

Crony Attack

Strategic Attack's Silver Bullet?

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Contents

<i>Chapter</i>		<i>Page</i>
	DISCLAIMER	<i>ii</i>
	ABSTRACT	<i>v</i>
	ABOUT THE AUTHOR	<i>vii</i>
	ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	<i>ix</i>
1	INTRODUCTION	1
2	BACKGROUND	5
3	THEORY OF CRONY ATTACK.	15
4	STRATEGY OF CRONY ATTACK	21
5	OPERATION ALLIED FORCE: A CASE STUDY	27
6	CONCLUSIONS	41
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.	43

Illustrations

<i>Figure</i>		
1	Ehrhard's air strategy analysis framework	3
2	Mechanism close-up	3
3	Political institutions necessary for leader selection	12

<i>Table</i>		
1	Strategic attack theorist summary	9

Abstract

As a strategy, crony attack targets key elite supporters of an enemy leader to effect policy change in the attacker's favor. It is also one of a set of tools used in coercive diplomacy. Other tools include economic sanctions and information operations. To properly and efficiently leverage the potentially powerful mechanism of crony attack demands coordination among those responsible for wielding the military, diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power.

This thesis describes crony attack, comments on requirements for successful development of crony attack methodology, and investigates a prominent case where the United States apparently used this strategy. This thesis treats crony attack primarily as a form of strategic attack, carried out during the air campaign portion of military operations. It also outlines a theoretical foundation for such a targeting strategy. While acknowledging that current policy and practice regarding ongoing and recent crony attacks are properly mired in secrecy, this paper investigates the case of crony attack against the Slobodan Milosevic regime during Operation Allied Force in 1999. The damage to capital-producing facilities, controlled by key political supporters of Milosevic and his wife, eventually incited those supporters to push for policy change and an end to the war.

About the Author

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In this new era of warfare, we can target a regime, not a nation. Our aim is to track and strike the guilty. Terrorists and tyrants have now been put on notice; they can no longer feel safe hiding behind innocent lives.

—Pres. George W. Bush

On 3 June 1999, Slobodan Milosevic capitulated to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after 78 days of air attacks against Yugoslavia. NATO's war against Milosevic became widely acclaimed as the first war to be won through an air-only military campaign. Such an air campaign seeks to accomplish objectives by attacking targets. The net result of striking those targets was to coerce the enemy to concede to attackers' demands to help create the desired political and military end state. NATO realized success in its bombing campaign against Yugoslavia through crony attack.

Crony attack, the strategy of targeting key elite supporters of an enemy leader to effect policy change in the attacker's favor, is also one of a set of tools used in coercive diplomacy. Others include economic sanctions and information operations. To properly and efficiently leverage the potentially powerful mechanism of crony attack demands coordination among those responsible for wielding the military, diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power.

This thesis describes crony attack, investigates a prominent case where the United States seems to have used this strategy, and comments on requirements for successful development of the crony attack methodology. This thesis treats crony attack primarily as a form of strategic attack, carried out during the air campaign portion of military operations. Like strategic attack itself, this should not be construed to mean crony attack is confined to military operations. It simply is recognition of the current trend toward the Air Force's continuing bid to manage effects in the deep battlespace, which best fits into the traditional concept of a bombing campaign. Other activities meant to affect the deep battlespace—information operations, special operations, and ongoing diplomatic and economic negotiations wherein the leadership and key supporters typically live and operate—should be coordinated with the architect of the air campaign who is charged with creating the primary deep effects during military operations. Note that current policy and practice regarding ongoing and recent crony attacks are properly mired in secrecy. This thesis outlines a theoretical foundation for such a targeting strategy. The Yugoslavian case study assumes that crony attack played a role in the comprehensive targeting strategy, although I have no specific knowledge of such a scheme that goes beyond accounts in the popular press.

Strategic attack doctrine, as of this writing, has been under revision for seven years. That neither the Air Force nor the rest of the joint community can agree on doctrine or definition does not mean airpower cannot be applied strategically. Indeed, all of the military operations in the last five years have had a strong strategic attack component to them.

Of course, strategic attack is distinct from air strategy. Strategy, simply stated, is a plan to reach desired ends with available means. But the how and why of devising a strategy that maximizes the asymmetric airpower advantage this country holds over most others can be elusive. The lack of a concise formula for airpower application is due to the lack of a concise formula for military power application generally as well as a lack of concise formula for manipulation of the entire array of the country's instruments of power.

The enduring promise of airpower since its inception has been the ability to capitalize on the third dimension. Flying over surface forces offers the opportunity to penetrate into the heartland of enemy territory and attack those key targets the enemy holds most dear. Unfortunately, the record of strategic attack in practice has been mixed at best.¹ There have been cases where strategic attack made significant contributions to victory.² However, the mechanism by which the enemy was moved to grant concessions has always been somewhat fuzzy. Put prescriptively, is it better to target facilities that affect the capability of the enemy to continue fighting, or is it more profitable to strike targets that, if lost, will cripple the enemy's will to continue?

The distinction between will and capability can become rapidly muddled, but the distinction remains an old one. Clausewitz described limited war versus total war, in which limited war aimed to gain concessions from the enemy. Ultimately, unless the enemy literally fights to the last man, a concession must be granted, and forcing this concession with the least outlay of effort represents the optimum strategy. When the enemy grants the desired concessions, the enemy is demonstrating the loss of will to continue fighting. To reduce this directly would be a most efficient strategy. Air strategists from Giulio Douhet to the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) thinkers to Col John Warden have sought to characterize to what degree direct attack on the enemy's will can be efficacious.³

Thomas P. Ehrhard's "Air Strategy Analysis Framework" (hereafter called the "Ehrhard framework") is a way to think about the ends and means of airpower application.⁴ More accurately, it is a way to think about ends, means, and mechanisms. It builds on a narrower, simpler, framework developed by Robert Pape. The Ehrhard framework is more general because it includes not only the target country as an object of the strategic action but also the less cleanly delineated entities of third parties and domestic audience. This framework allows us to investigate the potential efficacy of air strategies such as crony attack.

This thesis utilizes the backdrop of the Ehrhard framework because it allows us to place the object of our action on a continuum from general to specific (fig. 1). A crony attack mechanism is predicated on a view of the




Figure 1. Ehrhard's air strategy analysis framework (Reprinted from Thomas P. Ehrhard, "Making the Connection: An Air Strategy Analysis Framework" [master's thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, June 1995]).

target country that is nonunitary. Taken in this context, the target country becomes a less-unified political entity than that typically claimed by classic realist international political theory (fig. 2). The Ehrhard framework is summarized as having three elements:

- Outcomes are the policy manifestations of airpower action following refraction through a political process. There are three categories of outcomes that the air strategist must consider. Those are target, domestic, and third party. They are interactive and have short- and long-term characteristics.
- The mechanism is a set of descriptive policy process models that link airpower action to their corresponding policy outcomes. A mechanism is comprised of a core policy process theory with two second-order elements called thresholds (the link to outcomes) and the action focus (the link to means).
- The airpower action element is a military action model in which assumptions and calculations about capabilities, tactics, and targets of airpower application manifest themselves. This is a unitary element in that it influences each mechanism.⁵




Figure 2. Mechanism close-up (Reprinted from Thomas P. Ehrhard, "Making the Connection: An Air Strategy Analysis Framework" [master's thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, June 1995]).

It is within the core policy process theory that the mechanism of differential attack on cronies is distinguished from other mechanisms of strategic attack. Crony attack assumes a disaggregated, governmental decision model. Simply stated, crony attack attempts to negatively affect the key supporters and advisors of the adversary leader to effect policy change in our favor. It can be inserted into the Ehrhard framework as the actionable mechanism linking means—bombing attacks on things those supporters hold dear—with ends or policy changes.

This thesis proposes a method of air targeting strategy that fits within the Ehrhard air strategy framework. The following chapter describes other frameworks and methodologies that also seek to force policy change, specifically classic ACTS theory, Warden's theory, coercive diplomacy, and one of its more specific forms, economic sanctions. Chapter 3 describes the theory of crony attack more fully, and chapter 4 details the strategy of crony attack and reviews requirements and techniques for successful application. Chapter 5 offers a case study analysis of Operation Allied Force, the 1999 NATO operation against Yugoslavia's Slobodan Milosevic.

Ultimately, crony attack is a focused strategic attack mechanism. Depending on many factors, including the structure of the enemy government and the extent to which we are prepared to conduct military strikes, crony attack may or may not be a silver bullet. Strategists should add it to the array of effective coercive war-fighting tools.

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

1. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 317–18.
2. Historian Ernest R. May presents Japan in World War II, Italy in World War II, and Korea during the Korean War as prominent examples. Others have listed Vietnam in 1972 and Iraq in 1990 as examples before the past five years. See May, *Lessons of the Past*, 125–42.
3. Douhet, *Command of the Air*, 60; Hansell, "Development of the United States Concept of Bombardment Operations," 152–58; and Warden, "Enemy as a System," <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/warden.html> (accessed 23 May 2003).
4. Ehrhard, "Making the Connection."
5. Ibid.

Chapter 2

Background

War is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. . . . The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace. . . . Is war not just . . . another form of speech or writing? Its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.

—Carl von Clausewitz

War seems to many to be an irrational act of passion. . . . Yet for all the emotion of the battlefield, the premeditation of war is a rational process consisting of careful, deliberate calculations.

—Bruce Bueno de Mesquita

Crony attack is a coercive air strategy. By targeting assets of the key supporters of the enemy leader, crony attack can weaken the regime's resolve to oppose our desired policy. In short it is a way to coerce the enemy to do what we want. This strategy assumes a disaggregated model of enemy government decision making. Although there is a single leader in whom ultimate power is vested, that leader is advised and supported by a small subset of the population. Those key elites may be coerced through damage to assets they own, making their support of the leader less rewarding. Of course they may also be coerced through other instruments of power, to include economic pressure, diplomatic actions, and information operations. These can be tried before, and in parallel with, military operations. When the military instrument of power is to be used, however, crony attack as an air strategy offers the same promise of an efficient application of airpower as strategic attack generically has claimed. Indeed, by focusing more finely on the precise mechanism to be tripped to achieve the desired objective, crony attack could be strategic attack's silver bullet.

While I will advance this theory more clearly in the next chapter, this chapter seeks to get inside of Ehrhard's air strategy mechanism, particularly the core policy process theory, to survey how other coercive mechanisms might fit. First, it looks at how classic airpower theorists have conceived of strategic attack and how their theories have been characterized in terms of the Ehrhard framework. Second, it looks at the core process theory represented by a disaggregate model of government decision making. Third, this chapter examines Graham Allison's models and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's theories of war, international relations, and politics. Fourth, it detours into the realm of economic sanctions to validate the disaggregate government model as viewed by wielders of other instruments of

power. Fifth, this chapter concludes by regrounding airpower in terms of its use as a coercive instrument.

