


FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

APRIL 17, 2015



Challenges Exist for Asset Accountability and Maintenance and Sustainment of Vehicles Within the Afghan National Security Forces

INTEGRITY ★ EFFICIENCY ★ ACCOUNTABILITY ★ EXCELLENCE

The document contains information that may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTEGRITY ★ EFFICIENCY ★ ACCOUNTABILITY ★ EXCELLENCE

Mission

Our mission is to provide independent, relevant, and timely oversight of the Department of Defense that supports the warfighter; promotes accountability, integrity, and efficiency; advises the Secretary of Defense and Congress; and informs the public.

Vision

Our vision is to be a model oversight organization in the Federal Government by leading change, speaking truth, and promoting excellence—a diverse organization, working together as one professional team, recognized as leaders in our field.



For more information about whistleblower protection, please see the inside back cover.



Results in Brief

Challenges Exist for Asset Accountability and Maintenance and Sustainment of Vehicles Within the Afghan National Security Forces

April 17, 2015

Objective

Our objective was to determine whether the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s Ministries of Defense and Interior have controls in place to effectively manage asset accountability for vehicles.

Findings

CSTC–A, Ministries of Defense (MoD), and Ministries of Interior (MoI) did not have controls in place to effectively manage accountability of the approximately 95,000 vehicles procured by DoD for Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) since 2005. In addition, MoD and MoI advisors were not confident that ANSF could effectively take over maintenance and sustainment of vehicles provided by DoD and Coalition forces.

This occurred because CSTC–A did not implement an effective system to properly track and account for vehicles transferred to ANSF; CSTC–A did not enforce consequences to hold MoD and MoI accountable for tracking vehicles transferred; and MoD and MoI did not place adequate controls over the accountability of vehicles they received from DoD and Coalition forces. In addition, MoD and MoI did not consistently follow property accountability procedures. MoD and MoI also lacked trained personnel to perform supply chain management.

Furthermore, ANA’s common practice of not maintaining vehicles has hindered its ability to successfully maintain and sustain its fleet.

As a result, there was a lack of assurance that all vehicles transferred to MoD and

Findings (cont’d)

MoI were used for their intended purpose. In addition, if ANP and ANA are left to maintain vehicles without contractor assistance, their vehicles will rapidly deteriorate, reducing their ability to defend their country. Furthermore, DoD has spent at least \$21 million on replacement engines and transmissions for High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles that likely could have been avoided.

Recommendations

Among other recommendations, the Commander, CSTC–A should instruct the Security Assistance Office to reconcile information in the Operational Verification of Reliable Logistics Oversight Database to information in the Security Cooperation Information Portal to ensure vehicle information is accurate and complete. The Commander should also assess the accuracy of CSTC–A’s records and take the necessary steps to maintain the completeness and accuracy of these records.

Regarding maintenance and sustainment of vehicles by ANA and ANP, we recommend the Deputy Chief of Staff–Support enforce consequences in the commitment letters if MoD continues the practice of requesting unjustified replacement vehicles and spare parts. The Deputy Chief should also examine the training program that Automotive Management Services conducts to train Afghan National Police on supply chain management and determine whether it is feasible to implement a similar training model for Afghan National Army to help ensure the Afghan National Army progresses in building its supply chain management capability to an independent level.

Management Comments and Our Response

The U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, Audit Program Manager, responding for the Commander CSTC–A and the Deputy Chief of Staff–Support, addressed all specifics of Recommendations A.1 through A.8 and B.1, B.3, B.4, and B.5 and partially addressed B.2. We request the Program Manager to provide additional comments on Recommendation B.2 to the final report. See the Recommendations Table on the next page.

Recommendations Table

| Management | Recommendations Requiring Comment | No Additional Comments Required |
|---|--|--|
| Commander, Combined Security Transition–Afghanistan | None | A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6, A.7, A.8 |
| Deputy Chief of Staff–Support | B.2 | B.1, B.3, B.4, B.5 |

Please provide comments by May 18, 2015.



**INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500**

April 17, 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION
COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF SUPPORT

SUBJECT: Challenges Exist for Asset Accountability and Maintenance and
Sustainment of Vehicles within the Afghan National Security Forces
(Report No. DODIG-2015-107)

We are providing this report for your review and comment. DoD did not have effective controls to ensure full accountability of vehicles provided to Afghan National Security Forces. In addition, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior advisors were not confident that Afghan National Security Forces could effectively take over maintenance and sustainment of vehicles provided by DoD and Coalition forces. We conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We considered the Commander Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and the Deputy Chief of Staff-Support comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report. Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly. The U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, Audit Program Manager, responding for the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and the Deputy Chief of Staff-Support addressed all specifics of Recommendations A.1 through A.8 and B.1, B.3, B.4, and B.5, but partially addressed Recommendation B.2. Therefore, we request comments on Recommendation B.2 by May 18, 2015.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 601-5945 (DSN 664-5945).

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Lorin T. Venable".

Lorin T. Venable, CPA
Assistant Inspector General
Financial Management and Reporting

Contents

Introduction

| | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Objective | 1 |
| Background | 1 |
| Review of Internal Controls | 4 |

Finding A. CSTC–A, MoD, and MoI Could Not Fully Account for Vehicles

| | |
|---|----|
| Lack of Control to Manage Accountability of Vehicles | 5 |
| MoD and MoI Lack Accounting Records for Vehicles | 7 |
| Controls Over Vehicles Were Not in Place When Title Transferred To ANSF | 8 |
| CSTC–A Needs to Enforce Consequences for the ANSF Failure to Account for Vehicles | 10 |
| ANSF Needs to Improve Controls to Account for Vehicles Provided by DoD and Coalition Forces | 10 |
| Lack of Assurance Vehicles Were Used as Intended | 12 |
| Actions Taken by CSTC–A to Improve Accountability of Vehicles | 12 |
| Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response | 13 |

Finding B. ANSF Could Not Demonstrate Vehicle Maintenance and Sustainability

| | |
|---|----|
| ANSF Not Ready to Maintain and Sustain Donated Vehicles | 19 |
| ANP Needs Additional Training to Independently Maintain and Sustain Its Fleet of Vehicles | 22 |
| ANA Training Needs Improvement to Independently Maintain its Fleet of Vehicles | 23 |
| Common Practice to Not Maintain Vehicles Within the ANA | 24 |
| Results of Lack of Maintenance and Sustainment of Vehicles | 26 |
| Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response | 27 |

Contents (cont'd)

Appendix

| | |
|--------------------------------|----|
| Scope and Methodology | 30 |
| Use of Computer-Processed Data | 31 |
| Prior Coverage | 31 |

Management Comments

| | |
|----------------------------------|----|
| United States Forces–Afghanistan | 33 |
|----------------------------------|----|

| | |
|----------------------------|----|
| Acronyms and Abbreviations | 40 |
|----------------------------|----|



Introduction

Objective

Our objective was to determine whether the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIRoA) Ministries of Defense and Interior have controls in place to effectively manage asset accountability for vehicles and buildings. Specifically, we evaluated the adequacy of the policies and procedures that:

- verified the existence of the donated assets;
- forecasted maintenance and replacement operations requirements; and
- identified requirements for asset replenishment.

For purposes of this report, we will refer to the forecast of maintenance and replacement operations requirements and identification requirements for asset replenishment as supply chain management.¹

On August 26, 2014, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction initiated an audit evaluating the DoD oversight of infrastructure projects (including bases, hospitals, and roads) transferred to the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. To avoid duplication, we focused our audit on vehicles. For a discussion on scope and methodology, see the Appendix.

Background

The audit was conducted to address a congressional request in the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires a plan for sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) through the end of FY 2018. According to Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), from FY 2005 through FY 2014, DoD and Coalition forces purchased approximately 95,000 vehicles at an estimated cost of \$6.5 billion for GIRoA Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI).

The purpose of these vehicles was to assist the MoD and MoI in defending their country against their adversaries. These vehicles included light-tactical vehicles, medium-tactical vehicles, and high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) for use by the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Hereafter, ANA and ANP will be referred to as the ANSF when discussed together. ANA reports to the MoD, and ANP reports to MoI.

¹ Supply chain management consists of purchasing parts and materials necessary for the maintenance, forecasting of maintenance and replacement operation requirements, identifying requirements for asset replenishment, managing a supply warehouse, and executing parts distribution of vehicles.

Defense Article Accountability

The Arms Export Control Act² requires the President to establish an End-Use Monitoring (EUM) program to improve accountability for defense articles sold, leased, or exported under the Act. To comply with the law, the Director, DSCA was delegated the authority by the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to administer the DoD EUM program, known as Golden Sentry. DoD Manual 5105.38-M³ provides guidance on accountability over defense articles (items) and associated spare parts and requires enhanced and routine EUM. DSCA works with the Military Departments, the combatant commands, and the Security Cooperation Organization to implement DoD's EUM program. Golden Sentry is the DoD's EUM program for defense articles provided to partner nations from the U.S. Government.

Bilateral Financial Commitment Letters

The 1393⁴ Bilateral Financial Commitment Letters (commitment letters) serve as a bilateral agreement between CSTC-A and GIRoA to provide funding to MoD and MoI. The letters establish the CSTC-A commitment to supplement the 1393 MoD and MoI budget by fiscal year.

Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan

The CSTC-A mission is to train, advise, and assist ANSF by providing resources in support of ANSF development. It provides technical support to develop a lasting, sustainable ANSF capacity and capabilities. In addition, CSTC-A executes U.S. Government responsibilities for financial management and security assistance. The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund supports the CSTC-A mission to equip, train, and sustain the ANSF.

DoD Instruction 4140.66⁵ requires the Commander, CSTC-A to establish a registration and monitoring system for DoD government-to-government transfer or export of defense articles, services, or both. The Security Assistance Office, which is part of CSTC-A, stated that it conducted congressionally required reviews to ensure accountability for vehicles. These reviews were conducted during its normal duties. According to DSCA officials, this instruction was established as a result of FY 2010 National Defense Authorization Act.

² Section 2785, title 22, United States Code (2010).

³ DoD Manual 5105.38-M, "Security Assistance Management Manual," September 2014.

⁴ The Afghan FY 1393 represents the period between December 21, 2013, through December 20, 2014.

⁵ DoD Instruction 4140.66, "Registration and End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles and/or Defense Services," September 7, 2010.

The Deputy Chief of Staff–Support (DCOS–SPT) is a component that works with CSTC–A and is responsible for the functions of Essential Function 5. Specifically, Essential Function 5⁶ is required to sustain the force, manage facilities, and maintain equipment.

Contracted Maintenance and Training Services

Army Contracting Command awarded two contracts to assist ANSF with the maintenance and operational support of DoD-provided vehicles and train ANSF personnel. The contracts help ANSF to maintain and manage its vehicles.

According to the contracts, ANSF used three levels of maintenance support:

- 1. Organizational Support**—provides preventive maintenance checks and services, minor repairs, adjustments, and quick replacement of parts, such as starters, radiators, alternators, tires, and brakes at the infantry and combat support levels.
- 2. General Support**—provides in-depth troubleshooting, testing, diagnosis, and repair of light tactical vehicles, medium tactical vehicles, and HMMWVs for the regional units.⁷ This support also includes repairs to major assemblies such as engines, transmissions, and axles. It also requires increased mechanical skills, a wider range of repair parts, light-machine tool support, diagnostic equipment, and other specialized tools.
- 3. National Support (depot-level support)**—provides repairs that require the use of machine tools, test equipment, heavy lifting, and specialized facilities. It also provides maintenance to rebuild individual components, overhaul of components and major assemblies, and overhaul of complete equipment pieces.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan and CSTC–A, through the Afghanistan Technical Equipment Maintenance Program contract awarded to the Afghan Integrated Support Services (AISS), developed a program that combined the training of personnel for vehicles and equipment maintenance support for ANSF. The contract required AISS to perform maintenance at regional unit locations and advise and mentor ANA personnel at the organizational level.

After the contract was awarded, CSTC–A reduced the scope of the contract from 10 to 2 AISS maintenance sites. CSTC–A also removed the requirement for the contractor to perform routine maintenance such as oil changes and other small

⁶ CSTC–A and DCOS–SPT is part of eight essential functions that are responsible for various roles including but not limited to transparency, accountability, oversight, maintenance and sustainment.

⁷ Regional units are corps located in logistic regions throughout Afghanistan.

repairs for the ANA fleet of vehicles. ANA was then responsible for providing all general and organizational-level maintenance. AISS performed general support that provided in-depth troubleshooting, testing, diagnosis, and repair for the fleet of vehicles that are in reserve.⁸

CSTC-A also implemented the program through the contract that was awarded to the Automotive Management Service (AMS) to provide equipment, maintenance, and supply-chain management for MoI and ANP vehicles and national-level maintenance to support the MoD and ANA fleet of vehicles. In addition to those services, AMS provided training to ANP for equipment, maintenance, and supply chain management. AMS training and support of ANSF throughout Afghanistan consists of 2 national level facilities, 10 regional maintenance centers, and 61 contact teams⁹ that travel to various ANP units within the different regions.

Review of Internal Controls

DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," May 30, 2013, requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. We identified internal control weaknesses in ANSF's fleet accountability and its ability to independently maintain and sustain its fleet of vehicles received from the DoD and Coalition forces. CSTC-A, MoD, and MoI did not have controls in place to effectively manage accountability of the vehicles. Furthermore, MoD and MoI advisors were not confident that ANSF could effectively take over the maintenance and sustainment of vehicles transferred to it by DoD and Coalition forces. We will provide a copy of this report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in the CSTC-A and DCOS-SPT.

⁸ The ANA's reserve fleet consists of repaired vehicles that will replace inoperable vehicles.

⁹ Contact teams consist of two mechanics, a maintenance truck stocked with tools and enough parts to stay out in the field for 30 days.

Finding A

CSTC–A, MoD, and MoI Could Not Fully Account for Vehicles

CSTC–A, MoD, and MoI did not have controls in place to effectively manage accountability of the approximately 95,000 vehicles procured by DoD for ANSF since 2005. Although CSTC–A took steps to improve accountability of vehicles whose titles were transferred to MoD and MoI, CSTC–A could not provide a list of vehicles transferred to ANSF. In addition, MoD and MoI could not fully account for vehicles they received from CSTC–A.

This occurred because:

- CSTC–A did not implement an effective system to properly track and account for vehicles transferred to ANSF;
- CSTC–A did not enforce consequences outlined in the commitment letters to hold MoD and MoI accountable for tracking vehicles transferred; and
- MoD and MoI did not place adequate controls over the accountability of vehicles they received from DoD and Coalition forces. Furthermore, MoD and MoI did not consistently follow property accountability procedures.

As a result of lack of accountability, there was a lack of assurance that all vehicles transferred to MoD and MoI were used for their intended purpose. In addition, CSTC–A's inability to determine which vehicles and how many vehicles were transferred to ANSF hinders its ability to hold ANSF accountable for its vehicles.

Lack of Control to Manage Accountability of Vehicles

(FOUO) CSTC–A did not have controls in place to effectively manage accountability of its vehicles. Specifically, CSTC–A could not provide a list of vehicles transferred to ANSF by DoD and Coalition forces. According to DSCA officials, DoD purchased approximately 95,000 vehicles for ANSF since 2005. Of the 95,000 vehicles bought, Security Assistance Office officials estimated that [REDACTED] vehicles were delivered for distribution to MoD, and [REDACTED] were delivered for distribution to MoI.

During our review, DoD delivered vehicles to two transfer lots:¹⁰ Safya Edna Khalil IT Solutions (SEK Solutions) and Afghan Union Transportation and Logistics, which held vehicles until transferred to ANSF. ANSF personnel signed transfer title

¹⁰ For the purposes of this report we refer to waypoint yards as transfer lots. These transfer lots are where DoD temporarily holds vehicles prior to transferring them to MoD and MoI.

documents at the lots to take ownership of the vehicles. According to the Security Assistance Office, as of October 2014, DoD had 2,748 vehicles at the transfer lots pending title transfer. Figure 1. and Figure 2. show vehicles in these transfer lots in Afghanistan before CSTC-A transferred them to ANSF.




Figure 1. SEK Solutions Lot
Source: CSTC-A, Security Assistance Office




Figure 2. Afghan Union Transportation and Logistics Lot
Source: CSTC-A, Security Assistance Office

CSTC-A has taken steps to update its records so that it could determine the total number of vehicles whose titles it transferred to ANSF. In 2010, CSTC-A began using an access database called the Operational Verification of Reliable Logistics Oversight Database (OVERLORD) to record information for vehicles it transferred to ANSF, which complied with DoD Instruction 4140.66. The database included the vehicle type, vehicle identification number, disposition (government-to-government transfer), and other information.

Before 2010, various regional depots located throughout Afghanistan maintained title transfer information on paper record. Recently, CSTC-A headquarters began to manually enter the paper records into OVERLORD. This time-consuming process required CSTC-A personnel to enter approximately 25 footlocker-sized boxes of title transfer information into OVERLORD. After the data base is updated, CSTC-A will use OVERLORD to upload the vehicle information into the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP). SCIP served as a repository of data to establish a baseline for EUM designated items transferred by serial numbers. It allows registered users, such as DSCA, to access information related to foreign military sales data and provides necessary information to perform inventories, track items, and maintain historical related information.

CSTC-A initially could not estimate how many vehicle titles it needed to upload into SCIP or how long it would take for its personnel to enter this information into OVERLORD. However, according to the Deputy Commanding General CSTC-A, as of January 2015 there were tens of thousands of records. CSTC-A officials noted that even after they entered all title information into the database, it was possible that SCIP would not be fully accurate. They explained that after CSTC-A completes the manual entry of the data, the records may remain incomplete because of missing or inaccurate information. In addition, officials stated they were not confident that all title documents were in the 25 boxes because the boxes were moved among several locations in Afghanistan over the last few years.

CSTC-A initially could not estimate how many vehicle titles it needed to upload into SCIP or how long it would take for its personnel to enter this information into OVERLORD.

