

The Persian Gulf War

**An Air Staff Chronology
of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM**

Compiled by
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**Center for Air Force History
Washington, D.C.
1994**

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Preface

Whereas the media dates the start of the Persian Gulf War from Iraq's 2 August 1990 military invasion of Kuwait, the crisis actually unfolded some two weeks earlier. On 17 July 1990, in his National Day speech, Iraq's President Saddam Hussein made ominous threats against Kuwait. The initial American response came on 7 August (C-day)—just thirty-four hours after the order was issued—with the deployment of two squadrons of U.S. Air Force F-15 fighters and a Headquarters CENTAF contingent. Called Operation DESERT SHIELD, this first phase of the deployment witnessed a gradual buildup to 236,000 American troops and 723 USAF aircraft in the area of responsibility (AOR), primarily in Saudi Arabia. The second phase started on 8 November 1990 when President Bush ordered additional American troops to the Persian Gulf area and directed that they prepare to carry out "an adequate *offensive* military option." Phase II of DESERT SHIELD lasted through 16 January 1991. U.S. forces in the AOR increased to more than 426,000 personnel and aircraft deployed by USAF totaled 1,131. Operation DESERT STORM began when U.S. and coalition air forces launched the air campaign against Iraq and Iraqi forces in Kuwait in the early morning hours of 17 January (D-day). Land and naval forces joined the air assault on 24 February, and 100 hours later President Bush declared Kuwait liberated and ordered a cessation of hostilities. On 3 April, the UN Security Council outlined cease-fire terms and voted to end the Persian Gulf War.

For ease of reference, events in this chronology are presented under separate political and military headings for specific dates listed. Political events, providing the domestic and foreign policy backdrop, were drawn from leading newspapers, including *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*. Military events and statistics were derived from documents used by Air Staff personnel to support the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff. The documents came from such Pentagon offices as the Air Force Contingency Support Staff, Air Force Logistics Readiness Center, Air Staff's Directorate of Plans and its Force Assessment Division, and Air Force Intelligence Agency's Middle East Division. The documents cited include briefings given to the Secretary and the Chief of Staff, point papers written and used by the Air Staff, intelligence reports written by Middle

Gulf War Chronology

East analysts who briefed the Air Staff, and USCENTCOM message traffic that came to the Pentagon.

Two explanations are in order regarding source documents and the data used in preparing this chronology. First, while CENTAF situation reports were used occasionally for specific detailed information, CENTCOM situation reports, along with Air Staff briefings and point papers, were the primary sources for this chronology. Besides giving a more general and complete account of USAF activity in the AOR, the CENTCOM messages listed all component command sorties throughout the crisis and provided summaries of activity by Iraqi armed forces. Moreover, Air Staff action officers, by their own account, relied more on the CENTCOM reports when preparing daily briefings for the Secretary and the Chief. Air Staff briefings and point papers were a more useful source for the chronology than the CENTAF documents because they served as a guideline to information that was presented directly to Pentagon officials. Secondly, the composition of CENTAF changed as the Persian Gulf Crisis evolved from DESERT SHIELD through DESERT STORM. For DESERT SHIELD, the data for fixed-wing flight activity were given by CENTAF (USAF with some USMC assets), MARCENT, and NAVCENT. CENTAF activity was divided into tactical/support, tanker refueling, and intratheater airlift sorties. For DESERT STORM, an overall CENTAF sortie total was given from a recapitulation of the air tasking order; USAF sorties were listed by type and totals were given for MARCENT, NAVCENT, and allied air activity.

The Center for Air Force History published this work as a Secret document in 1992. While deletions were made from that chronology to produce this unclassified version, the product as a whole was not severely affected. Every entry has been annotated as to its source.

Acknowledgements

Several individuals on the Air Staff reviewed this chronology and offered useful comments on how to improve it. Special thanks are owed to the following: Col. Leonard Walls, the Deputy Director for Contingency Operations and Exercises, who provided access to individuals and documents in the Air Force Operations Center; Dr. Wayne W. Thompson, a historian temporarily assigned to the Directorate of Plans, Force Assessment Division, throughout the Persian Gulf crisis, who helped expedite the collection of documents; SMSgt Steven Ward, Superintendent for Contingency Operations and Exercise, who dispensed invaluable advice on conducting research in the Operations Center; Capt. David Sysma, Middle East analyst, who furnished advice on intelligence documents covering the early days of the crisis; and the staff of the Logistics Readiness Center, which shared copies of their daily summary package. The declassification of the first version of the chronology was painlessly accomplished with the advice and expertise of the Secretary of the Air Force Reserve Declassification and Review Team and Ms. June Forte, Chief of the Air Force Office for Security Review. Several members of the Center for Air Force History made special contributions to this project: Ms. Karen Fleming-Michael performed invaluable service in the chronology's creation by making critical contributions to the research and organization of the text, searching out and preparing the photo essay, and editing the entire draft; Dr. Janet Bednarek and Dr. Charles J. Gross assisted with portions of the research used in the DESERT STORM section; and Mrs. Barbara Wittig performed a copy edit on the DESERT SHIELD portion. Also, useful suggestions were made by Col. David A. Tretler, Mr. Herman S. Wolk, Mr. Robert J. Smith, Mr. Bernard C. Nalty, Dr. Richard G. Davis, Dr. Perry Jamieson, and Mr. William T. Y'Blood. Numerous other individuals throughout the Air Force History program also contributed many helpful comments.

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Center for Air Force History

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Table of Contents

Preface iii

Acknowledgements v

List of Illustrations vii

Summary of Key Events ix

Operation DESERT SHIELD 1

Operation DESERT STORM 237^a

Epilogue 423

Glossary 427

Appendices

United Nations Security Council Resolutions 433

USAF Aircraft Deployed to the AOR, 16 January 1991 435

Allied Aircraft Deployed to the AOR 436

Iraqi Air Order of Battle 437

Iraqi Military Equipment in the KTO 437

DESERT STORM Cumulative Sorties 438

CENTAF Daily Sorties, 1 September 1990-28 February 1991 438

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition 441

Mobilization and Demobilization of U.S. Forces 443

Operation DESERT SHIELD Strategic Airlift Deployment, Mission

Summary By Aircraft Type, 7 August 1990-10 March 1991 444

Military Airlift Command C-130s In Operation DESERT SHIELD-
DESERT STORM 444

Index 445

Illustrations

Persian Gulf Region Map xiv

World Time Zones 13

Multinational Force Command Relationships 20

CENTAF-Iraqi Flight Activity during DESERT SHIELD 82

USAF Forces, 9 November 1990 134

USAF Forces, 16 January 1991 234

Detected Iraqi Flights to Iran 262

Scud Launches 268

Coalition Fixed-Wing Kills (Air-to-Air) 307

DESERT STORM Sortie Totals 377

Summary of Key Events

- | | |
|----------------|--|
| 2 August 90 | Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. |
| 6 August 90 | The United Nations (UN) imposed economic sanctions against Iraq. |
| 7 August 90 | [C-day] With Saudi willingness to host multi-national forces, President George Bush ordered U.S. military aircraft and troops to deploy. |
| 8 August 90 | [C plus 1] The first USAF combat aircraft arrived in Saudi Arabia approximately thirty-four hours after the deployment order. |
| 31 August 90 | [C plus 24] More than 500 USAF aircraft were deployed to the area of responsibility (AOR) along with more than 20,000 CENTAF personnel and more than 90,000 total U.S. personnel. The personnel total included more than 2,000 women. |
| 8 November 90 | [C plus 94] President Bush ordered more than 150,000 additional American ground, sea, and air forces to the Persian Gulf area. He said they were needed to achieve "an adequate offensive military option" to drive Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The total U.S. military personnel deployed to the AOR exceeded 235,000, including nearly 13,000 women. |
| 22 November 90 | [C plus 107] President Bush was in Saudi Arabia on a Thanksgiving "tour of the troops." |
| 29 November 90 | [C plus 114] By a vote of twelve to two, with China abstaining, foreign ministers of the UN Security Council adopted the U.S.-sponsored resolution that stated that, unless Iraq withdrew from Kuwait by 15 January 1991, member states could "use all necessary means . . . to restore international peace and security in the area." |

Gulf War Chronology

- 6 December 90 [C plus 121] Saddam Hussein said that all the 2,000 or more foreigners being held hostage in Iraq and Kuwait would be released promptly. More than 950 foreigners, including about 163 Americans, left Iraq on 9 December.
- 30 December 90 [C plus 145] At the request of Germany and France, the foreign ministers of the 12 European Community nations planned to meet in Luxembourg in a last-ditch attempt to avert war. More than 900 USAF aircraft were deployed in the AOR along with more than 37,000 CENTAF personnel and 325,000 total U.S. military personnel. The personnel total included more than 21,000 women.
- 12 January 91 [C plus 158] Congress voted to give President Bush the authority to use military force against Iraq. More than 1,000 USAF aircraft were deployed in the AOR along with more than 44,000 CENTAF personnel and 408,000 total U.S. military personnel. The personnel total included more than 24,000 women.
- 17 January 91 [C plus 163/D-day] The United States and allied forces mounted an air assault, striking targets in Baghdad and Kuwait at 0239 (16 January at 1839 EST). More than 1,100 USAF aircraft were deployed in the AOR along with more than 47,000 CENTAF personnel and 426,000 total U.S. military personnel. The personnel total included more than 25,000 women.
- 23 January 91 [C plus 169/D plus 6] Allied air forces achieved air superiority.
- 27 January 91 [C plus 173/D plus 10] Allied air forces achieved air supremacy. At least 39 of Iraq's top-line combat planes had been flown to Iran to escape destruction.
- 10 February 91 [C plus 187/D plus 24] The United States received \$50 billion in pledges from other countries to finance the Gulf War.
- 12 February 91 [C plus 189/D plus 26] Defense Secretary Richard Cheney invoked the "Feed and Forage Act" which allowed commanders to pay for medicine, trans-

Gulf War Chronology

portation, fuel, and other expenses without congressional approval.

The allied strategic objectives were to incapacitate and isolate the Saddam Hussein regime. Thus, the emphasis was to suppress, not to destroy, the Iraqi civil infrastructure.

- 13 February 91 [C plus 190/D plus 27] Two U.S. laser-guided bombs killed hundreds of Iraqi civilians in what Iraq called an air raid shelters, but which U.S. officials insisted was a military command center.
- 15 February 91 [C plus 192/D plus 29] During a twenty-four-hour period allied air forces claimed to have destroyed 167 tanks, 48 armored personnel carriers, 53 artillery pieces, and more than 200 assorted vehicles and buildings.
- 16 February 91 [C plus 193/D plus 30] Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf imposed a theater ceiling of 530,000 troops to stop the inflow of unplanned units and individuals.
- 19 February 91 [C plus 196/D plus 33] General Schwarzkopf, in an interview with the media, said that Iraq's military was on the verge of collapse and that the military's capabilities were probably overrated from the start.
- 22 February 91 [C plus 199/D plus 36] President Bush gave Iraq one last chance to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait by noon the next day.
- 24 February 91 [C plus 201/D plus 38] The ground assault against Iraq began. As a prelude to the offensive, allied air forces flew over 3,000 sorties, including 400 close-air support sorties.
- 28 February 91 [C plus 205/D plus 42] President Bush suspended allied offensive operations.
- 4 March 91 [C plus 209/D plus 46] Iraq released ten allied prisoners of war (POWs), including six Americans. The next day thirty-five more POWs, including fifteen Americans, were released.
- 7 March 91 [C plus 212/D plus 49] The first wave of 5,188 American troops returned home from the Persian Gulf.

Gulf War Chronology

- 15 March 91 [C plus 220/D plus 57] Air Force Chief of Staff, General Merrill A. McPeak, briefed the media on details of the air campaign against Iraq.
- 3 April 91 [C plus 239/D plus 76] The UN Security Council voted to *formally end the Persian Gulf War*.
- 7 April 91 [C plus 243/D plus 80] Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, *relief flights for Kurdish refugees fleeing Iraq*, officially began.

Operation DESERT SHIELD

July 1990

17 July 90

POLITICAL

In his National Day speech to the nation, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of stabbing Baghdad "in the back with a poisoned dagger" by conspiring with the United States to lower world oil prices and weaken Iraq. He warned that Iraq might take direct action if the Gulf States continued their policy of flooding the world oil market and costing Baghdad billions of dollars in lost revenues. [Caryle Murphy, "Persian Gulf Crisis Swells: Iraqi Is Given New Title," *The Washington Post*, 20 Jul 90, p 12.]

18 July 90

POLITICAL

The Iraqi media made public a letter from Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to the Arab League in which he bitterly accused Kuwait of stealing billions of dollars worth of Iraqi oil, building military installations on Iraqi territory, and refusing to forego Iraq's debts to Kuwait from the war with Iran. [Caryle Murphy, "Persian Gulf Crisis Swells: Iraqi Is Given New Title," *The Washington Post*, 20 Jul 90, p 12.]

Gulf War Chronology

19 July 90

POLITICAL

Iraq's national assembly ended debate on a new constitution and adopted a recommendation to elect Saddam Hussein "President for Life." The recommendation contradicted Saddam Hussein's affirmation during his National Day speech that a direct presidential election by secret ballot would be held later in 1990. [Msg, State RCI to SORAX, "Iraq: Saddam for Life," 20/1110z Jul 90.]

In its message to the Arab League, Kuwait responded to Iraq's verbal attacks with a charge that "Iraq has a rich record in its violations of Kuwaiti territory." Kuwait argued that Iraq was digging oil wells on Kuwaiti territory and repeatedly had refused to settle the long-standing border dispute between the two countries. Kuwait appealed for Arab League resolution of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi confrontation. [Caryle Murphy, "Persian Gulf Crisis Swells: Iraqi Is Given New Title," *The Washington Post*, 20 Jul 90, p 12.]

21 July 90

MILITARY

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) announced an increased threat to U.S. citizens and interests. It continued to monitor closely the Persian Gulf region. [Brfg, "CJCS Morning Briefing," 23 Jul 90.]

The UAE feared an air attack from Iraq against its offshore oil platforms. Believing that this could occur as early as 25 July, the UAE planned to initiate a twenty-four-hour combat air patrol beginning 22 July. It requested two USAF KC-135s for aerial refueling. [Msg, American Embassy Abu Dhabi to SECSTATE, "UAE Fears Iraqi Air Attack," 21/2142z Jul 90.]

22 July 90

MILITARY

The UAE continued pressing for KC-135 support on the basis that it was essential for UAE operations and, at the same time, nonthreatening to Iraq. Because of UAE concern over actions on or immediately after 25 July, the date of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) meeting to discuss Iraqi grievances, it desired a prompt U.S. response to the request for tanker support. The UAE was also interested in the role naval vessels could play in early warning. The Deputy Chief of Staff believed the most likely Iraqi attack profile, based on past events, would be either

July 1990

Su-24/Fencers or Mirage F-1s flying at night in commercial air routes. He believed U.S. naval forces would be helpful in detecting such an approach. [Msg, American Embassy Abu Dhabi to SECSTATE, "UAE Request for Aerial Refueling Support," 22/1319z Jul 90.]

23 July 90

POLITICAL

Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak, Jordan's King Hussein, and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz met in Alexandria, Egypt, to discuss developments in the region. [Nora Boustany and Patrick Tyler, "Iraq Masses Troops at Kuwait Border," *The Washington Post*, 24 Jul 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Gen. Colin L. Powell, directed a U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)-sponsored reconstitution exercise, code named IVORY JUSTICE, to practice air refueling, early warning, and communications procedures with the UAE and other GCC states. In the concept of operations, USCENTCOM deployed two KC-135 aircraft and support, to include personnel, from RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom, to Al-Dafra Air Base (AB), UAE, to provide refueling support to UAE aircraft. U.S. surface combatants were to be moved into position to optimize early warning detection and to exercise communications interoperability with UAE and other friendly Gulf States. The exercise was to last "approximately 8 days." [Msg, USCINCCENT to USCINCEUR, "Deployment Order for Exercise IVORY JUSTICE," 23/0417z Jul 90.]

The lack of logistical support for Iraqi forces along the Kuwaiti border, and a less than two-to-one ratio in tanks, argued against immediate military action by Iraq against Kuwait. Hussein's verbal assault, coming just before the OPEC summit scheduled for 25 July, was regarded as an attempt to coerce Kuwait and the UAE into helping ease Iraq's huge war debt and reconstruction costs. [Brfg, "CJCS Morning Briefing," 23 Jul 90.]

24 July 90

POLITICAL

Two KC-135s and one C-141 were sent to the UAE as part of a joint exercise. Additional combat ships were sent to the Gulf. Navy Secretary H. Lawrence Garrett III stated that American ships in the Gulf were at a "heightened state of vigilance" and were conducting an exercise with the naval forces of the UAE. Iraq reportedly had moved 30,000 troops to the

Gulf War Chronology

Kuwaiti border. [Michael Gordon, "U.S. Deploys Air and Sea Forces After Iraq Threatens 2 Neighbors," *The New York Times*, 25 Jul 90, p 1.]

A Pentagon spokesman announced that U.S. tanker aircraft and ships in the Persian Gulf were holding a "short-notice exercise" with the UAE. [Patrick Tyler, "Iraq's Hussein Acts to Ease Gulf Crisis as U.S. Debates Commitments," *The Washington Post*, 26 Jul 90, p 34.]

Egypt's President Mubarak visited Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia in an attempt to mediate the crisis. [Caryle Murphy, "Mubarak Tries to Ease Crisis in Gulf," *The Washington Post*, 25 Jul 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

Events in the Persian Gulf region indicated the existence of a significant threat to U.S. citizens and interests. [Brfg, "CJCS Morning Briefing," 30 Jul 90.]

25 July 90

POLITICAL

The UAE denied that it was carrying out maneuvers with U.S. forces in the Gulf. Instead, the activities were described as part of routine technical training. ["U.S.-Arab Maneuvers Denied," *The New York Times*, 26 July 90, p 6.]

President Mubarak announced that Iraq and Kuwait would begin direct talks in Saudi Arabia to settle differences over boundaries and oil policies. Mubarak said he had assurances from Saddam Hussein that Iraq had "no intention" of invading Kuwait. Saddam Hussein sent a message to President Bush through American Ambassador April Glaspie, in Baghdad, expressing Iraq's desire to peacefully end the crisis in the Persian Gulf and avoid a confrontation with the United States. Contentious issues between Iraq and Kuwait included the following:

- Kuwait's habit of oil-quota busting, at a rate of approximately 500,000 barrels per day, resulting in lower oil prices.
 - A thirty-year disputed ownership of the Rumaila oil field astride the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. Iraq claimed Kuwait stole oil worth \$2.4 billion.
 - Iraqi designs on gaining ownership of the Bubiyan and Warba islands. Largely uninhabited, the islands commanded the access to Umm Qasr, Iraq's principal outlet to the Persian Gulf.
- [Caryle Murphy, "Mubarak Says Iraq, Kuwait Will Begin Talks This Weekend," *The Washington Post*, 26 Jul 90, p 34.]

July 1990

American Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, met for two hours with Saddam Hussein. Hussein told the American ambassador that he would take no action against Kuwait until meeting with Kuwaiti officials. [Msg, American Embassy Baghdad to SECSTATE, "Saddam's Message of Friendship to President Bush," 25/1246z July 90.]

MILITARY

The Iraqis had at least a corps deployed against Kuwait. DIA estimated 75,000 troops were located along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. Since the Kuwaiti border was within range of Iraqi air assets, no aircraft predeployment to the south was necessary. Nevertheless, Iraq was improving air defenses around airfields near the border. ["Iraq-Kuwait: Border Buildup Continues," *Army Black Book*, 25 Jul 90.]

26 July 90

POLITICAL

OPEC ministers began their formal meeting under the shadow of the Iraqi threat to use force against Kuwait. This regular midyear meeting marked the first time in the thirty-year history of OPEC that one of the member countries brandished possible military action against another member to protect its interests in cartel decisions. [Edward Cody, "Iraq Is Seen Gaining in Oil Price War," *The Washington Post*, 26 Jul 90, p 1.]

27 July 90

POLITICAL

OPEC oil ministers formally agreed to a 22.5-million barrel per day production ceiling and the first increase in target oil prices—from \$18 to \$20 per barrel—since 1986. Saudi Arabia and such non-Gulf members as Venezuela were able to convince others that the \$21 per barrel price was more realistic than the \$25 per barrel price sought by Iraq. Industry analysts viewed the meetings as the most successful in recent years. The unusual consensus was viewed as reflecting OPEC confidence in its influence over the global oil market. [Msg, State to SORAX, "Secretary's Morning Summary/Intelligence Roundup," 28/1618z Jul 90.]

Iraq denied reports from diplomats and the media that it was massing troops in the disputed area. It pointed instead to its preparations for direct talks with Kuwait. ["Iraq Eases Saber-Rattling, Prepares for Kuwait Talks," *The Washington Times*, 27 Jul 90, p 8.]

Gulf War Chronology

MILITARY

Additional Iraqi armor, mechanized infantry, and support units continued to move to the border area with Kuwait. Iraq had two full armored divisions, elements of four infantry divisions, and more than forty artillery battalions deployed in the area. [Msg, State to SORAX, "Secretary's Morning Summary/Intelligence Roundup," 28/1618z Jul 90.]

29 July 90

POLITICAL

The CIA warned the White House that an Iraqi attack on Kuwait was imminent. [Sam Meddis, "Iraq Duped Everyone, Except CIA," *USA Today*, 12 September 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

U.S. officials received a request from UAE to extend exercise IVORY JUSTICE, the joint aerial refueling and coordination of early warning operation. USCINCCOM recommended extending the exercise for seven days to 8 August. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "UAE Request for Extension of Exercise IVORY JUSTICE," 29/2100z Jul 90.]

30 July 90

POLITICAL

American Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, departed Baghdad and stayed in the United States for the remainder of the crisis. [Telecon, Karen A. Fleming, AF/HO, with David Good, Public Affairs Officer for the Middle East, U.S. Department of State, 12 Apr 91.]

Jordan's King Hussein made a two-hour stopover in Kuwait to discuss the crisis with the emir. [Msg, American Embassy Kuwait to SECSTATE, "King Hussein's Visit to Kuwait," 01/0605z Aug 90.]

Iraqi and Kuwaiti officials, hosted by Saudi King Fahd, met in Jeddah to negotiate. Kuwait was expected to make financial concessions in exchange for Iraqi troop withdrawal and the settlement of border disputes. [Andrew Borowiec, "Hussein May Stop Squeeze of Kuwait for Lucrative Offer," *The Washington Times*, 31 Jul 90, p 8.]

In Oman, the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis elicited no official reaction. As a result of the U.S.-UAE joint exercises, Oman recognized the U.S. commitment to

July 1990

the security of the Gulf States. [Msg, American Embassy Muscat to SECSTATE, "Omani Reaction to Iraq-Kuwait Confrontation," 30/0654z Jul 90.]

31 July 90

POLITICAL

Assistant Secretary of State John H. Kelly told a meeting of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee that the United States was continuing a joint air-refueling exercise with the UAE and that U.S. Navy ships in the Gulf "have increased their vigilance." [Caryle Murphy, "Iraq Takes Hard Line as Talks Open," *The Washington Post*, 1 Aug 90, p 14.]

Saddam Hussein assured Egyptian President Mubarak that all the troops on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border were "present before" the latest crisis and that he had no intention of moving them toward Kuwait. [Caryle Murphy, "Iraq Expands Force Near Kuwaiti Border," *The Washington Post*, 31 Jul 90, p 16.]

MILITARY

A senior Kuwaiti military official stated that Kuwait would not take any domestic actions, for he believed that alerts would give Saddam Hussein justification to seize Kuwaiti territory by force. He said that the Kuwaiti armed forces did not "want to play Saddam's game and give him an excuse to attack." Should the attack occur, the official believed that Iraq would not attack any deeper than the 30th parallel. He believed Iraq wanted to seize all Kuwaiti territory north of that line. He openly admitted that Kuwaiti forces could not defend against an all-out Iraqi attack. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Potential Iraqi Operations Against Kuwait," 31/2125z Jul 90.]

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August 1990

1 August 90

POLITICAL

Negotiations in Jeddah collapsed after a two-hour session, according to Saudi mediators. Iraq said the talks failed because Kuwait was not serious about meeting demands to cede territory and cancel debts incurred by the Iraqis during the Gulf War with Iran. ["Iraqi Troops Cross Kuwaiti Border," *The Washington Times*, 2 Aug 90, p 1.]

At approximately 2100 EDT, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft told President Bush of the Iraqi predawn invasion of Kuwait. [R.W. Apple, "Invading Iraqis Seize Kuwait and Its Oil: U.S. Condemns Attack, Urges United Action," *The New York Times*, 3 Aug 90, p 1. There was a seven-hour difference between the AOR and Washington D.C. times.]

2 August 90

POLITICAL

The United States condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces. Along with Kuwait, the United States called for an emergency session of the UN Security Council. [Mark Matthews and Richard Sia, "Iraqi Troops Cross Border into Kuwait," *The Baltimore Sun*, 2 Aug 90, p 1.]

Gulf War Chronology

President Bush signed orders which froze Iraqi assets and banned imports from Iraq. [R.W. Apple, "Invading Iraqis Seize Kuwait and Its Oil: U.S. Condemns Attack, Urges United Action," *The New York Times*, 3 Aug 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

The main Iraqi advance involved an armored and mechanized assault down the eastern coastline, another down the Basra-Ahfra highway, and a secondary advance through the open countryside to the west of the highway. The main objectives of the assault—the Kuwait Army's positions around Al Jahra and the governmental buildings in Kuwait City—were secured within five hours. The Iraqi foreign minister stated that Iraq had no territorial ambitions and, once order was restored, would withdraw its troops. The emir and the crown prince both were able to escape to Saudi Arabia. Kuwaiti troops within the city were driven out after the arrival of armored and mechanized reinforcements. The Kuwaitis retreated to the south, but continued fighting. The air forces of all the GCC countries were on alert. The Saudis avoided movement of ground forces for fear of antagonizing the Iraqis and were flying their AWACS in an eastern orbit. Among Arab nations, the only denunciation of the invasion had come from Lebanon. [Point Paper, Air Force Intelligence Agency/INOM, "Iraq-Kuwait Update," 3 Aug 90.]

Estimates of Kuwaiti casualties were 200 to 400. Iraqi casualties were believed to be minimal due to the rapidity of their campaign and the fact that Kuwaiti resistance was weak. [Point Paper, Air Force Intelligence Agency/INOM, "Memorandum in Response to Secretary of the Air Force Questions," 6 Aug 90.]

3 August 90

POLITICAL

President Bush and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher raised the possibility of joint UN economic and/or military action against Iraq. State Department officials reported that six American oil-field workers were taken into custody and that Iraqi forces were rounding up others among the 3,000 American citizens who lived in Kuwait. The Kuwaiti Ambassador in Washington asked for immediate American military intervention. Soviet officials suspended military shipments to Iraq. The UN Security Council issued a unanimous call for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. [R.W. Apple, "Invading Iraqis Seize Kuwait and Its Oil: U.S. Condemns Attack, Urges United Action," *The New York Times*, 3 Aug 90, p 1.]

The whereabouts of 4,000 American and other Westerners in Kuwait was not known. It was reported that they were being bused to Baghdad. Arab

August 1990

reaction to the invasion remained subdued. [Point Paper, Air Force Intelligence Agency/INOM, "Iraq-Kuwait Update," 3 Aug 90.]

4 August 90

MILITARY

At Camp David, President Bush met with Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, CJCS General Powell, and U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Central Command (USCINCCENT), General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, to discuss military options in the Gulf crisis. The president concluded that the United States needed to put a force in Saudi Arabia as a signal to Saddam Hussein that an attack against that country would also be considered an attack against the United States. [Ann Devroy and Dan Balz, "For Bush, Moment of Decision Came Saturday at Camp David," *The Washington Post*, 9 Aug 90, p 31.]

5 August 90

POLITICAL

President Bush dispatched Defense Secretary Cheney to Saudi Arabia to meet with King Fahd. He carried intelligence information about the Iraqi troop buildup along the border with Saudi Arabia in an attempt to persuade the Saudis to allow the United States to use their country for basing in a Gulf military operation. Secretary Cheney was accompanied by Mr. Robert Gates, deputy National Security Adviser, and General Schwarzkopf, USCINCCENT. China joined with Western nations and the USSR in declaring that it would not sell arms to Iraq. [Patrick Tyler, "Bush Orders Effort Aimed at Toppling Saddam: Defense Secretary Dispatched to Saudi Arabia," *The Washington Post*, 6 Aug 90, p 1; Lionel Barber, "Cheney Trip to Bolster Saudis," *The London Financial Times*, 7 August 1990, p 3. Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner also accompanied Secretary Cheney. He remained in Saudi Arabia as the USCENTCOM Forward commander after Secretary Cheney and General Schwarzkopf departed.]

6 August 90

POLITICAL

The UN Security Council voted thirteen to zero to impose economic sanctions against Iraq. Saddam Hussein declared the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq. Several hundred Westerners, including at least twenty-eight Americans, were taken from hotels in Kuwait and transported by bus to Baghdad. President Bush pushed for a complete international economic embargo against Iraq, including the shutdown of Iraq's two oil export

Gulf War Chronology

pipelines through Saudi Arabia and Turkey. [Patrick Tyler, "UN Security Council Votes Embargo on Iraq: Saddam Says Seizure of Kuwait Is Permanent," *The Washington Post*, 7 Aug 90, p 1.]

7 August 90 (C-day)

[C-day is the day on which movement of troops, cargo, weapons systems, or a combination of these elements from their place of origin begins. (JCS Pub 5-02.1)]

POLITICAL


King Fahd approved the deployment of multinational forces into Saudi Arabia for defense against Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait. Turkey shut off the pipelines that carried Iraqi oil across its territory to the Mediterranean. Secretary Cheney met in Cairo with President Mubarak who agreed to send about 2,000 airborne troops plus ranger and armored units. Also, Mubarak approved passage of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS *Eisenhower* and its escort ships through the Suez Canal. Later in the day, Secretary Cheney met with Morocco's King Hassan seeking his support in the Gulf crisis. [Nora Boustany, "U.S. Sends Troops, Jets to Saudi Arabia as Iraqi Forces Pose 'Imminent Threat'" *The Washington Post*, 8 Aug 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

The first elements of the 71st Tactical Fighter Squadron departed from Langley AFB at 1725 EDT, about eighteen hours after the deployment order. [Brfg, Contingency Support Staff to Lt. Gen. J.V. Adams (AF/XO), "Iraq-Kuwait Update," 8 Aug 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CORONA, "Desert Shield Update," 8 Nov 90.]

At 0902 EDT, U.S. Air Forces, Central Command (CENTAF), 9th Air Force (CENTAF) personnel from Shaw AFB, led by Maj. Gen. Thomas R. Olsen as CENTAF commander, departed for Riyadh. Traveling via Zaragoza AB, the group arrived in Saudi Arabia on 8 August at 0430 EDT to establish CENTAF Forward. [Monograph, William T. Y'Blood, *The Eagle and the Scorpion* (Center for Air Force History, Washington D.C., 1992), pp 40-41.]

Strategic airlift operations began with the flight of a C-141 from Charleston AFB, South Carolina. The aircraft, manned by a reserve crew from the 459th Military Airlift Wing, arrived at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 8 Aug at 0400 EDT. [Rpt, MAC Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Air Transportation/XOCR, "Military Air Integrated Reporting System (MAIRS) DESERT SHIELD History," Aug 1990.]



- Time Zones
- Agriculture and Other Thematic Maps

Gulf War Chronology

8 August 90 (C plus 1)

POLITICAL

Declaring that "a line has been drawn in the sand," President Bush told the nation he had deployed U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia to take up "defensive positions" to protect against possible attack from Iraqi troops massed on the border with Kuwait. He equated the U.S. commitment to defend Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations to the four-decade "struggle for freedom in Europe," and compared Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler. "If history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms." He stated that the United States was not preparing for "a long ground war"; nevertheless, he warned the public to be prepared for a lengthy commitment. [Dan Balz and Molly Moore, "Bush Asks Nation to Back 'Defensive' Mission as U.S. Forces Begin Arriving in Saudi Arabia," *The Washington Post*, 9 Aug 90, p 1.]

Britain became the first foreign power to join the United States in sending military forces to defend Saudi Arabia. [Glenn Frankel, "Britain First to Join Multinational Force," *The Washington Post*, 9 Aug 90, p 37.]

MILITARY

Twenty-four F-15s from the 71st Tactical Fighter Squadron, Langley AFB, arrived in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, at 0900 EDT, approximately thirty-four hours after the deployment order. Five AWACS aircraft from Tinker AFB "closed" at Riyadh at 1300 EDT. These were the first USAF aircraft to arrive in the AOR in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD. Enroute to Dhahran, the F-15s were refueled seven times. This support came from 2d Bomb Wing KC-10s, themselves enroute to Riyadh, and from KC-10s at Zaragoza AB, Spain; RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom; and Sigonella, Italy. [Brfg, Contingency Support Staff to Lt. Gen. J.V. Adams (AF/XO), "Iraq-Kuwait Update," 08/2200 EDT Aug 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CORONA, "DESERT SHIELD Update," 8 Nov 90; Monograph, William T. Y'Blood, *The Eagle and the Scorpion* (Center for Air Force History, Washington D.C., 1992), pp 43-45.]

Col. John A. Warden III, Director for Warfighting Concepts (AF/XOXW), briefed General John M. Loh, the Vice-Chief of Staff, on a concept for bombing Iraq. In response to General Schwarzkopf's request for Air Staff assistance, General Loh directed Colonel Warden to proceed with the development of a plan. Target priorities were strategic air defense, strategic offense (including missiles with chemical warheads and a nuclear research program), the Saddam Hussein regime (and its command, control, and communications), electricity, refined oil for Iraqi consumption, railroads, and highways. [Brfg, AF/XOXW, "Iraqi Air Campaign," 8 Aug 90.]

August 1990

The Iraqis had captured U.S.-made Hawk surface-to-air missiles in Kuwait. It was estimated that, if they also obtained manuals and captured some operators, the missiles would be operational immediately. If no operators were captured, then it was believed that the Iraqis would need two days to bring the Hawks to minimum operational capability. [Point Paper, Air Force Intelligence Agency/INOM, "Iraq-Kuwait Update," 08/1530 EDT Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—31

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
F-15	24	E-3 (AWACS)	5
		KC-135	2

[Brfg, Contingency Support Staff to Lt. Gen. J.V. Adams (AF/XO), "Iraq-Kuwait Update," 08/0500 EDT Aug 90.]

9 August 90 (C plus 2)

POLITICAL

President Bush sent a notice to Mr. Thomas Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives, informing Congress that he ordered U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia. "I am providing this report on the deployment and mission of our Armed Forces," stated the president, "in accordance with my desire that Congress be fully informed and consistent with the War Powers Resolution." ["Military Assistance to Saudi Arabia," 101st Cong, 2d Sess, House Doc 101-225, 9 Aug 91.]

Public opinion polls showed that more than 80 percent of Americans supported President Bush's deployment of forces to the Persian Gulf. [George Haj, "Poll: Troops Should Be in Mideast," *USA Today*, 9 Aug 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

The first RC-135 entered Saudi airspace and began collection against Iraqi targets. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 10/0650z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—61

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
F-15	45	E-3 (AWACS)	5
		KC-10	8
		KC-135	2
		RC-135	1

[Brfg, Contingency Support Staff to Lt. Gen. J.V. Adams (AF/XO), "Iraq-Kuwait Update," 09/0700 EDT Aug 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

10 August 90 (C plus 3)

POLITICAL

The American Embassy in Kuwait reported having food and water shortages. It had enough food for eight days and did not expect to hold out longer than thirty days. Information from hotels in Kuwait City was that Americans were healthy and not having difficulties with food, water, or harassment from Iraqi troops. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 10/0650z Aug 90.]

MILITARY

The major logistics limiting factors identified were the lack of U.S.-owned antitank munitions, the shortage of chemical warfare defense equipment, and fuel additives. The Joint Staff tasked the Army to act as executive agent for all chemical warfare protective gear and antidotes. No fuel problems were reported, but this remained a concern because supplies were totally dependent on host nation support. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX, "Saudi Logistics Support," 10 Aug 90.]

A 24-hour AWACS orbit was being maintained through a joint U.S. and Saudi effort. Saudis were providing a 24-hour fighter combat air patrol. The Dhahran-based USAF F-15s flew training and orientation flights and were preparing for follow-on combat air patrol assignments. Iraqi soldiers were reportedly looting Kuwait City. Iraqi air defenses in Kuwait included two SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites that appeared to be operational and a third site under construction. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 10/0650z Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—25,317

Total CENTAF Personnel—6,143

[Brfg, Contingency Support Staff to Lt. Gen. J.V. Adams (AF/XO), "Operation DESERT SHIELD Update," 10/1500 EDT Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—104

Combat		Support	
F-15	45	E-3 (AWACS)	5
F-15E	19	KC-10	8
F-16	24	KC-135	2
		RC-135	1

[Brfg, Contingency Support Staff to Lt. Gen. J.V. Adams (AF/XO), "Operation DESERT SHIELD Update," 10/1500 EDT Aug 90.]

August 1990

11 August 90 (C plus 4)

POLITICAL

The American Embassy in Kuwait was informed that Westerners, to include Americans, Canadians, and British specifically, would not be allowed to leave Kuwait. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 11/0848z Aug 90.]

MILITARY

The JCS was advised of the necessity to consider reprioritizing airlift schedules because of the limitation caused by the "near total lack of air-to-ground capability." One example cited was that sixty-five C-141 loads of F-15 and F-16 standard air munitions packages and standard tank racks adapters and pylons packages were still waiting transportation due to lack of airlift. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Wiseman, AF/LEYX, "Munitions Status," 11 Aug 90.]

Exercise ARABIAN GULF was conducted to coordinate air operations in the Persian Gulf. Participants included the Royal Saudi Air Force, USAF, USN, and Headquarters Special Operations Command Central deployed units. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 11/0848z Aug 90.]

A total of seven Iraqi SA-2 and four SA-6 surface-to-air missile batteries were identified in Kuwait. Reacting to the growing U.S. presence, Iraqi air activity significantly increased. During daylight hours, Mirage F-1s, MiG-23/Floggers, and MiG-25/Foxbats conducted near-continuous defensive fighter patrols over southeast Iraq and Kuwait. Il-76/Candids were being used to airlift supplies into southern Iraq and Kuwait. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 11/0848z Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—28,367

Total CENTAF Personnel—8,981

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 11/0848z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—110

Combat		Support	
F-15	45	E-3 (AWACS)	5
F-15E	19	KC-10	10
F-16	24	KC-135	4
		RC-135	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 11/0848z Aug 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

12 August 90 (C plus 5)

POLITICAL

In a negotiation proposal, Saddam Hussein linked the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land and Syrian-Israeli occupation of Lebanese land to the Gulf crisis. [Edward Cody, "Time Could Be Saddam's Most Reliable Weapon," *The Washington Post*, 12 Sep 90, p 29.]

MILITARY

At 1700 EDT, CENTAF Rear Command, from Shaw AFB, and the Tactical Air Command (TAC) Battle Staff were consolidated at Headquarters TAC, Langley AFB. [Msg, Hq CENTAF (TAC) Langley AFB to Hq USAF Wash., D.C., "Sitrep," 13 Aug 90.]

The first British aircraft, twelve Tornados, arrived in AOR. A second ARABIAN GULF exercise was conducted to coordinate combat air patrols over the southern Gulf region. The exercise lasted twelve hours. A 24-hour alternating U.S.-Saudi AWACS orbit continued along with a 24-hour U.S.-Saudi combat air patrol. Plans were completed for a second AWACS orbit and combat air patrol supported by U.S. aircraft. F-16 aircraft began orientation flights. The first B-52 aircraft arrived at Diego Garcia. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 12/0621z Aug 90.]

