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Project No. DODIG-2015-156



# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

August 5, 2015

## (U) Drawdown of Equipment in Afghanistan: Summary of Weaknesses Identified in Reports Issued from August 19, 2011, Through May 18, 2015

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## (U) Results in Brief

*(U) Drawdown of Equipment in Afghanistan: Summary of Weaknesses Identified in Reports Issued from August 19, 2011, Through May 18, 2015*

**August 5, 2015**

### (U) Objective

(U) We summarized systemic challenges associated with the drawdown of equipment and forces in Afghanistan identified in audit reports issued by the DoD Office of the Inspector General.

### (U) Finding

(U) Since 2011, DoD OIG issued 10 reports on the Afghanistan drawdown. Two of the 10 reports identified sufficient planning for retrograde operations and effective procedures for processing commercial cargo. However, the 10 reports also identified the following recurring weaknesses:

- (U) lack of physical security controls,
- (U) ineffective equipment accountability controls,
- (U) insufficient contract oversight,
- (U) inaccurate property accountability systems, and
- (U) inadequate implementation of policies and procedures.

(U) The reported weaknesses indicate there is an opportunity to improve drawdown procedures by applying lessons learned to future retrograde operations as the United States continues to draw down in Afghanistan.

(U) In addition, this summary report can serve as a reference for personnel overseeing and conducting retrograde activities in Afghanistan and future contingency operations.

### (U) Recommendations

(U) Of the 10 reports, 3 reports did not contain recommendations because the commands took action during the audits to resolve deficiencies, and 7 reports contained 25 recommendations. Of those recommendations, 11 are closed and 14 remain open. We are not making additional recommendations in this report because this is a summary report.

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INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

August 5, 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS  
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY CENTRAL  
COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND  
COMMANDER GENERAL, U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND  
COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY SUSTAINMENT COMMAND  
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF  
ARMY DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS, G-4  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY  
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: (U) Drawdown of Equipment in Afghanistan: Summary of Weaknesses  
Identified in Reports Issued from August 19, 2011, Through May 18, 2015  
(Report No. DODIG-2015-156)

(U) We are providing this report for information and use. This project relates to the overseas contingency operations, Operation Freedom's Sentinel and Inherent Resolve, and will be completed in accordance with the OIG's oversight responsibilities, as described in Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. This report compiles weaknesses identified in 10 DoD Office of Inspector General reports related to the drawdown of equipment in Afghanistan. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Commander, U.S. Central Command; Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan; Commander, U.S. Army Central; Commander, U.S. Transportation Command; Commander General, U.S. Army Materiel Command; Commanding General, U.S. Army Sustainment Command; Director, Joint Staff; Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, G-4; and the Director, Defense Contract Management Agency should read this report to be aware of challenges and opportunities for improvement.

(U) This report contains no recommendations for action. We did not issue a draft report, and no written response is required. We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 604-9187 (DSN 664-9187).

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Michael J. Roark", is positioned above the printed name.

Michael J. Roark  
Assistant Inspector General  
Contract Management and Payments

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## **(U) Introduction**

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### **(U) Objective**

(U) Our objective was to summarize systemic challenges associated with the drawdown of equipment and forces in Afghanistan identified in audit reports issued by the DoD Office of the Inspector General. Since August 2011, the DoD OIG issued 10 reports related to the Afghanistan drawdown. This report was prepared to serve as a reference for personnel overseeing and conducting retrograde activities in Afghanistan and future contingency operations.

### **(U) Background**

(U) In June 2011, the President announced that U.S. forces would begin drawing down operations in Afghanistan. From 2011 through 2014, logisticians were working to retrograde more than a decade's accumulation of assets, equipment, and personnel in theater. After December 2014, the United States began to transition to a train-and-assist mission in Afghanistan that required fewer troops and equipment. In March 2015, the President announced that the United States would maintain 9,800 troops through the end of the year, and will develop plans for the continued drawdown by the end of 2015. Therefore, DoD plans to continue to remove troops and equipment from Afghanistan in the future.

