US Military Force and Operations Other Than War

Necessary Questions to Avoid Strategic Failure

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Lt Col R. A. Estilow explores the possibility that much of operations other than war (OOTW) may be incompatible with the use of US military force. He believes political leaders may properly focus the diplomatic, political, economic, and informational elements of power on OOTW; but, often place too little regard on the specific object of the military element of power. Colonel Estilow reviews the military missions compiled today under OOTW, and then assesses the acceptability, feasibility, and suitability of using military combat force to pursue those missions. He observes that the decision to commit US military force to OOTW is critically important today. First, future trends of a changing world point toward developing a strategy that demands nontraditional forms and uses of military force. Second, we have already moved in this direction by rejecting the Weinberger Doctrine, which provided traditional criteria for commitment of military force. Most importantly, we have adopted a National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, which relies heavily upon and even aggressively seeks the more active involvement of the US military in OOTW.

Colonel Estilow’s close examination of these issues highlights the purpose and importance of establishing explicit criteria for employment of US military force (combat force in hostile environments). Such a commitment of combat force abroad may present critical differences from the use of (noncombat) military forces in benign environments; for example, military engineers providing disaster relief. Next, he develops specific, qualitative criteria for the strategic decision to commit combat force. These criteria could guide the decision-making process to test the acceptability, feasibility, and suitability of using US military force for the specific mission under consideration. In broad terms, the test seeks to answer the following questions: Will political leaders and ultimately the American people support the mission? Are mobilized and usable resources sufficient for implementing the mission? Will the mission (if properly executed) attain, promote, or protect the political aim?
Colonel Estilow then examines doctrinal military missions of OOTW to determine the risk of combat. He notes that current doctrine embraces no less than 28 OOTW missions. His analysis breaks these missions into three categories: category I (high risk), clearly combat missions; category II (moderate risk), benign intent but significant combat potential; category III (low risk), clearly humanitarian missions. The missions of each category are then assessed against the acceptability, suitability, and feasibility criteria to determine if military force is an appropriate instrument of power for these mission groups. Finally, his paper draws conclusions and makes recommendations to guide the future use of US military force for OOTW.

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Though our current doctrine for employment of military force relies heavily on Clausewitz’s concepts (center of gravity, culminating point, sphere of influence of victory, etc.), world conflicts decreasingly are resolved by nation states wielding traditional military force in traditional ways. Future war will become increasingly complex at all levels. Tactically, technology may relegate direct action to highly trained, highly sophisticated special operations forces. The high cost of conventional ground warfare may reduce standing forces worldwide. Operationally, success in war in the information age may depend on the careful integration of not only military but also of other forces. Strategic influence may be wielded by, and may more often have to contend with, an increasing number of important nonstate players. Indeed, competition may replace conflict with preparation for war that is constant and more important than conduct of war. Preventive war may take new forms, and states may be forced to use their military forces boldly to ensure the (relatively) uninterrupted “commerce” of the information age. Questions of when, where, and how to employ US military force will become increasingly difficult. The day may arrive when Clausewitz’s most quoted dictum, “War is an instrument of policy,” becomes his only idea still in vogue. Nevertheless, his most overlooked correlation will grow in importance also: There are some political aims for which military force is not appropriate. Ultimately, strategic decision makers must accurately determine “the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something which is alien to its nature.”

By defining a set of conditions for the employment of US military forces abroad, the Weinberger Doctrine attempted to ensure such a match between military means and political ends. It proposed a series of six tests to determine the appropriateness of using military force. Explicitly, Secre-
tary Weinberger put the burden of proof on the situation, realizing that many such situations clearly did not support the use of combat force. He highlighted the caution we must observe before committing forces to overseas combat, emphasizing the moral requirement not to risk lives through an inappropriate use of military force. In addition, the tests served a practical purpose. Moral high ground aside, will the use of US military force bring success? The Weinberger Doctrine provided guidelines for determining acceptability (political support of our leadership and eventually our populace), feasibility (appropriate levels of forces and resources), and suitability (well-defined objectives matched by an effective plan).  

The Weinberger Doctrine came under immediate attack. In the press, from the right and the left, deliberately trivial summaries of the doctrine criticized it as too restrictive. The media venom centered on Weinberger’s test for political and ultimately popular support. In essence, critics felt that political leadership should employ US military forces ahead of popular support for “vital interests” (on the right) or for “the rightness of the cause” (on the left). The toughest criticism of the Weinberger Doctrine came from the State Department.  