Iraqi armor, mechanized infantry, and artillery assets in Kuwait remained deployed in a predominantly defensive posture and continued to improve their positions. This orientation of forces gave the appearance that Iraq was more concerned with coastal defense or defense against threats from the Saudi border than with conducting offensive operations. There was no indication of Iraqi preparation for use of chemical weapons in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. There were no confirmations of press reports that Saudi troops fired surface-to-air missiles at Iraqi reconnaissance planes which were overflying Saudi territory. Iraqi air defense units in Kuwait had been given free-fire orders. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 12/0621z Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—28,102*

Total CENTAF Personnel—8,220*

*Personnel numbers not consistent with previously reported statistics. They represent an adjustment in reported numbers.

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 12/0621z Aug 90.]

August 1990

USAF Aircraft Deployed—158

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
F-15	45	C-130	16
F-15E	19	E-3 (AWACS)	5
F-16	44	KC-10	10
		KC-135	16
		RC-135	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 12/0621z Aug 90.]

13 August 90 (C plus 6)

MILITARY

A second U.S. AWACS orbit was initiated on western Saudi Arabia with a U.S.-Saudi 24-hour fighter combat air patrol. U.S. F-16 aircraft at Al Dhafra, UAE, began flying an alert posture as munitions were built up. Oman formally requested 3,500 sets of chemical protective equipment.

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 13/0717z Aug 90.]

The Iraqi ground order-of-battle was three infantry divisions, two armored divisions, and one mechanized infantry division. The first active SA-3 surface-to-air missile site located in Kuwait was set up by Iraqi forces.

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 13/0717z Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—26,045*

Total CENTAF Personnel—5,150*

*Personnel numbers not consistent with previously reported statistics. They represent an adjustment in reported numbers.

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 13/0717z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—165

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
B-52	7	C-130	16
F-15	45	E-3 (AWACS)	5
F-15E	19	KC-10	10
F-16	44	KC-135	16
		RC-135	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 13/0717z Aug 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

August 1990

14 August 90 (C plus 7)

POLITICAL

All U.S. government employees and their dependents were moved to the American Embassy in Kuwait, bringing the total population there to 149. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 14/0600z Aug 90.]

MILITARY

USCENTCOM directed the reprioritizing of airlift to increase the flow of munitions, and the TAC battle staff realigned the Time Phased Force Deployment List accordingly. Standard air munitions package shipments were still delayed. Of the thirty-six packages planned to arrive in-country, only three had been delivered. Initial review of the chemical warfare defense equipment inventory identified significant shortfalls in aircrew hoods, masks, and filters. Of the eighty-eight mission-capable C-5s, seventy-four planes (84 percent) were dedicated to DESERT SHIELD. Of the 187 C-141s, 119 (64 percent) were assisting with the operation. [Point Paper, "Daily Logistics Update," 14 Aug 90.]

USCENTCOM was awaiting the execution order for maritime interdiction operations to enforce an economic quarantine on Iraq/Kuwait. Twelve British Jaguars and a Nimrod aircraft joined the multinational forces in AOR. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 14/0600z Aug 90.]

Additional major elements of an Iraqi regular army mechanized infantry division were identified in Kuwait. There was no chemical or Scud activity observed in Kuwait. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 14/0600z Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—28,731

Total CENTAF Personnel—6,221

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 14/0600z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—218

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
B-52	14	C-130	32
F-15	46	E-3 (AWACS)	5
F-15E	22	KC-10	10
F-16	44	KC-135	42
		RC-135	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 14/0600z Aug 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

15 August 90 (C plus 8)

MILITARY

USCENTCOM informed the Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) that standard fuels would be provided by the host nations at no charge to the United States and that DFSC contracts were not to be used. USCENTCOM DP advised that units deploy with three sets of chemical warfare defense equipment, in contrast to the table of allowance authorization of four. Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) accelerated contract production of chemical warfare equipment. General Hansford T. Johnson, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Transportation Command/Commander-in-Chief, Military Airlift Command (CINCTrans/CINCMAC), increased allowable cargo loads and augmented passenger and cargo missions with commercial airlift when possible, but he acted short of exercising the Civil Reserve Air Fleet option. [Point Paper, "Daily Logistics Update," 15 Aug 90.]

The potential deployment of Iraqi aircraft, such as the Su-25/Frogfoot, into Kuwaiti bases remained high. Such a deployment would indicate Iraqi confidence in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti integrated air defense network and provide increased offensive capability closer to the forward line of troops. An Iraqi SA-3 surface-to-air missile battalion was located in Kuwait for the first time. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 16/0800z Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—30,033

Total CENTAF Personnel—6,798

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 15/0615z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—225

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
B-52	14	C-130	32
F-15	46	E-3 (AWACS)	5
F-15E	22	KC-10	6
F-16	44	KC-135	53
		RC-135	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 15/0615z Aug 90.]

16 August 90 (C plus 9)

POLITICAL

Iraq directed U.S. and British diplomats in Kuwait to order the 2,500 Americans and 4,000 Britons stranded there to assemble in two hotels. Both

countries protested the order and described it as "ominous." [Bill McAllister, "Iraq Directs Americans, Britons to Assemble," The Washington Post, 17 Aug 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

HQ USAF-Logistics Readiness Center continued to evaluate the TAC and MAC decisions to send three chemical warfare defensive equipment sets per man versus the four sets that were the table of allowance standard. USCENTCOM reported that in-theater stocks of lip balm and sunblock were not sufficient. DESERT SHIELD Encompassed 97 percent of total C-5 missions and 88 percent of C-141 mission-capable aircraft. For the first time in history, the entire U.S. strategic airlift capability was committed worldwide. [Point Paper, "Daily Logistics Update," 16 Aug 90.]

USCINCCENT was planning maritime quarantine operations to enforce economic sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait. Dhahran remained the primary reception airfield in the eastern province. The main problem was a lack of refueling capability. This was expected to be solved by the arrival of an R-14 storage system and nine R-9 refuelers. USCINCCENT pointed out that excessive reliance on Dhahran as the primary aerial port of debarkation (APOD) was hampering the rapid buildup of combat power. He was taking action to identify and open additional APODs. The priority of flow was to build combat power, with emphasis on antitank capability. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 16/0800z Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—31,684 (693 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—7,527 (463 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 16/0800z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—229

<i>Combat</i>	<i>Support</i>
B-52 20	C-130 31
F-15 46	E-3 (AWACS) 5
F-15E 22	KC-135 54
F-16 44	MH-53 4
	RC-135 3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 16/0800z Aug 90; All KC-10s departed from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and those remaining at Diego Garcia were scheduled for departure. Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 17 Aug 90.]

17 August 90 [C plus 10]

MILITARY

General Johnson, CINCTrans/CINCMAC, activated the Civil Reserve Air Fleet for the first time since its creation in 1951. This added 17 aircraft capable of carrying in a total of 1,920 passengers per day and 21 aircraft, with a cargo airlift capacity of 490 tons per day. CENTAF was reviewing additional Aerial Ports of Debarkation with priority directed toward improving the flow of standard air munitions packages, specifically those with antiarmor concentration. [Point Paper, "Logistics Summary Briefing Operation DESERT SHIELD," 18 Aug 90.]

Strategic airlift had moved 20,060 passengers and 15,000 tons of cargo. All strategic airlift capability remained committed. DESERT SHIELD encompassed 95 percent of the mission-capable C-5s and 85 percent of the mission-capable C-141s. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 18 Aug 90.]

While performing a quality control check on chemical warfare defensive equipment products from Camel Manufacturing, the Defense Personnel Support Center discovered that 3,456 suits had been "fabricated defectively." All but 773 suits were recalled. The Logistics Readiness Center forwarded manufacturer's production code sequence numbers to all MAJCOMS to locate and return the defective suits. [Point Paper, "Logistics Summary Briefing Operation DESERT SHIELD," 17 Aug 90.]

USCENTCOM executed maritime interception operations to enforce economic sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait within the AOR. Host nations were cooperative in the release and movement of prepositioned assets from Bahrain and Oman to Saudi Arabia. The utility of such prepositioning schemes was demonstrated in the drawdown of equipment. The program proved to be a valuable strategic tool in aiding U.S. response time and sustaining deployed forces. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 17/0635z Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—38,028 (802 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—11,026 (551 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 17/0635z Aug 90.]

August 1990

USAF Aircraft Deployed—229

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
B-52	20	C-130	32
F-15	46	E-3 (AWACS)	5
F-15E	22	KC-135	53
F-16	44	MH-53	4
		RC-135	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 17/0635z Aug 90.]

18 August 90 [C plus 11]

MILITARY

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—39,438 (802 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—10,524 (551 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 18/0613z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—231

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
B-52	20	C-130	32
F-15	46	E-3 (AWACS)	5
F-15E	22	KC-135	55
F-16	44	MH-53	4
		RC-135	3

Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 18/0613z Aug 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 18 Aug 90.]

19 August 90 [C plus 12]

POLITICAL

An Iraqi government official announced that U.S. detainees would be "invited" to stay in Iraq until tangible guarantees were given to Iraq that no hostilities would occur. He said arrangements had been made with the ministries of oil, industry and military industrialization, the armed forces, and the refinery complex in Kuwait to hold detainees. This supported the reports that indicated Iraq would place Western detainees in Iraq near strategic sites to prevent U.S. air strikes. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 19/0655z Aug 90.]

MILITARY

U-2 imagery and electronic intelligence collections began in the AOR. Operations began to build an imagery database and to relieve the RC-135s that had been flying twenty-four-hour operations. The CENTCOM antitank capability was significantly increased with the closure of the first A-10 squadron, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade Cobra helicopters, and the initial Apache helicopters of the 101st Airborne Division. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 19/0655z Aug 90.]

Col. John A. Warden III, Director for Warfighting Concepts (AF/XOXW), and a group of staff members arrived in Riyadh with a plan to bomb Iraq. In less than two weeks after General Schwarzkopf had requested HQ USAF assistance, this plan had been developed in the Air Staff's Checkmate facility by Air Force, Navy, and Marine planners. Before going to Saudi Arabia, Colonel Warden had briefed General Schwarzkopf, General Powell, Admiral F. B. Kelso II (Chief of Naval Operations), and General Alfred M. Gray (Commandant of the Marine Corps). [Plan, AF/XOXW, "Instant Thunder," 17 Aug 90.]

The four MH-53 Pave Low helicopters of Air Force Special Operations Command Central received its initial Operation DESERT SHIELD mission—a forty-five-minute alert response to pick up U.S. Navy SEAL special reconnaissance teams stationed along the Saudi border. [Ltr, AFSOC/HO to CAFH/DRE, "Gulf War Chronology," 24 Jan 92.]

U.S. AWACS reported multiple Iraqi fighter flights out of all three primary Kuwaiti airfields in recent days. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 20/0554z Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—45,026 (879 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—11,068 (623 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 19/0613z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—302

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	24	C-130	48
B-52	20	E-3 (AWACS)	5
EC-130(CC)	3	KC-135	55
F-4G	20	MH-53	4
F-15	48	RC-135	3

August 1990

F-15E	24	U-2	2
F-16	46		

*Aircraft configured for the COMPASS CALL mission.

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 19/0613z Aug 90; Brfg,
AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 19 Aug 90.]

20 August 90 [C plus 13]

POLITICAL

In Iraq, 32 American citizens were at the American Embassy and 502 were at locations outside the embassy grounds. Thirty-five Americans were being held at an unknown location. In Kuwait, 125 Americans were at the American Embassy and 2,500 were outside embassy grounds. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 20/0554z Aug 90.]

MILITARY

Two B-52s flew training missions in the AOR to establish coordination procedures with AWACs. King Fahd International Airport (KFIA) was designated as an aerial port of debarkation for airlifting supplies and troops. After first being deployed to Riyadh and then to Dhahran, Special Operations Command Central also began moving to KFIA. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 20/0554z Aug 90; Ltr, AFSOC/HO to CAFH/DRE, "Gulf War Chronology," 24 Jan 92.]

Iraqi forces in southeastern Kuwait had constructed berms and extensive trenching in front of defensive positions. The large amount of engineering equipment indicated that this construction was extensive and would probably continue. This activity did not alter Iraq's option to defend or attack with little or no warning. The American Embassy, Kuwait, reported seeing a Scud-B transporter-erector-launcher in Kuwait City. This report was not confirmed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 20/0554z Aug 90.]

It was believed that Iraq had deployed a detachment of fighter aircraft to the Ali al Salem Airfield, Kuwait. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 21/0632z Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—48,381 (898 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—12,105 (623 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 20/0613z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—304

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	24	C-130	48
B-52	20	E-3 (AWACS)	5
EC-130(CC)	3	KC-135	57
F-4G	20	MH-53	4
F-15	48	RC-135	3
F-15E	24	U-2	2
F-16	46		

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 20/0613z Aug 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 20 Aug 90.]

21 August 90 [C plus 14]

POLITICAL

General Johnson, CINCTrans/CINCMAC, said in a Pentagon press conference that one billion pounds of materiel had arrived or were en route to Saudi Arabia in the first two weeks of the operation. He stated that this effort was more complex than the airlift to Southeast Asia and called it "the largest sustained airlift ever over a short period of time." Each day, 89 C-5 and 195 C-141 sorties were being flown to or from Saudi Arabia. [Rick Atkinson and Molly Moore, "Pentagon's Prodigious Supply Line," The Washington Post, 22 Aug 90, p 1.]

Reports indicated that, over the previous two days, two camps holding Americans and/or Europeans had been set up near an oil refinery and a power station. The camps, surrounded by barbed wire, held 50 to 150 individuals at each location. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 21/0632z Aug 90.]

MILITARY

Airlift in support of operations reached 33,864 passengers and 25,150 tons of cargo. [Msg, MACCAT to USTRANSCOM, "Sitrep," 22/0001z Aug 90.]

American Embassy reports substantiated claims that resistance activity in Kuwait was ongoing. Small Iraqi patrols had been ambushed, and embassy officials saw burning armored personnel carriers (APCs). There were continuing indications that Republican Guard units in Kuwait were being replaced by elements of the Iraqi regular army. Armored and mechanized infantry divisions on the

southern defensive perimeter were thinned out and replaced by infantry units. Also, the presence of Chinese-made APCs and older model armor, as opposed to top-of-the-line equipment employed by the Republican Guards, was noted. There were indications that Iraq had mined all the Kuwaiti harbors to enhance its coastal defense. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 21/0632z Aug 90.]

Iraqi air activity significantly increased in this 24-hour period. Major flight activity focused on transport flights, ground controlled intercept training in southern Iraq, and defensive patrols. Transport flights into Kuwait were evenly dispersed among all three primary airfields. This was in contrast to earlier flight activity when, on 18 and 20 August, respectively, flight activity was concentrated at Al Jaber AB and Al Salem AB. Inside Iraq, early warning and surface-to-air missile radars were usually turned on. Inside Kuwait, almost no electronic intelligence had been noted from early warning radars, and only sporadic surface-to-air missile radar emissions had been intercepted. These procedures were part of Iraq's attempt to mask the location of its air defense units. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 22/0405z Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—52,836 (1,000 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—12,284 (727 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 21/0632z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—364

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	48	C-130	51
B-52	20	E-3 (AWACS)	5
EC-130(CC)	3	HC-130	2
F-4G	20	KC-135	70
F-15	48	MH-53	4
F-15E	24	RC-135	3
F-16	46	U-2	2
F-117	18		

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 21/0632z Aug 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 21 Aug 90.]

22 August 90 [C plus 15]

MILITARY

In response to intelligence assessments that Iraq had weaponized anthrax, the Services' Surgeons General and the Assistant Secretary of the Defense Health Affairs concurred with a recommendation to vaccinate U.S. forces in the AOR. The vaccinations were given on a "priority" basis, with special operations forces being the first priority among USAF personnel. The vaccination program for anthrax began in mid-January 1991. [Point Paper, Col. Pitt Tomlinson, SGPS-PSP, "Medical Defense Against Anthrax for Operation DESERT SHIELD," 27 Aug 90; Intvw, Dr James Nanney, Historian, USAF Surgeon General's Office, 17 Apr 1991.]

The first "afloat" prepositioned ship, *Advantage*, with B-52 ammunition and air base assets, arrived in Jeddah and was offloading vehicles and equipment. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 22/0405z Aug 90. The first prepositioned ship from Diego Garcia, carrying supplies and munitions for the U.S. Marine Corps, arrived at Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15 Aug 90.]

The first night flying by Iraqi defensive patrols since the invasion of Kuwait occurred. Defensive patrols with MiG-29/Fulcrums and MiG-23/Floggers over Kuwait had increased. The emphasis of patrol coverage was on oil facilities, main lines of communication, and border regions. In forty-eight hours, there had been two airspace violations by Iraqi fighters. These were believed to be an Iraqi test of alert and response procedures. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 23/0400z Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—57,614 (1,025 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—12,356 (728 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 22/0405z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—364

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 22/0405z Aug 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 22 Aug 90.]

23 August 90 [C plus 16]

POLITICAL

Defense Secretary Cheney told the military services they could activate as many as 49,703 National Guard and reserves forces. The call-up could be made between 23 August and 1 October. (Patrick Tyler, "Cheney Authorizes Mobilization of 49,703 Reservists," The Washington Post, 24 Aug 90, p 1.)

MILITARY

Iraqi regular army units continued to replace Republican Guard forces. This operation was believed to be near completion. Evidence was discovered that indicated Iraq was preparing two artillery battalions in Kuwait for chemical weapons use. Eight large storage tanks, believed to be the ones removed earlier from a chemical warfare facility, were observed with artillery units in Kuwait. The containers held chemical warfare decontaminant which would be used in case of agent leakage during the firing of chemical artillery rounds. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 23/0400z Aug 90.]

Iraqi defensive air patrols increased over Kuwait and southern Iraq. Noted activity was combined Su-24/Fencer and MiG-29/Fulcrum training missions, and Mirage F-1s in training with early warning aircraft. Also, more than a dozen assault/attack helicopters were flown from southern Iraq to air bases in Kuwait. The increased fighters and helicopters at southern Iraqi and Kuwaiti airfields were seen as clear indications of forward deployment by Iraqi forces. The Iraqis appeared to be maintaining a primarily defensive posture with their air defense assets. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 24/0651z Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—60,999 (1,060 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—13,545 (764 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 23/0400z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—368

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	48	C-130	51
B-52	20	E-3 (AWACS)	5
EC-130(CC)	3	HC-130	4
F-4G	20	KC-135	70
F-15	48	MC-130	2

F-15E	24	MH-53	4
F-16	46	RC-135	3
F-117	18	U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 23/0400z Aug 90.]

24 August 90 [C plus 17]

POLITICAL

A convoy carrying nonessential U.S. government employees and their dependents traveled from Kuwait City to Baghdad. The 110 American citizens were resting at the embassy in Baghdad. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 24/0651z Aug 90.]

MILITARY

Air-to-ground munitions, particularly antitank, were receiving heavy emphasis due to the Iraqi ground force threat to Saudi Arabia. Virtually all USAF munitions on prepositioned ships were air-to-ground and were being off-loaded. The USAF force structure in Southwest Asia was three squadrons air-to-air and eight squadrons air-to-ground. Five additional air-to-ground squadrons were due to arrive by 4 September. The goal was to have a 60-day supply of air-to-ground munitions in the theater. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Cummings, AF/LRC, "Air-to-Ground vs Air-to-Air Emphasis in SWA," 24 Aug 90.]

Analysts believed that the heavily armored Republican Guard divisions in the interior of Kuwait had been replaced by units of the regular army. Elements of at least three armored/mechanized divisions assumed positions along the southern defensive line, while three Republican Guard infantry divisions continued to defend along the Kuwaiti coast. Reliable intelligence sources reported the presence of Scud transporter-erector-launchers with missiles in Kuwait. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 24/0651z Aug 90.]

The Iraqis scrambled four aircraft in reaction to an allied aircraft in Saudi airspace west of Kuwait. The allied aircraft was targeted as "hostile," indicating that the Iraqis considered the "Red Zone" (the South Kuwaiti border to the 28th parallel; no western boundary identified) as within their defensive perimeter. Iraqi reaction to allied aircraft conducting operations south of the Kuwaiti border—i.e., U.S.-Saudi AWACS and combat air patrol activity—was steadily increasing. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 25/0537z Aug 90.]

August 1990

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—62,921 (1,170 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—13,691 (768 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 24/0651z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—369

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	46	C-21	3
B-52	20	C-130	51
EC-130(CC)	3	E-3 (AWACS)	5
F-4G	20	HC-130	4
F-15	48	KC-135	68
F-15E	24	MC-130	2
F-16	46	MH-53	4
F-117	18	RC-135	3
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 24/0651z Aug 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 24 Aug 90.]

25 August 90 [C plus 18]

POLITICAL

Iraq was holding firm to its rule of no exit for dependents and staff of embassies which remained open in Kuwait. It appeared, from debriefings of evacuees, that American citizens continued to remain in their private dwellings or had been provided shelter by friendly Kuwaitis. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 25/0537z Aug 90.]

MILITARY

The Defense Personnel Support Center continued to search for defective chemical warfare defensive equipment sets that may have been shipped into Southwest Asia. Four sets were located within the AOR, but 574 suits remained unaccounted for. MAC determined 463L pallets to be in critical supply and had advised deploying DOD component units to use their own stockpiled assets. AFLC ordered 5,472 new pallets. Increased emphasis was placed on action to return 463L equipment from the AOR to fulfill still-to-be-deployed shipment requirements from the continental United States (CONUS). [Point Paper, "Logistics Summary Briefing Operation DESERT SHIELD," 25 Aug 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—64,699 (1,307 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—13,872 (793 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 25/0537z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—387

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	46	C-20	1
B-52	20	C-21	4
EC-130(CC)	3	C-130	51
EF-111	8	E-3 (AWACS)	5
F-4G	20	HC-130	4
F-15	48	KC-135	68
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	46	MH-53	4
F-117	18	RC-135	3
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 25/0537z Aug 90; Brfg,

AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 25 Aug 90.]

26 August 90 [C plus 19]

POLITICAL

The Japanese government offered to provide noncombatant supplies and equipment to fill DESERT SHIELD shortfalls. This offer stimulated the development by each command of both a generalized and a specific "wish list" of shortages that could be filled by any country wanting to assist DESERT SHIELD forces. Foreign donated airlift was being scheduled into the transportation flow. [Point Paper, "Logistics Summary Briefing Operation DESERT SHIELD," 26 Aug 90.]

An Iraqi spokesman announced that dependents of diplomats of nations refusing to close embassies in Kuwait would be permitted to depart Iraq. A reliable source reported that 59 nonofficial American citizens, part of the 110 who made up the convoy from Kuwait, were allowed to depart from Baghdad. Iraqi authorities described the departure of these dependents as a humanitarian gesture in response to an appeal by King Hussein of Jordan. The electricity to the American Embassy in Kuwait was shut off. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 26/0552z Aug 90.]

MILITARY

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, and Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Robert B. Johnston, USMC, arrived in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. General Schwarzkopf replaced Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, USAF, as USCINCCENT. Lt. Gen. Horner took command of CENTAF from Maj. Gen. Thomas R. Olsen. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 27/0513z Aug 90.]

There were indications that Iraqi forces had deployed in brigade strength to at least three locations west of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, increasing the threat to allied troops. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 26/0552z Aug 90.]

Iraqi air activity remained high. More than 70 flights were noted. MiG-23/Floggers and MiG-29/Fulcrums maintained a near continuous combat air patrol in a north-south orbit over southern Iraq and central Kuwait. A formation of two MiG-23/Floggers was launched from Ali al Salem AB, Kuwait, and they conducted practice flights along a route paralleling the Saudi-Iraqi pipeline in the vicinity of the Saudi-Iraqi border. The aircraft may have flown eleven nautical miles inside Saudi territory. The number of fighter patrols originating from Kuwaiti bases increased over the last week. While there was no confirmation of permanent basing of Iraqi aircraft, the frequency and number of flights suggested the Iraqis were conducting terrain and base familiarization along with exercising their alert and response procedures. An Iraqi airborne early warning platform was noted active with two unidentified aircraft. The Iraqi capability to command and control fighter aircraft had not been confirmed, but high levels of airborne early warning air activity did confirm their intent to master this capability. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 27/0513z Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—69,221 (1,373 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—15,189 (851 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 26/0552z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—409

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	46	C-20	1
B-52	20	C-21	4
EC-130(CC)	3	C-130	54
EF-111	8	E-3 (AWACS)	5
F-4G	20	HC-130	4

F-15	48	KC-135	69
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	46	MH-53	4
F-111	18	RC-135	3
F-117	18	RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 26/0552z Aug 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 26 Aug 90.]

27 August 90 [C plus 20]

POLITICAL

In Iraq, 57 American citizens were being held at the American Embassy, 466 American citizens were outside the embassy, and 51 Americans were being held at unknown locations. In Kuwait, 44 American citizens were at the embassy and 2,414 were outside the embassy. The nonofficial American citizens who had departed from Baghdad crossed the border into Turkey. Three American males, older than 18 years of age, were denied permission to exit Iraq and were returned to the American Embassy in Baghdad. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 27/0513z Aug 90.]

MILITARY

Lack of sufficient anti-armor and anti-radiation munitions in theater continued to be a major logistical concern. [Brfg, "Daily CSS Briefing/Logistics Portion," 27 Aug 90.]

USAF strategic airlift had delivered 42,673 passengers and 32,607 tons of cargo. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 27 Aug 90.]

A Republic of Korea Boeing 747 airliner began making airlift support flights, and a second 747 was offered for use. Kuwait also offered two 747s, but neither plane was integrated into the flight schedule at this time. Japanese assets were under review. [Point Paper, "Logistics Summary Briefing Operation DESERT SHIELD," 27 Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—72,512 (1,463 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—16,211 (886 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 27/0513z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—427

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	48	C-20	1
B-52	20	C-21	4
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	54
EF-111	8	E-3 (AWACS)	5
F-4G	24	HC-130	4
F-15	48	KC-135	79
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	46	MH-53	4
F-111	18	RC-135	3
F-117	18	RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 27/0513z Aug 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 27 Aug 90.]

28 August 90 [C plus 21]

POLITICAL

German authorities arrested Juegen Mohammed Gietier, a thirty-five-year-old archivist for the German Foreign Affairs Ministry, for selling secret U.S. and German documents to Iraq. German intelligence sources said the case was "very serious" because Iraq learned "the U.S. analysis of the Gulf situation" before Iraq's 2 August invasion of Kuwait. [Marc Fisher, "German Arrested as Spy Selling Iraq Recent Data," The Washington Post, 18 Oct 90, p 41.]

MILITARY

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—77,724 (1,586 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—16,431 (940 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 28/0221z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—436

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	48	C-20	1
B-52	20	C-21	4
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	61
EF-111	10	E-3 (AWACS)	5

F-4G	24	HC-130	4
F-15	48	KC-135	78
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	46	MH-53	4
F-111	18	RC-135	4
F-117	18	RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 28/0221z Aug 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 28 Aug 90.]

29 August 90 [C plus 22]

MILITARY

A C-5 bound for the AOR crashed on takeoff at Ramstein AB, killing thirteen of the seventeen personnel on board. [Point Paper, "Logistics Summary Briefing Operation DESERT SHIELD," 30 Aug 90; Marc Fisher, "Crash of Gulf-Bound Jet Revives German Fears," The Washington Post, 30 Aug 90, p 33.]

MAC reported administrative delays in the use of the Japanese-volunteered airlift in support of DESERT SHIELD. Successful use of Japanese aircraft hinged on the definition of "nonmilitary" cargo. MAC wanted to incorporate four flights per week of Japanese aircraft. [Point Paper, "Logistics Summary Briefing Operation DESERT SHIELD," 29 Aug 90.]

The first TR-1 surveillance mission was flown in the AOR. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Aug 90.]

Iraqi air activity reached its highest sortie rate since the invasion of Kuwait. Of the 171 sorties noted, 50 percent involved fighter aircraft training. The training activity in southern Iraq and Kuwait involved ground attack, ground-control intercept, low-level, and defensive patrol profiles. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—82,806 (1,549 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—17,752 (904 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—442

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	48	C-20	1
B-52	20	C-21	4
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	66
EF-111	10	E-3 (AWACS)	5
F-4G	24	HC-130	4
F-15	48	KC-135	79
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	46	MH-53	4
F-111	18	RC-135	4
F-117	18	RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Aug 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 29 Aug 90.]

30 August 90 [C plus 23]

MILITARY

Maximum use of theater C-130 assets kept tasking of available aircraft consistently more than 95 percent per day. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Aug 90.]

The number of Iraqi tanks in southern Iraq and Kuwait totaled 1,500 to 2,000. With the air-to-surface missiles and 30-mm rounds in theater, the USAF tank kill potential was estimated to be 3,270. Adding USA, USN, USMC, and allied capability to the USAF's, the potential existed to destroy all known Iraqi tanks. [Point Paper, Col. Walls, AF/XOX, "AF Anti-Tank Munitions and Capability," 30 Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—87,103 (1,879 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—19,208 (968 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—479

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	48	C-20	1
B-52	20	C-21	4
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	67
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3 (AWACS)	5

EF-111	10	HC-130	4
F-4G	24	KC-135	79
F-15	58	MC-130	4
F-15E	24	MH-53	4
F-16	70	RC-135	4
F-111	18	RF-4C	6
F-117	18	TR-1	2
		U-2	2

*Aircraft configured for the VOLANT SOLO mission.

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Aug 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "D<MS>ESERT S<MS>HIELD Brief," 30 Aug 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—265	
Tactical/Support	137
Tanker Refueling	25
Intratheater Airlift	103
MARCENT—122	
NAVCENT—65	

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Aug 90.]

31 August 90 [C plus 24]

MILITARY

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)/Logistics Directorate (J-4) policy limited the issue of desert battle dress uniforms to security police and tactical air control party individuals. However, USAF Logistics Readiness Center asked JCS/J-4 to amend that policy to allow the issue of certain items from the complete set to personnel engaged in flightline activities and exposed to the wind and sand. Specific items requested included desert goggles, scarves, and protective lightweight gloves. The explosives waiver for Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) aircraft passing through the Federal Republic of Germany expired today; however, the State Department notified USTRANSCOM that the waiver would most likely be renewed. [Brfg, "Daily CSS Briefing/Logistics Portion," 31 Aug 90.]

The first USAF Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) mission was conducted in the Gulf crisis. An MH-53 crew responded quickly. The crisis proved to be negative; however, valuable lessons were learned which were incorporated into the CSAR plan. A total of 364 ships were intercepted by naval forces during August. Nine ships were

August 1990

boarded and searched. Only four ships were turned back. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Aug 90.]

Iraqi ground forces continued to improve their defensive positions throughout Kuwait; however, their defensive efforts were not uniform across the region. In some areas, the defenses were layered with trenches, wire, and probable covering fire, while in other areas the defensive line was sparse and not well defined. Iraqi corps and divisional boundaries traditionally were considered weak areas and subject to exploitation. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Aug 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—90,317 (2,068 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—20,562 (1,037 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Aug 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—513

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	72	C-20	1
B-52	20	C-21	4
EC-130(CC)	6	C-130	70
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3 (AWACS)	5
EF-111	10	EC-130E*	6
F-4G	24	HC-130	4
F-15	58	KC-135	79
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	70	MH-53	4
F-111	18	RC-135	4
F-117	18	RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

*Aircraft configured for the ABCCC mission.

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Aug 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 31 Aug 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—250

Tactical/Support 95

Tanker Refueling 37

Intratheater Airlift 118

MARCENT—91

NAVCENT—140

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Sep 90.]

September 1990

1 September 90 [C plus 25]

MILITARY

Air operations priorities were listed in the following order:

Priority 1—Counterair: Combat air patrols for AWACS, RC-135 (RIVET JOINT), and airfield protection were to be maintained. If attacked, air assets were to disrupt enemy air operations and attrit enemy aircraft, with a priority placed on the destruction of enemy bombers.

Priority 2—Interdiction: A defensive posture with ground alert aircraft was to be maintained. These assets were to delay and attrit any Iraqi ground forces that crossed into Saudi territory by attacking chokepoints and areas of troop concentrations.

Priority 3—Close Air Support (CAS): A capability to provide support for friendly troops in contact with Iraqi forces was to be maintained.

Priority 4—Air assets were to continue preparations for possible D-day operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Sep 90.]

The Saudis allowed use of numerous national assets and military facilities at no cost and assisted in obtaining essential leasing and support contracts. Use of Saudi ports, port facilities, warehouses, ammunition holding areas, marshaling areas, airfields and ramp space, headquarters building space, bulk water, and some military compounds was provided at no cost. The Saudis provided approximately 25,000 meals per day at no cost, and host nation, U.S.—

funded vendor contracts provided additional meals costing, to date, \$3.8 million. Saudi Arabia had provided 32 million gallons of fuel, 30.5 million gallons by U.S.-funded defense fuel service contract and 1.5 million gallons free of charge. The host nation was providing approximately 1.1 million gallons of bulk water per day, free of charge. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Sep 90.]

The Iraqi ground forces continued to fortify their defensive positions with construction of man-made obstacles. It was believed that Iraq possessed the capability to attack Saudi Arabia within eighteen to twenty-four hours of making that decision. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Sep 90.]

Iraqi air activity decreased significantly in twenty-four hours. No defensive patrols had been flown for two days. One reason for this inactivity was conservation of resources—equipment, fuel, and logistics—an action which could be undertaken only in recognition of the nonhostile intentions of the U.S. and allied forces. This procedure placed increased reliance on the Iraqi early warning-acquisition radar system and on Iraqi aircraft on alert status. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—95,965 (2,494 women)
Total CENTAF Personnel—21,694 (1,111 women)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—563

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	72	C-20	1
B-52	20	C-21	4
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	70
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3(AWACS)	6
EF-111	10	EC-130E	6
F-4G	24	HC-130	4
F-15	70	KC-135	79
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	106	MH-53	6
F-111	18	RC-135	4
F-117	18	RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Sep 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—825

Air-to-Air	106
(F-14, F-15)	
Air-to-Ground	204
(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)	
Dual Role	214
(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)	

Total Combat Aircraft 524

Support Aircraft 301

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—290

Tactical/Support	125
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Tanker Refueling	36
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Intratheater Airlift	129
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MARCENT—59

NAVCENT—139

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Sep 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	405
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Boarded	13
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Diverted	4
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Warning Shots Fired	2
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[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Sep 90.]

2 September 90 [C plus 26]

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity continued at a lower level. A probable Su-17/Fitter conducted a reconnaissance run which penetrated approximately two miles into the former neutral zone and continued east along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border. Two Iraqi MiG-29/Fulcrums scrambled to perform defensive patrols in expectation of reaction from Saudi-based forces. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—99,747 (2,649 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—21,968 (1,118 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—615

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
B-52	20	C-21	4
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	70
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3(AWACS)	6
EF-111	10	EC-130E	6
F-4G	24	HC-130	4
F-15	70	KC-135	79
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	6
F-111	32	RC-135	4
F-117	18	RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—485	
Tactical/Support	241
Tanker Refueling	41
Intratheater Airlift	203
MARCENT—86	
NAVCENT—61	

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 03/0800z Sep 90.]

3 September 90 [C plus 27]

MILITARY

General Schwarzkopf observed that, despite the "extraordinary effort by [US] TRANSCOM and Military Sealift," command sealift "closure" had slipped continuously from the start of the deployment. Vessels had not met breakout requirements and had experienced mechanical difficulties. "The end result is a slippage in my high confidence defense date," General Schwarzkopf stated. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Sep 90.]

A working group developed the final draft of the concept of operations for a combined defense. The Saudis requested the mission statement be adjusted to transition away from language that implied

Gulf War Chronology

the United States would defend, to language that indicated the U.S. and Arab-Islamic forces would assist the Saudis to defend in a combined effort. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Sep 90.]

Recently identified navigation towers in south central Iraq explained the turning areas for Iraqi reconnaissance flights. The Iraqi Air Force was conducting its high-speed, low-level flights west of Kuwait also by keying on a number of towers in the vicinity of the training area. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—103,446 (2,731 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—23,489 (1,152 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—618

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
B-52	20	C-21	4
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	70
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3(AWACS)	6
EF-111	10	EC-130E	6
F-4G	24	HC-130	4
F-15	72	KC-135	79
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	119	MH-53	8
F-111	32	RC-135	4
F-117	18	RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—412

Tactical/Support 239

Tanker Refueling 30

Intratheater Airlift 143

MARCENT—61

NAVCENT—109

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Sep 90; Msg,

COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 04/0800z Sep 90.]

4 September 90 [C plus 28]**MILITARY**

For the first time, U.S. forces seized control of an Iraqi ship in support of the UN embargo against Iraq. The *Zanoobia* was taken to Muscat, Oman. The Iraqi Ambassador to Oman instructed the ship to return to Sri Lanka to off-load its cargo of tea. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—104,304 (2,827 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—23,854 (1,243 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—619

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
B-52	20	C-21	4
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	70
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EF-111	10	EC-130E	6
F-4G	24	HC-130	4
F-15	72	KC-135	79
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	32	RC-135	4
F-117	18	RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—505

Tactical/Support 333

Tanker Refueling 38

Intratheater Airlift 134

MARCENT—93

NAVCENT—125

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 05/0800z Sep 90.]

5 September 90 [C plus 29]

MILITARY

Strategic airlift missions in support of DESERT SHIELD reached 1,922, with 1,615 flown to the AOR. The total number of passengers was 67,263, and the total amount of cargo was 46,946 tons. [Brfg, "Logistics Readiness Center Daily CSS Briefing/Logistics Portion," 5 Sep 90.]

Iraqi tactical air activity included three combat air patrols and night ground controlled intercept training. Transport activity made up approximately 50 percent of the Iraqi sorties. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—106,100 (3,083 women)
Total CENTAF Personnel—24,399 (1,303 women)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—631

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
B-52	20	C-21	4
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	70
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3(AWACS)	6
EF-111	10	EC-130E	6
F-4G	36	HC-130	4
F-15	72	KC-135	79
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	32	RC-135	4
F-117	18	RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Sep 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 5 Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—370	
Tactical/Support	184
Tanker Refueling	33
Intratheater Airlift	153
MARCENT—93	
NAVCENT—117	

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 06/0800z Sep 90.]

6 September 90 [C plus 30]

POLITICAL

Saudi Arabia gave the United States an explicit commitment to contribute billions of dollars in windfall oil revenues to underwrite the cost of DESERT SHIELD. U.S. officials hoped this and other contributions from wealthy Persian Gulf states, along with smaller amounts from Europe and Japan, would cover most of the estimated \$6 billion in extra expense the U.S. military would incur by the end of the year. [David Hoffman, "Saudis Agree to Pay Billions for Defense," *The Washington Post*, 7 Sep 90, p 1.]

Britain's Parliament, meeting in emergency session for the first time since the Falklands War eight years earlier, voiced overwhelming support for the Western military deployment in the Persian Gulf. [Glenn Frankel, "British Gulf Role Wins Broad Backing," *The Washington Post*, 7 Sep 90, p 25.]

In Iraq, ninety-six American citizens remained in the American Embassy. It was believed that 300 Americans were being held hostage at fifteen to twenty strategic sites in Iraq. Thirty-nine American citizens were in the embassy in Kuwait. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Sep 90.]

MILITARY

MAC requested use of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, as a staging base for crews. [Brfg, "Logistical Readiness Center Daily CSS Briefing/ Logistics Portion," 6 Sep 90.]

Efforts continued to coordinate more realistic air-to-ground tactics training in Saudi Arabia. Primary areas included reduction of

Gulf War Chronology

low-level restrictions and range use for live and "dry" tactics training. Small-scale exercises were planned to coordinate use and connectivity of electronic combat assets. Priority tactical airlift was being used to distribute munitions to desired air bases to build local stocks. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—110,221 (3,153 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—26,281 (1,356 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—634

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
B-52	20	C-21	4
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	70
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3(AWACS)	6
EF-111	13	EC-130E	6
F-4G	36	HC-130	4
F-15	72	KC-135	79
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	32	RC-135	4
F-117	18	RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Sep 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 6 Sep 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—897

Air-to-Air 109

(F-14, F-15)

Air-to-Ground 243

(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)

Dual Role 227

(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)

Total Combat Aircraft 579

Support Aircraft 318

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—410	
Tactical/Support	220
Tanker Refueling	30
Intratheater Airlift	160
MARCENT—120	
NAVCENT—22	

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Sep 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	622
Boarded	22
Diverted	5
Warning Shots Fired	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Sep 90.]