### ***(U) Retrograde Operations in Afghanistan***

(U) Retrograde is the process of moving equipment and materiel from one theater of operations to a repair facility, or to another theater of operations for re-use. The Army uses Redistribution Property Assistance Teams (RPAT) to turn in excess Army property in theater, redistribute equipment to fill shortages, and retrograde excess equipment to the United States. Specifically, RPATs in Afghanistan relieve redeploying Army units of their equipment, clear their property books, and prepare Army units to redeploy to their home stations. After relieving the units of accountability, the RPATs either process the equipment for retrograde or hold the equipment at the RPAT yards for incoming troops. DoD maintains several automated systems to support the retrograde process and account for all equipment throughout the drawdown.

## ***(U) Key Organizations Involved in the Retrograde Process***

### ***(U) U.S. Central Command***

(U) U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) was established in January 1983, with an area of responsibility that includes Afghanistan.

### ***(U) U.S. Army Central Command***

(U) U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) commands Army forces in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility to assure access, build partner capacity, and develop relationships. ARCENT coordinates security and logistics throughout the region and supports retrograde operations from Afghanistan.

### ***(U) 1st Theater Sustainment Command***

(U) The Army's 1st Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) plans, prepares, and executes operational sustainment support and re-postures forces to support all ARCENT operations throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.

### ***(U) Army Materiel Command***

(U) The Army Materiel Command (AMC) provides materiel to forces for joint military operations readiness: technology, acquisition support, materiel development, logistics power projection, and sustainment. The Army Sustainment Command (ASC), a subordinate command, provides sustainment-level logistics and supports Army, Joint, and Coalition forces through the management of equipment at designated locations. The Army Contracting Command (ACC), another subordinate command of AMC, provides the Army with worldwide support by acquiring equipment, supplies and services vital to soldiers' missions and well-being.

(U) The 401st Army Field Support Brigade (AFSB) executes, directs, and manages field and sustainment-level logistics for U.S. and selected Coalition forces in Afghanistan and provides its headquarters, ASC, a forward presence. The 401st AFSB developed and operates the RPAT yards in Afghanistan. Additionally, the 401st AFSB's two battalions at Bagram and Kandahar have been responsible for executing all Afghanistan RPAT operations.

### ***(U) U.S. Transportation Command***

(U) U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is the single manager of the U.S. global Defense Transportation System. USTRANSCOM coordinates missions worldwide using both military and commercial sea, air, and land transportation assets in response to DoD's warfighting commanders' needs across the full spectrum of



(U) support, ranging from humanitarian operations to military contingencies. USTRANSCOM is responsible for oversight of DoD distribution activities, including sustainment and retrograde activities. USTRANSCOM's Army Service Component Command, U.S. Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), oversees contractor operations for all military equipment shipments from Afghanistan, including facilitating booking and execution, and maintaining in-transit visibility.

### *(U) Defense Logistics Agency*

(U) The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is responsible for administering the Defense Materiel Disposition Program worldwide. DLA-Disposition Services (DS) is responsible for the disposal of excess personal property, scrap, and hazardous waste, and for demilitarizing property generated by DoD activities. DLA-DS operates at four primary sites in Afghanistan.

### **(U) Army Property Accountability Requirements**

(U) Army Regulations (AR) 735-5, "Property Accountability Policies," August 22, 2013, and AR 710-2, "Inventory Management-Supply Below the National Level," March 28, 2008 describe how the Army should account for equipment. AR 735-5 provides guidance for accounting for Army property including accounting for lost, damaged or destroyed Army property. It states that all property acquired by the Army from any source must be accounted for with continuous accounting from the time of acquisition until the ultimate consumption or disposal of the property occurs, and that supporting documentation must be maintained. It further states that all Army property, except real property, is assigned an accounting requirements code (ARC) of expendable, durable, or nonexpendable. The ARC identifies the degree of accounting and control that must be applied at the user level. Nonexpendable property requires formal accountability throughout the life of the item. Nonexpendable items will be accounted for by using unit-level property book procedures in accordance with AR 710-2.

(U) AR 710-2 provides guidance for the accountability and assignment of responsibility for property issued to a unit. It states that all property acquired by the Army, regardless of source needs to be accounted for, and all nonexpendable items must be accounted for on a formal property book. It further states that property book records must provide a complete audit trail for all transactions. It also states that all military and civilian employees of the Army are required to turn in all found Government property to the supply system for disposition.



