Summary of Lessons Learned – DoD IG Assessment Oversight of “Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip” Operations by U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan
Mission

Our mission is to provide independent, relevant, and timely oversight of the Department of Defense that supports the warfighter; promotes accountability, integrity, and efficiency; advises the Secretary of Defense and Congress; and informs the public.

Vision

Our vision is to be a model oversight organization in the Federal Government by leading change, speaking truth, and promoting excellence—a diverse organization, working together as one professional team, recognized as leaders in our field.
Objective

The overall objective of this project was to provide DoD military commanders and other stakeholders responsible for Operation Inherent Resolve a summary of lessons learned gleaned from DoD IG assessment oversight of U.S. and Coalition “Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip” efforts during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. We reviewed 30 assessment reports issued by the DoD IG between July 2008 and January 2015. These reports contained 342 observations related to U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop the national security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Lessons Learned

In our summary project, we sought lessons learned that might apply to future contingency operations as well as to Operation Inherent Resolve. Based on our review, we identified five systemic challenge and problem areas, with related lessons learned, in the U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop partner nation security forces, such as those of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Training and Equipping of Partner Nation Security Forces and Ministries

Training and Organization of Security Ministries

- Develop security ministries’ support capabilities to include planning, programming, budgeting, and execution.
- Build ministerial capacity for efficient and accountable resource management.

Training and Equipping of Security Forces

- Train and equip security forces to counter actual and potential enemy threats to forces, civilians, and government stability.
- Develop combat enabler capabilities concurrently with basic security force unit formation.
- Ensure all maintenance and supply-related contracts contain training for partner nation security force mechanics, supply technicians, and logistics managers.

Command and Control

- Identify impediments to the development of partner nation command and control capability for security forces.
- Provide the partner nation with command and control technology and equipment that can be used and sustained locally.
Executive Summary

Summary of Lessons Learned – DoD IG Assessment
Oversight of “Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip” Operations by U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan

Lessons Learned (cont’d)

Advisory Assistance in Support of Partner Nation Security Forces and Ministries

U.S. and Coalition Advisors/Mentors/Trainers

- Establish consistent staffing requirements, advisor standards and performance metrics, and clearly defined advisor objectives.
- Revise U.S. Military Service personnel caveats to allow advisors to be reassigned by in-country commanders.
- Adequately staff and train Coalition advisors for their specific advisory position and ensure advisors have required subject matter expertise and experience.

Leader Development

- Ensure partner nation security forces establish a merit-based personnel system to enhance the development of a core group of competent officer and noncommissioned officer leaders.
- Define the roles and responsibilities of the noncommissioned officer corps, and gain support for their effective use among commanders and general officers.

Personnel Management

- Ensure security force personnel consistently receive their pay.

Medical System Development

- Focus on point-of-injury care for security force personnel.
- Develop adequate partner nation casualty evacuation capacity by land and air.
- Develop security force medical capability and reduce over-reliance on U.S.-funded and purchased pharmaceuticals and supplies.

Logistics Development and Sustainment

Partner Nation Logistical System Development

- Develop a single, integrated plan to coordinate the multiple security force logistics development initiatives.
- Develop logistical and sustainment capability concurrent with the buildup of operational forces.
- Develop logistical processes and procedures that can be flexible and responsive to the supply requirements of fielded security forces.
Lessons Learned (cont’d)

- Develop a demand-driven supply system and limit U.S. and Coalition forces “push” of materiel resupply.
- Ensure U.S. and Coalition commands have a sufficient number of properly trained logistics advisors to provide mid- to senior-level national force officers with adequate and timely training and orientation in essential logistical management skills.

Accountability and Control of U.S.-Supplied Equipment

Policy, Processes, and Procedures for U.S.-Supplied Equipment and Supplies

- Develop and enforce applicable partner nation policy, processes, and procedures for the accountability of sensitive equipment.

Inventory Management for U.S.-Supplied Equipment

- Ensure U.S. and partner nation security forces maintain a chain of custody for U.S.- and Coalition-supplied equipment.
- U.S. forces must coordinate and conduct required end use monitoring inspections for sensitive equipment items supplied.
- Develop a professional culture of accountability and control for military equipment and supplies within the partner nation security forces.
- Advise the partner nation security forces regarding development of a system of policy and guidance for oversight of sensitive equipment items.

U.S. Contract Management

U.S. Contractor Actions with Respect to Campaign Plan Accomplishment

- Ensure contracting requirements and performance support are adjusted to meet U.S. strategic and operational objectives.

Contract Oversight

- Ensure sufficient numbers of trained and qualified U.S. contracting personnel deploy to provide adequate contract oversight.
- Develop, implement, and consistently execute quality assurance surveillance plans regarding contract execution.

Combatting Trafficking in Persons

- Include mandated combatting trafficking in persons clauses in support contracts and direct periodic inspections to ensure compliance.
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN


We are providing this final report for your information and use. The report relates to the overseas contingency operation, Operation Inherent Resolve. It was completed in accordance with the OIG’s oversight responsibilities, as described in Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

This is not a new inspection but a summary of previously published material regarding DoD IG assessment reports issued between 2008 and 2015 related to the “Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip” operations conducted by U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

We performed this project in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations,” published by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. We excluded planning and evidence requirements because this report only summarizes previously released DoD IG reports. We conducted this summary project from November 2014 through March 2015.

This report contains no recommendations; therefore, no written comment is required.

Please direct your questions to [Contact Information] or [Contact Information].

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Introduction

Objective

Our objective was to review DoD IG assessment reports issued on Departmental operations in Southwest Asia between 2008 and 2015, summarize the key observations and recommendations, and identify lessons learned that could have applicability in Operation Inherent Resolve and future contingency operations.

Background

This report summarizes 30 assessment reports issued between July 1, 2008, and January 30, 2015, relating to U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop the national security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan.

We reviewed the observations, conclusions, and recommendations contained in these reports and identified five systemic challenge and problem areas in the DoD’s efforts to develop these partner nation security forces:

- Training and equipping of partner nation security forces and ministries,
- Advisory assistance in support of partner nation security forces and ministries,
- Logistics development and sustainment,
- Accountability and control of U.S.-supplied equipment, and
- U.S. contract management.

Within each of these major areas, we have cited sub-themes regarding more specific issues and lessons learned.
Training and Equipping of Partner Nation Security Forces and Ministries

Discussion

After the initial defeat of the Taliban in 2001 and the Iraqi Army in 2003, the United States was faced with stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq, which included rebuilding their respective security ministries and training, equipping, and advising their police and military forces. From 2008 through 2015, the DoD IG conducted multiple oversight assessments of the challenges encountered and progress made in this protracted effort.

Training and Organization of Security Ministries

Focus on development of security ministries’ support capabilities, to include planning, programming, budgeting, and execution

The security ministries of Iraq and Afghanistan did not have the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) functional capability necessary to supply timely resource support to their respective security forces in order to sustain combat operations. These PPBE processes are fundamental to establishing an operational and self-sustaining security force structure. In addition, U.S. and Coalition advisors often lacked the specialized training in PPBE required to assist the security ministries properly in developing their PPBE capability.

A 2011 logistics report\(^1\) described weak Ministry of Defense (MoD) PPBE processes that limited its capacity to resource the maintenance and repair parts requirements of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). This weakness in PPBE processes, along with supply chain dysfunction, contributed to chronic shortages of critically needed operational equipment in the field, such as vehicles, weapons, and weapon systems. These materiel shortages negatively affected ISF mission readiness and its ability to respond to significant security threats.

