north of Ambrose Lightship. She was under observation of several patrol craft in the vicinity, particularly the CG-83306 and the CG-83337, standard 83-footers. Suddenly, at about 0620, a terrific explosion in the vessel shook the whole area, and was followed by several more. Immediately, six boats partly manned by Temporary Reservists were dispatched from the Rockaway Lifeboat Station, and six others similarly manned were sent from the Sandy Hook Lifeboat Station, arriving variously on the scene between 0725 and 0755. The two 83-footers which were near the scene at the time of the explosion returned to the Sandy Hook Station with survivors at about 0740. The CG-83343 went in with 45 survivors. Thirty-nine were picked up by the CG-1904, a pilot boat, and taken to Pier 18 Base at Staten Island. Other Coast Guard vessels which had responded picked up several more survivors and much debris, including many confidential publications, codes, blueprints, etc. Between 1030 and 1200, many Naval vessels had reached the scene, and all but one of the Coast Guard craft were ordered to return to their bases. The CG-77003 remained, acting as communications vessel for the Navy until the latter part of the afternoon. The Sandy Hook Station took care of immediate first aid and hospitalization of survivors, assisted later by 11 Navy nurses and 6 enlisted men of the Navy. Of the 160 survivors, 156 had been rescued by the Coast Guard in accordance with the traditions of the Service. Not all vessels participating were under the Captain of the Port, but many were, and brought much credit to the organization.

EMERGENCY PLANS

Foresight was shown in the establishment of several emergency plans for use by Harbor Patrol craft in case of necessity. On 5 April, 1943, the commanding officer of the Harbor Patrol Fleet issued instructions on procedure to be followed when an air raid warning sounded. On 15 July, 1943, the Captain of the Port issued a comprehensive communications casualty plan to be used in case of interruption to the "TWPL" and telephones circuits by accident, sabotage, or other enemy action. A general Disaster or Hurricane Plan was formulated in the Spring of 1944 for (a) safeguarding Coast Guard boats and equipment, (b) rendering assistance and restoring order, and (c) policing area to prevent pillaging and disorder. Duties of all units were outlined. The

fact that such plans were formulated is of more importance in this work than the actual details.

CONTROL OF TRAFFIC AT LAUNCHINGS

In most ports, Coast Guard harbor patrol craft patrolled launchings to keep areas clear and take precautions against accidents. Probably the most complicated and important problem of traffic control at launchings was encountered in the East River at New York, where traffic was heavy and in a very confined area. Therefore, as an example of the ultimate in traffic control at launchings, the following details are given on such operations by the Harbor Patrol Fleet at New York. The general procedure followed during these launching operations is illustrated in Operation Order No. 1-1945, issued for the launching of the USS KEARSARGE, which is quoted.

General Information:

(1) The USS KEARSARGE will be launched at 1700 EWT 5 May, 1945, from the ways of the westward side of the Navy Yard, Brooklyn, N. Y.

(2) All traffic must be cleared from the area between Manhattan and Williamsburg Bridges in the East River not later than 1600 EWT.

(3) The Throgs Neck patrol will advise all west-bound traffic that the above area will be closed to navigation between 1600 EWT and the completion of operations. Such notification shall be given from 1400 to 1630 EWT unless instructions are received to the contrary.

TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) Patrol Officer
 - 1. Able CG-72005
- (b) Williamsburg Bridge Area
 - 1. Williamsburg CG-38487
- (c) Manhattan Bridge Area
 - 1. Manhattan CG-38492
- (d) Hell Gate Area
 - 1. Hell Gate CG-38495
- (e) Battery Area
 - 1. Battery CGR-1919

The words preceding the boat numbers are the radio calls for those boats for this special assignment.

TASK ASSIGNMENTS

- (a) PATROL OFFICER - The patrol officer aboard the CG-72005 will be in charge of the operations. Orders to other boats assigned to this operation will be issued by the patrol officer. This boat will cover the entire closed area as necessary.
- (b) WILLIAMSBURG BRIDGE AREA - This boat, the CG-38487, will take station approximately under the Williamsburg Bridge at the time designated by the Patrol Officer. When ordered by "Able" (approximately 1600 EWT) to close the area, this boat will fly a large "Baker" flag, and such flag will be flown until the area is opened upon orders from "Able."
- (c) MANHATTAN BRIDGE AREA - This boat, the CG-38492 will take station approximately under the Manhattan Bridge and will follow the same general procedure as "Williamsburg."
- (d) HELL GATE AREA - This boat, the CG-38495, will take station just south of Mill Rock in Hell Gate at the time designated by the Patrol Officer.



FIRE FIGHTERS BATTLE RAGING FIRE
ON BOARD THE TANKER SPRING HILL IN NEW YORK HARBOR

When ordered by "Able" (approximately 1500 EWT) to warn traffic of closing of Navy Yard area at 1600 EWT this boat will warn (not stop) all south bound traffic of this fact.

- (e) BATTERY AREA - This boat, the CGR-1919, will operate in the area between the Battery and the Brooklyn shore at a time designated by the Patrol Officer. When ordered by "Able" (approximately 1530 EWT) to warn traffic of closing of Navy Yard area at 1600 EWT this boat will warn (not stop) all north bound traffic of this fact."

Special Instructions: Time: All Coast Guard vessels assigned to patrol this launching, with the exception of the Hell Gate area patrol boat, will report to the Patrol Officer at Pier 9, East River, at 1500 EWT. The Hell Gate area patrol boat will report on station at 1500 EWT and will notify "Able" by radio when such station is established.

Communications Procedure: All boats assigned to patrol this launching will adopt the radio call signs hereon stipulated for the duration of the operation. All communications will be in plain language and will be addressed "Able from Hell Gate" which will be acknowledged "Hell Gate from Able" followed by originator's plain language text which is repeated for the word "Roger." 3410 shall be the frequency used.

Signals to Dock Master: The Patrol Officer's boat, CG-72005, will be in position where it can be observed at all times by the docking master at the Navy Yard. This boat will keep the docking master informed of conditions by flying one of the two flags as follows: Red "Baker" signified area not all clear, do not proceed with launching. Blue "Peter" signifies area all clear, proceed with launching.

Navy Yard Signals: When all clear is given by the Coast Guard, a red flag will be hoisted atop the ways to warn craft to keep clear. The Navy Yard whistle will be sounded when the USS KEARSARGE slides down the ways. When the tugs have taken the USS KEARSARGE in tow after the launching the International flag "Fox" will be hoisted on the Navy tug traffic. Patrols will then be instructed by the Patrol Officer to allow all or part of the traffic to proceed as conditions warrant.

Securing: The Patrol Officer will notify the patrols when to secure. Upon securing, patrol boats will resume their regular duties or return to their bases depending on their duty status.

OIL POLLUTION Oil pollution was a troublesome problem at New York, as in most ports. Every precaution was taken to reduce this to a minimum and to care for actual cases. Experience at New York showed almost 75% of all violations occurred during tank filling operations when oil overflowed through the scuppers. Careless fueling was almost always the cause, as well as pumping of bilges and ballast containing oil. The Captain of the Port issued instructions that all scuppers be plugged during fueling, and that frequent soundings of tanks should be taken when nearing completion of filling, and pumps slowed down. A breakdown of oil pollution violation cases reported by the Coast Guard at New York during several months of 1945 is as follows;

Cause	Cases
Fueling Operations	86
Bilge and Ballast Pumping	53
Leaky Seams, etc.	48
Loading and Unloading Cargo	18
Cleaning Tanks	12
Undetermined	12
Mechanical Defects	7
Leaky Oil Drums on Deck	2
Sanitary Tank Discharge	1
Washing Deck	1
Filling Settler Tank	1
	241

TWO CASES OF ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE

Shortly after our entrance into World War II, the commanding officer of the Munitions Detail was personally inspecting two ships which were loading ammunition at Gravesend Bay. They had wooden sheathing between the skin and the holds. He noticed that some of the knots in the boards had been dislodged. He had his men rip down some of these boards, and they found cotton on the ship's skin. Further search brought to light Manila rope strands combed down to bare fiber also lying around. A check on the ship's history revealed that it had never carried cotton. And a check on the cotton disclosed a certain chemical treatment which would have made it self-igniting in high temperatures. On another ship this same officer found a shackle pin on the head block of the boom that had been unscrewed to the last thread. The lanyard keeping it in place had been cut almost through during the night. A sling of explosives might have been dropped as a result with disastrous effect. In fighting sabotage, nothing could be taken for granted.

DIFFICULTIES DUE TO CONDITION OF VESSELS

Owing to the pressure on ocean transports and the demand for cargo space, the maintenance and repair suffered in comparison with peacetime standards. Time was lacking and repair facilities were not always able to keep vessels in first class condition. Consequently, a condition arose which was of considerable concern to Captain of the Port vessel inspectors. There were leaking oil lines, defective oil burners, extinguishing equipment in poor condition, and other unsatisfactory circumstances. Oily bilges could not always be pumped on schedule for lack of barge or shore tanks. Gasoline, normally transported by water in modern tankers with full safety equipment and design, could not always be so handled under war pressure. Much had to be moved in 5-gallon cans or smaller containers according to the needs of the receiving field units. These were shipped in ordinary cargo vessels. The cans were usually single trip containers with thin shells. Handling of these was a continuing problem, especially when damage must be avoided. Any damage caused release of gasoline vapors. These cans also endangered piers where they were stowed.

SPECIAL SERVICE BATTALION

At New York, there was a "Special Service Battalion" of about 250 men quartered in a converted experimental ship capable of being towed to any place in the harbor, and located at Pier 9, East River. These men handled such matters as the security of the NORMANDIE, the Swedish liner GRIPSHOLM, and the QUEEN ELIZABETH and QUEEN MARY. How much standby duty these men had is not clear. The Battalion was used in emergencies requiring either tactful or forceful handling such as threatened race riots on the piers between white and colored longshoremen, and such. When not on a special job, these 250 men of the CGB-48 were undergoing training. One of the most difficult tasks of

██████████
this unit was tracking down and capturing 5,000 drums of high octane gasolene that were set adrift when a barge capsized in the Upper Harbor.

OVERCROWDING OF EXCURSION BOATS

In the late summer of 1944, there were complaints that excursion boats were being overcrowded, and steps were taken to supervise strictly the number of passengers permitted on such craft. Checking in this regard was done on Saturdays and Sundays by Temporary Reserve personnel operating under the Port Security Command, though no record was taken during the week. As an example, on an excursion boat at Pier "A", there were found to be 2,900 passengers whereas only 2,740 should have been allowed on board. Operations of this detail eliminated this danger.

NEW YORK HARBOR WATER TAXIS

The water taxis at New York presented many difficult problems for the Captain of the Port. Letters informed him of exorbitant rates charged, an arrogant attitude of the taxi operators, who adhered to the "carry whom, run as and where we please" policy, and even letters from merchant seamen claiming they had been robbed of their savings while being ferried back to their ships under the influence of liquor. Consequently, in 1943, after due deliberation the Captain of the Port issued some regulations for launch service in New York Harbor. Some requirements were that persons brought in from vessels should be disembarked only at specified control stations; that Customs Inspectors and Coast Guardsmen would be on duty at such control stations 24 hours a day; that launch services were under direct supervision of the U. S. Customs at all times; that a Coast Guardsman should accompany every launch on every trip; that each launch operator should submit to the Coordinator of Port Security a schedule of his rates which should be all inclusive, and that no additional rates might be charged and that these would be posted at each control station and in each vessel. The same applied to boats of repair yards. Regular schedules were set up. The boats were not restricted to zones, but they had to keep the schedules unless weather, breakdown or other contingency prevented, in which case notice had to be given and another taxi substituted. These orders were effective 29 March, 1943. In the summer of 1945, these duties were largely performed by Customs officers, thus relieving the Coast Guard.

SHIPS SANITATION DETAIL

Early in 1943, the Captain of the Port of New York assigned 22 enlisted men to the U. S. Public Health Service, working at the New York Quarantine Station, Rosebank, Staten Island. Their work was vital to the safety and security of the United States, - heading off any possibility of the "black plague" infested fleas carried by rats. Throughout World War II, more than 20,000 rats were destroyed on board vessels entering New York. An average of 1,100 inspections were made every month, and 24 fumigations executed. Special attention was given vessels from ports suspected of disease. This work was undertaken under direction of the U. S. Public Health Service. It was dangerous and involved the handling of deadly hydrocyanic gas. Prior to fumigation, there was a search for stowaways, and then tear gas was used to make sure there was no one on board. Deadly dis-coids of gas were then tossed into sealed holds. After 2 hours, the ship was completely aired out, and then the real hunt began for the "kill." Any rats found were sent to the laboratory for examination, and any fleas found were tested for evidence of the plague. Such evidence was found on one ship arriving from Casablanca in January, 1943, for the first time in 20 years at New York. It was believed that none of the rats got ashore.

FOURTH NAVAL DISTRICT

THE PORT OF PHILADELPHIA

The importance of Philadelphia as a wartime shipping port (one of the largest fresh water ports in the world) may be realized from the fact that during the war it handled more than 100,000,000 tons of shipping. Yet, despite the hazardous nature of much of the cargo, the shortage of man-power to handle loading and unloading, the pressure of demands for ever faster turnaround of ships in port, and the presence of many neutral vessels with special problems of alien seamen, foreign agents, and sabotage possibilities, the accident rate was reduced, no incidents of sabotage occurred, and hardly any waterfront fires got out of control. Philadelphia has 20 miles of Delaware River waterfront, with extensive facilities vitally important in the war effort.

EARLY COTP ACTIVITY

The Captain of the Port, Philadelphia, was established 8 October, 1939, as a representative of the Commander, New York District. Originally, Philadelphia was part of the Third Naval District, but on 1 December, 1940, the Fourth District was established, separate from New York, with headquarters at Philadelphia. Before the COTP was set up, the only representative of the Coast Guard at Philadelphia was the tug NAUGATUCK, and there was no shore organization. After the old Lighthouse Service was merged and assimilated in 1939, seven officers and men inspected armed merchant vessels of belligerent nations coming into port to determine if they were defensively armed, sealed radios, and conducted normal activities relating to maintenance of aids to navigation on the Delaware River and Bay. As war progressed, duties increased, and by November, 1940, personnel had grown 300%. At that time the Philadelphia Section was organized. As 1941 progressed, duties further increased. It was estimated that the discharge of duties for supervision of the loading of explosives, patrol of river and anchorages and dock areas, escort of explosives vessels, transportation of Customs and Immigration officials, guards and radio sealing men would require about nine 75-foot patrol boats, 3 tugs, and 14 38-foot picket boats. Plans were evolved for patrol of the water and protection of the waterfront from sabotage, as the imminence of war became more apparent. Special efforts were made to enlist city and state policemen to provide an immediate source of men experienced in police work, and firemen were also enlisted for similar reasons. The nucleus of the Waterfront Security Patrol was established in October, 1941, for the purpose of providing a "flying squad" which would proceed to any place on the waterfront to safeguard vessels or property upon notification of crew trouble or other disturbances. With the outbreak of hostilities, this patrol was initiated with 12 men to check up on the proper performance of duty of civilian guards placed on all vessels by the owners. By the end of 1943, when the approximate personnel peak was reached, there were 50 officers and 1,300 enlisted men in Captain of the Port work aside from the Volunteer Port Security Force. Spars eventually numbered about 100.

EXPLOSIVES OPERATIONS

There was little essential difference between explosives operations at Philadelphia and those at other ports. Originally, the crew of the tug NAUGATUCK superintended the loading of armed guard ammunition on merchant vessels in cooperation with the Navy Port Director. This developed into the usual loading supervision, and at this stage about one vessel was loaded every two weeks. No officers except a warrant boatswain were assigned to the detail until 1 June, 1943, when a regular Munitions Officer was

appointed. In the first half of 1943, 35,496 tons of explosives were loaded into 49 ships. Soon after a regular Munitions Detail was established, it set up its own personnel training. The program lasted 2 weeks, and consisted of lectures on the importance of enforcing safe handling, identification of all classes of explosives and ammunition, procedure to be followed on duty, and motion pictures of actual loading operations. The men also took a 2-day course at the Navy Fire School at Philadelphia. All explosives vessels were escorted through the river by Coast Guard patrol craft. In April and May, 1944, 2 months before the Normandy invasion, there was a heavy step-up in loading operations, and heavy traffic in munitions-laden vessels. Comparative quarterly statistics on operations of the explosives loading detail follow:

Quarter Ended	Explosives Loaded (tons)	Inflammable and Other Dangerous Cargo (tons)
September 1943	49,176 (38)	42,579 (51)
December 1943	48,022 (38)	14,014 (49)
March 1944	91,786 (58)	3,822 (47)
June 1944	130,687 (64)	8,217 (93)
September 1944	186,919 (54)	7,216 (63)
December 1944	275,564 (59)	37,430 (61)
March 1945	320,000 (66)	20,334 (70)
June 1945	145,302 (45)	13,226 (44)
September 1945	None	16,628 (36)

Quarter Ended	Defensive Arms Loaded (tons)	Officers Attached	Enlisted Men
September 1943	400 (40)	13	108
December 1943	540 (72)	21	104
March 1944	1,186 (193)	21	92
June 1944	1,524 (206)	16	180
September 1944	832 (106)	20	202
December 1944	993 (89)	20	221
March 1945	1,093 (192)	24	218
June 1945	1,540 (212)	15	66
September 1945	471 (69)	2	25

NOTE: Figures in parenthesis are the number of vessels loaded.

THE FIRE DETAIL

The Fire Detail at Philadelphia became one of the largest units under the Captain of the Port. As in most ports, there were three functions, (a) operation of the fireboats, (b) operation of trailer pump units for fire-fighting on shore, and (c) conduct of fire inspections. Fireboats were strategically located on the Delaware River at points at Philadelphia, Camden, and Wilmington, and numbered from 6 to 12. The following figures are of interest:

	Average Personnel	Fireboats	Inspections Conducted
1942 (July through December)	105	6	898
1943	205	11	5,441
1944	192	12	4,740
1945 (Through August) 199		9	2,260

The regular Fire Detail was augmented by Temporary Reserve members of the Volunteer Port Security Force, who organized a highly trained and efficient Fire Detail which cooperated fully with the regular unit. These members, however, did not man the fireboats. The fireboats were placed in operation on 12 July, 1942, and numbered 2.

A FEW EXAMPLES OF FIRE DETAIL OPERATIONS

One of the first occasions for action by the fireboats

came on 29 September, 1942, at a carbarn fire on the waterfront. The Coast Guard fireboat which responded had streams on the fire promptly, whereas the city fire apparatus did not have hoses functioning until an hour later. Another early job for the fireboats occurred on 29 August, 1942, at 0214, in the morning. The wooden steamship JOHN CADWALADER caught fire, and unaccountably, the blaze spread quickly to all parts of the ship. It was soon a raging inferno. Coast Guard fireboats arrived immediately and Coast Guardsmen policed the area. Ammunition on board the ship exploded with the heat of the flames. After 7 hours of continuous battle, the fire was extinguished, but the vessel was almost a complete loss. There was no damage to the pier, or the pier cargo. One member of the crew, a native of Liverpool, was detained for further action, as his behavior on the morning of the fire indicated that he had had a very important part in causing it. On 5 January, 1943, a fire was reported at Pier 103, South Philadelphia, at the Publicker Alcohol Company. Fireboats CG-65006-F and CG-88002-W were ordered to proceed to the scene. At 2030 the fire was reported of a serious nature due to alcohol burning at the stills. Additional help was requested, and the CG-66001-F and equipment from Pier 98, South Philadelphia were ordered to the scene. At 2110, the fire being fought effectively from the waterside, with two CG fireboats in operation and two more under way. This fire was brought under control soon afterward, and was extinguished by 0105 on 6 January.

WATERSIDE PATROLS

There were two groups of waterside patrols under the Captain of the Port in the Delaware River. There was the Delaware River Patrol Group, composed of CGR boats based at Pier 181, North. Here, there was an office building, as well as a mess and recreation building and two barracks for 288 men. Duties of this patrol were boarding vessels in the river, patrolling shipyards and vital defense areas, sealing radios, patrolling the Navy Yard, and escorting explosives vessels. The radio sealing operations, conducted by a unit of 8 men, may be summarized:

1942	2,500 radios sealed
1943	5,828 radios sealed
1944	7,613 radios sealed
1945	336 radios sealed

The other patrol group was called the "Middle River Patrol Group" based at Essington. This group patrolled the Delaware River between the Schuylkill River and Reedy Island, 40 miles below. About 9 CGR boats undertook these patrols. They covered regular and explosives anchorages, performed ship-launching patrols at private yards and at the Navy Yard, escorted Navy ships from one anchorage to another, and protected Navy and Coast Guard vessels undergoing conversion. These patrols were augmented by Temporary Reserve forces afloat.

DULL PATROLS OCCASIONALLY BROKEN BY ACTION

As in most ports, water patrols were dull and monotonous, and the men engaged in this activity welcomed unusual happenings. The patrols had hardly been organized when on 16 February, 1942, the U. S. Customs notified the Coast Guard that they had information of a plan to blow up the Delaware River Bridge. The CGR-646 from the Delaware River Patrol Base at Port Richmond was sent to cooperate with the harbor police. Additional men were also assigned to duty with the waterfront security patrol in the area. However, no suspicious activities were detected, and on the 21st the CGR-646 was relieved by the harbor police. The Delaware River Patrol had an unusual experience in the early part of June, 1942. HMS EMPIRE WOODCOCK had a fire in a hold started from spontaneous combustion in cotton bales which had been wetted during

a shower while loading. Men of this patrol departed their base on board a cutter with CO₂ equipment, and contacted the vessel at Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania. Steam was forced into the hold and later, firemen entered the hold and extinguished the flames with minimum damage. Coast Guard personnel attending this fire received commendation from the British Consul.

WATERFRONT GUARDS

Philadelphia had a highly organized division for the shore-side protection of waterfront facilities. In this, the Volunteer Port Security Force assumed a major part. This started with the Waterfront Security Patrol, organized early in the war. It served on a 24-hour basis. By the middle of 1942, there were 300 men of the regular service maintaining guard on the more important facilities at Philadelphia, Camden and Wilmington. Duties were the same as in all ports. Regular personnel reached its peak in January, 1943, with about 600 men. By the end of 1943, the Volunteer Port Security Force had become very effective, and regulars had been reduced to about 200. Special attention was paid to oil pollution, and in 1944, about 130 men were engaged in inspection of slips in this connection.

SOME EARLY GUARD EXPERIENCES

Situations in which the waterfront guards found themselves were of a varying nature. Early in May, 1942, the Belgian steamer ROUMANIE was berthed at Pier 181, North. Sixteen of the seamen were refused permission to go ashore by the immigration officials there because their papers were not in order. They became disorderly and were taken under guard to the Gloucester Immigration Station. At about the same time, railroad companies reported that freight car robberies had been reduced to a minimum since inception of the waterfront guard program. On the night of 31 May, 1942, a watchman at the Camden Marine Terminal observed a man in the lumber yard who, on being challenged, disappeared into the shadows. Men from the Captain of the Port radio-equipped station wagon completely searched the yard and found paper stuffed in between the lumber which was assigned for British lend-lease. Coast Guardsmen remained there on duty for the rest of the night, but nothing more was observed. On 1 August, 1942, the Penn-Jersey Shipbuilding Company at Camden asked for guards at 0110, due to anticipated labor trouble. A detail of Coast Guardsmen responded for investigation. The trouble was between crane operators, and several were escorted home to prevent violence. There was also trouble between shipyard workers and crews on board the Kaighn Avenue ferries because the former would not comply with ferry rules. Coast Guardsmen were placed at the Camden ferry piers, and further trouble was avoided. The captain of a tug reported on 22 August, 1942, that a man was observed on the stern of a ship going downstream sending a signal by flashlight toward the Philadelphia shore at Horseshoe Bend. The SEA BEE III overtook the SS RICHARD ALVEY promptly and ordered it to anchor off Edgemoor. An armed guard was placed on board, and Naval Intelligence officers were transported from Wilmington for an investigation. After completing their inquiry, the officers were returned to Wilmington and the ship permitted to proceed. There was a shortage of Customs Guards at Philadelphia. To help relieve the situation, about 30 Coast Guardsmen were sworn into the Customs Service in May, 1943, and served until January, 1945. They made 27 seizures during their tour of duty, which included accompanying Coast Guard guards on vessels on the Delaware River.

THE ARMED GUARD DETAIL

In December, 1942, an Armed Guard Detail was organized to act as guards in neutral vessels entering and leaving

Philadelphia. These guards were placed on board to escort vessels to and from the Delaware Capes and through the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal to Baltimore. Each crew usually consisted of a coxswain, signalman and seaman. Duties were to see that radio silence was observed, that the ship made no visual signals except to patrol boats, made no unauthorized communications with the shore, that it landed only properly authorized personnel, and that no objects were thrown overboard. In December, 50 men performed 7 escort missions, in 1943 an average crew of 38 did 390, in 1944, an average crew of 50 performed 250, and also 160 missions in 1945 up to June, when operations ceased. Men on this duty presented a problem of feeding. This was solved by running boats from the bases with food, and if the vessels stayed a long time, the guards were changed. Guards were also placed on river excursion vessels to assure there were no cameras or binoculars, and that no pictures were taken.

POLITICAL STRIFE ON GREEK SHIPS


Late in February, 1945, the District Coast Guard Officer was alerted by Headquarters to the possibility of political strife on Greek ships arriving at Philadelphia. The first two Greek ships that arrived after that were boarded, but no political trouble or other incidents were reported. However, the third Greek ship arrived with its crew in turmoil and near to mutiny because of a split among the crew between ELAS partisans and loyal Greek Government men. The ELAS partisans were headed by two officers of the ship who were later removed and ordered to New York for a hearing and trial.

