THE COAST GUARD
AT WAR

BEACH PATROL
XVII

PREPARED IN THE
HISTORICAL SECTION
PUBLIC RELATIONS DIVISION
U. S. COAST GUARD
HEADQUARTERS
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Among the many and varied activities of the Coast Guard during the present war is the operation of a security force for the protection of our coasts and inland waterways. As a supplement to port security, a beach patrol organization was established a few months after the outbreak of hostilities with Japan. During the critical period of 1942 and 1943, when our shores were constantly endangered by saboteurs and enemy attack, beach patrol was one of the most important phases of national defense. Although somewhat comparable to the peacetime life-saving beach patrols, the new system was fundamentally different from earlier patrols, both in origin and operational functions. Primarily a security force, it was designed to protect American shores against sabotage, enemy submarines and enemy landings and "fifth column" activities along the coast. Actually, it has three basic functions: To detect and observe enemy vessels operating in coastal waters and to transmit information thus obtained to the appropriate Navy and Army commands as a basis for naval action against the enemy; to report attempts of landing by the enemy and to assist in preventing such activity; and to prevent communication between persons on shore and the enemy at sea. Subsidiary, but not incidental, objectives were numerous. Two of them were of fundamental importance. The beach patrol would serve as a most useful agency in rescuing survivors of our own and friendly vessels sunk by the enemy; it would also act as a unified guard force in policing the prohibited or restricted areas of the coast. The former work was of incalculable service to the country. In the innumerable rescues of ships' crews and grounded aviators, the beach patrol more than justified its operation.

Many of the responsibilities of beach patrol were not new to the Coast Guard. For years it had maintained beach patrols along limited sectors of the coast. The original life-saving service had always patrolled the beaches in regular line of duty, while hundreds of Coast-guardsmen were long accustomed to the tireless vigilance of lookout, harbour and revenue patrols. Furthermore, since the beginning of European hostilities in September, 1939, the Coast Guard had materially assisted in enforcing the Neutrality Act. Port security was established within a week after Pearl Harbour, in order to protect port installations and effectively guard waterfront facilities. Captain of the Port complements were expanded, with well organized harbour patrols extended to cover miles of port waterfront in the United States. Nor were such safe-guards entirely unprecedented in earlier history. During the last World War, the danger from enemy saboteurs or landing parties was not considered grave enough to warrant the creation of a separate beach patrol. However, the 199 Coast Guard stations then in existence did increase their vigilance, that any activity of enemy agents along the coast might be intercepted. Limited patrols were conducted but they were more in the nature of an extension of local station activity rather than distinctive administrative units. On the other hand, the current development of defensive patrols had, from the moment of its original inception, a distinctive growth. It represents not only something of a departure in Coast Guard policy but also a striking innovation in the conduct of the present war.
THE MENACE OF INVASION

During the early months of 1942 the German and Japanese submarine menace became increasingly alarming. Submarine activity along the Atlantic seaboard was painfully evident to all who refused to blind themselves to actual realities. The situation had suddenly grown acute, even before Naval and Coast Guard offshore patrols were prepared to cope with it. Japanese submarine action off the Pacific coast, although never successful, was, nevertheless, sufficient to warn us of the approaching danger. It was rather a shock to realize suddenly that the entire coast was, in effect, open to possible raids by the new, all-powerful, far-ranging submarines of the enemy. The need of organized security was imminent. Unless adequate defense precautions were taken, saboteur landings would become common. Even the actual invasion of our shores was certainly not beyond the realm of possibility. In the spring of 1942, the German U-boat attacks on our merchant marine along the Atlantic coast thoroughly awakened the public to a sense of immediate danger. At the same time, subversive activity throughout the country was constantly growing. Investigations of espionage or rumours of saboteurs were a daily occurrence. Innumerable instances of industrial sabotage did more than any reports of various investigation committees possibly could do, to convince America of the growing gravity of the situation. In the words of J. Edgar Hoover, Americanism was on trial. "The spy, the saboteur, the subverter must be met and conquered." Already the "Fifth Column" of destruction was slowly advancing. Still, the necessary preventative were slow in emerging. It took a few graphic incidents to initiate full action.

SABOTEUR INCIDENTS ON THE ATLANTIC COAST

In 1941 and during the early months of 1942, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had brought to light some striking cases of saboteur operations in the United States, but there had been no actual proof of enemy landings on our shores. Yet it was generally felt that as U-boat depredations grew steadily worse, isolated attempts to test our defense would be made. In fact, shortly after we entered the war, intelligence reports were received that indicated comprehensive German plans for landing agents on our coasts. The first incidents of successful saboteur landings came in June, 1942. Shortly before midnight, on the thirteenth of June, a German submarine surfaced about five hundred yards off a Long Island beach. Under the cover of the fog, a rubber boat was lowered and four men with four large boxes, silently landed on the shore at a point some hundred miles from New York City. Patrolman John C. Cullen of the Amagansett Coast Guard station, which maintained a regular patrol of this area, was on his nightly six-mile easterly patrol when the landing occurred. Surprising one of the group before the party had succeeded in making its way inland, Cullen stopped and questioned the saboteur leader. Two other men in the background, speaking in German, at once aroused his suspicion, but, being alone, he could do little more than cleverly lead the spokes-

1. One of the most outstanding agents apprehended by the FBI was Geo. Sylvester Viereck, who was labeled by the indictment as the most dangerous Nazi agent in this country. Herr Viereck was arrested in New York City on 9 October, 1941.
man into self-incriminating statements. Alarmed, the German at first threatened, then bribed Cullen, who feigned a friendly acceptance of the money only to report the incident just as soon as he could get away.¹ 

The ensuing arrest of the saboteurs proved the effectiveness of well established beach protection. On 17 June, four more German agents were put ashore from a U-boat on Ponte Vedra beach, just south of Jacksonville, Florida.² Both groups brought with them ample funds of American currency and supplies of high explosives, detonators, timing devices, and so on, designed at the special school of sabotage near Berlin, where these men were trained. All eight agents were eventually apprehended by FBI officials. Six were later electrocuted, one given life imprisonment and the other sentenced to thirty years. The results were sufficient to justify immediate action. The importance of beach patrol was no longer questioned. "Within a month, the new Coast Guard organization was underway."

BEACH PATROL ESTABLISHED

Shortly after these incidents, the Federal Bureau of Investigation recommended that a Coast Guard beach patrol system be established. Information had been uncovered which indicated that Germany proposed to send out a series of organized groups of saboteur agents, operating out of established American bases, to initiate a wave of terror within the United States. Reports of this kind made immediate measures almost imperative. The practical suggestions offered by the F.B.I. were incorporated into the later plans of operation of beach defense. After preliminary Army-Navy (Coast Guard) conferences, comprehensive surveys were made of strategic sections of the coast. District Coast Guard Officers cooperated by submitting complete analysis of existing defense arrangements in their respective regions. It was agreed that an extended chain of coastal patrols and lookouts would be required to fully protect the coastline against the landing of foreign agents by surface craft. On the 25th of July, 1942, Headquarters authorized the institution, in all naval districts adjacent to the coast, of an organized beach patrol system. Districts were directed to maintain well equipped beach forces in all areas where the terrain would permit. Patrolmen were to be properly armed and fully instructed in execution of their duties. Adequate provision was made for the establishment of an efficient system of communications. It was further suggested that such a system be so designed as to enable every unit of patrol promptly to relay its reports or signals to the proper Coast Guard authorities. All patrols were to be integrated with the regular Army and Navy defense forces operating in the districts.

¹ The leader, George John Dasch, presumably gave Cullen $300, but he later found the sum to be actually $260. Dasch was subsequently picked up at Yorkville, New York.
² These four German saboteurs were reported by local fishermen who found the hidden boxes that contained their incriminating paraphernalia—small bombs and incendiary devices.
³ Directive from Headquarters, 25 July, 1942. The development of beach patrol in the ten districts so organized is presented in this study as separate units on each of the districts having an operative patrol.
Meanwhile, a comprehensive program for the defense of the entire coastline of the United States had been developed. By General Orders of 3 February, 1941, all coast areas had been organized into defense divisions, known as Naval Coastal Frontiers. After the sixth of February, 1942, these divisions became "Sea Frontiers," with Defense Commands of Army and Navy troops established in each area generally to guard the coast and prevent enemy invasion of our shores. When this coastal defense system was completed, there were altogether ten Sea Frontiers established for the protection of territorial waters and the long coastal shoreline extending from Maine in the northeast to Alaska in the northwest. These divisions, the Eastern, Gulf, Caribbean, Panama, Western, Northwestern, Alaskan, Hawaiian, Philippine, and the Moroccan Sea Frontiers, included both near land and sea areas along the coast, as well as important offshore waters. The Army defended the land areas while the Navy was responsible for maintaining inshore and offshore patrols. The beach patrol system was designed to fit into this basic pattern of organization. As an integral part of the United States Navy, the Coast Guard was assigned the task of operating an "information system," by means of beach patrols and lookout watches, to effectively guard against surprise landings or saboteur activity of the enemy.

Since the Army, Navy, and FBI all had tangible interests in coastal defense, it was necessary to define clearly the exact nature of the defense work that the Coast Guard was to assume. The FBI was primarily concerned with the detection of evidence, either of subversive activity along the coast or of attempted landings of enemy agents. Its successes in the apprehension of spies and saboteurs was predicated, in part, upon the receipt of information gained by both the Army and Navy Intelligence. In time, direct and immediate reports of all questionable incidents was a fundamental prerequisite to any plan of beach patrol operation. On the other hand, the predominant interest of the Army and Navy in the proposed Coast Guard System was mainly in matters that might affect their own operations. The Navy needed observations of marine traffic, enemy activity, and the movement of suspicious vessels off the coast. They also wished the Coast Guard to maintain a surveillance over local small craft operating in home waters and to assume the major responsibility for the rescue of survivors of marine disasters. The Army, in turn, demanded a beach patrol force that would furnish it with specific information regarding possible enemy invasion or threats of invasion. Reports must be instantaneous and exact. On the basis of these dominant interests the beach patrol system was organized as a special agency, an integral part of general frontier defenses. The Army was basically charged with all responsibility for the defense of the beaches and for the conduct of any military operations involved in repelling enemy invasion of United States territory. This responsibility likewise included Army reconnaissance and patrol activity. The Navy was held responsible for

1. The Moroccan Sea Frontier was set up in February, 1943. The last defense area established was the Alaskan Sea Frontier, organized in March, 1944. The Philippine Sea Frontier was rendered inoperative by the Japanese occupation of 6 May, 1942.
the protection of coastwise merchant shipping against submarine attack and for the rescue of merchant seamen. Its general function in coastal frontier defenses is that of conducting operations to gain and maintain command of strategic sea areas and to protect the various sea lanes vital to the defenses of the United States. In cooperation with other military units, it is specifically charged with supporting the Army in repelling any attacks upon coastal objectives and with the operation of an intelligence division within the elements of sea defense. This latter provision for a communications and intelligence organization is logically maintained by means of a naval "information system," operating through the medium of Coast Guard stations, lighthouses and light vessels. Thus, the original inception of beach patrol was that of an official organ to act as the eyes and ears of the Army and Navy in the capacity of a reporting agency. It was essential to both activities.

**SPECIFIC FUNCTION OF BEACH PATROL**

While beach patrol was, in part, a service of information for the Army and Navy, it also aided in the actual defense of the coastal frontiers. As a part of naval operations, the beach patrol and coastal lookout organization was closely integrated with the military coast defenses and the anti-aircraft warning system.

Normally, it was directed by the Coast Guard Commandant, under the general supervision of the Chief of Naval Operations. However, in cases of actual invasion, it became a part of the regular Army command. Beach patrol units were periodically inspected by Army Sector officers and regularly participated in local combat exercises, which later served as an excellent experience for men who were subsequently transferred to active duty in war theaters. Nevertheless, the specific function of the Coast Guard was to guard the coast, not to repel military invasion. Any ambiguity regarding its basic responsibility was clarified by Headquarters, when it explicitly defined the primary objective of beach patrol to be essentially non-military in nature. The directive added:

These beach patrols are not intended as a military protection of our coastline, as this is a function of the Army. The beach patrols are more in the nature of outposts to report activities along the coastline and are not to repel hostile armed units. The function of the Army in this connection is not to guard against surreptitious acts, but rather to furnish the armed forces required to resist any attempt by armed enemy forces or parties to penetrate the coastline by force. Since the likelihood of such an attempt is small in comparison with other contingencies which the beach patrol is organized to cope with, it would be illogical to subordinate the latter contingencies to the former.

**GENERAL ORGANIZATION**

On July 30th, 1942, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations informed commanders of the Sea Frontiers that the beaches and inlets of the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts would be patrolled by the Coast Guard whenever and when
PRESENTATION OF NAVY AND MARINE CORPS MEDAL FOR HEROISM BY CAPTAIN W. K. SCASHELL TO S/1C JACOB KLEIN
ever possible. Areas over which the Coast Guard was to assume full responsibility were definitely delimited, in agreement with Army sector commanders. In such areas, the sector commanders were given a general coordinating control over all patrol units, in order "that effort be unified and defense action prompt." Where the Army and Coast Guard jointly maintained patrol units operating in the same general area, centralized controls were set up, by which regional defense commanders established effective cooperation. Methods of immediate identification of patrols were effected; a system of reporting was worked out whereby all combat teams could be notified promptly in cases of actual enemy landings; Army and Navy Intelligence Officers organized a close liaison with the Coast Guard Intelligence which continued to operate as a separate command but under Navy direction; and all patrol activities were integrated with the work of FBI and other local services. As a normal command procedure, information reported by lookouts or patrols was speedily dispatched through intermediate channels to the headquarters of the Naval District, the Sea Frontier and the Defense Command. In each echelon of command adjacent Army and Navy units were notified and the nearest representative of the FBI contacted. Although the Coast Guard cooperated with the FBI, the ultimate responsibility for investigation of sabotage activity rested with that organization. Any request for the assistance of civilian groups or of local law enforcing agencies remained solely within its jurisdiction. In all cases, coordination for complete coastal defense was the keystone of the plan of organization. The ultimate success of beach patrol was due as much to the sustained cooperation of the several agencies involved as it was to the constant vigilance of the individual patrols.

DISTRIBUTION

In conformity with broad, basic provisions established by Headquarters, each district set up its beach patrol organization as it desired. Administrative divisions were duly established, under the direction of a special Beach Patrol Officer, who, along with the section officers, were controlled directly by the District Coast Guard Officers. The chain of command thus extended from the local stations, through the various divisional units, to the District Office. In order to assure a complete unity of operation, it was found desirable to separate beach patrol from the other activities of the districts. Prior to July, 1942, when the new system was formally established, the existing patrol forces had operated as a part of Port Security, which has been rapidly expanding to provide the increased protection necessary for harbours and water-fronts. When it was separated from that organization, an independent, national Beach Patrol Division

1. Various other agencies frequently carried on operations in the areas patrolled by the Army or Coast Guard. Patrols were sometimes maintained by both the local combat teams attached to the defense sectors and the Immigration Service. Likewise, state and local police forces operated on the beach fronts in many localities.
was organized at Headquarters under the capable direction of Captain R. J. Mauerman. In 1943, after beach patrol was in full operation, special officers were appointed as "Coordinators", to unify all Coast Guard activities on the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts. Under this administrative organization activation of patrols proceeded with exceptional rapidity. Hundreds of new stations were opened during the autumn of 1942, with temporary quarters hurriedly erected to provide necessary accommodations until permanent constructions were completed. In most districts the existing communications system was highly inadequate to meet the increased demands imposed upon it, while, in many sections, an entirely new telephonic service had to be established. Estimates, based on a unit cost of $835 per man, called for an appropriation of $720,000 for the first 192 stations established. An additional $12,525,000 was needed in September for the completion of the program. Altogether, ten coastal districts maintained a beach patrol organization, which, at the peak of its operation, employed approximately 24,000 officers and men. Extended beach patrol coverage totaled about 3,700 miles, exclusive of areas covered by strategically located lookout towers. By boat, jeep, truck, on foot and on horseback, Coast Guardsmen tirelessly patrolled the Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf coasts. In August, 1942, the first dog patrol was instituted, which greatly improved the effectiveness of the service. During the following September, the use of horses was authorized. Before the close of the fiscal year, some 2000 sentry dogs and approximately 2,991 horses were on active duty in the several districts.

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED

The establishment of an effective coverage of several thousand miles of beach, under conditions which sometimes seemed almost insurmountable, was by no means a simple task. The undertaking involved not only the easy patrolling of long stretches of open, sandy beach but also the guarding of unusual coastal terrain; sand dunes, inlets, rivers and rocky cliffs; the rugged and heavily fortified areas of the Pacific Northwest; the treacherous shore of New England, with its wild, indented coasts of Maine; the isolated Keys of Florida and the swampy, mosquito-infested regions of the Gulf. Along many sections of the coast, mounted patrols, or even foot patrols, were virtually impossible, as in the remote and unpopulated barrier islands of the Charleston District or in the swampy, isolated jungles of southern Louisiana. In fact, no attempt was made to established a complete coverage of the more inaccessible regions. The most that could be accomplished was a series of lookout posts, operating on a full twenty-four hour basis. Supplementary were the innumerable inlet boat patrols, which operated out of

1. Captain Mauerman was succeeded in the Beach Patrol Office by Captain A. M. Martinson, Captain G. W. Bloom and Lieut. Commander C. C. Gardner.
2. Read Admirals Stanley V. Parker and Edward D. Jones were appointed respectively Atlantic Coast Coordinator and Pacific Coast Coordinator.
beach patrol, lighthouse, lookout, and surf stations. In the First District, picket patrols guarded waterways for long distances offshore. These boats not only executed the specific duties assigned to them but also acted as anti-submarine units, attacking and destroying the enemy wherever contacted. At the beginning of the year, 1944, the Coast Guard had 21,853 boats engaged in beach patrol activities.\(^1\) When foot patrols or mounted patrols were impracticable, or where coastal conditions permitted, organized motorized patrols were established. This was particularly true in Maine, Washington, and Florida.

