




# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

DECEMBER 19, 2014



## Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army

INTEGRITY ★ EFFICIENCY ★ ACCOUNTABILITY ★ EXCELLENCE

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## Mission

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# Results in Brief

## *Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army*

December 19, 2014

### Objective

The primary objective of this project was to evaluate the progress made by U.S. and Coalition Forces to train, advise, and assist in the development of an enduring logistics sustainment capability for the Afghan National Army (ANA).

The specific objectives of this assessment were to:

- assess the planning and execution of logistical processes developed and implemented by the U.S. and Coalition Force in Afghanistan for the ANA, and
- review plans for the continued development of Afghan National Security Forces sustainment capability during the RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION post-2014.

We did not assess our second announced objective, a review of plans for the continued development of Afghan National Security Forces sustainment capability during the post-2014 RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION. The Bilateral Security Agreement governing U.S. presence in Afghanistan after December 2014 remained incomplete, and the May 2014 announcement of post-2014 U.S. force levels did not leave sufficient time for detailed plan development.

### Observations

While Afghan National Security Forces demonstrated the capability to conduct combat operations, the development of ANA combat support services lagged. The development of the ANA logistics system, especially by organizations above the ANA Corps, remained a work in progress.

The report contains 14 observations resulting in 28 recommendations. Our observations identified issues requiring attention in four general areas:

ANA development of a sustainable logistics planning capability. Specific issues were outdated and incomplete logistics policy and guidance; underdeveloped capability to forecast and generate logistic requirements; retention of trained mechanics; nascent contracting expertise; partial decentralization of logistics training; and inefficient use of information management systems.

ANA equipment disposal processes. Specific issues were implementation of turn-in and disposal of irreparable equipment; turn-in of useable excess equipment, parts, and other supplies; and planning for vehicle fleet management.

Coalition Forces advisor support to ANA logistic system development. Specific issues were unity of effort among Coalition subordinate staffs; obtaining the required number of logistics advisors with the right experience and expertise; and planning for post-2014 continued contractor support.

Coalition Forces initial issue of sufficient spare parts to generate authorized stockage and prescribed load lists for major pieces of ANA equipment at the ANA Central Supply Depot and Regional Logistic Support Centers.





# Results in Brief

## *Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army*

### Recommendations

We recommended that the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense establish a formal developmental program for DoD civilians who volunteer as advisors for the post-2014 RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION.

We recommended that Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command:

- Ensure functional Security Force Assistance teams have the capability and resources required to continue effective development of ANA logistics; and develop clear position descriptors and a reporting chain for civilian Ministry of Defense and General Staff advisors.
- Advise and assist senior ANA leaders to identify and prepare to issue support contracts for required, Coalition-provided capabilities that ANA organic support cannot replace; determine proper roles, responsibilities, resources, and a unified training program of instruction for the Regional Military Training Centers; and analyze the value of automation in logistic processes for units below the ANA Corps and develop training for that automation as appropriate.

We recommended that Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan:

- Determine fleet reset, management, and funding options for long-term sustainment of ANA equipment; and ensure Contracting Advise and Assist Teams encourage the inclusion of properly designed quality assurance surveillance plans in new contracts; and highlight the costs of maintaining non-repairable equipment and support streamlining efforts to properly dispose of such items.
- Advise and assist senior ANA leaders to develop and implement an Afghan-led forecasting and requirements generation model; pay and incentive

plans to recruit and retain skilled ANA mechanics; an Afghan-supported policy and process to return excess serviceable and unserviceable equipment and parts; and procedures to identify, procure, and distribute required authorized items to the Central Supply Depot and distribute those items, as required, to lower echelon organizations.

Finally, we recommended that the Commander, International Security Assistance Force, complete command restructuring and establish roles and responsibilities for the continued development of ANA sustainment.

### Management Comments and Our Responses

We received comments from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the International Security Assistance Force, and the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan. Since the publishing of the draft report, the military commands in Afghanistan have undergone realignment. Consequently, we redirected the recommendations in accordance with the current organizational structure and responsibilities. The table below, and the text within the report, contain the redirected recommendations. Management concurred with all the recommendations, save for one. The complete management comments are included in the appendix. We request additional comments as detailed in the Recommendations Table on the next page.

## ***Recommendations Table***

Management	Recommendations Requiring Comment	No Additional Comments Required
Deputy Secretary, Dept of Defense		3.c.
Commander, International Security Assistance Force	1.a.; 3.a.; 5.a.; 5.b.; 6.a.; 6.b.; 7; 11.a.; 11.b.; 12; 14	1.b.; 2.a.; 2.b.; 4.a.; 4.b.; 8.a.; 13.a.; 13.b.; 13.c.
Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command		10.a.; 10.b.
Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan	3.b.1; 8.b.; 8.c.	3.b.2; 9.a.; 9.b.

Please provide comments by January 20, 2015.





**INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

December 19, 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army  
(Report No. DoDIG-2015-047)

We are providing this report for review and appropriate action. This is a continuation of a series of reports published by the Office of the Inspector General's Special Plans and Operations directorate that focus on the mission to train and equip the National Security Forces of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

We conducted this assessment from October 2013 through April 2014 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations," published by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency in January 2012.

We considered management comments to a draft of this report when preparing the final report. As a result of those comments, we redirected Recommendations 8.b and 8.c to Commander, Combined Security Transition Command. We also request Commander, International Security Assistance Force provide additional information on implementation of Recommendations 1.a, 3.a, 5.a, 5.b, 6.a, 6.b, 7, 11.a, 11.b, 12, and 14.

We should receive your comments by January 20, 2015. Your comments should describe what actions you have taken or plan to take to accomplish the recommendations and include the completion dates of your actions. Please send copies of documentation supporting the actions you may have already taken.

Please provide comments that conform to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3. If possible, send your comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to [SPO@dodig.mil](mailto:SPO@dodig.mil). Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We are unable to accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

[REDACTED]

Kenneth P. Moorefield  
Deputy Inspector General  
Special Plans and Operations

***Distribution:***

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*Commander, U.S. Central Command*

*Commander, International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan*

*Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan*



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### Acronyms and Abbreviations

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## Introduction

For the past 12 years, the United States and Coalition Force have been committed to developing the capacity of the Afghan security forces, including the ANA. By December 2013, U.S. Forces had largely transitioned from directly fighting insurgents to training, advising, and assisting the ANA. Afghan security forces have demonstrated the capability to conduct effective combat operations, but the development of ANA combat support services, including those related to ANA logistics capability, has lagged.

As announced by the President on May 27, 2014, U.S. and Coalition Force plan to reduce their presence throughout 2014, removing combat forces to focus primarily on the train, advise, and assist role through 2015. According to Coalition Force officials, an independent ANA logistics sustainment capability was critical to establishing and sustaining an independent ANA operational readiness capability in the future.

## Objectives

The primary objective of this project was to evaluate the progress made by U.S. and Coalition Forces to train, advise, and assist in the development of an enduring logistics sustainment capability for the ANA.

The specific objectives of this assessment were to:

- assess the planning and execution of logistical processes developed and implemented by the U.S. and Coalition Force in Afghanistan for the ANA, and
- review plans for the continued development of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) sustainment capability during the RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION post-2014.

The U.S. President announced his decision regarding the post-2014 RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION after the completion of field work for this project, and the Bilateral Security Agreement governing the U.S. presence in Afghanistan after December 2014 remained incomplete. As a result, plans for post-2014 operations lacked detailed development and we therefore did not review them during the conduct of this project.

## Background

In December 2011, DoDIG published the results of an assessment of U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop the ANA logistics sustainment capabilities.<sup>1</sup> In late 2013, while there had been demonstrated ANA progress, the ANA and Ministry of Defense logistics sustainment capabilities still lagged, threatening the ANA's ability to conduct and sustain independent operations. As Afghanistan prepared for the 2014 presidential elections and the annual fighting season, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander identified the development of an independent, demand-based logistics system as a command priority.



Figure 1. ANA Class III (Fuel) Bulk  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

Afghan Ministry of Defense and ANA officers and senior civilians advisors interviewed were proud of their accomplishments during the previous and current fighting seasons. However, ANA officials stressed the importance of the Coalition's role in continuing their train and advise logistics mission after December 2014. Many demonstrated an understanding of how the logistics system was designed to work and their part in it.

<sup>1</sup> Report number DODIG-2012-028, "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army," December 9, 2011.

## ***The ANA Logistics System***

At different points over the last 12 years, U.S. and Coalition Forces demonstrated different models for distributing and maintaining materiel and supplies, and managing facilities for the ANA. Prior to 2011, U.S. and Coalition Forces implemented the equivalent of a “push” system, where Coalition Forces determined ANA needs, set allocations of commodities and equipment, and pushed supplies to ANA units from central locations. This model provided equipment and supplies for the rapid generation of ANA Forces, and ensured essential delivery of materiel and oversight of certain inventory management functions. Unfortunately, it also closely resembled the Soviet logistics model that many senior ANA officials were taught during the 1980s, generating experience contrary to the demand-based “pull” system the Coalition desired to create.

While contributing to immediate combat effectiveness, the “push” model used by Coalition Forces to support ANA force generation did not substantially build the capabilities of the ANA or Ministry of Defense to conduct independent sustainment support. Since 2011, U.S. and Coalition Force efforts have emphasized the development of an independent ANA logistics sustainment system similar to the western demand-based model used by the U.S. Army. Coalition Force officials stated that the efficiencies of a functioning pull system (that is, demand-based) are key to creating a sustainable ANA Force.



Figure 2. ANA Class I Storage  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

Since 2011, Coalition Forces have assigned active duty military, civil service, and contracted advisors and trainers to assist Afghan officials at all levels of the ANA logistics system including the Ministry of Defense. ISAF also contracted for training and combat support services where the Afghan labor market lacked individuals with skills and expertise to ensure ANA operational readiness. Contracted services included vehicle<sup>2</sup> and aircraft maintenance,<sup>3</sup> information systems, and facilities management. Most of these contracts were scheduled to end by December 31, 2014, if not sooner, although the Command retained the capability to extend them if needed. Additionally, senior ANA officials and Coalition Force advisors were determining which services, if any, would continue under contract post-2014, only funded and managed by the ANA instead of the Coalition Forces.

### *ANA Logistics System Roles and Responsibilities*

The mission of Western-style demand-based logistics systems is the planning and execution of the movement and support of forces. These systems include the aspects of military operations that deal with:

- materiel design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, and disposition;
- facilities acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition; and
- service acquisition or furnishing.

In the ANA logistics system, these operations were grouped into three operational levels: strategic, operational, and tactical.

- Strategic. The Afghan Ministry of Defense and General Staff were responsible for developing national military policies, including those for ANA logistics sustainment. The Assistant Minister of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics was tasked with developing and publishing logistics doctrine and integrating national strategy with operational requirements. This level of logistics also included the central supply depots under the authority of the ANA Logistics Command.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> ANA Maintenance contracts included the supply and management of repair parts.

<sup>3</sup> We did not include Afghan Air Force logistics in the scope of this report. We addressed the issue in DODIG-2012-141, "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan Air Force," September 28, 2012. Also, in January 2014, a senior team representing multiple DoD logistics organizations conducted a review of the transition of the Afghan Aviation Enterprise from contractor logistics support at the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

<sup>4</sup> The descriptions of the ANA logistics system in this report exclude the Aviation Support Depot, responsible for aviation-specific items, and aviation fuel, and aircraft and spare parts.



- Operational. The Regional Logistics Support Centers (RLSC) were responsible for supply, transportation, and maintenance support to all supported ANA Corps units. These organizations were nested in each ANA Corps.
- Tactical. Combat Service Support Kandaks (ANA battalions) were assigned to each ANA Brigade. These units directly supported and sustained their parent brigades.

### *Organization of ANA Unit Logistics Support*

The ANA used a system of supply points constituting a supply chain from the national depots to unit supply rooms supporting unit missions. These supply points controlled designated types of supplies based on common and unique characteristics. RLSCs and Combat Service Support Kandaks managed supply points to receive, store, issue, and account for materials of each Class of Supply for all supported units.

*Table 1. ANA Materiel Groups and Classes of Supply*

Supply Class	Grouping	Description
CL I	Food and Rations	Sustenance
CL II	Clothing, Stationary, Supplies, Equipment, General Supply	General supply items, items consumed in use, clothing, material, uniform items, office equipment, furnishings, supporting sets, kits, outfits, general equipment
CL III	Fuel, Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants	Petroleum products transported and stored in bulk, such as heating oil, diesel, benzene or petrol / petroleum products transported in consumption size containers or packages
CL IV	Construction Materials	Material normally only associated with construction
CL V	Ammunition, Explosives	Ammunition and explosives
CL VII	End Items	Weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and automatic equipment
CL VIII	Medical Material	Consumables to support the health care
CL IX	Spares / Repair Parts	Items required to be replaced on class VII end items. Includes ground support items

Source: ANA Decree 4.0

As of late 2013, the Coalition had transitioned management of Class I, II, and some Class III supplies to the ANA. Coalition officials further planned to transition the remaining classes of supply to independent ANA management during 2014.

### *The ANA Maintenance System*

Ministry of Defense Decree 4.9, “Maintenance Management Policy and Procedures,” February 28, 2010, described maintenance as a “combat service support function that supports equipment and its associated systems in the field and garrison” and “sustains materiel in an operational status, restores it to serviceable condition, or upgrades its functional utility through modification or product improvement.” The ANA maintenance system encompassed three tiers of maintenance support – organizational, general, and national – starting from Combat Service Support Kandaks, running through the RLSCs to the Central Workshop in Kabul.



Figure 3. ANA Vehicle Repair  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

- Organizational maintenance included standard services of equipment, removal and replacement of designated items (e.g. starters, radiators, etc.), and limited repairs to certain items.
- General maintenance required mechanics with advanced training and included extensive diagnostics, replacement of major assemblies (e.g. engines, transmissions, transfer cases, etc.) and limited repairs to removed assemblies.
- National or depot maintenance required the highest level of expertise by mechanics and included repair, overhaul, and rebuild of individual components, major- and sub-assemblies, and modules.

### ***Coalition Force Roles and Responsibilities in Developing the ANA Logistics System***

In July 2013, Commander, ISAF reorganized the roles and responsibilities of ISAF subordinate commands, splitting the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A)/ Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) into different reporting chains. NTM-A was re-aligned under the Commander, ISAF Joint Command (IJC), while CSTC-A remained a separate command subordinate to ISAF. The Commander, IJC assumed primary responsibility for development of certain institutional and operational elements of the ANA logistics system. The Commander, CSTC-A retained primary responsibility for overall development of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and General Staff, to include logistic matters.



## Observation 1

### Standardized Forecasting and Requirements Generation

The ANA had not developed the capability to plan for and forecast the requirements for materiel required to sustain their logistical system.

This occurred because of:

- Nascent U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop supply forecasting and collection of demand data within the ANA Corps.
- Senior Afghan logistician incomplete training and inexperience with supply forecasting and analysis.

The lack of a developed and accepted Afghan logistics planning process negatively impacted supply chain management across the ANA. Inexperienced and incompletely trained Ministry of Defense and General Staff logisticians remained dependent on U.S. and Coalition officials' expertise and unable to project supply system needs.

### Discussion

A Coalition Force assessment of the Ministry of Defense showed that sustainable, independent ANA logistical operations required continued advisory assistance in several logistics capabilities: requirements generation, contracting structure, technical assessment, and contract administration.<sup>5</sup> While the ability of the ANA to plan and synchronize logistics for future operations continued to develop, ISAF Joint Command Coalition advisors observed that ANA forecasting and supply management remained immature and required ongoing support.

### *Coalition Logistics Advising Efforts*

As the ANA approached full personnel strength in late 2012, Coalition priority shifted from force generation to improving the quality of ANA units and their supporting systems. The Commander, ISAF designated the continued development of ANA logistics capabilities as a top priority, emphasizing training to ensure qualified personnel were available to support the entire logistics system. Coalition officials outlined a three-part implementation strategy.

- Deliver contractor-led sustainment training at the RLSCs. The intent was to ensure an enduring capability through Afghan-contracted mobile training teams for selected key nodes after Coalition-funded teams were no longer available.

<sup>5</sup> In 2013 ISAF used the Capability Milestone Matrix to assess ministerial functions, including those related to the ANA logistics system.

- Direct advising by Coalition Regional Commands. Coalition Regional Command advisors trained their respective ANA partners on supply forecasting and the elements of supply management, including receipt, accountability, identification, storage, requisition, and stock control.
- Maximize attendance at logistics training courses at the National Combat Service Support School in Kabul.

Officials reported that advisors shared best practice initiatives among Regional Commands, and more recently functional groups, in order to maximize Coalition training efforts in the remaining time with Coalition Force presence.

Coalition Force officials developed timelines for ANA logistic system development. Senior Afghan logisticians interviewed at the Ministry and ANA Corps headquarters emphasized their intent to continue the existing partnership with their Coalition advisors and stated they were committed to the timeline for the transition of logistics from Coalition control to the ANA. Senior ANA officials also recognized that their logistic system remained underdeveloped.

In some cases where the ANA had not properly planned or forecasted supply requirements, advisors expedited resupply of mission-essential materials to the ANA using Coalition logistics systems. Coalition Force officials reported instances of advisors “bypassing” the existing Afghan system because they did not want to allow their counterparts to fail. This behavior, while infrequent and sometimes necessary to maintain operational momentum, hindered overall ANA logistics system development.

