




# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

JULY 21, 2017



## Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Build Counterterrorism and Stability Operations Capacity of Foreign Military Forces with Section 1206/2282 Funding



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# Results in Brief

## *Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Build Counterterrorism and Stability Operations Capacity of Foreign Military Forces with Section 1206/2282 Funding*

July 21, 2017

### Objective

Our objective was to determine whether the Department of Defense (DoD) Global Train and Equip Program, created pursuant to Public Law 109-163, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Section 1206 (2006),<sup>1</sup> as amended, henceforth “Section 1206,” effectively managed and enhanced partner-nation security-force capabilities. Our specific objectives were to determine whether Section 1206:

- efforts resulted in improved partner nation capability to conduct counterterrorism operations or to participate in stability operations with U.S. Armed Forces,
- performance-feedback data informed DoD Section 1206 program decision making,
- was administered by DoD officials consistent with U.S. statutes and guidance, and
- coordination between the DoD and the Department of State (DOS) at all levels appropriately supported planning and execution.

<sup>1</sup> In December 2014, Section 1206 became codified as Section 2282, title 10, United States Code (10 U.S.C. § 2282 [2015]), with different and expanded provisions. Section 1241 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 will repeal 10 U.S.C. § 2282 [2015] and incorporate it into Section 333, title 10, United States Code, (10 U.S.C. §333 [2017]) Chapter 16-Security Cooperation, § 333. However, we concluded our fieldwork under the provisions of Section 1206. We therefore refer to Section 1206 throughout this report unless there is a reason not to do so.

### Findings

The FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 1206, authorized the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to conduct or support a program to build the capacity of foreign military forces to conduct counterterrorism and stability operations.

The use of Section 1206 funds by the DoD and the Department of State (DOS) provided partner nations with equipment, training, and services to enhance their capabilities to conduct counterterrorism and stabilization operations.

Partner nations, along with DoD and DOS stakeholders, reported continued interest in receiving this support.

Although the DoD and the DOS had established systematic interagency coordination processes in planning and execution, the DoD needs to enhance its Section 1206 management and reporting. Specifically, we determined that:

1. The DoD had not established Section 1206 as a distinct and fully developed program, including:
  - developing a programmatic strategy with clear objectives and an overarching execution plan, and
  - allocating sufficient personnel and other resources necessary to effectively manage Section 1206.
2. Project proposal guidance, selection criteria, analysis procedures, and metrics for determining results achieved from Section 1206 implementation required improvement:
  - Project proposal guidance was not sufficiently instructive or enforced.
  - Project proposals did not always include data or analysis essential to enable prioritization about projected costs, benefits, and risks.
  - Performance measurement methodology did not sufficiently define progress achieved with respect to programmatic goals.





# Results in Brief

## *Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Build Counterterrorism and Stability Operations Capacity of Foreign Military Forces with Section 1206/2282 Funding*

### Findings (cont'd)

- Section 1206 reporting to congressional and senior-level DoD and DOS leaders has not been sufficiently informative in explaining the collective impact of Section 1206 in support of U.S. counterterrorism and stability operation objectives.

### Recommendations<sup>2</sup>

We recommend that:

- Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:
  - designate a lead manager with sufficient authority, resources, and staff capacity to effectively plan and execute the mission authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 2282, and
  - develop a comprehensive implementation plan.
- Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, ensure that implementation of 10 U.S.C. § 2282 results in projects based on:
  - proposals that fully describe partner-nation requirements and the means to sustain the capability provided;
  - a selection process that enables proposals to be prioritized on the basis of a comprehensive comparison of the respective costs, benefits, and risks;
  - performance measures and indicators that enable senior-level management reviews in accordance with applicable Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and other Government directives and guidance.

- Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict:
  - identify process deficiencies that impede fast, effective procurement and provision of fully operational equipment – and develop a plan to address these deficiencies; and
  - ensure that Geographic Combatant Command and United States Embassy Security Cooperation personnel are aware of, and fully use, all funding authorities and sources available for sustaining capabilities provided by 10 U.S.C. § 2282.

### Management Comments and Our Response

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Combat), performing the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, responding for management, agreed with 13 of the 15 recommendations in this report, partially agreed with the 14th recommendation, and did not respond to the remaining 15th recommendation. However, management's comments did not fully meet the intent of certain recommendations to:

- Identify process deficiencies impeding fast, effective procurement and delivery of fully operational equipment and develop sufficient internal controls to preclude the shipment of incomplete or inoperable equipment (Recommendation E.1).
- Develop a comprehensive plan to address the deficiencies identified in the previous bullet (Recommendation E.1), ensuring that responsible DoD personnel use all Federal Acquisition Regulation and Defense Federal Acquisition

<sup>2</sup> All recommendations in this report refer to DoD activities that were originally authorized by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, Section 1206 (2006), as amended, and are currently authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 2282, December 19, 2014.



# Results in Brief

## *Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Build Counterterrorism and Stability Operations Capacity of Foreign Military Forces with Section 1206/2282 Funding*

### **Management Comments (cont'd)**

Regulation Supplement authorizations, as well as allowable waiver and exemption options, to meet program requirements (Recommendation E.2—management did not respond to this Recommendation).

Because the management comments did not fully address these recommendations, they are unresolved, and they remain open. We request that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Combat), performing the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, provide:

- Additional comments on what inefficiencies, if any, have or will be removed and what data, if any, shows how new equipment procurement processes have improved the effective procurement and delivery of fully operational equipment. (Recommendation E.1).
- A response to recommendation E.2.

We consider Recommendation B.2 resolved, but still open. We ask that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Combat), performing the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, provide a copy of the guidance or documentation that results in a strategy-driven, resource-informed set of objectives that drives development and evaluation of indicators for activities authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 2282.

We consider Recommendation C1.a resolved, but still open. We ask that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Combat), performing the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, provide a copy of the comprehensive project proposal form given to the Geographic Combatant Commands that addresses all elements of program design.

We request that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Combat), performing the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, provide the additional information requested by August 21, 2017 (30 days from the final report). Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of the recommendations.

## Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy		B.1.a; B.1.b; B.1.c; B.2*	
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict	E.1*; E.2*	C.1.a*; C.1.b; C.2; D.1; D.2; F.1; F.2; G	C.1.c

Please provide Management Comments by August 21, 2017.

\* Additional comments required in response to the Final Report.

Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations.

- **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.



**INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

July 21, 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
AND LOWINTENSITY CONFLICT

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Build Counterterrorism and Stability  
Operations Capacity of Foreign Military Forces with Section 1206/2282 Funding  
(Report No. DODIG-2017-099)


We are providing this final report for review and comment. We conducted this evaluation in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation" published by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency in January 2012.

We found that the Department of Defense is building Counterterrorism and Stability Operations capacity of Foreign Military Forces with Section 1206/2282 funding in accordance with federal law. However, we also identified areas for improvement concerning program management. Specifically, we identified the need to improve linking strategic objectives with proposal implementation, development of achievement plans, allocation of sufficient personnel for program execution, and records management.

We considered management comments on a draft of the report when preparing the final report. DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Comments received addressed Recommendations B.1.a, B.1.b, B.1.c, B.2, C.1.a, C.1.b, C.2, D.1, D.2, F.1, F.2, and G; therefore, those recommendations are resolved, but still open. However, Recommendations E.1, and E.2 were partially addressed or not addressed and are considered unresolved. We consider Recommendations C.1.c to be closed. (See the Recommendations Table on page iv of the Results in Brief for definitions of unresolved, resolved, and closed.) We request that the senior official Performing the Duties of Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) provide additional comments as requested in the Results in Brief by August 21, 2017.

Please send a PDF file containing your comments to [SPO@dodig.mil](mailto:SPO@dodig.mil). Copies of your comments must have the autographic signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We cannot accept the /signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to Michael de la Garza, 703-699-0213, [Michael.DeLaGarza@dodig.mil](mailto:Michael.DeLaGarza@dodig.mil), or Stanley Meyer at (703) 604-9130, [Stanley.Meyer@dodig.mil](mailto:Stanley.Meyer@dodig.mil).

  
Kenneth P. Moorefield  
Deputy Inspector General  
Special Plans and Operations

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## Introduction

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The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) conducted this evaluation as a follow-up review to a previous report, entitled “Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program,”<sup>3</sup> which the DoD and DOS OIGs jointly issued in 2009.

## Objectives

Our objective was to determine whether the Department of Defense (DoD) Global Train and Equip Program, stipulated by Public Law 109-163, National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006, Section 1206 (2006), as amended, [henceforth “Section 1206”] was effectively managed, and whether it enhanced partner-nation security-force capabilities. Our specific objectives were to determine whether:

- DoD Section 1206 efforts resulted in improved partner-nation capability to conduct counterterrorism operations or to participate in stability operations with U.S. Armed Forces,
- performance-feedback data informed DoD Section 1206 program decision making,
- DoD officials administering 1206 efforts acted consistently with U.S. statutes and guidance, and
- coordination between the DoD and the Department of State (DOS) at all levels appropriately supported planning and execution.

## Methodology

We began the evaluation by reviewing observations and recommendations from the previous joint DoD OIG and DOS OIG report. We then determined the current statutory provisions and implementation status of Public Law 109-163, “The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006,” Section 1206, January 6, 2006, as amended (FY 2006 NDAA).

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<sup>3</sup> DoD IG Report No. IE-2009-007 “Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program,” August 31, 2009.

We evaluated program<sup>4</sup> operations and processes through research and field visits with relevant agencies and congressional staff, Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), partner nations, and U.S. embassies within those countries. Specifically, we visited 19 countries that had received Section 1206<sup>5</sup> support, five GCC headquarters, and the U.S. Special Operations Command headquarters.

We considered various factors in determining which countries and project sites to visit. These factors included (but were not limited to):

- the total amount of Section 1206 funding that the partner nation had received;
- threat level, as determined by the number of terrorist attacks within the respective partner nations;
- which projects had been executed between FY 2009 and the time of our evaluation;
- whether each partner nation was visited as part of the joint DoD and DOS Inspectors General Section 1206 assessment of 2009;
- whether each partner nation had been assessed by using the Section 1206 Assessment Framework of the Office of the Secretary of Defense;
- the type of capability (that is, land, sea, or air) that a project provided to a partner nation;
- the feasibility of visiting the partner nations or the limitations on accessing project sites within a particular partner nation;
- whether a given project had a regional focus (including multiple countries); and
- specific issues or suggestions raised by the respective GCCs or other authoritative sources, such as U.S. embassy and DOS officials.

Our team's intent was to review a representative sample of projects implemented across GCCs. Figure 1 provides a geographic overview of the evaluation's diversity and its global scope. See Appendix A for additional information about our scope and methodology and Appendix C for details about the various sites visited.

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<sup>4</sup> In this report we apply these terms to mean: Program – The full set of organized activities and global projects that the ASD(SO/LIC) undertook and directed toward a common purpose (in counterterrorism and stability operations) to carry out its responsibilities under Section 1206/2282. Project – A specific set of Section 1206/2282 capabilities that a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) or other stakeholder proposes for a recipient partner-nation unit. For example, night-vision goggles for a special-operations partner-nation unit.

<sup>5</sup> In December 2014, Section 1206 of the NDAA of Fiscal Year 2006 was codified as Section 2282, title 10, United States Code (10 U.S.C. § 2282 [2015]), with different and expanded provisions. In December 2016, Section 1241 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 incorporated what had been Section 2282 into Section 333, title 10, United States Code (10 U.S.C. § 333 [2017]). However, we concluded our fieldwork under the provisions of Section 1206. We will refer to Section 1206 throughout this report, unless there is a reason not to do so.

Figure 1. DoD OIG Section 1206/2282 Evaluation Site Visit Locations



Source: DoD OIG.

As we evaluated Section 1206 goals and objectives, we used guidance in:

- GAO “Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.” It states that implementing appropriate internal control is a key factor in helping Federal managers to achieve agency missions while minimizing operational problems.<sup>6</sup>
- Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-11, “Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget,” provides a practical illustration of how adhering to GAO standards supports Presidential budget development and execution.
- Presidential Policy Directive 23 (PPD-23) Security Sector Assistance. PPD-23 states that agencies must plan, synchronize, and implement Security Sector Assistance activities through a deliberate process that aligns activities and resources with national security priorities.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> GAO “Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,” November 1999, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (11/99), p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> The security sector is composed of institutions such as partner governments and international organizations that have the authority to use force to protect both the state and its citizens, to enforce the law, and to provide oversight of those organizations and forces. U.S. Security Sector Assistance policy is aimed at strengthening U.S. ability to help allies and partner nations to build their own security capacity, consistent with the principles of good governance and the rule of law. Presidential Policy Directive 23, “Security Sector Assistance,” April 5, 2013.



## Background

### ***History of Authority and Implementation Under Section 1206 and Section 2282***

In the FY 2006 NDAA, Section 1206 authorized the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to conduct or support a program to build the capacity of foreign military forces to conduct counterterrorism or stability (or both) operations. Congress repeatedly extended and expanded the Section 1206 authority from FY 2006 until the FY 2015 NDAA codified it as an enduring authority in 10 U.S.C. § 2282. Changes in the legislation over that period included (but were not limited to):

- increase in annual authorization funding from \$200 million to \$350 million,
- authorization for the DoD to “build the capacity of a foreign country’s national maritime or border-security forces to conduct counterterrorism operations,”<sup>8</sup>
- increased scope of the authority from “stability operations in which the United States Armed Forces are a participant” to “participate in or support ongoing allied or coalition military or stability operations that benefit the national security interests of the United States,”<sup>9</sup>
- authorization for the DoD “to build the capacity of a foreign country’s national-level security forces that have, among their functional responsibilities, a counterterrorism mission for such forces to conduct counterterrorism operations,”<sup>10</sup> and
- increased the amount and type of information that the DoD is required to provide in its congressional notification and in an annual report summarizing assessment findings for each fiscal year.<sup>11</sup>

The specific extent and type of assistance provided by the DoD using the Section 1206 authority has varied considerably since its enactment, in FY 2006, providing partner nations with equipment ranging from small arms and ammunition to aircraft. Overall, our research determined that Section 1206 had provided 74 countries with various types of counterterrorism and stability operations assistance in the form of multiple projects. Of these, 19 countries received stability operations assistance, and 60 received counterterrorism assistance.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Public Law 113-291, the “Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015,” December 19, 2014, Section 1205.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> Total numbers differed because some countries received both counterterrorism and stability-operations assistance.

According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism (DASD[SOCT]) officials, the decision to provide assistance using the Section 1206 authority involved joint DoD and DOS consideration of a partner nation's ability to absorb, implement, and sustain different types and amounts of equipment and training activity. This counterterrorism and stability operations assistance generally consists of three main categories of security capability projects – those that fortify a partner nation's land, sea, or air capability. It is not uncommon for projects to include also communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance equipment.



Figure 2. Boats provided under Section 1206 Authority to the Maltese Maritime Squadron to Support Counterterrorism operations in the Mediterranean Sea  
Source: DoD OIG.

Though most Section 1206 projects focused on creating or enhancing a single partner nation's capability, DoD records indicated that some projects were regionally focused, and that they involved multiple partner nations. For example, one stability operations project covered multiple European countries, including Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. The project provided counter-IED and related mobility training, as well as training for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected and up-armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle drivers and mechanics, preparing units from those countries for deployment to Afghanistan in support of the NATO mission there.

Another regional project, the Integrated Maritime Surveillance System, involved Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The system is a tightly linked network of ship and shore sensors (coastal radars), communication devices, and computing resources that collect, transmit, analyze, and display a broad array of maritime data from automatic identification systems, surveillance cameras, radars, GPS, and radio transmissions from ship traffic.