7 September 90 [C plus 31]

MILITARY

CENTAF's munitions requirements remained under review. Lack of firm requirements inhibited sustainability and resupply planning. Strategic airlift totals reached 71,106 passengers and 51,243 tons of cargo delivered. [Brfg, "Logistics Readiness Center Daily CSS Briefing/Logistics Portion," 7 Sep 90.]

The working relationship between U.S. contracting officers and Saudi military contracting personnel continued to evolve. An effort was being made to formalize this arrangement and to publish policy in the near term. The value of contracts awarded to the Saudis, excluding Defense Fuel Supply Center contracts, totaled approximately \$60 million. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Sep 90.]

USCINCCENT emphasized that combined defense planning, which incorporated all U.S., Saudi, and other national forces, continued. Efforts were focused on the mutual development of an "objective (oriented) defense plan" that incorporated all forces into a cohesive defense in depth. Also, the United States was working closely with the Saudi Joint Staff in providing information and guidance on the establishment of a functional joint operations center, joint intelligence center, and a centralized command and control facility. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Sep 90.]

Iraqi ground forces had established a defensive belt running from the northern shore of Kuwait Bay around to the northwestern corner of Kuwait. In addition to the nine divisions committed to the defense of Kuwait, they had a counterattack force consisting of two armor, one mechanized, and two infantry divisions. It was estimated that these fourteen divisions could switch from the defensive to the offensive within twelve to twenty-four hours after receiving the order to do so. [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—112,814 (3,271 women)
 Total CENTAF Personnel—26,382 (1,365 women)
 [Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—648

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
B-52	20	C-21	4
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	74
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3 AWACS)	6
EF-111	13	EC-130E	6
F-4G	36	HC-130	4
F-15	72	KC-135	89
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	32	RC-135	4
F-117	18	RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Sep 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 7 Sep 90. No sortie totals were given because the CENTCOM "sitrep" was not available and the CENTAF "sitrep" (08/0800z Sep 90) did not give a complete report on flight activity. The CENTCOM "sitrep" switched to an Address Indicating Group (AIG) distribution number beginning on 9 September.]

8 September 90 [C plus 32]

MILITARY

CENTAF began an integrated package training program. Missions consisted of packages of air-to-ground, air-to-air, and

adversary aircraft. Initially, packages were single-service, but plans were made to progress to multiservice and multinational organizations. Long-range optical missions were started with RF-4Cs flying twelve nautical miles south of and parallel to the northern border of Saudi Arabia. [Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 08/0800z Sep 90.]

Lack of intratheater airlift to move oversize transportation assets forced logistics to line-haul critical equipment. However, customs clearance at the Saudi-United Arab Emirates border brought vehicle movement to a standstill. R-9 refuelers, vacuum sweepers, and P-13 fire fighting equipment were on flat bed trucks at the border but were unable to move. [Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 08/0800z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total CENTAF Personnel—27,453 (1,427 women)

[Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 08/0800z Sep 90.]

Total military personnel and aircraft figures were not given because the CENTCOM "sitrep" was not available.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—562

Tactical/Support 354

Tanker Refueling 46

Intratheater Airlift 162

MARCENT—100

NAVCENT—143

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 09/800z Sep 90.]

9 September 90 [C plus 33]

POLITICAL

Meeting in Helsinki, Finland, President Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev issued an unprecedented joint declaration condemning Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait. The declaration called for the "complete implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions" which demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi troops and the restoration of legitimate government in Kuwait. [David Hoffman, "Bush, Gorbachev Toughen Stand Against Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 10 Sep 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—119,243 (3,714 women)
Total CENTAF Personnel—28,943 (1,473 women)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—648

(No change)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—494
Tactical/Support 307
Tanker Refueling 36
Intratheater Airlift 151
MARCENT—95
NAVCENT—135

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 10/0800z Sep 90.]

10 September 90 [C plus 34]

POLITICAL

Saddam Hussein offered to give free oil to Third World nations that could arrange shipping. [Edward Cody, "Iraq: Free Oil for 3d World If They Come and Get It," *The Washington Post*, 11 Sep 90, p 7.]

MILITARY

USCENTCOM critical munitions shortages were identified as AGM-65, AGM-88, CBU-87/89, and GBU-15/24 and were CENTAF's first priority for movement. [Brfg, "Logistics Readiness Center CSS Daily Briefing/Logistics Portion," 10 Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—143,263 (3,750 women)
Total CENTAF Personnel—29,172 (1,485 women)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—674

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	4
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3(AWACS)	6
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	13	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-135	89
F-15	72	MC-130	4
F-15E	24	MH-53	8
F-16	120	RC-135	4
F-111	32	RF-4C	6
F-117	18	TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Sep 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 10 Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—635	
Tactical/Support	391
Tanker Refueling	48
Intratheater Airlift	196
MARCENT—58	
NAVCENT—144	

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 11/0800z Sep 90.]

11 September 90 [C plus 35]

POLITICAL

Defense Secretary Cheney and CJCS General Powell testified before Congress. They stated that the total troop deployment had reached 160,000. The estimated cost of the operation was \$11 to \$15 billion. Approximately half of the cost was expected to be paid by U.S. allies. [Rowan Scarborough, "Cheney Raises DESERT SHIELD's Bill to \$15 Billion," *The Washington Times*, 12 Sep 90, p 8.]

The American Ambassador to Japan asked the Japanese to double their contribution of \$1 billion support for deployed multinational forces and to provide emergency aid to Turkey, Egypt,

and Jordan. [Point Paper, "Logistics Summary Briefing Operation DESERT SHIELD," 11 Sep 90.]

MILITARY

For the next five days, tactical airlift would be involved in realigning malpositioned munitions. [Brfg, "Logistics Readiness Center Daily CSS Briefing/Logistics Portion," 11 Sep 90.]

Iraqi unit subordinations and locations were being reevaluated to reflect the "fusion product" that was under review. As an immediate result of this fusion product, USCENTCOM/Intelligence Directorate (J-2) assessed that eleven Iraqi divisions were committed with five divisions reinforcing the defensive position in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO). The sixteen divisions were assessed as capable of offensive operations within twelve to twenty-four hours after receiving orders to do so. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Sep 90.]

A redeployment of five Iraqi SA-6 surface-to-air missile batteries from central Kuwait to southern Iraq indicated further the defensive moves by Iraqi forces. This redeployment removed more than 50 percent of the SA-6s assessed to be in Kuwait and was further indication of the growing emphasis on protection of the Iraqi border. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—147,786 (4,323 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—29,550 (1,501 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—674

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Sep 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—960

Air-to-Air 109

(F-14, F-15)

Air-to-Ground 263

(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)

Dual Role 227

(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)

Total Combat Aircraft 599

Support Aircraft 361

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—598

Tactical/Support 371

Tanker Refueling 41

Intratheater Airlift 186

MARCENT—84

NAVCENT—57

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 12/0800z Sep 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged 779

Boarded 41

Diverted 4

Warning Shots Fired 2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Sep 90. "Sitrep" of 6 September erroneously listed five ships diverted. See Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Sep 90.]

12 September 90 [C plus 36]

POLITICAL

President Bush taped an eight-minute message to the Iraqi people. The White House said that if Hussein failed to broadcast it on state television within five days, the United States would release the message to the rest of the world. [Dan Balz, "Bush Tapes Message for Iraqis," *The Washington Post*, 13 Sep 90, p 34.]

The full buildup of U.S. forces needed to combat the Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia would not be completed for two more months, or about one month later than the target date of 15 October, according to General Schwarzkopf. The buildup had been slowed about a week by breakdowns of ships carrying heavy combat equipment. Also, airlift had dropped from an average of about eighty flights per day to seventy due to maintenance requirements. "The good news is that at the most dangerous time, everything went great," said General Schwarzkopf. [Molly Moore, "Buildup in Gulf Reported Behind," *The Washington Post*, 13 Sep 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

The training emphasis of U.S. air assets was on executing large force packages. A combined package included U.S. F-4G, Saudi F-15, and Tornado aircraft. CENTAF was conducting large package coordination with four F-15s, four F-15Es, two EF-111s, and four F-4Gs. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Sep 90.]

The USS *Wisconsin* fired its main battery sixteen-inch guns as part of a "live fire" program designed to exercise U.S. forces in the AOR. This was the first firing of the main battery guns since the moratorium on their use had been lifted. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Sep 90.]

Iraqi ground forces continued to remain defensively deployed. Infantry units located in Kuwait along the Saudi Arabian border were being deployed in a classic Iraqi "two up and one back" formation. Typical triangular berms had not yet been constructed along the line, but improvements of defensive positions were expected to continue. Unit subordinations and locations were still being reevaluated. USCENCOM/J-2 assessed ten divisions committed and seven reinforcing within the KTO. This array of seventeen divisions could be switched to the offensive within twelve to twenty-four hours after receiving orders to do so. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—148,866 (4,454 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—29,746 (1,590 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—683

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	4
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3(AWACS)	6
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	13	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-135	89
F-15	72	MC-130	4
F-15E	24	MH-53	8
F-16	120	MH-60	8
F-111	32	RC-135	4

September 1990

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
F-117	18	RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Sep 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 12 Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—624	
Tactical/Support	374
Tanker Refueling	48
Intratheater Airlift	202
MARCENT—122	
NAVCENT—83	

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 13/0800z Sep 90.]

13 September 90 [C plus 37]

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity was at a moderate level of eighty sorties, consistent with the observed daily average for September, to date, of eighty-two. For the first time, a British Nimrod reconnaissance flight elicited a response from an Iraqi aircraft. A Mirage F-1 illuminated the Nimrod with its Cyrano radar. The focal point for Iraqi transport activity was the Kuwait International Airport through which nearly one-half of the transport flights passed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Sep 90.]

Iraqi ground forces continued to remain defensively deployed. Heavy Republican Guards units located immediately north of the Kuwaiti border were deployed in assembly areas. However, they were not in a high state of readiness, and logistic support for these key units was not complete. The withdrawal of these primary Iraqi assault forces from Kuwait and their disposition increased the time required for Iraq to mount an offensive. USCENTCOM/J-2 saw no indications of offensive preparations by Iraq. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Sep 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—153,113 (4,882 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—29,900 (1,875 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—684

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	4
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3(AWACS)	6
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	13	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-135	90
F-15	72	MC-130	4
F-15E	24	MH-53	8
F-16	120	MH-60	8
F-111	32	RC-135	4
F-117	18	RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Sep 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 13 Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—627

Tactical/Support 370

Tanker Refueling 42

Intratheater Airlift 215

MARCENT—67

NAVCENT—114

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 14/0800z Sep 90.]

14 September 90 [C plus 38]

POLITICAL

Japan announced it would contribute another \$3 billion to aid the United States effort in the Persian Gulf: \$2 billion for economic assistance to Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey, and \$1 billion for the multinational military effort in the Gulf. This contribution was in

addition to the \$1 billion Japan had pledged two weeks earlier. [Steven Weisman, "Japan Defends Aid to U.S. in Mideast," *The New York Times*, 14 Sep 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

The mission-capable rate for USAF aircraft in the AOR was 90 percent. CENTAF Forward was concerned, however, that the lack of spare parts allowed the potential for hangar queens to develop. Aircraft engines, as expected, were suffering from sand ingestion and heat exposure. Pratt & Whitney representatives were inspecting F-15 fourth-stage turbine disks for potential damage. [Point Paper, Logistics Readiness Center, "Logistics Summary Briefing Operation DESERT SHIELD," 14 Sep 90.]

A three-day, joint, combined fire-support conference with the Saudi Northern Area Command (NAC) and the Eastern Area Command (EAC) was concluded. The purpose of the conference was to coordinate, integrate, and refine U.S. and Saudi fire-support plans in NAC and EAC. The conference attendees discussed coordination plans and procedures, emphasizing simplicity, mutual support, and feasibility. The Saudis were particularly interested in CAS. Special Operations Command, USCINCCOM, was training Saudi pilots to act as forward air controllers. Other areas of interest were the use of airborne command, control, and communication; naval gunfire; and airspace coordination. According to USCINCCENT, the discussions were "positive and constructive." [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Sep 90.]

Iraqi ground forces maintained their defensive posture with ten divisions committed and eight reinforcing in the KTO. A new trench line was discovered stretching fifteen miles along the western Kuwaiti border. As a result of the Iraqi force dispositions, intelligence assessments were that probable courses of action, in order, were to defend, delay, reinforce, withdraw, and attack. Although attack was the least likely Iraqi course of action, estimates were that within thirty-six to forty-eight hours of a decision these forces could transition to an offensive posture. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—154,445 (4,946 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—29,987 (1,687 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Sep 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

USAF Aircraft Deployed—684

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—471

Tactical/Support 276

Tanker Refueling 40

Intratheater Airlift 155

MARCENT—116

NAVCENT—182

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 15/0800z Sep 90.]

15 September 90 [C plus 39]

MILITARY

General Schwarzkopf noted that, as the U.S. force buildup continued and opportunities for interaction with Arab hosts increased, "It becomes increasingly obvious that our community relation programs must keep pace." He assured the JCS that full attention was being given to the significant differences between Arab and U.S. societies. "Every commander in the AOR has been personally instructed to make himself and his people aware of the local Islamic customs," he stated. Community relations action councils had been established at every major command location to improve communication and understanding to preclude problems and to resolve, at the lowest level, those that did occur. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Personnel—157,281 (5,055 women)

CENTAF Personnel—30,530 (1,735 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Sep 90.]

September 1990

USAF Aircraft Deployed—686

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	4
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	14	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-135	91
F-15	72	MC-130	4
F-15E	24	MH-53	8
F-16	120	MH-60	8
F-111	32	RC-135	4
F-117	18	RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—494

Tactical/Support	250
Tanker Refueling	59
Intratheater Airlift	185

MARCENT—84

NAVCENT—140

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Sep 90.]

16 September 90 (C plus 40)

POLITICAL

Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Dugan stated the JCS had concluded that U.S. military air power, including a massive bombing campaign against Baghdad specifically targeting Saddam Hussein, was the only effective option to force Iraqi forces from Kuwait if war erupted. [Rick Atkinson, "U.S. to Rely on Air Strikes If War Erupts," *The Washington Post*, 16 Sep 90, p 1.]

France announced it would deploy a regiment of the 6th Light Armored Division, a helicopter regiment, and some tactical aircraft. This force was expected to total approximately 4,000 troops. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Sep 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

MILITARY

The AOR aircraft mission-capable rate was 89 percent. Lack of spares replenishment continued to be a problem. Hangar queens for the F-4Gs, A-10s, and F-117s were imminent. Engineering and Services reported that many sites were approaching completion of expedient construction for initial beddown and feeding. Emphasis was changing to preparations for hostilities—hardening, dispersal, and backup utilities. CENTAF's top priorities were munitions, resupply and war readiness spares kits, and F-15 external fuel tanks. [Point Paper, "Logistics Summary Briefing Operation DESERT SHIELD," 16 Sep 90.]

CENTAF flew two large package interdiction exercises. One package consisted of forty F-16s while the second included eight F-16s and two F-4Gs. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Sep 90.]

The majority of Iraqi fighter operations remained focused on training. Other activity was highlighted by reaction to a RF-4C reconnaissance flight and Mig-23/Flogger night training along the Saudi-Iraqi border. USCENTCOM/J-2 assessed flight activity as defensively oriented with fighter activity in Kuwait virtually nonexistent over the past twenty days. J-2 anticipated that most fighter activity would continue to be conducted from southern Iraqi airfields. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—163,831 (5,280 women)
Total CENTAF Personnel—30,533 (1,706 women)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—686

(No change)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Sep 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,043

Air-to-Air	129
(F-14, F-15)	
Air-to-Ground	300
(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)	
Dual Role	228
(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)	
Total Combat Aircraft	657
Support Aircraft	386

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Sep 90.]

September 1990

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—624

Tactical/Support	371
Tanker Refueling	48
Intratheater Airlift	205

MARCENT—75

NAVCENT—225

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 17/0800z Sep 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	993
Boarded	64
Diverted	5
Warning Shots Fired	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Sep 90. On 16 September, naval interdiction forces completed the 1,000th interception action since the operation began on 12 August. An average of forty intercepts and four boardings occurred daily by U.S. and allied warships enforcing the UN sanctions.]

17 September 90 (C plus 41)

POLITICAL

Defense Secretary Cheney relieved Air Force Chief of Staff General Dugan for public remarks on U.S. contingency plans for a war with Iraq. Also, the administration was disturbed over Dugan's assertion that Israel was assisting the United States in its targeting and that the Air Force would play the most important role in any attack on Iraq. [Jeffrey Smith, "Chief of Air Staff Fired by Cheney," *The Washington Post*, 18 Sep 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

Strategic and tactical reconnaissance remained a critical element of planning for the defense of Saudi Arabia, according to General Schwarzkopf. Daily employment of U-2 and TR-1 theater assets provided detailed coverage of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti borders. This coverage was supplemented by tactical reconnaissance with RF-4C, Saudi RF-5, and F-14 Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Pod System aircraft. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—166,023 (5,339 women)
Total CENTAF Personnel—30,530 (1,713 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Sep 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

USAF Aircraft Deployed—686

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Sep 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 17 Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—492

Tactical/Support 223

Tanker Refueling 74

Intratheater Airlift 195

MARCENT—102

NAVCENT—275

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Sep 90.]

18 September 90 (C plus 42)

POLITICAL

The Turkish Foreign Ministry said it would extend a defense pact allowing the United States to use military bases in the country as launch sites for possible action against Iraq. ["Turkey Extends U.S. Bases Pact," *The Washington Times*, 19 Sep 90, p 9.]

MILITARY

U.S. AWACS and RC-135 RIVET JOINT missions provided continuous surveillance coverage of Kuwait and southern Iraq. A second AWACS orbit was flown by the Saudis during daytime hours for additional coverage in the north central region. A-10 missions were flown over eastern province troop positions to allow aircraft familiarization for the ground forces. NAVCENT continued large package coordination exercises in the Red Sea with a sixty-three-aircraft night strike package from the USS *Kennedy* and USS *Saratoga*, using KC-135 refueling support. A combined force package was flown with F-4G and Saudi F-15 and Tornado aircraft. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—167,779 (5,631 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,179 (1,711 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—686

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Sep 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 18 Sep 90.]

September 1990

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—616

Tactical/Support	398
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Tanker Refueling	47
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Intratheater Airlift	171
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MARCENT—87

NAVCENT—251

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 19/0800z Sep 90.]

19 September 90 (C plus 43)

MILITARY

To maximize the unique capability of AWACS, its "picture" was integrated into the land-based and shipboard command and control systems.

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Sep 90.]

Iraqi air activity was slightly higher than average, with the majority of fighter activity focusing on pilot training and proficiency. Transport continued at moderate levels, and helicopter activity was heavier than it was in the past several days. USCENCOM/J-2 believed this flight activity was defensively oriented with fighter activity in Kuwait virtually nonexistent over the past two weeks. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—170,604 (5,725 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,065 (1,787 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—686

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—655

Tactical/Support	383
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Tanker Refueling	56
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Intratheater Airlift	216
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MARCENT—96

NAVCENT—157

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 20/0800z Sep 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

20 September 90 (C plus 44)

MILITARY

Training sorties remained at an increased tempo with several joint and combined packages being successfully flown. A day package included eight F-16s, four F-4Gs, and four Saudi Tornados. A night package included four F-15s and twelve F-111s. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Sep 90.]

Iraqi forces remained defensively deployed. USCENTCOM/J-2 assessed ten divisions committed and nine reinforcing within the KTO. Infantry units continued to deploy in front of mechanized and armored divisions in accordance with Iraqi defensive doctrine. All but three of the twelve heavy divisions in the Iraqi inventory were located in the KTO, but the bulk of these units was still positioned to the rear of the forward defensive line. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Sep 90.]

Iraqi air activity had been slightly higher than average for the third consecutive day, possibly an indication that the Iraqis were rotating flight crews. Similar activity was noted in late August and early September. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—172,891 (5,928 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,142 (1,808 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—686

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—607

Tactical/Support	343
Tanker Refueling	46
Intratheater Airlift	218

MARCENT—82

NAVCENT—100

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 21/0800z Sep 90.]

September 1990

21 September 90 (C plus 45)

MILITARY

The Saudis received six F-15Cs, the first half of the foreign military sales delivery from the United States. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Sep 90.]

A combined training program was approved by USCINCCENT and the commander of the Saudi Arabian Joint Forces and Theater Operations Command. Training would begin when training areas and units for a pilot program had been identified. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Sep 90.]

USCENTCOM/J-2 assessed a total of twenty-two Iraqi divisions in the KTO, with ten committed against Kuwait, nine reinforcing, and three committed along the Iranian border. Although J-2 saw no indications of offensive preparations, the Iraqi divisions were capable of switching to the offensive within thirty-six to forty-eight hours of the decision to do so. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Sep 90.]

Iraqi air activity was slightly higher than average for the fourth consecutive day, an indication that the Iraqis were, in part, rotating aircraft. The majority of fighter activity continued to focus on pilot training and proficiency, with activity at southern dispersal airfields increasing. After a lull in fighter activity in Kuwait, there were signs that Iraq intended to operate fighters out of Kuwait again. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—174,313 (6,261 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,201 (1,819 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—686

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Sep 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 21 Sep 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,041

Air-to-Air	129
(F-14, F-15)	
Air-to-Ground	300
(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)	
Dual Role	228

Gulf War Chronology

(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)
Total Combat Aircraft 657
Support Aircraft 384
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—519
Tactical/Support 247
Tanker Refueling 48
Intratheater Airlift 224

MARCENT—82

NAVCENT—152

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 22/0800z Sep 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged 1,169
Boarded 90
Diverted 5
Warning Shots Fired 3
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Sep 90.]

22 September 90 (C plus 46)

MILITARY

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—176,148 (6,279 women)
Total CENTAF Personnel—31,296 (1,833 women)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—686

(No change)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—551
Tactical/Support 274
Tanker Refueling 54
Intratheater Airlift 223

MARCENT—104

NAVCENT—160

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Sep 90.]

September 1990

23 September 90 (C plus 47)

MILITARY

USCENTCOM/J-2 assessed a total of twenty-three divisions in the KTO, with eleven committed against Kuwait, nine reinforcing, and three committed along the Iranian border. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115 Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—169,761 (6,425 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,154 (1,868 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—692

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	4
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	14	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-10	6
F-15	72	KC-135	91
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	32	MH-60	8
F-117	18	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—528

Tactical/Support 279

Tanker Refueling 45

Intratheater Airlift 204

MARCENT—74

NAVCENT—76

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 24/0800z Sep 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

24 September 90 (C plus 48)

MILITARY

Training packages flown included a combined unit of F-15, F-4G, and Saudi Tornado aircraft. Also scheduled was a package of five B-52s working a low-level strike mission, with F-4Gs providing defensive suppression. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Sep 90.]

Iraqi air activity returned to levels consistent with the first half of the month, following six days of higher than average activity. A similar decrease in activity was noted in late August to early September, following the end of a training cycle. USCENTCOM/J-2 anticipated a general return to normal levels of eighty sorties per day over the next few weeks, with a possible reduction or lull in activity. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25 Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—171,113 (6,555 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,079 (1,876 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—692

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—666

Tactical/Support	398
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Tanker Refueling	58
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Intratheater Airlift	210
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MARCENT—98

NAVCENT—168

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 25/0800z Sep 90.]

25 September 90 (C plus 49)

POLITICAL

The UN Security Council approved an air embargo of Iraq. The resolution called on UN members to prevent Iraq-bound flights from taking off from their territory or to allow such flights to use their airspace. The only exceptions were flights carrying food "in humanitarian circumstances," authorized by the Security Council's sanctions committee. [John Goshko, "UN Tightens Sanctions, Bans Air Traffic to Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 26 Sep 90, p 1.]

September 1990

MILITARY

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—172,201 (6,662 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,299 (1,902 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—692

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—650

Tactical/Support 382

Tanker Refueling 52

Intratheater Airlift 216

MARCENT—85

NAVCENT—148

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 26/0800z Sep 90.]

26 September 90 (C plus 50)

MILITARY

The mission-capable rate for CENTAF aircraft in the AOR increased to 91 percent. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Roan, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics," 26 Sep 90.]

Combined package operations continued using four F-16s, four F-4Gs, and four UK Jaguars escorted by four Saudi F-15 aircraft. USAF and USMC air assets exercised joint CAS procedures with six A-10s, twelve F-16s, eight AV-8s, and Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center aircraft. Four night B-52 low-level sorties, working with F-4G suppression assets, were flown. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26 Sep 90.]

Command and control of theater air assets had improved steadily since the arrival of the first tactical fighter squadron and AWACS aircraft on 8 August, according to USCINCCENT. AWACS air surveillance and command and control capability were immediately integrated into the existing Saudi air defense structure. During the past six weeks, a complete system of ground-based and airborne command and control assets was airlifted to the Arabian peninsula. These assets facilitated combined Saudi, British, and U.S. joint air operations. All of these command and control nodes were connected with one another through voice and/or datalink communication. Each node not only had a specific function, but it also provided backup in the event of combat damage. "Our theater tactical air capabilities and the

Gulf War Chronology

requisite command and control structure are ready to meet the challenges of Operation DESERT SHIELD," reported USCINCCENT. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26 Sep 90.]

Although a major ground attack by Iraq was considered unlikely, the recent UN vote to impose an air embargo coupled with increasing world community pressure and continued allied military deployments could increase the potential for Iraq to react militarily. Increased vigilance by U.S. and allied forces was warranted. USCENTCOM/J-2 believed that twenty-four Iraqi divisions were in the KTO, with eleven committed against Kuwait, ten reinforcing, and three committed along the Iranian border. Assessments were that Iraq could switch its forces to the offensive within thirty-six to forty-eight hours. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26 Sep 90.]

Contrary to earlier predictions, Iraqi air activity continued to be higher than average. Ground controlled intercept, defensive patrols, navigational training, and mission-in-zone flights were observed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—172,949 (6,710 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,563 (1,906 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—692

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Sep 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—982

Air-to-Air	110
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(F-14, F-15)	
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Air-to-Ground	286
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(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)	
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Dual Role	210
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(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)	
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Total Combat Aircraft	606
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Support Aircraft	376
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[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—685

Tactical/Support	429
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Tanker Refueling	44
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Intratheater Airlift	212
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September 1990

MARCENT—95

NAVCENT—89

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 28/0305z Sep 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged 1,429

Boarded 129

Diverted 6

Warning Shots Fired 4

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Sep 90.]

27 September 90 (C plus 51)

MILITARY

Part of the proposed D-day air tasking order was rehearsed. Increased AWACS, RC-135 RIVET JOINT, and combined Saudi-U.S. combat air patrol sorties were flown at levels near those expected if hostilities were to break out. Also, 200 aircraft were "load generated" to test generation times, load times, and taxi plans. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Sep 90.]

It was believed that Iraqi air activity continued at a higher than average level due to the increased U.S. and allied air operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—174,612 (6,998 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,714 (1,928 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—692

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—493

Tactical/Support 245

Tanker Refueling 49

Intratheater Airlift 199

MARCENT—104

NAVCENT—95

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Sep 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 28/0800z Sep 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

28 September 90 (C plus 52)

MILITARY

The Saudis received four additional F-15Cs from their foreign military sales contract with the United States. This made a total of ten F-15Cs delivered and two remaining. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—175,653 (6,845 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,607 (1,928 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—697

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	95
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	14	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-10	6
F-15	72	KC-135	93
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	32	MH-60	8
F-117	18	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Sep 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 28 Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—313

Tactical/Support 70

Tanker Refueling 44

Intratheater Airlift 199

MARCENT—84

NAVCENT—153

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Sep 90.]

September 1990

29 September 90 (C plus 53)

MILITARY

Three packages were flown for coordination and interoperability. The packages included thirty-two F-16s with four F-15s; eight F-16s, four F-4Gs, and four UK Jaguars with Saudi F-15s providing opponent air; and seven F-117s and four F-111s. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Sep 90.]

While a major Iraqi ground attack was not likely, intelligence analysts noted that Saddam Hussein could take advantage of anniversaries and religious holidays—such as Yom Kippur on this date—to make a show of force which could precipitate a larger conflict. Iraqi-sponsored terrorism, especially, could not be ruled out. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Sep 90.]

Iraqi air activity remained high—115 sorties—similar to the last four days. Fighter sorties over Kuwait highlighted the day's activity. The Iraqis had not regularly flown fighter aircraft over Kuwait since the beginning of September. In descending order of probability, Iraq's assessed options were: defend, reinforce, attack, and withdraw. The attack option was raised one increment to reflect an increased possibility of conflict coinciding with the Prophet Muhammad's birthday (1 October) and Iraq's Independence Day (3 October). [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—179,477 (7,377 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,699 (1,931 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—697

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—539

Tactical/Support	274
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Tanker Refueling	59
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Intratheater Airlift	206
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MARCENT—80

NAVCENT—161

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Sep 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

30 September 90 (C plus 54)

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity was high—123 sorties. The operations were highlighted by a 2-hour, 47-minute defense pattern flown by two Mirage F-1s. This activity included a "buddy refueling" operation. Reconnaissance activity over the past four days was higher than normal, with an average of four reconnaissance flights daily. Celebrations commemorating the anniversary of the Prophet's birth were expected to continue in Iraq. Extra caution was advised during this period because of the increased potential for terrorism. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Oct 90.]

Two U.S. airmen were killed when their F-15E crashed in the southern Saudi desert during a routine training exercise. The aircraft was assigned to the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Sep 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—183,089 (7,670 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,987 (1,944 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—696

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	95
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	14	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-10	6
F-15	72	KC-135	93
F-15E	23	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	32	MH-60	8
F-117	18	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—440

Tactical/Support 192

September 1990

Tanker Refueling	44
Intratheater Airlift	204
MARCENT—70	
NAVCENT—55	

[Msg. USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Oct 90.]

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October 1990

1 October 90 (C plus 55)

POLITICAL

President Bush told the UN General Assembly that an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait could open the door for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. [Editorial, "The New World Vision Thing," *The Washington Times*, 3 Oct 90, p G-2.]

The Pentagon assured the nation that the United States had not placed nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia or surrounding countries and had no plans to use them in response to an Iraqi chemical or biological weapons attack. Many analysts agreed that there was enough ambiguity in U.S. deployments of nuclear weapons at sea and America's ability to deliver them by air to "plant seeds of doubt in Hussein's mind." [John Broder, "U.S. Forces Have No Nuclear Arms in Gulf States, No Plans to Use Them," *The Los Angeles Times*, 2 Oct 90, p 6.]

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity was lower than average—ninety-two sorties—probably reflecting the observance of the Prophet's birthday. Flight activity was characterized by point-to-point navigation and airfield familiarization training, indicating that new pilots were rotating into southern Iraqi airfields and engaging in area familiarization training. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Oct 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

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October 1990

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—185,881 (8,018 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—32,122 (1,968 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—696

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Oct 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—988

Air-to-Air 110

(F-14, F-15)

Air-to-Ground 286

(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)

Dual Role 209

(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)

Total Combat Aircraft 605

Support Aircraft 383

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—585

Tactical/Support 320

Tanker Refueling 56

Intratheater Airlift 209

MARCENT—82

NAVCENT—74

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Oct 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 02/0800z Oct 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged 1,629

Boarded 158

Diverted 7

Warning Shots Fired 4

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Oct 90.]

2 October 90 (C plus 56)

POLITICAL

The U.S. Senate approved, by a 96 to 3 vote, a resolution supporting President Bush's deployment of U.S. military force to the Persian Gulf. Along with the House resolution that passed two days earlier by a 380 to 29 vote, the Senate measure gave the president the overwhelming political

Gulf War Chronology

support he wanted for his actions in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. [Walter Pincus, "Senate Backs Bush's Actions in Gulf," *The Washington Post*, 3 Oct 90, p 1.]

The United States bolstered its forces in the Persian Gulf with the arrival of the aircraft carrier USS *Independence*. This was only the second time that a carrier battle group had passed through the Strait of Hormuz. The USS *Constellation* did so in 1974. [Jocelyn Noveck, "Carrier Boosts Forces in Gulf," *The Washington Times*, 3 Oct 90, p 1.]

The Soviet Union, which over the last two months had steadily escalated its criticism of Iraq, complained that Baghdad had started delaying exit visas. Several hundred Soviet citizens, whose contracts had expired, wanted to return home. [Michael Parks, "Iraq Stalling Exit Visas for Workers, Soviets Say," *The Los Angeles Times*, 3 Oct 90, p 11.]

In an interview, Chief of the Soviet General Staff Mikhail Molseyev stated that economic sanctions against Iraq were working and that no force should be used in the Persian Gulf unless it was approved by the United Nations. [Michael Gordon, "Top Soviet General Tells U.S. Not to Attack in Gulf," *The New York Times*, 3 Oct 90, p 1.]

Saudi Arabia received two additional F-15Cs, completing delivery of the twelve fighters it purchased from the United States. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Oct 90.]

MILITARY

Host nation support continued to be vital to U.S. forces engaged in Operation DESERT SHIELD. USCENCOM continued to contract with civilian firms for services that exceeded the host nations' military capability. The total value of contracts let to date was estimated to be \$499 million. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Oct 90.]

Combined package missions included eight F-16s, four F-4Gs, and two Saudi Tornados; twelve F-16s, four F-4Gs, and eight UK Jaguars; six F-16s, four F-4Gs, and four UK Jaguars; and, four F-4Gs, two EF-111s, four F-111, and two Saudi Tornados. A-10s, F-16s, and Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center aircraft conducted a large-scale CAS exercise. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Oct 90.]

Iraqi air activity was moderate—105 sorties. A reconnaissance flight by two Mirage F-1s, five to ten miles north of the Saudi border, highlighted the activity. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Oct 90.]

October 1990

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—187,188 (8,042 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—32,445 (1,980 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—696

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—672

Tactical/Support	412
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Tanker Refueling	42
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Intratheater Airlift	218
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MARCENT—106

NAVCENT—87

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Oct 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 03/0800z Oct 90.]

3 October 90 (C plus 57)

MILITARY

Combined planning efforts resulted in general agreement between U.S. and Saudi commanders on several key issues. They agreed to establish a common tactical boundary, with defined coordination points, between Eastern Area Command (EAC) and Northern Area Command (NAC), to eliminate unassigned terrain between friendly forces. Because Syria and Iraq both used Eastern Bloc equipment, it was agreed to employ Syrian forces on the left flank to reduce possible fratricide. Two Egyptian divisions were to be employed on the right side of the NAC, with one division kept in reserve. USCINCCENT's theater reserve forces (1st Cavalry Division) were to be shifted to the west to improve the capability to respond to major penetration in the northern sector. The French armored brigade was to be employed as a "screen" on the left flank of the NAC, to capitalize on its reconnaissance and counterattack capabilities. All three Saudi brigades were to be employed generally on line in the EAC to increase the density of the forces along the Saudi forward edge of the battle area. U.S. forces immediately to the rear negated the requirement for a Saudi reserve in the EAC. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Oct 90.]

The USS *Independence* was conducting flight operations in the Persian Gulf. This was the first such operation in the Persian Gulf since 1974. Three B-52 night sorties were scheduled in conjunction with four F-4G suppression sorties. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Oct 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

New assessments were that Iraqi ground forces totaled twenty-two divisions in the KTO: twelve committed and ten reinforcing. Infantry forces operating west of Kuwait were assessed as part of a newly identified infantry division, raising the number of committed divisions to twelve. The three infantry divisions previously located along the Iraqi-Iranian border in the KTO had departed, leaving only a small caretaker force. These units moved into Kuwait or southern Iraq as early as 1 September and were previously double-counted. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Oct 90.]

Iraqi air activity was higher than normal—127 sorties. Air operations were highlighted by at least four MiG-23/Floggers out of Qasr Amij South dispersal airfield, performing air combat maneuvers. This was the first noted activity out of this airfield and exemplified an ongoing Iraqi effort to disperse their air assets. It was anticipated that other dispersal airfields would be activated in the future. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—188,499 (8,150 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—32,262 (1,992 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Sep 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—697

Combat		Support	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	95
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	14	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-10	6
F-15	72	KC-135	94
F-15E	23	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	32	MH-60	8
F-117	18	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Sep 90.]

October 1990

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—581

Tactical/Support	293
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Tanker Refueling	68
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Intratheater Airlift	220
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MARCENT—95

NAVCENT—142

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Oct 90.]

4 October 90 (C plus 58)

MILITARY

A D-day-type tasking coordination exercise of air assets was conducted. Packages contained eight F-16s, four F-4Gs, two EF-111s, and four Saudi F-15s; twelve F-18s; and a CAS exercise consisting of thirty-four A-10s, two AC-130s, one MC-130, five OV-10s, ten F-18s, and fourteen AV-8s. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Oct 90.]

Iraqi air activity remained high—120 sorties. Air operations were highlighted by air-to-ground strike training. An additional Iraqi infantry division was identified along the southern Kuwaiti border bringing the number of divisions in the KTO to twenty-three: thirteen committed and ten reinforcing. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—189,036 (8,258 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—32,228 (1,998 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Oct 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

USAF Aircraft Deployed—698

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	95
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	14	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-10	6
F-15	72	KC-135	94
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	32	MH-60	8
F-117	18	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—647	
Tactical/Support	393
Tanker Refueling	40
Intratheater Airlift	214

MARCENT—119

NAVCENT—85

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Oct 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 05/0800z Oct 90.]

5 October 90 (C plus 59)

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity was high—117 sorties—with the majority of flights for navigation and ground attack training purposes. Mirage F-1s and MiG-23/Floggers conducted a third day of air-to-ground strikes. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—192,364 (8,268 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—32,331 (1,994 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Oct 90.]

October 1990

USAF Aircraft Deployed—698

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Oct 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 5 Sep 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—478

Tactical/Support	241
Tanker Refueling	39
Intratheater Airlift	198

MARCENT—96

NAVCENT—112

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Oct 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 06/0800z Oct 90.]

6 October 90 (C plus 60)

MILITARY

Packages flown in training exercises included ten F-16s, four F-4Gs, and four F-15s; fourteen F-16s, four F-4Gs, two EF-111s, two F/A-18s, four Saudi F-15s, and three UK Tornados; and six F-16s, four F-4Gs, and four F-15s. Three B-52 night sorties with F-4G support were planned. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Oct 90.]

Iraqi air activity continued at high levels—127 sorties. The majority of the day's sorties were navigation, ground attack, and ground-controlled intercept training. Three reconnaissance flights were detected. One reconnaissance flight crossed over the western Iraqi-Saudi border for about two minutes. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—193,361 (8,324 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—32,300 (1,994 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—698

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Oct 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—991

Air-to-Air	110
(F-14, F-15)	
Air-to-Ground	286
(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)	

Gulf War Chronology

Dual Role	210
(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)	
Total Combat Aircraft	606
Support Aircraft	385

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—623	
Tactical/Support	356
Tanker Refueling	57
Intratheater Airlift	210
MARCENT—62	
NAVCENT—128	

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Oct 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 07/0800z Oct 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	1,918
Boarded	191
Diverted	8
Warning Shots Fired	5

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Oct 90.]

7 October 90 (C plus 61)

MILITARY

Strike training continued, including packages of the following: forty F-16s, four F-15s, and four F-4Gs; six F-16s, four F-4Gs, and four UK Tornados; and sixteen F-16s, four F-4Gs, and six Saudi Tornados. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Oct 90.]

Iraqi air activity—112 sorties—continued to be consistent with the levels observed since mid-September. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—194,901 (8,375 women)
Total CENTAF Personnel—32,453 (2,023 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—698

(No change)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Oct 90.]

October 1990

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—437

Tactical/Support 263

Tanker Refueling 49

Intratheater Airlift 125

MARCENT—62

NAVCENT—166

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Oct 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 08/0800z Oct 90.]