In its basic form, the Ehrhard framework is simply a strategic process model. It links actions taken—in this case air attacks—with objectives—desired political outcomes through a mechanism of action. This mechanism, analogous to a black box, is the key to providing the desired outcome. But some serious implications to actions taken do not work as conceived; they may produce effects along third party or domestic mechanism channels. Not predicting or understanding those other channels can produce different political outcomes from those desired. A typical negative example was the Vietnam War: national-level strategists failed to account fully for the negative domestic effect of purposefully extended air action that resulted in a forced termination before completely obtaining the desired target political outcome. A positive effect was the Doolittle raid on Japan in 1942. Although minimally effective toward reaching the political outcome in strictly military terms, it bolstered domestic support for the war at a time when arguably the preponderance of national effort focused on the home front manufacturing war materiel.

Understanding the mechanisms triggered by purposeful military action is critical to a strategist's success. Furthermore, while the mechanism is critical, strategists should define the desired political outcome. The connection between the mechanism and the outcome, what Ehrhard terms the threshold concept, is made either when the current government decides the cost of continuing current policy is too high and thus shifts toward a beneficial policy or when the current government is deposed or significantly altered to allow a new government to implement a favorable policy. While a specific mechanism might allow for either occurrence, strategists should seek the most advantageous one or the one least likely to cause other problems.

Finally, any strategy must account for the opponent's own strategy as well as consider the enemy, domestic, and third party outcomes. A complex web of interactions can be envisioned between our tripartite mechanisms and the opponent's mechanisms. For example, our action against the supporters of an enemy leader can be countered by the enemy leader's actions to uphold domestic support. Such interactive complexity pales in comparison to the complexities of the real world, but to act purposefully, we must have a reasonable expectation of the efficacy of our action.

Strategic Attack Theorists

Air theorists typically have hailed the advent of the airpower age as an opportunity to conduct warfare in new, more efficient ways. At one level the differences can be described in terms of types of targets—and that is certainly of great practical importance. These theorists generally have placed airpower targets in some combination, more or less, of the four categories of military, economic, population, and leadership.¹ However, each has a distinguishable, if not always overtly stated, mechanism of action.

Douhet was one of the most influential of the early airpower proponents. He believed the primary mechanism to defeat any country was to incite revolt among the population by causing mass panic among them. Douhet proposed targeting the population directly with high explosives, gas, and incendiaries. The objective of the Air Force would be to “inflict upon the enemy the greatest possible damage in the shortest possible time.”² Following such a devastating attack, “the life of the city would be suspended,” and “the people themselves, driven by the instinct of self-preservation, would rise up and demand an end to the war.”³ In those early days of aircraft technology, Douhet thought the bombing aircraft would not meet effective defenses; so, any target would be open to bombardment. For Douhet strategic attack meant directly targeting enemy morale.

The ACTS theorists did not advocate the direct targeting of civilians on moral grounds, but their own threshold mechanism of air strategy was similar to Douhet’s. They would cause social breakdown through the destruction of economic targets. Haywood S. Hansell, an ACTS instructor before the war and a primary architect of the air plan against Germany, envisioned the concept as a syllogism. His first premise was that “modern nations cannot wage war if their industries are destroyed”; his second was that “aircraft can penetrate any known air defenses and destroy any known target with bombs”; and his conclusion was that “air warfare is therefore a method of destroying the enemy’s ability to wage war. It is primarily a means of striking a major blow toward winning the war, rather than a direct auxiliary to surface warfare.”⁴ The destruction of the industrial web could bring about moral collapse and a civilian uprising; it also would deny the nation the necessary capability to wage war. While this outcome was realized in part in Germany during World War II, the demonstrated weakness of Hansell’s second premise made it an extremely costly and lengthy campaign.

In the aftermath of the atomic attack on Japan in 1945, the nature of air warfare became much more serious, with higher stakes. In 1946 Bernard Brodie was among the first air theorists to usher in two trends of air/nuclear theory: he identified a fundamental shift in military strategy toward taking advantage of the mere threat of nuclear air strikes, and he was a civilian who played a central role in the intellectual debate over air strategy.⁵ Two decades later, civilian theorist Thomas Schelling formalized the concept of risk manipulation. He differentiated between the purpose of military power to hurt and military power to take or destroy; he also differentiated between the positive and negative aspects of what he termed coercion. *Compellence* is making the enemy do what you want, while *deterrence* is preventing him from acting against you. In either case, getting your way was a matter of convincing the enemy that he risks greater cost by acting following a disparate policy than by acting in accord with his own interests. This risk strategy translated into an air strategy that metered out pain at a level that allowed for escalation and at a rate that granted the enemy time to calculate the utility function. Furthermore, there needs to be a positive choice: “Any

coercive threat requires corresponding *assurances*; the object of a threat is to give somebody a choice.”⁶ Simply stated, targets were to be chosen to inflict pain, with only tangential effect on enemy capability. This was the philosophy behind Operation Rolling Thunder in the Vietnam War from 1966 to 1969.

Col John Warden reasserted military air strategic thought in the years before and after the First Gulf War by rejecting Schelling’s risk strategy; he reemphasized a targeting scheme meant to reduce the enemy’s capability to wage war. The mechanism to accomplish that end was not to attack fielded military forces, economic targets, or population, but leadership. He emphasized a decapitation strategy that would inflict rapid confusion on the command and control system of the enemy through parallel attack on leadership targets. He reasoned that that target set offered the biggest payoff for air attack over a short period. He brought this theory to life by forging Operation Instant Thunder, the strategic attack plan against Iraq; the coalition had the advantage of stealth aircraft delivering precision weapons against enough targets to affect strategic paralysis. The shock caused by the death of a thousand cuts did not cause Iraq to acquiesce based on bombing alone, but it inflicted significant capability reduction. Colonel Warden later wrote of the outcome as the product of capability multiplied by morale (or will).⁷ Because, in his estimation, we can never know will or accurately assess our ability to reduce it, we should only attack capability. Colonel Warden argues that the enemy can be modeled as a system, and any system loses its capability without leadership and control. His theory suffered from the logical dilemma of who would actually concede if the leadership was cutoff; that is, how would they know the conditions were dire enough, or indeed, that their capability was waning?

Robert Pape critiqued Colonel Warden on that score, but he flatly rejected the risk manipulation philosophy as a failure. He used similar terminology as did Schelling, but the mechanism was aimed at the enemy’s strategy—the capability to carry it out. Pape differentiated between the infliction of pain to cause morale breakdown—what he termed a punishment strategy—and the defeat of an enemy’s military strategy, something he called denial. In *Bombing to Win*, he categorized 40 instances of strategic bombing as either utilizing a punishment or denying a strategy and as either successful or not.⁸ Pape concluded that denying the “leader’s expectations of being able to take or hold the disputed territory with force” is the most successful strategy. As he admits, however, there is a fine line between denial strategy meant to coerce the enemy to give in through the efficient use of airpower and war fighting, which is analogous to Schelling’s brute force and is simply meant to soundly defeat and destroy the enemy.

Brig Gen David A. Deptula has shifted the discussion of airpower application back toward Colonel Warden’s categorization of target types related to center of gravity, with attacks conducted near simultaneously in parallel fashion. Brigadier General Deptula, however, does not focus exclusively on the targets but rather on the method. He describes a conceptual shift toward “effects-based operations,” wherein attacks are designed to pro-

duce the effects required to support the overall strategy. Just as in Colonel Warden’s description of parallel war, Brigadier General Deptula shows the combination of target attacks within a short time is as important as the absolute level of destruction of those targets. Orchestration of air attacks takes airpower into the mental and moral realm of the leadership in coercive fashion potentially to end the war sooner. Indeed, imposition of desired effects to support the overall strategy may not use kinetic attacks but rather nonkinetic information operations. Brigadier General Deptula’s concentration on effects has led to a current focus away from specific platforms and methods towards capability to produce desired effects.⁹

Table 1 summarizes the views of key theorists regarding the Ehrhard framework (the outcome in each case is policy change, but listed below is the threshold’s emphasis, morale, or capability).

Table 1. Strategic attack theorist summary

<i>Theorist</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Mechanism</i>	<i>Airpower Action</i>	<i>Pape Typology</i>
Douhet	Morale failure	Revolt	Bomb population centers	Punishment
ACTS	Capability failure	Economic failure	Bomb industrial web	Punish/Denial
Schelling	Morale failure	High future costs	Gradually increase bombing	Risk
Pape	Capability failure	Denial of strategy	Defeat enemy military	Denial
Warden	Capability failure	Decapitation	Rapidly target leadership	Decapitation
Deptula	Morale failure	Paralysis	Strategic effects	Denial/Risk

Note: This table was created solely by the author.

The risk strategy is important in that it is actually inherent in all the others. Strategic airpower is meant to bypass the pain of slogging it out on the surface. When the capability to strike a target exists, it begs the question of which targets to strike. The desire to end the war more quickly means inflicting negative utility on the enemy: for them it is not worth continuing the fight. The various mechanisms described above each assumes a different idea about what the enemy’s utility function looks like. For Pape the lack of capability to carry out military strategy is predominant; for Colonel Warden it is the lack of ability to command and control; for Schelling it is simply and purely the prospect of greater pain (measured in undefined terms). But in any case, it is the enemy decision maker’s perception of the bleakness of continuing that causes capitulation.

It is in this utility measurement that the full Ehrhard framework becomes especially valuable. Just as a strategist must consider the domestic and third party implications of air action, an enemy decision maker calculates utility not only based on the military situation alone but also based on his own domestic and third party factors.

Context of International Relations Theory

At the center of the mechanism for connecting means and ends in the Ehrhard framework is the core policy process theory, which is essentially an explanation of how the enemy's utility function works. It "explains the way certain political actors react to stimuli" and "contains the basic assumptions and beliefs that affect outcomes."¹⁰ Put into a broader context, the theory reflects an acceptance of one of several available theories of international relations. Theorist Barry Posen breaks the various views broadly into two categories: balance of power theories and organizational theories.¹¹ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye contrast realism and "complex interdependence."¹² Either way, there is a choice between focusing on the state as having a unitary utility-maximizing and decision-making function or of being a complex entity more subject to the theories of organizational interaction and intra-action. Values and shortfalls to both approaches abound, but ultimately human and state interactions have to be modeled in some manner for the strategist to predict the efficacy of his proposed course of action. What is the entity toward which we aim our coercive activity?

In his analysis of the Cuban missile crisis, Allison explained the course of events from the multiple perspectives of what he termed Models I, II, and III interpretations of governmental decision making.¹³ Model I, the rational actor model, follows the realist mode of characterizing the state as a unitary actor with a single predominant utility function. Model II focuses on the bureaucratic interworkings of key organizations within the government, while Model III accentuates the negotiating give-and-take of domestic politics among key leaders. Models II and III capture an explanatory richness that no doubt is often more valid than Model I, but their complexity can make a strategist's job much more difficult. The Ehrhard framework captures some of this complexity by considering the domestic and third party consequences of action, but even these considerations leave open the realist's unitary versus disaggregated decision-maker quandary.