## Change in Statutory Direction

The FY 2015 NDAA, enacted late in 2014, presented the DoD with new requirements and a unique opportunity to determine how it planned to manage the Section 2282 initiative going forward. Prior to the FY 2015 NDAA, the original FY 2006 NDAA Section 1206 authorization included a September 30, 2007, termination provision, which Congress extended by single or multi-year increments in subsequent NDAAs. In interviews that we conducted before the FY 2015 NDAA, DoD officials stated that the temporary nature of the authority made it infeasible to commit the resources necessary to effectively manage Section 1206 as a “program.”<sup>13</sup> However, in authorizing Section 2282, title 10, United States Code (10 U.S.C. § 2282), the Congress provided more specific language than previous authorizations about how Congress expects the DoD to manage and measure the performance of these activities. For example, subparagraph (e) of 10 U.S.C. § 2282 specifies that, before starting activities to build a foreign country’s capacity for counterterrorism and stability operations, the DoD will submit to the appropriate committees of Congress information about:

- the budget, implementation timeline with milestones, anticipated delivery schedule, and completion date;
- the source and planned expenditure of funds to complete the activities;
- a description of the arrangement, if any, for sustainment, and source of funds to support longer-term sustainment of the capabilities and performance outcomes, if applicable;
- a description of the objectives and assessment framework to be used to develop the capability and performance metrics associated with operational outcomes for the recipient units;
- information, including the amount, type, and purpose, of the assistance provided to the country during the three preceding fiscal years;

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<sup>13</sup> Refer to footnote 4 for an explanation of how this report distinguishes between the terms program and project.

- an assessment of the capacities of the recipient countries to receive and use the proposed Section 2282 assistance; and
- an assessment of how the program fits into the theater security cooperation strategy of the applicable geographic combatant command.

The FY 2015 NDAA specified additional DoD reporting requirements, including the submission of an annual report “summarizing the findings of the assessments of programs carried out under . . . Section 2282”<sup>14</sup> authority. The DoD annual reports must now include a description of the specific terrorist threat, program objectives, and a description of the assessment framework used to develop the performance metrics and effectiveness. The DoD must use that defined framework to assess both program performance and effectiveness in achieving the intended operational purpose, and it must include those assessment results in its reports to Congress.

Furthermore, subparagraph (f) of 10 U.S.C. § 2282 states that the DoD can use funding amounts designated by the authority to conduct assessments and determine the effectiveness of its efforts.

Existing DoD and other Government orders, directives, policies, regulations, and instructions provide the DoD with considerable guidance about how to effectively manage and conduct activities originally authorized by Section 1206, later by Section 2282, and now comparable sections of NDAA FY 2017, Section 1241. The FY 2017 NDAA requires Section 2282 to be replaced in September of FY 2017 with comparable language in Section 333, title 10, United States Code. See Appendix B for a summary of applicable guidance.

## Overview of the Section 1206 Process

The Section 1206 project<sup>15</sup> review-approval-execution cycle starts about nine months before the start of each fiscal year. This cycle begins with internal planning and with the DASD(SOCT)’s issuing guidance for submitting annual project proposals. Based on that guidance, GCCs work with U.S. embassies and their associated Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) to develop Section 1206 project proposals.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> See footnote 3 for an explanation of this report’s distinction between the terms project and program and their use within this report.

Past DASD(SOCT) guidance for annual proposals directed GCCs and SCOs to directly coordinate with Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Military Department Implementing Agencies (MILDEP IAs),<sup>16</sup> and other relevant stakeholders to ensure that project proposals were complete, accurate, and executable within the next fiscal year. The FY15 NDAA and DoD policy reiterate that Section 1206 proposals must be jointly formulated by the DoD and the DOS.<sup>17</sup> The DOS Chiefs of Mission are required to formally coordinate and concur on projects proposed for their respective countries.

Having received concurrence by the Chief of Mission, each GCC internally assesses, prioritizes, and submits its Section 1206 project proposals to the Joint Staff J5 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate for further review by DASD(SOCT). The DOS concurrently coordinates these same project proposals through its various regional and functional bureaus, with the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs serving as the principal action office.

About 4 months before the start of each new fiscal year, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict) (ASD(SO/LIC)) convenes a strategic review by senior-level Section 1206 stakeholders to begin the process of strategically prioritizing and selecting project proposals for recommended approval. This forum includes senior GCC officials and representatives from DSCA, DASD(SOCT), Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Joint Staff J5, Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller, MILDEP IAs, and congressional committee staff members, among others. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs serves as the main coordinator for DOS matters.

The DoD and DOS efforts to further review, assess, and prioritize submitted project proposals include considering independently developed rank-order listings of those proposals by both Joint Staff J5 and USSOCOM. The DASD(SOCT) and senior DOS representatives collectively consider a diverse range of security and diplomatic aspects to enable the DASD(SOCT) to develop a list of recommended projects. The ASD(SO/LIC) then coordinates that list of recommended projects through appropriate channels for Secretary of Defense approval and Secretary of State concurrence. After receiving that approval and concurrence, the DoD notifies Congress of its recommended projects shortly after the new fiscal year begins.

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<sup>16</sup> Implementing Agency. The military department or defense agency responsible for the execution of military assistance programs. With respect to Foreign Military Sales, the military department or defense agency assigned responsibility by DSCA to prepare a Letter of Offer and Acceptance and to implement a Foreign Military Sales case. For Foreign Military Sales cases, the IA is responsible for the overall management of the actions that will result in delivery of the materials or services set forth in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance that was accepted by a foreign country or international organization. Defense Security Cooperation Agency Manual 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual (eSAMM), April 30, 2012, (electronic format only) Glossary (refer to Table C5.T2 for a listing of IAs).

<sup>17</sup> Public Law 113-291, the “Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015,” December 19, 2014, Section 1205, para. (a); Authority and DoD Instruction, 5111.19, “Section 1206 Global Train-and-Equip Authority,” June 26, 2011, para. 3.a.



This notification by the Department must occur at least 15 days before starting a project. Thereafter, approved projects are executed. DoD Instruction 5111.19 requires that, during execution, GCCs direct the SCOs to coordinate with MILDEP supporting agencies and DSCA to closely track the procurement, shipment, and delivery of requested equipment or the scheduling of designated training. Throughout each year, the DoD selectively assesses the progress of previously approved and executed projects and uses assessment results to fulfill its congressionally mandated DoD reporting requirements.

See Appendix D for additional information about the Section 1206 project review-approval-execution cycle.

## Report Overview

This report is generally organized around the annual Section 1206 cycle, discussed above; it includes the following seven findings:

- Finding A – summarizes notable Section 1206 progress;
- Finding B – discusses programmatic planning, management, and objectives;
- Findings C and D – discuss the project proposal development, submission, prioritization, and selection actions that lead to project approval and congressional notification;
- Finding E – discusses issues associated with the procurement and delivery of equipment, training, and services;
- Finding F – discusses the challenges of sustaining partner-nation capabilities; and
- Finding G – discusses measuring and assessing operational impacts and programmatic performance with respect to identified goals and objectives.



## Finding A

### Section 1206 Funds Provided Partner Nations with Enhanced Capabilities to Conduct Counterterrorism and Stability Operations

#### Discussion

Since its initial NDAA authorization in FY 2006, the Section 1206 initiative has expended over \$2B to provide enhanced capabilities for counterterrorism and stability operations to more than 70 recipient countries. DoD officials have continued to refine the management processes associated with Section 1206.

Interagency coordination and organizational initiatives by the DoD and the DOS, in particular, have contributed to this progress. Coordination was particularly noteworthy at the Country Team level and between the DoD DASD(SOCT) and the DOS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

Efforts by other DOS functional and regional bureaus, DSCA, MILDEP IAs, and U.S. Missions and their SCO personnel also advanced Section 1206/2282 development. The Joint Consolidation Point established by DSCA, discussed below, is an additional example of a positive initiative.

#### ***Joint Consolidation Point***

On behalf of the DoD, the DSCA is responsible for coordinating the procurement and delivery of Section 1206/2282 equipment. As a part of that support, it established a Joint Consolidation Point (JCP) to speed up shipments to partner nations, provide better accountability of equipment, and correct other field-identified discrepancies. DSCA officials at the JCP cited initiatives, such as improved contract-award and monitoring processes for equipment items as evidence of the progress made in supporting these goals.

Other reported JCP actions included continuous-process improvements based on Lean Six Sigma<sup>18</sup> practices. One improvement was that JCP officials established a requirement that Section 1206 equipment movements have dedicated escorts who accompany the aircraft to provide SCO officials in the recipient countries with

<sup>18</sup> Lean Six Sigma is a part of the DoD-wide Continuous Process Improvement implementation. Lean refers to a methodology focused on workflow, customer value, and the elimination of process waste, which differs from traditional process-improvement strategies in that it focuses primarily on eliminating non-value-added activities. Six Sigma is a disciplined, data-driven methodology that strives to satisfy customer requirements while minimizing waste by reducing and controlling process variation. DoD Instruction 5010.43, "Implementation and Management of the DoD-Wide Continuous Process Improvement/Lean Six Sigma (CPI/LSS) Program," July 17, 2009, pp. 1 and 21.

on-site coordination assistance to ensure smooth deliveries. Shipment-delivery survey responses indicated that most SCO personnel had experienced improved DSCA JCP deliveries.

### ***Enhanced Partner-Nation Capabilities***

Partner nations, DoD officials, and DOS officials also reported during interviews that they maintained an interest in continuing to receive Section 1206 support.

As noted, more than 70 countries have received assistance under the authority of Section 1206. Some examples of productive partnerships using Section 1206 assistance include:

- During interviews, U.S. military and civilian officials identified the government of Kenya as a strong partner with significant ability and commitment to absorb and use enhanced counterterrorism capability to combat national and regional threats. The team observed equipment and training provided by Section 1206 for the Kenyan Ranger Regiment and the Special Boat Unit, both deployed to Somalia in support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to counter al Shabaab.
- The government of the Philippines used Section 1206 support to improve its combat effectiveness against Abu Sayyaf insurgents in the southern part of the country. We received classified briefings detailing the enhanced capability and successful counterterrorism operations resulting from equipment delivered under the authority of Section 1206. We also visited Philippine Marine Special Forces units in the field and observed demonstrations of capabilities provided or enhanced by Section 1206 equipment and training.



Figure 3. Section 1206 Provided Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles to Support a Georgian Infantry Battalion's Stability Operations Deployment to Afghanistan  
Source: DoD OIG.

## ***Counter-Islamic-State Implications***

Besides the broader partner-nation support outlined above, Section 1206 was used to directly support other countries in the Middle East to counter aggression from ISIL. For example, Section 1206 projects provided items such as small arms and ammunition for Jordan and Iraq early in FY 2015.

The DoD also approved Section 1206 fixed-wing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, along with equipment for unmanned-aerial systems for Jordan and Lebanon to counter ISIL. Concurrently, border-security projects for both Jordan and Lebanon were approved, as was a quick-reaction-force project for Jordan. As early as June 2015, equipment was in the delivery process for those projects.

Security units in Lebanon, equipped under Section 1206, provided essential security support, which in 2014 enabled Lebanese forces to thwart an Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) cross-border attack on the country's northeastern border. The team observed the weapons, equipment, and ammunition used in counterterrorism operations by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), specifically in the operations against ISIL.

## ***Stability Operations***

GCCs, SCO's, and partner-nation officials stated during interviews that Section 1206 support of stability-operation efforts has contributed to developing productive stability-operations partnerships. These partnerships have resulted in troop contributions in support of U.S., North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Coalition efforts in Afghanistan. For example, because of Section 1206 support, Poland and Romania, two of NATO's newer members, have served as stability-operations partners with the U.S. and Coalition in Afghanistan. Due to these relationships, each of these two countries has:

- deployed forces to Afghanistan in support of U.S. interests;
- expressed their willingness to adopt and train to NATO/U.S. operations doctrine to assist the U.S. in pursuing national-security objectives, especially in the Baltic region, which is threatened by Russian aggression; and
- achieved an interoperability capability with the U.S. that allowed multiple successful deployments to Afghanistan in support of NATO, where they successfully completed operational missions as a part of the Coalition.



## Conclusion

The Section 1206 assistance provided by the DoD, in coordination with the DOS, has contributed to enhanced partner-nation capability to conduct counterterrorism and stability operations in support of U.S. national-security objectives and interests.

Specifically, DoD has used Section 1206 authority to support U.S. and coalition stability-operation efforts in Afghanistan for many years, and it has provided support for our partner nations in the Middle East to help counter ISIL. Process improvements by DoD management enhanced delivery timeliness and accuracy.

## Finding B

### Planning, Management, and Objectives

The DoD did not thoroughly plan, manage, or resource activities funded under Section 1206.

Before the FY 2015 NDAA,<sup>19</sup> the DoD conducted Section 1206 activities without assurance that Congress would continue the authority each year. This caused the DoD to delay committing the resources each year to effectively manage, and execute Section 1206 projects.

Consequently, the DoD's Section 1206 implementation lacked sufficient resources and a planning strategy with clearly defined objectives and a comprehensive execution plan. This may have impeded the DoD from achieving the greatest impact for resources expended.

### Discussion

Section 1206 initiatives are part of the DoD contribution to Security Sector Assistance.<sup>20</sup> Presidential Policy Directive 23 (PPD-23) states that one of the policy guidelines for Security Sector Assistance initiatives is to “be more selective and use resources for the greatest impact.”<sup>21</sup> To maximize the impact of Security Sector Assistance resources, U.S. Government programs:

will be strategic and focused on investments aligned with national security priorities and in countries where the conditions are right for sustained progress. Resource allocation will be evaluated based on common interagency assessments, multiyear strategies, and performance against measures of effectiveness.<sup>22</sup>

PPD-23 also states that agencies must plan, synchronize, and implement Security Sector Assistance activities through a deliberate process that aligns activities and resources with national-security priorities. The directive further requires agencies

<sup>19</sup> During the fieldwork for this report, Congress enacted 10 U.S.C. § 2282 and 10 U.S.C. Chapter 16. These statutes specified actions that reinforced guidance in existing DoD and other Federal directives about effectively managing resources expended under that authority, which are issues that are discussed in this report.

<sup>20</sup> The security sector is composed of institutions such as partner governments and international organizations, which have the authority to use force to protect both the state and its citizens, to enforce the law, and to provide oversight of those organizations and forces. U.S. Security Sector Assistance policy is aimed at strengthening U.S. ability to help allies and partner nations to build their own security capacity, consistent with the principles of good governance and the rule of law. Presidential Policy Directive 23, “Security Sector Assistance,” April 5, 2013.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

to “inform policy with rigorous analysis, assessments, and evaluations.” The directive defines monitoring and evaluating programs and introducing common standards and expectations. These standards must:

- establish measurable objectives,
- collect appropriate data on the impacts and results of programs, and
- inform decision making with improved data derived from evaluations of impacts when permissible.<sup>23</sup>

PPD-23 states that it is essential that activities be selective, focused, and aligned with broader foreign policy and national security objectives. PPD 23 also lists goals for targeted security sector assistance that provides that alignment. Examples include:

- Help partner nations to build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges, specifically to disrupt and defeat transnational threats.
- Promote partner support for U.S. interests.
- Promote universal values.
- Strengthen collective security and multinational defense arrangements and organizations.<sup>24</sup>

Furthermore, congressional committee reporting emphasized that Section 1206 differed from traditional foreign assistance authorities, noting the significance of the “fundamental distinction . . . between requirements generated on behalf of the foreign nation (consistent with U.S. policy), and requirements generated through a DoD-led assessment of the United States’ national security needs.”<sup>25</sup>

DoD Directive 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” reflects the PPD-23 guidelines, requiring security cooperation<sup>26</sup> efforts such as Section 1206 to be “planned, programmed, budgeted, and executed with the same high degree of attention and efficiency as other integral DoD activities.”

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> House Report 111-166 to accompany the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010.

<sup>26</sup> DoD Directive 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation,” October 24, 2008, defines security cooperation as including “DoD-administered security assistance programs.”

## ***Program Goals and Objectives***

GAO “Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government” states that implementing appropriate internal control is a key factor in helping Federal managers to achieve agency missions while minimizing operational problems.<sup>27</sup> According to the GAO, control activities are the policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms that management uses to enforce its directives, such as the process of adhering to requirements for budget development and execution. Other activities (such as establishing clear, consistent objectives, monitoring performance measures and indicators, and comparing actual performance with planned or expected results) also play a significant role in promoting performance-based management and in achieving overall performance goals.

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-11, “Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget,” provides a practical illustration of how adhering to GAO standards supports Presidential budget development and execution. For instance, this circular requires Federal agencies to “discuss performance goals and indicators” as a part of the narrative support for justifying their obligations. Circular No. A-11 also states the requirement of the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 that goals “be expressed in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form,”<sup>28</sup> and it further emphasizes, “leaders at all levels of the organization are accountable for choosing goals and indicators wisely and for setting ambitious yet realistic targets.”<sup>29</sup>

Documentation related to Section 1206 activities did not meet the above standards for communicating specifically how obligating funds would support strategic and national security objectives. For example, the narrative support that DSCA provided in its FY 2015 Defense-Wide Operations and Maintenance budget estimates for Section 1206 stated:

The FY 2015 plan is to obligate the funds available in support of Secretary of Defense notified programs. The objectives of the Program are to provide support to partner nations to better enable them to conduct counter terrorism and stability operations.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>27</sup> GAO “Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,” November 1999, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (11/99), p. 1. Unless, in consultation with OMB, agencies determine that this is not feasible. In these cases an “alternative-form.”