George Schultz also focused on the “popularity test.” He stated that public support was not required in advance for such clearly legitimate uses of military power as liberating a people or preventing abusive aggression _when military force was to be applied in measured doses_. This last item forms the crux of the State Department argument. Weinberger viewed military force as a separate element of national power, equal to the diplomacy, economic, or informational (psychological) elements as a policy tool. As such, it was properly the element of last resort to protect only the most vital interests. Schultz saw military force as a subset of the diplomatic element of power, the stick to the carrot of other diplomatic tools. *Any* restriction on the use of military force threatened to limit “coercive diplomacy.” Weinberger obviously felt that, while the threat of force may usefully enhance diplomacy, the actual use of force deserves more careful scrutiny. Ultimately, there may exist
some political aims for which the employment of force is not appropriate.

The current National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement definitely adopts the Schultz view. One of the central goals of this new direction in national security policy focuses our resources to promote democracy abroad. While acknowledging the traditional role of our armed forces to deter, fight, and win conflicts over vital interests, the new national security strategy seeks to become more proactive in the OOTW environment. Engagement and enlargement promises not just containment but a rollback of nondemocratic, nonfree market states. It proposes the use of specialized units and general purpose forces against an expanded array of OOTW; however, criteria for determining when to use military force receive too little definition.

The new national security strategy seeks to focus engagement and enlargement in areas which most affect our strategic interests: large economies, critical locations, nuclear weapons, and potential refugee problems. In light of employment of US military forces in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, these criteria may not narrow the field enough. The strategy proposes the further guides of measured use of force, multilateral efforts, and reasonable cost. It also asks critical questions, the most important of which are:

1. Have we considered nonmilitary means that offer a reasonable chance of success?
2. What types of US military capabilities should be brought to bear, and is the use of military force carefully matched to our political objectives?
3. Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives?
4. Do we have time lines and milestones that reveal the extent of success or failure, and, in either case, do we have an exit strategy?²⁶

These questions touch on acceptability, feasibility, and suitability issues; but are much more open-ended than the Weinberger Doctrine. Their generally less restrictive nature points to more frequent use of US military forces as well as military (combat) force. More frequent use may not be bad,
but each specific use of US military force abroad must be carefully evaluated to ensure it is appropriate. Specifically, we must ensure that the use of military force in OOTW is not counterproductive for the particular situation or long-term national security. However important to long-term employment, the strict “popularity test” of the Weinberger Doctrine may not be appropriate to the short-term use of the US military in OOTW. Nevertheless, thorough analysis before employment of US military force is always relevant. We should develop clear and specific criteria to judge the acceptability, feasibility, and suitability of employing military force in general; and then to test the proposed missions for OOTW specifically. These criteria should address the restrictive and exclusionary criticisms of the Weinberger Doctrine, but provide more definition to thought process than the criteria for engagement and enlargement.

**New Criteria for Employment of US Military Force**

Acceptability is probably the first prerequisite for the use of US military force to attain a political aim abroad. The Weinberger Doctrine as well as the new national strategy highlight the ultimate requirement for the broad support of the American people. Perhaps such support does not represent the relevant acceptability for short-term, limited force employments in OOTW. Acceptability in broad terms answers the question: Will the proposed use of US military force obtain the support of political leaders? But, this question only hints at the acceptability questions to consider first in obtaining, then to retain political support throughout the operation.

Assuming that the president directs the use of military force in OOTW, his support only begins the test of acceptability. Even within the constitutional authority as commander in chief, a president must quickly engage the support of Congress for action. Since Vietnam, Congress has become an almost equally important player in determining initial acceptability. Are there War Powers Act implications to the proposed action? Will Congress try to restrict the employment of the US military through its control of the
purse strings? Answers to these acceptability questions can be affected by nonrelated but important issues.

Is an election year dynamic at play? Proposed military action in OOTW during a presidential or congressional election season generally has difficulty in obtaining bipartisan support. This weakens the president’s hand in building a consensus of support for acceptability. Initial congressional support may be accelerated by rapid employment of US military force. Supporting an actively engaged military commonly unifies Congress, but a heavy burden of proof remains on the president particularly as the employment lengthens. How long is the proposed military action? Congress has greater difficulty supporting an apparently open-ended commitment.

Time plays an important role in determining support from another critical component of the acceptability equation—the media. In a large measure, sympathetic news coverage may prompt the use of US military force in OOTW. But generally, the media provides fickle support for acceptability over the long-haul. Highlighting divided support among the executive and legislative branches provides great news. The media usually race to be first to divine the shaping of public opinion on the issue of employment of US military forces in OOTW. What is the probable affect of the media on establishing public support for the issue? Polls track over time possible public reaction.

As the OOTW extends over time, support of the national populace becomes more important to the acceptability issue. Is there a requirement for a reserve call-up? Use of “voluntary reserve” support (approximately 25 percent of the reserve component) may avoid this issue in the short term; but, as the current drawdown continues, reserves increasingly become required for every employment of US military force. What is the impact on the domestic economy (tax increase)? What is the impact of perceived or actual casualty potential? These issues over time increase the public input to the acceptability equation and, in fact, become critical. They receive their scope by the public perception of importance. Presidential, congressional, and media rhetoric aside, public support becomes the key question of acceptability, particularly in the OOTW envi-
How critical (really) are the US interests involved?