A similar situation existed in Afghanistan. An Afghan National Army (ANA) logistics report\(^2\) from 2012 described the MoD and General Staff PPBE processes as immature and unable to identify requirements and acquire equipment and materiel necessary to sustain the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) logistics systems.

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\(^1\) SPO-2011-001, Observation 5.  
\(^2\) DODIG-2012-028, Observation 4.
U.S. and Coalition advisory resources at the level of security ministries were generally insufficient in numbers, experience, grade, and length of assignments to develop security ministry essential skills, including PPBE.

A 2015 ANA logistics report concluded that the existing and projected assignment processes for U.S. and Coalition advisors had not and would not produce sufficient advisors with the required technical knowledge, experience, or interpersonal skills to advise their counterparts effectively. Another recent Afghan National Police (ANP) logistics report found that advisors lacked skills because the Coalition leadership had not adequately identified the qualifications and experience necessary for advisors. Moreover, there were few personnel incentives to attract more highly skilled and experienced candidates as advisors. The report also noted that U.S. and Coalition leaders did not properly synchronize individual advisor tour lengths with the Command’s conditions-based mission criteria. The lack of proper synchronization reduced their effective time on the ground, which is critical for effective mentoring because it enables mentors to gain necessary experience and build effective partner relationships.

The 2015 ANA logistics report concluded that ineffective advisors impaired the development of critical ministerial logistics functions, increasing the risk that U.S. funds would not be budgeted or spent effectively by security ministries.

The inability of the partner nation security forces and ministries to carry out their support capabilities, to include PPBE processes, hinders the development of an operational and self-sustaining security force structure.

**Build ministerial capacity for efficient and accountable resource management**

Development and capacity building of security ministries—Defense and Interior—were critical to effective support of army and police field operations; however, efficient and accountable resource management by these ministries was not an advisory priority emphasized in the early stages of U.S. and Coalition involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather, the emphasis was on developing partner nation combat forces. Consequently, such resource management was more difficult once it became a key priority.

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4 DODIG-2015-067, Observation 11.
5 DODIG-2015-047, Observation 3.
Recent reports⁶ have observed that ANSF security ministries became dependent on U.S. and Coalition expertise due to North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security Training Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) force generation priorities that delayed prioritizing ministerial development. U.S. and Coalition priorities then shifted to improving the quality of ANSF supporting systems, such as logistics, to create sustainable ANSF forces. Doing so required developing the PPBE capability and the capacity of ministerial-level logisticians and other key functional staff.

However, the ANSF experienced difficulty transitioning their logistics supply system, while still fighting the war, from a “push” model that was centrally driven, often by the United States and Coalition, to a “pull” model that was demand-driven from the unit level. Making this transition required accurate readiness reporting and related supply forecasting skills, which were in a nascent state of development. Inexperienced and incompletely trained MoD, MoI, and General Staff logisticians remained dependent on U.S. and Coalition officials’ expertise and were unable to project supply system needs.⁷ In essence, the ANSF logistics planning processes were deficient and supply chain management across the MoD and MoI was incapable of ensuring consistent supplies in support of combat or garrison operations.

Future train and equip missions should include an early emphasis on development of security ministries support capabilities, including logistics and accountable resource management systems. A robust advisory effort will be required to develop this ministerial capacity during the force generation phase in order to ensure timeliness in achieving longer-term security force sustainment goals.

**Training and Equipping of Security Forces**

*Train and equip security forces to counter actual and potential threats to forces, civilians, and government stability*

The training, equipping, and advising of the partner nation police and military should focus on the actual and potential threats those forces will face, and be flexible enough to evolve as the threat evolves. However, DoD IG assessments revealed that sometimes U.S. and Coalition training and equipping initiatives lagged operational needs of partner security forces.

For example, in Afghanistan, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have produced the majority of ANP casualties. The ANP primarily travelled on roads in light tactical vehicles and did not have sufficient training and counter-IED equipment

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to defend against the IED threat. ANP commanders requested that they receive better equipment and that more counter-IED training be included in the program of instruction. In some cases, Afghan commanders were reluctant to send their police officers to training during the fighting season, even when training space was available. Terrain and weather also made it difficult for police officers to attend training during the winter months.

The 2011 report on the Afghan Local Police (ALP) described that the ALP, equipped with standard issued AK-47s, were frequently outgunned by the insurgents. The insurgents used heavier weapons that were effective at longer ranges, such as the Pulemyot Kalashnikova machine gun, knowing that the ALP could not effectively respond with their AK-47s. It is likely that police forces that are consistently “outgunned” by their adversaries will fail to provide required security to the local population.

The inability of police forces to counter current and potential threats degrades their operational effectiveness and morale, increases their desertion rate, and reinforces a defensive mind set to avoid major casualties, rather than engaging in proactive patrolling of their communities. Sufficient equipping and training to counter current and potential enemy threats will improve force protection practices and reduce casualties of partner nation forces.

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8 SPO-2011-003, Observation 10.
9 DODIG-2013-081, Observation 12.
10 DODIG-2012-109, Observation 6.
Develop combat enabler capabilities concurrently with basic security force unit formation—not after basic security force units are organized and equipped

Combat enabler capabilities, such as intelligence, logistics, medical, engineer units, and counter-IED support are essential to enhance fielded combat forces. In the initial effort to train, equip, and field operational forces, the United States and Coalition delayed the building of these support and enabler units until the end of the force generation cycle of combat units, and not concurrent with the formation of the basic combat units that required their support. This resulted in the partner nation security forces becoming reliant upon U.S.- and Coalition-provided enablers, which hindered their progress in becoming independent, self-sufficient security forces capable of securing and sustaining themselves.

Developing enabler units and capabilities concurrently with the combat forces they support would help synchronize partner nation security forces’ transition from force generation and development to force sustainment. This would lead to more independent, self-sufficient security forces sooner and less reliance on U.S. and Coalition forces faster.

Ensure all maintenance and supply-related contracts in support of security forces contain requirements for training mechanics, supply technicians, and logistics managers

During a recent DoD IG assessment in Afghanistan, we observed that the ANA was unprepared to maintain and repair complex U.S.-provided equipment after contractor logistics support ended. Coalition forces’ logistics support contracts focused on equipment readiness, but often had no contractual requirement to also train ANA mechanics present on-site, which slowed the development of ANA maintenance capacities and extended ANA dependence on U.S. and Coalition support. The long-term viability of an ANA strategic reserve of vehicles, for example, would require contracted depot-level maintenance training for ANA military and civilian mechanics well prior to transitioning the program to the ANA.

Without proper sustainment training for partner nation mechanics and supply technicians, U.S.- and Coalition-provided contract maintenance support may cause a gap in repair capabilities and a rapid increase in the amount of inoperable equipment. It may also cause degraded operational readiness of partner nation security forces after the withdrawal of U.S. and Coalition forces and advisors.

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11 DODIG-2014-027, pg. 7.
Command and Control

Identify potential impediments to development of partner nation command and control capability for security forces and develop a mitigation plan to address those impediments

While partner nation operational capabilities increased in effectiveness, the development of commensurate command and control capabilities were hampered due to many impediments.

In the 2013 report on the ANA command and control system,\(^\text{13}\) we observed that senior commanders within the ANA perceived that they were unable to remove officers assigned to them for misconduct or negligence, or when they had lost confidence in their officers’ ability to execute their assigned duties. Several factors, such as legal impediments, lack of a formal process at the corps and brigade level to remove military personnel, especially officers, from their position, and political influence, contributed to this perception.