<sup>28</sup> Unless, in consultation with OMB, agencies determine that this is not feasible. In these cases an “alternative-form” performance goal may be used. Circular No. A-11, “Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget,” Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, June 2015, p. 200-14.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> DSCA “Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Estimates,” March 2014. The submission included the same text for Section 1206 program plans and objectives for FYs 2014 and 2015.

For FYs 2012 through 2014, the guidance simply quoted the language of the statute as the purpose of Section 1206 activity. Also, DoD project-proposal guidance (sent to GCCs and SCOs at U.S. embassies worldwide in FY 2015) said that the purpose of Section 1206 program activity was “to advance U.S. national security interests by leveraging the interests the United States shares with partners in combating terrorism and stability operations.” However, the guidance still did not require project proposals to establish goals, such as those articulated in PPD-23, to provide a link to strategic and national security objectives.

These shortcomings indicate that the DoD did not define objectively measurable performance goals for Section 1206 program activities to effectively maximize the counterterrorism and stability impact with partner nations as required by PPD-23.

### ***Division of Responsibilities and Unified Management***

GAO standards additionally state that an “agency’s organizational structure clearly define[s] key areas of authority and responsibility and establish[es] appropriate lines of reporting.”<sup>31</sup> DoD Instruction 5111.19, “Section 1206 Global Train-and-Equip Authority,” July 26, 2011, assigned responsibilities to various DoD Components to execute and manage Section 1206 projects,<sup>32</sup> with the ASD(SO/LIC)<sup>33</sup> tasked to “provide section 1206 policy oversight and guidance . . . to regional and functional offices and the DoD Components.” However, in executing this task, the ASD(SO/LIC) did not further designate a primary office with clear authority to coordinate, synchronize, and direct actions across all entity-wide program activities necessary for establishing or enhancing a partner nation’s counterterrorism or stability operations capacity.

Section 1206 was a temporary provision in law from 2006 until the FY 2015 NDAA established it as a permanent authority in 10 U.S.C. § 2282. DoD officials reported that, during the years while Section 1206 was a temporary authority, it was not feasible for SOCT to fully staff the managing of these activities. Those officials stated that, though manned to manage and oversee Section 1206 activities, SOCT was not expected to conduct “program-management” functions.

Consequently, we identified issues about the coordination of equipment delivery, the operational suitability of equipment delivered, the completeness of equipment delivered, or the sufficiency of partner-nation training in 14 of the 19 Section 1206 recipient countries visited. (Further details are provided in Finding E.)

<sup>31</sup> Op. Cit., GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (11/99).

<sup>32</sup> The Instruction divided key responsibilities among DoD Components, including the ASD(SO/LIC), Secretaries of the Military Departments, GCC Commanders, the Directors of DSCA, and the Defense Institute of International Language Studies Director.

<sup>33</sup> The title for the ASD(SO/LIC) in DoD Instruction 5111.19, dated July 26, 2011, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD(SO/LIC&IC)), is no longer current.

An official of A DSCA stated that coordination within DoD to correct these types of deficiencies was difficult because there was no dedicated DoD lead manager (for example, a program manager, responsible for directing and coordinating Section 1206 activities). We also concluded that the lack of a lead manager within the office of the ASD(SO/LIC) contributed to authority and responsibility gaps in DoD that impeded effective coordination and synchronization of Section 1206 project-development and -execution activities.

### ***Congressional Section 1206/2282 Management Requirements***

When Congress in 10 U.S.C. § 2282 codified Section 1206 as a permanent authority, the new statutory language added authorities, such as extending the availability of funds for program assessment. It also included additional reporting requirements, which required the DoD to include a description of program objectives, an assessment of the capacity of recipient countries to absorb assistance, and arrangements for sustaining this assistance. These specified report elements explicitly applied Federal performance-based management requirements to Section 1206 activities, now authorized under Section 2282. In summary, the new Section 2282 language presented the ASD(SO/LIC) with an opportunity to improve the management of activities authorized under the section.

### **Conclusion**

DoD officials informed our team that, before the enactment of 10 U.S.C. § 2282, the DoD was reluctant to commit personnel and other resources necessary to plan and deliberately manage the implementation of Section 1206 as a program. As a result, the administration of Section 1206 funding and projects lacked a multiyear strategy and an implementation plan with clearly defined program goals and objectives directly pursuant to U.S. strategic and national military objectives for counterterrorism and stability operations. Applicable DoD and other Federal directives require a plan with strategically focused, outcome-related goals and objectives, along with performance goals to define the level of performance to be achieved. We identified areas in which Section 1206 management needed to improve efforts to meet the prescribed Federal management requirements.

During the fieldwork for this report, Congress enacted 10 U.S.C. § 2282. This statute specifies actions that reinforce guidance in existing DoD and other Federal directives about effectively managing resources expended under that authority.



## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response<sup>34</sup>

### **Recommendation B.1**

**Under Secretary of Defense for Policy conduct Department of Defense activities authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 2282 in accordance with Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-11 and all applicable Department of Defense and other United States Government statutes, directives, and guidance for Department of Defense programs by:**

- a. Designating a lead manager and management office with the responsibility to coordinate, synchronize, and integrate relevant activities, with sufficient operating authority over Department of Defense implementing components, to ensure effective management control in program execution.**

#### *Management Comments to Recommendation B.1.a*

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Combat) (ASD(SO/LIC)), performing the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (PDO) USD(P) agreed with Recommendation B.1.a. The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P) stated that, in September 2015, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism created the position of Director, Counterterrorism Partnerships, as the lead office to coordinate, synchronize, and integrate relevant counterterrorism activities. The FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directs the department to consolidate security cooperation program-management functions into the DSCA. The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P) is in the process of exploring options to migrate these responsibilities to the DSCA.

#### *Our Response*

Management's comments were responsive to the recommendation, and we consider the recommendation to be resolved, but still open. We will close the recommendation after we determine if the plan developed to migrate responsibilities from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to the DSCA identifies a lead manager and office with sufficient operating authority to coordinate, synchronize, and integrate activities authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 2282. We will request a copy of this plan in six months.

<sup>34</sup> All recommendations in this report refer to Department of Defense activities that were originally authorized by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, Section 1206 (2006), as amended, and are currently authorized under Section 2282, title 10, United States Code, December 19, 2014.

- b. Ensuring that the designated program management office has sufficient professional staff with the necessary expertise and appropriate resources to effect timely procurement and delivery of appropriate equipment components, training, and other services necessary for enabling partner nations to reach the intended full operational capability.**

#### *Management Comments to Recommendation B.1.b*

The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), agreed with Recommendation B.1.b. In 2016, Policy leadership sought approval for 15 more program-management staff personnel. According to the ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), these billets will be transferred to the DSCA, in line with direction in the FY17 NDAA to consolidate security cooperation management functions into the DSCA. Management is planning to move security cooperation responsibilities from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to the DSCA. The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), continues to work to ensure the adequate staffing for the DSCA program-management responsibilities.

#### *Our Response*

Management's comments were responsive to the recommendation, and we consider the recommendation to be resolved, but still open. We will close the recommendation after we receive confirmation of the increase in billets in the DSCA to support their increased program-management responsibilities resulting from consolidating security cooperation management functions into the DSCA. We will request an update in six months.

- c. Issuing updated instructions to support effective program implementation, execution, and management oversight.**

#### *Management Comments to Recommendation B.1.c*

The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), agreed with Recommendation B.1.c, stating that, beginning in FY17, the Counterterrorism Partnerships Office provided updated program-design guidance consistent with the new program-implementation approach. The planning guidance included program-design guidance and process steps. ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), intends to leverage these best practices, as well as lessons learned from interagency partners, to ensure that proposals for the transition to security cooperation program management by the DSCA incorporates a performance-management framework to support effective oversight and execution.

### *Our Response*

Management's comments were responsive to the recommendation, and we consider the recommendation to be resolved, but still open. We will close this recommendation after we receive a copy of the proposals being developed for the transition to security cooperation program management by the DSCA that incorporates a performance-management framework to support effective oversight and execution. We will request an update in six months.

### **Recommendation B.2**

**Under Secretary of Defense for Policy direct the development of a comprehensive plan to implement activities authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 2282 through a strategy with outcome-oriented objectives that are quantifiable and measurable. The strategy should include clear mission, purpose, and goals about the allocation of resources and the use of partner-nation security forces to achieve results that effectively support the goals and objectives of United States counterterrorism and stability operations.**

### *Management Comments to Recommendation B.2*

The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), agreed with Recommendation B.2, stating that, based on key strategic planning-guidance documents, the new planning approach begins with an articulation of the theory of change and the desired outcome in the form of the security role that the DoD seeks a partner to play. The Counterterrorism Partnerships Office issues a strategy-driven, resource-informed set of objectives that can drive the development and evaluation of indicators. This approach will continue to be implemented as the Department transitions to security cooperation program management under 10 U.S.C. § 333.

### *Our Response*

Management's comments were responsive to the recommendation, and we consider the recommendation to be resolved, but still open. To close this recommendation, we request, by August 21, 2017, a copy of the guidance or documentation that results in a strategy-driven, resource-informed set of objectives that drives development and evaluation of indicators.

## Finding C

### Developing and Submitting Project Proposals

DoD Section 1206 proposals did not always provide certain information necessary for making informed selection decisions. Common omissions included clearly defined requirements for partner-nation security equipment and training, measuring project operational impact, and sustainment of delivered capability.

This occurred because:

- a. Guidance for SOCT project proposals was not sufficiently instructive to ensure that Section 1206 proposals included all essential information;
- b. SOCT did not require GCCs to comply with its guidance for project proposals; and
- c. DoD personnel who developed project proposals did not always possess, or have ready access to, the expertise and information necessary to accurately and sufficiently define equipment specifications and training requirements.

As a result, SOCT personnel had limited success, despite considerable follow-up coordination with GCC personnel, in obtaining the required information, such as partner-nation capacity to use and sustain the equipment, identification of metrics, and project outcomes. Further, these factors impeded SOCT from making fully informed project-selection decisions, sometimes resulting in partner nations receiving inappropriate, or less compatible, equipment than required. Ultimately, this increased the potential that partner nations would not gain the counterterrorism capacity intended to support U.S. security interests.

### Discussion

We reviewed Section 1206 project proposals for counterterrorism and stability operations submitted for FYs 2013 through 2015. These proposals were developed by DoD in coordination with the DOS and partner nations, to support U.S. and partner nation security interests. SOCT proposal guidance varied from year to year about the amount of the detail required to describe certain areas, such as sustainment plans, and limitations associated with building a capacity over time. However, this guidance did require proposals to:

- explain metrics and milestones,
- assess past performance,

- link national-security objectives, and
- include plans for equipment sustainment.

A comparison of proposals against these guidelines showed that many proposals did not contain the required information that would allow SOCT to make fully informed selection decisions and to assess the progress of approved projects.

Common specific omissions included:

- goals and objectives sufficient to develop appropriate performance metrics and execution milestones for measuring Section 1206 project progress;
- performance metrics and execution milestones for measuring operational impacts and measuring Section 1206 project progress;
- objective evidence, based on past-performance data, of a partner nation's ability to integrate and employ the capability;
- a target level of performance against a validated threat sufficient to determine whether the project, over time, would reliably support U.S. counterterrorism- and stability-operations goals and objectives; and
- adequately developed and sufficiently detailed equipment-sustainment plans, with evidence that those plans could be effectively executed.

### ***Sufficiency of Guidance and Proposals***

As with the annual guidance, the templated forms (for the Section 1206 proposals) also changed each year. The guidance and the template for FY 2015 continued to generate proposals that did not include information adhering to the guidelines listed above. For example, while the FY 2015 guidance included "Tips for Successful Proposals," the template did not explicitly require metrics, milestones, or comments on past performance. Moreover, while the FY 2015 guidance suggested that the proposal "describe the urgency and impact (risk) if the capability is not provided," urgency was not a required element in the FY 2015 templated form.

FY 2015 guidance and the associated templates did not provide examples illustrating the specific type of information and detail required to fully complete specific sections of the proposal form. Nor did the guidance require that proposals include sufficient:

- data (including past-performance data), analysis, and results demonstrating that the partner nation could effectively absorb, sustain, and use the equipment and training to conduct operations; and
- anticipated project performance, impact metrics, and execution milestones.

Including samples of clearly defined sustainment plans in the guidance would have been particularly useful. For example, many FY 2015 proposals lacked adequate information about partner-nation sustainment of equipment and training funded under Section 1206. To correct this, the updated guidance should include a sample proposal containing sufficient information about equipment sustainment and training.

Further, SOCT included metrics and milestones as required elements in its FY 2013 proposal template, but it did not require them in its FY 2014 and 2015 templated forms. SOCT also modified the sustainment sections of the templates, removing the requirement for data about Foreign Military Financing (FMF) as a major source of funding.

SOCT reported that it had followed up with GCCs and SCOs to obtain data required by its guidance that was not in the submitted project proposals. However, our review indicated that SOCT had achieved limited success.<sup>35</sup> For example, of the first 12 FY 2015 Section 1206 project proposals sent to Congress, we determined that, while one project proposal did attempt to provide metrics, as required, none of the proposals included sufficiently detailed metrics to evaluate future project performance. Our review also indicated that SOCT did not use past-performance data to track or assess projects, or to justify future proposals. This is notable, since OMB guidance listed past-performance data as important to justifying budget decisions.

Presidential Policy Directive 23 (PPD-23) indicates that collecting data about the impact and results of activities such as Section 1206 projects is important to ensuring informed decisions. However, the information gaps outlined here caused even approved proposals to lack required key project information, such as metric descriptions, absorbability of proposed capability, and sustainment details necessary for fully informed selection decisions.

### ***Compliance with Established Guidance***

Numerous Section 1206 proposals submitted to Congress did not comply with SOCT's proposal guidance. Shortfalls included erroneous or omitted information, such as metrics, described in the previous subsection, as well as incomplete responses to standard proposal questions. Missing or incomplete information complicates project selection and approval by requiring assumptions, which may lead to inappropriate or less effective investment of Section 1206/2282 funds.

<sup>35</sup> April 2016 GAO report also stated, "... fiscal year 2015 Global Train and Equip project proposal packages did not always document consideration of baseline assessments and sustainment plans, and rarely did so for absorptive capacity." GAO Report 16-368, "Counterterrorism: DoD Should Enhance Management of and Reporting on Its Global Train and Equip Program, April 2016, p. 12.



Incomplete and inaccurate project proposals reportedly increased the workload of GCC and SCO officials.

According to SOCT officials, correcting and finalizing incomplete and inaccurate project proposals resulting from insufficient guidance, lack of expertise, or lack of personnel increased the workload of GCC and SCO officials submitting them, as well as the SOCT officials reviewing them. GCC officials told us that they had expended additional time and effort in responding to follow-up requests for required Section 1206 proposal information.

SOCT officials further stated that the impact of increased workloads was especially apparent in one particular GCC, which, when compared with other GCCs, had the longest response time to SOCT's proposal follow-up requests.

SOCT reported that SOCT had used all relevant information while selecting projects, which was consolidated into and recorded as a complete project package. One official stated that SOCT was developing a location for storing consolidated proposal information, but at that time the Joint Staff J5 website was the best source of archived information. Our subsequent review of the Joint Staff J5 website indicated that consolidated proposal "packages" were not posted to that site. For example, requests for information (RFIs) sent by SOCT and responses received were not posted under a particular proposal (to present a complete record of the initiation, development, and final notification of the proposal). GCC and SCO personnel did not have access to the latest data, short of directly calling or e-mailing Joint Staff J5 action officers.<sup>36</sup>

### ***Personnel Experience and Expertise***

Officials at multiple command levels stated that the technical and operational knowledge of Section 1206/2282 project developers assigned to SCOs varied. This variance in SCO expertise, coupled with rapid staff turnover and personnel vacancies, contributed to inconsistent quality of proposal information. In some cases a lack of specific expertise limited the ability of SCO officials to accurately determine requirements. For example, an official with the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group – Philippines indicated that their organization could identify capability gaps but lacked a degree of technical ability to determine what specific equipment was needed to fill these gaps.

