Air
National Guard
Structure for the Twenty-first Century
The Multimission Framework for Total Force Integration

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Lieutenant Colonel, NEANG

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Foreword

For nearly three decades, the Air National Guard has served as a strategic reserve available to the Total Force only during a time of crisis. Today, the days of the “baseball cap flying club” are long gone, and Total Force Integration is firmly ensconced as the only way to fight the nation’s wars. With the added complications of reduced budgetary outlays and high operational tempo, Total Force considerations and organizational constructs become even more important to the mission’s bottom line for the United States Air Force.

Given the myriad of Total Force organizational constructs, is there one “best” unit structure for optimum Total Force Integration? If so, what might that unit look like, and why? If not, what framework of common traits might ensure future success? Lt Col Kevin Dailey offers the Multimission Framework as an answer. His research for the framework originates with an extensive series of interviews with senior service leaders, multiple case studies of the different current constructs, an extensive literature review, and an examination of current challenges. By reviewing the constitutional mandate for the militia forces, the rationale for an Air National Guard, and the complex series of Guard missions, as well as organizational unit types, Colonel Dailey adds further depth to the strength of a new framework built on the common threads of successful models. This framework is built to maximize effectiveness in future integration efforts and is presented as “Multimission Integration.”

The Multimission Framework for operational integration proposed by Colonel Dailey is a synthesis of the successful constructs across the many models currently being utilized throughout the Total Force. Current models in vogue are the Active Associate Wing, the Reserve/Guard Associate Wing, the “Blended” Wing, and the Integrated Wing. Colonel Dailey examined each of these models for its positive and negative contributions to the Total Force. His research presented an ironic challenge: all of them work to varying degrees of success when coupled with good leaders and good people. Can history and research demonstrate a better way forward?
Digging deeper uncovered the key to the Multimission Framework. Binding together each successful model are the common threads of policy, procedure, and programs that make the Multimission Framework the key way forward. This new framework for integration includes these successful common threads—a robust concept of operations, an ethical and legal chain of command, proper human resourcing (the right people and the right leaders), clear administrative controls, a clear operational direction chain, HRO supervisory training, judge advocate general (JAG) approval, volunteerism, recruiting, and the mobilization hammer. These common threads balance the various contributions of all types of forces without neglecting the unique requirements and missions of both federal and state forces. Although US Code Titles 10 and 32 draw relatively clear lines in the sand on responsibilities, both federal and state forces share missions more often than not.

Colonel Dailey makes a strong case for the Multimission Framework as a primary organizational construct for future Total Force success. When the entire Total Force team embraces operational unity for effect, yet understands and retains the distinctive strengths of each component, operational and strategic success for the United States Air Force will be assured.

As with all Maxwell Papers, this study is provided in the spirit of academic freedom, open debate, and the serious consideration of issues. We encourage your responses.

STEPHEN J. MILLER
Major General, USAF
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About the Author

Lt Col Kevin Dailey is an active duty Nebraska Air National Guardsman from Offutt AFB, Nebraska. He holds a bachelor of science degree in military history from the US Air Force Academy and a Master of Human Relations (MHR) degree from the University of Oklahoma. As an RC-135 master navigator, he has flown nearly 5,000 hours of operational reconnaissance, combat, combat support, instruction, evaluation, airborne command and control, and training sorties. He has held several staff jobs including chief, Reconnaissance Assignments at Headquarters Air Force Personnel Center, as well as joint service in both the US Space Command and the US Northern Command as an operational plan advisor to the combatant commanders and as chief of operations for the Mobile Consolidated Command Center. Most recently, Colonel Dailey held the position of formal training unit (FTU) flight commander in the 170th Operations Support Squadron. The FTU flight is now the 238th Combat Training Squadron, operationally integrated within the 55th Wing. He deployed to Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom as a director of operations for the 763rd Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron. The unique mission partnership between the Nebraska Air National Guard and Air Combat Command’s 55th Wing presented Colonel Dailey with true operational expertise in the Total Force arena. He is currently a member of the Air War College Class of 2008 at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
Abstract

Since the Vietnam War, much has changed with regard to the Total Force and the structure of the Department of Defense. The Air National Guard, in particular, began many transformational programs designed to better enhance its mission capabilities for both state and federal missions. In fact, the Air National Guard evolved into an operational reserve necessary to successfully fight the nation’s wars. Ultimately, the strength of the Air National Guard is built upon its greatest asset: its people. With people at the center of the equation, is there a best organizational construct in which to form an Air National Guard unit? If so, what might that unit look like? If not, might there be certain traits which resonate successfully within all the models? With these research questions in hand, the author began a quest for resolution on the optimum Guard organizational construct.

When a researcher pursues new subject matter, there is the possibility that the research results may be significantly different than expected. In this case, through a myriad of senior officer interviews, multiple model case studies, an expansive literature review, and a thorough review of the challenges in new units, the research indicated that there is almost no limit to the number of successful types of Total Force Integration models. However, what the research did demonstrate was the importance of certain core threads necessary for any models to both survive and thrive. Because of these core threads, this study recommends a common framework for the way ahead for future integration efforts, which shall be presented as the “Multimission Framework for Total Force Integration.”

Within the discussion, it became necessary to examine the historical chronology of Total Force Integration as well as Air National Guard history and culture. A thorough examination of cultural artifacts and challenges leads to the proverbial question of why a governor needs fighters. US Air Force core competencies remind us of the need for Guard members to be proficient in the same missions as their active duty peers. However, Guard personnel also have a dual-mission nature due to state and federal laws. A
brief look at *US Code*, Articles 10 and 32, demonstrates the key differences by law and clarifies the common misconceptions in this statutory guidance. With the groundwork laid, the study examines all current major integration models in vogue: the Guard Reserve/Active Associate Wing, the Blended Wing, and the Integrated Wing. Through careful examination of the strengths and weaknesses behind each model, a Multimission Framework is proposed as the way ahead.

The Multimission Framework for integration relies upon the following successful common threads: a robust concept of operations, an ethical and legal chain of command, proper human resourcing (the right people and the right leaders), clear administrative controls, a clear operational direction chain, HRO supervisory training, the JAG’s approval, volunteerism, recruiting, and the mobilization hammer. Given these successful threads, it becomes possible to weave an extraordinarily successful unit capable of optimum integration. As demonstrated by the case study evaluations and common threads, the more carefully an integration effort is prepared using the Multimission Framework, the more likely a new organization will achieve long-term success. By embracing the diversity and distinctive strengths of the active and reserve components, the Total Force becomes better prepared for operational and strategic success for the nation.
Introduction

We simply could not accomplish today’s dynamic mission without the Total Force integration of our Guard, Reserve and Active Duty force. Gone are the “strategic reserve” days of the Guard and Reserve. Today, our total force sacrifices daily through extended deployments in the most challenging missions we have. As an integral part of this highly skilled team, the Guard and Reserve train to the same high standards set by our Active Duty, operate the latest equipment and participate in every mission across the spectrum of operations.