The same report also observed that low literacy rates, inadequate generation and distribution of electricity, and lack of information networking capacity were command and control limitations inherent to Afghanistan. In addition, the pool of qualified personnel to operate and maintain the array of networks, systems, and programs within the ANSF command, control, and communications systems was also insufficient to sustain its operability.

Failure to grant partner nation senior commanders the authority to remove subordinate officers for cause negatively affects their command and control authority and mission effectiveness. Partner nation forces’ technical capability should also be assessed during the organizational phase of implementing a command and control system in order to plan a proper level of training and education.

Provide partner nations with command and control technology and equipment that can be sustained and used without substantial U.S. and Coalition support

Partner nations were not always able to use and sustain command and control technology provided by U.S. and Coalition forces.\(^\text{14}\) This was caused by the limited capacity of their security forces to integrate, use, and sustain relatively complex equipment, reflected in the significant reliance on the related planning and operational capability of U.S. and Coalition forces to operate and maintain this equipment.

\(^{13}\) DODIG-2013-058, Observations 4 and 6.

\(^{14}\) DODIG-2013-058, Observation 6.
The Coalition lacked a comprehensive and integrated plan for providing computer automation and information technology to the ANSF that properly recognized and adapted to the educational, literacy, and electrical power limitations inherent to Afghanistan. The complexity of computer automation and information technology provided by the Coalition exceeded ANSF capacity to assimilate, integrate, and sustain this capability. Moreover, the costs to implement, operate, and maintain advanced automated systems could be beyond the ability of partner nations’ forces to fund required maintenance.
Advisory Assistance in Support of Partner Nation Security Forces and Ministries

Discussion

One of the key building blocks for DoD in standing-up Iraqi and Afghan security forces capable of planning, conducting, and sustaining independent operations has been extensive U.S. military and Coalition advisory support. The United States and Coalition have embedded military and civilian mentors and advisors throughout the military forces and within the security ministries to develop institutional, personnel, and leadership capacity. The DoD IG has identified the following lessons learned from oversight activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

U.S. and Coalition Advisors/Mentors/Trainers

Establish consistent staffing requirements, advisor standards and performance metrics, and clearly defined advisor objectives in plans at the beginning of advisor tours

There were multiple reports that concluded that Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and CSTC-A lacked sufficient security assistance mentoring personnel; moreover, those who were available often did not possess the requisite security assistance training, skills, and experience.

In one example from 2009, we determined\textsuperscript{15} that, in Iraq, only 13 of the 39 personnel assigned to the MNSTC-I security assistance office arrived in-country possessing security assistance training, and only 5 arrived in-country with prior security assistance experience. Additionally, there were three observations in a 2011 report\textsuperscript{16} that determined that United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) did not have sufficient personnel to serve as mentors for the ISF logistics mission.

In Afghanistan in 2008, we reported\textsuperscript{17} that the CSTC-A joint manning document allocated only nine personnel billets to the Afghanistan Security Assistance Office (SAO). This staffing level was not commensurate with the staffing levels provided to other SAOs working in countries critical to U.S. interests, much less an SAO engaged in supporting a country at war. Additionally, none of the nine SAO billets were filled by personnel who had received mandatory security assistance program management training or possessed security assistance experience.

\textsuperscript{15} SPO-2009-002, Observation 6.
\textsuperscript{16} SPO-2011-001, Observations 1, 8, and 11.
\textsuperscript{17} SPO-2008-001, Observation G.
Reports from 2011 and 2012\textsuperscript{18} concluded that the planned expansion of the ANP and the ALP would outpace the number of Coalition mentors available to embed with, train, and support these Afghan police organizations. The lack of sufficient numbers of mentors or advisors could result in a significant delay or even inability of U.S. forces to develop and sustain the essential security force combat and logistical capability.

Inconsistent mentoring standards between the different U.S. and Coalition mentoring teams have also been problematic. An ANP report\textsuperscript{19} from 2011 determined that U.S. and Coalition trainers and advisors at various ANP training centers were interpreting and implementing the basic training program of instruction differently. This was mainly because the training cadres comprised personnel from various countries with different policing backgrounds. Similarly, a 2013 ANA report\textsuperscript{20} found that U.S. and Coalition advisors at NTM-A institutional schools and training programs demonstrated a wide variance in understanding their advising mission and aptitude and competence for carrying it out.

Another 2009 report\textsuperscript{21} concluded that there was a lack of coordination between guidance issued to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mentoring teams and guidance provided to CSTC-A mentoring teams. Further, the report concluded that ISAF teams were mentoring to a different standard than CSTC-A teams, which may not have been consistent with Afghan MoD/MoI directives.

A 2009 ANSF train and equip report\textsuperscript{22} noted tour length disparity of three to nine months among advisors drawn from U.S. Army personnel, to include the Guard and Reserve, in addition to advisors from the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and Coalition nations. Since the effectiveness of mentors/advisors/trainers often depends on developing a personal relationship with partner nation counterparts, all mentor/advisor/trainer tour lengths should be standardized to a length sufficient for this to occur. The lack of standardized tour lengths created personnel turbulence in the advisor program and uneven mentor performance and effectiveness by the different mentor teams.

U.S. and Coalition commands must establish a common operating picture of the advisory mission and standardized training and sufficient length of tours for all advisors, regardless of Service or country of origin. Without coherence and consistency in the overall mentoring effort, the advisory mission will be substantially impaired.

\textsuperscript{18} SPO-2011-003, Observation 5 and DODIG-2012-109, Observation 2.
\textsuperscript{19} SPO-2011-003, Observation 3.
\textsuperscript{20} DODIG-2013-094, Observation 7.
\textsuperscript{21} SPO-2009-006, Observation 9.
\textsuperscript{22} SPO-2009-007, Observation 9.
Review U.S. Military Service caveats for advisors to allow for reassignment by in-country commanders to meet changing mission requirements

A 2009 ANSF train and equip report\(^23\) identified restrictive U.S. Military Service limitations preventing an individual or unit re-assignment to a function outside of its core competency. Most commonly, this issue arose with U.S. Navy or U.S. Air Force personnel serving in assignments “in lieu of” Army personnel, especially on embedded training teams (ETTs) within the ANSF. ETT personnel are required to share responsibility for carrying out all of the team’s assigned duties, including standing guard/watch duty, providing convoy security, and manning crew-served weapons. If Navy or Air Force personnel are assigned to an ETT, but due to their Service caveats are unable to share in these essential duties, then the ability of the ETT to carry out its mission of training, advising, and assisting will be impaired. Due to limitations imposed by these Service caveats, field commanders were hampered in achieving the full capability of their teams and units.

Adequately staff and train Coalition advisors and ensure advisors have required subject matter expertise and experience

As previously discussed, U.S. mentors assigned to the security assistance mission in both Iraq and Afghanistan did not uniformly receive adequate training prior to deployment. Further, in a pair of ANSF reports\(^24\) from 2009, mentors reported that their pre-deployment training focused largely on combat survival skills, without sufficient emphasis on Afghan-centric mentoring and training skills specific to their assignments. Notably lacking was training on logistics and weapons accountability. In a 2011 ISF logistics report,\(^25\) U.S. mentors deployed to Iraq reported that their pre-deployment training seemed disjointed and ineffective, without a cohesive program of instruction. A recent report\(^26\) regarding ANP logistics also concluded that some U.S. military and civilian logistics advisors did not have the required skill sets, experience, or cultural awareness to support functional-based, multi-echelon advising.