MoD and MoI Lack Accounting Records for Vehicles

(FOUO) MoD and MoI could not fully account for vehicles they received from CSTC-A. For MoD, Security Assistance Office officials estimated that they received [REDACTED] vehicles from DoD and Coalition forces; however, MoD could not provide a complete list of vehicles that it received. According to MoD advisors, although MoD at the national level had policies and procedures to account for vehicles received from the DoD and Coalition forces, the MoD subordinate unit, ANA, at times obtained the vehicles directly instead of at a central receiving point.

On October 29, 2014, MoD advisors asked ANA officials to provide a detailed list of vehicles that were transferred to them; however, ANA officials stated they would need a directive from their command before they would provide the information. As of the end of January 2015, ANA still had not provided the list of vehicles.

There is a high risk that MoI records will never be fully accurate because of misplaced, stolen, or destroyed vehicles.

(FOUO) For MoI, Security Assistance Office officials estimated they received [REDACTED] vehicles from DoD and Coalition forces; however, a high-ranking MoI official stated he could not provide a comprehensive list of vehicles that were transferred to the ANP. MoI officials said they issued a memorandum to the regional commands to obtain this information to update their records. Although this step may have helped complete the ANP property books, there is a high risk that MoI records will never be fully accurate because of misplaced, stolen, or destroyed vehicles.

(FOUO)
MoI could not ensure that [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] vehicles were properly maintained or were in the possession of ANP.

(FOUO) The lack of effective controls and ineffective policies and procedures by ANSF to track vehicles it received from DoD and Coalition forces impacted ANSF's ability to ensure all vehicles received scheduled maintenance. For example, AMS put controls in place¹¹ to ensure it performed maintenance on all authorized ANP vehicles, by registering¹² the vehicles that ANP brought in for maintenance. However, ANP officials circumvented the control by not bringing all vehicles in for maintenance. As of October 2014, AMS had only approximately [REDACTED] vehicles registered in its system. Since ANP officials did not bring all vehicles in for maintenance, AMS could not register the vehicles and therefore lacked records for approximately [REDACTED] of the estimated [REDACTED] vehicles procured for ANP. Consequently, MoI could not ensure that [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] vehicles were properly maintained or were in the possession of ANP. Since MoD also could not provide a complete list of vehicles received from DoD and Coalition Forces, ANA also lacked the controls to ensure all vehicles were properly maintained and were in the possession of ANA.

Controls Over Vehicles Were Not in Place When Title Transferred To ANSF

CSTC-A could not fully account for vehicles because it did not implement an effective system to track and account for vehicles transferred to ANSF. Specifically, CSTC-A could not determine how many of the 95,000 vehicles procured by DoD were transferred to ANSF since FY 2005. CSTC-A did not make accountability a priority at the time of transfer since its priority was to fully equip ANSF to fight against its enemies. However, CSTC-A should have had controls in place that would have captured all vehicle titles in a central database at the time the titles were transferred to ANSF. Instead, CSTC-A officials stored title transfer documents in boxes at regional depots throughout Afghanistan.

CSTC-A could not determine how many of the 95,000 vehicles procured by DoD were transferred to ANSF since FY 2005.

CSTC-A, Security Assistance Office established procedures to comply with DoD Instruction 4140.66 in September 2010, which requires the Commander, CSTC-A to establish a registration and monitoring system for

¹¹ This control ensured AMS only performed maintenance on authorized vehicles in accordance with the contract.

¹² The registration process included recording the date and time received; vehicle type; vehicle identification number; and serial number

DoD government-to-government transfer or export of defense articles. However, CSTC-A, Security Assistance Office did not take timely action to ensure it entered titles for vehicles transferred to the ANSF before 2010, when CSTC-A Security Assistance Office established procedures to comply with the instruction. Specifically, CSTC-A Security Assistance Office did not begin to enter these older titles until September 2014. Although DoD Instruction 4140.66 was not issued until September 2010, DoD had been aware of concerns regarding ineffective property accounting practices based on lessons learned in Iraq since at least July 2007, when GAO issued its report "DoD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces." By only entering titles transferred after September 2010, CSTC-A Security Assistance Office cannot assure they have a complete listing of vehicle property records that provide evidence that CSTC-A transferred ownership of vehicles to ANSF.

Furthermore, without complete property records, CSTC-A could not provide MoD and MoI advisors with important information regarding the number of vehicles DoD and Coalition forces transferred to ANSF. Without the knowledge of how many vehicles DoD and Coalition forces transferred, it is difficult for CSTC-A to hold ANSF responsible for accounting for the vehicles it received. According to DSCA and CSTC-A officials, several factors have contributed to the backlog of vehicle titles CSTC-A needs to enter in its property records. One factor was the lack of clear guidance prior to 2010. Another factor was the fragmented process in which DoD transferred ownership of the vehicles to ANSF.

After the CSTC-A, Security Assistance Office completes uploading OVERLORD information into SCIP in December 2015,¹³ CSTC-A will know how accurate and complete its property transfer records were. When properly maintained, SCIP will provide accurate and complete inventory reports that can help CSTC-A hold ANSF accountable for vehicles it receives from DoD and Coalition forces. After CSTC-A transfers the OVERLORD information to SCIP, based on the extent of data availability, SCIP should contain all information from the point of purchase to when a vehicle's title is transferred to GIRoA. To determine the completeness of its property transfer records, CSTC-A can compare the total number of vehicles purchased and the number of vehicles at the transfer lots. CSTC-A, Security Assistance Office should reconcile information in OVERLORD to information in SCIP to ensure vehicle information is accurate and complete. After the Security Assistance Office completes the reconciliation, the Commander, CSTC-A should assess the accuracy of their property transfer records and take the necessary steps to maintain the completeness and accuracy of these records.

¹³ The Deputy Commanding General CSTC-A estimated CSTC-A will complete entering title transfer information into OVERLORD in December 2015.

CSTC–A Needs to Enforce Consequences for the ANSF Failure to Account for Vehicles

CSTC–A did not enforce consequences outlined in the commitment letters such as reducing the committed amount of funding when MoD could not demonstrate accountability of vehicles. According to the MoD commitment letters, MoD must demonstrate to the international community that proper controls are in place to ensure accountability and transparency of vehicles. It further states that CSTC–A will not provide funding if MoD does not meet these conditions. While the MoD commitment letter contained explicit language regarding consequences for lack of accountability, the MoI commitment letter did not have explicit language that would ensure accountability and transparency of vehicles. The Commander, CSTC–A should add language to the next MoI commitment letter as included in the MoD Commitment Letter.

DoD and Coalition forces placed more emphasis on providing any equipment that ANSF requested without determining whether it was actually required. MoD and MoI advisors stated that regardless of whether it was justified or not, DoD and Coalition forces replaced vehicles including, but not limited to, light and medium tactical vehicles, and other vehicles such as HMWWVs. MoD and MoI advisors also stated that this practice created a culture that did not account or properly justify the need for ANSF’s current fleet of vehicles. Instead, ANSF requested that DoD and Coalition forces replace vehicles without providing appropriate documentation. The Commander, CSTC–A should enforce consequences by withholding funding if MoD and MoI do not follow the requirements outlined in the new commitment letters to establish adequate controls for the accountability of vehicles provided by DoD and Coalition forces.

Regardless of whether it was justified or not, DoD and Coalition forces replaced vehicles.

Neither MoD nor MoI could provide a comprehensive list of vehicles they received.

ANSF Needs to Improve Controls to Account for Vehicles Provided by DoD and Coalition Forces

MoD and MoI officials could not fully account for all vehicles transferred to them because they did not have adequate controls in place when they first received the vehicles. Neither MoD nor MoI could provide a comprehensive list of vehicles they received because neither developed a central repository of title information for the vehicles. At times, ANA and ANP received vehicles at their individual corps

level, which complicated their accountability at the national level. Therefore, ANA and ANP did not have visibility at the national level over vehicles received at the individual corps level.

Furthermore, MoD and MoI did not consistently follow property accountability procedures. According to an MoI advisor, ANP officials did not ensure they properly recorded combat-damaged vehicles in their property book records. ANP officials removed vehicles from the property records and recorded them as destroyed when, in fact, they were still fully operational. However, according to MoI procedures, vehicles were only supposed to be removed from property records when they were damaged beyond repair during combat, which allowed a replacement vehicle to be ordered.

Both MoD and MoI had procedures that included a certification process by various ranking officials before vehicles could be removed from its property books. However, MoI advisors stated this procedure was not followed. For example, in October 2014, MoI advisors stated that an anticrime police vehicle, reported as destroyed by battle damage, was brought to AMS by ANP to receive maintenance. CSTC-A identified an irregularity when the vehicle's identification number was flagged as a disposed vehicle in the contractor's system. Although MoI advisors did not know how many vehicles were unnecessarily replaced, according to MoI advisors, it was a common occurrence.

