




INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

JULY 26, 2016



U.S. Army Central Support Element– Jordan Did Not Implement Controls to Effectively Maintain Facilities at the Joint Training Center–Jordan



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Results in Brief

U.S. Army Central Support Element–Jordan Did Not Implement Controls to Effectively Maintain Facilities at the Joint Training Center–Jordan

July 26, 2016

Objective

Our objective was to determine whether DoD is effectively maintaining facilities at the Joint Training Center (JTC)–Jordan.

JTC is a contingency base occupied by elements of the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) and Allied partners. There are two types of U.S.-occupied facilities on JTC: JAF-owned facilities and U.S.-built facilities. The U.S. Army Central Support Element–Jordan (ASE-J) pays a monthly utilization fee for the use of the JAF-owned facilities. In March 2016, the ASE-J and JAF entered into an Implementing Arrangement (IA) to the U.S.-Jordan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, which outlined reimbursement for maintenance performed by the JAF for the JAF-owned, U.S.-occupied facilities. However, ASE-J personnel stated the IA did not require JAF to provide maintenance to U.S.-built facilities on JTC.

Finding

ASE-J made significant life, health, and safety improvements throughout FY 2016 at the JTC. Specifically, the ASE-J replaced flooring in several housing units, rewired entire housing blocks, and purchased new housing units. However, ASE-J did

Finding (cont'd)

not adequately coordinate with JAF to ensure U.S.-occupied facilities were effectively maintained at the JTC. Specifically, in the past year, the JTC experienced:

- non-operational street lights,
- holes and soft spots in the floors of the housing units, and
- water leaks in the latrines.

This occurred because, prior to March 2016, no formalized agreement existed between ASE-J and the JAF outlining how maintenance for JAF-owned, U.S.-occupied facilities would be reimbursed by DoD. In addition, ASE-J did not ensure the ASE-J Maintenance Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) contained sufficient detail to effectively maintain U.S.-occupied facilities at the JTC. Further, ASE-J did not develop a mechanism, such as a separate maintenance contract, to maintain U.S.-occupied facilities.

As a result, the health and safety of U.S. military personnel at the JTC are at increased risk. In addition, DoD is at increased risk for paying for repairs it made at the JTC instead of JAF.

Recommendations

We recommended that the Commander, U.S. Army Central Support Element–Jordan:

- amend the existing Maintenance SOP to:
 - establish deadlines for repairs based on risk levels;
 - require all work orders to be tracked on the maintenance tracker;
 - include the method of calculating ASE-J's costs for repairs;
 - include a process for reducing the monthly utilization fee for repairs that JAF does not make; and
 - award a maintenance contract to ensure U.S.-occupied facilities at the JTC are effectively maintained.



Results in Brief

U.S. Army Central Support Element–Jordan Did Not Implement Controls to Effectively Maintain Facilities at the Joint Training Center–Jordan

Management Actions

On April 14, 2016, we informed the ASE-J Commander that insufficient controls existed to effectively maintain both the JAF-owned and U.S.-built facilities at the JTC. Specifically, the Maintenance SOP did not contain sufficient details to effectively report, track, and seek reimbursement for repair requests sent to JAF for JAF-owned facilities. In addition, ASE-J did not have a mechanism in place to address maintenance issues with the U.S.-occupied facilities.

The ASE-J Commander agreed with our observations and immediately initiated steps to implement our suggested corrective actions. The ASE-J amended its Maintenance SOP to include: repair deadlines based on the severity of the issue, maintenance request tracking requirements, and the paperwork and coordination required with the JAF financial representative to adjust the monthly utilization fee. Additionally, ASE-J decided to utilize a Base Life Support contract to maintain all U.S.-occupied facilities, including both the JAF-owned and U.S.-built facilities. This contract, expected to be awarded in August 2016, will provide routine maintenance and address all future deficiencies of all U.S.-occupied facilities at the JTC. The management actions taken during the audit addressed the concerns we identified; therefore, we are not making any additional recommendations.