**BEACH PATROL IN OPERATION**

After several months of experimentation, a general conformity of organization was achieved, in which procedures were standardized as much as possible. Most of the coast, including concentrated coverage for the more vulnerable areas, was under constant surveillance by the close of 1943. Night patrols, foot or mounted, operated from a continuous chain of stations extending from Maine to Florida, from Key West to Corpus Christi, and from Southern California to the Vancouver Sound. In many regions, where danger of invasion or sabotage activity was greatest, a full twenty-four hour beach coverage was undertaken. Elsewhere, patrols were continued only during the periods of darkness or during daylight hours of low visibility. Continuous lookout watches, however, were maintained both day and night. The schedule for individual patrols varied from two to four hours, depending upon the number of men available and the difficulty of the terrain. In most districts, the patrolmen travelled in pairs, the length of the patrols being generally about two miles or less. Periodic reporting by phone every quarter of a mile assured the necessary vigilance to duty. Prescribed equipment varied. All patrolmen were armed with rifles or side arms and equipped with flashlights and Very pistols. Mounted patrolmen usually carried portable radio receiver-transmitter sets, a compass, whistle, and often both pistol and rifle. In many cases the routine required of the men was most rigorous. Some posts were completely isolated from civilization for long periods at a time. Without thought of leave or liberty these patrolmen worked seven days a week, often from ten to fourteen hours per day. In the thickly wooded sections of Washington and Oregon they also did their own cooking and managed the general upkeep of the isolated stations. Jungles were penetrated, new trails blazed through the forest. Not infrequently, the beach lay 200 or 300 feet below the upland. Steep ascents were difficult; open, rocky beaches left the men exposed to blinding snow and rain in winter or to the blistering heat of the summer months. Naturally, considerable variation in organization and pattern developed among the various units. The Sixth District, for example, used mounted patrols almost exclusively, whereas the First and Third Districts only employed dogs. Boat patrols were particularly adaptable to sections of the Maine, Carolina, Florida and Louisiana coasts, while other areas could be more expeditiously covered by motorized patrols. The great differences in climate entailed the use

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of special equipment for certain areas. The Army Remount Service furnished all riding gear, but the Coast Guard had to equip its riders. Special clothing was constantly in demand. Severe weather gear, of long rubberized jackets and trousers, was procured for the heavy rainy seasons of the South and West coasts. Camouflaged ponchos, which blended in with the concealing shrubbery of the forest-lined coast were used by the lookouts of the northwest. Watchcaps, leathern jackets, khaki breeches, helmets or face masks for winter were commonly used. The individual stations wisely modified the official regulation in dress to meet the peculiar exigencies of its climate. In some of the patrol units of the bayous of the south there was little formal organization or standardization of dress. The appearance of the "Cajun" patrolmen of Louisiana or the bearded Coast Guardsmen of the northwest with his winter woodsman's outfit, contrasted strongly with the trim, neat dress of the patrols along the public beaches of the Atlantic seaboard. In more isolated spots, obedience to command, constancy in duty, and vigilance of watch were more important attributes, than mere conformity to regulations.

PROCEDURE IN HANDLING SUSPECTS

Prominent among the definite regulations was the standardization of procedure in repelling landing attempts by the enemy. The capture of the enemy was the objective. That would prevent the party from fulfilling its mission; at the same time, it would enable authorities to obtain the maximum of information desired. Care should be observed in preserving all evidences of possible sabotage. Many patrolmen were sent to Police Schools for expert instruction in the apprehension of suspects and in the evaluation of evidence. In the event a suspected enemy landing was once effected, it must be stopped at all costs. However, extreme caution was urged, that irreparable blunders might be avoided. A landing party was challenged by the command, "Halt! Hands Up!" given once or twice before any threat was indicated. If the party obviously understood the order, the patrolman was instructed to fire a warning shot, either overhead or into the ground. Only when they attempted to run or escape, should the guard shoot to kill. The Manual for the Sixth Naval District further warned the Coast Guardsman that he was authorized to fire on suspects for the sole purpose of stopping the vehicle or challenged party, "but not to create casualties." In the event that the warning was not heeded, the patrols were to open direct fire the instant hostile intent was apparent. Mounted patrols were urged to dismount when suddenly coming upon a suspect. The horse could thus be used as an effective barrier. If the suspect ran away, the horse could then be remounted in order to run him down or to cut off all possible avenues of escape. The second patrolman was to turn in an alarm just as soon as the culprit was under control. Where dogs were employed the dog guarded the apprehended party while the patrolman turned in his report. In cases of accident, or where the communications system was

Sixth Naval District, Charleston, South Carolina.
A MOUNTED PATROL MAN QUESTIONS TWO BATHERS
deficient, the dog was sent back to the nearest post for assistance. Very
guides and flash reports were used in critical cases. Beach Patrol "Red
Flash" reports cleared all telephone lines for important calls. The re-
porter secured instant attention by the words "Red Flash." He then pro-
cceeded to give the code name of the beach, the number of his Jack box,
the source of information, nature of the incident, its location, urgency
and so on. Full written reports always followed these emergency calls or
signals. Combat exercises prepared Coast Guard personnel for the event-
uality of an armed invasion.

**Policy on Enlistment**

During 1942 and 1943 the proper distribution of manpower
was a matter of vital concern to the nation. It was
fully realized that an accomplishment of the beach patrol
objectives would require a considerable number of men.

At first, a quota of 25,000 was contemplated, which called for a decided
speeding up of the enlistment program. With a view of strengthening land
units and COTP details, the Coast Guard Auxiliary and Temporary Reserves
were organized. After the dog and mounted patrols were instituted early
in June, 1942, it became necessary to recruit men specially qualified for
that new type of work. Enlistment of horse and dog personnel, under the
classification of "Specialist (D)", proceeded rapidly in 1943. By the
end of the year, 675 such specialists were on active beach patrol duty in
the districts concerned. Other men were selected from existing comple-
ments to be trained as horse and dog specialists. Special training schools
were established at Elkins Park, Pennsylvania and at Hilton Head, South
Carolina for this purpose. Most of the districts also set up special
training programs, either as special schools or short courses of in-
struction in the several beach patrol activities.

**Coast Guard Auxiliary and Temporary Reserve**

Meanwhile, active plans were under way for augmenting
the rescue fleet. The Coast Guard Auxiliary and Re-
serve Act of 19 February, 1941, provided for the estab-
ishment of a new Coast Guard Reserve for home-front
duties which were normally performed by Regular and Re-
serve Coast Guard personnel. The Auxiliary is a non-
military organization of yacht and motorboat owners and associates, who
became temporary members of the Reserve. While not available for active
combat duty, they wear the military uniform, have full military status
and work with the permanent Coast Guard Regulars and Reserves. In addi-
tion to the enrollment of Reservists, the act further authorized the
acquisition of yachts, motorboats and small craft for "purposes incident
to the carrying out of the functions and duties of the Coast Guard."
Henceforward, such craft could be used only for rescue work or for the
patrolling of marine regattas, but the new legislation enabled these

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1. Usually referred to as simply the "Auxiliary." (Bill H.R. 562) Re-
port on "C. G. Auxiliary and Reserve" from Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries (Report No. 25, 77th Congress), 5 February, 1941.
The act provided for necessary travelling expenses and per diem of not
over $5.00.
A LOOKOUT STATION ON THE GULF COAST
auxiliary vessels to be used for regular picket patrols.¹ A few of the
temporary reservists served on part time pay but the vast majority of
them were unpaid volunteers. At the end of the 1942 fiscal year, the
Auxiliary numbered approximately 11,500 members, with 9,500 boats. By
the close of 1943, the total number had been augmented to 35,481, with a
vessel enrollment of 17,477, organized into 564 flotillas. However, the
Auxiliary program was curtailed in 1944. On June 30, the 51,173 members
were for the most part, engaged in port security work.² During 1943, when
beach patrol was at its height, the Auxiliary played a dominant role in
all types of patrol activity. Since 25 May, 1943, all efforts of the
Auxiliary have been directed primarily to qualifying members for active
duty in the Reserve force. Enlistments of Temporary Reserve were dis-
continued in 1944. Those members who were not discharged from the ser-
vice were enrolled in the Coast Guard Reserve. The Auxiliary had made
it possible for the Coast Guard to organize and man a huge fleet of
small flotillas for defense use in home waters, serving indiscriminately
in offensive action or in patrol and rescue work, as circumstances re-
quired. Thus vessels suitable for combat duty were gradually released
for overseas service.

MOUNTED PATROLS

One of the contributions made by the Temporary Reserve
organization was in assisting the development of the
mounted beach patrol units. In October, 1942, Head-
quartermasters approved the use of horses as practicable in
lieu of foot patrols along shore fronts where the terrain was suitable.
It was estimated that a mounted patrolman could patrol twice the dis-
tance covered by a footman, "without impairing the effectiveness of the
patrol." Patrols were scheduled for coverage of a two-mile front by
two mounted patrolmen, travelling at a distance of approximately 100
feet apart.³ Plans were made for enlisting the cooperation of volun-
tary horsemen and mounts for this service. Special appeals were made
to former United States Army Reserve Cavalrymen, ex-mounted policemen,
sportsmen, and experienced horsemen living near the Atlantic or Gulf

¹The first act creating the Auxiliary was in June, 1939. It was designed
to enlist the services of some 262,000 small boats and pleasure type
 craft than in the hands of private owners. By June 30, 1941, 16,939
boats and 53,396 members were enrolled in the Auxiliary. (Gov't. pub-
ication No. 86) "The United States Coast Guard - Its Functions and
its Place in the Governmental Structure," p.1014.
²Annual Reports, U.S. C.G., for the years 1942, 1943 and 1944. The
figures for 1944 include women as well as men. About 14,430 of the
51,173 total were serving without pay. In order to standardize train-
ing, the C. G. Auxiliary Training Institution was established in New
York City, N. Y.
³Directives of 16 October and 26 October, 1942. On 16 September, the
Secretary of the Navy had authorized the institution of a mounted
beach patrol.
coasts. The intent was to enroll unpaid volunteers in the Temporary Reserve who would be duly indoctrinated and trained in operational duties. Horsemen were asked to provide their own mounts, as well as the feed, stabling and veterinary facilities necessary for the maintenance of the horses. In cases where the services of the mounts but not the horsemen were contributed, the Coast Guard agreed to furnish riders. Districts were requested to contact interested parties and report their findings to Headquarters. The results were not too encouraging. Although the general response of public spirited citizens showed an enthusiastic interest in the program, few individuals were willing to contribute both horses and their own services free of charge. Those who did offer horses felt that the government should at least provide for their upkeep. Some districts objected to entrusting such important duty to civilian groups on the grounds that it would divide responsibility and undermine the morale of the service. Consequently, the program for the use of privately owned mounts was cancelled on the 16th of September, 1942, with the exception of such patrols as had already been organized and were functioning successfully. In certain coastal areas only men and horses experienced in the difficult geography of the region and insured to local conditions were found to be at all practicable. The mounted patrol unit of 96 men and 60 privately owned mounts at Grand Cheniere in the New Orleans District was a typical instance of the success of the experiment.

Meanwhile, the Army cooperatively volunteered to furnish beach patrol with trained army horses and complete equipment, without any expense whatsoever to the Coast Guard except for the cost of maintenance. Army-Coast Guard surveys were conducted along the east, west and south coasts to determine where mounted patrols should be established. Stabling arrangements were made for quartering horses in suitable localities and Army Remount Officers, acting in an advisory capacity, assigned to each district. Horse patrol got under way in November of 1942, being first inaugurated on the East and Gulf coasts. Two training schools for equitation were duly established at Elkins Park and Hilton Head. The Army provided altogether 2,991 horses for the eight districts which made use of mounted units. The results attained by the mounted patrols far exceeded expectations. On isolated coastal sections mounted horsemen were much more practical than any other type of patrol. They

2. These schools also became training centers for Coast Guard war dogs, as well as training institutions for Specialist (D) personnel. Supra, p.
3. In September, 1943, the Beach Patrol reported that 17,535 officers and men were assigned to foot, dog or mounted units. At that time 1,806 dogs and 3,222 horses were employed. The First and Third Districts never used horses.
could traverse difficult ground more rapidly than either footmen or motor vehicles, run down suspects more easily and more speedily carry reports to remote points where ordinary communication was unavailable. Furthermore, horses were more alert to unusual circumstances than men and could detect the presence of strangers long before the rider was aware of them. In congested areas, such as the popular New Jersey beach, horsemen proved useful in controlling crowds and in maintaining a sharp lookout over heavily trafficked junctions.

ABOLITION OF MOUNTED PATROLS

As beach patrol began to be curtailed in 1944, surplus mounts were disposed of at public auction through the services of the Procurement Division of the Treasury. Sales began in the Fifth District in January when two lots of 20 horses each were sold at Ocean City, Maryland and at Virginia Beach, Virginia, on the 5th and 6th of the month. The average sales price for these horses was $65. Sales continued during the year, with averages for lots ranging from $38 to over $100 each. Although the horses varied somewhat in age and quality, local conditions often determined their sales value. In general, the quality of horses used on the west coast was quite superior to those in the Gulf and East coast districts. The highest price received for any of the beach patrol horses was in the sale at Tillamook, Oregon, where 49 mounts brought an average of $117 each.

DOG PATROLS ORGANIZED

The first dog patrol was instituted even before the mounted units were established. In fact, dogs were employed almost from the very beginning. Soon after Pearl Harbour, the institution of Dogs for Defense Incorporated was founded. It eventually became the official procurement agency for all dogs employed by the armed forces. By March, 1942, Dogs for Defense had its first lot of 200 trained dogs ready for military use. Early in May, it turned over to the Army nine dogs, assigned to sentry duty at Fort Hancock, New York. Later, the Army decided to establish its own training schools; after July, 1942, Dogs for Defense recruited, but no longer trained, the dogs which it continued to provide for the Army and Marines. During the first two years of its operation, the institution furnished some 20,000 dogs to the armed forces at an enlistment cost of less than $7 each. All dogs were donated free, being supplied by over 400 dog clubs and countless numbers of patriotic citizens representing every state in the union. After the Coast Guard dog program was instituted in the autumn of 1942, Dogs for Defense became the chief source of supply for the 2000 trained dogs used by beach patrol during its period of operation. Dogs were first

1. Throughout the United States the Coast Guard personnel assisted in these public sales. In many cases, demonstrations by the riders greatly aided in boosting the sale price. "Report of Sales of Beach Patrol Horses," by Humphrey S. Finney, technologist, assigned as Technical Advisor to the Procurement Division of the Treasury.
TWO HEADS ARE BETTER THAN ONE
tried in the Fourth Naval District, where an experiment with thirty dogs, trained at the Elkins Park, Widner Kennels, was undertaken at the District Training Station, Brigantine, New Jersey. Dog patrols were begun there during the last of August. The trial represented the first Coast Guard dog patrol in the United States. It was immediately successful. Within a year over 1800 dogs were on active duty in the various districts.

Although the use of dogs for defense purposes was a striking innovation for the Coast Guard, it was not new in the history of modern warfare. Precedents during the first World War had conclusively demonstrated the usefulness of trained dogs for sentry duty or patrol purposes. Furthermore, the principal participants in the present conflict had proved the value of dogs as fighting units long before America was in the struggle. Dogs were rather widely used in several theaters of combat, notably by the Germans in the Russian campaigns and by Japan in the Malay Peninsula and at Hong Kong. However, when we entered the war, the Army had no trained military dogs, but a "dog army" was soon organized as a special division, the K-9 Corps. A number of breeds were trained, not only for sentry and patrol work but also for messenger, rescue, sled, parachute, attack and mine locating duties. The Coast Guard drew heavily upon this invaluable Army and Marine experience in planning its training program.

From the very beginning the Coast Guard had the complete cooperation of the Army in setting up its dog program. Before Coast Guard training schools were established, most of the patrol dogs were Army trained. Later, they were procured from Dogs for Defense, from the German Shepherd Dog Club of America or by direct enlistment. Two major dog

1. The late Lieutenant Commander McClelland Barclay, of the United States Naval Reserve, has been credited with being the first to publicly suggest the use of trained dogs to guard the American Coast. Shortly after the Amagansett incident, Barclay proposed to the New York Times a plan whereby an effective coverage of all salient points along the coast might be attained by means of dog patrols. The plan was later submitted to the Navy, with the suggestion that such a proposal be submitted to the Coast Guard. His ideas are interesting because they incorporated the essential principals later adopted in the Coast Guard dog program.

2. Because of their greater size, strength, adaptability and general intelligence, the German Shepherds, Doberman Pinschers, and Airdales were favoured by all branches of the military. The Marines, who were the first American troops to use dogs in active combat duty, preferred the Doberman Pinscher, although the German Shepherd has proved to be the most popular with the Army and Coast Guard.
schools were organized, one at Elkins Park, Pennsylvania, and the other at Hilton Head, South Carolina. The Elkins Park Training Station was opened in August, 1942, on the three-hundred acre estate of F. A. Widner. This estate had formerly been the training center for Dogs for Defense, Inc., Mr. Widner, who was subsequently commissioned into the Coast Guard as a part-time adviser, generously turned over the entire facilities of his estate to the government. It soon became one of the best dog-training institutions in the country. In December, 1942, a basic indoctrination course was instituted for Specialists (D), but it continued its basic training of dogs and horses. The Training Station at Hilton Head, in the Charleston District, was formally opened in December. While it was primarily a center for mounted patrols, it also trained Coast Guard dogs and Specialist personnel. A few of the districts maintained subsidiary bases, where special instruction in the care of dogs was presented. Leading trainers and sportsmen from all over America were recruited to assist in the new program. Under their able direction public demonstrations and shows were held in several districts to interest and educate the public in the important contributions being made by our four-footed "soldiers of democracy." Various breeds were shown in action to illustrate the special character of the work performed by these animals. While the Coast Guard used altogether about eighteen different breeds of dogs, it generally found the German Shepherd the most adaptable to patrol duties. These animals were also efficient fighting dogs. A fifty to seventy-five pound dog, attacking with teeth bared, was oftentimes a more dangerous adversary than a man with a gun.