Bueno de Mesquita, who focuses on the leader, provides the strategist's need for a simple yet accurate model of government decision making. He rejects a strictly organizational approach as being too diffuse but highlights many of the same shortcomings of the realist model that bureaucratic model theorists such as Allison have raised. His critiques of a unitary model's focus on the decision-making process are that the predominant "literature rarely makes explicit whether unanimity, decision making by a strong leader, or restrictions on preference orderings are being assumed. Which assumption is adopted has important implications."¹⁴ He concludes the best approach is to assume "that ultimate responsibility rests in the hands of a single policy maker [sic] charged with the final duty of approving a decision to wage war."¹⁵

Furthermore, this single policy-making leader is governed by an expected utility function that includes factors addressed by bureaucratic theorists. Thus, the richness of the context is preserved for a single entity,

a single individual, to act. This allows the strategist to attempt to manipulate factors within the leader's utility function to affect the outcome desired. This utility function is not tattooed on the leader's forehead; so, discerning it remains the challenge of the coercer. Foreign leaders do not wish to maximize the same thing. They typically act to maximize their state's national interest, but their actions are moderated by domestic factors, third party (other country) relations, and such personal factors as risk-tolerance and posterity consideration. Bueno de Mesquita has developed and tested numerous expected-utility functions to refine his theory of war, international relations, and politics. While one is reluctant to embrace mathematical precision fully in issues of human interaction, the body of work of Bueno de Mesquita is compelling.¹⁶

A strategist inserting Bueno de Mesquita's concept into the core process theory of the Ehrhard framework comes up with a target mechanism focused on the enemy leader. To the extent we are focusing on a decision maker as an object of coercion, this is not significantly different from the realist model. The focus on a single individual, however, adds his domestic considerations to the targeting mix. Of course, this is not original: Douhet's mechanism envisioned revolt by the population against the leader. Indeed, only Schelling's risk strategy seems to flatly treat the enemy as a single expected utility calculation. But Bueno de Mesquita's game theory approach allows us to weigh the various contributions of disparate factors.

The domestic factors' weight in the decision-making process of the leader can be related to the form of government and the method of leader selection. Bueno de Mesquita described a concept of relating a leader's ability to make independent decisions, even if these decisions negatively affect the welfare of the populace as indicated in the following passage: "The population of a state falls into a series of nested groups. The largest group is the set of all citizens. A subset of the citizenry has an institutionally legitimate right to participate in choosing the country's political leadership. This subset is the selectorate. . . . The selectorate can be very small, very large, or anywhere in between."¹⁷ The winning coalition is the subset of the selectorate required for the leader to maintain office; in a democracy the coalition is typically a simple majority, but in a monarchy or authoritarian regime, it may be small (fig. 3). To keep the loyalty of the winning coalition, the leader distributes "private goods" out of state coffers. Bueno de Mesquita observes that "other goods take the form of public policies that affect the welfare of everyone in the state."¹⁸ It is overall utility that counts, he writes: "to hold on to power, a leader must provide sufficient benefits to the winning coalition so that the least satisfied member still prefers to support the incumbent rather than defect to the rivals."¹⁹ For a strategist, this offers the opportunity to negatively affect the benefits that the least satisfied member of the winning coalition realizes.

However, the ability and cost to negatively affect the ruling coalition's benefits varies with the type and form of government—and with the availability of rival leaders. Three general forms of government exist under this construct. A

democracy is designed to have a large selectorate and a large winning coalition. An autocracy has a large selectorate, meaning theoretically almost anyone has some small chance of rising to the top (i.e., as in a Stalinist regime), but a small winning coalition. A monarchy—or similarly a military junta, both a selectorate (royalty/military)—and a winning coalition are small. Since “the greatest incumbency advantage in using private goods to satisfy constituents belongs to leaders of political systems that have small winning coalitions and large selectorates,” it stands to reason it is difficult to topple autocratic regimes. This is because of the relatively small ability to negatively leverage either the public good of the selectorate or the private good of the winning coalition. It is slightly less daunting to apply the large effort required to reduce the public good required to topple democratic regimes, but the targeting focus is necessarily diffuse. There is perhaps the greatest potential in damaging the high degree of private good required to bolster monarchies and juntas because the target set is focused, and the overall effort required is less than in either the authoritarian or democratic cases. Thus, the strategist can begin to build into the core policy process theory a determination of varying threshold concepts for foreign domestic (internal) utility reduction based on opposing government type (fig. 3).




Figure 3. Political institutions necessary for leader selection (Note: This figure was created solely by the author.)

An Example: Economic Sanctions

Utility maximization is not based on economics alone, but Jonathan Kirschner’s “The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions” provides an example of how to array utility-modifying sanctions against subsets of the target state.²⁰ He argues that a unitary actor model approach to economic sanctions yields a mixed-success determination based on the rather flat analysis of “do they work?” A better question, “how do they work?” yields a richer disaggregation of the target state. Kirschner argues that “A micro-

foundations approach looks not at economic sanctions in general, but at the differences between various forms of economic statecraft. Instead of considering how those sanctions hurt the target state, this approach emphasizes how groups within the target are affected differentially, and how these consequences change with the form of statecraft chosen.”²¹

Kirschner examines the ability of different types of economic sanctions—trade, aid, finance, currency, and assets—to affect different outcomes, compel action, communicate preferences, support allies, deter third parties, or contain the adversary. The measure of effectiveness is, again, not whether they work but whether they produce relative strategic advantage.²² He follows up with the following observation.

In summary, one cannot understand the utility and relative effectiveness of sanctions without first disaggregating the target, in order to understand how the sanctions will affect groups within the target economy. Of particular importance is the direct effect of sanctions on the central government, and the extent to which those sanctions get the attention of core groups from which the government ultimately derives its power. Since state vulnerability and the composition of the core will differ from case to case and since different sanctions affect sectors in society differentially, it is also necessary to understand the distinct functional consequences of each of the various instruments.²³

Kirschner concludes with case studies of economic sanctions against Panama in 1987 and the Dominican Republic in 1960–62. He shows that the Panama sanctions did not work because they were of the wrong type and ill-focused on the general economy rather than on the true power base, Manuel Noriega and the military. In the Dominican Republic, however, sugar trade sanctions struck directly at the personal fortune of the ruling Trujillo family, which styled itself as a hereditary junta, causing their weakening, overthrow, and a transition to democracy.

Both Bueno de Mesquita and Kirschner prescribe coercive action finely tuned to maximize leverage against a disaggregated enemy. Kirschner comes to similar conclusions as does Bueno de Mesquita regarding target composition and the decision-making process, even though he is investigating a different form of power leverage.

Conclusion

The Ehrhard framework provides a useful framework for examining air-power theorists’ prescriptions for strategic attack. Since these theorists are making an attempt at coercion, Bueno de Mesquita’s model of the efficacy of leadership utility functions related to public and private good manipulation provides a core policy process theory to fit the mechanism of the Ehrhard framework.

None of the theorists categorize their target sets in terms of targeting public or private good, but a quick characterization can be made. Douhet’s prescription clearly seeks to reduce public good, as ACTS and Schelling do to lesser degrees. Pape’s denial strategy is a form of reducing private goods but only if

the military is included within the winning coalition. Colonel Warden seeks to prevent the utility function from even being calculated, but once it does, the parameters are similar to Pape who observed that the lack of capability to continue military operations due to strategic paralysis causes capitulation.

In the right context, any of these strategies could be successful. The “action focus” element of the mechanism within Ehrhard’s air strategy analysis framework demands assessment of context to apply the right strategy and take the most efficient action. In Bueno de Mesquita’s terms, one of the most important contextual elements is the form of adversary’s political institutions, which will affect how the leader makes decisions.

A strategy of crony attack, then, must fit within the right context. Certain governments are more susceptible to crony attack; certain strategic objectives are more conducive to crony attack.

Notes

1. These represent the three that ACTS identified (i.e., social, industrial, military) plus one that Warden and others have emphasized—leadership.
2. Douhet, *Command of the Air*, 60.
3. *Ibid.*, 58.
4. Hansell, “Development of the United States Concept of Bombardment Operations,” 152.
5. Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*.
6. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 74.
7. Warden, “Enemy as a System.”
8. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 529.
9. Deptula, *Effects-Based Operations*.
10. Ehrhard, “Making the Connection,” 31.
11. Posen, “Explaining Military Doctrine,” 23–43.
12. Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 23–37, 246.
13. See chapters 2, 4, and 6, Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*.
14. Bueno de Mesquita, *War Trap*, 17.
15. *Ibid.*, 20.
16. Indeed, in his latest book, *Predicting Politics*, Bueno de Mesquita builds his theories of war, international relations, and domestic politics into a prescriptive policy tool. Full analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, but it seems valuable. The challenge remains an accurate divination of the diverse factors involved. See Bueno de Mesquita, *Predicting Politics*.
17. Bueno de Mesquita et al., “Policy Failure and Political Survival,” 147–61.
18. *Ibid.*, 149.
19. *Ibid.*, 50.
20. Kirschner, “Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions,” 32–64.
21. *Ibid.*, 33.
22. *Ibid.*, 34.
23. *Ibid.*, 50.

Chapter 3

Theory of Crony Attack

If we recall the nature of actual war, . . . that the probable character and general shape of any war should mainly be assessed in the light of political factors and conditions, . . . [and] that each individual act contributes to the whole and itself originates in the original concept, then it will be perfectly clear and certain that the supreme standard for the conduct of war . . . can only be that of policy.

—Carl von Clausewitz

Crony attack is a strategy to affect adversary policy change by inflicting cost on the influential subordinates of the leader. It recognizes the importance of the single decision maker, the adversary's leader, as outlined by Bueno de Mesquita. More specifically, targeting the utility of the regime's elites indirectly reduces the utility of the leader due to their influence, enmity, or even the threat of insurrection. The degree to which cronies can influence the leader varies depending on the government's power structure on a scale of democracy to autocracy. Success also depends on the severity of policy change being demanded. Crony attack likely works best in a weak autocracy in seeking relatively modest policy change.

Utility Function

We can develop a utility function for the adversary's leader that builds on the basic utility function and includes a consideration of elite support. The basic utility function follows:

$$U = (p_B \times B) - (p_C \times C),$$

where U is the expected utility, p is the probability of benefit, B , or cost; C is the association with a particular policy. In other words, the policy should change if the expected future utility goes negative; that is, if the expected future costs exceed expected future benefits. The utility of crony support (CS) can be expressed (with p left out for ease of expression) as follows:

$$U_{CS} = B_{CS} - C_{CS}$$

B_{CS} correlates to the support of the selectorate, while C_{CS} correlates to the total private goods distributed to that selectorate, as described by Bueno de Mesquita.¹

We seek to affect the cronies' utility directly through crony attack. Their individual utility of supporting the leader as a crony (Cr) can be depicted as follows:

$$U_{Cr} = B_{Cr} - C_{Cr},$$

where B_{Cr} represents the personal goods retained (not given to the leader in the form of taxes) and private goods distributed directly by the leader. C_{Cr} repre-

sents the taxes paid to the government or leader and the opportunity costs of the loss of potential gain derived from alternative policies. Also included as a benefit (or negative cost) is the opportunity cost of not supporting the leader, which is the personal loss (possibly of life) that could occur if the crony stops supporting the leader. This is not just the loss of the distribution of private goods by the leader but the taking of personal assets already held. Private goods may take the form of financial reward from business dealings, heightened personal security, extra personal luxuries, and/or enhanced prestige through placement in prominent positions or roles.²

Crony attack seeks to reduce the utility of being a crony of an adversary regime by directly reducing benefits, B_{Cr} , or increasing costs, C_{Cr} . This can be accomplished most readily in a situation where the private goods distributed by the leader come from business dealings. By reducing financial gain, the attacker can reduce the benefit of private goods distribution and thus reduce the utility for the crony for supporting the leader. To induce change, however, the expected utility of another policy—the attacker’s desired policy—should be greater than the utility the cronies would receive from continuing to resist. Since the leader, not the cronies themselves, makes the decision to change policy, the action the attacker wants is for the cronies to push for policy change from the leader.