If CSTC-A reduces funding to enforce the consequences as outlined in the commitment letters when ANSFs requests unjustified replacement vehicles, then it can reduce and deter fraud, waste, and abuse. It is also important that MoD and MoI officials maintain accurate property books and conduct periodic physical inspections to verify the existence of provided assets. CSTC-A should leverage the commitment letters to ensure that MoD and MoI reconcile their national and individual corps property books to develop an accurate comprehensive list of vehicles received from the DoD and Coalition forces, which would demonstrate they provide controls for transparency and accountability to the international community in compliance with the commitment letters. After this is complete, CSTC-A should obtain a complete inventory of vehicles received by the Afghan National Security Force and reconcile this list to help identify any missing records in the Security Cooperation Information Portal. In addition, CSTC-A should advise MoD and MoI officials to maintain consolidated property book records for all vehicles received from DoD and Coalition forces. CSTC-A should also advise MoD and MoI to follow the MoD and MoI certification process to ensure they only remove verified lost or destroyed vehicles from their property books.

Lack of Assurance Vehicles Were Used as Intended

As a result of ANSF's inability to fully account for all vehicles it received from the DoD and Coalition forces, there was a lack of assurance that all vehicles transferred were used as intended. Vehicles not listed on the property books could be diverted for personal or other unauthorized use, instead of for authorized use by the ANSF,

CSTC-A could not determine which vehicles and how many vehicles were transferred to ANSF.

or possibly stripped down and sold for parts. Furthermore, without complete and accurate property books, it was unlikely that vehicles received adequate maintenance, which would have greatly reduced the useful lives of the vehicles.

In addition, since CSTC-A could not determine which vehicles and how many vehicles were transferred to ANSF, it would hinder CSTC-A's ability to hold ANSF accountable for its vehicles. The Commanding General CSTC-A stated that they need to change how they help the ANSF by holding them accountable. However, this task will be more difficult if DoD and Coalition forces do not know how many vehicles they could hold ANSF accountable for.

Actions Taken by CSTC-A to Improve Accountability of Vehicles

In November 2014, DoD and Donor Nations met with GIRoA Ministerial leaders, including leaders from MoD and MoI, to explain the expectation of transparency and accountability. Furthermore, on December 12, 2014, the Deputy Commanding General stated that as of December 8, 2014, ANA and ANP would not receive further vehicles until they demonstrated 100-percent accountability against the Security Assistance Office vehicle transfer records. The Deputy Commanding General further stated that once the ANA and ANP have validated their on-hand quantities, title transfer would allow replacement of vehicles that were battle damaged or beyond economic repair. In addition, per DoD requirements, CSTC-A would require prior authorization and supporting validated documentation, including a destruction plan in accordance with U.S. demilitarization regulations, which would be subject to periodic inspections. The Deputy Commanding General stated he expects to have the backlog of hard copy titles entered into SCIP by December 2015. Finally, as of October 2014, CSTC-A changed the process in which AMS registered their vehicles to register vehicles at the transfer lots to ensure future vehicle accountability.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

We recommend the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan:

Recommendation A.1

Instruct the Security Assistance Office to reconcile information in Operational Verification of Reliable Logistics Oversight Database against information in Security Cooperation Information Portal to ensure vehicle information is accurate and complete.

CSTC-A Comments

The U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Audit Program Manager, responding for the Commander, CSTC-A, agreed, stating that CSTC-A began to reconcile information in June 2014. The Program Manager further stated that they are in the process of transitioning information in OVERLORD to SCIP and working with DSCA to transfer historical records. The Program Manager added that all records must be entered into SCIP to ensure full accountability. As mentioned in the Program Manager’s response to Recommendation A.2, the Security Assistance Office will complete the process to enter title information into SCIP by June 30, 2016.

Our Response

Comments from the Program Manager addressed the specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

Recommendation A.2

Assess the accuracy of property transfer records after the Security Assistance Office completes its reconciliation and take the necessary steps to maintain the completeness and accuracy of these records.

CSTC-A Comments

The U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Audit Program Manager, responding for the Commander CSTC-A, agreed, stating that CSTC-A will follow through to perform a final assessment to determine the accuracy of property transfer records. The Program Manager said that CSTC-A has been executing the Golden Sentry program, which includes verifying the accuracy of Afghan property records based on quantity transferred versus by vehicle identification number.

The Program Manager disagreed that an effective system was never implemented to track and account for vehicles transferred to the Afghan National Defense Security Forces. The Program Manager stated that CSTC-A always had an effective system to record vehicles transferred to ANSF. He said that the tracking shortfalls were due to the dispersion of paper copy records throughout various coalition depots in Afghanistan where CSTC-A did not have access to the records to upload into SCIP.

The Program Manager further stated that upon closure of the depots and the reorganization of CSTC-A, all records were delivered to Security Assistance Office for review and compilation. This delivery from the depots to CSTC-A was completed in July 2014. The Program Manager explained that Security Assistance Office will complete the process to enter title information into SCIP by June 30, 2016. The Program Manager reiterated that CSTC-A would continue to follow the Public Law 111-84 Section 1225 and Golden Sentry process and resolve any discovered shortfalls.

Our Response

Comments from the Program Manager addressed the specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required. Although the Program Manager agreed with the recommendation, he stated that CSTC-A exceeded the standards of the Golden Sentry Program. However, those standards do not require CSTC-A to maintain complete and accurate property books.

We maintain our position that CSTC-A did not have controls in place to effectively manage accountability of the approximately 95,000 vehicles procured by DoD for ANSF. CSTC-A could not provide a list of vehicles that were transferred to ANSF because titles were only maintained on paper records dispersed throughout various coalition depots in Afghanistan. In addition, vehicle title transfers were not recorded in a central record system such as SCIP. If the CSTC-A method to track vehicles was effective, it could have provided this information.

Without a complete list of vehicles provided to ANSF, DoD would have to locate the paper title within the 25 footlocker-sized boxes to support that the vehicles actually transferred to their intended recipient, ANSF. Without the control of having a complete list of vehicles, the process to transfer vehicles was at risk of waste, fraud, and abuse. It is critical that CSTC-A complete its process to ensure vehicle title information is loaded into SCIP and take steps to ensure SCIP is fully accurate.

Recommendation A.3

Add language to the next Ministry of Interior commitment letter that will help DoD and Coalition forces enforce accountability and transparency of vehicles provided to the Ministry of Interior.

CSTC-A Comments

The U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Audit Program Manager, responding for the Commander CSTC-A, neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation. The Program Manager stated that CSTC-A complied with the recommendation by strengthening the controls in the 1394 MoI U.S. Afghan Security Force Fund Commitment Letter. The Program Manager stated that the commitment letter now states that CSTC-A will not approve funding until MOI demonstrates that the requirement for a vehicle is authorized and that a replacement vehicle has not already been provided.

Our Response

Comments from the Program Manager addressed the specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

Recommendation A.4

Enforce consequences by withholding funding if the Ministries of Defense and Interior do not follow the requirements outlined in the new commitment letters.

CSTC-A Comments

The U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Audit Program Manager, responding for the Commander CSTC-A, agreed, stating that CSTC-A has already strengthened consequences outlined in 1394 MoD and MoI commitment letters. According to the Program Manager, these new consequences have created positive results from MoD and MoI senior officials. He explained that CSTC-A can leverage its influence over MoD and MoI through the withholding of funds.

Our Response

Comments from the Program Manager addressed the specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

Recommendation A.5

Leverage the commitment letters to ensure the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior work with the national and individual corps level to reconcile their property books to produce a complete and accurate set of property books.

CSTC-A Comments

The U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Audit Program Manager, responding for the Commander CSTC-A, agreed, stating that CSTC-A uses the commitment letters to influence Afghan accountability. The Program Manager further stated that CSTC-A developed a new process as part of the on-going inspection program that will include testing of the Afghan’s property book and on-hand inventory of vehicles. The Program Manager stated the Security Assistance Office will use these assessments to encourage property accountability.

Our Response

Comments from the Commander CSTC-A addressed the specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required. However, the new procedures described by the Program Manager would not detect vehicles that were transferred to the ANSF if they were never listed on the Afghan property books. As a result, lost or stolen vehicles intentionally left off the property books would still remain undetected. This underscores the importance of CSTC-A leveraging commitment letters to ensure MoD and MoI maintain an accurate comprehensive set of property books that CSTC-A can use to draw a sample to test the existence of vehicles.

Recommendation A.6

Obtain a complete inventory of vehicles received by the Afghan National Security Force and reconcile this list to help identify any missing records in the Security Cooperation Portal.

CSTC-A Comments

The U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Audit Program Manager, responding for the Commander CSTC-A and Deputy Chief–Support, agreed, stating that after ANSF provides a complete list of vehicles, Security Assistance Office will have advisors compare the list to the SCIP database and reconcile any discrepancies. The Program Manager further stated that Essential Function 5 will assist CSTC-A to maintain vehicle accountability by training, assisting and advising Afghan senior

officials on the importance of property accountability and stewardship of resources provided by the international community. The Program Manager also stated CSTC-A would use the Logistics Readiness and Assessment Tool to reconcile the difference between ANSF and CSTC-A records.

Our Response

Comments from the Program Manager addressed the specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

Recommendation A.7

Advise Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior officials to maintain consolidated property book records for all vehicles received from DoD and Coalition forces.

CSTC-A Comments

The U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Audit Program Manager, responding for the Commander CSTC-A and Deputy Chief–Support, neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation. The Program Manager stated that Essential Function 5 will advise ANSF leaders on the importance of property accountability and assist CSTC-A to maintain vehicle accountability by training, assisting and advising Afghan senior officials on the importance of property accountability and stewardship of resources provided by the international community.