Figure 1 shows the electrical panel at the JTC dining facility.




Figure 1. TF-POWER personnel inspecting an electrical panel at the JTC dining facility.
Source: DoD OIG

Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Requiring Comment
Commander, U.S. Army Central Support Element–Jordan	None



**INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500**

July 26, 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: U.S. Army Central Support Element–Jordan Did Not Implement Controls to Effectively Maintain Facilities at the Joint Training Center–Jordan (Report No. DODIG-2016-115)

We are providing this final report for your information and use. U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) Support Element–Jordan (ASE-J) made significant life, health, and safety improvements throughout FY 2016 at the Joint Training Center (JTC). However, ASE-J did not adequately coordinate with the Jordanian Armed Forces to ensure U.S.-occupied facilities were effectively maintained at the JTC. We conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

ASE-J made significant life, health, and safety improvements throughout FY 2016 at the JTC. Specifically, the ASE-J replaced flooring in several housing units, rewired entire housing blocks, and purchased new housing units. However, ASE-J did not adequately coordinate with JAF to ensure U.S.-occupied facilities were effectively maintained at the JTC. Specifically, in the past year, the JTC experienced non-operational street lights, holes and soft spots in the floors of the housing units, and water leaks in the latrines. During the audit, we notified ASE-J officials of our findings and recommendations. The ASE-J management actions taken during the audit addressed our recommendations; therefore, we will not make any additional recommendations in this report. We obtained and considered feedback on a discussion draft when preparing the final report.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at Michael.Roark@dodig.mil, (703) 604-9187 (DSN 664-9187).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M. Roark", is positioned above the typed name.

Michael J. Roark
Assistant Inspector General
Contract Management and Payments

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Introduction

Objective

Our objective was to determine whether DoD is effectively maintaining facilities at the Joint Training Center (JTC)–Jordan. This is the third in a series of audits on the maintenance of training facilities in Jordan.

Background

Joint Training Center

JTC is a contingency base occupied by elements of the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) and Allied partners. JTC facilities include training ranges, troop housing, dining facilities, and additional life-support facilities. The U.S.-occupied compound of JTC is primarily used to support the training of JAF personnel. Additional U.S. military and U.S. Federal agencies use JTC facilities in support of contingency operations in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility.

The U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) Support Element–Jordan (ASE-J) is a forward-deployed command subordinate to ARCENT that is responsible for logistical support of U.S. personnel at the JTC, including establishing and maintaining Base Life Support contracts, dining facility contracts, and housing for tenant units conducting operations in Jordan. ASE-J personnel are responsible for JTC billeting and the management of base camp operations, including conducting routine maintenance and ensuring compliance with safety standards. In addition, ASE-J is responsible for ensuring the life, health, and safety of U.S. personnel stationed at the JTC. ASE-J coordinates with JAF to resolve maintenance issues identified in the U.S.-occupied facilities at the JTC.

CENTCOM established Task Force Protecting Our Warfighters, Electrical, and Resources–Jordan (TF POWER–Jordan) to provide electrical power and fire safety expertise and repair capabilities in Jordan. TF POWER–Jordan conducts inspections of all U.S. facilities and infrastructure in Jordan, provides guidance and instructions on maintaining a safe working environment, responds to emergencies to mitigate immediate risk, and inspects, educates and advises on structural fire safety and prevention.¹

¹ The background section of this report comprises information from interviews with ASE-J officials.


Types of Facilities

There are two types of U.S.-occupied facilities on JTC: JAF-owned facilities and U.S.-built facilities.

JAF-owned facilities include, but are not limited to: a dining facility, gym, multipurpose building, and housing and latrine facilities in the Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie blocks of the JTC. ASE-J should pay a monthly utilization fee for the use of JAF-owned facilities and the cost of electricity for those facilities. ASE-J tracks the utilization of JAF-owned facilities by U.S. personnel.