SHIP INSPECTION AND PLIMSOLL MARK DETAILS

Ship inspection personnel increased from an original 10 in October, 1942, to about 40 by August, 1945. After the Volunteer Port Security Force became effective, it took over such inspection at Philadelphia, and the regular detail covered only the outlying areas such as Camden, Paulsboro, Wilmington, Marcus Hook and Chester. Customs officials were relieved of the Plimsoll Load Line Inspections of all allied and neutral vessels leaving the port. A Captain of the Port detail averaging 5 men checked the vessels for gross and net tonnage, destination foreign or coastwise, drafts fore, aft, and mean, the submergency of the Plimsoll Mark, whether the proper seasonal load line was being used, and other pertinent information. Ship inspection and load line were combined in 1945.

COAST GUARDSMEN AID AT RAILROAD WRECK

On 6 September, 1943, the Pennsylvania Railroad's "Congressional Limited" was wrecked at Frankford Junction in North Philadelphia. In this, Captain of the Port men saw unusual action. The Coast Guard immediately dispatched 90 men from the barracks at Third and Spruce Streets, Philadelphia, and 30 from the Port Richmond Patrol Base. The latter were the first military group to reach the scene, at 1825. Both groups went to work immediately upon arrival under the direction of the Philadelphia Police, removing bodies, carrying injured persons to waiting ambulances, guarding and gathering personal property of those who were on board the train and preventing looting. They released many trapped passengers. The troop transport from the Base was used in the removal of bodies and their luggage to the morgue for identification. Assistance and housing was also rendered to some of the injured. The men threw a cordon around the two wrecked railroad cars, patrolled the wreckage, installed lighting equipment, and assisted firemen in handling hose lines. Morphine syrettes, blankets, and other medical supplies were donated in the emergency. The detail of men remained on duty until 0030 on 7 September, when all necessary work had been completed.



AT THE GATEWAY TO A BUSY EMBARKATION PORT
COAST GUARD SHORE PATROLMEN AND ARMY MILITARY POLICE BOTH STAND GUARD
CHECKING CREDENTIALS OF ALL SEEKING ENTRANCE



MODERN FIRE-FIGHTING TRAILER UNITS SUPPLEMENT THE FIREBOAT FLEET
THIS EQUIPMENT WAS MANNED BY VOLUNTEER PORT SECURITY FORCE UNITS

VPSF REGIMENT

The Volunteer Port Security Force was a vital factor in the successful operation of the Captain of the Port undertaking at Philadelphia. Personnel reached 3,200 for the Regiment alone and, in addition, Temporary Reserve units afloat served long and efficiently in the river patrols. The Regiment is mentioned in earlier parts of this monograph on the Temporary Reserve. The three million man-hours of duty provided by the VPSF at Philadelphia in the security of the port from the landslide stand as significant proof of their service.

FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT

NORFOLK AND BALTIMORE THE PRINCIPAL PORTS

In the Fifth Naval District, Norfolk and Baltimore were the principal ports, and the responsibilities of the Captains of the Port were heavy. In this District there was also a Captain of the Port at Morehead City, North Carolina and at Washington, D. C., with Assistant Captains of the Port at Annapolis and Elizabeth City. The area of the COTP, Norfolk, included one of our largest Naval Operating and Air Bases, and also Navy Yards and Army Bases. This, and the vast commercial functions of the port made Hampton Roads an extremely important area. In Norfolk and Portsmouth Harbors, there are 230 piers, wharves, and docks. The eight railroads serving Norfolk operated 30 piers, with 7 miles of berthing space. The shipbuilding and repair industry had 33 piers. There were also 41 piers at Newport News. Guarding these areas and guarding the shipping using them was a huge task. At Baltimore, there were three explosives loading points, and at the peak of activity it was necessary to have on duty 60 commissioned officers in the Port Security organization, and 1,000 enlisted men, plus about 2,500 Temporary Reservists in the VPSF and on duty afloat. The number of patrol boats at Baltimore reached 63.

MOST ACTIVITIES THE SAME AS IN OTHER DISTRICTS

Most of the activities in the Fifth Naval District, coming under the Captain of the Port, were similar to those in other localities, with little outstanding in the matter of harbor patrol, pier guards, identification, ship movement and such. However, in some respects there were differences worthy of mention as well as some particular incidents. In the earliest days there were the usual conferences with those interested in the security of the port, beginning in 1941. Special emphasis was placed on terminal facilities for handling explosives. Surveys of shipyards, of which there were many in the area, were conducted, security guards provided, and identification cards issued. In all, about 59,000 such cards were issued at Norfolk. There was one important activity in the Fifth Naval District, however, that varied slightly from the experience in others, for the Examination Vessel at the Virginia Capes was considered a separate operation under the Captain of the Port.

EXAMINATION VESSEL AT THE VIRGINIA CAPES

The Examination Vessel located at the Virginia Capes was established 10 January, 1942, and at first was manned by the Navy. However, after a brief period, it became the responsibility of the Coast Guard, and operated as a separate activity under the Captain of the Port, Norfolk. The first ship was relieved shortly by another which, in turn, was relieved by a lightship which became permanent. The Coast Guard cutter JACKSON was one of these. She turned over and foundered later while at sea on a rescue mission during the hurricane of 14 September, 1944. This Examination Vessel, as was the case with most, was charged with the responsibility of examining all merchant vessels and small craft enter-

ing and departing, to determine their identity, cargo, characteristics, and intentions, as well as to issue warnings regarding unauthorized radios, and to apprise masters of vessels about local regulations and special instructions to be followed in the port to which the vessel was destined. A shore battery and an examination anchorage were established to collaborate with the Examination Vessel. Examination officers boarded all ships entering independently from foreign ports. In the case of convoys, the Convoy Commodore's ship only was boarded, information for the entire convoy being obtained from that source. Three-flag hoists were issued to incoming vessels from foreign ports. There was telephone communication with the Harbor Entrance Control Post at Cape Henry and with the Port Director at Norfolk, but there was cable difficulty and this eventually proved impracticable. Radio communication was also maintained with shore authorities and with the Inner Examination Vessel (IGR) just inside Old Point Comfort which examined all fishing vessels entering or departing Hampton Roads. The Examination vessel in the outer location carried its commanding officer, four examination officers, and a crew of about 50 enlisted men.

DANGEROUS DUTY

The Examination Vessel was struck several times while on station, sometimes with considerable damage. The outstanding incident occurred on 20 July, 1944, at about 2120. The vessel (Lightship #105) was accidentally rammed and sunk by two barges towed by the tug P. F. MARTIN. All hands abandoned ship in two motor surf boats and a skiff. The survivors were picked up by nearby Naval craft. Fortunately, none of the men was injured, but all personal gear was lost.

DUPLICATION OF EFFORT

As was the case in most ports where there were both Harbor Entrance Control Posts and Examination Vessels, there was much duplication or work, but cooperation was good and each unit served as a check upon the other. This, of course, reduced the percentage of error, and in spite of some work duplication, contributed to the security of the port and the vessels concerned. The following is a summary of the work of the Examination Vessel at the Virginia Capes, given for several months taken at random.

ARRIVALS

Month	Merchant Vessels	Fishing Vessels	Total
March 1944	1,078	260	1,338
June 1944	524	132	656
November 1944	561	35	596
March 1945	647	159	806

DEPARTURES

May 1944	668	25	713
August 1944	451	168	619
December 1944	415	68	483
March 1945	513	143	656

THE LOADING OF EXPLOSIVES

Most loading of explosives in the Fifth Naval District was done under supervision of the Captains of the Port at Norfolk and Baltimore. There were three loading piers at Baltimore with the principal one at Hawkins Point. The principal loading under COTP Norfolk was at Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation. For most of the period, explosives loading officers worked long hours, 12 on and 12 off. They experienced some difficulty which was more or less general at all explosives loading

ports, wherein steamship agents, masters, stevedores, and such often did not fully understand the regulations or see clearly why they must be complied with. These difficulties were faced daily, and were overcome only by the tactful, patient, persistent and, on occasion, firm insistence that the prescribed regulations be observed. Great care had to be exercised in the case of ships undergoing repair and carrying ammunition. However, due to war pressure and personnel factors there was occasional relaxation. For instance, in January, 1945, 31 ships were at Baltimore undergoing repairs, and of these, 23 were permitted to leave defensive ammunition on board. Such relaxation increased as time went on. All civilian personnel working explosives were required, as everywhere, to have "red cards." These were issued very efficiently at Norfolk. All stevedoring unions and companies, as well as steamship agents, were contacted. Work details were sent to various piers and union halls to process the persons required to have the permits. Thousands made application because stevedores handling explosives were paid premium wages, but many were denied permits for reasonable cause. The following figures show the amount of explosives loading supervised under the Captain of the Port, Norfolk, throughout the period 1 July, 1942 to 15 August, 1945.

Year	Explosives (tons)	Other Dangerous Articles	Total
1942	32,472.00	406.00	32,878.00
1943	263,423.94	95,873.75	359,297.69
1944	967,733.20	65,334.07	1,033,067.27
1945	377,512.34	16,847.68	394,360.02
Total	1,641,141.48	178,461.50	1,819,602.98

In comparison with these figures, total tonnage loaded at Hawkins Point, Baltimore, was 1,034,287 on 373 vessels. The Explosives Detail there finally reached 22 officers and 170 enlisted men.

THE FIRE DIVISION

Fire prevention and fire-fighting units in the ports of the Fifth Naval District were organized, equipped, and trained the same as elsewhere. Ship and pier inspections followed orthodox lines. From time to time, joint letters on fire prevention matters were sent out by the Chief of the Norfolk Fire Department and the Captain of the Port. In the Fall of 1944 a letter was written on heating hazards, and a follow-up call was made jointly by the Coast Guard and Fire Prevention Bureau representatives. So successful was this undertaking that during the Fall and Winter of 1944-1945, not a single heating hazard fire originated on the waterfront. Excellent cooperation was had from all interested agencies. Many safety meetings were conducted. Much of the success of the program can be attributed to the fact that, as far as possible, the work was continued and carried on through the existing agencies. Whenever it was felt credit could be reflected on some private or municipal agency, the Coast Guard stayed in the background, and this contributed to the good cooperation. There were 10 fireboats operating under COTP, Norfolk, and 7 at Baltimore. As was usual, the fireboat crews were largely recruited from fire departments. At Norfolk, the fireboat unit responded to 591 alarms rendered service at 73 fires, laid 60,050 feet of hose, pumped for 1,305 hours, used 100 50-pound cans of liquid foam, and 250 50-pound cans of powdered foam. Waterfront fires at Norfolk were 82% under those of prewar days. Details of men were placed on board transports while in port for fire protection.

INSTANCES OF ASSISTANCE AT WATERFRONT FIRES

In mid-December, 1942, Captain of the Port personnel assisted the Norfolk Fire Department at a serious

\$250,000 fire at a furniture company. Four fireboats responded, three pumping water, the fourth standing by. The fire was 1,000 feet from the pier, and three boats used a total of 3,800 feet of hose and pumped water for 23 hours. There was a shortage of water in the city mains. Coast Guardsmen fought the fire with the city firemen and relieved those overcome by smoke. The following month, the fireboats pumped water for 22 hours at a fire on board a dredge off Craney Island. At 0430, on 30 January, 1944, there was a serious fire at a Norfolk pier, and seven engines and two truck companies of the municipal fire department responded. However, the fire could be fought effectively only from the waterside, and the Coast Guard was called upon. Five fireboats and five picket boats with pumps responded, and the fireboats alone pumped water for 3 1/2 hours. The fire was extinguished, and the officer-in-charge of the fireboat unit received a letter of commendation from the Commandant and from the District Coast Guard Officer. In the later days of the war fire-fighting units were reduced in efficiency, however, due to a shortage of men because of transfer to sea. Due to lack of personnel, for instance, the Baltimore fire division could operate only 3 of its 7 fireboats.

VESSEL FIRES

On the evening of 21 June, 1942, the American tanker ROBERT C. TUTTLE, loaded with fortified fuel oil, was in a damaged and leaking condition due to collision, and was brought into lower Chesapeake Bay. Fire broke out in the vicinity of the pump room, and this was followed by explosions. The vessel was in a very serious condition, with all her piping and valves smashed, the ship very nearly broken in two, and everything else broken apart. Water and foam were used to quell the flames, but without avail. At about midnight, 10 tons of dry ice were taken on board in blocks about 12 inches cubed. These were dropped into the hold to the extent of about 2 tons. From then on, the fire diminished in that tank, and did not break out again. The use of dry ice was an experiment, but it worked well and the fire was extinguished in less than two hours after the first application. In all, about 5 tons were used. The vessel carried nearly 400,000 barrels of very dangerous crude oil, all of which was removed from the ship with every bit of machinery out of order. On 1 June, 1943, the American freighter JOHN MORGAN, loaded with explosives, and the Navy tanker MONTANA collided in convoy off the Virginia Capes. Fire resulted in both ships, and the MORGAN blew up almost immediately and sank. The Coast Guard tug ACUSHNET was dispatched and assisted in fighting the fire in the tanker, and was joined by Naval craft. This fire burned two days before being extinguished. The MONTANA was towed to Lynnhaven anchorage, but water in her tanks made her draft too great, and water was therefore pumped from her tanks, a fireboat stood by, and a security watch was placed on board. These details were secured on 1 July, when the tanker was towed to Norfolk Navy Yard for repairs. On 31 March, 1945, 4 fireboats responded to a fire at Pier 5, Newport News, on board the SS THOMAS GUARDIA. Fire was extinguished with CO₂ extinguishers. The crews of the fireboats assisted in removing the cargo from the vessel. The Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation Fire Department also rendered assistance in fighting the fire which originated in hold No. 2 where sulphur had been stored, along with oil drums and machinery stored in the same hold when the fire occurred.

FIREBOATS AND PUMPING OPERATIONS

In most Districts and ports, there were occasions when fireboats and even picket boats equipped with fire pumps were extremely useful in keeping leaking vessels afloat. These cases were unspectacular, but losses of many thousands of dollars were avoided and vessels

kept in operation which otherwise would have been lost. As an example, on 20 August, 1943, a fireboat was sent from the Captain of the Port, Baltimore, to assist Barge #424 of the Chesapeake Lighter Corporation which was found to be in a sinking condition. The barge was pumped out and towed to safety, saving valuable war cargo. On 26 December, 1943, the CG-59005-F pumped water out of a Baltimore & Ohio Railroad barge with 4 feet of water in the bilges at Pier 10, Baltimore. The barge was returned to a safe condition.

WATERSIDE PATROLS

Harbor patrols in small craft were conducted about as in most other ports with little to set them apart. One special problem arose when the Captain of the Port at Norfolk was called upon to patrol the large Naval Firing Range in Lower Chesapeake Bay between Smith Point and Wolf Trap Light. Ten patrol boats with 100 personnel were required for this duty. The problem was difficult, because fuel capacities of the boats were limited and the distance considerable to reach the patrol area. A base at Crisfield, Maryland, was established for these craft, thus reducing time and fuel consumption in reaching the area. Temporary Reservists were used to good advantage especially at Baltimore and in the Norfolk area. After full organization day and night crews were well balanced. The Captain of the Port, Norfolk, stated that regular and TRS boats were equally well-run, and he could see no difference in their operation. One special situation arose in the very early days of patrol. In August, 1942, a COTP boat patrolled one of the Liberty ships off Lambert's Point, information having been received that sabotage was being committed on board. No one was permitted to leave the ship and 2 FBI men were carried out to the vessel. The Port Security unit of the Captain of the Port placed 233 guard details on board 19 ships at piers and at the anchorage in Hampton Roads, and also on the deperming range. Four special details composed of commissioned officers and chief petty officers boarded four foreign ships which were bound for Baltimore. Patrol boats generally enforced a 6-knot speed limit in the vicinity of the Norfolk Navy Yard. In June, 1943, two men from the Captain of the Port detail assisted in removing the body of a man caught in the lifting gears of the Virginian Railway Bridge in the Southern Branch of the Elizabeth River. The bridge could neither be raised nor lowered until the body had been removed and Captain of the Port boats patrolled the area, stopping all traffic while the bridge was inoperative. At about the same time, a Liberty ship struck the Norfolk-Portsmouth Toll Bridge, putting it out of commission, and patrol boats covered the area warning all ships to proceed with caution. A Civil Air Patrol plane crashed offshore and a picket boat was sent out from Morehead City. The COTP contacted the section base and learned that a convoy was within two miles of the position of this crash. The convoy escort was notified and the pilot and observer were picked up, demonstrating good cooperation between the services.

PROBLEM OF THE MOREHEAD CITY CAPTAIN OF THE PORT

Usual patrols were conducted by the Captain of the Port at Morehead City, most of which were inlet patrols. Approximately 11 inlets were kept under surveillance. One boat was necessary constantly to free Army and Navy boats en route through the intracoastal waterways from shoals, the groundings being caused by inexperience and high speed. In two cases, a channel of 30 feet to 70 feet in width had to be dredged before boats could be floated. It was stated that action should be taken against operators for excessive speed in such places, but whether this was done is not clear. Boats of this unit had to be especially alert for floating mines. Occasionally, mines were washed ashore on the beach. In such places,

the Mine Disposal Officer was notified and the mines sent to Core Banks where the officer disarmed them.

SHIP AND SHORE GUARD


As often happened elsewhere, there was some question in the early days as to division of authority and responsibility at the Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation. It was worked out satisfactorily, and the Coast Guard became responsible for the security of the merchant ships at the Port. Here, probably, existed the best cooperation and understanding between the various services and the smoothest working out of jurisdictions. The usual security patrols and inspections were carried out in the Fifth Naval District. One variation at Norfolk was that the British Security Officer made inspections of ships other than American entering Hampton Roads in regard to security measures in port. Completely harmonious relations existed, and there was an excellent spirit of cooperation between the Captain of the Port and the British Consular Security Office. How long this arrangement continued has not been determined. A complication arose in August, 1942, when many steamship agents requested that crews on board foreign ships be detained on board. Though the Immigration authorities had no reason for detaining the crews, and a delicate international situation might arise, it became for some time the policy of the Captain of the Port to hold crews of neutral ships on board while in Hampton Roads, and when the master of such a vessel went ashore a Coast Guard officer escorted him until his return to the ship. (A record of any incident bringing this about has not been discovered.) Shore guards were alert for any derelictions. In April, 1943, guards at Baltimore apprehended a taxi driver of German origin boarding a ship with a stevedore's badge. Investigation was made, and the badge taken up. As in most ports, the Captain of the Port furnished guards whenever German prisoners arrived and were transferred to railroad trains.

EUMBOAT SUPERVISION


An important part of Captain of the Port intelligence duties was the supervision of boats carrying passengers and crew members to ships in the harbor. At Norfolk, this program was started in June, 1942, when an enlisted man was stationed at a landing near the Newport News Ferry Dock, Norfolk, to check identification of men going to and coming from vessels in the harbor, and their business on board, for it had been found that many solicitors and unauthorized persons were boarding these vessels. The operators of all other water taxis at Norfolk and Newport News furnished the COTP with lists of men carried, and Coast Guard enlisted men were eventually stationed at all landings. The lists were checked against the suspect lists of the District Intelligence Office. No landings were allowed except at specified places.

POTOMAC RIVER COMMAND

The Captain of the Port, Washington, D. C., operated under the District Coast Guard Officer of the Fifth Naval District, but also in complete cooperation with the Potomac River Naval Command. The latter had no control over many activities normally connected with the Coast Guard, but its two major functions were (a) port security, and (b) cooperation in the military defense of Washington. Under the military defense, the main responsibility was the protection of the numerous bridges crossing the Potomac River. Cooperating in these purposes, the Captain of the Port issued a general license to rowboats, canoes and sailboats under 40 feet in length to operate generally within 5 miles of their regular moorings. These craft were forbidden to operate at



A COAST GUARD PICKET BOAT MANEUVERS CLOSE
TO FIGHT A STUBBORN FIRE THAT BADLY DAMAGED PIER 3
IN THE NAVY YARD ANNEX AT ST. HELENA, BERKLEY, VIRGINIA



COAST GUARD FIRE-FIGHTERS
PLAY HIGH PRESSURE STREAMS FROM TRAILER PUMPS
AT THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY PIER FIRE AT CHARLESTON, S. C.

night in the vicinity of the bridges over the Potomac and Anacostia Rivers. Other vessels less than 100 feet in length were operated under individual movement licenses. The Captain of the Port paid especial attention to landside guards for the bridges, and waterside patrols in bridge areas, guarded other important areas in a manner common to Port Security units, and furnished guards for tankers. There were no outstanding events connected with this activity.

EXAMPLE OF A
FORTNIGHT'S WORK
BY THE BALTIMORE UNITS

A summary of the work of the Captain of the Port units at Baltimore for the fortnight ended 29 February, 1944, is of interest chief-

ly as an example of the varied type of work accomplished. This is presented not because it is unusual, but rather because it is representative of the work of Port Security units in most ports of comparable size. Coast Guard Moorings reported 48 trips for transporting personnel, 12 for servicing aids to navigation, 4 for distress calls, 13 for towing Navy barges and assisting Navy tugs, 2 transferring men to and from lighthouses, 47 for changing ship guards, 16 for patrolling launchings, and a number of other miscellaneous tasks. Fire prevention and protection included 1,200 inspections of merchant vessels afloat and inspections of piers, 48 fire prevention inspections in ammunition ships with fires under Coast Guard responsibility occurring. The Munitions Detail handled 15 military explosives loadings and unloadings and 45 details of loading and unloading defensive ammunition. In all, 25,700 long tons of explosives were loaded and 373 long tons unloaded at the explosives pier. In addition, fireboat and harbor patrol activities were maintained, and several thousand boardings were made by the Port Security Patrol. A daily average of 61 ships were in the harbor.

SIXTH NAVAL DISTRICT

SHIPBUILDING
AN IMPORTANT ACTIVITY

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Captains of the Port were established in the Sixth Naval District at Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah and Jacksonville, with Assistant Captains of the Port at Wrightsville Beach, Southport, Beaufort, Georgetown, Brunswick and Fernandina. Activity of these units was orthodox, and there was little of outstanding nature. Shipbuilding was very active in this District. It has been said that 13% of the shipyards and 10% of all the building ways in the United States were located there. Thus, protection of these facilities was an important function. There was, in this District, the difficulty rather general in some Southern ports involved in the "manana method" of doing business. Tomorrow was a good time for doing anything, and promises were made "for Tomorrow" which could not be carried out. Many things took an unnecessarily long time for accomplishment.

AUXILIARY PATROLS

Especially in the early days of the war, the patrol of the many inlets was an essential activity. Harbor patrol and inlet patrols were started by Auxiliary flotillas. In the Cape Fear area, a flotilla was organized on 21 December, 1941, and voluntarily guarded for 24 hours at a stretch 4 inlets that break the southeastern North Carolina coast-line. The first patrols in the Jacksonville area were started in June, 1942, at Nassau Sound and Fort George Inlet. The Savannah flotilla was organized 15 April, 1942, and on 5 June, 1942, began patrolling Wassaw and Ossabow Sounds. The Charleston flotilla was organized in the Spring of 1942 and the first patrol was undertaken 25 June, 1942, covering 7 inlets. A flotilla at Georgetown was formed on 29 March, 1942, and patrolled inlets, waterways and rivers and bays between the North Carolina line and

Bull's Bay. Thus, as in many Districts, the Auxiliary started many vital patrols which were later conducted by temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve. By June, 1942, all sounds and inlets on the coast fronting on the ocean were covered by Coast Guard Reserve or Auxiliary vessels. Auxiliary boats were used on patrol well into 1943.

EXPLOSIVES
SUPERVISION

Supervision of the loading of explosives progressed in this District as in others, with little unusual experience. At Savannah, about 170,000 tons of munitions were loaded under Coast Guard supervision in 94 vessels. About 200,000 tons were loaded at Jacksonville. At Charleston, 155 ships were loaded with 458,873 tons of explosives, and 59 ships discharged 298,384 tons during the war period. There were several discharge jobs of more than ordinary interest. In one case, the SS EDWARD W. SCRIPPS, which had been loaded with a full load of bombs at Houston, Texas, scheduled for the European theater, was routed 13 April, 1945, via Charleston for the purpose of removing 5,000 150-pound general purpose bombs which had been declared of very dangerous nature by the Chief of Ordnance, Washington, D. C. These bombs were of very thin casing, originally intended for chemical warfare, but had been reconverted by filling with high explosives. To minimize the hazard of unloading, a special explosives detail was assigned supervision of discharge. The bombs were placed in an Army barge, towed and escorted to sea and blown up by time fuses.

THE FIRE DETAILS

Fire details in the Sixth Naval District were organized as elsewhere, and the fire record in the District was good, everything considered. However, fire-fighting units were called upon to combat several serious fires. There were two disastrous fires at Charleston which taxed the 7 fireboats and the shore units there. On 6 October, 1944, the Southern Railway Peir #2 was almost destroyed by fire. This was used by the United Fruit Company, but had been idle up to three months before. The pier could not be saved, and all efforts were concentrated on preventing spread of the fire. The Chief of the Charlestown Fire Department credited the Coast Guard with saving adjoining facilities. Another fire at a warehouse caused \$500,000 loss, including the dock on which the warehouse was situated. At a fire in Jacksonville on 12 February, 1943, 50 men responded with 2 fireboats and other equipment. This blaze was at the Atlantic Coast Line warehouses, and due to wind and inflammable contents, 3 warehouses were destroyed with a loss of \$100,000. A Coast Guard seaman suffered fractures of both legs besides multiple bruises and contusions on this occasion. The city fireboat was trapped in the fire area and the Coast Guard towed her away and sprayed water over her during the process. A serious episode also occurred at Jacksonville on 6 October, 1943. An empty steel oil barge, owned by a private concern and previously used for transporting gasoline, was moored at a dock and under repair. A violent explosion occurred during welding operations, and the barge caught fire. Twelve of the shipyard workers were killed, and a score injured. Four Coast Guard fireboats, 6 patrol boats, and 60 Coast Guardsmen assisted in combatting this fire and in subsequent rescue operations. One troublesome problem was encountered with fire equipment, similar to difficulty at New Orleans. Trailer pumps were unable to pick up water at low tide, thus limiting usefulness of the equipment. Also, there was complaint at Savannah that the fireboat could not operate except by backing up into a fire because the force of the nozzle was greater than the speed of the boat, and the man who operated it could not see where he was going.