Our Response

Comments from the Commander CSTC-A addressed the specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

Recommendation A.8

Advise Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense officials to follow its certification process to ensure Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense only remove verified lost or destroyed vehicles from Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense property books.

CSTC-A Comments

The U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Audit Program Manager, responding for the Commander CSTC-A and the Deputy Chief–Support, neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation. The Program Manager stated that CSTC-A will continue to emphasize the importance of vehicle accountability. Further, the Program Manager stated CSTC-A developed a new process that requires ANSF

to submit vehicle identification numbers before it approves the destruction of a vehicle. He said that after a vehicle is destroyed, ANSF will receive a certificate of demilitarization. The Program Manager stated that Essential Function 5 will reconcile the MoI and the MoD property books by only removing lost or destroyed vehicles that they have verified.

Our Response

Comments from the Commander CSTC-A addressed the specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

Finding B

ANSF Could Not Demonstrate Vehicle Maintenance and Sustainability

MoD and MoI advisors were not confident that ANSF could effectively and independently maintain and sustain vehicles transferred to it by DoD and Coalition forces. Specifically, ANSF did not show it could forecast its maintenance and replacement requirements for parts and identify requirements for vehicle replenishment. In addition, both ANP and ANA relied extensively on contractors to maintain and sustain their vehicles.

This occurred because both MoI and MoD lacked trained personnel to perform supply chain management. Furthermore, the common practice of not maintaining vehicles at the unit level has hindered ANA's ability to successfully maintain and sustain its fleet.

As a result, if ANP and ANA are left to maintain vehicles without assistance from contractors, their fleet of mission-ready vehicles will rapidly deteriorate, and they will no longer have the vehicles needed to defend their country against their adversaries. Furthermore, DoD has spent at least \$21 million on replacement engines and transmission that could likely have been avoided through better maintenance.

ANSF Not Ready to Maintain and Sustain Donated Vehicles

MoD and MoI advisors were not confident that ANSF could effectively and independently maintain and sustain vehicles transferred to it by DoD and Coalition forces. ANP was in the beginning stages of training mechanics and specialists and relied heavily on its contractor, AMS, to maintain and repair vehicles and to manage the replacement parts and supplies.

Although ANA is responsible for performing the majority of its maintenance, as well as supply chain management independent of contractor support, ANA continued to rely on contractors to perform repairs and maintenance that it was capable and required to perform. In addition, according to MoD advisors, ANA did not have the capability to effectively perform supply chain management.

Heavy Reliance on Contractors to Maintain ANP Vehicles

(FOUO) According to MoI advisors, they were not confident that ANP could take over the maintenance and sustainment of the approximately [REDACTED] vehicles that

have been provided by the DoD and Coalition forces. Although

AMS started to train and produce some mechanics for ANP, ANP still fully relied on the contractors to perform maintenance and supply chain management.

Although AMS started to train and produce some mechanics ... ANP still fully relied on the contractors.

AMS established a comprehensive training curriculum to train ANP mechanics and specialists. AMS taught a multiple-step process that ensured vehicles were properly diagnosed to receive necessary repairs and tracked vehicles

throughout the repair process. Furthermore, AMS designed

controls throughout the repair process to ensure that all replacement parts were accounted for. For example, before a part was replaced, the mechanic had to turn in the used part where it was accounted for in a separate department. This was an example of one of the controls that AMS implemented to prevent unnecessary repairs and prevent theft. Figure 3. shows a training model of a chassis at an AMS training facility.

MoI advisors stated that AMS provided successful training to its students using working models of chassis, engines, and electrical systems. However, until ANP is able to provide enough personnel for AMS to train to take over maintenance, supply, and management, AMS will continue to perform all services for the ANP. Figure 4. shows AMS performing maintenance on ANP vehicles at its central maintenance facility.



Figure 3. AMS simulated classroom training
Source: DoD IG




Figure 4. AMS maintenance facility
Source: DoD IG

According to MoI advisors, although it was ANP's desire to become self-reliant for performing all repairs and maintenance within the ANP structure, ANP will not be ready until it becomes less reliant on the contractors management and supply logistics.

ANA Unwilling to Perform Repairs and Unable to Manage Spare Parts

According to MoD advisors, ANA could perform most repairs and maintenance of light- and medium-tactical vehicles and HMMWVs; however, it lacked the ability to perform supply chain management. Rather than purchase parts and perform repairs that it could perform, ANA brought its vehicles to a contractor, AISS, that was responsible for maintaining a fleet of reserve vehicles.

Rather than purchase parts and perform repairs that it could perform, ANA brought its vehicles to a contractor, AISS, that was responsible for maintaining a fleet of reserve vehicles.

During our visit to Afghanistan in October 2014, we observed 412 vehicles parked in the holding lot at the AISS facility, waiting for repair that ANA should have performed. According to the contractor, ANA operates the holding lot and accepted any vehicle that arrived at the lot.

Although AISS informed ANA officials that their units should perform their own basic maintenance and repairs, ANA continued to send vehicles to the contractor for repair.

An Essential Function 5 mentor noted that only 30 or 40 vehicles were in that same lot when he visited just 1 month before our visit. Figure 5. shows contractor holding lot housing 412 vehicles either waiting for repair, or that had received repair.





Figure 5. AISS Facility Holding Lot Housing the 412 ANA Vehicles
Source: DoD IG

In addition, ANA lacked the ability to manage its need for spare parts. For example, ANA prepared the Logistics Readiness Assessment Tool report, which it relied on to determine which vehicles were mission-ready. This report was supposed to include summary information received from all ANA levels of the operational readiness by vehicle type. However, the ANA corps consistently turned in its information for the report a month late or not at all. In addition, the reports were often inaccurate.

To demonstrate MoD's struggles with managing spare parts, an MoD advisor stated that during a recent site visit to an ANA unit he found that within the repair facility, the ANA unit personnel did not properly handle spare parts. Specifically, he found that the ANA unit did not



The MoD advisor observed parts lying around the facility with no indication of what the parts were or would be used for.

catalog or mark parts to identify the type of part. The MoD advisor observed parts lying around the facility with no indication of what the parts were or would be used for. He also stated there was a lack of information technology equipment, such as phones, computers, nor internet connectivity. According to the advisor, a lack of technology makes the management of spare parts very difficult.


ANP Needs Additional Training to Independently Maintain and Sustain Its Fleet of Vehicles

Although Coalition forces had some success in training mechanics, ANP was not prepared to successfully take over maintenance and sustainment of vehicles because it did not have the same success in training supply chain management and other key positions to sustain the vehicles.

DCOS-SPT, and AMS developed a curriculum to train mechanics and supply chain specialists; however, they could not obtain enough qualified candidates to meet staffing requirements by the target date of June 2015. MoI advisors projected they would need 1,400 mechanics and 200 supply chain specialists to sufficiently manage the ANP fleet of vehicles.

AMS planned 3-month sessions to train the required number of mechanics and supply chain specialists. However, the first training session, which ended in September 2014, graduated only 260 mechanics and 15 supply chain specialists for ANP. As of October 26, 2014, (2 weeks into the second session) AMS had 271 new mechanic students and only 2 students enrolled in the supply chain specialist course. At this rate, with an average of 266 mechanics and 8 supply chain specialists per class, ANP would only produce an estimated 1,064 of the 1,400 required mechanics and 32 of the 200 required supply chain specialists by June 2015.

According to an AMS contractor, the lack of literacy and basic computer skills were major problems in obtaining qualified candidates. Another challenge is that the pay for either position is lower than that of a police officer. Recruiting qualified students will continue to be difficult until MoI introduces more incentives for the training program. DCOS-SPT should work with MoI to determine whether ANP should continue to utilize a contract approach for vehicle maintenance and sustainment, or implement a phased approach to gradually take ANP off its current contract with AMS to allow enough time to complete training of the predetermined number of mechanics required to sustain the ANP fleet and train supply-chain logisticians. In addition, DCOS-SPT should advise MoI and MoD officials to offer incentives to become mechanics and supply chain specialists, expressing the importance that sustaining the ANSF vehicle fleet has on its ability to defend their country.



The lack of literacy and basic computer skills were major problems in obtaining qualified candidates.

ANA Training Needs Improvement to Independently Maintain its Fleet of Vehicles

Although ANA has made progress with training its staff to be qualified mechanics, it needs to further develop supply-chain specialists and to train these specialists on their supply management system. ANA sent students to the Combat Service School to receive this specialized training as well as training on the Core Inventory Management System used to manage the supplies in their warehouses at the national and region levels. However, the ANA has yet to achieve its goal of consistently using the Core Inventory Management System throughout ANA.

According to a mentor (within Essential Function 5), some units used the system with some success; however, others did not use it at all. As further evidence that ANA was not ready to maintain its fleet of vehicles, mentors assisted the ANA Central Supply Depot staff with developing an authorized stock list of vehicle parts. The authorized stock list consisted of the repair parts needed to support ANA units and directed and specified the quantities needed.

Although DCOS-SPT had difficulty in meeting its recruiting goals for mechanics and supply chain specialists, according to MoI advisors, ANP benefited from the formal training and controls that AMS implemented. DCOS-SPT should examine AMS training of ANP personnel on supply chain management and determine whether a similar training model is feasible for ANA.