—Secretary of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne
“Letter to Airmen: Recognizing the Total Force,”
July 2006

For many years, the Air National Guard (ANG) acted “more or less in parallel with active duty counterparts, working in unison but only interacting occasionally for exercises and such.”¹ Today, the ANG is extensively employed worldwide with both active and reserve components as part of the Total Force. During the Cold War, the ANG represented a “strategic reserve” not unlike an off-the-shelf capability which could only be utilized in times of great crisis or war. In an era of ever-tightening budgets, drastic decreases in manpower, ongoing global war efforts, and larger responsibilities within the CONUS, is there any wonder that Total Force Integration (TFI) continues to receive great attention on Capitol Hill? Air Force officials affirm that “the integration of active duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve Command forces made possible Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.”² With the added complications of reduced budgetary outlays, personnel downsizing, and force recapitalization, Total Force considerations have become even more important to the mission’s bottom line. As figure 1 graphically depicts, the post–9/11 era drove a dramatic man-day increase in both the Total Force OPTEMPO (operational tempo) and operational commitments with little hope for relief in the current global war on terror (GWOT).³
Since 1973, when the Total Force policy was first put into practice, Air Force leaders have discussed how to optimally employ the Air National Guard on both federal and state missions. In 1973, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger declared, “Total Force is no longer a concept. It is now a Total Force Policy which integrates the active, Guard, and reserve forces into a homogenous whole.” The focus of this study is to explore the structures of Total Force Integration and to ultimately determine the optimum organizational framework for integration efforts with the Total Force as one complete service. Is there a “best” unit structure for TFI? If so, what might that unit look like, and why? If not, what framework of common traits might ensure future success? The research involves a series of interviews with senior service leaders, multiple case studies of the current constructs, an extensive literature review, and an examination of current challenges. This study recommends a common framework for the way ahead for future integration efforts, which shall be presented as the “Multimission Framework for Total Force Integration.”

**Air National Guard History and Culture**

There can be no true integration solutions without examining the Air National Guard’s rich heritage. Like the Army
National Guard, the Air National Guard traces its true roots to the Constitution of the United States. The Preamble states that the Congress shall “provide for the common defence [sic] . . . and secure the blessings of Liberty.” Article 1, section 8, lays out the foundations for the Guard: “To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” From this hallowed document, Guard members draw forth their important charge to organize, train, and equip for both federal and state missions. From the lens of colonial history and the era of the minuteman, one can imagine the concern of a fledgling democracy requiring a significant militia to protect its new homeland.

Historically, however, the United States holds great disdain for large, standing military forces. This could be expressed no more plainly than by the author of the Constitution, James Madison: “A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty. The means of defence agst. [sic] foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyranny at home.” In essence, President Madison and the founding fathers wanted to minimize the threat of a large military on home soil through placement of “citizen soldiers” in the form of a militia in communities. These forces could rise to the nation’s defense during a time of crisis and then demobilize back into society after the conflict.

Culturally, the Air National Guard traces its roots back to the militia concepts developed early in the nation’s formative years. However, the aerospace medium did not involve airpower, per se, during colonial times. “Although the Air National Guard was not established as a separate component of the U.S. Air Force until 1947, National Guard aviators have played significant roles in all of America’s wars and most of its major contingencies since the beginning of the 20th Century.” What makes the ANG truly unique harkens back to the very “militia” nature at its core. Day to day, Guard members serve in and around the communities they protect and defend. They enjoy enduring, positive community relationships and have
significant ties to the state or territory in which they serve. Many Guard members belong to modern “militia” units where they remain for much of their adult lives. In comparison, active duty members move on average every two to three years, lowering the possibility of sustained local relationships.

Other ANG-unique cultural artifacts revolve around unit identity, esprit de corps, and primary mission core competency. In fact, Guard members tend to be extraordinarily efficient at their primary roles and missions. Many possess more than one career qualification and can work seamlessly in multiple career areas. Active duty counterparts talk about the incredible manner in which the Guard maintains its equipment. Compare and contrast a Guard C-130 or KC-135 with its active duty counterparts. The Guard aircraft will be pristine and functional inside and out. It will have more on-time takeoffs and fewer maintenance aborts. Why? The reason is found in the “ownership” of the aircraft and the effort put into keeping unit aircraft top-notch. For example, the Wyoming Air National Guard flies C-130 aircraft; “Three Guard crew chiefs watched all eight of the 153rd’s airplanes come off the assembly line.” The level of continuity possessed in such a unit is unbeatable. There are dedicated crew chiefs everywhere in the Total Force, but in the Guard, the crew chief adopts the aircraft as part of his or her family.

As for esprit de corps and community linkages, most traditional Guard units contain “high timers” possessing 20 to 30 years’ service, all in the same state or wing. This experience core has immeasurable significance in helping to bridge the knowledge gaps for younger, traditional Guard members. In fact, long-time Guard members know the community, and the community embraces their service. The failure to embrace local community ties represents what Gen Creighton Abrams “sought to eliminate [through] the disastrous Vietnam War fallacy . . . [where] wars could be fought ‘in cold blood’ without paying the price of national mobilization.”

When wars or crises arise, the Guard needs to be utilized not just as an operational or strategic reserve, but also to spread the burden of warfare through communities across the country. Just as local disasters represent an opportunity for the National Guard to serve, so does a conflict. If the National Guard or the Reserves are not utilized, the nation will not bear the burden universally nor experience the shared
sacrifice of its military. In the era of the “all-volunteer force,” it becomes all the more critical to share burdens across the nation to prevent a disproportionate price being paid by active duty forces and only a small segment of society. General Abrams created what he referred to as National Guard “roundout brigades” for the US Army in an effort to burden share. These “roundout brigades comprised a strategic hedge against the possibility of a protracted campaign in the Persian Gulf or a regional crisis elsewhere.” In August of 1970, then-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird began implementation of the Total Force concept, which “sought to strengthen and rebuild public confidence in the reserves while saving money by reducing the size of the active duty force.” Furthermore, Secretary Laird required that “all policy-making, planning, programming, and budgeting activities within the DoD considered both active and reserve forces concurrently.”

This balanced approach to the reserve component would prove beneficial to the Total Force. In the ANG, the Total Force concept brought the introduction of more modern weapon systems and new missions. For example, the Nebraska Air National Guard (NEANG) received RF-4Cs and a tactical reconnaissance mission as the conflict in Vietnam wound down. In 1992, the unit converted to the KC-135R and worldwide mission-essential air refueling operations. Both aircraft missions proved invaluable to the Air Force and helped to energize the total force partnership. Such a partnership goes hand-in-hand with the citizen-soldier ethos. Many Guard members carry their civilian skill sets directly into the service of the nation. For instance, an airline pilot traditional guardsman might fly Boeing 737s for United Airlines during the week and fly Boeing KC-135s on the weekend. Such a move remains common in traditional ANG flying units and builds directly on the professional pilot’s skill set.

Likewise, a traditional Guard member helps share the efficiency of the ANG skill set at a discount on the tax dollars expended. The Guard maintains a perishable skill set while retaining traditional Guard members at combat mission ready (CMR) standards for times of crisis or war. However, does this explain why the governor needs “his own air force”? More specifically, why does the governor of any state need an F-16?
Why Does the Governor Need Fighters?