The U.S.-built facilities on the JTC include the Post Exchange, Coalition Coordination Center, housing and latrine facilities in the Delta block, and a Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) facility. The U.S.-built facilities were constructed with U.S. funding, and ASE-J does not pay a monthly utilization fee for these buildings. Figure 2 shows a map of JTC and the “X” labels facilities constructed with U.S. funding.

Figure 2. Joint Training Center Facilities



Source: ASE-J

Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreements

Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreements (ACSAs) are bilateral agreements between the United States and authorized foreign entities for the exchange of logistics support, supplies, and services (LSSS). LSSS includes, but is not limited to, base operations support, use of facilities, training services, and repair and

maintenance services. ACSAs allow logistical exchanges between the United States, the military forces of eligible countries, and international organizations of which the United States is a member. The United States and JAF agreed to an ACSA effective March 29, 2006, for the reciprocal exchange of LSSS throughout Jordan to include JTC.

Implementing Arrangement

An implementing arrangement (IA) is supplementary to an ACSA and can prescribe details, terms, and conditions to implement cross-service agreements more effectively. IAs may be more detailed regarding levels of support than the ACSA, but they must be consistent with the associated cross-service agreement.

ASE-J and JAF agreed to an IA in March 2016, for the reciprocal exchange of LSSS at JTC, which included facilities maintenance. Prior to March 2016, no formalized agreement existed between ASE-J and the JAF outlining how maintenance for JAF-owned, U.S.-occupied facilities would be reimbursed by DoD. The IA identified each JAF-owned, U.S.-occupied facility at JTC for which JAF was to provide maintenance. According to the IA, the cost of any repairs performed by U.S. forces for JAF-owned, U.S.-occupied facilities can be deducted from the monthly utilization fee. According to ASE-J personnel, the IA was not intended to address the JAF providing maintenance to U.S.-built facilities on the JTC.

ASE-J Maintenance Standard Operating Procedures

The ASE-J Maintenance standard operating procedure (SOP)² for JTC provides a breakdown of ASE-J personnel's responsibilities and duties regarding safety and facility maintenance at the JTC. In addition, it serves as a guide to assist incoming personnel responsible for facility maintenance at the JTC. The Maintenance SOP sets the standards for base camp operations and provides a shared understanding of the responsibility of each organization that occupies the JTC. According to ASE-J personnel, while the IA applies only to JAF-owned facilities, the Maintenance SOP applies to both U.S.-built and JAF-owned facilities.

Table 1 illustrates the differences in maintenance responsibilities for U.S.-built and JAF-owned facilities.³

² In this report, the Combined Joint Operations Center, Joint Training Center–Jordan Continuity book is referred to as the ASE-J Maintenance SOP.

³ According to ASE-J personnel, JAF is not responsible for maintenance of U.S.-built facilities.

Table 1. Maintenance Responsibilities for JTC Facilities

Facility Type	Facilities	Maintenance Responsibilities	IA Applies?	SOP Applies?
U.S.-built	Post Exchange, Coalition Coordination Center, Delta block housing and latrines, and MWR facility	U.S. Responsible	No	Yes
JAF-owned	Dining facility, gym, multipurpose building, and Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie blocks housing and latrines	JAF Responsible	Yes	Yes

Source: DoD OIG

Review of Internal Controls

DoD Instruction 5010.40⁴ requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. We identified internal control weaknesses in ASE-J's Maintenance SOP, which lacked sufficient detail for maintaining U.S.-occupied facilities at the JTC. In addition, ASE-J did not have a mechanism in place, such as a separate maintenance contract, to ensure U.S.-occupied facilities were adequately maintained. Management initiated corrective actions to address the concerns identified during the audit to resolve the internal control weaknesses. We will provide a copy of the report to the senior official responsible for internal controls at ASE-J.

⁴ DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," May 30, 2013.