CHARACTER OF DOG TRAINING

The training of dogs for Coast Guard duty was one of the most interesting features of beach patrol. A brief description of a typical dog's experience at "school" will suffice to illustrate the thoroughness of the training. First, the dog was recruited, contracted, and sworn in to "perform active service without pay or allowance." Then he was photographed, tagged and properly identified by a serial number tattooed on the inside of the left ear. Record cards detailed pertinent information regarding his character, personality and life history—information significant in determining the type of training for which he was best fitted. A preliminary orientation period of from seven to ten days was followed, in which the dog was permitted to make his adjustment to the new life. A basic training course of about two weeks followed. Each dog was assigned to two "handlers" who commanded him on the training fields under the direction of the regular trainers. All dogs were first trained to properly follow their handlers, who, in many cases, eventually became their later patrolmen. "Heeling" was the first command taught, followed by "sit", "down", "cover", "stay", "jump", "get him", "let go" and so on. Training was by squads, with one trainee or "handler" working with each dog, and a squad instructor for the group. Periods were usually about a half hour in duration for two sessions per day. All animals were accustomed to certain types of conditioning, such as gasmask, muzzles, riding in motorized vehicles, smoke, gunfire and
habituation to the presence of strangers. As much as possible they were rested frequently and isolated from all disturbing influences. Visitors were generally prohibited lest the dogs loose their acutely acquired sensitivity to unusual circumstances or to strangers. The handlers took complete care of the animals, feeding, praising or petting them as the occasion required. No one else was permitted to make friends with the dogs. The earliest training was "on leash," by means of lead strings attached to choke collars around the neck. At the command "Heel!", the dog was taught to walk at the handler's left side, with the left shoulder even with the patrolman's knee. This left the Coast Guardsman's shooting arm free. When ordered to "Cover", both man and dog dropped motionless, remaining in a prone position until directed to "Crawl." Implicit obedience was required. When the handler called his name and signalled "Come", the dog was taught to approach but was made to stop instantly when he was ordered "Down." The dog would then drop, to await the command to proceed to his master.

ATTACK TRAINING

In patrol activities the dogs were used only at night and always worked under leash. Actually, they were walking sentries, "alerting" by sudden motionless rigidity, bristling, tail movement or by growling or barking. They were commonly put on alert by the command "Watch him," spoken in a low, almost inaudible whisper. "Enemy training" was begun at first by chaining the dog to a stake, then on leash, and finally off the leash. Strange, padded, shouting, aggressive individuals, known as "aggrevators" made quick, unexpected attack on the dogs. When a pistol was fired at him, the dog was taught an instant response. Seizing his pistol arm, the dog fought the opponent until he was conquered and then quietly held him until ordered to "Let go." The prisoner was then guarded while the patrolman went for help. "Aggrevators" were frequently changed so that dogs grew to assume that all individuals save their own handlers were aggressors. Training under peculiar conditions might be given as in woods at night or in high grass, where the "enemy" lurked for surprise attack. Of course, the dog was always allowed to win over the "enemy" in these training maneuvers. Thus supreme confidence was established under all conditions.

CURTAILMENT OF DOG PATROLS

After about a year of successful operation, Headquarters began a policy of a general curtailment of the dog patrols. In the autumn of 1943, the dog schools were closed and dog patrols were reduced to about a quarter of their maximum strength. Curtailment, however, did not anticipate an immediate discontinuance of the dog program. Many dogs were retained on special guard duty or assigned to necessary, limited patrols. "Surplus animals released from patrol activity were released to the Army or turned over to the Navy for guard duty at air bases and other

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1. Voice commands were usually accompanied by hand signals.
Since April, 1943, the Coast Guard has functioned as a procurement and training agency for Navy dogs and dog specialists. By the end of the year there were approximately fifty naval units in the United States where dogs were employed. The innovation of dog patrols was one of the most important and popular developments of the beach patrol service.

The very nature of beach patrol required a careful selection of personnel. The work was hard and exacting, with little reward save the personal satisfaction in a job well done. Despite the many difficulties encountered and overcome, the morale of the men was universally high. Adequate facilities were sometimes lacking but the spirit of cooperation was widespread. Neither material equipment of comfort were fundamentally prerequisites for efficiency. Rather it was the prevailing attitude of the officers and men that made the success of beach patrol possible. Since the personnel were well chosen, the feeling of obligation to duty was strong. From the very beginning men were strongly impressed with the seriousness of the work performed. As far as morale was concerned, special indoctrination was unnecessary. In many regions patrolmen were actually guarding their own local communities. Where horses and dogs were used, consideration of the animals was often more important than the comfort of the men. Upon them, as much as upon the welfare of the handlers, depended the sustained vigilance of the patrols. Love of rider for mount or close mutual affection of patrolmen and his dog was a marked characteristic of all districts. Neglect in the care of animals was never a problem of beach patrol. That this fine spirit of cooperation could be sustained, even under the most adverse circumstances, is at once a tribute to the entire personnel of the organization and to the personnel force that directed it. Their work was routinized and seldom spectacular. The methodical tramp, tramp of weary feet plodding their beats back and forth, amid fair weather and foul, stood as a constant reminder that the military duties on the home front are often as essential to victory as the more exciting activities of the far-flung battle line.

During the summer of 1943, the danger of enemy landings generally receded. It was felt that full beach coverage was no longer necessary. As the submarine menace diminished in the Gulf of Mexico, renovations were in-
BEACH PATROLMAN ARMED AND READY FOR ACTION
stituted in the southern districts. Many of the beach patrol stations were eliminated altogether, while others were consolidated with the coastal lookout system. On the 27th of November, 1943, the Office of Chief of Naval Operations announced that the critical stage of the war required the use of all available manpower and resources, which rendered necessary the restriction of all purely defensive measures. It was recommended that a study of Coast Guard activities be made with a view of reducing the number of personnel engaged in port security and beach patrol work. These reductions were accomplished by the joint action of the District Army-Navy Planning Boards, who determined the location of patrol units to be retained. In anticipation of the indicated trends, the First, Third, Fifth and Eighth Districts had already revamped their beach patrol organizations. Likewise, on the Pacific coast the Sea Frontiers recommended a gradual elimination of most of the defense patrols. Foot patrols and the less necessary boat patrols were the first to go. Mounted and dog units were usually kept to the last, because they guaranteed the maximum of beach coverage with the minimum of manpower. By the end of 1944, the total number of men on patrol duty had been reduced to 14,395. The following February brought the total down to slightly over 12,000. Beach patrol had never reached the anticipated strength of 25,000 men that was at first contemplated. In few cases did districts ever secure the full numbers of their authorized complements.

FINAL ABOLITION

Progressive elimination was ordered on the east and south coasts beginning 1 April, 1944; the three Pacific districts were directed to discontinue and demobilize all beach patrols as of 15 July. Already they had effected over a 50% reduction. But just as it had taken great effort and time to perfect the system, so did it require considerable time to tear it down. Besides, it was not desirable that all protection be suddenly removed. To leave uninhabited sections entirely unguarded would be merely inviting trouble. Saboteur agents could operate in some of the coastal islands for months without being detected. It was generally agreed that existing harbour entrance control posts should be continued. Likewise, a screen of observation posts along the seacoast was retained. Except for special points, all patrols in the future were to be conducted by the Army. Mechanized cavalry units reestablished intermittent motor patrols of the coast, where necessity required continued safeguards. The Coast Guard patrol force reverted back to its former peacetime status. Buildings were dismantled; equipment either disposed of or stored for future use; men reassigned or reclassified for sea duties. Pursuant to

1. Earlier in July, 1943, it was estimated that approximately 1800 officers and 35,000 enlisted personnel would be required of the Coast Guard for sea duty during the ensuing nine months.
2. The Charleston District advanced a strong plea on such grounds for retaining a substantial beach patrol coverage. It recommended a modified plan of reduction in which patrols would be continued in essential areas. Recommendation of the Joint Planning Committee, 27 January, 1944.
Army direction, horses were sold at public auction. Dogs were either turned over to the Navy or returned to the Quartermaster Corps of the Army. The Office of District Beach Patrol Officer was finally abolished by Headquarters on the 15th of October, 1944.

ACHIEVEMENT OF BEACH PATROL

The sum total of beach patrol contributions to the important achievements of the Coast Guard at war was by no means insignificant. Although prevention of enemy landings was its chief mission—the elimination of coastal sabotage activity the raison d'être of its existence, patrol activities were more than preventative. Positive results were contributed to the safety and general welfare of the community in every area where it operated. A part of its assignment had been the major task of guarding prohibited or restricted beach zones. This it did most effectively. Thousands of suspects were challenged and forced to justify their presence on the coast. Numberless others were apprehended for further investigation by intelligence authorities or the FBI. Countless incidents of a suspicious or questionable nature were reported. True, many of them turned out to be "false alarms", but a great number were of inestimable value to Intelligence units, throughout the country whose duty it was to evaluate this body of information. The slightest matter of significant interest was faithfully reported. Patrolmen and patrol boats recovered flotsam and jetsam, discovered booby traps, mines, bombs and other dangerous contrivances of the enemy and turned over to proper authorities valuable articles or bits of wreckage which were found along the beaches. Finally, Coast Guardsmen were constantly available for all kinds of assistance to local agencies, whenever and wherever they were needed. They aided in blackout and defense exercises; helped supervise airraid drills; and actively cooperated with the Army, Navy, Marine and civil authorities in ordinary law enforcement. Among the many public services rendered was that of fire control. Beach fires were prevalent in various coastal regions. Patrols were often able to spot fires in time to prevent their spreading into dangerous proportions. Organized assistance in fire fighting or relief work in local regions of floods, storms or hurricanes was not infrequently the most exciting work of the patrolman's routinized daily activity.

RESUE ACTIVITIES

The most outstanding work of beach patrol was in its traditional role of life saving. Foot or boat patrols were in a position to sight vessels in distress or to spot planes just as they were forced into crash landings. In fact if not in form, patrols became an important air-sea rescue agency. On many remote beachheads or in isolated islands, Coast Guard patrolmen and lookout watchmen were the only people present for this kind of work. The mounted service proved especially valuable in rescue activity, because on several occasions horsemen were able to locate bodies that were missed by the foot patrolmen. Furthermore, the

1 The Coast Guard Air-Sea Rescue Agency was not officially established until 22 February, 1944.
PATROLMAN AND HIS "MATE" PAUSE TO STUDY THE BEACH BELOW
efficient beach communications system enabled alarms to be turned in quickly enough to bring almost immediate assistance. Official reports are filled with instances of outstanding service rendered by patrolmen in saving the lives of shipwrecked sailors or airplane crews that had been forced down on treacherous terrain. By sea and by land they searched, indefatigable in effort, tireless in their pursuance of the call to duty. Such services are not easily replaced. Whatever else communities may think of local wartime beach patrol, they will not soon forget the Coast Guard contribution to the alleviation of human suffering.

CONCLUSION

Beach patrol had been in operation for approximately two years. It sprang up, virtually overnight, as a result of the growing saboteur and U-boat menace of 1941 and 1942. Its expansion continued during the extended period of immediate danger of enemy landings. As this danger receded the organization was gradually reduced to relieve beach patrol personnel for the more necessary duties of offensive operations. Beach patrol was preventative as well as constructive. On the negative side, its success is measurable, in part, by what did not happen. It is impossible to estimate what would have been the ultimate results had our coasts remained unguarded. That it was effective is proved by the significant fact of negation. No major saboteur landings occurred. The military did not have to oppose the enemy on home shores. Obviously, there is no way of knowing how many spies, despite all possible precautions, eluded the patrols by slipping into the country via the route of the eight apprehended saboteurs of 1942. Even as this study is written, two Nazi spies are convicted and sentenced to the gallows by the Army court. Secretly landing behind our defense lines they had "conspired to commit espionage and sabotage." It would be futile to conjec-
ture how many, if any, similar attempts have been successful. Rather let the positive achievements of the security program be remembered as the imponderables of negative dangers are forgot.

1. Instances of particular rescue activities by beach patrol forces are too numerous to be recorded. The rescue of the crew of the Russian Leman, wrecked off Tachwit Head, Washington, on the 2nd of April, 1943, or the recovery of bodies from the Greek steamer, Louise, which broke up near the Little Kinakeet Coast Guard Station in the Norfolk District, on the 16th of December, 1942, are typical of such cases. The rescue work of some of the patrol units attracted nation-wide attention. "The Coast Guard at War", Assistance, XIV. Prepared in the Public Relations Division, Historical Section, 30 October, 1944.

2. Activities often extended to purely volunteer work. Patrols cooperated with other agencies in flood relief operations, sandbagging levees and with various forest and fisheries services.
USE OF HORSES MAKES BEACH PATROL MORE EFFECTIVE
THE FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT

Boston, Massachusetts

The First Naval District

BIOGRAPHICAL LIMITS OF THE DISTRICT

The first Naval District has a long highly indented coastline, extending from the Canadian boundary on the north to the Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island, on the south. It incorporates the waters of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Not all of this shoreline, however, was adaptable to regular patrols. The irregular broken coast of Maine, with its innumerable small islands, bays and inlets, was never as closely guarded as were the more accessible coasts to the southward. Extended boat patrols covered the northern region, operating, for the most part, out of lookout stations located at the more salient points. Where conditions were favourable, Army and Coast Guard truck patrols were established along the coast.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

Territorially, the district was divided into six divisions, known as "sections." Extending from the south to the north they were the Newport Section, Cape Cod or Chatham Section, Boston Section, Gloucester Section, Portland Section and the Rockland Section. For tactical and administrative purposes all patrols were organized into battalion, company and platoon units, in conformity with the naval plan of organization. Each of the six sections automatically formed a distinct battalion, comprising various company and platoon units. Section Officers also acted as tactical battalion commanders, responsible to the main District Coast Guard Officer at Boston Headquarters. Since all the patrols functioned as a Task Force under the Navy and came under Army authority in the event of an actual invasion, there was an interlocking, joint responsibility in all military matters pertaining to operations. Most of the patrols were established during the autumn of 1942, although certain of the surf stations had been operating limited foot patrols since the outbreak of war. Since December 1, 1941, when lifeboat patrols were doubled, foot patrols had been gradually extended. An acute shortage of personnel at many of the stations limited beginning operations. When footmen were not available, motorized patrols were substituted until such time as the new system could be fully activated.

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT

Beach patrol had no sudden rise in the Boston District; nor was it instituted at the same time everywhere along the coast. Rather its development was gradual and fair-
ly slow, dependent upon a great many varied circumstances. Since it was realized that an equal distribution of effort along the entire coastline was not feasible—that any attempt to systematically patrol certain areas was unwarranted under the existing conditions, there was never, at any one time, a general conformity of pattern. As local conditions or existent threats of enemy activity varied, the system was expanded or contracted. One section might be rapidly extending its chain of defense, establishing new patrols, while at the same time, another section would be curtailing activities. For example, the protection of numerous islands, such as Martha's Vineyard, was largely conditioned by the number of men available and the immediacy of the enemy menace. In August, 1942, it was evidenced that the Germans had acquired property there; submarines were observed hovering nearby. Admiral Brown expressed grave concern as to the adequacy of the existing patrols on Martha's Vineyard and requested their extension. At the same time, many isolated islands off the coast of Maine were not guarded at all. Until full facilities and manpower were available in all sections, the strengthening of patrols in one spot usually meant the curtailment of activity in another. Furthermore, as the foot and motorized patrols were gradually abolished in 1943, the coastal lookout system was expanded. In fact, August of 1943 saw the final completion of about sixty lookout stations which had been under construction since the beginning of the War. Four new ones were shortly erected at Martha's Vineyard, Watchet Pond, Childs Beach, Katama Point and Wasque Point. Simultaneous with this development, inspection reconnaissance was under way in Massachusetts and Maine with the intent of redistributing or reducing defense patrols in certain areas. Circumstances were seldom conducive to a fixed pattern of organization.

Inshore and offshore patrols were the first to be put into operation. They were obviously not difficult to organize, since for the most part, they could operate from stations already established. As early as June, 1942, the District Coast Guard Reserve was expanded by the acquisition of numerous civilian craft for patrol duty. At the same time, the district was instructed to station lookouts on the suitable outlying islands and points along the Maine coast, northward of Portland and to provide suitable patrols of the several waterways and approaches to the sea. As auxiliary vessels were taken over and manned, coastal picket patrols were speedily organized. Various new bases were established, the principal one being located at Gloucester, Massachusetts. Definite schedules were set up in conformity with the operational plan of the Eastern Sea Frontier. Inlet patrols were integrated with the foot patrols in the Newport and Cape Cod Sections and with Army truck patrols along the coast of the Gloucester Section. Long distance offshore patrols were maintained in the Maine area, principally in the neighborhood of Quoody Roads, Owls Head, Heron Neck, Head Harbour, Lubec Narrows, Friar Roads, the Western Passage and around Franklin, Mosquito, Long, Moose, Petit Manon, Mark, Cross, Machias, and adjacent islands. The longest boat patrols were those in the far north:
OFF DUTY HOURS IN THE RECREATION HALL
the "Vagabond Patrol" around Long Island and the Lubec Station picket patrol from West Quoddy Head, through Lubec Narrows and Friar Roads, around Moose Island northward through the Western Passage. This patrol followed the United States—Canadian offshore boundary line. Several regular motorized patrols guarded the more accessible mainland coast. A long Coast Guard truck patrol was maintained from Little Machias Bay northward to Quoddy Roads; another along the coast of Mount Desert Island to supplement the Southwest Harbour and Canterbury Island boat patrols. Limited Army patrols continued in all the sections. In some places, as in the Boston area, they were chiefly at Army reservations, posts, or particular restricted military zones, but, in the Maine sector, especially, the Army conducted extensive patrols as an efficient supplement to the Coast Guard inshore and offshore picketboat units.

CHARACTER OF BEACH PATROL

In August, 1942, the Army ceased to expand its own coastal patrols, in anticipation of the Coast Guard taking over. By February, 1943, the beach patrol organization was ready for efficient operation in all the sections. The types of patrol differed but slightly in the various regions. Generally, patrols were planned on the basis of approximately six miles of shore front assigned to each station or barracks. This coverage required two patrols, of two men each, the length of each beat being about three miles. Patrolmen normally travelled in pairs, at a distance of about 100 to 200 yards apart, operating on the basis of four-hour watches. When patrolling alone, men usually covered no more than a mile and a half of beach. However, as more men were made available, the patrols in critical areas were increased in density until there was, on an average, a coverage of all important points every two hours. All the lookout watches were of four hour duration, with one or two men on duty twenty-four hours a day. It was estimated that to obtain the desired efficiency, the services of 3,000 men would be required. Reports do not indicate how many were actually employed by beach patrol. However, Headquarters' records reveal that the proposed allocation for the First District was 1,700 men, as of December 2, 1943, with an assignment of 2,169 personnel for February of that year. During that period reduction in personnel was already underway.