When does the governor of Iowa need F-16s? Could he utilize these aircraft to quell a riot of corn farmers over grain prices and unfair labor practices? Such inane questions pervade both society and the active duty military. However, these misdirected questions avoid the true core issue behind the question: What is the mission of the Air National Guard? Simply put, the ANG augments the USAF’s core competencies and operational and strategic surge capability and facilitates greater budgetary efficiency in manpower. Furthermore, it provides state augmentation to first responders during natural disasters, homeland defense missions, and a myriad of other tasks set forth by the Constitution and the state or territory.4

The US Air Force and the Total Force share a common set of core competencies. As the Air Force declares: “Our Nation’s Air Force develops, trains, sustains, and integrates the elements of air and space power to produce: air and space superiority, global attack, rapid global mobility, precision engagement, information superiority, and agile combat support.”5 For the ANG to be capable in modern warfare, it must execute missions resident within the Air Force. Organizing, training, and equipping per the constitutional mandate prepare the organized militia or National Guard to fight and defend the homeland if so called upon.6 Similarly, the ANG does not invent missions, as the first question implies, but rather completes missions tasked by appropriate national and state command authorities. If the mission is not required to defend our nation and state or to prepare other service members to fight, then the ANG does not need to be resourced to be a part of the solution. For example, if the country did not need tactical airlift or air refueling, the mission type would disappear from the Guard’s capability set.

The ANG also fulfills its commitment as an operational reserve. As mentioned previously, the ANG can no longer afford to fly outdated or incapable equipment because of mission changes and the increased needs of the nation. The director of the Air National Guard, Lt Gen Craig McKinley, explains: “Since 1989, the active duty Air Force has reduced its forces by 210,000 personnel and 2,800 aircraft
and relied on the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve to fill the gap. The ability of the Air National Guard to add a critical surge capability through the use of its traditional force increases the efficiency of the active duty Air Force.” In fact, the Air National Guard represents “24 percent of the Air Force.” General McKinley continued: “Since the events of 11 September 2001, our expeditionary combat and combat support units have filled over 140,000 individual deployment requirements.” Figure 2 illustrates the impact of the ANG on the Total Force team in raw numbers and weapon systems types as of 2007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission category</th>
<th>Air Guard quantities</th>
<th>As percentage of total USAF (active and reserve)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel end strength</td>
<td>106,678</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters and attack aircraft</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>31%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recon/BM/C3I aircraft</td>
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<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations aircraft</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker aircraft</td>
<td>260</td>
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<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Aircraft</td>
<td>1,321</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Completing the team as an operational reserve (Adapted from “2007 Air Force Almanac,” Air Force Magazine [May 2007]: 48, 62.)

According to General McKinley, “In addition to meeting training and readiness requirements, Air National Guard aircraft have flown over 176,000 sorties as part of air defense and Air Expeditionary Forces in support of the GWOT.” Furthermore, the ANG provides 65 percent of required tactical airlift, 35 percent of strategic airlift, and 80 percent of Operation Noble Eagle (homeland defense) tanker sorties as well as 100 percent of CONUS air sovereignty ground-alert sorties. When the active duty Air Force needs airlift, air refueling, close air support, or many other missions, it
calls upon the ANG to lead, assist, or augment. As the active duty force reduced its manpower to 334,200, the ANG maintained its manpower at 106,678 through a challenging strategy. Across-the-board personnel cuts on active duty were avoided by the ANG through an increased “exposure to risk” by slightly reducing flying hours and maintenance. This risk strategy demonstrated the high priority placed on taking care of people through the practice of positive recruiting and retention in the Guard.

The ANG provides critical core capabilities for use as an operational reserve, but “on a budget.” The Air National Guard budget for FY06 was $7.6 billion. This represents about six percent of the USAF total budget outlay while producing significant quantities of the aforementioned airpower. This savings to the US taxpayer is accomplished through the ANG’s militia structure and organization. By keeping a relatively small number of Guard members on full-time active duty, a percentage as part-time technicians, and a larger percentage as traditional Guard members, the ANG as a whole can keep current and qualified personnel “waiting in the wings” for utilization during crises.

The fourth and final mission carried by the ANG is a state mission. State (or territorial) governors are commanders in chief of the Guard forces in their state or territory. According to National Guard Bureau (NGB) Public Affairs, “Under state law, the Air National Guard provides protection of life [and] property and preserves peace, order, and public safety. These missions are accomplished through emergency relief support during natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, and forest fires; search and rescue operations; support to civil defense authorities; maintenance of vital public services, and counterdrug operations.”

Much like first responders, the Guard, when activated, provides considerable relief to strained infrastructure during times of state turmoil or crisis.

Perhaps the most compelling reason for the ANG’s role is found in the legal system which established it. The US Constitution gives the legal mandate, but US statutory law lays the expanded framework. Specifically, US Code, Titles 10 and 32, are the linchpins to the establishment of these forces. Their structure is illustrated in figure 3 and discussed in detail in the next section.
US Code, Titles 10 and 32, and the ANG Structure

US Code, Title 10, establishes the roles and responsibilities of the armed forces as well as organizing them by branch and establishing general military powers for their employment. Title 10 places the military under the president of the United States as commander in chief of the armed forces. As shown in figure 3, a military member (or activated Guard member) would have a reporting chain which ultimately ends with the president on the right-hand side. Under US Code, Title 32, the Air National Guard is
established under the governor as commander in chief of the militia air arm per the left-hand side of the diagram. The chain of command goes through Guard members at the state headquarters to the governor with the adjutant general (TAG) providing advice as depicted. When Guard members are activated and mobilized under Title 10 orders, their chain of command goes through the federal chain of command on the right. Also, Guard members who are assigned to the NGB fall under Title 10 and are considered ANGUS (Air National Guard of the United States).

The reality of being a global superpower requires significant flexibility in tailoring military forces both in the CONUS and overseas. For the United States to stay relevant in world affairs, it must remain engaged with a robust military force. This vigorous requirement for a standing military frightened ordinary Americans during post-Civil War reconstruction, causing the government to enact a federal law known as the Posse Comitatus Act preventing the US Army (and the US Air Force as of 1956) from acting in the role of law enforcement or as a police force. This prohibition was laid out in *US Code*, Title 8, Section 385, as follows: “Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”

One key exception to *Posse Comitatus* is the presidential exclusion for quelling domestic violence. In general, Title 10 forces (active military and federalized Guard members) are required to obey *Posse Comitatus* and not participate in law enforcement activities except for the domestic violence exception authority granted to the president. When Guard members are utilized in state status, they are serving under Title 32 and can be used as required for law enforcement, training, or other state operational missions.

Each Guard unit consists of personnel listed on a unit manning document which appears quite similar to an active-duty unit. However, the average ANG unit includes three different types (or status) of personnel. First, Active Guard Reserve (AGR) personnel serve to organize, train, and equip the units. They are on call “24/7,” 365 days a year, like
their active-duty counterparts. Second, Air Reserve Technicians (ART) reside on the manning roster at both a military rank (when activated) and a state grade/skill level (Civil Service). “The concept of the Technician Program is military technicians are part of a full-time cadre that performs the same type of job in a technician status they perform in their capacity as a military member.” In general, they are limited to 40 hours per week while in ART status and must be offered compensatory time or overtime pay should they exceed allotted hours. Finally, there are the traditional drill-status Guard members. Of the three types, this is the most like a militia because their job hours are limited to unit training assemblies (UTA), core training periods, and voluntary deployments when not activated or mobilized. The three types of personnel in a Guard unit contribute to the “cost savings” of the Guard over active-duty forces.