### ***ANA Logistician Experience with Forecasting and Analysis***

Senior ANA logisticians assigned to the Ministry of Defense and General Staff acknowledged their general lack of experience applying demand-based logistics planning. Most general officers assigned to key Ministerial or General Staff positions had received training early in their careers in the Soviet “push” logistics model but had little experience with strategic logistical planning and operations in a “pull” system. Some Coalition Force and ANA leaders said they realized that Ministry of Defense staff officers were not fully trained and educated in how to effectively conduct supply analysis and forecasting.



Generally, a Corps G-4 (Logistics) staff officer would generate logistics requirements for operations and direct logistics without input from subordinate units. Additionally, each ANA Corps had a different method for forecasting supply requirements. This resulted in instances of ANA Corps logisticians ordering too many or not enough supplies in the short-term. There was also a consistent failure of the ANA Corps to engage subordinate units regarding their future supply needs, which hindered the development of junior logisticians and denied the system consistent supply consumption data from the Kandaks and brigades. This demand data was necessary to properly analyze and accurately forecast resupply.

Earlier deferred Coalition efforts to develop ANA logistic systems and inexperience on the part of senior ANA logisticians resulted in continued Afghan dependence on the Coalition. Both Coalition and Afghan officials were aware of the limited time remaining to train ANA officials while meeting transition goals.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### ***Recommendation 1.a***

**Commander, International Security Assistance Force, ensure functional Security Force Assistance teams have the training and capability to develop Afghan logistics capacity in the Afghan National Army Corps.**

#### *Commander, International Security Assistance Force Comments*

Commander, ISAF concurred with the recommendation. Comments provided described mandatory training for advisors. Comments also identified a potential training gap for any junior ranking advisors re-missioned to a logistics-advising billet during their assignment, suggesting a need for country advisor training for those individuals.

#### *Our Response*

The response partially addressed the recommendation. We request Commander, ISAF provide data illustrating the impact of re-missioned personnel over time, if any.

### ***Recommendation 1.b***

**Commander, International Security Assistance Force, conduct key leader engagements with the Minister of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the General Staff Logistics Director to develop an Afghan-led solution that institutes a forecasting and requirements generation model for use by the Afghan Ministry of Defense and General Staff organizations.**

#### ***Commander, International Security Assistance Force Comments***

Commander, ISAF concurred with the recommendation. The Command gave specifics regarding Essential Function 5 (Sustainment) key leader engagements and on-going support from a Department of Defense-sponsored team of logistics experts in Afghanistan.

#### ***Our Response***

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. No further comment is required.

## Observation 2

### Unity of Effort in Logistics Development

The ISAF command and control structure for ANSF logistics development lacked sufficient unity of effort.

This situation existed because the command realignment initiated in December 2013 assigned officials with significant responsibility for developing ANA logistics capabilities across different ISAF commands and levels of authority. Key roles and responsibilities for ANSF logistics development were insufficiently defined among senior military and civilian leaders.

Insufficient lines of authority and definitions of roles and responsibilities resulted in unclear prioritization of resources and initiatives at a time when Coalition resources were decreasing and the need to develop ANSF logistics capability was great. This increased the risk that Coalition Force efforts to train the ANA to conduct independent sustainment operations during and after 2014 would not succeed.

### Discussion

In December 2013, Commander ISAF realigned the Coalition command structure. Prior to this realignment, NTM-A was responsible for the development of the ANA institutional base and logistics advising at the RLSCs and higher commands. The new command structure subordinated NTM-A to the IJC, but assigned responsibility for advising the Ministry of Defense and General Staff logisticians (and all other functions) under CSTC-A. Both IJC and CSTC-A Commanders were direct reports to Commander, ISAF.

The Commander ISAF created an Executive Director of Sustainment position for a civilian official at the senior executive service level within CSTC-A. As of December 2013, this position did not have an official position description. However, the incumbent understood that his position reported directly to Commander ISAF and was generally understood to be responsible for the development of sustainment functions at the Ministry of Defense, including the Assistant Ministerial of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics, and for coordinating the forecasting and purchase of repair parts for the ANA from the U.S. supply system. This seemingly overlapped the responsibilities of the NTM-A Deputy Commander for Support Operations. The lack of clarity complicated the command and control of the logistics battlespace. As a result, the focus

and prioritization of the mission to develop the ANA logistics system remained ambiguous and poorly defined. According to Coalition Force officials interviewed, this command structure created overlapping lines of responsibility with confused boundaries that impeded synchronization of efforts, allowed gaps to develop, and wasted resources through duplication of effort.

Senior Coalition advisors stated that Afghan leaders were frustrated at receiving confusing mixed-messages from meetings with a variety of ISAF and non-ISAF advisors. As the ANA assumed responsibility for facilities and resupply, any lack of coordination and clarity in Coalition advising on the multiple ANA logistics projects underway could have made their execution even more challenging and could negatively impact their accomplishment.

For example, in late 2013, the contractors from the Executive Director of Sustainment's office were completing a guide for maintainers with illustrations of how to perform basic vehicle maintenance. The guide filled a valid need to improve preventative maintenance across the Corps and thus reduce damage to vehicles resulting from lack of maintenance and poorly understood vehicle stewardship. However, the guide was outside the defined scope of the senior civilian's office as it touched maintenance occurring at the ANA Corps, which was the responsibility of the IJC Regional Commands. Because of the difficulty coordinating the project sufficiently across the commands, it lacked a command chain to track implementation in the field, assess effectiveness, or support its sustainability.

## **Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

### ***Recommendation 2***

**Commander, International Security Assistance Force:**

- a. Complete command restructuring and establish clearly defined and understood roles and responsibilities for the continued development of Afghan National Army sustainment.**
- b. Clarify the role and responsibility of the senior civilian logistician with regard to the International Security Assistance Force command and control structure.**

*Commander, International Security Assistance Force Comments*

Commander, ISAF concurred with recommendations 2.a. and 2.b. The restructuring of ISAF was on-going and was to be complete by September 30, 2014. The senior civilian was assigned in writing as the lead of Essential Function 5 (Sustainment).

*Our Response*

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. No further comment is required.





## Observation 3

### General Staff and Ministry of Defense Advisors

The existing and projected assignment process for U.S. and Coalition Force advisors to the Afghan General Staff and Ministry of Defense has not and will not produce sufficient advisors with the required technical knowledge, experience, or interpersonal skills to effectively advise their counterparts.

This situation existed because:

- The Command did not develop enduring mission requirements or performance criteria for civilian and military advisors in theatre.
- Advising requirements changed within the time it took to recruit, train, and assign Coalition military and civilian advisors.
- The U.S. DoD did not establish/resource a formal developmental program for civilian advisors.

Ineffective advisors impaired the development of critical ministerial logistics functions upon which the Corps depended and increased the risk that U.S. funds, in the form of direct contributions post-2014, will not be budgeted or spent effectively and responsibly by Afghan General Staff and Ministry of Defense officials.

### Discussion

Coalition forces assigned advisors to senior Ministry of Defense and General Staff officials in order to improve the performance of security forces within the Afghan political and legal framework. The U.S. staffed Ministry of Defense and General Staff advisors from three sources: the Military Services, the U.S. Civilian Expeditionary Workforce Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) Program,<sup>6</sup> and contractors. Coalition partners (against NATO requirements) also assigned advisors to Ministry of Defense and General Staff officials. Coalition officials at IJC and Regional Commands stated that the overall skill set, experience, and in some cases, interpersonal skills, of advisors in place did not support the development of Ministry of Defense and General Staff officials.

<sup>6</sup> The DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce program deployed Federal civil service employees with specialized skills to assist with DoD missions world-wide. The MoDA program was a subordinate program that sourced senior civil servants to assist partner nations to develop ministerial-level management. As of February 2014, the MoDA program sourced 95 advisors serving in the Afghan Ministry of Defense, Ministry of the Interior, and NATO organizations in Afghanistan. The program also provided advisors to ministerial development efforts in Montenegro, Bosnia, Kosovo, Georgia, Indonesia, Libya, Columbia, and Yemen.

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency was assigned responsibility for the MoDA program in late 2012. In March 2013, the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Commander, NTM-A/CSTC-A executed a memorandum of agreement that established roles and responsibilities for program management.<sup>7</sup> However, command officials, advisors, and the MoDA program manager all indicated that application of the performance evaluation guidance, whereby deployed leaders only provided input to the advisor's state-side supervisor for performance evaluation was ineffective. Allowing the U.S.-based supervisors of MoDA advisors complete performance evaluations did not give deployed supervisors sufficient authority.

### ***Advisor Management and Training***

Uniformed military, civilian, and contract advisors to Ministry of Defense and General Staff officials had non-standard supervisory structures. Senior General Staff officials were advised by uniformed officers with a rank of Major to Colonel. These military advisors had two reporting chains: the senior Colonel coordinated daily activities while Service representatives rated their performance. Most of the U.S. advisors to senior Ministry of Defense officials were federally employed civilians on temporary duty status staffed through the MoDA program office in Washington, D.C. These civil service advisors reported to a senior Colonel in theater for administration, but their parent organizations completed their performance evaluations. Command officials we interviewed were unaware of a formal process for establishing performance standards and evaluating the performance of MoDA-assigned advisors against those standards. A Coalition official also stated he had only indirect authority over contractors serving as advisors.

Training for advisors assigned to the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff varied by source, but did not include familiarization with Afghan laws and military doctrine. Further, the U.S. and NATO nations did not have a common curriculum for advisor training. U.S. military advisors received pre-deployment training at a central location or through their Service. Civilian advisors assigned through the MoDA program received standardized training sponsored by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. However, the training did not include instruction on Afghan laws or policies for which senior Afghans were responsible. Civilian MODA advisors stated that the Command did not supplement their training to close the gap.

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<sup>7</sup> For more information on challenges concerning the Ministry of Defense Advisor Program, see DoDIG-2013-05, "Performance Framework and Better Management of Resources Needed for the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program," October 23, 2012.

### ***Ongoing and Future Challenges***

Rapidly evolving duty requirements detracted from advisor effectiveness. Afghan development and increasing sovereignty made advising senior Ministry of Defense and General Staff officials more complex. In addition, a MoDA program official confirmed that successive military commanders repeatedly modified the selection criteria for advisors based on his priorities and assessment of ministerial advising needs. As a result, the position requirements, selection and preparation criteria for MoDA were not submitted to program management on a timely basis and varied widely dependent on past and current leadership.

Although DoD considered staffing the MoDA program a priority, Coalition Force and program officials reported that DoD components did not uniformly support or endorse MoDA service. A senior MoDA program official stated that finding a sufficient number of qualified DoD volunteers to fill ministerial advisor positions was an ongoing challenge. In his opinion, the incentives were not sufficient to offset living in a physically dangerous, austere environment with severe constraints on movement. Civil servants who volunteered faced a disruption in their career progression despite guaranteed return rights to their permanent position and did not receive off-setting recognition for their service in Afghanistan. Finally, budget uncertainty in 2013 impacted the ability of the MoDA program to fill positions due to furloughs and hiring freezes.

In 2013, DoD deployed three senior executives with managerial expertise in logistics, human resources, and resource management to Afghanistan for one-year tours. While executives had sufficient experience to advise senior Afghan officials and convened groups of ministerial advisors to share advising experience and expertise, they were given no authority over advisors, or input into advisor performance management and, consequently, were unable to positively impact the performance of coalition advisors.

According to Coalition Force officials, lagging ministerial development posed a serious risk to the eventual ability of the ANA logistics system to operate independently. The ministerial development effort was expected to be a major part of the Resolute Support Mission post-2014. In order to be effective, DoD needed a strategy for incentivizing, selecting, and managing ministerial advisors of all types for the duration of U.S. presence in Afghanistan.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### ***Recommendation 3.a***

**Commander, International Security Assistance Force, in coordination with Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan and the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency:**

- 1. develop enduring position requirements for advisor positions,**
- 2. establish a clear management chain for General Staff and Ministerial advisors, and,**
- 3. update and enforce the terms of the March 2013 Memorandum of Agreement governing performance evaluation to give deployed military and civilian supervisors greater authority over the performance evaluation of deployed civilian advisors.**

### ***Commander, International Security Assistance Force Comments***

Commander, ISAF concurred with Recommendation 3.a. Management stated they identified required positions for the RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION, reorganized logistics advisors under Essential Function 5 to enhance synchronization across all echelons, and were reviewing the 2013 Memorandum of Understanding to strengthen the authority of deployed supervisors.

### ***Our Response***

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. We request Commander, ISAF provide the updated Memorandum of Understanding when complete.

### ***Recommendation 3.b***

**Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan:**

- 1. ensure NATO-provided Ministry of Defense and General staff advisors receive sufficient training on relevant Afghan law, policy, processes and culture as they relate to their areas of responsibility prior to assignment as an advisor;**

### ***Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan Comments and Our Response***

We did not receive a response specific to Recommendation 3.b.1. We request Commander, CSTC-A reply to the final report.

**2. develop a plan for contracted advisor augmentation to address identified advisor shortfalls during the RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION.**

*Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan Comments*

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with Recommendation 3.b.2. Comments provided detailed actions in support of a surge of contract advisors intended to provide support from the Regional Corps to the Ministerial level.

*Our Response*

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. No further comment is required.

**Recommendation 3.c**

**Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, establish a formal developmental program, including career track incentives, for individuals who volunteer as General Staff and Ministry of Defense advisors during the post-2014 RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION.**

*Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Comments*

The Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, concurred with Recommendation 3.c. saying it will assist, through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), the Defense Security Cooperation Agency in developing options for incorporating the skillsets needed to support enduring advisory requirements into career program development tracks, leveraging training and development resources to build a formal development program with consideration to career track incentives.

*Our Response*

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. No further comment is required.





## Observation 4

### Advisor Drawdown

The IJC advisor drawdown plan reduced the number of logistics advisors below that necessary to complete Coalition efforts to develop and transition ANA logistics capabilities.

This occurred because IJC plans for advisor drawdown were not always conditions-based with respect to the ISAF mission and did not accurately reflect the priority for ANA logistics development assigned by the Commander, ISAF.

As a result, ANA logistics capabilities will not reach full development for sustainable, independent operations.

### Discussion

#### *Shift in Advisory Focus*

The Commander, ISAF determined mission-essential priorities for the remainder of 2014 leading into the RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION. These priorities included shifting emphasis from operational and tactical advising to functional advising in five key areas.<sup>8</sup> Logistics sustainment was one of the functions deemed critical to the future operational viability of ANSF.

Coalition officials reported that the future emphasis of Coalition advising should be on the priority capacity needs of the ANA, which they described as “heavy on logistic, medical, and other enablers [combat support] areas.” However, incomplete training of Afghan Ministry of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics personnel and their poor communication with subordinate units, suggested a needs-based drawdown of logistic advisors supporting ANA organizations at Corps levels until the ANA achieved desired proficiency.

However, logistics advisors and senior Coalition Force officials said that drawdown plans called for advising resources to be withdrawn from ANA Corps on pre-determined timelines, regardless of the logistics capability of ANA leaders at the Corps they advised. Specifically, advisors in Regional Command – Southwest stated that maintenance trainers had already stopped assisting the 215<sup>th</sup> ANA Corps. Advisors also reported that ANA maintenance personnel could not sustain complex equipment received in 2013 and 2014, and they did not expect the ANA to develop a sustainable maintenance capability without continued maintenance advising after the conclusion of the Afghan Integrated Support Services contract later in 2014.

<sup>8</sup> The five functional were: Command and Control, Leadership, Combined Arms Integration, Training, and Sustainment.

### ***Quality of Advisors***

The Commander, IJC, stated that ANA sustainment advising was a complex, long-term challenge that would extend beyond January 2015. While recounting examples of advisor-related challenges, he asserted that, as the Coalition Forces drew down, assigning appropriately qualified personnel to advisor positions would be key.

Senior Coalition officials said they required advisors with a higher level of logistics experience and skill sets who could quickly identify urgent issues and solutions, and effectively coach/mentor ANA leaders. Logistics advisors in Regional Command - Southwest said logistics advisors to ANA Corps had to have the requisite experience and expertise to give timely recommendations to solve problems posed by their principal.

### ***Mitigation Measures***

Coalition Force officials also demonstrated methods to mitigate the effect of degradation of logistics advising:

- Regional Command – East increased the advising staff by delaying the early redeployment of a brigade and redistributing the brigade as advisors and security elements for advisors and critical logistics nodes.
- Regional Command – South used “Tiger Teams,” including a train the trainer component, to improve logistics processes and procedures that they believed were critical issues for their supported ANA Corps.

While an important part of maximizing available resources, the above measures were not fully sufficient to meet the current and projected need to address the Command-identified priority development of logistics to ensure the future viability of the ANA. Continued support of an effective logistics sustainment advisory effort with skilled and experienced personnel was critical. Without the right advisor capabilities in sufficient numbers, the probability that the ANA will become logistically self-sustaining in the future is uncertain, if not unlikely.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### ***Recommendation 4***

**Commander, International Security Assistance Force:**

- a. Assess conditions and determine advisor resources required, and**
- b. Review Train-Advise-Assist drawdown plans and retain sufficient logistics advisors and resources.**

### ***Commander, International Security Assistance Force Comments***

Commander, ISAF concurred with recommendations 4.a. and 4.b. Management stated that the personnel plan for the RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION contains the required logistics advisors, and the ISAF ANSF-Logistics Officer identified appropriate ranks and skills for logistics advisors.

### ***Our Response***

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. No further comment is required.



## Observation 5

### Turn-in and Disposal of Irreparable ANA Equipment

ANA units were unable to turn-in and dispose of non-reparable equipment, even though the ANA had current, signed policy describing the process.