The lack of adequate technical knowledge about required equipment, training, or services (on the part of SCOs and GCC personnel) resulted in a few instances where partner nations received incomplete or inappropriate equipment. For example, the Philippines, in the USPACOM area of responsibility, received radio equipment

<sup>36</sup> In August 2016 follow-up correspondence, SOCT officials indicated that they had developed a storage repository for project proposals and associated information. However, it was unclear whether all required Section 1206/2282 stakeholders could access that information, especially GCCs, SCOs, and other DoD field components.

without critical components and night-vision devices without helmet mounting brackets. Indonesia received Evinrude boat engines, which were difficult for them to maintain, instead of the engines originally requested. Two other countries, in different GCC areas of responsibility, received equipment that did not match the nations' needs and was of limited use for the anticipated purpose. Uganda needed a particular type of armored personnel carrier but received a different vehicle, which was harder to maintain. Azerbaijan also received Evinrude boat engines, which were reported as not operational at the time of our visit. Even if the inexperience of SCO and GCC personnel had caused or contributed to this issue, there was no internal control function at SOCT, DSCA, or the MILDEP IAs to identify these deficiencies before the shipment of the equipment to the SCO. (See Finding E).

## Conclusion

A lack of required data in proposals contributed to the increased workload of DoD staff to collect the data necessary for developing and selecting proposals. Of even more importance, a lack of essential data hindered fully informed selections, and it increased the risk that Section 1206 projects would not achieve the intended enhanced partner-nation defense and security capacity. A lack of technical expertise about specific types of requested equipment also contributed to missing or incorrect data in the development and submission of project-proposals, sometimes resulting in the delivery of incomplete or inappropriate equipment.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### ***Recommendation C.1***

**Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict pursuant to implementing activities authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 2282, take action to:**

- a. Issue and enforce proposal guidance, including standards for submitting specific information necessary to fully describe partner-nation requirements, the metrics to assess project impact, and the means to sustain a project, if applicable.**

### ***Management Comments to Recommendation C.1.a***

The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), agreed with recommendation C.1.a, stating that, late in 2015, the Counterterrorism Partnerships Office, the lead office to coordinate, synchronize, and integrate relevant counterterrorism activities, provided to the Geographic Combatant Commands a new comprehensive proposal form to address

all elements of program design. The Counterterrorism Partnerships office then implemented cross-department, interagency “red teams” to enforce standards. As a part of the FY17-NDAA-mandated security cooperation reforms. The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), is developing a plan to integrate metrics and outcome indicators into program design.

### *Our Response*

Management’s comments were responsive to the recommendation, and we consider the recommendation to be resolved, but still open. No later than August 21, 2017, we request a copy of the comprehensive proposal form that addresses all elements of program design. In six months, we will request a copy of the plan being developed to integrate metrics and outcome indicators into program design. We will close the recommendation if we determine that these documents fully describe partner-nation requirements, the metrics to assess project impact, and the means to sustain a project.

- b. Update proposal forms to provide guidance about including sections that enable Geographic Combatant Commands and United States Embassy Security Cooperation Organizations to document required data.**

### *Management Comments to Recommendation C.1.b*

The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), agreed with recommendation C.1.b, stating that the Counterterrorism Partnerships Office provided to the Geographic Combatant Commands a new comprehensive proposal form, referenced in management’s response to recommendation C.1.a.

### *Our Response*

Management’s comments were responsive to the recommendation, and we consider the recommendation to be resolved, but still open. To close this recommendation, we request that management provide a copy, by August 21, 2017, of the comprehensive proposal form that addresses all elements of program design.

- c. Establish procedures for consolidating and maintaining a record of project-relevant information that all United States Embassy Security Cooperation Organizations, Combatant Commands, and Office of Secretary Defense personnel can readily access.**

### *Management Comments to Recommendation C.1.c*

The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), agreed with recommendation C.1.c, stating that, in November 2015, the Counterterrorism Partnerships Office developed a new electronic filing system to maintain guidance for counterterrorism programs and proposals, proposal-development products, proposals, and equipment lists. The

ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), is now developing options for a collaborative online capability, and it has issued DoD Instruction 5132.14, "Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise," dated January 13, 2017, which requires the maintenance of such records.

### *Our Response*

Management's comments were responsive to the recommendation. We reviewed the DoD Instruction 5132.14 and determined that it addressed our concerns in this recommendation about the management and maintenance of records, therefore, we consider this recommendation closed.

## **Recommendation C.2**

**Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict in coordination with applicable Combatant Commands and Military Department Implementing Agencies, take action to ensure that Security Cooperation Organization personnel assigned to United States Embassies have the appropriate training, capability, and necessary Department of Defense support to develop equipment and requirement details meeting project-proposal standards required by 10 U.S.C. § 2282.**

### *Management Comments to Recommendation C.2*

The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), agreed with recommendation C.2, stating that the FY17 NDAA mandated that the DoD develop a program to professionalize the security cooperation workforce, including enhanced training and certification requirements and the establishment of career paths. The DSCA manages the workforce-reform effort. The DSCA is working, in coordination with the Geographic Combatant Commands and the Military Departments, to develop an implementation plan. In the near term, the ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), and the DSCA are examining options to provide supplemental planning support to the COCOMs and SCOs.

### *Our Response*

Management's comments were responsive to the recommendation, and we consider the recommendation to be resolved, but still open. In six months, we will request a copy of the implementation plan for the program to professionalize the security cooperation workforce, which includes enhanced training and certification requirements and the establishment of career paths. If we determine that the implementation plan will enable DoD to improve the professionalization of the security cooperation workforce, we will close the recommendation.



## Finding D

### Prioritizing and Selecting Project Proposals

SOCT's process for prioritizing and selecting Section 1206 project proposals did not comply with applicable executive policy and Department guidance.

This occurred because the ASD(SO/LIC) needed:

- updated procedures that enabled comprehensive, systematic comparison of, and differentiation among, the various submitted projects' costs, benefits, and risks; and
- clear documentation of project-selection criteria and methodology, along with the basis for the decisions.

The lack of a clear, rigorous methodology for project prioritization and selection hindered DoD's ability to ensure that resources expended would achieve the greatest possible impact in support of U.S. objectives for counterterrorism and stability operations. It also inhibited the ability of responsible DoD officials to justify project selections to Congress and other stakeholders.

### Discussion

DoD Directive 5111.10<sup>37</sup> tasks the ASD(SO/LIC) to develop policy and to provide advice to senior DoD officials about the use of U.S. Government resources in counterterrorism and other sensitive national missions. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, ASD(SO/LIC), is responsible for providing "Section 1206 policy oversight and . . . to regional and functional offices and the DoD Components."<sup>38</sup> Within ASD(SO/LIC), the DASD(SOCT) is the subordinate Component assigned with the responsibility to establish DoD Section 1206 processes and subsequently to refine those processes.

Federal policies require that agencies and, by extension, their subordinate elements ensure the efficient use of taxpayer funding. More specifically, policies and programs for security sector assistance must be selective. They must focus on investments, align with national-security priorities, and allocate resources for the greatest impact. To satisfy this requirement, DASD(SOCT) executed the prioritization and selection process outlined in the Introduction and Appendix E of this report.

<sup>37</sup> DoD Directive 5111.10, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC))," March 22, 1995, Change 2, October 21, 2011.

<sup>38</sup> DoD Instruction 5111.19, "Section 1206 Global Train-and-Equip Authority," July 26, 2011, Enclosure 2, p. 5, para. 1.a.



DoD Instruction 5010.40 directs DoD managers to comply with various Federal management standards.<sup>39</sup> These standards include establishing a clear, organized strategy for ensuring compliance with applicable laws and regulations and achieving effective, efficient operations.

### ***Justifying Project Selections***

SOCT asserted that its project-selection process equitably evaluated proposals from multiple GCCs against operational, policy, and other considerations. For example, SOCT officials listed 11 factors used to determine an initial group of projects for congressional notification but further explanation revealed a subjective process, which one official characterized as “more art than science.” Additional explanations of their selection factors did not fully account for all essential characteristics, such as the relative importance assigned to the various criteria, or the information about the partner nation’s past performance, which OMB guidance indicated was important in making budget decisions.

In separate interviews with Congressional staff and with SOCT officials, they each highlighted the importance of the partner nations’ ability to sustain equipment. However, SOCT officials were unable to explain how they evaluated the capability of partner nations to sustain projects.

SOCT officials reported that they required the Joint Staff J5 to independently rank-order all project proposals submitted by GCCs for a given year. However, SOCT officials did not fully explain how, during their deliberations, they considered these inputs and integrated them into final selection decisions. Also, several DoD officials interviewed about Section 1206 activities at different overseas locations expressed uncertainty as to how SOCT selected its projects. SOCT officials themselves did not explain how Joint Staff J5 and USSOCOM selected their proposed respective projects.

Congressional-committee reports accompanying Defense authorization and appropriations bills over multiple years indicated that SOCT often had difficulty in reporting the impact of resources expended under the Section 1206 authority. Congressional staff reinforced this point during our discussion.

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<sup>39</sup> DoD Instruction 5010.40, “Managers’ Internal Control Program Procedures,” May 30, 2013. Specifically, DoD Instruction directs DoD Components to ensure that their management activities comply with OMB Circular 123, “Management Responsibility for Internal Control,” December 21, 2004, and “GAO Standards for Internal Control for Federal Agencies,” November 1999.

## ***Effective Communication and Documentation***

Federal management standards required SOCT to effectively communicate to stakeholders the results of its project selections.

In its FY 2013 report series, entitled “Managing for Results,” GAO further stated that Federal-agency staffs needed to have the skills necessary to analyze and clearly communicate complex data for decision making as one of its nine leading management practices.<sup>40</sup>



Federal management standards required SOCT to effectively communicate to stakeholders the results of its project selections.

The lack of clearly defined and documented criteria and procedures limited SOCT’s ability to effectively communicate to Congress, the DoD, and the DOS about the basis of its project-selection recommendations.<sup>41</sup>

Conversely, USSOCOM Section 1206 managers reported to the team during our interviews that USSOCOM had developed and used a rigorous methodology for prioritizing proposals. USSOCOM officials explained their process, highlighting key features, such as a questionnaire, as well as clearly defined and weighted criteria. SOCT and the ASD(SO/LIC) could adapt elements of the USSOCOM process to enable their selection and documentation procedures to meet the increased annual reporting requirements of 10 U.S.C. § 2282.

Continual turnover of personnel involved in executing Section 1206 duties underscored the need for reliable documentation, including the documentation of SOCT selection criteria, procedures, and proceedings. Without the essential documented continuity from one official to the next about program elements, communication gaps resulted in incomplete or inaccurate status of proposals or misinformation about equipment delivery, maintenance, or employment. For example, three of SOCT’s most senior Section 1206 officials departed and were replaced during our fieldwork. Without crucial historical records, newly arrived personnel could not readily engage in program administration, support, or operations. GCCs and SCOs also experienced disruptive personnel turnover. Multiple SCOs reported that staff members who proposed a project would transfer and leave their successors with responsibility to complete projects.

<sup>40</sup> GAO Report 13-228, “Data-Driven Performance Reviews Show Promise, but Agencies Should Explore How to Involve Other Relevant Agencies,” February 27, 2013.

<sup>41</sup> An April 2016 GAO report also stated, “Fully documenting the basis of project approval decisions could enhance transparency, provide additional assurance that resources are efficiently allocated, and help to ensure the long-term benefits of projects and careful use of scarce U.S. and partner-nation resources.” GAO Report 16-368, “Counterterrorism: DoD Should Enhance Management of and Reporting on Its Global Train and Equip Program,” April 2016, p. 26.

During this evaluation, several DoD Components at different organizational levels either did not or could not provide sufficient records. For instance, one SCO official in Europe indicated that problems in tracking Section 1206 equipment were at least partially attributed to poor data entry by accountable personnel into the Security Cooperation Information Portal.<sup>42</sup> The DoD OIG evaluation team saw other instances in which SCO records were not complete. For example, some SCOs had no shipping manifests, change-of-custody forms, or approved project-proposal forms in their records.

## Conclusion

SOCT's project-selection challenges require a comprehensive, systematic approach to make its deliberations more transparent, justifiable, and verifiable. Lacking a rigorous methodology for prioritizing and selecting proposals, SOCT could not adequately justify its project selections to Section 1206 stakeholders, especially Congress.

The DoD and Executive Branch standards and policies reinforced the importance of program documentation to effectively communicate results and provide continuity of operations while personnel depart, and replacements arrive. The current reporting requirements of 10 U.S.C. § 2282, such as congressional notification and DoD program assessment, further highlighted congressional concerns that the DoD needed to more effectively substantiate and document the impact achieved by all pertinent Section 1206/2282 activities.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### ***Recommendation D.1***

**Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict establish a rigorous, transparent methodology for prioritizing and selecting projects that meets the intent of 10 U.S.C. § 2282, using clearly defined criteria, such as a comparison of respective costs, benefits, and risks, to effectively justify selections to stakeholders, especially Congress. Consider adapting elements of the methodology of the United States Special Operations Command for selecting and documenting project decisions.**

### ***Management Comments to Recommendation D.1***

The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), agreed with recommendation D.1, stating that the Counterterrorism Partnerships Office implemented a two-step process, in which initial concepts are considered in a cross-department integrating forum.

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<sup>42</sup> The Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) is a key system for recording and tracking Section 1206/2282 equipment details.

The final, resource-informed, adjudicated document is issued as a full proposal demand signal (planning order), which enables stakeholders across the DoD and interagency partners to assist in the development of each proposal. To implement the provisions of 10 U.S.C. §333, the ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), is establishing a governance board with an executive secretariat to convene regional and functional policy offices to oversee the process.

### *Our Response*

Management's comments were responsive to the recommendation, and we consider the recommendation to be resolved, but still open. In six months, we will request copies of the planning orders, as well as an update on the establishment of a governance board with an executive secretariat to convene regional and functional policy offices to oversee implementation of 10 U.S.C. §333. We will close this recommendation if we believe documentation received indicates that management has established a rigorous, transparent methodology for prioritizing and selecting projects that meets the intent of 10 U.S.C. § 2282, using clearly defined criteria, such as a comparison of respective costs, benefits, and risks.

## **Recommendation D.2**

**Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict ensure that Department of Defense components responsible for implementing 10 U.S.C. § 2282 comply with Department of Defense security cooperation directives and procedures for documenting and retaining records pursuant to that authority.**

### *Management Comments to Recommendation D.2*

The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), agreed with recommendation D.2, stating that the Counterterrorism Partnerships Office implemented a new procedure, in which Counterterrorism Partnerships serves as the central repository for all proposal materials and individual equipment lists. This requirement will shift to the DSCA.

### *Our Response*

Management's comments were responsive to the recommendation, and we consider the recommendation resolved, but still open. We will close the recommendation when we can review sample project proposals and equipment lists in the central repository that will be established in DSCA. We will request an update in six months.



## Finding E

### Procuring and Delivering Equipment, Training, and Services

DoD Section 1206 processes sometimes did not result in the:

- procurement of the specific equipment, training, and services required;
- assembly or installation of components before delivery; or
- coordination of delivery of equipment, training, and other services to the GCCs and SCOs.

This was due to:

- the compression of procurement timelines because of the requirement to obligate Section 1206 funds within the same fiscal year in which a project is authorized;
- requirements to use Foreign Military Sales (pseudo-FMS)<sup>43</sup> procurement processes; and
- missed opportunities for applying contracting flexibilities authorized by Federal and DoD acquisition regulations.

These factors increased the risk of partner nations' not achieving the intended level of operational capability on a timely basis. In some cases the equipment provided was:

- less compatible or inappropriate for partner-nation requirements,
- delivered with missing critical parts, or
- delivered later than required or not delivered at all.

These factors, sometimes coupled with inadequate coordination of required training, delayed the development of the planned capability.

<sup>43</sup> "Although pseudo-FMS cases use many of the traditional FMS procedures, these cases are subject to unique policy requirements to ensure that the cases are developed and managed according to the particular program requirements applicable to the funding authority or other relevant provisions of law. For example, some pseudo-FMS cases developed for training, design, and construction services are subject to particular, additional requirements," and DoD Instruction 5111.19, "Section 1206 Global Train-and-Equip Authority," July 26, 2011, Enclosure 3, Program Guidelines, para. 7.