Advisor personnel need to arrive in country sufficiently prepared to carry out their responsibilities. If they do not, then the risk of delay or failure to develop partner nation ministerial, operational, and logistical systems increases.

\(^{23}\) SPO-2009-007, Observation 7.
\(^{25}\) SPO-2011-001, Observation 10.
\(^{26}\) DODIG-2015-067, Observation 11.
Leader Development

Ensure a true merit-based personnel promotion and assignment system to enhance the development of a core group of competent noncommissioned officer and officer leaders

Our report\textsuperscript{27} in 2013 on the U.S. and Coalition’s effort to develop leaders within the ANA highlighted the shortcomings of the personnel system. In short, the ANA lacked a comprehensive and effectively functioning personnel management system to support merit-based promotion and assignments. Specific issues included a highly centralized decision authority for virtually all personnel actions, incomplete and paper-based records, no functioning retirement system, and a climate that allowed nepotism and favoritism to taint assignment and promotion processes.

In the 2013 report on ANA command and control systems,\textsuperscript{28} we observed that senior commanders within the ANA were unable to remove officers assigned to them for misconduct or negligence, or because the commander had lost confidence in their officers’ ability to execute their assigned duties. Contributing to this situation were several factors, including the lack of a formal process to remove military personnel, especially officers, from their position and undue political influence.

This caused uncertainty for many soldiers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and officers regarding career development and retirement prospects, and limited the ANA’s ability to reduce personnel attrition and increase retention. Furthermore, the lack of a meaningful and attractive retirement system also contributed to a backlog of older, less effective personnel who remained on active duty in the ANA and hindered upward mobility for younger, better-educated, institutionally trained officers and NCOs.

The effectiveness of the NCO corps, while critical to the operational effectiveness of the ANSF, was impeded by unclear roles and responsibilities and a lack of support from general officers

In the DoD IG report on leader development,\textsuperscript{29} we analyzed the training and utility of NCOs in ANA units. We found they were not delegated the authority and responsibility commensurate with the level of their training and capability and their role intended by doctrine.

\textsuperscript{27} DODIG 2013-094, Observation 2.
\textsuperscript{28} DODIG-2013-058, Observation 4.
\textsuperscript{29} DODIG-2013-094, Observation 1.
This occurred because NCOs have not historically had a significant role in ANA units and because of the disconnect between the curricula of the NCO and officer training courses. ANA officer training did not present the NCO relationship model taught to NCOs during their instruction. The enhanced role for NCOs taught to NCOs in their training was inconsistent with the traditional ANA officer-NCO relationship and required a cultural change in officer attitudes to be accepted.

Realistically, the cultural shift required could not be accomplished merely by updating doctrine, policy guidance, and training; rather, it is more likely to be adopted over time, as younger officers replaced older, more entrenched officers leaving the military service through retirement or removal.

As a result, in spite of significant efforts by the training establishment to train and develop NCOs, they were significantly underutilized and not generally allowed to perform the roles intended that could benefit unit effectiveness.

**Personnel Management**

*Ensure partner nation security force personnel consistently receive their pay on a timely basis in order to prevent morale problems, low re-enlistment, and desertion*

We reported on problems with ANSF personnel consistently receiving their pay.

Our reports from 2009 and 2011 determined\(^{30}\) that, due to the lack of an established banking system throughout Afghanistan, some ANSF personnel did not regularly receive their pay, especially those units operating in remote locations. In addition, a 2012 ALP report\(^{31}\) discussed the problem of “ghost policemen,” resulting in instances of personnel who did not exist being maintained on the payroll of some police units. Even in units where ANSF personnel were paid electronically, commanders reported personnel on the payroll who were not in their unit.

Inconsistent pay systems have a negative impact on force morale and could result in higher rates of attrition and corruption.

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\(^{30}\) SPO-2009-007, Observation 10 and SPO-2011-003, Observation 24.

\(^{31}\) DODIG-2012-109, Observation 12.
Medical System Development

Focus on point-of-injury care to adequately support security force personnel

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the security forces, both military and police units, operate independently across vast distances amid very remote and rugged terrain. Police forces in particular operate in small, widely dispersed units without a robust support infrastructure. It is critical that both military and police units and personnel have the ability to render first aid to themselves and others while they wait for medical evacuation.

However, a 2014 report on ANP healthcare discussed the inability of ANP personnel to render effective point-of-injury care (self-aid and buddy-aid). This occurred for several reasons, including the following:

- Most police personnel did not have individual first aid kits available when conducting security operations,
- The ANP did not have a sufficient number of medics deployed to provide care to injured policemen at the point of injury, and
- ISAF planning efforts and advisory resources were not sufficient to develop the ANP’s capability to provide effective point-of-injury care.

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DODIG-2014-072, Observations 1, 2, and 7.
As a result, ANP policemen were unable to provide the necessary care for injured personnel, which led to increased mortality and a likely demoralizing effect on ANP personnel.

**Develop adequate partner nation casualty evacuation flight capacity**

One of the key enabling capabilities essential to the development of a sustainable military health care delivery system is the ability to provide air support for casualty evacuations. Multiple reports\textsuperscript{33} from 2009 and 2013 cited that partner nation security forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan depended on Coalition air assets to provide significant medical support for airborne casualty evacuations.

Continued reliance on U.S. and Coalition casualty evacuation support hampered partner nations’ ability to develop and implement their own sustainable healthcare delivery system. As U.S. forces have withdrawn from Afghanistan, the ANSF has had to rely on their limited airborne evacuation capability and increasingly on vehicular movement of casualties to the nearest medical facility.

**Develop security force medical capability by reducing over-reliance on U.S.-funded and purchased pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and equipment**

A 2011 report on ANSF medical logistics\textsuperscript{34} concluded that the ANA relied heavily on the U.S. supply chain in order to procure pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and equipment. This was because the ANA health care system had been primarily supplied through U.S. pseudo-Foreign Military Sales (pseudo-FMS) shipments and contracts generated through NTM-A/CSTC-A. In addition, MoD Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics personnel did not have significant experience with medical acquisition.

Closely related to this challenge was the failure of the ANA, and by extension the U.S. and Coalition advisor program, to develop effective inventory controls over U.S.-funded and purchased pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and equipment. This led to the apparent misappropriation and diversion of this critical medical materiel, which contributed to the substandard medical conditions found to exist at the ANA Dawood National Military Hospital in 2011.\textsuperscript{35}

Reliance on U.S. and Coalition logistical support for their pharmaceutical and medical supply needs delayed the development of a sustainable partner nation medical logistics system.

\textsuperscript{33} SPO-2009-002, Observation 19; DODIG-2013-058, Observation 8; and DODIG-2013-081, Observations 1 and 2.

\textsuperscript{34} SPO-2011-007, Observation 1.

\textsuperscript{35} SPO-2011-007, Observation 11.
Logistics Development and Sustainment

Discussion

Logistics is the branch of military science and operations dealing with the procurement, supply, and maintenance of equipment; the movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; and the provision of facilities and services necessary to sustain the operational capability of the forces. It consists of the efforts to procure, transport, resupply, repair, and retrograde materiel. The logistics area of this report, as we have used the term, can be viewed as the product of the efforts of both the “Advise and Assist” and the “Train and Equip” sections of this report.