This occurred for several reasons, including:

- ANA organizations had difficulty completing the Estimated Cost of Damage and Ministry of Defense Forms 63 and 64 Processes.
- ANA leaders in the Corps were not directing Reports of Survey / Financial Liability Assessments as required, and in some cases could not determine liability for damages in order to complete required documentation.
- ANA had a shortage of qualified ANA mechanics and logisticians capable of conducting and completing technical inspections.

This led to the:

- continued accumulation of combat-ineffective, non-reparable vehicles and other equipment in ANA units requiring continued accountability,
- inability to reallocate serviceable parts from destroyed and or non-reparable vehicles and equipment that could be used to support repairable vehicles needing parts,
- unusable equipment remaining on unit property books preventing requisition of replacements, and
- continued decrease in the confidence of the logistics system to function as intended.

### Discussion

ANA units could not complete the turn-in and disposal of damaged, non-reparable equipment for removal from unit property books. ANA leaders at Corps, as well as Coalition Force leaders and advisors at all levels, communicated a continuing frustration with the inability of the ANA to complete these processes. We observed and reported on this problem in our 2011 report.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Report number DODIG-2012-028, "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army," December 9, 2011.



Figure 4. Irreparable Equipment  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

Each ANA camp visited had storage yards full of destroyed equipment, primarily vehicles, waiting to be turned in for disposal and/or disassembled for useful parts. Much of the equipment was excess to unit authorizations. However, because these items remained on the property book, ANA units could not exercise the system to obtain any replacement vehicles, weapons systems, or communications equipment within authorized allowances. The inability to obtain functional replacement items would, over time, eventually reduce the operational readiness and combat effectiveness of ANA units. In addition to taxing unit storage capacity, yards full of useless equipment further eroded confidence in a fledging logistics system.

### ***Process Challenges***

The Ministry of Defense Decree 4.9 contained policies and procedures for equipment disposal, known as “estimated cost of damage and disposal.” As of early 2014, Coalition officials stated the turn-in process required a lengthy process of 45 official signatures to complete and remove the item from the property book, starting at the unit and concluding with final approval at the Ministry of Defense. Acquiring these signatures was especially difficult given the geographic dispersal of commanders and staff officers and the largely paper-based ANA logistics system. Coalition officials surmised that Ministry of Defense officials required the multiple layers of review to avoid any appearance of corruption.



According to Coalition Officials, some Corps commanders added to the challenge, withholding their authorization to turn in destroyed equipment until the Ministry of Defense/General Staff G4 staff reviewed additional forms - the Ministry of Defense Form 72 [Request for Vehicle, Weapon, and Material Repair] and Form 64 [Disposal]. Coalition officials calculated that those turn in actions actually completed in 2013 took more than 90 days from start to finish, rather than the 25 days dictated in the ANA Decree.

A critical part of approval for turn-in was the requirement to conduct a report of survey, including an assessment of financial liability. Coalition Force officials reported that the ANA Corps did not consistently complete these reports, causing officials above Corps to reject requests. The 201<sup>st</sup> ANA Corps Commander reported that damage to many of his command's vehicles occurred years ago, when ANA units conducted operations at the direction of the Coalition, without the operations being named. He said in these instances, units could not include operational names on the forms to satisfy the Ministry of Defense. Also, they could no longer determine which vehicle damage resulted from participation in an operation (combat), poor driving (operator error), or simply from operating on rough terrain (wear and tear).



Figure 5. Additional Irreparable Items  
Source: DoD IG-SPO



Finally, the ANA faced a shortage of trained mechanics or logisticians capable of conducting technical inspections. See observation 14 for a detailed discussion regarding the shortage of trained staff.

The Coalition determined that Ministry of Defense adherence to procedures was a mission essential task, and reported that the General Staff G4 [Logistics] had not been taking necessary action regarding “vehicle/ weapon repair and or replacement”. Coalition advisors discussed with ANA senior leaders the importance of establishing a functioning turn-in process and the enforcement of command policies. In August 2013, CSTC-A’s Executive Sustainment Directorate mentored and advised the Ministry of Defense and the ANA on establishing three ANA disposal yards around the country in an attempt to expedite the reduction of non-mission capable vehicles stockpiled at ANA units.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### **Recommendation 5**

**Commander, International Security Assistance Force:**

- a. **Advise all Afghan National Army leaders as to the costs of maintaining broken, damaged, and non-repairable equipment.**
- b. **Advise and assist the Assistant Minister of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics in streamlining and following the established process and procedures for approval of the Estimated Cost of Damage and disposal of equipment processes. (This is a repeat recommendation from our 2011 report.)**

### *Commander, International Security Assistance Force Comments*

Commander, ISAF concurred with recommendations 5.a. and 5.b. Management described on-going key leader engagements addressing the impacts of retaining non-repairable equipment. The topic will also be on the agenda of the upcoming Maintenance Shura.

### *Our Response*

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. In response to the final report, we ask that Commander, ISAF, summarize the outcome of the Maintenance Shura regarding non-repairable equipment.

## Observation 6

### Turn In Processes for Excess Equipment and Parts

The ANA did not have functional procedures for turning in excess serviceable equipment and/or parts from lower level units to higher echelons.

This occurred because:

- Coalition Forces only recently focused efforts to assist in the development of a turn in program within the ANA.
- Ministry of Defense and General Staff senior leaders did not appreciate the value of a turn-in process and therefore did not emphasize its importance.
- Senior Afghan commanders have traditionally resisted turning in any excess equipment, parts, or supplies.

As a result, the lack of a functioning process for the turn-in of excess, ANA units continued to stockpile unneeded equipment and parts that overfilled unit storage and operating space. Excess equipment in units operating hindered efficient commodity management and prevented potential redistribution of supplies to units which could effectively use them. Moreover, units were unable to request replacement equipment.

### Discussion

Doctrine and policy governing the turn-in of excess equipment and parts was in place prior to December 2013. ANA Decree 4.0, "Supported and Supporting Unit Logistics Policy and Support Procedures," governed ANA logistics sustainment operations. Chapter 8 of Decree 4.2, "Materiel Accountability Policy and Procedures," contained basic policy for the turn-in of excess serviceable supply and equipment. The policy held commanders at all levels responsible, but required the "Corps G4 or equivalent" approval and disposition instructions for ANA units to turn in serviceable supplies. Coalition officials stated that while the logistics decrees were disseminated across the ANA, procedures were not effectively implemented.

However, senior Coalition officials and Afghan leaders agreed that excess serviceable equipment and parts in ANA was a growing concern to the development of an efficient logistical system and were considering options for resolving the problem. Coalition advisors assigned to the Afghan Corps noted that they were unaware of active ANA procedures for the turn-in of serviceable items or any



Figure 6. Potential Excess Equipment  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

actions taken to do so. A senior ANA official reinforced advisor comments, stating that there was no functioning ANA process for units to turn in serviceable equipment. He further expressed concern that some excess equipment was likely not properly accounted for.

### ***Coalition Focus***

Coalition Forces pushed equipment and supplies to ANA Corps units, including in excess of authorized needs, during force generation and in support of ongoing operations. Since 2009, the primary mission of NTM-A was generating units to grow the ANSF to its objective final personnel strength. Likewise, IJC was focused on operations and preparing ANA units to lead the fighting. Accounting for and turn-in of excess equipment over authorization was not a priority.

Officials from NTM-A reported that they recognized that ANA units had stockpiles of excess parts and equipment. They further stated that they needed to highlight the importance of the issue with ANA leadership. Coalition officials also discussed the need for training to be conducted across the ANA to establish an ANA-wide turn in program.



Figure 7. ANA Vehicle and Excess Bumpers  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

### ***Proliferation of Excess***

NTM-A officials stated that many senior ANA leaders were Soviet-trained and preferred a “push” style logistics system in which excess was never turned in. In this model, supplies are distributed based on operational tempo and authorized numbers of people and quantities of equipment as determined by a top-down, centrally controlled system. While predictable, the inevitable result was either too much or too little resupply sent to any given unit. In any event, maintaining excess equipment or parts was in contradiction with the demand-pull supply system desired for the ANA.

Leaders we interviewed in the ANA Corps stated that poor functionality of the ANA repair part resupply system contributed to the quantity of excess parts in their units. ANA logisticians related that they would correctly complete requests that were never filled, only later receiving parts or other items that they neither requested nor needed.

### ***Resistance to Turn In***

While some ANA leaders voiced a willingness to turn in excess, we observed resistance as well during interviews. One ANA Corps Commander stated that he was aware that his units had received incorrect spare parts, and he supported and would enforce turn-in of the excess in the hope of receiving the needed items. This commander also understood the potential benefits to other ANA Corps of turning in



his excess. Other ANA senior leaders were less supportive, stating that some units used excess spare parts and equipment for to repair broken equipment in their units or as scrap metal.

Coalition advisors attributed the Afghan propensity to hoard material and resist returning even unneeded items as a survival tactic in response to historic scarcities. However, Coalition officials indicated that they were aware that some ANA leaders wanted to turn in excess and clear it out of their unit area of operation.

### ***Efforts Toward a Solution***

We observed an abundance of excess equipment and parts in each of the ANA Corps visited. Further, excess equipment in unit areas and the inability to turn it in was a serious point of frustration among much of the ANA leadership across the Corps. ANA logisticians interviewed indicated that this had a negative impact on routine supply management in unit areas and vehicle fleet readiness.

In September 2013, the Chief of the ANA General Staff issued cipher 319 providing additional guidance concerning procedures for turn in of excess serviceable and unserviceable vehicles and equipment.<sup>10</sup> This order was an attempt to expedite the return of damaged vehicles and repairable items to the national level and provide ANA units with operational vehicles and equipment in return. According to Coalition officials, the intention was to use items turned in to central locations to build an ANA-wide vehicle fleet and equipment reserve to replace damaged items. Coalition officials acknowledged ANA units had not complied with the “cipher” (order) issued by the ANA General Staff, but that they planned to continue to work to address the associated challenges across the ANA.

## **Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

### ***Recommendation 6.a***

**Commander, International Security Assistance Force, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army General Staff, select an Afghan National Army Corps unit to model effective turn-in procedures, demonstrating system functionality to build confidence across other Corps.**

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<sup>10</sup> Cipher #319 of the Chief of General Staff, dated 29 September 2013. Three repair and maintenance workshops were established in the Central Region, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif to speed up the process of repair for vehicles and equipment of the ANA units and to increase the technical capacity of ANA. Managed by contractors, these new workshops leverage the existing repair workshops of the ANA and perform the kinds of repairs that are beyond the present capabilities of the ANA.

*Commander, International Security Assistance Force Comments*

Commander, ISAF concurred with recommendation 6.a. Management described three ongoing actions: the Base Maintenance Depot initiative, continuing engagement with MoD and General Staff logisticians to ensure enforcement of ANSF doctrine, and establishment of an ANA-wide Maintenance Readiness Report.

***Recommendation 6.b***

**Commander, International Security Assistance Force:**

- 1. advise and assist the Afghan National Army General Staff to implement an Afghan-supported policy and process to return excess serviceable and unserviceable equipment and parts to the Afghan National Army inventory.**
- 2. advise and assist the Afghan National Army Training Command to establish a training program to teach equipment turn-in procedures to Afghan National Army logisticians.**

*Commander, International Security Assistance Force Comments*

Commander, ISAF concurred with recommendation 6.b. Management described three ongoing actions: the Base Maintenance Depot initiative, continuing engagement with MoD and General Staff logisticians to ensure enforcement of ANSF doctrine, and establishment of an ANA-wide Maintenance Readiness Report.

*Our Response*

The response partially addressed recommendations 6.a and 6.b. We request Commander, ISAF provide a summary of the impacts of the Base Maintenance Depot initiative on the turn-in of unserviceable equipment.





## Observation 7

### Afghanistan National Army Vehicle Management

The ANA did not have a fleet management plan for the repair and return to the force of severely damaged vehicles, or the purchase of replacements for vehicles beyond repair.

This occurred because:

- Coalition Forces fielded the ANA multiple models of non-standardized commercial vehicles.
- The ANA was unable to coordinate turn-in, transport, repair, and return of severely damaged vehicles to and from the Central Workshop.
- Ministry of Defense and General Staff logisticians lacked fleet management and related budget expertise.
- The Ministry of Defense and General Staff lacked policy and guidance relating to long-term fleet management.

Lack of an ANA fleet management plan has or will result in reduced ANA ability to:

- expedite the validation of vehicles as repairable or qualifying for disposal,
- execute logistics sustainment for an aging ANA fleet that includes numerous vehicle models with non-interchangeable parts, and
- build a vehicle fleet reserve to maintain long-term readiness.

### Discussion


The Ministry of Defense did not have a national level fleet management plan with policy guidance for the repair and return to the force of severely damaged vehicles, or for the purchase of replacements for vehicles beyond repair. ISAF officials recognized this gap and the associated challenges, and identified the reset<sup>11</sup> of the ANA vehicle fleet as a priority for ANA long-term force readiness development through training, advising and assisting.

<sup>11</sup> Joint Publication 4-0 defines "Reset" as "A set of actions to restore equipment to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with a unit's future mission."

## ***Challenges to ANA Vehicle Reset***

The ANA lacked a fleet management plan in part because Coalition Force fielding and donations from non-Coalition countries over several years resulted in multiple models of commercial vehicles in the fleet. Multiple vehicle models had parts that were not interchangeable, requiring a larger inventory of repair parts. This in turn increased the difficulty of repair parts management in an austere battlefield environment.

Sustainment procedures for commercial vehicles differed greatly from those developed for vehicles acquired specifically for military use. Commercial vehicles lacked long-term support packages and established military supply chains. In addition, commercial vendors modified vehicle models on a short cycle, and some of the vehicles in the ANA were approaching a decade of use. Coalition Force advisors expected procurement of parts for older vehicles to become more difficult and expensive.



The ANA could not routinely conduct complex maintenance actions and remained heavily dependent on Coalition-funded, contracted maintenance support for repairs performed above unit level. ANA Central Workshop in Kabul was the only ANA heavy repair workshop available, creating a transportation challenge for the more remote Corps. ANA leadership and Coalition advisors reported that lack of repair parts, a shortage of trained mechanics, and minimal ANA command emphasis on maintenance prevented adequate visibility of battle-damaged equipment across the entire ANA. For example, in December 2013, one ANA Corps reported 1,208 of 5,000 vehicles as “degraded” or non-mission capable, but submitted documentation declaring the status for only 87 of these 1,208 vehicles to their RLSCs.

Further, the ANA Central Workshop in Kabul, responsible for national (depot) vehicle repair support, was not functioning effectively due to inadequate funds, limited space, missing equipment, and lack of properly trained mechanics. Coalition-funded contractors filled these capabilities gaps, hindering the establishment and development of a vehicle fleet management program which relied on ANA capability to make higher level repairs. This capability may be a critical service for which the ANA will continue to rely on Afghan-funded and managed contract support post-2014.

Insufficient fiscal resources also constrained development of an ANA fleet management plan. The Ministry of Defense had no funds designated to upgrade or replace the ANA Central Workshop in Kabul. Generation of any ANA-wide vehicle reserve would have to be from the existing fleet, as Coalition leadership confirmed that there was no funding programmed for new vehicles to constitute an ANA strategic reserve.

Ministry of Defense and ANA logistics managers also lacked fleet management expertise. Personnel assigned to the Assistant Ministry of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the G4 section of the General Staff were responsible for developing and implementing ANA-wide materiel management capability. However, the ANA Commander of the Central Warehouse observed that senior officers in those organizations had limited technical or fleet management experience and were still receiving resource management training from Coalition advisors.

Ultimate failure to develop a comprehensive vehicle fleet management plan that encompassed all the vehicles in the fleet would leave the ANA without a long-term sustainment capability for an aging vehicle fleet. A viable plan would enable development of processes to identify and retrograde<sup>12</sup> repairable and non-repairable vehicles from the ANA Corps. Finally, implementation of a comprehensive plan with related policy guidance would provide the opportunity to build a strategic reserve to support ANA Forces beyond 2014.

### ***Coalition Efforts to Sustain ANA Vehicles Through 2014***

In an initial effort to create a fleet management system, ISAF developed and the Ministry of Defense published a vehicle maintenance plan in January 2014 to simultaneously increase vehicle readiness and create an ANA strategic reserve fleet for three vehicle types. The plan addressed light tactical vehicles (Ford Rangers),

<sup>12</sup> Joint Publication 1-02 defines "Retrograde" as "The process for the movement of non-unit equipment and materiel from a forward location to a reset (replenishment, repair, or recapitalization) program or to another directed area of operations to replenish unit stocks, or to satisfy stock requirements."

medium tactical vehicles (five-ton trucks), and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles. Coalition Force officials expected resistance to the plan resulting from the reluctance of ANA officials to cross-level excess equipment or turn in damaged vehicles.

Coalition leaders estimated the on-hand quantities of these vehicles to be between 150 and 200 percent of authorization throughout the ANA. The excess inventory presented an opportunity to convert repairable vehicles to a strategic reserve while removing non-repairable vehicles from the inventory. When complete, ANA Corps vehicle fleets would remain at or above authorized strength.

The plan proposed that the ANA would retrograde vehicles determined to be beyond the Corps capability to repair to collection points where they would be inspected and designated for repair or disposal. Coalition Force-contracted maintenance would repair vehicles at locations designated in the plan. Repaired vehicles would become a part of an ANA strategic reserve in support of operations in 2014 and beyond. Success of the plan required support from the Assistant Ministry of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the G4 section of the General Staff, and implementation by ANA Corps Commanders.