NOTES ON
HARBOR PATROL

As indicated, harbor patrol in the Sixth District started early, and was conducted with special care as long as the necessity existed. There were few outstanding events in this activity, which testifies to the effectiveness of the patrols. One of the chief responsibilities of the Captain of the Port at Jacksonville was patrol of launchings, of which there were more than 250. Despite the narrowness of the river and a considerable traffic, movement of vessels was handled efficiently and all launchings were completed without incident. One early experience occurred on the night of 19 November, 1942, when a possible landing of a crew from a small boat was stopped by the crew of the CGR-920. A motor vessel was noticed approaching the beach at Old Topsail Inlet from the sea, and the officer-in-charge of the CGR-920 challenged her. Immediately thereafter, the motor vessel turned back to sea. About 75 rounds of machine gun ammunition were fired at the fleeing vessel, but this did not halt her flight and she escaped. Afterward, a strong odor of diesel fuel oil was prevalent. The duties of the Assistant Captains of the Port at Georgetown, Brunswick and Beaufort were less general than at the other ports, their primary activity being control and checking of traffic through the inland waterway at those points. Special patrol duty was performed in April, 1945, at Charleston. On 24 April, a message was sent by Navy Operations, New York, to a group of 32 merchant ships to go into Charleston Harbor as a result of submarine activity in the South Atlantic. For three days these vessels were under Coast Guard protection of special patrols. On 15 August, 1943, a fuel barge tore loose from its moorings at Charleston and crashed into the Beaufort River Bridge, causing a section of the bridge to cave in, thus obstructing all traffic and transportation between Beaufort and Madies Island, South Carolina. The Coast Guard ferried an average of 609 persons daily, including Army combat teams, Marine, Naval and Coast Guard personnel and civilians, until 24 August, when the bridge reopened, or a total of 5,488.

EXAMPLES OF
RESCUE ACTIVITY

Small boats and personnel of this District were repeatedly engaged in rescuing survivors of torpedoed vessels off the coast during 1942 and 1943. A particularly noteworthy case was on 15 March, 1942, when an oil tanker was torpedoed off Southport, North Carolina. She burst immediately into flames. Several boats from Captain of the Port, Wilmington, North Carolina, including boats of the Auxiliary, worked for hours rescuing severely burned and wounded men from the sinking tanker. Being in the hurricane area special attention was paid to organization and planning in the event of a big blow. On 1 August, 1944, the hurricane plan covering the Wilmington, Georgetown, Charleston, Beaufort, Savannah and Brunswick areas was put into effect due to a tropical disturbance in the vicinity. However, the storm was not serious. The test came later, on 18 October, 1944, and one of the most momentous achievements of the COTP organizations was the rescue work done during the hurricane that struck at that time. This blow struck particularly the area centering around Brunswick. Regulars and Temporary Reservists performed together many and varied duties of an outstanding nature during the storm. These men responded to the emergency in an exemplary manner in which orders were executed regardless of personal dangers, and Coast Guardsmen were directly responsible for the evacuation of approximately 400 residents from flooded lowlands without a single casualty. The Temporary Reservists were officially credited with preventing, through their untiring efforts, initiative, and good leadership, what might have been a serious disaster.

GUARD OPERATIONS

Guard operations in this District varied little from those elsewhere, and there were no outstanding episodes. Day and night patrols were maintained at all important facilities, who checked persons for identification cards, refused admittance to restricted areas, maintained guards on all ships working cargo, guarded carloads of explosives in railroad yards awaiting shipment, guarded vital bridge installations, and such in accordance with regular custom. By mid-1944, the Volunteer Port Security Forces at Savannah, Charleston and Jacksonville stood about all the night watches except where explosives were being handled, and later, most of the day watches also were covered. There was, on 21 December, 1942, a threat of sabotage at Wilmington, North Carolina. Naval Intelligence notified the Captain of the Port, Wilmington, of information that there would be an attempt on that day, at noon, to sabotage the North Carolina Shipyards. The Captain of the Port immediately placed an armed guard of 7 enlisted men, with a petty officer in charge, around the shipyard at places designated by officials and dispatched 3 CGA boats with a lieutenant in charge to patrol the river front of the shipyards to take care of any emergency or rescue work. Nine men in charge of a commissioned officer of the Mounted Beach Patrol were also placed around the yard to guard outside. There was no difficulty.

SEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

EARLY COTP
SITUATION IN FLORIDA

The Captain of the Port, Tampa, had nearly the whole western coast of the Florida peninsula under his jurisdiction in 1941. This included the ports of St. Marks, Cedar Keys, Tarpon Springs, St. Petersburg, Tampa, Sarasota, Bradenton, Fort Myers, Punta Gorda and Boca Grande. The Captain of the Port at Key West had fewer ports to supervise, since his jurisdiction covered the Florida Keys and a small section of the mainland. However, this section offered opportunities for alien landings which made it doubly hard to protect. The Miami area included Miami, Port Everglades, West Palm Beach and Fort Pierce. Because the Miami and Tampa areas were too large to be supervised by only one officer each, three Assistant Captains of the Port were appointed, followed shortly afterward by several more. By October, 1942, there were 14 COTPs or ACOTPs in the Seventh District.

ESTABLISHMENTS
OF SECTIONS

Sections were planned for the Seventh District before the Section plan was adopted by Headquarters. On the first of October, 1942, there were 14 regularly appointed Captains (or Assistant Captains) of the Port, and each was appointed Section Coast Guard Officer and Sections were established. A letter dated 13 November, 1942, from the District Coast Guard Officer of the Seventh District to all units stated:

"1. For operational efficiency and under authority of directives from Coast Guard Commandant, Seventh Coast Guard District was divided into fourteen sections. In each Section is a Captain of the Port of the principal port, responsible for security of the port. Section Coast Guard Officers are responsible for all duties outside security of the principal port, such as beach patrols, coastal communications, coastal picket patrols, aids to navigation, etc.

"2. However, there is no set up in Headquarters or in Regulations for 'Sections.' In all correspondence with Coast Guard Headquarters, or correspondence covering assignment of boats, equipment, personnel, or with operations, reference should not be made to 'Sections.'"

This plan was later approved by Headquarters and the term "Section Coast Guard Officer" was formally adopted in the Coast Guard Shore Establishment Plan of 1 September, 1943.

NOTES ON THE TAMPA SECTION

Tampa had the most traffic and more port facilities than any other port in Florida. The principal traffic consisted of ammunition and oil. The waterfront contained many wooden docks and warehouses and a large shipyard, and guarding such areas was vital. Early in 1942, when enemy submarines operated on the Florida East Coast, much oil from Texas went into Tampa for transshipment overland. The Section had a difficult shore to patrol, with impassable swamps to the shoreline from Cedar Keys north. Boat patrol in such areas was very important. In many communities in this section considerable diplomacy and tact were needed to make the residents realize that restrictions were necessary. From Tampa to Fort Myers the coast is a maze of small islands, outer beaches, and inlets and rivers. Transportation of vital cargo by barge through the cross-state canal necessitated Port Security measures at Fort Myers.

CHARACTER OF OTHER SECTIONS

Key West became an important Naval Base, and coastal and Caribbean convoys formed there. Large minefields surrounded the convoy anchorage, and the harbor was a closed port. Over the Keys ran the only road to the mainland, and along this ran a large pipe line carrying Key West's supply of fresh water. The protection of this link was vital, and extensive land and water patrols were provided by the Captain of the Port. Anchorages and mine fields also were patrolled. In the Port Everglades Section there was an artificial harbor south of Fort Lauderdale and the terminus of the Cuban Car Ferry. This port had a large oil storage, and was the ocean shipping center for the lower East Florida Coast. This area was small, and presented few security problems. There were no large ports in the New Smyrna, Fort Pierce and Miami Sections, and much of the work of the Captains of the Port was control of small boats engaged in fishing and coastal trade. There was little of the usual wide variety of duty engaged in at the larger ports. Only 4 Captains of the Port in the District had the problem of the security of large waterfront shipping facilities - Tampa, Port Everglades, Key West, and Miami. Inspection of persons on the waterfront was carried out in all areas. Generally, there were no longshoremen in the District qualified as explosives loaders, and about the only ammunition which was moved was at Tampa.

THE ALIEN PROBLEM

In the Seventh Naval District, the Coast Guard had a "Customs Search Squad" somewhat similar to that in the Fourth District, but it is not certain that the men were formally sworn in as Customs Officers. Coast Guard petty officers are customs officers by law, but most of these men were seamen and inexperienced. They found some rum and some letters, but little else. These and other Coast Guardsmen would have had a hard time at Port Everglades checking boats had it not been for the Temporary Reservists afloat. There was the important problem of keeping aliens out. There were many Greek sponge fishermen including numerous aliens operating on the West Coast of Florida. Several supposedly Cuban fishing vessels were boarded close to the coast, but there were no fish on board and all hands were loafing. It was possible that they were endeavoring to land aliens on our shores, for the nature of the coast lent itself to such landings. The best that could be done was a careful check, but not enough

men were available to give the coast complete coverage. There were no specific, important incidents in this District worthy of special mention.

CURTAINMENT

For two years, beginning about October, 1942, activity in this District was fairly high, but in the Fall of 1943, there was a falling off in some areas, and Sections were reduced to 11 in number. The war had apparently left the Florida coast. In December, 1943, some Sections were consolidated, leaving only 6. By August, 1944, it was considered that Tampa, Port Everglades and Key West were the only ports needing Coast Guard security, and even by October, 1944, Key West COTP had been discontinued. In March, 1945, all Port Security activities at Tampa were performed by Temporary Reservists, and all Port Security activity in the District ceased in July, 1945.

EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICT


EARLY EFFORTS AT PORT SECURITY

By March, 1942, Captain of the Port organizations had been established at 10 ports in the Eighth Naval District, and shortly afterward, several Assistant Captains of the Port were appointed. Early efforts were largely directed toward prevention of sabotage. Civilian guards for waterfront facilities and vessels were increased, the identification program got under way, and as personnel and equipment expanded, Port Security activities covered a broader range. There were few patrol craft, but extensive port and harbor coverage was obtained, patrols being performed at irregular intervals, but with special attention to facilities more vulnerable to damage. Water patrols were gradually extended, and landside patrols began in the Spring of 1942. These were mostly roving patrols due to insufficient personnel and equipment. It was believed that Coast Guard and private guards combined were, at that time, insufficient to have prevented any organized and well-executed sabotage. During the latter part of 1942, personnel and equipment expanded rapidly. One of the most important activities was maintenance of patrols at inlets along the coast, requiring many patrol vessels and several thousand men. Thirty-eight inlets were patrolled constantly by forces under the Captain of the Port, New Orleans. Marshlands in these areas prevented guarding by beach or shoreline patrols.


ANTI-SMOKING ORDINANCES

The Eight Naval District included 26 ports of varying size, 16 of them with deep water, and the coastline of the District extended for about 1,000 miles. Most ports, however, were not used to more than about 50% of capacity. For a long time, well into 1943, guards were not used on any wharves except at Texas City, and at New Orleans to a limited extent. Yet, most of the ports were oil ports. Texas City required attention, because it was found difficult to enforce the Oil Pollution act there. Even at Texas City and New Orleans, most guards were posted only at night until well into 1943. It was important, therefore, that anti-smoking ordinances be passed and placed in effect in the more active ports. Such ordinances were passed at Mobile and Baton Rouge, followed by New Orleans, Galveston, and Panama City, and thereafter it was unlawful in those ports to smoke on docks or on vessels berthed at the docks.

RESTRICTED



A QUARTER OF 1,000-POUND AERIAL BOMBS
TO HELP KEEP THE AXIS CAULDRON BOILING
IS SWUNG ABOARD SHIP UNDER EXPERIENCED COAST GUARD EYES
A COAST GUARD FIREBOAT STANDS BY, JUST IN CASE



A COAST GUARD FIREBOAT (LEFT) AND FIREMEN ON SHORE (RIGHT)
BATTLE A BLAZE AT THE ANACOSTIA RAILROAD BRIDGE
OVER HISTORIC POTOMAC RIVER IN WASHINGTON, D. C.

RESTRICTED

SUPERVISION
OF EXPLOSIVES

There was relatively little explosives loading activity in the Eighth District until the latter part of 1943.

Greater concentration on such activity then caused a considerable decrease in personnel in certain fields which caused some difficulties. During the Fall of 1943, the New Orleans Port of Embarkation informed the Captain of the Port at New Orleans that round-the-clock loading operations were contemplated at the Braithwaite and Concord Explosives Docks below the city. The Army planned to load vessels with explosives to full capacity, rather than partially as theretofore, meaning 5,000 to 7,000 tons of explosives per vessel. The Captain of the Port assigned details of 10 to 12 men to each vessel, depending upon the number of holds. Supervision also extended to the unloading of explosives from railroad freight cars at the terminal. The program was fully under way at the beginning of 1944, and continued with little or no let-up until the end of hostilities with Germany. Most of this activity was at New Orleans. However, there was some activity at Mobile, Alabama, chiefly in connection with ships sailing for Dutch Guiana with dynamite used for mining bauxite, and returning with bauxite ore for the Mobile plant of the Aluminum Company of America. There were no real facilities at that port, and this brought about complaint from various steamship companies. About the only pier available for explosives loading and sufficiently isolated, was at Theodore, Alabama, 10 miles below Mobile. In September, 1943, this pier became an authorized loading point, but it is not clear whether the Coast Guard supervised loading there at that time. In all, more than 325,000 tons of explosives were loaded during the war at the Braithwaite and Concord terminals under Coast Guard supervision, and about 150,000 tons were handled at the San Jacinto Ordnance Depot below Houston, beginning in September, 1944. Between VE and VJ-days, over 75,000 additional tons were handled at these terminals. Also, in the latter part of 1944, Coast Guard details were assigned for Navy explosives loading on merchant and public vessels at the Naval Magazine, Theodore, Alabama, with a total of 70,000 tons supervised.

FIRE-FIGHTING
AND PREVENTION

There was little to set fire-fighting and prevention in this District apart from similar activities in other

Districts, except that development of equipment and personnel was slow. It was not until about the first of 1943 that Coast Guard fireboats were placed in operation in the District. Until then, the only fire protection was by small 50-gallon pumping units on board patrol vessels. These could be considered only as "first aid" in the extinguishment of fires in their incipient stages. Municipal floating fire equipment was available only at New Orleans, Houston and Galveston. Special attention was paid to safety while hot work was being done in vessels even though, in early October, 1942, there was no requirement for Coast Guard permission, written or oral, prior to the commencement of welding or cutting operations on board merchant vessels. Several dangerous cases prompted the Captain of the Port, New Orleans, to initiate the requirement of written Coast Guard per-

mission to carry on hot work in any vessel within the limits of the port of New Orleans. This was adopted by other COTPs, and an appreciable reduction in waterfront fires resulted. However, once fire prevention got under way, rapid progress was made, and eventually the Eighth District had 33 fireboats in operation. Although there were few fires of consequence, experience varied rather widely. On 31 January, 1944, the Captain of the Port at Panama City dispatched a detail of 20 men to fight a forest fire on U. S. Highway 231, 25 miles north of the city. The fire was extinguished after 7 hours of work. On 1 March, 1944, a 25,000-barrel tank of gasoline exploded at the Cities Service Refinery below Lake Charles, Louisiana. Because of fire danger, a Coast Guard unit responded and remained on duty until 4 March. It was noted that there seemed to be little organization to cope with emergencies at many of the refining properties. Fire units were often called upon for pumping operations, as elsewhere noted. On 27 March, 1944, the Aransas Pass Captain of the Port detail was notified at 0200 by the Harbor Entrance Control Post that the YP-159 was in a sinking condition three miles off the entrance to Aransas Pass Inlet. The CG-38365 was dispatched and assisted the vessel to Port Aransas. The vessel had lost her shaft and wheel and was taking in considerable water. The CG-50084-F lay alongside and pumped YP-159 dry, and remained until emergency repairs were made.

SHIP FIRES

There were only two ship fires in the District which were of any consequence and

involved any appreciable loss. The first, at New Orleans in December, 1943, was in the hold of an Argentine vessel. It originated in a full cargo of tobacco and newsprint paper. It was very inaccessible and could be extinguished only by flooding and removal of the cargo. There was minor damage to the vessel, but the cargo loss was \$175,000. The other occurred during transfer operations of oil into barges on the Houston Ship Channel in February, 1945. This was a flash fire of undetermined origin, which resulted in the loss of two barges, a Coast Guard fireboat, and damage to a seagoing tanker. There was a definite hazard in case of collision involving gasoline barges. One instance was at New Orleans, where a collision occurred near Algiers Point on 15 December, 1942, between the Argentinian SS RIOCHUBUT and a gasoline barge. The barge was towed to a forebay in Industrial Canal where Coast Guard personnel assisted in materially reducing gasoline leakage. Work was discontinued for several hours at one point in the river as a precautionary measure because of gasoline on the water. Another somewhat similar incident occurred at New Orleans on 20 October, 1944. A Navy LST was proceeding downstream and the tug ALEXANDER MACKENSIE, with 9 oil barges, was headed upstream. There was a collision as a result of which the LST caught fire together with two of the oil barges. The damaged barges spilled about 100,000 gallons of crude oil into the river, and this became ignited. Two Coast Guard fireboats, a picket boat and a cutter were dispatched from New Orleans. On arrival at the scene, the fire in the LST had been extinguished, but the other fires were extinguished by the Coast Guard details. The cutter secured the barges torn adrift by the collision.

The oil, which constituted a serious fire hazard, was broken up and passed through the port of New Orleans. Two fireboats were assigned to the intake of the New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board water purification plant and for 36 hours washed the oil away from the intake and prevented its entry into the city water supply. Considering the tremendous tonnage of general cargo, petroleum products, and explosives which were loaded and unloaded on board vessels throughout this District for nearly 4 years, one may conclude that the Coast Guard combined good work with good luck in the fire division of Port Security.

HARBOR PATROL EXPERIENCE

Harbor patrol was well-organized, but as in numerous ports, water patrols were dull, unspectacular affairs, and little happened. The presence of the patrols on the job contributed, of course, to that situation, and thus they were fully effective. Many were originally conducted by Auxiliaries, and these were later taken over by the Temporary Reservists who eventually operated 18 patrol boats at New Orleans, Mobile, Houston, Galveston, and Corpus Christi where they handled virtually all waterside patrols. Operations were largely routine, but occasionally there was excitement and an opportunity to be of vital assistance. On 6 January, 1944, the 6,000-ton Army hospital ship OCTORARA sank by the stern while moored at the Todd-Johnson Dry Dock at New Orleans. A request was made by the Army Port of Embarkation for a patrol by a Coast Guard vessel to regulate the speed of passing ships in order to prevent the OCTORARA sliding off a ledge and out into deep water. On 2 April, 1944, the Captain of the Port at Galveston was notified that several boats had capsized near a causeway and that several persons had drowned in a very sudden and fierce squall. All the available boats of the COTP were dispatched from the Galveston Lifeboat Station. During the day's operations, 37 persons were rescued from peril and 4 skiffs and one motor launch were recovered. From 3 April to 9 April, the search for bodies of all missing persons continued until all were accounted for. Eight people were drowned, of which four bodies were recovered by the Coast Guard. In September, 1944, there was considerable difficulty at New Orleans from oil spills. It was necessary to detail a fast patrol boat to full time duty discovering the spills, checking sources of pollution, and communicating with the Captain of the Port that prompt protective measures might be taken.

PROBLEM AT MOBILE

Loading vessels at Mobile sometimes was a problem, due to the fact that the stevedores were negroes of low mentality, poorly trained and led, and very short in number. When a ship arrived for loading, it was often necessary to send out trucks to round up enough to handle the loading job. There was some race riot trouble at the port. Authorities all seemed to want the Coast Guard to handle the situation. Mobile was generally lax in the matter, and it seemed that no one in Mobile would arrest anyone who lived in Mobile, and there was fear the policemen might get hurt. The Coast Guard did not assume the responsibility, but did cooperate and partially solved the problem by stationing fireboats along the waterfront with orders to use the fire hose on anyone attempting to damage waterfront facilities. This expedient proved quite effective, and served a double purpose, since the docks at Mobile were old and a distinct fire hazard.

HURRICANE EVACUATION PLAN IN OPERATION

On 15 September, 1943, the Weather Bureau warned that a hurricane reported two days earlier in the Gulf of Mexico south of the Texas coast might be expected to

strike at the Louisiana coast within the next 24 hours. The Captain of the Port, New Orleans, decided to put the already formulated Hurricane Evacuation Plan into operation. Residents in the coastal marsh area from the Mermentau river to the Pearl River were advised to seek shelter, those without transportation to inland points being evacuated in Coast Guard vessels. All inlet patrols were discontinued, and Coast Guard vessels were ordered to seek shelter. The next day, the Weather Bureau advised that the storm had moved inland over a wide area without damaging effects and warnings were ordered down. On the 20th, a surfboat and 3 other Coast Guard craft were dispatched to Raceland, Louisiana, to evacuate civilians from farmlands flooded during the blow. The flood was the result of a heavy water hyacinth dam impeding the natural drainage through Bayou Folse into Lake Field. Several families were evacuated and workmen were transported to strengthen levees and repair breaks. During the period 16 to 20 September, 1943, the Captain of the Port, Port Arthur, Texas, was under hurricane plan two and the communications plan as directed by the Navy Commandant, Eighth Naval District.

CURTAINMENT

Toward the latter part of 1943, personnel became scarce, activities in the District fell off in many respects, some ACOTPs were abolished, and many inlet patrols were discontinued. By early 1944, Port Security efforts were concentrated at Mobile, New Orleans, Port Arthur, Houston, Galveston and Corpus Christi. Limited protection, however, was still furnished at the oil shipping centers of Texas City, Beaumont and Port Neches. Activity dropped rapidly in 1945, and ceased by mid-summer.

NINTH (CLEVELAND) NAVAL DISTRICT

NINTH DISTRICT DIVIDED INTO TWO MAIN SECTIONS

The Ninth District covered, in a general way, the principal waterways of the Middle West. These naturally fell within two classifications, (a) the Cleveland District (and the Lake Michigan area) which embraced most of the Great Lakes region and (b) the St. Louis District which broadly included the Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Cumberland, Illinois, Tennessee and tributary rivers. Generally, it may be said that the District stretched from Pennsylvania to Colorado and from Minnesota to Alabama. As in other Districts, early activity in waterside patrols was considerable, with assistance from the Auxiliary and later from the Temporary Reserve.

IMPORTANCE OF GREAT LAKES AS A WARTIME WATERWAY

Great Lakes traffic was of very great importance in the war effort, with its huge movements of grain and iron ore and substantial movements of coal, petroleum products and general freight. Shipbuilding, especially Naval construction, attained large proportions in the many yards on the Lakes. Saboteurs could work as easily in the Great Lakes area as elsewhere with, they might feel, less suspicion. It was essential that the great steel production centers be fed with every bit of ore which could be transported, and it was necessary that the lakes waterways be kept open and safe, even though the District be far from the invasion coasts of France and the South Pacific. The Coast Guard's vigil 24 hours a day in all sections was a vital necessity, as was that of Coast Guardsmen afloat. Traffic stoppage would have had a serious effect upon speedy prosecution of the war. Regulars, regular Reservists and later Temporary Reservists took up the duty of guarding the shore-line, docks, vessels, bridges, patrolling the harbors, manning lookouts and generally keeping the lake waters secure.

COMMISSIONING OF
LICENSED LAKE OFFICERS

To increase the protection of lake carriers, licensed officers of the carriers were commissioned as Temporary Reserve officers. This was an effective means of protection, and allowed withdrawal of the regular enlisted guards for sea duty. Maintenance of such guards to this point proved a heavy drain on regular District personnel. Pilots, also eventually enrolled in the Temporary Reserve, played an important part in the movement of newly constructed Naval vessels to salt water, and between the several lake ports.

THE EFFECT OF GREAT
LAKES ICE CONDITIONS

It was impossible to continue waterside patrols on the Great Lakes during the winter months. Ice closes the Lakes to navigation in the Fall, and attains almost unbelievable thickness during the coldest part of the winter, — so great that the Coast Guard ice breakers often find it impossible to keep channels open. Except for maintenance, most men assigned to boat patrol, whether regulars or Temporary Reservists had winter assignments ashore in cooperation with other Captain of the Port units guarding bridges, piers and ships, driving jeeps, or serving in lifeboat stations and lookouts.

