THE COAST GUARD AT WAR
INTELLIGENCE
XII

This material is designed for confidential
Service distribution. Recipients are requested
to forward corrections, comments and criticisms
to the Commandant (INT), Headquarters, U. S.
Coast Guard, Washington 25, D. C.
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- PREFACE -

To properly understand the story of Intelligence it is necessary to first understand the meaning of the word. In this connection, Noah Webster, in the 1944 edition of his Dictionary, defines "Intelligence" as "the obtaining or dispensing of information, particularly secret information." He also states that an intelligence bureau or department is a "bureau for collecting information or compiling statistics of a particular character; especially one dealing with military or naval information."

Coast Guard Intelligence is not an "action" agency. Its primary function is to gather and disseminate information to those charged with the responsibility of action. With the advent of World War II, Coast Guard Intelligence received the additional designation as the investigative body of the Coast Guard. As such it was charged with conducting all necessary investigations of Coast Guard personnel, and all applicants for positions therein, as well as investigations of applicants for merchant marine documents. Further, Coast Guard Intelligence was charged with conducting investigations in connection with the Coast Guard's regulatory functions (except Marine Inspection Regulations).

Thus, it follows, that the spectrum of Coast Guard Intelligence during World War II was probably broader than any other single Coast Guard unit. Intelligence, by its very nature, was brought into direct contact with every phase of Coast Guard activity.

The wartime accomplishments of Coast Guard Intelligence, while not apparent on the surface, will be found intertwined with the accomplishments of other Coast Guard activities. Intelligence performed its part in each of the offshore operations, whether rescue or combat. The same is true in the culmination of the Port Security and Merchant Seaman Screening program. Intelligence is one "link" in the Coast Guard "chain." The successful accomplishment of its wartime mission is a tribute to the Service as a whole.
COAST GUARD INTELLIGENCE

HISTORICAL

Coast Guard Intelligence came into existence shortly after the inception of the Coast Guard itself. Article 304 of the Coast Guard Regulations provides that a Chief Intelligence Officer shall be attached to the Office of the Assistant Commandant. The responsibilities of this officer are stated in Article 614, to be the "securing of information which is essential to the Coast Guard in carrying out its duties; for the dissemination of this information to responsible officers, operating units of the Coast Guard, the Treasury Department and other collaborating agencies; and the maintenance of adequate files and records of law enforcement activities." An Intelligence Officer is provided for a Coast Guard District in Article 601, which states: "When an Intelligence Officer is assigned to the staff of a District Commander, he shall be assigned to the office of the Chief of Staff." We learn from Article 611 that "the District Intelligence Officer is responsible for obtaining and disseminating to proper officials information of the plans and movements of vessels and persons engaged and suspected of being engaged in the violation of laws, the enforcement of which is charged to the U. S. Coast Guard."

PROHIBITION DAYS

Coast Guard law enforcement activities reached their peak during the pre-war days, in the enforcement of the Prohibition Act during the 1920s. No mention can be made of Coast Guard law enforcement or intelligence activities without paying tribute to the valiant efforts of the Coast Guard patrol boats, who fought a winning war against the rum-runners, and did much of their own investigating at the same time. They engaged in a battle of skill and wits against some of the most ruthless gangsters of this century, and their success exemplifies Intelligence at its best.

WAR CLOUDS

As war clouds gathered in Europe and the threat of United States involvement increased, so too did the demands on Coast Guard Intelligence increase. Finally, on September 3, 1939, the President proclaimed the neutrality of the United States and prescribed neutrality enforcement to the Federal Government departments. The Treasury Department, together with the Commerce Department, was assigned neutrality enforcement pertaining to merchant vessels. Of the Coast Guard's neutrality enforcement assignments, Intelligence was charged with administering three major projects: 1) compiling and submitting daily reports on the movement of all foreign merchant and public vessels in United States waters, 2) sealing of radios on merchant vessels, and 3) radio monitoring. These projects, although established as neutrality measures, were continued as wartime projects.

ESPIONAGE

Further burdens were added to an already overburdened Intelligence when the President, by Proclamation 2622 dated June 27, 1940, invoked the provisions of the Espionage Act. Under the terms of the Espionage Act the Coast Guard exercised control over the movement of all vessels, foreign or domestic, within the territorial waters of the United States, and was empowered to remove those persons not specially authorized to go or remain on board. This Act, subsequently augmented by Executive Order 8074, dated February 24, 1942, constituted the basic authority for practically all Coast Guard wartime port security authority. Although the Coast Guard controlled the movement of vessels in the harbors of the United States and issued identification cards to persons desiring access to vessels and waterfront facilities, it was not until July 20, 1942 that definite regulations were prescribed on which to exclude certain undesirables from vessels and waterfront facilities. Coast Guard Intelligence was assigned the duty of compiling and processing the data on which exclusions were effected. Thus, it was also on July 20, 1942 that Coast Guard Intelligence began to play a major role in the Port Security program. Subsequently, Intelligence was requested to investigate applicants for Exclusive Loading Permits and certain applicants for Captain of the Port identification cards. Also, to conduct on the waterfront all investigations necessary to prevent destruction, loss or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents, or other causes of a similar nature, to vessels, harbors, ports and waterfront facilities of the United States and its territorial possessions.

ORGANIZATION

In the meantime, on June 1, 1942, the Commandant directed that all investigatory matters of the Coast Guard be assigned to the Chief Intelligence Officer. Subsequently, as outlined in the Coast Guard Organization Manual, the Chief Intelligence Officer, as head of the Intelligence Division and subject to the direction of the Assistant Commandant, shall plan or institute: (a) investigations of Coast Guard personnel; (b) investigative activities in connection with the Coast Guard's law enforcement and regulatory functions; and (c) such other intelligence activities as are allocated to the Coast Guard by the Navy.

DUTIES

The specific duties of the Chief Intelligence Officer shall be to:

1. Plan or conduct investigations involving Coast Guard personnel, civilian and military (with the exception of persons enrolled as temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve for plant security); applicants for positions in the Coast Guard; members of the Coast Guard Auxiliary; applicants for merchant marine licenses and other seamen's papers.

2. Plan or conduct investigations in connection with the Coast Guard's enforcement and regulatory functions, exclusive of investigative responsibilities vested in marine inspection personnel.

3. Collect and furnish to the proper agency intelligence information received in Headquarters from any source.

4. Maintain active liaison with the Naval Intelligence Service in connection with investigative work conducted by that Service which is of interest to the Coast Guard.
5. Collect and disseminate to appropriate Coast Guard Officers information furnished by Naval Intelligence Service and other services relative to Coast Guard activities.

6. Formulate plans and procedures designed to coordinate the activities of the several District Intelligence Officers.

7. Develop standards for maintaining the internal security of Headquarters, check on compliance therewith, and direct such Coast Guard personnel as may be assigned to Headquarters security duty.

8. Direct the follow-through on apprehension of Coast Guard deserters.

9. Maintain fingerprint records at Headquarters and plan procedures for maintenance of such records in the districts.

FIELD OFFICES

The field activities of Intelligence were in the hands of District Coast Guard Intelligence Officers, each of whom was under the administrative control of the Assistant DGCO and a member of his staff. The District Intelligence Officers' duties were similar to those outlined in the previously mentioned Headquarters Organization Manual, with the following additions:

1) Collaborate with Naval Intelligence in regard to Port Security investigations.

2) Assist in the conduct of Naval Intelligence investigations when so required.

3) Be responsible for issuing and validating identification cards for Coast Guard personnel.

4) Maintain contacts with the Public Information Officer and with Naval Intelligence for the provision of photographic services for Intelligence purposes.

DELIMITATION AGREEMENT WITH ONI

On February 9, 1942 a Delimitation Agreement was entered into by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the military Intelligence Division. This Agreement set forth the spheres of activity of the domestic intelligence field for each of the various Services. As the Coast Guard was then operating as a part of the Navy Department, Coast Guard Intelligence was bound by the Delimitation Agreement in so far as it defined the activities of the Naval Service. The problem, therefore, remained as to the relationship between Coast Guard Intelligence and Naval Intelligence. By a directive dated November 3, 1942, the Chief of Naval Operations assigned the responsibilities and jurisdiction of the Coast Guard in the Intelligence field and defined the relationship of Coast Guard Intelligence to Naval Intelligence and other investigative agencies, as follows:

(A) Conduct all investigations concerning all personnel of the Coast Guard, civilian and military; applicants for any position in the Coast Guard; and members of the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Investigation of persons enrolled as temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve for plant security shall be the responsibility of the Naval Intelligence Service.

(B) Conduct, on the waterfront, all investigations necessary to prevent destruction, loss or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents, or other causes of a similar nature, of vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities in the United States and in Alaska, the Territory of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except such waterfront facilities as may be directly operated by the War Department. The Coast Guard shall promptly furnish the Naval District Intelligence Officer concerned with all information and material coming into its possession relative to alleged or suspected acts of sabotage, espionage, or subversive activities.

(C) Act in situations where time is an important factor and the failure to act promptly might jeopardize the successful conclusion of cases included in the categories of espionage, counter-espionage, subversion, and sabotage. When so acting, the Coast Guard will be assumed to be acting temporarily for the agency having primary responsibility (Military Intelligence Service, Naval Intelligence Service, or the Federal Bureau of Investigation) until a representative of that agency arrives on the scene to adopt the case.

Upon arrival of the representative of the adopting agency, the representative of the Coast Guard shall promptly transfer the case to the one in its entirety to the former, and when informed by him that he has assumed responsibility, and the assistance of the Coast Guard is no longer desired, the Coast Guard representative shall withdraw from the case. In every such case in which the Coast Guard acts, the appropriate Coast Guard authority shall, as soon as practicable, report the case to the nearest representative of the Naval Intelligence Service, giving full information and the name of the adopting agency.

(D) Furnish to the Naval Intelligence Service all information received which has a direct or indirect bearing on or is included in the categories of espionage, counter-espionage, subversion, and sabotage. This contemplate that normal Coast Guard liaison with the Military Intelligence Service, the Naval Intelligence Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation on all matters of espionage, counter-espionage, subversion, and sabotage shall be the appropriate representative of the Naval Intelligence Service. The Coast Guard has no investigative responsibility for and shall not investigate any activity involving these four categories except in connection with its own personnel, as specified in paragraph (A) and except investigations of preventative character relating to security of ports as specified in paragraph B.

(E) Furnish to appropriate representatives of the Naval Intelligence Service information having Naval Intelligence value or interest, obtained by the Coast Guard in the conduct of its several duties, such as that contained in various Coast Guard reports, relating to and including; coastal flights, investigations and hearings of marine casualties, operations of Coast Guard vessels, violations of anchorage regulations, violations of mule sealing instructions, waterfront fires or other casualties, coastal information, commerce...
and travel, removal of undesirables from vessels or denial of access to waterfront facilities, and other important matters in order that the Naval Intelligence Service may receive maximum information through the facilities of the Coast Guard in the latter's fields of activities. This contemplates that the Coast Guard, acting as an element of the Navy Department, will report to the Naval Intelligence Service all information having naval interest which is obtained by the Coast Guard.

(P) Conduct all investigations necessary in the administration of the navigation and shipping laws and regulations and make all investigations appropriate under the authority of the statute defining the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard which act vests broad police power in the Coast Guard (14 U.S.C. Sec. 45). Examples of the first type of investigation are those made in connection with marine casualties for the purpose of ascertaining the cause of the disaster and for the purpose of determining whether the license of any officer or the certificate of any seaman should be suspended or revoked and in connection with violations of the navigation and motor boat laws. In the second type of cases involving the exercise of its police power the Coast Guard may deal directly with the appropriate federal agency concerned. For example, violations of the customs laws would be referred to the Bureau of Customs, violations of narcotics laws to the Bureau of Narcotics; threats against the President to the Secret Service; violation of the immigration laws to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and in cases of mail fraud to the Post Office Department.

(G) Designate the number of agents desired for port security at each port, make nominations of prospective agents to the appropriate representative of the Naval Intelligence Service, assign such agents to duties, evaluate and take the necessary action to result from or indicated by the reports of such agents.

