Assessment of Intelligence Support to In-Transit Force Protection
Mission

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Vision

Our vision is to be a model oversight organization in the Federal Government by leading change, speaking truth, and promoting excellence—a diverse organization, working together as one professional team, recognized as leaders in our field.

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Objective

We conducted this assessment as a follow-on to our 2003 evaluation following the bombing of the USS Cole. We assessed the effectiveness of in-transit force protection; specifically, the authority, direction, and control of the management, training requirements, and standardizing of force protection operations of the Force Protection Detachment (FPD) program. We assessed the effectiveness of FPDs to: detect and warn of threats to DoD personnel and resources in-transit at overseas locations without a permanent DoD counterintelligence presence, serve as a force multiplier for the U.S. Embassy Country Team in support of the DoD presence and mission, and provide support to force protection operations.

Findings

We found that the FPD program is viable in providing counterintelligence, intelligence, security, and law enforcement support for in-transit DoD forces and the U.S. Embassy Country Team. The U.S. Embassy Country Teams overwhelmingly support the FPDs because they are an extremely valuable force multiplier for the U.S. Embassy Country Team in support of the DoD presence and mission, and provide support to force protection operations.

Findings (cont’d)

and effectively carry out policy. As a result, both FPD personnel and their customers interpret policy guidance in ways that make it relevant only to their particular mission.

We found that a standardized and consistent training program did not exist that addresses the training needs FPD agents require in the field. While the Services trained their agents, the training was inconsistent.

The current validation and prioritization process does not continually monitor FPDs once they have been established and does not consider the viability of FPD offices throughout their life cycle.

In 2012, major aspects of the FPD program were studied by the FPD working group. To ensure that policies, the FPD Joint Standard Operating Procedure, and memorandum of agreement capture the current exigencies, those findings, in conjunction with this report should ensure that processes are current and consistent.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Service Counterintelligence organizations, update policy and training to ensure consistency in program execution, and update the prioritization and validation process, to ensure consistency with current processes, mission execution, program management, and policy to ensure FPDs are operating as the USS Cole Commission originally intended.

Once policy has been updated, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, coordinate with the appropriate office of the Department of State to update the existing memorandum of understanding to correspond with the updated policies to ensure a full understanding of the role of FPDs with U.S. Embassy Country Team members.
Management Comments and Our Response

Management concurred with our comments to update policies and memorandums of understanding as necessary to adequately address current FPD practices; to provide a standardized and consistent training program; and to strengthen the validation and prioritization process to continually monitor FPDs once they have been established. The comments addressed the specifics of the recommendations, and no further comments are required. Please see the recommendations table on the next page.
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MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
COMMANDER, AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
DIRECTOR, NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

SUBJECT: Assessment of Intelligence Support to In-Transit Force Protection
(Report No. DODIG-2015-064)

We are providing this report for your information and use. Policies and memorandums of understanding should be updated to adequately address current Force Protection Detachment (FPD) practices and there is a need for a standardized and consistent training program. In addition, the current validation and prioritization process should be strengthened to continually monitor FPDs once they have been established. We conducted this assessment in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation.

We considered comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report. Management concurred with all recommendations. Comments from the Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command; Commander, Air Force Office of Special Investigations; and Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service addressed all specifics of the recommendations and conformed to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3; therefore, we do not require additional comments.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 699- or the Project Manager at (703) 699- (DSN 499- ).

Assistant Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program Assessments
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Introduction

Objective

As a follow-up to DoD IG Report 03-INTEL-11, “Intelligence Support to In-Transit Force Protection,” June 10, 2003, DoD IG Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program Assessments (ODIG-ISPA), the objective of this assessment was to determine the effectiveness of in-transit force protection. Specifically we assessed the authority, direction, and control of the management, training requirements, and standardizing of force protection operations.

Background

We conducted this evaluation as a follow-up to our June 2003 report, because at that time, the Force Protection Detachment (FPD) program was in its infancy. That report’s overall objective was to determine and assess the status of DoD efforts to improve intelligence support to in-transit force protection. Specifically, the evaluation determined how DoD intelligence support to in-transit force protection evolved since the issuing of the USS Cole Commission report in 2001.

FPDs were established as a result of the USS Cole bombing\(^1\) to address the dangers posed to U.S. forces while in-transit. Force protection was the central theme of the January 2001 USS Cole Commission Report. Additionally, in 2003, we became aware of the FPD program during our evaluation of intelligence support to in-transit force protection, at the request of the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, through the Chairman of the Military Intelligence Board.\(^2\) While our coverage was not extensive at that time, this assessment will provide us the opportunity to evaluate how the FPD programs have progressed since our evaluation in 2003.

The attack on the USS Cole demonstrated gaps in efforts to protect U.S. forces, namely in-transit forces. The January 9, 2001, USS Cole Commission review was focused on finding ways to improve U.S. policies and practices for deterring, disrupting, and mitigating terrorist attacks on U.S. forces in transit.

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\(^1\) On October 12, 2000, the USS Cole was attacked by suicide bombers while in port in Aden, Yemen, for refueling. The explosion ripped a hole in the hull of the ship, killing 17 U.S. sailors. Thirty-nine other individuals were injured.

\(^2\) The Military Intelligence Board serves as the senior-level board for coordinating intelligence assets in support of military operations globally. The board is chaired by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and seeks consensus among commands, agencies, and Services, and is a forum to discuss any intelligence issues related to the military.
The review was based on the premise that worldwide presence and continuous transit of ships, aircraft, and units of the U.S. military support the engagement elements of both the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy and are in the nation's best interests.

The USS Cole Commission findings most closely associated with the FPDs are findings 4, 14, 20, and 21, as follows:

- **Finding 4: Service manning policies and procedures that establish requirements for full-time Force Protection Officers and staff billets at the Service Component level and above will reduce the vulnerability of in-transit forces to terrorist attacks.**
  - Recommendation: Secretary of Defense direct the Services to provide Component Commanders with full-time force protection officers and staffs that are capable of supporting the force protection requirements of transiting units.

- **Finding 14: Intra-theater transiting units require the same degree of attention as other transiting units to deter, disrupt, and mitigate acts of terrorism.**
  - Recommendation: Secretary of Defense direct Geographic CINCs [Commanders in Chief] and Component Commanders to reassess current procedures to ensure that AT/FP [anti-terrorism/force protection] principles enumerated in this [USS Cole Commission] Report are applied to intra-theater transiting units.
• **Finding 20:** Service counterintelligence (CI) programs are integral to force protection and must be adequately manned and funded to meet the dynamic demands of supporting in-transit forces.
  