Common Practice to Not Maintain Vehicles Within the ANA

ANA's common practice of not maintaining vehicles at the unit level has hindered its ability to successfully maintain and sustain its fleet. According to AMS contractors, ANA consistently turned in vehicles that lacked simple maintenance. This caused larger, much more expensive repairs that could have been avoided. For example, an AMS official stated that often engines in vehicles, such as a HMMWV, would not be started for an extended time, which caused the battery to "die." ANA soldiers would then use jumper cables that were not designed for a HMMWV, which damaged the electronic control unit of the vehicle, affecting the transmission's ability to shift gears.

Instead of bringing the vehicle in for immediate repair, ANA soldiers would drive the vehicle in second gear until the teeth on the gear were completely worn, resulting in an inoperable vehicle and a much more expensive transmission overhaul. Figure 6. shows a gear box with a stripped gear.



Figure 6. Gearbox with the gears stripped
Source: DoD IG

According to Tank Automotive and Armaments Command,¹⁴ from November 2010 through September 2014, DoD spent approximately \$21 million to replace engines and transmissions for HMMWVs in Afghanistan. According to the Director of Logistics Operations for Essential Function 5, in over 20 years in the Army, he rarely saw situations where DoD needed to replace transmissions or engines on HMMWVs.

DoD spent approximately \$21 million to replace engines and transmissions for HMMWVs in Afghanistan.

The following table shows the number of HMMWV engines and transmissions replaced from October 2010 through September 2014, as well as the cost of the replacement.

HMMWVs Engines and Transmissions Ordered for Afghanistan From November 2010 Through September 2014.

| Part Description | Quantity Ordered | Cost Per Unit | Total Cost |
|-------------------|------------------|---------------|---------------------|
| Transmissions | 1,810 | \$3,424 | \$6,197,440 |
| Engines | 1,116 | \$12,877 | \$14,370,732 |
| Total Cost | | | \$20,568,172 |

In addition to the lack of maintenance, an AISS contractor stated most of the 412 ANA vehicles at the contractor’s holding lot were not damaged in battle, but instead were the result of collisions. The continued funding to repair vehicles by ANA personnel with minimal regard for maintenance is a further reason that they should undergo more training similar to what ANP personnel receive. DCOS-SPT should provide replacement vehicles and replacement spare parts only when ANSF can justify the requirement.

In addition, an MoD contractor stated that ANA soldiers often stripped the vehicle of easily removable parts, such as headlights and seats, before they delivered the vehicles to AISS for maintenance. The advisors and contractors said they believed ANA sold the parts or “hoarded” them for later use. According to the MoD advisors and contractors, this behavior was not the “exception but the rule.”

ANA soldiers often stripped the vehicle of easily removable parts ... before they delivered the vehicles ... for maintenance.

¹⁴ Tank Automotive and Armaments Command is responsible for lifecycle management for the Army.

The AISS contractor said that the ANA soldiers were accustomed to the contractor replacing these items before the vehicles were returned. DoD and Coalition forces enabled this behavior by providing MoD with everything it requested whether it was new transmissions, engines, or replacement vehicles. Figure 7. and Figure 8. show vehicles with missing parts that ANA personnel removed before they delivered the vehicles for repairs.



Figure 7. HMMWV with missing headlights
Source: DoD IG



Figure 8. HMMWV with missing seat
Source: DoD IG

DCOS-SPT should enforce consequences if MoD continues the practice of stripping removable parts prior to delivering the vehicles to the contractor for repair.

Results of Lack of Maintenance and Sustainment of Vehicles

If ANP and ANA are left to maintain vehicles without assistance from the contractors, their fleet of mission-ready vehicles will deteriorate at a rapid pace, and they will no longer have the vehicles needed to defend themselves against their adversaries.

DoD spent approximately \$21 million to replace engines and transmissions for HMMWVs in Afghanistan that likely could have been avoided. These costs were primarily the result of neglect and abuse and could have been avoided if ANSF would have taken better care of the vehicles that DoD and Coalition forces provided them.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

We recommend the Deputy Chief of Staff–Support:

Recommendation B.1

Work with the Ministry of Interior to determine whether Afghan National Police should continue to utilize a contract approach for vehicle maintenance and sustainment, or implement a phased approach to slowly remove the Afghan National Police from current contract, allowing enough time to train the number of mechanics and supply chain logisticians required to sustain the Afghan National Police fleet of vehicles.

Deputy Chief of Staff–Support Comments

The U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Audit Program Manager, responding for the Deputy Chief–Support, neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation. The Program Manager stated that Essential Function 5 worked with MoI and determined that ANP should continue to use contract logistics support for vehicle and weapon maintenance because MoI is not currently capable of conducting supply maintenance and management operations.

Our Response

Comments from the Program Manager addressed the specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

Recommendation B.2

Advise the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense officials to establish a program to offer incentives to become mechanics and supply chain specialists expressing the importance that sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces vehicle fleet has on its ability to defend their country.

Deputy Chief of Staff–Support Comments

The U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Audit Program Manager, responding for the Deputy Chief of Staff–Support, agreed, stating that MoD and MoI should offer incentives to become mechanics and supply chain specialists. The Program Manager stated that low literacy rates directly impacts the ability to recruit and maintain qualified candidates because these positions require a higher education level but pay less than a police officer.

Our Response

Comments from the Program Manager partially addressed the recommendation. The Program Manager discussed factors that affected the ability to recruit and maintain qualified candidates; however, he did not describe the action he would take to establish a program that offers incentives for Afghan's to become mechanics and supply chain specialists. Accordingly, the Program Manager needs to clarify whether the Deputy Chief plans to advise the MoD and MoI to establish a program to offer incentives to become mechanics and supply chain specialists.

Recommendation B.3

Examine Automotive Management Services training of Afghan National Police in supply-chain management and determine whether it is feasible to implement similar training for the Afghan National Army to help ensure it progresses in building its supply chain management capability to a sustainable level.

Deputy Chief of Staff–Support Comments

The U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Audit Program Manager, responding for the Deputy Chief of Staff–Support, neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation. The Program Manager stated that Essential Function 5 is developing the National Maintenance Strategy Performance Work Statement that will include requirements from the AMS contract. The Program Manager stated the new performance work statement will place logistics experts at key national and regional levels to conduct maintenance and supply chain management operations, while at the same time, train, advise, and assist the ANSF leaders in maintenance and supply chain management operations. The Program Manager stated that this will ensure leaders make decisions based on demand for supply. In addition, leaders can use that information to improve reporting and accountability of donated property.

Our Response

Comments from the Program Manager addressed the specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

Recommendation B.4

Provide replacement vehicles and replacement spare parts only when Afghan National Security Forces can justify the requirement.

Deputy Chief of Staff–Support Comments

The U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Audit Program Manager, responding for the Deputy Chief of Staff–Support, neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation. The Program Manager stated that because ANSF is not currently capable of performing supply chain management, Essential Function 5 plans to implement a National Maintenance Strategy that will enable DoD to collect demand-based supply information for ANSF and only provide repair parts that are required by ANSF.

Our Response

Comments from the Program Manager addressed the specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

Recommendation B.5

Enforce consequences in the commitment letters such as withholding funds if Ministry of Defense continues the practice of requesting unjustified replacement vehicles and spare parts; and stripping removable parts prior to delivering the vehicles to the contractor for repair.

Deputy Chief of Staff–Support Comments

The U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Audit Program Manager, responding for the Deputy Chief of Staff–Support and the Commander CSTC-A, neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation. The Program Manager stated that CSTC-A will continue to enforce fiscal responsibility by including more stringent language in subsequent commitment letters. The Program Manager said that Essential Function 5 implemented policy and procedures to enforce the process of properly coding assets and enabling a replacement in a timely manner. The new process will reduce unjustified replacement of vehicles and provide historical data on vehicles lost during battle. The Program Manager further stated that Essential Function 5 is investigating the practice of stripping removable parts such as batteries and tires before the vehicles are sent to the contractor for maintenance. In addition, Essential Function 5 will implement procedures to reduce the theft of repair parts.

Our Response

Comments from the Program Manager addressed the specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

Appendix

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from September 2014 through February 2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

We interviewed:

- **DSCA representatives** to obtain a list of vehicles procured for the ANA and ANP from FY 2005 through September 2014. We used this list as a baseline to determine reasonableness of the CSTC-A estimates of the total number of vehicle titles transferred to the MoD and MoI.
- **CSTC-A, Security Assistance Office representatives** to understand how the U.S. and Coalition forces obtained documents, and transferred vehicles to MoI and MoD and performed monitoring on the transferred vehicles.
- **MoI officials** to determine if we could obtain a comprehensive list of vehicles provided to ANP. Due to security concerns in Afghanistan, the audit team performed limited interviews with MoI officials and could not interview MoD officials or visit forward operating bases. Instead, the audit team interviewed MoD advisors who had recently met with these officials.
- **DCOS-SPT officials** (while in Afghanistan) to obtain an understanding of the responsibilities of Essential Function 5.
- **AMS Central Maintenance Facility contractor personnel** to gain a basic understanding of the controls they have in place for quality control and the safeguarding of parts and equipment.