However, this benefit comes at a cost. Despite being mission ready, Guard members cannot instantly deploy outside their states without an activation order or working agreement. For the president to employ Guard members in federal active-duty military service, he has three options: “Volunteerism, Presidential Reserve Call-up, and Mobilization (partial, full, or total).” In general, most Air Guard members deploy under the first method, volunteerism. The system tends to deploy combat mission ready (CMR) Guard members when it best fits the requirements of the member, the state guard unit, and the urgent need for more active-duty forces in the world. In accordance with US Code, Title 10, 12301(d), “At any time, an authority designated by the Secretary of Defense concerned may order a member of a reserve component under his jurisdiction to active duty, or retain him on active duty, with the consent of that member.” Furthermore, the voluntary action also comes with the mutual consent of the state or territorial governor and the member.

This system works for the Guard but can be frustrating for active duty counterparts without proper planning and accounting. A Guard unit must engage all its members to solicit volunteers to match requirements for the combatant commander. For example, an air refueling unit might volunteer a portion of its capability and combine with Guard members from another state to fulfill an air expeditionary force (AEF) tasking. The two states would include a mix
of active duty, traditional, and technician Guard members to fulfill the tasking. Each unit, however, would recruit its own people through volunteerism to meet the tasking. The task sounds simple, but many traditional Guard members are citizen-soldiers; some fly for airlines, others work for local governments, and perhaps others are small-business owners. When a large Guard unit leaves a small town, it can leave a great void. This community bridge is usually spanned by shorter periods of separation from the home state with greater numbers of rotations.

Guard members may also be involuntarily activated by a presidential reserve call-up, or mobilization. For a presidential reserve call-up, the action must be “for not more than 270 days.” \(^{34}\) For a full mobilization, involuntary active duty can be “for not more than 24 months.” \(^{35}\) Involuntary activations for extended periods of time can have a devastating impact on a Guard unit. Guard members are extremely patriotic, but when a member is mobilized involuntarily, numerous unintended consequences result. For example, a farmer might lose two or three growing seasons and the associated harvests. A small-business owner could lose revenue if no one else is available to serve clients. Ultimately, involuntary activations impact long-term recruiting and retention when it appears that special unit missions will be involuntarily activated on a regular basis. Wars tend to be unplanned, of course, but this is why Guard members prefer voluntary deployments over involuntary activations.

Another unique attribute of the Guard is that most members stay in their units or states for many years or, in some cases, their entire careers. This leads to the “Guard family” being tightly knit through lengthy careers. These tight bonds and familial-type relationships occasionally raise the ire of active duty counterparts. For example, the use of first names in the workplace or even siblings serving in the same unit might surprise an active duty commander.

This appearance of a “casual” work environment leads active duty members to assume that Guard members might be less professional or less willing to demand a high standard of performance. The reality is actually far from the archetype. Performance is based on a standard and can be measured over relatively short periods of time. Relation-
ships, on the other hand, are the product of time, relational transparency, and long periods of interaction.

Picture the Guard members who help rescue someone from a tornado or a flood as well as participate in clearing and reconstruction after the disaster. The governor can utilize Guard personnel immediately following a natural disaster declaration due to the unique chain of command found in the Air National Guard and the close, established relationships with first responders. The unique attributes and strengths of the ANG can be empowered if they are placed in the correct environmental structure. An integrated structure with active duty forces can help facilitate these processes. The first organizational construct examined is the Reserve or Active Associate Wing Model.

The Reserve/Active Associate Wing Model

One of the more popular structures employed in the ANG in recent years is the Associate Wing Model. The Reserve Associate Wing Model is defined as those “Guard or Reserve units assigned to an Active Duty wing or squadron that are administratively and organizationally separate, but operationally combined” with the active duty wing forces. The Active Associate Wing (sometimes referred to as a “reverse associate”) is defined as those “Active Duty units assigned to a Guard or Reserve wing or squadron that are administratively and organizationally separate, but operationally combined” with the ANG forces.\(^{36}\)

The obvious distinct advantage to either arrangement is the proximity to the mission partner. When the ANG and active duty components reside on the same piece of real estate, unique synergies develop. Guard personnel tend to have the advantage of great depth and breadth across their particular mission sets. Active duty Airmen tend to be younger than their ANG peers but bring fresh generational ideas to the wing.

One successful unit is the 153rd Airlift Wing in Cheyenne, Wyoming. This unit embraced the Active Associate Wing Model with the 30th Airlift Squadron (active duty) as one of 20 units operationally subordinate to the ANG wing. The 153rd is trailblazing the first-ever reverse associate unit in the Air Force.\(^{37}\) The Total Force arrangement is already bearing fruit. Seasoning young active duty Airmen,
as mentioned above, occurs everyday through day-to-day interaction with experienced Guard members. The active duty Air Force also gets increased access to a larger number of C-130 mobility assets by flying, training, and deploying with ANG equipment and personnel—something the active USAF budget cannot afford at this time.\(^{38}\)

According to Col Harold Reed, 153rd Airlift Wing commander, “Some people see the active associate as an experiment; we see it as a way to make sure the nation gets the most out of its airplanes, air crews, and tax dollars. . . . Mixing the two unique cultures is producing a better Airman and a better way of doing business.”\(^{39}\) Although challenges remain in the arrangement, the wing continues to perform admirably. In fact, the 30th Airlift Squadron’s operations superintendent believes the unique integration effort creates benefits unavailable to active duty Airmen: “Here we get the chance to deploy for operations like Coronet Oak and Joint Forge and do off-station trainers. In the active-duty world those opportunities are not available. And we still deploy for combat. With that mix, we can’t get any better.”\(^{40}\) In addition, active core competencies could be strengthened if active airmen fly with the ANG on the US Forest Service’s modular airborne fire-fighting system missions.\(^{41}\) Such missions historically resided in the reserve component and now augment training for active duty C-130 crews as well.

Another superb example of the Associate Model comes with the latest integration efforts of the Virginia Air National Guard. The 192nd Fighter Wing (ANG) is training to fly the F-22 Raptor with the active duty 1st Fighter Wing. The 192nd acts as a reserve associate, flying 1st Fighter Wing aircraft. In this example, “The Air Force fighter wing taps into a pool of highly experienced Air Guard pilots and maintainers. In return, the 192nd will trade its 1980s-era F-16s for the most advanced warplane in the U.S. arsenal.”\(^{42}\)

As is often the case with a complex, shared working environment, there are challenges. Col Jay Denney, 1st Fighter Wing vice-commander, explains: “We’re breaking new ground here between Title 10 and Title 32. . . . Administratively, he [the guardsman] is disciplined, trained, and paid by the Guard, as the chain of command goes through the Guard chain.”\(^{43}\) The concern is that a Guard member could be flying an active duty aircraft and not be directly under the com-
mand of the active duty wing. The key is developing a concept of operations (CONOPS) which addresses this issue up front. For instance, if a four-ship flight of F-22s is flying a mission, one member of the flight will be the flight lead. Regardless of which unit the member belongs to, he or she will give "operational direction" to the flight. By ensuring qualifications are appropriately documented and achieved, the challenges to safe mission execution are reduced.