The development of the logistics system for the support of the security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan was in each case fundamentally different. Whereas Iraq had existing national security forces with a functioning logistics system that was staffed by literate and, for the most part, trained and competent professional soldiers, and supported by a modern national infrastructure, Afghanistan was deficient in most of these areas or lacked such capability altogether. It is worth emphasizing, as have several U.S. commanders of our train and equip missions in each country, that logistical development of a partner nation security forces is significantly more complex than force generation.

Partner Nation Logistical System Development

Develop a single, integrated plan to coordinate the multiple security force logistics development initiatives

U.S. and Coalition commands in both Iraq and Afghanistan did not, at least initially, have a single integrated logistical development plan for the partner nation security forces. Furthermore, within the U.S. and Coalition command structures, there was no single officer or office responsible for partner nation logistical development.

During a 2011 assessment in Iraq, the DoD IG noted that USF-I did not have a comprehensive, integrated plan for developing the ISF logistics system that unified the efforts of U.S. logistics trainers and mentors across USF-I lines of operation. In part, this was due to the initial focus on generating Iraqi combat forces, which meant a lesser priority was given to developing Iraqi logistics capability.

A 2009 report from Afghanistan stated that U.S. and Coalition plans for development of ANSF did not provide a clearly defined path to achieving an end state in which MoD, Mol, and the ANSF would be capable of independently carrying

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36 SPO 2011-001, Observation 3.
37 SPO 2009-001, Observation 1.
out military and police logistics operations. Specifically, the plans for development of ANSF logistics sustainment did not provide a time-phased, conditions-based approach for accomplishing end state objectives. Rather, in many cases, the plans defined only broadly stated objectives and milestones. Further, the plans generally did not identify a specific person or office responsible for the execution of specific tasks.

Three years later, in 2012, a DoD IG assessment in Afghanistan revealed that United States and Coalition commands had not fully addressed this weakness. We found that ISAF lacked a plan that integrated the efforts of the International Joint Command and NTM-A/CSTC-A, in partnership with the MoD, General Staff, and ANA. Such a plan would have to address the complexities of achieving timely development of an essential core ANA logistics capability, according to an established timeline and defined end state. There was a significant gap between the growing ANA personnel and unit strength and ANA logistical ability to support their field operations. Additionally, the ANA still primarily relied on U.S. and Coalition logistics support.

The ability of the partner nation security forces to execute their own sustainable logistical support is a critical element of success. Developing this capability must be driven from a single, integrated plan and a well-defined end state. Disparate efforts to develop logistical capability must be unified under an integrated, single advisory plan and unit.

*Develop logistical and sustainment capability concurrent with the buildup of operational forces*

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the development of the operational combat capability of the security forces took precedence over other efforts, such as the development of logistical and sustainment capability. Because of this reality, the United States and Coalition conducted logistical support operations with the unintended, but perhaps predictable, consequence that the national security forces came to rely on U.S. and Coalition efforts and had little incentive to assume responsibility for their own logistical and sustainment capability. This occurred to an even greater extent in Afghanistan.

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38 DODIG 2012-028, Observation 1.
The consequences of the decision to generate ANSF combat forces before the development of their logistical ability to sustain those forces were identified in a 2012 report. This report highlighted, again, the lack of an integrated logistical development plan for the ANSF. Such a plan was needed to integrate the complex efforts of the International Joint Command and NTM-A/CSTC-A to build the logistical capacity of the MoD, the General Staff, and ANA.

Without reliable logistical processes of their own, the ISF and the ANSF forces relied on U.S. and Coalition processes to deliver needed, sometimes critical, supplies. Some advisors opined that the “cannot fail” attitude toward their counterparts actually hampered and delayed the goal of establishing a fully independent logistics support system.

In future contingency operations of this nature, if at all possible, the logistical capacity of partner nation’s security forces should be developed concurrent with their forces’ combat capability.

Organization and execution of partner nation logistical processes and procedures were highly centralized, and, as a result, were incapable of responding flexibly and responsively to the supply requirements of fielded security forces

In Afghanistan, we determined that parts and supplies were being shipped to depots without prior coordination. We reported on ANP equipment shipments that arrived at forward depots unannounced, without coordination, and lacking proper shipping paperwork. These shipments were often “pushed” by the United States or the MoI with little or no regard for the actual requirement or need.

In a 2011 report on ISF logistics, we described a nonstandard arrangement for logistical support. Fielded Iraqi forces sought logistical support from logistical centers with which they had developed relationships, rather than from their assigned support command.

The logistical centers were organized to provide logistics support to specifically assigned Iraqi Army divisions, but were not under the control of those divisions. The logistical centers reported to the MoD, and the Iraqi Army divisions were under Iraqi Ground Forces Command. The proper routing of any request for support from the division went up the chain of command to the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, over to MoD, and eventually back down to the logistical centers. That

39 DODIG 2012-028, Observation 1.
40 Interviews with Coalition advisors, December 2013.
41 SPO 2011-003, Observation 20.
42 SPO 2011-001, Observation 17.
process was cumbersome and time-consuming. In most instances, the issuance of supplies to the requesting division took place directly from the National Iraqi Army depot at Taji. The request was never sent to the logistical center responsible for providing division support, where the requested supplies might already be on-hand. Consequently, logistical centers had not developed a strong supporting/supported link with their respective Iraqi Army divisions, as intended.

Develop a demand-driven supply system by reducing U.S. and Coalition forces “pushing” materiel resupply

As a consequence of the efforts to generate combat forces rapidly, ANSF units became accustomed to receiving equipment from the United States without any specific request. When the ANSF constituted and trained a new unit, the unit would often receive its equipment concurrent with its development. Additional equipment provided was “pushed” to the unit in its deployed location at a later date. This push of equipment became routine to ANSF units.

We identified this reliance on the push system in a 2012 report. Since almost all ANA organizations were relatively new, many ANA logisticians became accustomed to receiving most of their equipment, vehicles, and supplies via the push system. They therefore did not establish a practice of filling out supply requisitions, forecasting future requirements, or tracking usage rates—all of which were essential elements of the desired end state “demand-pull” logistical system.

In a more recent report, we discussed the issue of requirements development as integral to a demand-pull logistics system. At this point, the ANA had not developed the capability to plan for and forecast the requirements for materiel needed to sustain combat operations. Additionally, the lack of training and experience of senior Afghan logisticians with supply forecasting and analysis impeded the development of a requirements based system.

Although necessary for the generation of new operational units, the equipping of ANSF units by the United States concurrent with their training may have induced a negative lesson: the Afghans believed they would always receive supplies and equipment without having to make a specific request. Even when unit-level ANSF logisticians generated appropriate requests for supplies or equipment, the request rarely resulted in the delivery of the requested material. The push system closely resembled the Soviet system that many senior Afghan officers worked under in the former ANA. While advances have been made in the ANSF transition to a demand-pull logistics system, additional efforts were still required to fully develop all aspects of such a system.

43 DODIG 2012-028, Observation 12.  
44 DODIG 2015-047, Observation 1.
Ensure U.S. and Coalition commands have a sufficient number of properly trained logistics advisors to provide mid- to senior-level national force officers with adequate and timely training and orientation in essential logistical management skills

A sufficient number of trained and able logistics advisors are a prerequisite to success in developing a national army’s logistical systems. Early in the Iraq train, advise, and equip effort, we identified the fragile nature of the rebuilt ISF logistics system. At the same time, the U.S. and Coalition commands in Iraq did not have sufficient advisory personnel with the requisite skills to provide necessary logistical mentoring assistance.