Finding

ASE-J Needs to Improve Coordination With JAF to Effectively Maintain U.S.-Occupied Facilities at the JTC

ASE-J made significant life, health, and safety improvements throughout FY 2016 at the JTC. Specifically, the ASE-J replaced flooring in several housing units, rewired entire housing blocks, and purchased new housing units. However, ASE-J did not adequately coordinate with JAF to ensure U.S.-occupied facilities were effectively maintained at the JTC. Specifically, in the past year, the JTC experienced:

- nonoperational street lights,
- holes and soft spots in the floors of the housing units, and
- water leaks in the Delta block latrines.

This occurred because, prior to March 2016, no formalized agreement existed between ASE-J and the JAF outlining how maintenance for JAF-owned, U.S.-occupied facilities would be reimbursed by DoD. In addition, ASE-J did not ensure the Maintenance SOP contained sufficient detail to effectively maintain U.S.-occupied facilities at the JTC. Further, ASE-J did not develop a mechanism, such as a separate maintenance contract, to maintain U.S.-occupied facilities.

As a result, the health and safety of U.S. military personnel at the JTC are at increased risk. In addition, DoD is at increased risk for paying for repairs it made at the JTC instead of JAF.

ASE-J Improved Living Conditions at the JTC in FY 2016

Throughout FY2015, unsafe and unsanitary living conditions existed at the JTC, such as several housing units with holes in the floors, mold in the latrines, and dangerous electrical wiring in various facilities that resulted in three electrical fires. Specifically, two fires occurred at the dining facility and an electrical fire occurred in the MWR facility.

ASE-J replaced flooring in several housing units, rewired entire housing blocks to comply with U.S. standards, and purchased new housing units.

However, during FY2016, the ASE-J took several initiatives to improve the living conditions at the JTC. Specifically, the ASE-J replaced flooring in several housing units, rewired entire housing blocks to comply with U.S. standards, and purchased new housing units, which alleviated overcrowding in the housing blocks. Furthermore, the TF POWER-Jordan's inspection of the MWR

facility in December 2015 identified multiple electrical hazards so significant that it resulted in the closure of the facility until final upgrades were completed. ASE-J rewired the DFAC and MWR to ensure both facilities were upgraded. Figure 3 shows the electrical upgrades done at the MWR facility to improve safety.



ASE-J Did Not Adequately Coordinate With JAF to Resolve Maintenance Deficiencies

Although ASE-J's initiatives improved living conditions at the JTC, ASE-J did not adequately coordinate with JAF to ensure U.S.-occupied facilities were effectively maintained at the JTC. Specifically, in the past year, the JTC experienced: nonoperational street lights, holes and soft spots in the floors of the housing units, and water leaks in the Delta block latrines.

Nonoperational Street Lights at JTC Not Repaired

Street lights were not properly maintained at the JTC. In March 2016, the ASE-J issued a memorandum to the JAF requesting the replacement or repair of 57 nonoperational street lights. The ASE-J memorandum identified safety and security concerns as the reason for the repairs. However, as of June 2016, the JAF had not repaired all of the lights. Figure 4 shows two of the nonoperational street lights, demonstrating the safety concerns at JTC. Specifically, the lack of lighting on JTC presents significant hazards in the living and working areas on base.



Figure 4. Two nonoperational lights
Source: DoD OIG

Flooring Safety Repairs Were Identified But Not Made

Several JTC housing unit floors had holes and soft spots. In November 2015, the ASE-J issued a memorandum to the JAF requesting specific material required to make safety repairs to flooring in two living areas and the ASE-J working area. The memorandum stated the floors in the living areas had holes and soft spots in the wood from moisture damage. In January 2016, the ASE-J reissued the memorandum to the JAF requesting material for the same safety repairs. As of June 2016, the JAF had not provided the requested material; therefore, the ASE-J working area and the two living area floors have not been adequately repaired. Figure 5 shows the makeshift repairs the ASE-J did to temporarily patch the holes in the floor of a housing unit; however, the holes remain a significant safety issue and a more permanent fix is necessary.