Another challenge comes in scheduling Guard personnel. Approximately 30 percent of the 192nd are full-time personnel, and 70 percent traditional. The F-22 has a much higher utilization rate than previous-generation aircraft, so it can be flown more often. This gives the ANG increased flexibility on when to fly but also means there can be conflicts when the aircraft is needed both by active duty pilots and the Guard on UTA weekends. The integration of support group functions yields another challenge. In this case, ANG manning is limited to the ratio (30:70) mentioned above. Flexibility on both sides makes the solution more palatable. Guard members may fly with active duty and vice versa.

Funding can also challenge this construct. Clearly, when a Guard member flies an F-22, he or she is burning ANG flying hours and maintenance time. However, what about Guard members’ use of base infrastructure or commissary privileges? Truly, the Guard presence at Langley AFB will cost the active component some increased resources. However, the prize is precious. The 1st Fighter Wing incorporated the skill sets of highly experienced ANG fighter pilots like Lt Col Phillip Guy, who brought “17 years of flying F-16s and 2,700 hours of flight time [to the table].” Guy recently deployed to Kadena Air Base, Japan, on the first overseas deployment of the F-22. The deployment took advantage of both the Raptor’s extraordinary capabilities and the synergy of the ANG and active duty operating as one team.

The “Blended” Wing

Carl von Clausewitz once wrote that “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.” The world of politics also plays an important role in the structure of the Air Force and the Air National Guard. In 2001,
the 116th Bomb Wing at Robins AFB, Georgia, learned it would lose its B-1B flying mission due to an Air Force decision to retire 33 B-1Bs from the inventory. Furthermore, 1,150 Guard members would be left without a flying mission.48 In the words of Lt Gen H. Steven Blum, chief of the NGB, "If you take the flying unit out of the National Guard, you’ve taken the Air out of the . . . Air National Guard."49 This force structure change would be the equivalent of "taking the Air" out of the Air National Guard for the state of Georgia. Then–Secretary of the Air Force James Roche came up with an extraordinary idea to “blend” active duty and ANG personnel in the same unit. Roche proposed using the 93rd Air Control Wing (ACW) and its E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft as the solution to the Georgia ANG’s loss of mission.

Brig Gen Tom Lynn, the first ANG commander of the 116th ACW, expanded on the topic: "We never, quite frankly, considered JSTARS . . . it was a mission still in growth."50 The 93rd ACW did not possess a full complement of people or aircraft. The 116th Bomb Wing, however, now possessed a large number of people in need of an air mission. Secretary Roche’s proposal would allow for the blending of people and aircraft assets to both meet needs and achieve unity of effort.51 However, new concepts can be challenging to implement, especially in the low-density, high-demand (LD/HD) world of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. A high OPTEMPO could further exacerbate the challenge of this Total Force experiment with the cultural shifts between the active duty and the ANG.

The biggest challenge in the blended environment is establishing unity of command. With Guard members under Title 32 and active duty under Title 10, there was a concern about how to “organize, train, and equip” together while in a different status. Brig Gen Jim “Rev” Jones embraced the challenge from the beginning head-on as the 116th Operations Group commander and later as the first active-duty wing commander of the 116th ACW. A groundbreaking charter needed to be established and observed. General Jones, in concert with General Lynn and the Georgia adjutant general, established a repeatable and enduring process for the wing’s success down the road. This led to legislation for “dual-hatting” of the commander of a blended wing should it be-
come necessary in the future. In other words, the commander of the 116th ACW could gain a dual commission under both Titles 10 and 32. In the Title 10 world, it is easy to establish unity of command with a set of “G-series” orders. However, when you lead personnel from both authorities, a parallel command structure becomes a necessity.\textsuperscript{52}

Nevertheless, in the 116th ACW, there was both an “ethical” and a “legal” command chain. General Jones explains: “What we came to understand was that there is a difference between a legal, lawful binding order and operational direction.” As the active duty wing commander, he ethically commanded all the people in the wing. Legally, he was the active duty element commander. The vice wing commander, a Georgia guardsman, ethically became the 116th vice wing commander. Legally, the vice became the element commander for the Georgia Guard members in the wing. When leadership rotated out, the two positions would reverse. When the wing commander gave operational direction, there existed a “tacit implication where the ANG commander gave the exact same guidance to the guardsmen.” General Jones stated the key to the arrangement: “In a blended wing, leadership is very personality dependent. It requires a great deal of trust . . . working side-by-side . . . two commanders, but one must be subordinate to the other to achieve objectives.”\textsuperscript{53}

Another key element of success in the blended wing came from the supervision of the different types of Guard personnel. All frontline supervisors, whether active duty or ANG, were required to take a three-day Human Relations Office (HRO) course on supervision. This clarified supervisory actions and made it possible for various supervisors to generate reports on all personnel types, with a special emphasis on the differences associated with technicians and traditional Guard members. Through coordination with the judge advocate general (JAG), a policy was established that leaders would rate a subordinate’s performance in both title and position. However, to prevent possible legal problems, the final reviewer and authority endorsed the performance report under the same statute as the member—Title 32 for Guard members and Title 10 for active duty. One by-product of the blending effort came in the form of timelier, higher-quality performance reports. Both active and
ANG members wanted to ensure that they did not inadvertently hurt someone’s career due to differences in accepted phrases, acronyms, or accepted component jargon. Ultimately, the element commander’s final review and approval ensured that the component’s quality cut remained fair and accurate.54

One other important consideration must be evaluated. When considering the lifecycle of a weapon system and its personnel, one would expect approximately four to five years for turnover. The E-8C reached its initial operating capability (IOC) in October 2002. This turnover time would represent the first generation of JSTARS in October 2007. General Jones believes the true advantages of a blended unit are just being harvested. For example, a single ANG crew chief would take care of a single aircraft for years, or a weapons officer could generate new and better tactics for the long-term employment of the system. Guard personnel bring stability, longevity, and experience to an LD/HD platform.55 In fact, the 116th ACW cross-trained former ANG bomb wing personnel in ratings or similarity of functions wherever possible. In several cases, former B-1 weapon systems operators (WSO) cross-trained to the air battle manager (ABM) career field creating “tremendous synergies,” according to General Jones. “Now you have shooters who are talking to other shooters controlling the fight.”56 This creates a situation where the controlling ABM experienced both the direct employment of weapons in the B-1 and now could control with both authority and credibility.