There is potential cost to the crony in recommending change. This is represented as follows:

$$U = U_{Cr} - U_{PR},$$

where U_{Cr} is the utility of being a crony under the current policy, and U_{PR} is the utility of recommending change. The leader could cut off the crony from private goods distribution, or do something worse. Thus, the crony will recommend a change only if the expected utility of doing so is positive. This is more likely to be the case if the recommended policy change is relatively modest. It is more likely to occur if a larger number of the cronies are recommending the change, because the leader is less able to excise all or most of the winning coalition keeping him in power.

An important factor in crony attack is the attacker’s ability to affect the utility of the cronies. Specific methods of attack are discussed in the next chapter, but two other factors are evident in the crony attack problem: the objective and the form of government. The severity of the objective relates primarily to the degree of relative influence the cronies’ policy change recommendation will have on the leader. The form of government relates primarily to the potential cost to the crony for recommending change, because it is that cost that must be overcome by the expected utility of policy change.

Type of Objective

The effectiveness of a crony’s attack strategy depends on the severity of the policy change objective. For the leader, the utility comparison is between crony dissatisfaction and utility of changed policy. At the easy extreme might be the change of a tariff or trade disadvantage, where the attacker might pay

or threaten a crony or cronies to recommend policy change to the leader. If the change will cost the regime relatively little compared to the loss of support of the crony, the policy may readily be changed. At the other extreme is regime change, where the severity of a policy of relinquishing power is likely to be difficult to affect solely through crony attack.

Relatively minor policy changes may be readily made through the influence of elites. Indeed, most day-to-day policy changes probably are made this way. Policies that significantly affect other countries enough for that other country to have them changed may be slightly more difficult, but still they are applicable outside the context of war or significant conflict; they usually represent the arena of trade policy. A loose example of a crony attack (not during war) would be the Chinese government's funneling campaign contributions in the 1996 campaign to United States' lawmakers who would favor extending China's most favored nation trading status, a clear advantage to China.³

On the other end of the spectrum, a demand of regime change imposes high costs on the leader that he is unlikely to incur to satisfy the concern of cronies. However, since the leader's power is ultimately based on the support—willingly given or not—of the elites, a concerted action by the elites could overthrow the leader. Concerted action, however, becomes a collective action problem for the cronies, because the leader will impose considerable costs on any one or small subset of the selectorate who defects. This is particularly the case in Stalinist-style autocratic regimes. The recent inability to overthrow Saddam Hussein by exerting pressure on his cronies reflects this difficulty.⁴

Form of Government

The form of government is an important factor in conducting a crony attack. The more tightly the leader holds the reigns of power, the more tightly he focuses on the distribution of private goods to the selectorate; thus, the public goods are more diffused among the nonselectorate and are less important to the members of the selectorate. Public goods are those things the leader provides for the good of the populace as a whole, including national security, public services, national prestige, and economic support.⁵ The form of government ranges from a democracy to strict autocracy.

On one end of the spectrum is a democracy, where only a loose concentration of power encircles the leader. In a Western-styled democracy, there are few government-distributed private goods that are circulated widely among a large selectorate. For any given member of the selectorate, this utility is relatively unaffected by private goods and more dominated by the public goods distributed to all. While policy change certainly may affect the utility of the selectorate, it is difficult to conduct crony attack to foment policy change because it is more difficult to focus on limiting private goods distributed from the leader to the "crony." Large changes in public goods

certainly may cause policy change. It was exactly this mechanism of action that Douhet proposed: attack the population directly on a large scale and cause them to force the leadership to change policy or change the leadership. In a less direct way, the decline in public goods during the Vietnam War caused the American populace to press for policy change—ending United States (US) involvement.

In an autocratic regime, the leader typically is surrounded by a smaller group of elites. For any one crony, the relative utility of private goods is significantly more than that of public goods, which potentially provides a high-leverage opportunity by forcibly limiting private goods distribution. However, in a strict autocracy, the potentially private costs of championing significant change could be quite high. Risk of death to self or to family members is the high cost for advocating change—even if it is a change away from financial ruin. Indeed, in a Stalinist-styled autocracy, even the public costs of widespread advocacy of policy change could be quite high, as witnessed by the large-scale purges both before and after World War II. There is ample evidence that Saddam Hussein held his cronies to their loyalty through threats to family members. In such a government, the ability to pressure a few cronies to advocate significant policy shift is small. A more promising approach might be to cause the elites to overcome the collective action problem and recommend change, but this approach suffers from some of the same shortcomings as Douhet's approach. This was arguably the objective of Operation Clarion, the two-day bombing effort in March 1945 of rail yards in the smaller German towns to affect the mid-level German leadership, and of Operation Thunderclap, the large-scale bombing in February 1945 of the government buildings in the center of Berlin.⁶ Those attacks, however, were not successful because they lacked the specificity of effects on key crony assets.⁷

Between the extremes, in a loose autocracy or junta, the possibility for pressure is greater. For members of the selectorate, the disparity between private goods and public goods may not be as great, and the threat of death for proposing change may be significantly lower. Certainly, a collective action problem still may exist, but without such a high concentration of power, the leader can afford less loss of support. If the leader relies more on distribution of goods than threat of death to maintain loyalty, a greater opportunity to affect those goods from the outside is a reality. While regime change through crony attack on this form of government is still difficult, it may be easier to promote an alternate regime, which forces the leader to rely more on the selectorate than he has previously. This provides greater leverage opportunity for the crony threatening to shift support elsewhere and offers that crony the greater possibility of utility in an alternative regime. Thus, crony attack in this context does not itself induce regime change, but the greater chance of regime change enhances the chance of crony attack to induce policy change short of regime change.

Context of War

The full array of crony attack potential is really only available in the context of war, but the war context also significantly affects the leader's utility calculus. In the context of war, the leader already has decided that the cost of conducting war itself is worth it, either because of the potential utility of victory or the potential benefit of a "soft victory" of inflicting pain, appearing strong, upholding a principle, or consolidating domestic power—even if the ultimate outcome is technically a military loss. One must suppose that Saddam Hussein was seeking some form of soft victory in accepting the most recent war with the United States and the United Kingdom. In that context, however, a change of policy that would end the war might also lose the "soft victory" being sought, especially if it will be seen as a matter of posterity to a leader to whom posterity is highly valuable. The context of war effectively increases the severity of the objective being sought and makes it more difficult to achieve policy change through crony attack, even in cases where it might have been successful before the initiation of war.

Therefore, crony attack is more likely to be successful when it is combined with other war-winning strategies. It is possibly best thought of as a strong catalyst in the presence of the primary reactants of war to produce policy change. This is analogous to ACTS's thinking before World War II, when an attack directly on morale was thought to be promising only in the context of near defeat, to "bring the enemy to the brink."⁸ Indeed, Air War Plan Directive 1 spoke of ensuring that "proper psychological conditions" exist before attempting attacks on other than military capability.⁹

Pape's Coercive Typology

Crony attack, as described here, does not fit neatly into Pape's typology of coercive airpower strategies. It lies somewhere near decapitation, which is either the actual killing of the political leader or the fomenting of a coup d'etat. Pape characterizes decapitation as a mix of punishment and denial. Pape derides punishment, which he terms as attack on civilians, as an ineffective mechanism to affect leadership decision calculus. He disputes the effectiveness of decapitation because of the difficulty of finding individual national leaders, the lack of concentration of power in a single individual, and the lack of ability to predict or promote a favorable alternative leader in the event of a coup.¹⁰

Crony attack addresses Pape's concerns about decapitation, however, and thus should be characterized as a distinct form of coercive air attack altogether, or at least as a distinct variation of decapitation. Crony attack targets a wider array of more easily findable targets, purposefully attacks the entire distribution of power, and seeks only policy change, not necessarily complete regime change.

Conclusion

Crony attack is a form of strategic attack, in that it seeks to reduce the enemy's will to fight. However, it promises to be more effective than strate-

gic attack, as classically described. Thus, it holds the promise of being the more efficient war-winning strategy—the silver bullet—that strategic attack advocates never quite fully realized. However, as noted above, crony attack is probably better thought of as a catalyst and must be properly applied as part of an effective overall strategy of coercive war fighting.

Notes

1. See Bueno de Mesquita et al., “Policy Failure and Political Survival,” 147–61.
2. For more discussion of leadership’s manipulation of private and public goods, see Fahrenkrug, “Factors of Regime Change.”
3. US Senate, *Special Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence*, 6 January 1999 to 15 December 2000. The committee looked into allegations that the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) had sought to influence Congress by contributing funds to candidates seemingly sympathetic to Beijing’s interests. The investigative hearing did find that “PRC officials provided funds to US political campaigns,” but that there “is no intelligence information indicating that contributions had any influence on U.S. policy or the U.S. political process or that any recipients knew the contributions were from a foreign source.” See *ibid.*, B-1.
4. For more on regime change as related to government types and distribution of goods, see Fahrenkrug, “Regime Change and Airpower.”
5. *Ibid.*, 24.
6. Davis, *Carl A. Spaatz and the War in Europe*, 552, 572.
7. According to historian James Corum, Operation Clarion also helped to paralyze the German rail transport even further just as the Allies were crossing the Rhein. Whatever its side intention as a means of influencing or demoralizing the German leadership, the Clarion attacks also had a very clear military tactical/operational reason with military effects.
8. Interview with airpower historian David Metz, 21 February 2003.
9. Davis, *Carl A. Spaatz and the War in Europe*, 436.
10. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 79–86.

Chapter 4

Strategy of Crony Attack

Any use of force will have an impact that transcends the immediate situation.

—Richard N. Haass

We're intensifying our contacts with all the different elements of Serbian society.

—White House official

A strategy to affect policy change by influencing cronies must rely on an analysis of who those cronies are. Thus, the crony attack strategy relies primarily on intelligence. Like any other strategy, however, crony attack must define the objective, the means of achieving the objective, and the method of the attack. A network of cronies must be carefully mapped out, and it must be based on the nature of the relationship with the leader to help determine how best to influence the regime. This chapter outlines the basics of such analysis. As the next chapter shows, any actual planning and execution of crony attack strategies by the United States is a supposition only, though certainly evidence exists of the possibility of such a strategy in Operation Allied Force against Slobodan Milosevic and Yugoslavia in 1999. The intelligence collection, analysis, and modeling methodology, however, closely reflect the practice of law enforcement agencies in operations against organized crime. While this thesis does not investigate in detail law enforcement based on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act, the modeling tools used in RICO are applicable to crony modeling and analysis.