## Discussion

More than 70 countries have received support for counterterrorism and stability operations under Section 1206, as stated earlier in Finding A. These efforts have contributed to increased capabilities for counterterrorism and stability operations in recipient countries, but they have not always achieved that capability as quickly or as completely as intended. Several factors, individually or collectively, contributed to shortfalls.

### ***Compressed Procurement Timelines***

Shortened procurement timelines occurred, in part because Congress had authorized the DoD to use Operations and Maintenance funds for Section 1206, which required the obligation of funds within the fiscal year authorized. The requirement for delivery of Section 1206 equipment was unclear, and those responsible for executing Section 1206 activities interpreted the requirement as being delivery of the equipment in the same fiscal year for which it was obligated. Title 10, Section 2282 clarified this issue, requiring obligation in the same fiscal year as authorized and delivery of equipment by the end of the next fiscal year, which provided additional management flexibility.

Because conventional FMS procurement timelines routinely extended over multiple years and used foreign-source funds, normal FMS procedures could not be applied while still meeting the “same-year/next year” requirement. If congressional notification and approval of projects occurred late in a fiscal year, timelines became further compressed, adding to the difficulty of delivering equipment or training in that same year or the next.

### ***Pseudo Foreign Military Sales Case Processes***

DoD Instruction 5111.19 directed the DSCA to use “the foreign military sales (FMS) pseudo-case process” to execute approved Section 1206 projects. The process is useful when the U.S. Government uses its own funds, instead of a partner nation’s using its government funds, to purchase equipment, services, or training.

FMS processes, as well as FMS pseudo-case processes, help to ensure compliance with important DoD national security safeguards, such as U.S. export restrictions and visibility at key points in the procurement and transportation processes. Also, these procedures enhance the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied equipment after delivery. However, in certain Section 1206 cases that we reviewed, the procurement and delivery processes used did not enable the DoD to fully meet the needs of partner-nation security forces.

The FMS pseudo case procurement and delivery processes used for Section 1206/2282 led to:

- the substitution of less compatible or inappropriate equipment for the requested or required equipment; and
- delayed or unsynchronized delivery of some equipment, training, and services.

### ***Substituted Equipment***

DoD officials reported that MILDEP IAs periodically substituted equipment other than items requested in the project proposal. This substitution would not occur in a conventional FMS case without partner-nation agreement. Since DoD officials request the Section 1206/2282 equipment, and the DoD makes the purchase with DoD funds, the partner nation does not need to agree to substitutions. For example, tactical vehicles and aircraft provided to Yemen were not what the SCO had requested to fulfill the desired capability. Furthermore, the items delivered were reportedly not well suited to the mission or operating environment. Vehicles delivered to Niger and Uganda also differed from what the partner nations preferred. Another SCO official said that DSCA and MILDEP IAs had informed him of proposed equipment substitutions because the requested items could not be procured. Although the SCO thought that the substituted equipment would not meet the partner nation's needs as well as the item requested, he stated that he had to accept the substituted equipment, or the partner nation would not receive equipment under that specific Section 1206/2282 proposal.

In Indonesia, we learned that Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) provided with 1206 funding were non-mission-capable because the Indonesians had difficulty in obtaining spark plugs for the American-made Evinrude engines. The Indonesian Navy unit commander reported that they had requested Suzuki engines because they were easy to maintain, and parts were readily available. The SCO noted that the Evinrude engines had been substituted for the Suzuki engines in the procurement process, most likely to support the "Buy American Act."<sup>44</sup> U.S. officials in Azerbaijan also reported a problem with the maintenance of Evinrude engines on boats provided with Section 1206 funding. An official in the Embassy in Burundi also expressed concerns with the perceived procurement limitations of the "Buy American Act" that resulted in procurement of equipment that could not be sustained without difficulty.

<sup>44</sup> Although the Buy America Act requires that only manufactured articles, materials, and supplies made in the U.S. shall be acquired for public use unless a designated authority determines the acquisition to be inconsistent with the public interest or their cost to be unreasonable, it also specifically states that these provisions do not apply to articles, materials, or supplies acquired for use outside the United States. Sections 8301-8305, title 41, United States Code, "Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8305 (2015), as amended.



Partner-nation forces were less familiar with substituted equipment than they were with the equipment originally requested, thus increasing the training requirement and not achieving the intended capability. The team learned that substituted equipment was also sometimes more difficult and expensive to maintain, a cost for which the partner government had not budgeted or could not afford.

### ***Delayed or Unsynchronized Delivery of Equipment and Associated Training and Services***

As previously noted, Section 1206 officials used DoD Operations and Maintenance funds to procure a variety of items to address partner nations' specialized needs. As also previously noted, by using O&M funds for Section 1206 procurement, the DoD found it necessary to meet certain legal and fiscal requirements, such as obligating the funds within the fiscal year authorized and required delivery in that same year.<sup>45</sup> Given this constraint, using these funds to procure a varied mix of items from multiple sources on compressed timelines stressed the capacity of Section 1206 equipment procurement-and-delivery system.

Another contributing factor is that partner nations did not take ownership of articles directly from the supplier, as is the case in conventional FMS. When the FMS pseudo-case process is used for Section 1206 equipment, the DSCA is more directly involved in shipping and delivery. For example, instead of coordinating shipments directly from a supplier with a partner nation, MILDEP IAs

<sup>45</sup> Section 2282 allows the completion of a project in the next fiscal year after the fiscal year of the obligation of the funds.

arrange for the delivery of the Section 1206 equipment to the DSCA-run Joint Consolidation Point (JCP), and the JCP delivers that equipment to the partner nation.<sup>46</sup> Multiple MILDEP IAs could be involved in procuring different items for the same Section 1206 partner-nation project. A DSCA official stated that it was therefore possible that the responsibility for procuring a major end item, certain sub-components, and required training could be delegated to several MILDEP IAs.

Dealing with multiple IAs is possible for conventional FMS, but doing so under compressed timelines imposed additional stresses onto Section 1206 procurement and delivery processes. Moreover, when multiple MILDEP IAs provided the JCP a diverse mix of equipment and components for projects, JCP personnel did not see it as their responsibility to ensure that equipment was complete and fully functional. They reported that the responsibility to provide fully functional equipment rested with the MILDEP IAs. The JCP forwarded equipment to the partner nations even if not all the sub-components to make the equipment fully operational were yet available. This could lead to inadequate coordination of required training or other necessary services, impeding development of the intended partner-nation capability.

### ***Exercise of Authorized Contracting Flexibility***

MILDEP IA contracting practices were another factor that, at times, negatively impacted Section 1206 project implementation. MILDEP IAs had primary responsibility for procuring Section 1206 equipment, training, and services requested by GCCs and SCOs to support partner nations in conducting counterterrorism or stability operations. Some MILDEP IA contracting officers located in the continental U.S. indicated that they felt constrained by the “Buy America Act” to procure only U.S. equipment, and that they did not know that there were allowable exceptions to fulfill unique requests. However, U.S. military SCO personnel whom we interviewed reported that, in certain cases, non-U.S. items they requested were necessary to meet partner-nation requirements. DSCA’s responsibility for coordinating GCC and SCO requirements with the MILDEP IA procurement officials included execution of procurement, shipment, and deliveries to meet those requirements. A DSCA official stated that his organization did not have the authority to require MILDEP IA contracting officers to procure non-U.S. equipment to satisfy specifically requested equipment for Section 1206 projects. The Buy America Act, as well as subpart 225.75 of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, entitled “Balance of Payments Program” (April 26, 2002, revised December 30, 2015), applies to acquisition and procurement of defense articles for the U.S. Armed Forces.

<sup>46</sup> Joint Consolidation Point: The DSCA-run warehouse and consolidation facility located within the Naval Supply Activity, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. (See Finding A, Discussion).

Both this law and DoD regulations include exceptions that allow contracting officers to fulfill unique requests. One allowable exception is procuring equipment intended for use overseas, including by partner nations, which is the case for Section 1206/2282 procurements.

### ***Speed of Delivery versus Providing Intended Capability***

DSCA and JCP officials stated that the JCP was primarily focused on efficient, timely overseas shipment and on accounting for Section 1206 equipment items. One JCP official stated that the facility focused on timely delivery of the Section 1206 items that the MILDEP IAs procured, rather than ensuring that an equipment package was complete with all required items. JCP personnel stated that it was not their responsibility to check sub-components and assemblies to ensure that they are present, compatible, and operating properly before overseas delivery. In their opinion, this responsibility belonged to the contracting authority, in this case, the MILDEP IAs.

When MILDEP IAs did not perform this task, GCCs and SCOs sometimes received shipments with missing, incomplete, or incompatible items. For example, the evaluation team learned about a project for Burundi operating in Somalia where supplies for first-aid kits arrived without the associated carrying cases. We also found instances of night-vision goggles arriving in the Philippines and Malta without the necessary helmet mounting brackets and straps. In another documented case the sub-components required to install a radio system in an aircraft belonging to the Philippine Air Force had not arrived two years after the radio was received.

Not correcting such delivery deficiencies increased GCC and SCO workloads because it became necessary for the GCC and SCO members to ensure that these issues became resolved satisfactorily with the partner nation. Furthermore, the delivery of incomplete equipment could delay training necessary to employ the equipment and could delay achieving the intended level of operational capability.

## **Conclusion**

The combination of DoD Section 1206 obligation requirements and use of FMS pseudo-case processes sometimes resulted in slowed or diminished development of a sustainable partner-nation capability.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### ***Recommendation E.1***

**Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, in coordination with Geographic Combatant Command Commanders, Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and Military Department Implementing Agencies, take action with respect to procuring and delivering goods and services currently authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 2282 to identify process deficiencies impeding fast, effective procurement and delivery of fully operational equipment and develop sufficient internal controls to preclude shipment of incomplete or inoperable equipment.**

### ***Management Comments to Recommendation E.1***

The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), agreed with recommendation E.1. Since the completion of the DoD OIG evaluation in December 2015, the Counterterrorism Partnerships Office has actively engaged stakeholders – partners and customers – with the aim of collectively identifying and removing any inefficiencies in program management. The process items, guidance documents, and procedures documented in item B.1.c and elsewhere in this response are evidence of these efforts.

### ***Our Response***

Management's comments were partially responsive to the recommendation, and we consider the recommendation to be unresolved. Based on management's comments and the process items, guidance documents, and procedures documented in item B.1.c and elsewhere in management's response, it appears that management now gathers additional data to manage equipment deliveries in support of activities authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 2282. We request, by August 21, 2017, that management provide documentation that identifies what inefficiencies, if any, have been removed or will be removed and what data, if any, shows how the processes and guidance referred to by management have improved the effective procurement and delivery of fully operational equipment.



## ***Recommendation E.2***

**Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, in coordination with Geographic Combatant Command Commanders, Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and Military Department Implementing Agencies, take action with respect to procuring and delivering goods and services currently authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 2282 to develop and implement a comprehensive action plan to address these deficiencies, ensuring that responsible DoD personnel use all Federal Acquisition Regulation and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement authorizations, as well as allowable waiver and exemption options, to meet program requirements.**

### ***Management Comments to Recommendation E.2***

The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), did not provide comments in response to Recommendation E.2.

### ***Our Response***

We consider this recommendation to be unresolved. We ask that management provide comments on recommendation E.2 in response to the final report by August 21, 2017.



## Finding F

### Sustaining Enhanced Partner-Nation Capability

In some cases, counterterrorism equipment and training capabilities bought for partner nations using Section 1206/2282 funds were not sustainable.

This occurred because:

- project proposals often did not contain detailed, well-coordinated plans for sustaining requested capabilities;
- the DoD sometimes did not use all available funding authorities or sources to ensure that Section 1206/2282 provided capabilities became effectively sustained;
- partner nations did not always have the technical proficiency to maintain the equipment and sustain training in the necessary skills; and
- partner nations sometimes were unable to cover the costs of sustaining delivered capability.

In some instances, these shortcomings resulted in the DoD's and partner nations' either:

- not sustaining delivered capabilities as planned, or
- expending additional resources to sustain equipment and obtain the training proficiency necessary to ensure effective partner-nation operations.

### Discussion

Senate Report 110-35 accompanying the FY09 NDAA indicated that Section 1206 funds should not be used to indefinitely sustain a capability.<sup>47</sup> Responding to congressional concerns of this type, SOCT guidance for FYs 2012 through 2014 stated, "As a general rule, Section 1206 will not be used to provide the same capability to the same military force for more than three years."<sup>48</sup> Following three years of Section 1206 support, Country Teams were supposed to have taken steps to ensure that host nation or Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds were in place to sustain the capability.

<sup>47</sup> Senate Report 110-35 to accompany the NDAA for FY 2009, Section 1204.

<sup>48</sup> FY 2012 Guidance and Lessons Learned Global Train and Equip: Section 1206 of the FY 2012, August 1, 2011, p. 7; FY 2013 Guidance and Lessons Learned Global Train and Equip: Section 1206 of the FY 2013, August 1, 2012, p. 7; FY 2014 Guidance and Lessons Learned Global Train and Equip: Section 1206 of the FY 2014, May 24, 2013, p. 7.

DSCA officials reported to us that past Section 1206-related questions from Congress focused on equipment sustainment, as was the case in earlier congressional reports accompanying the NDAAAs. While some SOCT officials indicated that they planned for sustainment during project selection, sustainment requirements were not always met. Other officials stated that equipment sustainment remained a challenge for partner nations.

### ***Sustainment Planning***

Section 1206 project proposals lacked detailed plans for sustaining the proposed equipment over time. Project proposals did not usually include enough objective data to determine whether sustainment costs were affordable. For example, in Kenya, the provided Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) exceeded their estimated annual flight hours in the first quarter of operations, indicating that the original flight usage estimate was incorrect. This also resulted in SCOs or partner-nation officials needing to try to source these unplanned, longer-term sustainment costs.



Figure 5. Kenyan Defense Forces Soldier Launches Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)  
Source: Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System.

The inadequacy of proposal-sustainment plans developed by GCC and SCO personnel can be attributed in part to lack of expertise with proposal equipment specifications, high personnel turnover, or limited access to additional subject-matter expertise. Not all of the GCCs visited had dedicated staff members to manage and execute Section 1206 projects. GCCs then tasked SCOs to develop project proposals and sustainment planning details. However, several SCO officials reported that their offices also had limited staff capacity and expertise to develop proposal sustainment details.

For example, U.S. officials in the SCO in Mauritania cited a shortage of personnel and expertise as a factor in sustainment planning. Personnel from the SCOs needed to conduct the required Section 1206 tasks along with their other duties.

Some Section 1206 project proposals relied on DOS-provided FMF<sup>49</sup> support for sustainment after the initial years of project execution. However, this could be problematic because FMF funding was not always available. In some cases, evidence indicated that identifying FMF as the follow-up sustainment support was due to a lack of knowledge about other potential DoD funding sources. One DoD official interviewed was unaware that other possible funding authorities<sup>50</sup> could be used to repair an equipment-maintenance facility for Section 1206 equipment, or that Section 1206 project proposals could include up to \$750,000 for small-scale construction.

A GCC official reported that the annual Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund was a sustainment-support option. The \$1.3 billion Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, part of the FY 2015 DoD Overseas Contingency Fund, was another. If the circumstances of a request met the specifications of the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund authorization, DoD officials reported that they could use those funds to sustain certain Section 1206 projects. Using alternative authorities and funding sources as described could reduce the reliance on FMF for continued, follow-on sustainment.

### ***Partner Nation Ability and Commitment for Sustainment***

SCO officials indicated that some partner nations had a limited ability to sustain Section 1206 capabilities because partner nations:

- lacked available replacement parts or key components following the initial period of DoD-supported sustainment;
- lacked maintenance or other skills essential to sustainment; or
- received equipment that was inappropriate, given the needs of their military and partner-nation sustainment capabilities.

<sup>49</sup> Foreign Military Financing: Secretary of State-run program that provides financing to partner nations on either a grant (non-repayable) or direct-loan basis for procurement of U.S. defense articles, services, and training. DSCA webpages, <http://www.dscamilitary-financing-fmf>, accessed on September 19, 2016.

<sup>50</sup> Foreign Military Construction Sales, 22 U.S.C. § 2769 (2015) and Credit Sales, 22 U.S.C. § 2763 (2015).