According to General Jones, one clear advantage of the blended construct over the other models is the cutback on manpower and facilities required to perform basically the same tasks as an integrated or associate unit. If everything from the jets to command sections is shared, less space is required than with the other models. On the other hand, one clear disadvantage is the reality of deployments in a high OPTEMPO or an LD/HD wing. The original site activation task force (SATAF) and P-Plan (personnel programming plan) for the blended wing established a 1:1 ratio for availability of forces, with an additional 205 authorizations to grow the back-end mission personnel. Unfortunately, the assumption of 1:1 availability is not true, especially when considering traditional Guard members. General Jones ex-
plains: “You can’t expect a traditional guardsman to deploy at the same rate as active duty. They can’t sustain it . . . and if you involuntarily activate them, you stand a good chance of losing them on the back side.”

Once again, General Jones came up with an innovative solution to the personnel availability problem. Rather than just counting the number of crews available, it would be better to consider effective or deployable crews. This required establishing some standardized expectations for Guard personnel. For planning deployable crews and personnel, “an AGR or a full-time technician could be expected to be available half of the time” when compared to an active-duty member. A traditional guardsman, on the other hand, could be expected to be “available for one quarter of the time.” These availability expectations ultimately made it possible to plan farther out, resulting in increased volunteerism on the Guard side. Jones adds: “We also allowed for intra-AEF rotations since the LD/HD community is outside the AEF construct. This also increased volunteerism since some Guard members might not be able to do a whole AEF, but could do a half.” Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) Michael Dominguez agreed with the mathematical assessment. According to General Jones, “The Air National Guard needed 192 full-time bodies. The active duty went from a 2.0 to a 2.25 crew ratio to give us the additional bodies” necessary to compensate for a shortfall in available and deployable personnel.

One challenge associated with the blending experiment at Robins came in the form of expectations. Col Keith “Alf” Jones, former deputy operations group commander for the 116th, noted, “In a blended unit, career tracks and paths are imported from the active duty side. On the active side, new personnel usually come from off base all the time whereas Guard members are homegrown. Expectations vary for who becomes the commander or director of operations (DO). Which commanders are guardsmen and which are active duty?” For example, a recent graduate from senior developmental education might be selected to command a unit prior to arrival on station. To a Guard member at Robins, this is the equivalent of hiring an outsider from another community. If the Guard member anticipated commanding
or becoming a DO, then the perceived outsider might upset both personal and unit expectations. Likewise, the active duty Air Force also stratifies its personnel on a regular basis. In the 116th ACW and the 116th Operations Group (OG), it became necessary to identify both a Guard and an active duty stratification list. In the active duty world, stratification could very easily be the difference between promotion and being passed over. For Guard personnel, stratification can also make a difference in the field grades and early promotions. By clarifying where people sit in terms of stratification, it became possible to clarify expectations on who might be next in the queue for leadership opportunities.

Perhaps the most difficult challenge to the blended construct came through what Colonel Jones refers to as the “perception of a better deal.” If an equitable number of leaders from either the Guard or active duty were not in leadership positions, then either side might be slighted by the perception. One current proposal to manage this perception issue was a proposal to identify an affiliation to a unit. For example, the training unit command position would be active duty, while the operations support squadron would be Guard. The current proposal recommends three commander positions be active duty, with two positions going to the Guard. This design would match the 60:40 ratio of active duty to Guard personnel in the 116th Air Control Wing.

A final blended construct challenge comes in the form of the different rules surrounding Guard technicians. “By law, dual-status military technicians are Civil Service employees of the federal government who must be military members of the unit that employs them. Technicians train with the unit and are mobilized with it when it's activated.” Technicians also fall under the representation of a union. In the case of the 116th Operations Group, the union must be coordinated with to accomplish mission-specific events which might go beyond normal hours. Colonel Jones used an operational readiness exercise as an example. Prior notification of the employees' union must occur before training event initiation. Although this pre-coordination required both time and energy, the coordination never prevented training from occurring during Colonel Jones' tenure as deputy group commander. Rather, the union attempted to
protect its members by ensuring appropriate acknowledgement of paid hours and compensatory time.\textsuperscript{64}

Despite some challenges, “The differences . . . are slowly dissolving away, and I think that just comes from working together and building relationships,”\textsuperscript{65} says General Lynn. Perhaps the best testament to the strength of the blended concept came during Operation Iraqi Freedom and a recent AEF rotation. A Guard-centric rotation saw Guard members in F-16s, JSTARS, C-130s, and the 165th Air Support Operations Squadron, all working in tight concert with the 48th Brigade Combat Team to take the fight to the enemy.\textsuperscript{66} Ironically, the Army did not care which title Airmen wore in the CONUS or which state they represented. What the Army did care about was the precise application of airpower, especially when it directly impacted land power.\textsuperscript{67} Employment of the Total Force as “one team in one fight” might be a significant takeaway from the current “long war.”

**The Integrated Wing**

The third and final Total Force Integration (TFI) construct currently being employed is the Integrated Model. The definition of an integrated wing is those wings “that are administratively separate, but organizationally and operationally combined.”\textsuperscript{68} The first unit to explore this operational construct was Detachment 1, Nebraska Air National Guard. The former detachment is now the 170th Group with two squadrons, the 238th Combat Training Squadron and the 170th Operations Support Squadron (OSS). Developed under the joint vision of Maj Gen Roger Lempke and Col Rick Evans, the 170th Group is under the operational direction of the 55th Wing, the largest wing in Air Combat Command and the second largest in the USAF. The 55th Wing operates 46 aircraft of seven different types, including the RC-135S/U/V/W, the OC-135B, the WC-135, and the E-4B.\textsuperscript{69}

By design, the 170th Group was created to assist its active duty mission partners, the 55th Wing and 55th Operations Group, in those areas considered stressed in continuity or experience. Those areas most ideal for employment of experienced Guard members included the RC-135 FTU (formal training unit) and the 55th OSS. The “Fightin’ 55th” experiences an extraordinary turnover due to a sustained
high OPTEMPO and the worldwide requirements associated with the RC-135 reconnaissance mission. The NEANG worked with the 55th Wing to establish a working CONOPS that directly focused upon the perceived multiple stressed shortfalls in the 55th Wing.

As the ANG unit grew to fill those critical gaps, the mission growth areas were seeded with experienced Guard members. For example, in the FTU, instructor pilots, instructor navigators, instructor ravens (EWOs, or electronic warfare officers), and instructor ASEs (airborne systems engineers) helped train initial qualification student crewmembers to qualified CMR status. In the OSS, seasoned Guard members took key roles in scheduling, reconnaissance operations, the Rivet Joint mission trainer, the RC-135 operational flight trainer, wing tactics, wing safety, base weather, base operations, wing intelligence, and wing plans. The 170th Group’s success is due to the depth and breadth of its people. For example, the average flight crew member in the 170th Group has over 3,100 hours of total flight time, 950 instructor hours, 125 evaluator hours, and nearly 600 combat or combat support hours. Such extensive experience helps to minimize voids associated with large manpower-intensive wings like the 55th.