The January 2014 plan focused primarily on preparation and support for fleet management in 2014. It stated the need for long-term vehicle fleet management and maintenance capability for the ANA, but discussed no options. Longer-term viability of an ANA strategic reserve of vehicles would require allocation of sufficient funding for a contracted maintenance solution, or significant depot level maintenance training to ANA military and civilian mechanics prior to transitioning the program to the ANA. In addition, the Assistant Ministry of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the G4 section of the General Staff would need to continue to develop fleet management expertise to properly manage this program beyond 2014.

Coalition Forces used advanced fleet life cycle management concepts that typically included: long-term acquisition planning; fleet performance monitoring; testing and evaluation; and demand-based logistics support packages with budgets and milestones throughout vehicle life-cycles. These advanced fleet management options were thought by advisors to be beyond Ministry of Defense and ANA management capabilities for the foreseeable future.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### ***Recommendation 7***

**Commander, International Security Assistance Force, assist the Ministry of Defense to establish a vehicle fleet management plan for the long-term sustainment of the Afghan National Army that at a minimum addresses: policy; organic and contracted capabilities at all levels of maintenance; and funding within budget constraints.**

### ***Commander, International Security Assistance Force Comments***

Commander, ISAF concurred with the recommendation. Management described ongoing efforts to build senior Afghan staff capability to manage the vehicle fleet, and support from a Department of Defense-sponsored team of logistics experts in Afghanistan.

### ***Our Response***

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. We request Commander, ISAF share a copy of the findings and briefings generated by the DoD team.



## Observation 8

### Coalition Force Planning for Afghan National Army Post-2014 Contractor Logistics Support

The ANA was unprepared to maintain and repair complex equipment after contractor logistics support concluded. This was a particular concern with combat service support unit equipment issued in limited amounts.

This situation existed because:

- insufficient time remained on expiring, new equipment support contract packages for equipment fielded in 2013 and 2014 to enable contractors to train ANA mechanics on specialized maintenance tasks;
- inadequate assistance from Coalition Forces supporting the development of ANA maintenance capabilities for specialized equipment;
- Coalition Force logistics support contracts focus on equipment readiness slowed the development of ANA maintenance capacities and extended ANA dependence.

The withdrawal of Coalition Force advisors and contract maintenance support may result in a gap of repair capabilities, a rapid increase in the amount of inoperable equipment, and degraded ANA operational readiness post-December 2014.

## Discussion

According to Coalition Force officials, maintenance plans to achieve long-term sustainment plans did not exist for specialized new equipment fielded in late 2013 and 2014. Much of this equipment filled ANA combat support capabilities considered essential by the Coalition for independent ANA operational capability.<sup>13</sup> For example, equipment supplied to ANA Combat Engineer Kandaks, Mobile Strike Forces, and Counter-Improvised Explosive Device teams did not have repair or maintenance plans once the Coalition-funded Afghan Integrated Support Services contract concluded prior to the end of 2014. The ANA had not developed the capability to repair and maintain complex equipment, as demonstrated by the reported 80 percent non-operational rate for heavy engineer equipment issued to the Combat Engineer Kandaks.

<sup>13</sup> For more information on logistics issues impacting enabler capabilities see DODIG-2014-027, "Planning for the Effective Development and Transition of Critical ANSF Enablers to Post-2014 Capabilities Part II - Cross-Cutting Issues of Afghan National Army Enabler Development (Classified)," December 23, 2013.



### ***Coalition Funded Contract Maintenance***

Approximately seventeen percent of the ANA's vehicle fleet received repair and maintenance through the Coalition-funded Afghan Integrated Support Services contract. In addition to vehicle and equipment repair, tasks under this contract included mentoring and leading ANA mechanics in proper troubleshooting and repair of equipment. While executing the contract, the contractor developed a system for ordering, tracking, and distributing spare parts necessary to perform maintenance and repair in Afghanistan.



Figure 9. ANA Heavy Equipment  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

The Afghan Integrated Support Services contract period of performance ended on December 29, 2014. However, Coalition Force officials planned to terminate the contract, including its self-contained parts supply chain, earlier in regions where advisors believed the ANA demonstrated sufficient capability for independent operations. Regional Command - North, advising the 209<sup>th</sup> ANA Corps, was the first Regional Command to conclude Afghan Integrated Support Services in March 2014. Officials reported that the contractor turned over the remaining parts in its supply chain to the ANA at the end of the contract.

## ***Contractor Support for Equipment***

In sharp contrast to the other ANA vehicle fleet repair and maintenance operations, Coalition Force officials said the Afghan Integrated Support Services contractor generally obtained required repair parts in a timely manner and adequately trained ANA mechanics. However, Coalition officials also commented that the Afghan Integrated Support Services contract may actually have inadvertently slowed the development of ANA maintenance capability. While contractor efforts helped maintain ANA unit readiness during the fighting season, the contractor was reluctant to take the extra time to allow ANA mechanics to learn from their mistakes.

Coalition Forces developed a schedule for concluding the contract by region throughout 2014. Officials stated that before terminating contract support in a region, they will assess ANA capabilities and take into account operational risks. Coalition advisors and ANA officials said the reduction of this support through December 2014 could result in gaps of maintenance capability and a reduction in ANA readiness.

The anticipated impact was most severe for specialized equipment fielded in late 2013 and 2014, much of which supported ANA combat support capabilities that the Coalition considered crucial to ANA independent operations. One Coalition Force advisor suggested that the ANA may need contract maintenance for Mobile Strike Force units beyond 2014 due to the lack of an ANA capability to maintain specialized equipment.

Finally, according to Coalition Force officials, forces administratively assigned to the Corps were less likely to receive logistics support than those under the direct command of ANA Corps commanders. This implied that the RLSCs were unlikely to prioritize support to units such as the ANA Special Operations and Mobile Strike Force Kandaks, potentially creating serious vulnerability in these elite units which the ANA cannot operationally afford.

## **Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

### ***Recommendation 8***

**Commander, International Security Assistance Force:**

- a. **Assist the Afghan National Army to determine the mix between organic capability and funded contracts that will replace expiring Coalition-funded maintenance contracts and assist with contract development;**

*Commander, International Security Assistance Force Comments*

Commander, ISAF concurred with Recommendation 8.a. Comments received described organizational efforts that will continue into the Resolute Support Mission to transition Coalition contracts to the ANA.

*Our Response*

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. No further comment is required.

***Redirected Recommendation 8.b and 8.c***

Recommendations 8.b and 8.c were originally intended for the Commander, International Security Assistance Force for response. The Commander, International Security Assistance Force requested that we redirect both recommendations to Commander, Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan.

***Recommendation 8***

**Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan,**

- b. Advise Afghan National Army Corps Commanders regarding the need to provide maintenance support for specialized units not subordinate to the Corps but in their area of operations;**
- c. Assist the Afghan National Army with the development of fully-functioning training classes to enable Afghan National Army maintainers to repair recently fielded, specialized equipment.**

*Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan Comments and Our Response*

As a result of management comments received from ISAF, we redirected Recommendation 8.b. and 8.c. to Commander, CSTC-A and request a response to the final report.

## Observation 9

### ANA Contracting

ANA oversight of Afghan-generated contracts was inadequate and inconsistent.

This occurred because Coalition advisors, in an effort to generate a baseline level of ANA contract competence and compliance, had not uniformly emphasized the importance of key oversight functions, including quality assurance and performance incentives, in the ANA contract planning process.

Contracts without adequate oversight, such as quality assurance surveillance plans increased the risk that deliverables will not meet contract requirements and specifications, adversely impacting contract performance and overall ANA operational effectiveness.

### Discussion

Coalition Forces used service and support contracts to perform functions for the ANA, including basic service and maintenance at most ANA facilities, and to procure goods for the ANA. As ANA capabilities increased, Coalition officials intended to transfer the management of some of these contracts to ANA control. As of early 2014, the ANA managed contracts for food, potable water, waste water disposal, trash removal, power generation, and some minor construction. Coalition contract advisors stated that ANA officials were not uniformly performing contract oversight of existing contracts or planning to include oversight requirements in new contracts.

As responsibility for tasks transitioned to the ANA, Coalition Force contract advisors were tasked with providing guidance to ANA contracting officials regarding their compliance with Afghan procurement law. U.S. advisors had minimal training in the Afghan procurement system and, as a result, were applying their knowledge of U.S. procurement law, including the Federal Acquisition Regulation, to their advising duties. While somewhat effective, this advisory approach was not optimal and could be improved through appropriate training and orientation of Coalition advisors.

U.S. contracting laws and regulations were generally more established and provided more specific guidance than Afghan law governing contracts. However, Afghan law provided ANA officials the right “to inspect, including observing and receiving reports on, all aspects of the performance of the contractor” and

apply remedies if the contractor underperformed.<sup>14</sup> As the level of direct funding provided to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan increases, ANA officials will be required and expected to perform their duties in compliance with Afghan law rather than U.S. regulations.

Coalition Force advisors reported that ANA contracting officials had developed the capability to execute and manage simple contracts. Specifically, advisors reported that these ANA officials advertised, bid, and awarded contracts with little need for direction from advisors. However, these same advisors said the ANA officials did not uniformly include oversight functions in new contracts or perform oversight functions for existing contracts. One advisor said the ANA had a “fire and forget” mentality regarding contracts post-award. According to another advisor, and resource management and contract oversight were areas the command intended to emphasize during the next contracting cycle.

The progressive withdrawal of Coalition Forces resulted in diminished advisory support for ANA contracting officials. The Command continued to grapple with the challenge of obtaining qualified advisors at all the Regional Commands and to the Ministry of Defense. One contracting officer reported that advisors assigned to the ANA Corps were junior officers who did not understand contracting and did not have sufficient experience to develop the contracting capability of the ANA. In Regional Command – South an advisor indicated there was no plan to replace the contracting and financial advisors assisting the 205<sup>th</sup> ANA Corps; leaving a critical gap. In late 2013, the senior civilian tasked with developing resource management capabilities in the Ministry of Defense convened a working group to help advisors learn the basic Afghan procurement laws.

When experienced and skilled Coalition Force contracting officers were assigned, it gave ANA officials access to necessary expertise as they developed their contracting skills. Their presence also provided the Command valuable insight into whether ANA funds were being used accountably, and to develop Afghan capacity to responsibly manage the continued use of these fiscal resources.

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<sup>14</sup> The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Procurement Law, 2008, Chapter VI, Articles 53; and The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement, November 19, 2009, Chapter IX – Contract Administration, Section A, Rules 149 and 151.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### ***Recommendation 9***

**Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, in coordination with Regional Commanders,**

- a. ensure that Contracting Advise and Assist Teams encourage their Afghan counterparts to include in new Afghan National Army contracts properly designed quality assurance or surveillance plans and to perform oversight functions on existing contracts;**
- b. create a robust plan to provide contract management and resource management advisors to Ministry of Defense, Afghan National Army logistics organizations above Army Corps, and those in the Afghan National Army Corps.**

### ***Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with recommendations 9.a and 9.b. Management stated that advisors stress contract quality assurance and oversight to their counterparts, and encourage the incorporation of quality control language in contracts. They also wrote that advisors complete a three-day orientation on Afghan law and regulations prior to arrival in country. Finally, management described contracts in process that will increase Ministerial logistics advisor support from 31 to 67 advisors.

In an unsolicited comment, Commander, ISAF described a plan for the assignment of additional contract advisors at MoD and the ANA Corps headquarters.

### ***Our Response***

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. No further comment is required.





## Observation 10

### ANA Institutional Training

Courses offered at the Regional Military Training Centers under the control of the ANA Corps were independent of and duplicated those presented at ANA Training Command branch schools.

Inadequate oversight by and support from the ANA institutional base contributed to the conditions observed.

Regional Corps-developed training at the Regional Military Training Centers had the potential for producing several unintended adverse effects, including:

- loss of a common training standard,
- inefficient use of the national training base due to declining attendance at ANA Training Command courses,
- loss of operational readiness among ANA Corps.

### Discussion

#### ***Realignment of the Regional Military Training Centers***

The Coalition and the ANA established Regional Military Training Centers, along with the Kabul Military Training Center, to conduct foundational military training for new recruits. Until 2013, the five Regional Military Training Centers were subordinate to and resourced by the ANA Training Command, although they resided in the ANA Corps battle-space.<sup>15</sup> In 2013, the Chief of the ANA General Staff reassigned command and control of the Regional Military Training Centers to their respective ANA Corps.

In September 2013, the 215<sup>th</sup> ANA Corps opened a Regional Corps Battle School. The Regional Corps Battle School was a 'proof of concept' initiative, located adjacent to the existing Regional Military Training Center. The goal of instruction at the Regional Corps Battle School was to provide follow-on combat arms and combat service support functional training to recent basic warrior training graduates from the Regional Military Training Center. In early 2014, the Regional

<sup>15</sup> Regional Military Training Centers were aligned with ANA Corps: 201<sup>st</sup> and 203<sup>rd</sup> Corps (East), 205<sup>th</sup> Corps (South), 207<sup>th</sup> Corps (West), 209<sup>th</sup> Corps (North), and 215<sup>th</sup> Corps (Southwest).

Corps Battle School offered seven infantry and ten combat service support courses, with additional collective unit training for fielded forces planned. During our site visit, this initiative was the most developed among the ANA Corps, making it the basis for preliminary analysis and conclusions.

### ***Requirement and Support for a Regional Corps Battle School***

The motivation for establishing the Regional Corps Battle School in support of the 215<sup>th</sup> ANA Corps was directly related to its remote location and the associated difficulty in transporting soldiers to Kabul for follow-on training. A challenge shared by several other Corps commanders, based on geographic location. This transport/mobility issue was exacerbated by the perception on the part of ANA commanders that soldiers who went to Kabul for training would not return. One advisor supported the validity of this concern voiced by ANA field commanders, stating it was not uncommon for promising graduates to be administratively “poached” by Kabul-based military organizations at the completion of training and reassigned.

Advisors reported that Regional Corps Battle School under-resourcing partially resulted from a concern on the part of ANA Corps commanders that the ANA Training Command would regain control of the both the Regional Military Training Center and the Regional Corps Battle School. Should control of the Regional Corps Battle School revert back to the ANA Training Command the Corps would lose those resources (facilities and personnel) assigned to the Regional Corps Battle School. By one estimate, this could be up to fifteen percent of the personnel assigned to the Corps.

Consequently, the Regional Corps Battle School infrastructure was inadequately resourced. We observed numerous plumbing issues, overfull portable toilets, and unrepaired generators. The food preparation facility was described by one advisor as “...primitive; even by southern Afghan standards.” Another advisor stated that the ANA officer responsible for oversight of the service contract failed to report contractor lack of performance, even on those occasions when money was made available to incentivize contractor performance.

### ***Unintended Consequences***

At least three unintended and deleterious consequences could result from continuation of the present situation. The first is the loss of a common standard of instruction across the ANA. The program of instruction for Regional Corps Battle School courses originated from the ANA Training Command. However, instructors were drawn from the 215<sup>th</sup> ANA Corps, initially aided by a cadre of 87 Coalition advisors and contractors, with the ANA expected to take complete control by the

end of 2014. Without close coordination and oversight from the ANA Training Command, the risk is high that variation and dilution of the effectiveness of the ANA-wide instruction standard will increase over time. The establishment of Regional Corps Battle Schools in the remaining ANA Regional Corps would multiply this risk, potentially leading to a loss of interoperability among ANA Corps.

The second consequence would be a decrease in attendance at ANA Training Command schools. The courses taught at the 215<sup>th</sup> ANA Regional Corps Battle School will lead to reduced attendance at the national branch schools. Specifically, advisors to the combat support service school calculated the student course seat fill rate through December 2013 at approximately 50 percent. Further underutilization of this established, Coalition-funded facility would represent an avoidable inefficient use of resources.

Third, the Regional Corps Battle School instructional staff consisted of soldiers assigned to the 215<sup>th</sup> ANA Corps. These instructors were officers and non-commissioned officers who otherwise held leadership positions and responsibility for unit operational performance. This drain on skilled personnel could adversely impact the operational readiness of the Corps.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### ***Recommendation 10***

**Commander, International Security Assistance Force, Joint Command:**

- a. Conduct key leader engagements with the Afghan National Army General Staff to determine the desired roles and responsibilities, and service support standards, for the Regional Military Training Centers and then properly resource them to conduct quality instruction within an acceptable quality of life environment, and**
- b. Conduct key leader engagements with the Afghan National Army Training Command to assign, and the Afghan National Army Corps Commanders to accept, liaison officers from the Afghan National Army Training Command to advise and monitor the Afghan National Army Corps produced training programs of instruction.**

*Commander, International Security Assistance Force, Joint Command Comments*

Commander, IJC concurred with recommendations 10.a. and 10.b. Management detailed the frequency of key leader engagements with the ANA General Staff, Corps Commanders, and the Army National Training Command. Management also stated the aspiration to assist the ANSF to develop a training and doctrine command similar to that in the U.S. Army.

*Our Response*

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. No further comment is required.

## Observation 11

### Logistics Information Management Systems

Coalition Force had not equipped the ANA with an integrated logistics information system with complete functionality, and MoD and ANA logisticians were not fully using, and could not support, fielded logistics information management systems.

This occurred because:

- The infrastructure to support fielded logistics information systems was not available at all units organizationally at and below the ANA Corps.
- ANA users were not adequately prepared or trained to use logistics information management systems.

As a result, logisticians used manual processes that were not standardized across the ANA for stock control, warehouse management, and maintenance management and were unable to establish effective asset visibility.