For example, the Integrated Maritime Surveillance System coastal radars in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia were less than fully effective because of problems with partner-nation sustainment issues (ranging from the availability of reliable electrical power, the availability and cost of repair parts and repair capability, and the need for enough trained operators. U.S. officials also reported that Romania had no plan to sustain Section 1206 equipment, citing financial constraints in their defense budget.

### ***Additional or Unplanned Partner-Nation Expenditures***

Partner nations experienced unexpected difficulties in maintaining the longer-term effectiveness of the Section 1206 equipment that they had received in the absence of either formal agreements or informal understandings with the U.S. on equipment sustainment. For example, in Georgia and the Philippines, the FMF was the planned means for sustainment of radios and night-vision goggles after the initial years of DoD-procured support. However, when the FMF was required, the funding was no longer available. In such instances partner nations were sometimes unexpectedly required to use their own funds to maintain Section 1206-purchased equipment. For example, a U.S. official in the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines expressed the opinion that the partner nation saw that the unexpected sustainment costs for 1206-provided equipment was unaffordable. In other instances unrealistic projected use rates or other unforeseen factors caused unavoidable, higher-than-expected sustainment costs.

## **Conclusion**

Capabilities provided by Section 1206 equipment were at risk of not being sustained for several reasons. First, plans for sustainment were not always complete, and the projected use of partner-nation funds, or the FMF was not assured. Second, Section 1206 does not provide authority to sustain a capability indefinitely, usually providing spare parts for only two years. Third, sustaining equipment, conducting related training, and providing other essential services could be difficult for some partner nations. Finally, in some cases sustainment costs could increase to a level higher than anticipated. It was therefore important that Section 1206 project proposals include detailed, fully coordinated, and mutually agreed (before project approval and funding) sustainment plans, based on realistic projections of partner-nation sustainment capability.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

As a result of management comments, we deleted draft Recommendation F.2 from the final report. In addition, we renumbered draft recommendation F.3 as Recommendation F.2 in the final report.

### ***Recommendation F.1***

**Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, in coordination with relevant United States Government stakeholders, take action to ensure project proposals currently authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 2282 include fully developed and coordinated sustainment plans, as warranted.**

#### *Management Comments to Recommendation F.1*

The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), agreed with recommendation F.1, stating that, in 2016, the Counterterrorism Partnerships Office implemented a new program design guidance and documentation product to capture, among other key proposal elements, the sustainment requirements, costs, and source of funding. Further, the new 10 U.S.C. §333 authority seeks to address sustainment in two ways. First, it requires the Department to certify that it undertakes a complementary institutional capacity-building program, which seeks to ensure that the partner can eventually and independently employ and sustain the equipment provided through the authority. Second, it authorizes the Department to provide funding for sustainment for as many as 5 years.

#### *Our Response*

Management's comments were responsive to the recommendation, and we consider the recommendation to be resolved, but still open. In six months, we will request an updated analysis from management on sustainment planning, as required by 10 U.S.C. §333. We will also ask for examples of sustainment plans supporting project proposals. We will close this recommendation if we determine that the information provided in that update shows that project proposals include fully developed and coordinated sustainment plans.

***Recommendation F.2***

**Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, in coordination with relevant United States Government stakeholders, take action to ensure geographic Combatant Commands and United States Embassy Security Cooperation Organizations are aware of, and fully use, all funding authorities and sources available for sustaining capability provided by 10 U.S.C. § 2282.**

***Management Comments to Recommendation F.2***

The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), agreed with recommendation F.2, stating that the Counterterrorism Partnerships Office continues to actively engage with the GCCs and U.S. Embassy Security Cooperation Organizations to develop sustainment training plans that consider all potential authorities and resources. In August 2016, the Deputy Secretary issued “DoD Guidance for Security Cooperation,” which addresses the need to diversify, integrate, and sequence security-cooperation activities to achieve more strategic and lasting results.

***Our Response***

Management’s comments were responsive to the recommendation. We consider the recommendation to be resolved, but still open. We request, by August 21, 2017, a copy of the “DoD Guidance for Security Cooperation” and an example of “sustainment training plans that consider all potential authorities and resources.” We will close the recommendation if we determine that the additional documentation shows that Geographic Combatant Commands and United States Embassy Security Cooperation Organizations are aware of, and fully use, all funding authorities and sources available for sustaining capability provided by 10 U.S.C. § 2282.

## Finding G

### Measuring Impact, Performance, and Progress

The DoD did not develop the metrics and processes necessary to effectively evaluate performance and assess the individual and collective impacts of Section 1206 projects.

This occurred because the ASD(SO/LIC) had not:

- ensured that each Section 1206 project defined an expected level of operational impact, tracked progress, and compared the results to actual impact achieved; or
- developed a systematic program-assessment methodology to determine the collective impact of implemented projects on Section 1206/2282 programmatic objectives.

This inhibited the ASD(SO/LIC)'s ability to:

- identify and correct persistent systemic problems with data accuracy and performance reviews, identify and share best practices, and build the capacities of partner-nation counterterrorism and stability operations; and
- provide Congress and senior DoD leaders with objective, data-driven, performance-based justification for Section 1206 budget requirements.

### Discussion

DoD Components reported that they had assessed Section 1206 progress. However, responsible officials were unable to identify the actual operational impact achieved, which was necessary information for conducting program-wide reviews and communicating program results.

#### ***Obtaining Adequate Data***

Officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense indicated that collecting and assessing data necessary for conducting Section 1206 strategic reviews were difficult. The team observed inconsistent record keeping at several DoD Components, including U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. European Command. Furthermore, several SCOs in U.S. Embassies lacked copies of the original project proposals that should have identified what partner-nation capability was to be provided or enhanced with Section 1206 equipment or training. This lack of documentation could prevent efficient and informative future reviews of progress



and determination of outcomes. The same information is also necessary to conduct informed evaluations by management and oversight organizations. Consequently, the lack of historical records could also lead to inaccurate information being provided to organizational components that require specific operational and analytical information to conduct detailed management planning and informed decision making for partner-nation support.

As discussed in Finding C, the ASD(SO/LIC) did not ensure that Section 1206/2282 project proposals contained data on performance metrics and execution milestones sufficient for measuring project progress and operational effectiveness. Also, SOCT-sponsored assessments focused primarily on short-term changes in operational capability and performance of partner-nation units after receipt of equipment and completion of associated training. There was less focus on the long-term operational impact<sup>51</sup> resulting from that project or its contribution to the entire Section 1206 program. The DSCA reported having collected information about equipment consolidation and delivery performance. Although useful, these data-collection efforts did not provide informed perspectives on results that would have come from a broader program-level performance assessment.

### ***Data-Driven, Performance-Based Reviews***

Applicable Government directives and guidance required the ASD(SO/LIC) to collect essential operational performance and impact data necessary to conduct senior-level program reviews.

For example, GAO reported that obtaining essential data about effectiveness or performance was important to conducting informed senior-level reviews of government programs.<sup>52</sup> The report described examples of data-driven performance reviews conducted by Federal agencies. The GAO reported that the most effective reviews resulted from direct and visible engagement by agency leadership to understand and interpret the data.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Operational impact refers to long-term Section 1206 outcomes reflecting major changes to the operating state achieved or behaviors exhibited. For example, on a continuum, impacts (long-term outcomes) reflect numbers of high-value terrorists killed or captured or terrorist groups destroyed or dismantled, which differs from immediate (short-term) or intermediate (medium-term) outcomes, such as changes in operational capability and performance of recipient units after the delivery of 1206 equipment and training. Section 1206 Assessment Handbook, Version 1.3, November 2012, p. 2.

<sup>52</sup> GAO Report, "Managing for Results," GAO 13-228, February 2013, p. 1.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

That GAO report listed nine leading practices that contribute to successful data-driven, performance-based reviews at the Federal level.<sup>54</sup> Of the nine practices, we noted Section 1206 shortfalls in the following four:

- ensuring alignment among agency goals, program activities, and resources;
- having the capacity to collect accurate, useful and timely performance data;
- ensuring that staff members had the skills to analyze and clearly communicate complex data for decision making; and
- engaging in rigorous and sustained follow-up on problems identified during reviews.

OMB Circular A-11 provides detailed information about conducting effective strategic and performance reviews.

Partner-Nations’ Commonly Collected Data, like statistics from the Tunisian Fast Response Boat (FRB) System, could have been useful for DoD Section 1206 Assessment purposes.

*Figure 6. Missions Performed Over a Period of 18 Months by 13 Shore-Based Fast-Response Boats System Within the Tunisian Navy*

Mission	North Zone	Center Zone	South Zone	Total
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security	208	44	422	674
HVA Escort	19	1	0	20
Search & Rescue	13	8	27	48
Illegal Immigration Interdiction	0	2	10	12
Fisheries Law Enforcement	0	0	53	53
Participation in Naval Exercises	38	12	6	56

Source: Tunisian Navy.

Effective program reviews are frequent (at least quarterly) and data-driven. That Circular states that reviews enable agencies to identify, plan, and potentially improve existing practices to support mission goals and strategic objectives. In the case of Section 1206, applicable program objectives focused on enhanced partner-nation capacity for counterterrorism or stability.

The Section 1206 proposals and assessment methodology used by SOCT did not produce the quantifiable and verifiable operational-impact data that Congress required to assess the overall effectiveness of Section 1206 activities. SOCT

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

officials stated that DoD status reports submitted to Congress were based on the SOCT-sponsored readiness assessments, described previously, of individual partner-nation recipient units, not an analysis of data that encompassed the operational impact achieved by all GCC Section 1206/2282 projects.

The USD(P) FY 2014 Statement of Assurance, issued in accordance with DoD Instruction 5010.40, “Manager’s Internal Control Program Procedures,” May 30, 2013, acknowledged the Section 1206 program-review process as a weakness.

The report stated, “No formalized program review process exists to assess impacts of 1206 funding and to shape future engagement strategy for building partner capacity.”<sup>55</sup>

### ***Implications for Effective Management***

Although SOCT began systematically assessing Section 1206 projects in 2012, congressional-committee staff stated that those efforts did not capture and analyze data necessary to fulfill reporting requirements. House and Senate committee reports accompanying the NDAs from FY 2012 to 2013<sup>56</sup> also stated the importance of assessing the effectiveness of program activities. Congress mandated an updated annual reporting requirement in 10 U.S.C. § 2282.

Several senior GCC officials stated that they did not have enough personnel with the necessary skills to collect and assess data specifically for Section 1206 projects. We concluded that conducting program-wide reviews without essential data for such assessments could impede the ASD(SO/LIC)’s ability to:

- capture the operational impact that individual Section 1206 projects had achieved, and the collective support that partner-nation operations had afforded to the objectives of U.S. counterterrorism and stability operations;
- detect and correct problems, share best practices, and thus improve Section 1206 performance; and
- provide Congress and senior DoD leaders with objective, data-driven, performance-based justification for Section 1206 budget requests.

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<sup>55</sup> USD(P) FY 2014 Statement of Assurance.

<sup>56</sup> House Report 111-491, to accompany the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011; House Report 112-479, to accompany the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013; Senate Report 112-26, to accompany the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012; Senate Report 112-173, to accompany the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013.

## Conclusion

Effective senior-level reviews depend on data and analysis describing the operational effectiveness of projects in relation to clearly stated objectives. Data should be systematically measured, collected, recorded, analyzed, and effectively communicated.

However, our evaluation could not determine whether the results of those efforts significantly enabled DoD project-resourcing decisions or congressional analysis of DoD reporting. The ASD(SO/LIC) has found it difficult to describe Section 1206 program achievement in quantifiable, verifiable terms.

DoD leaders need to improve focus on collecting, consolidating, and analyzing data explaining the operational impact achieved by implemented Section 1206/2282 projects. The results of their analysis need to be communicated in a manner that supports senior DoD and congressional decision-makers.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### ***Recommendation G***

**Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, in coordination with relevant Department of Defense stakeholders, systematically monitor implementation of 10 U.S.C. § 2282 with performance measures and indicators that enable senior-level management reviews in accordance with applicable Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and other Government directives and guidance.**

### *Management Comments to Recommendation G*

The ASD(SO/LIC), PDO USD(P), agreed with recommendation G, stating that, in 2017, the Department issued DODI 5132.14, "Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise." Because of this new guidance, the DoD is developing the capacity to develop performance metrics and indicators. Moving forward, implementation of 10 U.S.C. §333 in FY18 will require a quarterly monitoring report to Congress.

### *Our Response*

Management's comments were responsive to the recommendation, and we consider the recommendation to be resolved, but still open. After six months, we will request an update on DoD development of performance metrics and indicators, and examples thereof. Depending on our review, we may subsequently request the latest quarterly monitoring report to Congress. We will close this recommendation when we determine that the DoD has developed performance measures and indicators that meet the intent of Recommendation G.



## Appendix A

### Scope and Methodology

We conducted this evaluation from April 14, 2014, to December 15, 2015, in accordance with Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in January 2012. We planned and performed the evaluation to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings, conclusions, and recommendations, based on our objectives. We conducted site visits from June 9, 2014, to November 6, 2014. Refer to the table in Appendix C for additional details about each site.

We reviewed documents such as Federal laws and regulations related to internal controls, Federal budget estimates, and security cooperation in general and Section 1206 specifically. Besides specific criteria listed and described in Appendix B relevant laws included:

- Public Law 113-291, “Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act,” for Fiscal Year 2015, December 19, 2014
- Public Law 113-66, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014,” December 26, 2013
- Public Law 112-239, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013,” January 2, 2013
- Public Law 112-81, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,” December 31, 2011
- Public Law 111-383, “Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011,” January 7, 2011
- Public Law 111-84, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, October 28, 2009”
- Public Law 110-417, “Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009,” October 14, 2008
- Public Law 110-181, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,” January 28, 2008
- Public Law 109-364, “John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,” October 17, 2006
- Public Law 109-163, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006,” January 6, 2006

The purpose of this evaluation was to determine whether the Department of Defense (DoD) Global Train and Equip Program stipulated by Public Law 109-163, Section 1206, (2006), as amended, [henceforth “Section 1206”] was effectively managed, and whether it enhanced the capabilities of partner-nation security forces. The following areas were within the scope of this project:

- DoD program efforts from FY 2009 to the present for building the capacities of partner-nation military and maritime security forces for counterterrorism and stability operations pursuant to the authority and direction of Public Law 109- 163, Section 1206, as amended;
- program policies, plans, procedures, guidance, execution, support, and performance;
- related public laws;
- documents and records retained by various DoD departments, offices, and organizations, including, but not limited to:
  - the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
  - Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
  - the Joint Staff,
  - U.S. Special Operations Command,
  - U.S. Geographic Combatant Commanders, and
  - the Service Departments;
- key interfaces between Section 1206 and other programs for building partner capacity, security assistance, and security cooperation, especially programs under the Public Law 112-81, Section 1207, “Global Security Contingency Fund,” December 31, 2011; and
- associated DoD coordination and interactions with other USG organizations, including DOS Functional and Regional Bureaus and U.S. embassies within the countries we intended to visit, along with recipient partner nations’ governments.

Outside the scope of this project were details of other programs and aspects that pertain to supporting or building partner capabilities and capacities pursuant to other authorities – specifically, programs and aspects dealing with counter-narcotics, special operations, demining, non-proliferation, Coalition Support Funds, and the support of Afghan and Iraqi security forces.

We visited or contacted (or both) officials from the offices listed in Appendix C to discuss Section 1206/2282 and their processes.



## Use of Computer-Processed Data

We used computer-processed data from several sources for this evaluation. Sources included management-provided extracts from the Security Cooperation Information Portal, compilation of DSCA delivery-survey results, and a variety of spreadsheets. We used the data to further our understanding of the breadth and extent of Section 1206/2282 activities, and we concluded that it was reliable enough for our purpose in support of our objectives. Because the data did not contribute significant support to report findings, conclusions, or recommendations, we did not assess or test the reliability of the data.

## Use of Technical Assistance

We did not require technical help to make this evaluation.

## Prior Coverage

Since 2009 the GAO has issued four reports discussing Section 1206, and the DoD OIG has issued one report.

Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>.

Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm>.

## Government Accountability Office

GAO Report No. 16-368, “Counterterrorism: DoD Should Enhance Management of and Reporting on Its Global Train and Equip Program,” April 18, 2016

This report examines (1) the extent to which DoD considered and documented the consideration of key security-assistance elements for FY 2015 project proposals, and (2) the reported results of the achievement of project objectives since FY 2009. The GAO analyzed agency data and program documents and interviewed DoD and State officials in Washington, D.C., and at selected combatant commands and embassies.