The organized crime model applies to many regimes worldwide. The regimes that stay in power by distributing a large amount of private goods to the selectorate—the cronies—can be termed *kleptocracies*. Many governments do indeed resemble crime families in ideology, practice, and outlook. Increasingly separating Milosevic from the average drug cartel chief was the fact that he actually ran a country. Some regimes do draw significant power and control from ideology (radical Islam) as illustrated in many other third world regimes where the high-private goods kleptocracy is a good model.

Furthermore, while not an example of crony attack to affect policy change (as opposed to regime change), the analysis of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq is an excellent example of that required for crony attack. The deck of cards was the most obvious evidence of such analysis, but numerous depictions of the Iraqi regime's power structure in the news

media did exist. These depictions reflected the initial intelligence activity required for successful crony attack.

Intelligence

The critical question seeks to determine who are the people who most influence the adversary leader and the nature of their relationship. It is also important to assess the assets of the cronies to determine how they might be influenced and the relationship of the cronies with one another.

The normal intelligence process is probably adequate to determine the relationships between the leader and members of his regime. Open source media also provides much of the information necessary to map those relationships. Chances are great, however, that some less-formal relationships may be more difficult to determine through such sources. Determination of assets and leverage mechanisms is likely more readily attained through more formal intelligence channels, however, and specialized financial intelligence methods.

As noted above, this analysis is similar to the one used by law enforcement agencies in modeling and in collection. There is a greater requirement for human intelligence to gather personal information from other cronies, to swim upstream to find information about those nearest to the leader. The relationships part is only the start. Kleptocracies, like organized crime leaders, are clever at setting up dummy corporations, fronts, and money laundering schemes to hide their assets. The criminal wants to hide assets and wealth from the government and tax man. The corrupt government wants to hide their semicriminal activities from their own people and from the world in general. As in any organized crime or counterdrug operation, it may take a significant amount of investigation to expose the financial relationships among cronies, the leader, and extra state clandestine-market operators. Such investigation requires a high level of cooperation between US intelligence and law enforcement agencies and foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

Modeling

Charting relationships among cronies has been called RICO charting based on the practice of antiorganized crime law enforcement. These charts show the links between cronies and the leader, important links among the cronies, and the strength of the links. They also could depict the nature of the relationship, such as family, financial, political, or social. RICO charting is closely related to social network mapping, which seeks to describe the nature of relationships and links among people, although not necessarily in a hierarchical setting.¹

Police agencies rely on some commercially available modeling programs to do social network mapping and RICO charting. Some of these programs, including InFlow software by orgnet.com, are designed as collection and analysis tools to model strength of relationships based on such data sets

as phone call histories or e-mails.² Influence Net Modeling, produced by Science Applications International Corporation, “is a structured process that allows those responsible for strategic planning and decision making to investigate complex issues of cause and effect in order to determine optimal courses of action to influence outcomes.”³ Marketed to law enforcement for RICO charting, Analyst’s Notebook by i2 Investigative Analysis Software is perhaps the most promising of the software packages.

Targeting Methods

Creating the desired effects of negatively affecting a crony’s utility can be created through either kinetic or nonkinetic means. Such targets can be physical assets or financial assets. The form of crony attack that most closely resembles classic strategic attack is to deny, degrade, or destroy a money-making asset of the crony, such as a factory. Note that the effect of denying assets, so destruction may not be necessary if denying power, for example, is possible.

Nonkinetic means of creating effects offers a more easily reversible means of targeting crony assets. Computer network attack, for example, can be used to directly freeze or seize financial assets through direct action on the banking system. Focused psychological operations, such as direct communications to the crony, can be used to increase the feeling of vulnerability or hopelessness.

These effects should consider the type of relationship the crony had with the leader. The typical effect we try to achieve is a financial one because it has strong coercive power. But, if the crony relationship is social only, some means of discrediting the relationship may be sufficient to sever the link. Or, if the relationship is purely political, then action taken to seed discontent among the crony’s subordinates may have good effect. For example, the mayors of several central Serbian towns were losing control of portions of their cities during Operation Allied Force and were able to apply some pressure on Milosevic to change the policy.⁴

Coordination

Crony attack efforts must be conducted to achieve unity of effort. The chances are quite large that services and agencies other than the Air Force will be involved in the crony attack operation. At the lowest level, a single coordination cell, such as the information operations (IO) cell, operating as an element of the joint force commander (JFC) chief of operations (J-3) staff will be able to coordinate efforts. National intelligence agencies, if involved in the operation, as will likely be the case, must be represented on such a cell.

At the highest level, the National Security Council (NSC) will be responsible for coordinating among US agencies. These will include such intelligence agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, such law enforcement agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investi-

gations, and agencies within the Department of Commerce, Treasury Department, State Department, and Department of Defense. An interagency working group will coordinate its work with the NSC and with the JFC J-3 interagency IO cell.

Assessment

One of the most difficult aspects of any operation is assessing effects. This is especially true where those effects are primarily nonphysical. So, as with psychological operations and IO generally, the value of a crony attack strategy may not be readily known, and it may never be fully assessable. Human intelligence and other carefully directed collection reveal crony actions taken to convince the regime to change policy. The active involvement of a negotiating effort to seek the end of hostilities is likely to be a source of information regarding the mood of the leader and those surrounding the leader.

Legal Issues

The targets that are struck as part of a crony attack strategy are likely to be dual-use targets. They have military and civilian uses, and our justification for targeting them should be based on military necessity and proportionality, just as with all targeting.⁵ Furthermore, some targets may have dual effect: their degrade or destruction meets two or more objectives. For example, targeting oil infrastructure is a classic interdiction effect, but it also degrades the commercial viability of the oil industry, thus denying financial reward to the owners or controllers of the oil industry. Those oil targets have the dual effect of meeting military interdiction objectives as well as crony attack objectives. Media targets, while considered civilian targets, are justifiable in wartime as an aspect of the IO campaign to prevent the regime from effectively disseminating propaganda. It has the dual effect of damaging financial reward from advertising and other operating revenues to the owner or controller of the media outlet, if it is someone other than the state. Legally, that creates a stronger argument for military effect, but care must still be taken to avoid the appearance of wanton destruction of nonmilitary targets.

Ehrhard Framework

Seen within the Ehrhard framework, crony attack relies on a coercive core policy process theory. The mechanism the cronies impose upon the leader to change the offending policy is responsible for the resort to combat. Third party and domestic implications of such a strategy are anchored in the legal discussion above. Cronies are typically civilians, although they are also part of the ruling regime. Without a clear argument of military necessity, legal interpretation is muddled, and so is third party and domestic opinion. As with many issues, the interpretation of the crony attack

appropriateness is likely to track with the viewer's opinion of the military action generally. If military action is deemed appropriate, there is more likelihood to view effective crony attack favorably.

Conclusion

As described in chapter 3, crony attack works best with other coercive military strategies to produce several negative factors to the decision-maker's utility calculus. This also helps to hide the true intent of crony attack actions among other military targeting operations to keep it hidden. However, that also makes it easy to produce a conflict with other effects. Crony attack depends on good intelligence and analysis, but it also requires a concerted unity of effort. It likely will be nationally directed and coordinated with the knowledge and authorization of the president. But, as the particulars are planned and conducted, careful coordination between intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies responsible for monitoring international criminal activity must take place.

Notes

1. Johnson, "Who Loves Ya', Baby?"
2. [Http://www.orgnet.com/](http://www.orgnet.com/). Orgnet.com offers social network analysis software and services for organizations, communities, and their consultants.
3. SAIC (Science Applications International Corporation) web site, <http://www.inet.saic.com/inet-public/>.
4. "Milosevic faces internal pressure for settlement."
5. For more information on moral and legal targeting implications, see Murray, "Moral Implications of Precision Weapons."

Chapter 5

Operation Allied Force

A Case Study

This is not a surrender of the state, but of a wrong policy.

—Mira Markovic

Operation Allied Force pitted NATO against Slobodan Milosevic in what has been called a humanitarian intervention, coercive diplomacy, the first information war, and the first war won by airpower alone. It was NATO's first war as a coalition. Though one of the primary considerations in conducting the war was to keep the alliance together, it was hardly a homogenous or monolithic effort. Americans held most of the leadership positions and conducted the majority of the strike and support sorties. They also conducted some tactical operations, such as B-2, F-117, and cruise missile strikes that were classified "US Only" and were largely kept secret from the alliance. Strategic and operational planning also was carried out behind a veil of secrecy. Apparently, one such operation was an IO that included kinetic and nonkinetic attacks on assets controlled by members of Milosevic's inner circle: a crony attack strategy.

Operation Allied Force was first and foremost a coercive campaign to convince Milosevic to desist in his ethnic cleansing activities in Kosovo. Pres. William Clinton's statement of objectives explicitly declared its coercive nature. On 31 March 1999, he stated the alliance objectives: "To raise the price of aggression to an unacceptably high level so that we can get back to talking peace and security, to substantially undermine the capacity of the Serbian government to wage war."¹ He precluded the option of using ground forces, which put the onus on airpower and information operations as the only military levers. These joined the economic sanctions that had been in place since 1991 and came on the heels of the failed Rambouillet diplomatic talks. After 78 days, coercion by air attack and economic and political sanctions succeeded when Milosevic agreed to terms allowing NATO to lead an occupation of Kosovo. Milosevic never has publicly explained his decision. Commentators have cited several other reasons for the Yugoslavian president's capitulation, including the threat of ground attack and Russian diplomatic assertiveness, but all ascribe weighty coefficients to air strikes as part of Milosevic's decision calculus. Central to many explanations of capitulation is the pressure from key elites, his cronies.²

Serbia represents a useful example of crony attack. The leader is authoritarian but draws power from a small ruling coalition drawn from an equally small electorate. Yugoslavia and Serbia have post-communist parliamentary systems that place significant power in the hands of party leaders and

economic and media leaders. This group of power brokers, though elected to parliamentary positions, represents the true electorate of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Milosevic's ability to stay in power is further enhanced by his ability to induce the coalition to look the other way while bending the constitutional rules of governance. He does this by allocating private goods to his coalition members at the expense of public goods for the population at large. Thus, an outside attack on the assets of the ruling coalition could, and did, affect its calculus regarding Milosevic's war policies.

Background: Serbian History Overview

Yugoslavia emerged from World War II as a communist country under former partisan guerrilla leader Joseph Broz Tito.³ He reunified a country that had been divided under Nazi occupation (Croatia had been established briefly as an independent country) and consolidated power over previous military factions that fought a civil war against the backdrop of the world war. The most significant other groups were the Croatian Ustache and the Serbian Chetniks, both of which were fascist/nationalist groups dominated by their respective people (Bosnian Muslims split between these groups). Vicious fighting and atrocities were committed by all parties, which imbued later conflicts with the partial justification of revenge. Initially, Tito's focus was to consolidate power under communism, but the remainder of his rule was characterized by attempts to minimize nationalist and ethnic identity and enmity.