SAULT STE. MARIE

The enforcement of the rules promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce is assigned to the Captain of the Port at Sault Ste. Marie, and normally the St. Mary's River Patrol comprises all Coast Guard personnel and equipment employed by the Captain of the Port in their enforcement. From the early days preceding the war throughout the period of hostilities the guarding, and the supervision of movement, of vessels through this waterway were of the utmost importance. In the eight month's period of navigation, the normal average of vessel passages through the canal is about 17,000, or one passage every 20 minutes, day and night. Wheat and ore are the principal commodities transported, and these are handled in great quantity. Movement of both stepped up strongly during the war. Coast Guard ice breaking was essential in opening up the channels to navigation as soon as possible in the Spring and in keeping them open late into the Fall, for that meant more iron ore for urgent war demands. The Soo locks were of special concern, therefore, for unless adequately guarded they were open to acts of sabotage, with possibly disastrous results, and difficult to protect against surprise air attack. Passages through Sault Ste. Marie increased materially with the advent of war, the number increasing from 17,614 in 1940 to 25,865 in 1941 and 26,884 in 1942. In 1942, about 85,000,000 tons of iron ore were carried through the locks in about 350 vessels. These vessels made the trip of about 1,200 miles each way, and until the vessel officers were commissioned, Coast Guard guards were placed on board for the whole trip to avoid stopping before and after passing through the locks. These guards made guarding of docks and gangways unnecessary by shore personnel.

EARLY JURISDICTIONAL
PROBLEM AT DULUTH

As has been mentioned previously, there were many jurisdictional problems in the earlier days of the war between various branches of the armed services. Even at Duluth, Minnesota, there was confusion in this regard. The Captain of the Port had been established and had things well under control. About June, 1942, the Army stepped into the picture and seemed to assume responsibility for security. For a while there was no knowledge of who was responsible for what, but eventually it was determined that the Coast Guard was responsible for the waterfront patrols and the security

of new vessels in the water undergoing conversion or repair, that the Navy, through the District Security Office, was responsible for new construction and plant security, leaving Army responsibility undetermined for some time.

GUARD DUTY
AND INSPECTIONS

Guarding of piers, bridges and vessels was an important part of Port Security duty, as in all Districts. Practically all steamship companies cooperated well while their ships were tied up for the winter by supplying civilian guards. Such vessels, however, were frequently inspected along with all waterfront facilities by Captain of the Port details to be sure all regulations were being observed and the watchmen alert. Infractions were reported to the COTP and vessel owners, and promptly rectified. Armed guards were furnished for Navy vessels under construction. Due to personnel shortage, it was requested that the Navy Commandant allow the use of Temporary Reserves in this duty. This was refused at first but in August, 1943, permission was finally granted to use them for Navy vessels subsequent to launching and until they were commissioned and departed from the builders' yard. For a considerable period, armed guards were placed on board vessels proceeding to tidewater via the Illinois waterway from Chicago, but this was discontinued in the Fall of 1944. Tank vessels entering Great Lakes ports were inspected by a trained specialist and gangway guards were posted to make certain that no regulations were violated. In mid-1944 the greatly increased traffic in petroleum products, particularly aviation gasoline, grain, and iron ore required more active boarding inspections and safety measures to insure uninterrupted movement, at a time when the Port Security complement had just about been halved. This taxed the COTP forces to the utmost. New emphasis had to be placed on different Port Security activities, to meet the cut in manpower, but the new complement emphasized fire protection and fire-fighting activities to afford minimum protection to already over-taxed wartime facilities and vessels, and also emphasized greater dependence upon the Temporary Reservists.

WATER PATROLS

Patrols by small craft were performed in most of the ports of the District, first by Auxiliaries, then by the Temporary Reservists, augmenting patrols by regular personnel. Most of the craft in this duty were CGR boats. There were no outstanding episodes in this type of duty. Toward the end of the navigation season of 1944, in view of the trend of foreign affairs, numerous units in the District were advised to curtail their patrol boat activities by changing the daylight patrols from full time operation to a spot check basis wherever feasible. There was relatively little patrol work in the harbors in 1945. At the end of the 1944 season, 35 of the smaller units consisting of COTPs, ACOTPs and Patrol Bases were discontinued, cutting the total to 7 COTPs and 3 ACOTPs.

CASES OF
POSSIBLE SABOTAGE

Late in July, 1942, a bridge tender on a highway bridge at Toledo, Ohio, came across a package of material evidence of the operation of Nazi agents in Toledo. This was turned over to Coast Guard District headquarters by the Assistant Port Security Officer, and in turn submitted to the FBI. In November of the same year, information was received at District headquarters from the commanding officer of the Detroit Base, which he had received from Royal Canadian Mounted Police through immigration border patrol at Detroit. Three or four Germans were suspected of having landed by submarine near Quebec. One of them

had been captured, but the others were at large. Captains of the Port in the District were alerted and a close lookout was maintained for these men. The Coast Guard Commandant, and Naval Commandant of the District were notified by restricted dispatch. The Captain of the Port at Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin, was informed by the mayor of the city that, on the night of 22 August, 1944, every fire hydrant in the vicinity of the shipyards was opened and the caps of the hydrants damaged so that no appreciable water pressure could have been delivered in case of a fire. It happened in an area which was not Coast Guard responsibility, but the unit was alerted to prevent any possible trouble.

FLOOD RELIEF

Between 26 December, 1942 and 5 January, 1943, flood conditions in the Ohio Valley required assistance from the Coast Guard, and units were sent from the Ninth Cleveland and Ninth St. Louis Districts to effect rescues and provide general flood relief. Units sent from Cleveland included 6 motor lifeboats and one communications truck. On the passing of flood waters, the units returned to their normal tasks.

CAUTION AGAINST AN UNUSUAL HAZARD

On 6 October, 1944, a pipe line on the dock of the Standard Oil Company at Cleveland broke and gasoline drained into the Cuyahoga River. While this facility was the responsibility of the Army under the Master Inspection Responsibility List, the Coast Guard was vitally interested because of the hazardous exposure to other waterfront facilities. A Coast Guard fireboat was dispatched to the scene and made ready in case of need. Temporary Reservists were strategically stationed at key points along the dock and the Jefferson Street Bridge. All traffic passing over the bridge was stopped and warned against smoking. Continuous standby and patrol duty was maintained throughout the night. The hazardous condition had passed by morning without incident.

EXPLOSION AND FIRE AT CLEVELAND

At 1140 on the afternoon of 20 October, 1944, there was an explosion of liquid gas stored in the tanks of the East Ohio Gas Company at Cleveland, followed by fire and numerous small explosions. There ensued one of the greatest holocausts in the history of Cleveland. Hundreds of homes were completely destroyed by the explosion, over 150 persons lost their lives, and property damage mounted to between \$5,000,000 and \$7,000,000. While the facility was not under cognizance of the Coast Guard, the fire was of such proportion as to endanger the entire waterfront area. All available Coast Guard personnel and equipment responded to an urgent call. By radio, telephone, and word of mouth, all available Temporary Reservists were ordered to report to the Captain of the Port. Local TR units and those at Lorain and Fairport furnished help within a very short time. These men joined with the other COTP details and assisted in preventing spread of the fire, policed the area embracing several acres of land, protected merchant shops from looting, and uncovered several bodies of persons who had perished. It was generally recognized that the efforts of all Coast Guard personnel prevented spread of the fire and the explosion of 5 tanks of highly noxious and explosive material stored in an adjoining plant which undoubtedly would have resulted. Navy and other personnel also participated. It was three days before all danger had passed and Coast Guard activity there was secured.

NINTH (CHICAGO) NAVAL DISTRICT

NATURE OF DUTY AT CHICAGO

Along the Chicago waterfront are many steel mills, oil

tanks and refineries, and railroad properties, but there are few piers. The area included many war plants and about 20 shipyards. The Captain of the Port had about 1,300 personnel, and 60 patrol boats operating on a 24-hour basis. The principal duty here was to provide adequate boat patrols to assure security of these areas. Much effort was directed toward fire prevention and fire-fighting. Although Hanley fireboats were considered satisfactory there, the Captain of the Port planned on having a tug available to move them into position. The other chief duty at Chicago was furnishing guards for vessels, about 400 being assigned to ships transiting the Soo Locks.

VESSEL GUARDS

Especially in the earlier days the furnishing of guards on Lake vessels was important. The commissioning of licensed officers relieved this somewhat, and allowed return of some men to lifeboat stations which had had personnel drawn down to a dangerously low point. Beginning about July 20, 1942, the Captain of the Port furnished guards on car ferries. This served a useful purpose and gave, at the same time, valuable training to the men. Over 100 men at a time were on Pere Marquette car ferries operating out of Ludington, Michigan, receiving training in engine-room, deck and galley duties - helpful later when men were transferred to sea. No guards were assigned to lake vessels while navigation was closed by ice, vessel owners having the responsibility to furnish standby guards at such times. Such guarding was often found to be indifferent. Guards were placed on Army Shipping Board and British vessels under construction after they were afloat. Also, it was the practice to place two guards on each Navy vessel when it left the shipyard for tidewater until the vessel was commissioned, usually at New Orleans. This was also done for the Maritime Commission, upon request.

PILOTS

For most of the war period, there was a shortage of pilots. Many wished to remain in a civilian status because they could make more money than in working for the Coast Guard. Practically all enrolled were employed as officers on the lake vessels, a few very old men being about the only exceptions. Vessels proceeding from the Lakes to tidewater sometimes required pilots in Lake Michigan as well as escorting and clearance through the bridges to the first lock in the Illinois River, at which point the St. Louis District assumed pilotage.

TUGBOAT SITUATION AT MILWAUKEE

A bad situation during wartime existed at Milwaukee, where the only tugboat concern had gone out of business and offered its tugs for sale because of the demands of labor. Steamers there were in danger of damaging themselves and the bridges and docks without the assistance of tugs. A report from this District to Headquarters said: "At first Coast Guard Station boats helped the steamers with lines and landing men, but orders have been given to refrain from any action that might be criticized by labor." Apparently, under the circumstances, criticism by labor was more momentous than damage to vessels and bridges.

FIRE ON VESSEL WITH "DANGEROUS CARGO"

The usual precautions against fire were taken in the various ports of the District which had Captains or Assistant Captains of the Port, and the usual fire-fighting units were maintained. Special care was exercised at the ore dock at Escanaba which was wooden, 2,700 feet long and 50 feet high, and as "vulnerable as a fire cracker." A group of oil companies at Chicago provided a 3-day course in fire-fighting methods where oil

RESTRICTED



A CARGO TRANSPORT CREEPS DOWN THE CHICAGO RIVER BEHIND A TUG
AFTER A VOYAGE THROUGH THE LAKES
PRECEDED BY THE COAST GUARD ICE BREAKER MACKINAW



THE COAST GUARD ICE BREAKER MACKINAW
BREAKS A PATH THROUGH THE ICE OF THE ST. MARY'S RIVER
ALLOWING PASSAGE OF FOUR SEAGOING FREIGHTERS

RESTRICTED

was concerned. Fireboats were located strategically. There were few serious fires. One, however, occurred on 26 July, 1943, at Indiana Harbor in the Canadian tanker BRUCE HUDSON. It was extinguished by Coast Guardsmen after a one and a half-hour battle. Four men of the vessel's crew, including the master, were killed. This fire started after the vessel was fully loaded with high test gasoline, with steam up and ready to depart. Probably the fire was caused by fumes which had not been properly dispensed. It was noted that vents in Canadian vessels were not wholly proper, that such vessels should be inspected to determine the grade of cargo carried, and that extra precautions should be taken. After this episode, it was planned that foreign vessels would not be permitted to load dangerous cargoes such as high test gasoline unless all tanker rules were complied with.

SPECIAL CONDITION AT EAST CHICAGO

A special condition existed at East Chicago where the oil refineries were located. The refineries and steel mills in the area discharge water from their cooling systems into the lake, and this raises the temperature of the water to 93 degrees. The heat of the water raises the temperature of the cargoes, thus creating another safety factor to be taken into consideration.

CHICAGO MERGED WITH CLEVELAND

Because of the change in war conditions and the desire for organizational simplification, the Ninth (Chicago) District was merged with the Ninth (Cleveland) District on 31 December, 1943, Captains of the Port continuing operations under the District Coast Guard Officer at Cleveland.

NINTH (ST. LOUIS) NAVAL DISTRICT

NATURE OF THE ST. LOUIS DISTRICT

The nature of the area and the type of duty needed in the St. Louis District differed materially from those of the Great Lakes area. The water areas consisted almost entirely of navigable rivers. They were subject to periods of low water, as well as floods and varying hazards. A great volume of river traffic essential to the war transited the Mississippi River and the major tributaries, and much of this consisted of newly built medium-sized Naval vessels on their way to tidewater. The larger cities and the nearly 6,500 miles of navigable waterways required security. Coast Guardsmen were needed for patrol of the dock areas and boat patrol from the waterside, but the demand for men at sea was as great here as elsewhere, and Temporary Reservists stepped in and eventually assumed a large part of the responsibility for security.

THE SCOPE OF DUTY

The St. Louis District was unique in that it had no coast, though it embraced all or part of 19 mid-western states. A total of 207 waterfront facilities under the jurisdiction of the Army, Navy, or other Federal agencies existed in the District. While the problems of internal security rested with the individual military or civilian branch concerned, adequate protection against possible damage from waterfront itself was provided by the District Security Office in the form of water borne patrols. In the Tennessee Valley Authority area were located 16 power locks and dams, many supplying electric power to vital war industries. Continuous security patrols were maintained at 14 of these. A large proportion of total tonnage transiting the waterways was inflammable and combustible liquids, including aviation gasoline, and this required a continuous security program to

insure safe handling of these cargoes. It was a difficult and never-ending task. A considerable amount of personnel and equipment was involved in this security program. Hanley fireboats were placed at important points. It was found that they were not generally adaptable to river use due to lack of speed and maneuverability and to the effect of currents. About 470 men were detailed as guards and fire-fighters. The 180 CGR and Coast Guard patrol boats utilized 650 men in waterborne patrols. There were 40 scout cars, 12 fireboats, 27 mobile trailer pumps and 7 temporary skid units. Small gasoline-powered fire pumps were installed in picket boats, and these seemed adequate in places where regular fireboats would not be justified. About 18% of all equipment and personnel in anti-sabotage and security patrol activities were assigned to the all-important TVA area. Most of the 427 waterfront facilities under Coast Guard responsibility were oil tank farms and refineries receiving or shipping their entire supply by barge. The 207 waterfront facilities mentioned earlier were primarily engaged in war production. In the northern sections, mobile land units replaced waterborne patrols in the winter. In all, there were 55 floating patrols. Here, as in most Districts, personnel turnover was extremely troublesome, but this was eventually alleviated by the use of Temporary Reservists.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COTP UNITS

One of the oldest establishments was the East Chattanooga Coast Guard Depot (December, 1941). Captain of the Port activities began in that area at that time using the Aids to Navigation depot as a combination base for both Port Security operations and aids to navigation. Immediately upon declaration of war, patrols were established in the TVA system. Port Security activities there consisted of patrolling from the waterside above and below each lock and dam as well as guarding the power projects above the head of navigation on the Tennessee River. In the first part of 1942, several picket boats were assigned to the Pittsburgh area, and Reserve vessels were added. Besides performing water patrols, it was important to have shoreline deep patrols, and to inspect and check 4 times a day the bridges and bridge piers in the vicinity. The usual Port Security activities were performed at Pittsburgh with regard to plant protection, fire hazards, loading of inflammable cargoes, identification, etc. Other COTPs were established at Sheffield, Alabama and Nashville, and one was established at Memphis in April, 1942. This unit was very important, since there was great need for Port Security there due to fire hazards caused by the great volume of gasoline and petroleum products which passed up the Mississippi or were transhipped to Memphis. Eventually, the St. Louis District Captain of the Port units were as follows:

COTP	St. Louis, Missouri
COTP	Cairo, Illinois
COTP	Memphis, Tennessee
COTP	Cincinnati, Ohio
COTP	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
COTP	Rock Island, Illinois
COTP	St. Paul, Minnesota
COTP	Sheffield, Alabama
COTP	Chattanooga, Tennessee
COTP	Peoria, Illinois
COTP	Nashville, Tennessee
ACOTP	Paducah, Kentucky

CHANGES IN CAPTAINS OF THE PORT

Early in 1943, owing to difficulties encountered in attempting to enforce Port Security regulations throughout the District with relatively green and inexperienced

personnel then available, the District Coast Guard Officer at St. Louis, with authorization by Headquarters, designated each of the 9 Officers-in-Charge, Marine Inspection, as Captain of the Port for the area under his jurisdiction, and the District Marine Inspection Officer was assigned as District Security Officer, in addition to his other duties.

BRIDGES

One of the principal concerns of the Port Security units was the security of bridges. The importance of this in a District of rivers can be realized. The sabotage of any of these bridges, especially over the Illinois River between Cairo and Chicago would have delayed immeasurably the transit of naval and other craft to tidewater. The Coast Guard agreed to guard the bridges from the waterside, whereas the Army undertook to guard them on the landside and upside. Coast Guard officers cooperated with the Inland Waterways Corporation with reference to security, stranding and bridge clearance, a Coast Guard officer accompanying each vessel in the earlier days of the war. Later, one of the chief duties of the DCOG at St. Louis, was furnishing Coast Guard pilots to vessels transiting the river. Many vessels were almost 500 feet long, and it was a tight operation getting them down the Illinois waterway. There were 51 bridges across the Illinois River, 15 of which had to be converted to lift bridges to permit the passage of sizeable vessels. There were 82 bridges over the 3 rivers in the Pittsburgh area, and this required patrol vessels to keep on the move in order to visit them 4 times in each 24 hours. The 35 navigation locks and dams in the area were the responsibility of the Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army. Innumerable bridges also crossed the rivers at widely varying places throughout the District. At many places, jeep patrols went along and stopped bridge traffic while vessels passed under, to prevent having anything dropped on the vessels from the bridges.

DUTIES PERFORMED BY AUXILIARISTS AND TEMPORARY RESERVISTS

Personnel of the District increased, and by 15 January, 1943, enlisted personnel numbered 2933, divided between 1861 in shore units and 1,072 in floating units, with 575 on Captain of the Port duty. However, these numbers were considerably augmented by Auxiliarists in the earlier days and Temporary Reservists later. In the initial period boat patrols were conducted by Auxiliarists in their own craft. In January, 1943, these numbered 1,230 and 1,014 respectively. One of the first transitions to the Temporary Reserve was at St. Louis, where a unit was formed to cover St. Louis and Alton, with an authorized complement of 300. By February, 1943, 294 men had been enrolled and these manned 3 picket boats 24 hours a day as well as a fireboat, and performed some sentry duty and work at the District office. Other units were organized. Generally, Temporary Reserve duties performed were boat patrol of rivers at strategic localities with special attention to bridges, boat maintenance, fireboat operation, security jeep patrols, guard and sentry duties, boarding and inspection details, telephone communications watches, identification cards, and special pilot assignments. Duties did not, however, extend to escort of LSTs, LCIs, DEs, or security details on board Naval vessels. Included in the duties performed was flood relief, in which these men were extremely helpful and valuable. In the later days of the war, the TRs had taken over entirely a good part of patrol duties in the District.

OIL TRAFFIC ON WESTERN RIVERS

Oil and gasoline movements on the western rivers increased steadily well into 1943. With the large

increase and the pressure for haste, security measures were likely to be overlooked. Therefore, an intensive campaign for safety was inaugurated. The danger which existed in large-scale handling of waterborne high test gasoline and the increasing number of inexperienced personnel in commercial vessels created a real problem, and further supervision of such vessels at terminals and elsewhere was badly needed. Shortage of personnel was finally overcome and such supervision was carried out.

RELATING TO PASSAGE OF NAVAL CRAFT

A large amount of Naval craft, chiefly for the purpose of operating with invasion fleets, was constructed on the Great Lakes and in the major cities on rivers tributary to the Mississippi. These varied in size from small landing barges to LSTs. They contributed a substantial amount of traffic in the Lakes and on these rivers on their way from the builders' yards to tidewater in the Gulf of Mexico. There was a need for a constant check on their positions and on the availability of patrol boats and cutters, together with alert and well-organized personnel including Temporary Reservists to ensure safe passage through the waterways. Officers and crews of these Naval vessels were generally inexperienced. Piloting on the rivers was different and needed much more local knowledge than elsewhere. The Coast Guard furnished pilots for most of these craft as related on page 97 under the general Section on Pilots. The arrangement was peculiar in that, being Naval vessels, the pilot had no authority but merely advised the commanding officer. Between 7 September, 1942, when the first DCOG "Ferry Crew" delivered the first Navy craft to the Navy Commandant, Third Naval District and 31 December, 1944, such ferry crews delivered to tidewater 1,257 Navy vessels for a total of 1,553,393 vessel-miles. (These figures do not include Army or other vessels). The breakdown of such deliveries follows:

Number of Vessels	Type	Destination	Vessel Miles
601	LST	New Orleans	661,008
412	LCT(6)	New Orleans	439,726
136	LCT(5)	New York	295,756
63	LCT(5)	New Orleans	74,193
36	LCT(6)	New York	73,242
9	AG	New Orleans	9,468

FLOOD RELIEF AN IMPORTANT ACTIVITY

The Mississippi River and its major tributaries have the disastrous habit of overflowing their banks and inundating vast areas of rich farmlands, cities and towns. Floods in some sections occur almost every year, but the war years seemed to have more than their share of these emergencies. The Coast Guard was established at or near the affected areas and had many occasions for pursuing its primary peacetime function of rescue of persons, and protection of property. Regular Coast Guardsmen were joined and assisted by Temporary Reservists in all flood relief activities such as loading sandbags for levees, repairing levees, evacuating people and livestock, saving stored crops, and other duty connected with such relief activities.

155,000 PERSONS DRIVEN FROM HOMES

In May, 1943, high water conditions on the rivers of the District developed into a major flood. It was estimated that 155,000 persons were driven from their homes and that the crop loss was about \$5,000,000. All available personnel and equipment in the District turned to flood relief work. Surf boats and communications trucks were sent from the Cleveland and

Chicago Districts to augment equipment on the scene. These floods continued at various points for about a month.

THE FLOOD OF 1944

In January 1944, the Flood Operating Plan was completed and in process of printing for distribution throughout the Coast Guard. A supplementary plan was prepared for use within the St. Louis District including 23 questions regarding local facilities in 181 towns in the flood areas along the Ohio, Illinois, Upper and Lower Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, for the purpose of providing personnel assigned to flood relief operations with readily accessible local information for use in connection with such work. This was foresighted, and contributed greatly to Coast Guard efficiency in the floods which followed three months later. Swollen waters of the Mississippi, Missouri, and Illinois Rivers and tributary streams ravaged the valleys of those rivers in April, 1944, due to excessive rains, and attained a crest of 39.15 feet at St. Louis on 30 April — the highest mark in 100 years. Over 6,000 families were made homeless or otherwise affected, more than 1,500,000 acres were inundated and about 6,000 buildings were damaged or destroyed. Relief agencies fed 3,640 persons and sheltered 2,455. The Coast Guard made available all of its facilities in the District. Coast Guard Task Forces joined Federal troops, State guardsmen, prisoners of war and civilian volunteers engaged in the fight to save levees and in evacuation and other assistance for the stricken population. Radio facilities on board the CGC GOLDENROD maintained communications between the Coast Guard Relief Force, Missouri River Section, and District headquarters. The TWX facilities at the Grafton Patrol were utilized for communications between the Illinois River Section Relief Force and the District office. Invasion craft en route to tide water were diverted to rescue work. The District Coast Guard Officer had excellent cooperation from the District Hydrographic Section in keeping informed of flood conditions and weather prospects, as well as flood crest probabilities. It is to the credit of the Coast Guard and others that only 6 lives lost were directly attributable to flood waters. Of these, two were Coast Guardsmen performing their duty. Regular and Reserve Coast Guardsmen engaged in these duties totaled 375, and Temporary Reservists, who became an integral part of the rescue forces, numbered over 250.

THE OHIO RIVER FLOODS OF 1945

During the unprecedented three successive floods which inundated the Ohio and Mississippi Valleys in the Spring of 1945, Coast Guard task forces, augmented by aircraft including a helicopter, rescued more than 10,000 persons and evacuated thousands of head of cattle. In addition, they transported food, medical supplies, mail, household effects and such throughout the area and adjacent danger zones. Much new and improved flood relief equipment was used, and much of this was manned by Temporary Reservists. Between the regulars and the TRs, the Coast Guard was able to carry out operations on a 24-hour basis for the duration of the emergency. When residents of a Louisville suburban community lost their fight to keep flood waters behind a dyke hurriedly built of sandbags, Coast Guardsmen were standing by and evacuated 35 families as water rose 12 feet in a few hours.

CURTAINMENT

The war situation had progressed to the point where, by the latter part of 1944, a very considerable curtailment of Port Security activity was undertaken in the St. Louis District. This curtailment was well summarized in an article in the October 1944 issue of Waterways entitled

"Freight that Moves on Inland Waters." This summary is quoted:

"Virtually all Coast Guard Port Security functions within the 22-state Ninth Naval District will be abolished on or before November, 15.

"This will mean the cessation of such wartime protective measures as Port Security boat patrols, jeep patrols, inspection of loading and unloading tank barges and other related activities. The only boat patrol remaining under the Port Security program will be maintained for the Tennessee Valley Authority along the Tennessee River.

"A large number of officers and men will be made available for sea duty by the move, which was adopted to conform with the policy of a general reduction in port operations. The program was made possible to a great extent by the cooperation of river interests with security regulations.

"All regular Coast Guard operations, including aids to navigation work, general river patrol duty, fireboat units and vessel inspections will continue throughout the District.

"Although scores of vessels will be removed from patrol duty in various sections of the District, all Coast Guard craft will remain in the District. Many privately owned reserve boats that were loaned to the Coast Guard at the outset of the war will be returned to their owners as soon as possible.