(H) Safeguard all classified material, including the security of all sources of information furnished by the Naval Intelligence Service, as prescribed by Navy Regulations.

(I) Make Coast Guard personnel available for assignment by the local representative of the Naval Intelligence Service, when specifically requested so to do, and when compliance with such request is feasible.

IDENTIFICATION SECTION

As the war progressed additional duties were assigned to Coast Guard Intelligence. The Commandant, on 1 March, 1943, directed that the Identification Section be transferred from the Enlisted Personnel Division to the Intelligence Division. This office, which maintains fingerprint records of all Coast Guard personnel, thus functions as a part of Coast Guard Intelligence. Its duties include supervision of the identification system of the Coast Guard.

WATCH OFFICERS

On August 24, 1943 Intelligence was assigned the duty of investigating all aliens applying for licenses as watch officers on vessels of United States Registry. Also the investigation of all applicants for original merchant marine licenses.

JAPANESE

As a result of action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Coast Guard in March, 1944 was directed by the SECNAV to establish and administer security procedures to determine the feasibility of permitting maritime employment to American citizens of Japanese descent. This function, which included the determination of approval or denial of such employment, was in turn delegated to Intelligence.

MERCHANT SEAMEN SCREENING

SECNAV Order of 27 June, 1944 directed the Commandant to institute a program for the security control of merchant seamen and officers of all nationalities entering and departing the United States and territorial ports and waters. The whole program, which involved interrogating, fingerprinting and miscellaneous record checks of thousands of seamen, was turned over to Intelligence.

COAST GUARD'S BROAD INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES

Thus it will be seen that Coast Guard Intelligence in World War II was concerned with two phases of Intelligence, internal and domestic, including counter-espionage. Its purpose was to secure, evaluate and disseminate information pertaining to Coast Guard and maritime matters, including assisting in the investigation of actual and potential enemy agents or sympathizers. Coast Guard Intelligence also conducted investigations of personnel in, employed by, or controlled by the Coast Guard. As the Coast Guard had responsibility for protection of vessels and waterfront facilities in the United States, Coast Guard Intelligence conducted investigations in the field of counter-espionage, which included the supervision, coordination and operation of all investigative measures maintained to prevent sabotage to these facilities, and to prevent the transmission of information to the enemy by couriers on merchant vessels. The Commandant exercised control and direction over Coast Guard Intelligence activities through the Chief Intelligence Officer at Headquarters. Under the Assistant Commandant, this officer was immediately responsible for developing broad policy and procedures governing Intelligence operations in the districts; maintaining liaison with Federal agencies; initiating investigations for and furnishing information to the Office of the Commandant and department heads at Headquarters; servicing the District Coast Guard Officers and the District Coast Guard Intelligence Officers with information, and, through liaison in Washington, providing the district offices with official sources of information; and, correlating field investigations extending beyond a single district. In each of the districts a District Coast Guard Intelligence Officer served on the staff of the District Coast Guard Officer and operated under his immediate administrative supervision.

PERSONNEL

MAXIMUM AUTHORIZED COMPLEMENT

The maximum authorized complement for Coast Guard Intelligence during World War II was 630 persons

(June, 1943). There were authorized, 81 officers, 325 enlisted personnel and 26 civilians. The
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Complement of the Intelligence Division at Headquarters provided for 15 officers, 28 enlisted personnel and 26 civilians. The remaining Intelligence personnel were apportioned to the District Coast Guard Officers of the various Naval Districts, with the 3rd District maintaining the largest Intelligence group, followed by the 11th, 13th and 12th Districts, in that order.

Pre-War Complement

Prior to World War II there were 40 persons assigned to Intelligence duties throughout the Coast Guard. Of this total, 9 persons (4 officers and 5 civilians) were assigned to Headquarters, the remainder being assigned to the various field offices. With the exception of the Chief Intelligence Officer and two other officers, Coast Guard Intelligence during World War II was provided by reserve personnel. An overwhelming majority of enlisted personnel assigned to Intelligence were also Reserve personnel.

Source of Intelligence Personnel

Commissioned, warrant and enlisted personnel serving on Intelligence duty were largely recruited from the ranks of Federal law enforcement officers, attorneys, investigators and persons of considerable administrative experience in private life. They were carefully selected for Intelligence assignment by virtue of loyalty, experience and aptitude. As one of the Treasury Enforcement agencies in peace-time, it was natural that the Coast Guard, in war-time, should recruit Intelligence personnel primarily from the Treasury Enforcement agencies.

Specialist "X" (Int)

During World War II there was inaugurated a rating for enlisted personnel assigned to Intelligence duty whose talents and capabilities could not be categorized within regular Reserve ratings. The highest authorized total for Specialist "X" (Int) was 222, broken down as follows: 65 Chief Specialists, 77 Specialists 1st class, 53 Specialists 2nd class and 26 Specialists 3rd class. However, of this total only 261 ratings were actually filled. To the Specialists "X" (Int) fell a large burden of the investigative work performed by Coast Guard Intelligence. They were, by and large, persons with investigative, law enforcement or legal backgrounds and were capable of carrying out investigations with a minimum of supervision. Specialist "X" (Int) ratings were also assigned to fingerprint experts detailed to the Identification Section of the Intelligence Division at Headquarters. It was unfortunate that the preWar Intelligence and the inflexibility of personnel complements precluded the attainment of commissioned rank by all, except an especially deserving few, since many Specialists "X" (Int) performed duties commensurate with those of commissioned officers in other services.

Lessons Learned

The Coast Guard prior to World War II had no Reserve and at this writing, although there are men (Veterans of World War II) holding Reserve commissions, there are no training provisions and no indication as to their assignments in case of another emergency. Intelligence is a specialty, requiring not only specialized training, but also personnel of a particular temperament. In order that the Intelligence organization of the Coast Guard can properly and promptly function in another emergency, we must profit from our experience during World War II, recognize the need for Intelligence and establish a Reserve training program that will provide a trained and organized Intelligence group constantly in reserve and on call in case of emergency.

Neutrality

U.S. Neutrality Proclaimed

Presidential Proclamation 2348, dated 5 September, 1939, proclaimed the neutrality of the United States in the war between Germany and France, Poland, the United Kingdom, India, Australia and New Zealand. Executive Order 8233, also dated September 5, 1939, prescribed neutrality enforcement to the several Government departments. The Treasury and Commerce Departments were charged with enforcing neutrality pertaining to merchant vessels, unless for defensive purposes. Of the Coast Guard's neutrality enforcement assignments, Intelligence was charged with 1) compiling and submitting, daily reports on the movements and locations of all foreign merchant and public vessels, 2) sealing of radios on merchant vessels, and 3) radio monitoring. Although established for neutrality enforcement, the foregoing programs were continued as war-time projects and a related project involving the photography of merchant vessels was later assigned.

Vessel Movement Reports

As a result of the President's Executive Order concerning neutrality enforcement, the Coast Guard was directed to furnish the White House, State, Treasury and Navy Departments, and certain other interested Governmental agencies, a daily report of movements of all foreign merchant and public vessels and aircraft within ports of the United States, for each preceding 24-hour period. The project was established by Headquarters dispatch dated September 5, 1939. The Commandant, subsequently, by letter dated October 2, 1939, transmitted detailed instructions to all District Commanders directing them, among other things, to forward to the Chief Intelligence Officer, at Headquarters, a daily report showing:

1. The name, location, and other pertinent information, of all merchant and public vessels of foreign nationalities entering, found or reported to be within, harbors, ports, roadsteads or waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or on the high seas adjacent to the territorial waters of the United States.

2. The name, location and other pertinent information, of all civil or public aircraft of foreign nationality entering, sighted or reported at or over airports of entry located in the immediate or general vicinity of coastal waters or harbors, ports, roadsteads or waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or over the high seas adjacent to the territorial waters of the United States.
(3) The name, location and other pertinent information, of all domestic vessels or aircraft whose movements or activities appear to be suspicious, unusual, or not in keeping with the previously announced schedule of the vessel or aircraft, or which appear to be engaged in a business or venture in violation of the neutrality of the United States.

COAST GUARD
MOVEMENT REPORTS
DISCONTINUED
1942 dated June 27, 1940, activated the Espionage Act with controlling the movement of all vessels, foreign and domestic, within the territorial waters of the United States. Under this authority vessel movement reports were continued and expanded to cover domestic vessels. With the establishment of Navy Port Directors, it became apparent that the vessel movement reports made by the Coast Guard duplicated reports then being made by the Navy Port Directors. Accordingly, Coast Guard movement reports were discontinued in November, 1943.

RADIO SEALING
Treasury Decision No. 6997, issued pursuant to Executive Order 8233 and Presidential Proclamation 2346, both dated 5 September, 1939, charged the Coast Guard with the enforcement of neutrality in radio communication by merchant vessels of belligerents. The Presidential Proclamation read in part:

"* * * All belligerent vessels shall refrain from use of their radio and signal apparatus while in the harbors, ports, roadsteads, or waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, except for calls of distress and communications connected with the taking of the vessel within, or departure from, such harbors, ports, roadsteads or waters, or passage through such waters; provided, that such communications will not be of direct material aid to the belligerent in the conduct of military operations against an opposing belligerent. The radio of belligerent merchant vessels may be sealed by the authorities of the United States, and such seals shall not be broken within the jurisdiction of the United States except by proper authority of the United States."

Based on the foregoing authority, plans for radio sealing were prepared and instructions issued to the field. On September 16, 1939 orders were issued to immediately commence sealing of radio apparatus of all merchant vessels of belligerents. Little change was made in the original instructions, except to enlarge the list of belligerent countries, until December, 1942. On December 29, 1942, an amendment to the Communications Act of 1934, charged the Secretary of the Navy with issuing regulations governing the sealing of radio apparatus of merchant vessels. Regulations thereon were published under Title 34, CFR, Chapter I, Part 16. Coast Guard enforcement of these regulations continued on the East Coast until 24 August, 1945, and on the West Coast until 11 September, 1945, at which time it was discontinued with the general curtailment of port security activities. The Navy regulations, previously referred to, were revoked 1 March, 1946 (11 FR 2225).
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Departments and agencies of the Government; and, second, the overlapping of jurisdiction between various units of each Department and agency. Add to this the fact that policies, by necessity, were changing practically from day to day, and the result is a tribute to the men in the several Departments and agencies, who by their tact, understanding, cooperation and diligent effort gradually perfected a smooth running organization.

Of interest in this connection are the following excerpts from a letter released by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations dated 24 April, 1942:

"The manner in which the Coast Guard, including its Intelligence activities, and the Naval Intelligence Service should function should present little confusion if these points are kept in mind:

"(a) As previously outlined, the Naval District Intelligence Officer will continue to make available to the Captain of the Port information in the District Intelligence Office related to waterfront protection; the Captain of the Port will continue to make available to the District Intelligence Office information obtained which would be of interest to him.

"(b) Personnel required by the Captain of the Port for the evaluation of information pertaining to waterfront protection will be provided by the Coast Guard.

"(c) Coast Guard Lighthouses, lifeboat stations and other Coast Guard coastal facilities, in so far as they have been a part of the Coastal Information System, will remain a part of the Naval Intelligence net.

"(d) It is realized that within the areas specified in Executive Order 9074, a fine distinction must be drawn between the collection of Intelligence information and the enforcement of waterfront protection measures. The former, which is a function of Intelligence, is so closely related to the latter, that only the closest liaison between the District Intelligence Officer and the Captain of the Port will provide adequate coverage of subversive activities in the waterfront areas. Liaison with FBI and CID on all matters of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage within these areas will be through the Naval Intelligence Service."

In these early days of the war, Coast Guard Intelligence offices were not in operation in all Districts, nor had they been able to immediately supply the Intelligence personnel requested by the Captains of the Port. Some Captains of the Port had established their own "Intelligence Offices." As plans were perfected and qualified personnel were obtained, Coast Guard Intelligence offices were opened in each District. Wherever possible, trained groups were assigned to the Captain of the Port offices. It must be stated, however, that Coast Guard Intelligence, at no time during World War II, was able to fill its authorized personal complement.