  ○ *Recommendation:* Secretary of Defense ensure DoD CI organizations are adequately staffed and funded to meet CI force protection requirements.

• **Finding 21:** Clearer DoD standards for threat and vulnerability assessments must be developed at the joint level and be common across Services and commands.
  
  ○ *Recommendations:

  - Secretary of Defense standardize CI assessments and increase CI resources.
  - Secretary of Defense direct DoD-standard requirements for the conduct of threat and vulnerability assessments for combating terrorism.
  - Secretary of Defense direct the production of a DoD-standard CI Collection Manual for combating terrorism.

The FPD program, under DoD Instruction 5240.22, “Counterintelligence Support to Force Protection,” September 24, 2009, provides that DoD embassy-based CI Agents from Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), and Army Intelligence give CI support to force protection. These Joint Service offices require National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 38\(^3\) approval from the Ambassador.

Agent positions are long-term assignments where the Services maintain operational and administrative control of their Agents. FPDs coordinate their activities with the Senior Defense Official (SDO) and Country Team. Each Combatant Command (CCMD) works through the SDO to task the FPD. Military Intelligence Program funds and Overseas Contingency Operations funds primarily finance the program.

The primary mission of the FPD program is to detect and warn of threats to DoD personnel and resources in-transit at overseas locations without a permanent DoD CI presence. The mission further includes serving as a force multiplier for the U.S. Embassy Country Team to support the DoD presence and mission, which includes liaison, defense threat assessments, route and travel threat assessments, foreign intelligence and terrorist threat briefings, DoD investigative lead reporting, intelligence report production, and conducting vulnerability assessments of ports,

\(^3\) NSDD 38, June 2, 1982, gives the Chief of Mission (CoM) control of the size, composition, and mandate of overseas full-time mission staffing for all U.S. Government agencies.
airfields, and routes used by in-transit forces. FPD Special Agents have unique access to foreign military, law enforcement, and security officials capable of fulfilling priority DoD force protection needs.

The FPDs have an extensive stakeholder community, which include:

- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD[I]);
- Joint Staff;
- CCMDs;
- Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA);
- Army Military Intelligence;
- NCIS;
- AFOSI; and
- Department of State (DoS), Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

In May 2010, the Director, Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center, approved the concept for carrying out a joint assessment of the FPD program and its individual offices. The FPD Functional Management Office was responsible for overseeing the joint assessment in conjunction with the Services and in coordination with the DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the CCMDs. The joint assessment's purpose was to assess the execution of mission and functions of the FPD program with the goal to identify and correct systemic enterprise-wide problems and to highlight best practices.

In accordance with DoD Instruction 5100.93, “Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center,” August 13, 2010, DIA conducted an interim review of the FPD program to assess program performance and efficiency (August 1, 2012). Following this assessment, DIA conducted a program study of the FPDs (October 4, 2012).

The 2012 FPD program assessment included:

- pre-assessment data calls;
- staff visits to CCMD headquarters;
- individual site visits to FPD offices; and
- an interim report based on data responses, Military Department CI Organization site visit reports, and information obtained during the review.

The assessment focused on functional management, resource management, office administration, and training. Our assessment’s findings were similar to what was found during the 2012 joint assessments.
Finding A

Effectiveness of Existing Policy

We found that policies are obsolete, overlap, or do not provide sufficient guidance. The FPD program developed many policies during the program's existence, which had not been re-coordinated. Uncoordinated policies make it difficult for field personnel to consistently carry out policy in the most effective manner. As a result, both FPD personnel and their stakeholders interpret policy guidance in ways that make it relevant only to their particular mission.

We were informed by USD(I) representatives, upon notification of this assessment, that scheduled policy updates were being placed on hold pending the publication of the assessment results.

Policies

DoD Instruction 5240.22

DoD Instruction 5240.22, “Counterintelligence Support to Force Protection,” September 24, 2009, is the primary policy governing the FPD program. The Instruction states that:

- The FPD's primary mission is to detect and warn of threats to DoD personnel and resources in-transit at overseas locations without a permanent CI presence;
- The FPD mission includes serving as a force multiplier for the U.S. Embassy Country Team;
- FPDs shall maintain close operational synchronization with the Regional Security Officer (RSO), the Defense Attaché, and other country team members, as appropriate; and

We found that guidance contained in DoD Instruction 5240.22 was not sufficiently aligned with the May 2, 2003, memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the DoS Diplomatic Security and DoD’s Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA). (See Finding B.) For example, DoD Instruction 5240.22 does not state that FPD

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4 CIFA was disestablished on May 15, 2008, and its mission, functions, and all associated resources were transferred to DIA’s Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center.
agents will assist in protective service operations (PSO). We found that numerous FPD agents are not only assisting with PSOs, but are providing direct PSO for distinguished visitors, U.S. Ambassadors, Combatant Commanders, and other U.S. government personnel.

We found that DoD Instruction 5240.22 provides insufficient detail on how commands are to determine which FPDs to close, especially when they no longer meet the intent of the USS Cole Commission findings; specifically, Finding 20. The Commission report recommended that FPDs be located where DoD personnel and resources are at higher risk. According to DoD Instruction 5240.22, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall receive, validate, and prioritize requests for new FPD locations from the CCMDs. It also states that the CCMDs shall prioritize requests for new FPD locations in their area of responsibility and submit the requests to the Joint Staff. It further states that DIA supports establishing FPDs. However, we did not find that any of these organizations continuously monitored or adequately addressed the need to close an FPD. (See Finding D.)

**DoD FPD Joint Standard Operating Procedure**

The Army’s Counterintelligence, Foreign Disclosure, and Security Directorate Headquarters; the AFOSI; and the NCIS signed the FPD Joint Standard Operating Procedure (JSOP), on June 30, 2007, which standardizes procedures for operating DoD FPDs. There is a more current (2011) version of the JSOP, however, that version is not signed. When updated, the JSOP should reflect current policy.