### Discussion

#### *Information Technology Systems*

In 2008, Coalition-funded contractors developed the Core Inventory Management System (Core-IMS) as the ANA warehouse inventory management software system. Initially designed for use in the Central Supply Depot, application was later extended to the ANA Corps. Unfortunately, Core-IMS was not designed to capture demand history, a necessary step to establish a demand-based supply system. ANA officials verified the fielding of Core-IMS to the RLSCs at the ANA Corps, but stated that supply transactions with Corps units continued to use an analog (paper based) system.

The Afghan Integrated Support Services contractor<sup>16</sup> exposed some Coalition advisors and Afghan maintenance personnel to an integrated maintenance management and inventory management system: Web Manage. Web Manage was used by Coalition-funded maintenance contractors in Iraq starting in 2005 and imported to Afghanistan in 2008. System functionality included asset, maintenance, inventory, warehouse, and freight management.

<sup>16</sup> This Coalition-funded, ANA-wide contract maintenance capacity to ANA units and training to ANA mechanics.

## ***Technical Issues***

Both Afghan officials and Coalition advisors identified technology gaps impeding ANA use of information technology. Core-IMS was dependent on Internet availability and connectivity; a persistent challenge for the ANA. Senior Afghan officials at the ANA Logistics Command and Central Supply Depot cited lack of connectivity as a major challenge with Core-IMS. These officials reported requesting assistance from the General Staff-G6 (Communications), but as of June 2014 the issue had not been resolved.




Figure 10. ANA Ledger Books  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

While connectivity among the ANA national-level organizations in Kabul appeared to be functional during this assessment, Afghan officials and advisors identified connectivity to the ANA Corps as problematic. One Coalition advisor described Corps-level use of information technology as spotty, particularly in the 215<sup>th</sup> ANA Corps. Coalition advisors noted an overall lack of computers and fiber optic lines with necessary bandwidth.

Web Manage was used by the Coalition-funded Afghan Integrated Support Services maintenance contractors and included the use of satellite communication for connectivity; no issues with connectivity were reported.

## ***Information Technology Personnel Training and Deficiencies***

Advisors cited the lack of education, formal training, and computer skills as impediments to the wide-spread use of information technology in the ANA. An ANA official in the 215<sup>th</sup> ANA Corps noted that some soldiers assigned to logistics positions were uneducated and could not be trained on computers. A senior Coalition ministerial advisor highlighted a gap in computer proficiency

across the ANA. The ANA Combat Service Support School in Kabul offered a nine-week logistics non-commissioned officer course that included training for Core-IMS. However, Coalition advisors and ANA leadership expressed dissatisfaction with the number of classes offered and seat allocations for each course. In addition, many trained personnel were unable to use their training due to connectivity challenges described above. Collectively, these impediments left the ANA with a limited cadre of logisticians capable and able to use information technology intended to support logistics functions and systems.

### ***Lack of Consensus***

In addition, Coalition advisors and ANA officials disagreed as to which system the ANA should adopt for logistics information management. Several Coalition advisors supported the use of Web Manage, citing its advantages due to better connectivity, ease of operation, and overall stability. However, they also noted that the senior ANA officials did not embrace Web Manage because they mistakenly believed it belonged to the Afghan Integrated Support Services contractor and its operation would cease with the ending of the contract at the end of 2014. An Afghan official stated the Command was committed to using Core-IMS, even though Coalition advisors observed that the system was difficult for the ANA to operate.

Senior Afghan leadership also expressed differing opinions. One senior Afghan leader in Kabul stated his 100 percent support for Core-IMS, while an ANA logistics unit commander said that Core-IMS was non-functional and did not support it.

## **Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

### ***Recommendation 11.a***

**Commander, International Security Assistance Force, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army General Staff:**

- 1. Conduct/sponsor an analysis to determine to what extent automation can be effectively used in supply and maintenance management at Afghan National Army Corps and below and prepare to apply the conclusions prior to the termination of the Afghan Integrated Support Services maintenance contract.**
- 2. Determine functional and personnel training requirements for logistics information management systems users at Afghan National Army Corps and below, and whether existing training offered meets these requirements.**



*Commander, International Security Assistance Force Comments*

Commander, ISAF concurred with the recommendation. Management detailed information about DoD-sponsored teams reviewing the efficiency of the ANSF policies, procedures, management, and accountability for commodities.

*Our Response*

The response did not address the specifics of the recommendation. The DoD-sponsored teams discussed were not expected to address the use of automation in supply and maintenance management. However, we are aware of a DoD-sponsored team chartered to specifically review business system automation. We request Commander, ISAF share a copy of the findings and briefings generated by this DoD team.

**Recommendation 11.b**

**Commander, International Security Assistance Force, assist the Ministry of Defense to investigate possible options for reducing the reliance of Core-IMS on internet access.**

*Commander, International Security Assistance Force Comments*

Commander, ISAF concurred with the recommendation. Management further stated they submitted a funding change to allow Core IMS to operate without internet connectivity.

*Our Response*

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. We request Commander, ISAF inform us when the contractor completes the action.

## Observation 12

### ANA Policy and Guidance

Coalition-provided ANA logistics policies, procedures, and technical manuals remained lengthy, complex, and frequently not well understood by ANA personnel.

This occurred for several reasons:

- Many ANA logistics policies, procedures, and technical manuals were directly translated from U.S. Army supply system manuals.
- Translators often did not have sufficient logistics background to understand and accurately interpret relevant logistics terms and concepts.
- In some cases initial versions of manuals were not updated to reflect ANA and advisory field experience based on implementation.

This led to a lack of clarity in ANA logistics system guidance and policy; poor understanding of system implementation by ANA soldiers; and decreased logistics system functionality.

### Discussion

Afghan Ministry of Defense leadership, Commanders of the ANA Logistics Command and RLSCs, and Coalition advisors stated that ANA logistics policies, procedures, and technical manuals needed to be rewritten to better address current ANA logistics operations and requirements. As originally defined, the ANA logistics system was based on U.S. / NATO doctrine, and ANA policies, procedures, and technical manuals came from U.S. Army manuals translated into Dari for use by the ANA. This relatively literal translation resulted in ill-fitting procedures and meaningless terminology, in some cases, and garbled, lengthy and overly complex sections, in others. Consequently, according to Coalition and ANA leaders, ANA logistics policies have had limited utility for ANA leaders and soldiers.

For example, Chapter 6, Property Accountability at Unit Level, ANA 10-27-4, “ANA Unit Level Supply and Services for Unit Leaders,” states under Managing Excess Property, “The quantity and type of property on the property book is based that which is authorized by TOE [Table of Organization and Equipment] or TDA [Table of Distribution and Allowances].” While this definition was technically accurate according to U.S. procedures, it was virtually meaningless to ANA logisticians. The terms “Table of Organization and Equipment,” “Table of Distribution and Allowances” are U.S. Army logistical terms that are not used by the ANA. The ANA term “tashkil” collectively refers to the terms above.

ANA senior officials, including the Commander of the ANA Logistics Command, opined that existing ANA policy and guidance was so lengthy and confusing that officers were uncertain of its meaning and how it should be implemented. ANA officials believed this was a partially a result of the use of translators who did not understand logistics terminology. In other cases, the initial version of manuals had not been updated to reflect significant procedural changes. Coalition advisors noted that ANA published logistics orders frequently created uncertainty rather than clarity within the ANA command regarding logistic policies and procedures.

At the time of our fieldwork, ANA officials reported they were looking to the Coalition to help refine these documents, which they considered a priority. Coalition officials concurred with the need, but did not have a plan to address it. The lack of clarity in ANA logistics system guidance and policy impeded the ability of ANA mechanics and logisticians to do their jobs and decreased the functionality of the ANA logistics system. Clear and concise ANA logistics policies and guidance are essential to ensuring ANA understanding of the fundamental processes and procedures required and their uniform and sustainable implementation across the system.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### ***Recommendation 12***

**Commander, International Security Assistance Force, in coordination with Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army senior leaders to take full ownership of, and develop a plan to simplify their logistics manuals, guidance, and policies.**

#### *Commander, International Security Assistance Force Comments*

Commander, ISAF concurred with the recommendation. Management stated that the Afghan Ministry of Defense and National Army have policy, leadership understands and follows the policy, and National Army leadership intended to publish a National Maintenance Strategy.

#### *Our Response*

The response partially addressed the recommendation. We believe that the Ministry of Defense will require motivation from the Command to update logistic policy. We request Commander, ISAF send us summarized specifics of the plan to simplify ANA logistics policy.

## Observation 13

### Afghan National Army Initial Issue of Unit Spare Parts

The Coalition did not issue ANA units sufficient repair parts to fill authorized stockage lists and prescribed load lists at the Central Supply Depot, RLSCs, or the Combat Service Support Kandaks.

This occurred as a result of the:

- rapid fielding of ANA combat capability and lagging creation of the supporting logistical system,
- reliance on contractor logistics support associated with initial equipment initial fielding,
- lagging development of the ANA supply system required to generate required parts lists and distribute parts.

Insufficient stocks of repair parts across the ANA logistics system resulted in unresponsive maintenance support, hindered Afghan acceptance of their demand-driven supply system, delayed the timely development of demand histories required to generate required parts lists, and reduced unit combat readiness.

## Discussion

The ANA continued to suffer vehicle and equipment repair parts shortages. Coalition advisors and ANA leaders confirmed that there were incomplete and insufficient authorized stockage list parts on hand at the Central Supply Depot, Corps RLSCs, or Combat Service Support Kandaks, and limited prescribed load list parts in ANA units. The DoD Inspector General identified this issue in a previous report.<sup>17</sup>

Authorized stockage and prescribed load lists are the critical, frequently-demanded repair parts that units are authorized to maintain in stock as defined in Ministry of Defense Decree 4.0, "Supported and Supporting Unit Logistics Policy and Support Procedures." Typical items include vehicle batteries, brake pads, and starters, with historical demand establishing the required quantity of each item for unit storage.

<sup>17</sup> Report No. DODIG-2012-028, "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army," December 9, 2011. DoDIG, in Recommendation 12a, recommended that NTM-A/CSTC-A, in coordination with IJC and MoD/GS, "...identify and push a core set of 'shoot, move, and communicate' supply items necessary for sustainable logistics in fielded Afghan National Army units into the Central Warehouse and Forward Support Depots." The Command agreed with the recommendation and stated that stockage of CL IX ASL for ANA was in progress. With the publishing of this report, we will administratively close Recommendation 12a from DODIG 2012-0028.




Figure 11. ANA Class IX (parts) Storage  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

### ***ANA Equipment Fielding and Contractor Maintenance***

In 2009, ISAF and Afghan Ministry of Defense leadership decided to prioritize the rapid and expanded development of ANSF combat capability. By November 2013, ISAF reported that force generation was almost complete and they had shifted their focus to sustaining the force long-term. During the force build-up, the Coalition delivered new vehicles and equipment to ANA units with an initial issue of spare parts and contracted maintenance support. For example, the Light Tactical Vehicle (Ford Ranger) was fielded to the ANA Corps with a one-year supply of critical parts, and the Coalition subsequently pushed spare parts based on their own experience not on the actual needs of the ANA.

The ANA relied on Coalition-funded contracted maintenance to provide parts and labor for more difficult vehicle repairs. A review of work orders for this level of maintenance completed in two ANA Corps RLSCs during October and November 2013 indicated that local civilians and contractors completed 31 and 52 percent, respectively, of the wheeled vehicle work orders. Further, the contractor conducting these repairs established a method of re-supply of repair parts that bypassed the formal ANA supply system. This degree of ANA reliance on Coalition-funded contract maintenance, specifically the requisition of repair parts, delayed development of ANA organic capability.

### ***Stockage Lists Development and ANA Resupply Process***

Development and fielding of authorized stockage lists for wheeled vehicles occurred slowly. The Coalition approved the authorized stockage lists for Combat Service Support Kandaks in July 2013. The Coalition generated authorized stockage lists for RLSCs in April 2013, but they were still under revision and pending approval in March 2014. Approval of authorized stockage lists for the Central Supply Depot was planned for later in 2014. Coalition officials said they were using contractor-generated demand data from wheeled vehicle maintenance and repair to develop authorized stockage lists for ANA vehicles.

Ministry of Defense Decree 4.0 directed ANA units to identify the critical parts they routinely ordered over time and use this information to validate or revise authorized stockage and prescribed load lists. However, ANA units were unable to collect reliable and accurate demand histories due to challenges with the ANA supply requisition process, including:

- missing maintenance manuals, and incorrect parts identification numbers,
- inaction and/or no feedback from supply requisition approving officials throughout the system, and
- failure to use proper procedures to maintain records of requests and items due.

The Coalition and ANA pushed large amounts of excess parts, at times unexpectedly to the ANA supply system, reportedly causing significant disorganization in ANA warehouses, and disrupting the doctrinal demand-based supply operations necessary for the development of authorized stockage and prescribed load lists.

The ANA supply system continued to lack accountability. Advisors reported that units could not identify or account for parts received, did not know the status of their parts requested, and received very few requested items. Without a functioning system, units could not generate the demand histories needed to support authorized stockage and prescribed load lists. Further, Coalition officials reported equipment was frequently hoarded at various locations in the supply chain or diverted from the requesting units. In addition, the ANA lacked regular, prioritized distribution schedules to regulate parts releases and avoid overwhelming units with parts shipments.



### ***Procurement and Distribution of Repair Parts***

The Coalition had not transferred responsibility for procuring repair parts from Coalition-funded contractors to the ANA. However, advisors were training the ANA to develop this capability and had given the ANA some procurement funds for that purpose. The Coalition developed indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contracts for repair parts and was considering local purchase contracts to increase the flexibility and timeliness in support of the ANA parts supply system.

IJC leadership considered the availability of repair parts to be the key to initiating and sustaining the authorized stockage list system. Coalition-designed and executed fills of repair parts (resembling a “push”) were considered an intermediate step to a functioning system of authorized stockage and prescribed load lists. The Coalition identified a three-part fill: “Warlord 13” for the Corps Service Support Kandaks, “RASCL” for the RLSCs, and “Domino” for the Central Supply Depot. The parts issues were designed to provide critical repair parts for vehicles already identified as non-mission capable, plus spares to begin to fill authorized stockage list requirements. As of June 2014, the “Domino” effort, while planned for late 2014, remained unfunded.

Irrespective of ongoing initiatives, the critical tasks for developing a functioning ANA supply system remained to be accomplished: identify and procure supplies in a timely manner and in the right quantities, and distribute the parts to the intended customers.

## **Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

### ***Recommendation 13***

**Commander, International Security Assistance Force:**

- a. emphasize and prioritize training, advising, and assisting the logistics processes at the Afghan National Army Central Supply Depot and Regional Logistic Support Centers that sustain the authorized repair parts stocks.**
- b. identify, procure, and distribute the required authorized basic parts supply to the Central Supply Depot.**
- c. assist the development of the Assistant Minister of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and General Staff G4 capability to distribute the necessary supply of repair parts from the Central Supply Depot to the Regional Logistics Support Centers and Combat Service Support Kandaks to sustain logistics support of ANA unit operations.**



*Commander, International Security Assistance Force Comments*

Commander, ISAF concurred with recommendations 13.a., 13.b., and 13.c. Management described continuing advising efforts, listed ongoing parts procurement programs, and outlined a recent Afghan National Army-led Sustainment Shura.

*Our Response*

The response addressed all specifics of the recommendation. No further comment is required.



## Observation 14

### Retention of Afghan National Army Maintainers

The ANA experienced high rates of attrition for military and civilian mechanics after the completion of their basic and advanced functional training.

Trained mechanics, with the benefit of technical knowledge gained at the Combat Service Support School, had a marketable skill that enabled them to return home to work in the private sector at higher pay.

The result was a considerable shortfall of trained mechanics at logistics units, RLSCs, and the Central Workshop, leading to increased numbers of non-mission capable equipment and reduced ANA operational readiness.

### Discussion

The ANA employed uniformed and civilian mechanics to perform three tiers of maintenance – organizational (Units and the Corps Service Support Kandaks), general (RLSCs), and national (Central Workshop). The Combat Service Support school in Kabul taught ANA military and civilian maintainers basic skills, while Coalition-funded contractors trained ANA mechanics in the field as part of the Afghan Integrated Support Services contract.



Figure 12. ANA Mechanics  
Source: DoD IG-SPO

### ***Personnel Readiness***

Coalition advisors reported that a significant number of trained military and civilian mechanics tended to leave the ANA following their term of enlistment or contract.<sup>18</sup> For example, leaders at the 215<sup>th</sup> ANA Corps RLSC reported a serious deficit in which only 8 of 120 authorized civilian mechanics (6 percent) were on-hand. Also, the RLSC in Regional Command-Southwest was assigned the full complement of military mechanics, but the 205<sup>th</sup> ANA Corps (Regional Command-South) had only 124 out of 990 authorized civilian mechanics (12 percent). The shortage in the 205<sup>th</sup> ANA Corps was particularly problematic because Coalition Forces identified Kandahar, home of the 205<sup>th</sup> ANA Corps, as a future logistics base.

### ***Attrition of Mechanics***

Afghan officials and Coalition advisors cited a number of reasons for the attrition of trained mechanics from the ANA, including higher pay and better benefits in the private sector, without the hardship required by military service. ANA officials and Coalition advisors cited remote ANA living locations away from families, austere living conditions, and concern for personal safety as causes of attrition among both military and civilian mechanics in some units.

Three Coalition Regional Commands visited during this assessment mentioned challenges associated with the retention of skilled mechanics in their supported ANA Corps. Regional Command – Southwest (215<sup>th</sup> ANA Corps) had a unique problem that particularly influenced the high rate of attrition: unpopularity of the ANA in their area of operations which was highly contested by insurgent groups. On the other hand, Coalition advisors to the 215<sup>th</sup> ANA Corps noted that the “soldiers in Mazar-e-Sharif [209<sup>th</sup> ANA Corps] get off work at 1700 daily, walk the streets in uniform, and attend night classes at the local university.”