Tito cooled relations with former communist sponsor, the Union of Soviets Socialist Republics, during the early 1950s, which provided the promise of greater relations with the West. However, Tito remained communist and developed a strong influence among the third world countries of the nonaligned movement. His communist politics and western-friendly commercial practices were called the Yugoslavian system, which provided more capital and the highest standards of living in the communist world. Greater levels of trade with western European countries and the United States also brought a greater sense of openness to Yugoslavia generally, and during the early 1970s, Yugoslavians could even travel freely. Market ownership and control remained tight, however, and the system allowed favoritism and corruption to become the tools for gaining control of companies in Yugoslavia. Tito's health began to decline in the late 1970s, and he began to transfer power to a shared presidency. He also set up a power-sharing structure among the leaders of the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia, the autonomous regions of Serbia; Kosovo, which had an Albanian majority; and Vojvodina, which had a very large Hungarian minority. This was meant to diffuse Serbian nationalistic tendencies, but in practice, it gave Serbia the potential to split the pairing by controlling the latter four entities.

Milosevic rose to power in the era of Tito's decline and death in 1980. Milosevic's fortunes were attached to Ivan Stambolic, who became Serbian

Communist Party chief in 1984 and then Serbian president by 1986. In a personally rancorous move, Milosevic surpassed his mentor in 1988 by yoking himself to both the former preeminent communist power base and the rising nationalist movement represented by sometime dissident and wealthy novelist Dobrica Cosic. He began to consolidate power among the Serbs by installing puppet leaders in Kosovo and Montenegro—the previous leaders were arrested on dubious charges. The breakup of Yugoslavia began in 1990 as a response to the general demise of communist regimes in Europe and from Milosevic's political engineering of the eight-man presidency, which included a constitutional change to establish a single president (although Milosevic did not hold the title of Yugoslav president until 1998). The Communist Party Congress reached an impasse over the issues and effectively dissolved, which led Slovenia, then Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia to secede, with varying degrees of resistance from the Serbian-controlled federal government.

During the Operation Deliberate Force NATO air campaign and the subsequent Dayton peace accord process, Slobodan Milosevic demonstrated his ability to be swayed by bombing and his penchant for giving up on former political allies as in this case Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. This was due, in part, to Milosevic's anger at the Bosnian Serbs' taking of 375 United Nations peacekeepers hostage during the bombing. The Serbian president threatened to have Karadzic killed, which resulted in the release of the hostages and the cessation of bombing. Milosevic was respected in the West for being wise enough to relent under pressure.⁴

Serbian Regime Characteristics

Milosevic's regime was particularly vulnerable to a crony attack strategy.⁵ While Serbia clothed itself in some of the trappings of democracy, it was really a weak autocracy that relied on the support of family and a group of political and business elites who were fed by Milosevic's corrupt asset distribution system.

This resulted from three traditions in Yugoslavian communist government. The first is single-party communism. Although Tito was one of the more liberal communist leaders, experimenting with multiparty local elections in the 1970s, national politics were that of the Yugoslavian communist party, or as it was called later, the Socialist Party. The second tradition is antinationalism. Tito feared the fevered emotion of nationalist philosophy (Serbian especially) and sought to carefully balance power among the eight constituent federal bodies, going so far as to divide Serbia into three parts (Vojvodina, Serbia, Kosovo) to dilute its power. Paradoxically, the third tradition is nationalism. The historic enmity among the three primary ethnic groups—Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims—was punctuated by hatred of the Muslim Albanians in Kosovo and to a much lesser degree by disdain for the Hungarians in Vojvodina. The Slovenia case was relatively straightforward: almost all Slovenes lived in Slovenia, and almost everyone else in

Slovenia was a Slovene. When Milosevic sought to create a greater Serbia that contained all ethnic Serbs, he would have had to retain portions of all the republics but Slovenia. However, to maintain power, he paradoxically let portions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia go (Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia) to guarantee a ruling coalition of majority Serbs held together by the stronger emotional ties of nationalism, which was more forgiving in the details of benevolent rule. He also allowed the rise of political parties, which was formed by the score, and ensured that no single party could ever challenge his traditional Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). Similarly, he held elections but used classic corrupt methods to ensure he retained power while presenting the trappings of democracy.

Milosevic's regime could be rightly described as a kleptocracy because he redistributed goods from publicly held industries into the pockets of key supporters. When that system threatened to fail in the wake of economic sanctions in the early 1990s, he simply printed enough money to further weaken the economy, while building up paramilitary smuggling groups such as Arkan's Tigers, Seselj's Chetniks, and smaller groups run by men of less consistent loyalty: the White Tigers, Yellow Wasps, and Serbian Falcons. These groups gave him greater access to hard currency in the form of deutsch marks, which ensured rewards to loyal cronies. These paramilitaries also inflicted the proper amount of pain when required.

Milosevic was autocratic but was not a classic dictator. He did not rule through personal charisma, though he could be quite charming, especially in small groups. His Serbian biographer, Slavoljub Djukic, emphasizes Milosevic's use of political power. He was a master at holding power and manipulating the people through the instruments of the media, money, and internal security apparatus. Indeed, his career had prepared him well for that, having served as chairman of the Beogradska Banka, head of Radio and Television Serbia (RTS), and chairman of the Belgrade, Serbian, and Federal Socialist party before becoming Serbian prime minister in 1990. He was a master of propaganda, spinning half-truths so complex that sometimes even he seemed to believe them. Yet, he always allowed enough independent media presence to deflect significant criticism of his autocratic rule. He was more cunning than overbearing and often ingratiating rather than confrontational. He was an expert at the stab in the back. But, he was always wary and never collegial.

Djukic allowed one partner during Milosevic's reign: his wife Mirjana Markovic. Especially later in his career, Markovic at times ruled almost as if by proxy. She had a strong hold on Milosevic, and he didn't seem to mind, as their mutual trust was strong. Flighty and often emotional, she was feared as much or more than he and was the primary tender of the cronies. In 1992 she formed her own political party, Yugoslavia United Left (YUL), which brought together the traditionally wealthy communist functionaries who had been the stalwarts of the pre-dissolution government. It was she who designated rewards and punishments; often by way of a gos-

sip column written in the state-run paper *Borba*, which predicted rather than reported key hirings and firings.

Any influence mapping done on Milosevic would start with his wife, but much is available in the Serbian press. For the purposes of this paper, Milosevic's cronies are described by the list of key regime personnel prohibited from international travel by the European Union and the US sanctions in 1998.

Crony Attack Strategy

That there was a crony attack strategy in Operation Allied Force seems certain. However, details of any specific target selection criteria being followed for the express purpose of crony attack are mired in secrecy. However, we can seek to describe the targeting of dual-use facilities from the perspective of potential affects on cronies who controlled the output and assets of those facilities. What is revealed is a significant degradation in the regimes capability to allocate private goods to its ruling coalition.

Operation Matrix

The existence of an explicit plan to affect policy change by influencing the Milosevic regime has been primarily described by journalist and military analyst William Arkin.⁶ Arkin, a controversial airpower critic who applauds the precision of air warfare while decrying current air strategists, has a penchant for exposing carefully veiled government programs.⁷ He described Operation Matrix in a series of articles following the war and covered the war by revealing various aspects of suspected information operations, especially computer network attack.⁸ According to Arkin, Operation Matrix was a combined US and British information warfare operation aimed at Milosevic's ruling coalition. Phone calls were made to the owners of a particular factory to warn of an attack, which then occurred the next night. Two particular examples cited by Arkin are the Bor copper smelter and the Smederevo iron works, both bombed by B-2 bombers on 15 May 1999. The Bor smelter was controlled by Nikola Sainovic, the federal vice president who siphoned funds from the plant to line his and YUL's accounts.⁹ The Sartid Iron Company plant in Smederevo had been a Yugoslavian work project since construction started in the early 1970s; it had operated for only 10 years before being struck by a B-2 on the same night as Bor to get at ex-SPS party deputy leader Dusan Matkovic, who controlled Sartid.¹⁰ Arkin has written that these were the only targets struck purely for Operation Matrix but later suggested more Matrix targets, even attributing some of the confusion surrounding the Chinese embassy bombing incident on 7 May 1999 to a botched attempt to target the Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement (also known as Yugoimport).¹¹ A strike at Yugoimport headquarters would have been aimed at the assets of director Jovan Cekovic, an SPS former army officer who arranged sanctions-

busting arms trade among Russia, Iraq, and other former Yugoslavian republics.¹²

Air attack on crony assets was not the only aspect of Operation Matrix. It had diplomatic, economic, and informational dimensions also. Another apparent nickname for Operation Matrix was the 54-day plan for the planned timing of initiation, 15 May 1999, although targets that counted as crony targets had been struck as early as the first night of the war, as listed below.¹³ Yet another moniker described the target sets to be attacked: the 3M strategy—money, ministry of the interior (MUP), and media.¹⁴ These were the primary tools of power for the Milosevic regime; they were targeted kinetically and nonkinetically. What resulted was a campaign coordinating “covert operations, psychological warfare, information operations, and bombing” aimed at the regarrdime and coordinated by special envoy and Balkans expert Richard S. Gelbard.¹⁵ The strategy was summed up by national security adviser Sandy Berger:

We knew the power to change Serbia’s course was concentrated in Milosevic’s hands. And we knew he was not immune to pressure from within. By raising the alliance consensus, we were able to strike harder and wider at Serbia’s military-related assets.

And we employed other means—enforcing tough economic sanctions; tightening travel restrictions; freezing financial holdings; making it difficult for Serbia’s privileged class to go abroad, move money around, or plan their exits. In one case, a Milosevic crony, with family in tow and suitcases bulging, found himself denied entry to a nearby country. Such developments raised the level of anxiety and discontent within Belgrade’s power circles.¹⁶

This was not a US-only objective. A week into the war, German general Klaus Naumann, NATO military committee chairman, stated: “We clearly intend to loosen [Milosevic’s] grip on power and break his will to continue. . . . If we start to chip away at the institutions that keep him in power, he may think it over.”¹⁷

Operation Matrix, as described already, entailed most robust information operations attempted to date. The methodology apparently included detailed intelligence work that resulted in influence diagram of Milosevic’s power structure. Decisions were then made on the best method to degrade the advantage of a crony’s relationship with Milosevic. Arkin surmised that this included the use of computer network attack on the Serbian banking system in a June 1999 column;¹⁸ his later retraction did not preclude the tactic from at least having been considered.¹⁹ Psychological operations, such as leaflets and substitute media broadcasts, were also conducted. Those were aimed primarily at a broader audience than the ruling coalition, for specific telephone and e-mail messages were sent to the cronies.²⁰ The phone warning followed by bombing of factories was just one of the methods of persuasion. As noted above, a new round of sanctions by the United States and the European Union implemented in late April and early May restricted travel of 146 specifically named members of the regime, sought to freeze banking and investment assets, and restricted sale

of petroleum and other “services or technology for targets that had been destroyed by NATO.”²¹

Dual-Use Targets

Bor and Smederevo may have been the only targets struck purely to affect crony discontent (according to Arkin), but many of the dual-use strategic targets resulted in crony asset reduction. In fact, almost all of the punishment targeting (in Pape’s nomenclature) also fit into the counterregime decapitation strategy. In other words, in a kleptocracy-type regime, attacks on civilian and dual-use targets that are seemingly aimed at reducing public goods also reduce the private goods of the ruling-coalition owners. By its own categorization, NATO struck seven such counterregime targets as the presidential villa, the MUP headquarters, and the presidential retreat. But, it also bombed 17 military goods factories; 19 petroleum, oil, and lubricant facilities; 17 television transmitters; and 68 bridges and railroads.²² Because Milosevic dished out control of key industries and most media and maintained control of paramilitary smuggling groups, damage to all of these target sets affected the regime’s inner circle. Moreover, general damage to the economy affected not only the public but more directly the assets and financial dealing of the hundred or so people who constituted the ruling coalition.