Because of the unique relationship with the mission partner, numerous synergies result. For instance, the 763rd Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron has had an ANG commander or operations officer on multiple occasions. The weapons officer position on the deployed mission planning team is critical to mission success for the RC-135 in the US Central Command area of responsibility (AOR). This position is manned two-thirds of the time by ANG weapons officers. In Wing Plans, a Guard USAF Test Pilot School graduate leads classified requirements and upgrades to the RC-135. Similarly, half of the officer instructor force in the FTU is ANG. Guard personnel also make deployments worldwide in support of the Open Skies mission, the Combat Sent, the Cobra Ball, and the Rivet Joint. Every deployment a Guard member takes lowers the OPTEMPO for the active duty 55th Wing mission partner. In an LD/HD world, each contribution makes a difference. Organizing, training, and equipping for combat remain essential to the core CONOPS of the 170th Group; however, some integration challenges remain.
One challenge is retaining the unit culture. Since Guard unit members are scattered throughout the mission partner’s active duty wing, they spend more time with active duty personnel than with their Guard counterparts. The unifying events are tied to the UTA. During the week, most AGRs and technicians are fully engaged with their mission partner. As the former flight commander for all Guard members assigned to the FTU, the author confirms that 90 percent of daily actions involved the operations of the 338th Combat Training Squadron (CTS), the active duty mission partner, rather than the ANG, leaving only 10 percent of a normal duty day to manage “pure Guard members’” administrative issues. However, in most scenarios, the author provided “Top Three” coverage for the 338th CTS and directed operations in the operations office. At times, administrative issues for the ANG might conflict with operational issues with the mission partner. However, the mission focus of the ANG team at the FTU created an ideal work environment for integration with the mission partner.

Another challenge to integration involves the “dual-hatted” nature of both position and authority. All 170th Group personnel who are integrated into the 338th CTS or 55th OSS give and take operational direction based on their positions. For example, the 55th Wing chief of reconnaissance operations, an ANG position, supervises and gives direction to three active duty planners for the movement of wing assets around the world. Likewise, he or she takes direction from operational leaders in the 55th Wing chain of command in the execution of his or her duties. Due to the constantly changing nature of the reconnaissance world, Recon Ops often works hours outside of normal duty periods. Further, the position often requires launching aircraft during UTA periods on weekends. Unfortunately, this can put the Guard member behind on core training events. In this example, the operational mission takes priority over the UTA weekend, since the chief of recon ops is an AGR position and can make up the training during normal weekdays with the mission partner.

One perceived challenge to the dual-hatted nature of Guard/active duty integration comes in the perception of chain of command. As previously stated, the model at Offutt placed leaders from the ANG in positions of supervision
but did not give them *Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)* authority over those non–Guard members they supervised. Any *UCMJ* action against an active duty member would have to be carried out by another active duty member on G-series orders. Likewise, a Guard member’s chain of command extends through the ANG for any administrative issues or actions. From decorations to performance reports to fitness, Guard members alone rate Guard members. The challenge comes when a supervised ANG member requires discipline from the active duty command chain. In such a case, the active duty commander or supervisor would speak to the ANG commander to resolve the issue. If a *UCMJ* action were warranted, the ANG commander on G-series orders would levy the action against the Guard member. This issue only occurs in this model when the member supervised requires some sort of administrative discipline. Simply put, the commander with administrative authority, either ANG or active duty Air Force, always retains administrative control (ADCON) over his or her members. Some of the best practices of the Integrated Model will be incorporated in the Multimission Framework.

**The Multimission Framework and the Way Ahead**

The Multimission Framework for operational integration is a synthesis of the various constructs currently utilized throughout the Total Force. Each case discussed possesses positive and negative characteristics. However, there are common threads of policy, procedure, or programs that successfully resonate within each case, which are incorporated into the Multimission Framework. Figure 4 depicts the clear lines of command and operational supervision necessary for the notional Multimission Framework to be successful, while breaking out the administrative requirements of Titles 10 and 32. This new framework for integration includes the following successful threads of commonality: a robust CONOPS, an ethical and legal chain of command, proper human resourcing (the right people and the right leaders), clear ADCON, a clear operational direction chain, HRO supervisory training, JAG approval, volunteerism, recruiting, and the mobilization hammer.
The first thread considered is the robust concept of operations. All good CONOPS contain both a scope and a strategy to meet the desired end state. However, it is critical to establish the CONOPS utilizing what consultant Mack McKinney calls the “five key considerations in writing: Purpose, Audience, Content, Style and Mechanics.” When establishing a Guard–active duty integration effort, it is critical to establish the purpose of the effort. In the 70th Group’s integration, a clear purpose was to fill voids in experience in the FTU and the OSS. Similarly, the audience must be engaged prior to writing the CONOPS. If the governor of a state is opposed to integration efforts in his or her state, then it would be pointless to attempt such a move. Once the audience is clarified, subject-matter experts can begin engaging the content of the document. The style should be clear and mechanically sound. As McKinney points out, “Do not permit the concept of writing style to become an excuse for poor writing.” An excellent CONOPS will include the baseline of expectations for all leadership stakeholders and will incorporate reasonable inputs.

The second thread of the Multimission approach focuses on the ethical and legal understanding of the chain of command. According to Air Force doctrine, “Unity of command ensures concentration of effort for every objective under one responsible commander. This principle emphasizes that all
efforts should be directed and coordinated toward a common objective. . . . Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is, however, best achieved by vesting a single commander with the authority to direct all force employment in pursuit of a common objective. In the Multimission Framework, active duty Airmen fall under a different administrative commander than their ANG peers. To achieve unity of command, operations need to be entirely under one commander. As noted in the Integrated Model, best exemplified by the 55th Wing, all officers follow the operational direction or orders of those leaders placed over them. The 55th Wing commander is an active duty officer whose operational leadership and direction to the wing is peerless in matters associated with the active duty 55th Wing. The 170th Group (ANG) falls under the operational direction of the 55th WG, but administratively falls under the State of Nebraska. Ethically, the 55th Wing commander’s orders would be accepted by any officer in the 55th Wing, active duty or Guard. Legally, those orders would be accepted by all active duty officers. If a Guard member found some order or direction untenable or not binding, he or she would have to stand before the Guard commander to explain the refusal of such an order from someone in the operational chain of command, regardless of title. In essence, this practice would ensure unity of command while preserving the distinctly different titles served by Guard members and active duty USAF members.

The third characteristic of the Multimission Framework is appropriate human resourcing. Clearly, hiring the right people for the nature of the model is essential. If the framework favors an Associate Model, then the personnel would be similar in age and experience to the comparable Air Force version. However, if the CONOPS specify that Guard members would be integrated in areas specifically requiring high levels of experience or unique identifiers (i.e., Weapons School), then the ANG unit would need to be built with a higher-grade structure, similar to the 170th Group at Offutt AFB, Nebraska. In essence, ANG units will hire the appropriate personnel for the Multimission Framework unit’s design, construct, and purpose.

The fourth characteristic of the Multimission Framework refers to hiring the right leaders for the integration construct. When a model is brand new, the leader needs to be
part visionary and part magician. A new unit sometimes creates friction because of differences in ideas, culture, and infrastructure. A more established unit requires an emphasis on standards and objective guidance appropriately aligned under the parent wing’s major command. With the integrated construct, the growth of ANG personnel and presence can also change the footprint of infrastructure needs. Sensitivity to the needs of both sides will make the integration team stronger. Further, the right Guard leader will also be patient with the frequent changes in active duty peer leaders. Many active duty leaders have served with great success in the AOR, but few have served in an integrated unit within the CONUS. Therefore, an immersion process should be initiated with new leaders to educate and develop mission partners’ Guard knowledge.