Generally, Coalition advisors, ANA leadership, and officials at the Ministry of Defense cited pay as the primary cause for the low retention rate of trained military and civilian mechanics. The high rate of attrition among these skilled personnel created a capability gap that prevented the timely repair of equipment. One ANA senior logistician stated that his Corps needed experienced personnel and did not have the needed mechanics to repair vehicles. Additionally, the loss of these mechanics forced the ANA to recruit and train replacements on a recurring basis, leading to increased strain on personnel and resources.

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<sup>18</sup> We observed and reported on this condition in our 2011 report, DODIG-2012-028, “Assessment of US Government and Coalition Efforts to develop the Logistics Sustainability Capability of the Afghan Army,” December 9, 2011.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### ***Recommendation 14***

**Commander, International Security Assistance Force, advise and assist the Assistant Minister of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics to develop pay and incentive plans to recruit and retain skilled Afghan National Army mechanics; recruit maintenance personnel working on logistics support contracts; and employ them in the ANA civil service workforce.**

### *Commander, International Security Assistance Force, Comments*

Commander, ISAF non-concurred with the recommendation. Management stated that they had already researched and rejected pay incentives as an effective tool for retention because of secondary effects.

### *Our Response*

The response partially addressed the recommendation. We accept the rejection of increased pay, but this does not preclude the possibility of other incentives. We request Commander, ISAF consider non-monetary incentives to assist the Afghan National Army to improve the retention of mechanics.



## Appendix A

### Scope and Methodology

We conducted this assessment from October 2013 through April 2014 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations,” published by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency in January 2012. Our objective was to assess the planning and execution of logistical systems and processes developed and implemented by U.S. and Coalition Forces to develop the ANA. We believe that the evidence we obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our assessment objective.

Our scope was defined by the activities conducted and progress to date made by DoD, other U.S. government, and non-U.S. entities related to ANA logistics development. This included contract statements of work and contractor performance as it impacted ANA logistics sustainment. We limited our scope by excluding contractor performance and pricing related to delivery of goods and services in support of the ANA, and logistics support provided to or by ANA medical elements.

To assess our objective, we reviewed Federal laws and Department policy, including the “National Defense Authorization Act,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff policy, DoD directives and instructions, and appropriate U.S. Central Command, NATO/ISAF, IJC, NTM-A, and Ministry of Defense/ANA guidance. We also reviewed Coalition Force development plans and performance metric data for ANA Forces.

We contacted organizations and interviewed officials in the U.S. that were directly responsible developing ANA logistical processes. These included officials at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Senior Warfighter Integration Group, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Assessment team personnel assigned in Afghanistan collected documents and conducted interviews throughout the entire period of our assessment. In addition, six team members from headquarters deployed to Afghanistan from December 4 through 20, 2014. The team conducted interviews with Coalition Force commanders, staff, and other subject matter experts in the Capital Region and Regional Commands East, South, and Southwest. We chose these Coalition commands for site visits based on their high operational tempo and the resulting demands placed on ANA logistics systems. Visiting four of six regions also allowed for identification of systematic logistics issues that could impact the overall operational readiness and logistical sustainment of the ANA.



At each site we also interviewed selected ANA leaders responsible for logistics functions including the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, and three ANA Corps (201<sup>st</sup>, 205<sup>th</sup>, and 215<sup>th</sup>). We visited ANA central logistics facilities in the Capital Region and RLSCs in the three reviewed ANA Corps to observe the state of operations and interview relevant officials.

Finally, during our site visit in December we reviewed information from the Command relating to the 21 open recommendations from Report No. DODIG-2012-028, “Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army,” December 9, 2011. As a result of actions taken by the Coalition and Afghan government organizations, documents received, and changed circumstances, we coordinated the closure of 19 recommendations. The remaining two remained open as repeat recommendations in this report.

## **Use of Computer-Processed Data**

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this assessment.

## **Use of Technical Assistance**

We did not use Technical Assistance to perform this assessment.

## Appendix B

### Summary of Prior Coverage

The Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG), Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a number of reports that are significant within the context of our assessment objective: the U.S. Government and Coalition Force efforts to develop the logistics sustainment capability of the Afghan National Army.

Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm>.

Unrestricted DoD reports can be accessed at <http://www.defense.gov/pubs>.

Unrestricted SIGAR reports can be accessed at <http://www.sigar.mil>.

Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.gao.gov>.

### **DoD IG**

DODIG-2014-027, "Planning for the Effective Development and Transition of Critical ANSF Enablers to Post-2014 Capabilities Part II - Cross-Cutting Issues of Afghan National Army Enabler Development," December 23, 2014 (CLASSIFIED REPORT)

DODIG-2013-094, "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop Leaders in the Afghan National Army," June 24, 2013

DODIG-2012-028, "Assessment of US Government and Coalition Efforts to develop the Logistics Sustainability Capability of the Afghan Army," December 9, 2011

SPO-2009-007, "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces," September 30, 2009

SPO-2009-006, "Assessment of the Accountability and Control of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) Provided to the Security Forces of Afghanistan," September 11, 2009

SPO-2009-001, "Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Control and Accountability; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Afghan National Security Forces," October 24, 2008

Statement of Ambassador (Ret.) Kenneth P. Moorefield Deputy Inspector General for Special Plans and Operations Department of Defense Office of Inspector General before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Armed Services Committee on Afghan National Security Forces and Security Lead Transition, "The Assessment Process, Metrics and Efforts to Build Capability," July 24, 2012

## **DoD**

Report to Congress in Accordance with Sections 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, to include reports in response to section 1221 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), and Sections 1212, 1223, and 1531(d) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013(Public Law 112-239), “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” November 2013

Report to Congress in Accordance with Sections 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, and Section 1221 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), and Sections 1212, 1217, 1223, and 1531(d) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-239), “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” July 2013

## **SIGAR**

SIGAR Audit 14-3-AR, “Afghan National Army: Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Lacks Key Information on Inventory in Stock and Requirements for Vehicle Spare Parts,” October 16, 2013

SIGAR Audit 13-1, “Afghan National Security Forces Facilities: Concerns with Funding, Oversight, and Sustainability for Operations and Maintenance,” October 30, 2012

## ***Commission on Wartime Contracting***

Final Report to Congress, “Transforming Wartime Contracting—Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks,” August 2011

Second Interim Report to Congress, “At What Risk? Correcting Over-reliance on Contractors in Contingency Operations,” February 24, 2011

## **GAO**

GAO-13-381, “More Detailed Planning and Improved Access to Information Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in Afghanistan,” Apr 30, 2013

GAO-13-201, “A Completed Comprehensive Strategy is Needed to Guide DOD’s In-Transit Visibility Efforts,” February 28, 2013

GAO-12-951T, "Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces," July 24, 2012

GAO-11-760, "Actions Needed to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to Support the Advising Mission," August 2011

GAO-11-710, "Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Improve Accountability of U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan Government," July 2011



# Management Comments

## Deputy Secretary of Defense Comments



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

NOV 14 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: DoD Inspector General's Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the DoD Inspector General's "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army." After careful review, DoD concurs with five of the six primary Inspector General recommendations and partially concurs with the sixth recommendation.

The attached response provides our comments on each of the DoD Inspector General's primary recommendations. The DoD will remain engaged in addressing these critical Afghan National Army logistics capability and capacity issues as we continue to work alongside the Afghan National Security Forces.

Attachment:  
As stated



OSD008667-14



## Deputy Secretary of Defense Comments (cont'd)

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"Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army" (DoD IG Report)

DoD submits the following responses to the DoD IG recommendations, summarized on page ii of the subject report.

**1. Recommendation to the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense:** *That the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense establish a formal developmental program for DoD civilians who volunteer as advisors for the post-2014 RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION.*

**DoD Response: Concur**

The Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (OSD(P&R)), will assist the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) in developing options for incorporating the skillsets needed to support enduring advisory requirements into career program development tracks, leveraging training and development resources to build a formal development program with consideration to career track incentives.

**2. Recommendations to Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command:**

*a. That Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command (IJC) ensures functional Security Force Assistance teams have the capability and resources required to continue effective development of Afghan National Army (ANA) logistics; and develop clear position descriptors and a reporting chain for civilian Ministry of Defense and General Staff advisors.*

**DoD Response: Concur**

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) continues its reorganization into Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) functional groupings as it prepares for its transition to RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION beginning January 1, 2015. As a result of this reorganization, Ministerial and General Staff logistics advisors are under a single staff organization in order to enable synchronization across all logistics echelons. Additionally, ISAF is reviewing administrative processes to strengthen the authority of in-theater supervisors' evaluations over in-country (deployed) civilian advisors.

The Essential Function (EF) 5 (Sustainment) staff element is the ISAF proponent for logistics advisors. The TAA effort includes the ongoing EF 5 review and input to the pre-deployment training syllabus for logistics advisors. Additionally, the EF 5 staff is conducting an analysis of logistics advisor requirements for the RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION with the ISAF and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) personnel managers in order to ensure experienced logisticians of the appropriate rank and skillsets are assigned to RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION logistics advisor positions.

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## Deputy Secretary of Defense Comments (cont'd)

### UNCLASSIFIED

*b. That Commander, IJC advise and assist senior ANA leaders to identify and prepare to issue support contracts for required, Coalition-provided capabilities that ANA organic support cannot replace; determine proper roles, responsibilities, resources, and a unified training program of instruction for the Regional Military Training Centers; and analyze the value of automation in logistic processes for units below the ANA Corps and develop training for that automation as appropriate.*

#### **DoD Response: Concur**

The ISAF EF 5 staff and subordinate advisors, not CSTC-A, provide assistance and advice to the ANA in order to optimize ANSF contracting. Although this advisory effort will involve transitioning some Coalition contracts to contracts managed by the Government of Afghanistan, the long-term focus will be the establishment of total package support contracts tied to foreign military sales (FMS) cases for sustaining ANSF equipment, particularly U.S. standard end items. Linking the Afghan supply system to the DoD supply system is also a key focus. Given that FMS cases are the vehicle through which the U.S. Government provides security assistance to partner nations around the world, implementation of FMS in Afghanistan will reflect a more normalized security relationship between the United States and Afghanistan post-2014.

Information technology initiatives will complement EF 5 efforts to build a sustainable ANA logistics system. The fielded Core-IMS system for Afghan asset visibility is limited by the lack of Internet connectivity across many ANA units. CSTC-A has submitted a funded change request to allow Core-IMS to operate without Internet connectivity. Additionally, CSTC-A is reviewing options to provide both off-line and web-based capabilities, including supply visibility, accurate demand tracking and forecasting, and inventory control functionality.

### **3. Recommendations to Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:**

*a. That Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) determine fleet reset, management, and funding options for long-term sustainment of ANA equipment; and ensure Contracting Advise and Assist Teams encourage the inclusion of properly designed quality assurance surveillance plans in new contracts; and highlight the costs of maintaining non-repairable equipment and support streamlining efforts to properly dispose of such items to senior ANA officials.*

#### **DoD Response: Concur**

The EF5 lead under ISAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Support has responsibility for this task. The EF5 staff leadership is conducting key leader engagements with both the Minister of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the General Staff Logistics Director (G-4), to develop a life cycle management staff to oversee efforts to manage the life cycle of the major equipment that DoD has provided to the ANSF. These efforts will include using the FMS system for reach-back support to DoD.

ISAF is hiring more advisors to cover contract management and resource

## Deputy Secretary of Defense Comments (cont'd)

### UNCLASSIFIED

management functions, and the EF 5 staff is providing guidance to the ANSF and ministries on the quality management functions for contract management. ANA equipment is currently sustained by DoD contracts; therefore, DoD intends to transition these legacy contracts by leveraging FMS sustainment cases with DoD contracts better tailored to the particular end items within ANSF formations.

*b. That Commander, CSTC-A advise and assist senior ANA leaders to develop and implement an Afghan-led forecasting and requirements generation model; pay and incentive plan to recruit and retain skilled ANA mechanics; an Afghan-supported policy and process to return excess serviceable and unserviceable equipment and parts; and procedures to identify, procure, and distribute required authorized items to the Central Supply Depot and distribute those items, as required, to lower echelon organizations.*

#### **DoD Response: Partially concur.**

The ISAF EF 5 staff is currently spearheading a Base Maintenance Depot initiative in order to ensure that the ANSF promulgate the appropriate Decrees and Ciphers to set in place an effective nation-wide process for the return of excess serviceable and unserviceable equipment and parts. Additionally, the EF 5 staff has established a Maintenance Readiness Report to provide the Coalition with visibility into ANA Corps performance for the eventual export of lessons learned and best practices to other ANSF units. EF 5 staff continues to advise the ANA on the importance of clear and measurable processes for reporting unit on-hand equipment numbers, readiness rates, and usage/consumption data including an emphasis on chain-of-command involvement in and review of reporting processes.

EF 5 logistics advisors continue to focus their TAA efforts on the ANA Central Supply Depot and Regional Logistic Support Centers that sustain the authorized repair parts stocks. Based upon identified shortcomings in on-hand authorized basic parts supplies at the Central Supply Depot, the EF 5 staff initiated and funded bulk parts purchases to address the shortfalls. Additionally, the ANA executed an Afghan planned and led Sustainment Shura with the ANA Deputy Corps Commanders and their Directors of Logistics to provide command emphasis and reinforce adherence to existing logistics doctrine.

Finally, although understanding the DoD Inspector General recommendation to assist the ANA in developing incentive pays for skilled mechanics and contracting officers, DoD's position is that such incentives would gradually inflate ANSF pay and create perceived inequities among the ANA soldiers. However, DoD will re-evaluate this position as it continues developing ANA logistics sustainment.

**4. Recommendation to Commander, International Security Assistance Force:** *That the Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) complete command restructuring and establish roles and responsibilities for the continued development of ANA sustainment.*

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## Deputy Secretary of Defense Comments (cont'd)

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**DoD Response: Concur**

The restructuring of logistics support to the ANSF is a priority within the overall restructuring of the ISAF headquarters in preparation for the RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION. In order to develop ANSF sustainment more effectively, all logistics support, including coalition logistics advisors, now falls under the EF 5 staff section. This transition achieved full operating capability on October 1, 2014. A Senior Executive Service civilian serves as the ISAF Executive Director of Sustainment and the EF 5 lead responsible for the TAA of ANSF logistics, maintenance, medical, and information and communications technology sustainment.

4

**UNCLASSIFIED**

## Commander, ISAF Comments



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO, AE 09354

USFOR-A DCDR-S

28 August 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, FL 33621

SUBJECT: United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Response to DODIG Draft Report No. DODIG-XXXX-XXX, "Efforts to Develop Logistics Sustainment Capability of the ANA" July 30 2014

1. References:

a. DODIG Draft Audit Report No. DODIG-XXXX-XXX, "Efforts to Develop Logistics Sustainment Capability of the ANA" July 30 2014

b. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Response Memorandum to DODIG Draft Report, 21 August 2014 (Encl 1)

c. International Security Assistance Force Joint Command (IJC), Essential Function 5 (Sustainment) (IJC EF-5) Response Memo to DODIG Draft Report, 21 August 2014 (Encl 2)

d. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) Response Memorandum to DODIG Draft Report, 21 August 2014 (Encl 3)

2. I have reviewed the ref DODIG draft report along with the responses from CSTC-A 1.b. (Encl 1), IJC EF-5 1.c. (Encl 2) and NTM-A 1.d. (Encl 3). I acknowledge that the recommendation to observation 14, "Retention of Afghan National Army Maintainers" was non-concurred by IJC EF-5, and agree with their assessment.

3. Point of contact for this memo is [REDACTED]

2 Encls:

1. CSTC-A Response Memo

2. IJC EF-5 Response Memo

3. NTM-A Response Memo

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Jeffrey N. Colt".  
JEFFREY N. COLT  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Deputy Commander, Support  
United States Forces-Afghanistan

## Commander, CSTC-A Comments



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

HEADQUARTERS  
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN  
MINISTERIAL ADVISORY GROUP  
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09356

CSTC-A

21 AUG 2014

### MEMORANDUM THRU


United States Forces - Afghanistan (CJIG), APO AE 09356  
United States Central Command (CCIG), MacDill AFB, FL 33621

FOR Office of the Department of Defense Inspector General, Special Plans and Operations, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: CSTC-A response to Draft Report No. DODIG-xxxx-xxx, "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army", dated July 30, 2014 (Project No. 2014-D00SPO-0008).

REFERENCE: Draft Report, dated July 30, 2014, Department of Defense Inspector General, Special Plans and Operations (DoD IG SPO).

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide responses to the recommendations in the DoD IG draft report dated July 30, 2014. Due to the recent reorganization, oversight of logistics within the Ministries of Defense and Interior is conducted by ANSF LOG. CSTC-A has provided responses to recommendations 3.b.2 and 9 (a and b), which pertain to contracting.
2. CSTC-A appreciates DoD IG's continued efforts in bringing forth areas of vulnerability regarding the logistical sustainment capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA). To increase the contracting capability, the plan moving forward is to surge with additional advisor support for both ministries, including the Ministry of Defense. Contracts for advisory work are currently being adjusted into new contract solicitation that will increase CSTC-A's ability to better provide the ANA the necessary logistical, finance, and contract advisors. The current and follow-on contracts are increasing Afghan National Army advisor support from the regional corps level to the ministerial level by 38 advisors. The importance of quality assurance and good contract oversight is currently addressed during the advising and mentoring of the Afghan National Army by encouraging the incorporation of quality control language in the contracts as well as stressing the importance of overseeing the contractor's work and expected quality. Advisors are required to complete a three day orientation on Afghan laws, regulations and guidelines upon entry into theater.
3. Point of contact for this action is [REDACTED] or via e-mail at [REDACTED]

  
KEVIN R. WENDEL  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commanding General

Enclosure: CSTC-A Response



## Commander, CSTC-A Comments (cont'd)

### CSTC-A DRAFT REPORT RESPONSE

"Assessment of US and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army"  
(DoDIG Draft Report 2014-xxx)

1. Recommendation 3.b

Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan:

2) Develop a plan for contracted advisor augmentation to address identified advisor shortfalls during the RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION.