It should also be borne in mind that port security functions, while derived from the same general directives, varied in scope and application as well as volume, in the several Coast Guard Districts. This was also true in the various ports within a District. Accordingly, Coast Guard Intelligence functions varied. Some Captains of the Port had large explosive loading terminals within their jurisdiction, while others had none. Consequently, some Intelligence offices had a large number of investigations of applicants for Explosive Loading Permits. Other Intelligence offices had few, if any, Coast Guard Intelligence offices located in Pacific Coast Districts were especially concerned with the screening of United States citizens of Japanese descent. Conversely, this program was of little or no concern to most East Coast Districts. The volume of shipping and other maritime activities created a port security and Intelligence problem in New York City entirely different from that of Miami, Florida and other comparable ports. Further, the Ship Examination function, normally carried out by Captain of the Port, operating forces, in some Districts was assigned to Intelligence. In other Districts, oil pollution investigations were made by Intelligence.

With this as a foreword, there follows a discussion of the major Coast Guard Intelligence functions for Port Security:

INTELLIGENCE PHOTO LAB., WHERE THE GRAPHIC EVIDENCE WAS CAREFULLY DEVELOPED

APPLICANTS

IN PARTICULAR CASES, UPON REFERRAL FROM THE CAPTAIN OF THE PORT OFFICE, COAST GUARD INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATED APPLICANTS FOR CAPTAIN OF THE PORT IDENTIFICATION CARDS. BY AUTHORITY OF THE COMMANDANT, ALL PERSONS HAVING ACCESS TO VESSELS AND WATERFRONT FACILITIES WERE TO BE CHECKED FOR SECURITY. SINCE OVER 4,000,000 SUCH IDENTIFICATION CARDS WERE ISSUED BY THE CAPTAIN OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK ALONE, IT WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS OF ALL SUCH PERSONS. THE CAPTAIN OF THE PORT IN ISSUING THE IDENTIFICATION CARD HAD TAKEN THE INDIVIDUAL'S FINGERPRINTS AND FORWARDED THEM TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR SEARCH AND REPORT. THIS, THE CRIMINAL RECORD OF EACH APPLICANT WAS AVAILABLE. ONLY COMPLAINTS AND THOSE CASES WHICH AROUSED SUSPICION WERE INVESTIGATED. IN ADDITION TO THE FINGERPRINT CHECK, THE INVESTIGATION CONSISTED OF A LOCAL AND...
national subversive check and, if information was developed of a derogatory nature, such further investigation as was necessary in a particular case to determine whether Exclusion proceedings should be instituted.

With the inauguration of the Merchant Seamen’s Screening program, it was possible to effect a tighter control in this regard, because of the requirement that all applicants for maritime documents and persons engaged as merchant seamen be investigated as a matter of routine and an endorsement “screened for security” be placed on their identification card. Statistics are not available to indicate the number of investigations made under this program, but it is known that over 15,000,000 Captain of the Port identification cards were issued.

The correlation of this work with the Exclusion program and the Merchant Seamen’s Screening program resulted in the exclusion of those persons against whom there was sufficient derogatory information to warrant it, and the constant surveillance of those against whom some degree of suspicion was attached. The responsibility for these investigations was vested entirely within the discretion of the District Coast Guard Officer and no attempt was made to exercise direct control through Headquarters, because, as previously stated, the diversity of the problems and the geographical distribution of each District made such direct control impossible. The District Coast Guard Officer was vested with the responsibility and discharged it in accordance with his needs.

APPLICANTS
FOR EXPLOSIVE LOADING PERMITS
Unlike applicants for the identification cards, all applicants for Explosive Loading Permits were investigated. This was necessary because of the greater security risk involved. While many applicants for COTP identification cards had no direct business in waterfront areas and applied for the identification card for “recreational purposes,” the applicants for Explosive Loading Permits were those persons who were actually, during their entire working day, handling explosives, munitions, and other dangerous cargo destined for the combat zones. The normal dangers were great and explosive terminals or explosive laden ships were excellent potential objectives of saboteurs. The Coast Guard was directly charged with not only the security of the vessel, but also the supervising the handling and loading of the dangerous cargo. It was natural then, that investigations should be conducted of all applicants for Explosive Loading Permits. Over 5,000 such investigations were made by Coast Guard Intelligence. The investigation covering citizenship, and a local and national check for criminal or subversive record, and, if information was developed of a derogatory nature, such other investigations as were necessary to determine the desirability of the applicant’s employment as an explosive handler. Particular attention was made in regard to those applicants with former records of arson or extensive drunkenness.

VOLUNTEER PORT SECURITY FORCE
All persons enlisted in the Volunteer Port Security force were investigated for character and loyalty by Coast Guard Intelligence. These were considered Fort Security investigations primarily because such volunteers were recruited directly, as part of the Port Security program, and in carrying out their duties they had direct access to vital waterfront installations. Such investigations could not be classified as character investigations, except in the case of officers, all of whom were investigated to determine their fitness. The enlisted personnel of the Volunteer Port Security Force were investigated for loyalty and trustworthiness because of the nature of their assignments. Conversely, all information gathered by volunteer personnel while engaged in patrol or guard duties was reported directly to the Coast Guard Intelligence office for correlation.

PORT SECURITY
Commandant’s Circular No.
FUNCTIONS
8-46 dated 25 February, 1966, transferred all responsibilities of the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Division, the last war-time Port Security measure was terminated by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Proclamation 2732, which inactivated the provisions of the Espionage Act.* Commandant’s Memorandum No. 10-47 dated 25 June, 1947, cancelled previous Coast Guard directives on the subject, and the Coast Guard’s war-time Port Security program was brought to a successful conclusion.

EXCLUSIONS FROM VESSELS AND WATERFRONT FACILITIES

One of the types of investigation performed by Coast Guard Intelligence which was of very great importance to the whole Port Security program and to the Nation’s war effort, was that in enforcing the regulations relating to the removal and exclusion of persons from vessels and waterfront facilities. It was a very serious matter to deny to any person his natural right to make a living in his chosen field. It should be realized that this is precisely what an exclusion order meant to a man whose normal work was aboard vessels or along the waterfront.

INTELLIGENCE

Coast Guard Intelligence, as the natural medium within the Service to collect and evaluate data, as well as to make investigations, was assigned the duty of compiling and processing the data on which exclusions were effected. It was originally believed that most cases of exclusion would be initiated on complaints of the Captains of the Port, or on the request of other Intelligence agencies. However, the most prolific source of information was the Coast Guard Identification office issuing Captain of the Port identification cards. Many exclusion cases also emanated from the Merchant Seamen Screening program, but regardless of the immediate source of the information, the responsibility for the exclusion or non-exclusion was that of the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard Intelligence office served as the clearing house for all such information and played an important part in the factual development and processing of the case.

COAST GUARD
RESPONSIBILITY

The Coast Guard had the responsibility for the protection of vessels and
waterfront facilities. In carrying out these responsibilities, the Coast Guard was the agency which controlled movement of vessels in the harbors of the United States. It provided identification cards for persons seeking access thereto and generally patrolled these facilities for the purpose of preventing sabotage or espionage. The question naturally arose concerning the responsibility for and the enforcement of keeping undesirable and disqualified persons from having access to these facilities. Because of the Coast Guard's responsibility and the position it occupied, the Secretary of the Navy delegated to the Commandant of the Coast Guard the responsibility for removing and excluding persons from all vessels and waterfront facilities, except those facilities directly operated by the War Department. This authority was granted under the Espionage Act of 1917 (30 U.S.C. 191, 192, 193 and 194) and Executive Order 9074.

DELEGATION TO DOGO

Pursuant to this authority, the Commandant by letter dated 20 July, 1942, delegated the responsibility for removal and exclusion action to the several District Coast Guard Officers and empowered the various Captains of the Port to remove and exclude when there was not sufficient time to place the facts before the District Coast Guard Officer. This alleviated delay in the movement of the vessel.

A WAR-TIME MEASURE

The Exclusion program was designed as a war-time expedient to deal with subversive or persons suspected of subversive intentions. As a precautionary measure, its guiding policy was to exclude, where the circumstances indicated a possible security danger to shipping and to waterfront facilities, even though the facts and lack of evidence did not constitute direct prosecution of violation of the Espionage Act. Before a decision was made to remove or exclude an individual from merchant vessels or waterfront facilities, the District Coast Guard Officer was obligated to have found reasonable grounds on which to base his belief that the individual was one (a) who would engage in sabotage, (b) who would engage in espionage, (c) who had subversive inclinations indicated by pro- Axis statements or actions, (d) who had a criminal record which indicated that his presence on a vessel or waterfront facility would lead to a serious hazard, (e) who was habitually unfit for duty by reason of drunkenness, or (f) who was mentally incapacitated or whose presence on board a vessel or on a waterfront facility would for any other reason constitute a menace to national security or to safety of life or property.

DEFECTS DEVELOPED

Subsequent to 20 July, 1942 a number of procedural defects arose out of the administration of the program which seriously endangered its objective. Various interpretations placed upon the Commandant's instructions by the several District Coast Guard Officers resulted in a lack of uniform treatment. Executive Order 9074 carried no criminal penalties and exclusion orders issued thereunder were only in notices of exclusion. They neither "commanded" nor "prohibited." There was no provision to grant persons excluded a hearing, nor was there any procedure for temporary exclusion pending investigation and hearing. It, therefore, was evident that the establishment of a uniform and amplified procedure was necessary to insure a consistent and successful administration of the program.

TEMPORARY EXCLUSION

In order to correct the foregoing difficulties, a procedure was outlined by the Commandant by letters dated 19 October and 17 December, 1943. These provided for a system of temporary exclusions. Exclusions were to be regarded as tentative and not prejudicial to final results after hearing. Moreover, in order that such exclusions, temporary in the beginning, but capable of being permanent, might be legal and provide penalties in the event of violation, it was necessary to obtain an agreement between the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Navy. In addition, any such penalty had to be approved by the President.

LEGAL ASPECTS

Under the procedure as revised by the Commandant in his letters of 19 October and 17 December, 1943, the District Coast Guard Officers and Captains of the Port excluded temporarily any persons whose presence on vessels and waterfront facilities constituted a menace to national security. No permanent exclusion could be ordered without first giving the person involved an opportunity for hearing. The responsibility for holding hearings in exclusion cases and for making findings upon the record made at such hearings was vested by the Regulations in the Commandant and in the space of the Coast Guard subject to his direction and supervision. Accordingly, strict adherence to the procedural requirements of the Regulations was necessary to invoke the terms of the Act of July 9, 1943 (Public Law 127, 78th Congress) providing that an exclusion could not be ordered in the event of violation of a temporary or permanent exclusion order. It is of interest to note that the decisions in which exclusion actions by the War Department (Scheidler v. Drum, 31 F. Supp. 583 (D.C.Pa.) and Ovaa v. Drum, 52 F. Supp. 189 (D. Mass.) were enjoined by the courts were carefully studied before the Commandant's directive was issued in order to avoid the procedural defects noted by the courts in exclusion cases there reviewed.

FINAL EXCLUSION ORDER

The Commandant's procedure in all cases of exclusions since October 19, 1943 was carefully designed to conform with the requirements of the Regulations. Whenever a person was served with an exclusion order by the District Coast Guard Officer or the Captain of the Port, Headquarters was immediately notified by dispatch and all other Districts were placed on notice as information addressess. The purpose of immediate and general notification to all other Districts was to prevent the person served from shipping out or obtaining employment on waterfront facilities until such time as the Commandant had reviewed the case and had issued a Final Order either making the exclusion permanent after hearing or vacating the temporary exclusion order. Thus, whenever an exclusion order was issued, the person served had a right to apply for a hearing within thirty days following the service of the notice upon him. In the event that he failed to apply for a hearing or failed to appear for a hearing on the date set, the District Coast Guard Officer then notified Headquarters of the default and a Final
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LT. V. E. HOWARD ISSUING THE ONE MILLIONTH I.D. CARD

MEMBER OF COTF'S SHIPS' DETAIL TAKING APPLICANT'S FINGERPRINTS

CAPTAIN OF THE PORT IDENTIFICATION OFFICE 13ND

LAMINATING PROCESS (1) PUTTING I.D. CARD SANDWICH TOGETHER

B-11511
Order making exclusion permanent for the duration of the War by reason of default was issued by the Commandant without further consideration, decision or review.