8 October 90 (C plus 62)

MILITARY

Additional fighter combat air patrols were flown in the western and central Iraqi-Saudi border regions in response to previous Iraqi reconnaissance and fighter activity in the area. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Oct 90.]

Ten American servicemen were killed in the crashes of three military aircraft, making this the worst day of casualties in the Persian Gulf since the U.S. military buildup began. Two USMC UH-1 helicopters crashed, killing eight Marines. An RF-4C, assigned to the Alabama Air National Guard, crashed in the southern Arabian peninsula, killing both crewmen. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Oct 90; Douglas Jehl, "10 GIs Believed Killed in Crashes of 3 Gulf Aircraft," *The Los Angeles Times*, 9 Oct 90, p 1.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—194,010 (8,452 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—32,431 (2,033 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Oct 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

USAF Aircraft Deployed—697

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	95
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	14	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-10	6
F-15	72	KC-135	94
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	32	MH-60	8
F-117	18	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	5
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—617	
Tactical/Support	402
Tanker Refueling	57
Intratheater Airlift	158

MARCENT—81

NAVCENT—174

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Oct 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 09/0800z Oct 90.]

9 October 90 (C plus 63)

MILITARY

CENTAF exercises involved thirty-six sorties with Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center aircraft: twenty A-10s and sixteen F-16s.

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—197,680 (8,543 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—32,293 (2,017 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—697

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Oct 90.]

October 1990

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—602

Tactical/Support 368

Tanker Refueling 44

Intratheater Airlift 190

MARCENT—74

NAVCENT—64

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Oct 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 10/0800z Oct 90.]

10 October 90 (C plus 64)

MILITARY

The crash of an F-111 during a night training flight on the southern Arabian peninsula was the second fatal accident in three days which involved aircraft deployed with Operation DESERT SHIELD. This crash prompted Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, CENTAF commander, to cancel training missions (from 1200 to 1700, Riyadh time) and direct units to conduct safety dialog meetings. Of the thirty-two U.S. servicemen who had died in accidents connected with the deployment, twenty were USAF members. [Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 10/0800z Oct 90; Molly Moore, "Jet Crash Kills 2 More U.S. Pilots in Gulf Region," *The Washington Post*, 11 Oct 90, p 30; Molly Moore, "Air Force Bans Gulf Training Flights," *The Washington Post*, 12 Oct 90, p 1. Since operations began on 7 August, USAF had lost five aircraft: F-111 (10 October), RF-4C (8 October), F-15E (30 Sep), F-16 (3 September), and C-5 (29 August).]

Air-strike training packages included eight F-16s, four F-15s, four F-4Gs, four EF-111s, and four Canadian F-18s; and four F-16s, four F-4Gs, eight Saudi Tornados, and four Saudi F-15s. Four B-52s were scheduled to fly night low-level sorties. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Oct 90.]

Iraqi air activity was the highest observed thus far in October—140 sorties. The majority of the flights were for routine training. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—200,079 (8,655 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—32,333 (2,013 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Oct 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

USAF Aircraft Deployed—697

Combat		Support	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-29	1
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	95
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EF-111	14	EC-130E	6
F-4G	36	HC-130	4
F-15	72	KC-10	6
F-15E	24	KC-135	94
F-16	120	MC-130	4
F-111	31	MH-53	8
F-117	18	MH-60	8
		RC-135	4
		RF-4C	5
		TR-1	2
		U-2	2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Oct 90; Brfg. AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 10 Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—448	
Tactical/Support	235
Tanker Refueling	34
Intratheater Airlift	179

MARCENT—82

NAVCENT—1

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Oct 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 11/0800z Oct 90.]

11 October 90 (C plus 65)

POLITICAL

More than 300 U.S. citizens and a few other refugees left Iraq on a flight to London. As in previous evacuation flights, most of the passengers were American women and children and Americans of Arab ancestry. The group also included a few Britons, Canadians, and Japanese. ["U.S. Flies 300 from Iraq, Activates 5,000 Reserves," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 11 Oct 90, p 4.]

In a speech, Saddam Hussein warned that Iraq had a new missile, the "Al Hijarah" (stone), a reference to the weapons used by young Palestinians. The intelligence community believed this was simply the "Al Abbas" missile renamed. Hussein's remarks were viewed as an attempt to divert

October 1990

attention away from his occupation of Kuwait and toward the plight of the Palestinians and recent events in Jerusalem. Arab states coalesced in their condemnation of the Jerusalem shootings on 8 October. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Oct 90.]

MILITARY

USAF Brig. Gen. Buster C. Glosson, Director of the Special Planning Group, briefed President Bush in Washington, D.C., on a three-phase air campaign plan. Phase I would strike targets in Iraq; Phase II would gain air supremacy over the KTO; and Phase III would attack Iraqi ground forces—first the Republican Guards in the rear and finally the frontline forces along the border with Saudi Arabia. [Brfg, CENTAF/CCS, 11 Oct 90.]

CENTAF flew a reduced flying schedule to allow time for meetings emphasizing safety and training awareness. Additional flight restrictions were established:

- Minimum altitude of 1,000 feet above ground level (AGL) for low-level training. Exception—500 feet AGL for B-52s on established low-level training.
- Minimum altitude of 5,000 feet AGL for air-to-air training.
- No practice "gun jinking" from simulated air-to-air or surface-to-air threats.

Two strike packages flown included forty F-16s, twelve F-4Gs, four EF-111s, with UAE Mirage F-1s providing opponent air; and thirty-six F-16s and four F-4Gs. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Oct 90.]

CENTAF reported that AOR aircraft had a mission-capable rate of 89 percent. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics," 11 Oct 90.]

The second draft plan for the combined defense of Saudi Arabia was completed and distributed for review and comment. With the completion of the draft basic plan, the combined planning staff was preparing to conduct a reconnaissance of three key areas: the length of the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian border, the proposed EAC-NAC boundary, and proposed blocking positions for the defense of Riyadh. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Oct 90.]

Iraqi air activity reached a new height for October—148 sorties. A majority of the flights were for routine training. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Oct 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—201,110 (8,709 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—32,061 (2,008 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—697

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Oct 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 11 Oct 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—999

Air-to-Air	110
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(F-14, F-15)

Air-to-Ground	285
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(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)

Dual Role	210
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(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)

Total Combat Aircraft	605
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Support Aircraft	394
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[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—571

Tactical/Support	319
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Tanker Refueling	40
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Intratheater Airlift	212
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MARCENT—80

NAVCENT—9

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Oct 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 12/0800z Oct 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	2,190
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Boarded	224
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Diverted	9
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Warning Shots Fired	6
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[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Oct 90.]

12 October 90 (C plus 66)

POLITICAL

More than 130 peace activists, representing 85 organizations, met in New York City and founded the first national campaign to oppose U.S. involve-

October 1990

ment in the Persian Gulf crisis. [Laurie Goodstein, "Quietly, New 'Peace Movement' Presses for Troop Withdrawal," *The Washington Post*, 12 Oct 90, p 16.]

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity was reduced to its lowest level in October with 52 sorties. This followed the previous day's monthly high of 148. The severe reduction was attributed to maintenance requirements, crew rest, and the observance of the Islamic holy day (Friday). Fighter sorties, which normally averaged seventy per day, decreased to twenty-eight and involved routine training including navigation, ground controlled intercept, reconnaissance, and defensive air patrol. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—202,482 (8,721 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,953 (2,007 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—699

Combat		Support	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-29	1
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	95
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EF-111	14	EC-130E	6
F-4G	36	HC-130	4
F-15	72	KC-10	6
F-15E	24	KC-135	94
F-16	120	MC-130	4
F-111	32	MH-53	8
F-117	18	MH-60	8
		RC-135	4
		RF-4C	5
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Oct 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 12 Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—492

Tactical/Support	244
Tanker Refueling	38
Intratheater Airlift	210

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Gulf War Chronology

MARCENT—94

NAVCENT—166

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Oct 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 13/0800z Oct 90.]

13 October 90 (C plus 67)

MILITARY

CENTAF flew one strike package that included eight F-16s and six F-4Gs. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Oct 90.]

Iraqi air activity returned to normal levels—130 sorties—although fighter sorties (92) were well above the daily average of 70. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Personnel—204,248 (9,105 women)

CENTAF Personnel—32,110 (1,997 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—700

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-29	1
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	95
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EF-111	14	EC-130E	6
F-4G	36	HC-130	4
F-15	72	KC-10	6
F-15E	24	KC-135	94
F-16	120	MC-130	4
F-111	32	MH-53	8
F-117	18	MH-60	8
		RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—546

Tactical/Support	255
Tanker Refueling	58

October 1990

Intratheater Airlift 233
MARCENT—70
NAVCENT—152

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Oct 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 14/0800z Oct 90.]

14 October 90 (C plus 68)

POLITICAL

Iran and Iraq reopened embassies in each other's capitals, resuming full diplomatic ties and ending a decade of enmity. The exchange of diplomats came only two years after a UN-brokered cease-fire halted hostilities in the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. ["Iran, Iraq Resume Full Diplomatic Ties," *The Baltimore Sun*, 15 Oct 90, p 3.]

MILITARY

General Schwarzkopf remarked that allied air combat forces included more than 830 fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, and more than 1,150 support aircraft. The United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Italy added more than 150 combat and support aircraft which were included in the air tasking order. Continuous AWACS, RC-135 RIVET JOINT reconnaissance flights, and combined combat air patrols were being flown. Combat air training had progressed from small single-unit missions to large multinational strike packages, with opposition air, escort fighters, early warning aircraft, and Wild Weasel support. CAS exercises were expanded to include all echelons required for coordination. These complex exercises spanned twelve- to fourteen-hour time periods and maintained four to eight aircraft in the target area throughout. The levels of air munitions exceeded the seven-day surge requirements, and nearly 60 percent of the required weapons types met or exceeded the thirty-day operational requirements. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—205,672 (9,384 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,800 (2,028 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Oct 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

USAF Aircraft Deployed—708

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-29	1
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	95
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EF-111	14	EC-130E	6
F-4G	36	HC-130	4
F-15	72	KC-10	6
F-15E	24	KC-135	102
F-16	120	MC-130	4
F-111	32	MH-53	8
F-117	18	MH-60	8
		RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—471

Tactical/Support	219
Tanker Refueling	39
Intratheater Airlift	213

MARCENT—44

NAVCENT—147

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Oct 90; Msg, COMUSCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 15/0800z Oct 90.]

15 October 90 (C plus 69)

POLITICAL

President Bush condemned Iraq's dismantling of Kuwait as "Hitler revisited" and warned Saddam Hussein that his brutal acts against the Kuwaiti people could result in Nuremburg-like trials, once the conflict was over, "Every day now," said the president, "new word filters out about the ghastly atrocities perpetrated by Saddam's forces." [Dan Balz, "President Warns Iraq of War Crimes Trials," *The Washington Post*, 16 Oct 90, p 19.]

Under fire from parliamentary critics for risking a military entanglement in the Persian Gulf, Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze promised his government would not commit troops to the region without prior

October 1990

approval from the legislature. [Bill Keller, "Shevardnadze Promises to Consult Parliament on Gulf Involvement," *The New York Times*, 16 Oct 90, p 16.]

MILITARY

Combined force strike package training continued with four separate packages containing up to eighteen aircraft including U.S., UK, Saudi, and Canadian assets. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—207,316 (9,260 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,953 (2,040 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—708

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—579

Tactical/Support	316
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Tanker Refueling	60
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Intratheater Airlift	203
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MARCENT—68

NAVCENT—127

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Oct 90; Msg, USCENAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 16/0800z Oct 90.]

16 October 90 (C plus 70)

MILITARY

General Schwarzkopf, emphasizing the interservice and international cooperation that had occurred in the AOR, said, "This multinational effort, as evidenced by burgeoning training programs between U.S. and allied forces, confirms that DESERT SHIELD is truly a combined arms, combined forces operation." [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Oct 90.]

Iraqi air assets flew 173 sorties, the highest level since 30 August. Fighter sorties, which normally averaged 70 per day, totaled 124. Air combat maneuvers (ACM) were highlighted, while navigation/low-altitude missions in the southern area were temporarily discontinued. Some ACM training was conducted without reliance on ground controlled intercept. This training was to prepare Iraqi fighter pilots for a combat contingency in which ground controlled intercept would be denigrated or destroyed.

Gulf War Chronology

Transport activity was also higher, with four sorties into and six out of Kuwait. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—208,128 (9,356 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,697 (1,985 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—708

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Oct 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,019

Air-to-Air	110
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(F-14, F-15)

Air-to-Ground	286
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(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)

Dual Role	210
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(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)

Total Combat Aircraft	606
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Support Aircraft	413
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[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—652

Tactical/Support	406
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Tanker Refueling	57
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Intratheater Airlift	189
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MARCENT—100

NAVCENT—120

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Oct 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCENT, "Sitrep," 17/0800z Oct 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	2,463
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Boarded	241
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Diverted	11
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Warning Shots Fired	6
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[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Oct 90.]

October 1990

17 October 90 (C plus 71)

POLITICAL

The first units of the British 7th Armoured Brigade, known as the "Desert Rats," arrived in Saudi Arabia. The estimated 9,000 British troops would take positions in the desert over the next week. [James LeMoyné, "'Desert Rats' from Britain Are Latest to Join the Buildup," *The New York Times*, 18 Oct 90, p 13.]

MILITARY

The boundaries and defense sectors in the NAC and EAC were being realigned to accommodate objective defense force employments in the draft Combined Operation Plan. The NAC forward edge of the battle area was moved fifteen to twenty kilometers south of the location specified in the plan. This increased distance between the Saudi-Kuwaiti border and the forward edge of the battle area would allow more time for the air interdiction campaign to attrit enemy forces. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Oct 90.]

Iraqi air combat maneuver training continued for the third consecutive day. Navigation/low-altitude missions in the southern area resumed. Other fighter activity included a border violation into Iran, but no Iranian reaction was detected. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—211,137 (9,580 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,500 (1,995 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—708

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—682

Tactical/Support	418
Tanker Refueling	47
Intratheater Airlift	217

MARCENT—89

NAVCENT—63

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Oct 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCENT, "Sitrep," 18/0880z Oct 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

18 October 90 (C plus 72)

MILITARY

CENTAF continued large package strike operations using UAE Mirage F-1s for opponent air. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Oct 90.]

The mission-capable rate for CENTAF AOR aircraft was 90.1 percent. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Roan, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics," 18 Oct 90.]

Iraqi air activity was at its second highest level for the month—153 sorties. Most of the activity was for routine training. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—211,630 (9,660 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,459 (2,009 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—708

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—593

Tactical/Support	403
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Tanker Refueling	65
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Intratheater Airlift	125
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MARCENT—118

NAVCENT—65

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Oct 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCENT, "Sitrep," 19/0800z Oct 90.]

19 October 90 (C plus 73)

MILITARY

A combined U.S.-Saudi team completed a four-day terrain reconnaissance in the NAC and EAC. The objective of the operation was threefold: to verify that a proposed boundary between NAC and EAC was easily identifiable terrain; to look at "trafficability" along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, with particular emphasis on the Wadi al Batin area; and to find defensible terrain along the approach into Riyadh. The combined after-action report indicated that the proposed boundary was valid, the terrain immediately south of the border had no obstructions, and there was little

October 1990

defensible terrain north of Riyadh. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Oct 90.]

The mission-capable rate for CENTAF aircraft in the AOR was 88.9 percent. A breakdown of mission-capable rates, by aircraft, follows:

<i>Aircraft</i>	<i>Mission Capable, %</i>
A-10	95.8
AC-130	80.0
B-52	95.0
EC-130 (VS)	99.1
EF-111	92.9
F-4G	95.8
F-15	88.9
F-15E	91.7
F-16	94.2
F-111	84.4
F-117	89.9
HC-130	88.4
MC-130*	76.3
MH-53**	84.8
MH-60	92.1

*MC-130s continued to have problems with the Watkins Johnson 1840 antenna (located near the belly) during landings on dirt strips. The antennas were expensive and in limited supply.

**On 26 September 90, desert landings with the MH-53s were restricted to save engines from the sand corrosion problem.]

[Point Paper, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Narrative," 19 Oct 90; Ltr, AFSOC/HO to CAFH/DRE, "Gulf War Chronology," 24 Jan 92.

The Iraqis flew ninety-three sorties, including a Mirage F-1 two-ship formation which conducted reconnaissance along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Oct 90.]

The Iraqi aircraft inventory included 327 fighters (278 were all-weather capable), 357 fighter-bombers and bombers, 74 transports, and 487 helicopters. The Iraqis had 249,000 military personnel inside Kuwait with 1,990 tanks, 1,418 armored personnel carriers, and 1,420 artillery pieces. In southern Iraq, there were 184,000 military personnel, 1,510 tanks, 920 armored personnel carriers, and 950 artillery pieces. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 19 Oct 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—213,971 (9,708 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,411 (1,994 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—708

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—381

Tactical/Support	235
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Tanker Refueling	33
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Intratheater Airlift	113
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MARCENT—82

NAVCENT—101

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Oct 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 20/0800z Oct 90.]

20 October 90 (C plus 74)

MILITARY

New assessments of Iraqi ground forces raised the number of divisions in the KTO to twenty-five: fourteen committed and eleven reinforcing. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—215,566 (10,144 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,408 (1,990 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—708

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—500

Tactical/Support	348
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Tanker Refueling	38
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Intratheater Airlift	114
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MARCENT—49

NAVCENT—60

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Oct 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 21/0800z Oct 90.]

October 1990

21 October 90 (C plus 75)

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity was at a reduced rate with seventy-five sorties flown. In fighter activity, a MiG-29/Fulcrum was detected operating in southern Iraq for the first time in over a month. Transport activity remained at normal levels with sixteen sorties. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—216,510 (10,132 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,422 (1,985 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—714

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-29	1
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	95
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EF-111	14	EC-130E	6
F-4G	36	HC-130	4
F-15	72	KC-10	6
F-15E	24	KC-135	108
F-16	120	MC-130	4
F-111	32	MH-53	8
F-117	18	MH-60	8
		RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Oct 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,035

Air-to-Air	110
(F-14, F-15)	
Air-to-Ground	286
(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)	
Dual Role	210
(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)	
Total Combat Aircraft	606
Support Aircraft	429

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Oct 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—472

Tactical/Support 246

Tanker Refueling 45

Intratheater Airlift 181

MARCENT—60

NAVCENT—153

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Oct 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 22/0800z Oct 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged 2,652

Boarded 266

Diverted 11

Warning Shots Fired 6

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Oct 90.]

22 October 90 (C plus 76)

MILITARY

CENTAF conducted a large-scale CAS exercise in northeast Saudi Arabia. Three combined strike packages were flown with Canadian F-18s and UK Tornados as opponent air. Strike packages included F-4Gs, F-16s, F-15s, RF-4s, UK Jaguars, and Saudi Tornados. Four B-52 low-level night sorties were scheduled. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Oct 90.]

Iraq's least likely course of action was changed by analysts from withdrawal to attack. While speculative at this time, the American Embassy in Baghdad offered tenuous evidence that Saddam Hussein could have been preparing for a partial withdrawal from Kuwait. Iraqi forces retained the capability to switch to the offensive within thirty-six to forty-eight hours. In decreasing order of probability, Iraq's options were assessed as defend, reinforce, withdraw, and attack. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—217,198 (10,287 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,439 (1,958 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—714

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Oct 90.]

October 1990

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—628

Tactical/Support	396
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Tanker Refueling	65
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Intratheater Airlift	167
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MARCENT—72

NAVCENT—159

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Oct 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCENT, "Sitrep," 23/0880z Oct 90.]

23 October 90 (C plus 77)

POLITICAL

Fourteen American men were allowed to leave Baghdad aboard a flight to Amman, Jordan, in a continuing trickle of hostage releases ordered by Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi National Assembly voted to release all of the more than 300 Frenchmen who also had been held in Hussein's human-shield defense against a U.S. bombing attack. [Edward Cody, "Iraq Frees 14 Americans," *The Washington Post*, 24 Oct 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

CENTAF conducted a large-scale, joint CAS exercise in northeast Saudi Arabia. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Oct 90.]

Iraqi air activity was moderate with 106 sorties. Most of the activity was routine low-level navigation flights. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—218,717 (10,420 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,405 (1,958 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Oct 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

USAF Aircraft Deployed—717

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-29	1
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	95
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EF-111	14	EC-130E	6
F-4G	36	HC-130	4
F-15	72	KC-10	6
F-15E	24	KC-135	111
F-16	120	MC-130	4
F-111	32	MH-53	8
F-117	18	MH-60	8
		RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—615	
Tactical/Support	416
Tanker Refueling	54
Intratheater Airlift	145

MARCENT—88

NAVCENT—148

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Oct 90; Msg, USCENAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 24/0800z Oct 90.]

24 October 90 (C plus 78)

POLITICAL

Governmental agencies estimated that between 368 and 468 American citizens were in Iraq: 81 in the American Embassy, approximately 250 held at an estimated 31 strategic sites, and the remainder unaccounted for. Approximately 250 Americans were in Kuwait: 17 were in the American Embassy and the rest were unaccounted for. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Oct 90.]

MILITARY

The 36-hour flying exercise INITIAL HACK began. Its scenarios included pre- and poststrike air refueling, airfield attacks, airfield defense, and CAS. The exercise tasked command and control functions and flying units to

October 1990

generate and fly simulated D-day air tasking orders. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Oct 90.]

An additional infantry division was detected in the KTO, raising the total to twenty-six: fifteen divisions committed and eleven divisions reinforcing. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Oct 90.]

Iraqi air activity was at a lower than average level—ninety sorties. Air operations were highlighted by the reappearance of defensive patrol activity. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—221,335 (10,949 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,550 (1,977 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—717

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—633

Tactical/Support 404

Tanker Refueling 65

Intratheater Airlift 164

MARCENT—91

NAVCENT—105

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Oct 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 25/0800z Oct 90.]

25 October 90 (C plus 79)

POLITICAL

The Bush administration decided to expand the number of American forces in the Persian Gulf and to send as many as 100,000 more troops to the region, according to Defense Secretary Cheney. Mr. Cheney said the exact number was not yet known, and he gave no date for completing the American military buildup in the region, the largest since the Vietnam War. [Michael Gordon, "U.S. Decides to Add as Many as 100,000 to Its Gulf Forces," *The New York Times*, 26 Oct 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

INITIAL HACK scenarios continued with combined strike packages making airfield attacks on Al Dhafra, Taif, and Al Ahso airfields. Strike packages

Gulf War Chronology

included thirty-two F-16s, two EA-6s, and two French Mirage 2000s; eight F-16s, two RF-4s, eight Italian Tornados; and, as a night airfield attack package, two F-117s, four F-15Es, two B-52s, two F-4Gs, two EF-111s, one EC-130, six Saudi Tornados, and eight UK Tornados. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Oct 90.]

The Iraqis flew 150 sorties consisting of low-level navigation flights and air combat maneuver training. Transport activity was higher than normal with 38 sorties. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—226,537 (10,992 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,580 (1,997 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—717

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—669

Tactical/Support	429
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Tanker Refueling	92
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Intratheater Airlift	148
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MARCENT—107

NAVCENT—102

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Oct 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 26/0800z Oct 90.]

26 October 90 (C plus 80)

MILITARY

The mission-capable rate for CENTAF aircraft in the AOR was 90.5 percent. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 26 Oct 90.]

Exercise INITIAL HACK ended. USCINCCENT remarked that the exercise refined command, control, and coordination for employment of joint and combined air forces in the AOR. It had involved approximately forty U.S., Saudi, Canadian, British, Italian, and French units that conducted counterair, strike, and CAS missions. More than 300 tactical sorties, conducted in 18 training packages, were flown. More than 200 support sorties were flown to provide airborne early warning, electronic combat, and air refueling. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Oct 90.]

October 1990

Iraqi air activity was at the highest level for the month with 176 sorties. The high count was a result of enhanced collection by multiple AWACS. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—227,491 (11,359 women)
Total CENTAF Personnel—31,386 (2,008 women)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—717

(No change)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—496
Tactical/Support 292
Tanker Refueling 59
Intratheater Airlift 145

MARCENT—65

NAVCENT—79

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Oct 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCENT, "Sitrep," 27/0800z Oct 90.]

27 October 90 (C plus 81)

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity was at its lowest level since 12 October—sixty-seven sorties. The limited flight activity included two reconnaissance flights, but no defensive patrols or reactions. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—229,361 (11,602 women)
Total CENTAF Personnel—31,661 (2,008 women)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—717

(No change)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—378
Tactical/Support 162
Tanker Refueling 27

Gulf War Chronology

Intratheater Airlift 189

MARCENT—54

NAVCENT—68

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Oct 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCENT, "Sitrep," 28/0800z Oct 90.]

28 October 90 (C plus 82)

POLITICAL

Saddam Hussein reversed a decision to ration fuel and dismissed his Oil Minister on the grounds that a miscalculation by the official had led to the announcement ten days previously that the country faced a gasoline shortage. [John Burns, "Iraq Is Dropping Its Fuel Rationing, Blaming Minister," *The New York Times*, 29 Oct 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity returned to normal levels—130 sorties (the average for October was 125). [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—229,768 (11,631 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,657 (2,011 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—718

Combat		Support	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-29	1
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	95
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EF-111	14	EC-130E	6
F-4G	36	HC-130	4
F-15	72	KC-10	6
F-15E	24	KC-135	112
F-16	120	MC-130	4
F-111	32	MH-53	8
F-117	18	MH-60	8
		RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Oct 90.]

October 1990

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—411

Tactical/Support 220

Tanker Refueling 44

Intratheater Airlift 147

MARCENT—47

NAVCENT—144

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Oct 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINC-CENT, "Sitrep," 29/0800z Oct 90.]

29 October 90 (C plus 83)

MILITARY

Two B-52s were flown as day missions to Khamis, and two additional B-52s flew low-level night missions. A combined CAS exercise involving A-10s, F-16s, EC-130s, C-130s, and Saudi F-5s was flown. Kuwaiti A-4s flew their first local mission out of Dhahran. DESERT TRIANGLE, a continuing exercise designed to assess Iraqi reaction to air threats, began. Four F-16s made a high-speed approach to within fifteen miles of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, then climbed and turned to parallel the border. No significant Iraqi response was noted. DESERT TRIANGLE was scheduled daily until further notice, combining a variety of numbers and types of aircraft. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Oct 90.]

The mission-capable rate for CENTAF aircraft was 92.8 percent. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 29 Oct 90.]

Iraqi ground forces continued to develop a series of trenches designed to be filled with oil and ignited as additional barriers. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Oct 90.]

Iraqi air activity was lower than average—ninety-four sorties. Air operations were highlighted by a Mirage F-1 reconnaissance mission which flew southeast, closely paralleling the Saudi border. Upon reaching the tri-border area, the aircraft proceeded north and was twice intercepted by MiG-29/Fulcrums. This mission was unique in that it flew so close to the Saudi border, within one or two kilometers. Additionally, this was another instance where a mission aircraft was used as a target of opportunity of ground controlled intercept. Alternatively, the MiG-29/Fulcrums could have been providing air cover for the reconnaissance mission. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Oct 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—225,761 (11,785 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,631 (2,011 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—720

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-29	1
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	95
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EF-111	14	EC-130E	6
F-4G	36	HC-130	4
F-15	72	KC-10	6
F-15E	24	KC-135	114
F-16	120	MC-130	4
F-111	32	MH-53	8
F-117	18	MH-60	8
		RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—632

Tactical/Support 426

Tanker Refueling 62

Intratheater Airlift 144

MARCENT—65

NAVCENT—138

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Oct 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCENT, "Sitrep," 30/0800z Oct 90.]

30 October 90 (C plus 84)

POLITICAL

Within the next week, the Bush administration planned to discuss a timetable for possible use of military force against Iraqi forces in Kuwait at talks with U.S. allies in Europe and the Persian Gulf. Administration officials were becoming increasingly convinced that UN sanctions would not force Iraq to withdraw. [Jack Nelson and Douglas Jehl, "U.S. Plans Talks on Gulf Offensive," *The Los Angeles Times*, 30 Oct 90, p 1.]

October 1990

MILITARY

General Merrill A. McPeak became Chief of Staff, USAF. [Telecon, Karen A. Fleming, AF/HO, with AF/DPG, 15 April 91.]

As part of Exercise DESERT TRIANGLE, four Saudi Tornados made a high-speed approach to within fifteen miles of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, then turned to parallel the border. No significant Iraqi response was noted. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Oct 90.]

The first DESERT EXPRESS mission was flown. The daily C-141 mission from Charleston AFB, South Carolina, to Dhahran and/or Riyadh was designed to provide the highest priority express service to deliver "show stopper" items to the AOR. The USAF was allocated four pallets on each mission. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 30 Oct 90.]

Iraqi air activity was higher than normal with 163 sorties. Transport activity was also higher than normal with 36 sorties. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—227,247 (11,861 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,587 (2,014 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—720

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Oct 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,038

Air-to-Air	109
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(F-14, F-15)

Air-to-Ground	263
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(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)

Dual Role	228
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(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)

Total Combat Aircraft	600
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Support Aircraft	438
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[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Oct 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—644

Tactical/Support	432
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Tanker Refueling	61
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Intratheater Airlift	151
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Gulf War Chronology

MARCENT—95

NAVCENT—140

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Oct 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 31/0800z Oct 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged 2,968

Boarded 325

Diverted 14

Warning Shots Fired 8

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Oct 90.]

31 October 90 (C plus 85)

POLITICAL

The plight of Iraqi-held hostages and the limited impact of the UN embargo against Iraq made a U.S.-led military strike more likely. "We are edging closer to the military option," said a State Department official. [Andrew Borowiec, "U.S. Strategy 'Edging Closer' to War," *The Washington Times*, 31 Oct 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

Four U.S. F-16s flew a DESERT TRIANGLE mission, approaching at high speed to within fifteen miles of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. No significant Iraqi response was noted. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Oct 90.]

Spare engine levels fell to or below the authorized standards at nine AOR locations. Engines were added to the CENTAF priority list and placed in second position, after resupply and war readiness spares kits. It was also reported that AOR fire fighters lacked chemical warfare defensive equipment protective undergarments. CENTAF Rear was determining the quantities that could be redistributed from CONUS assets. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 31 Oct 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—228,201 (11,857 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,520 (2,014 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Oct 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—720

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Oct 90.]

October 1990

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—691

Tactical/Support	430
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Tanker Refueling	81
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Intratheater Airlift	180
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MARCENT—86

NAVCENT—83

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to US-CINCCENT, "Sitrep," 01/0800z Nov 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

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November 1990

1 November 90 (C plus 86)

MILITARY

AWACS vectored two F-15s, flying combat air patrol, to shadow an Iraqi Mirage F-1 that was paralleling the Saudi-Iraqi border. Shortly thereafter, AWACS committed the same F-15s on two Iraqi aircraft flying south. As the F-15s began the intercept, the Iraqi aircraft violated the border. As the F-15s closed on the aircraft, the Iraqis turned north, having violated the Saudi border by six nautical miles. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—229,154 (11,894 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,456 (2,020 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—720

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—559

Tactical/Support	320
Tanker Refueling	46
Intratheater Airlift	193

Gulf War Chronology

MARCENT—85

NAVCENT—64

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 02/0800z Nov 90.]

2 November 90 (C plus 87)

MILITARY

Naval air assets conducted DESERT TRIANGLE flight activities. Patterns were restricted to no closer than thirty nautical miles from the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. A night CAS exercise was held involving A-10s, AC-130s, and Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center aircraft. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Nov 90.]

The USCENTCOM public affairs organization had accredited more than 800 media representatives since 9 August 90 to provide extensive press coverage of Operation DESERT SHIELD. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Nov 90.]

The level of Iraqi air activity—ninety-eight sorties—was consistent for the Islamic holy day. An increased number of total sorties occurred along the Iraqi-Saudi border. Two Mirage F-1s conducted border reconnaissance, and three others flew ACM training along the border. Two MiG-25/Foxbats made runs at the border, possibly simulating intercept operations. This increased border-area activity was likely in response to U.S.-allied DESERT TRIANGLE probes of the border over the past few days. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—231,918 (11,959 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,319 (1,970 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—720

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—415

Tactical/Support	246
Tanker Refueling	32
Intratheater Airlift	137

November 1990

MARCENT—93

NAVCENT—170

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 03/0800z Nov 90.]

3 November 90 (C plus 88)

MILITARY

Naval air assets conducted DESERT TRIANGLE flight activities. Patterns were restricted to no closer than twenty nautical miles from the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. There was no apparent Iraqi reaction. A night air defense exercise was scheduled involving four F-111s, four F-4Gs, two UK F-3s, two Saudi F-15s, and a Marine Hawk battery. The exercise tested all aspects of air defense integration and occurred along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Nov 90.]

Intelligence collection flights highlighted Iraqi air activity. The missions paralleled the Iraqi-Saudi border, flying west to east and thirty to forty nautical miles from the boundary. No border violations or reactions to U.S.-allied DESERT TRIANGLE missions were noted. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—238,781 (12,049 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,187 (1,970 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—720

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—607

Tactical/Support	402
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Tanker Refueling	57
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Intratheater Airlift	148
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MARCENT—67

NAVCENT—155

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 04/0800z Nov 90.]

4 November 90 (C plus 89)

MILITARY

USCINCCENT stated that Exercise DESERT TRIANGLE added a new dimension to USCENTCOM's operational air readiness posture. Missions were flown daily using a variety of aircraft, and mission scenarios were designed to assess Iraqi radar, early warning, surface-to-air missile, and interceptor response capabilities. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Nov 90.]

The DESERT TRIANGLE package consisted of four F-16s and two F-4Gs working two patterns in northeastern Saudi Arabia. The pattern was restricted to no closer than ten nautical miles to the border. There was no apparent Iraqi reaction. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—240,213 (12,257 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,168 (1,968 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—720

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—409

Tactical/Support	244
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Tanker Refueling	43
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Intratheater Airlift	122
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MARCENT—52

NAVCENT—72

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 05/0800z Nov 90.]

5 November 90 (C plus 90)

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity was highlighted by a possible reaction to an RF-4 reconnaissance flight by a pair of MiG-23/Floggers. The Floggers conducted a defensive patrol following the normal racetrack pattern in southern Iraq, west of the western Kuwaiti border, at 13,500 feet and about 400 knots. Their closest point of approach to the border was thirty nautical miles. This was the first possible reaction since September. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Nov 90.]

November 1990

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—232,809 (12,277 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,043 (1,969 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—723

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	5	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-29	1
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	96
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EF-111	14	EC-130E	6
F-4G	36	HC-130	4
F-15	72	KC-10	6
F-15E	24	KC-135	116
F-16	120	MC-130	4
F-111	32	MH-53	8
F-117	18	MH-60	8
		RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Nov 90; Brfg AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 5 Nov 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,030

Air-to-Air	91
(F-14, F-15)	
Air-to-Ground	264
(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)	
Dual Role	240
(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)	
Total Combat Aircraft	595
Support Aircraft	435

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—632	
Tactical/Support	419
Tanker Refueling	58
Intratheater Airlift	155

Gulf War Chronology

MARCENT—70

NAVCENT—2

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to USCINCCENT, "Sitrep," 06/0800z Nov 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	3,220
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Boarded	367
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Diverted	16
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Warning Shots Fired	8
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[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Nov 90.]

6 November 90 (C plus 91)

MILITARY

The DESERT TRIANGLE scenario consisted of eight F-16s flying at high speed toward the border, then turning to parallel the border no closer than ten nautical miles. There was no apparent Iraqi response. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Nov 90.]

Iraqi air activity was the highest yet observed in November—186 sorties. Overwater flights highlighted the day's activity. A formation of three to four aircraft flew overwater to about the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, then turned west to parallel the border. The flight may have been intended to elicit and collect against a U.S.-allied response. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—233,524 (12,268 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,983 (1,963 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—723

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—580

Tactical/Support	380
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Tanker Refueling	47
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Intratheater Airlift	153
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November 1990

MARCENT—66

NAVCENT—160

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 07/0800z Nov 90.]

7 November 90 (C plus 92)

POLITICAL

Secretary of State Baker said that "the credibility of the UN is at stake" because of Saddam Hussein's refusal to leave Kuwait. It was becoming increasingly clear that a new UN Security Council resolution authorizing use of force would be necessary to hold international consensus, should the Persian Gulf crisis come to war. [David Hoffman, "Baker Wants UN to Approve Force," *The Washington Post*, 8 Nov 90, p 1.]

Defense Secretary Cheney initiated the first combat reserve call-up since the Korean War when the Marine Corps asked for and received his permission to summon 3,000 Marine reservists. [Patrick Tyler, "Pentagon Considering Call-Up of Army Combat Reserve Units," *The Washington Post*, 7 Nov 90, p 7.]

MILITARY

The mission-capable rate for CENTAF aircraft in the AOR was 91.7 percent. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Roan, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 7 Nov 90.]

Iraqi air activity continued at higher than normal levels with 170 sorties. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—236,096 (12,704 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,000 (1,966 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—723

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—529

Tactical/Support	310
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Tanker Refueling	73
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Intratheater Airlift	146
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MARCENT—72

NAVCENT—146

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Nov 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

8 November 90 (C plus 93)

POLITICAL

President Bush ordered more than 150,000 additional American ground, sea, and air forces to the Persian Gulf area, saying they were needed to achieve "an adequate offensive military option" to drive Iraqi troops from Kuwait. [Michael Gordon, "Bush Sends New Units to Gulf to Provide 'Offensive' Option: U.S. Force Could Reach 380,000," *The New York Times*, 9 Nov 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

A large CAS exercise involving eight-one aircraft was flown. In a mass launch exercise from Al Dhafra, UAE, thirty-six F-16s, four F-4Gs, two RF-4s, and two UAE Mirage 2000s flew as a strike package against opponent air provided by UK Tornados. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Nov 90.]

Iraqi air activity was lower than normal—109—due to thunderstorms in northeastern Iraq. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—235,008 (12,708 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,928 (1,959 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—723

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—541

Tactical/Support	367
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Tanker Refueling	45
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Intratheater Airlift	129
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MARCENT—100

NAVCENT—72

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 09/0800z Nov 90.]

NATO combat air forces in support of DESERT SHIELD—127

Britain

Tornado	37
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Jaguar	22
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France

Mirage F-1	26
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Mirage 2000	8
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November 1990

Jaguar	8
Canada	
CF-18	18
Italy	
Tornado	8

[Brfg, AF/XO to CORONA, "DESERT SHIELD Update," 8 Nov 90.]

Arab combat air forces in support of DESERT SHIELD—506

Saudi Arabia

F-5	85
F-15	82
Tornado	47
Strikemaster	32
Hawk	30

United Arab Emirates

Mirage 2000	25
Mirage III	14
Mirage 5	14

Egypt

F-4	48
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Oman

Jaguar	22
Strikemaster	12
Hunter	10

Kuwait

A-4	20
Mirage F-1	15
Hawk	5

Bahrain

F-15	12
F-16	12

Qatar

Mirage F-1	12
Alpha	6
Hunter	3

[Brfg, AF/XO to CORONA, "DESERT SHIELD Update," 8 Nov 90.]

9 November 90 (C plus 94)

POLITICAL

The additional U.S. soldiers, sailors, and aircrews to be deployed to the Persian Gulf indicated the magnitude of the military problem posed by Iraq and the caution of American military leaders in preparing to confront the

Gulf War Chronology

Iraqi Army. The new deployment was seen as a turning point from the U.S. defensive posture of the first three months of the crisis, to an offensive posture by early next year. [Patrick Tyler, "New Deployment Signals U.S. Switch to Offensive," *The Washington Post*, 9 Nov 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

USAF strategic airlift totaled 5,226 missions "closed" in the AOR; 178,358 tons of cargo and 185,891 passengers had been transported. The AOR aircraft mission-capable rate was 92.9 percent. Logistical priorities were engine spares, resupply and war readiness spares kits, ALQ-131 ECM pods, fire operations and crash rescue, and Harvest Falcon air base supply kits. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 9 Nov 90.]