"The Coast Guard had been contemplating a somewhat relaxed security program for some time, but nothing was done until an exhaustive study was completed. The first step was made October 15, when the use of Captain of the Port identification cards was discontinued.

"Boat patrols and other Coast Guard activities will be curtailed at the following bases, in keeping with the announced program; St. Paul, Minneapolis and Salvage, Minn.; Catlettsburg, Louisville, Paducah, Ky.; Charleston, W. Va.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; Cincinnati, Portsmouth and Ironton, Ohio; Memphis and Nashville, Tenn.; Evansville, Ind.; Keokuk, Iowa; Rock Island and Alton, Ill.; and St. Louis and Kansas City, Mo.

"Fireboats will remain at Memphis, Charleston, St. Louis, Wood River, Ill., and Pittsburgh, Pa."

These remaining activities continued for a while, but virtually no Port Security activity continued anywhere after the summer of 1945 on capitulation of the Axis powers.

TENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

THE TENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

The Tenth Naval District comprised Puerto Rico and the other islands of the United States in the Caribbean Sea, including the Virgin Islands, with headquarters at San Juan, Puerto Rico. The city is an important port, and especially in wartime security of shipping and protection against sabotage and fire was paramount. The principal Captain of the Port units were at San Juan and at Charlotte Amalie in the Virgin Islands, and there were roughly 10 Assistant Captain of the Port units spread throughout the area, chiefly in Puerto Rico. (For list of units see page 28).

WATERFRONT SITUATION AT SAN JUAN

There were 14 piers at San Juan, including one modern pier just completed which was immediately taken over by



WHILE ALWAYS HAZARDOUS
FLOOD RESCUE WORK ALONG THE MID-WESTERN RIVERS
HAD ITS PLEASING MOMENTS



HANLEY FIREBOATS, SUCH AS THIS,
POURED HUNDREDS OF GALLONS OF WATER A MINUTE
ON RIVERFRONT FIRES

the Navy. Practically the entire normal export of San Juan is raw sugar. Less than 5% of the people working on the docks spoke English, and this was a bar to normal dealings with the dock-workers. Despite 40-odd years of possession by the United States, English was not taught in the schools. There was considerable difficulty with pilferage, but the placing of guards in the hatches of loading vessels reduced this 60% to 70%. The longshoremen were chiefly responsible. They were searched, convicted in Court and fined \$2, which did not bother them much. Then the practice of lifting the men's cards was established, thus keeping them off the dock, and this was more effective. Waterside patrol at San Juan was almost non-existent. Boats, including 83-footers, were laid up at times longer than justified due to transportation difficulties and inability to get parts. Fishing was allowed only during daylight hours.

PILOT PROBLEM

The Coast Guard had complete pilot control, though there was some difficulty because masters who had been running in for years would not stop for a pilot outside, but proceeded in to a point under El Morro before stopping. On the other hand, masters unfamiliar with San Juan would stop 5 or 6 miles outside, and expect a pilot to go out there. Finally, a pilot was kept always at the Navy Net Tender ready to go on assignment at any time. Merchant Marine Inspectors worked right along with the regular boarding party.

THE SAN JUAN VOLUNTEER PORT SECURITY FORCE

In the Tenth District, as in about all Districts, there was a continuous personnel problem due to shortage of available men. To relieve this situation as far as possible, a Volunteer Security Force was organized, which became a very important part of the Captain of the Port function. This unique regiment, with personnel over 80% Puerto Rican, was one of the finest VPSF units, and functioned well at San Juan. About November, 1943, the regiment had 13 officers, 285 men, 17 women, and 168 men in training. In February, 1944, 431 men were enrolled, and were performing over 30% of Coast Guard duty on the San Juan waterfront posts, serving every night, and standing day watches also on Sundays. Each of the ultimate 8 sections (or platoons) of somewhat over 50 men was commanded by an ensign, and included:

- 1 Chief Boatswains Mate
- 1 Boatswains Mate, First Class
- 1 Boatswains Mate, Second Class
- 4 - 6 Coxswains
- 1 Yeoman, Second Class
- 1 Storekeeper, Third Class

There was little boat patrol at San Juan, but some VPSF members served in the patrol craft occasionally. This unit functioned a bit over a year, and was secured 23 December, 1944. Very few members ever attained the 600-hour total of duty, due to watch changes and relatively early inactivation of the unit. Several members traveled far to attend the fire school at Fort McHenry, Baltimore. (For additional information on this unit, see Page 73).

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AT COTP, SAN JUAN

It is interesting that the Captain of the Port, San Juan, was also:

- (a) Assistant District Coast Guard Officer, 10 ND
- (b) Section Coast Guard Officer, San Juan Section
- (c) Commanding Officer, San Juan Base
- (d) Commanding Officer, Receiving Station
- (e) District Port Security Officer
- (f) District Operations Officer

The figures which follow will give an idea of the size and variation of personnel and equipment at San Juan during the year 1944.

	29 Feb.	Peak For 1944	31 Oct.
Commissioned Officers (including Spars) in Port Security duties	10	10	7
Warrant officers and enlisted personnel in Port Security floating units	33	39	15
Warrant officers and enlisted personnel in Port Security duties ashore (excluding Beach Patrol)	209	209	78
Explosives Detail: Commissioned and Warrant Officers	2	2	1
Explosives Detail: Enlisted Men	8	15	10
Temporary Reservists: Port Security Afloat	0	32	0
Temporary Reservists: Port Security Ashore	464	503	244
Temporary Reserve Absenteeism	1.92	1.98	.003
Fireboats, capacity 2,000 gallons-per-minute or over	1	1	2
Fireboat Personnel (enlisted)	11	25	24
Port Security Patrol and Picket Boats (no CGR boats)	6	6	4
Chrysler, Halc, or similar trailer fire pumps	2	2	2
Port Security Motor Vehicles (borrowed from motor pool)	5	5	3
Personnel in COTP Housing Facilities	800	800	120
Office Space (square feet)	7,000	7,000	750
Wharfage Facilities (linear feet) for COTP boats	1,000	1,000	1,000

NO OUTSTANDING EPISODES

There were no outstanding episodes in the history of Port Security at San Juan or in the Tenth Naval District. The District had its share of small fires, and a few which were not small, but experience was in line with general experience in all Districts. An unusual accident occurred at Guayanilla on 7 November, 1942, when a pipe line of the West India Oil Company broke, and 16,000 gallons of gasoline flooded a section of the Playa. The Coast Guard patrolled the section, preventing fire until the local fire department washed the area.

ELEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

POINTS OF THE ELEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Los Angeles and San Diego were the only major ports in the Eleventh Naval District, and by far the most traffic was at Los Angeles. San Diego became exclusively a Navy harbor nearly in the status of a Navy Yard. Principal COTP activities there were harbor patrol and shore guard duty. A VPSF regiment served there for nearly a year. Perhaps no other harbor was as congested as Los Angeles Harbor. Oil storage and oil pumping was everywhere near at hand, and always surrounding or adjacent to lumber yards, shipyards, and marine terminals loading explosives and inflammables. There was much concern about oil storage at the time of Pearl Harbor, and on 9 December, 1941, the Captain of the Port wrote the President of the Defense Council of the Oil Industry: "Urgent all oil storage above ground this area is in jeopardy of destruction. Captain of the Port Los Angeles hereby directs that all oil storage at waterfront be now removed therefrom." Los Angeles was the principal port of shipment of petroleum products for the United States forces in the Pacific area, and in the first two years of war, Los Angeles exported more refined petroleum than any port, and had done it without mishap or destruction of ship or terminal. There was at times a serious congestion of vessels, and for months 20 were lying there waiting for engines. Each day an average of 4 tankers entered and departed, and 55 to 60 tankers and cargo vessels were in the harbor at all times, on the average. In the later days, there was a great deal of unloading of scrap battle brass and such items. It has been said that Los Angeles Harbor was probably the most congested, most poorly designed, and most hazardous harbor in the United States. It was largely man-made, and the opinion was offered at the Headquarters Conference of Port Security Officers that never has there been a harbor where God did so little, and man so much. Executive Order No. 8953, dated 27 November, 1941, established the Los Angeles-Long Beach Harbor Naval Defense Sea Area, setting forth its limits and providing regulations for identification, entry and operation of vessels into the area. This was chiefly because of its being the chief petroleum export harbor of the Pacific, and because the oil industry augmented and centralized in that vicinity the special refineries necessary to manufacture aviation highest octane motor fuels. Disaster in the area would have arrested every activity in the forward zone. For many months before Pearl Harbor representatives of industry and men in military, naval and civilian positions of authority cooperated fully for the protection of harbor facilities (see page 11).

SPECIAL SECURITY REGULATIONS INAUGURATED BY THE COTP

Because of the critical nature of the port of Los Angeles and its shipping, and the great need for care of every description in the handling of dangerous or inflammable cargoes, the Captain of the Port prepared war regulations for tank vessels and for waterfront petroleum terminals. They were approved, concurred with, and promulgated by the Navy Commandant and the Commanding General of the Military Area. Many provisions were later incorporated in the National rules. These regulations were very strict and specific, and differed only in minor degree and as to certain details from the regulations as finally adopted in United States ports. They were dated 22 June, 1942 and 4 September, 1942, respectively, and in these early days it was provided that guards be furnished by the vessels and operators. Provisions for tank ships covered such matters as:

Guards
Identification
Enemy Aliens
Boiler Fires
Galley Fires
Sea Valves
Hoses
Damage Control (submergence)
Air Ports
Screening of Openings
Loading Caution
Lockers and Storerooms
Fire Protection
Mooring to Docks
Towing Wires
Repairs and Alterations
Dead Ships
Burning and Welding
Removal of Refuse
Bunkering
Lights
Tank Barges
Lifeboats
Blackouts
Arrivals and Departures

Provisions for petroleum terminals covered:

Security Director
Fencing
Standards of Lighting
Guarding
Night Orders
Vehicles
Smoking
Removal of Refuse
Prohibition of Dangerous Articles
Fire Prevention
Fire-fighting Facilities
Sand
Mooring of Tank Vessels
Hoses
Bunkers and Fresh Water for Ships
Tank Barges
Boiler and Galley Fires
Stowage of Petroleum
Stowage
Boat Service
Alerts and Emergencies

SPECIFIED LANDING PLACES The many beaches of Southern California, so alluring to bathers and tourists, at once became potential enemy landing places with the advent of war. As a safeguard, the Captain of the Port, Los Angeles, obtained Army and Navy approval of confining landings to six places only, on the shores of the Eleventh Naval District. There was later a slight alteration, but the places designated as landing points were Los Angeles (Long Beach), Newport Beach, Avalon, Santa Monica, Redondo Beach, Santa Barbara, and toward the end of the war, Malibu Beach. Only in the Eleventh District were such measures inaugurated. Thus, any vessel or person seen landing at other than the approved places was at once put under surveillance and arrest by military, naval, or civil authorities.

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

The Los Angeles Captain of the Port area of jurisdiction extended from the northern limit of the District to Oceanside, about 50 miles north of San Diego, and included the offlying islands of the area. COTP headquarters were at Wilmington, California, (Los Angeles) through most of the war, but were later moved to the Times Building at Los Angeles. The Port Security

organization was composed on one regiment, 4 battalions, and several companies with regimental headquarters at Wilmington. The Assistant Captain of the Port forces, for example, were included within the command and supervision of the Commanding Officer of the Second Battalion. Other Battalion Commanders supervised the functional duties that were relegated to Operations, Fire Division, Ship Inspection, Ship Control, Explosives Division, and such. As of 1 January, 1945, the Captain of the Port, Los Angeles, had about 100 officers, 1,500 enlisted men and women, 60 patrol boats, 12 fireboats, 4 inspection barges, 91 vehicles, 13 fire trailer pumps, 1 mobile identification unit, and 2 permanently located identification units.

EXPLOSIVES ACTIVITY

Explosives loading and supervision was conducted in the Eleventh District as in all others. However, it was not until 1943 that the operation was secluded at the explosives loading terminal at the new Victory Pier on the extreme east end of Long Beach Harbor. Eventually, much activity was transferred to a new, secret, man-made harbor at Port Huename, near Ventura, roughly 50 miles up the coast from Los Angeles. This was the Port of Embarkation for the Seabees through which passed a huge amount of explosives, equipment and personnel. The Assistant Captain of the Port there, under COTP, Los Angeles, had Port Security responsibility, handling ship inspections, and supervision of the loading of explosives and dangerous cargoes, as well as usual Port Security activities. Though a small harbor, 7 ships could load there simultaneously. The port was exclusively for naval, military and War Shipping Administration vessels.

EARLY PRECAUTIONS

Before the pilots were temporary officers of the Coast Guard Reserve, the Captain of the Port, Los Angeles had established a Ship Control Station that effected control of pilotage, ship-building and tug boat operations. The war had been in progress for many weeks before the Japanese were evacuated from Terminal and Morman Islands where they had lived in the heart of the harbor for several generations, surrounded by ship-building, oil storage, and the shipment of overseas cargoes. Thus, alert surveillance of Los Angeles Harbor, day and night, was very essential. During a breakdown in the lighting system of the Harbor Boat Works in October, 1942, the Coast Guard Battalion placed an extra guard around the company's facilities until light was restored.

INCIDENTS WORTHY OF NOTE

The most serious event in the Los Angeles Harbor area affecting the security of the port occurred when the pier of the Hammond Lumber Company was demolished by fire. Several members of the Naval service lost their lives and about 26 were injured. Three LSTs were involved, and all were considerably damaged. The Fire Division and the Port Security force of the Captain of the Port, responded with fireboats and trailer pumps. The fire was not brought under control until about 15 hours later. The origin was undetermined, but carelessness at lumber yards, especially in the early days, was notorious. In July, 1942, the agent for the British steamship OCEAN VIRTUE found household matches in a car of cotton being unloaded into his ship. This, and other incidents, were instrumental in a meeting of representatives of the Pinkerton and Burns Detective Agencies, ex-marine guards and the port watchmen's association with the Captain of the Port in the interest of closer cooperation of watchmen and guard service. In July, 1943, the Examination Barge Detail at Los Angeles, while searching the fishing boat EETSY discovered 10,000 gallons worth of "B" gasoline coupons

which could not be satisfactorily explained. This Examination Detail's volume of work may be realized from the following outline of duty performed during the first two weeks of August, 1944: the Detail inspected small craft and credentials of crew members entering and departing the harbor, numbering 1,274 small craft and 7,121 persons. In San Diego, the similar detail there examined almost as many of each during the same period.

TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT

THE SITUATION IN 1941

The first Captain of the Port order at San Francisco was issued in August, 1941.

There were 12 Coast Guard vessels under his direction in early 1941 employed for the usual law enforcement, anti-sabotage patrols and identification of vessels. There were 300 Port Security men in early 1941. The formal Captain of the Port Battalion started 15 August, 1941 with 30 men, and by the end of December, that year, the battalion comprised 250 men. Early in the Fall of 1941, plans were formulated and emergency organizations were set up to determine action to be taken in case of a sudden outbreak of war. The "Seattle Plan" was generally adopted by Federal agencies for the San Francisco Bay area. Another plan, using various law officers such as deputy sheriffs, deputy collectors of customs, Army officials, Coast Guard lifeboat stations, and others, was formulated in the small ports along the coast. On 7 December, 1941, these plans "went into action" and functioned successfully. The departure by sea of various Italian and Japanese aliens who had been under surveillance for some time was thus prevented.

THE CAPTAIN OF THE PORT BATTALION

By October, 1942, the Captain of the Port Battalion at San Francisco numbered about 1,000 men. It was broken

up into companies with a Headquarters Company, Fire Company, and "A", "B" and "C" Guard Companies. Firemen and policemen were enlisted for these companies from local municipalities. The organization was divided into functional sections and each one expanded with officers and men as the needs were felt and personnel were made available. There was little change in this set-up after early 1943. The Headquarters Company did staff work. The Fire Company consisted of trained fire-fighters and was the pool from which crew members were drawn to man the fireboats and fire barges. The Guard Companies were the pools from which security watch standers and dangerous loading details were drawn. The Guard Companies provided security watches for 3,192 vessels, or 1,683,346 man-hours during the war.

FUNCTION OF VESSEL CONTROL The office designated as "Vessel Control" dispatched all boats on Captain of the Port patrols, all COTP fire equipment and men to fires, all guard details as ordered by the Vessel Security, Waterfront Security and Dangerous Cargo Control Sections. Also, it:

- (a) Handled all launchings and bay and sea trials;
- (b) Maintained liaison with Civilian Defense, municipal fire departments, and tow boat companies;
- (c) Controlled the use of anchorages, and took necessary action in connection with violations of oil pollution, anchorage areas, cable areas, and restricted areas;
- (d) Maintained liaison with Air-Sea Rescue and Navy Patrol Force and Naval Intelligence for assistance in crashes and emergencies;

(e) Controlled movement of all dangerous cargo vessels in the Bay area;

(f) Kept logs of all incidents and actions;

(g) Maintained the "Chart Room" for the Bay area, showing all vessels, anchorages, locations, etc.;

The office handled an average of 500 telephone calls and 100 radio and teletype messages daily. It cleared 48,309 fishing vessels to sea, received 708 fire alarms and dispatched equipment to 575 waterfront fires, and handled the supervision of 460 launchings, and 667 bay and sea trial runs.

SEALING AND BOARDING ACTIVITY, SAN FRANCISCO

The Radio Sealing Unit, later called the Radio Control Section, consisted of 2 officers and 20 enlisted men. Boarding operations numbered 6,617, while there were 3,744 tests of radios while in port. After January, 1945, the radio sealers carried mail pouches to incoming vessels, and delivered 2,336. In the summer of 1944, the Captain of the Port took over boarding officer duties from the Navy, and this continued until November, 1945. The total number of radios sealed by the sealing unit was 3,564.

FIGURES RELATING TO COTP AND DISTRICT OPERATIONS

An excellent idea of the volume of work and the operations carried out in San Francisco and the Twelfth Naval District can be had from figures which are available. The COTP San Francisco Identification Division removed 73 persons from vessels; barred 241 persons from waterfront facilities; disapproved 371 civilian guards; issued 231,395 identification cards; indexed and filed alphabetically 285,951 names; placed 26,255 stopper cards in the identification files and made 29,700 name checks; forwarded 343,680 finger-print cards to FBI Headquarters; received 92,075 FBI criminal returns; apprehended 1,080 "wanted" persons and uncovered 20 violations by enemy aliens. At the peak of activity, on VJ-Day, the Dangerous Cargo Control Division had 53 officers and 995 men. Explosives loading supervision was at all times given priority by the Captain of the Port. There was the usual problem of inadequate facilities and urgent military necessity. During the war, the COTP issued a total of 2,807 permits for loading and discharging dangerous cargo totaling 2,086,122 tons. The Explosives Detail supervised 2,096 explosives loadings, and 265 explosives barge movements. This tonnage is said to have been about one-seventh of the total tonnage for the United States. Waterborne patrols started in the Spring of 1942, with the usual duties, plus thorough checks for oil pollution. Throughout the Twelfth District, boat patrols made 22,800 boardings of pleasure craft and fishing boats, noted 606 instances of boat violations, 1,653 instances of navigation law violations, checked 81,112 persons for identification cards of which 1,206 were found to be without such cards, and kept under constant supervision 250 miles of bay shoreline and 112 miles of estuary shore. The patrol boats were on duty for 340,004 hours. Thirty restricted areas and 27 anchorages were supervised. The Security Section made 25,356 inspections of operating vessels, 23,505 inspections of vessels in repair or conversion, or made cognizance of 2,951 vessels unable to move under their own power, 61,886 inspections of shipyards and docks, found 14,746 instances of violations of security regulations, issued 19,115 security directives, investigated 666 fires, investigated numerous instances of pollution of the local waters, and secured evidence for prosecutions.

RECORDS

~~RECORDS~~

Figures such as the above, for all ports and Districts

would have an immense study value, but unfortunately such figures are not available. One of the outstanding accomplishments in the Twelfth District, from the standpoint of future officers of the Coast Guard, was compilation of such figures and statistics regarding its various operations, and the maintenance of good records. Perhaps such records were better kept in this District than in any other. Thus, much valuable information is available in usable form which is lacking in most other Districts. From a national standpoint, partial statistics are of dubious value, but if all Districts had been as meticulous about records, a vast amount of usable, valuable material would be available to historians, students of Port Security experience, and future officers. This success was due to the foresightedness and attention to detail of Captain Paul B. Cronk, Captain of the Port, San Francisco, and District Port Security Officer, who established an organization, though small, the duty of which was to keep accurate records and statistics.

THE FIRE-FIGHTING COMPANY

The Captain of the Port Fire-fighting Company consisted of 500 experts in fighting fires on piers, vessels and waterfront facilities. The nucleus was 50 professional fire-fighters recruited from municipal fire departments. In emergencies, this unit helped the city fire department at fires throughout the city. They responded to 575 fire alarms, and in addition extinguished several thousand incipient fires for which no alarm was turned in. Equipment for most of the period was 6 fireboats, 8 fire barges, and 9 trailer units, though more fireboats were assigned late in the war. The boats were manned by 190 men. One of the earliest serious fires occurred on 26 June, 1942, on the SS WILSONSIN. The blaze was caused by defective oil burners and started in the boiler room. The vessel, which suffered loss of \$100,000, was at Anchorage 13 in San Francisco Bay loading dynamite at the time of the fire. The COTP Explosives Loading Detail, consisting of one officer and 10 men, assisted the ship's crew in putting out the fire and keeping it from spreading. Another troublesome fire occurred at 0200 on 12 June, 1943, at the Union Oil Company at Oleum. Two fire barges and three patrol boats assisted in extinguishing the fire which lasted for 7 hours, and destroyed 10,210 barrels of petroleum and 15 tanks.

SOME EXAMPLES OF FIRES

Possibly the greatest loss from fire on the waterfront was suffered on 28 February, 1943, when a fire, starting at 2017 caused an estimated \$6,000,000 loss to the Albers Milling Company plant at Oakland outer harbor. One Coast Guard fire barge, 4 fireboats, and 7 patrol vessels assisted in extinguishing the blaze after 4 hours. A vessel moored at the pier was towed to safety with only slight damage. Coast Guard fire-fighters also assisted in putting out a \$100,000 fire at Navy Pier 48A, San Francisco, on 13 May, 1943. Participation at this fire, believed caused by illicit smoking, included 4 fire barges, 4 fireboats, 10 patrol boats, 13 trailer units, 26 trucks, 2 jeeps and 870 Coast Guardsmen exclusive of the foregoing participating units. Although this fire was fought for 4 hours, the major portion of the pier and all cargo on the pier, were saved. Cargo on the pier included ammunition. Vessels moored to the pier were towed to the stream unharmed. Of the Coast Guardsmen assisting at this fire, 125 were treated for over-exposure or minor injuries. Also fighting this fire were 28 pieces of city equipment and two city fireboats. During 1944, Coast Guard fireboats, fire barges and patrol boats assisted variously at some large fires as follows:

	<u>Loss</u>
(a) Petroleum drum reconditioning plant	\$ 90,000
(b) Government warehouse	5,000,000
(c) Nearly completed Government Warehouse	400,000
(d) Redwood Manufacturing Company	750,000
(e) Southern Pacific Pier, used by Navy	150,000
(f) Shipyard	80,000

EXTRACURRICULAR
COTP DUTIES

In addition to the regular and usual Captain of the Port duties, the COTP, San Francisco was charged with:

- (a) The furnishing of guards for the OWI Radio Station, San Francisco, and the OWI Radio Station, Belmont.
- (b) Providing personnel for the U. S. Public Health Service Quarantine and Fumigation Detail.
- (c) Removal of obstructions in the local waters for the Army Engineers.
- (d) The collection of data and handling of radio communications for the Federal Coordinator of Fisheries at San Francisco and Monterey.
- (e) Liaison with the security section of the British War Ministry Lend-Lease Coordinator and Purchasing Commission of the U. S. S. R.
- (f) The control and operation of the North Net Gate and the South Net Gate of the anti-submarine net across the entrance of San Francisco Bay.

EXAMPLES OF ASSISTANCE

During the first half of March, 1944, Captain of the Port men were involved in various cases of assistance. The CG-36369 rescued three men from a capsized dory off Golden Gate Station, and landed them at Fort Point Station. The CG-36339 towed the motorboat 28-A-16, aground on Angel Island, to a mooring at the St. Francis Yacht Club. The CG-36383 recovered the body of a woman reported to have jumped from the Golden Gate Bridge. The CG-38705 recovered the body of an unidentified colored man sighted drifting off Pier 90-A, and delivered it to the custody of the San Francisco coroner. A detail of 25 men assisted the San Francisco Fire Department at the scene of a 4-alarm hotel fire. The Coast Guardsmen removed the bodies of 19 persons from the burned building.

FLOATING DYNAMITE

Forces of the Captain of the Port, San Francisco, were involved in an unusual incident in early April, 1943. The MANUEL ESPINOSA, an old 135-foot one-masted lumber "schooner" with motor, and under Panama registry, had loaded with 350 tons of dangerous cargo for delivery to Central and South American ports. The Explosives Detail had supervised the loading of 9,420 cases of dynamite, 2,720 bags of powder 176 cases of blasting caps, and 156 cases of fuses. The MANUEL ESPINOSA sailed on 4 April, 1943. Fifty or sixty miles out, encountering heavy weather, she began to leak, and headed back to port for repairs. Due to fog she was forced to stay outside until morning. The rough water was too much, and she started to sink. The crew were promptly saved by Coast Guard motor lifeboats and picket boats, but currents tossed the vessel about on the bottom, and she broke open disgoring most of her cargo of dynamite. The cased explosives popped to the surface and were carried into San Francisco Bay by the incoming tide. All shipping was stopped, and all COTP and lifeboat station craft, together with some Navy patrol boats, went to work

gathering up the floating cases of dynamite. The cases floated low in the water and were not easily visible. In the midst of this work the tide changed, carrying the cases out to sea again, and on the next incoming tide the cases were strewn along the beach south of San Francisco and were picked up from the shore. All were turned over to the Commanding Officer of Fort Baker. This went on for several days, but for many months an occasional floating case would be found. Excellent packaging avoided much damage to the dynamite which was considered active and dangerous.