International or coalition support at the onset of US military action in OOTW usually enhances domestic acceptability. Indeed, President Reagan’s Caribbean coalition for Grenada and President Clinton’s similar, early attempts for Haiti reflect this phenomenon. As the action extends in time, international or coalition support must provide more material influence to continue to contribute to the acceptability of the action. The coalition built under US auspices for Somalia is an example. As such, international support may also contribute to feasibility.

Superficially, feasibility looks less dynamic than acceptability, but feasibility should go well beyond the size of the US military force to be employed in the proposed action. Fundamentally, feasibility is concerned with the question: Are the mobilized and usable resources sufficient for the proposed use of military force in the specific OOTW? Since OOTW normally require rapid employment of forward deployed forces, the character of standing forces (operational and logistical) becomes critical. What is the size, composition, and training of the forces at hand? What is their doctrine for employment in OOTW? These questions are particularly critical to the fundamentally nontraditional missions involved in OOTW. Another important consideration for feasibility is opportunity cost.

Assuming the character of the standing forces indicates feasibility: What was the impact on the force’s wartime mission capability to achieve this character? Cost in dollars as well as in training time must be explicitly considered. While not mutually exclusive, tasks for conventional war and OOTW are not considered totally compatible. Some OOTW missions may have no combat application. More importantly, combat units employed for extended periods in OOTW require significant retraining for combat. Has the force been specifically resourced (personnel, money, time) for the increased mission requirements of OOTW? What is the impact on force morale of increased operations tempo? More importantly—How many Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti missions can the collective morale of the force withstand? Major recruiting commands in the Army
and Marine Corps report a negative effect from OOTW missions in Somalia and Haiti. Do the tactics required for the specific OOTW create problems beyond feasibility? For example, does the tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructure become politically unacceptable as with the French in Algeria? This consideration touches on the suitability issue.

Is the proposed employment of US military force technically capable of promoting, defending, or protecting the political aim? In OOTW this issue becomes much more than a military question. Success in OOTW usually requires the operational orchestration of the diplomatic, political, economic, informational/psychological, and military elements of power. To ensure success, this orchestration must occur much lower than the national level. Within the theater of operations in conventional war, we synchronize tactical victories into major operations to achieve strategic success. What analogous method will we use in the OOTW theater to "operationalize" the use of military and other elements of power?

In conventional war, command dominates control for guiding the synchronization of subordinate military actions. This relationship promotes operational unity of effort and preserves tactical flexibility. Normally, this situation reverses in OOTW. Complex and changing rules of engagement (ROE) rigidly control action at the lowest tactical level. Disparate actors at the theater level must struggle for unity of effort. What is the command and control architecture for OOTW?

The broad range of OOTW missions exacerbates questions of suitability. Purely humanitarian operations or disaster relief efforts usually occur in low-threat environments. Suitability issues are relatively simple. Multilateral peacekeeping, such as efforts under United Nations auspices, tend to be highly suitable for US military participation. Under some circumstances, however, they carry the danger of US personnel presenting too tempting a target for opposition forces. Missions in volatile environments (unilateral peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and insurgency) can turn from benign to open combat overnight. How do we protect the
force? How do we wrest initiative from the adversary? Have our military forces been reduced to important targets? The nature of some OOTW missions and environments poses even deeper suitability questions for US military forces.

Our Constitution places careful strictures on the employment of our military forces domestically. The Founding Fathers viewed the use of military force for domestic tranquillity skeptically, as creating more problems than it solved. How tolerant can we expect the target or host nation populace to be of foreign forces promoting domestic tranquillity? Will success of the OOTW mission lead to greater or lesser acceptance by the local population? Who are we trying to legitimize by our actions? These suitability problems may be exacerbated—not resolved—by a clearly defined exit strategy or timetable. The perceived transient nature of US resolve may enhance domestic acceptability at the expense of in-theater suitability. It may put time as well as initiative on the side of our adversaries.

The use of US military forces in OOTW clearly is a complex issue. Trends in future war, rejection of such restrictive employment criteria as the Weinberger Doctrine, and the new National Security Policy of Engagement and Enlargement point to more, not less, OOTW. We must use explicit criteria for acceptability, feasibility, and suitability to evaluate the specific employment of military force. We should examine critically the nature of the many missions of OOTW. Ultimately, some may indeed represent political aims for which the use of military force is not appropriate.