In Afghanistan, U.S. and Coalition drawdown plans may have hampered logistical advisors outside the Kabul area by limiting their force protection, transportation and other required support, and, therefore, their access to ANA units at and below the corps level. The U.S. and Coalition drawdown appears to have prolonged the mission to help build a complete ANSF logistics system.

In a 2009 report, we identified that a formal logistics specialty training track did not exist in Afghan military professional development schools. Therefore, ANA personnel working in logistics billets either were not fully trained or not trained at all, although the United States and Coalition had provided some functional logistics training to enlisted personnel. With U.S. and Coalition efforts, a formal logistics school was ultimately established for ANA personnel; however, information later obtained indicated that the school was underutilized. Reportedly, roughly half the billets in any class went unfilled. Attendance at formal training for partner nation officials must be strongly encouraged.

In addition to formal training, the quality of guidance provided by U.S. and Coalition advisers is likewise an imperative to success. While recognizing potential constraints on bottom-line numbers of advisors, having the right personnel with the requisite skill sets in key logistical advising nodes is critical to success.
Accountability and Control of U.S.-Supplied Equipment

Discussion

One of the pillars of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan has been to stand-up security forces that can plan, conduct, and sustain independent operations. In support of this rebuilding effort, the United States has transferred tens of billions of dollars in equipment and supplies to the Iraq and Afghanistan security forces, including such sensitive items as weapons, ammunition, and night vision devices. U.S. law requires the United States to maintain accountability and control of this equipment through turnover to the partner nation security forces and accountability after turnover, in some cases through end use monitoring.49

Without proper accountability and control, U.S.-supplied weapons and equipment may be subject to misplacement, loss, or theft and could even find their way into the hands of insurgents.

Policy, Processes, and Procedures for U.S.-Supplied Equipment and Supplies

Develop and enforce applicable policy, processes, and procedures with partner nation security forces for the issuance, accountability, and control of sensitive equipment, such as weapons, ammunition and night vision devices, and such highly pilferable supplies as pharmaceuticals and fuel. The Department of Defense is responsible for establishing and maintaining records and accountability of property over which it has control, including such property not in its physical custody as property furnished to a foreign government. This includes sensitive items, which must be controlled and managed to protect against unauthorized use, disclosure, or loss.50 For example, when small arms are furnished in support of foreign military sales or security assistance activities, the weapons’ serial numbers for each shipment must be recorded in order to meet DoD inventory management requirements and to establish continuous visibility over small arms by serial number.51

49 DoD Instruction 5000.64, “Accountability and Management of DoD Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” May 19, 2011.
50 Ibid.
Several reports from 2008 and 2009 identified a lack of applicable policies and procedures for the accountability of sensitive items. In Iraq, we determined\textsuperscript{52} that United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), and MNSTC-I had not issued written procedures for the accountability and control of arms and ammunition delivered to or transported through the USCENTCOM area of responsibility and subsequently provided to ISF or Coalition partners. Further, MNF-I had not clearly defined procedures for the accountability, control, and final disposition of weapons captured by U.S. forces, to include recording serial numbers, nor had MNF-I issued written procedures to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I for the accountability, control, and disposition of weapons captured by U.S. forces.

Similarly, in Afghanistan, we concluded\textsuperscript{53} that neither CSTC-A nor USCENTCOM had issued written guidance and procedures that addressed coordination between U.S. commands. Such guidance would set standards for the accountability, control, physical security, and final disposition of captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons held by U.S. forces, ANSF, and law enforcement organizations. Further, the serial numbers of those weapons were not properly recorded.

We also found\textsuperscript{54} that MNSTC-I personnel were unfamiliar with or did not follow published policy and standard operating procedures to conduct a joint serial number inventory at the time of transfer of sensitive items from U.S. custody to their Iraqi partners.

Early development of and compliance with command policy and guidance is integral to ensuring proper accountability of weapons and other sensitive items provided to partner nation security forces. The failure to understand and implement in-country security and accountability requirements for sensitive items until formal turnover to the partner nation security forces could lead to misappropriation and theft.

\textsuperscript{52} SPO-2008-001, Observations B and C.
\textsuperscript{53} SPO-2009-001, Observations E.
\textsuperscript{54} SPO-2009-003, Observations 2.
Inventory Management for U.S.-Supplied Equipment

Ensure United States and partner nation security forces maintain an unbroken chain of custody by serial number for sensitive equipment, including at turnover of U.S.-supplied equipment to partner nation security forces

U.S. forces did not always maintain an unbroken chain of custody for U.S.-controlled arms and ammunition. A chain of custody requires that every transfer of goods from organization to organization is documented by authorized individuals. Those records must contain evidence of the entire process, to include the recording of serial numbers. Properly executed chain of custody ensures that sensitive equipment, including arms, ammunition, and night vision devices, are tracked from procurement through delivery to the ultimate recipient and the items received are in the same condition, type, and count as originally shipped.

In a 2009 report on the ANSF,\(^{55}\) we determined that CSTC-A did not accurately report to the DoD Small Arms/Light Weapons Registry\(^{56}\) the serial numbers of DoD-procured weapons that were transferred to the ANSF. In addition, weapons donated by other countries to the DoD for transfer to the ANSF were not always

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\(^{55}\) SPO-2009-001, Observations C and D.

\(^{56}\) The DoD central repository for small arms and light weapons serial numbers that are or were under DoD control. The registry serves as the single point of access for inquiries relating to the last known record of DoD-controlled small arms and light weapons serial numbers. (DLM 4000.25-2).
accurately reported to the DoD Small Arms/Light Weapons Registry. By not recording serial numbers in the Small Arms/Light Weapons Registry, the DoD was unable to establish continuous visibility over these small arms/light weapons. Likewise, in a 2008 report on the ISF, we concluded that the containers, such as pallets or cases, holding DoD-procured/controlled weapons shipped to MNSTC-I for transfer to ISF did not include lists of serial numbers, because the contract did not require it. In addition, U.S. forces and ISF did not always perform joint inventories of U.S.-procured/controlled weapons prior to formal handover to ISF. A comparison of the weapons’ serial numbers recorded at the time of a joint inventory by DoD and partner nation personnel to those shown on the serial number lists that should have accompanied the shipping containers improves the accountability and control of the weapons.

The 2009 report also determined that the process to populate the MNSTC-I centralized database of weapon serial numbers for weapons issued to ISF by U.S. forces lacked sufficient internal data input controls. Errors identified included partial weapons’ serial numbers, extraneous characters within the weapons’ serial numbers that rendered the entry unusable, mislabeled weapon manufacturer identification, and data entered into the wrong database columns. In a 2009 report on night vision device (NVD) accountability, we concluded that MNSTC-I was not able to account for, by serial number, all of the night vision devices procured for and given to the ISF. The lack of serial number accountability for NVDs led to misappropriation and theft, ultimately putting U.S. Service members at risk of our enemies gaining this capability.

Proper enforcement of such chain of custody procedures as tracking serial numbers can help prevent misplacement, loss, and theft of weapons and the potential of them falling into enemy hands.

*Conduct required end use monitoring inspections for sensitive equipment items*

The 2009 NVD report discussed compliance with end use monitoring requirements for sensitive items. The report noted that MNSTC-I had not developed or implemented procedures for the execution of the Department of State’s Blue Lantern program, which requires routine end use monitoring of NVDs procured through direct commercial sales and supplied to the ISF. MNSTC-I personnel were uncertain of the routine end use monitoring requirements

57 SPO-2008-001, Observation G.
58 SPO-2008-001, Observations H.
59 SPO-2009-003, Observation 1.
60 SPO-2009-003, Observations 5.
for NVDs procured through methods other than foreign military sales. As a result, MNSTC-I procured and provided approximately 19,000 NVDs under the auspices of the Blue Lantern without “reasonable assurance” that the government of Iraq was complying with the related requirements imposed by the U.S. Government with respect to use, transfer, and security of defense articles.