HORSE AND DOG PATROLS

There was some deliberation regarding the feasibility of instituting mounted patrols in the district, but, after a conference with Army authorities, it was decided that cold weather made such a plan impractical. On the other hand, dogs were found to be most useful for both sentry and patrol duty.

1. The records of beach patrol for the First District, are brief and incomplete. The District reported by Sections, only two of which described administrative operations. Three of the six sections submitted nothing but area maps, showing the location of individual stations, and patrols. Consequently, most of the material for District activities is drawn from the "War Diaries" and records from the Beach Patrol Office at Headquarters.
MAN, DOG, AND HORSE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN INSEPARABLE PALS
Experimental dog patrols conducted during August, 1942, in the Cape Cod Section, met with such success that the program was soon expanded to include other sections. In many regions, one man and a dog were substituted for the earlier two-man patrols in order to reduce personnel requirements. In January, 1944, curtailment was begun. By June, most of the surplus dogs had been transferred to the War Dog Training and Reception Center at Front Royal, Virginia.

**CURTAILMENT AND ABOLITION**

Continued demands for more personnel to man sea-going vessels brought frequent changes to the beach patrol organization. In order to reduce man power, adaptations in beach coverage were, from time to time, authorized. It was in part because of this need to reduce personnel that dog patrol had been instituted. As stations were closed, the mobility of the system enabled men and dogs to be transferred to more vital areas, where full patrols were continued. By 1 April, twenty-seven stations had been evacuated and the total beach patrol force reduced to some 800 men. Final abolition came in June, 1944. All beach patrol activities thereafter remained at the par with, or in some cases even below, their normal peacetime strength.

**ESTIMATE OF ACHIEVEMENT**

No outstanding work of a military nature was accomplished in the district. Most of the innumerable incidents reported proved to be false alarms. Reports of unidentified landings, fires, local disturbances, submarines or enemy vessels sighted were all a regular part of a day's job. Valuable assistance of a non-military character was frequently rendered, especially by the boat patrols which occasionally encountered vessels in distress. Routinized work of any character seldom attracts much attention. Its importance perhaps, lies in the fact that it receives no publicity. The major function of beach patrol was preventative. That no serious incidents occurred is the best indication of its success. One example is sufficient to illustrate the high degree of efficiency attained by the patrol units. In April, 1943, a small Navy boat, with ten or twelve armed personnel, tried to make an unidentified landing on the eastern side of the Cape Cod Canal. The beach patrol intervened and successfully prevented the landing. The incident doubtless came as a surprise to both parties concerned, but it was proof conclusive that the Coast Guard was on the alert.

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1. The Monhegan Island Coastal Lookout Station was continued until 31 July, as an improved security to the Searsport Harbour, Maine. At the end of September, all Coast Guard activities at Newport, New Bedford, Providence, and Gloucester were discontinued. At the same time, all COTP units were closed, with the exception of Boston, Portland, Rockland, Searsport, and Cape Cod Canal.
WHEN A SUSPICIOUS SOUND IS HEARD THEY TAKE NO CHANCES
THE THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT
New York City, New York

GENERAL DISTRICT SAFEGUARDS

The New York District incorporates not only the great port of New York but also includes some 1,400 miles of beach in Long Island and New Jersey. The port section has naturally been the point of greatest surveillance since the beginning of the war, but more remote areas have not been neglected. Such stations as Latimer Reef, Fishers Island, Rocky Point, Orient Point, and the New London Base, are all included within the district's jurisdiction and covered by its official Coastal Reporting System. This system achieves a coordination of all beach and waterfront operations as reported by land and water patrols, boats, peeps, lookouts, sentries or civilian agencies. The safeguarding of the waterfront of New York City is the special function of the Coast Guard Security Detail. However, cutter and picket boat patrols are a regular part of the district's services.

STATUS OF PATROLS IN 1941

Considerable patrolling, both by land and water was carried on in the Third District before the extended program was begun in the summer of 1942. At the beginning of December, 1941, there were nineteen lifeboat stations, manned by experienced surfmen. Reconnaissance patrols were maintained by these stations during bad weather conditions and limited beach patrols carried on as a part of their regular work. Near the close of 1940, many of the trained personnel were transferred to special duty or assigned to amphibious training, so that it became necessary to train newly enlisted recruits in surf duties and for small boat operations. As the month of December, 1941 progressed a general expansion of coastal activities was instituted. Older decommissioned stations were reopened, new lookouts established, patrol phone boxes installed, and a fuller beach patrol instituted. Many former Coast Guard housing units had been sold or dismantled; new buildings now had to be leased or constructed. Since the personnel complement consisted mostly of the new inexperienced and untrained recruits, it once more became the task of the older men of the stations to indoctrinate the new members and train them for efficient duty. This was the situation during the first quarter of 1942. By the time the Coast Guard was given full responsibility for guarding all the coastline, it already had an unbroken chain of beach stations from Montauk Point, New York to Manasquan Inlet, New Jersey.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

Due to the unexpected discovery of the German saboteur landing effected on Long Island Beach, 13 June, 1942, beach patrols were set up in the Third District somewhat sooner than in other regions. The Amagansett incident forcibly brought home to the public the fact that it was possible for enemy agents to invade our shores.1 By request of the Army, the task

1. Vide ut supra; p.3
MANASQUAN INLET LIFEBOAT STATION. ONE OF THE IMPORTANT INLET STATIONS THAT MAINTAINED OFFSHORE PATROLS
of guarding the beaches was specifically assigned to the Coast Guard. The District beach patrol system was established almost immediately after its authorization by Headquarters. By public proclamation, certain zones along the beaches of the district were declared either restricted or prohibited areas. Defined military sectors were, for the most part, guarded by the Army. The Coast Guard system established differed but little from the patrol organizations in the other districts. The coast was geographically divided into three sections. The Long Island and New Jersey Sections, being nearer New York City, were the more important and necessitated the greater expansion. The Connecticut Section, which included the entrance to Long Island Sound, as well as the Connecticut shoreline, was more adequately protected by the Army and Navy. The Naval Submarine Base at New London, and Army stations at Fishers Island and elsewhere, effectively guarded this area. Civilian defense organizations assisted the Coast Guard in maintaining local patrols wherever necessary. The Long Island and New Jersey sections already had enlarged their complements to meet the demands of constantly increasing activities. When the Coast Guard relieved the Army at the beginning of November, 1942, the beach patrol force numbered over 1200 personnel.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

The District patrol organization was characterized by special conditions peculiar to the New York area. Patrols had to be conducted within city limits or along stretches of coast where main highways paralleled the beach only a few yards from the shore. Excessive traffic and densely populated districts presented a complicated problem. This was especially true in New Jersey and along the western end of Long Island, where more than fifteen million people lived within a short distance of the coast. These people had been frequenting this area for years and felt that they had certain defined rights in their own communities. Moreover, popular beaches, resorts, and local business districts brought hundreds of transient civilians within the jurisdiction of Coast Guard watches or patrolmen. Thousands of pedestrians had to be stopped and questioned, while many were often temporarily detained for further investigation. Exceeding tact had to be exercised by the Coast Guard personnel engaged in these activities and special techniques of interrogation and examination worked out. Every care was taken in the indoctrination program to impress upon patrolmen the delicacy of the situation, yet, at the same time, to make them cognizant of the necessity of a thorough investigation of every untoward incident. All these matters were so carefully planned that a remarkable efficiency was attained. In general, the public responded nobly, without undue resentment to close supervision. Likewise, the manner of patrolling the beaches, the best way of relieving watches, and the precautions necessary in covering suspects had to be studied and thoroughly standardized. It is noteworthy to record that in the year and a half of beach patrol operation, during which innumerable unauthorized persons were apprehended, not one injury was sustained in this entire section.
The chain of beach front operations embraced lifeboat, lookout, and beach patrol stations, as well as regular Coast Guard stations, distributed along a 140 mile coastal front. Units of organization were set up under the administration of the principal stations in each vicinity.

There were six units in the Long Island Section, located at Rockway, Freeport, Bay Shore, Bell Port, Shinnecock, and Amagansett; the Northern New Jersey Section embraced seven, Seabright, Monmouth Beach, Long Branch, Deal, Shark River, Spring Lake and Sea Girt. Telephone plug-in posts were spaced one quarter-mile apart to accommodate frequent reporting. These posts were all numbered and easily identified. Patroils were continuous during the night, from sunset to sunrise, but not in the daytime, except at times of low visibility. Density of patrols varied, depending upon circumstances, but the majority were four men per mile, travelling in pairs. One man walked along the beach near the waterline, the other followed him slightly inland, along the dunes. Patroils reported each quarter of a mile, the patrol extremities of each station being terminated by a station control terret. Patroils were required to cover the distances between their report posts within an allotted time; failure to make a report brought immediate investigation to that point.

Horses and dogs

Almost all the patrols were foot patrols. This was probably due to the thickly populated areas that were under patrol, where both horses and dogs might prove to be more of a handicap than an asset. No instances of mounted patrols are mentioned in the District reports. However, dogs were used at two stations on Long Island and at one in New Jersey.1

During May, 1942, a system of convoying was inaugurated in the New York District. During June, however, convoys eastward were discontinued and some of the convoy vessels assigned to patrol duty. Escort duty was continued along several runs, which enabled those vessels to do patrol work during the time they were not on active escort duty. The number of cutters and picket boats available for routine patrols varied at different times. During the spring and summer of 1943, there were 84 or 85 coastal picket enrollments, engaged primarily in anti-submarine activities. They operated from 11 established bases and rendered a valuable service in sighting enemy submarines, landing assistance to vessels in distress or in rescuing lives. On the 15th of November, 1943, pursuant to the orders of the Eastern Sea Frontier, the Coastal Picket Unit of the Third District was dissolved. Until such time as patrol boats were transferred to other units or assignments, localized patrols were continued.

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1. These dogs were secured, already trained from the Army. Further information on these dog patrols is not available for this study.
By 1943, the progress of the war had rendered many of the earlier defense precautions no longer necessary. Patrol units were being broken up everywhere. The curtailment of beach patrol activities in the New York District came gradually, enabling authorities to reorganize the system and transfer personnel from one unit to another as necessity required. As units were dissolved, barracks, quarters, and equipment were secured or otherwise disposed of. Most of the men were released for sea duty. Final abolition of all units came on the first of June, 1944. Beach Patrol reverted back to its original status as a part of the responsibility of the lifeboat stations. The old system was again brought back into operation. Limited one-man patrols were maintained in certain designated areas.

Other than patrolmen Cullen's surprise discovery of the four German agents landing on Long Island, no definite cases of sabotage were detected during the period of beach patrol operation. The vast majority of suspicious incidents reported were either false alarms or else they had purely negative results. However, many were of sufficient significance to cause general alarms to be sounded or temporary "alerts" instituted. Thousands of suspicious individuals or questionable circumstances were thoroughly investigated. There is no way of ascertaining the danger that might have resulted had such cases been overlooked. On the other hand, the sea patrols did a positive service in detecting submarines, spotting mines and floating debris, saving lives, and in giving assistance to vessels in distress. Many fires, lights signals, explosions, and so on were reported by both water and beach patrols. Coast Guard cutters and picket boats materially aided in chasing submarines away from the danger zone along the coast. Finally, in addition to effectively preventing active sabotage or surprise landings, the organization had helped to train and indoctrinate hundreds of men for later combat duty.

THE FOURTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

The Fourth Naval District includes the three strategic defense areas of the Delaware coast, the shores of southern New Jersey and the vital port of Philadelphia. Early in the war subversive activity along the coast, as well as enemy submarine action in the North Atlantic, stimulated the necessity for a well organized beach defense system for the New York-Philadelphia sector. Accordingly, the Philadelphia District Office immediately began to plan provisional measures to meet this new contingency. Old patrols

1. The Fourth, or Philadelphia, Coast Guard District was separated from the New York District in 1940.
were gradually increased while new posts and lookout towers were soon established; recruiting campaigns were instituted, cooperation of district units effected and station complements substantially increased. By the autumn of 1942, a complete scheme of organization was in operation. The district was divided into two sections, with headquarters at Atlantic City and at Lewes. The Atlantic City Section covered the New Jersey coast from Manasquan Inlet to Cape May, the Lewes Section the Delaware coast from Lewes to the Maryland State Line. Both sections included "local sectors" of the coast, but patrols were designed to exclude those regions already under the control of the Army and Navy. Commander G. W. Hitchens, Captain of the Port for Atlantic City and Lt. C. A. Osborne, the Assistant Captain of the Port of Lewes, were duly appointed Section Officers for their respective districts. Each section was, in turn, sub-divided into "groups" of stations in order to facilitate more efficient administrative control. Local sectors were placed under the control of the commanding officers of the local stations within those areas, under the direct supervision of the section officers. Finally, necessary provisions were made to coordinate the land patrols with the older and more permanent water patrols of the coastal inlets and bays.

DENSITY OF PATROLS

After some preliminary experimentation and study the entire coastline was broken down into sectors, which were classified as "critical beaches," "non-critical beaches" and important inlets. Beach areas were patrolled by mounted or foot patrols on the basis of two or four men per mile, depending upon the significance accorded to the area to be defended. Generally speaking, patrols were scheduled only during the night, but lookout stations maintained continuous twenty-four hour watches. Where sufficient personnel was available, two men per mile were assigned for all night patrols and during thick foggy daytime weather, but one man to each mile of coast was considered adequate for day duty. Less concentrated patrols, covering regions between important inlets, were organized to reinforce picket boat surveillance. Patrolmen usually travelled in pairs, one preceding the other by approximately thirty-five paces. However, mounted patrols operated singly rather than in pairs. Regular inshore boat patrols were so distributed that at least one boat was on duty at every important inlet at all times. Coastal lookouts made "Army Flash" reports over the Bell Telephone System to the Army Information Center at Baltimore, Maryland. Any questionable observations or suspicious incidents encountered along the coast were reported to Joint Operations at Cape May via Coast Guard District Headquarters.

REGULATIONS GOVERNING PATROLS

After the beach patrol system had been fully organized in the district, the number of personnel was gradually increased to meet minimum requirements. In 1943, when patrol activity was at its height, over 2,000 persons were engaged in this work. That maximum was continued.

1. A full twenty-four hour coverage was maintained along particularly important sectors of the coast. The schedule of duty for all patrolmen was normally four hours, unless special circumstances warranted otherwise.
until March, 1943, when the first curtailment of the service was begun. The following August, a large-scale reduction decreased the number to some 900 men. By March, 1944, the total was lowered to 452. In all cases of selection of personnel, a genuine effort was made to secure the right man for the job. Horse and dog patrol units were selected on the basis of past training and experience, men with special adaptability and liking for animals being given preference. Ordinary patrolmen were given special courses in indoctrination, and patrol training was offered at a regular school established for that purpose. By the first of November, 1942, both the Atlantic City and Lewes Section reported that they were in readiness to patrol the beaches of the district in the required manner outlined by the Joint Army-Navy Operation Plan. Commander Kitchens was placed in charge of the centralized District administration, which was officially designated as the Coastal Beach Patrol. Definite rules and regulations were worked out to cover all possible emergencies. Detailed instructions determined forms of procedure in cases of attempted landings or the treatment of apprehended suspects. Since the capture, rather than the killing, of saboteur agents was the primary objective of the patrols, the men were specifically charged to take no chance of permitting the enemy to escape. If necessary, it was better to kill the suspects rather than to let them get away. The utmost secrecy concerning all incidents was urged. No information could be released to the public except by higher authority.

Any unusual circumstance that might be of value to higher intelligence divisions was phoned in to the station from post telephones distributed at quarter-mile distances along the beaches. Information to be immediately reported included the following specific items: landings, flashing lights, flares, fires, naval vessels, unidentified aircraft or ships, gunfire, explosions, bombings, splashes, hostile or suspicious vehicles or individuals, submarine mines, land mines, demolitions, obstacles, chemicals, sabotage, flotsam, wreckage, and unusual objects. Regular "check" reports were made by the patrolmen at each reporting station on their posts. Occasional measurements of efficiency were secured by means of "invasion" maneuvers staged by the Army and Navy. One of these was presented shortly after the beach patrols were organized and, during succeeding months, several such exercises were held at various points along the coast.

DOG PATROL

The use of trained dogs for beach patrol work was instituted at the District Training Station, Brigantine, New Jersey, in the Atlantic City Section, in August, 1942. The innovation represented the first Coast Guard dog patrol in the United States. Thirty dogs, trained at the Elkins Park Widner Kennels proved the success of the undertaking. A few men had been especially selected to undertake the experiment. Mr. Theodore Kapnek, Pennsylvania Regional Field Director of Dogs for Defense, Inc., was commissioned to take charge of the new program. A veterinarian, trainer, civilian volunteers, and selected enlisted personnel suitable for the work were recruited. Upon the expert advice of Widner, Kapnek and others, German shepherd dogs were chosen as the most suitable for the purpose. A minimum of two dogs per mile, working not more than four hours at a time,
was considered sufficient for night patrol duty since the dogs would not be used on day patrols. As soon as trained personnel and adequate equipment could be provided, other stations organized dog patrols. They were particularly useful for the one-man foot patrols, where one dog was required for each mile of patrol. On the two-man foot patrols, one dog, controlled by the leading man, was found to be most expedient. By January, 1943, the District had trained 375 dogs, with 15 separate dog kennels in full operation and 12 others in the process of completion. However, the height of the U. S. patrol was reached during the first half of 1943. The maximum of active patrols was attained in July, at which time there were 115 dogs operating in the district, with 26 elsewhere in reserve or in training. Shortly after this came a swift curtailment of the service. By August, only half a dozen dogs remained in the district. The following year only three of these were kept for sentry duty and used at Unit No. 30, Selbyville, Delaware.

THE MOUNTED PATROL

The first suggestions for a mounted patrol in the Fourth District came from Coast Guard Headquarters at Washington. It was requested that the possibilities of organizing volunteer troops of civilian horsemen be explored. However, investigation revealed that civilians, even when offered temporary reserve status, were unwilling to provide the mounts and so the plan was temporarily abandoned. Later, after the War and Navy Departments had agreed upon a plan for mounted Coast Guard beach patrol, experimental units were formed. By the end of January, 1942, regular patrols had been established along the Delaware shore, with Lt. Warren McKinney in charge. As the mounted patrols were extended, the District Office ruled that no separate organization should exist but that the new units be integrated with the regular foot and dog patrols. Mounted patrolmen, therefore, were subject to foot patrol duty, while other station personnel were trained to ride in order to effect a more unified organization. By the end of 1943, the District supported 16 patrol stables, with over 370 horses on active duty. All but about 20 miles of the entire district coastline were under mounted patrol from October, 1943, to the end of operations in June, 1944. At the close of the calendar year, 1943, the need for the extensive training in horsemanship had so decreased that Headquarters authorized a horse replacement center at Elkton Park as a substitute for the regular training school. On the first of March, 1944, all Coast Guard activities for the training of horses and dogs at the Widner Estate were terminated. In June of the same year, patrol operations on the beaches were discontinued.