The total Iraqi aircraft inventory included 445 fighters (322 were all-weather capable), 401 fighter-bombers and bombers, 73 transports, and 583 attack helicopters. Iraqi ground forces had elements of 26 divisions in the KTO totaling 422,000 troops: 240,500 in Kuwait and 181,500 in southern Iraq. These forces had 3,575 tanks, 2,360 armored personnel carriers, and 2,370 artillery pieces. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 9 Nov 90.]

Many documents and briefings present lists of coalition members. The definition used to form these lists varies among the sources, and the size of the lists ranges from twenty-eight to forty-seven countries. The following list includes all NATO members who participated in any way and countries that sent more than a token national air, land, or naval force. (For example, New Zealand, which provided only two C-130s, and Niger, which sent 480 troops to guard Moslem shrines in Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia, were omitted. Likewise, by this criteria, the 300 Mujaheddin who went to the AOR do not qualify Afghanistan as a coalition member.)

[Rpt, Lt. Col. Joseph P. Englehardt, Director, Middle East Studies, "DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM: A Chronology and Troop List for the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1991.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—235,904 (12,972 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,991 (1,956 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—723

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Nov 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,030

Air-to-Air

91

(F-14, F-15)

November 1990

Air-to-Ground	264
(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)	
Dual Role	240
(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)	
Total Combat Aircraft	595
Support Aircraft	435
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Nov 90.]	

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—433	
Tactical/Support	259
Tanker Refueling	39
Intratheater Airlift	135

MARCENT—87

NAVCENT—158

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 10/0800z Nov 90.]

Argentina	Germany	Poland
Australia	Greece	Portugal
Bahrain	Honduras	Qatar
Bangladesh	Hungary	Saudi Arabia
Belgium	Italy	Senegal
Canada	Kuwait	Spain
Czechoslovakia	Morocco	Syria
Denmark	Norway	The Netherlands
Egypt	Oman	Turkey
France	Pakistan	United Arab Emirates

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	3,407
Boarded	389
Diverted	16
Warning Shots Fired	8

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z October 90.]

10 November 90 (C plus 95)

POLITICAL

Secretary of State Baker completed a week of talks, visiting eight countries that were part of the coalition against Iraq. The overarching lesson from his tour was that the coalition remained solid as long as military action was not imminent. Reportedly, the closer Washington edged toward using military force, the greater the chance that small differences that existed between coalition partners could develop into major problems. Admini-

Gulf War Chronology

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November 1990

stration officials said they did not believe President Bush had decided whether or not to go to war. [Thomas Friedman, "Baker Trip Shows Coalition Discord on War with Iraq," *The New York Times*, 11 Nov 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—236,982 (12,995 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,933 (1,942 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—723

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—403

Tactical/Support 198

Tanker Refueling 29

Intratheater Airlift 176

MARCENT—40

NAVCENT—72

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 11/0800z Nov 90.]

11 November 90 (C plus 96)

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity continued at reduced levels for the third consecutive day. The average for the month was 129 sorties per day. Air activity was highlighted by two Mirage F-1 overwater flights over Bubiyan Island. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—237,807 (13,050 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,894 (1,940 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—723

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—404

Tactical/Support 241

Gulf War Chronology

Tanker Refueling	43
Intratheater Airlift	120
MARCENT—44	
NAVCENT—27	

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 12/0800z Nov 90.]

12 November 90 (C plus 97)

POLITICAL

Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that President Bush was following the wrong strategy by doubling U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf. "We're committed to defend Saudi Arabia, but I do not think that means we have to build up an offensive force to liberate Kuwait," said the Georgia Democrat. Senator Nunn's skeptical words on U.S. military policy marked the first time a top congressional leader seriously questioned President Bush's Persian Gulf policy. [J. Jennings Moss, "Nunn Cools to Gulf Buildup," *The Washington Times*, 12 Nov 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

Three combined strike packages containing U.S., Saudi, British, and French aircraft were flown. A large-scale, combined CAS exercise involving 108 U.S., Saudi, and Kuwaiti aircraft was conducted. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Nov 90.]

Iraqi sortie totals increased to normal levels after four consecutive days of low activity. A total of 130 sorties were detected. Most of the activity was routine: navigation flights, local airfield operations, practice ground controlled intercept training, overwater flights, ground attack training, touch-and-go landings, and reconnaissance. Air activity was highlighted by two MiG-25/Foxbats performing "teardrop" intercept profiles, simulating rear hemisphere climbing attacks against high-value air assets. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—233,787 (13,050 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,978 (1,945 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—723

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Nov 90.]

November 1990

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—645

Tactical/Support	405
Tanker Refueling	52
Intratheater Airlift	188

MARCENT—79

NAVCENT—140

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 13/0800z Nov 90.]

13 November 90 (C plus 98)

POLITICAL

Key Senate Republican leaders urged President Bush to call a special session of Congress to approve his plans for major new military deployments to the Persian Gulf. Senate Democrats, amid expressions of concern that the United States was moving toward war while support for its Gulf policy was eroding at home and abroad, announced that a hearing on the administration's move toward an offensive military posture in the Gulf would be convened during Congress' midwinter recess. [Helen Dewar and John Yang, "Key GOP Senators Seek Vote on Gulf," *The Washington Post*, 14 Nov 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

Exercise SANDY BEACH was flown in Qatar. The scenario consisted of a U.S. strike force of twelve F-16s, four F-15s, and four F-4Gs attacking airspace defended by French and Qatar Mirage F-1s. Large-scale CAS exercises continued. One exercise tasked 120 aircraft from U.S., Saudi, Kuwaiti, and French forces over a twenty-hour period. The aircraft used ranges and routes in eastern and central sectors of Saudi Arabia. The exercise tested CAS procedures, strike planning, and counterair techniques. C-130s performed simulated inserts of personnel and equipment into designated drop zones while A-10s, A-4s, Jaguars, and F-5s flew support missions. A C-130E provided command, control, and communications for the exercise. The A-10s coordinated with USMC OV-10s for control of the CAS missions. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Nov 90.]

The CENTAF aircraft mission-capable rate was 92.2 percent. The primary CENTAF logistics priorities were engine spares and war readiness spares kits. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 13 Nov 90.]

Iraqi air activity increased for the fourth consecutive day, returning to levels observed during the first week of the month. A total of 160 sorties were detected. Air activity was highlighted by the detection of a B-

Gulf War Chronology

6D/Badger loaded with two C-601 antiship cruise missiles. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—234,843 (13,357 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,022 (2,024 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—723

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—566

Tactical/Support	384
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Tanker Refueling	53
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Intratheater Airlift	129
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MARCENT—66

NAVCENT—125

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 14/0800z Nov 90.]

14 November 90 (C plus 99)

POLITICAL

President Bush held a White House meeting to reassure worried congressional leaders that he had not decided to use force against Iraq. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell and House Speaker Thomas Foley said after the meeting that the congressional leadership had no plans to call an emergency session of Congress to debate the Gulf buildup. "The president's assertion is that this additional buildup does not reflect a decision to use offensive force, but to have the capability for such a decision," Foley said. [Ann Devroy and John Yang, "Bush Acts to Allay Hill Unease on Gulf," *The Washington Post*, 15 Nov 90, p 1.]

Secretary of Defense Cheney authorized the call-up of another 72,500 National Guard and reserve troops. This was the first step toward fulfilling President Bush's decision to deploy up to 200,000 additional U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf. Included in the new order was the first Pentagon authority under Operation DESERT SHIELD to activate Army combat reserve units. Cheney's decision more than doubled the number of National Guard and reserve personnel previously authorized for service with the operation. The Defense Department's new ceiling of 125,000 reservists who could be on active duty at one time represented a substantial increase from the 50,050

November 1990

authorized after Iraq's 2 August invasion of Kuwait. [Jeffrey Smith, "72,500 More Reservists Authorized for Call to Active Duty by Cheney, *The Washington Post*, 15 Nov 90, p 32.]

MILITARY

Two DESERT TRIANGLE missions were flown. The first mission profile consisted of six AV-8s, two F/A-18s, and two F-4Gs simulating an airfield attack on a Saudi airfield. The second mission profile consisted of eight F-14s, two E-2s, two S-3s, and two EA-6Bs making a high-speed run along the Saudi-Iraqi border. Neither profile took the U.S. aircraft closer than ten nautical miles to the Saudi border with Kuwait or Iraq. No Iraqi reaction was noted. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Nov 90.]

Iraqi air activity increased to 170 sorties. Most of the activity was routine: navigation flights, practice ground controlled intercept, and ground attack training. There were a total of five overwater flights by MiG-23/Flogger and Mirage F-1 aircraft. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—235,715 (13,357 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,077 (2,000 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—723

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—430

Tactical/Support 247

Tanker Refueling 42

Intratheater Airlift 141

MARCENT—69

NAVCENT—88

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 15/0800z Nov 90.]

15 November 90 (C plus 100)

POLITICAL

President Bush said that, while the increased U.S. military deployment in the Persian Gulf did not mean he had abandoned hope for a peaceful conclusion, there was "a ticking of the clock" domestically and internationally that limited the time available to wait for Saddam Hussein to bend to

Gulf War Chronology

nonmilitary action. [Ann Devroy and Dan Balz, "Bush Says Time Is Limited for Peaceful Gulf Solution," *The Washington Post*, 16 Nov 90, p 1.]

The United States was ready to seek a UN resolution authorizing offensive military action against Iraq, provided that final consultations with other members of the Security Council went as expected. Secretary of State Baker arrived in Brussels to begin an intensive round of country-by-country conferences involving at least nine of the Security Council's fifteen members. In particular, he wanted to confirm that the Soviet Union and China would cooperate. [R.W. Apple, "U.S. Reported Ready to Ask UN to Back a Gulf Assault," *The New York Times*, 16 Nov 90, p 12.]

Yevgeny Primakov, the Soviet Union's chief Middle East expert and President Gorbachev's special envoy in the Persian Gulf crisis, called for delaying the introduction of a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. He favored allowing time for a final negotiating effort that would give Saddam Hussein a "face-saving" reason to give up Kuwait. Primakov added that, if such an initiative failed, not only should a Security Council resolution authorizing force be approved, but military action should be taken immediately against Iraq. [Paul Lewis, "Soviet Aid Urges Delay of UN Move on Force in Gulf," *The New York Times*, 16 Nov 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

Exercise IMMINENT THUNDER began. This was a fully integrated joint and combined air, ground, and naval exercise. Flying operations were planned to closely simulate actual D-day air tasking orders. Sorties included nine combined strike packages and one CAS package involving more than 700 aircraft. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Nov 90.]

The "follow-on forces" fuel requirements were being analyzed to determine the impact on logistics. The Defense Fuels Supply Center was analyzing Saudi refining capabilities to determine if the additional demand could be met. Early estimates suggested that, if war began, fourteen ocean tanker loads (nine million gallons each) of jet fuel per month would be needed to augment Saudi production. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 15 Nov 90.]

Iraqi air activity dropped below normal, to forty sorties. A decrease in flight activity typically characterized Iraq's reaction to U.S. and allied air operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Nov 90.]

November 1990

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—235,215 (13,179 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,981 (2,005 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—723

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Nov 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,035

Air-to-Air 91

(F-14, F-15)

Air-to-Ground 264

(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)

Dual Role 240

(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)

Total Combat Aircraft 595

Support Aircraft 440

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—878

Tactical/Support 653

Tanker Refueling 95

Intratheater Airlift 130

MARCENT—146

NAVCENT—90

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 16/0800z Nov 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged 3,680

Boarded 417

Diverted 16

Warning Shots Fired 9

Refused to Stop 3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Nov 90.]

16 November 90 (C plus 101)

POLITICAL

Egyptian President Mubarak urged the United States to delay ordering military action in the Persian Gulf for up to three months to give Iraq time

Gulf War Chronology

to consider pulling out of Kuwait. [John Goshko, "Egypt Opposes Early Attack in Gulf," *The Washington Post*, 17 Nov 90, p 15.]

MILITARY

U.S. and coalition flight operations were planned to closely simulate the actual air tasking orders for D-day plus 1. Sorties included twelve combined strike packages and a CAS exercise. The exercise involved more than 200 sorties. Combined U.S., Saudi, and French forces participated in combat search and rescue exercises as part of IMMINENT THUNDER. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Nov 90.]

Iraqi air activity returned to an average level of 128 sorties. Most of the flights occurred in the morning, including six overwater sorties. Flight activity was substantially reduced after 0600 in response to exercise IMMINENT THUNDER. Air activity was highlighted by the use of the modified Il-76/Candid airborne early warning aircraft over the southern dispersal airfields while three fighters conducted air combat maneuver training. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—236,196 (13,395 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,818 (1,995 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—721

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-29	1
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	96
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EF-111	14	EC-130E	6
F-4G	36	HC-130	4
F-15	72	KC-10	6
F-15E	24	KC-135	115
F-16	120	MC-130	4
F-111	32	MH-53	8
F-117	18	MH-60	8
		RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Nov 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 16 Nov 90.]

November 1990

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—865	
Tactical/Support	601
Tanker Refueling	75
Intratheater Airlift	189

MARCENT—113

NAVCENT—28

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 17/0800z Nov 90.]

17 November 90 (C plus 102)

POLITICAL

According to *The Washington Post*—ABC News poll, broad public support continued for the overall U.S. objective of driving Iraqi military forces out of Kuwait. However, most Americans wanted to call Congress back into session to debate U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf, and a growing majority believed President Bush should seek congressional approval before taking any military action against Iraq. [Richard Morin, "Majority Wants Hill In on Gulf," *The Washington Post*, 17 Nov 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

Flight operations were planned to closely simulate the potential for air tasking orders D plus 2. The sorties included five combined strike packages and a CAS exercise. The CAS exercise included more than 280 sorties. F-117s conducted a simulated night airfield attack. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Nov 90.]

Iraqi ground forces in the KTO totaled twenty-seven divisions: seventeen committed and ten reinforcing. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—236,919 (13,431 women)
Total CENTAF Personnel—30,679 (1,971 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—721

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—805	
Tactical/Support	561

Gulf War Chronology

Tanker Refueling	91
Intratheater Airlift	153
MARCENT—128	
NAVCENT—153	

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 18/0800z Nov 90.]

18 November 90 (C plus 103)

POLITICAL

Defense Secretary Cheney, calling Congress "a great debating society," worried that a vigorous congressional debate on the use of troops in the Persian Gulf could "undermine our purposes in the Gulf." The administration was trying to deal with public opinion polls that showed an increasing public wariness about U.S. troop deployment in the Middle East and the potential for war. Secretary Cheney said that unrestrained debate of the president's goals could "give Saddam Hussein comfort because he'll perceive that there's a possibility that the United States might, in fact, not continue to remain firm." [Eleanor Randolph, "Cheney Cautions Congress on Debate of Gulf Policy," *The Washington Post*, 19 Nov 90, p 22.]

U.S., British, and Israeli intelligence experts concluded that Iraq had acquired a nuclear weapons capacity that could enable it to begin manufacturing and using a small but devastating stock of nuclear missiles, shells, and bombs within ten years. [Malcolm Browne, "Unless Stopped, Iraq Could Have A-Arms in 10 Years, Experts Say," *The New York Times*, 18 Nov 90, p 1.]

Defense industry executives and procurement experts said that the U.S. defense industry would be hard-pressed to substantially accelerate production of weapons and spare parts if a Middle East war created an urgent need to replenish existing supplies. They remarked that the United States had never deployed so many troops so quickly, providing no time for industry to mobilize. The experts worried that a war fought entirely with current stocks could pose grave risks if the fighting was not resolved quickly. [Ralph Vartabedian, "War Could Overburden Defense Supply System," *The Los Angeles Times*, 18 Nov 90, p 1.]

Saddam Hussein announced that, "unless something should occur to disturb the atmosphere of peace," Iraq would free all remaining foreign hostages starting 25 December 90 and continuing through 25 March 91. There were believed to be some 2,000 foreigners trapped or held hostage in Iraq and in Iraqi-occupied Kuwait. This announcement, timed to precede an impending visit by President Bush to Saudi Arabia, was seen as a move

November 1990

by Saddam Hussein to divide world public opinion and to protect Iraq from attack during the January-March period, the most likely time for the beginning of a U.S.-led offensive to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait. [Nora Boustany, "Saddam Offers to Release Hostages If Peace Holds," *The Washington Post*, 19 Nov 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity was higher than normal with a total of 172 sorties. Despite the heightened activity, there were no significant "tracks" noted. Most of the sorties were routine and included navigation, local airfield operations, reconnaissance, and ACM training. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Nov 90.]

An Iraqi SA-6 surface-to-air missile unit was observed west of Kuwait City, near Minaqish. This was the farthest south an SA-6 had been observed. These missile units most often accompanied maneuver groups and, to this time, only the Republican Guard forces. Another SA-6 battery was located along the northern Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—237,250 (13,443 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,801 (2,000 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—721

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—537

Tactical/Support	324
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Tanker Refueling	61
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Intratheater Airlift	152
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MARCENT—128

NAVCENT—62

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Nov 90.]

19 November 90 (C plus 104)

POLITICAL

Iraq announced it was sending 250,000 additional troops to Kuwait and southern Iraq, a buildup it claimed the United States would be unable to match. The state-run Iraqi News Agency said Saddam Hussein decided at

Gulf War Chronology

a meeting of his general command "to mass seven additional divisions immediately and to call up more than 150,000 fighters from the reserves and regular troops." Pentagon officials said Iraq already had about 450,000 troops in Kuwait and southern Iraq. [Nora Boustany, "Iraq Says It Will Expand Force in Kuwait," *The Washington Post*, 20 Nov 90, p 10.]

President Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev concluded a meeting in Paris on the Persian Gulf crisis, without the Soviet leader issuing an anticipated public endorsement of a possible UN resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said: "There are still people we need to talk to, that they want to talk to. And so we just simply have not reached a point of decision." [Ann Devroy and Michael Dobbs, "U.S. Awaits Soviet OK on Force," *The Washington Post*, 20 Nov 90, p 1.]

Leaders of the twenty-two NATO and Warsaw Pact nations ended more than four decades of military confrontation by signing the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. The treaty signing ceremony was followed by a three-day "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" which included the sixteen NATO members, six Warsaw Pact nations, and twelve neutral countries. [William Drozdiak, "22 Nations Sign Arms Pact at Paris Peace Conference," *The Washington Post*, 20 Nov 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

IMMINENT THUNDER flying continued with a 296-sortie CAS exercise. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Nov 90.]

The CENTAF logistics priorities were Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer (Red Horse), and communications equipment. Red Horse became a priority because of the increased construction requirements at several air bases. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 19 Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—237,496 (13,453 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,848 (1,991 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—721

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—660

Tactical/Support 464

November 1990

Tanker Refueling	66
Intratheater Airlift	130
MARCENT—167	
NAVCENT—67	

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 20/0800z Nov 90.]

20 November 90 (C plus 105)

MILITARY

Exercise IMMINENT THUNDER continued with a 210-sortie CAS exercise. One U.S. AWACS, one EA-6B, eight F-14s, and one E-2C conducted a DESERT TRIANGLE exercise in northwestern Saudi Arabia. The F-14s flew a high-speed run toward the border, then turned to parallel the border at no closer than ten nautical miles. There was no Iraqi response. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Nov 90.]

The CENTAF aircraft mission-capable rate was 92.3 percent. There was a general improvement in the flow of spare engines to the AOR "due in large measure to increased attention" from USTRANSCOM. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 20 Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—237,601 (13,462 women)
Total CENTAF Personnel—30,868 (1,971 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—721

(No change)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Nov 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,035

Air-to-Air	91
(F-14, F-15)	
Air-to-Ground	264
(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)	
Dual Role	240
(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)	
Total Combat Aircraft	595
Support Aircraft	440

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Nov 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—617

Tactical/Support	414
Tanker Refueling	67
Intratheater Airlift	136

MARCENT—68

NAVCENT—132

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 21/0800z Nov 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	3,840
Boarded	450
Diverted	17
Warning Shots Fired	9
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Nov 90.]

21 November 90 (C plus 106)

MILITARY

Exercise IMMINENT THUNDER ended with four strike packages flown by U.S., Saudi, British, French, and Canadian forces, and one package flown by U.S., Saudi, and Kuwaiti forces. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Nov 90.]

USCINCCENT remarked that IMMINENT THUNDER demonstrated "that we and our allies are ready to fight." Exercise participants included more than 1,000 Marines, 19 ships of the amphibious task force, carrier and battleship battle groups, and 1,000 aircraft from CENTAF, Navy Central Command (NAVCENT), and Marine Central Command (MARCENT), which flew approximately 4,000 sorties. Allied participation tested the capabilities of Saudi ground, air, and naval forces, as well as French, British, Kuwaiti, and Canadian air forces. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Nov 90.]

Iraqi air activity was higher than normal—147 sorties. Two overwater navigation flights and two possible reconnaissance flights were observed. The most significant activity was thirty-two helicopter flights which were moving troops along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti northern border. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Nov 90.]

November 1990

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—237,930 (13,587 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,873 (1,995 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—721

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—435

Tactical/Support	232
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Tanker Refueling	60
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Intratheater Airlift	143
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MARCENT—65

NAVCENT—101

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 22/0800z Nov 90.]

22 November 90 (C plus 107)

POLITICAL

President Bush was in Saudi Arabia on a Thanksgiving "tour of the troops." He told U.S. servicemen that he had acted "with restraint and patience." But, he added, "Saddam Hussein is making the mistake of his life if he confuses an abundance of restraint with a lack of resolve." [Andrew Rosenthal, "Visiting U.S. Troops in the Desert, President Talks Tough About Iraq," *The New York Times*, 23 Nov 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

Omani Jaguar aircraft refueled from U.S. KC-135s for the first time in Operation DESERT SHIELD. An EC-130E VOLANT SOLO began "Voice of America" broadcasts into Kuwait by picking up transmission from Greece. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—237,787 (13,527 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,038 (2,003 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—721

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Nov 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—167	
Tactical/Support	48
Tanker Refueling	53
Intratheater Airlift	66

MARCENT—51

NAVCENT—151

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Nov 90.]

23 November 90 (C plus 108)

MILITARY

Two Omani Jaguars attempted refueling from a U.S. KC-10 for the first time in Operation DESERT SHIELD. Excessive fuel spray from the basket coupling forced them to discontinue refueling operations after the fifth attempt. The problem was being investigated. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—238,191 (13,536 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,993 (2,003 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—721

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—305	
Tactical/Support	125
Tanker Refueling	30
Intratheater Airlift	150

MARCENT—57

NAVCENT—1

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 24/0800z Nov 90.]

24 November 90 (C plus 109)

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity returned to higher levels after two days of reduced flight activity. Reconnaissance flights by MiG-25/Foxbats highlighted the 152

November 1990

sorties flown by the Iraqis. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—238,673 (13,580 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,998 (1,992 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—721

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—409

Tactical/Support 201

Tanker Refueling 47

Intratheater Airlift 161

MARCENT—55

NAVCENT—137

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 25/0800z Nov 90.]

25 November 90 (C plus 110)

POLITICAL

U.S. administration officials and foreign diplomats said that the United States had enough support in the UN Security Council to gain approval of a resolution that would authorize the use of military force against Iraq if it did not withdraw its forces from Kuwait. The White House was pushing for a 1 January 1991 deadline, but diplomats said that no final decision had been made. There was speculation that the Security Council would set the deadline for the end of January to allow more time for last-minute attempts to promote a peaceful settlement. [Paul Lewis, "U.S. Is Reported to Win Support for Use of Force," *The New York Times*, 26 Nov 90, p 1.]

The Bush administration stepped up efforts to raise American concern about Iraq's ability to develop nuclear weapons. Defense Secretary Cheney and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft said that the Iraqi nuclear weapons program was advancing despite the embargo, and Baghdad might be able to produce a crude nuclear device within a year. These remarks were intended to add weight to the White House's argument that the situation in the Persian Gulf must be resolved this winter. [Michael Gordon, "U.S. Aides Press Iraqi Nuclear Threat," *The New York Times*, 26 Nov 90, p 13.]

Gulf War Chronology

MILITARY

A DESERT TRIANGLE package was flown, including two F/A-18s, two A-6s, four F-14s, two E-2Cs, one EA-6B, and one EA-3. The operation, conducted in northwest Saudi Arabia, drew no response. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Nov 90.]

Iraqi air activity was reduced to 117 sorties. At least six fighters engaged in low-level ground attack training at a bombing range in Iraq. The aircraft conducted level passes, indicating the use of rockets. There was evidence that Iraq may have developed and practiced simultaneous refueling of two fighter aircraft from a modified Il-76/Candid. Iraq's Mirage F-1s, Su-24/Fencers, MiG-23/Floggers (F/H models), and some Su-17-22/Fitters were air-to-air refuelable. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—239,228 (13,662 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,972 (1,994 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—721

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Nov 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,035

Air-to-Air	91
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(F-14, F-15)	
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Air-to-Ground	264
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(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)	
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Dual Role	240
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(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)	
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Total Combat Aircraft	595
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Support Aircraft	440
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[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—451

Tactical/Support	206
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Tanker Refueling	44
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Intratheater Airlift	201
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MARCENT—53

NAVCENT—80

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 26/0800z Nov 90.]

November 1990

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	4,056
Boarded	483
Diverted	19
Warning Shots Fired	9
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Nov 90.]

26 November 90 (C plus 111)

POLITICAL

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council were in agreement on a U.S. call to authorize use of military force to end Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, but they disagreed about the date for the deadline. The United States proposed 1 January 1991 while the Soviet Union favored 15 January. Diplomatic sources said the later date seemed the more likely choice. [John Goshko, "U.S. Gains Backing for Use of Force," *The Washington Post*, 27 Nov 90, p 1.]

The Soviet Union demanded that Iraq release more than 3,000 Soviet citizens stranded there, charging for the first time that Baghdad was preventing them from leaving. At a Soviet Foreign Ministry news conference and later in "apparently testy meetings" with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, Kremlin officials accused Iraq of reneging on promises to let Soviet citizens return home from jobs as industrial and military specialists. [Bill Keller, "Kremlin Insists That Iraqis Let Russians Leave," *The New York Times*, 27 Nov 90, p 1.]

Eleven of the country's most prominent law professors filed a brief urging a federal judge to rule that President Bush could not commit the United States to war against Iraq unless he received the explicit permission of Congress. The brief was submitted as part of a suit brought by forty-five Democratic congressmen who were asking District Judge Harold Greene to issue an order that it would be unconstitutional for the president to initiate a war without congressional approval. [Neil Lewis, "Law Professors Demand War-Making Limits," *The New York Times*, 27 Nov 90, p 17.]

MILITARY

A combined CAS exercise, using 117 aircraft, was flown. Four B-52s flew a night mission. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Nov 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—239,416 (13,670 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,987 (1,998 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—721

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—532

Tactical/Support	316
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Tanker Refueling	63
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Intratheater Airlift	153
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MARCENT—56

NAVCENT—58

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 27/0800z Nov 90.]

27 November 90 (C plus 112)

MILITARY

A combined CAS exercise, involving 167 aircraft, was flown. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Nov 90.]

Iraqi air activity was significantly below normal—forty-five sorties. Thunderstorms in southern and central Iraq accounted for the decline. Iraqi fighter operations were noted for minimal activity during poor weather conditions. Transport and helicopter activity, which accounted for thirty-seven of the day's sorties, were at normal levels. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—240,387 (13,719 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,115 (1,996 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—721

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—535

Tactical/Support	331
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November 1990

Tanker Refueling	53
Intratheater Airlift	151
MARCENT—51	
NAVCENT—43	

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 28/0800z Nov 90.]

28 November 90 (C plus 113)

POLITICAL

A top-secret U.S. intelligence report, reflecting a consensus among intelligence agencies, including the CIA, estimated that Iraq would be able to build a "crude" nuclear weapon within six months. [Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Saddam Close to Nuclear Weapon," *The Washington Times*, 28 Nov 90, p 1.]

Senate and House Democrats called on President Bush to give economic sanctions against Iraq a chance to succeed and asked him to open direct talks with Saddam Hussein before making a decision to use force. These signs of increasing congressional uneasiness over administration policy came as the Senate Armed Services Committee began a review of U.S. Persian Gulf policy before the 102d Congress convened in early January 1991. [Tom Kenworthy and David Broder, "Democrats Urge Caution on Gulf," *The Washington Post*, 28 Nov 90, p 1.]

Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, two former chairmen of the JCS, retired Navy Admiral William Crowe and retired Air Force General David Jones, said the deployment of additional troops could lead inexorably to war with Iraq. They strongly urged the Bush administration to give the UN embargo against Iraq enough time to force Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. [Walter Pincus and Ann Devroy, "Ex-Joint Chiefs Chairmen Urge Reliance on Sanctions," *The Washington Post*, 29 Nov 90, p 1.]

Britain's Queen Elizabeth II accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. John Major took office as the new prime minister after winning a three-way race to lead the Conservative Party. [Allen Richardson, "Major in Command of Britain," *USA Today*, 28 Nov 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity returned to normal levels, highlighted by six intelligence collection flights. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Nov 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—240,618 (13,711 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,161 (1,980 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—721

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—570

Tactical/Support	329
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Tanker Refueling	74
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Intratheater Airlift	167
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MARCENT—55

NAVCENT—96

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 29/0800z Nov 90.]

29 November 90 (C plus 114)

POLITICAL

By a vote of twelve to two, with China abstaining, foreign ministers of the fifteen-member UN Security Council adopted the U.S.-sponsored resolution allowing the use of force to achieve an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. The resolution stated that unless Iraq, by 15 January 1991, fully complied with previous council resolutions calling for its unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait and release of foreigners, member states may "use all necessary means . . . to restore international peace and security in the area." This was only the second resolution in UN history authorizing use of force to repel aggression. [John Goshko, "UN Vote Authorizes Use of Force Against Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 30 Nov 90, p 1.]

In a defiant speech delivered in Baghdad to a gathering of Arab students, Saddam Hussein said that his nation was ready for war against American-led troops. "If war breaks out, we will fight in a way that will make all Arabs and Muslims proud," he said. Because he had appeared conciliatory toward the United States and other Western nations in recent television interviews, Western diplomats in Baghdad were surprised by the belligerent tone of Hussein's remarks. [Philip Shenon, "Defiant Iraqi President Declares He Is Ready for War Against U.S.," *The New York Times*, 30 Nov 90, p 1.]

November 1990

MILITARY

In response to the ongoing Iraqi buildup in the KTO, USCINCCENT increased the threat condition for all U.S. forces. Two AWACS twenty-four-hour orbits, with commensurate increased fighter combat air patrol, were being flown. The number of ground alert aircraft was increased from twenty-six to thirty-eight, with an additional forty fighters and seventy-one A-10s uploaded and mission ready. Four B-52s were placed on three-hour night alert. All ships in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf and the Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries were at increased alert readiness. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Nov 90.]

A combined CAS exercise, involving 125 aircraft, was flown. Four joint combined strike packages, consisting of 16 to 54 aircraft, were flown. A DESERT TRIANGLE Package, comprised of eight F-14s, two E-2s, one EA-6B, one EA-3, and one S-3, was flown in northwestern Saudi Arabia. The F-14s flew at high speed toward the border, then turned to parallel at no closer than ten nautical miles. There was no Iraqi reaction. A second AWACS track and associated air defense patrol was established to increase coverage of the northwestern Saudi-Iraqi border. Additional air defense aircraft were placed on ground alert for an increased readiness posture. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Nov 90.]

Iraqi air activity was slightly higher than normal with 148 sorties. Intelligence collection flights highlighted the flight activity. During the afternoon, a single fighter orbited approximately ten nautical miles from the Saudi border for thirty minutes. Four F-15s reacted, but no border violation occurred. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Nov 90.]

Iraqi ground forces continued to reinforce the KTO. Armored brigades, artillery battalions, and mechanized infantry brigades were moving into the theater. Also, the Iraqis were constructing new trenches and improving existing ones. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Nov 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—240,599 (13,894 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,194 (1,978 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Nov 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

USAF Aircraft Deployed—741

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	96	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-29	1
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	96
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EF-111	14	EC-130E	6
F-4G	36	HC-130	4
F-15	72	KC-10	6
F-15E	24	KC-135	115
F-16	120	MC-130	4
F-111	52	MH-53	8
F-117	18	MH-60	8
		RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Nov 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—528

Tactical/Support	289
Tanker Refueling	73
Intratheater Airlift	166

MARCENT—90

NAVCENT—141

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Nov 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 30/0800z Nov 90.]

30 November 90 (C plus 115)

MILITARY

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—241,040 (13,931 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,288 (1,991 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Nov 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—741

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Nov 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,063

Air-to-Air

91

November 1990

(F-14, F-15)	
Air-to-Ground	284
(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)	
Dual Role	240
(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)	
Total Combat Aircraft	615
Support Aircraft	448
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Nov 90.]	

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—406	
Tactical/Support	133
Tanker Refueling	51
Intratheater Airlift	222

MARCENT—56

NAVCENT—98

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 01/0800z Dec 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	4,305
Boarded	517
Diverted	20
Warning Shots Fired	10
Refused to Stop	3
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Nov 90.]	

Gulf War Chronology

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December 1990

1 December 90 (C plus 116)

POLITICAL

Georgi Shakhnazarov, one of Soviet President Gorbachev's top foreign policy aides, said that neither the Soviet legislature nor the general public would tolerate a "military adventure" by USSR forces into the Persian Gulf. The Gulf crisis, he explained, followed too closely the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. "It is the same situation as when the United States just finished the war in Vietnam," Shakhnazarov said. "If [the Gulf crisis] had happened then, certainly the Congress would have banned military involvement by the U.S. anywhere else in the world." [David Remnick, "Soviets Would Stay Out of Gulf War," *The Washington Post*, 2 Dec 90, p 34.]

MILITARY

An air defense exercise was flown in the central and eastern sectors of Saudi Arabia. The exercise was designed to test the air defense command and control system, as well as practice detection, identification, and "handoff" procedures. Exercise participants included AWACS, two U.S. Navy combat air patrols, and two aircraft on ground alert. Ground participants included all appropriate air defense assets and command and control units. The "faker" package consisted of four F-4Gs, four F-111s, and four F-16s. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraq continued to reinforce the KTO. Minor repositioning and reinforcement was seen throughout the front line of defense. Reinforcing forces continued to arrive at railheads where company- and battalion-sized for-

Gulf War Chronology

mations were noted in staging areas. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—241,720 (13,941 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,480 (1,995 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—741

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—652

Tactical/Support	348
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Tanker Refueling	77
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Intratheater Airlift	227
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MARCENT—53

NAVCENT—84

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 02/0800z Dec 90.]

2 December 90 (C plus 117)

POLITICAL

Both U.S. and Iraqi diplomats expressed optimism about prospects for a peaceful settlement of the Persian Gulf crisis. Secretary of State Baker said there was an "excellent chance" world opposition could persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Abdul Amir Anbari, Iraqi Ambassador to the UN, said his nation "was prepared to talk about all the issues that exist in the region" with "no reservation and no condition." [E.J. Dionne and Ann Devroy, "U.S., Iraqi Officials Hopeful on Accord," *The Washington Post*, 3 Dec 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

Aircraft from the USS *Saratoga*, attempting to elicit a response from Iraqi airfields across the border, flew a DESERT TRIANGLE exercise in northwest Saudi Arabia. The package included four F-14s, two A-6Es, two F-18s, two E-2Cs, one EA-6B, one EA-3, and one S-3. There was no apparent reaction. Due to the Scud missile launches in Iraq, a second air defense exercise, SANDY BEACH (air-to-ground attack against a simulated target in Qatar), and CENTAF training for U.S., Saudi, British, and French units was canceled. Instead, the aircraft were generated and loaded for heightened readiness. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Dec 90.]

December 1990

Iraqi air activity was heavier than normal—209 sorties. Most of the activity, though high, was routine and included reconnaissance navigation flights, local airfield operations, overwater flights, air combat maneuver training, and practice ground controlled intercepts. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraq launched three Scud missiles that traveled in a west-northwesterly direction and impacted within the country. The USSPACECOM assessment was "that the ballistic missile launch warning system reacted nominally to the Scud launches." All reporting systems provided information into the CENTCOM AOR, demonstrating the practical use of space systems to provide tactical support to theater commanders. "In retrospect," stated a USSPACECOM report, "Iraq provided a timely opportunity to hone our skills in support of tactical war fighting forces." [Msg, USSPACECOM/SPJ3 to CENTCOM FWD/CCJ3 et al., "Tactical Missile Support to CENTCOM AOR," 21/2357z Dec 90.]

General Schwarzkopf remarked that the Iraqi test firing of Scud missiles "offered us an opportunity to evaluate and fine tune our missile warning procedures from the top down." Previously agreed upon procedures allowed USSPACECOM to enter the USCENCOM network and disseminate Scud launch information simultaneously to all components, key personnel, and units. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Dec 90. After these launches, all Patriot batteries remained in the "automatic" mode to engage the Scuds.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—242,578 (14,070 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,648 (2,009 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—741

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—311

Tactical/Support 84

Tanker Refueling 48

Intratheater Airlift 179

MARCENT—33

NAVCENT—121

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 03/0800z Dec 90.]

3 December 90 (C plus 118)

POLITICAL

Defense Secretary Cheney told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Iraq probably would be able to "ride out" international economic sanctions and that war would be the only certain means of forcing Iraqi troops out of Kuwait. He also told the committee that President Bush required no additional authorization from Congress before sending U.S. forces into combat in the Persian Gulf. His comments deepened the split between the administration and Democratic legislators over the proper role of Congress in the crisis and whether economic pressures against Iraq should be given more time to work. [Rick Atkinson and Jeffrey Smith, "Cheney: Iraq Likely to Outlast Embargo," *The Washington Post*, 4 Dec 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—242,763 (14,080 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,705 (2,021 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—747

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	102	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-29	1
EC-130(CC)	5	C-130	96
EC-130(VS)	2	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EF-111	14	EC-130E	6
F-4G	36	HC-130	4
F-15	72	KC-10	6
F-15E	24	KC-135	115
F-16	120	MC-130	4
F-111	52	MH-53	8
F-117	18	MH-60	8
		RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Dec 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 3 Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—614

Tactical/Support 335

December 1990

Tanker Refueling	72
Intratheater Airlift	207

MARCENT—52

NAVCENT—110

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 04/0800z Dec 90.]

4 December 90 (C plus 119)

POLITICAL

Iraq announced that it would allow all 3,232 Soviet nationals in the country to leave. This followed Kremlin threats to use military force to protect its citizens from harm in a Persian Gulf military confrontation. [Michael Dobbs, "Iraq Says All Soviets May Leave," *The Washington Post*, 5 Dec 90, p 29.]

MILITARY

A short-range ballistic missile storage facility was identified in west central Iraq, approximately eighty-five miles west of Baghdad, near the Euphrates River. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Dec 90.]

Lead elements of a new infantry division were identified in the KTO. This raised the total to twenty-eight divisions in the KTO: eighteen committed and ten reinforcing. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—244,070 (14,251 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,795 (2,030 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Dec 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

USAF Aircraft Deployed—765

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	102	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	14	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-10	6
F-15	72	KC-135	116
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	52	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—593	
Tactical/Support	348
Tanker Refueling	61
Intratheater Airlift	184

MARCENT—81

NAVCENT—191

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 05/0800z Dec 90.]

5 December 90 (C plus 120)

POLITICAL

Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy, in discussions with American Ambassador William Brown, warned against allowing Iraqi military power to remain intact through a peaceful solution to the Persian Gulf crisis. Levy said the principal U.S. commitments had been to bring about the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and to "remove the military threat" from Iraq. Levy told Brown that Israel had agreed to adopt its "low profile" policy during the crisis largely because of its perception of those U.S. commitments. [Jackson Diehl, "Israel Warns U.S. Against Leaving Iraqi Military Power Intact," *The Washington Post*, 6 Dec 90, p 43.]