The JSOP includes unclear guidance on both RSO and SDO tasking authority over the FPD. For example, under the Command and Control section, the guidance states the RSO has tasking authority over the FPD for the purpose of requesting incidental force protection/security support. The JSOP should clearly explain the meaning of incidental force protection, first responder, and security support to avoid any misunderstanding.

**Draft FPD Letter of Instruction**

DIA’s draft Letter of Instruction (LOI) is intended to explain the FPD lines of authority and responsibilities. DIA is still staffing the draft LOI; however, we found that the draft LOI was not needed because of its redundancy and overlapping of the original MoU, DoD FPD JSOP, DoD Instruction 5240.22, and DoD Directive 5205.75. Even if enacted, the
LOI would not replace these policies, and we are further recommending that the policies themselves need to be updated. Additionally, we are recommending that policies and MoUs be updated or created, where appropriate, to adequately address current FPD practices, and to make it easier for field personnel to consistently carry out policy in the most effective manner.

**DoD Directive O-5240.02**

DoD Directive O-5240.02, “Counterintelligence,” December 2007, states that DoD CI shall maintain a presence in designated overseas locations through FPDs to support the CCMDs by detecting and warning of threats to in-transit and assigned DoD personnel and resources. The FPDs shall receive CCMD requirements through the SDO/Defense Attaché and may be dual-hatted as the DoD CI coordinating authority. Each FPD should have a multi-Service CI team, with one Service serving as the lead.

Both DoD Directive O-5240.02 and DoD Instruction 5240.22 state that the CCMDs shall task the FPDs through the SDO. Also, the CCMDs shall work through the SDO for tasking the FPD under DoD Directive 5105.75. We found that most FPDs did not receive CCMD requirements through the SDO/Defense Attaché, nor did they receive direct tasking from the CCMDs. Additionally, Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System (APACS) cannot ensure protection of transiting personnel if they are unaware of the personnel’s impending arrival. During the course of interviews, we found that some agents stated this was the case. One way to ensure the awareness of transiting forces is by using the Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System (APACS). APACS is a web-based tool designed to aid DoD aircraft mission planners and operators, and DoD travelers on official business (and in some cases official leave).
overseas in meeting the clearance requirements outlined in the DoD Foreign Clearance Guide. APACS automates the process of requesting and approving diplomatic and personnel clearances using a secure, centralized database.

The use of APACS for processing DoD-sponsored foreign travel in all CCMDs has been mandatory since May 1, 2008. The DoD Executive Agent for the Foreign Clearance Program has authorized APACS as the web-based tool to create, submit, coordinate, and approve aircraft, diplomatic, and personnel travel clearances (Special Area, Theater, and Country) for DoD-sponsored travel.

**DoD Directive 5205.75**


The FPD is required to coordinate its mission through the SDO, but it is also a separate agency and exercises the right as its own point of contact on FPD matters. We found this Directive sufficiently addresses FPD operations at U.S. Embassies and the SDO’s coordinating authority over DoD elements.

**DoD Directive 5143.01**

DoD Directive 5143.01, “Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)),” November 23, 2005, authorizes the USD(I), as the Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense, to issue DoD policy in DoD Instructions regarding intelligence, CI, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters. In this capacity, the USD(I) exercises the Secretary of Defense’s authority, direction, and control over the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities that are Defense intelligence, CI, or security Components and exercises planning, policy, and strategic oversight over all DoD intelligence, CI, and security policy, plans, and programs. The USD(I) also oversees Defense intelligence, CI, and security policy, plans, programs, required capabilities, and resource allocations, which include exercising responsibility for the DoD Components in the Military Intelligence Program.

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5 The DoD Foreign Clearance Guide provides necessary information for aircraft international mission planning and execution, personnel travel to foreign countries, as well as general information on foreign locations.
Conclusion

We found that policies should be updated or created where applicable, and the JSOP should be updated to reflect current policy. The 2007 FPD JSOP is outdated and one of the signatory agencies—CIFA—no longer exists. There is a 2011 version of the JSOP; however, that version is not signed.

DIA is still staffing the draft LOI; however, we found that the draft LOI is not needed because of its redundancy and overlapping of the original MoU, DoD FPD JSOP, DoD Instruction 5240.22, and DoD Directive 5205.75. Even if enacted, the LOI would not replace these policies, and we are further recommending that the policies themselves need to be updated.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

Recommendation A1

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence review all Force Protection Detachment roles and responsibilities, and update policies as necessary to include, at a minimum:

- and required use of the Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System; and
- office/team composition.

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Comments

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence concurred with our recommendation to review all Force Protection Detachment roles and responsibilities and update existing policies. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence was already in the process of updating those policies, with an anticipated completion of no later than the end of the 4th quarter of FY 2015.

Our Response

Comments from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

Recommendation A2

We recommend that the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, in conjunction with the Service counterintelligence components and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, update the Force Protection Detachment Joint Standard Operating Procedure so it contains current and clear guidance for Force Protection Detachment operations.
Office of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, in Conjunction with the Offices of the Service Counterintelligence Components and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Comments

The office of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency concurred with our recommendation to update the Force Protection Detachment Joint Standard Operating Procedure, in conjunction with the offices of the Service Counterintelligence Components and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. An initial update is slated for completion on March 31, 2015. Once policies and the memorandum of understanding (recommendations A1 and B) are completed, a final update will be accomplished.

Our Response

Comments from the office of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, in conjunction with comments from the offices of the Service Counterintelligence Components and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.
Memorandums of Understanding

Department of State Report of Inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security Directorate for International Programs

In a December 2005 Report of Inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security Directorate for International Programs, the DoS OIG stated that two interagency agreements form the foundation of the FPD program—the 1997 DoS/DoD MoU on Security of DoD Elements and Personnel in Foreign Areas, and the 2003 DoS/DoD MoU concerning FPDs. The 1997 MoU established a framework for assigning responsibility for the security of DoD personnel in foreign areas not under the DoD-area Combatant Commander. The MoU established guidelines for CoMs and CCMDs to enter into local implementing agreements, or MoUs, for the security of all DoD personnel in-country. Under these guidelines, all DoD personnel under the security responsibility of the CoM are listed under Annex A of the local implementing agreement, and those DoD personnel under the security responsibility of the Combatant Commander are listed under Annex B.