*CSTC-A response:*

Concur. Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has a plan moving forward in support of COMISAF's direction to surge with additional contracted advisors supporting both ministries, including the Minister of Defense (MoD). The advisors are intended to provide support from the regional corps to ministerial advisory level. These contracted subject matter experts will focus on various logistical, financial, and contracting disciplines. The scope of work includes contracted advisors and mentors who are subject matter experts in providing advice, guidance, instruction, and mentoring; while increasing the knowledge base, education levels, leadership and management skills, tactics, techniques, procedures, and sustainability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Contracted advisory work for the MoD and ANA is currently performed under contract W91CRB-11-C-0030. The recent surge of logistics, finance, and contracting advisors will add 38 advisors over the next couple months. A new contract solicitation, designated as W52P1J-14-R-0166, will replace the current MoD Contracted Advisor contract, and is expected to be awarded in the first half of 2015. This contract will allow the continued capability of providing the necessary logistical, financial, and contracting advisors.

2. Recommendation 9

Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, in coordination with Regional Commanders:

a) Ensure that Contracting Advise and Assist Teams encourage their Afghan counterparts to include in new Afghan National Army contracts properly designed quality assurance or surveillance plans and to perform oversight functions on existing contracts.

*CSTC-A response:*

Concur. The importance of quality assurance and good contract oversight is currently addressed during the advising and mentoring of the Afghan National Army by encouraging the incorporation of quality control language in the contracts, as well as stressing the importance of overseeing the contractor's work and expected quality. Advisors are required to complete a three day orientation on Afghan laws, regulations, and guidelines upon entry into theater. The guidelines for mentorship of procurement quality focuses on the continued adherence to the Afghanistan Procurement Rules of engagement titled "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance (MOF), The Rules of Procedure for Public Procurement, Procurement Policy Unit (PPU), 18 November 2000", "Procurement Law, 2008 with January 2009 incorporated amendments", the "Manual of Procedures of Procurement Appeal and Review, Procurement Policy Unit (PPU), January 2010", and various Ciphers and Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan guidance. Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) advisors continue to provide oversight of the procurement and budget process with the existing advisors that are mentoring their principles at the regional corps and ministerial levels in accordance with the Procurement Law under Chapter VI: Contract Administration, and Chapter VII: Transparency and Accountability. Advisors work closely with their co-advisors at the various ministry and corps levels to insure proper coordination and communication of changing guidance and to remediate challenges as they occur.

## Commander, CSTC-A Comments (cont'd)

### CSTC-A DRAFT REPORT RESPONSE

"Assessment of US and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army"  
(DoDIG Draft Report 2014-xxx)

b) Create a robust plan to provide contract management and resource management advisors to Ministry of Defense, Afghan National Army logistics organizations above Army Corps, and those in the Afghan National Army Corps.

#### *CSTC-A response:*

Concur. Contract W91CRB-11-C-0030 and solicitation W52P1J-14-R-0166 provide for numerous contracted advisors to these organizations at all levels. The number, type, and roles of the advisors reflect exactly what the requiring activity has requested in order to meet the identified risks in the Afghans ability to transition to a self-sufficient government. The recently directed surge of advisors in Essential Function 1 (Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution) and Essential Function 5 (Logistics) requires that the contract will increase Afghan National Army advisor support from the regional corps level to the ministerial level from 31 to 67 advisors. Contracted advisors will perform within the statement of work of their contract written to directly support the Plans of Action and Milestones (PoAM)) to meet the transition requirements of the Resolute Support Mission within each CSTC-A directorate.

#### APPROVED BY:

COL, U.S. Army  
Contracting Enabler Cell  
Director, [REDACTED]


#### PREPARED BY:

LTC, U.S. Army  
Contracting Enabler Cell  
Deputy Director, [REDACTED]




## Headquarters, ISAF Comments

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED



**HEADQUARTERS**  
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)  
United States Forces-Afghanistan  
Kabul, Afghanistan  
APO AE 09386




IHQ/RES/0018/14 25 Aug 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR USFOR-A IG ( [REDACTED] Deputy IG)

SUBJECT: ISAF Response to DoD IG Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army (Project No. D2014-D00SPO-0008)

REF: CENTCOM Tasker USCC1421132959

1. Since this task was sent to USFOR-A, the IJC Logistics component, previously "ANSF LOG" has come under the new ISAF organizational construct of Essential Function 5 (Sustainment).
2. This command has combined the responses for both the prior ANSF LOG as well as ISAF logistics (prior "EAG Sustainment") under our new Essential Function 5 (Sustainment).
3. This command concurs with all of recommendations except one, recommendation 14 (develop pay and incentive plans to recruit and maintain maintenance personnel).
4. Refer questions to my deputy, [REDACTED]



PATRICK J. DULIN, SES2 (OF-7)  
Executive Director for Sustainment  
EF-5 Lead  
DCOS SPT, ISAF HQ

Enclosure

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## Headquarters, ISAF Comments (cont'd)

### ISAF RESPONSE TO DoD IG ASSESSMENT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT AND COALITION EFFORTS TO DEVELOP THE LOGISTICS SUSTAINMENT CAPABILITY OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

#### Recommendation 1.a.

Commander, International Security Assistance Forces Joint Command, ensure functional Security Force Assistance teams have the training and capability to develop Afghan logistics capacity in the Afghan National Army Corps.

**Concur.** Deploying personnel, who are aligned to fill an advisory position, attend advisor training. ANSF-Log provides input to the 162nd Infantry Brigade to assist in the continual updating of the 162nd Advisor Training Program of Instruction as it relates to pre-deployment training for service members who will serve as logistic advisors to ANSF. A gap exists in the training of re-missioned deployed service members. USFOR-A/ISAF Personnel Managers may re-assign (re-mission) Service members (individual deployers who choose to extend, have their original deployment mission curtailed, etc.) to ANSF-Log to meet a personnel vacancy. Such a re-missioning precludes attendance at focused advisor training.

Coalition personnel may not receive the same level of preparation for their advisor mission. This measureable inconsistency creates a distinct gap among various team members' capabilities to advise at the operational/strategic level. Additionally, operational/strategic level advisors requirements are best satisfied through senior NCOs, Warrant Officers and OF 4 – OF6 officers rather than re-missioned junior ranking personnel. While, senior Military Logisticians may be able to operate without extensive advisor training (COL, Senior LTC, MSG, CW5/4), less experienced logisticians will benefit from in-country advisor training being provided by ISAF.

#### Recommendation 1.b.

Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) conduct key leader engagements with the Minister of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the General Staff Logistics Director to develop an Afghan-led solution that institutes a forecasting and requirements generation model for use by the Afghan Ministry of Defense and General Staff organizations.

**Concur:** The leadership in Essential Function 5 (Sustainment) are conducting Key Leader Engagements with both the Minister of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the General Staff Logistics Director (G-4) support to establish a demand based system. In addition, the leadership of EF-5 sustainment, in conjunction with CSTC-A, OSD- AT&L and the Defense Logistics Agency have a team of logistics experts on the ground in Afghanistan to both assess the gap areas and identify the solution to the entire ANSF supply chain that institutes a forecasting and requirements generation model.

#### Recommendation 2

Commander, International Security Assistance Force/United States Forces – Afghanistan:

a. Complete command restructuring and establish clearly defined and understood roles and responsibilities for the continued development of Afghan National Army sustainment.

Enclosure

## Headquarters, ISAF Comments (cont'd)

b. Clarify the role and responsibility of the senior civilian logistician with regard to the International Security Assistance Force command and control structure.

**Concur:** ISAF HQ has begun restructuring all of its logistics support to the ANSF under the Essential Function grouping for logistics (EF-5). 1 July 2014 was the beginning of the transition (IOC) and the transition is to be complete by 30 Sept 2014. The new role of the senior civilian has been codified in an ISAF SOP. The SOP highlights the duties of the Senior Civilian as the EF-5 lead, and responsible for the TAA role relating to sustainment of the ANSF combat power through Logistics, Maintenance, Medical, and Information and Communications Technology Sustainment.

### **Recommendation 3.a.**

Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, in coordination with Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan and the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency:

1. Develop enduring position requirements for advisor positions,
2. Establish a clear management chain for General Staff and Ministerial advisors, and,
3. Update and enforce the terms of the March 2013 Memorandum of Agreement governing performance evaluation to give deployed military and civilian supervisors greater authority over the performance evaluation of deployed civilian advisors.

**Concur:** As stated earlier ISAF has reorganized by its Train Advise and Assist functional groupings, and also solidified all of the key TAA billets to be enduring through Resolute Support. The intent is to have all billets set by the end of October 14. Ministerial and General Staff logistics advisors are now all under the single EF-5 organization to enhance synchronization across all of the logistics echelons. We are currently reviewing the 2013 Memorandum of Agreement to strengthen the authority of supervisor's evaluations over their deployed civilian advisors.

### **Recommendation 4. Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command:**

- a. Assess conditions and determine advisor resources required, and
- b. Review Train-Advise-Assist drawdown plans and retain sufficient logistics advisors and resources.

**Concur:** ANSF-Log (EF 5.1) remains in constant coordination with the ISAF CJ1 and the USFOR-A J1. The planning for transition from ISAF Mission to Resolute Support has resulted in the mainstreaming of HQs ISAF and IJC during the period Aug to Nov 14. Underpinning this process has been analysis of personnel resources. The Resolute Support plan has addressed this requirement. ANSF-Log currently reviews sourcing documents (JMD, CJSOR) to ensure the most appropriate rank and skills are identified and coordinated thru appropriate channels.

## Headquarters, ISAF Comments (cont'd)

### Recommendation 5

Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, International Security Assistance Forces Joint Command:

- a. Advise all Afghan National Army leaders as to the costs of maintaining broken, damaged, and non-repairable equipment.
- b. Advise and assist the Assistant Minister of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics in streamlining and following the established process and procedures for approval of the Estimated Cost of Damage and disposal of equipment processes. (This is a repeat recommendation from our 2011 report.)

**Concur:** EF-5 leadership is conducting Key Leader Engagements to address the impacts of holding on to equipment beyond repair. This topic has resonated with Afghan logistics leadership and will be addressed during the Fall Maintenance Shura.

**Recommendation 6.a.** Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army General Staff, select an Afghan National Army Corps unit to model effective turn-in procedures, demonstrating system functionality to build confidence across other Corps.

### Recommendation 6.b.

Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan:

1. Advise and assist the Afghan National Army General Staff to implement an Afghan-supported policy and process to return excess serviceable and unserviceable equipment and parts to the Afghan National Army inventory.
2. Advise and assist the Afghan National Army Training Command to establish a training program to teach equipment turn-in procedures to Afghan National Army logisticians.

**Concur.** Concur with both recommendations in 6a. and 6b. The following comments are germane to both recommendations. The Base Maintenance Depot initiative is currently ongoing. ANSF has promulgated the appropriate Decrees and Ciphers to set in place the governance and management system for a nation-wide process to return excess serviceable and unserviceable equipment and parts. ANSF-Log advisors are working with the General Staff and MoD to ensure correct application and understanding of ANSF doctrine specific to handling of this category of equipment.

Additionally, the EF5.0 Coordinator/Manager has recently established a Maintenance Readiness Report that may provide the coalition with visibility on the best performing ANA Corps. ANSF-Log continues to advise ANA on the importance and need to execute requisite processes as they relate to reporting on-hand equipment, readiness, and usage/consumption data. The focus of all advisors, in support of the EF5.0 initiative, is on the importance of the chain of command enforcing the reporting of ANA Tashkil authorized, on hand, & FMC/NMC along with Class III(B), V, VII, VIII, & IX on hand balances and consumption.



## Headquarters, ISAF Comments (cont'd)

### Recommendation 7

Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command assist the Ministry of Defense to establish a vehicle fleet management plan for the long-term sustainment of the Afghan National Army that at a minimum addresses: policy; organic and contracted capabilities at all levels of maintenance; and funding within budget constraints.

**Concur:** The leadership in Essential Function 5 (Sustainment) are conducting Key Leader Engagements with both the Minister of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the General Staff Logistics Director (G-4) support to establish a life cycle management system. The intent is to develop a Senior Staff capability to manage the entire fleet of vehicles, forecasting scheduled maintenance and upgrades. This will both extend the life of the fleet, reduce Operations and maintenance costs, as well as, facilitate national level long term budget forecasting. The leadership of EF-5 sustainment, in conjunction with CSTC-A, OSD- A,T&L TACOM, and PEO-CSCSS have placed a team of logistics experts on the ground in Afghanistan to both assess the gap areas and identify the solution to the absence of a entire ANSF supply chain that institutes a forecasting and requirements generation model.

### Recommendation 8. Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command:

a. Assist the Afghan National Army to determine the mix between organic capability and funded contracts that will replace expiring Coalition-funded maintenance contracts and assist with contract development;

**Concur.** ANSF-LOG provides assistance and advice to ANA to transition Coalition Contracts to GfRoA Contracts. This is an effect that is horizontally aligned to ongoing efforts in EF 1 (Plan, Program, Budget and Execute) that will continue into Resolute Support, particularly with respect to Maintenance in ANP.

b. Advise Afghan National Army Corps Commanders regarding the need to provide maintenance support for specialized units not subordinate to the Corps but in their area of operations.

**Concur.** ANSF-Log does not advise ANA Corp Commanders, but does encourage those responsible for Command-level advising to emphasize logistic accountability and support. Regional support for Non-Corps units is not yet fully supported outside of Kabul. Organizations responsible for advising the Corps Commanders will continue to advise the need and responsibility for area support.

c. Assist the Afghan National Army with the development of fully-functioning training classes to enable Afghan National Army maintainers to repair recently fielded, specialized equipment.

**Concur.** However, development of training does not fall in ANSF-LOGs task and purpose. Currently, Central Work Shop (CWS) maintainers attend ANA Component Repair Program run by AMS LLC, where they receive training on the proper procedures for component repair. Each major component is introduced, dismantled, diagnosed of fault and rebuilt/repared in 2-week rotations for 12 weeks of consistent training. Components introduced during the 12-week course include the following:

HMMWV and Ranger- Electrical Starter Motors and Alternators  
Ford Ranger-Engine

## Headquarters, ISAF Comments (cont'd)

HMMWV-Engine & Transmission  
International- Gearbox  
DRS Civilian contractors instruct ANA maintainers on communications and electronics repair in the C&E shop.

### Recommendation 9

Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, in coordination with Regional Commanders,

- a. ensure that Contracting Advise and Assist Teams encourage their Afghan counterparts to include in new Afghan National Army contracts properly designed quality assurance or surveillance plans and to perform oversight functions on existing contracts;
- b. create a robust plan to provide contract management and resource management advisors to Ministry of Defense, Afghan National Army logistics organizations above Army Corps, and those in the Afghan National Army Corps.

**Concur:** The Command is both hiring more advisors to adequately cover contract management and resource management functions as well as providing more guidance on the quality management functions for contract management.

**Recommendation 11.a.** Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army General Staff:

1. Conduct/sponsor an analysis to determine to what extent automation can be effectively used in supply and maintenance management at Afghan National Army Corps and below and prepare to apply the conclusions prior to the termination of the Afghan Integrated Support Services maintenance contract.
2. Determine functional and personnel training requirements for logistics information management systems users at Afghan National Army Corps and below, and whether existing training offered meets these requirements.

**Concur.** DoD Teams will be reviewing the efficiency of the ANSF Fuel/Ammo policies & procedures IRT management & accountability. These teams will be reviewing ANSF Decrees, policies, & processes/procedures that have been sent to the Team prior to arrival in theater by ANSF Log. The teams will conduct interviews of key personnel in MOI & MOD MAGs, DLO, DNL, RC-S, RC-E and the ANSF to ascertain the current status and transition on the associated commodities. This will include: vulnerabilities in the management/accountability of the commodities and any challenges to developing ANSF processes. The teams will conduct site visits to RC-E/RC-S of ANSF facilities in conjunction with support from the local advisors. This will provide operational/tactical level data to support information from the strategic, national, and tactical level SMEs. Additionally, the teams will focus more on consumption based reporting and the order/receipt processes.

OSD will look at all commodities at the advisor and SME levels. DoD IG will look only at Fuel/Ammo from the DLO/DNL and RC perspective largely focusing on the ANSF side. The OSD and DOD IG team visits will look at similar areas from different perspectives and are separate.

### Recommendation 11.b

## Headquarters, ISAF Comments (cont'd)

Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan assist the Ministry of Defense to investigate possible options for reducing the reliance of Core-IMS on internet access.

**Concur:** The EF-5 leadership has submitted a funded change request to allow Core-IMS to operate without connectivity to the internet. Currently the change is with the proprietors (Core Partners) and they are modifying the software.

### **Recommendation 14**

Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, advise and assist the Assistant Minister of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics to: develop pay and incentive plans to recruit and retain skilled Afghan National Army mechanics; recruit maintenance personnel working on logistics support contracts; and employ them in the ANA civil service workforce.