December 1990

MILITARY

Exercise DESERT FORCE began with the U.S. Navy flying three large strike training packages. Seven additional packages were flown by the U.S., Saudi, British, and French air forces. Air activities involved 243 aircraft attacking simulated targets in the eastern training areas and Tabuk Range. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraqi flight activity was light with only 100 sorties. This resulted from a maintenance rest period following the higher levels of air activity which had occurred 2-5 December. Iraq demonstrated increased attention to U.S. and coalition activity in western Saudi Arabia and to activity in Syria by conducting aerial reconnaissance flights along those borders. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—252,131 (14,463 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—32,043 (2,036 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—765

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Dec 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,163

Air-to-Air	111
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(F-14, F-15)

Air-to-Ground	339
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(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)

Dual Role	240
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(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)

Total Combat Aircraft	690
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Support Aircraft	473
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[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—626

Tactical/Support	328
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Tanker Refueling	94
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Intratheater Airlift	204
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MARCENT—73

NAVCENT—145

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 06/0800z Dec 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	4,519
Boarded	553
Diverted	21
Warning Shots Fired	10
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Dec 90.]

6 December 90 (C plus 121)

POLITICAL

Saddam Hussein said that all 2,000 or more foreigners being held hostage in Iraq and Kuwait would be released promptly. The surprise announcement, which met one of the three UN objectives for resolution of the Persian Gulf crisis, was cautiously applauded by American Embassy officials in Baghdad. [Dana Priest, "Saddam Orders the Release of All Hostages," *The Washington Post*, 7 Dec 90, p 1.]

President Bush, in the midst of a five-nation Latin America tour, said that Saddam Hussein's move to release the hostages showed that the U.S. strategy of economic sanctions and the threat of war "is working," and he insisted that Iraq fully comply with UN resolutions calling for the complete withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. "We've got to continue to keep the pressure on," he stated. [Dan Balz, "Bush Welcomes Pledge but Bars Any Concessions," *The Washington Post*, 7 Dec 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

Exercise DESERT FORCE continued. It involved 159 aircraft in four strike packages attacking simulated targets in the eastern training areas and Tabuk Range. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraq continued to reinforce the KTO. There were twenty-nine divisions in the KTO: eighteen committed and eleven reinforcing. Iraqi forces were improving their strong forward infantry defensive positions along the major approaches. Unit repositioning and new force deployments over the past three weeks focused on extending the defenses to the West in an effort to deny an open flank and a high-speed attack axis from that direction. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—254,132 (14,633 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—32,252 (2,065 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Dec 90.]

December 1990

USAF Aircraft Deployed—765

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—488

Tactical/Support	183
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Tanker Refueling	83
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Intratheater Airlift	222
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MARCENT—102

NAVCENT—198

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 07/0800z Dec 90.]

7 December 90 (C plus 122)

MILITARY

Exercise DESERT FORCE concluded. It involved seventy-four aircraft in two strike packages attacking simulated targets in the eastern and western training areas. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraqi air activity was heavier than normal for the Islamic holy day, with 134 sorties flown. Fighter aircraft accounted for eighty-three sorties. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Dec 90.]

The total Iraqi aircraft inventory included 445 fighters (322 all-weather capable), 400 fighter-bombers and bombers, 73 transports, and 583 attack helicopters. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 7 Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—257,230 (14,742 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—32,406 (2,072 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—765

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Dec 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 7 Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—460

Tactical/Support	204
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Tanker Refueling	60
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Intratheater Airlift	196
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Gulf War Chronology

MARCENT—67

NAVCENT—136

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 08/0800z Dec 90.]

8 December 90 (C plus 123)

MILITARY

An air defense exercise was canceled due to insufficient time for coordination with the Saudis. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Dec 90.]

Movement of another Iraqi armored division into the KTO raised the total to thirty divisions: nineteen committed and eleven reinforcing. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—260,329 (15,081 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—32,542 (2,074 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—765

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—540

Tactical/Support	284
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Tanker Refueling	40
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Intratheater Airlift	216
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MARCENT—68

NAVCENT—87

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 09/0800z Dec 90.]

9 December 90 (C plus 124)

POLITICAL

More than 950 foreigners, including more than 160 Americans, left Iraq in the first mass departure since Saddam Hussein decided to stop holding hostages. Americans and other foreigners were being brought to Baghdad for evacuation. [Dana Priest, "Hostages Pour Out from Iraq, Kuwait," *The Washington Post*, 10 Dec 90, p 1.]

December 1990

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity was heavier than normal with 186 sorties. Fighter activity accounted for 129. Five intelligence collection flights were flown along the Saudi border and over northern Kuwait. This was the second day in a row that Iraq made a large collection effort against coalition force dispositions and activities. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraq conducted several intelligence collection flights. The flights consisted of two MiG-25/Foxbats flying over central and southern Iraqi dispersal fields, one Boeing 727 reconnaissance mission, and a single fighter reconnaissance mission over southern Iraq. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—264,810 (15,246 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—32,708 (2,080 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—770

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	102	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	14	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-10	6
F-15	72	KC-135	121
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	52	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—458

Tactical/Support	216
Tanker Refueling	48
Intratheater Airlift	194

Gulf War Chronology

MARCENT—62

NAVCENT—87

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 10/0800z Dec 90.]

10 December 90 (C plus 125)

POLITICAL

Two leading Democrats, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell and House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin, expressed support for President Bush's threat to use force against Iraq in order to free Kuwait. However, they added that the president must receive congressional authorization before ordering U.S. troops into action. [Walter Pincus and John Yang, "2 Key Democrats Back Bush in Threat of Force Against Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 11 Dec 90, p 16.]

MILITARY

Additional AWACS provided training in south central Saudi Arabia. An F-16 dropped simulated leaflets from 4,500 and 15,000 feet to refine release parameters and measure leaflet dispersal patterns. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Dec 90.]

The ship of highest interest to the maritime interception operation was the Iraqi-flagged *Ibn Khaldoun*. Publicized as a "peace boat," the ship was located off the coast of Libya and was en route to Umm Qasr, Iraq. It was carrying 300 women from various countries, 20 journalists, and medical supplies. The vessel was scheduled to make port calls in Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, and Oman prior to arriving in Iraq on 26 December. Three of those countries—Libya, Sudan, Yemen—openly supported Iraq. USCINCCENT stated, "Regardless of the *Khaldoun*'s publicized humanitarian mission, we intend to intercept and board her IAW [in accordance with] UNSC [UN Security Council] Resolution 661." [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—264,858 (15,318 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—33,521 (2,118 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—770

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Dec 90.]

December 1990

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,100

Air-to-Air	92
(F-14, F-15)	
Air-to-Ground	325
(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)	
Dual Role	222
(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)	
Total Combat Aircraft	639
Support Aircraft	461

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—551

Tactical/Support	277
Tanker Refueling	63
Intratheater Airlift	211

MARCENT—58

NAVCENT—80

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 11/0800z Dec 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	4,833
Boarded	583
Diverted	22
Warning Shots Fired	10
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Dec 90.]

11 December 90 (C plus 126)

POLITICAL

Bush administration authorities estimated the cost of supporting the U.S. military force in the Persian Gulf to total \$30 billion for fiscal 1991. This figure was twice the amount estimated by Defense Secretary Cheney two months earlier, before President Bush decided to nearly double the number of troops deployed. The new figure included transportation, fuel, supplies, and operating expenses for supporting more than 400,000 U.S. troops and sailors in the Gulf area for fiscal 1991. [Molly Moore, "U.S. Troop Deployment May Cost \$30 Billion in 1991, Aids Say," *The Washington Post*, 11 Dec 90, p 18.]

In a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, President Bush pledged continued U.S. aid and vowed not to seek Middle East peace talks until Iraq had vacated Kuwait. These U.S. commitments were seen as a

Gulf War Chronology

reward to Israel for taking "a back seat" in the Persian Gulf crisis. Mr. Shamir told President Bush that Israel did not plan to launch preemptive strikes against Iraq and that it would continue to defer to U.S. leadership in the Persian Gulf crisis. [Paul Bedard, "Shamir Breaks Ice, Wins Bush Promises," *The Washington Times*, 12 Dec 90, p 1.]

British and American citizens, evacuated from Kuwait after months of hiding, spoke of heroic Kuwaitis who saved them from capture by Iraqi soldiers and who smuggled them daily provisions. They described Kuwait, after more than four months of occupation, as a "shell of a country, a dirty, dangerous place . . ." Without exception, those interviewed said that the Kuwaiti resistance movement was still active. [Dana Priest, "Resistance in Kuwait Is Alive, Say Evacuees," *The Washington Post*, 12 Dec 90, p 1.]

An American evacuation flight from Kuwait left the occupied country with no Americans on board, confirming that approximately 310 U.S. citizens had chosen to stay. As many as 200 Americans had decided to remain in Iraq. Since the evacuation flights began, more than 200 Americans had flown home, according to the State Department. [Dana Priest, "500 to Forgo U.S. Evacuation," *The Washington Post*, 12 Dec 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

The CENTAF aircraft mission-capable rate was 92.4 percent. All units possessed, or had in the pipeline, their authorized number of spare engines. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 11 Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—261,943 (15,481 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—33,569 (2,122 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Dec 90.]

December 1990

USAF Aircraft Deployed—782

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	102	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	14	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-10	6
F-15	72	KC-135	121
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—643

Tactical/Support	355
Tanker Refueling	60
Intratheater Airlift	228

MARCENT—83

NAVCENT—78

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 12/0800z Dec 90.]

12 December 90 (C plus 127)

POLITICAL

With the UN deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait a little more than a month away, Washington and Baghdad failed to agree on a date for their foreign ministers to meet. While both sides appeared to agree to Iraq's Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz coming to Washington on 17 December, they did not agree on when Secretary of State Baker should go to Baghdad. The United States suggested any date from 20 December 1990 to 3 January 1991, but the Iraqis offered only 12 January 1991. Iraqis said their leadership was too busy to see Mr. Baker before the 12th. The United States argued that meeting so close to the 15 January UN deadline undermined the purpose of the resolution. [Thomas Friedman, "U.S. and Iraq Remain Deadlocked on Date for Talks Urged by Bush," *The New York Times*, 13 Dec 90, p 21.]

Gulf War Chronology

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity was significantly increased to 213 sorties with 139 flown by fighter aircraft. Three reconnaissance flights were detected. Two MiG-25/Foxbats flew over the southern dispersal airfields, and one modified B-727 flew in southern Iraq near the Kuwaiti border. Transport activity was high with forty sorties. This was attributed to hostage release activity. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraqi ground forces increased to thirty-one divisions in the KTO: twenty committed and eleven reinforcing. The presence of the new division further supported the Iraqi practice of "defense in depth" and of relying on a "belt" defense. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—263,984 (15,566 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—33,717 (2,180 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—785

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	102	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	14	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-10	6
F-15	72	KC-135	126
F-15E	24	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Dec 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 12 Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—657

Tactical/Support	357
Tanker Refueling	70
Intratheater Airlift	230

December 1990

MARCENT—72

NAVCENT—171

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 13/0800z Dec 90.]

13 December 90 (C plus 128)

POLITICAL

The American Embassy in Kuwait City was evacuated. [Telecon, Karen A. Fleming, AF/HO, with David Good, Public Affairs Officer for the Middle East, U.S. Department of State, 12 April 91.]

MILITARY

Three joint combined training packages involving seventy-one aircraft attacked simulated targets in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Dec 90.]

CENAF initiated a change to the Table of Allowance's Basis of Issue for hot weather (jungle) boots. Authorization was increased from one to two pairs. The rationale behind this decision was that the desert environment accelerated their "wear-out" rate. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 13 Dec 90.]

Iraqi air activity—188 sorties—was well above the daily average which had increased to 143. Fighter aircraft accounted for 131 sorties. This air activity indicated that training for deep strike missions was being conducted. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Dec 90.]

Fire trenches, constructed by Iraqi ground forces, were noted for the first time. The trenches, in various stages of construction, were in southern Iraq in the vicinity of the tri-border area. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—264,445 (15,635 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—33,851 (2,189 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—785

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Dec 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 13 Dec 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—553

Tactical/Support	266
Tanker Refueling	60
Intratheater Airlift	227

MARCENT—90

NAVCENT—97

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 14/0800z Dec 90.]

14 December 90 (C plus 129)

POLITICAL

Retired General Charles L. Donnelly, former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Air Forces Europe, told the House Armed Services Committee that U.S. air forces flying 20,000 sorties in the first ten days of a war with Iraq would lose approximately 100 aircraft. He also said the United States could keep Israel out of the war if it were to strike ballistic missile sites in northern and northwestern Iraq. [*Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 14 Dec 90, p 17.]

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity was at a reduced rate of ninety-eight sorties. The activity was routine, with air combat maneuvering and ground controlled intercept training being flown. The lower activity level was due to Iraqi sensitivity to the Moslem holy day, aircrew rest, and aircraft maintenance. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—268,437 (16,050 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—34,090 (2,208 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Dec 90.]

December 1990

USAF Aircraft Deployed—787

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	102	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	14	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-10	6
F-15	72	KC-135	126
F-15E	26	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Dec 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 14 Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—443

Tactical/Support	174
Tanker Refueling	38
Intratheater Airlift	231

MARCENT—75

NAVCENT—153

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 15/0800z Dec 90.]

15 December 90 (C plus 130)

MILITARY

A DESERT TRIANGLE mission involving twelve USS *Kennedy* aircraft was flown in northwest Saudi Arabia with no Iraqi response. An exercise testing command and control for air defense was conducted. The command was divided into three sectors, all of which conducted the exercise simultaneously. Each sector utilized small "faker" packages, combat air patrols, fighters on alert, and air defense assets. Some intermittent "link connectivity" problems were identified during the exercise. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Dec 90.]

The Saudi Arabian Petroleum Ministry deputy confirmed that, due to a fire, the Ras Tanura refinery would be shut down for approximately fifteen

Gulf War Chronology

days. Production was expected to resume in January at 300,000 barrels per day vice the 530,000 barrels per day rated capacity. The Saudi official reconfirmed host nation support and commitment to meet U.S. fuel requirements. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 17 Dec 90.]

Iraqi air activity returned to higher levels. Among the 174 sorties flown were 116 fighter missions. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—271,127 (16,856 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—34,163 (2,239 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—787

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Dec 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,115

Air-to-Air	92
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(F-14, F-15)

Air-to-Ground	337
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(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)

Dual Role	222
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(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)

Total Combat Aircraft	651
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Support Aircraft	464
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[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—609

Tactical/Support	326
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Tanker Refueling	71
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Intratheater Airlift	212
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MARCENT—55

NAVCENT—87

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 16/0800z Dec 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	5,197
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Boarded	629
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Diverted	24
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Warning Shots Fired	10
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Refused to Stop	3
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December 1990

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Dec 90.]

16 December 90 (C plus 131)

POLITICAL

U.S. intelligence experts concluded that Saddam Hussein would not withdraw his troops from Kuwait until convinced he "is in peril of imminent military attack," said CIA Director William Webster. Until then, Hussein was expected to stretch out the Persian Gulf crisis, possibly by staging a partial pullout or some other move short of the UN demand for a full withdrawal by 15 January. Mr. Webster added, "I don't believe the military assessments contemplate a quick buckle." The Iraqis were set up in "a very tough, defensive land position so that much would depend on the effectiveness of an air assault . . . but we know they're pretty well dug-in and shielded." [George Lardner, "No Iraq Move Seen Until Attack Near," *The Washington Post*, 16 Dec 90, p 1.]

Despite a warning from Moscow, Iraq delayed the departure of 2,300 Soviet advisers working at oil and military installations. Iraqi officials told Moscow they would impose economic penalties if the Soviet government did not fulfill large oil, hydroelectric, and military contracts that were employing about 7,000 Soviet technicians when Iraq invaded Kuwait. [Patrick Tyler, "Iraq Is Delaying Soviet Departure," *The New York Times*, 17 Dec 90, p 1.]

Saddam Hussein had acquired enough Western technology to produce a nuclear bomb, according to British sources. His scientists built a factory for producing centrifuges capable of separating fissionable matter, which are required in making a nuclear device. They had also built a secret uranium-enrichment laboratory on the outskirts of Baghdad. This information indicated that Iraq was at least three years nearer—as close as 1991 or 1992—to nuclear capability than Western intelligence agencies had thought. [*The London Sunday Times*, 16 Dec 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity increased to the third highest level in December. The Iraqis had established a pattern of flying their highest sortie levels on Sundays. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—275,832 (16,851 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—34,242 (2,237 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Dec 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

USAF Aircraft Deployed—787

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—489

Tactical/Support 215

Tanker Refueling 58

Intratheater Airlift 216

MARCENT—59

NAVCENT—85

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 17/0800z Dec 90.]

17 December 90 (C plus 132)

POLITICAL

Secretary of State Baker told a meeting of NATO that he expected Saddam Hussein to take a dramatic step, such as a partial withdrawal from Kuwait, on the eve of the UN 15 January deadline. Baker urged his colleagues to stand united against such a "ploy" to split the international coalition between those who insisted on a total Iraqi withdrawal and those who would accept a partial solution to avert war. [Thomas Friedman, "Major Iraqi 'Ploy' Can Be Expected, Baker Tells NATO," *The New York Times*, 18 Dec 90, p 1.]

President Bush accused Saddam Hussein of being uninterested in a peaceful solution to the Persian Gulf crisis and said the United States would not yield "one single inch" on its demands that Iraq withdraw completely from Kuwait. Officials said the president was told by Turkish President Turgut Ozal that Hussein did not believe Bush had the will or the support of the American people necessary to use military force. President Bush's statement used some of the strongest words yet regarding the U.S. commitment to use force after 15 January if Iraq did not withdraw totally from Kuwait. [Ann Devroy and Al Kamen, "Bush Warns Iraq U.S. Won't Yield," *The Washington Post*, 18 Dec 90, p 1.]

An "other than honorable" discharge was given to a USAF reservist who refused to go to Saudi Arabia. Ronald Jean-Baptiste cited his mother's cancer as well as what he thought was an incident of racial discrimination by the military as the grounds for his refusal. The situation drew national attention as the first case of a reservist's being recommended for a court-martial for refusal to participate in Operation DESERT SHIELD. [Douglas Campbell, "Persian Gulf Resister to Be Discharged," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 18 Dec 90, p 8B.]

December 1990

MILITARY

CENTAF began changing aircraft call signs to improve operations security. Operation BORDER LOOK began. It involved, on average, approximately thirty daily sorties conducting intercepts near the border, but no closer than ten nautical miles. The purpose was to present an irregular, different air defense picture to the Iraqis. BORDER LOOK ended 9 January. Also, an aggressive dissimilar aerial combat tactics (DACT) training program began. For the next two days, DACT involved sixty-eight fighters and allowed AWACS to practice intercept training as well as the coordination of the retreat and protection of high-value assets. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Dec 90.]

The new munitions sixty-day requirements were received. AIM-7/9 shortages were filled through TAC ferry and MAC airlift. All other munitions shortfalls were transported by sealift due to extreme airlift shortage. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Roan, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 17 Dec 90.]

Iraqi air activity dropped from the previous high levels, but it remained consistent with average levels for December. A total of 154 sorties were flown, with fighters accounting for 104. Two fighters, operating at altitudes between 1,000 and 2,000 ft, intercepted a fighter at 3,500 ft in the Baghdad-Basra transport corridor. Intercept training of this type indicated that Iraq intended to operate defensive patrols at low altitudes in a look-up scenario. It had used this tactic during the Iran-Iraq war. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraqi ground forces in the KTO increased to thirty-two divisions: twenty-one committed and eleven reinforcing. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—277,860 (16,716 women)
Total CENTAF Personnel—34,326 (2,228 women)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—787

(No change)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—688	
Tactical/Support	370
Tanker Refueling	91
Intratheater Airlift	227

Gulf War Chronology

MARCENT—63

NAVCENT—82

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Dec 90; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 18/0800z Dec 90.]

18 December 90 (C plus 133)

POLITICAL

Prospects for peace talks between Iraq and the United States "all but evaporated" when Baghdad defied warnings of war and vowed not to budge from Kuwait until the Arab-Israeli conflict was settled. Saddam Hussein said there was no point in sending his foreign minister to Washington only to have President Bush reiterate that Iraq must pull out of Kuwait by 15 January. Secretary Baker was becoming aware that he probably would not get to deliver the West's uncompromising message directly to Hussein. European Community foreign ministers, meeting in Brussels, Belgium, decided against meeting Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz unless he first went to Washington. [John Pine, "Peace Talks Pointless, Saddam Says," *The Washington Times*, 19 Dec 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity increased to the highest fighter sortie level and the third highest total sortie level observed in December. A total of 208 sorties were flown, with fighters accounting for 156. The flight activity was routine, with navigation flights, range training, ground controlled intercept training, and air combat maneuver training. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraqi ground forces in the KTO totaled thirty-three divisions: twenty-two committed and eleven reinforcing. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—281,728 (16,758 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—34,326 (2,233 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—787

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—651

Tactical/Support 371

December 1990

Tanker Refueling	66
Intratheater Airlift	214
MARCENT—58	
NAVCENT—67	

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Dec 90.]

19 December 90 (C plus 134)

POLITICAL

Defense Secretary Cheney and CJCS General Powell arrived in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, for briefings from U.S. military leaders. Army Lt. Gen. Calvin A. H. Waller, deputy commander of American forces in the Persian Gulf, said his troops would not be ready for "combat activities" on 15 January and that he couldn't "imagine" President Bush ordering an offensive that soon. White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, when asked about the general's comments, said, "What he really said is they might not be as ready as they would like to be . . . for all the contingencies. We are assured they will be ready to do whatever they are called upon to do." [Barton Gellman, "General: U.S. Troops Won't Be Ready," *The Washington Post*, 20 Dec 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

A SANDY BEACH exercise took place in Qatar involving sixteen inbound U.S. fighters, six allied fighters, and Qatar's air defense. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraqi sorties totaled 191: 146 fighter, 2 reconnaissance, 15 helicopter, 24 transport, and 4 unidentified. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraqi ground force defensive improvements included the repositioning of corps and army level artillery assets both in southeast Kuwait and west of the tri-border area. This repositioning significantly enhanced Iraq's capability to defend key approaches along the coastal highway to Kuwait City and into southwestern Kuwait. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—284,378 (17,962 women)
Total CENTAF Personnel—34,391 (2,242 women)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Dec 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

USAF Aircraft Deployed—788

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	102	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	6
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	14	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-10	6
F-15	72	KC-135	127
F-15E	26	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Dec 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 19 Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—640	
Tactical/Support	346
Tanker Refueling	68
Intratheater Airlift	226

MARCENT—103

NAVCENT—76

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Dec 90.]

20 December 90 (C plus 135)

POLITICAL

Turkey asked its NATO partners to send a multinational force of air units to bolster Turkish defenses against possible border clashes with Iraq. The request from President Turgut Ozal's government was made in anticipation of possible warfare after the 15 January 91 deadline set by the UN for Iraq to end its occupation of Kuwait. [John Goshko, "Turkey Asks NATO Force to Bolster Iraqi Frontier," *The Washington Post*, 20 Dec 90, p 26.]

Attempting to limit the political damage caused by General Waller's comment that U.S. forces would not be ready to fight Iraq on 15 January, Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams said Defense Secretary Cheney would not draw any conclusions about American military readiness until he had completed his five-day trip to the Persian Gulf. Administration officials,

December 1990

sharply criticizing the general, said that the comments "undercut their Gulf strategy" to persuade Saddam Hussein to pull out of Kuwait. General Waller's comments were significant because they marked the first time a senior American military commander had recommended against launching an attack until all 430,000 American forces in, or bound for, the Gulf were ready. [Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Seeks to Diminish Effects of Officer's Remarks," *The New York Times*, 21 Dec 90, p 14.]

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze resigned, saying he feared that the Soviet Union was headed toward dictatorship. President Gorbachev condemned the decision of his long-time friend and political ally, but he insisted that there would be no changes in Soviet foreign policy. In a somber speech to the full Soviet parliament, Gorbachev ruled out the possibility of an imminent military coup while insisting that "strong government" was needed to keep the country from slipping into political and economic chaos. [Michael Dobbs, "Shevardnadze Out as Foreign Minister," *The Washington Post*, 21 Dec 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

A DESERT TRIANGLE exercise was flown in northwest Saudi Arabia with no Iraqi reaction. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraqi air activity reached its second highest level for December and the highest fighter activity level since September. A total of 210 sorties were flown, with fighter activity accounting for 170. The air activity, itself, was routine. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—287,502 (17,836 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—35,062 (2,292 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—813

Combat		Support	
A-10	102	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	7
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	14	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-10	6
F-15	96	KC-135	127
F-15E	26	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8

Gulf War Chronology

F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Dec 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,174

Air-to-Air	116
(F-14, F-15)	
Air-to-Ground	341
(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)	
Dual Role	246
(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)	
Total Combat Aircraft	703
Support Aircraft	471

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—565	
Tactical/Support	277
Tanker Refueling	65
Intratheater Airlift	223
MARCENT—124	
NAVCENT—191	

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Dec 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	5,509
Boarded	676
Diverted	27
Warning Shots Fired	10
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Dec 90.]

21 December 90 (C plus 136)

POLITICAL

Pentagon officials, traveling with Defense Secretary Cheney, disputed General Waller's earlier comment that U.S. forces would not be ready for combat on 15 January. They issued a statement acknowledging that "some parts of the force become ready before others," but emphasized that Air Force and Navy warplanes would be prepared for combat before ground troops finished taking positions. Along with this emphasis, a senior official

December 1990

cited public speculation that a U.S. attack would start with an air campaign.
[Barton Gellman, "Officials Dispute General on Gulf Forces' Readiness," *The Washington Post*, 21 Dec 90, p 32.]

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity decreased to 174 sorties. Fighter aircraft accounted for 118. Iraq continued periodic surges in night interceptor training. Assessments were that Iraq's goal was for night training to reach 25 percent of each daily sortie total. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraqi ground forces in the KTO increased to thirty-four divisions: twenty-three committed and eleven reinforcing. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—293,578 (18,285 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—35,277 (2,306 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—817

Combat		Support	
A-10	102	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	7
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-10	6
F-15	96	KC-135	127
F-15E	26	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Dec 90; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 21 Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—450

Tactical/Support 173

Tanker Refueling 50

Intratheater Airlift 227

Gulf War Chronology

MARCENT—103

NAVCENT—159

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Dec 90.]

22 December 90 (C plus 137)

MILITARY

A successful connectivity-link check with the NATO AWACS in Turkey was completed. An air defense exercise involving twenty U.S. and British fighter aircraft, AWACS, ground air-defense artillery (ADA), and air defense command and control facilities was conducted. During the exercise, "fakers" flew strikes. Command and control handoff between fighter and missile engagements was practiced. ADA successfully engaged faker aircraft. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraqi air activity totaled 138 sorties, with fighter aircraft accounting for 91. This was a normal Saturday level and consistent with the overall higher levels noted in December. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—300,264 (18,662 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—35,724 (2,330 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—817

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—604

Tactical/Support	309
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Tanker Refueling	74
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Intratheater Airlift	221
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MARCENT—83

NAVCENT—109

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Dec 90.]

23 December 90 (C plus 138)

POLITICAL

Defense Secretary Cheney returned to the United States from the Persian Gulf. He stated that "the days are drawing closer" when the U.S. and its

December 1990

allies would force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. "Today I see no sign that Saddam Hussein intends to withdraw his forces from Kuwait," Cheney said. "One has to conclude that the situation is not improving and that the days are drawing closer when we may be forced to resort to military force," he added. [Thomas Lippman and Barton Gellman, "Cheney Ends Gulf Tour on Fiery Note," *The Washington Post*, 24 Dec 90, p 1.]

A ferry carrying American sailors capsized and sank off the coast of Haifa, Israel, killing twenty-one. The men, assigned to the USS *Saratoga*, were returning from shore leave. This was the worst single military accident since Operation DESERT SHIELD began. [Youssef Ibrahim, "20 Confirmed Dead in Ferry Accident," *The New York Times*, 24 Dec 90, p 3.]

MILITARY

Air-to-air training with U.S. F-15s and Kuwaiti Mirage F-1s was conducted for the first time. Eight aircraft of each type were used in the training. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraqi ground forces in the KTO totaled thirty-four divisions: twenty-three committed and eleven reinforcing. Additional infantry forces were beginning to take up positions behind and slightly west of Iraq's westernmost infantry division. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—303,572 (18,711 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—35,913 (2,355 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Dec 90, no USCINCCENT "Sitrep" for 24 Dec could be located.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—817

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—455

Tactical/Support 173

Tanker Refueling 59

Intratheater Airlift 223

MARCENT—69

NAVCENT—100

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Dec 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

24 December 90 (C plus 139)

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity decreased to ninety-eight total sorties. Fighter aircraft accounted for forty-nine. This was the second lowest level of activity in December, and was due to poor weather. The low number of fighter sorties during the poor weather conditions confirmed U.S. assessments that Iraqi pilots were not adequately trained in all-weather operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—307,246 (19,697 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—35,958 (2,362 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—819

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	102	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	7
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	36	KC-10	6
F-15	96	KC-135	127
F-15E	28	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—428

Tactical/Support 148

Tanker Refueling 52

Intratheater Airlift 228

MARCENT—66

NAVCENT—68

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Dec 90.]

December 1990

25 December 90 (C plus 140)

POLITICAL

Top U.S. military commanders in the Middle East cautioned administration officials against going to war with Iraq before the American force was fully prepared in early to mid-February. Defense Secretary Cheney and General Powell conveyed these concerns to President Bush after returning from their five-day visit to the Persian Gulf. Their report to the president echoed, without necessarily adopting, the views of General Waller who stated on 19 December 1990 that U.S. forces would not be fully combat ready on 15 January 1991. [Molly Moore, "Cautions Conveyed on Gulf Readiness," *The Washington Post*, 26 Dec 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity totaled 176 sorties, with fighters accounting for 124. Flight activity was higher than the previous day, and above average for a Tuesday. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraqi air bases conducted simultaneous countrywide nighttime ground controlled intercept training. Approximately thirty fighters from six bases participated in the exercise. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—310,143 (19,606 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—36,443 (2,384 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—819

(No change)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Dec 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,206

Air-to-Air	116
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(F-14, F-15)

Air-to-Ground	365
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(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)

Dual Role	250
-----------	-----

(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)

Total Combat Aircraft	731
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Support Aircraft	475
------------------	-----

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Dec 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—408	
Tactical/Support	155
Tanker Refueling	47
Intratheater Airlift	206

MARCENT—81

NAVCENT—37

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Dec 90.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	5,766
Boarded	706
Diverted	30
Warning Shots Fired	11
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Dec 90.]

26 December 90 (C plus 141)

POLITICAL

Israel indicated that it would not launch a preemptive strike against Iraq, despite repeated threats from Baghdad. Saddam Hussein had said in a Spanish television interview that Tel Aviv, Israel, would be the first Iraqi target in the event of war. Israeli defense officials were telling their citizens that an Iraqi offensive was unlikely to wreak much damage or cause many casualties. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens stated, "Saddam Hussein's missiles have the range to reach Israel. But their capability is very restricted. If we are hit we shall strike back. But there is no need for panic." [Jackson Diehl, "Israel Shuns First Strike Against Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 27 Dec 90, p 1.]

The Persian Gulf deployment of European-based U.S. forces was likely to reduce the American presence on the continent to a level forecast for the late 1990s. The withdrawal of heavy armament was large enough that most U.S. forces in central Europe would immediately come into compliance with the new Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. The Soviet Union, under the terms of the treaty, had more than three years before it was required to meet the same force level. [Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Military Cuts in Europe Hastened by Crisis Over Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 26 Dec 90, p 32.]

British Air Vice Marshal Bill Wratten, the deputy commander of Britain's Gulf forces, said that under the right circumstances the allied air forces could for the first time in history win a war without using the army. "The air strike, once it has started and been allowed to run to its conclusion, could

December 1990

be conclusive," he stated. [Giles Elgood, "Air Forces Could Win It Alone, British Military Says," *The Washington Times*, 26 Dec 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

General Schwarzkopf asserted that the "prevention of fratricide" was of great concern to himself and was the priority of General Horner, his air defense commander. To combat the problem, all multinational forces were integrated into the overall command and control structure. U.S. and Saudi air defense forces established a Combined Control and Reporting Center (CCRC) for the Northeastern Sector of Saudi Arabia. Syrian, Egyptian, and French liaison officers maintained 24-hour contact with their air defense forces through U.S.-supplied communications equipment located in the CCRC. They passed early warning and weapons status information, as well as notice of friendly aircraft overflight, to their respective headquarters. Another communications channel linked the CCRC, through the U.S. air support operations center, to the tactical air control parties located with each nation's forces. Centralized identification and engagement control, visual recognition training during simulated CAS missions, air defense exercises, and coordinated strike and minimum risk route procedures were all being used to prevent fratricide. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraqi air activity totaled 156 sorties, with fighter aircraft accounting for 97. A Boeing 727 intelligence collection flight approached closer than normal to the Iraqi-Saudi border. Similar events were anticipated, with increasing frequency, as the UN 15 January deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait approached. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Dec 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—313,483 (19,959 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—36,559 (2,398 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—830

Combat		Support	
A-10	102	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	7
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	47	KC-10	6
F-15	96	KC-135	127
F-15E	28	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—630

Tactical/Support 352

Tanker Refueling 55

Intratheater Airlift 223

MARCENT—133

NAVCENT—87

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Dec 90.]

27 December 90 (C plus 142)

POLITICAL

Lt. Cmdr. Darlene Iskra became the first woman to be named commander of an active U.S. Navy vessel. She was installed as commander of the salvage vessel USS *Opportune*, after Cmdr. Edgar Jones was relieved of command due to a medical emergency. The ship, which could be sent to an area outside a war zone to provide support, was responsible for recovering equipment or the wreckage of ships and planes, and for making repairs to Navy vessels. ["Woman to Helm Navy Vessel," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 30 Dec 90, p 10.]

December 1990

Bob Hope entertained thousands of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia under a Pentagon ban that prohibited most female entertainers, risque jokes, and press coverage. Hope told a news conference that his show was carefully screened by Pentagon and Saudi representatives to eliminate anything that might offend the conservative Islamic government or people. [Laurence Jolidon, "Women Back in Hope's Act," *USA Today*, 27 Dec 90, p 4.]

MILITARY

Heavy sand clouds in the AOR caused unscheduled engine removals in the F100-100/200 engines with the 1,800-cycle configuration cores. The sand caused early deterioration of the airfoils. It was anticipated that the airfoils would have to be removed 400 cycles earlier than the regularly scheduled depot interval. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Roan, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 27 Dec 90.]

Iraqi air activity totaled 191 sorties, with fighter aircraft accounting for 151. It was believed that Iraq reached its goal of night sorties making up 25 percent of the total activity. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—321,096 (20,171 women)
Total CENTAF Personnel—36,787 (2,415 women)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—830

(No change)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—609
Tactical/Support 316
Tanker Refueling 64
Intratheater Airlift 229

MARCENT—137

NAVCENT—129

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Dec 90.]

28 December 90 (C plus 143)

POLITICAL

Senior government officials said President Bush, after weighing the political and military consequences of further delay, decided that the United States should move quickly to launch a massive military attack on

Gulf War Chronology

Iraqi forces if Iraq failed to withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January. They added that neither congressional nor public sentiment on the issue would make any difference in the president's determination to proceed because he believed that delaying much beyond the deadline would increase the number of American casualties. [Jack Nelson, "Bush Determined Not to Delay Gulf Attack," *The Los Angeles Times*, 28 Dec 90, p 1.]

MILITARY

CENTAF/Logistics (LG) advised against establishing jet engine intermediate maintenance to overhaul engines in the AOR. The Queen Bee system, where spare engines were shipped to locations outside the AOR, was working satisfactorily. Reasons for staying with that system included scarcity of maintenance and personnel beddown facilities, lack of intratheater airlift to move maintenance and personnel assets, and availability of special tools for maintenance. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Roan, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 28 Dec 90.]

Iraqi air activity decreased to 115 sorties, with fighter aircraft accounting for 78. A Mirage F-1 flew overwater reconnaissance along the Kuwaiti coast and approached to within twenty-two nautical miles of an F/A-18 flying combat air patrol. There was no reaction by either aircraft. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Dec 90.]

Analysts who were tracking Scud missile activities found that Iraq gave considerable effort to hide and protect the surface-to-surface missiles. Mobile erector launchers were dispersed into many areas of the countryside. [Msg, 1 SW/DOXI to 2 CS et al., "Conflict in the Middle East," 28/2010z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—324,797 (21,034 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—36,938 (2,447 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Dec 90.]

December 1990

USAF Aircraft Deployed—851

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	102	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	7
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	47	KC-10	6
F-15	96	KC-135	130
F-15E	46	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—583	
Tactical/Support	308
Tanker Refueling	48
Intratheater Airlift	227

MARCENT—119

NAVCENT—113

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Dec 90.]

29 December 90 (C plus 144)

POLITICAL

President Bush called key congressional leaders to the White House to provide "an update on the diplomatic and military situation" in the Persian Gulf. Administration officials said the session did not signify that the president would ask for formal authorization from Congress. The congressional group was similar to the one President Bush had met with several times since Iraq invaded Kuwait. It included key bipartisan leaders of the House and Senate, and chairmen and ranking minority members of several committees that worked with foreign policy and military issues. [Ann Devroy, "Bush Will Update Hill Leaders on Gulf," *The Washington Post*, 30 Dec 90, p 37.]

Gulf War Chronology

MILITARY

A mass launch of thirty-six F-111s was staged to exercise large-force generation and launch and refueling procedures. An E-2/Hawkeye orbit in the northern Gulf was added to the AWACS coverage. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Dec 90.]

Iraqi air activity reached its highest level since the invasion of Kuwait. Sorties totaled 231, with fighter aircraft accounting for 175. A contributing factor to the higher count was the coverage, added to the ongoing AWACS routes, by the E-2/Hawkeye working in the northern Gulf. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Dec 90.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—324,251 (20,487 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—37,373 (2,451 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—877

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	120	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	7
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	47	KC-10	6
F-15	96	KC-135	138
F-15E	46	MC-130	4
F-16	120	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—668

Tactical/Support 382

Tanker Refueling 71

Intratheater Airlift 215

MARCENT—119

NAVCENT—71

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Dec 90.]

December 1990

30 December 90 (C plus 145)

POLITICAL

Several congressional leaders, including Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole, said that the Bush administration should not start a war with Iraq before making further efforts to arrange a direct meeting between Secretary of State Baker and Saddam Hussein. They warned that Americans would not support combat until opportunities for a peaceful settlement had been exhausted. Mr. Dole said, "I have sort of a gut feeling the American people are not yet committed to war, and they want to make certain that President Bush has done everything, pursued every avenue for peace, before the firing starts." [Jeffrey Smith, "New Efforts Urged on Talks with Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 31 Dec 90, p 1.]

At the request of Germany and France, the foreign ministers of the twelve European Community nations planned to meet in Luxembourg in a last-ditch attempt to avert war. Some diplomats expressed concern that a separate European initiative would put the European Community at odds with the Bush administration, but the Germans said their call for a European peace effort represented no break with American handling of the crisis. [Marc Fisher, "West Europeans Set Meeting Aimed at Peaceful Solution," *The Washington Post*, 31 Dec 90, p 8.]

Iraq threatened to strike U.S. interests around the world if President Bush launched a war to liberate Kuwait. The ruling Ba'ath party newspaper said a war against Iraq would not be confined to the Gulf. "Moslem guerrilla" fighters, it said, would carry out the war against U.S. interests "all over the globe." [Peter Sisler, "If Attacked, Iraq Threatens U.S. Targets Around World," *The Washington Times*, 31 Dec 90, p 8.]

Nineteen people, including peace activist Philip Berrigan, were arrested outside the White House after eleven demonstrators scaled the front fence and poured human blood and red food dye on the North Lawn fountain to protest U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf. [Eric May, "19 Arrested Protesting Gulf Action," *The Washington Post*, 31 Dec 90, p 3B.]

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity totaled 219 sorties, with fighter aircraft accounting for 182. For the second consecutive day, Iraqi MiG-23/Floggers flew over the northern Persian Gulf and Kuwait in coastal defense and fighter sweep operations. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Dec 90.]