The JAF had not provided the requested material; therefore, the ASE-J working area and the two living area floors have not been adequately repaired.



Figure 5. Temporary Patch for Holes in Housing Unit Floors
Source: DoD OIG

Water Leaks Were Identified But Not Repaired

In April 2016, ASE-J personnel identified water leaks from the main water pipes entering the latrines; however, as of May 2016, the water pipe leaks had not been repaired. Figure 6 shows the water leaks outside the Delta block latrine, demonstrating poor facility maintenance.



Figure 6. Water Leaks in the Delta Block
Source: DoD OIG


Maintenance Responsibilities Were Not Previously Defined

Prior to March 2016, no formalized agreement existed between ASE-J and the JAF outlining how maintenance for JAF-owned, U.S.-occupied facilities would be reimbursed by DoD; instead, only an ad hoc process existed to request facility maintenance issues for JAF-owned facilities. Specifically, since there was no written agreement in place outlining JAF's maintenance responsibilities, ASE-J could not require JAF to either provide the materials needed or make the repairs. According to ASE-J officials, all they could do was issue a memorandum to the JAF identifying deficiencies and requesting either the materials for ASE-J personnel to make the repairs or for the JAF to make the necessary repairs; however, there was no mechanism in place to enforce JAF's compliance.

According to ASE-J officials, in order to get repairs done in a timely manner, ASE-J generally attempted to make the repair if it had the necessary materials on hand and had the ability to do so. However, when ASE-J did not have the materials on hand and JAF did not provide them—such as the material to repair the floor in the housing units and working areas—deficiencies were not resolved.

The Maintenance SOP Lacked Sufficient Detail

The Maintenance SOP did not contain sufficient detail to effectively maintain all facilities at the JTC. The Maintenance SOP lacked sufficient details, such as establishing deadlines for work orders based on severity levels and requiring the tracking of all work order requests. In addition, the Maintenance SOP did not outline the process for deducting repair costs ASE-J incurred for repairs made on JAF-owned facilities from the monthly utilization fee.



The Maintenance SOP lacked sufficient details, such as establishing deadlines for work orders based on severity levels and requiring the tracking of all work order requests.

ASE-J Did Not Include Deadlines for Repairs in the Maintenance SOP and Did Not Require All Maintenance Requests to Be Tracked

The Maintenance SOP did not include deadlines for completing reported repairs or establish severity levels for different types of maintenance problems. Establishing the severity level for each repair is critical to distinguish maintenance requests that involve life, health, and safety from more routine types of maintenance requests. Suspense dates are necessary to ensure that maintenance requests are acted upon by JAF in a timely manner.

For example, work orders could be classified into the following three categories:

- Emergency—requires 24-hour response time if the deficiency could cause injury or death;
- Urgent—requires 48-hour response time for less severe, but not routine, repairs; and
- Routine—requires 7-day response time for repairs that do not impact life, health, or safety.

The Maintenance SOP did not require all work order requests to be tracked. ASE-J personnel created a maintenance tracker spreadsheet to track maintenance requests. The maintenance tracker included fields for the type of issue, date reported, date forwarded to JAF, and date closed. However, ASE-J officials did not include all maintenance requests in the maintenance tracker. For example, ASE-J officials decided to upgrade the existing electrical wiring in the Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie block housing areas to comply with U.S. electrical standards; however, the maintenance tracker only tracked the Charlie block rewiring effort. It is imperative to track all maintenance requests to ensure all maintenance issues are resolved in a timely manner and to provide continuity between rotational ASE-J units on repeat deficiencies and upgrades performed. During the audit, we suggested ASE-J amend its Maintenance SOP to establish deadlines for repairs based on risk levels and require that all work orders are tracked on the maintenance tracker.