**Nonconcur:** ISAF leadership have researched this proposal, as well as paying incentives to other specialties, and it was determined that the aggregate effect of paying incentives was generally negative, as it would gradually inflate all pay and create perceived inequities.



## NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan Comments



NATO TRAINING MISSION – AFGHANISTAN  
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN  
APO, AE 09354

20 August 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR USFOR-A/IG

FROM: NTM-A DOS

SUBJECT: DoDIG Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army

1. NTM-A is only able to respond to Recommendation 9a provided within the draft DoDIG report. Our responses to recommendations are listed in this document.

*a. Recommendation 9a: Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan / Essential Function 4 (EF-4) Lead, in coordination with the Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police Training General Command in the following:*

- *Develop a sustainment training policy, which identifies the requirement to provide appropriate training to all levels of Afghan National Police logistics personnel.*
- *Monitor the Afghan National Police attendance at the Afghan National Army Combat Service Support School to ensure that seats allocated do not go unfilled.*
- *Encourage Afghan National Police Commanders to send logistics personnel to the Afghan national Army Combat Service Support School.*

*b. Response to: "Develop a sustainment training policy, which identifies the requirement to provide appropriate training to all levels of Afghan National Police logistics personnel":* NTM-A continues to advise Training General Command (TGC) on developing an institutional sustainment training policy for MoI approval. However, there is a Memorandum of Understanding between MoD and MoI which allows the ANP to attend ANA logistics training. Currently, the average attendance by the ANP at the ANA CSS School is 25% of their allotted slots for each course offered. Although the MOU exists and allows for ANP attendance, there are not enough police attending the training. This is partly due to operational requirements and misallocated funding. NTM-A continues to work with MoI and TGC to ensure the MOU is utilized and funding is properly placed to provide students with the means to attend the school. We believe the sustainment training policy will help by allocating funding to facilitate promotion of student attendance at the school. Plans of instruction (POI) are being developed with the intent to go through the Professional Development Board for accreditation. This will facilitate standardized training country-wide.

*c. Response: "Monitor the Afghan National Police attendance at the Afghan National Army Combat Service Support School to ensure that seats allocated do not go unfilled."* NTM-A will continue to work with the MoI and TGC to track trained personnel ensuring those patrolmen, NCOs and Officers are being utilized in proper positions beneficial to the institutional development of logistics sustainment. Further, the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System (AHRIMS) being installed across the country will assist in recruiting, training and assigning qualified personnel into needed appointments as determined by force requirements. The management oversight it will provide will help ease a patronage-oriented

## NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan Comments (cont'd)



NATO TRAINING MISSION – AFGHANISTAN  
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN  
APO, AE 09354

selection process into a more professional merit-based selection system. Currently, the ANA CSS is the only school available to ANP that can offer the level of training required to professionalize the force. As a long-term effort, we will also work with TGC to develop a more robust logistics curriculum so the ANP does not have to rely on attendance at the ANA CSS School. By filling the allotted slots at the ANA CSS School, the ANP will develop a qualified logistics corps with the ANP that can fill their Tashkil and operational sustainment needs.

d. **Response:** *"Encourage Afghan National Police Commanders to send logistics personnel to the Afghan national Army Combat Service Support School."* NTM-A will continue to work with the TGC to get the MoI to direct ANP Commanders to send personnel to logistics training. This will require pressure from MoI and concurrence between the operational and training Commanders to ensure the training needs are being met. Additionally, within the next quarter the ANP are working on executing a Commander's Conference that will help facilitate issues such as this one.

2. Point of contact for this is [REDACTED]

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David J. Ell", is written over the typed name and title.

DAVID J. ELL  
COL, FA  
Director of Staff, NTM-A

## Headquarters, ISAF Comments



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**HEADQUARTERS**  
International Security Assistance Force  
United States Forces-Afghanistan  
Kabul, Afghanistan  
APO AE 09356



DCOS-RES-ANSF-LOG-EF5.1

21 August 2014

### MEMORANDUM FOR ISAF JOINT COMMAND INSPECTOR GENERAL (IJC/IG)

**SUBJECT:** Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army.

**1. BACKGROUND:** Since the publishing of the DRAFT IG report, ANSF-LOG has realigned from the IJC to a subordinate staff element under HQ ISAF in preparation for the transition to RS. ANSF-LOGs mission and focus while a part of IJC was Essential Function (EF) 5.0. ANSF-LOG now is focused on EF 5.1: Logistics Information Management, Demand-based Requirement Generation, Transition of National Logistics Nodes and Commodities, and Transition of ANSF to GIRoA-controlled Maintenance.

ANSF-LOG (EF5.1) responses to DoDIG recommendations reflect ANSF-LOGs mission now and anticipated mission during Resolute Support. ANSF-LOG cannot address recommendations across the other staff sections, EF Directors (EF1.0 thru EF8.0), and organizations (RCs/TAACs/AACs) with advisory or SF-FBA responsibilities.

#### 2. DoDIG Recommendations and Responses:

**Recommendation (1.a.):** Commander, International Security Assistance Forces Joint Command, ensure functional Security Force Assistance teams have the training and capability to develop Afghan logistics capacity in the Afghan National Army Corps.

**Response (1.a.):** Concur. Deploying personnel, who are aligned to fill an advisory position, attend advisor training. ANSF-Log provides input to the 162nd Infantry Brigade to assist in the continual updating of the 162nds Advisor Training Program of Instruction as it relates to pre-deployment training for service members who will serve as logistic advisors to ANSF. A gap exists in the training of re-missioned deployed service members. USFOR-A/ISAF Personnel Managers may re-assign (re-mission) Service members (Individual deployers who choose to extend, have their original deployment mission curtailed, etc.) to ANSF-Log to meet a personnel vacancy. Such a re-missioning precludes attendance at focused advisor training.

Additionally, operational/strategic level advisors requirements are best satisfied through senior NCOs, Warrant Officers and OF 4 – OF6 officers rather than re-missioned junior ranking personnel. While, senior Military Logisticians may be able to operate without extensive advisor training (COL, Senior LTC, MSG, CW5/4), less experienced logisticians would benefit from in-country advisor training vice OJT.



## Headquarters, ISAF Comments (cont'd)

**Recommendation (4):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command: a. Assess conditions and determine advisor resources required, and b. Review Train-Advise-Assist drawdown plans and retain sufficient logistics advisors and resources.

**Response (4):** Concur. ANSF-Log (EF 5.1) remains in constant coordination with the ISAF CJ1 and the USFOR-A J1. The planning for transition from ISAF Mission to Resolute Support has resulted in the mainstreaming of HQs ISAF and IIC during the period Aug to Nov 14. Underpinning this process has been analysis of personnel resources. The Resolute Support plan has addressed this requirement. ANSF-Log currently reviews sourcing documents (CE, JMD, CJSOR) to ensure the most appropriate rank and skills are identified and coordinated thru appropriate channels. As a subordinate staff section, final decision for staffing ANSF-Log is through the higher headquarters manning process and priorities.

**Recommendation (6.a.):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army General Staff, select an Afghan National Army Corps unit to model effective turn-in procedures, demonstrating system functionality to build confidence across other Corps.

**Response (6.a.):** Concur. The Base Maintenance Depot initiative is currently ongoing. ANSF has promulgated the appropriate Decrees and Ciphers to set in place the governance and management system for a nation-wide process. ANSF-Log advisors are working with the General Staff and MoD to ensure correct application and understanding of ANSF doctrine.

Additionally, the EF5.0 Coordinator/Manager has recently established a Maintenance Readiness Report that may provide the coalition with visibility on the best performing ANA Corps. ANSF-Log continues to advise ANA on the importance and need to execute requisite processes as they relate to reporting on-hand and consumption-based data. Focus of all advisors, in support of the EF5.0 initiative, is on the importance of the chain of command enforcing the reporting of ANA Tashkil authorized, on hand, & FMC/NMC along with Class III(B), V, VII, VIII, & IX on hand balances and consumption.

**Recommendation (8.a):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command: a. Assist the Afghan National Army to determine the mix between organic capability and funded contracts that will replace expiring Coalition-funded maintenance contracts and assist with contract development.

**Response (8.a):** Concur. ANSF-LOG provides assistance and advice to ANA to transition Coalition Contracts to GfRoA Contracts. This is an effect that is horizontally aligned to ongoing efforts in EF 1 (Plan, Program, Budget and Execute) that will continue into Resolute Support, particularly with respect to Maintenance in ANP.

**Recommendation (8.b):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command: b. Advise Afghan National Army Corps Commanders regarding the need to provide maintenance support for specialized units not subordinate to the Corps but in their area of operations.

**Response (8.b):** Concur. ANSF-Log does not advise ANA Corp Commanders, but does encourage those responsible for Command-level advising to emphasize logistic accountability and support. Regional support for Non-Corps units is not yet fully supported outside of Kabul. Organizations responsible for advising the Corps Commanders should continue to advise the need and responsibility for area support.

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## Headquarters, ISAF Comments (cont'd)

**Recommendation (8.c):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command: c. Assist the Afghan National Army with the development of fully-functioning training classes to enable Afghan National Army maintainers to repair recently fielded, specialized equipment.

**Response (8.c):** Concur. However, development of training does not fall in ANSF-LOGs task and purpose. Currently, CWS maintainers attend ANA Component Repair Program run by AMS LLC, where they receive training on the proper procedures for component repair. Each major component is introduced, dismantled, diagnosed of fault and rebuilt/repared in 2-week rotations for 12 weeks of consistent training. Components introduced during the 12-week course include the following: HMMWV and Ranger- Electrical Starter Motors and Alternators, Ford Ranger-Engine, HMMWV-Engine & Transmission, International- Gearbox, DRS Civilian contractors instruct ANA maintainers on communications and electronics repair in the C&E shop.

**Recommendation (11.a.):** Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army General Staff:  
1. Conduct/sponsor an analysis to determine to what extent automation can be effectively used in supply and maintenance management at Afghan National Army Corps and below and prepare to apply the conclusions prior to the termination of the Afghan Integrated Support Services maintenance contract. 2. Determine functional and personnel training requirements for logistics information management systems users at Afghan National Army Corps and below, and whether existing training offered meets these requirements.

**Response (11.a.):** Concur. DoD Teams will be reviewing the efficiency of the ANSF Fuel/Ammo policies & procedures IRT management & accountability. These teams will be reviewing ANSF Decrees, policies, & processes/procedures that have been sent to the Team prior to arrival in theater by ANSF Log. The teams will conduct interviews of key personnel in MOI & MOD MAGs, DLO, DNL, RC-S, RC-E and the ANSF to ascertain the current status and transition on the associated commodities. This will include: vulnerabilities in the management/accountability of the commodities and any challenges to developing ANSF processes. The teams will conduct site visits to RC-E/RC-S of ANSF facilities in conjunction with support from the local advisors. This will provide operational/tactical level data to support information from the strategic, national, and tactical level SMEs. Additionally, the teams will focus more on consumption based reporting and the order/receipt processes.

OSD will look at all commodities at the advisor and SME levels. DoD IG will look only at Fuel/Ammo from the DLO/DNL and RC perspective largely focusing on the ANSF side. The OSD and DOD IG team visits will look at similar areas from different perspectives and are separate.

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## Headquarters, ISAF Comments (cont'd)

### 3. OSD draft timeline

#### 18-31 Aug: Admin/Background Phase

- Discussion of Demand Based Supply(DBS) and Life Cycle Management(LCM)
- Review policies/decrees/processes

#### 1-14 Sept: ANSF Log integration

- 4 team members will focus on DBS/2 team members will focus on LCM; all six will integrate with ANSF LOG
- 4 members will integrate with the MAGs to go over DBS/LCM
- Estimated 5 Sept Coalition/OSD in progress review (IPR): lessons learned and prep for business


#### Automation (BA) team arrival

- 12 Sept 6: pers BA team arrives; integrates with ANSF Log/MAGs
- 15-30 Sept: Discussion current state of BA; possible KLEs; IPR as necessary; fly away engagements
- 1-16 Oct: Documentation Phase
- 17-31 Oct: Implementation Phase

#### DOD IG timeline

- 26 Aug: Final IPR
- 28-30 Aug: location ISAF
  - pre-brief/office calls/meet & greet with ISAF and MAGs
- 29 Aug: In-brief
- 31 Aug-4 Sept: location IJC/NKAIA
- 31 Aug interviews with DLO/DNL SMEs
- 1-3 Sept KLEs/on the road with DNL
- 4-10 Sept: RC-E/TAAC NoK/travel days
  - KLEs/site visits with local advisors
- 10-14 Sept: location RC-S/KAF/travel days
  - KLEs/site visits with local advisors
- 15-17 Sept: location NKAIA
  - Prep for out-brief
- 18 Sept: location ISAF
  - Out brief

FOR:



DAVID P. SHIELDS  
Brigadier, AUS Army  
Director, ANSF Logistics (EF5.1)

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## ISAF – IJC Comments



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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF)  
Joint Command (IJC)  
Kabul, Afghanistan  
APO, AE 09320



IJC-IG

14 September 2014

MEMORANDUM THRU USFOR-A and CENTCOM  
FOR Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General

SUBJECT: Responses to Follow-up Request for DoD IG Audit #D2012-028- Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army

1. Recommendation #10: Commander, IJC:

a. Conduct key leader engagements with the Afghan National Army General Staff to determine the desired roles and responsibilities, and service support standards, for the Regional Military Training Centers and then properly resource them to conduct quality instruction within an acceptable quality of life environment, and

b. Conduct key leader engagements with the Afghan National Army Training Command to assign, and the Afghan National Army Corps Commanders to accept, liaison officers from the Afghan National Army Training Command to advise and monitor the Afghan National Army Corps produced training programs of instruction.

2. IJC Response: Commander, IJC conducts Key Leader Engagements (KLEs) with the Afghan National Army General Staff on a weekly rotation; conducts monthly KLEs with Corps Commanders; and KLEs with the Afghan National Army Training Command is on a less frequent rotation (every 60 days) due to the more frequent involvement from key leaders within NTM-A. An essential function and COMIJC are looking at helping the ANSF develop a TRADOC like organization which will help with unity of training.

3. POC for this response is IJC Deputy IG, [REDACTED], at [REDACTED]

FRANCISCO ARCE [REDACTED]

FRANCISCO ARCE  
COL, USA  
Inspector General

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## Headquarters, ISAF Comments

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED



HEADQUARTERS  
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)  
United States Forces-Afghanistan  
Kabul, Afghanistan  
APO AE 09355



IHQ/RES/0018/14


12 Sept 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR USFOR-A IG [REDACTED], Deputy IG)

SUBJECT: ISAF Response to DoD IG Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army (Project No. D2014-D00SPO-0008)

REF: CENTCOM Tasker USCC1421132959

1. Since this task was sent to USFOR-A, the IJC Logistics component, previously "ANSF LOG" has come under the new ISAF organizational construct of Essential Function 5 (Sustainment).
2. This command has combined the responses for both the prior ANSF LOG as well as ISAF logistics (prior "EAG Sustainment") under our new Essential Function 5 (Sustainment).
3. This command concurs with all of recommendations except one, recommendation 14 (develop pay and incentive plans to recruit and maintain maintenance personnel).
4. Refer questions to my Executive Officer, [REDACTED], or email [REDACTED]

  
JOHN A. KLOTSKO  
GS-15  
Deputy, EF-5  
DCOS SPT, ISAF HQ

Enclosure

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## Headquarters, ISAF Comments (cont'd)

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### ISAF RESPONSE TO DoD IG ASSESSMENT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT AND COALITION EFFORTS TO DEVELOP THE LOGISTICS SUSTAINMENT CAPABILITY OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (CONTINUATION)

12. Commander, ISAF/USFOR-A, in coordination with CSTC-A, advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army senior leaders to take full ownership of, and develop a plan to simplify their logistics manuals, guidance and policies.

Response: **Concur.** MOD and ANA have published Decrees and Ciphers. ANA leaders are knowledgeable and execute IAW established documents. ANA intends to develop a National Maintenance Strategy. This will provide the opportunity to assist in the update of Decrees, should ANA leaders seek to change their established doctrine.

13. CSTC-A, in coordination with the Commander, IJC:

- a. Emphasize and prioritize training, advising, and assisting the logistics processes at the Afghan National Army Central Supply Depot and Regional Logistic Support Centers that sustain the authorized repair parts stocks.

Response: **Concur.** ANSF LOG (EF-5.1) personnel routinely travel to these locations providing advice and assistance at these depots and centers.

- b. Identify, procure and distribute the required authorized basic parts supply to the Central Supply Depot.

Response: **Concur.** Specific named purchase actions have recently been initiated to support this recommendation. These are titled ZIZILLA, DOMINO, and RASCAL.

- c. Assist the development of the Assistant Minister of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and General Staff G4 capability to distribute the necessary supply of repair parts from the Central Supply Depot to the Regional Logistics Support Centers and Combat Service Support Kandaks to sustain logistics support of ANA unit operations.

Response: **Concur.** ANA recently executed an Afghan planned and let Sustainment Shura with the Deputy Corps Commanders and their Director of Logistics. The MOD distribution supply requisition process was reinforced to the attendees. Additionally, the Corps have sent representatives to meet with their CSD Corps LNO and the CSD Commander ensuring communication happens between supported and supporting organizations.

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<b>ANA</b>	Afghan National Army
<b>ANSF</b>	Afghan National Security Forces
<b>CSTC-A</b>	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
<b>IJC</b>	ISAF Joint Command
<b>ISAF</b>	International Security Assistance Force
<b>MoDA</b>	Ministry of Defense Advisor
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NTM-A</b>	NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
<b>RLSC</b>	Regional Logistics Support Center

# **Whistleblower Protection**

## **U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

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