COMMUNICATIONS

Prior to the initiation of beach patrol, the Coast Guard communications system in the Fourth District was almost completely undeveloped. The only means of communication between beach patrolmen and their stations was a single telephone installed about a mile or so from the stations at the end limits of their patrols. To remedy this deficiency and establish an adequate communications system was a major objective of the District Office. Eventually, a satisfactory
service was set up. A plowed-in special beach wire, metallic telephone, common battery circuit was established; small receiving switchboards were installed at all patrol stations; commando jack boxes were distributed along the beach at 1200 to 1500 feet intervals; and, finally, patrolmen were equipped with portable hand-set telephones which could be conveniently plugged into any commando jack box to establish immediate communication with their stations. When, in the winter of 1943–1944, the beach telephone system between Manasquan Inlet and Atlantic City was, for all practical purposes completely broken down, \(^1\) jack boxes were installed on the main line Coast Guard telephone poles along the beach. Local lines throughout the district were connected with the regular telephone and telegraph systems. As the beach patrol organization began to be curtailed, a Detex clock system was inaugurated, which minimized the need for the constant checking of patrolmen that formerly had been necessary. A system of regular written reports and emergency "flash reports," reinforced the telephone service.

**Curtailment and Dissolution**

The beginning of the reduction in beach patrol came in 1943. The personnel was considerably reduced after the daylight patrols were discontinued in March of that year. Dog patrols were gradually supplanted by the extended system of mounted patrols. By August, continued reduction of personnel had brought the number of those engaged in patrol activities down to about 900. Further curtailment came in the early months of 1944. By the end of March there was at no one time more than 20 foot patrolmen and 36 mounted patrolmen operating in the district.\(^2\) In view of the progress of the war, it was decided that the coastal areas of the district were no longer in imminent danger. In May, 1944, the section organization was abandoned, and on the 15th of June all beach patrols were discontinued.\(^3\) Patrols were thereafter sent out only during fogs and storms, or in the event of an emergency. Meanwhile, the Temporary Reserve of the Coast Guard Auxiliary had been organized and assigned to relieve regular lookout personnel. The 33 lookout towers along the coast from Bay Head to Bethany continued to maintain their full wartime surveillance.

**Accomplishments of Beach Patrol**

The coastal defense patrol program as organized in 1942 lasted for approximately two and a half years. Some 10^4 miles of coast line in New Jersey and Delaware had been effectively guarded. The results were obviously not spectacular: no attempts at invasion occurred; no organized groups of saboteurs were detected. But many survivors of offshore torpedoings were saved and vital information was furnished to both the Army and the Navy. The final success of the undertaking is perhaps measurable in its negation rather than positive achievements. The fact that the coast was guarded undoubtedly thwarted contemplated landings. Concerted action did adequately protect the coast.

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1. This breakdown was a result of beach erosion, wreckage, local theft, and destruction of lines by civilian beach working parties.
2. At the same time, there were 80 lookout watchmen and 452 personnel in beach patrol work still retained in the district.
3. Horses were sold at public auction, according to the plan of disposal worked out for all districts.
THE FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Norfolk, Virginia

COASTAL LIMITS OF THE FIFTH DISTRICT PATROLS

The territorial limits of the Fifth Naval District extend along the Atlantic Seaboard from Fenwick Island, Maryland, on the north, to the New River Inlet, North Carolina, on the south. It includes the important areas of Raleigh Bay, Pamlico Sound, Albemarle Sound, and Chesapeake Bay. In assuming responsibility for guarding and patrolling the beaches of its coastline, the District worked in close coordination with the Army and Navy. Where the Army had been patrolling the beaches, the Coast Guard took over as soon as the Army Sector Commanders had withdrawn their patrols. In vicinities where the Army had establishments, it agreed to continue its own patrols for the duration of the war. These areas were located around Broad Bay, Cape Lookout, and Beaufort Inlet. At New River Inlet, a sector of the coast at Brown Island and Onslow Beach, within the limits of the Marine Reservation of New River Inlet, was patrolled by the Marine Corps. The section around Washington, D. C., including the mouth of the Potomac River, is technically within the territory of the District, but it was then administered by Headquarters as the Potomac River Naval Command.

BEACH PATROL ORGANIZATION

By general directive of 25 July, 1942, the district was ordered to establish a beach patrol organization. It became effective on the first of the following September, when the administrative plan became operative. Four sections were set up, each with its own immediate command, under the direct administration of the District Beach Patrol Officer. Administratively, the District was divided into two parts, generally supervised by Assistants to the Beach Patrol Officer. The north division included all units north of the Smith Island Lifeboat Station and the south division incorporated all stations south of Cape Henry. To further strengthen the organization, individual units, i.e., lifeboat stations, lookout towers, beach patrol stations, and patrol posts, were grouped under centrally located "command stations." There were ten command stations and fifty ancillary units established in the district. During the year 1943, there was a general increase of Coast Guard activity all over the district. The number of men engaged in ship duty, explosive detail work, guard duty and walking patrols was steadily augmented as station complements expanded. By the end of the year the Norfolk station alone had 5,867 men on general guard duty, 2,143 on explosive details, and 1,522 engaged in foot patrols. At its maximum expansion, the District beach patrol force numbered 2,165 men. By the time of final demobilization, in May, 1944, this number had been reduced to a total of 680 personnel.

WAT PATROLS

Since a great many inlets along the coast were included within the jurisdiction of the district, water patrols became as important as beach patrol. Before the organization of beach patrol, rescue, observation, and anti-
submarine patrols were maintained by the COTP units. However, only two inlets were actually patrolled at that time – the Ocean City Inlet and Beaufort Inlet. The new patrol system soon had twenty-one additional inlets under regular patrol. The type of boat required varied according to the nature of the coast. In some instances, unusually shallow water necessitated the use of small skiffs, while in other localities, patrol in and out of the inlets were not even feasible because of the extreme shallowness of the entrance. Thus in many cases, only entrance patrols were established. Altogether, about thirty boats were required for this inshore patrol, all of which were equipped with two-way radio telephone sets capable of sending or receiving on frequencies of 2670 kc and 2696 kc. These radios were light mobile units, capable of easy transfer from one boat to another. Thirteen beach patrol stations were provided with similar equipment. Supply bases were established as servicing and replacement centers. Regular reports kept the District Office closely in touch with all activity going at these more isolated coastal points. Boats were on duty during both day and night periods, clearing the inlets and intercepting any vessel sighted in the vicinity. In addition to regular patrol duties, they undertook various special tasks requested of them by the Navy or local authorities. As the year 1943 progressed, it became increasingly difficult to properly execute all required assignments. As foreign duty began to call men and equipment from the home front, shortage of boats and personnel further complicated the situation. When, in the spring of 1944, beach patrol began to be reduced, the picket units were among the first to be eliminated. Such inlet patrols as were continued were returned to the COTP administration.

In general, the existing Coast Guard stations were used for housing purposes. However, new housing units had to be installed for remote islands or on isolated sections of the beach where transportation of personnel was difficult. Plans provided for the fabrication and installation of some 15 sub-stations and about 127 posts. The sub-stations were so equipped with cooking, messing and toilet facilities as to house an average of 8 men and a cook. The posts were temporary buildings of light construction, provided with lookout towers and sleeping accommodations for four men. These individual units were located not more than two miles apart. All stations, sub-stations and posts maintained a five-man personnel unit for a twenty-four day patrol duty. Four of the five men were required to be on duty at all times. During the daytime only one lookout was maintained, but for the night, and during heavy weather, foot or mounted patrols were continuous. The patrolmen travelled in pairs, making only one round of the post; they were then relieved by another pair, while the first pair remained at the post resting or sleeping. By this system no man would have to walk more

1. Each post contained a small stove, mattresses and emergency rations for four men.
2. Of each five-man team, four men were retained at their post for a period of eight days. The fifth man, after enjoying a liberty of two days, relieved one of the four men who had completed the eight-day period. By this systematic alternation, each man had two days off duty or liberty during every ten days.
CHARGING DOWN THE BEACH AT A LONELY OUTPOST
than four miles on any one patrol. Frequent changes of direction in the walking of patrols effected a greater security of the beaches, since the enemy could not so easily discover the sequences of the patrols or determine the probable location of the patrolmen at any given time.

**DOG PATROLS AND MOUNTED PATROL UNITS**

On 1 September, the district was authorized to organize dog patrols and to recruit suitable specialists for the new program. The first shipment of eight dogs arrived at Chincoteague on the twelfth of the month and dog patrols began at Metamkin Lifeboat Station and Parramore Beach. Although there was considerable expansion, the Fifth District never employed as many dogs as most of the other districts. Only a total of 81 dogs, operating out of fourteen different stations, were used. On the other hand, mounted patrols became very popular. Experimental test patrols at Currituck Beach proved highly successful. Not only did horses increase the efficiency of the organization but their use also effected an appreciable saving in man power. Mounted units were organized at various stations in North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland, which at the peak of their activity, employed a total of 561 horses. All mounted patrols were dissolved during the spring and early summer of 1944.

**DEMOBILIZATION AND ABOLITION**

The beach patrol organization was operative for approximately twenty-one months, from 1 September, 1942 to 15 June, 1944. However, its period of full-time operation was considerably less than that, owing to the length of time required to activate the various units. The demobilization, upon the other hand, was effected with a minimum of delay. The directive for dissolution came on the 10th of May and the order to commence demobilizing all horse and dog beach patrols by 15 June, 1944, was received on the following 26th. By 1 June, thirteen sub-stations were closed and all personnel and equipment removed. Stations that could be used in the general permanent organization of the District were retained, with a somewhat reduced complement, while others were dissolved. Altogether fourteen stations were decommissioned. All the personnel thus released were made available for sea duty, although some were reassigned to other district activities.

**ACHIEVEMENTS OF BEACH PATROL**

The achievements of the patrol forces were numerous but not spectacular. No contact was made with the enemy nor sabotage attempts detected, but the routine, efficient patrols carried on just the same. The boat patrols rendered a great deal of valuable service in patrolling ships, ship launchings and in assisting disabled vessels. They also aided in enforcing the fishing and blackout regulations. The beach patrol properly, both mounted and foot, prevented fires, reported numerous incidents or

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1. A mounted patrol actually covered a sector of 3.4 miles of beach as many times as a footman could cover 2.1 miles.
findings, and materially strengthened the rescue work of the district. The most outstanding achievement to their credit was in reporting the disaster of the Greek Steamer, Louise, which broke up just offshore near the Little Kinakeet Coast Guard Station. The mounted patrol discovered the first of the eleven bodies washed ashore. This report made it possible for two lives to be rescued. If no serious beach incidents happened, it is to the credit, rather than a reflection upon, the patrol system. Its function was, after all, preventative. In that respect it was entirely efficient.

THE SIXTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Charleston, South Carolina

NATURE OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COASTLINE

The Sixth Naval District embraces the long stretch of coastline from New Topsail Inlet, North Carolina, to Ponte Verde, Florida. It includes part of the coast of North Carolina, all South Carolina and a section of the north Florida coast. The nature of the coast along this section of the Atlantic seaboard made it very hard to patrol certain areas effectively. In fact, no other district encountered quite such peculiar difficulties. The 540 miles of beach patrolled included barrier islands and reefs, of which the vast majority were remote and unpopulated. Hilton Head, for example, which became the basic training ground for the mounted patrol, was a swampy, jungle-infested island, isolated some twenty miles off the mainland. Dense tropical growth made certain coastal areas particularly hazardous, for they were alike infested with insects and disease, as well as inhabited by poisonous snakes and dangerous alligators. Many of the islands abounded in wild life, which necessitated special precautions to prevent coast guardsmen from poaching. Tidal conditions required great care in selecting the location of camps, which sometimes determined an even greater isolation of patrol units. All these conditions presented special problems in transportation, personnel management, recreational facilities, and in original surveys that would assure favourable locations for stations. Time proved the wisdom of careful preliminary planning. Only two stations had to be moved from their original sites due to adverse weather or tidal developments. In all cases, the morale of the men was high and personnel discipline excellent.

ESTABLISHMENT OF PATROLS

Beach patrol was established in the autumn of 1942, when the submarine menace along the Atlantic coast was at its height. An agreement was entered into with the Army whereby the Coast Guard was to take over the guarding and patrolling of the coast, just as rapidly as patrol units could be organized. It guaranteed to assume full responsibility for all observations and patrols and to report immediately information regarding enemy movements to the Army combat teams. Unlike most of the districts, mounted patrols were contemplated from the very beginning. In many localities foot patrols were instituted at first, but only used as an emergency expedient until such time as mounted units could be established. Full surveys were immediately put underway to investigate the exact nature of the terrain.
to be patrolled and determine the character of the section areas to be established. Already preliminary reconnaissance patrols had been conducted to determine the feasibility of using mounted units in certain parts of the district. This was simply an anticipatory measure which came as a part of the planning that was begun even before the final orders were issued from Headquaters. In June, 1942, limited beach patrols were started at Savannah, all guardsmen being armed with rifles, revolvers, and sub-machine guns. Continuous lookout were established during that summer at various points, while COTF offices organized waterfront and harbour patrols. Regular inshore and offshore boat patrols were maintained at important points for the duration of the danger period.1 Meanwhile, beach patrol proper was being organized. The first post was opened on Smith Island, in the Wilmington area, on 6 December. Scheduled patrols were begun there three days after.

OPERATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

The district was organized along sectional lines. Eight sections, officially designated as beach patrol "areas," administered the various patrol units. Since a greater part of the district's coastline had but a few scattered surf stations and lighthouses, the system had to be set up from the very foundation. Barracks, corrals, stables, and kennels were constructed, communications circuits established, training courses instituted special horse and dog patrols activated, - even a small bloodhound unit was created to locate escaped suspects in the more inaccessible jungle regions. As construction work was completed, men were sent out to man the stations as rapidly as the training school could furnish them. Patrols were taken over from the Army at the average rate of 97.7 miles per month. At the peak of operation, the district had about 1900 men, 835 horses and 200 dogs distributed among the 104 stations directing the patrols. Normally patrols were maintained from darkness to daylight, although watchtowers continued a full twenty-four hour lookout. Footmen travelled singly, or in pairs, the density being determined "by the necessities of the area to be patrolled." During 1943 mounted units gradually replaced many of the earlier foot patrols. They rode together in single file, always within sight or hearing of each other. Rather considerable more attention was given to form than in the other districts. Definite instructions were issued to govern daily behavior; patrolmen wore the complete uniform of the day; all conversation with passers-by was prohibited; smoking was not permitted at any time while on duty; and definite forms for walking or riding the patrols were required. Specific methods of challenging or attack were carefully outlined for the men. The main objective was to contribute to the general efficiency of the system. All the regulations were a natural outgrowth of the thorough training program which was required of beach patrol personnel.

TRAINING

Since the patrols of the district were primarily mounted units, training in horsemanship and care of mounts was a major responsibility. The training school for horse and dog Specialists was opened in December, 1942, shortly after the patrol system was inaugurated. Mounted and dog units were substituted for the

1. These patrols consisted of Coast Guard picket, cutter, Auxiliary, and Reserve vessels.
original foot patrols as soon as the Specialists could be properly trained. The former Marine Barracks at Hilton Head, in the Beaufort Area, became the nucleus for the new training center. The island site, just south of Port Royal Sound at the mouth of Brood River, proved to be an admirable training ground. Hilton Head was typical of the many isolated barrier islands of the district and presented all the hazards likely to be encountered elsewhere in other areas. Its coast was broken and treacherous, its interior swampy and the beaches menaced by snags, stumps, and water at high tide. A wide variety of climate added to the obstacles. It was thought that an adjustment to such varied conditions would prove to be of desirable disciplinary value. Undoubtedly the thorough and rigorous training did contribute, in large measure, to the remarkable success attained by the mounted patrols. Courses of instruction were fundamental and comprehensive, and equitation was naturally emphasized, because the school's major function was that of training horsemen and mounts. However, other forms of training were not neglected. As the school progressed, the training of dog handlers became an official part of its program. Competent instruction was also presented in the use of firearms, machine guns, peloruses, explosives, fire prevention, military courtesy, patrol regulations and in miscellaneous fields of practical information. Eventually a service manual on "U. S. Coast Guard Beach Patrol" was prepared by the school's staff, which became a convenient hand-book of rules and regulations for all beach patrolmen. It was later used as a text for local courses of training offered at various Area headquarters. During the period of its operation the center trained 1,800 men for the Charleston District and 600 for patrol duty in other parts of the country. Early in September, 1943, the Hilton Head School was officially closed. A District Training School was opened at Charleston, which henceforth served as a receiving, replacement, and transfer center for all the patrol units.

CUTRALLMENT OF BEACH PATROL

As the immediate danger of enemy submarines declined, so did the possibility of hostile landings become remote. Likewise, the menace of subversive activity became less important. Concurrent with these developments, the District modified its patrol program. Patrolling of less critical areas was discontinued; certain beaches were relinquished to the Army; and twenty-four hour watches eliminated at some towers. Without impairing continued vigilance, the units began to direct more of their attention to life saving, fire prevention, the salvaging of equipment of wrecked military aircraft and numerous other incidental activity by which they might be of material assistance to civil and military authorities. On 1 April, 1944, a progressive reduction in personnel was begun, which necessitated considerable readjustment. All twenty-four hour patrols were abandoned, although the watches in lookout towers were continuous, with regular reconnaissance patrols at dawn. At that time the District Coast Guard Office entered a

1. A voluntary mounted beach patrol unit was organized at Neptune Beach, Florida, as early as August, 1912, before the regular horse patrols got underway. It was independent of the Coast Guard and proved to be a valuable auxiliary to the regular service.
A MODERN "PAUL REVERE" RUSHES TO SOUND THE ALARM
plea with Headquarters for the retention of sufficient personnel to continue the lookout stations and the full communications system. Permission to keep facilities and men sufficient to maintain an effective coverage of vital coast areas was urged. It was pointed out that the actual defense of the coast was by no means the only service that had been rendered by the patrol organization. It was the opinion of the District authorities that it should not be abandoned in its entirety. At the same time, the Army Air Base Headquarters, Bluetenthal Field, North Carolina, wrote Coast Guard Headquarters, expressing the hope that the further curtailment of Coast Guard operations would not be so comprehensive as to seriously impair the valuable assistance given to the Army operations in that area. With the progressive reductions already authorized, the beach patrol would be restricted to about 600 men, manning 64 lookout and communication posts. This would still enable lookout watchmen to keep unauthorized people off the beaches by reporting any violations to their station commands who could then send out special guards to apprehend them.