The 2003 DoS/DoD MoU concerning FPDs sets forth the purpose and principles of the operation of FPDs and their relationship to the CoM and RSO. As the MoU states, FPD is the program title for an initiative to permanently place DoD Special Agents at overseas locations with a history of significant in-transit DoD ships, personnel, and aircraft. The FPD program's primary mission is to help protect DoD personnel under the security responsibility of the CCMD. This includes personnel listed under Annex B of the local implementing agreement of the 1997 MoU.

According to the 2003 MoU, FPDs will be placed in U.S. missions under the auspices of the RSO, who will oversee FPD operations and have tasking authority over them. However, DoS management expressed concerns about the lack of clarity concerning the relationship between FPD personnel assigned to a mission and the mission's RSO as it relates to separating force protection responsibilities between the CoM.
and the CCMD. DoS had not provided implementing guidelines of the 2003 MoU for RSO use. The report further stated that the wording of the 2003 MoU can be misleading about the relationship between the FPD and the mission's RSO.

The concern of DoS managers, which was shared by DoS OIG, is that lacking sufficient clarity in the MoU, and lacking implementing guidelines, an RSO or a CoM might inadvertently influence or attempt to control the FPD’s work and thereby be held responsible for the security of DoD personnel, when in fact they are the CCMD’s security responsibility. The report also stated that the MoU should be reviewed so that it is either amended or guidelines are implemented to ensure adequate CoM and RSO oversight over FPDs without involvement with, or interference in, the performance of the FPD’s primary mission.

Therefore, the DoS OIG recommended that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security review the 2003 Memorandum of Understanding between the DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security and DoD's CIFA concerning FPDs and either amend the memorandum or establish implementing guidelines to ensure adequate COM oversight, while maintaining the required separation of security responsibilities between the COM and the Area Theater Combatant Commander.

**DoD OIG Assessment of the 2003 Department of State and DoD Memorandums of Understanding**

The May 9, 2003, MoU states that the:

- FPDs will be placed in U.S. Missions as an associated DoD force protection activity under the auspices of the RSO office;
- RSO has oversight of FPD operations to ensure compliance with DoS policies and procedures;
- RSO has tasking authority over the FPD for the purpose of requesting incidental force protection/security support; and
- RSO and FPD will mutually support the force protection missions of both organizations in and outside the embassy.

This MoU, signed between DoS’s Diplomatic Security and DoD’s CIFA, is outdated and CIFA was deactivated on August 3, 2008. The DIA assumed FPD management responsibilities on behalf of DoD.

We assessed that the MoU is intended to provide flexibility, but it is too ambiguous. The MoU states that FPDs will be placed “within the auspices of the RSO office.” We found that DoD and DoS leaders did not always agree on the interpretation of that terminology. According to DoD Directive 5105.75, Department of Defense Operations at U.S. Embassies (now DoD Directive 5205.75), the SDO exercises
coordinating authority over all DoD elements under CoM authority. The MoU, however, does not mention the DoD representative's role, but instead refers the reader to another MoU signed between the DIA and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Security and Information Operations Counterintelligence office on the interaction of DAOs and FPDs.

The MoU states that FPDs and RSOs will work together to ensure there are no conflicts in their sources of information; ensure that information is properly shared; and ensure that no confusion is created among host-nation officials about each of their primary responsibilities. However, FPDs are also required to ______ but the MoU does not mention that requirement.

The MoU further states that the RSO has tasking authority over the FPD to request incidental force protection and security support. We assessed that this authority, however, is too vague and leads to confusion among the embassy’s FPD, DoS, and DoD leadership. Also, as stated in the DoS OIG report, there were concerns about the lack of clarity concerning the relationship between FPD personnel assigned to a mission and the mission’s RSO as it relates to separating force protection responsibilities between the CoM and the CCMD.

Lastly, the DoS MoU states that FPD activities will be carried out according to priorities that the geographic Combatant Commanders established in coordination with the RSO. Those activities will include, but not be limited to, preparing threat assessments and informational documents; communicating with foreign law enforcement and security officials; preparing antiterrorist surveys, route/travel threat assessments, antiterrorist and CI threat briefings; assisting in investigations/operations, and in PSOs; and serving as a point-of-contact in the embassy for DoD CI and law enforcement organizations. However, the MoU lacks provisions for additional FPD activities, such as for direct support to PSOs.

**Conclusion**

We found that the MoUs lack provisions for additional FPD activities, such as for direct support to PSOs, and clarification of “FPDs will be placed within the auspices of the RSO.” DoD policy had not been updated to reflect the latest DoD policy and associated requirements with the FPD program and the Embassy’s Country Team environment.
Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

**Recommendation B**

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, coordinate with the appropriate Department of State office to update the 2003 Memorandum of Understanding to reflect DoD policy and requirements with the Force Protection Detachment program and the Embassy's Country Team environment.

**Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Comments**

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence concurred with our recommendation to update the 2003 Memorandum of Understanding with the appropriate Department of State office. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will complete the update no later than the end of the 4th quarter of FY 2015.

**Our Response**

Comments from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.
Finding C

Effectiveness of Existing Training

We found no standardized and consistent training program that addresses the FPD field agent's needs. The Services trained their Special Agents, but the training was inconsistent because a common competency-based training course had not been established. The absence of a consistent training program results in a fragmentary training structure and reflects the absence of an integrated program framework.

The challenges and needs of today's FPDs call for establishing a training course that addresses core competencies associated with FPD mission execution. The Services instituted language and critical training skill requirements to ensure robust CI support to force protection efforts, in accordance with the Secretary of Defense's-directed implementation of USS Cole Commission recommendations. Those skills and knowledge requirements are established in the FPD JSOP.

Special Agents in Charge have identified several areas of training for agents assigned to FPDs. Training consistent with the JSOP ensures a baseline for all agents assigned abroad, regardless of their CI component origin, and reduces the time needed for newly-arrived agents to become 100 percent mission capable.

Current Training Policy

DoD Instruction 5240.22 requires the DIA to determine common advanced training standards for CI support to force protection skills and incorporate the standards into the training curriculum at the Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy (JCITA). The Instruction requires the Services to ensure that deploying CI personnel receive specialized training on CI support to force protection.