Gulf War Chronology

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—328,575 (21,107 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—37,428 (2,485 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—913

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	120	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	7
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	47	KC-10	6
F-15	96	KC-135	150
F-15E	46	MC-130	4
F-16	144	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Dec 90.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,310

Air-to-Air	116
(F-14, F-15)	
Air-to-Ground	365
(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)	
Dual Role	294
(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)	

Total Combat Aircraft 775

Support Aircraft 535

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Dec 90.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—562

Tactical/Support 299

Tanker Refueling 60

Intratheater Airlift 203

MARCENT—69

NAVCENT—73

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Dec 90.]

December 1990

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	6,054
Boarded	725
Diverted	31
Warning Shots Fired	11
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Dec 90.]

31 December 90 (C plus 146)

POLITICAL

A senior Iraqi official expressed his country's desire to reach a compromise leading to direct talks with the United States. "Iraq would be ready to receive any new proposal from the United States on date-fixing," he said, referring to the possibility of Secretary of State Baker's visiting Baghdad and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz's visiting Washington. In addition, the official accused the United States of blocking what Iraq regarded as the most workable diplomatic initiative under way. Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid visited Saudi Arabia to initiate talks, but, according to the Iraqi official, the United States had prevented Saudi participation by refusing to allow Bendjedid to meet with Saudi King Fahd. [Todd Robberson, "Iraq Says It Wants Talks with U.S.," *The Washington Post*, 1 Jan 91, p 1.]

Iraq ordered seventeen-year-olds to report for military duty. It was Iraq's fourth major military call-up since the invasion of Kuwait and was aimed at the youngest age-group ever drafted in modern Iraq. [Laura King, "Iraq Starts Calling Up 17-Year-Olds," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 1 Jan 91, p 1.]

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati said his government would not take sides in any war between Iraq and the U.S.-led coalition. His remarks were in sharp contrast to a speech by supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who vowed that Iran would act with the peoples of Gulf Arab States to banish the United States and its Western allies from the Persian Gulf. ["Foreign Minister Says Iran Will Be Neutral," *The Washington Times*, 1 Jan 91, p 8.]

Israeli military experts were virtually unanimous that, in the event of war, Iraq would launch at least twenty missiles armed with conventional or chemical warheads against Israel. The military experts and government officials said they thought that Israel would survive an Iraqi missile assault without catastrophic damage or loss of life. However, the experts were divided on what Israel's response to an Iraqi attack would be. [Youssef

Gulf War Chronology

Ibrahim, "Israel Expecting Missiles From Iraq In Case of a War," *The New York Times*, 1 Jan 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Two combined U.S. and Saudi strike packages of fourteen and eight aircraft, respectively, conducted training with French Mirage 2000s providing opponent air. Twelve Italian Tornados conducted interoperability air refueling from a KC-135. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Dec 90.]

The CENTAF aircraft mission-capable rate was 92.6 percent. CENTAF requested that all supporting commands operate mission-capability sections twenty-four hours a day in anticipation of wartime aircraft surges. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Roan, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 31 Dec 90.]

Iraqi air activity totaled 107 sorties. This was lower than the December average for Mondays—125. For the second day in a row, there was no Boeing 727 intelligence collection flight over southern Iraq. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—330,971 (22,734 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—38,164 (2,488 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Dec 90.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—922

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	120	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	7
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	47	KC-10	6
F-15	96	KC-135	159
F-15E	46	MC-130	4
F-16	144	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Dec 90.]

December 1990

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—502

Tactical/Support	228
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Tanker Refueling	72
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Intratheater Airlift	202
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MARCENT—81

NAVCENT—59

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Jan 91.]

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January 1991

1 January 91 (C plus 147)

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity was significantly lower with thirty-six total sorties. The low number was due to severe weather conditions over Iraq and Kuwait. The Iraqis resumed intelligence collection flights with their Boeing 727 aircraft. It flew a normal mission profile over the tri-border area. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Jan 91.]

Iraqi ground forces in the KTO remained at thirty-four divisions; however, the assessment was changed to reflect twenty-four committed and ten reinforcing. The total number of brigades in the KTO was 120: 42 heavy and 78 light. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—334,921 (22,799 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—39,028 (2,526 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Jan 91.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—952

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	120	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	7

Gulf War Chronology

EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	48	KC-10	6
F-15	96	KC-135	164
F-15E	46	MC-130	4
F-16	168	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Jan 91.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—451	
Tactical/Support	189
Tanker Refueling	58
Intratheater Airlift	204

MARCENT—81

NAVCENT—73

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Jan 91.]

2 January 91 (C plus 148)

POLITICAL

The White House effectively dropped its insistence that Saddam Hussein meet with Secretary of State Baker before 3 January. It signaled Baghdad that if a compromise date before 12 January (the day Baghdad insisted on meeting) was offered, the United States would most likely accept. This statement was believed to result from congressional and allied pressure to find a peaceful way out of the Persian Gulf crisis. [Thomas Friedman, "White House Hints It May Talk If Iraq Offers a New Date," *The New York Times*, 3 Jan 91, p 1.]

President Bush said that "no price is too heavy to pay" to repel "the aggression of Saddam Hussein against Kuwait." Accusing the Iraqi president of committing genocide against the people of Kuwait, President Bush said the world had faced "nothing of this moral importance since World War II." [James Gerstenzang, "No Price Too High to Oust Iraq—Bush," *The Los Angeles Times*, 2 Jan 91, p 1.]

NATO announced that, within a week, Germany, Belgium, and Italy would send forty-two jet fighters and at least 470 supporting personnel from the alliance's rapid reaction force to Turkey to bolster defenses along

January 1991

that country's border with Iraq. This would be the first crisis deployment of this NATO force since its creation in 1960. It would also mark the first time since World War II that German military forces were sent abroad in response to a threat of war. [Marc Fisher, "NATO to Send Warplanes to Defend Turkey," *The Washington Post*, 3 Jan 91, p 17.]

The Arab News, Saudi Arabia's major English-language newspaper, labeled 15 January "Kuwait Day." The editor, Khaled Maeena, expressed little confidence in the effect of the trade embargo against Iraq. "The Crisis of August 2nd was like a cancer, and the longer you wait to remove it, the worse it gets," he said. "I think President Bush has got the guts to go to war." [David Evans, "Saudis Start Counting Toward War, 'K-Day,'" *The Chicago Tribune*, 2 Jan 91, p 1.]

Pentagon officials imposed a physical fitness test on journalists who wished to be sent out with American troops. The test required the reporters to meet the standards the military sets for its own men and women for sit-ups, push-ups, and a mile-and-a-half run. [Philip Shenon, "O.K., Flabby Press Corps, 32 Pushups for Uncle Sam," *The New York Times*, 3 Jan 91, p 8.]

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity continued below normal levels because of poor flying conditions. The sortie total was thirty-seven. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—336,655 (22,058 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—39,441 (2,547 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Jan 91.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—954

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	120	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	7
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	48	KC-10	6
F-15	96	KC-135	164

Gulf War Chronology

F-15E	48	MC-130	4
F-16	168	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Jan 91; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 2 Jan 91.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—567

Tactical/Support	299
Tanker Refueling	65
Intratheater Airlift	203

MARCENT—104

NAVCENT—70

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Jan 91.]

3 January 91 (C plus 149)

POLITICAL

Declaring his willingness to "go the extra mile for peace," President Bush proposed that Secretary Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz meet in Switzerland within a week. At the same time, the president withdrew his offer to meet with an Iraqi representative in Washington. "This offer is being made subject to the same conditions as my previous attempts," stated the president. "No negotiations, no compromises, no attempts at face-saving, and no rewards for aggression." [James Gerstenzang, "Bush Proposing Baker Meet with Iraqis Next Week," *The Los Angeles Times*, 4 Jan 91, p 1.]

Iraqi authorities informed the foreign diplomatic corps in Baghdad that the government was planning to move "all functions" out of the capital city. The plan to relocate key government ministries and foreign diplomatic missions was the most far-reaching evacuation proposal yet to emerge in the countdown to the deadline of 15 January. This announcement added to the alarm in some foreign embassies that Iraq had deepened its resolve to go to war. [Patrick Tyler, "Iraqi Government to Leave Baghdad," *The New York Times*, 4 Jan 91, p 10.]

MILITARY

An air defense exercise in Saudi Arabia and the weekly SANDY BEACH exercise in Qatar were conducted. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Jan 91.]

January 1991

Iraqi air activity increased over the previous two days, but was below average with only ninety-three sorties. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Jan 91.]

In the KTO, Iraq had deployed 532,900 personnel, 4,000 tanks, 2,700 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, and 3,020 artillery pieces. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—341,754 (22,314 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—39,927 (2,599 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Jan 91.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—978

Combat		Support	
A-10	120	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	96
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	8
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	48	KC-10	6
F-15	96	KC-135	169
F-15E	48	MC-130	4
F-16	186	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Jan 91; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 3 Jan 91.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—689

Tactical/Support 425

Tanker Refueling 67

Intratheater Airlift 197

MARCENT—123

NAVCENT—54

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Jan 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

4 January 91 (C plus 150)

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity decreased and remained much lower than the December averages. A total of forty-eight sorties were flown. Most were transport and resupply missions into the KTO. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—343,512 (22,437 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—40,708 (2,626 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Jan 91.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—1,007

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	120	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	120
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	8
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	48	KC-10	6
F-15	96	KC-135	174
F-15E	48	MC-130	4
F-16	186	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Jan 91; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 4 Jan 91.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,422

Air-to-Air	116
(F-14, F-15)	
Air-to-Ground	385
(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)	
Dual Role	336
(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)	
Total Combat Aircraft	837
Support Aircraft	585

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Jan 91.]

January 1991

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—762

Tactical/Support	466
Tanker Refueling	58
Intratheater Airlift	238

MARCENT—198

NAVCENT—86

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Jan 91.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	6,346
Boarded	759
Diverted	33
Warning Shots Fired	11
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Jan 91.]

5 January 91 (C plus 151)

MILITARY

An air defense exercise—using six "fakers" and AWACS, airborne combat air patrol aircraft, ground alert combat air patrol aircraft, and air defense command and control agencies—was conducted in western Saudi Arabia. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Jan 91.]

Iraqi air activity remained below average levels, with sixty sorties. Transports accounted for more than 50 percent of the activity. Analysts noted that the lack of normal air activity during the previous four days increased the number of sorties Iraq could fly in support of offensive or defensive operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—345,249 (22,537 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—41,063 (2,630 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Jan 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

USAF Aircraft Deployed—1,012

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A-10	120	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	120
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	8
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	48	KC-10	6
F-15	96	KC-135	179
F-15E	48	MC-130	4
F-16	186	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Jan 91.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—771	
Tactical/Support	448
Tanker Refueling	90
Intratheater Airlift	233
MARCENT—88	
NAVCENT—175	

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Jan 91.]

6 January 91 (C plus 152)

MILITARY

Combined U.S. and allied training included dissimilar aerial combat tactics, low-level navigation, surface attack, and air refueling. A large-scale tanker surge operation was planned as a night operation. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Jan 91.]

Iraqi air activity totaled eighty-eight sorties. Fighter activity, which was nearly four times higher than the operations of the previous three days, accounted for sixty-four of the sortie total. Analysts believed that Iraqi air activity would increase in an attempt to reach operational proficiency prior to 15 January. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Jan 91.]

January 1991

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—358,326 (22,228 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—41,995 (2,661 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Jan 91.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—1,034

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A/OA-10	142	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	120
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	8
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	48	KC-10	6
F-15	96	KC-135	179
F-15E	48	MC-130	4
F-16	186	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	4
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Jan 91.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—551

Tactical/Support 246

Tanker Refueling 103

Intratheater Airlift 202

MARCENT—85

NAVCENT—167

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Jan 91.]

7 January 91 (C plus 153)

POLITICAL

Reportedly, U.S. military leaders, prepared for combat with Iraq, decided against using nuclear or chemical arms to destroy Iraqi military installations or retaliating against Iraqi poison gas or germ warfare attacks. The decision not to use "weapons of mass destruction" reflected high confidence in the overwhelming firepower of U.S. conventional forces, plus a desire not to compound the already unpredictable political consequences of a potential military conflict. [Jeffrey Smith and Rick Atkinson, "U.S. Rules Out Gulf Use of Nuclear, Chemical Arms," *The Washington Post*, 7 Jan 91, p 1.]

Gulf War Chronology

MILITARY

Exercise FISH BARREL, a CAS and air interdiction operation, began. The exercise schedule included 226 sorties and an additional 40 light cannon firing sorties. Fighter aircraft from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Britain, and Kuwait participated. Four strike training packages of eighteen to thirty aircraft were flown with forces from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Britain. For the first time, B-52s (six) completed a strike training mission in northeast Saudi Arabia. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Jan 91.]

The host nation refueling capability at Bateen, UAE, was not sufficient to support the twenty-one C-130s stationed there. Fuel supplies were exhausted twice during the previous week. To supplement the host nation refueling and storage capacity at Bateen, CENTAF doubled the number of refuelers (R-9s) by deploying three more, and sixteen 50,000-gallon bladders were installed and filled. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 7 Jan 91.]

Iraqi air activity, due to poor weather in the KTO, was lower than the previous day. There were fifty-nine sorties, with fighter aircraft accounting for seventeen and transports for twenty-nine. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Jan 91.]

Iraqi ground forces in the KTO increased to thirty-five divisions: twenty-four committed and eleven reinforcing. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—363,456 (22,364 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—42,771 (2,661 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Jan 91.]

January 1991

USAF Aircraft Deployed—1,046

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A/OA-10	144	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	128
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	9
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	4
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	48	KC-10	6
F-15	96	KC-135	179
F-15E	48	MC-130	4
F-16	186	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	5
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Jan 91; Brfg. AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 7 Jan 91.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—975	
Tactical/Support	668
Tanker Refueling	83
Intratheater Airlift	224
MARCENT—122	
NAVCENT—108	

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Jan 91.]

8 January 91 (C plus 154)

POLITICAL

The top diplomats of Iraq and the United States arrived in Geneva, Switzerland, for the first high-level talks since Iraq invaded Kuwait. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz warned that "Iraq does not yield to pressure." Secretary Baker completed a tour through Europe aimed at keeping pressure from U.S. allies focused on Baghdad. [David Hoffman and William Drozdiak, "Baker and Aziz Arrive in Geneva: France May Push Plan If Talks Fail," *The Washington Post*, 9 Jan 91, p 1.]

President Bush issued "an unusually blunt appeal" to Congress for approval of a resolution authorizing the use of "all necessary means" to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. He stated that "anything less would only encourage Iraqi intransigence" and erode the international coalition against Iraq.

Gulf War Chronology

The president's request was made in a letter to congressional leaders who were preparing to open debate on the president's Persian Gulf policies. [Dan Balz, "Bush Asks Congress to Back Force Against Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 9 Jan 91, p 1.]

According to *The Washington Post*-ABC News survey, 67 percent of those questioned said they approved of the way President Bush was handling the situation in the Persian Gulf. This was the highest level in a *Post*-ABC survey since early September. Also, most Americans wanted Congress to support more strongly President Bush's Middle East policies. [Richard Morin, "Gulf Poll: Most Americans Want Hill to Back Bush," *The Washington Post*, 8 Jan 91, p 12.]

MILITARY

Exercise FISH BARREL included 237 CAS sorties along with 48 light cannon firing sorties. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Jan 91.]

Iraqi air activity increased to 130 sorties, with fighters accounting for 89. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—369,348 (22,718 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—43,139 (2,659 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Jan 91.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—1,072

Combat		Support	
A/OA-10	144	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	128
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	9
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	48	KC-10	6
F-15	96	KC-135	179
F-15E	48	MC-130	4
F-16	210	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	5
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	2
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Jan 91; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 8 Jan 91.]

January 1991

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—983

Tactical/Support	674
Tanker Refueling	99
Intratheater Airlift	210

MARCENT—99

NAVCENT—82

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Jan 91; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 09/0800z Jan 91.]

9 January 91 (C plus 155)

POLITICAL

The United States and Iraq failed to reach agreement on a peaceful resolution of the Persian Gulf crisis. "Regrettably, I heard nothing today that suggested to me any Iraqi flexibility," said Secretary Baker. Iraqi Minister Tariq Aziz stated that his country was "preparing for the worst." If Iraq was attacked, he said that it would "absolutely" respond by attacking Israel. President Bush accused Iraq of giving a "total stiff-arm" to American efforts to persuade Iraq to pull back from Kuwait. The president said that, while it was still possible for a diplomatic formula to be found to avert war, he was "discouraged" about that possibility. [Thomas Friedman, "Baker-Aziz Talks on Gulf Fail," *The New York Times*, 10 Jan 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

The CENTAF aircraft mission-capable rate was 92.2 percent. Deployed low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night units reported that at least thirty-six forward looking infrared radar windows had deteriorated, with replacement imminent. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 9 Jan 91.]

Iraqi air activity was lower than normal for the seventh consecutive day. The sortie count totaled eighty-one: twenty-three fighter, one intelligence collection, forty-five transport, eight helicopter, and four unidentified. Transport activity was primarily into and out of Kuwait, southern Iraq, and Jordan. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—389,588 (23,687 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—44,101 (2,890 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Jan 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

USAF Aircraft Deployed—1,075

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A/OA-10	144	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	128
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	9
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	48	KC-10	7
F-15	96	KC-135	179
F-15E	48	MC-130	4
F-16	210	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	5
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	4
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Jan 91; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 9 Jan 91.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,566

Air-to-Air	135
(F-14, F-15)	
Air-to-Ground	417
(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)	
Dual Role	377
(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)	
Total Combat Aircraft	929
Support Aircraft	637

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Jan 91.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—784	
Tactical/Support	448
Tanker Refueling	109
Intratheater Airlift	227

MARCENT—100

NAVCENT—91

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Jan 91.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	6,719
Boarded	800
Diverted	36

January 1991

Warning Shots Fired 11
Refused to Stop 3
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Jan 91.]

10 January 91 (C plus 156)

POLITICAL

Congress opened debate over whether to authorize the president to use military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, or to insist that he wait longer for economic sanctions to work. [Helen Dewar and Tom Kenworthy, "Top Democrats Back Sanctions: Close Vote Expected in Senate," *The Washington Post*, 11 Jan 91, p 1.]

Secretary Baker met with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to discuss the timing of an attack on Iraqi forces. The Americans and Saudis had an understanding that no attacks would be launched from Saudi territory without the prior agreement of King Fahd and President Bush. [Thomas Friedman, "Baker and Saudi King Talk About Timing of an Assault," *The New York Times*, 11 Jan 91, p 10.]

CIA Director William Webster "stepped into the middle" of the congressional debate over potential war with Iraq by writing a letter that stated economic sanctions alone would not force Iraq out of Kuwait for at least a year. The letter was cited by House Armed Services Committee chairman Les Aspin during the congressional debates on the president's Persian Gulf policy. [Jeffrey Smith, "CIA Says Sanctions Would Need at Least a Year to Succeed," *The Washington Post*, 11 Jan 91, p 26.]

MILITARY

Iraqi air activity increased to 130 sorties, with 89 attributed to fighters. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—383,802 (23,522 women)
Total CENTAF Personnel—43,723 (2,695 women)
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Jan 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

USAF Aircraft Deployed—1,079

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A/OA-10	144	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	128
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	10
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	48	KC-10	9
F-15	96	KC-135	179
F-15E	48	MC-130	4
F-16	210	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	6
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	4
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Jan 91; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 10 Jan 91.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—555	
Tactical/Support	305
Tanker Refueling	28
Intratheater Airlift	222

MARCENT—99

NAVCENT—82

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Jan 91.]

11 January 91 (C plus 157)

MILITARY

U.S. and Saudi AWACS continued to provide 24-hour surveillance of Kuwait, the northern Gulf, and southern Iraq. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—389,588 (23,687 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—44,101 (2,890 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Jan 91.]

January 1991

USAF Aircraft Deployed—1,079

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A/OA-10	144	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	128
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	10
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	48	KC-10	10
F-15	96	KC-135	179
F-15E	48	MC-130	4
F-16	209	MH-53	8
F-111	64	MH-60	8
F-117	36	RC-135	6
		RF-4C	6
		TR-1	4
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Jan 91; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 11 Jan 91.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—788	
Tactical/Support	424
Tanker Refueling	70
Intratheater Airlift	294

MARCENT—130

NAVCENT—153

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Jan 91.]

NATO combat air forces in support of DESERT SHIELD—146

Britain	
Tornado	68
Jaguar	11
France	
Mirage F-1	25
Mirage 2000	8
Jaguar	8
Canada	
CF-18	18
Italy	
Tornado	8

[Brfg, "DESERT SHIELD CSAF Briefing," 11 Jan 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

Arab combat air forces in support of DESERT SHIELD—492

Saudi Arabia	
F-5	85
F-15	82
Tornado	49
Strikemaster	32
Hawk	30
United Arab Emirates	
Mirage 2000	25
Mirage III	14
Mirage 5	14
Egypt	
F-4	32
Oman	
Jaguar	22
Strikemaster	12
Hunter	10
Kuwait	
A-4	20
Mirage F-1	15
Hawk	5
Bahrain	
F-15	12
F-16	12
Qatar	
Mirage F-1	12
Alpha	6
Hunter	3

[Brfg, "DESERT SHIELD CSAF Briefing," 11 Jan 91.]

12 January 91 (C plus 158)

POLITICAL

After three days of debate, Congress voted President Bush the authority to go to war against Iraq. The Senate voted 52 to 47. The House voted 250 to 183. The document was called the "Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution," and it stated that President Bush was authorized "to use United States armed forces pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 678." The UN resolution authorized member nations to use "all necessary means" against Iraq if it did not withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January. [Adam Clymer, "Congress Acts to Authorize War in Gulf," *The New York Times*, 13 Jan 91, p 1.]

January 1991

The American Embassy in Baghdad was evacuated. [Telecon, Karen A. Fleming, AF/HO, with David Good, Public Affairs Officer for the Middle East, U.S. Department of State, 12 April 91.]

MILITARY

Air-to-ground units loaded 40 percent of assigned aircraft, and air-to-air units loaded 70 percent. F-16s began augmenting F-15s in air defense patrols. Exercise CALLING ANGEL was conducted at ten locations in the AOR to test the ability of the newly arrived search-and-rescue local user terminal to locate emergency beacons of simulated downed pilots. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Jan 91.]

Iraqi air activity totaled 221 sorties. The increase in activity resulted from good weather over the KTO. Fighter activity consisted of simulated air combat training, local area training, and overwater training. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—408,876 (24,660 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—44,867 (2,907 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Jan 91.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—1,088

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A/OA-10	144	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	128
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	10
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	48	JSTARS	2
F-15	96	KC-10	12
F-15E	48	KC-135	180
F-16	209	MC-130	4
F-111	64	MH-53	8
F-117	36	MH-60	8
		RC-135	6
		RF-4C	10
		TR-1	4
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Jan 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—770

Tactical/Support	445
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Tanker Refueling	81
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Intratheater Airlift	244
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MARCENT—92

NAVCENT—165

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Jan 91.]

13 January 91 (C plus 159)

MILITARY

Air-to-ground units loaded 60 to 70 percent of the assigned aircraft, and air-to-air units loaded 100 percent of assigned aircraft. AWACS and high-value asset combat air patrols continued to increase. A tanker exercise was conducted to practice manning wartime orbits. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Jan 91.]

Inclement weather lowered Iraqi air activity. Of the 142 sorties, 61 were by fighters and 56 were by transports. It was assessed that the Iraqi Air Force had sufficient time to disperse aircraft to any of the 128 airfields in Iraq. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—414,685 (24,737 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—45,158 (2,938 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Jan 91.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—1,093

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A/OA-10	144	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	128

January 1991

EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	10
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	48	JSTARS	2
F-15	96	KC-10	15
F-15E	48	KC-135	180
F-16	209	MC-130	4
F-111	64	MH-53	8
F-117	36	MH-60	8
		RC-135	6
		RF-4C	12
		TR-1	4
		U-2	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Jan 91.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—476	
Tactical/Support	214
Tanker Refueling	60
Intratheater Airlift	202

MARCENT—48

NAVCENT—153

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Jan 91.]

14 January 91 (C plus 160)

MILITARY

Iraq flew two daily Boeing 727 intelligence collection flights against coalition forces. Fighter activity was reduced and assessed to be simulated air combat training and local area training. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—417,913 (24,731 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—45,585 (3,005 women)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Jan 91.]

USAF Aircraft Deployed—1,121

Combat		Support	
A/OA-10	144	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8

Gulf War Chronology

B-52	20	C-130	128
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	10
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	48	JSTARS	2
F-15	96	KC-10	22
F-15E	48	KC-135	194
F-16	208	MC-130	4
F-111	64	MH-53	8
F-117	36	MH-60	8
		RC-135	6
		RF-4C	18
		TR-1	4
		U-2	5

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Jan 91; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 14 Jan 91.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—524	
Tactical/Support	210
Tanker Refueling	75
Intratheater Airlift	239

MARCENT—74

NAVCENT—145

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Jan 91.]

15 January 91 (C plus 161)

POLITICAL

The Bush administration said it was reaching "a point of decision" for war. Officials were weighing options on exactly when to give the order to attack if there was no move by Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The White House expressed little hope that diplomacy would produce a solution to the crisis. France abandoned its effort at negotiating the crisis since Iraq showed no interest in a plan to link Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait to an international conference on the Middle East. [Maureen Dowd, "U.S. Weighs Timing of Attack Against Iraq as Deadline Arrives and Diplomacy Fails," *The New York Times*, 16 Jan 91, p 1.]

Kurtcebe Alptemocin, the Turkish foreign minister, announced that his nation would not participate in an attack against Iraq. He said that U.S. and allied planes recently sent to Turkey would be used only for defensive purposes. [Jeffrey Smith and Al Kamen, "Turkish Official Renounces Military Attack Against Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 16 Jan 91, p 6.]

January 1991

MILITARY

Air-to-ground units maintained 60 to 70 percent of their aircraft loaded with munitions, and air-to-air units maintained 100 percent of their aircraft loaded. U.S. AWACS provided, with two orbits, continuous surveillance of Kuwait, Iraq, and the northern Gulf. An E-2/Hawkeye also provided surveillance in the northern Gulf. Fighter aircraft continued to provide high-value air asset protection and fly combat air patrols. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Jan 91.]

More than 1,000 "third-country-national drivers," who hauled bulk petroleum from refineries to the bases, walked off their jobs. The CENTAF logistics contingency plan was to fill host nation trucks with "Blue Suiters." All MAJCOMS were tasked to provide CENTAF/LG with the number of qualified drivers who could be deployed. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Roan, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 15 Jan 91.]

Iraqi air activity was dominated by transport flights assessed to be involved in dispersal efforts, logistical support, and munitions buildup at dispersal bases. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Jan 91.]

Iraq defended the KTO with elements of thirty-five divisions: twenty-four committed and eleven reinforcing. This force had 546,700 personnel, 4,280 tanks, 2,880 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, and 3,100 artillery pieces. KTO forces had elements of 125 brigades: 42 heavy and 83 light. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—422,041 (24,743 women)

Total USAF Personnel—46,563 (3,152 women)

[Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Jan 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

USAF Aircraft Deployed—1,123

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A/OA-10	144	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	128
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	10
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	48	JSTARS	2
F-15	96	KC-10	22
F-15E	48	KC-135	194
F-16	210	MC-130	4
F-111	64	MH-53	8
F-117	36	MH-60	8
		RC-135	6
		RF-4C	18
		TR-1	4
		U-2	5

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Jan 91; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 15 Jan 91.]

Total U.S. Aircraft Deployed—1,847

Total Combat Aircraft	1,098
Air-to-Air	195
(F-14, F-15)	
Air-to-Ground	477
(A-10, A-6, F-111, F-117, A/V-8, B-52)	
Dual Role	426
(F-16, F/A-18, F-15E)	
Support Aircraft	749
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Jan 91.]	

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—605	
Tactical/Support	246
Tanker Refueling	76
Intratheater Airlift	283
MARCENT—86	
NAVCENT—177	
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Jan 91.]	

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	6,913
Boarded	820

January 1991

Diverted	36
Warning Shots Fired	11
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Jan 91.]

16 January 91 (C plus 162)

MILITARY

U.S. AWACS provided continuous surveillance of the Kuwaiti-northern Gulf-Iraqi borders. Fighters continued to provide high-value air asset protection and fly combat air patrols. Air-to-ground units maintained 60 to 70 percent of their aircraft loaded with munitions, and air-to-air units kept 100 percent of their aircraft loaded. CENTAF air operations priorities were the following:

Counterair—Disrupt and destroy enemy air operations; suppress enemy air defenses; gain and maintain air superiority.

Interdiction—Delay and attrit Iraqi ground forces; strike pre-planned targets that can support and sustain enemy combat operations.

Close Air Support—Provide air support for friendly troops; Delay and attrit attacking Iraqi forces.

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Jan 91.]

The CENTAF mission-capable rate was 94 percent. CENTAF required 200 tractor trailer drivers to be in place at Riyadh not later than 17 January to replace the third-country nationals who walked off their jobs. Fifty drivers were sourced from Tactical Air Command, Strategic Air Command, Air Training Command, and United States Air Force Europe. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 16 Jan 91.]

Iraqi ground forces remained in a defensive posture and on alert for a coalition attack. No significant dispersal of heavy divisions in the KTO was noted. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—426,222 (25,578 women)

Total USAF Personnel—47,731

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Jan 91. "Sitrep" no longer listed the number of women deployed by component. Only the total women deployed was given.]

Gulf War Chronology

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January 1991

USAF Aircraft Deployed—1,131

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A/OA-10	144	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	128
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	10
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	48	JSTARS	2
F-15	96	KC-10	30
F-15E	48	KC-135	194
F-16	210	MC-130	4
F-111	64	MH-53	8
F-117	36	MH-60	8
		RC-135	6
		RF-4C	18
		TR-1	4
		U-2	5

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Jan 91; Brfg. AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT SHIELD Brief," 16 Jan 91.]

Flight Activity (Sorties)

CENTAF—443	
Tactical/Support	121
Tanker Refueling	42
Intratheater Airlift	280

MARCENT—80

NAVCENT—182

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Jan 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

January 1991

Gulf War Chronology

Operation DESERT STORM

January 1991

17 January 91 (C plus 163/D-day)

POLITICAL

After almost a day of partisan arguing, the Senate voted without dissent to commend President Bush and support U.S. troops in the Gulf. The resolution stated that "Congress commends and supports the efforts and leadership of the president as commander-in-chief in the Persian Gulf hostilities" and that "Congress unequivocally supports the men and women of our armed forces who are carrying out their mission with professional excellence, dedicated patriotism and exemplary bravery."

[Helen Dewar and Tom Kenworthy, "Senate Commends Bush, Backs Troops," *The Washington Post*, 18 Jan 91, p 29.]

MILITARY

Allied air forces began the Operation DESERT STORM air campaign against Iraq and Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The first ordnance impacted at 0239 in the AOR (16 January at 2339z; 16 January at 1839 EST), 18 ½ hours after the expiration of the UN deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. Aircraft survival was exceptional with only one aircraft, a USN F/A-18, reported lost. Tanker operations and aircraft recovery went well for the first strikes. Four Air Force Special Operations Command Central MH-53s led an equal number of U.S. Army Apaches during the first mission on Operation DESERT STORM. The plan, codenamed EAGER ANVIL, had the MH-53s navigate to two separate early warning and ground-controlled intercept radar sites in far western Iraq. An air corridor was opened, allowing coalition planes to hit Baghdad undetected. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904,

Gulf War Chronology

"Sitrep," 17/2115z Jan 91; Ltr, AFSOC/HO to CAFH/DRE, "Gulf War Chronology," 24 Jan 92.]

Seven B-52s from the 2d Bomb Wing, 8th Air Force, launched thirty-five modified air launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) at eight high-priority Iraqi targets, including power generation and transmission facilities, and military communication sites. The ALCMs' success rate, determined through bomb damage assessment, was approximately 85 percent. The bombers departed Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, at 0635 on 16 January, making them the first aircraft launched in Operation DESERT STORM. They flew a total of 14,000 miles and remained in the air for over thirty-five hours with four aerial refuelings. This was the longest aircraft combat mission in history. [Press Conference, Pete Williams (OSD/PA) to News Media, 16 Jan 1992; Press Rpt, "USAF Acknowledges Conventional ALCMs in DESERT STORM," HQ SAC News Release NR 90-001, 16 Jan 92.]

Allied forces attacked strategic, operational, and tactical targets in Iraq and Kuwait. USCINCCENT stated, "We have struck his [Saddam Hussein's] command and control, air defense, and his offensive capability, hard and relentlessly." Seventeen strategic targets in the Baghdad area were struck with over 100 cruise missiles. Although battle damage assessment was incomplete, it was apparent that the strike missions were successful for the most part. Friendly losses were "extremely low" for the first day. Proven Force assets launched their first missions with forty-three aircraft attacking targets in Northern Iraq. In border activity, Special Operations Forces aircraft, USAF A-10s, and USN/USMC AV-8s flew damage assessment missions against Iraqi forces, while U.S. and coalition ground forces began repositioning for offensive operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Jan 91; Memo, Thomas Snyder, USAF Command Historian, to Jack Neufeld, HQ USAF/HO, subj: "Gulf War Chronology," 17 Jan 92.]

Iraqi aircraft did not mount effective defensive counterair operations, nor did they attempt to fly offensive counterair or interdiction operations against coalition targets. It was believed that the purpose of their limited activity (noted were MiG-25/Foxbat, MiG-29/Fulcrum, and Mirage F-1 flights) was to allow maximum use of free-fire zones for antiaircraft artillery. Also, analysts believed that Iraq did not want to engage coalition aircraft in aerial combat. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Jan 91.]

A maximum of fifty-four Iraqi combat air patrols were flown. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Jan 91.]

Between twelve and thirty-one intercepts against coalition aircraft were attempted by Iraqi fighters. Iraqi aircraft were staying clear of their own

January 1991

surface-to-air missile (SAM) envelops. The SAM radars were active, but the Iraqis demonstrated little discipline in SAM fire control. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Howey, AF/XOWF, "BDA DESERT STORM: Operator's Look," 17 Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—454,128 (25,814 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—48,679

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Jan 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,388 Total Sorties

USAF—1,381

Offensive Counterair 337

Defensive Counterair 116

Interdiction 381

Close Air Support 47

Tanker Refueling 286

Intratheater Airlift 36

Other Support 188

MARCENT—169

NAVCENT—415

ALLIED—423

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Jan 91.]

18 January 91 (C plus 164/D plus 1)

POLITICAL

Defense Secretary Cheney declared an "airlift emergency" and activated Stage II of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet plan. This authorized the government to contract with civil air carriers to use up to 181 aircraft to help ferry U.S. war supplies to the Middle East. Domestic airlines had hauled 65 percent of the troops and 22 percent of the cargo destined for the U.S. buildup in Saudi Arabia. [Don Phillips, "Cheney Orders Airline Alert," *The Washington Post*, 19 Jan 91, p 19.]

Areas in Tel Aviv and Haifa, Israel, were struck by Iraqi Scud missiles carrying conventional warheads. Very little damage was done—seven people were slightly injured by broken glass or were in shock. Israeli authorities took precautions as if chemical weapons had landed and urged citizens to wear their gas masks. [Joel Brinkley, "Iraq Hits Israeli Cities With Missiles After Second Day Of Allied Bombing; U.S. Warplanes Strike at Launchers," *The New York Times*, 18 Jan 91, p 1.]

Gulf War Chronology

MILITARY

U.S. and coalition air forces prosecuted an intensive offensive air campaign against targets in Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Operations proceeded as planned, with thirty-two strike packages and numerous additional combat missions being flown. CENTAF interdiction priorities were Scud missile sites, leadership centers, oil and electrical production facilities, Republican Guard forces, and major lines-of-communication in southern Iraq. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Jan 91.]

CENTAF reported an aircraft mission capable rate of 94.6 percent. The 33d Tactical Fighter Wing requested depot assistance and repair kits for permanent repair of cracks on the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer of the F-15. Sixteen of twenty-four F-15s were affected, but the aircraft were not flight restricted. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 18 Jan 91.]

Iraqi air activity remained light with only 25 combat air patrols noted. No helicopter activity was detected. The majority of the surface-to-air missile engagements against allied forces were optical. Due to damage or destruction of radar and emission controls, there was a significant degradation of Iraq's capability to detect and track coalition aircraft. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Jan 91.]

Baghdad was without electricity. Iraq's strategic air defense system was severely disrupted. Several intelligence and sector operations centers were damaged or destroyed. Poor antiaircraft and surface-to-air missile fire discipline was exhibited by Iraqi forces. No communications were detected in the southern early warning radar networks. Iraqi defenses were described as "stunned." Analysts expected that, with experience, the Iraqis would learn to "work around" the electronic and communications problems caused by the air strikes. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Howey, AF/XOWF, "BDA DESERT STORM: Operator's Look," 18 Jan 91.]

Except for limited artillery action along the coast and in the tri-border area, no other Iraqi ground activity was noted. Analysts believed that Iraqi ground forces were staying in defensive positions for protection from U.S. and coalition air attacks. Unconfirmed reports from Kuwaiti resistance elements stated that Iraq would soon begin destroying Kuwaiti oil rigs. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—461,586 (26,095 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—48,903

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Jan 91.]

January 1991

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,200 Total Sorties (Cumulative—4,588)

USAF—1,529 (Cumulative—2,910)

Offensive Counterair	204
Defensive Counterair	76
Interdiction	397
Close Air Support	52
Tanker Refueling	256
Intratheater Airlift	395
Other Support	149

MARCENT—122

NAVCENT—233

ALLIED—316

[Msg. USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Jan 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—7

USAF—3

F-15E	2
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F-16	1
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USN—3

A-6	2
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F/A-18	1
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USMC—1

OV-10	1
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Allied Aircraft—4

A-4 (KU)	1
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Tornado (IT)	1
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Tornado (UK)	2
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Iraqi Aircraft—17

MiG-29/Fulcrum	10
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Mirage F-1	4
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On Ground

Su-17/Fitter	1
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Poss. destroyed	
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in shelter	2
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[Brfg. AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 19 Jan 91.]

19 January 91 (C plus 165/D plus 2)

POLITICAL

Iraq launched a second missile attack against Tel Aviv. The missiles carried conventional weapons. President Bush urged Israel not to retaliate, fearing that Israeli intervention would shatter the coalition against Iraq and

Gulf War Chronology

broaden the Persian Gulf crisis into a Middle East war. American officials assured Israel that the allied forces were tracking down the Iraqi missiles and their launchers. [Joel Brinkley, "Tel Aviv Hit Again," *The New York Times*, 19 Jan 91, p 1.]

Two Patriot antimissile batteries were delivered by the United States to Israel. Israel had previously received two Patriot systems, but the batteries were not operational because Israel did not want American technicians to operate them. Due to the Scud missile attacks, Israel accepted the additional Patriot systems and allowed Americans technicians to operate them. [Maureen Dowd, "Bush Urges Israeli Restraint in Phone Appeals to Shamir," *The New York Times*, 20 Jan 91, p 16.]

Thirty-five C-5s and nine C-141s transported Patriot missile batteries to Israel to counter the Scud threat from Iraq. [Brfg. AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief: PM Update," 19 Jan 91.]

MILITARY

Allied air forces prosecuted an intensive offensive air campaign against targets in Iraq and Iraqi-occupied Kuwait with thirty strike packages flown. Iraqi targets receiving emphasis were Scud fixed and mobile launch systems, the Republican Guard, military headquarters, and nuclear-biological-chemical facilities. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Jan 91.]

Four strike packages and all F-117 missions were aborted due to area weather. [Msg, USCENAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 19/0800Z Jan 91.]

A B-52 that flew a mission from Diego Garcia sustained battle damage and was recovered at Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The tail of the aircraft was severely damaged aft of the parachute door by a surface-to-air missile. There was no major damage to the vertical or horizontal stabilizers, and flight characteristics were not noticeably impaired. The aircraft flew to Andersen AFB, Guam, where a G model with a cracked wing spar was on station and could be cannibalized. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Knox, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 20 Jan 91; Brfg. AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief: PM Update," 19 Jan 91.]