HANDLING APPEALS

When application for hearing was made within the thirty day period, however, the District Coast Guard Officer was authorized to convene a Hearing Board composed of Intelligence, Fort Security and Legal officers. This Hearing Board was to inquire into the case and their findings of fact, opinion and recommendation were placed before the District Coast Guard Officer. The entire record with the recommendation of the District Coast Guard Officer was forwarded to Headquarters for evaluation by the Chief Intelligence Officer and for review by the Chief Operations Officer, the Assistant Commandant and the Commandant. When an exclusion had been approved by the Commandant and had been made permanent for the duration after a hearing, the District Coast Guard Officer was notified by letter. Copies of the Final Exclusion Order were forwarded for service on the person excluded.

SURRENDER OF DOCUMENTS

Another important step was added to the exclusion program when the Commandant by letter dated July 7, 1944, issued instructions relating to the surrender of maritime documents by persons excluded from vessels and waterfront facilities. Heretofore, maritime documents were surrenderable only as the result of proceedings instituted under the provisions of R. S. 4450 (46 USC 239). When a seaman was excluded from vessels and waterfront facilities, his Captain of the Port Identification card was stamped "Excluded from the Waterfront Facilities." No effort was made to destroy the card or to take up his maritime documents. Under instructions of July 7, 1944, however, any person against whom a temporary exclusion order was issued was required to surrender all maritime documents in his possession. If, upon review of his case the Commandant decided upon permanent exclusion, these documents were forwarded to Headquarters for safekeeping and the Captain of the Port Identification card was destroyed.

COOPERATION WITH STATE DEPARTMENT

The term "maritime documents" as defined in the Regulations (33 CFR 9.103) did not include seaman passports issued by the State Department. Accordingly, a letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy, dated August 11, 1944, requested that the Coast Guard, when excluding a seaman from vessels and waterfront facilities, and in pursuance of such exclusion takes up the maritime documents which he possessed, it should, at the same time, take up his seaman's passport. If he did not possess such a document, the evidence that he had applied for a passport (usually referred to as a "receipt"), should be taken up. As a measure of cooperation with the Department of State, the Commandant, on September 19, 1944, issued Further Instructions to District Coast Guard Officers, in which he supplemented his directive on the surrender of maritime documents by authorizing and directing that the Coast Guard act as the agency for the State Department in picking up seaman passports.

R.S. 4450

It will be noted that there are certain similarities in the exclusion procedure with the procedure governing the investigation, and other proceedings under R.S. 4450 (46 USC 239) under which the Commandant of the Coast Guard exercised the functions relating to the investigation of marine casualties, and the suspension and revocation of licenses and certificates. There are, however, important differing aspects of the program. While both exclusion and R.S. 4450 proceedings dealt with merchant seamen problems, under existing directives, action was taken separately. In his letter of October 19, 1943, the Commandant stated that the exclusion policy was designed exclusively as a war-time measure, to safeguard vessels and waterfront facilities from persons whose presence would constitute a menace to the national security or to the safety of life and property. The exclusion procedure was not intended as a substitute for, nor implementation of, disciplinary procedures as prescribed under R.S. 4450. Exclusion orders, therefore, were not issued other than in the prescribed form, nor for punitive purposes or for facilitating appearances for trial on charges of misconduct, nor for implementing the procedure established for misconduct cases under the provisions of R.S. 4450.

EXCLUSION - NOT PUNISHMENT FOR CRIMINAL ACT

Exclusion as a war-time expedient, therefore, did not function as punishment for criminal acts. Under R.S. 4450, the proceedings were predicated upon the commission of an act, whereas the purpose of exclusion was to prevent the occurrence of the act. As a matter of security, the exclusion process was resorted to in those cases which were not within the reach of existing statutes. Decisions under R.S. 4450 must be reached on the basis of proof of conduct which was a threat to national security and the source of information, whereas, proceedings under R.S. 4450 required the production of witnesses, and hence, disclosure of the source of information. Finally, the exclusion procedure was a forbidden act which reached cases that did not come within the scope of R.S. 4450, but whose principals were considered sufficiently dangerous to be removed from employment on vessels and waterfront facilities.

INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION

Under the exclusion program set forth above, the Intelligence Division, in its evaluation of cases of exclusion sent to Headquarters, carefully reviewed the information on which the exclusions were based. Considerable care was exercised in sifting the reliable from the unreliable information, so that maximum protection was afforded vessels and waterfront facilities with a minimum of hardship to the individual concerned. There were 664 exclusion cases reviewed by Headquarters. Of this number the Commandant approved the recommendations of the District Coast Guard Officers and made the exclusion permanent in 487 cases, and the recommendations of the District Coast Guard Officers to vacate the exclusion orders in 119 cases. In 58 cases the Commandant reversed
the action of the District Coast Guard Officers.

EXCLUSION ORDERS VACATED

Since the exclusion procedure was purely a wartime measure, shortly after VE-Day the Intelligence Division at Headquarters undertook to re-examine all cases of exclusion from vessels and waterfront facilities made by the Commandant. Such re-examination included a further evaluation and a check of agency records to determine whether or not exclusion should be continued in full force or, if in view of the developments of the War, the exclusion could be modified or rescinded. The re-examinations continued until VE-Day, when it was believed that the exclusion program no longer was required as a security measure in view of the cessation of hostilities. Accordingly, between the period of September 3 and September 15, 1945, notices were sent to all persons permanently excluded, advising them that in view of the cessation of hostilities, the Commandant had vacated their exclusion orders. Simultaneously, the District Coast Guard Officers were notified to vacate all temporary exclusion orders which they had outstanding.

CONTROL, DOCUMENTATION AND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION OF ALIEN MERCHANT SEAMEN (INCLUDING OFFICERS) IN THE USA

MERCHANT SEAMEN SCREENING PROGRAM—A SECURITY MEASURE

Shortly before the invasion of the European continent by the Allies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were appraised of the lack of security Intelligence interrogation of aliens to enter the United States of America, for loyalty and the essential aspects of security. The British Isles were in full invasion, since the disclosure of such preparations to the enemy by their espionage agents would be disastrous. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred the matter to the Joint Security Control Panel for study and recommendation.

Joint Security Control made careful inquiries into the matter, holding conferences with representatives of all the security agencies, including Coast Guard Intelligence. The conclusion reached by the Joint Security Control after careful examination was, that a certain amount of security was achieved in the field of alien seamen control if only from the bewildering number of security agencies involved and the various aspects of their problems. However, the system was dangerously compromised by the lack of effective coordination between the agencies concerned, by partial coverage of the problem, by the non-participation in security examination of some of the agencies best equipped at the time to deliver information quickly on such men, by easy avenues for violation of the immigration laws, by the number of laws, proclamations, regulations, and exceptions to them, and by the actual war requirements for the number of ships. The Joint Security Control also found that it was perfectly simple for a seaman from neutral countries, such as Spain and Portugal, United States, or illegitimately, to move about the country freely for considerable periods, or to obtain, without security interrogation, U.S. Coast Guard documents required for ship.

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ping in United States owned or controlled vessels and departing in such vessels to theatres of operation, or any place in the world.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RECOMMEND SCREENING BY THE COAST GUARD

On the basis of this report, it was recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among other recommendations, that the Coast Guard be requested to cease issuing "Z" certificates (Certificates of Identification), Continuous Discharge Books and Certificates of Service to alien seamen until it had conducted a search of available intelligence records and an interrogation of the applicant and had determined that it was not inimical to the United States to make such issues. The Coast Guard also was requested to conduct a similar investigation in the cases of aliens to whom the aforementioned documents had already been issued and cancel such documents in cases which appeared to be inimical to the United States.

In order to clarify the authority of the Coast Guard to carry out the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was recommended by the Commandant that the Secretary of the Navy, pursuant to Executive Order 9074, authorize and direct the Commandant and such officers as may be designated, to take such steps, institute such measures, and issue such regulations and orders as may be necessary for security in connection with the presence of alien seamen and officers on vessels in the United States, Alaska, Territory of Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. It was further requested that the Commandant should be authorized and directed to take appropriate actions relating to the identification, investigation and interrogation of such aliens for loyalty to the United Nations; or for subversiveness, the withholding of the issuance of Certificates, licenses, employment cards, identification cards, or other seamen's papers; or for the removal or exclusion of aliens under the Regulations Relating to the Removal and Exclusion of Persons from Vessels and Waterfront Facilities, previously approved by the Secretary of the Navy and the President; and to take action in connection with the approval of aliens for employment as seamen and officers on merchant vessels.

THE SCREENING PROGRAM

The Coast Guard further proposed a contemplated program for security control under the following general conditions:

(a) To conduct an Intelligence interrogation and check of each alien prior to the issuance of seaman’s documents;

(b) To conduct a similar check in the cases of aliens to whom seamen’s documents had already been issued;

(c) Where the information ascertained through the foregoing checks rendered necessary, to institute exclusion proceedings;

(d) Where the information assured adequate security, to grant necessary approval for employment on merchant ships to particular aliens now subject to employment restrictions by reason of nationality under directives previously issued;

(e) To conduct the necessary security interro-
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Alert to prevent rough handling and broken packages

Better to be safe than sorry! Coast guardsmen check longshoremen's identification cards, look for nails in shoes, etc.

Unloading munitions from the freight cars

Coast guard munitions men were vested with the authority to supervise the handling, loading and stowage of explosives.
gations of all other alien seamen on vessels calling at United States ports, and

(1) Where vessels were bound for British-controlled ports, to furnish appropriate information to British authority concerning the presence of alien seamen aboard such vessels.

On June 27, 1944, the Secretary of the Navy approved the foregoing recommendations and by Order (SR 7204) delegated to the Commandant of the Coast Guard the authority to take whatever steps were necessary to insure the successful prosecution of the program. The Commandant issued instructions to all District Coast Guard Officers on June 28, 1944, instituting a merchant seamen screening program to be followed in the control of all seamen. In drafting the instructions, every effort was made to eliminate from the job the screening of many thousands of United States seamen who had been screened and registered for the past three years by the various Governmental agencies engaged in that work. Coast Guard Intelligence records indicated that a large portion of United States and allied seamen had been previously screened so that it was believed advisable to confine the screening of that group to those United States and Allied seamen applying for original or duplicate documents.

In addition to making provisions for the screening of allied seamen and for United States citizens applying for documents after July 10, 1944, the Commandant, on November 3, 1944, advised all District Coast Guard Officers that Headquarters had retained control over the granting of clearances to seamen who had deserted from neutral ships. This problem was approached by Coast Guard Intelligence with a view of preventing espionage and courier activities among incoming neutral merchant seamen, especially from Portuguese ships, since it was known that deserting seamen had engaged in activities detrimental to the Allied war effort. In particular Coast Guard Intelligence was to prevent enemy couriers and agents from masquerading as bona fide seamen and from sailing to the theatres of war on vessels of the United Nations. As the result of this program, a large percentage of deserters were apprehended and turned over or reported to the Immigration and Naturalization Service for deportation.

EXTENSIVE NECESSARY

Liaison concerning merchant seamen was made on several levels, both with Governmental and non-Governmental organizations, including numerous Federal, State and local agencies, representatives of Allied and neutral governments, shipping companies and seaman organizations. The merchant seaman screening program involved a high degree of cooperation locally, nationally and internationally. Coast Guard Intelligence had established liaison with foreign naval and shipping missions, as well as with the proper representatives of other security agencies in order that Headquarters would be kept advised, 1) when large numbers of nationals of the representative countries were expected in this country, 2) the ports at which they would appear, 3) the extent of security clearance extended to them abroad, 4) the identity of the screening organization abroad, and any other pertinent information. Transfers of Liberty and other ships to the French, Greek, Belgian and Norwegian governments further enhanced the problem.