**Military Missions in Operations Other Than War**

The greatest problem with operations other than war is that the military missions hidden under this rubric are war. Most of the 28 OOTW missions, identified in joint and service doctrine, involve a significant risk of direct combat for the military force involved. The danger of generalizing these missions with the misleadingly benign OOTW umbrella is that strategic leaders easily miss Clausewitz's critical dictum: ‘The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander
have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its na-
ture." Joint doctrine defines military operations other than war as "encompassing a wide range of activities where the military instrument of National Power is used for pur-
poses other than large-scale combat operations usually as-
associated with war." The same document also lists raids,
strikes, and insurgencies as other than war missions. Doc-
trine seems to focus on the key words "large-scale," but success may depend more on the key words "combat op-
erations."

Unless focused on a nonstate actor, each of these mis-
sions is an explicit breach of another nation’s sovereignty. Such action usually results in war or at least a warlike reaction. One nation’s OOTW easily becomes a survival issue for the other nation or nonstate actor. Witness the hunt for Mohammed Farah Aidid in Somalia. For the US, this operation represented the UN sanctioned arrest of a criminal. Aidid and the Somali clans who regard him as a national hero saw things quite differently. One hundred Ranger casualties and three posthumous Medals of Honor later, the US was forced to withdraw in failure—not of the heroic military personnel but failure of strategic policy. The OOTW rubric masked the real intent of what the political and military leaders expected the US military force to ac-
complish.

The military missions of OOTW must be thoroughly ana-
lyzed to determine risk of combat. This risk measure can be used to distinguish between the wide variety of mis-
sions, whose specific, critical natures are disguised under OOTW. Those missions presenting a significant risk of combat must be treated as such. US military force commit-
ted to them is committed to combat. These commitments must be submitted to rigorous tests of acceptability, feasibility, and suitability to ensure that US military power is not squandered on failure.

Potential risk of combat for the doctrinal military mis-
sions of OOTW can be evaluated independently of specific circumstances. The first critical issue is the mission’s im-
pact on the sovereignty of another nation. Clearly, the
more overt the breach of sovereignty the higher the risk of combat. Some breaches of sovereignty are supported by international law or supra national organizations. While such support may reduce international outcry, it does little to reduce the risk of combat. A further measure is the hostility of the environment or the status of belligerents.

The anarchy surrounding failed governments, organized forces and weapons densities of civil wars, or the military resolve of an “international outlaw” state could increase the risk of combat for even benign missions. Humanitarian relief to Somalia, peace enforcement in Bosnia, and aid to the Kurds in Iraq illustrate this contention. Humanitarian assistance to the Kurds may have been quite different had we not been dealing with a recently defeated Iraq. Another important aspect of assessing the risk of combat lies with which side retains the initiative or controls the timing of the proposed military action. Initiative must be evaluated beyond the initial action to include which side has the capacity to unilaterally escalate the situation to a higher risk level. Initiative also lies with which antagonist can create a protracted conflict. This issue has particular import for the US, which has developed a quick success or exit mentality for most military operations.

Using the points discussed above to evaluate risk of combat, current OOTW missions can be arrayed as follows:

**Category I (High Risk)**
- Raids
- Strikes
- Counterdrug (direct action)
- Noncombatant evacuation operations (nonpermissive)
- Recovery operations
- Quarantines
- Insurgency
- Counterinsurgency
- Counterterrorism

**Category II (Moderate Risk)**
- Peace enforcement
- Enforcement of sanctions
- Enforcement of exclusion zones
Maritime interception
Ensuring freedom of navigation
Protection of shipping
Peacekeeping
Show of force
Arms control

Category III (Low Risk)
Noncombantant evacuation operations (permissive)
Peace building
Nation assistance
Security assistance
Foreign internal defense
Humanitarian assistance
Counterdrug support
Support to US domestic civil authorities
Disaster relief
Peacemaking

Clearly, category I missions require US combat action and invite a combat response from the adversary. From the perspective of strategic decision making, category II missions may pose even greater danger. They present a politically alluring but dangerous mix of peaceful intent with volatile environment. These missions are most susceptible to an ends-means dysfunction. In contrast, category III missions are distinctly nonbelligerent, mostly humanitarian efforts, occurring in benign environments.

Category I missions present a clear breach of sovereignty, when exercised against nation states. Against non-state actors, they are acts that will be challenged if possible. Raids and strikes are deliberate combat actions to inflict punishment. Planned withdrawal notwithstanding, they are acts of war that place military forces in danger. Counterdrug direct action closely resembles a raid or strike, if it occurs within the sovereign territory of another state. Even though counternarcotics receives wide support from the international community, unrequested counterdrug direct action risks combat with the sovereign nation as well as the drug cartel.

Recovery operations, quarantines, and insurgency support also threaten sovereignty. Though a quarantine is not
by definition an act of war under international law, it could easily provoke the same response as a blockade. Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism usually do not provoke sovereignty problems, since US policies normally restrict our efforts to support of host nation forces not involving direct combat. However, even these missions involve hostile environments and capable belligerents.