**FINAL ABOLITION**

Despite these requests for a partial continuation of the organization, gradual abolition followed during the summer and autumn of 1944. By the end of July, all dogs had been returned to the Army and half of the horses sold at public auction. In early August, the Mounted Beach Patrol became the Coastal Observation and Communications System, which was continued for a few weeks, in keeping with the wishes of the District Office. Nevertheless, the new organization was short-lived. On the 22nd of August, it became simply a Coastal Lookouts system and, on the first of the following month, 1945, was abolished altogether by a directive from Headquarters.

**SIGNAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS**

Conditions in the District were fundamentally different from those obtaining in coastal districts adjacent to it. Unlike other coastal areas, there were no local inhabitants to rally to the aid of Coast Guard forces in cases of alarm or to report unusual incidents. In most areas the Coast Guard stood alone as the sole defense and rescue agency on marshy islands or along miles of isolated jungle coast. In spite of serious handicaps, the record of their achievements is not inconsiderable. The observation and rescue boat patrols were active for the entire period of organization. Innumerable submarines were sighted and quite a number of lives saved. Various boats, barrage balloons, miscellaneous articles, and drifting military equipment were picked up and delivered to responsible authorities. On several occasions, stations fought large forest fires, with the result that valuable timber, property, wild life, and vegetation were saved. All

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1. Floating mines, unexpected bombs, life rafts, parts of ships or planes, etc. were found on, or near, beaches.
CONTINUOUS LOOKOUT WATCHES WERE MAINTAINED AT THE OBSERVATION TOWERS.
patrolmen were well trained in both fire fighting and rescue work. Their contributions in spotting crashed planes or in rescuing injured aviators is a matter of established record. Undoubtedly that was the greatest single achievement during the period of active operation of the beach patrol. There is no proof that constant vigilance actually warded off enemy attempts at landing or that it prevented enemy agents from operating along the coast, but it is safe to assume that it acted as a strong deterrent to such attempts. In its assistance to the Army and Navy in the general enforcement of military regulations and in helping to apprehend escaped prisoners of war, the mounted patrols were invaluable. Full appreciation of their services was expressed in all quarters.

THE SEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Miami, Florida

ANTECEDENTS OF BEACH PATROL

Beach patrol in the Seventh District was by no means new. For years Coast Guard lighthouses and lifeboat stations had maintained lookout watches and short patrols along the beaches. With the coming of war the possible danger of enemy action off the Florida coast was soon recognized and initial steps taken to enforce proper surveillance. All surf stations and lighthouses initiated special lookout, while new posts were established to reinforce the peninsular shoreline protection. Guard details numbering 93 men kept a continuous night and day watch, submitting regular reports of all unusual activity detected from the coast. The first extended beach patrol was the voluntary horse patrol organized to man the Hollywood-Baker's Haulover beach. However, the project was soon abandoned as unsuccessful. The mounted patrols that were later established were carried out by regular enlisted personnel and proved to be eminently satisfactory.

REORGANIZATION OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT

After the consolidation of the lifesaving districts, the Seventh District incorporated the waters of Georgia, South Carolina and Florida east of the Apalachicola River. However, both the Sixth and Seventh Districts were soon subjected to several reorganizations. In April, 1942, the Seventh, or Jacksonville District, became the Key West District, excluding the two northern Florida counties of Duval and Nassau and the counties west of the Apalachicola River. Shortly thereafter, on 21 May,

1. The District report suggests a twofold explanation for the ostensible failure of this attempt: "Lack of authority to enforce military discipline and the obvious inability of members to cooperate."
2. Reorganization Act of 1939 (Public No. 19, 76th Congress) Amendment to Regulations, United States Coast Guard. General Order No. 37 (Effective as of 1 July, 1939).
1942, the District headquarters were transferred from Key West to the present site of Miami, in keeping with the policy of having the headquarters of the District Coast Guard Officer in the same city as the headquarters of the Naval Commandant under whom he served. The Gulf Sea Frontier headquarters were likewise moved to Miami at that time. Some three months later a section system was established for the district.1

**ORGANIZATION AND INSTALLATION OF PATROLS**

During the beginning weeks of patrol organization, emergency needs necessitated rapid expansion. To facilitate the greatest possible speed, official directions were often given by word of mouth. Before the Headquarter's directive of 7 August, 1942, establishing the district plan of operation, night truck patrols and foot patrols already had been instituted. These were operative along the more isolated beaches of the eastern coast, which was more vulnerable than most of the western coastline. Regular patrols were never established for the entire west coast. The long section from Tarpon Springs northward was composed of innumerable small islands and dense mangrove jungles which constituted an excellent natural defense. Furthermore, the shallowness of the water for some ten miles offshore rendered enemy landings improbable. The eight stations that were set up on the west coast had only a short period of operation. Although they were all disbanded in October, 1943, the western shores were not left entirely unguarded. All vessels operating in that area were carefully checked and boat patrols were continued in important waters. Following a joint Army-Navy-Coast Guard conference and in accordance with Headquarter's directive, the Coast Guard officially started its beach patrol program on the 12th of October, 1942.2 It took over all coastal lookout stations and assumed the responsibility for all beach patrol activities within the district. The agreement also provided for Coast Guard patrolling of the Overseas Highway to Key West. In keeping with the general arrangements with the Army throughout the United States, the beach patrol system never attempted to actually defend the beaches except in correlating its activities with the Army coast defense system, which was primarily responsible for all defense work.

**DETAILS OF OPERATION**

Meanwhile, a survey of the Florida coast had been completed in October. Plans for 60 lookout towers distributed approximately every six miles along the shore were approved; within six months barracks construction had been completed and installations continued. Wherever possible buildings were leased rather than new ones constructed; CCC camps that were available were utilized. Despite the chronic lack of personnel, extension of patrols progressed rapidly during the winter months. The district was particularly lacking in an adequate staff of trained and experienced officer personnel to supervise organization and take charge of the rapidly

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1. 31 August, 1942. The District was divided into 14 sections, each division under a Section Coast Guard Officer.
2. Lieut. Commander G. W. Schellenger was put in command of the beach patrol organization.
increasing activities. While this difficulty was never entirely overcome, it nevertheless, did not seriously reduce efficiency. Generally patrols were not activated until adequate personnel quotas could be filled. The peak of expansion was reached in 1943, when thirty stations were in full operation. Sixty lookout towers and twenty-three lighthouse and lifeboat stations maintained twenty-four hour watches daily. Land and water traffic along the Inland Waterway between St. Augustine and Key West was supervised by armed Coast Guard patrols, while forty-five bridges along this route were put under guard. The vital overseas highway from Miami to the Keys was also put under close surveillance. Various factors combined to make this highway one of the most important traffic arteries of the whole peninsula: main telephone, telegraph and water lines paralleled it; the series of connecting bridges, some as much as seven miles in length, which linked the Florida Keys with the mainland, were of strategic importance; and the growing Key West Naval Operation Base brought an ever increasing traffic of food and munitions over this route. A combined highway and boat patrol, with quarters at Tavernier, Pigeon Key and Pirate’s Cove, was established. Along the seven hundred miles of coast, interlocking night patrols were organized. By May, 1943, approximately 2000 men were on active patrol duty. Mounted patrols covered 20 miles and men afoot 12 miles of beach every night. The highways were mostly guarded by jeep patrols. The mounted patrols travelled singly, while those on foot were of two kinds. When dogs were used, one man and a dog was considered adequate, but otherwise, the guardsmen always patrolled in pairs, one walking a short distance behind the other. The system of schedules was so worked out that every point of the beach where the system was in operation was passed by some patrolman at least once during every half hour.

HORSE AND DOG PATROLS

Both horses and dogs were used in the district with complete success. The dogs were obtained from the dog training centers at Elkin Park, Pennsylvania, and Front Royal, Virginia, and horses transferred from the Army. Twenty-three kennels and stables were installed on the east coast and an animal hospital set-up at Delray Beach. Eventually a dog training station was opened at Juneau Beach. The district was fortunate in securing well qualified men for these special units. Enlisted personnel were chosen primarily on the basis of past experience and their knowledge of the Florida terrain. Most of them were obtained from Florida, Oklahoma and Texas. The smooth operation of the patrols was due chiefly to the efficiency and harmonious cooperation of its officers. Altogether 200 dogs and 500 horses were employed in the district.

1. The brief five-page report of the District is inadequate for any interpretation of beach patrol organization. Wherever possible this official report has been supplemented by the "War Diaries" and other sources.
2. This Inland waterway had formerly been patrolled by the Army, Immigration and Border Patrol personnel.
THE DISTRICT USED HORSES EXTENSIVELY ON LONG BEACH PATROLS
COMMUNICATIONS

In communications, general commercial facilities were used whenever possible, although they were never sufficient. During the early period of organization, when speed was so very essential, 70 miles of underground and submarine cable were installed; later, the 60 miles of the temporary underground link were replaced by permanent overhead lines. Immediate communications for all towers and stations was soon established; a Coast Guard line from Jupiter to Fort Pierce, a private line for the New Smyrna-Canaveral area, and the Homestead-Key West system for the territory along its lines. A total of 58 telephones, supplemented by radios, proved adequate for all communication needs. Patrolmen were taught a standardized system of flare signaling, which was changed periodically to guarantee the greatest possible secrecy.

ABOLITION OF THE PATROL SYSTEM

Two factors operated in the decision to curtail the activity of the beach patrol. One was the lessened danger of enemy action along the coast, the other the increasing demand for Coast Guard personnel in overseas services. As the numbers in the Auxiliary and Spar ranks increased, units of patrol were consolidated and men released for sea duty. Restrictions began during the autumn of 1943, but the organized beach patrol was not discontinued until February, 1944. In areas where the Temporary Reserve was strong enough, the watch towers continued their regular services. However, all tower watches were terminated, with approval of Headquarters, on the first of September of that year. Horses were returned to the Army and subsequently sold at public auction. Many of the dogs were transferred to sentry duty at Coast Guard and Naval air stations. Some of the personnel were delegated to other complements in the district but the majority were reassigned to sea duty.

CONCLUSION

During its period of operation the beach patrol force was always alert. In addition to regular duties, it participated in several "invasion" maneuvers staged at the Fort Pierce Naval Amphibious Training Base. This was a joint training program worked out by the Army and Navy to train men for invasion techniques and to test the efficiency of the beach defenses.\(^1\) Such exercises added a touch of colour and enthusiasm to the monotonous day to day routine of patrol. The value of that constant watchfulness, however, was demonstrable in the countless little incidents that were reported. Unauthorized people were kept off the beaches and many cases of suspects submitted to Intelligence or the Federal Bureau of Investigation for further examination. Of the hundreds of incidents reported, the majority dealt with unidentified objects found on the beaches, or suspicious lights or explosions observed from the shore. The fact that no landing or sabotage attempts were made after the Ponte Vedra incident was ample justification for the effort expended.

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\(^1\) Most of these maneuvers were night exercises. Complete satisfaction was expressed in the results obtained.
THE EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICT
New Orleans, Louisiana

INAUGURATION OF BEACH PATROL

When Headquarters instructed the Eighth Naval District to inaugurate beach patrol in the autumn of 1942, a comprehensive prospectus of the plan of organization was prepared. The plan called for the establishment of 105 units with 25 watch towers and a complement of 5,540 enlisted personnel. The coastal lookout division was organized as proposed, with 112 authorized personnel, but the total beach patrol complement was revised several times. Except for a few alterations, the entire organization was soon activated as planned. The system was in operation from August, 1942, until 15 September, 1944, when both beach patrols and the coastal lookouts were abolished.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PATROL SYSTEM

For administrative purposes the district was divided into eight sections, with local headquarters at the principal station in each area. Extending from the Apalachicola River westward, they were the Panama City Section, Mobile Section, Pascagoula Section, New Orleans Section, Port Arthur Section, Galveston Section, Corpus Christi Section, and the Brownville Section. The patrols extended over 724 miles of shore coastline, 245 miles of swamp coastline and 22 additional inlets and harbours outside the Louisiana coast. Not all of this hazardous beach line was ever systematically patrolled, but a total of 98 units and 25 shelters, located at watch towers where no quarters were available, were eventually organized. Units were located six miles apart along the coast and new watch towers erected at salient points where no towers or light stations were already situated. Each unit was to be responsible for the surveillance of three miles of coastline on either side of its base, with a complement of 48 men assigned to permanent duty. Every three-mile section was patrolled during the night by 16 men, divided into eight groups of two each. Eight men in watches of two men each stood guard duty at the watch towers. The remaining men were assigned as reliefs, cooks and office personnel. Although the authorized complement of beach patrol was never reached, it totaled 23 officers and 2,950 enlisted men in September, 1944. Meanwhile, the full quota of 241 dogs and 329 horses had been received. Mounted patrols were necessarily limited because of the impossible terrain in certain areas; conversely, only foot and boat patrols were practical in a considerable portion of the district. Where major sectors of the coastline were impassable, jeep patrols along important highways were inaugurated.

1. Most of the District Report on Beach Patrol deals with this prospectus. Plans are given in full but very little data is included on the organization of the system that was actually operative. The following account is based in part on the "War Diaries" and published articles.
GENERAL DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED

The areas to be guarded included isolated regions, impassable swamps and difficult beach terrain. Almost insurmountable obstacles had to be overcome in the setting up of adequate patrols. Each of the eight sections presented its own peculiar difficulties. Some local areas were fairly well populated, with villages, tourist camps, and summer resorts available for quarters and supplies, whereas other regions were remotely isolated with no local facilities for housing or transportation. Certain islands were inaccessible except by boat, and fresh water supplies had to be labouriously provided. This usually required the sinking of wells, or the use of trucks, peeps, and boats to bring in all the water and general supplies necessary. In many cases, after wells were drilled, the water had to be analyzed before it could safely be used for drinking purposes. A few islands as well as long stretches of the coast, were mere swamplands or infested jungles where patrols were practically impossible, except by inhabitants of the area who were intimately familiar with the local region. In a large part of the coastal portions of the district, horse patrol was either impossible or impracticable, and in particular sections, such as the New Orleans Section, boat patrol was about the only expedient. Furthermore, tropical disturbances and disease rendered the possibility of immediate evacuation an additional difficulty that had to be taken into consideration. Altogether, the Eighth District grappled with more vexing problems in initiating its beach patrol than did most of the other Coast Guard districts.

HORSES AND DOGS

By the autumn of 1943, the full quota of horses and dogs authorized for the Eighth District had been received. Dogs were never used to any great extent, except in three sections. Of the total of 241 dogs received 168 were assigned to the Brownsville Section, while Galveston and Corpus Christi were allotted 46 and 47 respectively. Mobile was given 24 and New Orleans and Panama City eight each. Upon the other hand, mounted patrols were employed wherever possible. Many of the mounts were furnished by the owners, so that the only cost to the Coast Guard was for transportation, feed and stable maintenance. In some communities, mounted patrol volunteers were willing to provide both horses and feed, although the cost of stable construction was borne by the District. Sections of the Texas coast were particularly adapted to the use of mounted patrols. A complete Texas defense unit for horse patrol was organized. Port Arthur, which had no dog units at all, used 187 horses in its mounted patrols. The total of 699 horses employed in the district were distributed as follows: Panama City, 201, Port Arthur 187, Mobile 162, Galveston 71, Corpus Christi 48 and Brownsville 20. Due to the nature of its coastline, which was at once swampy and in large part impassable, the New Orleans section used no horses and only eight dogs in patrol duty. Picket boats constantly patrolled the Mississippi, while small craft also guarded island areas, as well as innumerable bays, coastal points and inlets. Adequate bases for these boats were provided at Bay St. Louis, Grand Isle, Pass a Loutre, Port Eads, Algiers, Houma and Morgan City.

1. The approximate cost of feeding was estimated at about $20. a month per horse.
AIR AND AUXILIARY PATROLS

As the submarine menace grew acute in 1942, every effort was made to secure effective protection for the gulf region. Ship sinkings, with tankers predominating, occurred mostly in the Ship Shoal and Mississippi Passes area. At the beginning, very few patrol vessels were available for combating this threat, although all units were put on the alert to meet any possible contingency. Twenty-five lookout stations were maintaining full twenty-four hour watches by the end of May, 1942. An auxiliary flotilla of sixteen boats was established at Lake Charles, Louisiana, on the 17th of June and soon thereafter others were provided for Abbeville and Lafayette, Louisiana. In Morgan City, 135 fishing boats undertook the responsibility of patrolling neighboring waters; some 735 boats were anticipated for this area by 1 July. During the same period the strength of the Mississippi Air Station at Biloxi was increased by several additional patrol planes. Six regular daily patrols were organized, with two planes normally standing by for emergency calls. Coast Guard planes also provided air coverage for the convoy patrols in the waters of the Eighth Naval District.

WORK OF CIVILIAN VOLUNTEERS

Every effort was made throughout the district to promote the public cooperation of all defense and security organizations. Voluntary assistance of local civilian groups was often indispensable. The exemplary work of the volunteer port security force is well known through the publicity accorded it by the public press. However, the varied activities of civilian lookout observers have attracted less attention. At the beginning of April, 1943, the District Coast Guard had enrolled and indoctrinated a total of 543 civilian coastal observers. In addition to that number, there were thirteen "waterfront agents" operating at strategic gulf ports.

CURTAILMENT AND FINAL ABOLITION OF THE PROGRAM

By the autumn of 1943, it was felt by District authorities that the need for rigid surveillance of the beach had largely disappeared. Accordingly on 29 October, a reorganization plan for a modified program was suggested to Headquarters. It was proposed that certain patrols be eliminated altogether and that the others be immediately consolidated with the Coastal Lookout System. This suggestion was approved and made effective as of 13 November. All dogs were returned to the Army Quartermaster Corps and patrol horses sold at public auction.\(^1\) Releas of special agreement with the Army, relative to the patrolling of certain areas, was effected. Considerable attention was given to the problem of revamping the Coastal Lookouts. The system was expanded with little inconvenience and practically no expense. The authorized lookout complement was decreased from 664 to 112 men. Nine lookout stations were discontinued and nineteen were retained, to be united with the beach patrol units.