## (U) Results

### (U) Drawdown of Equipment in Afghanistan: Summary of Weaknesses Identified in Reports Issued from August 19, 2011, Through May 18, 2015

(U) Since 2011, DoD OIG issued 10 reports on the Afghanistan drawdown.<sup>1</sup> Two of the 10 reports identified sufficient planning for retrograde operations and effective procedures for processing commercial cargo. However, the 10 reports also identified the following recurring weaknesses:

- (U) lack of physical security controls,
- (U) ineffective equipment accountability controls,
- (U) insufficient contract oversight,
- (U) inaccurate property accountability systems, and
- (U) inadequate implementation of policies and procedures.

(U) The weaknesses indicate there is an opportunity for personnel overseeing and conducting retrograde activities to improve drawdown procedures by applying lessons learned to future retrograde operations.

(U) Of the 10 reports, 3 reports did not contain recommendations because the commands took action during the audits to resolve deficiencies, and 7 reports contained 25 recommendations. Of those recommendations, 11 are closed and 14 remain open.

### (U) Drawdown Weaknesses Identified by DoD OIG

(U) DoD OIG issued two reports that identified sufficient planning for retrograde operations and effective procedures for processing commercial cargo. Specifically, Report No. DODIG-2015-012 found that DoD was prepared and had sufficient capacity for projected volume of equipment related to the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Additionally, Report No. DODIG-2014-058 found that USTRANSCOM's contractors accounted for, secured, and processed cargo in a timely manner. However, DoD OIG also identified weaknesses related to the retrograde of equipment during the

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix B for a summary of the ten DoD OIG Reports issued.

(U) Afghanistan drawdown. Specifically, DoD OIG audit reports identified recurring weaknesses in physical security controls, equipment accountability controls, contract oversight, property accountability systems, and policies and procedures.

### **(U) Lack of Physical Security Controls**

(U) We identified weaknesses in implementing access controls to adequately safeguard equipment; these access control weaknesses varied by equipment type. Physical security controls decrease the risk of unauthorized access to personnel, equipment, installations, and information, and safeguards them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. Without proper security features, unauthorized individuals could gain access to, and potentially steal Government equipment. The following five reports discussed a lack of physical security controls:

- (U) DODIG-2014-007, "Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Services Afghanistan Disposal Process Needed Improvement," November 8, 2013.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) DODIG-2014-053, "U.S. Transportation Command Needs To Improve Oversight Procedures for the Multi-Modal Contract Used To Ship Equipment From Afghanistan," April 4, 2014.
- (U) DODIG-2014-058, "Commercial Multimodal Cargo Procedures in Dubai Were Generally Effective, but Contract Oversight Could Be Improved," April 11, 2014.
- (U) DODIG-2014-098, "The Army Did Not Properly Account For and Manage Force Provider Equipment in Afghanistan," July 31, 2014.
- (U) DODIG-2015-012, "The DoD Retrograde Process in Afghanistan Needed Improvement," November 5, 2014.

(S//NF) DoD OIG: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(g)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



***(U) Ineffective Equipment Accountability Controls***

(U) We identified systemic weaknesses in maintaining accountability of equipment and failing to report equipment losses in a timely manner in Afghanistan. Equipment accountability controls decrease the risk of equipment loss. To control equipment accountability, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics assigns DoD personnel the responsibility for the proper use, care, physical protection, and disposal or disposition of all Government equipment to include the reporting of property loss. When equipment loss is identified, the accountable officer must search for the missing property, initiate the inventory loss investigation, and notify the approving authority within 15 days of the date of the loss. If the Army does not report lost equipment in a timely manner, the risk increases that the equipment will not be recovered. The following four reports discussed ineffective controls over lost equipment:

- (U) DODIG-2014-043, "The Army Needs To Improve Property Accountability and Contractor Oversight at Redistribution Property Assistance Team Yards in Afghanistan," March 4, 2014.
- (U) DODIG-2014-098, "The Army Did Not Properly Account For and Manage Force Provider Equipment in Afghanistan," July 31, 2014.
- (U) DODIG-2015-009, "The Army Needs to Improve the Processes for Reporting Inventory Losses in Afghanistan," October 30, 2014.
- (U) DODIG-2015-126, "Contract Oversight for Redistribution Property Assistance Team Operations in Afghanistan Needs Improvement," May 18, 2015.