We visited:

- MoI Headquarters;
- AISS warehouse;
- AISS maintenance workshop;
- Afghanistan Auto Component Overhaul Program facility; and
- AMS Central Maintenance Facility to observe work performed on DoD and Coalition forces provided vehicles.

We did not review buildings, which was initially within the scope of our review. On August 26, 2014, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction initiated an audit evaluating DoD's oversight of transferred infrastructure projects including bases, hospitals, and roads to the GIRoA. To avoid duplication, we focused our audit on vehicles.

We also reviewed policies and procedures, laws and regulations, from both the DoD and Afghanistan government as well as DoD contracts.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) issued seven reports discussing asset accountability within Afghanistan. Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm>. Unrestricted SIGAR reports can be accessed at <http://www.sigar.mil/audits/auditreports>.

DoD IG

Report No. DODIG 2015-067, "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics and Maintenance Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Police," January 30, 2015

Report No. DODIG 2015-047, "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army," December 19, 2014

Report No. DODIG 2014-102, "Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Needs to Provide Better Accountability and Transparency Over Direct Contributions," August 29, 2014

Report No. DODIG-2012-103, "Accountability of Night Vision Devices Procured for the Afghan National Security Forces needs Improvement," June 18, 2012

Report No. D-2009-100, "Afghanistan Security Forces Fund Phase III – Accountability for Equipment Purchased for the Afghanistan National Police," September 22, 2009

SIGAR

SIGAR Audit 14-84 – “Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Weapons Accountability,” July 2014

SIGAR Audit 13-3 – “Afghan Police Vehicle Maintenance Contract: Actions needed to Prevent Millions of Dollars From Being Wasted,” January 2013

Management Comments

United States Forces–Afghanistan

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC



HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

USFOR-A-IG

16 March 2015

MEMORANDUM THRU USFOR-A DCDR-S

FOR United States Central Command Inspector General (CCIG), MacDill Air Force Base, FL 33621

SUBJECT: United States Forces-Afghanistan, IG Consolidated Responses DODIG Audit D2014-219, "Audit of the GIRoA's Internal Controls for Asset Accountability"

1. The Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) issued a draft report with recommendations for USFOR-A. The tasker issued to USFOR-A contains recommendations for Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), in which case responses also involve the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) Support team (EF-5). These recommendations, and their respective answers, are detailed in the following discussion.

a. **DODIG Recommendation A.1:** *Instruct the Security Assistance Office to reconcile information in Operational Verification of Reliable Logistics Oversight Database against information in Security Cooperation Information Portal to ensure vehicle information is accurate and complete.*

CSTC-A's Answer: As stated by CSTC-A, "CSTC-A concurs with the DoD IG's recommendation and has been actively reconciling information since June 2014. We are currently transitioning from the legacy database of record, the Operational Verification of Reliable Logistics Oversight Database (OVERLORD) to the global system of record, the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) to account for vehicle transfers. This process has enabled synchronization across the tracking systems and verification of data records. Eventually, all historical records from OVERLORD will be added to SCIP by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Once updated, CSTC-A, through our Security Assistance Office (SAO), will be able to resume further updating and backfilling of all historical title transfer documents directly into SCIP as the primary accountability and tracking system. In conclusion, we agree that the information across these databases should be reconciled (hence the large effort underway to synchronize). We would add, however, that reconciliation is only a partial solution as all records should be consolidated into SCIP as the system of record for vehicle

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

United States Forces–Afghanistan (cont'd)

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

USFOR-A IG

SUBJECT: United States Forces-Afghanistan, IG Consolidated Responses
DODIG Audit D2014-219, "Audit of the GIRoA's Internal Controls for Asset
Accountability"

tracking and accountability. This will ensure that not only the data is correct, but the process affords future transfer tracking and accountability success."

b. **DODIG Recommendation A.2:** *Assess the accuracy of property transfer records after the Security Assistance Office completes its reconciliation and take the necessary steps to maintain the completeness and accuracy of these records.*

CSTC-A's Answer: As stated by CSTC-A, "CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation and will follow through on a final assessment of records accuracy, consistent with CSTC-A's compliance procedures and DODI 4140.66. However, it is important to note that CSTC-A is already executing the Golden Sentry program in Afghanistan, similar to how it is conducted around the world, exceeding DoD standards. In line with the Golden Sentry program, any reconciliation and accuracy of property transfer records will be accomplished by the quantity transferred, not by VINs. The latter is an Afghan process and responsibility. Our current approach, which began in June 2014, is to ensure full compliance with the law by assessing the accuracy records in SCIP after all legacy records have been transferred. Public Law 111-84 Section 1225 and DoD Instruction 4140.66, states that CSTC-A shall show the origin, shipping, and distribution of defense articles transferred to Afghanistan. CSTC-A has put a priority on uploading the 2010-2015 data first to ensure compliance with the law and has simultaneously been updating the pre-2010 records in order to maintain full accountability. CSTC-A strongly disagrees with the claim that an effective system was never implemented to track and account for vehicles transferred to Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF). On the contrary, CSTC-A has always had an effective system to record vehicles transferred to ANDSF. The tracking shortfalls were, in fact, due to the dispersion of paper copy records throughout various coalition depots in Afghanistan, where CSTC-A did not have access to the records to upload into SCIP. Upon the closure of the depots and the reorganization of CSTC-A, all records were delivered to SAO for review and compilation. This delivery from the depots to CSTC-A was completed in July of 2014. The tedious backfill process, in its entirety, is now being accomplished by SAO and is anticipated to be complete by 30 June 2016. In sum, CSTC-A will continue to follow the Public Law 111-84 Section 1225 and Golden Sentry process and resolve any discovered shortfalls."

c. **DODIG Recommendation A.3:** *Add language to the next Ministry of Interior commitment letter that will help DoD and Coalition forces enforce accountability and transparency of vehicles provided to the Ministry of Interior.*

CSTC-A's Answer: As stated by CSTC-A, "CSTC-A acknowledges and has complied with this recommendation in the 1394 Ministry of Interior (MoI) U.S. Afghan Security Force Fund (ASFF) Commitment Letter. CSTC-A has strengthened the conditional controls and requirements tied to funding in the 1394

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

United States Forces–Afghanistan (cont'd)

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

USFOR-A IG

SUBJECT: United States Forces-Afghanistan, IG Consolidated Responses
DODIG Audit D2014-219, "Audit of the GIRoA's Internal Controls for Asset
Accountability"

Mol Commitment Letter which support improved accountability and transparency of vehicles provided to the Mol. Annex D, Paragraph 6 of the Commitment Letter states, '**VEHICLE PURCHASE:** CSTC-A will not approve funding until the Mol shows that the vehicle requirement is correctly authorized on the Tashkil and that the requirement has not already been filled. Proper management of asset inventory is essential to operating an effective budget. The Mol currently has processes in place to adjust Tashkil numbers. Therefore, Mol must validate and update the Tashkil **and demonstrate compliance with established lifecycle management practices and disposition reporting for end use monitoring** prior to requesting additional funding for vehicles.'

d. **DODIG Recommendation A.4:** *Enforce consequences by withholding funding if the Ministries of Defense and Interior do not follow the requirements outlined in the new commitment letters.*

CSTC-A's Answer: As stated by CSTC-A, "CSTC-A concurs and has already strengthened the consequences outlined in the conditions specified in the 1394 MoD and Mol U.S. ASFF Commitment Letters. The more stringent conditionality applied to direct contribution funds provided to GIRoA has created positive results in the behavior of senior officials within the Mol and Ministry of Defense (MoD). These conditions enable CSTC-A to leverage its influence through funding, or the denial of funding, to MoD and Mol. Decrementing CSTC-A funds from MoD and Mol budgets to reach an outcome is always an option."

e. **DODIG Recommendation A.5:** *Leverage the commitment letters to ensure Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior work with the national and individual corps level to reconcile their property books to produce a complete and accurate set of property books.*

CSTC-A's Answer: As stated by CSTC-A, "Concur. We have used and will continue to use the Commitment Letters and other instruments to positively influence Afghan accountability through advising and establishing conditions based funding. For example, SAO currently has a process to assess property books while conducting Enhanced End Use Monitoring (EEUM) Inspections at the unit level. This process, called Routine End Use Monitoring (EUM), involves taking a 10% sample of the property book and verifying it against their inventory and then taking a 10% sample of their inventory and verifying it against their property book. This assessment is conducted in conjunction with almost every EEUM inspection going above and beyond stated requirements. Further emphasis of proper property book accountability will continue to be encouraged at these assessments."