1. The dogs were sent to the War Dog Reception and Training Center at Fort Robinson, Nebraska, after being cleared through Headquarters. Horses were sold in lots of 25 or more. The 675 thus disposed of brought a total of $44,775, or an average of $66.33 each.
that were converted to lookout stations. Forty-eight new units were established at former light, lookout or lifeboat stations.\(^1\) This conversion resulted in a saving to the District of approximately 2,000 personnel. The new lookout stations operated no patrols, but they did maintain twenty-four hour watches. Under this arrangement the amalgamated system continued until 15 September, 1944, when it was finally discontinued altogether.\(^2\) The office of District Beach Patrol Officer was abolished by Headquarters on the 15th of October, 1944.

**EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PATROLS**

The contributions made by the New Orleans District, in protecting the coast are somewhat different from the services rendered by the beach patrols in other districts. The continuous water patrol of strategic areas was just as important as the coastal lookouts and beach patrols. Many merchant vessels were attacked by German submarines in the waters of the district and a number of sinkings occurred from time to time. Without the close and effective cooperation of the three organizations, incalculable destruction of our merchant marine and coastal installations might have resulted. In spotting enemy craft and in the rescue of survivors from sinking vessels or crashed planes, the boat patrols performed a signal service. The District Intelligence Office repeatedly reported the effectiveness of the patrols. Miscellaneous bits of information turned in by the Coast Guard proved to be of great value in the ultimate checking of enemy action. Innumerable incidents of suspicious activities were reported. The spotting of fires, lights, flares, flare bombs, and floating supplies or debris, as well as the recovery of much valuable flotsam, such as paraffin, oil drums, copper tubing, boats, rafts, and large quantities of rubber, proved the vigilance of the active patrols. In various ways they rendered special services to local communities. When fires or accidents occurred, they were always on hand to give prompt assistance to local agencies.\(^3\) In cases of storms valuable assistance was frequently given by coastguardsmen.\(^4\) Such day to day activity was never spectacular. While reported incidents, within themselves, often turned out to be false alarms, the sum total of the information turned in was, nevertheless, an important link in the chain of investigation that materially aided in the defense of our southern coast.

**OUTSTANDING WORK AT GRAND CHENIERE**

The most outstanding achievements were accomplished by the Grand Cheniere station in the rescue of civilians and military personnel stranded or lost in the swamps of that treacherous, mosquito-infested morass. Grand Cheniere, "the end of the world," is a tiny ridge in the southern

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1. Established as of 29 October, 1943. The new locations were selected on the basis of a four-fold consideration, (a) the nature of the terrain, (b) past enemy activity in the locality, (c) the offshore distance to the ten-fathom curve and (d) the proximity to other lookout posts.

2. However, the Grand Cheniere area was continued as an air-sea rescue station.

3. Special mention should be made of Coast Guard assistance of the fires at New Orleans (April, 1943), Port Arthur (December, 1943) and the rescue of fliers in the Brownville Section (August, 1942).

Louisiana swamps, near the eastern Texas line. Fifteen miles long and one mile wide, the ridge has no inhabitable sections save the little community still existing at the spot where the notorious La Fitte headquarters were onetime located. Unguarded, it would have been an excellent base for the landing and operation of enemy saboteurs. The Coast Guard unit there, recently styled "the most unusual outfit in the United States armed forces," is composed almost entirely of native "Cajuns" (French Arcadians) who are thoroughly familiar with every foot of the swamps and bayous of this region. Patrolmen are equipped with pistols and radios as a necessary means of communication; pirogue boats and "marsh buggies" aid the foot patrolmen in rescue searches. At various times Army aviators were rescued from the swamps after planes had crashed. Joseph Klein, S. lc, was awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medal for Heroism for one of these rescues. Probably the toughest job accomplished by this unit was in the rescue of survivors of a B-26 bomber which crashed just off the coast. The crew wandered into the swamps in search of assistance and were hopelessly lost. The entire ridge was methodically searched before all the men were found. The work of this Coast Guard unit had become so indispensible that it was continued after the regular beach patrols of the district had been abolished. At that time, it had already saved thirty-five lives, during the short period of its existence. The colourful rescues at Grand Cheniere are but illustrative of the many acts of valor that have traditionally characterized the peacetime services of the Coast Guard along all our shores.

THE ELEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
Long Beach, California

ESTABLISHMENT OF BEACH PATROL

In direct pursuance of orders from Coast Guard Headquarters, dated 7 August, 1942, beach patrol was established in the Eleventh District. The defined objectives as set forth in the official directive was those prescribed for the United States at large, but the developing tactical organization of the district was somewhat different from the general pattern. The Army scheme of organization was adopted in order that beach patrol might be the more easily integrated into the general task force plans of the Army. The entire patrol system was organized as a regiment unit, with component battalions, companies, platoons and squads. However, at the later request of Headquarters, the original plan was modified in favour of the naval form of organization. This change effected a uniformity

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1. The "marsh buggy" is a tank-like motor vehicle used for loggy districts. It has drums for wheels and can cross the swamps at a speed of 20 miles per hour.
of task organization in the Eleventh District with that of the other Coast Guard districts. Meanwhile, patrols had been activated throughout the districts, the first unit being put in operation within a week after Headquarters request. During the following three months most of the section stations, sub-stations, and patrol posts had been established. The complete organization as finally established was in full operation by April, 1943. In July of that year, the last remaining Army beach patrols were withdrawn. Complete confidence in the functioning and efficiency of the Coast Guard patrol was expressed.

**DISTRICT ORGANIZATION**

It was decided that about 288 miles of the California coastline should be completely patrolled, while other sections of the coast could be effectively guarded by the lookout stations. Patrol units were distributed at approximately four-mile intervals, with two major base stations established at San Clemente and Lompoc. They became the official "Beach Patrol Warehouses," but actually they operated as administrative centers and training stations for beach patrol personnel. Administratively, the district was divided into two parts, the South Section and the North Section, whose headquarters were the San Clemente and Lompoc Stations. The north division contained four main stations and 40 sub-stations, the south four principal stations and 21 subsidiary stations. The 21 post units completed the area organization. A personnel force of 1,887 men was authorized, operating as an independent beach patrol system.

**BEACH PATROL OPERATIONS**

Definite schedules were set up for all the patrol stations and lookout posts. Stations were assigned patrols of five or six men each to cover the prescribed limits of the beach under their surveillance. District orders required each station to maintain a lookout watch during the daytime, between the hours of 0700 and 1900. This watch was kept only as long as visibility was high; when the visibility was low the regular night patrols continued during the day. Patrolmen travelled in pairs; where dogs were used, one animal was assigned to each two-man patrol, the leading man having charge of the dog. Accuracy and definiteness in reporting all incidents were especially emphasized. Reports were called in from each quarter-mile outlet phone. Likewise, "off-territory" and "on-territory" calls were made from each midway point between any two sub-stations. This procedure not only served as a check upon the communications service but also informed the duty officer that a patrol was in active operation. Furthermore, time schedules were strictly enforced. Failure of a patrolman to turn in the required reports, initiated an immediate investigation. Only five minutes leeway was allowed before a search was instituted to determine the cause of the negligence. "Jeep patrol" supervision was regularly conducted by the petty officers of the guard. Periodic tests and weekly inspection checked the efficiency of the patrols. In one respect the administration

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1. Low visibility was interpreted to mean "the inability of the lookout to see less than one mile seaward."
was far-sighted. A plan was devised by which all beach patrol personnel were rotated periodically with floating units in order that a broader training and experience for future duties might be provided. This eliminated the necessity of retraining men for other assignments after beach patrols were abandoned.

**DOG AND MOUNTED PATROLS**

Most of the District's stations operated only foot patrols. Dogs and horses were never used to any great extent. Approximately 180 dogs were employed all of which were supplied by the Remount Service of the Army Quartermaster Corps. The initial shipment of war dogs was received at Santa Barbara, along with twenty-four trained Specialists, in March, 1943. A War Dog Training and Reception Center was established at San Carlos, California, to receive the dogs and train the district personnel selected for dog patrol duty. Mounted patrols were considered but careful investigation showed that local conditions were unfavourable to the use of horses in a majority of the coastal areas. Several factors operated against the adoption of mounted patrols. Rough or broken terrain, heavy sand, rugged coastline, and lack of adequate water supply were the principal deterrents. Only two mounted units were ever organized, one operating from Huntington Beach, near the center of the district, and the other at Coronado Island. About twenty-seven miles of beach were covered by these two units. Despite the difficult maintenance problems involved, the experiment was highly satisfactory.

**CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE**

Undoubtedly the chief problem confronting the District authorities was that of obtaining adequate materials and equipment for the innumerable buildings that had to be constructed to accommodate the activation of the beach patrol program. The organization of the system came at a time when the entire state was taxed to its utmost capacity to furnish sufficient materials and supplies for the various indispensable commercial and military needs of the district. Great credit should be given to the several local agencies, as well as to the Coast Guard enlisted personnel, for their contributions in speeding the work of construction to a timely completion.

Although the use of tents was at first seriously considered, it was finally decided to use a new type of structure, known as the "hutlet," in cases where existing housing facilities were not available. It was thought that they would be more comfortable, more endurable and, in the end, less expensive than either the suggested tent or the standard "hutment" used by the Navy. The hutlets were small frame semi-portable buildings, 16 x 16 feet, sided with standard plywood and lined with insulating boards of one-half inch thickness. After undergoing a winter's exposure the hutlets were all weather proofed; this greatly increased both their durability and com-

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1. Some 60% of the housing units were constructed out of new materials by civilian contractors and the remainder from materials salvaged from CCC camps, by Coast Guard personnel. The U. S. Army Engineer Corps also assisted in the construction program.
"REX" PROMPTLY RESPONDS TO HIS TRAINER'S COMMAND
fort. In addition to the hutlets and permanent buildings constructed out of new material, the Coast Guard acquired six abandoned CCC camps from which sufficient materials were salvaged to build the remaining patrol units. Almost all of the electrical, plumbing and water storage facilities, as well as lavatory, heating and galley equipment necessary for furnishing the new units, were obtained from these camps. Transportation facilities were allotted to the Patrol Warehouses in proportion to their requirements just as speedily as vehicles could be secured. Certain of the cars were adapted for use as emergency ambulances. All of the motor vehicles on the patrols were equipped with first-aid kits and medicinal supplies, which in many cases rendered valuable service to the general public, as well as to the patrol personnel. The Army forces located in the vicinity generously cooperated with the Coast Guard in the loan of trucks and trailers for the transportation of materials and equipment during the early period of organization. Without this efficient transportation system, it would not have been possible to meet established schedules in the preliminary stages of development.

Dissolution of the Patrol Organization

For approximately twenty-four months, the coastal beach patrol had completely fulfilled its assigned mission. When, in 1944, Washington inaugurated a policy of curtailment of operations in the district, considerable time was required for the transfer or reassignment of the personnel involved, the disposition of the horses and dogs that were no longer needed, and for the dismantling or securing of buildings and physical equipment. In February of 1944, the beach patrol complement was reduced to 800 men. Effective as of midday on the 15th of July, all officers were notified to secure night patrols and to continue only the daytime lookout services. Surplus personnel were retained in section pools until they could be transferred to receiving ships for further assignment to duty. This was accomplished by the end of September, 1944. Equipment was either carefully stored or re-assigned to other units in the district. Leased property was restored to original owners, hutlets and temporary patrol buildings either dismantled or secured for future disposition. The beach patrol warehouse at Lompoc was retained for storage purposes. All excess motor vehicles were put in the District Operating Pool. Fifty-six horses and one-hundred fifty-six dogs were turned over to the Army Quartermaster Depot. The remaining eight hundred men were eventually transferred to other activities.

Summary of Achievements

The patrol system was active and efficient at all times. Literally scores of incidents were reported to District Coast Guard and Naval Intelligence, which resulted in the eventual development of important information. A great many suspicious characters were apprehended, some of whom proved to be escaped convicts or violators of emergency war regulations. The patrols assisted materially in recovering flotsam, reporting flares or illegal lights, the sighting of submarines, and in the enforcing of regulations appertaining to blackouts, air-raid precautions, forest fires, and fisheries. The organization was accorded public commendation for its various activities in fire-fighting and fire control along the beach. When, in November and December of 1943, "Red Commando Raid" exercises were begun in the district and...
the patrolmen actively participated in the training. They also cooperated fully with the forestry service in maintaining constant fire watches while on regular patrol duty. Several cases of attempted sabotage were reported, which contributed to the zeal in alertness to duty, as well as to an enthusiastic response to all special precautionary measures. Although no one particular incident was outstanding the sum total of all these activities greatly contributed to the peace and general security of the entire coastal area. The success of the beach patrol in the Eleventh District, can, in effect, be measured in terms of its ordinary but not unimportant daily routine.

THE TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT

San Francisco, California

INAUGURATION OF BEACH PATROL

Early in August, 1942, the Joint Army-Navy Local Defense Forces drew up an operations plan for the expansion of the beach patrol and coastal lookout system in the Twelfth Naval District. On the sixth of the month the District Coast Guard Officer was ordered to initiate patrols immediately. Upon the receipt of this reference an intensive recruiting campaign was organized. Without further delay patrols were activated, even before the general plan of organization had been effected. On August 16, 52 men were sent out to Morro Bay, about 230 miles south of District Headquarters, and the first beach patrol was under way. In the days that followed other critical beach areas were put under patrol. Meanwhile, lifeboat stations were directed to establish patrols on each side of their station as far as practical. By the eighteenth of August, only twelve days after the issuance of Headquarters directive, the district had some 250 men operating patrols at the more strategic points along the California coast, from Point Sal in the south to the California-Oregon state line. When the beach patrol system was later completed, it has increased this force to 15 commissioned officers and about 2000 enlisted personnel.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

Simultaneous with this early development, detailed coastal surveys revealed that there were about 400 miles of ocean shoreline, out of the more than 600 miles of extended sea coast included within the limits of the district, where enemy landings could possibly be effected. Accordingly, the beach areas to be patrolled were conveniently grouped in—

1. The most common sabotage device encountered was the lighted cigarette, with attached matches, which was employed to start beach or forest fires.
to eleven divisions or "station areas," each station being administratively assigned to appropriate Naval Sections under the command of the Naval Local Defense Forces. Thus the Coastal Lookout System officially became a part of the combat units of the Naval Establishment, with the administrative flow of command from the Commandant, through the District Coast Guard Officer to the Beach Patrol Officer, down to the immediate station commanders. The Local Defense Commander only exercised control of the patrol units for purposes of operation. The task organization included not only beach patrol and lookout stations but also light stations, lifeboat stations, mine watch stations, weather reporting stations and, in local defense, the Captain of the Port organizations. The beach patrol force headquarters at Treasure Island, San Francisco, set up a rather elaborate scheme of operations, although many of the stations were discontinued before the full system was actually perfected in all the areas. With few exceptions, the patrols followed the usual pattern. Post units were generally composed of four or five men, patrolling in one of four combinations: (1) two foot patrolmen (2) two foot patrolmen and a dog (3) two patrolmen mounted on horses, and (4) one foot patrolman and one dog alternating with a relief foot patrolman sleeping in a hut on the beach. As much as possible "chain patrols" were conducted, patrolling a continuous beach from beginning to end and returning over the same route, each patrol starting at a fixed interval of time and distance behind the next preceding group. All beach "incidents" were classified under twenty different heads, each subject to an immediate "flash report." Flash reports were made either by phone, or in person if convenient, while the incident was being duly investigated. If the circumstances warranted, fuller amplifying reports followed at intervals. Instructions were designed to cover all possible contingencies, but they proved to be rather too complex. Many of the patrolmen were immature, untrained, and undisciplined boys whose imagination ran rife. All sorts of ridiculous incidents were reported, oftentimes with more enthusiasm than serious intent. Station officers found it necessary to simplify regulations by practical common-sense application.

DIFFICULT PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

So many were the difficulties attendant upon the establishment of beach patrol that it was months before an efficient system could be developed. At the time of its inception the district had no adequate communications or transportation facilities, no trained personnel available, and quite a major portion of the beachline where no Coast Guard peacetime bases existed. Of the seven original lifeboat stations, five were concen-

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1. The Twelfth District did not adopt the usual "section" organization plan followed by most of the districts. At the beginning, a regimental system was employed, in which the entire district was divided into companies and sub-units, the platoons. However, when the beach patrol and coastal lookout systems were joined and put under the Naval Local Defense Forces for operational purposes on 13 November, 1942, the regimental organization was abandoned in favour of the "station area" plan.

2. A "post" was officially defined as a portion of the beach assigned to a patrol unit.
trated within a radius of 25 miles from San Francisco, while the other two were isolated 150 and 280 miles north of the city. In all cases, units were built from the very foundations, usually without competent officers to indoctrinate and train the raw recruits assigned to them. The need of responsible personnel was so great that the procurement of qualified officers for the patrol force became a major problem. For the most part, the enlisted personnel were too young and inexperienced for the difficult mission entrusted to them, being new recruits with but a month or so of service training. Some station complements consisted almost entirely of apprentice seamen or seamen 2/c, quite undisciplined and little acquainted with service life or responsibilities. The need for petty officers was acute, with little or no qualified material to draw upon. Officers and men had to be sent into new and isolated areas to establish patrols within twenty-four hours, with no local facilities available and no advanced warning as to what difficulties might be encountered. Furthermore, much of the beach terrain was anything but desirable. For some 300 miles of the coast there was no beach highway at all, the roads being as far as 20 to 30 miles inland. Numerous arroyos and rugged ranges made ready transportation of men and supplies almost impossible, while hundreds of miles of beaches had no means of telephonic communication whatsoever. Yet the Army demanded that an immediate and positive communication be established between all beach units and Army forces to the rear. These were but a few of the many problems that had to be overcome before a satisfactory organization was developed. That final success was attained at all is a standing tribute to the judgment and patience of the entire administrative personnel.