(U) Three reports identified problems with DoD officials maintaining equipment accountability. For example, Report No. DODIG-2014-098 stated that the Army did not properly account for equipment deployed to Afghanistan from 2001 through 2013, valued at approximately \$424.6 million, because the Army did not verify that the receiving unit recorded the equipment on the unit's accountability records and equipment tracking procedures were not consistent with applicable policies. Specifically, \$284.6 million worth of equipment was never accounted for and the Army could not determine how much equipment was improperly destroyed, lost, or abandoned. As a result of the Army's lack of accountability, the Army could not hold units responsible for proper use, care, and disposition of equipment deployed to

(U) Afghanistan. In response to our report, the Commanding General, Army Materiel Command established guidance to improve the procedures for tracking equipment; however, the DoD OIG continues to monitor the status of the implementation of five of the six recommendations for this report.

(U) Two reports identified weaknesses related to reporting equipment losses in a timely manner. For example, Report No. DODIG-2015-009 stated that the Army did not effectively report FY 2013 inventory losses at the Bagram and Kandahar RPAT yards. Specifically, the 401st AFSB did not report 15,600 pieces of missing equipment, valued at approximately \$419.5 million, in a timely manner. This occurred because 401st AFSB officials continued to look for the missing equipment rather than initiate a financial liability investigation of property loss (FLIPL). This practice led to the belief that the missing equipment would eventually be found when forward operating bases closed. As a result of the reporting delays, the ASC did not have accurate accountability and visibility of property in Afghanistan, and no one was held financially responsible for the property losses or accountable for the missed reporting deadlines. The 401st AFSB officials took several steps to resolve the concerns identified such as holding weekly meetings to emphasize the need to initiate FLIPLs within 15 days of the discovery of loss, rather than conducting searches. Management actions addressed the concerns identified in the report; therefore, no additional actions were required.

### ***(U) Insufficient Contract Oversight***

(U) We identified systemic weaknesses in establishing clear contractor requirements and providing appropriate quality control procedures. Insufficient contract oversight may lead to increased risk of services and goods not meeting the needs of the warfighter. The objective of contract oversight is to monitor contract performance to assure services are consistent with contract quality requirements and received in a timely manner. To be effective, contract oversight requires appropriate and immediate on-site monitoring of the services performed. The following five reports discussed the need for better contract oversight:

- (U) DODIG-2014-007, "Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Services Afghanistan Disposal Process Needed Improvement," November 8, 2013.
- (U) DODIG-2014-043, "The Army Needs To Improve Property Accountability and Contractor Oversight at Redistribution Property Assistance Team Yards in Afghanistan," March 4, 2014.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) DODIG-2014-053, "U.S. Transportation Command Needs To Improve Oversight Procedures for the Multi-Modal Contract Used To Ship Equipment From Afghanistan," April 4, 2014.



- (U) DODIG-2014-058, "Commercial Multimodal Cargo Procedures in Dubai Were Generally Effective, but Contract Oversight Could Be Improved," April 11, 2014.
- (U) DODIG-2015-126, "Contract Oversight for Redistribution Property Assistance Team Operations in Afghanistan Needs Improvement," May 18, 2015.

(U) Two reports identified weaknesses related to establishing clear contractor requirements. For example, Report No. DODIG-2014-053 stated that USTRANSCOM contracting officials did not establish effective oversight requirements to safeguard cargo staged for shipment in Afghanistan, which allowed the contractors to store retrograde cargo in an unsecured and ad hoc manner because contracting officials omitted specific security and oversight requirements. Specifically, the contract did not include specific requirements or procedures for the security and safeguarding of the cargo such as the use of perimeter fences, locks, and regular inspections. Instead, the contract's performance work statement required contractors to follow their commercial surface and air security and customs procedures to safeguard cargo despite contracting officials stating that to the best of their knowledge, there was no uniform commercial procedure. As a result, DoD had no assurance that contractors were properly securing cargo at Bagram and Kandahar Airfields. USTRANSCOM and SDDC officials took corrective action to resolve the weaknesses identified in the report and the recommendations are considered complete.

(U) Three reports identified weaknesses in providing appropriate quality control procedures. For example, Report No. DODIG-2014-058 stated that USTRANSCOM contracting officials did not provide sufficient oversight because they structured the contract to minimize Government involvement. Specifically, USTRANSCOM contracting officials did not appoint a contracting officer's representative in Dubai to oversee contractor operations because the contract structure allowed oversight from headquarters, instead of Dubai. As a result, the prime contractors contacted other officials in Dubai to resolve cargo-processing problems instead of officials with delegated contractual authority. USTRANSCOM officials took corrective action to resolve the weaknesses identified in the report and the recommendations were closed.