Each of the category I missions involves the employment of military force (combat action) against an interactive enemy. Raids, strikes, and recovery operations are military actions against point targets. If these are important enough to attack, we must assume that our adversary considers them important enough to defend. Furthermore, the recovery operation, or nonpermissive noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) leaves the advantage with the enemy. Unlike the raid or strike, the enemy knows exactly where we must act.

Most category I missions (less raids or strikes) may also present the adversary with opportunities to escalate the level of combat action. Insurgency support and counterinsurgency both occur in a distributed battlefield and represent protracted conflicts. Never does there exist the opportunity for a single, knockout blow. The adversary has ample opportunity to react, change strategy, or otherwise seize the initiative. The same holds true for a counterdrug or counterterrorist activity that exceeds a single strike-like event.

The issues of sovereignty, hostility of environment, status of belligerents, and reciprocal ability to seize the initiative all conspire to require US military force for category I missions. Risk of combat approaches the absolute and the strategic decision to execute a category I mission is clearly a decision for war (or a politically more palatable euphemism); however, “other than war” it is not.

Category II missions may pose even greater dangers for the strategic decision maker. Though reduced, the risk of combat remains strong. There is a great danger that the strategic decision maker may use “hope” as a course of action. Category II missions pose little or no threat to the sovereignty of recognized nation states. Where intent is not clearly benign, strong international sanction often reduces
any threatened sovereignty reactions. Some of the missions clearly reduce the risk of challenge by even an interactive adversary. But for many of these missions, the hostile environment and opportunities for the adversary to seize the initiative or to escalate the action destroy the ability of the US to escape combat.

The enforcement missions of category II normally arise from United Nations action. Freedom of navigation and protection of shipping result from long-standing international law. Maritime interception and show of force usually result from positions of overwhelming superiority. All of these factors reduce the risk of combat from category II missions to below that encountered in category I. But, as we move from missions which provide stand-off distance and from purely sea or air interventions to inland missions among belligerents, the risk of combat increases. Furthermore, all of these missions are protracted offering the opportunity for our adversary to counter or escalate.

Enforcement of sanctions over a hostile territory, arms control, and the peace missions require close contact with the belligerents. Over time the adversary can challenge sanctions in ways that may provoke combat. Arms control action inside another country, as in the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspections of Iraq, may even provoke the same combat response as a challenge to sovereignty. Even the “peace” missions occur in a hostile environment.

Peace enforcement requires the insertion of US military force between two active belligerents to separate combatants and to effect a cease-fire. Peacekeeping entails the insertion of troops between two formerly active belligerents, who agree to have a cease-fire enforced. For each category II mission except peacekeeping, we rely on the notion of overwhelming threat of force for success. So for the all-important threat to be credible, category II missions still require the US to commit military force.

Unlike the other category II missions, peacekeeping presumes a technically benign environment. US military forces, other than combat units, technically can fulfill peacekeeping duties. But, while hostilities are reduced and belligerents less active, danger remains. Unless the belligerents are absolutely exhausted, either can escalate by
breaking the cease-fire. This places peacekeepers in position of choice. Any action beyond reporting the infraction changes the situation from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, requiring combat action and military force.

Category III missions clearly present a low risk of combat. They do not require US military force. In fact, for most category III missions, combat service support personnel are preferable. Engineers, civil affairs, medical personnel, and other noncombat specialties provide the forces of choice for nation assistance, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. Breach of sovereignty is not an issue and the hostility of the environment is not connected to belligerent combat forces. When such conditions do not exist, as in the humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi Kurds, the specific situation may bump the mission up to category II. But generally, category III missions occur in benign environments with low risk of combat action.

The permissive NEO represents an emergency removal of threatened noncombatants from a foreign country, but the risk is not usually imminent combat. US support to many category III missions is limited to training programs for a host nation’s forces. Nation assistance, security assistance, and foreign internal defense may even involve training in combat skills. However, US military forces so involved are precluded by law from combat missions. Likewise, counterdrug support is limited to peacetime training or intelligence support to host nation combat forces. Peacemaking may involve some military personnel, but the term refers to purely diplomatic efforts during peace operations. Similarly, peace building refers to diplomatic and economic efforts for rebuilding government infrastructure and institutions after peace is restored.