DISASTROUS EXPLOSION
AT PORT CHICAGO

A vast amount of ammunition moved through the major Pacific coast ports. One munitions loading center was at Port Chicago in Suisun Bay, near Vallejo, and a considerable distance from San Francisco. Coast Guard explosives loading details had been assigned there, but on 1 November, 1943, at the request of the Navy Inspector of Ordnance in Charge, Naval Ammunition Depot, Mare Island, California, such details were withdrawn from that Depot and from the Naval Magazine at Port Chicago. On 17 July, 1944, the steamships QUINAULT VICTORY and E. A. BRYAN were loading ammunition at Port Chicago. The Coast Guard, at the time, had no responsibility there except to furnish a standby fireboat and patrol boat. Suddenly, at 2219, the E. A. BRYAN'S cargo of about 5,000 tons of ammunition exploded. The terrific explosion destroyed both vessels and was felt for 200 miles. Damage extended for 10 miles and there were isolated cases of broken windows 50 miles away. The pier and buildings of Port Chicago were extensively damaged, all aids to navigation in the vicinity were ruined, the Coast Guard fireboat CG-60014-F was destroyed and its crew of 5 killed, the patrol boat was damaged and its crew of 4 men injured. About 325 other lives were lost, mostly among Navy personnel, and thousands were injured.

COAST GUARD ACTION
FOLLOWING EXPLOSION

The Coast Guard immediately established patrols in the area which were maintained for several days, and stopped all traffic until 1000 the next morning. Another fireboat was sent to furnish water in the event of fire. These patrols searched for bodies, eventually recovering 67, and removed a tremendous amount of debris from the water. When the channel was opened, the patrol boats escorted vessels through the affected area. Five patrol boats were thus engaged. On 23 July, assistance was requested from the Temporary Reservists at Vallejo who responded with six boats, and conducted a search for bodies until 27 July, when their activity ceased after recovering 12 bodies.

THIRTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

GENERAL NATURE OF THE
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT

In the Thirteenth Naval District, there were two major ports, Seattle, Washington, and Portland, Oregon. These were centers of great shipbuilding activity, airplane construction and various manufacturing industries. The greatest water traffic was at Seattle, though in mid-1943 as many as 75 ships a month left Portland with cargo destined chiefly for Russia, Alaska, and the South Pacific. A new ship was launched there about every three days. Shipbuilding was also important at nearby Vancouver, Washington. There were about 5,000 fishing boats in the District, which required the usual clearance and boarding. The Coos Bay sector in the southern part of the District included about 100 miles of hard sand beaches and 200 miles of an almost unbroken line of apparently impassable rocky cliffs, but with many accessible inlets

and secluded coves good for enemy secret rendezvous. Further north, from Cape Elizabeth to the Salmon River lies a long, sandy beach extending about 100 miles, broken only by rocky headlands in the southern portion. North from there is a series of rocky promontories joined by sandy beaches for about 65 miles, with densely wooded, sparsely inhabited areas. Much of this coast was covered by beach patrol and coastal lookouts, cooperating closely with waterborne patrols where Captain of the Port operations made that possible. Inlets were patrolled by boat, but much of the coast was not actively covered by Captains of the Port due to its nature, and chief COTP activity was confined generally to the harbors and ports.

EARLY COTP SITUATION

The first Captain of the Port in the District was established at Astoria, Oregon, in January, 1940. He was the commanding officer of the ONONDAGA, and was engaged in the usual COTP duties of that time. Although there were small Coast Guard units at many of the District ports in the Fall of 1940, there were actually only two Captains of the Port during that year and 1941 -- at Astoria and Seattle. At the beginning of the war, the Customs Officers were the mainstay of the Captain of the Port, and they assumed much responsibility for COTP duties. The early COTP organization was very loose, but with issuance of Executive Order No. 9074, a real effort was made toward organization, with good results.

WATERFRONT COMMITTEES

In January and February, 1942, Harbor Security Committees and Waterfront Defense Committees were organized at the principal ports, similar to those mentioned under the Eleventh and Twelfth Districts. A committee was selected from the Staff Officers of the Army, Navy, Coast Guard, Customs and Port Commission, and a coordinator was selected. The plan was that all agencies, property owners, and operators would carry on their usual functions but, through education, all the parties would be instructed in the responsibilities and special interests of the various agencies so that there would be reciprocal service as well as good cooperation in the protection of the harbor and waterfront property. Employees were apprised of their responsibilities, a plan of policing was devised, and one day and two night automobile patrols were maintained, including a number of Coast Guard seamen and ratings on foot in the more congested areas. There were such defense committees at several ports of the District. On 7 January, 1942, the Treasury Department requested the Seattle Waterfront Defense Committee to forward its plans to ports throughout the United States as a basis for similar organizations. Posters were displayed publicizing city ordinances regarding prohibition of open fires, smoking, parking, etc., but the posters were only mute policemen, and when the Coast Guard later took over it was necessary to place men on the waterfront to enforce the regulations. Captains of the Port activity increased rapidly during 1942, and by mid-year military jurisdiction over various phases of port activity was well-established. The Committee was enlarged to include additional agencies, but its function was largely that of coordination.

RESTRICTED AREAS

One of the early steps toward sea area defense was taken on 24 March, 1941, in the State of Washington. The Governor, at the request of the Navy, Army, and others interested in national defense, put through an act in the legislature giving the Governor authority to establish protective defense areas. These were intended primarily to prevent people from taking pictures, making sketches, or using binoculars in or near military establishments. A little later, restricted areas were created by the Coast

Guard, Army, Navy and State without much rhyme or reason, and usually without due publication. There was much overlapping and little legal justification or authority. Obviously, this caused great confusion, and often an innocent usurper, coming into what he thought was an open area, was subject to possible bodily injury. Even Coast Guard vessels were subject to being fired upon when passing through "restricted waters" of which they had not been informed. After a considerable time these matters were straightened out in conference, and the Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District (Navy) established definite restricted areas legally using the authority of Executive Order No. 9074. Finally, on 14 August, 1943, a directive from the Vice Chief of Naval Operations required restricted areas and regulations governing them to be approved by the Commandant of the Coast Guard and published in the Federal Register on approval before publication in Notice to Mariners. This brought about a more organized establishment of restricted areas, and the confusion and turmoil created by the indiscriminate establishment of many types of areas were eliminated.

LICENSING OF VESSELS

Licensing of vessels was carried on in the Thirteenth District as in others, but in this connection, there was an unusual problem. It has been pointed out that the coast included inlets, beaches and coves which were conducive to possible landing points for saboteurs and espionage agents. The waters abounded with fishermen, most of whom were loyal but there were many aliens among them, including Japanese, who were unfriendly. Japanese ships would lie in United States harbors before the war and crews for them would be sent from Japan. Instead of this crew manning the waiting merchant ship, some would go on board the Japanese fishing boats, and the men they replaced would report on the merchant vessel for the return trip to Japan with their information, pictures, charts, and other data. Meanwhile, the new crew member of the Imperial Japanese Navy would take his turn at familiarizing himself with our coasts and harbors. Control of such shipping was vital. A system of licensing was set up in November, 1941, though up to December, 1942, there was no coordination, and each COTP issued licenses good only under his jurisdiction. The Captain of the Port at Seattle even required license numbers to be painted on rowboats and canoes. No prosecution for violation during this early period was ever carried to the Federal Courts, for a conviction probably would not have been gained because very few of the regulations were legally sound at that time. Legality was later established. It is interesting that, after the introduction of gasoline rationing, there was a sudden surge of pleasure boats applying for a change of registry to commercial operation. The two reasons were (a) extra gasoline allotment, and (b) the greater freedom of operation in defensive sea areas. A requirement that the owner swear that his vessel would be used only for commercial ventures, together with punitive measures taken in case of violation, effectively halted the effort.

BEGINNING OF EXPLOSIVES ACTIVITY

There was virtually no organization for explosives supervision until 1942. Earlier, the explosives detail consisted of only two chief boatswain's mates and a few enlisted men they had trained. Substantial movement of explosives in this District did not commence until late in 1943. In June, 1943, a number of ammunition loading piers were designated, limited to fixed ammunition of certain size, primarily to eliminate their excessive handling and to prevent a bottleneck as pressure in the Pacific increased, with the Coast Guard enforcing regulations, escorting explosives vessels and guarding explosives cars in waterfront areas. In anticipation of heavy explosives movement,

a new Army Explosives Pier had been constructed at Mukilteo which eventually handled most of the explosives moving out of Puget Sound. Here the Coast Guard encountered difficulty with the Army on responsibility for supervision of loading, but this was finally settled in conference after a long period of non-supervision. The District Coast Guard Officer refused to agree to divided responsibility. Despite the new loading terminal, there was for some time a shortage of loading piers in the Puget Sound area.

FAILURE TO NOTIFY
OF LOADING
FINALLY REMEDIED

In September, 1943, the failure of the Marine Inspection Division to notify the Port Security Office or the Captain of the Port, Seattle, that it had granted a waiver permitting the passenger vessel LAKINA to carry certain ammunition on board, and the steamship company's mistaken idea that the waiver covered all the provisions of the regulations involved, resulted in the vessel loading the ammunition without the permission of the Captain of the Port at a pier not designated for that purpose. Necessary steps were taken to prevent recurrence, and finally the success of the explosives loading in the District was achieved. Along with it were these accomplishments:

- (a) Consolidation of the COTP areas into one
- (b) A uniform explosives plan
- (c) Curtailment of explosives movements in the principal harbors
- (d) Supervision of defense ammunition
- (e) Coordination of fire-fighting activities at explosives terminals
- (f) Adoption of disaster plans for each facility
- (g) The convoy systems, and improvement of the waiver situation related to military necessity.

LONGSHOREMEN
PROBLEMS

In the early period of the red explosives cards identification program there was an acute problem. At Everett, Astoria and Aberdeen and similar ports, large numbers of aliens were being denied explosives cards in compliance with the existing regulations. It was obvious that, if this policy were to remain in effect, it would be necessary to send longshoremen from other ports to load explosives where many stevedores were aliens. At Astoria, most dock workers were aliens of Finnish descent who had worked these docks for years and who were unquestionably loyal, yet, under the regulations, could not be permitted to handle explosives. Headquarters, on 18 December, 1943, directed that if the District Coast Guard Officer believed this ruling seriously hampered the loading of explosives, it was his prerogative to waive the citizenship requirements for friendly aliens upon his own responsibility. Certain friendly aliens were thereafter issued red explosives cards with the words "Citizenship Requirements Waived - this area only." In some cases, masters of foreign vessels wished to have their crews load the ship when taking on explosives, and could not understand our regulations forbidding it. Enforcement of regulations was sometimes difficult because of leniency of the Courts. There was a case, for example, of a longshoreman who was arrested for smoking in the hold of an explosives laden vessel at Mukilteo. His case (and many others) was disposed of by the Federal Court on plea of guilty with a fine of \$5. This happened often. Such sentences were hardly a deterrent. After this experience, it seemed best to proceed through municipal authorities. In the Gray's Harbor, Washington, area the Court sentenced one person to serve 30 days in jail, and fined another \$100. Such disposal of these cases was effective.

REPERCUSSIONS OF THE
PORT CHICAGO EXPLOSION

The catastrophe which struck Port Chicago in the Twelfth District gave the Army, Navy and Coast Guard a startling and sudden impetus. The Port Security office of the Thirteenth District started the groundwork for a complete survey of explosives loading practices in the District, and anticipated the dispatch from Headquarters directing the DCGO to review the whole situation in order to determine whether such operations were being conducted efficiently. Officers of the District as well as those of the Port of Embarkation took stock of their operations and practices. It was particularly necessary, because many loadings which had been planned for Port Chicago were diverted to Seattle, thus increasing the load there. A comprehensive set of instructions was prepared, to be issued explosives loading officers and enlisted personnel to achieve additional safety and uniformity in operations. There was difficulty in securing sufficient gangs of longshoremen. To meet this problem, the Navy assigned 550 officers and men of a Navy Construction Battalion to the Beaver Ammunition Storage Point on the Columbia River for explosives loading operations. They worked under Coast Guard supervision.

DEGAUSSING NOT ALLOWED
WHILE LOADING EXPLOSIVES

In December, 1944, a request was made for permission to turn on the degaussing gear on a vessel loading explosives at the Mukilteo Terminal. This was denied after consultation with the Navy Degaussing Officer, because of the possibility that a short could create sparks in the hold. This was the first case of its kind, and it was referred to others to inform them what action to take in similar cases.

VOLUME OF EXPLOSIVES
HANDLED

From 29 March, 1944, when the Coast Guard began supervision of loading at Mukilteo, until 1 December, 1944, 95 ships with a total of 162,562 tons of explosives were handled at any of the District terminals was loaded in June, 1945, at Beaver Ammunition Storage Point in Oregon, when 77,000 tons were loaded in 47 vessels.

EARLY STEPS TOWARD
FIRE PREVENTION

In general, steps toward fire prevention in the Thirteenth District in the earlier days were similar to those taken elsewhere. However, there were a few particular problems. Personnel for surveys were short, and valuable surveys were made by the Washington Survey and Rating Bureau, a private organization maintained by insurance underwriters, on contract with the Captain of the Port, and in Oregon by the similar Bureau of that State. This saved much time, since officers available could not possibly have covered the entire waterfront in the short time available. The first fireboat protection was by some Lundeen lifeboats which were decked over and provided with fire pumps. These craft were small, makeshift affairs, but provided some badly needed protection until better apparatus became available. Later, some yachts were converted into fireboats, and 50-foot fire barges were built. These barges were unsuited to use on the Columbia River due chiefly to current conditions. The Lundeen were transferred to smaller units when the new equipment was ready. Officers of fire barges familiarized themselves with all piers and facilities in their particular areas, as well as the types of cargo handled on the piers, that they might know the best means of fire extinguishment. Late in 1942, two additional sections of the Seattle Building Code were passed requiring sprinklering of all waterfront property; however, this was not fully effective because of the virtual impossibility of obtaining sprinkler equipment.

The need was, nevertheless acute. A comprehensive survey of Seattle waterfront properties showed that, in May, 1942, of 79 premises surveyed, 19 had automatic sprinklers in the superstructure, and one was fully sprinkled. Only one pier had a sprinkler underneath the pier deck.

COOPERATION WITH SEATTLE FIRE DEPARTMENT

In most ports in the United States, cooperation between the Coast Guard fire-fighting units and the local fire departments was excellent, but at Seattle it was outstanding. The Seattle department was short of men throughout the war. Yet, much Coast Guard fire training was conducted with local fire chiefs. Actual coordinated fire drills between the two outfits at facilities resulted in good cooperative methods of attacking fires which might occur there. The Coast Guard manned the city-owned fireboat DUVAMISH, and the crew were quartered in a new city fire station, and subsisted by the city department. The Coast Guard also manned a regular city fire truck. Cooperating with the Captain of the Port, the Medical Officer sent pharmacist mates to all major fires to administer first aid.

WETTING DOWN OF PIERS

In the summer of 1943, all Captains of the Port were instructed to request the cooperation of managements of waterfront facilities in wetting down piers in hot, dry months. A short time later, they were asked to emphasize, in accordance with Headquarters request of March, 1943, the importance of watchmen making thorough checks at quitting time, as the time and frequency of reported fires showed many started shortly after daily closings. This check was to supplement the wetting of piers after the close of the regular business day.

THANKS FROM THE FIRE CHIEF

A letter from the Chief of the Seattle Fire Department to Lt. Comdr. J. B. Calkins, USCG, indicated the good feeling which prevailed between that department and the Coast Guard. The Chief said: "Sincerest thanks to you and all the members of the Coast Guard for their services during the disastrous plane crash and fire at the Frye Packing Plant upon February 18, (1943). The services rendered by the Coast Guard were of inestimable value and demonstrated in a very practical way the training and organization you have perfected for dealing with fires and other major disasters. Your men were alert, capable, willing, and measured by every standard performed an excellent service individually and collectively. They helped to raise ladders, to stretch hose lines, to direct fire streams, to recover bodies of victims, performed first aid to a number of firemen receiving minor injuries, and other services too numerous to mention. The service of your medical unit, a physician and chief pharmacist mate, was outstanding."

THE CHIEF SPOKE TOO SOON

The Chief of the Seattle Fire Department stated in May, 1943, that Seattle was in better shape along the waterfront than ever before, -- that the absence of large fires there was due largely to the regular inspections of property and fire-fighting equipment by the Coast Guard. He commended the excellent cooperation between the Coast Guard, Fire Department, and the COTP harbor patrol. About a week later, (30 May, 1943) there was a large fire involving and largely destroying four waterfront facilities consisting of manufacturing concerns. The fire started from a watchman's wood stove. The municipal department took the east and south sides, while the Coast Guard took the north and west. Thus, the fire was surrounded and prevented from spreading. The COTP communications system was especially

efficient, calling necessary officers, notifying all fire equipment on the first alarm to stand by, and later dispatching them as needed. The COTP units, which pumped 2½ million gallons of water into the fire from the bay, prevented a conflagration which otherwise might have resulted.

THE FIRE AT PIER "D" AT SEATTLE

An unusual fire occurred at Seattle on 26 April, 1944, on a clear, warm day. The facility involved in this serious fire was located on the waterfront just below the District Coast Guard Office. It consisted of a large unsprinklered warehouse resting on a pier which extended into Elliott Bay. It was 575 feet long and 185 feet wide, and contained essential war commodities. The cause of the fire is believed to have been either electrical appliances or oil heaters used by members of an anti-aircraft unit quartered at the upper west end of the facility, since the fire originated there. The fire was first spotted by an officer in the Seattle COTP office. Immediately, the Duty Officer, who had been informed, dispatched 3 50-foot fire barges and the fireboat DUVAMISH (city-owned and Coast Guard-manned) to the scene of the fire. Twenty-five men, a troop transport and pumping unit were dispatched from the Coast Guard Base at Harbor Island, and 75 men were sent from the COTP, Seattle. In all, about 150 Coast Guard personnel fought the fire. These men and equipment were en route before any alarm was received on the ticker by the Seattle Fire Department. The fire, discernable, of course, from the District Coast Guard offices, was seen to rise from the interior of the superstructure, and within 6 or 7 minutes traveled the entire length of the 525-foot roof top. The fireboats, barges, and personnel during this time were seen converging on the fire. The blaze was fought and extinguished chiefly from the waterside, and it was noted that the Coast Guardsmen reacted splendidly to the alarm. Fighting alongside the city firemen, they showed a splendid example of coordinated effort. When not handling hose, they were busy protecting cargo by covering it with tarpaulins. As the fire was considered under control in 25 minutes from the time it was discovered, it was an excellent example of response and action.

HARBOR PATROL

There was little of an outstanding nature in Thirteenth District harbor patrol. The first patrol was established by the Auxiliary which, on 7 December, 1941, had 210 CGA boats in the District, and there were 13 CGR boats which were later augmented to 120. Patrols started on 7 December, 1941, though they were poorly organized at that time. One unusual piece of equipment was a hospital picket boat which operated under the Captain of the Port, Seattle. Patrol boats used their fire pumps at innumerable fires which were thus extinguished before they could gather much headway and go out of control. One incident worthy of note occurred on 12 April, 1943, at Pier 1 of the Port of Embarkation, Air Forces Storage Depot, Everett, Washington. The pier caved in and dumped 1,216 55-gallon drums and 1,780 cases of two 7-gallon tins of aviation lubricating oil into the bay. Coast Guard personnel immediately manned borrowed rowboats and recovered approximately 90% of the oil. The rest was lost through leakage.

GUARD ACTIVITY

Guard duties continued in the Thirteenth Naval District as in others, with little to set it apart. There was the usual question of jurisdiction in the case of Army facilities. A conference was held on 8 October, 1943, with representatives of the Army's Port of Embarkation and Coast



THE FIRE AT PIER "D", SEATTLE, AT ITS HEIGHT

Guard Port Security officers to determine which of these two organizations would assume responsibility for Army transports and Army-chartered ships when the ships were tied up to an Army facility or being loaded from some dock not under Army responsibility. It was decided that the Coast Guard would assume responsibility for Army ships at all times when at other than Army facilities. During the period when personnel for guard duty were very short, an arrangement was made whereby 19 facility operators at Everett, Washington, employing watchmen would have the watchmen call the Officer of the Day every hour during the night, advising if his facility was secure. Such calls were logged on a mimeographed sheet. This made for closer cooperation between the watchmen and the Coast Guard, and seemed to provide adequate security under the circumstances.

THE "MAY" INCIDENT

Auxiliarists and Temporary Reservists cooperating with each other engaged in rescue and salvage operations in the sinking of the ferry MAY which resulted in the loss of 9 lives on the night of 10 February, 1943. The vessel was operating between Russel Moorage and the Vancouver shipyards, carrying 16 passengers and 3 crew. Inclement weather, heavy wind and rain, a generally unstable condition of the vessel, and crowding of passengers to the lee side for shelter caused the vessel to capsize and sink. Five passengers in the wheelhouse above the main deckhouse contributed to a topheavy condition. The CG PHANTON, the CG-55010-F (fireboat) and the CGR-1317 were dispatched at 2356 when first word of the disaster was received. Meanwhile, CGA-7701 with 2 Auxiliary members on board had proceeded to the sunken vessel and had begun dragging operations. Three bodies were recovered. Nine persons were rescued in a small rowboat by an employee of the Russel Towboat and Moorage Company.

REMOVAL OF A NUISANCE

In August, 1944, a conference was held between the Operations Officer, the Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard Station at Empire, Oregon, and the representatives of the Port Security Office and the Legal Division to determine the action to be taken in the case of the Mexican steam schooner SS ATREVIDO which, for more than a year, had been moored to the City Dock, North Bend, Oregon. It was in a serious condition of abandonment, disuse, and neglect. It was decided that the Legal Division should prepare a formal letter of notification to the owner of the SS ATREVIDO, whereby the Captain of the

Port would order and instruct such owner to shift or remove this vessel to a safe place. This letter required the shifting or removal of the vessel on or before midnight of 25 September, 1944. Meanwhile, a security watch was maintained at the vessel.

TROUBLE WITH RUSSIAN VESSELS

Most foreign vessels in the ports of Seattle and Tacoma were Russian. There was rather general disregard of regulations. There was difficulty with such vessels at the Mukilteo loading terminal which did not have spark arresters on their stacks. There always was trouble with the load line for Russian ships; finally an understanding was reached with the local agents. Although the overloading of Russian vessels was a continuous problem, the Navy Commandant of the District directed that no action be taken to deny clearance of Russian ships unless specifically directed by him. These vessels caused many cases of oil pollution. Because of the possibility of international complications, there was little enforcement in these cases. However, the Department of Justice and the War Shipping Administration pointed out that a decision had been reached that vigorous enforcement was in order, and all cases should be reported to the United States Attorneys.

ORGANIZATION USUALLY IN A STATE OF FLUX

The Captain of the Port organization in the Thirteenth Naval District seemed always to be in a state of flux. Starting with the "floating" Captain of the Port on board the ONONDAGA, the COTPs and ACOTPs were increased to 2, then 3, then 10, and in early 1944 the units were as follows:

- COTP Seattle
- COTP Everett
- COTP Tacoma
- COTP Astoria
- COTP Portland
- ACOTP Marshfield
- ACOTP Anacortes
- ACOTP Longview
- ACOTP Vancouver
- ACOTP South Bend

TEMPORARY RESERVISTS AND THE SCOPE OF THEIR ACTIVITY

The Temporary Reserve organization of the District was most highly developed at Seattle. The TRs were active in the early part of the war, virtually ceased operations for nearly a year, 1943 to 1944, at the behest of the District Coast Guard Officer, and then when the VPSF was organized became

very active and relieved about 455 regulars for sea duty by the end of the war. As a result of the TRs on waterfront posts, all city policemen were withdrawn from that area for use in other sections of the city where men were short. One odd, and not necessarily a good, requirement at Seattle was that enrollees have a 5-year residence in Seattle. This requirement eliminated many good and loyal men from the Temporary Reserve. There were four major departments in the Volunteer Port Security Force, as follows:

- (a) Base Operations
- (b) Patrol
- (c) Enrollment and Morale
- (d) Training

Activities of the Temporary Reservists covered a very broad field and included the following tasks:

Reving patrol	Motion picture men
Customs patrol	Public relations
Traffic guards	Explosives guards
Yeomen	Carpenters
Quartermasters	Painters
Duty officers	Radio repair; maint.
Fire-fighting instructors	Messmen
Drivers	Investigators
Swimming instructors	Electrical inspectors
Physiotherapists	Manning fire barges
Ship inspectors	Photographers
Mechanics	Publicity
Cooks	Cartographers
Bakers	Drill Officers
Pharmacists	Electricians
Elevator operators	Dispatchers
Masters at arms	Sentry
Recruiting	Gunners mates
Printers	Small arms instruction
Supply	Driving instructors
Jeep patrol	First aid men
Ship guards	Messengers
Judo instruction	Storekeepers
Fire and Rescue Squads	Morale
Fire inspectors	Editors

A maintenance and repair division was established in October, 1944, for the purpose of maintaining and keeping in repair the Coast Guard building at 77 Washington Street, and the Maynard Building. Starting with 10 men, it was augmented by August, 1945 to 65 men and one Spar yeoman. Work consisted of painting, electrical work, automobile maintenance, carpentry, sheet metal work and furniture repairing. By December, 1944, Temporary Reservists had replaced all dispatchers, drivers, sentries, maintenance and repair crews, radio maintenance men, fire inspectors and ship inspectors. For nearly a year, the TRs on guard duty carried clubs, but no guns. Several men took unwarranted beatings. Thereafter, they were armed, and there was no further trouble, but there was no instance in which a gun was used. Waterfront crime disappeared. The Volunteer Port Security Force was divided into several "patrols," each headed by an officer with one or more assistants, as needed, and these patrols were as follows:

1. Patrol
2. Transportation
3. Fire Prevention; Ship Inspection
4. Duty Officers
5. Military Training
6. Communications
7. Fire Barges
8. Pharmacists and First Aid

The Volunteer Port Security Forces experienced some difficulty due to the use of shore patrol uniforms and lack of knowledge by the public as to what the TRs were. This extended to some of the regular Coast

Guardsmen, merchant ship officers, explosives personnel, pier superintendents, and such. It took some time to acquaint such people with the fact that the TRs had full Coast Guard authority while on duty. This problem appeared here and there throughout the Districts, but never assumed major proportions. It was solved in the First Naval District by having TRs wear undress blues on duty, and there was never any trouble.