**Horse and Dog Patrols**

Horses and dogs were employed at all the stations with varying degrees of success. About 175 miles of beach distributed throughout the district, were adaptable to mounted patrols. The Army, who had earlier contemplated the use of four cavalry divisions in the Twelfth District, abandoned the plan and turned over its surplus horses and equipment to the Coast Guard. Over 4,000 horses were thus made available at once. Mounted patrols were scheduled at fixed posts of approximately two miles each on the basis of 2½ horses per mile. The first patrol was activated on Christmas Day, 1942, near Table Bluff in the northern part of the district. Within two weeks all the mounted patrols had been established. Unlike some of the other districts, the San Francisco District never attempted to combine horse and dog patrols. Although the dog patrol units were quite popular with the men, they did not prove to be very successful. Many of the beaches were not restricted and dogs soon ceased to pay any attention to strangers encountered. Some were inefficient and soon returned to their former centers. It was generally found that the horses were more alert to danger and unusual noises than were the dogs. In addition, the dogs required more care. Since the turnover of beach patrol personnel was quite rapid, it was very difficult to maintain an adequately trained group of handlers. These several factors generally combined to make the dog program only a mediocre success. Even before the personnel complements could be permanently stabilized, the patrols were being discontinued. Altogether 370 horses and 280 dogs were employed by the various stations during the peak period of their operation.
SPECIAL TRAINING

It soon became apparent that owing to the large number of inexperienced men assigned to beach patrol, an extensive program of training would have to be conducted. After the institution of the dog and horse patrols, which monthly required an increasing number of trained experts, the need of special training courses became urgent. Since the District's regular beach patrol training course did not have the staff or equipment for training Specialist (B) personnel, it was decided to send selected men to the San Carlos War Dog Reception and Training Center, which had developed an excellent eight weeks course for dog-handlers. Originally it was planned to have these selected men return to their stations after completing their initial training, bringing with them the four dogs which they had trained with at San Carlos. Thus, upon rejoining his organization, each man could then train eight more men, two for each of the four dogs. The theory was that perfect teams, consisting of two patrolmen and one dog, would never be separated and that eventually all handlers would have adequate training. However, the turnover in personnel was so rapid that the plan never became fully operative. It was too frequently necessary to assign dog patrolmen who had no special training but only the general training course. This was the master ten week course required of beach patrolmen. The schedule included thirteen different subjects, with a total of 160 hours of instruction. Special emphasis was given to guard duties, physical training, hand to hand combat, first aid, care of weapons, marksmanship and range practice, reporting and signalling and practical exercises in scouting and patrolling. General participation in periodic Army combat exercises completed the training program. Training centers were established at the Army sub-sectors headquarters at Santa Rosa and Monterey, where intensive two week courses were given for all Coast Guard patrolmen who had not been given the longer course presented at the individual stations.

ABOLITION OF PATROLS

The coastal lookout system was in operation for almost two years. It maintained patrols in all critical areas as long as the probability of enemy raids upon the California coast remained a definite threat. Toward the close of 1943, the demands for overseas service became more important than the protection of the home shoreline. Consequently serious reductions of patrols were made during the winter and spring of 1944. All district beach patrols were discontinued and demobilized, beginning on the 15th of July, 1944. On 30 September, all those operational units of the coastal lookout system that had been known as the beach patrol force ceased to exist.

CONCLUSION

After nearly two years of hard and extremely monotonous duty, beach patrol, for hundreds of the men participating in the program became an almost forgotten memory. The early days of confusion and inadequate equipment had gradually given way to order and efficiency. But the routine patrolling had gone on night

1. Altogether 73 men completed the prescribed eight weeks course at San Carlos.
after night, with little of interest having happened to break the tiring
vigil. No serious incidents occurred, no saboteurs were discovered, no
enemy landings attempted. A number of suspicious characters were picked
up and turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but the beach
patrol force never knew the final results of the inquiry. Only when they
had an opportunity of rendering assistance to individuals or local authori-
ties did their work on the lonely beaches attract any attention. But com-
munities unconsciously felt more at ease because of them; their homes and
families were safeguarded. The enemy knew, too, and so the attempts of
sabotage were never made. Furthermore, at least one definite objective had
been realized. Signalling from land to sea, which had been such a persis-
tant problem during the early months of patrol, had been eliminated, al-
though just how much of it represented subversive activity will never be
explained. These negative achievements were the real criteria of success.
That nothing spectacular can be recorded is a lasting tribute to every
beach patrolman on the American coast.

THE THIRTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Seattle, Washington

UNIQUE CHARACTER OF BEACH PATROL IN THE THIRTEENTH DISTRICT

The history of beach patrol in the Thirteenth Naval Dis-
trict represents something of a departure from the devel-
opment of the national beach patrol organization. Al-
though procedures were standardized and the same general
pattern of organization used, natural topography and local
circumstances combined to give it a colour not found in
other districts. While basic operations were similar in
all areas, regional problems altered the character of their development
along the northern Pacific coast. Difficult terrain, inclement weather,
rocky promontories, impassible cliffs, and the unusual vulnerability of
certain sections of the shore presented obstacles at once singular and
unique. Because of the hazardous nature of long stretches of the beach,
the coastal lookout system and the inlet patrols were of considerably more
importance here than elsewhere in the United States. Likewise, a compre-
hensive picture of the activities of the various district stations gives
a wide variation in pattern and form. Adjustments required of personnel
to meet these diverse situations was necessarily great. Consequently,
every effort had to be directed toward sustaining a high morale among the
men. The record of how these different situations were met and overcome
is the story of the Northwest beach patrol.

INITIATION AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT

On the sixth of August, 1942, the district was ordered
to organize a system of patrols along its 330 miles of
coastline.1 At the time, danger of enemy activity along
the Pacific coast was imminent. Extreme urgency demanded
that all necessary steps should be taken immediately to
activate an efficient patrol as soon as possible. There was no time for

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1.Tidal Shore Line unit measure 3 statute miles, is 1220 statute miles
and includes inlets, bays, and sounds.
extensive planning or for a systematic training of the required personnel. Both were, of necessity, accomplished concurrently with the development of patrol operations. The Coast Guard had already made previous surveys in setting up the lookout system. This information, supplemented by a complete set of coastal maps furnished by the Army, greatly facilitated the speed with which the patrols were established. Operations were started in the Lake Ozette region on 1 September, 1942, with a complete coverage twice a day for the 26 miles of beach along that section. Other units soon followed. By the end of March, 1943, the bulk of the patrols throughout the district had become effective. During the two-year period of its existence the organization grew in size and efficiency. At the peak of District operations as many as 3,132 Coast Guardsmen were employed in patrol duties.

THE LOOKOUT SYSTEM

Actually, several patrols were already in operation before Headquarters directed that emergency measures be taken. As early as May, 1942, the District Coast Guard Officer had instituted day and night patrols out of various stations, as a substitute for lookout watches during periods of low visibility when stationary guards were unable to detect attempted landings on the beach. Thus foot or motor patrols had been regularly operating some two months before the authorized beach patrol was formally established. This earlier development, however, was merely an extension of the Coastal Lookout System which had been organized in November of 1941. The ten original lighthouses along the coast of Oregon and Washington were equipped with signalling searchlights and manned by four Coast Guardsmen each. Other sites were subsequently selected and new lookout posts erected at salient points. Often these were high towers situated at some strategic coast projection, but sometimes they were merely sheltered huts designed to house searchlight, telephone, heater, power connection, binocular, dumb compass, and living accommodations for four enlisted men. Later, dogs were assigned to many of these lookout stations. At the beginning, the lookout posts were attached to the lifeboat stations. The men assigned to them were specially trained for the work; all were armed with rifles and pistols. In addition, machine guns were furnished to those stations where landing operations appeared likely. By the end of April, 1942, the district had thirteen lifeboat stations, maintaining a continuous lookout watch at harbour entrances, and twenty-six separate coastal lookout stations strategically located along the more vulnerable sections of the coast. Aided by Army posts and local civilian informers, the Coastal Lookout System was functioning smoothly and successfully when the more complete system of beach patrol was initiated. The two organizations logically supplemented each other. Beach patrol with its more extended coverage by inlet and mounted patrols was superimposed upon the structural foundations already established. In time it came to absorb the earlier system. Without this original chain of coastal lookout stations, the rapid expansion of beach patrol would have been impossible.

INLET PATROLS

Many isolated inlets and secluded coves of the highly dented northern coast offered excellent opportunities for enemy activity. Effective coverage of these waters was virtually impossible by anything except small boat
patrols. Accordingly, control stations were set up at important bays and river entrances, where administrative centers were desirable. From these centers, boat patrols were sent out to the various, more inaccessible inlets. If such inlets were remote from their administrative base, they operated as quasi-independent units, even performing the more important duties of the major control stations. When the system was perfected, inlet patrol boats were stationed at every principal inlet in the district. As in the case of the lookout stations, they were fully integrated with the central beach patrol organization. The main objective was never obscured; the primary mission of all stations at that time was to guarantee complete protection of the entire coastline of the district.

MAJOR DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED

To appreciate truly the character of the Seattle patrol organization it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the many difficulties that had to be surmounted in the long weary months of preliminary development.

To those engaged in the undertaking, the success in overcoming these barriers was an achievement within itself. First of all, meticulous surveys revealed the fact that the unusual terrain of the Oregon-Washington coast offered unusual handicaps. Not only did beach hazards have to be overcome, but continuous patrols had to be established under the most unfavourable weather conditions, in regions where food, supplies, and shelter were not readily available. The question of housing—the setting up and maintenance in full operation of stations that were literally built from nothing in the midst of a virgin forest, therefore, was a major problem. Special clothing and equipment were required to meet exigencies of the rigorous winter weather. Communication lines had to be installed in places where any contact with the outside world hardly existed. Under such circumstances, the success or failure of the beginning patrols largely depended upon the quality of the personnel selected to form these pioneer units. Morale building was no idle speculation but rather the deliberate planning of officers who realized that efficiency depended upon an enthusiastic complement. Furthermore, when all this had been accomplished, it was found that the Coast Guard lacked legal authority for the proper execution of its primary responsibilities.¹

ANALYSIS OF DISTRICT COASTLINE

The District’s coastline may be analyzed on the basis of its three natural divisions, which were to become the administrative sectors of the beach patrol organization.

¹Not until August, 1943, did the Coast Guard have the necessary legal authority to order persons from the beaches or institute criminal proceedings against people violating their orders. It was very demoralizing to expect patrolmen to exercise necessary vigilance when, at the same time, they had no actual power to enforce the orders they were attempting to execute. The Commanding General of the Western Defense Command refused to issue the desired regulations. The situation was clarified, however, when the governors of Oregon and Washington gave full authority to the Coast Guard by public proclamations.
Diversities of configuration, topography, and climate are pronounced. The Coos Bay Sector, in the South, includes about a hundred miles of hard sand beaches, but the remainder of its some two hundred miles of coast consists of an almost unbroken line of apparently impossibly rocky cliffs. However, impenetrable as it may seem, it is actually broken by many accessible inlets and quiet secluded coves, tucked away among the more prominent rock promontories. These hidden spots offered marvelous locations for secret enemy rendezvous. They were rendered particularly vulnerable by heavy timber which effectively conceals them, both to seaward and from the shore. At some points the cliffs are very rugged, rising directly out of the sea at the shore edge. Many of the open beaches are marked by stretches of sand dunes and marshes. Weather is frequently heavy, with unexpected fogs appearing at all seasons but particularly during the period from late July to October. Coastal lookout watches and inlet boat patrols were especially practicable in parts of this region. Further to the northward, between Cape Elizabeth and the mouth of the Salmon River, lies a long sandy beach extending for a distance of approximately one hundred miles. It is broken only by rocky headlands in the southern portion. Sheltered coves and inlets appear here and there to break the continuity of the generally wide sandy beach. They are sheltered by heavy timber lines and sometimes protected, as in the case of Cape Lookout, by long, almost perpendicular rock walls projecting straight out into the sea. Good roads follow the coastline along most of this area. Although heavy storms are prevalent during the winter and recurrent fogs obscure the coast in the early summer months, the weather is frequently mild and the sea calm. This Astoria Section is quite suitable for foot and mounted patrols. In contrast, the northern Port Angeles Sector, from Cape Flattery, which lies across the Juan de Fuca Strait from Vancouver Island southward to Cape Elizabeth, is mostly a series of rocky promontories, linked together by short sand beaches along sixty-five miles of rugged coast. The coastline there is densely wooded, sparsely populated if inhabited at all, and mostly inaccessible by roads. Heavy weather usually prevails. Dense blankets of fog settle over the district for weeks at a time, while deep winter snows cover the entire region. It is true that certain parts of this long shoreline were virtually impregnable, but many areas were vulnerable and had to be carefully guarded. Regardless of weather or terrain Coast Guard outposts had to carry on as best they could under the most adverse conditions.

**HOUSING AND COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES**

As patrols were established, immediate arrangements for quarters and subsistence were provided. In the more populated regions local inns, tourist camps, cabins, or whatever buildings were available were leased for this purpose, but in other sections standardized tents were utilized. In the uninhabited areas of the north, the patrol units were forced to shift for themselves. Convoys of trucks and privately owned cars carried the men to within hiking distance of the proposed location of a patrol center. With compasses, firearms, and loaded packs, they trekked through the forest to set up a new station. Tents, shelters or makeshift
lean-tos sufficed for quarters until they had built and equipped their station house. Isolated for weeks at a time, they faced the task of doing a full day's duty as their regular job and during their spare time, hewing out of the wilderness a service home. They were hunters, housewives, and guardsmen all in one, with only the companionship of skunks, rats, and vermin to remind them of the luxuries of the civilization they had left. Pioneer-like resourcefulness was a vital pre-requisite for such work. The men literally carried food, tools, building materials, and cooking utensils, clothing — in fact, every bit of equipment over miles of broken trail to their camps. In addition to building themselves a station, they not infrequently were obliged to undertake the establishment of a reliable communications system. And this within a time unit, because everything was a "rush job." In the language of the District Report, "the achievement of this goal required the clearing of right-of-ways through forests of wild and rugged territory, and the setting of pole lines under the most adverse weather conditions and in the most obstinate of terrain." The Oregon coastal area was generally served by independent telephone companies, some of which were uncooperative. Attachments to such circuits proved alike expensive and inefficient. Wherever possible the Coast Guard constructed its own lines and installed its own equipment, often with the faithful cooperation of local Army units. Supplemented by radio sets, used by both patrol boats and the lookout towers, the communications maintained throughout the district were at once speedy and practicable. Portable receiver-transmitter radios, the popular walkie-talkie sets used generally by the Coast Guard beach patrols, were furnished to all patrolmen on the beaches. In April, 1944, tactical exercises indicated the practical efficiency of the system. Trial messages from the beach at Westport to the Western Defense Command headquarters, via Coast Guard installations at Grayland, Washington, were received within twenty minutes of initiation. Such speed guaranteed that information of the landing of any enemy commandos would be reported in ample time for adequate defense.

The organized patrols in the Thirteenth District differed but little from the established national pattern. The main problem was in getting the organization established on a scheduled working basis. By August, 1943, the entire coastline was under patrol, or about 500

1. The most typical of this sort of cooperation was the splendid efforts of the Coast Guardsmen who established the patrol station at the north end of Lake Ozette. Between the first of September, 1942, and the following Christmas, they built a barracks, storeroom, armory, and other essential structures, as well as opening up 18 miles of forest trails. In the face of such odds as these, it is little wonder that small accomplishments, such as an improvised shower, gave them unrestrained pride.
miles of waterfront. Dog patrols began in February of that year and continued to be used throughout the period of operation. A total of 463 dogs and 117 handlers were employed at 36 different stations or posts. Horses were introduced a few months before the first shipment of dogs arrived. On the tenth of March, 1943, the first mounted patrols were inaugurated at Ocean Park, Washington. When station complements began to be reduced in the autumn of 1943, horse patrols were automatically increased as the only feasible means of maintaining an effective coverage of the coast with such a limited personnel. Nineteen of the thirty-six patrol units continued the mounted patrols until their final abolition in July, 1944. Due to weather conditions, both day and night patrols were maintained, operating on a basis of six-hour patrols covering from twenty to thirty miles. Horses proved successful and economical. As in most districts a high morale prevailed among the horse and dog personnel. The innate love of man for a horse or a dog was clearly reflected in the pride with which he praised the animals under his care.

REDUCTION AND ABOLITION

As the war successfully progressed, beach patrol became less and less important. Contemplated reductions in personnel became effective in August, 1943, when the total number of enlisted men engaged in patrol and lookout duties was reduced to 1,450. Mounted patrols were extended during the night, but were replaced in the daytime by continuous lookout watches. Further study of coastal sections indicated that the vulnerable areas could be covered by about 216 miles of patrolled coastline. Since the spring of 1944, the mechanized cavalry had been withdrawn from Oregon and Washington, so the Army was reluctant to agree to the abandonment of all patrols. Nevertheless, the beach patrol organization was finally abolished on the twenty-second of July, 1944. The Coastal Lookout System was then revamped to meet the needs of a limited defense. A unique feature of the new defense system was the organization of "informers", or authorized civilian agents, who were appointed by the Western Defense Command as intelligence operators. They investigated suspicious incidents and reported their findings to the State Police, Forest Service or the Coast Guard, where it was routed to the Army and Navy Intelligence.

EVALUATION OF BEACH PATROL ACTIVITIES

It is always difficult to evaluate negative achievements. The function of beach patrol was preventative – to serve as a deterrent to enemy action operating in the vicinity of coastal waters. As such the District's organization was eminently successful. No overt action occurred. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that certain incidents, discovered in time, tended to ward off further enemy action. Yet the patrols rendered other services to the coastal communities that

1. The daily rations of the patrol horses is interesting. The District Report includes the average feeding schedule: 10 lbs. oats, 2 lbs. bran, 1 lb. timothy, 5 lbs. alfalfa, 5 lbs. straw and as much salt as needed.
were strictly not within their specific line of duty. They were zealous in their assistance to the State Highway Patrol and the Forest Service - Detection and control of forest fires was one of their major contributions. In significant rescue work, patrolmen won the confidence and respect of the entire district. The most spectacular occurrence during the period of operation was the rescue of the survivors of the wrecked Lamut, in April, 1943. The lives of the passengers and the entire crew were saved as a result of the tireless efforts of the Coast Guardsmen from the LaPush Beach Patrol Station. This one incident was sufficient to justify the full two years of hard, routined activity.