The JSOP states that each Service is responsible for coordinating training required before assignment. Additionally, each Service is responsible for planning, programming, and funding routine professional development, personal proficiency training, and ancillary training, while in-country FPD Agents coordinate any training that may be available from the Embassy and satisfies Service requirements for professional development or personal proficiency training.
Critical skills key to Agent success, as the JSOP identifies, are:

- knowledge of or experience in CI collections, investigations, and reporting;
- ability to conduct threat assessments of hotels, routes, etc.;
- support to ship and aircraft visits;
- facilitation of PSOs; protective threat assessments;
- familiarity with criminal investigations and crime scene processing principles;
- anti-terrorism driving skills;
- U.S. Embassy Diplomatic operational considerations; and
- language fluency (desired but not mandatory).

**Current Training Landscape**

Information obtained during interviews confirmed the need for standardized, requisite, and consistent training in the FPD program.

Army Intelligence has a mixture of training from FPD immediate certification, new agent foundational, annual training, and supplemental/ad hoc training. The training focuses on such critical competencies as embassy operations and fiscal management; the Attache training program; FPD policies and procedures; FPD key tasks; and roles and responsibilities.

NCIS FPD Agents are assessed upon being approved for an FPD assignment and given the necessary training as determined by requirements from the DoS (working in an embassy, etc.) and/or specific skills needed (language, specific CI skills, etc.).

AFOSI follows the training requirements outlined in the JSOP, and also specific training identified for specific locations.

The Services have either developed training or send their Agents to training courses prior to sending them to their field locations. Moreover, the JCITA does not conduct in-house training for FPD agents because there are too few agents going through the in-house course to make in-house training viable.

**Future Training Efforts**

The JCITA is presently developing a computer-based training course for FPD agents. The curriculum consists of:

- FPD History and policy overview;
- “Embassy 101” — working overseas in a U.S. embassy (the DoS environment);
• FPD customers — who you work for/with;
• FPD operations;
• FPD generated products;
• FPD — Office management (the role of the Special Agent in Charge);
• Ethics and personal conduct;
• Force multiplier role;
• Cultural issues; and
• The family.

To ensure course currency, JCITA should establish a formal system to integrate FPD course feedback from graduates and their supervisors and report results, at least annually, to the FPD Functional Manager.

Conclusion

The challenges and needs of today’s FPDs call for the establishing an FPD training course to address core competencies associated with FPD mission execution. Those skills and knowledge requirements are established in the FPD JSOP. Integrating course feedback from graduates and their supervisors could help ensure course consistency.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

Recommendation C

We recommend the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, ensure that the Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy:

1. Completes and fields the Force Protection Detachment computer-based training course.
2. Establishes a formal system to integrate Force Protection Detachment course feedback from graduates and their supervisors and report results, at least annually, to the Force Protection Detachment Functional Manager.
Office of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Comments

The Office of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency concurred with our recommendation to ensure that the Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy completes and fields the Force Protection Detachment computer-based training course, to include formal feedback. The computer-based training is scheduled to be completed by July 2015.

Our Response

Comments from the office of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.
Finding D

Effectiveness of the Validation and Prioritization Process

The current validation and prioritization process does not continually monitor FPDs once they have been established and no focal point exists for deciding whether FPD offices are viable throughout their existence. Current guidance does not support the required level of monitoring to ensure existing FPD offices are still relevant to the overall DoD mission. If FPD offices are not monitored throughout mission life-cycle and decisions are not made regarding their disposition, DoD cannot ensure that FPD offices are being effectively used to meet the threshold of protecting DoD resources where those resources are at risk and no permanent CI presence exists.

Current Validation and Prioritization Process

As mentioned in Finding A, per DoD Instruction 5240.22, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall receive, validate, and prioritize requests for new FPD locations from the CCMDs; however, we have not found sufficient evidence that suggests the Joint Staff, nor any other organization, is continuously monitoring or adequately addressing the need to close an FPD. Additionally, DoD Instruction 5240.22 states that the CCMDs shall prioritize requests for new FPD locations in their area of responsibility and submit the requests to the Joint Staff; however, no mention is made that the CCMDs will consider whether an FPD office is viable once established. Finally, DoD Instruction 5240.22 also states DIA supports establishing FPDs; however, no mention is made that DIA will consider closing an FPD office.

We found that every three years, the J33 conducts a process in which it asks the CCMDs to rank the priority of the FPD offices which are located in their areas of responsibility, to include current and newly-nominated offices, and offices to close.

The CCMDs rank the FPDs according to the Prioritization Formula that the FPD Working Group developed. The process involves each CCMD completing their
prioritization list. The CCMD’s prioritized lists are processed by J33, resulting in a weighted score and being prioritized against all nominated FPDs. However, nothing in DoD Instruction 5240.22 mentions the requirements to close an FPD office.

**Threat Levels and Protection Thresholds**

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A process to review and revalidate incumbent FPDs for closure is needed, especially when they no longer meet the intent of the USS Cole Commission’s finding, particularly Finding 20. As part of our interviews with the FPD’s Special Agents and members of the U.S. Embassy Country Team, along with questionnaires received, FPD mission briefs, and informational reports, we overwhelmingly found that criminal threats, as opposed to terrorist threats, pose the greatest threat to in-transit forces, which is outside of their counterintelligence mission.
During this assessment, and in accordance with Monthly Activity Reports, of the

In many of these locations, we found the force protection mission is not being performed in a manner consistent with the DoD Directive O-5240.02, DoD Instruction 5240.22, and USS Cole Commission Findings.

The preferred FPD model was to establish CI in countries that transiting U.S. forces frequent where higher threat levels exist and was without a permanent CI presence. In accordance with the DoS MoU of May 9, 2003, the USS Cole Commission recommended to the Secretary of Defense to “resource Department of Defense counterintelligence agents to conduct counterintelligence collections/services to detect and defeat terrorist planning against DoD and place agents at key transit points where DoD personnel and resources are at risk.”

**Successful Practice — Force Protection Detachments Jordan and Colombia**

During our assessment, we visited the FPDs in Amman, Jordan, and Bogota, Colombia. We observed FPDs Jordan and Colombia to be excellent examples of how FPD offices should be modeled. FPDs Jordan and Colombia are both multi-Service offices with Special Agents representing each Service. An AFOSI senior agent leads FPD Jordan and it employs one Army and one Navy Special Agent. An Army
CI senior agent leads FPD Colombia and it employs two Army, one Navy, and one Air Force Special Agent. In both locations, these FPDs run their respective offices in accordance with the USS Cole Commission Report, Finding 20, and the FPD JSOP. In both FPD Jordan and FPD Colombia, each Special Agent is, or will be, language qualified in the host country’s language, which is due largely to the embassy offering language training to Country Team members who are not yet functional in their respective languages.