What follows are examples of facilities targeted to produce dual effects: military and a countercrony. This listing is not complete and is based purely on open-source information.²³

Industry

A socialist newsletter noted in June 1999 that none of the factories attacked by NATO were foreign owned. Actually, much of the industry was still officially state owned because the process of privatization begun a decade before was slow and rife with corruption. Many of those who reaped benefits from industry did so not through profits but graft and embezzlement. Typically, they were directors of state-owned factories as often as they were owners. An example is the Sloboda factory or Freedom factory in Cacak that was managed by Radomir Ljubic, a member of YUL party. The factory was severely damaged in attacks on 28 and 30 March. It was (and still is) an important ammunition producer, but its primary products were appliances, including vacuum cleaners, ovens, and heaters. Total damage was approximately \$300 million.²⁴

The Zastava automobile plant in Kragujevac was struck on 9 April. The producer of Yugos, the plant also refurbished armored vehicles. It was owned by Milan Beko, member of YUL and former minister of privatization.²⁵ He had been allowed to use his government position to gain a controlling share in the plant when it was privatized.

NATO hit petroleum, oil, and lubricants targets hard as part of its classic interdiction campaign. The initial assessment was a reduction by 57 percent of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia’s petroleum, oil, and lubricant reserves

and elimination of the refining capability after destroying the refineries at Pancevo and Novi Sad and much of the fuel distribution capability for the two largest oil companies, Oil Industry of Serbia (NIS) Jugopetrol and Beopetrol. While the effect on the nonmaneuvering Third Army in Kosovo was limited, the damage caused large losses of revenue and a significant hike in gas prices.²⁶ The oil industry had been impaired by earlier sanctions, but it had largely recovered through smuggling and clandestine market deals with primarily Russia, Libya, and Middle East sources through Lebanon intermediaries.²⁷ The oil industry was controlled by Milosevic cronies. NIS Jugopetrol was headed by Dragan Tomic, the speaker of the Serbian parliament. Technogas facilities were another prime target: these were run by Serbian prime minister Mirko Majanovic. Technogas, along with the import/export firm Progress, controlled most of the trade with Russia. Technogas's main trading partner in Russia was Gazprom, closely associated with former Russian prime minister and chief Yugoslavian envoy Victor Chernomyrdin.²⁸ (Beopetrol, the primary rival, had been set up to take over the industry lead when Mira Markovic friend and Beopetrol manager Zoran Todorovic was assassinated in 1997.)²⁹ The Duvanska Industrija Nis tobacco plant in Nis was controlled by Milosevic's son Marko, who used it as the hub of a vast smuggling ring. It was struck and seriously damaged on 5 April. Arkin has explained this strike as weapons aimed at other nearby targets. However, it was widely reported internally as an intentional attack; in either case, the effect was the same.³⁰

Transportation Infrastructure

Numerous road bridges were cut, mostly in the south. This was primarily part of the interdiction campaign to cut lines of communication to reduce resupply to the fielded forces. An additional effect was to degrade the fiber optic cable network, parts of which ran in conduits on the underside of bridges. A crony-related effect was to reduce the smuggling network that was tacitly encouraged by the regime. Marko Milosevic's smuggling operations ran primarily through the Macedonian border in the south. It is unknown exactly how much effect this reduction of trafficability had on their smuggling operations, but it is reasonable to expect at least short-term effects.

The railroad infrastructure was damaged significantly as part of an interdiction campaign to stop the flow of supplies to the Third Army in Kosovo. The Serbian government claimed NATO cut 19 major railways by destroying bridges or tunnels and destroyed or damaged five railroad stations.³¹ The railroad was controlled by Milomar Minic, a former SPS general secretary (under party president Milosevic) and former speaker of the lower house of parliament.³² He ran the Serbian railroad three years before the war and used it to maintain his prominence within the party and to line his pockets.³³

Electrical Power

NATO disrupted power to 70 percent of the population on 2 May and continued to turn out the lights through soft bombing of electrical transformer

yards. Such attacks were primarily intended to drive a wedge between Milosevic and the population. (One psychological operations leaflet asked, “How long will you suffer for Milosevic?”)³⁴ However, power outages had similar dual effects: by degrading the economic function, the cronies who control most of the economy suffered. Specifically, loss of electricity cut computer availability for the banking system, critical to the regime’s coherence.³⁵ Electrical power was probably the best example of the coincidence between cost to public goods and the private goods of the ruling coalition.

Media

Cutting television and radio transmitters was a key objective from an information warfare perspective. Milosevic ruled largely by manipulating the media’s message. Also, many transmitter towers handled military and government communications. NATO destroyed five radio and television stations, 17 major television transmitters, and more than 20 other radio and television transmitters.³⁶ The state-controlled media was controlled, not directly by an official instrument of government, but by cronies. The strike on the Usce Business Center was the most damaging. It contained the headquarters of Milosevic’s SPS party, Markovic’s YUL party, and four media outlets. Multimillionaire and Serbian minister with portfolio Bogoljub Karic ran BK TV along with his three brothers. BK TV was shut down for the remainder of the war. (A private banker on the restricted travel list, Karic was refused entry into Cyprus due to renewed EU sanctions during the war.) Entertainment channel TV Pink was knocked off the air; it was owned by longtime Markovic friend and YUL party functionary, Zeljko Mitrovic. After the bombing, Mitrovic bemoaned the loss of 123 episodes of *The Simpsons* and new episodes of *Friends*. The Usce attack also destroyed the facilities of the radio and TV station Kosava, financed by Karic and operated by Milosevic’s daughter Marija.³⁷

RTS and its associated entity Belgrade Television were controlled by longtime Milosevic associate and SPS party member, Dragoljub Milovanovic. Nearly all of RTS’s transmission capability was lost, although Belgrade Television managed to broadcast to limited areas throughout the conflict. NATO’s attack on the largest of the RTS transmission facilities, a large tower in the Fruska Gora hills area of Belgrade, caused some backlash due to the death of 16 RTS workers in the attack and the destruction of a Belgrade landmark.³⁸

Results

To the extent that Milosevic was pressured by his wife and other cronies to give in, the crony attack scheme worked. Evidence suggests that from early in the conflict, some of those close to Milosevic thought he was going down the wrong path. As the conflict wore on, there was growing discontent among the cronies, who were losing the money flow from factory operations. Several members of the coalition dropped out, some tried to leave

the country, and many sought to convince Milosevic to accept the Russian brokered deal. There was also a sharp reduction in support from the general population, which, while not nearly as important as in a purely democratic government, did have an effect on some power brokers, particularly in Milosevic's Socialist Party.

After two months of bombing, clear expressions of discontent were evident. Popular discontent should be distinguished from the discontent by cronies. At first, defiance of NATO was the rule. YUL-sponsored rock concerts held nightly on Belgrade bridges and in Republic Square drew crowds of tens of thousands. The hottest fashion fad was a T-shirt or hat with a bull's-eye and the word *target*. Reporters within Belgrade noted that the bombing had merely served to unite the Serbs against NATO. Gen Wesley Clark had bemoaned that in Belgrade "lovers strolled down riverbanks in the gathering twilight and ate at outdoor cafes and watched the fireworks."³⁹ He sought to change that by convincing the North Atlantic Council to allow escalated bombing in Belgrade in late April "to bring greater pressure against [Milosevic]." Evidence suggests that it began to work. Some outside observers believe, echoing Pape, that "the more NATO punishes civilians, the angrier people become at NATO and view themselves as victims."⁴⁰ However, in Belgrade, the rallies and concerts had stopped and open discontent was appearing in cities outside the capital. In Krusevac, for example, reservists refused to serve, and their mothers staged demonstrations against Milosevic. Among the young and educated in Belgrade, many just wanted to leave: they "are not discussing political change, but emigration from a broken, postwar Yugoslavia still ruled by Milosevic."⁴¹ An open threat to Milosevic's regime was not immediately evident, however, at least in Belgrade.

The situation among cronies was different. At first, the rally-around the flag effect was strong, as it was with the public, even driving former opposition leaders to support Milosevic. The clearest example of this actually dates from February, just before the Rambouillet talks, when prominent opposition leader Vuk Draskovic accepted an offer to join the government that already included sometime rival opposition leader SRS leader Vojislav Seselj. The most prominent remaining opposition leader, Democratic Party's Zoran Djindjic, escaped to Montenegro for most of the conflict. Draskovic's addition to the ruling coalition was relatively short lived, however, as he was fired by Milosevic (or perhaps left of his own accord) at the end of April (after the increase in Belgrade bombing) for threatening public protest over Milosevic's tight press policy.⁴²

The popular Draskovic's departure did not cause a breakup of the regime, but discontent was becoming evident. Italian foreign minister Lamberto Dini revealed the sentiment of some of his contacts among "the government coalition and factory managers" that "there is beginning to filter into Milosevic the doubt and the question that he is not likely to succeed and that he should seek a negotiated settlement."⁴³ (Italy was one of two NATO countries to maintain embassy presence during Operation Allied Force; the other was Greece.) According to a "source close to the Yugoslav government," the cronies "started

to break into pro-war and antiwar camps” after the electricity was turned off in the middle of May. The antiwar group gained most of its influence with Milosevic’s wife.⁴⁴ She reportedly was becoming “increasingly hysterical as the bombing intensified.”⁴⁵ But, in remarks to parliament regarding the deal to end the war, she stated the clearest rationale for not fighting until the bitter end: “This is not a surrender of the state but of a wrong policy.”⁴⁶

Conclusion

Eventually, the regime fell because of massive popular discontent 18 months later. In the meantime, Milosevic held on to power following the significant policy failure of defeat at the hands of NATO. The failure was caused by a threatened shift in ruling coalition. Milosevic’s SPS party faithful and especially his wife’s moneyed YUL regime members had realized a net reduction in private goods caused by crony attacks. Seselj’s Radical Party members of the coalition were less affected due to their greater reliance on smuggling activities that continued during the war; Seselj was against capitulation and subsequently resigned as deputy prime minister. Milosevic was held on to power by welcoming Draskovic back into the government with promises (unfulfilled) of greater press freedoms and government reform, which would allow the Draskovic’s opposition media supporters to gain more private goods. In short, coercion through negative manipulation of private goods of the ruling coalition worked to change policy without having to cause a regime change.