### **(U) Inaccurate Property Accountability Systems**

(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO) USTRANSCOM: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(g)

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ USTRANSCOM: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(g)

- (U) D-2011-100, "DoD Needs Bi-Directional Flow Agreements and Adequate Tracking Mechanisms for the Northern Distribution Network," August 19, 2011.
- (U) DODIG-2013-066, "Transportation Planning is Sufficient for Retrograde Operations; However, There is an Opportunity to Improve the Efficiency of Management Systems," April 12, 2013.
- (U) DODIG-2014-007, "Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Services Afghanistan Disposal Process Needed Improvement," November 8, 2013.
- (U) DODIG-2014-043, "The Army Needs To Improve Property Accountability and Contractor Oversight at Redistribution Property Assistance Team Yards in Afghanistan," March 4, 2014.
- (U) DODIG-2014-098, "The Army Did Not Properly Account For and Manage Force Provider Equipment in Afghanistan," July 31, 2014.

(U) For example, Report No. DODIG-2014-007 stated DLA-DS officials did not have accountability over \$7.5 million of \$8.5 million in excess equipment or correctly code excess equipment requiring demilitarization in Afghanistan. This occurred because DLA-DS officials did not adequately train personnel deployed in Afghanistan during a new system implementation to effectively use the system for performing daily accounting and inventory management operations. As a result, there was inaccurate or incomplete accounting for inventory within the system and lack of asset visibility. DLA-DS took actions to address the weaknesses identified during the audit, which provided greater assurance that the services operate effectively and efficiently during the drawdown in Afghanistan. Therefore, there were no recommendations made.

~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ USTRANSCOM: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(g)



(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO) USTRANSCOM: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(g)

### ***(U) Inadequate Implementation of Policies and Procedures***

(U) We identified systemic weaknesses related to DoD officials not developing policies and procedures for accountability, safeguarding and disposal of equipment or DoD officials not following the appropriate guidance. Comprehensive policies and procedures reduce the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse as the drawdown continues in Afghanistan. Policies and procedures assign responsibilities and provide guidance to personnel to perform actions to strengthen the internal controls of a program. Internal controls and procedures should be regularly evaluated for effectiveness and areas of improvement. The following eight reports discussed inadequate implementation or lack of policies and procedures:

- (U) D-2011-100, "DoD Needs Bi-Directional Flow Agreements and Adequate Tracking Mechanisms for the Northern Distribution Network," August 19, 2011.
- (U) DODIG-2014-007, "Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Services Afghanistan Disposal Process Needed Improvement," November 8, 2013.
- (U) DODIG-2014-043, "The Army Needs To Improve Property Accountability and Contractor Oversight at Redistribution Property Assistance Team Yards in Afghanistan," March 4, 2014.
- (U) DODIG-2014-058, "Commercial Multimodal Cargo Procedures in Dubai Were Generally Effective, but Contract Oversight Could Be Improved," April 11, 2014.
- (U) DODIG-2014-098, "The Army Did Not Properly Account For and Manage Force Provider Equipment in Afghanistan," July 31, 2014.
- (U) DODIG-2015-009, "The Army Needs to Improve the Processes for Reporting Inventory Losses in Afghanistan," October 30, 2014.
- (U) DODIG-2015-012, "The DoD Retrograde Process in Afghanistan Needed Improvement," November 5, 2014.
- (U) DODIG-2015-126, "Contract Oversight for Redistribution Property Assistance Team Operations in Afghanistan Needs Improvement," May 18, 2015.

(U) Four reports identified weaknesses where DoD officials needed to develop policies and procedures. For example, Report No. DODIG-2014-043 stated that ASC, ACC-Rock Island, and the 401st AFSB did not have effective procedures for processing and safeguarding equipment at the RPAT yards in Bagram and Kandahar Airfields, Afghanistan. This occurred because Army officials did not use automated procedures to maintain equipment accountability and did not implement effective controls over equipment at the RPAT yards in Afghanistan. As a result, the Army reported accumulated losses of \$586.8 million on 26 open FLIPL reports from May 2012 through May 2013. The recommendations in this report remain open and the DoD OIG continues to monitor the status of their implementation.