Although the FPD mission consists of CI, security, and law enforcement support to force protection for in-transit forces, FPDs Jordan and Colombia have been able to successfully bridge the gap between intelligence and law enforcement to protect against the high terrorism threat found in both countries. Both FPD Jordan and FPD Colombia have done an extraordinary job of keeping stakeholders informed of the threats that may affect not only DoD in-transit forces, but also DoD civilians, dependents, Embassy personnel, and U.S. Coast Guard in-transit forces. FPDs Jordan and Colombia have an extensive network of contacts in the military, CI, law enforcement, and security services in each country.

Special Agents of FPDs Jordan and Colombia play an integral role in providing CI support to the risk management programs of U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Transportation Command, and other stakeholders involved with in-transit forces. The Special Agents’ achievements, both individually and collectively, reflect success in securing the operations of DoD personnel who transit in and through Jordan and Colombia. Those achievements are seen in all areas including CI operations, law enforcement first response, and PSOs.

As a result of their outstanding reputation for innovative partnership, FPDs Jordan and Colombia represent the new paradigm for modern CI support to force protection, bridging the gap between intelligence and law enforcement to protect national assets through integration, collaboration, and partnership.

**Conclusion**

As articulated in Finding A, streamlined and tailored policy is key to ensure issues such as a process for validating, prioritizing, and reviewing incumbent FPDs for closure; specifically, closing those FPDs that no longer meet the intent of the USS Cole Commission's Finding 20 are addressed.
Moreover, if FPD offices are not monitored throughout mission life-cycle, and decisions are not made regarding their disposition, DoD cannot ensure that FPD offices are being effectively used to meet the threshold of protecting DoD resources, where those resources are at risk.

Conducting a study (to include reviewing roles and responsibilities, processes, and corresponding policy(s)) would provide the focus needed to ensure that FPDs are operating as originally intended. We believe that, commensurate with operational needs, and where practicable, each FPD should have a multi-service CI team to fully represent integration, collaboration, and partnership.

**Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

**Recommendation D**

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Service counterintelligence components establish in policy:

1. The need for creation of a consistent process for validating, prioritizing, and reviewing incumbent Force Protection Detachments for closure. Ensure that the USS Cole Commission’s finding 20 is a central criterion in the validation and prioritization process;
2. That priorities of the validation and prioritization formula are continuously monitored and accurately reflect the Force Protection Detachment’s mission and the threat against which they are protecting.

**Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in Conjunction with the Offices of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Service Counterintelligence Component Comments**

The office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Service Counterintelligence Components concurred with our recommendations to establish in policy a consistent process for validating, prioritizing, and reviewing incumbent Force Protection Detachments for closure; and that priorities of the
validation and prioritization formula are continuously monitored. During the course of the assessment a process was finalized and implemented through the Joint Staff and will be addressed in the policy update by the end of the 4th quarter of FY 2015.

Our Response
Comments from the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in conjunction with the comments of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Service Counterintelligence Components addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.
Appendix

Scope and Methodology

This assessment was conducted in collaboration with the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Office of Inspector General from May 2013 to April 2014, in accordance with Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation that the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency issued. Those standards require that we plan and perform the assessment to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our assessment objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our assessment objectives. To accomplish the objective, we reviewed relevant policies and guidance and interviewed officials responsible for carrying out the FPD mission.

We reviewed existing policies to determine the extent to which the policies governing the FPD program are consistent and effective. We also reviewed the mechanisms for disseminating intelligence to appropriate stakeholders and evaluated the level of preparedness and training of personnel assigned to support the FPD program.

Our data collection efforts involved collecting and reviewing more than 3,000 pages of relevant data from DoD, DoS, DIA, and the Services, including executive orders, directives, regulations, manuals, references, letters of instruction, operational directives, MoUs, and concept papers.

- We interviewed more than 100 U.S. government civilian and military personnel. Specifically, we conducted structured interviews (either in person, via telephone, or via video teleconferencing) with representatives from DoS, AFOSI, NCIS, Army Military Intelligence, DIA, OUSD(I), CCMDs, Joint Staff, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, Regional Affairs Office, Drug Enforcement Agency, DAOs, and embassy military offices that fall under the purview of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency—known as the Office of Security Cooperation, Military Assistance Group, Office of Defense Cooperation, or Security Cooperation Office.

- We developed comprehensive questionnaires designed to help us determine the attitudes and perceptions of the FPD Special Agents and Program Managers, DIA Functional Managers, and the OUSD(I), on training, command and control, operations, and production. The FPD Program Managers distributed those questionnaires to the FPD Special Agents on our behalf to 34 worldwide locations by secure communication links. Of the 39 questionnaires distributed (34 FPD Agents, 3 FPD...
Program Managers, 1 DIA Functional Manager, and 1 OUSD(I) representative), we received 31 responses (26 FPD Agents, 3 FPD Program Managers, 1 DIA Functional Manager, and 1 USD(I) representative).

- We conducted site visits to FPD locations in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic; Bogota, Colombia; Amman, Jordan; Nairobi, Kenya; and Sofia, Bulgaria. We also interviewed the Deputy CoM and/or Chargé d’Affaires, Regional Affairs Officers, SDOs, FPD Special Agents, and other Country Team members who have a direct working relationship with the FPD Agents. We made site trips to the CCMDs in Florida, where we visited Central Command and Southern Command, and interviewed the J2X and J3 of each.

**Computer-Processed Data**

We did not rely on computer-processed data to perform this assessment.

**Use of Technical Assistance**

During the assessment, we requested and received technical assistance from the DoD OIG Quantitative Methods Division (QMD). We worked with QMD during our planning phase.

**Prior Coverage**

In the last five years, neither the GAO nor the DoD OIG have issued any reports pertaining to Force Protection Detachments. Unrestricted GAO reports are at [http://www.gao.gov](http://www.gao.gov). Our website is [www.dodig.mil](http://www.dodig.mil).