Another thread to consider is the nature and strength of ADCON. In an integrated construct, administrative control helps to keep supervisors and leaders rating under the correct authority (either Title 10 for active duty or Title 32 for Guard members). The integrated model prevents either community from inadvertently harming careers through the use of inappropriate comments on performance reports. For example, it might be appropriate to discuss a “citizen-soldier’s” participation as a Little League coach on a report. However, on most active duty reports, such comments take away perceived space from mission accomplishment. Ultimately, both Guard members and USAF active duty members desire to supervise subordinates effectively. The key is to be understanding of the differences between the two systems and to establish clear gatekeepers in charge of quality control, mission feedback, and title safeguards for each administrative community.

A clear chain of operational direction authority is another important thread found in the Multimission Framework. According to Air Force doctrine, “True integration of effort cannot be achieved by merely carving up the battlespace.” Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), takes the concept further: “Integration is achieved through joint operation planning and the skillful assimilation of forces, capabilities, and systems to enable their employment in a single, cohesive operation rather than a set of separate operations.” In other words, integration efforts must take
the whole team in the operational direction required for success. The importance of clear lines of operational authority cannot be overemphasized. The Multimission Framework ensures that whoever is charged with operational direction gets the appropriate compliance from all personnel regardless of the organization in which they serve.

Another thread necessary for ANG and active duty personnel to supervise effectively together is HRO training. As General Jones required for 116th ACW personnel per regulation, all frontline supervisors must attend the three-day HRO course prior to entering supervisory roles, especially when supervising ANG technicians. The unique requirements of supervising a technician must be clearly spelled out to protect both the supervisor and the technician. Cervantes wrote this maxim: "Forewarned, forarmed; to be prepared is half the victory." There is no excuse for not understanding the rules and regulations associated with supervision of personnel in a different status. A frontline supervisor must understand the limitations of a technician to facilitate optimum utilization of the member towards achievement of overall wing goals. For example, a technician is paid for 40 hours of work in a week. Time served in excess of the 40 hours must be compensated. If the time is not compensated fairly, the technician is being taken advantage of and the supervisor could be at risk for discipline.

Perhaps the “deal breaker” in the thread of a new integration framework is the approval of the judge advocate general. The JAG is required to coordinate on all models at the National Guard Bureau. In fact, new unit concepts associated with TFI must be coordinated on by the state where the unit will reside, the NGB, and the USAF Air Staff, as they ultimately can impact force structure. If the JAG at any level rules that the structure of the model is incompatible with the current US Code or other laws, then the model will never be embraced by ANG leadership at the NGB or by the adjutant general from the state where the model is being fielded. Furthermore, there may be Air Force instructions or ANG instructions which need changes or waivers prior to introduction of the model.

The last thread contains the triple strands of volunteerism, mobilization, and recruiting. For an integrated framework to work effectively, active duty commanders need to
be able to count on the Guard’s deployable volunteers to achieve success in the “long war.” In general, volunteerism satisfies the requirements levied by active duty. However, there are times when a partial mobilization order is required to fulfill crew lineup requirements for a combat theater. This potential order helps encourage volunteerism while also giving war-fighting commanders the increased numbers necessary to fill out crew lineups.

However, utilizing such an order can hurt retention if it is abused. Craig W. Duehring, the principle deputy assistant secretary of defense for Reserve Affairs states it rather plainly: “The Air National Guard is not a dash to the finish, but a marathon. . . . Members sign up for permanent state service, but are on loan to the Federal government . . . you cannot sign up to a mission which you cannot recruit to.”79 In other words, the state militias must demonstrate excellence in recruiting at all levels to help sustain the operational reserve for federal activations and fulfill state missions simultaneously. Ultimately, volunteerism, recruiting, and mobilization must be considered together to effectively balance the ratio and deploy active duty and guard personnel together.

**Conclusions and the Way Ahead**

When placed in concert with one another, the threads of the Multimission Integration Framework can build a richly synthesized team. As General Jones eloquently explained, “Failure is not an option. All of the models can work. The key is working through the moral implications of leadership and the administrative challenges.”80 By weaving the common threads of excellence in the various Total Force Integration models into the Multimission Integration Framework, the pathway to success comes into focus. Success for the Total Force begins with a cultivated unit vision and thoughtful, focused CONOPS. It grows through the careful understanding of the ethical and legal aspects of command. The right people and leaders coalesce to build an integrated team capable of serving the nation more effectively and more efficiently. When the entire Total Force team embraces operational unity for effect, yet understands and retains the distinctive strengths of each component, operational and strategic success for the USAF will be assured.
Notes

18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 244.
31. Ibid., 125.
32. US Code, Title 10, Subtitle E, Part II, Chapter 1209, § 12301.
33. 2006 Air National Guard Almanac, 125.
34. US Code, Title 10, Subtitle E, Part II, Chapter 1209, § 12304.
35. Ibid., § 12302.
38. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.


50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., 28–29.

52. Brig Gen James J. Jones, 55th Wing commander and first active duty commander of 116th ACW, interview by author, 28 August 2007.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.


61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.


64. Col Keith R. Jones, interview.


67. Ibid., 67.


72. Ibid. (emphasis in original).


74. Ibid., 6.


76. Gen James J. Jones, interview.
78. Stevens, slide 6.
80. Gen James J. Jones, interview.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>air battle manager</td>
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<td>ACW</td>
<td>air control wing</td>
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<td>ADCON</td>
<td>administrative control</td>
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<td>AEF</td>
<td>air expeditionary force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>Active Guard Reserve (Title 32 guard member on active duty)</td>
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<td>ANG</td>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANGUS</td>
<td>Air National Guard of the United States (Guard members on Title 10 status)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility (as in a combatant commander’s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ART</td>
<td>Air Reserve Technician</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASE</td>
<td>airborne systems engineer on the RC-135</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMR</td>
<td>combat mission ready</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTS</td>
<td>combat training squadron (usually a formal training unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWO</td>
<td>electronic warfare officer or Raven on the RC-135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTU</td>
<td>formal training unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>Government Service or skill level, i.e. GS-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>global war on terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRO</td>
<td>Human Relations Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>initial operating capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSTARS</td>
<td>Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LD/HD</td>
<td>low-density/high-demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGB</td>
<td>National Guard Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFT</td>
<td>operational flight trainer—full-motion simulator for the RC-135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OG</td>
<td>operations group; usually used in reference to the commander of the group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>operational tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>operations support squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-Plan</td>
<td>personnel programming plan associated with a unit stand-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRCA</td>
<td>presidential reserve call-up authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RJMT</td>
<td>Rivet Joint mission trainer (simulator for the RC-135 mission compartment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATAF</td>
<td>site activation task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFI</td>
<td>Total Force Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCMJ</td>
<td><em>Uniform Code of Military Justice</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTA</td>
<td>unit training assembly, more commonly known as a Guard drill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSO</td>
<td>weapon system operator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