(U) Four reports identified weaknesses where DoD officials did not follow the appropriate policies and procedures. For example, Report No. DODIG-2015-126 stated that 401st AFSB personnel did not follow applicable Army regulations to initiate property loss investigations. This occurred because 401st AFSB officials used their resources to search for missing equipment rather than identify and initiate timely property loss investigations. As a result, 401st AFSB officials could not provide assurance that equipment would be recovered or that the losses would not continue until the property losses are identified, notified, and investigated timely. During the audit, 401st AFSB officials implemented corrective actions as suggested by the audit team and no recommendations were made in the report.

## **(U) Conclusion**

(U) Over a four-year period, DoD OIG issued 10 reports that addressed the Afghanistan drawdown. The reports identified weaknesses in physical security controls, controls over lost equipment, contract oversight, property accountability systems, and policies and procedures. The weaknesses indicate there is an opportunity to improve drawdown procedures by applying lessons learned to future retrograde operations as DoD continues to draw down in Afghanistan. This report can serve as a reference for personnel overseeing and conducting retrograde activities in Afghanistan and future contingency operations.

## **(U) Status of Recommendations**

(U) Of the 10 reports, 3 reports did not contain recommendations because the commands took action during the audits to resolve deficiencies, and 7 reports contained 25 recommendations addressing identified weaknesses. Of those recommendations, 11 are closed and 14 remain open.



(U) The following reports contain the 14 open recommendations:

(U) Report No. DODIG-2014-043, "The Army Needs To Improve Property Accountability and Contractor Oversight at Redistribution Property Assistance Team Yards in Afghanistan," March 4, 2014, contained eight recommendations addressing the need to improve contract oversight, evaluate property accountability processes and procedures, and employ new technology to improve the accountability and visibility of equipment. If management does not implement the recommendations, the Army may continue to have ineffective procedures for processing and safeguarding equipment at the RPAT yards while increasing the likelihood of property loss. We continue to monitor the actions taken related to the recommendations.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2013-066, "Transportation Planning is Sufficient for Retrograde Operations; However, There is an Opportunity to Improve the Efficiency of Management Systems," April 12, 2013, contained one recommendation to determine whether the expedited implementation of a tracking number should occur in a property accountability system. We are expecting an update on the implementation of this recommendation by September 2015. If management does not implement this recommendation, the Army has no assurance that they will be able to track equipment from origin to destination.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2014-098, "The Army Did Not Properly Account For and Manage Force Provider Equipment in Afghanistan," July 31, 2014, had five open recommendations addressing the need to improve property accountability systems and develop a process for validating information in property accountability systems. If management does not implement these recommendations, the Army will continue to have equipment accountability problems. We continue to monitor the status of the implementation of these recommendations.

(U) We are not making additional recommendations in this report because the recommendations made in the previous seven reports adequately address the reported weaknesses identified related to drawdown efforts in Afghanistan.

## **(U) Appendix A**

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### **(U) Scope and Methodology**

(U) We conducted this summary work from June 2015 through August 2015. We followed generally accepted government auditing standards, except for the standards of planning and evidence because this report summarizes previously released reports. We believe the information obtained provides a reasonable basis for our conclusions based on the project objectives.

(U) This report summarizes drawdown of equipment in Afghanistan challenges identified in 10 reports issued by DoD OIG from August 19, 2011, through May 18, 2015. To prepare this summary, we reviewed the 10 DoD OIG reports listed in Appendix B. We reviewed the findings and conclusions from the reports. We did not review the supporting documentation for the reports.

### **(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data**

(U) We did not use computer-processed data for this project.

### **(U) Prior Coverage**

(U) During the last four years, we did not issue reports summarizing problems specific to the drawdown of equipment in Afghanistan.



## (U) Appendix B

### (U) DoD OIG Report Summaries

(U) DoD OIG issued 10 reports on the Afghanistan drawdown that discussed the following:

- (~~S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO~~) D-2011-100, "DoD Needs Bi-Directional Flow Agreements and Adequate Tracking Mechanisms for the Northern Distribution Network," August 19, 2011, ~~ARCENT: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(a)~~  
[REDACTED]
- (U) DODIG-2013-066, "Transportation Planning is Sufficient for Retrograde Operations; However, There is an Opportunity to Improve the Efficiency of Management Systems," April 12, 2013, found that management systems used to support retrograde operations lacked a common data field, which resulted in inefficiency in the management systems, making it more difficult to provide planned to actual cargo movements and end-to-end in-transit visibility.
- (U) DODIG-2014-007, "Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Services Afghanistan Disposal Process Needed Improvement," November 8, 2013, identified the lack of adequate controls over disposal of excess equipment, which resulted in an increased risk of fraud, theft, improper release of sensitive excess equipment without proper disposal, and transfer of sensitive equipment technology.
- (U) DODIG-2014-043, "The Army Needs To Improve Property Accountability and Contractor Oversight at Redistribution Property Assistance Team Yards in Afghanistan," March 4, 2014, identified weaknesses in processing and safeguarding equipment at the RPAT yards, which resulted in reported losses of \$586.8 million in equipment.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) DODIG-2014-053, "U.S. Transportation Command Needs To Improve Oversight Procedures for the Multi-Modal Contract Used To Ship Equipment From Afghanistan," April 4, 2014, identified the need for effective controls over the storing and handling of retrograde equipment at aerial ports of debarkation in Afghanistan, which increased the risk of equipment loss, damage, or vandalism in transit.
- (U) DODIG-2014-058, "Commercial Multimodal Cargo Procedures in Dubai Were Generally Effective, but Contract Oversight Could Be Improved," April 11, 2014, identified effective procedures for processing commercial cargo in Dubai but the Customs and Border Clearance agents did not always apply United States-compliant container seals, which could allow individuals to gain unauthorized access to and potentially steal Government cargo during transit.
- (U) DODIG-2014-098, "The Army Did Not Properly Account For and Manage Force Provider Equipment in Afghanistan," July 31, 2014, identified \$424.6 million of equipment that was not accounted for and the Army did not require item managers to assign correct equipment coding. As a result, the Army could not hold units responsible for proper use, care, and disposition of equipment, and incorrect coding increased the risk that the equipment would be lost, destroyed, or abandoned in theater.
- (U) DODIG-2015-009, "The Army Needs to Improve the Processes for Reporting Inventory Losses in Afghanistan," October 30, 2014, identified ineffective reporting of inventory losses at the Afghanistan RPAT yards, which increased the risk that missing property would not be recovered.
- (S//NF) DODIG-2015-012, "The DoD Retrograde Process in Afghanistan Needed Improvement," November 5, 2014, DoD OIG: (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(g)

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- (U) DODIG-2015-126, "Contract Oversight for Redistribution Property Assistance Team Operations in Afghanistan Needs Improvement," May 18, 2015, identified the need for effective contract oversight of RPAT operations, which resulted in DoD losing visibility of at least \$26.5 million in equipment.

## (U) List of Classified Documents

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(U) Report No. D-2011-100, "DoD Needs Bi-Directional Flow Agreements and Adequate Tracking Mechanisms for the Northern Distribution Network:"  
SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO

Declassified Date: March 31, 2036

Generated Date: August 19, 2011

(U) Report No. DODIG-2013-066, "Transportation Planning is Sufficient for Retrograde Operations; However, There is an Opportunity to Improve the Efficiency of Management Systems:" SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

Declassified Date: December 12, 2037

Generated Date: April 12, 2013

(U//~~FOUO~~) Report No. DODIG-2014-053, "U.S. Transportation Command Needs To Improve Oversight Procedures for the Multi-Modal Contract Used To Ship Equipment From Afghanistan:" SECRET//NOFORN

Declassified Date: October 2, 2038

Generated Date: April 4, 2014

(U) Report No. DODIG-2015-012, "The DoD Retrograde Process in Afghanistan Needed Improvement:" SECRET//NOFORN

Declassified Date: June 5, 2034

Generated Date: November 5, 2014



## (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<b>ACC</b>	Army Contracting Command
<b>AFSB</b>	Army Field Support Brigade
<b>AMC</b>	Army Materiel Command
<b>ASC</b>	Army Sustainment Command
<b>ARCENT</b>	U.S. Army Central Command
<b>CENTCOM</b>	U.S. Central Command
<b>DLA</b>	Defense Logistics Agency
<b>DS</b>	Disposition Services
<b>DoD OIG</b>	Department of Defense Inspector General
<b>RPAT</b>	Redistribution Property Assistance Teams
<b>SDDC</b>	U.S. Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
<b>TSC</b>	Theater Sustainment Command
<b>USTRANSCOM</b>	U.S. Transportation Command

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

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