Management Comments

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE EVALUATIONS AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS

SUBJECT: Response to Assessment of Intelligence Support to In-Transit Force Protection (Project No. D2013-DINT01-0167.000)

This office has reviewed your draft report dated 29 October, 2014 and concurs with the recommendations. Attached are specific comments to the areas identified in the report (reference page ii of the report). My point of contact is [e-mail: mail.mil].

Attachments:
As stated
Finding A  
Effectiveness of Existing Policy  
We found that policies are obsolete, overlap, or do not provide sufficient guidance. The FPD program developed many policies during the program’s existence, which had not been re-coordinated. Uncoordinated policies make it difficult for field personnel to consistently carry out policy in the most effective manner. As a result, both FPD personnel and their stakeholders interpret policy guidance in ways that make it relevant only to their particular mission.

Recommendation A1  
We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence review all Force Protection Detachment roles and responsibilities, and update policies as necessary to include, at a minimum:
- and required use of the Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System; and office/team composition  
USD(I) CI & FLES response to Recommendation A1  
Concur with updating existing policies. As noted in the report, this office was preparing to start updating policy in 2013; however all policy updates were placed on hold pending the outcome of this assessment. Estimate completion no later than end of 4th quarter FY15.

Finding B  
Effectiveness of Existing Memorandums of Understanding  
We found that MoUs were outdated or were issued between agencies that no longer exist. This occurred because annual reviews were not conducted as stated in the MoUs. In the absence of annual reviews, details in the existing MoU cannot effectively address current exigencies.

Recommendation B  
We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, coordinate with the appropriate Department of State office to update the 2003 Memorandum of Understanding to reflect DoD policy and requirements with the Force Protection Detachment program and the Embassy’s Country Team environment.

USD(I) CI & FLES response to Recommendation B  
We concur with the recommendation and have begun working with DoS to update the Memorandum of Understanding. Estimate completion no later than end of 4th Qtr FY15.
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (cont’d)

Finding D
Effectiveness of the Validation and Prioritization Process

The current validation and prioritization process does not continually monitor FPDs once they have been established and no focal point exists for deciding whether FPD offices are viable throughout their existence. Current guidance does not support the required level of monitoring to ensure existing FPD offices are still relevant to the overall DoD mission. If FPD offices are not monitored throughout mission life cycle and decisions are not made regarding their disposition, DoD cannot ensure that FPD offices are being effectively used to meet the threshold of protecting DoD resources where those resources are at risk and no permanent CI presence exists.

Recommendation D
We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Service counterintelligence components establish in policy:
1. The need for creation of a consistent process for validating, prioritizing, and reviewing incumbent Force Protection Detachments for closure. Ensure that the USS Cole Commission’s finding 20 is a central criterion in the validation and prioritization process;
2. That priorities of the validation and prioritization formula are continuously monitored and accurately reflect the Force Protection Detachment’s mission and the threat against which they are protecting.

USD(I) CI & FLES response to Recommendation D1
We concur with the recommendation and wish to note that during the course of the assessment a process was finalized and implemented through the Joint Staff. The process will be addressed in the policy update.

USD(I) CI & FLES response to Recommendation D2
We concur with the recommendation and will address it in the policy update. Item D1 has been completed and will be referenced in policy no later than end of 4th quarter FY15. Item D2 is ongoing and will be referenced in policy no later than end of 4th quarter FY15.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code: 20318-3000  5 December 14

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR INTELLIGENCE EVALUATIONS AND SPECIAL
PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS

Subject: Assessment of Intelligence Support to In-Transit Force Protection
(Project No. D2013-DINT01-0157.000)

1. J-33 reviewed the assessment, specifically, Finding D, Effectiveness of the Validation and Prioritization Process, and agrees with the DoD IG’s recommendations.

2. During the course of this assessment, the validation and prioritization process was finalized and implemented by J-33. OUSD[IL] will codify that process in the next policy update of DoDI 5240.22.

3. My point of contact for this matter is [redacted] J-33, at [redacted]

THOMAS A. BUSSIERE
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Director for Nuclear, Homeland Defense and Current Operations, J-33

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
U-11,535-14/CCO

To: ACTING ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE EVALUATIONS AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS

Subject: Response to Assessment of Intelligence Support to In-Transit Force Protection

Reference: Assessment of Intelligence Support to In-Transit Force Protection (Project No. D2013-DINT01-0167.000)

This office has reviewed your draft report dated 29 October 2014 and concurs with the recommendations. Enclosed are specific comments to the areas identified in the report (page ii of the report). Point of contact is [Redacted].

Enclosure a/s

Deputy Chief, Community Coordination Office
Directorate for Operations
Office of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (cont’d)

Finding A
Effectiveness of Existing Policy
Recommendation A2

We recommend that the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, in conjunction with the Service counterintelligence components and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, update the Force Protection Detachment Joint Standard Operating Procedure so it contains current and clear guidance for Force Protection Detachment operations.

DIA Comment:

Finding C
Effectiveness of Existing Training
Recommendation C

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, ensure that the Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy:

1. Completes and fields the Force Protection Detachment computer-based training course.

2. Establishes a formal system to integrate Force Protection Detachment course feedback from graduates and their supervisors and report results, at least annually, to the Force Protection Detachment Functional Manager.

DIA comment:

Finding D
Effectiveness of the Prioritization and Validation Process

Recommendation D

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency;
Office of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (cont’d)

and the Service counterintelligence components establish in policy:

1. The need for creation of a consistent process for validating, prioritizing, and reviewing incumbent Force Protection Detachments for closure. Ensure that the USS Cole Commission’s finding 20 is a central criterion in the validation and prioritization process;

2. That priorities of the validation and prioritization formula are continuously monitored and accurately reflect the Force Protection Detachment’s mission and the threat against which they are protecting.

DIA comments:

OSD/JS: (b)(5); DIA: (b)(5), (b)(3), 10 USC § 424
Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ATTN: OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS

SUBJECT: U.S. Army Response to the Department of Defense Inspector General Assessment of the Force Protection Detachment Program (Project No. D2013-DINT01-0167.000)


2. The U.S. Army generally agrees with all findings and recommendations contained in the above referenced assessment. Of the recommendations contained in the assessment, only three are directly relevant to the Army. Detailed below are the Army’s responses to the three recommendations that directly pertain to Army equities or that will require Army participation in remedial measures:

   a. Finding A, Effectiveness of Existing Policy. The assessment team found existing Force Protection Detachment (FPD) Program authoritative documents were outdated and uncoordinated. Recommendation A2. The team recommended the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), in conjunction with the Services update the Joint Standard Operating Procedure (JSOP) document to provide current and updated guidance for FPD operations. U.S. Army Response. The U.S. Army agrees with this recommendation and will continue to fully participate and coordinate timely responses to DIA and the Office of the Secretary of Defense as they update and revise FPD Program authoritative documents.

   b. Finding D, Effectiveness of the Validation and Prioritization Process. The assessment team found current validation and prioritization process does not continually monitor FPDs for continued viability throughout their existence.