Prior to the surrender of Japan, extensive Intelligence procurement was undertaken by the Navy with respect to the Japanese coast, the China coast and Korea, for preparations for an invasion of these areas by Allied forces. That this invasion would have been made in the event the Japanese did not capitulate has been publicly announced. Many merchant seamen of all nationalities had information about the harbor facilities, depths of water, installations, and the like, concerning this territory. Arrangements were made with the Office of Naval Intelligence to gather such information in the course of interrogating enemy merchant seamen during the screening program. Much valuable information was thus disclosed, including for example, an underground oil refinery in Japan which was eventually bombed by our Air Force.

SEAMEN OF LIBERATED COUNTRIES

In the spring of 1945, the Coast Guard had been informed that the liberated European governments proposed, as soon as practicable, to replace a large percentage of their nationals who had been continuously at sea since the war began, with seamen from the newly liberated areas. The interest of the Coast Guard in such changes of crews, was, in general, the same as that of the governments in crews brought en bloc to the United States to man new ships. Accordingly, the Commandant, on March 2, 1945, advised all District Coast Guard Officers that the security clearance of crews brought en bloc to the United States will already have been accomplished by the security branches of the French Army and Navy, under an agreement with Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces. The agreement provided that a French security clearance of seamen in French ports, outside the military zone, was allocated to the French security agencies. It was contemplated that eventually screening processes would be developed in the several liberated nations, to be applicable equally to the seamen of such nations, so that in so far as practical, the same procedures as were made applicable to French seamen, would ultimately be extended to seamen of other liberated nations.

VOLUME

The number of merchant seamen screened for security under this program continued at a very high figure following its inception. An analysis was prepared covering the first five months of the program, which indicated the total number of United States and Allied seamen endorsed for security during the five-month period as being 188,351. During the same period 265 seamen were denied security endorsements. The total number of endorsements and denials, however, did not reflect the volume of cases handled under the program. In one District, for example, 36,000 seamen were checked against Intelligence records for derogatory information, 15,000 of whom were endorsed for security and only 12 denied security endorsements. The remaining 21,000 required no further screening because they were United States citizens in possession of maritime documents obtained prior to July, 1944, or were Allied seamen in possession of credentials showing clearance by Allied government security authorities. In another District, 13,000 were endorsed for security, but the
crew lists of 1,500 merchant vessels were examined, which meant that the names of 75,000 seamen were checked for subversive activities. The same was generally true throughout all Coast Guard Districts.

The drive for seamen recruits by the War Shipping Administration, changes in United States and Allied crews, and the continual process of re-screening necessarily followed in certain classes, caused the volume of cases to continue at about the same tempo. Through such process there gradually was built up in Coast Guard Intelligence files, a fund of information on seamen against whom there was a basis for suspicion, which ultimately resulted in their exclusion from vessels and waterfront facilities.

STATE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS ASSISTANCE IN PREVENTING THE DEPARTURE OF ALIENS

In May, 1945, at the request of the State Department, representatives of Coast Guard Intelligence and the Visa Division of the State Department met to discuss proposed revised regulations dealing with the enforcement of regulations controlling the departure of aliens from the United States. The State Department had anticipated that certain aliens in the United States in whose cases the Secretary of State may decline to issue permits to depart from this country, may attempt to circumvent departure control regulations by signing on merchant vessels in the guise of seamen with a view to deserting the vessels in foreign ports, thereby placing themselves in a position to engage in activities abroad prejudicial to the interests of the United States and of the Allied authorities in occupation of an enemy country. The State Department, therefore, asked that the Coast Guard take cognizance of the aforementioned possibility in connection with the administration of the merchant seaman screening program. (This request was made in accordance with the authority conferred upon the Secretary of State by Presidential Proclamation 2523).

COAST GUARD AGREES TO COOPERATE

The Commandant stated that the Coast Guard would cooperate with the Department of State in enforcing the above mentioned regulations, and to this end, instructions were issued to all District Coast Guard Officers on June 23, 1945, setting forth a procedure to assist the State Department in enforcing the Alien Departure Control Regulations. By this letter, the Commandant further stated that it was not intended to modify the responsibilities, policy or procedure of the Coast Guard with respect to the control, documentation and security intelligence interrogation of merchant seamen previously outlined, and that the setting up of new procedures was not necessary since the merchant seaman screening program would be utilized for this additional purpose. Specifically, the Department of State had asked that the Coast Guard withhold issuing documents to persons in the following categories:

(1) Aliens who are known to have been refused permission to depart from the United States as passengers and who were attempting to depart in the guise of bona fide seamen;

(2) Aliens who were obviously not bona fide seamen but who were attempting to depart from the United States in the guise of seamen and in evasion of the Regulations Controlling the Departure of Aliens, regardless of whether they may have applied for permission to depart as passengers in a regular manner;

(3) Aliens who, although bona fide seamen by occupation, are attempting to depart from the United States under such circumstances as the Coast Guard believes to be prejudicial to the interests of the United States; and

(4) Aliens who may be notified to the officers of the Coast Guard from time to time as being likely to attempt to depart in the guise of seamen under circumstances prejudicial to the interests of the United States or the Allied authorities in occupation of an enemy country.

Under the aforementioned program, District Coast Guard Officers were advised to cooperate closely with the naval officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and that from time to time Headquarters would receive from the Department of State lists of individuals whose departure was deemed prejudicial to the interests of the United States and who, therefore, fell within the above mentioned classes.

SCREENING OF NEUTRAL SHIPS

Under the Order of the Secretary of the Navy, dated June 27, 1944, the Coast Guard's responsibility for security with respect to seamen on merchant vessels in the United States and certain other areas, included all seamen, except the paneling (screening and interrogation) of those arriving on board neutral vessels. The Coast Guard, in the past, had been able to rely on the paneling conducted aboard neutral ships by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in connection with its own security responsibilities. Unnecessary duplication of security processes thereby had been avoided. However, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shortly after V-E Day, advised the Coast Guard that paneling of neutral vessels had not continued, thereby making it necessary for the Coast Guard to extend its screening program to include seamen on neutral ships.

In order to carry out effectively the screening processes, the Commandant, by letter to all District Coast Guard Officers (less the 9th Naval District) dated July 17, 1945, directed that the Coast Guard begin the screening of crew members of neutral vessels in view of the discontinuance of paneling in such cases by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Under the provisions of the Commandant's letter, it was stated that normally it would not be necessary to interrogate seamen previously questioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation unless the prior screening, or developments subsequent thereto, had aroused suspicion regarding such individuals, or unless it was otherwise indicated that the seaman possessed information of interest to the Coast Guard. It was stressed that particularly careful attention should be given to neutral vessels making their first trip to the United States as it was probable that a high percentage of their crew members would not have been previously interrogated. By this directive it was not intended that the Coast Guard would relax its
Interest in persons signing on in foreign ports irrespective of the nationality of the vessel, in view of the possibility that Axis war criminals may attempt to escape from Europe in the guise of merchant seamen.

In amplification of the foregoing letter, the Commandant, on July 31, 1945, advised all District Coast Guard Officers that many neutral vessels which would subsequently touch at East Coast ports had, within the preceding eighteen months, visited Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, since that city, together with Baltimore, Maryland, had previously been designated as ports of entry for neutral vessels. Thus, Coast Guard Intelligence files in the 4th Naval District reflected considerable information as to the crew members of neutral vessels. Consequently, in forwarding crew lists to a Coast Guard District in which a neutral vessel was due to arrive, a duplicate copy of the crew list was forwarded to the District Coast Guard Officer, 4th Naval District. A check would then be made of the Intelligence files in the 4th District and the appropriate District advised as to which seamen had, and who had not been previously screened. Any other pertinent information would also be transmitted. This procedure served to expedite the screening of neutral seamen at the port of arrival.

**INFORMATION CONCERNING HIDDEN AXIS ASSETS**

The Bretton-Woods Resolution No. VI, under which the United Nations took all possible steps to uncover and control enemy assets, as well as to prevent the enemy from realizing on looted property. As part of this program, the Treasury Department requested the Coast Guard, in conducting security intelligence interrogation of merchant seamen, to attempt to obtain information as to hidden Axis assets and possible disposition of looted property.

The Coast Guard advised the Treasury Department that it would comply with the request and, on July 25, 1945, the Commandant issued appropriate instructions to all District Coast Guard Officers. The Commandant stated that as the military defeat of Germany became imminent, enemy nationals and their agents had begun making attempts to conceal, sell, or otherwise dispose of enemy assets and looted property, particularly in the liberated areas and in Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Argentina and other Latin-American countries. Information, possibly in the possession of merchant seamen, was desired as to such concealment, sale or other disposal, especially as to enemy controlled property which might be employed as a means of preserving the enemy's economic, political and military potential abroad after the cessation of hostilities.

Information, developed as a result of interrogation of seamen, was requested since it was believed likely that officers and seamen on vessels of all registries, with emphasis on vessels of neutral registry, would provide a useful source of data from which the Treasury Department could "piece together" important facts concerning the whereabouts of enemy assets and loot.

**SCREENING MODIFIED AFTER V-J DAY**

The cessation of hostilities was followed by a general curtailment of port security and other war-time security measures. This, coupled with the Coast Guard's desire to effect rapid demobilisation, resulted in a complete revision of the screening program. In a directive to all District Coast Guard Officers dated 4 October 1945, the Commandant established a peace-time screening program. The new program provided for the screening of only those persons whose employment on merchant vessels requires United States maritime documents. It included both aliens and United States citizens and designated that the screening would take place at the time the individual applied for maritime documents and would consist of the following:

(a) Submission of Seaman's Certificate application;

(b) National security check (only in the case of alien applicants, and in such other cases as the District Commander deems necessary); and

(c) Fingerprint check in the case of all applicants.

**INVESTIGATIONS OF ALIENS APPLYING FOR LICENSES AS WATCH OFFICERS ON VESSELS OF UNITED STATES REGISTRY**

**WAIVERS NECESSARY TO EMPLOY ALIENS AS WATCH OFFICERS**

Pursuant to discussions regarding the employment of alien officers on United States Flag vessels, an understanding was reached at meetings of the Joint Coast Guard - War Shipping Administration Committee on March 17 and April 3, 1943, whereby it was understood that the Coast Guard would give consideration to the general question of employing alien officers on United States Flag vessels after careful investigation was made of each individual, and that the Coast Guard would advise the War Shipping Administration of the capacities in which the alien officers would be permitted to serve after a further examination of their sea experience.

Following these discussions, Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 39, dated August 24, 1943, was issued by the Commandant setting forth the procedure for effecting waivers of navigation and vessel inspection laws pertaining to the employment as watch officers of persons who are not citizens of the United States. Under R.S. 431 (46 USC 221) the employment as watch officers on vessels of the United States of persons who are not citizens was prohibited. However, Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 39 set forth special instructions to District Coast Guard Officers with respect to the exercise of their authority to effect waivers of R.S. 431 in so far as employment of alien watch officers was concerned, so that alien officers may be issued temporary letters of authority to sign on specified vessels in specified capacities for the duration of the Articles. In exercising their authority, the District Coast Guard Officers were to be guided as follows:

**CONFIDENTIAL**
AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR THE SEATTLE WATERFRONT WAS DECLARED A RESTRICTED AREA AND BARRICADES SET UP.

CLOSED
DESIGNATED CARS ONLY
DETOUR
BY ORDER U.S. NAVY

COAST GUARD POLICE
CONFIDENTIAL

(a) No alien was to be employed as watch officer who was not included in the approved list issued by Coast Guard Headquarters;

(b) No alien was to be employed as Master;

(c) The waiver should be granted only if no licensed officer of the United States was available;

(d) The waiver should be granted only when employment of an alien officer was necessary in order not to delay the vessel;

(e) The waiver was to be granted only for a single voyage; and

(f) All other requirements of Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 39 were to be complied with.

LOYALTY INVESTIGATIONS INTELLIGENCE
Under Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 39, the Coast Guard Intelligence undertook the investigation into the loyalty of each applicant in accordance with the following outline of procedure: On receipt of an alien officer's application from the War Shipping Administration, a check was made of Headquarters Intelligence files and of the Seamen's Record Section to determine whether any information had already been developed on the applicant, whether he held United States maritime documents, the extent of his service on United States flag vessels, and whether disciplinary action had been taken against him. A national security check was made of the records of the several Federal Intelligence agencies, and the records of the State Department were examined, as well as those of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. A fingerprint check was also made to detect any criminal record. Requests for investigation of the applicant's loyalty and employment record were also sent to one or more District Coast Guard Officers, as determined by the available information concerning the applicant's place of residence and employment.