The GAO reported that project proposals did not always adhere to federal internal-control standards for clearly documenting three of those elements – absorptive capacity, project assessment, and sustainment plans. For example, the DoD did not require project-proposal packages to document information about a recipient unit’s absorptive capacity. In addition, assessments of recipient-unit baseline capabilities did not always include all information required by agency guidance to facilitate project assessment.

Finally, 13 of 54 project proposals did not include required estimates of annual sustainment costs. The sharp increase in funding for program activities in fiscal year 2015 heightens the importance of documenting consideration of key planning elements to provide decision makers sufficient information about recipient units' ability to use and sustain assistance. Moreover, incomplete baseline assessments may limit the DoD's ability to conduct future project assessments to inform future funding decisions. While DoD reporting identifies some progress in building partner-nation capabilities, DoD reporting on Global Train and Equip project assessments has not met statutory deadlines.

GAO Report No.13-310, "U.S. Assistance to Yemen. Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Emergency Food Aid and Assess Security Assistance," March 20, 2013, and revised on March 22, 2013

This report examined (1) the extent of progress made toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen, (2) the extent of progress made by the Food for Peace and Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, and (3) key challenges to U.S. assistance efforts. The GAO reviewed agency documents and met with U.S. and Yemeni officials and implementing partners in Washington, D.C., and Sana'a, Yemen.

GAO Report No. 13-335T, "Building Partner Capacity, Key Practices to Effectively Manage Department of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation," February 14, 2013

This testimony highlights opportunities to strengthen the DoD's management of its efforts in building partner capacity by focusing on three key practices: (1) setting clear goals and defining terminology, (2) coordinating activities and sharing information, and (3) sustaining efforts and evaluating progress. It is based on the GAO's body of work on building partner capacity from April 2010 through November 2012.

GAO Report No. 10-431, "International Security: DoD and State Need to Improve Sustainment Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs," April 15, 2010

This report addresses the extent to which the programs (1) are consistent with strategic priorities, (2) are distinct from other programs, (3) address sustainment needs, and (4) incorporate monitoring and evaluation. The GAO analyzed data and program documents from the Departments of Defense and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and it interviewed U.S. and host-country officials.

### ***DoD OIG***

DoD IG Report No. IE-2009-007, "Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program," August 31, 2009

This report addresses the effectiveness of the Section 1206 program in building capacity for counterterrorism and stability and military operations; the efficiency of the Section 1206 program with project selection, execution, implementation, results, and sustainment; and management's compliance with Section 1206 statutory requirements.

## Appendix B

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### Applicable Criteria

#### **Program-Management Guidance**

The following criteria apply to all DoD-program activities.

#### *Legislation*

##### **Government Performance and Results Act, August 3, 1993**

The Congress enacted Public Law 103-62, “The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993” (GPRA), August 3, 1993, to, in part:

- “(3) improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability by promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer satisfaction;
- (5) improve congressional decision making by providing more objective information on achieving statutory objectives and on the relative effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and spending; and
- (6) improve internal management of the Federal Government.”

##### **GPRA Modernization Act (GPRA Mod Act) of 2010, January 4, 2011**

The Congress enacted Public Law 111-352, which stated that the head of each agency shall establish:

... a performance plan covering each program activity set forth in the budget of such agency. Such plan shall (1) establish performance goals to define the level of performance to be achieved during the year in which the plan is submitted and the next fiscal year; (2) express such goals in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form unless authorized to be in an alternative form . . . .

This GPRA Mod Act requirement is codified in 31 U.S.C. § 1115; it requires such plans to identify priority goals, describe how to achieve performance goals, and establish performance indicators to measure progress. Performance plans should:

- provide a basis to compare actual program results with established performance goals,
- describe the accuracy and reliability of the data used to measure progress, and
- communicate management challenges to program success.

If an agency or program is unable to establish objective, quantifiable, and measurable performance goals, it must provide a description of how minimally effective and successful programs look (in a manner that allows for an accurate, independent determination of program performance), along with a statement of why that program cannot be measured with quantifiable performance goals.

### *Government Accountability Office*

#### **Government Accountability Office (GAO) “Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,” November 1999, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.<sup>57</sup>**

These standards provide the overall framework for Federal managers to establish and maintain internal control and for them to identify and deal with major challenges and areas (in performance and management) at greatest risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

### *Executive Office of the President*

#### **Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, July 2014 (Revised November 2014)**

OMB Circular A-11 defines “program activity” not as the activity of a program but as “. . . activities or projects listed in the program and financing schedules of the annual budget of the United States Government.” Separately, OMB Circular A-11 defines and describes a “program” as:

. . . generally, an organized set of activities directed toward a common purpose or goal that an agency undertakes or proposes to carry out its responsibilities. Within this broad definition, agencies and their stakeholders currently use the term “program” in different ways.

Agencies have widely varying missions and achieve these missions through different programmatic approaches, so differences in the use of the term “program” are legitimate and meaningful . . . [A] gencies may identify programs consistent with the manner in which the agency uses programs to interact with key stakeholders and to execute its mission.

The DoD referred to “the 1206 program” in its annual budget-justification materials but did not define a 1206 program in its own instruction on the Section 1206 authority (DoD Instruction 5111.19, July 26, 2011).

<sup>57</sup> This reference was in effect during this evaluation and was used as a technical reference. It became superseded in September 2014.

**Budget Justification Materials**

OMB Circular A-11, July 25, 2014, (Revised November 2014), provides guidance to Federal agencies about proposed budget requests. This circular further requires thorough discussion of the evidence, both positive and negative, to include evaluation results, program-performance indicators, performance goals, and other relevant data analytics and research studies.

**Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123, Management's Responsibility for Internal Control, December 21, 2004**

OMB Circular No. A-123 defines management's responsibility for internal control in Federal agencies. It requires agencies and individual managers to take systematic and proactive measures to:

- (i) develop and implement appropriate, cost-effective internal control for results-oriented management . . . (iv) identify needed improvements, (v) take corresponding corrective action, and (vi) report annually on internal control through management assurance statements.

*Department of Defense***DoD Instruction 5010.40, Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures, May 30, 2013**

This instruction implements DoD policy, pursuant to OMB Circular A-123, that a Managers' Internal Control Program be established to review, assess, and report on the effectiveness of internal controls. It designates the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Component heads, and principal staff assistants with the responsibility to approve the statements of assurance of the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities under their authority, direction, and control before submission to the Secretary of Defense.

***Guidance on Counterterrorism, Stability Operations, and Security Cooperation****Executive Office of the President***National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 28, 2011**

This strategy describes the Federal Government's approach to countering terrorism, and it identifies the range of tools critical to this strategy's success. It declares the Administration's principles that guide our counterterrorism efforts, its overarching goals, and 10 focus areas.

**Presidential Policy Directive 23/PPD-23, Security Sector Assistance Policy, April 5, 2013**

This policy defines the security sector and security-sector assistance and the goals of such assistance. It also presents policy guidelines, a framework for improving the unity of effort, and the roles and missions of security-sector assistance. PPD-23 emphasizes building sustainable partner capacity for common security challenges, strengthening collective security, and promoting U.S. interests and values.

According to policy, security-sector assistance activities will:

- act consistently with broader national-security goals;
- foster policy coherence and interagency collaboration;
- build sustainable capacity in partners;
- act selectively in resource use for the greatest impact;
- respond to crises and opportunities;
- ensure that short-term action is consistent with long-term goals;
- use rigorous analysis, assessments, and evaluations; and
- act regionally and coordinate with other security-assistance donors.

*Department of Defense*

**Defense Security Cooperation Agency Manual 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), April 30, 2012 (electronic format only)**

The SAMM provides DoD-wide guidance to the DoD Components engaged in the management or implementation of DoD Security Assistance and Security Cooperation programs over which DSCA has responsibility, subject to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), U.S.C. title 10, and other DoD and related statutes and directives.

**Department of Defense Directive 5111.1, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), December 8, 1999**

This directive describes responsibilities, functions, relationships, and authorities of the USD(P). Specifically, it states that the USD(P) shall develop “DoD policy guidance, provide overall supervision, and provide oversight of planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of special operations activities . . . and of low-intensity conflict activities, including counter-terrorism, support to insurgency, and contingency operations.”



**Department of Defense Directive 5111.10, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), October 21, 2011**

This directive establishes the position of the ASD(SO/LIC), and it requires that the position develop policy and provide advice to senior DoD officials regarding the use of U.S. Government resources in counterterrorism and antiterrorism roles and other sensitive national missions.

**Department of Defense Directive 5132.03, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, October 24, 2008**

This directive sets DoD policy that security-cooperation activities will be planned, programmed, budgeted, and executed with the same high degree of attention and efficiency as other integral DoD activities. It also requires the USD(P) to evaluate completed-campaign plan assessments and security-cooperation program assessments and advise the Secretary of Defense on the effectiveness of DoD security-cooperation efforts.

**Department of Defense Instruction 5111.19, Section 1206 Global Train-and-Equip Authority, July 26, 2011**

USD(P) in 2011 issued DoD Instruction (DODI) 5111.19, "Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Authority," which established formal policy and assigned responsibilities for the development and execution of programs authorized under Section 1206 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended.

**Joint Publication 3-07, Stability Operations, September 29, 2011**

This publication defines stability operations as:

. . . various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

It further says:

The objective of a stabilization effort is to achieve and maintain a workable political settlement among the host nation government, competing elites, and the wider population.

**Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, August 11, 2011**

This publication sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for U.S. military involvement in multinational operations.

**U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) CONPLAN 7500-06, “Department of Defense Global War on Terrorism Campaign Plan,” March 29, 2006**

This plan outlines general policy goals and commander’s intent to disrupt, degrade, and defeat certain terrorist threats. CONPLAN 7500-06 also includes seven major counterterrorism objectives that provides a sufficient national-level perspective for our purposes. A related document provides additional evidence that USSOCOM identifies various countries as either “Critical Partners” or “Key Supporting Partners.”

## Appendix C

### Sites and Organizations Visited

#### USAFRICOM

Site Visits	Dates	Organization
HQ – Germany	7/31/2014 – 8/7/2014	J1, J2, J3, J5, J7, J8, Counterterrorism Programs, Special Operations Command AFRICOM, North, West and East Engagement Divisions, Marine Forces AFRICOM, USARAF (VTC), NAVAFA/6th Fleet (SVTC), DOS Somalia Liaison Officer, Kenya Desk Officer, SAIC Contractor
Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa	8/8/2014 – 8/9/2014	Commanding General, J5, J8, Staff Judge Advocate, Somalia Logistics Officer
Burundi	8/19/2014 – 8/21/2014	SDO/DATT, OSC, DOS RSO, COM, DCM, Burundi Chief of Land Forces, SPMAGTF, Burutex Warehouse, Harris Radio contractor
Djibouti	8/7/2014 – 8/10/2014	COM, ODC, Djibouti Navy, Force Aérienne du Djibouti (Army)
Kenya	11/3/2014 – 11/6/2014	SDO/DATT, OSC/Kenya-US Liaison Office, DCM, DOS Political Affairs, Kenya MoD, Kenya Ranger Regiment, Kenya Navy Small Boat Unit Mombasa, Kenya Air Force - Manda Bay Air Field
Mauritania	8/11/2014 – 8/14/2014	Chargé d'affaires, Station Chief, SDO/DATT, OSC, RSO, Special Operations Foreign Liaison Element, Mauritania CHOD, Mauritania DCHOD, Mauritania Logistics Battalion, Mauritanian Air Force
Niger	10/27/2014 – 10/30/2014	DCM, OSC, Forces Armées Nigériennes Inspector General, Secretariat General/External Affairs Director, CHOD, J3/J4/J5, DCMAT
Somalia	8/10/2014	Senior Military Liaison, Military Coordination Cell, Bancroft Representatives, DOS AMISOM Peacekeeping Operations Director
Tunisia	8/18/2014 – 8/21/2014	SDO/DATT, OSC, DCM, MoD, 71st Signal Corps Regiment, Naval Base Bizerte, 36th Air Unit, 43rd Artillery Regiment
Uganda	8/13/2014 – 8/15/2014	Uganda People's Defense Force, Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), SPMAGTF, SDO/DATT, ODC, Acting DCM (Management Officer)

**USCENTCOM**

Site Visits	Dates	Organization
HQ – Florida	6/11/2014 – 6/12/2014	J2, J5, Deputy Political Advisor
Bahrain	9/24/2014 – 10/2/2014	COM, Chargé d'affaires, Office of Military Cooperation, Bahrain Defense Force, Bahrain Coast Guard
Lebanon	9/24/2014 – 9/29/2014	MoD, Logistics Brigade Base, Ammunitions Storage, Air Force HQ, Beirut Air Force, Regimental Base, Unit Base, Executive Assistant to CHOD, SDO/DATT, ODC, Country Team
Yemen	SVTC	SDO/DATT, OSC

**USEUCOM**

Site Visits	Dates	Organization
HQ – Germany	7/15/2014 – 7/16/2014 8/11/14	J3, J5, SOCOM- Europe, Marine Forces Europe, Country Desk Officers
Azerbaijan	7/21/2014 – 7/23/2014	ODC, DCM, DAO, DOS POLAD, Azerbaijan Armed Forces 641st Special Warfare Naval Unit 25, Allen- Vanguard (Contractor) - 641st Special Warfare Naval Unit's Explosive Ordinance Device Instructor, Azerbaijan Naval Forces
Georgia	7/28/2014 – 7/30/2014	ODC, Georgia Training Team (U.S. Marines), Georgian Armed Forces, 23rd Light Infantry Battalion, DCHOD for the Georgian Armed Forces, Georgian Armed Forces Eastern Operations Command
Malta	7/25/2014 – 7/26/2014	CoM, DCM, DAO, DOS Political Officer/Economic Officer, Armed Forces of Malta, Armed Forces of Malta Air Wing, Armed Forces of Malta 1st Regiment, Armed Forces of Malta Maritime Squadron
Poland	7/21/2014 – 7/23/2014	ODC, Poland General Forces Command, GROM (Special Operations Task Force 49), Polish Armed Forces Mobile Intelligence Support Element, Polish Armed Forces 6th Airborne Brigade, JWK (Special Operations Task Force 50)
Romania	8/1/2014 – 8/5/2014	ODC; DAO; DOS POLAD; Romanian Land Forces; Romanian Armed Forces: Imagery Intelligence Battalion, 20th Infantry Battalion, 33rd Mountain Battalion, 495th Infantry Battalion; Polish Armed Forces 6th Brigade Special Operations Force; Romanian Land Forces Combat Training Center; Romanian CHOD

**USPACOM**

Site Visits	Dates	Organization
HQ – Hawaii	6/9/2014 – 6/10/2014	J4; J45; Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC) SOCOM- Pacific
Bangladesh	6/19/2014 – 6/25/2014	ODC; DCM; Bangladesh: Navy Commander; Navy Special Warfare Wing; Special Warfare, Diving and Salvage Command; Naval Stores Depot; Army Chief of General Staff; Armed Forces Division; Armed Forces Division Operations and Plans; Coast Guard; 1st Para Commando Battalion, Special Operation Forces
Indonesia	6/13/2014 – 6/16/2014	ODC, DCM, DAO, Indonesian MoD Procurement Centre, Indonesian Army Aviation 11th Squadron, Assistant for Indonesian Navy Procurement and Logistics, Indonesian Navy Western Fleet
Malaysia	6/16/2014 – 6/18/2014	ODC, Malaysia Joint Forces Command, East Region Joint Task Force 2
Philippines	6/19/2014 – 6/21/2014	JUSMAG - Philippines, DCM, Philippines Joint Staff Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Philippines Naval Special Operations Group, Philippines Air Force 15th Strike Wing, Philippines Marine Special Operations Group, Philippines 3rd Air Division, Philippines Naval Special Operations Unit-6

**SOCOM**

Site Visits	Dates	Organization
HQ – Florida	6/9/2014 – 6/10/2014	Deputy Commanding General, J3, J8, Geographic Support Group PACOM, AFRICOM-EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM, NORTHCOM

**SOUTHCOM**

Site Visits	Dates	Organization
HQ – Florida	12/4/14 1/8/15 – 1/9/15	Commander, SOUTHCOM; J2; J3; J5; J7; J8; J9; SOCOM - SOUTH

**DSCA**

Site Visits	Dates	Organization
Joint Consolidation Point – Naval Supply Activity (NAVSUP) Mechanicsburg, PA; Washington, DC	1/3/2014 3/11/2014 7/24/2014 12/11/2014 3/18/2015 5/13/2015	N/A