      (1) Recommendation D1. The team identified the need for a consistent evaluative process for FPDs throughout their lifespan. U.S. Army Response. The U.S. Army agrees with this recommendation and will continue to provide input into the validation, prioritization, and review for continued viability processes. The U.S. Army FPD Management Office will continue to coordinate these efforts with DIA, the other Services, and relevant stakeholders to enable a standardized, systematic approach.
Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (cont’d)

DOD OIG: (b)(6)

3. (U) The point of contact for this response is Program Manager, DSN (b)(6) or (CMIL) at (b)(6) or (email.mil).
MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE EVALUATIONS AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS

SUBJECT: Response to Assessment of Intelligence Support to In-Transit Force Protection (Project No. D2013-DINT01-0167.00)

1. This office has reviewed your draft report dated 29 October 2014 and concurs with the recommendations. Below are specific comments to the areas identified in your report.

a. **Finding A.** Effectiveness of Existing Policy. We found that the policies are obsolete, overlap, or do not provide sufficient guidance. The FPD program developed many policies during the program’s existence, which had not been re-coordinated. Uncoordinated policies make it difficult for field personnel to consistently carry out policy in the most effective manner. As a result, both FPD personnel and their stakeholders interpret policy guidance in ways that make it relevant only to their particular mission. **Recommendation A2.** We recommend that the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, in conjunction with the Service counterintelligence components and the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, update the Force Protection Detachment Joint Standard Operating Procedures so it contains current and clear guidance for Force Protection Detachment Operations.

b. **Finding B.** The current validation and prioritization process does not continually monitor FPDs once they have been established and no focal point exists for deciding whether FPD offices are viable throughout their existence. Current guidance does not support the required level of monitoring to ensure FPD offices are still relevant to the overall DoD mission. If FPD offices are not monitored throughout mission life-cycle and decision are not made regarding their disposition, DoD cannot ensure that FPD offices are being effectively used to meet the threshold of protecting DoD resources where those resources are at risk and no permanent CI presence exists. **Recommendation B.** We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Services counterintelligence components establish policy:
   1. The need for creation of a consistent process for validating, prioritizing, and review incumbent Force Protection Detachments for closure. Ensure that the USS Cole Commission’s finding 20 is a central criterion in validation and prioritization process;
   2. That priorities of the validation and prioritization formula are continually monitored and accurately reflect the Force protection Detachment’s mission and the threat against which they are protecting.

"EYES OF THE EAGLE"
Office of the Commander, Air Force Office of Special Investigations (cont’d)
Office of the Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS
NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
27130 TELEGRAPH ROAD
QUANTICO VA 22134-2253

INFO MEMO

December 9, 2014

FOR:  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, O     GENERAL
FROM: NCIS: (b) (6)
SUBJECT:  (U) Department of Defense, Office of The Inspector General Assessment of Intelligence Support to In-Transit Force Protection

•  (U/FOUO) The Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) concurs with the findings and recommendations contained in subject assessment including recommendations A2, D1, and D2, for which NCIS was asked to provide comment.
  •  (U) NCIS will immediately begin implementing any new or updated policy issued based on the recommendations in this assessment.
•  (U/FOUO) Recommendation A2, Effectiveness of Current Policy. The assessment team found existing policies were outdated and uncoordinated. The team recommended the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), in conjunction with the Services, update the Joint Standard Operating Procedure (JSOP) document to provide current and updated guidance for Force Protection Detachment (FPD) operations.
  •  (U) NCIS agrees with this recommendation.
•  (U/FOUO) Recommendation D. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Service counterintelligence components establish in policy:
  •  (U/FOUO) The need for creation of a consistent process for validating, prioritizing, and reviewing incumbent Force Protection Detachments for closure. Ensure that the USS Cole Commission’s Finding 20 is a central criterion in the validation and prioritization process.
  •  (U) NCIS agrees with this recommendation.
Office of the Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (cont’d)

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• (U//FOUO) That priorities of the validation and prioritization formula are continuously monitored and accurately reflect the Force Protection Detachment’s mission and the threat against which they are protecting.

• (U) NCIS agrees with this recommendation.

• (U//FOUO) NCIS believes the FPD program provides great benefit to the DoD. During FY13 the FPD Program supported 432 ship visits, 5,785 aircraft transits, 292,326 deployed personnel and 332 exercises. As noted in the report, U.S. Embassy personnel hosting FPDs lauded the support to in-transit assets as. The FPDs are a key member of Emergency Action Committee’s at U.S. Embassies worldwide and are instrumental in developing innovative ways to enhance force protection protocols supporting in-transit DoD assets. The FPDs provide the NCIS and the DON enhanced situational awareness and timely recognition of threats to deployed and deploying forces.

DISTRIBUTION: NAVIG
Point of Contact: , Special Agent, NCIS, National Security Directorate, FPD Program Manager
### Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<td>AFOSI</td>
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<td>APACS</td>
<td>Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System</td>
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<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence</td>
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<td>Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSOP</td>
<td>Joint Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>LoI</td>
<td>Letter of Instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NSDD</td>
<td>National Security Decision Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCIS</td>
<td>Navy Criminal Investigative Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODIG-ISP</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program Assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUSD(I)</td>
<td>Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSO</td>
<td>Regional Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SETL</td>
<td>Security and Environmental Threat List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>Senior Defense Official</td>
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<td>USD(I)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence</td>
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Whistleblower Protection
U.S. Department of Defense

The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 requires the Inspector General to designate a Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman to educate agency employees about prohibitions on retaliation, and rights and remedies against retaliation for protected disclosures. The designated ombudsman is the DoD Hotline Director. For more information on your rights and remedies against retaliation, visit www.dodig.mil/programs/whistleblower.

For more information about DoD IG reports or activities, please contact us:

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