Upon the completion of all record checks and the receipt of all investigation reports, the applicant's case was carefully reviewed and evaluated by Coast Guard Intelligence and a recommendation for approval or disapproval submitted to the Merchant Marine Personnel Division. Lists of those applicants approved and disapproved were then forwarded, from time to time, to the several District Coast Guard Officers for their action and guidance.

NATIONALITY NOT THE CONTROLLING FACTOR

The provisions of the Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 39, which specifically excluded citizens of Italy, Finland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria from consideration for employment as watch officers, was based on the policy of the Navy Department toward the employment of those nationals aboard United States and Panamanian merchant flag vessels, as outlined in a memorandum dated November 9, 1943. That memorandum stated that Naval District Intelligence Officers shall not recommend that seamen of the aforementioned nationalities be removed from, or denied employment on, vessels of United States or Panamanian registry, provided: 1) that they be prohibited from sailing upon vessels destined to certain specified ports, 2) that they be not employed as ship's officers or radio officers, and 3) that the number of such seamen be kept comparatively to a small percentage of the total crew.

Coast Guard Intelligence had, from time to time, received inquiries from citizens of Finland, Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria regarding their eligibility to serve as watch officers on United States flag vessels. These cases were certain individuals who, by reason of their loyalty and professional qualifications, could be used as merchant ship officers to good advantage in the war effort. It was the view of the Chief Intelligence Officer, that nationality should not be a controlling factor in denying loyal aliens permission to sail as officers on United States flag vessels, but that each case should be considered upon its own particular merit to determine the loyalty and ability of the alien in order to ascertain whether his presence would jeopardize the security of the vessel.

Subsequent to the change in policy in the manner of handling United States citizens of Japanese origin, and the Coast Guard's assumption of the responsibility of screening them for employment on vessels and waterfront facilities, it was recommended to the Commandant that favorable reconsideration should be given to the question of employing selected citizens of Finland, Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. In this connection, there appeared to be ample authority for the Commandant to give consideration to the recommendations of the Chief Intelligence Officer. Based on Executive Order 9074, the directive of the Secretary of the Navy dated June 27, 1944 (9 FR 7204) regarding the control, documentation and security Intelligence interrogation of alien merchant seamen (including officers), the United States, included a provision for appropriate approvals of persons for employment as officers and seamen on merchant vessels. That provision was intended to relieve the Chief Intelligence Officer of certain limitations carried in earlier directives of Naval Intelligence bearing on nationality as a restriction to maritime employment. Under this authority, the Chief Intelligence Officer recommended to the Commandant that Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 39 be revised and modified to the extent of striking therefrom the phrase "nor any citizen or national of Finland, Hungary, Italy, Romania or Bulgaria." That proposal was approved by the Commandant and a notice of revision was published as Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 53, on October 22, 1944.

RESULTS

From the inception of this program to V-J Day there were 1,508 alien officer applications received for investigation by Coast Guard Intelligence. Of this total, 1,396 were approved and 112 were disapproved. It should be noted here that the number of Coast Guard Intelligence were based on questions of loyalty resulting from checks of the records of the various Intelligence agencies and investigations. In many cases it was difficult to resolve the information for or against the persons as usually little information was available due to their short residence in the United States. In the interest of
security, however, the doubt was resolved in favor of the United States when the facts seemed warranted or where the information concerning the individual was too meager for proper evaluation.

INVESTIGATION OF APPLICANTS FOR ORIGINAL MERCHANT MARINE LICENSES

Another investigative responsibility of Coast Guard Intelligence was the investigation of applicants for original merchant marine licenses. During World War II, the Coast Guard acquired the statutory responsibility to determine the moral fitness of applicants for original licenses as officers in the Merchant Marine. This responsibility, prior to Executive Order 9083 dated 28 February, 1942, had rested with the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation of the Department of Commerce. Prior to its amalgamation with the Coast Guard, the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation had conducted no investigations of these applicants. Licenses had been issued to all applicants found professionally qualified.

B.C.D.s Sought to Accept Higher Pay as Merchant Seamen

It became apparent, in the latter part of 1943, that certain men with maritime training and background were getting undesirable or bad conduct discharges from the Armed Forces, for the purpose of joining the Merchant Marine. Inducement for such was, of course, the greater remuneration received by merchant seamen. Upon consideration of the whole problem it was deemed advisable for the Coast Guard to discharge its statutory responsibility. Accordingly, plans were drafted to provide for the investigation of all applicants for original licenses. Briefly, it encompassed the checking of former military or naval service and a national criminal and subversive check, as well as a review of the applicant’s former record as a merchant seaman. Coast Guard Intelligence developed the information on which the application was to be either granted or denied, and submitted the information to the Merchant Marine Personnel Division at Headquarters for final determination.

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON SEAMEN’S Passports

On April 21, 1943, the Secretary of State advised the Commandant that the State Department was issuing passports to United States seamen for their use in compliance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of State pursuant to authority granted by Presidential Proclamation of November 11, 1941 (6FR 5821). Individual passport applications were being cleared through the several Intelligence agencies of the Government and a number of reports had been received which indicated, in the opinion of the State Department, that the presence of certain of the applicants on board ships of United States registry might be considered a danger to national security by the agencies charged with those responsibilities. The Commandant was requested to designate an officer of the Coast Guard to cooperate with the representatives of certain other Government agencies, in a review of these cases to determine whether the information warranted the refusal of passport facilities to the persons concerned.

COAST GUARD REPRESENTED BY INTELLIGENCE

The Commandant designated the Chief Intelligence Officer to represent the Coast Guard on this Inter-Departmental Committee.

The Coast Guard representative met with representatives of the War, Navy and State Departments and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and it was agreed by this group that while they were willing to give their advice to the Department of State, they desired to remain anonymous and not assume responsibility for refusals on the grounds of security between themselves and the State Department; that the State Department would inform applicants who may be refused passport facilities, that the refusal was based on the discretionary power of the Secretary of State, and that no mention would be made of any joint Governmental advisory board. (The discretionary power for granting or refusing passports rested with the Secretary of State as set forth in Executive Order 7856).

Briefly, the procedure was as follows: Upon receipt of a seaman’s application in the Department of State, the applicant’s name was cleared through the files of the various member agencies. When this clearance was completed and no derogatory information was developed the passport was issued and forwarded in care of a previously designated Collector of Customs. When adverse reports were received through the clearance process, such cases were referred to the Inter-Departmental Committee for review to determine whether the information warranted a refusal of passport facilities. The Committee functioned regularly during the war period and from the time of its inception to V-J Day had reviewed 35,227 applications. Of this number 6,935 applications were ultimately approved for passports and 1,608 applications were approved for various reasons, such as pursuit of other vocation, death of applicant, etc.

SCREENING OF U.S. CITIZENS OF JAPANESE DESCENT FOR EMPLOYMENT ON VESSELS AND WATERFRONT FACILITIES

BACKGROUND

In historical retrospect, the treatment of one group of citizens, namely United States citizens of Japanese descent, during World War II, was one of the most important departures from a fundamental democratic treatment that this country has ever sanctioned.* The Coast Guard was concerned with one aspect of this problem only, and that was determining the risk involved in individual cases in allowing such persons to engage in maritime activities during the War. This phase became one of the investigative functions of Coast Guard Intelligence.

ORIGIN

When it became apparent in 1943 that the War Reloca-
tion authority was prepared to allow certain United States citizens of Japanese descent to depart from the Relocation Centers, the Secretary of the Navy suggested to the Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of Treasury, War Department and the Navy Department, as well as the War Shipping Administration and War Relocation Authority, that it would appear desirable for those agencies to formulate a policy with respect to employment of United States citizens of Japanese descent as seamen and waterfront workers. Pursuant thereto, representatives of these agencies held conferences in December, 1943, under the Chairmanship of the Commandant of the Coast Guard, to consider that policy. The sub-committees formulated a policy which was thereafter accepted by each of the heads represented, with the exception of the Department of Justice. That Department was unwilling to approve or disapprove the proposed policy on the ground that it had no responsibilities in the matter.

POLICY
The report agreed upon was
set in substance as follows:

(a) The U.S. Coast Guard was charged with the responsibility of determining the eligibility of United States citizens of Japanese descent for maritime employment, including the fisheries, under the following general policies:

1) No American citizen of Japanese descent was permitted to ship who did not conform to the standards of eligibility required for employment in war plants and facilities important to the war effort;

2) No American citizen of Japanese descent was permitted to ship if derogatory information had been developed against him, such as would bar any other person from sailing, and

3) No American citizen of Japanese descent was permitted to ship on any vessel whose course or destination was in the Pacific or Indian Oceans, including the Pacific coastal areas of the United States.

(b) Except in extraordinary cases involving unusual considerations, a decision by the Coast Guard that an American citizen of Japanese descent was eligible for maritime employment, would be binding on all other Government agencies in the absence of supplementary information of a derogatory nature. (The Passport Division of the Department of State did, in the ordinary course, issue seamen's passports to American citizens of Japanese descent, or waived the necessity therefor upon certification by the Coast Guard that the individual was eligible for seaman's passport.)

(c) In performing this function, the Coast Guard was entitled to the cooperation of all other Federal agencies and to all pertinent information in their respective files. Specifically, the Coast Guard was entitled to:

1) Deal directly with the appropriate agencies of the State, War, Navy and Justice Departments and the War Relocation Authority; and, require any or all of the aforementioned agencies to make available for consolidated review by the Coast Guard, all pertinent information in their files; and

2) Require that such additional investigations be made as were deemed necessary.

(d) American citizens of Japanese descent who possessed seamen's papers were permitted to continue or resume service aboard merchant vessels subject to the restrictions set forth in paragraph (a) hereof.

(e) Applications for seamen's papers filed by American citizens of Japanese descent were directed to, and passed upon by, the Coast Guard, which, after appropriate investigation, determined whether or not to grant the application.

(f) The recommendations therein contained were not implemented without the written approval of the heads of all Federal departments and agencies concerned.

APPROVED BY
THE SECRETARY
OF THE NAVY

This program was approved by the Secretary of the Navy, 1 February, 1944, and the Commandant forwarded an outline of the procedure to be followed for security clearance for such citizens, to the several District Coast Guard Officers on 31 March, 1944. It is to be noted that clearances given by the Coast Guard did not permit voyages in the Pacific or Indian Oceans, nor employment on waterfront facilities on the West Coast.

Procedurally, U.S. citizens of Japanese descent were placed in a separate category from other U.S. citizens by the requirement that they must have attained prior Coast Guard approval in the form of a letter from the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, for employment on merchant vessels and waterfront facilities. Application therefore, was required and approval was given only if investigation disclosed no evidence of disloyalty or subversion. Restrictions were placed against the scope of their maritime employment by prohibiting employment on merchant vessels for voyages in the Pacific or Indian Oceans, or on waterfront facilities on Pacific coast ports. At the time the program was placed into effect United States citizens of Japanese descent were barred from the Pacific coast areas of the United States by order of the Commanding General, Western Defense Command. The Coast Guard, in screening U.S. citizens of Japanese descent for maritime employment, was at all times to subjugate the program to any military or naval regulations promulgated by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command or the Commandant, Western Sea Frontier.

FEW APPLICATIONS
FOR CLEARANCE
From the inauguration of the program, relatively few applications were received for clearance by the Coast Guard; during the first nine-month period, only 299 applications being received. Of these, apparently 2% were from persons with neither maritime nor longshoreman experience. They were from applicants whose only desire obviously was to depart from Relocation Centers or to obtain better paying jobs. On 17 December, 1944, the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, issued Public Proclamation No. 21, stating that there had been a substantial improvement in the military situation
since the period when the imposition of certain restrictions on, and the exclusion of all persons of Japanese descent from designated areas within the Western Defense Command, was instituted. The military situation, he stated, made it possible to modify the system of mass exclusion of persons of Japanese descent and permit a system of individual determination and exclusion of certain individuals whose presence within the "sensitive" areas of the Western Defense Command was deemed a source of potential danger to military security, to be substituted.