TR SHIP INSPECTORS

Ship inspection work by TRs was organized in August, 1944. The group so occupied included many experienced

marine inspectors and underwriters. They made routine inspections at first, but finally duties consisted of:

- (a) Complete inspection of new ship arrivals from sea (25 to 30 weekly).
- (b) Routine inspections of ships in port (about 600 a week); all were inspected every 6 hours while in port.
- (c) Inspection of welding and burning permits on board ship.
- (d) Delivery of Federal Registers when required.

By August, 1945, when this duty ceased, the number of TR inspectors had grown to 94.

TR COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

The Temporary Reservists at Seattle became extremely useful in communications.

The Communications Division was established 2 June, 1944. It recruited and trained 14 night dispatchers for 1800-0600 duties at Station NLFD. By 1 August, these men had assumed full dispatching duties. Next, 14 dispatchers for day duty were recruited and trained, and took over the watches 0600-1800 on 1 January, 1945. Thus, the TR dispatchers were on 24-hour duty, replacing 4 full time regular Coast Guardsmen. A group of trained and experienced transmitter and receiver technicians was started on 1 July, 1944, to repair, install and keep in operating condition all of the 2-way radio units attached to the Captain of the Port's office. A radio repair room was installed with all necessary equipment. These men served in 2-man teams each night after 20 July, and in all numbered 14 men. Seven complete transmitters and receivers were installed in new units, and 392 individual transmitters and receiver units were repaired and put back on the air. The unit also installed a public address system at 77 Washington Street, and repaired many recreational radios for fire barge personnel.

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

COTP ESTABLISHMENT IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

The establishment of effective COTP organizations at the principal Hawaiian ports for the regulation of ship-

ping, anchorage supervision and general Port Security became immediately necessary with the outbreak of war. Due to the limited number of major ports in the Islands, only 4 COTPs were required. The largest and most important was, of course, at Honolulu. The principal seaports in the Islands are small, crowded and restricted, and this geographical feature required that special emphasis be placed on fire control and other safety regulations. The total authorized complement for the District was 1,000 officers and men, of which about 600 were at Honolulu. One of the principal difficulties was a shortage of personnel which

persisted for most of the war period. An added angle to this problem was the transportation of personnel from the mainland, and disapproval by the Navy for maintaining and employing the Coast Guard Auxiliary (and Temporary Reserve) for this activity. Temporary Reserves were not organized in the Fourteenth District for this same reason. In addition to Honolulu, which had two-thirds of the commerce of Hawaii, COTP units were set up at:

Kahului, on the island of Maui
Hilo, on the island of Hawaii
Port Allen, Ahukini, Nawiliwili, on island of Kauai

THE PORT OF HONOLULU

Honolulu has a population of about 260,000. During the war, it became of major importance as a stopping point for tremendously expanded trans-Pacific aviation operations incident to the war. In 1945, 715 vessels grossing some 7,000,000 tons discharged and loaded at Honolulu. With the beginning of war, shipping in some lines became restricted or ceased, while others expanded greatly. Inter-island yachting practically disappeared. Commercial fishing was stopped for a while, but was resumed under strict Coast Guard control. Enormous tonnages of explosives and dangerous cargoes went into the Hawaiian Islands. Vigilant harbor patrol was required at Honolulu because of restricted, crowded and wooden piers.

IMPACT OF PEARL HARBOR AND EARLY SITUATION

At the time of the outbreak of war there was no organized Port Security Force in the Fourteenth Naval District. Two 78-foot patrol boats and one speed boat maintained a security patrol of Honolulu Harbor, supervised anchorages, sealed radios on merchant vessels and controlled the handling of explosives and inflammable cargoes. There were no security measures at the other ports except what was done by the commanding officer of the CGC TIGER at Hilo. The most important function of the Coast Guard in the District after Pearl Harbor and the one in which inadequacies were most keenly felt was Port Security. After the directive of 25 February, 1942, there was great necessity for the immediate establishment of an organization to perform all the normal functions of the Captain of the Port. A total lack of trained personnel, logistic facilities and fireboats for this duty was the greatest single problem then faced. However, the lack was partially met by the establishment of a fine training school at Wailupe early in 1942, which was gradually expanded. The COTP organization at Honolulu struggled along for 6 months before any material help by way of trained personnel became available. It was late 1942 before adequate COTP units were set up at the smaller ports. The Hilo unit (ultimately 100 officers and men) was established 9 September, 1942, the Kauai unit on 7 October, Nawiliwili (sub-unit) 29 October and Kahului (on Maui) 6 January, 1943. Previously, Navy units had carried out certain COTP functions, because of Coast Guard personnel shortages, and this embarrassed the District Coast Guard Officer.

THE HONOLULU UNIT

The Captain of the Port organization at Honolulu was established with temporary quarters in March, 1942, at Pier 4. Lack of space necessitated erection of a "tent area" adjacent to the pier to accommodate 180 men who formed the nucleus of the organization. As the unit slowly increased to 600 men, a new headquarters was necessary. The Matson Line Pier #11 was acquired during the summer, and complete facilities were built into the pier for the COTP detail. One of the first problems of the engineering staff was the conversion of a number of small boats into fireboats. The critical shortage of materials

necessary for such conversion was a major problem, but this was solved temporarily by the use of makeshift and substitute material. Portable fire pumps arrived for these boats in May, 1942, and when ready, these boats afforded much needed fire protection since the fire hazard in Honolulu either from bombing, accidental or plane fires was serious, due to the condition of the piers and the compactness of the harbor. Several fireboats equipped at Honolulu were sent to the outlying COTPs for local protection. In general, the duties performed at Honolulu by the Captain of the Port were:

Clearance and Anchorage
Explosives Loading Supervision
Fire Prevention
Fire-Fighting
Harbor Patrol
Boarding
Intelligence
Minesweeping Operations

COASTAL LOOKOUTS

In the Hawaiian Islands, the several coastal lookout stations were placed under the immediate command of commissioned officers when assigned to COTP duty. Actually, they came under the Captains of the Port, but were operated separately and not as a regular Captain of the Port function.

THE PERSONNEL PROBLEM

The matter of personnel training was well taken care of through the training school established at the former Naval radio station at Wailupe. However, though Port Security personnel in the District ultimately reached about 1,200 officers and men, there was a constant and troublesome shortage of personnel properly trained, due partly to rotation and relief. This personnel shortage was acute throughout the war period. Recalling the situation in the Third District, it would seem that in the two places where personnel shortages were most acute, Temporary Reservists were used little or not at all.

FIRE EXPERIENCE AT HONOLULU

Several fires on board ships in the harbor were detected and extinguished before serious damage could result. In one case, Captain of the Port personnel distinguished themselves in helping to extinguish fires on a nest of Navy LSTs in West Loch, Pearl Harbor. The fire was started by an explosion in one LST and was fought with 4 fireboats and two picket boats from 1715 on 21 May until about 1700 on 22 May, 1944. Four men were seriously burned and 27 men in the fire-fighting detail were cited by the Commandant for displaying "courage and outstanding devotion to duty." On 2 July, 1945, the SS MARK HANNA, fully loaded with 8,000 tons of ammunition was discharging at Pier 40. An electric high lift in No. 2 hold handling palletized land mines caught fire. The blaze was immediately extinguished by Coast Guardsmen on duty in the hold, and by the driver of the high lift, through use of hand extinguishers. At the time of the incident, 5 explosives-laden vessels were moored at Piers 39 and 40.

CESSATION OF NAVY EXPLOSIVES LOADING AT HONOLULU

Explosives loading was active at Honolulu. In the first half of July, 1945, 18 ships were loaded with, or discharged, a total of 23,008 tons of explosives. An average of about 59 ships occupied Honolulu Harbor at one time during that period. As a result of an inspection made by the new District Coast Guard Officer, shortly after his arrival, a protest was made to the Navy Commandant of the District, and an order was issued that no further Navy loading of ammunition was to be done at Honolulu Harbor. Such

loading there was something the Coast Guard had deplored since its beginning early in the war, due to the hazard caused by the proximity of the loading piers to tank farms of fuel oil and high octane gas as well as the location of the piers very close to the heart of the city of Honolulu.

SECURITY WAS
PROVIDENTIAL

In port security except the total lack of planning and preparedness for the institution of the program before the outbreak of war. The security of the ports of Hawaii during the first few crucial months was largely providential for which the Coast Guard can take little credit."

SEVENTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

NATURE OF THE
SEVENTEENTH
NAVAL DISTRICT

The Seventeenth Naval District is an offshoot of the Thirteenth, and was created as a separate Naval District. About twice the size of Texas, it has a long and rambling coast-line extending the entire length of Alaska and including the Aleutians. As a military defense area, it has great strategic value to the United States. Development is difficult due chiefly to the remoteness of the territory and the very high costs of all transportation. Alaskan industries are too few and too small to support more than a comparative handful of workers. The four main industries are fishing, mining, lumbering and construction. Inhabitants number about 100,000 and lumped together, Alaska's industries and businesses provide no more work than does a medium-sized United States city. However, navigable waters are very extensive, and the small ports are scattered along the coast principally between Kodiak and Ketchikan. There was much wartime traffic which had to be controlled and protected. Yet it was a difficult area in which to carry on Port Security functions, for distances were considerable, transportation poor, and facilities greatly inadequate. Though many officers who were sent to Alaska were at first dissatisfied and under the impression they were being punished, most got to like the duty, and performed admirably.

THE CAPTAIN OF THE PORT
ORGANIZATION IN ALASKA

later Assistant Captains at the following ports:

Nome	Skagway
Dutch Harbor	Excursion Inlet
Kodiak	Juneau
Anchorage	Sitka
Whittier	Petersburg
Seward	Wrangell
Cordova	Craig

Eventually, in addition to the usual Captain of the Port duties, where they applied, the units in many ports were required to handle fishing and communication control, and in most ports were the Port Directors and boarding officers. In the larger ports they were also the Hydrographic Office representatives, and handled the sale of all charts and documents, and acted as routing officers. Ports were widely separated, and cooperation with the Army and Navy, and shipping and fishing interests was essential. Apparently, COTPs also had some responsibility in the upkeep of aids to navigation in their areas.

EARLY PATROLS

By July, 1942, two small patrol vessels had been assigned to investigation of canneries throughout southern Alaska, checking on boat licenses and identification cards of employees. An outpost was established in Hidden Inlet connecting with the communications system, and a man was assigned to Waterfall to act as outpost, check on vessels and fishing boats, and report suspicious craft and persons. The need for additional patrol vessels was great, but 10 Auxiliary vessels relieved the situation somewhat and were placed on special duty patrolling the more important points projecting into Dixon Entrance, Cordova Bay and Clarence Strait. By 1 August, there were 15 Auxiliary craft patrolling in the Ketchikan area, where within another two months 6 to 14 vessels were in transit daily. Traffic increased greatly as the Pacific war progressed, and in April, 1945, for instance, the activity of patrols can be judged from the fact that 258 ships entered the Port of Juneau and were boarded, checked, and cleared. Of these, 53 were over 500 tons.

THE SITUATION
IN JUNE, 1943

In mid-1943, efforts at Port Security in the Seventeenth District had made relatively little headway. Fire fighting equipment was far from sufficient, and at the time there was not a fireboat in the District. There were 13 Captains of the Port offices, with 18 commissioned officers and 250 enlisted men. Of the enlisted personnel, only 7 had been trained in Port Security work. Despite the meager protection afforded under the circumstances, most waterfront properties in the District were fire hazards. Sometimes, it seemed as if one of the major jobs was preventing drunken natives from burning down every port in Alaska. Winter brought heavy snows and very cold weather, with limited visibility. This created a hazard of damage to power and telephone lines, and made handling cargoes difficult and hazardous. With few personnel and inadequate equipment, waterfront guarding had to be done jointly by the Coast Guard and the Army in several places. Although this presented some problems, the operation worked reasonably well. As for the Coast Guard, however, there were not enough men to do a good job even in one Alaska port.

PARTIAL REMEDY

As time went on, the above situation was partly remedied. A few more men became available, some equipment was obtained, and there were more men with proper training. Before operations ceased, each Captain of the Port had a small but efficient firefighting group with a petty officer in charge who had received fire training at Baltimore. Twice, during the war, 4 officers toured the Alaskan ports explaining the latest fire-fighting methods. Each COTP had a patrol boat, and some fireboats were placed in operation. Apparently each Captain of the Port had men especially trained in maintenance of aids to navigation.

EXPLOSIVES LOADING

A moderate amount of explosives loading was done in the Seventeenth District, but little information on this is available. In April, 1945, the question of Coast Guard authority and responsibility regarding supervision of the handling of explosives loadings and cargoes in the Aleutian Chain was clarified. The Commandant (Navy) of the District and the Commanding General, Alaskan Department, agreed that the supervision of explosives cargoes should be in effect in all territory east of 175° 30' West Longitude, Cold Bay, excepted, where it was considered impracticable west of that point. The authorities mentioned did not consider Coast Guard supervision practicable unless specifically requested in each individual instance. They expressed the opinion that the

cessation of the war with Germany would justify no change in Port Security measures within the District.

REDUCTION OF ACTIVITY

Some reduction in Port Security activity, however, was apparently made during early 1945, for in May, 1945, the statement was made that if Port Security activities were discontinued, in the District, about 75 men and 5 officers would be available for other duty. It would seem that Port Security was a minor operation by that time.

PART X

CURTAILMENT

FIRST REDUCTIONS IN COTP ACTIVITIES

It has been seen that Captain of the Port activities covered a wide range. The actual peak in such activities as measured by personnel and COTP units came in mid-1943, and operations continued at about that level until the latter part of that year. About January, 1944, the man-power survey got under way, the purpose of which was to determine those units the usefulness of which had declined, those which needed to be augmented, personnel who could be used more efficiently elsewhere or in other work, and generally to use the available personnel in the most effective manner. These considerations, whether activated or not by this survey, brought about elimination in the latter part of 1943 of several COTP or ACOTP offices, or mergers of such offices. The first major result, however, of this survey was the drastic curtailment of beach patrol activity which, in March, 1944, reverted almost to its peacetime status. Practically all men capable of duty at sea were transferred from the beaches to sea, although the augmented coastal lookout system continued to function about as formerly for several months afterward. This curtailment, however, was not of direct concern to the Captain of the Port organizations, since most beach patrol was an activity apart, but operating in close cooperation with the COTPs. Almost coincidentally, Captain of the Port units in roughly 50 smaller ports were discontinued and their activities merged with major units or, where justified, eliminated altogether. This was due to the progress of the war and completion of many shipbuilding contracts, and a decline in the importance of security measures in these smaller localities.

FURTHER REDUCTION IN UNITS NOT RESPONSIBILITIES: The scope of Coast Guard responsibilities remained the same. Waterfront security, harbor patrol, ship movement and anchorage, and all the other subdivisions of activity continued, and none was eliminated. The curtailment came in the number of units concerned with these activities, and to some extent, personnel so engaged. As 1944 progressed, the need for many remaining COTP units declined, and there were further eliminations and consolidations. This accelerated as the year progressed. By the end of 1944, Captain of the Port units remained only at the major ports, and numbered approximately 35. At such ports, however, wartime traffic was still on the increase, for the most part, and the remaining units made no curtailment in their wide variety of activities except, in some instances, in the matter of identification.

FINAL WARTIME CURTAILMENT

Most units existing at the beginning of 1945 carried on right through until some time after the end of the war in Europe. During June, 1945, Temporary Reserve operations virtually ceased in all ports, harbor patrols

were reduced drastically, the guarding of piers reverted to pier operators with their own guards and watchmen, and so forth, although curtailment was far less on the Pacific coast for another two months. Wartime control of ship movement was relaxed and security measures were generally discontinued. After 14 August, 1945, when fighting ceased in the Pacific theater, Headquarters dispatch 211906 to Captains of the Port was issued which directed that Captain of the Port activities be confined to:

- (a) Proper handling, movement, loading and unloading of explosives and other dangerous cargoes;
- (b) Minimum fire protection measures;
- (c) Ordinary peacetime activities usually connected with COTP duties;
- (d) Elimination of all other Port Security functions as rapidly as possible.

This was the end of Port Security wartime activity in World War II.

PART XI

EVALUATION

EVALUATION FULL OF INTANGIBLES

An effort to evaluate Port Security in the United States ports during World War II encounters innumerable difficulties almost all of which come under the classification of "intangibles." Operations against the acknowledged enemy may be evaluated in terms of actual, tangible accomplishments. Port Security, on the other hand, was PREVENTIVE from every standpoint, and the success of the entire undertaking must be expressed in terms of what did not happen. Some positive results can be enumerated. The EL ESTERO did not explode and lay waste miles of Bayonne, 85 survivors of the SPRING HILL fire were rescued, the disastrous gas fire at Cleveland was prevented from spreading and causing other explosions, and there were many similar evidences of the effectiveness of the Captain of the Port units. No one can ever know the proportions to which fires might have grown but for their discovery by Coast Guardsmen in incipient stages — what saboteurs were prevented from carrying out destructive plans but for the harbor patrol boat or the pier guard present in their areas of proposed operations. Bonneville, Grande Coulee, and the Tennessee Valley Authority dams were intact at the end of hostilities. Had they been threatened? The Cape Cod Canal was kept clear except for a few days in mid-1942. One thing is virtually certain. If there had been no fire prevention and fire-fighting program, if harbors and piers had not been patrolled, if explosives loading had been carried on in haphazard fashion, and if all the other COTP activities had not been religiously performed, our ports would have had disastrous visitations of a wide variety. The flow of men, materials and munitions to the vital fighting fronts would have been interrupted, successful termination of the war would have been delayed, and many more lives would have been lost. There might have been far greater loss of life in our home ports! Actually, there was little loss of civilian life except in the gas explosion at Cleveland.

NO ONE KNOWS WHAT DID NOT HAPPEN

What did NOT happen is such a negative and intangible thing that there is no adequate answer. Things did not happen that would not have happened anyway. But other things definitely would have happened but for the vigilance of the Coast Guard, the training given

the men, the equipment ready for use, the long, tedious water and pier patrols, the care in loading explosives, the control of vessel movements, and all the other positive activities of this branch of the armed forces. It was the duty of the entire Captain of the Port and Port Security organizations to guard against and prevent any acts of sabotage, carelessness, neglect or accident which could in any way damage personnel, waterfront facilities, cargoes, and vessels in port, thus hindering in any way prompt delivery of men and materials and munitions for effective use against the enemy. The whole Port Security program was built around this objective. Obviously, where no loss occurred, it is hard to evaluate what had been accomplished. There were no real casualties, nothing much to show except virtually undamaged waterfronts, safe shipping, and uninterrupted movement of men and supplies.

DANGERS FROM WITHIN

There were many dangers from within during World War II, chiefly from sabotage or threat of sabotage, but the Coast Guard and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were effective bulwarks against successful exploitation by those in our country who would have tried to hinder our war progress. In terms of sabotage accomplished, the United States was exceedingly fortunate. The experience gained through preventive measures satisfactorily employed should stand the country and the Coast Guard in good stead in case of another emergency which could, very conceivably, involve carefully laid, well-organized, and widespread sabotage of ships, men, waterfront facilities, bridges and all forms of transportation. In World War II, there was some time to prepare and develop with the war's progress. A future emergency might develop with great suddenness and not permit time to prepare, train and enlist. The greatest defense against that contingency in terms of Port Security is the existence of a Coast Guard Reserve in our major ports trained during peacetime in Port Security specialties, and capable of being mobilized and placed on duty quickly in their own areas. Such a force would include both regular Reservists and Temporary Reservists. In the interests of national defense, sufficient appropriations should be made to maintain at least a minimum of such Reserves which would be effective in emergency, a minimum of necessary equipment for fire-fighting, and the arming of pier guards and sentries. Port Security programs for the principal ports should be formulated in peacetime and the Reserves trained and made acquainted with emergency duties. This would be the cheapest and possibly the most effective insurance against waterfront disaster in which the United States could invest.

SHORTAGE OF PERSONNEL

Every military service makes mistakes, and the Coast Guard was not immune. Possibly the greatest hindrance to successful prosecution of duties was inadequate personnel, especially in 1942 and early 1943, both in terms of numbers and training. An established Reserve would have largely alleviated that situation at its most critical point. Increase in the number and scope of duties which Captains of the Port were required to perform outpaced ability to enlist and train the necessary men. When, toward the latter part of 1943, demand for personnel in Port Security work was nearly met, the COTF complements were drained in order to effect the vessel-manning program. In view of this handicap, which affected practically every Captain of the Port, it is truly remarkable that Port Security was so successfully accomplished. The Temporary Reserve was a powerful factor in the end result, for in port after port, these unpaid volunteers were able to take over the major part of line work in guarding piers and other waterfront facilities on the land side, and

conducting patrols in small craft on the harbor waters.

EXPLOSIVES LOADING

In general, the supervision of the loading and discharge of explosives, and inflammable and other dangerous cargoes was carried out very efficiently and satisfactorily. The record of tremendous tonnage handled without mishap is the best possible testimonial of the success of the whole operation. Accidents occurring in Coast Guard jurisdiction were few, and none was actually disastrous. There were a few narrow escapes. However, the confusion and cross-purposes, questionable jurisdiction, divided authority, and such which explosives loading suffered at times, especially in the earlier days at Army Ports of Embarkation and at some Navy installations, should never again be permitted. Unification of the armed forces may result in elimination of such an unfortunate situation. But under any circumstances, jurisdiction and authority should be clearly defined and understood IN ADVANCE of any emergency, and strictly adhered to. The Army and Navy should not be able to waive Coast Guard regulations at will, in the name of war urgency, thus largely nullifying their effectiveness whenever so inspired. Had disaster resulted, as it might well have, the regulations would have been hollow, indeed.

ON FIRE PREVENTION

The entire fire prevention program of the Coast Guard was efficiently carried out. In most ports, fire prevention inspections were carried on by men who had been fire inspectors or underwriters for insurance companies or other interested agencies, and most were well-trained in their duties before entering the Coast Guard as regular Reservists or Temporary Reservists. They knew their business, for the most part, and effective fire prevention methods reflected this. One lamentable factor here was that, especially in the earlier days of the war, they could recommend and advise, but there was no means of enforcement, though there were means of retaliation by refusing to allow piers to be used.

FIRE-FIGHTING

In general, this activity was highly successful, and fire-fighting was favorably developed. With a large fleet of fireboats and numerous mobile trailer pumps, the Coast Guard was ready to fight fires on the waterfronts of principal ports and did so admirably. In relation to tonnage of shipping and cargo, and value of facilities, the fire experience on the waterfront was exceedingly low. Tonnage moved in our ports is summarized in Appendix II. Great care was taken to enlist in the fire units, as far as possible, experienced fire-fighters, and further training added to their natural efficiency. Fireboats were well handled and manned. The fireboats themselves, however, in many cases left much to be desired. While under certain circumstances Hanley fireboats seemed satisfactory, they were not wholly efficient under others. They were slow, difficult to maneuver in currents and winds, and in numerous ports were towed by faster craft to the scenes of fires! They had the advantage of working well in shallow waters and in being able to work under piers, but generally, they were not efficient fireboats. Efforts should be made to develop small fireboats with their good points, but without the bad ones. Lundeens were good as a makeshift, awaiting the time when better fireboats should be available. They were not otherwise satisfactory. Fire barges such as those used on the Pacific coast were efficient fire-fighters except that they were subject to currents which made them difficult to manage. Fireboats with deck pumps encountered difficulties in northern latitudes during winter months, due to severe cold weather. Regular converted fireboats were often slow, though maneuverability and

pump-power were generally good. After the program got well under way, the number of fireboats in the various ports was considered sufficient. In converting and supplying these boats, time was short, and under the circumstances the program was well-executed. However, peacetime experimentation should be carried out to develop small fireboats which can work in shallow water and under adverse conditions of wind and tide, with the efficiency of the larger craft.

MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES Harbor patrol, and pier and dock guard duty, eventually carried out largely by Temporary Reservists, were generally well operated. Problems were relatively few. Also, the pilot program functioned almost perfectly. There were few problems in Ship Movement and Anchorage, and in almost all ports this activity operated smoothly. Experience at the Boston Coast Guard Base demonstrated that Temporary Reservists are capable of manning and operating signal stations with efficiency, providing a proper training program is instituted. Signal stations in practically all major ports could have been so operated.