In this same report, our team found that SAO Golden Sentry end use monitoring standard operating procedures did not provide clear guidance for oversight and handling of sensitive items purchased via pseudo-FMS cases. This process linked U.S.-provided funding for the ISF with selected FMS procedures in order to procure equipment and supplies. Items purchased via the pseudo-FMS case process should provide the same oversight as regular FMS purchases for purposes of monitoring sensitive items under Golden Sentry.

SAO responsibility and standard operating procedures for the accountability of sensitive items under Blue Lantern and Golden Sentry must be clearly defined. U.S. law requires compliance with end use monitoring procedures for selected items including sensitive equipment. Commands should provide their personnel with appropriate training and guidance to carry out required end use monitoring activities.

**Develop a professional culture of accountability and control for military equipment and supplies within the partner nation security forces**

The efficacy of the U.S. and Coalition advisory efforts to build effective security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan was impeded by the partner nation’s military and police cultures that lacked sufficient professional emphasis on accounting for and controlling essential equipment and supplies required to maintain unit readiness and sustain the fighting capability of their forces. Therefore, building an effective and sustainable system of accountability for equipment and supplies has proven especially challenging and made reducing chronic corruption more difficult.

In several reports from 2009 to 2013, we determined that Afghan army and police commanders had not uniformly enforced existing MoD/MoI policy decrees requiring a determination of accountability for negligence of accidents resulting in damage, destruction, loss, or theft of ANSF equipment. A general perception of impunity existed within the army and police forces in which there were no consequences for negligent destruction or loss of ANSF equipment. This attitude contributed to damage and loss of U.S.- and Coalition-supplied equipment at an unacceptable and unsustainable level.

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61 SPO-2009-003, Observation 7.
62 Pseudo-FMS case is a security assistance program that used ISF or ASFF monies, but FMS procedures.
64 SPO-2009-007, Observation 8.
Recently, the U.S. command in Afghanistan imposed stricter controls over direct funded commodities and equipment supplied to the Afghan MoD and Mol, a strategy that has the potential to improve accountability. To achieve enduring professional responsibility, however, strong and committed senior government and security force leadership is required to establish and demonstrate appropriate professional standards.

**Advise and assist the partner nation security forces to develop a system of appropriate policy, processes, and procedures for oversight of sensitive equipment items**

Partner nation military leaders in the field did not clearly understand their roles and responsibilities regarding the oversight of sensitive equipment items.

The 2011 ANP report\(^{65}\) concluded that the Afghan MoI did not provide clear guidance and procedures for the accountability of sensitive items. As a result, ANP commanders misunderstood their authority and the command and control relationships with the MoI’s Regional Logistics Centers. The Regional Logistics Center commander did not know that he was supposed to report to MoI Director of Logistics, not the regional police commander. Lack of clear command and control guidance at the regional logistics centers led to diversion of supplies and critical equipment to forces not authorized by the MoI to receive them at that point in time.

The 2009 NVD report\(^{66}\) determined that the Iraqi MoD and Mol did not develop formal written policies and procedures to establish internal control processes for the receipt, inventory, control, and issue of sensitive items. As a result, there was the potential for sensitive items to become misplaced, lost, or stolen and their serial numbers to be recorded inaccurately.

In another 2009 assessment,\(^{67}\) we determined that NVD serial number accountability by the Iraqi Army was unsatisfactory: serial numbers, computer database and hardcopy ledger data, and specific warehouse locations regarding NVD storage locations could not be reconciled. Additionally, in 2008, we found\(^{68}\) that certain Iraqi Army units were accounting for weapons by type and quantity, but not by serial number.

\(^{65}\) SPO-2011-003, Observation 18.

\(^{66}\) SPO-2009-003, Observation 3.

\(^{67}\) SPO-2009-002, Observation 4.

\(^{68}\) SPO-2008-001, Observation K.
In Afghanistan, a 2009 report[^69] concluded that the MoD and MoI did not maintain centralized databases by serial number of weapons in their inventories or in the inventories of the ANA and the ANP.

The lack of appropriate policy, processes, and procedures for oversight of sensitive equipment within the partner nation security forces impaired their ability to have visibility and accountability regarding their respective weapon inventories; to effectively manage, control, and allocate their weapons; and to be able to hold accountable those security forces leaders who had been given responsibility for these weapons.

[^69]: SPO-2009-006, Observation 3.
U.S. Contract Management

Discussion

Throughout the years of contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, DoD has relied significantly on contracted services to accomplish its mission. Contractor services have played an important role in training and mentoring the partner nation security forces, infrastructure construction and maintenance, security, materiel provision, maintenance of U.S.-supplied equipment, and the development of partner nation logistics systems and capacity within the security ministries.

If properly coordinated and integrated with U.S. and Coalition military forces and intended battlefield effects, contracted services can be a significant force multiplier. Without proper coordination and integration of contracted operations, it is more difficult to obtain the unity of effort required to achieve U.S. strategic and operational goals in any overseas contingency operation.

U.S. Contractor Actions with Respect to Campaign Plan Accomplishment

Ensure contracting requirements and performance support are adjusted to meet U.S. strategic and operational objectives/effects on the battlefield

Joint Publication 4-10, “Operational Contract Support,” dated October 17, 2008, stresses that the “geographic combatant commander, subordinate joint force commanders and their staffs must be familiar with how to plan for and integrate operations contract support during military operations.” Coordinating and integrating the sheer magnitude and complexity of contractor support requires that operational commanders and heads of contracting activities have a joint plan for accomplishing their inter-connected missions. To most effectively leverage the results of contracted services in support of operational goals and objectives, this joint planning effort needs to provide, at a minimum, overall contract visibility, strategic direction, mission alignment, and efficient and effective resource allocation.

However, DoD IG oversight revealed that, in many instances, operational and contracting commands did not have an integrated planning and execution approach that effectively linked contract requirement and performance to accomplishment of campaign strategic and operational goals.
During a 2011 DoD IG assessment mission in Afghanistan, we observed\textsuperscript{70} that the complex and inefficient command and control relationship between the command (ISAF) and its subordinate commands and their supporting contractors contributed to the disjointedness of the overall process. The organizational reporting system hampered quick and effective communication of critical issues of common concern to the commands and their contractors. For example, contractors were reporting performance concerns up through their company’s reporting chain, which did not align well with the operational chain of command. Such misalignment often left on-the-ground military commanders ill-informed or uncertain about the impact of contracting programs and issues in their areas of responsibility. Thus, down-range contractors operating throughout Afghanistan reported problems to their supervisors in Kabul, who in turn had to make a determination whether or not to forward these problems to ISAF. If in fact reported to ISAF, commanders had to relay the information back to the relevant Regional Command commanders, who were located in the same area of operations as the contractor personnel who made the initial report.

Another concern highlighted in the 2011 report\textsuperscript{71} was that military commanders had no command and control authority over contractor personnel in their area of operation, or the duties a contracting officer’s representative (COR) performed in support of the contract—contractor personnel cannot be “commanded.” The contract’s terms and conditions govern the relationship between contractor personnel and the U.S. Government. Only the COR has the authority to direct contractor personnel. This is especially problematic in a Coalition military environment, such as the contingency operation in Afghanistan, with Coalition trainers and advisors embedded in ANA units and U.S. contractors supporting those same units. Both groups complained to the DoD IG assessment team of friction and confusion over roles, responsibilities, and mutually supporting objectives.