We will probably never know exactly what combination of pressures had the most leverage on Milosevic’s intransigence. He is reticent about interviews, particularly since being handed over to the Hague war crimes tribunal. Analysts have sought to figure his calculus, because the strategy stakes are high. This was, as Benjamin S. Lambeth states, “the first time in which airpower coerced an enemy leader to yield with no friendly land combat whatsoever.”⁴⁷ Noted British war historian John Keegan recanted earlier judgments on airpower to agree. Operation Allied Force is a counterpoint to Pape’s admonition that only denial strategies work, while risk, punishment, and decapitation do not. Among academics, RAND’s Stephen Hosmer has provided the clearest laundry list of possible reasons for Milosevic’s capitulation; similar explanations abound among journalists, most neatly by Jim Mokhiber of PBS *Frontline*. Both of them describe what is in effect a cumulative parallel strategy explanation, not pushing any one significantly in front of the others. Following is a combined list of the most common explanations:

- Milosevic was unable to force NATO to divide.
- Strategic bombing in Belgrade produced a shift in popular opinion for the war.
- Milosevic expected significant escalation in the bombing if he rejected NATO terms.
- Milosevic feared a threatened NATO ground invasion.

- Russia turned against Milosevic and urged him to accept terms.
- Russia sought to continue to help Milosevic by secretly promising to secure a Russian quadrant in occupied northern Kosovo.
- NATO's terms were just generous enough to enable him to want to stay in power.
- Milosevic's cronies put pressure on him to end damage to their companies, infrastructure, and economy in general.
- Some combination of some or all of the above.⁴⁸

Almost every commentator agrees it is the last one. Even Lt Gen Mike Short, who garnered much attention after the war by saying NATO should have gone for "the head of the snake" from the beginning, stated that it was "everything we did, and it was only going to get worse."⁴⁹

Did Milosevic give in to NATO due to pressure from his cronies? The evidence points toward considerable pressure applied through his wife. It was not the exclusive explanation, but, as Bueno de Mesquita posits, the utility function of the leader is the one that counts, his calculus will always include the utilities of his closest advisors, which may tend to magnify certain coercive actions. For example, Progress company director Majanovic, who controlled much of the arms trade with Russia, would have liked to see policies favoring close ties with Russia, while Cekovic might not have objected to some damage to Russian relations, if it meant the arms trade with China and Iraq he controls through Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement had increased. In this manner, we could begin to overlap the explanations for Milosevic's capitulation with crony advocacy to determine which crony's position would have been more or less enhanced depending on attacks or benefits we sent his way. It was advantageous to damage the cronies closest to Milosevic so they would seek to end the conflict but not necessarily overthrow the regime. Attacks on the more distant and radical Seselj would not have helped to end the conflict because of his strong support for it, but support to Draskovic to rejoin the regime after settlement ensured stability without a disintegration of the regime, which would have benefited almost no one (until a strong enough alternative existed).

Air targeting is certainly not the only way cronies were influenced in this campaign, but it was effectively complemented by diplomatic and economic levers that eventually provided for successful coercion of Milosevic to vacate Kosovo.

Notes

1. Quoted in Wieseltier, "Force without Force."
2. For example, see Hosmer, *Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did*, xiv-xv; Lambeth, *A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 67-82; and Mokhiber, "Why Did Milosevic Give Up?"
3. Following sections were compiled from Doder and Branson, *Milosevic*; and Sell, *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*.

4. Doder and Branson, *Milosevic*, 213.
5. This section draws primarily on information from Doder and Branson, *Milosevic*; Thomas, *Politics of Serbia in the 1990s*; and Djukic, *Milosevic and Markovic*.
6. Arkin and Windrem, "Other Kosovo War"; Arkin, "Smart Bombs, Dumb Targeting?" 46–53; and Arkin, "Operation Allied Force," 1–29.
7. Much of his early career was spent investigating nuclear programs and western test ranges. He also has garnered firsthand pictures of bombing damage following operations in Iraq and Lebanon as well as Serbia.
8. Although I have no independent confirmation of the existence or name of "Operation Matrix," this paper follows Arkin's nomenclature for a hypothetical operation of this type. Arkin's biweekly "dotmil" columns for *Washington Post* are available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/dotmil/archive.htm>. All of his seven columns during the war regard some aspect of cyberwar or information warfare.
9. Sainovic had previously been in charge of Kosovo affairs and was indicted by the Hague tribunal along with Milosevic. The Bor Smelter was used to incinerate victims of the genocide in Kosovo during Operation Horseshoe. It is not clear whether this entered into the targeting calculus. See Vlastic, "Dead Travel."
10. For more on Matkovic, see Fisk, "Mystery of Serbia's Missing Millions."
11. Arkin, "Chinese Embassy Continues to Smolder."
12. Isenberg, "Saddam and the Yugoslav Link."
13. Arkin, "Operation Allied Force," 1–29.
14. Arkin, "Smart Bombs, Dumb Targeting?"
15. *Ibid.*
16. Berger, "Winning the Peace in Kosovo."
17. Quoted in Gordon, "Weeks of Bombing Will Aim to Break Milosevic's Grip."
18. Arkin, "A Mouse That Roars?"
19. Arkin, "Cyber Bomb in Yugoslavia."
20. Hirsch, "NATO's Game of Chicken," 61.
21. Hosmer, *Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did*, 69.
22. Numbers vary according to source and release date of data. Arkin compiled this data from NATO and other sources that have been validated to a certain extent by his after action ground survey. See Arkin, "Operation Allied Force," 23.
23. A fairly complete listing of targeted factories and petroleum, oil, and lubricants facilities considered from a relatively unbiased civilian perspective is imbedded in a war timeline in United Nations Environment Programme and United Nations Centre for Human Settlements Task Force. See United Nations Environment Programme, "Kosovo Conflict: Consequences for the Environment and Human Settlements." A Serbian antiwar synopsis of damage is published on the Dutch NGO "DDH" Kosovo archive Web site: Dimitrije Boarev, "Damage from Defiance." For the official Serbian government report of damage, see Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FRY FMFA), *Official Report of NATO Destruction*.
24. Fidler, "NATO Strike Targets Milosevic Inner-Circle."
25. Richter, "Officials Say NATO Pounded Milosevic into Submission"; and Erlanger, "At Ruined Factory."
26. Hosmer, *Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did*, 67.
27. Sell, *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 189.
28. Fidler, "NATO Strike Targets Milosevic Inner-Circle," 2.
29. Djukic, *Milosevic and Markovic*, 113.
30. Arkin, "Operation Allied Force," 1–29.
31. FRY FMFA, *Official Report of NATO Destruction*, 17–18.
32. "Zarate's Political Leaders."
33. Kuburovic, "Forthcoming SPS Congress."
34. Quoted in Hosmer, *Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did*, 72.
35. Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo*, 42.

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

36. FRY FMFA, *Official Report of NATO Destruction*, 14.
37. Erlanger, "NATO Raids Send Notice to Milosevic."
38. Justice was later served: in 2002 Milovanovic was sentenced to 10 years in jail because he had known an attack on the RTS tower was imminent and did not evacuate the facility. See *Bosnia Report*.
39. Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*, 108.
40. Donnelly, "Milosevic's Best Friend."
41. Erlanger, "Belgrade's People Still Defiant, but Deeply Weary."
42. But he chose not to protest subsequently, for fear of suffering the same fate as outspoken press critic Slavko Curuvija, murdered by masked gunmen two weeks prior. See Djukic, *Milosevic and Markovic*, 127.
43. "Milosevic 'faces internal pressure for settlement'."
44. Hirsch, "NATO's Game of Chicken," 59.
45. Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo*, 71.
46. Sell, *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 310.
47. Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo*, 224.
48. Hosmer, *Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did*; and Mokhiber, "Why Did Milosevic Give Up?"
49. Interview with Lt Gen Mike Short, 15 November 2002.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

I am, quite frankly, a big fan of asymmetric warfare.

—Lt Gen Michael Short

Crony attack is a coercive air strategy. In the case of many regimes, by targeting assets of the key supporters of the enemy leader, crony attack can weaken the regime's resolve to oppose our desired policy. In short it is a way to coerce the enemy to do what we want. Crony attack assumes a disaggregated model of enemy government decision making. Although there is a single leader who wields ultimate power, a small subset of the population advises and supports that leader. Those key elites may be coerced through damage to their assets, making their support of the leader less rewarding. Of course, they also may be coerced through other instruments of power, including economic pressure, diplomatic actions, and information operations. These other instruments should be tried before, and in parallel with, military operations. When the military instrument of power is to be used, however, crony attack as an air strategy offers the same promise of an efficient application of airpower as strategic attack generically has claimed. Indeed, by focusing more finely on the precise mechanism to be tripped to achieve the desired objective, crony attack could be strategic attack's "silver bullet" in some cases.

Crony attack is a strategy to affect adversary policy change through the mechanism of inflicting cost on the influential subordinates of the leader. The degree to which cronies can influence the leader varies depending on the government's power structure on a scale of democracy to autocracy. Success also depends on the severity of policy change being demanded. Crony attack likely works best in a weak autocracy in seeking relatively modest policy change. There are perhaps a significant number of countries that hold power as kleptocracies. Post-colonial and post-communist states that have not aggressively completed a transition to Western-style democracy certainly fit the bill for being ideally suited to a crony attack strategy.

In terms of the Ehrhard strategy, the core policy process theory for crony attack to affect policy change is nearly the same as that for regime change. A crony attack strategy is similar to regime change because members of the adversary ruling elite are being targeted. However, the threshold concept is different. The goal of crony attack is policy change as a result of coercive pressure. It has a lower threshold of action to produce desired outcomes. It is difficult to coerce a regime change because the cost to the leader is so high. The case of coercing Milosevic to leave Kosovo was not a

CONCLUSIONS

modest demand. However, it was short of regime change, and Serbia retained, at least technically, its sovereignty.

Crony attack was effective in Serbia. In fact it served as the model because of the nature of the government and demands sought. Milosevic, a weak autocrat at the head of a semi-democratic government, held power by distributing control of key industries to cronies in exchange for their political support. NATO and the United States were able to determine who the key cronies were and to conduct the air campaign to apply coercive pressure on cronies. These cronies, led by the Yugoslavian president's wife, expressed enough dissatisfaction that, along with other coercive pressure, swayed Milosevic to change his policy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

A crony attack strategy will not always produce the outcomes desired, but the analysis tools may be used to map the regime structure and crony network. Coercive pressure for modest policy change among regime supporters still might work, even in the context of a regime change objective. While the case of Iraq is still too fresh to know what did or did not work, it appears that coercive pressure on key military leaders caused them to disobey any orders to use weapons of mass destruction.

Such a strategy must be carefully coordinated within the interagency process, from the NSC down to the theater combatant commander and his subordinate commanders and staffs. Crony attack represents cumulative strategic action within traditionally disparate channels for wielding the different national instruments of power. It particularly requires coordination with the military component of the Departments of State, Commerce, and Treasury to ensure the economic, diplomatic, and military aspects of the strategy synergistically work as a whole.

Crony attack is a focused strategic attack mechanism. Depending on many factors, including the structure of the enemy government and the extent to which we are prepared to conduct military strikes, crony attack may be a silver bullet. Strategists should add it to the array of effective coercive war-fighting tools.

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