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

United States Forces–Afghanistan (cont'd)

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

USFOR-A IG

SUBJECT: United States Forces-Afghanistan, IG Consolidated Responses
DODIG Audit D2014-219, "Audit of the GIRoA's Internal Controls for Asset
Accountability"

f. **DODIG Recommendation A.6:** *Obtain a complete inventory of vehicles received by the Afghan National Security Force and reconcile this list to help identify any missing records in the Security Cooperation Information Portal.*

CSTC-A and EF 5.0's Answer: As stated by CSTC-A, "CSTC-A acknowledges and agrees with this course of action. Once a complete listing of vehicles received by the ANDSF is submitted to CSTC-A, SAO, via advisor channels, will vet the listing against the SCIP database and reconcile any discrepancies." As stated by EF 5.0, "EF 5.0 will assist CSTC-A in maintaining accountability of ground wheeled vehicle platforms by training, assisting, and advising the Afghan senior leaders on the importance of property accountability and stewardship of resources provided by the International Community. EF 5.0 analyzes the ANDSF Logistics Readiness Assessment Tool (LRAT) on a monthly basis to reconcile the difference between the number of vehicles reported as On-Hand by the ANDSF versus the number of vehicles reported as issued by CSTC-A. EF 5.0 uses this information to engage the ANDSF leadership on property accountability issues during Key Leader Engagements."

g. **DODIG Recommendation A.7:** *Advise Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior officials to maintain consolidated property book records for all vehicles received from DoD and Coalition forces.*

EF 5.0's Answer: As stated by EF 5.0, "EF 5.0 will advise ANDSF leaders on the importance of property accountability."

h. **DODIG Recommendation A.8:** *Advise Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense officials to follow its certification process to ensure Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense only remove verified lost or destroyed vehicles from Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense property books.*

CSTC-A and EF 5.0's Answer: As stated by CSTC-A, "CSTC-A will continue to emphasize accurate property book accountability while engaged in Key Leadership Engagements with the ANDSF. Additionally, SAO has pioneered a new vehicle disposal process. The ANDSF are now required to submit VINs for destruction approval and upon destruction will receive a certificate of demilitarization. This process, which is currently underway, should greatly alleviate concerns regarding which vehicles should be removed from MoD/MoI property books. As stated by EF 5.0, "EF 5.0 will train, advise, and assist ANDSF leaders on the non-economically repairable vehicle (ECOD) process in order to reconcile lost and destroyed vehicles from the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense only remove verified lost or destroyed vehicles from Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense property books."

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

United States Forces–Afghanistan (cont'd)

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

USFOR-A IG

SUBJECT: United States Forces-Afghanistan, IG Consolidated Responses
DODIG Audit D2014-219, "Audit of the GIRoA's Internal Controls for Asset
Accountability"

i. **DODIG Recommendation B.1:** *Work with the Ministry of Interior to determine whether Afghan National Police should continue to utilize a contract approach for vehicle maintenance and sustainment, or implement a phased approach to slowly remove the Afghan National Police from current contract, allowing enough time to train the number of mechanics and supply chain logisticians required to sustain the Afghan National Police fleet of vehicles.*

EF 5.0's Answer: As stated by EF 5.0, "EF 5.0 has worked with the Ministry of Interior as part of the National Maintenance Strategy and determined that the Afghan National Police (ANP) should continue to utilize Contract Logistics Support for vehicle and weapon maintenance because they are not currently capable of conducting supply and maintenance management operations. The National Maintenance Strategy will focus on Shoulder to Shoulder Logistics training for junior to senior leader development in maintenance and supply chain management in order to prepare the ANP to conduct maintenance and supply chain management operations in the future."

j. **DODIG Recommendation B.2:** *Advise the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense officials to establish a program to offer incentives to become mechanics and supply chain specialists expressing the importance that sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces vehicle fleet has on its ability to defend their country.*

EF 5.0's Answer: As stated by EF 5.0, "EF 5.0 agrees that there should be incentives to become mechanics and supply chain specialists. This is further exacerbated by the low literacy rate, which directly impacts the ability to recruit and maintain qualified candidates because these positions require a higher education level but pay less than a police officer."

k. **DODIG Recommendation B.3:** *Examine Automotive Management Services training of Afghan National Police in supply-chain management and determine whether it is feasible to implement similar training for the Afghan National Army to help ensure it progresses in building its supply chain management capability to a sustainable level.*

EF 5.0's Answer: As stated by EF 5.0, "EF 5.0 is currently developing the National Maintenance Strategy (NMS) Performance Work Statement (PWS) to incorporate elements of the Automotive Management Services (AMS) A-TEMP contract into the new NMS PWS. The intent is to embed CLS logistics experts at key national and regional nodes to conduct maintenance and supply chain management operations while simultaneously training, advising, and assisting the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) leaders in maintenance and supply chain management operations. Additionally, this will ensure that demand based supply data is collected to enable leaders to make decisions based

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

United States Forces–Afghanistan (cont'd)

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

USFOR-A IG

SUBJECT: United States Forces-Afghanistan, IG Consolidated Responses
DODIG Audit D2014-219, "Audit of the GIRoA's Internal Controls for Asset
Accountability"

off logistics information and assist with the reporting and accountability of the International Community donated property."

l. **DODIG Recommendation B.4.** *Provide replacement vehicles and replacement spare parts only when Afghan National Security Forces can justify the requirement.*

EF 5.0's Answer: As stated by EF 5.0, "The ANDSF are not currently capable of conducting life cycle management and maintenance & supply chain management operations, so there is no demand based supply data to inform logistics decisions. The implementation of the National Maintenance Strategy will enable us to collect demand based supply data for the ANDSF fleet and only provide CL IX repair parts that are required by the ANDSF. Additionally, EF 5.0 is standing up a Product Management Office (PMO) within the Ministry of Defense and Interior to conduct life cycle management for the ANDSF."

m. **DODIG Recommendation B.5:** *Enforce consequences in the commitment letters such as withholding funds if Ministry of Defense continues the practice of requesting unjustified replacement vehicles and spare parts; and stripping removable parts prior to delivering the vehicles to the contractor for repair.*

CSTC-A and EF 5.0's Answer: As stated by CSTC-A, "CSTC-A has reinforced compliance in the MoI and MoD 1394 U.S. ASFF Commitment Letters. The conditions established in the Commitment Letters are the first step toward full accountability and transparency of ASFF used toward funding valid requirements. Subsequent Commitment Letters will increase conditionality and continue to enforce fiscal responsibility with more stringent language. The Commitment Letters enhance GIRoA's capability to govern and increase their capacity for security. CSTC-A continues to focus on proper accountability of all maintenance and sustainment items, to include property book items, which reflects our commitment to improve internal controls, correcting prior inspection findings and stewardship of taxpayer funds. All of the elements identified above contribute to strengthening the relationship between GIRoA and Coalition Partners." As stated by EF 5.0, "EF 5.0 has implemented policy and procedures to enforce the ECOD process in order to properly code out assets with documentation that satisfies U.S. End Use Monitoring policy and enables a replacement in a timely manner. The enforcement of the ECOD process will reduce unjustified replacement of vehicles and provide historical data on battle losses to use to forecast future CL VII requirements. The implementation of the NMS will reduce the unjustified requests for CL IX repair parts by providing historical demand based supply data which will be used to forecast future CL IX requirements. EF 5.0 is investigating the stripping of removable parts such as batteries and tires prior to ANDSF job ordering a vehicle into a CLA maintenance facility and we will develop and implement policies and procedures to reduce the pilfering of CL IX repair parts."

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

United States Forces–Afghanistan (cont'd)

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC


USFOR-A IG

SUBJECT: United States Forces-Afghanistan, IG Consolidated Responses
DODIG Audit D2014-219, "Audit of the GIRoA's Internal Controls for Asset
Accountability"

2. The point of contact is Colonel Patrick McEvoy: DSN 318-481-3414,
patrick.d.mcevoy@afghan.swa.army.mil.

2 Encls

1. (NRSI) CSTC-A's Response, 8 Mar 15
2. (NRSI) DCOS SPT's Response, 5 Mar 15



PATRICK D. McEVOY, Colonel
USFOR-A Audit Program Manager

NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

Acronyms and Abbreviations

| | |
|---------------------|---|
| AISS | Afghan Integrated Support Services |
| ANA | Afghan National Army |
| ANP | Afghan National Police |
| ANSF | Afghan National Security Forces |
| AMS | Automotive Management Service |
| CSTC–A | Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan |
| DCOS–SPT | Deputy Chief of Staff–Support |
| DSCA | Defense Security Cooperation Agency |
| EUM | End Use Monitoring |
| GIRoA | Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan |
| HMMWV | High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle |
| MoD | Ministries of Defense |
| MoI | Ministries of Interior |
| OVERLORD | Operational Verification of Reliable Logistics Oversight Database |
| SCIP | Security Cooperation Information Portal |
| SIGAR | Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction |
| U.S. CENTCOM | U.S. Central Command |

Whistleblower Protection

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 requires the Inspector General to designate a Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman to educate agency employees about prohibitions on retaliation, and rights and remedies against retaliation for protected disclosures. The designated ombudsman is the DoD Hotline Director. For more information on your rights and remedies against retaliation, visit www.dodig.mil/programs/whistleblower.

For more information about DoD IG reports or activities, please contact us:

Congressional Liaison

congressional@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

Media Contact

public.affairs@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

Monthly Update

dodigconnect-request@listserve.com

Reports Mailing List

dodig_report@listserve.com

Twitter

twitter.com/DoD_IG

DoD Hotline

dodig.mil/hotline

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE | INSPECTOR GENERAL

4800 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500
www.dodig.mil
Defense Hotline 1.800.424.9098

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~