**Espionage Act**

Prohibits employment of enemy aliens on vessels

**Employment of enemy aliens on vessels**

The action of the Commanding General, Western Defense Command in allowing the return of such citizens to the West Coast raised the question as to whether the limitations upon their employment as seamen in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and on waterfront facilities of the West Coast should be retained by the Coast Guard. The Army's action in allowing the return to such areas of certain alien Japanese residents also the question of whether Japanese aliens should be allowed access to and employment upon West Coast waterfronts. In this connection, "Port Security Regulations Governing the Security of Ports and the Control of Vessels in the Navigable Waters of the United States" issued by the Secretary of the Navy with the approval of the President under authority of Section I, Title II of the Espionage Act (50 USCS 191 - 194a) prohibited enemy aliens from employment on vessels but did not prohibit such employment on waterfront facilities.

**Acceptability of waterfront employment and coast guard responsibility**

While there appeared to be a basis for some liberalization of the policy on the part of the Coast Guard as a result of the Proclamation of the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, it was not believed that any material change in the program of the Coast Guard was indicated at that time. The reasons for this were believed to be as follows:

(a) The Coast Guard's program did not arise from the action of the Army in evacuating such citizens from the West Coast; it was, therefore, not dependent upon the Army's action in allowing their return;

(b) There was no dependable information available by which to estimate the number of such returning citizens from Relocation Centers and elsewhere who would desire maritime or waterfront employment. It was believed that unless the number was large, which under the procedure would result in considerable delays in the issuance of maritime documents, the method as utilized by the Commandant's instructions of March 31, 1944, would afford much greater security by reason of its requirement that the records of all interested Government agencies be consulted before eligibility was established; and

(c) If the number of such returning citizens was large, the procedure was capable of modification to the extent that the matter of delay would not be of serious proportions.

**Relaxing of Army restrictions did not affect coast guard responsibility**

The Army's rescission of its Proclamation banning Japanese-Americans from the West Coast, and conceded nor change the responsibility of the Coast Guard for the safety of vessels and waterfront facilities there, it was pointed out that no the Coast Guard to issue clearance to United States citizens of Japanese descent upon the Army's determination, constituting an abnegation of the responsibility imposed upon and accepted by the Coast Guard, by virtue of agencies, including the Army, for these true because Army authorities, in evaluating a case for the purpose, adjudged former maritime experience on the part of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent, as a derogatory factor and consequently did not certify such persons as loyal. The Coast Guard, on the other hand, was charged with the responsibility of determining the eligibility of such persons for maritime employment. Thus it was necessary for the Coast Guard to reconsider the factors involved in an individual case.

**Blanket restrictions continued - exceptions based on merits of individual case**

The Coast Guard and other interested agencies within the Navy Department undertook to study the current situation relative to the maritime employment. The Supreme Court opinions in the cases of ex parte Endo and Korematsu v. the United States, and the lifting of the mass exclusion order against Japanese by the Army on the West Coast, made desirable a reconsideration of the status of the above-mentioned nationals who desired access to West Coast waterfront facilities. Pending a determination of policy, cases of United States citizens were continued to be processed as prescribed by the Commandant's letter of March 31, 1944. The Commander, Western Sea Frontier had indicated that he had no objection to clearance of United States citizens of Japanese descent, provided they were properly screened by the Coast Guard and the Commanding General, Western Defense Command. The granting of security clearance, therefore, would not be a violation of the Inter-Departmental Agreement of March, 1944.

In line with the foregoing, the Secretary of the Navy, by letter dated May 30, 1946, indicated that the blanket restrictions against United States citizens of Japanese descent should be continued in effect only so long as the exigencies of military security made such restrictions imperative. Decisions to impose or to relax such restrictions must rest on considerations of military necessity, which can best be made by military and Naval commanders in the area. The Secretary of the Navy stated also, that the Commandant, Coast Guard, in discharging his responsibilities, was to be guided by the judgment of the Commander, Western Sea Frontier. Accordingly, the Commandant advised the Commander, Western Sea Frontier, that the Coast Guard was prepared immediately to direct the District Coast Guard Officers in the West Coast areas to authorize access to Pacific Coast waterfront facilities by any of the above-mentioned nationals after a determination of loyalty and water activities was approved by the Secretary of the Navy and subject to military considerations. Commander, Western Sea Frontier was requested to state whether military considerations now permitted relaxation of
those restrictions. In reply, the Commander, Western Sea Frontier indicated that he considered the military situation warranted a relaxation of the restrictions only as follows:

(a) No modification of the existing restrictions as to fishing or employment on vessels operating from or to Pacific Coast ports; and

(b) When properly screened by the Coast Guard and supplied with Coast Guard identification, access to waterfront facilities would be granted to loyal American-Japanese in the course of their employment, provided such employment excluded them from boarding any vessel, handling ammunition, explosives or gasoline, from operating winches and driving trucks and tractors in waterfront areas.

Meanwhile, however, in view of VJ-Day, the Coast Guard took steps to modify its policy with respect to fishing in the waters off the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts and on the Great Lakes, by issuing instructions to District Coast Guard Officers of the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, Cleveland 9th, and 10th Naval Districts on June 19, 1945, and on June 30, 1945 the Commandant advised the Pacific Coast Coordinator and the District Coast Guard Officers of the 11th, 12th and 13th Naval Districts of the procedures to be followed in the employment of United States citizens of Japanese descent on Pacific Coast waterfronts and vessels.

On August 21, 1945, the Commandant was advised by the Pacific Coast Coordinator, that the restrictions on official VJ-Day with regard to fishing off the Pacific Coast, employment in the Pacific and United States coastal trade, and employment in Interstate trade between the United States East and West Coasts. In other words, it was the informed judgment of the Commander of the Western Sea Frontier that effective with the official surrender of Japan, American citizens of Japanese descent should be subject to the same restrictions within the Frontier as control all other United States citizens. Accordingly, the Commandant, on September 1, 1945, advised the East Coast Coordinator, the West Coast Coordinator and all District Coast Guard Officers, by dispatch, that effective upon the formal surrender of Japan the Commandant revoked all Coast Guard procedures especially applicable to the employment of United States citizens of Japanese descent on waterfront facilities and vessels. The Coast Guard procedures generally governing maritime employment of United States citizens were thereby made applicable.

From March, 1944 to September, 1945, Coast Guard Intelligence received 531 applications from United States citizens of Japanese descent, conducting the necessary investigation in each case with the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approved</th>
<th>Disapproved</th>
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<td>432</td>
<td>99</td>
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SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF COAST GUARD PERSONNEL

AUTHORITY
Investigation of Coast Guard personnel for security purposes is the responsibility of the Coast Guard, in a letter dated 3 November, 1942, the Chief of Naval Operations stated that the Coast Guard shall conduct all investigations concerning all personnel of the Coast Guard, civilian and military; applicants for any positions in the Coast Guard; and members of the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Based on the foregoing authority the Commandant designated Coast Guard Intelligence as the unit to make the necessary investigations.

APPLICANTS FOR RESERVE COMMISSIONS
Prior to June, 1942 applicants for commissions were investigated by the office of the Inspector in Chief. However, with the transfer of the investigative functions of the Inspector in Chief to the Intelligence Division, investigation of applicants for commissions was assumed by Coast Guard Intelligence. Because of the urgency of obtaining personnel during the early days of the war it was not possible in many cases to complete investigations prior to commissioning. This was admittedly not an advantageous procedure as it was difficult to discharge officers, once commissioned, because of the same type of information which, if disclosed prior to their being commissioned, would have resulted in the rejection of their applications. However, after the recruiting drive had reached its peak all applicants were investigated prior to being commissioned. All applicants for Reserve officer training were also offered, as well as officer candidates for the Women's Reserve (Sparers)."
CONFIDENTIAL

Investigations were also conducted by Coast Guard Intelligence of all enlisted personnel who were assigned to handle classified material or who were to be placed in a position of trust or confidence. At Headquarters, for example, all personnel assigned thereto were investigated. Over 800 such investigations were made of Headquarters personnel alone. The several Coast Guard Districts were responsible for investigating all such personnel within their military command who were placed in a position of handling confidential material. It is estimated that 5,000 investigations of this type were made by the Coast Guard Districts.

Prior to the surrender of Germany, these investigations were almost as thoroughly conducted as those of applicants for commissions. The scope of these investigations was modified after VE-Day to include only a limited background (that is, employment and activities for the past five years), and criminal and national subversive checks. The responsibility in all such cases rested with the Commanding Officer. Coast Guard Intelligence conducted only such investigations as were requested by the Commanding Officer. The scope of the investigation too, was as requested by the Commanding Officer, based on the degree of security involved. The results of the investigation were transmitted to the Commanding Officer and it always remained his responsibility to evaluate the information disclosed by the Intelligence Investigation.

Investigations of civilian personnel were comparable to those made of military personnel. Personal History Statements were obtained; criminal and subversive checks were made; and references, schools and former employers contacted in a routine manner. In the event the employee was to be assigned to a position entailing a high degree of integrity and trust, a complete background investigation was conducted as in the case of officers.

INTERNAL INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS OF COAST GUARD PERSONNEL

Coast Guard Intelligence handled innumerable cases during World War II arising from alleged misconduct, unauthorized absences, frauds and thefts, rights to family allowance and deaths and accidents, involving Coast Guard personnel or property. Intelligence normally confined itself to the investigation of any number and variety of allegations and claims to ascertain the facts, which were then presented to appropriate action authorities. Many cases resulted in convictions and disciplinary action or other corrective measures, whereas, on the other hand, many Coast Guardsmen were exonerated and the Coast Guard itself thereby relieved of suspicion. In instances where a community may have believed the Service in general, and several individual members in particular, to be culpable.

MISCONDUCT

General misconduct ranged from minor misbehavior of Coast Guard personnel in public places or in Service establishments, to serious cases involving the flagrant crimes of violence. The investigation of these cases required cooperation of civilian law enforcement authorities, as well as the Naval, the Coast Guard, the War Patrol and Military Police, and many cases were investigated by Coast Guard Intelligence at the request of the above mentioned authorities. In the majority of instances, it was possible to furnish an offender's Commanding Officer with a detailed, authenticated and complete account of the circumstances, and the latter was able to take disciplinary action without delay. (In this connection it is of interest to note that the Commandant has seen fit, in the post-war era, to order a comprehensive pre-mist investigation in all cases.)

Inasmuch as all uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces were under the joint control of the Shore Patrol and the Military Police establishments, Coast Guard personnel were subject to apprehension and arrest by their designated representatives. Consequently, a number of instances arose where Coast Guard personnel were arrested and held pending action by the Coast Guard. It was the responsibility of Coast Guard Intelligence, when so requested by Commanding Officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding such arrests so as to present a clear picture of such incidents to the Commanding Officer for his action. The same procedure applied in the case of Coast Guard personnel involved with civil authorities.
Liaison between Coast Guard Intelligence and the Shore Patrol, military police and civil authorities was highly developed and offenders were usually delivered to appropriate Coast Guard activities in a matter of hours.

COMPLAINTS
Complaints against Coast Guard personnel were many and varied, ranging from allegations of illicit relationships and paternity charges to damage to private property allegedly perpetrated by Coast Guard personnel. In all cases the complaints were given thorough consideration and action taken in the fullest degree warranted. Occasionally, acts of serious misconduct were unearthed which otherwise might have gone unnoticed. In each instance where investigation developed that the complaint was well-founded, the facts were forwarded to the appropriate office for action.

DESETERS
It was the responsibility of Coast Guard Intelligence to assist in an effort to locate, apprehend and return deserters to the custody of the Coast Guard. The speedy return of deserters before they became hardened and difficult to apprehend in law enforcement activities, was an extremely important function, essential to the conduct of the War and of great significance, both as a morale factor and as a deterrent. From a broader social aspect, it was extremely desirable that such deserters be located and apprehended because they often resorted to criminal means for a livelihood. After inception of Intelligence responsibility in regard to unauthorized absences, it was possible to achieve an average of 75% of deserters in the period of 1943 to 1945. Deserters who were located and apprehended by the Service were often returned to their units for trial by courts-martial.