Military operations other than war is clearly a misnomer with regard to risk of combat. Category I missions are uniformly combat missions, requiring the use of military force. The status of belligerents and hostile environments of category II missions also require military force. Only category III missions warrant the operations other than war header. Strategic decision makers must move beyond the rubric of OOTW and analyze specific missions for the acceptability, feasibility, and suitability of military force.
New Criteria and Military Missions of Operations Other Than War

Category I and category II missions pose a significant risk of combat. They require the employment of US military force as opposed to noncombat military personnel. These are essentially fighting missions and require rigorous scrutiny by strategic decision makers before the engagement of combat troops. The strategic decision to commit US military force to a category I or II mission, even if not technically an act of war, should meet the rational standards for acceptability, feasibility, and suitability. Because of a significantly lower risk of combat, category III missions may not have to meet the same standards. Paradoxically, the proximity of category I missions to traditional acts of war and their self-imposed limit on duration, may make them more acceptable, feasible, and suitable than category II missions. Category II missions pose the most serious problems for the strategic decision maker in each area.

Category I missions present great appeal in acceptability, usually obtaining the support of political leaders. Raids and strikes (quick retaliatory actions) pose no War Powers Act implications. They fall well within the constitutional purview of the commander in chief and require no special funding from Congress. The nonpermissive NEO and recovery operations present the imperative of protecting US citizens and property abroad, a political aim with a long tradition of acceptability. Quarantines, as imposed during the Cuban missile crises, also receive political acceptability if clearly seen to further important US interests.

Counterterrorism and counterdrug direct action receive support in theory, but the dangers in application often deny mission acceptability. Sovereignty considerations exacerbate this consideration when hunting terrorist or drug targets in another country. Also, respected governments are held to a higher standard for acceptability than the targets they seek. For example, the British killing of IRA gunmen in Gibraltar brought widespread political criticism. Insurgency and counterinsurgency normally find little support in Congress. Overt overthrow of a legitimate government is rarely acceptable. Likewise, the US explicitly refrains from the direct involvement of military force in
counterinsurgency. The protracted nature of both missions presents Congress with ample opportunities to demonstrate unacceptability by cutting off funding. However, with the exception of these missions, category I missions usually pass the acceptability test. They also receive high marks for feasibility: a sufficiency of mobilized and usable resources.

Properly resourced for their wartime requirements, US military forces possess the exact capabilities required by category I missions. The active force structure embodies a redundant capability for all of these missions, normally without a major reserve call-up. Each is explicitly addressed in current war-fighting doctrine. Successful employment in category I missions enhances the force’s wartime mission capability. If even an extended series of these missions otherwise supports national security strategy, they will not exhaust the collective morale of the force. Not only are these missions exceptionally feasible, they also display a high degree of suitability.

Current and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures exist for each of these missions and contribute to the technical capability for success. Wartime command and control architecture facilitates category I mission accomplishment. More importantly, in execution most of these missions require little or no interface at the theater level with the other elements of power. They are military events orchestrated as such at the operational or theater level in a time proven fashion. The military force employed for category I missions provides its own protection. Timing for each of these missions or the initiative lies with the US military force. We decide when, where, and under what conditions to accept or decline “battle.”

The one major suitability exception in category I is counterinsurgency. This mission’s suitability problems even exceed those of acceptability. The critical factors revolve around the protracted nature of the conflict, the requirement for population acceptance, and the possibility of legitimizing the wrong elements with our actions. Counterinsurgency requires the fusion of all elements of power at the operational level. The US currently has no proven capacity to do this for counterinsurgency. US policy properly re-
stricts direct combat action in counterinsurgency. Likewise, counterdrug and counterterrorist actions are proscribed to training and intelligence support. Counterinsurgency suitability problems would plague counterdrug direct action and counterterrorism, if these missions became a campaign or series of actions rather than a finite strike-type mission.

As war (or at least warlike), category I missions generally are acceptable, feasible, and suitable for the employment of US military force. There is a high probability that the political aim of these military missions will be supported and achieved with standing operating forces. The hostile environment is met with equally hostile applications of US military force. Such is not normally the case with category II missions. These missions may well make demands of US military force that are not acceptable, feasible, or suitable.

Congress is presently considering legislation to restrict the authority of the commander in chief to commit military force to some category II missions. This manifestation of unacceptability springs not only from the combat risk but also from past feasibility and suitability problems. Enforcement of sanctions in Bosnia, peace enforcement in Somalia, and peacekeeping in Beirut have all proved to be dangerous, prolonged, and high cost. Such missions, therefore, are politically difficult applications of US military force. US Marines suffered 241 killed in the Beirut bombing, the highest one-day total since Vietnam. The two-year Somalia peace intervention cost $2 billion and resulted in 30 American peacekeepers killed in action and 175 wounded. In terms of achieving US political aims, results for both have been judged mixed at best.

Enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, assurance of freedom of navigation, and protection of shipping have normally been acceptable politically as within our international rights. This support tends to erode over time; however, especially as feasibility and suitability problems arise. For example, continued protection of shipping operations in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War faced serious acceptability challenges with the Iraqi attack on the USS *Stark* or the USS *Vincennes* shotdown of the Iranian airliner. In general, the protracted nature of cate-
Category II missions generates most acceptability problems. Prolonged involvement, combined with moderate risk of combat, invites War Powers Act debate in Congress; challenges to continued funding; and general erosion of support from the public. Political leaders demand an "exit strategy" before committing military force. This only complicates the feasibility and suitability of those missions, for which time is already on the side of our adversary. It signals that escalating the risk of combat might precipitate our withdrawal.

Conventional wisdom states that combat ready, conventional military force is most feasible for category II missions. Generally, such force does provide the most immediate, flexible, disciplined response; however, it does not negate several feasibility problems. Prolonged category II missions often require extended use of selected reserve component personnel. They also add to the already significant operations tempo of our downsized regular force. This increased tempo, combined with the difficulty of measuring success in Beirut, Somalia, or Haiti, negatively affects the collective morale of the military force so employed.

In valuable training time, these transitions to and from OOTW impose a significant opportunity cost for military forces used in category II missions. UN guidelines show a necessity for combat units or military forces to undergo up to six months predeployment training for peacekeeping duties. Only patrolling skills from unit combat training receive emphasis in US sponsored peacekeeping training. More importantly, individual members of the military force must fundamentally change combat trained attitudes and responses. Furthermore, those nations with most experience in UN peacekeeping recommend one year of post-peacekeeping combat training. Repeated transitions from combat training to peacekeeping duties also carry other significant hidden costs. Continuous rotation of US military force into category II missions may pose an even greater feasibility problem: combat ready forces may not repeatedly transition well from war to "other than war," from destruction and death to building and saving, from combat to noncombat.
Evidence exists that a military force may face difficulty adjusting to repetitions of this cycle. Since World War II, the Canadian Airborne Regiment has provided Canada with her most elite infantry force. NATO recognized the regiment as one of its most rigorously combat trained. It also has been one of the most experienced in UN peacekeeping. In the 1980s, the regiment successfully completed at least three, six-month peacekeeping deployments around the globe. But in 1993 Somalia, the regiment failed to make the transition. General lack of discipline in the use of combat force and failure of leadership to adjust resulted in peace mission failure and disgrace for the regiment and Canada. A series of courts-martial and reorganization of the regiment to a battalion proved unsuccessful in restoring this formerly distinguished combat formation. Subsequent discipline scandals resulted in the regiment’s total disbandment in March 1995.

Peaceful intent in a hostile environment may best be met by disciplined, military force, but such employment is not without cost. The US 10th Mountain Division participated in Florida disaster relief, Somalia peace enforcement, and Haiti nation building in quick succession. They performed each mission superbly. But, how many OOTW missions can the collective morale of the force withstand? The former commander of the division cited no signs of morale degradation. The failed Canadian Airborne Regiment and the remainder of Canadian armed forces suffered much. Though the US military may not have approached it, there may be a similar limit to feasibility of US military force for category II missions.

US military force in category II missions has faced severe suitability problems. It has had difficulties in its technical capability for promoting, defending, or protecting the political aims of category II missions. We have experienced many tactical failures in these missions. A failed naval air strike in addition to the Marine barracks tragedy, preceded our mission failure in Beirut as peacekeepers. Furthermore, tactically successful naval surface fire support against mountain artillery emplacements may have precipitated the Marine barracks attack, thus, representing an operational failure. As noted, we did not successfully pro-
tect the fleet in Gulf oil tanker reflagging during the Iran-Iraq War. Clearly, protecting the force has been a recurring problem.

If suitability problems in protecting the force reduce US personnel to targets, the initiative goes to the adversary. Category II missions rely on “threat of force” for uncontested success. Not only are these missions extended in time but the “battlefield” is also distributed geographically. The adversary usually has a surplus of opportunities to strike. Once lost, wresting the initiative from our adversaries has proven difficult. Although we recovered the initiative after USS Stark and USS Vincennes incidents, we never rebounded in Beirut from the Marine barracks or in Somalia from the Ranger attack. Ironically, successfully protecting the force may prove equally as disastrous to mission success as failure to protect the force.

The suitability dilemma for category II missions is that successful use of force may create more enemies than it eliminates. Even a provoked movement from threat of force to use of force coalesces opposition to our intervention. Category II peace missions, especially, manifest this dilemma. Any action in peace enforcement benefits one side over another. Provocation during peacekeeping, which elicits more than a reporting response, creates at least the appearance of choosing sides. Nonresponse may reduce US military force to an important target.

Much of this suitability dilemma revolves around the notion of a foreign military force promoting domestic tranquility. Aside from being instinctively unpalatable, this notion presents practical problems for the “legitimate” government we presume to support. The first prerequisite of legitimate government is a demonstrable ability to protect its own people. Having US military force provide constabulary services (services a nation would rather not see even from its own military force), only exacerbates the issue. In addition to the possibility of denying legitimacy, US military force may confer legitimacy on the wrong elements.