THE VOLUNTEERS Temporary Reservists on a volunteer, no-pay basis, ashore and afloat, and in special assignments served the Coast Guard well. These were mostly mature men almost all of whom had full time civilian employment, and served in the Coast Guard as additional work. Upon volunteering, they knew what would be required of them, and they knew there would be no draft deferment, no benefits, no pay and no glory. Except for an extremely small minority, their one motive was to do all they could under the circumstances to help Uncle Sam in his war effort, to give support to their sons and other kin on the fighting fronts, to protect their ports, and to calm their consciences. Such men were bound to be conscientious workers; few others would volunteer. The efficiency of the volunteer Temporary Reserve units depended not only upon the enlisted men but also upon their superior officers, both Temporary Reserve and regular. It was inevitable that, in some locations, units did not perform at top efficiency, but this was due less often to the men themselves than to indifferent leadership. This was corrected whenever possible. Such a situation, however, exists in any subdivision of the armed services. Looking upon the service of the volunteer Temporary Reservists as objectively as possible, it is concluded that this body of men performed a distinct service to the United States with virtually no cost to the Government, and with an over-all conscientiousness, interest, efficiency and determination in the job to be done, not exceeded in any other branches of the Service. These men relieved over 8,000 regulars for duty at sea.

SPARS Generally unsung, the members of the Women's Reserve assisted very greatly the entire Port Security program. They became fully effective fairly late in the war, but took over multitudinous duties in District and base offices, acting as clerks, stenographers, typists, truck and automobile drivers, quartermasters, cooks, dispatchers, telephone, radio and teletype operators, and doing many other kinds of work, invariably relieving men to go to sea who otherwise would have had to do this work "on the beach," at the expense of sea operations. Much the same may be said of the Temporary Reserve Spars who did similar work on a part time, no-pay basis, relieving men from office and other work to enable them to be on piers, patrol boats, and other facilities where they belonged and could be most effective. The Women's Reserve was a distinct success and an important, though indirect, aid to Port Security. The value of women in the Coast

Guard during times of emergency has been definitely established. Their work was truly invaluable.

CONGRATULATORY LETTERS

There is no need in this work to give verbatim the many congratulatory letters which were written at various times in recognition of the good work of the Coast Guard in carrying out Port Security responsibilities. However, the originators and recipients of some of these letters are listed below:

- President To the Secretary of the Navy
- Secretary of War To the Secretary of the Navy
- Secretary of the Navy To the Commandant of the Coast Guard
- Secretary of the Interior . To the Commandant
- Chief of Transportation ... To the Commandant (War Department)
- War Production Board To the Commandant
- Petroleum Industry War Council To the Commandant
- British Security Coordination To the Commandant
- National Board of Fire Underwriters To the Commandant
- National Board of Fire Underwriters To Captain Hall
- Commandant To Port Security Personnel

ADMIRAL WAESCHE'S APPRECIATION OF THE VOLUNTEER PORT SECURITY FORCE OF THE TEMPORARY RESERVE

In writing a foreword for the history of the Philadelphia Regiment, VPSF, Admiral Waesche said, in part: "As Commanding Officer whose duty it was in the fateful summer of 1942 to give official sanction to an untried project and who watched it grow from the tentative, embryonic Philadelphia Plan to a well-trained organization operating efficiently in twenty ports, I can truthfully say that I welcome the idea that the story of this far-reaching movement be told and published. In the hour of need, when it was imperative that regular Coast Guard personnel be freed from their local duties for service afloat and abroad, we searched for substitutes whom we might enroll and train for the protection of American wharves, warehouses, and loading ships. These substitutes were happily found in the members of the Volunteer Port Security Force. I should be ungrateful indeed if I did not take this opportunity to express my appreciation of their services..... The men and women of the Volunteer Port Security Force of the United States Coast Guard Reserve have proved themselves worthy successors to the bodies of patriotic volunteers who rendered similar service in all previous crises of our national history."

FITTING TRIBUTE BY SCHUYLER OTIS BLAND, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

A fitting tribute to the many Coast Guardsmen who served so faithfully to make this organization the greatest of its kind the world has ever known, was spoken by Honorable Schuyler Otis Bland of

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Virginia, in the House of Representatives at Washington:

"The Coast Guard takes pride in itself. But it takes an even greater pride in the tasks assigned to it and the tasks performed.

"Whatever the call, whether to provide security for the ports of the nation, whether to sink a submarine or land a force on a beach-head, or to rescue a shipwrecked crew, the work has been done quietly and well.

"They have not sought applause, but accomplishments. The awards have been few and, in my personal opinion, far below the number of the Coast Guard.

"Sailors in peacetime, the Coast Guard is always ready for war. Theirs is a life of courage, of fortitude and of unselfish service."

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it may be said that the entire Coast Guard Port Security program was well organized and well executed, despite what at times seemed insurmountable obstacles. Mistakes, when recognized and acknowledged as necessary to progress, will prove to have been constructive if, from the experience, better methods are devised and put into effect in case of future emergencies. However, in the whole Port Security effort, mistakes were fewer than might easily have been expected, and the full effectiveness of the entire program is evident when the war record of our ports is carefully weighed and evaluated in terms of WHAT DID NOT HAPPEN.

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APPENDIX I

THE COAST GUARD SS NORMANDIE SECURITY DETAIL

By
Lieutenant Oliver Rahle, USCG*

While it is not the intention to justify the human errors and the division of authority which was indirectly the cause of the Normandie burning and turning on her side, (the vessel capsized on the night of 10 February, 1942) the opportunity appears now at hand to relate the work which, as the security guard during the protective custody, and during the conversion as a skeleton crew, the Coast Guard performed and which only a few hours prior to the fire had been the subject for commendable remarks from the prospective Commanding Officer and his staff. This is particularly so since American skill and ingenuity have floated the Normandie and did provide the Navy, during the salvage operations, with a ship on which thousands of divers were trained. With this training it was possible in an incredibly short time to raise all ships sunk at Pearl Harbor and salvage others by the hundreds of thousands of tons in the harbors of the liberated countries. Besides, it aroused Congress to adopt laws giving the Navy authority, with the Coast Guard as its enforcing agency, to control the security of any port within the jurisdiction of the United States.

It is unfortunate that because she was the biggest ship in the world, the fire could not, in view of this, be judged as though she had been a vessel of a smaller tonnage undergoing repairs. Had this been the case, the public pride would not have been hurt, and the cause would only have been the concern of the interested parties. It would have avoided unfair criticism from the public for those who had worked hard to expedite the completion of the greatest ship conversion ever attempted.

Because of the political position of France, the functions of the Coast Guard Security Detail, during the protective custody of the Normandie, did develop into an intricate assignment. It became our duty to assist and protect the property of a friendly people who, in the course of events, were going through a series of reverses which, under the circumstances, could not be prevented by them. The loyalty of the officers and crew and their love for the ship, which most of them had seen being built as a symbol of France's greatness, could not be anything but commendable. They had in France's political confusion no other choice than remain on board. Between them and the Coast Guard personnel grew a spirit of close cooperative effort in guarding their ship against saboteurs.

At the time the security detail boarded the Normandie, the Coast Guard had begun, with men from its regular service personnel, to man Naval transports and other new floating units turned over to the Coast Guard to operate. Training centers had been established for new recruits but, up to the time the Normandie detail was originated, these recruits had time to receive but little training. Except for a skeleton of regular officers and enlisted men, most of the detail were therefore made up of young men entering the service for the first time. The uncertainty relative to the duration of the protective custody into which all French ships had been placed, prevented the adoption of a long-range program and added to the problems from the beginning.

To provide a military and efficient guard, the detail command started schools of various kinds, infantry

* Lieutenant Rahle was a Boatswain, and Security Officer at the time of the fire.

drills being held daily, with the result that within a few months this detail not only performed its specific assignments, but during the entire eight months on board, also served as a unit, training much needed men for sea duty, advancing them to higher ratings, and qualifying many for special schools.

After taking over the Normandie as the property of the government with the Navy directed to operate her, the Coast Guard Security Detail was reduced from its legal status as the agent of the Treasury Department designated under Federal law to prevent sabotage on axis-controlled vessels while in any United States port, to the status of part of the Naval forces in time of war. As a part of this force, the Coast Guard was without legal authority to decide safety violations, compel compliances with safety responsibilities in accordance with the contract's clauses, and practice safety precautions while work was in progress. The Coast Guard, therefore, did not perform any other functions than that of a temporary skeleton crew.

On the day the conversion began, the Security Detail was confronted with the problem of receiving on board shipyard and sub-contract workers, which, within a few days grew to 1,500 in number. With these new arrivals, new problems developed and caused adjustments which were not possible to visualize in advance. Added to this was the taking over of the security control system, replacing a full fire brigade personnel of forty men, assuming the control and starting the operation of a large and complicated blower system as well as the operation of all auxiliary engines, etc., which had only the day before been taken over from the French crew.

The distribution of work among the Coast Guard personnel was various, and included too many duties to be described in detail. The security guard consisted of forty men, made up from various ratings, divided into groups and assigned to patrol specific sections of the ship. While doing so they had to report to the control room at various telephone stations along the route. They had to keep open all panel doors covering fire plugs, hose and fire extinguishers. With panel doors open and the compartment painted red on its inside these were easier to find. Besides this, the security guard made notes on fire hazards as they discovered them. These hazards were investigated by a chief petty officer who took action, or when necessary, brought them to the attention of his superior, who in turn would advise the offending contractor. Other men were assigned to the control room and one man at all times stood by on the bridge to sound, on orders from the officer of the deck or the control room, the ship and city fire alarm. The security guard concerned themselves with the printing of all sorts of warning signs. They designated places where smoking would be allowed. They observed the alertness displayed among the shipyard fire patrols. They had an organization chart drawn up showing the method under which the fire brigade operated. This included instructions to distribute, as assisting groups, men not regularly assigned to stations. An air raid chart had also been drawn up showing, by numbers, stations which these groups could man in case of a raid or a fire. They reported on the condition of the fire equipment and recommended that private concerns undertake its reconditioning. They warned against the confusion arising from tinkering with the electric security signal equipment and the delay its being out of order would cause in bringing the fire brigade to the scene of a fire. They warned against the moving of the fire brigade from its permanent quarters to a temporary one and the removal of the city fire alarm box from the bridge to the dock.

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They had warned particularly against the hazards created by the stowing of gasoline on the dock and the storing on board of hundreds of bales wrapped in highly inflammable burlap and tar-covered paper. (It was in this material that the fire started).

The dock guard had the responsibility of preventing any unauthorized persons coming on board. They were posted by the entrances to the pier and at the gangway. They had a number of orderlies available as escorts to anyone coming on board on temporary business. They checked workmen through stalls. On shifts coming off, spot searches were made and their identifications verified. All Maritime Service and French Inventory Officials were checked in and out. They had special identification bands while on board. Because of the difficulty of obtaining a more suitable arrangement at once, sub-contractors' personnel had been permitted to use their company's address-tag for identification. A discrepancy in this system was discovered by the dock guard, and the Naval Inspector who was responsible for the issuing of passes was advised with the result other means were adopted.

The engineering force's difficulties were various and complicated. They had all of the initial work connected with keeping the auxiliary engines running. This included solving the operation of machinery foreign to them. Their untiring effort and labor can only be measured by the exhaustion they showed after many long continuous hours of experimenting and translating French directions for a clue as to how these various engines should be operated.

The feeding of hundreds of extra meals, with a large fluctuation daily, afforded a major problem for the Steward department. With conversion work going on in the galleys and mess decks, they were on constant move from one place to another. There was an officers' mess established and an improvised cafeteria started where a large group of people could be fed. This required collection for individual meals. Added to it was the outfitting of rooms given to officers reporting on board for duty as part of the permanent crew.

Functioning in these many directions and with the restrictions placed on the responsible authorities of the Coast Guard already related, there should have been in operation a pre-commission command, such as are now being placed during new construction of large Naval vessels. Had this been the position of the Coast Guard during the conversion work, their warnings and objections would not have been countermanded and the many commendable acts, both before and during the fire by the individual members of the security guard, would not have gone unnoticed.

/s/ Oliver Rahle

APPENDIX II

SHORT TONS OF COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC MOVEMENTS; LEADING U. S. PORTS

The following is a record of commercial traffic movements in short tons, according to Commercial Statistics in the Annual Reports of the Chief of Engineers, 1946, Part 2, War Department. Only those leading ports of the United States which had Captains of the Port on 15 February, 1943, are included.

<u>1941</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1945</u>
<u>FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT</u>				
Boston, Mass.				
18,826,770	10,431,177	8,471,046	10,743,017	12,850,522
Rockland, Maine				
205,877	143,146	100,909	82,849	72,613
Portland, Maine				
4,233,597	3,169,884	3,773,671	4,454,199	4,848,696
Portsmouth, N. H.				
571,828	203,747	200,506	231,301	231,346
Gloucester, Mass.				
119,445	117,227	117,664	121,821	135,685
Provincetown, Mass.				
6,387	6,516	6,628	12,362	17,330
Cape Cod Canal, Mass.				
10,867,060	18,690,255	16,513,760	16,851,194	14,683,878
Newport, R. I. (Vessel)				
86,869	81,902	40,189	55,650	54,996
Newport, R. I. (Ferry)				
217,683	215,068	220,023	312,099	255,326
<u>THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT</u>				
New London, Connecticut				
621,011	393,592	271,757	294,209	298,609
New York, New York				
139,597,449	101,880,786	111,813,422	110,282,139	103,962,023
<u>FOURTH NAVAL DISTRICT</u>				
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania				
28,806,356	17,119,409	18,757,310	24,390,953	26,179,373
Atlantic City (Absecon Inlet), N. J.				
153,424	91,411	48,642	52,658	90,055
<u>FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT</u>				
Baltimore, Md. (Vessel)				
27,319,917	17,479,118	16,086,321	17,651,411	23,183,721
Baltimore, Md. (Car Ferry)				
2,950,500	4,183,327	3,000,591	3,384,509	3,097,764
Baltimore, Md. (General Ferry)				
4,665	4,239	3,887	4,611	4,685
Norfolk, Virginia (Vessel)				
23,451,847	12,743,229	10,741,862	13,710,510	14,447,348
Norfolk, Virginia (In Transit)				
599,817	343,922	436,606	317,078	205,074
Norfolk, Virginia (Car Ferry)				
1,946,345	1,514,959	1,822,647	2,252,305	2,101,018
Morehead City, N. C.				
29,328	38,805	19,356	9,774	7,671
<u>POTCMAC NAVAL COMMAND</u>				
Washington, D. C.				
2,886,150	3,194,598	1,812,306	1,576,596	1,672,135
<u>SEVERN RIVER NAVAL COMMAND</u>				
Annapolis, Maryland				
79,772	41,942	25,344	44,842	37,342

	<u>1941</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1945</u>
<u>SIXTH NAVAL DISTRICT</u>					
Wilmington, N. C. (Rafted)					
4,526		1,294	418	439	—
Wilmington, N. C. (In Transit)					
230,607			—	—	—
Wilmington, N. C. (Vessel)					
2,555,244		623,497	404,255	901,563	1,046,763
Charleston, S. C. (In Transit)					
780,924		394,792	443,016	956,877	456,340
Charleston, S. C. (Vessel)					
2,354,391		1,156,187	838,538	2,275,466	3,818,034
Savannah, Georgia (In Transit)					
587,955		67,815	55,572	17,544	29,434
Savannah, Georgia (Vessel)					
3,828,218		878,218	1,234,900	1,833,660	2,478,959
Jacksonville, Florida					
313,620		315,504	555,990	928,472	796,817
<u>SEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT</u>					
St. Augustine, Florida					
36,028		3,562	5,562	6,391	7,797
New Smyrna, Florida					
—		—	—	—	—
Banana River, Florida					
—		—	—	—	—
Fort Pierce, Florida (In Transit)					
11,188		—	—	—	—
Fort Pierce, Florida (Vessel)					
102,585		5,230	10,441	22,891	23,560
West Palm Beach (Lake Worth Inlet)					
Florida (In Transit)					
4,126		5,812	50	900	1,425
West Palm Beach, Florida (Vessel)					
108,889		101,001	159,442	115,032	109,040
Port Everglades, Florida					
(Full Car Ferry)					
218,230		191,476	600,245	584,827	93,262
Port Everglades, Florida (Empty Car Ferry)					
202,950		153,925	316,175	329,600	58,375
Port Everglades, Florida (Vessel)					
1,106,730		1,267,211	1,790,958	1,569,899	1,556,505
Miami, Florida (In Transit)					
94,188		3,007	15,073	5,086	91,894
Miami, Florida (Vessel)					
1,675,415		977,581	1,030,738	1,182,313	1,672,361
Key West, Florida (In Transit)					
7,528		—	—	—	—
Key West, Florida (Vessel)					
158,966		253,126	242,725	216,683	130,021
Everglades, Florida					
—		—	—	—	—
Fort Myers (Drainage Area) Florida, (Ferry)					
11,526		11,203	5,676	7,323	9,034
Fort Myers (Drainage Area) Florida, (In Transit)					
183		—	—	—	—
Fort Myers (Drainage Area) Florida, (Vessel)					
47,455		59,050	26,207	18,196	25,204
Tampa, Florida (In Transit)					
324,756		319,446	3,087	2,456	9,653
Tampa, Florida (Vessel)					
4,162,400		3,394,186	4,421,470	4,345,912	3,344,628
Tarpon Springs, Florida (Anclote River)					
20,278		4,724	3,861	2,478	1,390
St. Marks, Florida					
55,189		55,904	54,629	65,804	74,879

	<u>1941</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1945</u>
<u>EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICT</u>					
New Orleans, Louisiana (Car Ferry)	4,180,000	2,945,000	—	—	—
New Orleans, Louisiana (Thru Traffic)	6,334,647	4,848,187	4,052,572	5,100,846	7,535,908
New Orleans, Louisiana (Vessel)	20,907,269	22,637,215	21,328,687	23,948,506	25,204,532
Panama City (St. Andrews Bay) Florida	956,346	585,933	599,460	1,503,395	1,300,377
Mobile, Alabama (In Transit)	830,454	831,487	884,055	673,782	769,592
Mobile, Alabama (Vessel)	5,124,624	4,406,065	3,855,206	2,851,616	4,289,408
Pascagoula, Mississippi (Rafted)	15,028	20,922	8,228	1,595	—
Pascagoula, Mississippi (Vessel)	149,380	160,752	160,440	148,861	172,812
Baton Rouge, Louisiana	8,449,508	7,744,220	6,862,316	7,843,697	8,121,747
Port Arthur, Texas (Thru)	24,647,758	12,082,407	10,705,785	12,945,128	16,259,012
Port Arthur, Texas (Vessel)	19,191,879	10,833,401	6,580,844	7,673,935	12,292,646
Houston, Texas	25,623,078	17,661,447	15,047,871	16,956,538	23,869,878
Galveston, Texas	31,409,997	14,470,680	10,154,430	11,821,777	22,543,364
Corpus Christi, Texas (Thru)	497,080	303,240	260,920	64,240	24,365
Corpus Christi, Texas, (Ferry)	2,620	715	4,344	2,400	2,976
Corpus Christi, Texas (Vessel)	13,801,100	6,710,140	7,375,439	9,553,854	13,074,220
Brownsville, Texas	99,121	128,821	87,409	213,172	313,000
<u>NINTH (ST. LOUIS) NAVAL DISTRICT--</u>					
St. Louis, Missouri	1,377,272	1,115,652	980,544	1,361,565	1,395,769
Calro (Ohio River) Illinois	36,556,854	38,280,812	36,610,262	37,610,262	33,867,919
Memphis, Tennessee	2,082,833	3,032,683	3,088,357	3,437,270	2,953,967
Cincinnati (Ohio River) Ohio	36,556,854	38,280,812	36,610,262	37,801,254	33,867,919
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	37,573,156	39,499,890	36,930,594	37,293,208	32,540,908
Rock Island (Illinois & Missouri Canal)	12,446	4,153	11,912	13,556	14,146
St. Paul, Minnesota	669,272	625,521	578,017	651,457	656,689
Kansas City (Missouri River K.C. to Mouth) Mo. (Rafted)	20,323	17,905	15,533	815	2,896
Kansas City (Missouri River K.C. to Mouth) Mo. (Vessel)	744,011	727,011	378,182	321,530	475,442
Sheffield (Tennessee River) Alabama (Car Ferry)	163,000	323,438	149,419	135,004	186,290
Sheffield (Tennessee River) Alabama (Vessel)	3,093,666	2,836,605	2,869,218	2,347,667	2,163,404
Chattanooga (Tennessee River) Tennessee (Car Ferry)	163,000	323,438	149,419	135,004	186,290
Chattanooga (Tennessee River) Tennessee (Vessel)	3,093,666	2,836,605	2,869,218	2,347,667	2,163,404
Peoria (Illinois Waterway) Illinois	6,735,657	6,790,041	6,445,373	7,803,577	6,590,939
Keokuk (Miss. River Minneapolis to Mo. River) Iowa	4,501,144	4,248,101	3,442,288	4,844,933	4,587,406

<u>1941</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1945</u>
<u>NINTH (CHICAGO) NAVAL DISTRICT</u>				
Chicago (Chicago River) Illinois				
2,879,779	2,801,402	2,369,219	2,366,042	2,543,182
Milwaukee, Wisconsin				
7,633,365	7,599,321	7,677,919	8,052,249	8,023,961
Manitowoc, Wisconsin				
1,694,142	1,851,211	1,927,767	2,019,584	2,094,559
Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin				
361,815	365,912	301,710	99,506	50,830
Green Bay, Wisconsin				
2,645,368	2,815,614	2,667,248	2,844,125	2,845,997
Escanaba, Michigan				
5,357,819	7,277,459	7,347,021	6,755,891	5,535,220
Charlevoix, Michigan				
24,361	32,666	37,309	33,007	31,274
Ludington, Michigan				
2,229,162	2,553,002	2,976,261	2,912,478	2,997,502
Muskegon, Michigan				
2,334,897	2,076,592	2,191,740	2,065,158	2,022,151
St. Joseph, Michigan				
278,495	248,547	269,442	343,942	300,645
<u>NINTH (CLEVELAND) NAVAL DISTRICT</u>				
Cleveland, Ohio				
21,544,142	21,963,485	20,670,793	20,596,477	18,656,853
Duluth, Minnesota				
67,762,996	74,314,646	68,656,789	67,188,858	65,410,743
Marquette, Michigan				
1,148,383	953,389	845,624	532,613	759,554
Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan (Ferry)				
2,270	2,546	1,326	1,046	719
Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan (Vessel)				
520,059	822,110	722,688	488,475	538,527
Detroit, Michigan (Car Ferry)				
8,946,301	14,504,395	16,104,414	16,126,672	14,034,622
Detroit, Michigan (Vessel)				
6,497,476	5,671,120	5,542,228	5,327,706	5,158,058
Erie, Pennsylvania				
8,576,088	10,172,423	7,255,140	8,793,219	9,197,149
Buffalo, New York				
20,613,290	18,764,724	18,708,182	19,369,862	19,506,459
Oswego, New York (In Transit)				
676,436	429,493	436,091	445,716	381,589
Oswego, New York (Vessel)				
2,028,982	2,265,799	2,277,332	2,623,633	3,018,544
<u>TENTH NAVAL DISTRICT</u>				
San Juan, Puerto Rico				
1,855,365	1,749,496	1,375,548	1,640,156	1,718,189
Charlotte Amalie, (St. Thomas) Virgin Islands				
1,526,657	659,810	65,373	77,287	132,601
<u>ELEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT</u>				
Los Angeles, California				
16,271,249	12,967,563	15,605,165	19,922,843	23,857,279
San Diego, California				
876,703	568,124	594,957	695,087	1,120,276
<u>TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT</u>				
San Francisco, California				
1,186,214	2,693,380	3,225,702	3,670,119	3,714,520
Monterey, California				
415,096	308,693	266,424	339,798	274,410
Eureka (Humboldt Harbor) California (Vessel)				
71,282	78,415	74,290	131,237	187,678
Eureka (Humboldt Harbor) California (Ferry)				
270	297	115	613	638

	<u>1941</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1945</u>
<u>THIRTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT (SEATTLE)</u>					
Seattle, Washington					
9,919,712	10,739,142	10,360,556	11,131,143	10,226,247	
Astoria, Oregon					
424,108	329,703	351,424	286,896	262,304	
Portland, Oregon					
9,728,415	9,310,872	12,104,234	9,732,374	10,521,083	
<u>THIRTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT (KETCHIKAN - LATER SEVENTEENTH)</u>					
Ketchikan, Alaska					
280,613	242,269	247,819	297,749	278,038	
<u>FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT</u>					
Honolulu, Oahu (Transit)					
2,327,051	—	—	—	—	
Honolulu, Oahu, (Vessel)					
4,328,318	2,116,212	2,194,348	6,506,528	4,808,137	
Hilo, Hawaii					
561,389	461,524	650,794	1,290,484	714,759	
<u>Islands of Kauai and Niihau</u>					
Nawiliwili					
93,911	48,320	44,314	44,378	71,971	
Ahikini					
138,767	106,849	139,497	164,829	136,980	
Port Allen					
232,104	189,433	244,523	345,614	240,609	
<u>Islands of Maui, Molokai, Lanai and Kahoolwe</u>					
Kaunapali					
306,263	191,041	337,742	254,794	227,007	
Kaanapali					
40,256	9,656	3,295	10,660	9,439	
Kaunakakai					
67,199	40,025	46,836	55,338	46,053	
Kahului					
522,444	468,398	502,603	709,217	535,563	