ASE-J Process for Offsetting Monthly Utilization Fee Was Not Defined in the Maintenance SOP

ASE-J did not establish a process for reducing the monthly utilization fee for repairs that JAF does not make. The IA provides JAF the opportunity to make repairs on JAF-owned facilities. If JAF is unable or refuses to make the repairs, the ASE-J can perform the repairs and deduct the repair costs from the monthly utilization fee. However, the Maintenance SOP did not outline the process for offsetting the monthly utilization fee when ASE-J repairs deficiencies at the JAF-owned facilities. Formally documenting this process is important to establish baseline requirements and ensure cost disagreements are properly resolved. In addition, a process is necessary to identify critical steps, such as the method of calculating ASE-J's costs for repairs, required forms and documentation to reduce the utilization fee, and how ASE-J advises JAF of the total cost incurred. During the audit, we suggested ASE-J amend the Maintenance SOP to include a process for reducing the monthly utilization fee for repairs that JAF does not make.

ASE-J Did Not Establish a Mechanism to Maintain U.S.-Occupied Facilities

ASE-J did not have a mechanism in place, such as a separate maintenance contract, to ensure U.S.-occupied facilities were adequately maintained. According to ASE-J personnel, the IA only applies to JAF-owned facilities, which led to repairs of U.S.-built facilities not being addressed. For example, JAF refused ASE-J's request to repair the water pipe leaks in the Delta block because the block is a U.S.-built facility. ASE-J did not have an alternate method in place to address the water pipe leaks. In order to repair the water pipe leaks, ASE-J had to award a contract; however, it took several months to award the contract before the repairs could be initiated. The contract ASE-J awarded did not include a comprehensive facilities maintenance scope of work; instead, it was strictly for the repair of the water pipe leaks. Therefore, until the ASE-J awards a comprehensive facilities maintenance contract for all U.S.-occupied facilities, each future maintenance deficiency will require a separate contract, which will delay the repair of the deficiency. During the audit, we suggested the ASE-J Commander consider awarding a maintenance contract for U.S.-occupied facilities at the JTC to ensure the facilities are adequately maintained.

Health and Safety Dangers Existed at the JTC and DoD Risks Overpaying for Repairs

The lack of effective maintenance increased the health and safety risks for U.S. military personnel at the JTC. For example, nonoperational street lights present security and safety concerns throughout the JTC, and holes and soft spots in the housing units' floors continue to present falling hazards.

DoD is also at risk for overpaying its monthly utilization fee due to the absence of a formal process to offset the monthly utilization fee with ASE-J's costs to perform repairs. For example, prior to March 2016, ASE-J performed

DoD is also at risk for overpaying its monthly utilization fee due to the absence of a formal process to offset the monthly utilization fee with ASE-J's costs to perform repairs.

some maintenance on JAF-owned facilities. With the implementation of the IA, ASE-J can now deduct future maintenance costs from the monthly utilization fee.

However, until an agreed-upon process between ASE-J and JAF to deduct monthly utilization fee for repairs made by ASE-J personnel is in place, JAF can refuse to offset any costs ASE-J incurs, which puts DoD at risk of performing necessary maintenance and not being able to deduct it from the monthly utilization fee.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

We recommended that the Commander, U.S. Army Central Support Element–Jordan:

- a. amend the existing Maintenance SOP to:**
 - 1. establish deadlines for repairs based on risk levels;**
 - 2. require all work orders are tracked on the maintenance tracker; and**
 - 3. include the method of calculating ASE-J's costs for repairs;**
 - 4. include a process for reducing the monthly utilization fee for the costs of repairs that ASE-J makes on JAF-owned facilities; and**
- b. award a maintenance contract to ensure U.S.-occupied facilities at the JTC are effectively maintained.**

Management Actions Taken

On April 14, 2016, we advised the ASE-J Commander that insufficient controls existed to effectively maintain both the JAF- and U.S.-built facilities at the JTC. Specifically, the Maintenance SOP did not contain sufficient details to effectively report, track, and seek reimbursement for repair requests sent to JAF for JAF-owned facilities. In addition, we advised that ASE-J did not have a mechanism in place to address maintenance issues with the U.S.-occupied facilities.