**DoD (SOCT)**

Site Visits	Dates	Organization
Washington, DC	2/28/2014 3/26/2015 5/14/2015	N/A

**Joint Staff**

Site Visits	Dates	Organization
Washington, DC	11/7/2014	N/A

**US Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC)**

Site Visits	Dates	Organization
Washington, DC	7/8/2014	N/A

**Navy International Programs Office (NAVIPO)**

Site Visits	Dates	Organization
Washington, DC	7/31/2014	N/A

**Department of State**

Site Visits	Dates	Organization
Washington, DC	5/5/2014 5/6/2014 5/8/2014 8/21/2014	N/A

## LEGEND

<b>SVTC</b>	Secure Video Teleconference
<b>SDO/DATT</b>	Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché
<b>OSC</b>	Office of Security Cooperation
<b>RSO</b>	Regional Security Officer
<b>COM</b>	Chief of Mission
<b>DCM</b>	Deputy Chief of Mission
<b>ODC</b>	Office of Defense Cooperation
<b>MOD</b>	Ministry of Defense
<b>CHOD</b>	Chief of Defense
<b>DCHOD</b>	Deputy Chief of Defense
<b>DOS</b>	Department of State
<b>POLAD</b>	Political Adviser
<b>DCMAT</b>	Direction Centrale du Materiel des Forces Armées Nigériennes [“Central Directorate of Equipment of the Nigerian Armed Forces”]
<b>SPMAGTF</b>	Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force
<b>DAO</b>	Defense Attaché Office
<b>GROM</b>	Jednostka Wojskowa Grupa Reagowania Operacyjno-Manewrowego [“Military Unit – Operational Maneuver Response Group”]
<b>JWK</b>	Jednostka Wojskowa Komandosow [“Military Unit Commandos”]
<b>JUSMAG</b>	Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group
<b>SOCOM</b>	U.S. Special Operations Command




## Appendix D

### Section 1206 Process Overview

Each year the DASD(SOCT) solicited project proposals from GCCs, which included concurrence by the associated U.S. Embassy Chiefs of Mission. Project proposals were submitted to, and reviewed by, Joint Staff J5 (Strategy, Policy, and Plans), USSOCOM, and DOS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. The DASD(SOCT), in coordination with the DOS, consolidated and prioritized the project proposals for final selection, approval, and congressional reporting (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. SOCT flow diagram for selection and approval process for Section 1206/2282 proposals



Source: SOCT.

### Annual Guidance on Special Operations and Combating Terrorism

Each year SOCT issued official Section 1206/2282 guidance, primarily to inform GCCs and SCOs about procedures for developing Section 1206/2282 project proposals and executing congressionally notified and approved projects for the next year.

SOCT usually updated its guidance annually to reflect changes to Section 1206/2282, lessons learned, changes to DoD policy, and congressional concerns. Even so, between FY 2010 and FY 2014, much of the content in SOCT guidance on Section 1206/2282 remained the same. However, SOCT developed and issued not only guidance but also two complementary Section 1206/2282 proposal forms: one for stability operations and another for counterterrorism operations. Each form included areas to document the subject projects.

During FY 2012 SOCT standardized its official proposal forms, requiring that all proposal developers complete and submit the forms (along with an equipment list) to the Joint Staff J5 for forwarding to SOCT for approval and prioritization. The intent of that action was to reduce follow-on requests for information, allow for quicker proposal reviews, and ensure that all associated costs were included.

SOCT in FY 2014 conducted its first Section 1206/2282 Strategic Review, which was primarily a top-level review of the various GCC project proposals from various stakeholders. This review was significant because its timeline required proposals to be submitted and initially reviewed earlier than in previous years.

With most GCCs participating in that forum, the ASD(SO/LIC) and DASD(SOCT) used it as an opportunity to clarify Section 1206/2282 guidance and to identify lessons learned as a basis for making process improvements. After that review SOCT and DOS Bureau of Political Military Affairs established a list of recommended project proposals for further consideration by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State and their potential referral to congressional reporting.

# Management Comments

## Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

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POLICY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

MAY 19 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) INSPECTOR GENERAL,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR  
SPECIAL PLANS AND OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Response to the DoD 2017 Inspector General (IG) Data Assessment of the  
Department of Defense Efforts to Build Counterterrorism and Stability Operations  
Capacity of Foreign Military Forces with "Section 1206" Funding (Project No.  
D2013-D00SPO-0190.000)

I have reviewed the subject report dated March 31, 2017. I appreciate the thorough and comprehensive work that went into this report. Since the IG's collection of information two years ago we have implemented a new approach to oversight of the authority, and the Department has implemented or plans to implement all but one of the recommendations in the draft report.

The FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (FY17 NDAA) consolidated several narrow train-and-equip authorities, including the 2282 authority that replaced Section 1206 in 2015. The new Section 333 authority is a more integrated, comprehensive authorization that allows the Department to address a broader range of contingencies. The FY17 NDAA does not extend the Section 2282 authority beyond September 2017. Although 2282 will no longer exist, the Department will continue to implement the IG recommendations in the context of the new Section 333 authority.

B.1. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:

1. Conduct Department of Defense activities authorized under Section 2282 in accordance with Office of Management and Budget Circular Number A-11 and all applicable Department of Defense and United States Government statutes, directives, and guidance for Department of Defense programs.

a. **Recommendation 1:** Designate a lead manager and management office with responsibility to coordinate, synchronize, and integrate relevant activities, and sufficient operating authority over Department of Defense implementing components, to ensure effective management control in programs execution.

**Concur.** In September 2015, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism created the position of Director, Counterterrorism (CT) Partnerships as

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## Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (cont'd)

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the lead office to coordinate, synchronize, and integrate relevant activities. This office has been empowered to develop strategic plans and provide program oversight over all aspects of the Section 2282 program. The FY17 NDAA directs the Department to consolidate program management functions in the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Policy is in the process of exploring options to migrate these responsibilities to DSCA to support implementation of Section 333.

**b. Recommendation 2:** Ensure that the designated program management office has sufficient professional staff with necessary expertise and appropriate resources to effect timely procurement and delivery of appropriate equipment components, training, and other services necessary for enabling partner nations to reach the intended full operational capability.

**Concur.** In light of continuing pressure to reduce headquarters staff across the Department, in 2016 Policy leadership worked with the Deputy Chief Management Officer to seek approval of an increase in program management staff by 15 people. In line with the FY17 NDAA direction to consolidate program management within DSCA, these 15 billets will be assigned to DSCA. Policy is further working with DSCA and DCMO to ensure adequate staffing for DSCA program management responsibilities.

**c. Recommendation 3:** Issue updated instructions to support effective program implementation, execution, and management oversight.

**Concur.** Beginning in FY17, the CT Partnerships Office provided updated program design guidance consistent with the new program implementation approach. The planning guidance included program design guidance and process steps. Policy intends to leverage these best practices as well as lessons learned from interagency partners to ensure that proposals for the new Section 333 incorporate a performance management framework to support effective oversight and execution.

2. Direct development of a comprehensive plan to implement activities authorized under Section 2282 through a strategy with outcome-oriented objectives that are quantifiable and measurable. The strategy should include a clear mission, purpose, and goals about the allocation of resources and use of partner nation security forces to achieve results that effectively support the goals and objectives of United States counterterrorism and stability operations.

**Concur.** Based on key strategic planning guidance documents, including the Geographic Combatant Command Theater Campaign Plan and the U.S. Country team Integrated Country Strategy (ICS), the new planning approach begins with an articulation of the desired outcome in the form of the security role DoD seeks the partner to play and the theory of change. CT Partnerships issues a strategy-driven, resource-informed set of objectives that can drive the development and evaluation of indicators. This approach will continue to be implemented under Section 333.

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### C. Developing and Submitting Project Proposals

#### C. 1. Pursuant to implementing activities authorized under Section 2282, take action to:

a. **Recommendation 4:** Issue and enforce proposal guidance, including standards for submitting specific information necessary to fully describe partner nation requirements, the metrics to assess project impact, and means to sustain a project, if applicable.

**Concur.** The CT Partnerships Office provided to Geographic Combatant Commands a new comprehensive proposal form to address all elements of program design in late 2015. CT Partnerships then implemented cross-department, interagency “red teams” to enforce standards. As part of the FY17 NDAA-mandated security cooperation reforms, Policy is developing a plan to integrate metrics and outcome indicators into program design.

b. **Recommendation 5:** Update proposal forms to provide guidance about including sections that enable Geographic Combatant Commands and U.S. Embassy Security Cooperation officers or organizations to document required data.

**Concur.** As addressed in the answer to C.1.a, above, CT Partnerships provided a new, comprehensive proposal form in 2015.

c. **Recommendation 6:** Establish procedures for consolidating and maintaining a record of project-relevant information that all United States Embassy Security Cooperation Organizations, Combatant Commands, and Office of Secretary Defense personnel can readily access.

**Concur:** In November 2015, CT Partnerships developed a new electronic filing system to maintain CT program and proposal guidance, proposal development products, proposals, and equipment lists in files on the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy network. Policy is currently developing options for a collaborative online medium and issued DoD Instruction 5132.14 (DoDI) on Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation (AM&E) that requires maintenance of such records.

1. **Recommendation 7:** In coordination with applicable Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and Military Department Implementing Agencies, take action to ensure that Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) personnel assigned to U.S. Embassies have the appropriate training, capability, and necessary Department of Defense support to develop equipment and requirement details meeting project proposal standards currently required by Section 2282.

**Concur:** The FY17 NDAA mandated that DoD develop a program to professionalize the security cooperation workforce, including enhanced training and certification requirements and establishment of career paths. The workforce reform effort is managed by DSCA. DSCA is working in coordination with the Geographic Combatant Commands and the Military Departments to develop an implementation plan. In the near-term, Policy and DSCA are examining options to provide supplemental planning support to the COCOMs and SCOs.

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### D.1. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict:

1. **Recommendation 8:** Establish a rigorous, transparent methodology for prioritizing and selecting projects that meets the intention of Section 2282, using clearly defined criteria to effectively justify selections to stakeholders, especially Congress. Consider adapting elements of the United States Special Operations Command methodology for selecting and documenting project decisions.

**Concur:** CT Partnerships implemented a two-step process in which initial concepts are considered in a cross-department integrating forum. The final, resource-informed, adjudicated document is issued as a full proposal demand signal (planning order), which enables stakeholders across DoD and interagency partners to assist in the development of each proposal. For Section 333 implementation, Policy is establishing a governance board with an executive secretariat to convene regional and functional Policy offices to oversee this two-step process.

2. **Recommendation 9:** Ensure that Department of Defense components responsible for implementing Section 2282 comply with Department of Defense security cooperation directives and procedures for documenting and retaining records pursuant to that authority.

**Concur:** CT Partnerships implemented a new procedure in which CT Partnerships serves as the central repository for all proposal materials and individual equipment lists. This requirement will shift to DSCA.

E.1. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, in coordination with Geographic Combatant Command Commanders; Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency; and Military Department Implementing Agencies, take action with respect to procuring and delivering goods and services currently authorized by Section 2282 to:

1. **Recommendation 10:** Identify process deficiencies impeding fast, effective procurement and delivery of fully operational equipment and develop sufficient internal controls to preclude shipment of incomplete or inoperable equipment.

**Concur:** Since the completion of DoD IG assessment in December 2015, CT Partnerships has actively engaged CT stakeholders – partners and customers – with the aim of collectively identifying and removing any inefficiencies in CT program management. The process items, guidance documents, and procedures documented in item B.1.c, and elsewhere in this response evidence CT Partnerships' effort.

2. **Recommendation 11 (F.1 & F.2):** Develop and implement a comprehensive action plan to address these deficiencies, ensuring that responsible DoD personnel use all Federal Acquisition Regulation and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement authorizations, as well as allowable waiver and exemption options, to meet program requirements

**Concur:** F.1. & F.2. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, in coordination with relevant United States Government stakeholders, updated its

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## Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (cont'd)

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template to include required information ensuring all newly developed proposals include in-country coordinated sustainment plans, an estimated financial forecast for three to five years of sustainment, a section for partner-nation agreements for sustainment responsibilities and the ability to provide sustainment in the out years.

**1. Recommendation 12:** Project proposals currently authorized under Section 2282 include fully developed and coordinated sustainment plans, as warranted.

**Concur:** As described above, in 2016 CT Partnerships implemented a new program design guidance and documentation product to capture, among other key proposal elements, the sustainment requirements, costs, and source of funding. Further, the new Section 333 authority seeks to address sustainment in two ways. First, it requires the Department to certify that it is undertaking a complementary institutional capacity building program, which seeks to ensure that the partner can eventually employ and sustain independently the equipment provided through the authority. Second, it authorizes the Department to provide funding for sustainment for up to five years.

**2. Recommendation 13:** That United States and partner nation officials conclude written agreements about respective sustainment responsibilities, including a forecast for when or whether the partner nation will have the ability to sustain the capability provided under Section 2282.

**Partially Concur:** CT Partnerships program design documentation includes a sustainment plan, including a forecast for when or whether the partner nation will have the ability to sustain the capability. OSD is piloting an effort to engage partners in a joint lifecycle cost analysis and budget planning. However, a formal "written agreement" between the United States and any partner-nation concerning "respective sustainment responsibilities, including a forecast for when or whether the partner nation will have the ability to sustain the capability requirement provided" is likely not feasible for many partners based on political relationship realities.

**3. Recommendation 14:** Geographic Combatant Commands and U.S. Embassy Security Cooperation Organizations are aware of, and fully use, all funding authorities and sources available for sustaining capability provided by Section 2282.

**Concur:** CT Partnerships continues to actively engage with the Geographic Combatant Commands and U.S. Embassy Security Cooperation Organizations to develop sustainment training plans that consider all potential authorities and resources. The FY17 NDAA established a new chapter in Title 10 focused on security cooperation, providing a framework to make it easier to integrate security cooperation authorities. In August 2016, in anticipation of the new authorities framework, the Deputy Secretary issued, "DoD Guidance for Security Cooperation," that addresses the need to diversify, integrate, and sequence security cooperation activities to achieve more strategic and lasting results.

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G. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, in coordination with relevant United States Government stakeholders, systematically monitors implementation of Section 2282 with performance measures and indicators that enable senior-level management reviews in accordance with applicable Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and other Government directives and guidance.

**Concur:** In 2017, the Department issued DODI 5132.14, Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise. As a result of this new guidance, DoD is developing the capacity to develop performance metrics and indicators. Moving forward, implementation of Section 333 will require a quarterly monitoring report to Congress.

If you have any questions regarding our comments, please call my Point of Contact for Section 1206/2282, Christopher P. Maier, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, (SOLIC/SOCT) at COMM [REDACTED]



Theresa Whelan  
Performing the Duties of  
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<b>ASD(SO/LIC)</b>	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
<b>COCOM</b>	Combatant Command
<b>DASD(SOCT)</b>	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism
<b>DOS</b>	Department of State
<b>DSCA</b>	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
<b>FMF</b>	Foreign Military Financing
<b>FMS</b>	Foreign Military Sales
<b>FOC</b>	Full Operational Capability
<b>GAO</b>	Government Accountability Office
<b>GCC</b>	Geographic Combatant Command
<b>GPRA</b>	Government Performance and Results Act
<b>GPRA Mod Act</b>	GPRA Modernization Act
<b>JCP</b>	Joint Consolidation Point
<b>JP</b>	Joint Publication
<b>MILDEP IA</b>	Military Department Implementing Agency
<b>NDAA</b>	National Defense Authorization Act
<b>OMB</b>	Office of Management and Budget
<b>O&amp;M</b>	Operations and Maintenance
<b>PDO/USD(P)</b>	Performing the Duties of Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
<b>PPD-23</b>	Presidential Policy Directive 23
<b>SCO</b>	Security Cooperation Organization
<b>SOCT</b>	Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism
<b>TOC</b>	Transnational Organized Crime
<b>U.S.C.</b>	Unites States Code
<b>USCENTCOM</b>	U.S. Central Command
<b>USD(P)</b>	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
<b>USEUCOM</b>	U.S. European Command
<b>USG</b>	United States Government
<b>USPACOM</b>	U.S. Pacific Command
<b>USSOCOM</b>	U.S. Special Operations Command
<b>USSOUTHCOM</b>	U.S. Southern Command



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