APPREHENSION
In many cases, the apprehension of a deserter or straggler in his home community was so simple as to be classed a routine matter, but in some instances, much difficulty and lengthy investigation was necessary. One deserter who had escaped from a Naval Prison, where he was serving a sentence imposed by a General Court Martial, was apprehended in Mexico City on the basis of information supplied by Coast Guard Intelligence. Another was taken into custody on a lonely mountain top where he was living more or less as a hermit to avoid capture.

THEFTS AND FRAUDS
A large number of thefts and frauds were perpetrated by Coast Guard personnel, investigation of which, was a function of Coast Guard Intelligence. There were a considerable number of cases involving the uttering of bad checks and the obtaining of money under false pretenses. Worthless check cases were the most common, many being cashed by persons representing themselves to be Coast Guard personnel, sometimes by the use of the Coast Guard Captain of the Port identification cards, which the general public was inclined to accept as satisfactory evidence of Coast Guard membership. A large number of Government checks intended for Coast Guard personnel went astray, either through forgery of signatures, theft, or under other circumstances. Such cases were handled jointly by Coast Guard Intelligence and the Secret Service, under the terms of a carefully worked-out informal agreement. Suitable action was taken by the Coast Guard in regard to its personnel who were offenders. In the closing days of the War a number of fraud-theft cases were investigated by Intelligence which developed into very large-scale operations. Some were of a very serious nature and a few were "wholesale" in proportion.

FAMILY ALLIGNANCE
Upon the passage of the Serviceman's Dependents Allowance Act of 1942, the Coast Guard was confronted with the problem of effectuating, as rapidly as possible, in accordance with the wishes of Congress, large scale family allowance payments to dependents of Coast Guard personnel. Consequently, the emphasis was placed on the authorization of such payments in the least possible time, and many such payments were authorized without Coast Guard Intelligence information. Investigation, revealed discrepancies and illegalities. When a decision could not be reached by utilizing routine procedures, Coast Guard Intelligence was called upon to investigate the full facts of the case. This phase of Intelligence activity became very important, involving many investigative agencies and requiring a high degree of legal and other knowledge. A good many instances, it was possible to establish bona fide dependencies through investigation, whose existence had hitherto been in serious question.

DEATHS AND ACCIDENTS
Investigations were conducted by Coast Guard Intelligence into the circumstances of death of Coast Guard personnel, other than combat deaths, in order to aid in determining 1) reason for death, other than medical, 2) right of designated beneficiaries to get death gratuities and other payments, since family of the person dying in a misconduct status is not entitled to such payments, and 3) persons or equipment responsible with a view to...
taking suitable disciplinary or corrective measures.

Coast Guard Intelligence also made investigations into the identity of beneficiaries, when the usual measures were inadequate. The right to payments was established in the least possible time so as to minimize hardship to individuals concerned.

Accidents to Coast Guard personnel and property were also investigated by Coast Guard Intelligence before convening, and sometimes in lieu of, a formal Board of Investigation, by use of Administrative Reports. It was possible to streamline procedures in this respect. Most accident cases investigated were in connection with collisions sustained by Coast Guard vehicles and drivers, but all accidents were subject to Intelligence investigation, excluding those marine casualties and accidents, investigation of which was the responsibility of Merchant Marine Inspection.

HOMOSEXUALS

Another duty of Coast Guard Intelligence, and an especially unpleasant one, was the investigation of Coast Guard personnel believed to be homosexually inclined. Since the Service classified homosexuals in two categories, those whose acts had criminal intent and had involved the privacy of others, and those who had performed homosexual acts in concert with others so inclined, it was necessary, in the first instance, to establish the category of a homosexual, whether self-confessed or discovered through investigation of complaints. Discharges or General Courts Martial were mandatory in such cases. Consequently, much careful investigation was necessary to establish the categories and circumstances surrounding the individual case. The interrogation of the victim often led to the detection of others. As in all other personnel investigations conducted by Coast Guard Intelligence, the investigation report containing the facts developed, was transmitted to the proper administrative office for determination and appropriate action.

MISCELLANEOUS

While the foregoing is a summary of the major categories of investigations conducted concerning Coast Guard personnel, since Coast Guard Intelligence was charged with conducting all investigations of Coast Guard personnel, it follows that there were numerous miscellaneous requests for personnel investigation. In this category could be mentioned investigations of fraudulent or underage enlistments, non-payment of bills, unbecoming conduct, violation of Censorship Regulations, obscene letters, etc. Investigations of Coast Guard personnel were undertaken by Coast Guard Intelligence only on the official request of a proper action officer and all reports of investigation were submitted to the proper action officer for his official use.

WOMEN'S RESERVE

A Coast Guard situation, peculiar to World War II, which should have specific mention in the story of Coast Guard Intelligence, is the whole problem of women in military service. Through investigative processes, Coast Guard Intelligence gave to officers, upon whom rested the burden of making decisions and the policy treatment of women in service, factual studies and other information important to their administrative decisions. This was of special value in cases where there was a question of disciplinary action, duty assignments, hospitalization and rehabilitation.

IDENTIFICATION

HISTORICAL

In 1924, the Commandant, recognizing the need for a positive means of identification for Coast Guard personnel, directed that an Identification Section be established at Headquarters and that the fingerprints of all Coast Guard personnel be taken and forwarded for processing and filing. The Section was assigned to the Enlisted Personal Division, and its scope was limited primarily to the processing of fingerprint records of Service personnel. The ensuing years brought about a greater utilization of the fingerprint files, which resulted in their being used in the detection of fraudulent enlistments, as well as in the identification and detection of other violators of Coast Guard discipline.

TREMENDOUS INCREASE IN WORK LOAD DURING WORLD WAR II

On December 7, 1941 the fingerprint files contained over 70,000 fingerprint records of Coast Guard or former Coast Guard personnel. The duties of the Section at that time consisted in the classifying, searching and filing of fingerprint records of Coast Guard personnel; the identification of applicants for certificates in lieu of lost discharges; the identification of personnel who were victims of amnesia, or unknown deceased persons, and occasional latent fingerprint case. Personal assigned to the Section, which at this time consisted of two fingerprint experts, later reached a war-time peak of forty. Fingerprint records were later received in 1941 at the rate of approximately 1,000 per month. However, at the height of activity during World War II, over 17,000 fingerprint records were received in one month, and 90,852 fingerprint records were received during the year 1942 alone.

IDENTIFICATION SECTION TRANSFERRED TO INTELLIGENCE

Shortly after the beginning of World War II, Coast Guard Intelligence was assigned the additional function of making all personnel and law enforcement investigations and, since the potential of the Identification Section could serve as a useful adjunct to these investigations, the Commandant, on 1 March, 1943, ordered the transfer of the Identification Section from the Enlisted Personnel Division to the Intelligence Division.

DUTIES EXPANDED

Under Intelligence, the Identification Section was assigned the following duties: Maintain the fingerprint files of the Coast Guard; process all fingerprint records; notify cognizant offices of detections uncovered as a result of fingerprint comparisons; establish, through fingerprint comparisons, the identity of applicants for certificates in lieu of lost discharges; establish, through
fingerprints, the identity of decomposed, mutilated, burned or unidentified bodies of Coast Guard personnel; operate a technical laboratory using scientific apparatus, such as photographic, electrical and chemical equipment for the development of latent fingerprints and other evidence in solving crimes; make searches for other agencies against the Coast Guard fingerprint file; issue Coast Guard identification tags and cards to Headquarters personnel; and, maintain a master alphabetical card index for all persons whose fingerprints are on file with the Coast Guard.

With the advent of the Merchant Seaman Screening program, the Identification Section was assigned the additional duty of handling and processing the fingerprint records of merchant marine personnel.

ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS

In addition, the Identification Section operated two mobile identification units to photograph and issue identification cards to personnel stationed at isolated units or stations where such facilities were not otherwise available. Similarly, thousands of identification tags (so-called "dog tags") were prepared for field units. With the closing of the offices of the Captain of the Port of Washington, D.C. in July, 1945, the issuance of Captain of the Port identification cards in the Washington area was transferred to the Identification Section.

Further, the Reception Desk, which controlled the identification, entry and departure of all persons to and from Coast Guard Headquarters, was a part of the Identification Section until June 15, 1945.

From December, 1941 through December, 1946, 527,743 fingerprint records were received. Of this number, 380,743 were prints of Coast Guard personnel and 147,000 were prints of merchant seamen.

ALSO PERFORMS A HUMANITARIAN SERVICE

The Identification Section has performed a humanitarian service for Coast Guard personnel and former personnel, by identifying victims of disasters and other casualties and by establishing identification for veteran's benefits.

LIAISON

LIAISON IS THE SINE QUÃ NON OF INTELLIGENCE

Except in a certain few instances, no mention has been made of the liaison conducted by Coast Guard Intelligence during World War II. However, liaison is the "sine qua non" of any Intelligence or investigative agency, and is worthy of specific coverage in any historical account of Intelligence activity. The Coast Guard, because of its field of operation, was able to contribute valuable information to many Government agencies, particularly those concerned with waterfront and maritime workers or employees. The screening program alone developed a source of information of inestimable value to all law enforcement agencies.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

As a component of the Navy Department during World War II, it follows that the most extensive, as well as the closest liaison was maintained with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval District Intelligence offices. Further, the provisions of the Delegation Agreement necessitated continuous liaison between Coast Guard Intelligence and the Office of Naval Intelligence, both at Headquarters and in the field. In many instances, Coast Guard Intelligence Officers were assigned to Naval Intelligence and vice versa to facilitate timely interchange of information.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Liaison was conducted between Coast Guard Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, especially concerning investigations involving sabotage or subversive activity along the waterfront. This liaison was maintained directly at Headquarters and through the Naval District Intelligence Officer in the field.

STATE DEPARTMENT

Through liaison with the State Department, the Coast Guard was notified of the arrival of each neutral vessel and furnished such information concerning the crew members. In addition, through this liaison, alien seamen were denied visas to enter the United States, if, in the opinion of the Coast Guard their presence on board neutral vessels arriving in this country represented a potential security menace. Close liaison was also maintained with British Security Coordination through the British Security Coordination in New York and its Naval Liaison office in Washington. All information with respect to the departure of seamen in the theatres of war who represented potential danger to the Allied war effort was relayed to the British Security Control officers and conversely, by that Agency to the Coast Guard and American Security Controls.

IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE

Liaison was maintained with the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, particularly with respect to the screening program. Immigration and Naturalization had primary responsibility with respect to the control of the entrance and departure of aliens. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the Coast Guard to supplement its own program by advising Immigration and Naturalization of the presence in the United States of any seamen who held views inimical to the war effort.

ARMY

Close liaison existed between Coast Guard Intelligence and Military Intelligence and the Army Transportation Service. The former in connection with Investigative
matters and the latter in connection with information regarding seamen employed on vessels under the direct control of the War Department, which were not within the purview of the Coast Guard responsibility for exclusions and screening.

TREASURY ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

Liaison was also maintained with all Treasury Law Enforcement Agencies as related to matters of collateral interest. The Coast Guard, through its normal peace-time function as one of the Treasury Enforcement Agencies, together with its broad war-time authority, was able to furnish extensive information of value, particularly to the Bureaus of Customs and Narcotics, and the Secret Service.

WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION

Liaison was also maintained with the War Relocation Authority in connection with the screening, by the Coast Guard, of United States citizens of Japanese descent. Intelligence investigations of aliens applying for licenses as watch officers on vessels of United States Registry necessitated close liaison with the War Shipping Administration.

CIVIL AUTHORITIES

The broad scope of Coast Guard Intelligence activities necessitated contacts and liaison with many other agencies and organizations, too numerous to mention. Worthy of special note, however, is the splendid relationship and spirit of cooperation which existed between the Coast Guard and the various Police Departments, Sheriff's offices and other local civil authorities. They assisted in the apprehension of deserters and in the investigation of accidents, as well as supplying valuable information in connection with character and security investigations. Most noteworthy, however, was their discreet handling of Coast Guard personnel coming into their custody, so as to afford the Service a minimum of unfavorable publicity.