We suggested the ASE-J update its Maintenance SOP to ensure repairs are completed within a specified time based on the severity of the issue; that each maintenance request is tracked and completed; and to establish a process to repair any issues that the JAF will not correct for JAF-owned facilities. In addition, we suggested that Maintenance SOP include a process to deduct the cost of repairs from the monthly utilization fee for repairs made by ASE-J personnel. Finally, we suggested ASE-J implement a mechanism to provide maintenance for U.S.-occupied facilities at the JTC.

The ASE-J Commander agreed with our observations and immediately initiated steps to implement our suggested corrective actions. The ASE-J amended its Maintenance SOP, which addressed our concerns. Specifically, the Maintenance SOP included repair time frames based on the severity of the issue, maintenance request tracking requirements, and the paperwork and coordination required with the JAF financial representative to adjust the monthly utilization fee. ASE-J ensured that the majority of the nonoperational street lights and the Delta block leaks were repaired. In addition, ASE-J developed a plan to repair the remaining

nonoperational street lights and the holes and soft spots in the JTC housing units. Furthermore, ASE-J decided to utilize a Base Life Support contract to maintain all U.S.-occupied facilities, including both JAF-owned and U.S.-built facilities. According to ASE-J, this contract, expected to be awarded in August 2016, will provide routine maintenance and address all future deficiencies of U.S.-occupied facilities.

The ASE-J management actions taken during the audit addressed our recommendations; therefore, we will not make any additional recommendations in this report and we are not requesting additional comments from management.

Appendix

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from March 2016 through June 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

We reviewed criteria to determine if the DoD is effectively maintaining facilities at the JTC. Specifically, we reviewed Unified Facilities Code 1-201-02, which explains the use of existing facilities in support of military operations; Unified Facilities Code 1-202-01 which explains the use of host-nation facilities for military operations; and Central Command Regulation 415-1, which explains construction in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Additionally, we reviewed the ACSA between Jordan and the United States, and the corresponding IA between the ASE-J and JAF. Finally, we reviewed the ASE-J's Maintenance SOP, meals contract, and performance work statement to identify facility maintenance requirements.

We conducted a site visit to the JTC–Jordan in April 2016, and interviewed ASE-J officials to determine the process for maintaining JTC facilities. Specifically, we interviewed the ASE-J Commander, ASE-J Mayor Cell personnel, and the TF POWER–Jordan fire and electrical inspectors. Additionally, we reviewed the TF POWER–Jordan inspections reports, ASE-J memorandums submitted to the JAF, and ASE-J's work order tracker to identify maintenance issues at JTC and the time to repair maintenance requests. Finally, we conducted inspections of JTC facilities with the TF POWER–Jordan electric and fire inspectors to determine whether facilities were adequately maintained.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued five reports discussing facility maintenance. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm>.

GAO

Report No. GAO-12-1026T, "Operational Contract Support, Sustained DoD Leadership Needed to Better Prepare for Future Contingencies," September 12, 2012

DoD OIG

Report No. DODIG-2016-067, "DoD Components Did Not Properly Use the Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement Automated Tracking and Reporting System," March 24, 2016

Report No. DODIG-2016-065, "U.S. Army Central and U.S. Army Contracting Command – Rock Island Need to Improve Facility Maintenance at King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center," March 23, 2016

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ARCENT	U.S. Army Central
ACSA	Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement
ASE-J	U.S. Army Central Support Element–Jordan
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
IA	Implementing Arrangement
JAF	Jordanian Armed Forces
JTC	Joint Training Center
LSSS	Logistics Support, Supplies, and Services
MWR	Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TF POWER–Jordan	Task Force Protecting Our Warfighters, Electrical, and Resources–Jordan

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