If properly coordinated and integrated with U.S. and Coalition military forces, contracted services can be a significant force multiplier. If not, contracted resources will be used inefficiently and maybe even counter to advisory goals and objectives.

\textsuperscript{70} DODIG-2012-028, Observation 7.
\textsuperscript{71} DODIG-2012-028, Observation 8.
**Contract Oversight**

*Ensure sufficient numbers of trained and qualified U.S. contracting personnel deploy to provide adequate contract oversight*

In support of efforts to rapidly build the ISF and ANSF, U.S. and Coalition partners focused on training, equipping, mentoring, and supporting construction services and related contract oversight in multiple geographic areas around both countries. For example, in the effort to develop the Afghan National Police, ISAF initiated a construction program\(^2\) of multiple logistical, training, coordination, and support centers throughout the country, including 36 training centers, 6 regional supply centers, and 34 provincial supply points.

The United States funneled the financial resources\(^3\) required to pay for these development efforts through the Iraq and Afghanistan Security Force funds, requiring USCENTCOM and its subordinate commands to provide effective and efficient execution and oversight. In Afghanistan, the United States spent approximately $10 billion on infrastructure construction projects alone through FY 2012. However, DoD IG oversight revealed an insufficient number of trained and qualified U.S. contracting officers and CORs deployed as necessary to provide adequate contract oversight.

Failure to monitor contracts effectively can result in critical supplies and support services being late, deficient, and/or outside the scope of contract requirements. In addition, since commanders have no command and control authority over contractor personnel, it is the contracting officer and COR who serve as the essential link between the contractor and the operational command. Therefore, battlespace commanders need sufficient U.S. Government oversight capability to assure that contractors meet the contract requirements.\(^4\) Contracting officers and CORs stationed at locations far removed from the battlefield location of contract execution hampered effective contract oversight.

During a 2011 DoD IG assessment mission in Afghanistan, the command reported, “they were able to provide oversight of approximately 40 percent of their current contract responsibilities, while additional ASFF [Afghanistan Security Forces Fund] is rapidly creating additional contracting oversight challenges.”\(^5\) At that time, the command needed an additional 300 oversight personnel to fulfill its contract oversight responsibilities.

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\(^2\) SPO-2011-003, Observation 15.
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) DODIG-2012-028, Observation 8.
\(^5\) SPO-2011-003, Observation 15.
In an effort to overcome what has become an enduring challenge in Afghanistan, the command developed a new oversight initiative to bridge the void created by limited numbers of contracting officers and CORs. The Office of Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics signed a Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR) Class Deviation authorizing foreign government and Coalition partners to serve as CORs. However, the assessment team noted that a lack of guidance, uneven training standards, and language barriers undermined this initiative. With the proper guidance, training, and standardized procedures, an initiative of this type could be useful in providing U.S. contract oversight and resource stewardship in geographic areas commanded by Coalition forces that lack sufficient CORs.

**Develop, implement, and consistently execute quality assurance surveillance plans**

A quality assurance surveillance plan (QASP) is a government developed and applied plan to ensure systematic quality assurance methods are used in the administration of a contract. The intent of a QASP is to ensure that the contractor performs in accordance with the contract performance metrics and the government receives the quality of services called for in the contract.

In the efforts to develop the ISF and ANSF, U.S. and Coalition forces used service and support contracts to perform functions for the partner nation security forces, including base management and maintenance, and to procure basic goods and services. As the partner nation security force capabilities increased, and as U.S. and Coalition forces drew down, the United States and Coalition transferred these contracts to partner nation control.

However, a recent DoD IG assessment in Afghanistan revealed that Afghan officials were not uniformly performing contract oversight of existing contracts or planning to include oversight requirements in new contracts.76

Including a QASP in a contract before it is transferred to partner nation control would give the United States a greater level of assurance that appropriate oversight will be performed on contracts sourced with U.S./Coalition money. Further, U.S. contract advisors should require their counterparts in the partner nation security ministries to include QASPs in any of their new contracts that are sourced with U.S./Coalition money.

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**Combatting Trafficking in Persons**

*Include Federal Acquisition Regulation / Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation-mandated combatting trafficking in persons clauses in support contracts and direct periodic inspections to ensure DoD contractors and subcontractors meet contractual combatting trafficking in persons requirements*

To combat trafficking in persons (TIP), the U.S. Government requires that any contract entered into by a Federal department include a clause authorizing the department to terminate the contract without penalty if the contractor or subcontractor engages in severe forms of TIP, has procured a commercial sex act during the period of time that the contract is in effect, or uses forced labor in the performance of the contract. This type of TIP activity could be encountered overseas in service and construction contracts when prime and sub-contractors use third country nationals to work on base maintenance, in dining facilities, and in other base service support functions.

The DoD IG conducted oversight of this legal requirement to include the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) combatting trafficking in persons (CTIP) clause in DoD contracts. In a 2012 report, we described how the USCENTCOM Contracting Command had issued acquisition instructions requiring the addition of a regional CTIP clause, without explicitly reinforcing inclusion of the required FAR clause. As a result, contractors remained unaware of U.S. Government policy and contracting officers were potentially unable to apply remedies in the case of violations.

Further, USCENTCOM subordinate commands in Afghanistan had not developed localized CTIP policies, procedures, or training. Additionally, throughout Afghanistan, third country and local national workers supporting DoD contracts had a limited understanding of their legal rights, as well as the CTIP requirements imposed on the contractors that employed them. The low rate of literacy and poor fluency in English contributed to this limited understanding.

Noncompliance with the requirement to include the FAR CTIP clause in contracts has two negative effects: first, contractors may not have been made aware of the U.S. Government’s “zero tolerance” policy and self-reporting requirements regarding CTIP; second, contracting officers were potentially unable to apply remedies to correct contractor violations when the CTIP clause was not properly present.

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77 SPO-2011-002, pg. 6.
78 DODIG-2012-086, Observation 2.
79 DODIG-2012-086, Observation 1.
Appendix A

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this project summary of previously released DoD IG assessment reports issued between July 1, 2008 and January 30, 2015 relating to U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop the national security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan. We performed our work in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations,” published by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, except for planning and evidence requirements, since this report only summarizes previously released DoD IG reports, where those requirements were met. Further, this report does not make recommendations because they were contained in the reports summarized.

We identified 30 related DoD IG assessment reports and reviewed the observations, conclusions, and recommendations contained therein.

Based on our review, we identified five systemic challenge and problem areas in the U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop partner nation security forces.

- Training and equipping of partner nation security forces and ministries,
- Advisory assistance in support of partner nation security forces and ministries,
- Logistics development and sustainment,
- Accountability and control of sensitive U.S.-supplied equipment, and
- U.S. contract management.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not use computer-processed data to compile information for this report.

Use of Technical Assistance

We did not require technical assistance to compile information for this report.
Appendix B

Summary of Prior Coverage

DoD IG


Appendixes


Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>Contracting Officer’s Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTIP</td>
<td>Combating Trafficking in Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraq Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNSTC-I</td>
<td>Multinational Security Transition Command – Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Noncommissioned Officer</td>
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<td>NVD</td>
<td>Night Vision Devices</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPBE</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAO</td>
<td>Security Assistance Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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</table>
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U.S. Department of Defense

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