Unintended lending of legitimacy often occurs because of the historic difficulty in synchronizing the diplomatic, economic, informational, and military elements of power at the theater level. What message do we send when we escort
Mohammed Aidid to high-level diplomatic meetings one day and hunt him with military force the next? Campaign plans for category II missions must fuse all elements to rationalize events. Otherwise, military force can easily work at cross purposes with diplomatic or economic measures, or diplomatic initiatives and requirements can render military force unprotected. Current joint and service doctrine only tritely prescribes cooperation, flexibility, and perseverance to resolve this issue. Fortunately, groundbreaking work at the Joint Warfare Center establishes doctrine for a civil military operations center and other innovative command and control architecture to address this key suitability problem.

Continuing development in this direction also will greatly enhance our capability in the truly “other than war” missions. Category III missions easily achieve political acceptability. The permissive NEO rescues or protects US citizens. Nation assistance, security assistance, and foreign internal defense form long and broadly supported parts of our foreign policy. Who can argue about the acceptability of disaster relief or humanitarian assistance? Most political leaders and the nation are proud of our efforts in flood-torn Bangladesh, in famine stricken Somalia, or for the homeless Kurds. Peacemaking and peace building, largely diplomatic and economic activities, are close behind in acceptability. From riots in Los Angeles, to fire fighting in the Pacific Northwest to hurricane relief in Florida, US military forces recently have answered the call in support of domestic civil institutions. The benign, emergency use of military personnel eliminates most of the acceptability problems of using US military force.

Feasibility problems are also minimized for category III missions. Eliminating combat from the equation negates most feasibility challenges. The one critical feasibility problem remaining is the opportunity cost in combat capability for a military force involved in any significant number of these other than war missions. While the combat force provides disciplined, organized, capable manpower to meet these emergencies, category III missions do little to enhance or preserve combat capabilities. These missions, however noble, can exhaust the combat capability of the
military force. This is especially true when political leaders enhance acceptability by absorbing the cost of category III missions in the military budgets required for maintaining combat capability.

An unbroken string of success in all category III missions undertaken to date attests to the suitability of US military force for these missions. Suitability problems only lurk where early success creates “mission creep.” Humanitarian assistance in Somalia worked; peace enforcement failed. Strategic danger surrounds a decision to use US military force without proper analysis of the (new) mission. Mission creep easily occurs when military force is used in category III missions because, after all, the force is already available. Thus even category III missions, far from being “no brainers,” require the strategic decision maker to first understand the character of the other than war activity upon which he is about to embark.

Conclusions

Strategic decision makers have long recognized the paramount importance to the state and to the people of decisions for war or peace. Such decisions must be taken with utmost deliberation. Careful evaluation of a specific situation against rigorous criteria should always precede each decision to employ US military force (e.g., combat force in a hostile environment). As a minimum, these criteria must establish for the strategic decision maker an assessment of acceptability—political support of our leadership and eventually our populace, feasibility—appropriate levels of forces and resources, and suitability—well-defined objectives matched by an effective plan.

Current US Strategy for Engagement and Enlargement recognizes the importance of such criteria but fails fully to develop rigor in its application. The rejected Weinberger Doctrine may have been too restrictive for strategic decision makers in the rigor of its acceptability test. We must develop comprehensive acceptability, feasibility, and suitability criteria that correct these polar deficiencies or risk strategic failure by incorrectly determining the kind of “war” on which we are embarking.
Nowhere is this risk greater than in operations other than war. The military missions disguised by this misleadingly benign rubric must be carefully analyzed for potential risk of combat. When measured against threat to sovereignty and hostility of environment, the 28 doctrinal military missions of OOTW clearly demonstrate a broad range: high risk (category I), clearly combat missions; moderate risk (category II), benign intent but significant combat potential; low risk (category III), clearly humanitarian missions. Each of these categories possesses its own unique acceptability, feasibility, and suitability challenges; however, unless the specific use of combat force or military mission is critically examined, a political ends to military means dysfunction can occur.

This dysfunction is most dangerous for strategic decision makers entertaining OOTW involving category II missions. They present a politically alluring but dangerous mix of peaceful intent with volatile environment. Their challenges to any comprehensive acceptability, feasibility, and suitability criteria are almost overwhelming—accounting for our strategic failures in Beirut, Somalia, and perhaps eventually Bosnia. The enforcement, protection, and especially peace missions of category II require special reassessment. We must ensure that strategic decision makers do not pursue with military force political aims for which such force is not an appropriate element of power.

Notes
2. Ibid., 88.
7. Clausewitz, 88.