An MC-130 leaflet drop was conducted, disseminating over a million leaflets into the KTO with "surrender, defect, and abandon equipment" messages. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Jan 91.]

The USAF aircraft mission capable rate in the AOR was 95.1 percent. [Brfg. AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief: PM Update," 19 Jan 91.]

January 1991

U.S. Navy A-6/ Crusaders and A-7/ Corsairs made the first launches of Standoff Land Attack Missile. Also, the USS *Louisville*, submerged in the Red Sea, fired the first submarine-launched Tomahawk Land Attack Missile of the war. ["The United States Navy in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM," Department of the Navy, 15 May 1991.]

Analysts estimated that Iraq had sixty-six Scud short-range ballistic missile launchers: thirty-six were mobile and thirty were fixed. All were believed to be operational. In the KTO, Iraq reportedly had 546,700 personnel, 4,280 tanks, 2,880 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, and 3,100 artillery pieces. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief: PM Update," 19 Jan 91.]

Iraq had up to eleven air defense early warning nodes active along the Saudi-Iraqi border. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—467,156 (26,293 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—48,902

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Jan 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—1,875 Total Sorties (Cumulative 6,463)

USAF—1,275 (Cumulative—4,185)

Offensive Counterair 110

Defensive Counterair 106

Interdiction 378

Close Air Support 29

Tanker Refueling 236

Intratheater Airlift 267

Other Support 149

MARCENT—108

NAVCENT—178

ALLIED- 314

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Jan 91; Msg, USCENAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 20/0800z Jan 91.]

20 January 91 (C plus 166/D plus 3)

MILITARY

Twenty-six USAF, USN, USMC, and coalition packages were flown. Three other packages and a total of 295 sorties were aborted due to poor target area weather. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Jan 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

Special Operations Forces conducted one combat search and rescue (CSAR) mission to recover a downed pilot who reportedly had voice contact with AWACS. Voice contact was lost prior to arrival of the CSAR forces, and although the mission penetrated 110 nautical miles inside Iraq, no contact was made. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Jan 91.]

Psychological operations (PSYOPS) leaflets were dispersed along the Kuwaiti and Iraqi borders. PSYOPS in support of combat operations began with the broadcast of news and surrender and abandon equipment appeals to Iraqi forces in the KTO. An F-16 leaflet bomb drop was conducted over Baghdad with "world is united against Saddam" and "abandon weapons" messages. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Jan 91.]

Iraq's defenses were assessed to be "largely disrupted" and airfields damaged "but useable"; the Iraqi Air Force was described as "still dangerous." Major damage was done to many nuclear-chemical-biological facilities. The country's infrastructure was "battered," and government facilities were "damaged" by the air war. The main objectives of the air campaign were to find and destroy Scuds, attack Iraq's integrated air defense system and command-control-communication centers, destroy chemical and biological weapon storage and production facilities, attack airfields, destroy military supply and production facilities, and attack Republican Guard forces. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 20 Jan 91.]

There was no change in Iraqi air operations for the preceding forty-eight hours. Limited defensive counterair operations were conducted, but there was no indication that Iraq prepared to attempt any type of offensive counterair campaign. Analysts believed that the degradation of air command and control nodes contributed to the lack of air activity. Iraq was using a system of human spotters along the Saudi-Iraqi border to provide early warning. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Jan 91.]

Limited bomb damage imagery made assessment of results difficult. There were limited operations at several Iraqi airfields, but all appeared usable. Some aircraft shelters and runways were hit. Iraqi antiaircraft and surface-to-air missile units were using barrage fire without radar control. Some backup early warning radars were restored by Iraqi technicians. Moderate damage was done to the Baghdad Nuclear Research Center; the Isis reactor was breached and spewing steam, but no radiation. Several government buildings in Baghdad were severely damaged; three or four appeared destroyed. Heavy damage was done to the telephone system. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Howey, AF/XOWF, "BDA DESERT STORM: Operator's Look," 20 Jan 91.]

January 1991

Two of Iraq's estimated thirty fixed Scud launchers were confirmed destroyed. Ten of the estimated thirty-six mobile Scud launchers were listed as unconfirmed losses. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 20 Jan 91.]

There were indications that command and control nodes inside Kuwait were dispersing. In western Iraq, Scud mobile launchers were staying in prepared "hide" positions, coming out to fire from presurveyed sites, then quickly returning to their protected facilities. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—472,740 (26,383 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—50,261

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Jan 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—1,842 Total Sorties (Cumulative—8,305)

USAF—1,223 (Cumulative—5,408)

Offensive Counterair 94

Defensive Counterair 72

Interdiction 327

Close Air Support 8

Tanker Refueling 155

Intratheater Airlift 399

Other Support 168

MARCENT—98

NAVCENT—175

ALLIED—346

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Jan 91. Sortie totals included Joint Task Force Proven Force flight activity from this date forward.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—9

USAF—5

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 2

USN—3

A-6 2

F/A-18 1

USMC—1

OV-10 1

Allied Aircraft—6

A-4 (KU) 1

Tornado (IT) 1

Gulf War Chronology

Tornado (SA)	2
Tornado (UK)	2
Iraqi Aircraft—29	
<i>Air to Air</i>	
MiG-23/Flogger	1
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	8
Mirage F-1	4
<i>On Ground</i>	
Su-17/Fitter	1
Poss. destroyed	
in shelter	13

[Brfg. AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 20 Jan 91.]

21 January 91 (C plus 167/D plus 4)

POLITICAL

The Iraqi military announced that it had placed captured allied airmen "among scientific and economic targets as well as among other selected targets." The statement was intended to deter allied air attacks against vital targets. President Bush condemned the act and said it would not alter American strategy in the Persian Gulf War. [Alan Cowell, "Iraq's Military Reported Hurt but Not Halted in 5 Days' Raids; Vows Captives Will Be Shields," *The New York Times*, 22 Jan 91, p 1.]

President Bush officially designated the Persian Gulf area and surrounding waters a combat zone, a move that exempted the armed forces serving there from income tax on their military pay. The president's executive order also gave the military in the war zone more time to file their income taxes. They were not required to file their Form 1040s until 180 days after they departed the Gulf. [Associated Press, "'Combat Zone' Troops Tax Exempt," *The Washington Post*, 22 Jan 91, p 16.]

MILITARY

Targeting Iraqi Scud capability remained the first priority of the allied air campaign, taking a significant portion of the coalition air effort. Suspected and confirmed Scud positions were attacked by using preplanned and airborne alert missions. Other targets were airfields, military and industrial production and storage facilities, command-control-communication centers, Republican Guard forces, and ground controlled intercept sites. Thirty-three packages attacked enemy targets. Three packages were canceled due to weather in the target area. Weather hindered precise targeting and caused air crews to shift to alternate targets or radar bombing

January 1991

with limited success. Thirty-one A-10 sorties attacked Iraqi Army forces and mobile Scuds along the Saudi border. MARCENT reported the rapid response of USCENTCOM and CENTAF to shift JSTARS surveillance areas to a real-time threat followed by rapid interdiction response. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Jan 91.]

Weather conditions and the large number of aircraft required to locate and destroy Scuds hindered the coalition's ability to strike strategic targets and the Republican Guard. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 21 Jan 91.]

Psychological operations included daily radio broadcasts and VOLANT SOLO nightly broadcasts into the KTO. An MC-130 leaflet drop disseminated a million "surrender appeal" leaflets into the KTO, while a bomb drop (F-16) spread 90,000 leaflets. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Jan 91.]

CENTAF logistics priorities were munitions, F-15/Eagle external fuel tanks, petroleum-oil-lubricant issues, resupply and war readiness spares kits, vehicles, and Harvest Falcon equipment. M117 GP bombs would be expended by 26 January (D+9). CENTAF required resupply of 1,200 M117s per day to meet unit wartime tasking. [Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 21/0800z Jan 91.]

The airlift of Patriot missile batteries to Israel was completed. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 21 Jan 91.]

The Iraqi Air Force was still considered "dangerous." "Good progress" was made in destroying Iraq's nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) warfare capabilities. Some NBC facilities were severely damaged. "Fair progress" was made against Iraq's offensive potential; however, Scuds were still a threat, and the Republican Guard remained strong. "Heavy damage" to government buildings was accomplished, and telecommunication and electrical power were disrupted. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 21 Jan 91.]

Limited Iraqi defensive counterair operations occurred, but there was no known offensive effort. Less than twenty Iraqi fighter sorties were detected. Indications were that, since Iraqi dispersal fields were attacked, Iraqi aircraft were using existing road networks to continue operations. Iraqi air forces still remained capable of launching offensive counterair and deep interdiction operations into Saudi Arabia. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Jan 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

Antiaircraft artillery was Iraq's most effective air defense threat. Barrage fire, from 57-mm or smaller artillery, was firing to an altitude of 10,000 to 15,000 feet. Iraq was making a major effort to reconstitute its integrated air defense system. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 21 Jan 91.]

Defense was estimated to be the most likely course of Iraqi action, while reinforcement the least likely action. Iraqi ground forces were expected to remain in established defensive positions to retain the maximum amount of combat power for future operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—474,365 (27,511 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—50,038

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Jan 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—1,907 Total Sorties (Cumulative—10,212)

USAF—1,394 (Cumulative—6,802)

Offensive Counterair 104

Defensive Counterair 68

Interdiction 463

Close Air Support 0

Tanker Refueling 245

Intratheater Airlift 377

Other Support 137

MARCENT—50

NAVCENT—217

ALLIED—246

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Jan 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—10

USAF—5

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 2

USN—4

A-6 2

F-14 1

F/A-18 1

USMC—1

OV-10 1

Allied Aircraft—7

A-4 (KU) 1

January 1991

Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (SA)	2
Tornado (UK)	3

Iraqi Aircraft—32

Air to Air

MiG-21/Fishbed	2
MiG-23/Flogger	1
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	6

On Ground

Su-17/Fitter	1
Poss. destroyed in shelter	14

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 21 Jan 91.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	6,968
Boarded	834
Diverted	36
Warning Shots Fired	11
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Jan 91.]

Proven Force Air Order of Battle—136

Incirlik AB, Turkey—121

C-130	1	F-15	24
E-3 (AWACS)	2	F-16	36
EC-130	4	F-111	18
EF-111	6	HC-130	4
F-4G	12	MC-130	2
		KC-135	12

Batman AB, Turkey—5

MH-53	5
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Hellenikon AB, Greece—2

RC-135	2
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Moron AB, Spain—8

B-52	8
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[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 21 Jan 91.]

22 January 91 (C plus 168/D plus 5)

POLITICAL

As the Soviet Union continued to try to broker peace in the Persian Gulf, President Bush demanded that Saddam Hussein withdraw from Kuwait by noon (Eastern Standard Time) on 23 January. Analysts believed that President Bush was hurrying into the land offensive rather than being forced to accept any compromise worked out between Iraq and the Soviet Union. [Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Demands Iraq Start Pullout Today Despite Its Assent to 3-Week Soviet Plan: Oilfields and Trenches Aflame in Kuwait," *The New York Times*, 23 Feb 91, p 1.]

Iraq showed two captured American airmen, Maj. Jeffrey Scott Tice and Capt. Harry Michael Roberts, on Baghdad television. The parading of downed allied airmen caused fierce protest in the United States as a violation of the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of war prisoners. [Alan Cowell, "Iraq Shows 2 More It Calls U.S. Airmen," *The New York Times*, 23 Jan 91, p 10.]

The first deadly attack by an Iraqi Scud against Israel occurred when the missile impacted in a Tel Aviv suburb. Israeli officials appeared to play down the three deaths, emphasizing that the victims suffered heart attacks. Seventy people were injured. [John Kifner, "3 Die, 70 are Hurt in Israeli Suburb," *The New York Times*, 23 Jan 91, p 1.]

Iraq set fires at two Kuwaiti oil refineries and the al-Wafra oil field near Kuwait's border with Saudi Arabia. In doing so, Saddam Hussein carried out his threat to destroy oil installations in the Persian Gulf if Iraq's occupation of Kuwait was challenged. [Philip Shenon, "Iraq Sets Oil Refineries Afire as Allies Step Up Air Attacks: Missile Pierces Tel Aviv Shield," *The New York Times*, 23 Jan 91, p 1.]

UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar called for Iraq to indicate its readiness to withdraw from Kuwait. Additionally, the Secretary General stated: "There are some countries which are trying to obtain a cease-fire or a pause in hostilities, but we have to think first of a withdrawal if we are consistent with the UN Security Council resolutions." ["Perez de Cuellar Renews Appeal for Sign Iraq is Set to Withdraw," *The Washington Post*, 22 Jan 91, p 21.]

Sixty-two protesters of the Persian Gulf War were arrested at the White House after kneeling in front of the north fountain and singing hymns. Those arrested were part of Pax Christi USA, a Roman Catholic peace organization. [Laura Sessions Stepp, "62 Protesters Are Arrested in Rally at White House," *The Washington Post*, 23 Jan 91, p 22.]

January 1991

MILITARY

Attacking Iraqi Scud capability took a significant portion of the allied air effort, but initial mission reports indicated some level of success. With the weather clearing, imagery of the Scud locations attacked in the last forty-eight hours was received. This information was being interpreted and used to adjust or refocus allied air efforts. Eighty-nine strike packages were tasked against targets in Iraq and the KTO. Ten packages went against the Republican Guard forces in the Basra area. Eight strike packages were canceled due to weather. Two other packages were canceled as a result of air refueling assets being canceled due to poor weather conditions. The first mission using Qatari Mirage F-1s as part of the coalition forces was canceled because of insufficient fuel to reach the target. Twelve F-16s, with Lantirn, were staged out of King Fahd International Airport to reduce ground alert response time for Scud strikes. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Jan 91.]

Air Force Special Operations Forces conducted their first combat recovery of a downed crew member—Lt. Devon Jones, a USN F-14 Tomcat crew member. The pickup was made approximately 125 nautical miles inside Iraq. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Jan 91; Ltr, AFSOC/HO to CAFH/DRE, "Gulf War Chronology," 24 Jan 92.]

JSTARS redirected, in "real time," airstrikes against three mobile Scud launchers and a sixty-vehicle convoy. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 22 Jan 91.]

CENTAF reported an aircraft mission capable rate of 93.3 percent. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Roan, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 22 Jan 91.]

Although the Iraqis exhibited energetic repair efforts, moderate damage to runways, taxiways, and aircraft shelters was accomplished. Most planes and pilots of the Air Force remained intact. The strategic air defense command-control-communication system showed signs of recovery and improvement. Alternative locations were used for intelligence and sector operations centers. Antiaircraft artillery was still using barrage fire. Iraq's leadership was described by analysts as "shaken" and "driven underground." The government was functioning from bunkers and relocation sites. Communications networks in Baghdad were heavily damaged; telephone communications were out, and television reception was intermittent. Four of Baghdad's six major communications centers were destroyed, including the main Ministry of Defense Computer Center. Some damage to Scud storage and production facilities was accomplished. Due to the coalition's concentrated attacks, Iraq could no longer fire Scud missiles "at will." Heavy damage was done to Iraq's chemical warfare production

Gulf War Chronology

facilities; 40 percent of the Samarra production facility was inoperable. The Baghdad Nuclear Research Facility remained functional but damaged. The Soviet reactor at the facility was undamaged, but the Isis nuclear reactor was destroyed. With two of three major refineries inoperable, over 50 percent of Iraq's oil refining capacity was affected. The Republican Guard was "pinned down" under the heavy air attack. Command-control-communications and logistics were degraded, particularly among the units near the front lines. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Harvey, AF/XOWF, "BDA DESERT STORM: Operator's Look," 22 Jan 91.]

Although the Iraqi air defense net was fragmented, controllers were able to provide tactical warning of ingressing coalition forces to surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery sites near the targets. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Jan 91.]

Unconfirmed reports stated that Iraqi Popular Army troops in the KTO were issued protective masks. This was seen as another indication that Iraq prepared to use chemical agents against coalition ground operations. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Jan 91.]

Thirteen of Iraq's estimated thirty-six mobile Scud launchers were listed as "possible losses." Two fixed Scud launchers were confirmed destroyed. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 22 Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—476,325 (27,982 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—50,334

[Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Jan 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—1,982 Total Sorties (Cumulative—12,194)

USAF—1,362 (Cumulative—8,164)

Offensive Counterair 92

Defensive Counterair 56

Interdiction 395

Close Air Support 28

SEAD 47

Tanker Refueling 228

Intratheater Airlift 429

Other Support 87

MARCENT—149

NAVCENT—189

ALLIED—282

*Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses.

[Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Jan 91.]

January 1991

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—13

USAF—5

F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	2

USN—4

A-6	2
F-14	1
F/A-18	1

USMC—2

OV-10	1
<i>Non-combat</i>	
AV-8	1

Allied Aircraft—8

A-4 (KU)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (SA)	2
Tornado (UK)	4

Iraqi Aircraft—36

Air to Air

MiG-21/Fishbed	2
MiG-23/Flogger	1
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	8

On Ground

Il-76/Candid	1
Su-17/Fitter	1
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Poss. destroyed	
in shelter	14

[Brfg. AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 22 Jan 91.]

23 January 91 (C plus 169/D plus 6)

POLITICAL

In an hour-long news conference, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell said that if Iraq did not surrender, a ground attack would begin when President Saddam Hussein's army had been damaged badly enough to keep coalition casualties to a minimum. General Powell also stated that the efforts to smash Iraqi communications and air defenses during the previous week had been largely

Gulf War Chronology

successful. [Andrew Rosenthal, "Pentagon Is Confident on War but Says Iraqis Remain Potent: Sees No Imminent Land Attack," *The New York Times*, 24 Jan 91, p 1.]

For the first time, U.S.-supplied Patriot missiles in northern Israel prevented an incoming Iraqi Scud missile from exploding in Israel. [Jackson Diehl and William Claiborne, "Patriot Battery in Israel Intercepts Iraqi Missile," *The Washington Post*, 24 Jan 91, p 1.]

Charles Bowsher, Comptroller General of the General Accounting Office, told the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee that the Pentagon was incapable of providing a precise cost for Operation DESERT STORM because of the military's "weak" accounting methods. War estimates ranged from several hundred million dollars a day to \$750 million. [William Hershey, "War's Cost Cannot Be Calculated," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 24 Jan 91, p 11.]

MILITARY

Allied forces gained "air superiority." The Iraqi Air Force and Scuds remained the major offensive threats. Nuclear-biological-chemical production was "severely disrupted," but delivery of biological and chemical weapons was still possible. Iraq's ground forces were "intact but immobile." Some restoration was accomplished by the Iraqis to their command-control-communications systems, and redundant networks were taking effect. Saddam Hussein's regime was "underground" but still in control. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 23 Jan 91.]

Strategic Air Command (SAC) was approached by the Joint Staff/J-3 on the availability of increased numbers of B-52 aircraft. Twenty aircraft could be made available in the near term. SAC asked CSAF for a service-level decision approving an indefinite delay on the retirement of any further B-52s in the force structure. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 23 Jan 91.]

Iraq had fired twenty-five Scud missiles (thirteen at Saudi Arabia and twelve at Israel) during the past five days. General Schwarzkopf was "pleased with the effectiveness of the Patriot system, which has successfully engaged all Scuds directed at key military and civilian installations in Saudi Arabia." He believed Saddam Hussein was using the Scud as a "terror weapon." The Scud's performance was militarily insignificant but was beginning to have a psychological impact on civilian populations. While Hussein had not yet used a chemical or biological warhead, General Schwarzkopf was "very concerned that if he [Saddam Hussein] has the capability and if cornered" he would use them in that mode. Given the serious Scud threat, Patriot resupply would remain a "number one priority." [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Jan 91.]

January 1991

Iraqi air operations were at a low level. Some flights were noted from dispersal and highway air strips. Electrical shortages and outages existed throughout Iraq. Blackouts were expected to be frequent and long-term. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Hill, AF/XOWF, "BDA DESERT STORM: Operator's Look," 23 Jan 91.]

Although the national command authority command-control-communications facilities in Baghdad had sustained significant damage, Iraq was expected to continue showing creativity and innovation in reconstituting critical communications networks in the KTO. Reconstitution capabilities were expected to weaken as the strategic air campaign continued. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Jan 91.]

Analysts believed that the Iraqi forward observers—serving as an early warning network—were still effectively operating. USAF EC-130/COMPASS CALL missions conducted electronic warfare against this reporting network. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 23 Jan 91.]

Iraqi ground forces appeared to be reoccupying first-echelon defensive positions in the "heel" of Kuwait. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—478,175 (28,300 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—50,462

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Jan 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,424 Total Sorties (Cumulative 14,618)

USAF—1,679 (Cumulative—9,843)

Offensive Counterair 204

Defensive Counterair 68

Interdiction 546

Close Air Support 20

SEAD 77

Tanker Refueling 260

Intratheater Airlift 396

Other Support 108

MARCENT—216

NAVCENT—238

ALLIED—291

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Jan 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—12

USAF—6

F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	3

USN—4

A-6	2
F-14	1
F/A-18	1

USMC—2

OV-10	1
<i>Non-combat</i>	
AV-8	1

Allied Aircraft—7

A-4 (KU)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	3
<i>Non-combat</i>	
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1

Iraqi Aircraft—34

Air to Air

MiG-21/Fishbed	2
MiG-23/Flogger	1
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	6

On Ground

Il-76/Candid	1
Su-17/Fitter	1
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Poss. destroyed	

in shelters	14
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[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 23 Jan 91.]

24 January 91 (C plus 170/D plus 7)

MILITARY

The establishment of allied "air superiority" was described by analysts as "a gift." Iraq's Air Force was largely intact and still dangerous, but it remained grounded for the most part. An intense campaign against Iraqi aircraft shelters—the "battle of the shelters"—began. The success and

January 1991

duration of this operation depended on weather and sortie allocation. Normal Iraqi government functions were "severely disrupted." The infrastructure was degraded with "severe physical damage." [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 24 Jan 91.]

Scud missiles remained the highest priority for the air campaign, however, the emphasis put on attacking Iraqi airfield facilities increased. Twenty-two packages were targeted against Scud-related and airfield targets. Two were flown by Joint Task Force Proven Force, from Turkey. Initial mission reports indicated that three bombers (Tu-16/Badgers) were destroyed along with numerous other weapons-loaded aircraft that were preparing for takeoff. Other efforts included eleven packages (one Proven Force) attacking Iraqi logistics, weapons production plants, lines of communication, and command-and-control centers. One package was canceled due to poor weather. However, generally improved weather allowed increased attacks against army positions. USAF A-10s continued to attack ground forces using "kill zones" along southern Iraq, west of the tri-border area, and in southern Kuwait. MARCENT moved the fire support coordination line farther north to avoid friendly engagement of troops operating near the border in southern Kuwait. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Jan 91.]

A Saudi F-15 shot down two Iraqi Mirage F-1s off the coast of the Kuwaiti-Saudi border. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Jan 91.]

Deception efforts were noted at several Iraqi airfields. Dummy bomb craters and paint resembling bomb damage on runways were used. After initial severe disruption, Iraq's strategic air defense command-control-communication (C³) system showed signs of recovery. Several intelligence and sector operations centers were heavily damaged, but alternate locations were established and C³ functions had shifted. The Iraqi government's normal control functions were severely restricted. Leadership activities were conducted from a large number of bunkers and relocation sites. The Defense Intelligence Agency reported that eleven of twenty primary national command authority above-ground facilities sustained moderate damage. Television transmissions, conducted from mobile vans, were sporadic. The Baghdad Nuclear Research Facility was largely demolished. The Soviet reactor was destroyed, and the Italian laboratories were moderately damaged. Heavy damage was done to the building housing gas-centrifuge, uranium-enrichment equipment. Iraqi's national electric grid was deteriorating—26 percent was shut down—with shortages and outages reported throughout the country. Because ten of twelve major petroleum refineries sustained partial damage, over 77 percent of Iraq's oil refining capacity was affected. The Republican Guard forces remained intact and combat effec-

Gulf War Chronology

tive; however, the air campaign impacted regular Iraqi ground force morale and combat effectiveness. Wounded soldiers were filling Kuwaiti hospitals, and Kuwaiti civilians were forced to give blood. Instances of soldiers begging for food were reported. Four railroad tracks were severed at the Az Zubayr railroad yard. This was the only railhead connecting southeast Iraq with the rest of the country, and it was the main supply channel for forces in the KTO. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Howey, AF/XOWF, "BDA DESERT STORM: Operator's Look," 24 Jan 91.]

Iraqi counterair operations changed with the first detected overwater flights since 17 January. Five Iraqi Mirage F-1s flew into the northern Gulf (two of these were shot down by the Saudi F-15). Iran appeared to be providing a sanctuary to Iraqi civil, military transport, and intelligence-early warning aircraft. Twenty-six Iraqi aircraft had flown across the Iranian border since 14 January. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—482,199 (28,696 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—50,738

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Jan 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,811 Total Sorties (Cumulative—17,429)

USAF—1,741 (Cumulative—11,584)

Offensive Counterair 127

Defensive Counterair 72

Interdiction 627

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 76

Tanker Refueling 268

Intratheater Airlift 468

Other Support 103

MARCENT—278

NAVCENT—455

ALLIED—337

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Jan 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—12

USAF—6

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 3

January 1991

USN—4	
A-6	2
F-14	1
F/A-18	1
USMC—2	
OV-10	1
Non-combat	
AV-8	1
Allied Aircraft—8	
A-4 (KU)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	4
Non-combat	
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft—39	
Air to Air	
MiG-21/Fishbed	2
MiG-23/Flogger	1
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	8
On Ground	
Il-76/Candid	1
Su-17/Fitter	1
Tu-16/Badger	3
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Poss. destroyed	
in shelters	14

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 24 Jan 91.]

25 January 91 (C plus 171/D plus 8)

POLITICAL

The United States accused Iraq of releasing millions of gallons of Kuwaiti crude oil into the Persian Gulf, creating a huge slick comparable to the Exxon Valdez disaster. According to Saudi and American military spokespersons, the slick was nine miles long and was flowing from tankers anchored at the port of Mina al-Ahmadi. [R.W. Apple, "U.S. Says Iraq Pumps Kuwaiti Oil into Gulf: Vast Damage Is Feared from Growing Oil Slick," *The New York Times*, 26 Jan 91, p 1.]

Gulf War Chronology

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January 1991

American Patriot missiles intercepted seven Iraqi Scuds that were fired at Haifa and Tel Aviv. One person was killed and forty-two were wounded when the midair explosions caused shrapnel to rain on residents. [Joel Brinkley, "7 Iraqi Missiles Are Fired at Cities in Israel and 2 at Saudi Arabia," *The New York Times*, 26 Jan 91, p 6.]

MILITARY

Improved weather allowed another day of high sortie rates. Targeting priorities were Scuds, airfields, and Republican Guard forces. Thirty packages (three from Proven Force) were flown. Two packages were retasked from airfields to the Republican Guard, and two were changed from airfields to Scud alerts. USAF A-10s flew sorties in support of 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). Primary targets in the 1st MEF area were artillery batteries, command posts, and ammunition dumps. Eight countries—the United States, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, Kuwait, and Qatar—had flown offensive operations in Kuwait or Iraq. Bahrain was flying defensive counterair under the air tasking order. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Jan 91.]

Because the Iraqi Air Force was largely intact, there was concern about a surprise attack. Runways were being repaired and the aircraft dispersed. Iraq's nuclear-biological-chemical production capabilities were collapsing, although delivery of biological and chemical weapons was possible. Primary command-control-communications systems were degraded, but redundant systems were proving difficult to destroy. The country's infrastructure was degraded, with government buildings suffering "severe physical damage" and oil refining disrupted. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 25 Jan 91.]

Based on planned sortie rates and projected fuel upload, U.S. fuel requirements were approximately 450,000 gallons per day. This was the same amount that was being issued. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Kolpin, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 25 Jan 91.]

Recovery of some Iraqi strategic air defense was evidenced by improved surface-to-air missile (SAM) fire discipline and better control of antiaircraft artillery barrage fire. Mobile SAMs were moved to ingress corridors identified by the Iraqis. Iraq's capability to produce chemical and biological warfare agents was reduced 40 to 50 percent. Power outages continued to spread; 50 percent of the national grid was shut down. [Point Paper, Maj. New, AF/XOWF, "BDA DESERT STORM: Operator's Look," 25 Jan 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—483,851 (28,115 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—50,883

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Jan 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,407 Total Sorties (Cumulative 19,836)

USAF—1,526 (Cumulative—13,110)

Offensive Counterair 136

Defensive Counterair 78

Interdiction 450

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 79

Tanker Refueling 257

Intratheater Airlift 434

Other Support 92

MARCENT—138

NAVCENT—396

ALLIED—347

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Jan 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—13

USAF—6

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 3

USN—5

A-6 2

F-14 1

F/A-18 1

Non-combat

F/A-18 1

USMC—2

OV-10 1

Non-combat

AV-8 1

Allied Aircraft—9

A-4 (KU) 1

Tornado (IT) 1

Tornado (UK) 5

Non-combat

Tornado (SA) 1

Tornado (UK) 1

January 1991

Iraqi Aircraft—40

Air to Air

MiG-21/Fishbed	2
MiG-23/Flogger	1
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	8

On Ground

Il-76/Candid	1
Su-17/Fitter	1
Tu-16/Badger	4
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Poss. destroyed in shelters	14

[Brfg. AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 25 Jan 91.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	6,980
Boarded	836
Diverted	36
Warning Shots Fired	11
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg. USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Jan 91.]

26 January 91 (C plus 172/D plus 9)

POLITICAL

American intelligence officials informed Congress that they concluded air power alone would not be enough to defeat Saddam Hussein. The Bush administration had publicly stated that it was still holding out the hope that air power alone would defeat the Iraqi force. [Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Officials Conclude Air Power Is Not Enough to Defeat Hussein," *The New York Times*, 27 Jan 91, p 1.]

Saudi officials readied barriers and dispersal chemicals to try to contain an enormous forty-mile long, eight-mile wide oil slick flowing south from Kuwait. [R.W. Apple, "Iraqi Missiles Are Fired at Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Riyadh Once Again," *The New York Times*, 27 Jan 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Twenty-five packages (three from Proven Force) were flown. Four packages were canceled: one due to Joint Chiefs of Staff direction, one due to lack of electronic warfare support, and two due to weather. MARCENT air forces experienced positive results using JSTARS to identify Iraqi logistics

Gulf War Chronology

sites with moving vehicles and vehicle convoys for immediate air strikes in the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force targeting area. USAF A-10s conducted battlefield preparation missions using "kill zones" in western Kuwait to attack artillery positions, revetments, and vehicles. They also continued daytime Scud-hunting missions. USAF F-15Es and F-16s continued night airborne and ground Scud alert missions. Multiple night strike responses were completed as a result of Scud launches at Saudi Arabia and Israel. In addition, five of the scheduled packages hit Scud-associated targets. The Bahraini Air Force flew its first offensive sorties (four F-15Es) in a strike scheduled against a CSSC-3/Silkworm surface-to-surface cruise missile site in Kuwait. With Bahrain's participation, nine countries had conducted offensive air operations in support of Operation DESERT STORM. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Jan 91.]

Six possible losses were inflicted on Iraq's estimated thirty fixed Scud launchers. Two fixed Scud launchers were confirmed destroyed. Thirteen of the estimated thirty-six mobile Scud launchers were listed as possibly destroyed. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 26 Jan 91.]

Besides transport and airborne early warning assets, Iraq was detected moving fighter aircraft (Mirage F-1s, Su-24/Fencers, MiG-29/Fulcrums) into Iran. At least forty-five aircraft had moved there since 14 January. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Jan 91.]

Analysts believed that, over the next twenty-four to ninety-six hours, the allied air campaign would force Saddam Hussein to reevaluate his campaign plan. They expected him to realize he could not remain in a strategic defense indefinitely and sustain his armed forces, as allied bombing intensified and the expected ground attack did not materialize. If Hussein chose to strike back, he was believed to be capable of conducting a spoiling attack against ground and naval forces while escalating the war through the introduction of chemical or biological weapons. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—485,644 (28,718 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—51,178

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Jan 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,672 Total Sorties (Cumulative—22,508)

USAF—1,635 (Cumulative—14,745)

Offensive Counterair 94

Defensive Counterair 82

Interdiction 609

January 1991

Close Air Support	0
SEAD	72
Tanker Refueling	252
Intratheater Airlift	423
Other Support	103
MARCENT—266	
NAVCENT—403	
ALLIED—368	

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Jan 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—13

USAF—6

F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	3

USN—5

A-6	2
F-14	1
F/A-18	1

Non-combat

F/A-18	1
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USMC—2

OV-10	1
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Non-combat

AV-8	1
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Allied Aircraft—9

A-4 (KU)	1
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Tornado (IT)	1
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Tornado (UK)	5
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Non-combat

Tornado (SA)	1
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Tornado (UK)	1
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Iraqi Aircraft—40

Air to Air

MiG-21/Fishbed	2
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MiG-23/Flogger	1
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MiG-25/Foxbat	2
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MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
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Mirage F-1	8
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On Ground

Il-76/Candid	1
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Su-17/Fitter	1
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Tu-16/Badger	4
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Gulf War Chronology

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January 1991

Tu-22/Blinder 1
Poss. destroyed
in shelters 14
[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 26 Jan 91.]

27 January 91 (C plus 173/D plus 10)

POLITICAL

General Schwarzkopf said that more than thirty-nine of Iraq's best combat planes were flown to Iran to escape destruction. To protect its neutrality, Iran said it would confiscate any warplanes landing within its borders and hold them until the end of the conflict. [Chris Hedges, "Iraq's Warplanes Continue to Seek Safe Haven in Iran," *The New York Times*, 28 Jan 91, p 8.]

MILITARY

"Air supremacy" was achieved, and allied combat air patrols pushed further into Iraqi airspace. Twenty-one packages (two from Proven Force) were flown. One package was canceled due to tanker availability, and one was retasked from an airfield strike to Scud storage sites and a hydroelectric power plant. U.S. A-10s, AV-8s, F/A-18s, and coalition Jaguars conducted battlefield preparation missions using "kill zones" in western and southern Kuwait to attack artillery positions, revetments, and command posts. USAF F-111s destroyed the Iraqi III Corp headquarters building, with possible heavy loss to corps leadership. Also, F-111s using GBU-15s made a direct hit on the pipeline manifolds at the Al Ahmadi refinery in an effort to minimize oil being pumped into the Gulf. Targeting of bridges showed positive results as eight were dropped or significantly damaged. Scuds continued to receive high priority. USAF A-10s continued daytime Scud hunting missions while F-15Es and F-16s continued night airborne and ground Scud alert. Four packages attacked Scud production and storage facilities. Multiple night strike responses were completed both before and after Scud launches aimed at Israel and Saudi Arabia. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Jan 91.]

The emphasis of the air campaign shifted to the Republican Guard and Iraqi sustainment capability in the KTO. All Republican Guard units were considered combat effective, with logistics degraded in some units and command-control-communication functions degraded 10 percent. Aggressive damage repair by Iraqi units limited airfield denial to one to two days. The only rail line between Baghdad and Basra was shut down by the destruction of the bridge over the Euphrates River. A one-week repair time was estimated. Civilian gas distribution was halted in Iraq. [Point Paper, Maj. New, AF/XOWF, "BDA DESERT STORM: Operator's Look," 27 Jan 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

Iraq continued to disperse high-value air assets to Iran. At least fifty-eight Iraqi aircraft had deployed to Iranian bases since 14 January. Analysts made note of the fact that Mirage F-1s, capable of firing the Exocet antiship missile, were included in the aircraft going to Iran. Iraq's logistical effort appeared to be reconstitution and resupply of first- and second-echelon forces. Its air defense command-control-communications capability appeared sorely degraded. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Jan 91.]

Analysts believed Iraqi forces would "most probably continue" their defense in place against the expected allied ground attack. Based on the amount of bomb damage, Iraqi corps commanders were expected to consolidate, resupply, and adjust defensive echelons at night. Saddam Hussein was expected to continue provoking an Israeli response by launching Scuds against Israel. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—492,785 (28,901 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—51,302

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Jan 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,263 Total Sorties (Cumulative—24,771)

USAF—1,471 (Cumulative—16,216)

Offensive Counterair 116

Defensive Counterair 85

Interdiction 448

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 73

Tanker Refueling 245

Intratheater Airlift 407

Other Support 97

MARCENT—169

NAVCENT—292 (Fleet Defense—210*)

ALLIED—331

* Fleet Defense numbers are not included in the NAVCENT flight activity total because they were non-Air Tasking Order sorties.

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Jan 91.]

28 January 91 (C plus 174/D plus 11)

POLITICAL

Allied pledges of \$37 billion were made to defray the costs of the Persian Gulf War. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait each promised \$13.5 billion in cash, Japan pledged \$9 billion and Germany \$1 billion, which left the United

January 1991

States with a charge of \$15 billion. ["War's Shared Price—and Costs," *The New York Times*, 29 Jan 91, p 20.]

Saddam Hussein, in an interview with Cable News Network's Peter Arnett, stated that Iraqi forces had the ability to put nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads on Scud missiles and would use such warheads if Iraq's losses became too great. [Rick Atkinson and Barton Gellman, "Iraq Trying to Shelter Jets in Iran, U.S. Says: Saddam Says Much Blood Will Be Shed," *The Washington Post*, 29 Jan 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Electric power in Iraq was shut down, and the national television network went off the air. Analysts were evaluating the dispersal of Iraqi aircraft to Iran. Possible explanations were deception, defections, or survival. A primary concern was that these aircraft would be reconstituted and used as a "strategic reserve" or "shock force" against allied forces. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 28 Jan 91.]

Twenty-two packages (two from Proven Force) were flown. One package was canceled due to tanker availability and one for target area weather. Ten packages targeted Scud production facilities, three targeted bridges, and four hit the Republican Guard. Although somewhat hampered by weather, U.S. A-10s, AV-8s, F/A-18s, and coalition Jaguars, A-4s, and F-5s flew hundreds of battlefield preparation missions in the KTO against armor, artillery positions, revetments, and command posts. Targeting of bridges and hardened aircraft shelters continued to show positive results. USAF A-10s again flew daytime Scud hunting missions, while F-15s and F-16 Scud alert combat air patrols conducted multiple night strikes on Scud launch sites. Three F-15 barrier combat air patrols were established during daylight hours in southeast Iraq, eastern Iraq, and northeast Iraq (this last one by Proven Force) to intercept Iraqi aircraft headed for Iran. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Jan 91.]

Based on "firm shipments," F-15 fuel tanks were removed from the CENTAF supply priority list. An F-15 was damaged by a wing tank jettisoned prior to engagement. The aircraft required a wing change. It was repaired with a patch for a one-time flight to the contractor located near Torrejon AB, Spain. A replacement aircraft came from Bitburg AB, Germany. [Paper, Lt. Col. Roan, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 28 Jan 91; Paper, Lt. Col. Kolpin, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 30 Jan 91.]

Iraq continued to fly high-value assets into Iran. An additional nineteen aircraft were detected flying into Iran, bringing to eighty the total number

Gulf War Chronology

detected flying into Iran since 14 January. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Jan 91.]

Iraq's national electrical power grid temporarily shut down. Power plants still operational were confined to local areas. The Republican Guard remained in place with logistics degraded in some units, but command-control-communications functions recovered to 98 percent effectiveness. No substantial damage was done to Republican Guard command posts at the corps or division level. All units were considered combat effective. [Point Paper, Maj. Hill, AF/XOWF, "BDA DESERT STORM: Operator's Look," 28 Jan 91.]

Iraqi ground forces continued to defend in place. While the majority remained in defensive positions as protection from allied bombings, minor repositions within unit areas occurred in the heavy division areas. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Jan 91.]

The six possible losses to Iraqi fixed Scud launchers (26 January) was reevaluated to three. USAF listed thirteen possible losses to an estimated thirty-six mobile Scud launchers. Only two losses, both to fixed Scud launchers, were confirmed against the sixty-six total estimated Iraqi launchers. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 28 Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—494,902 (29,485 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—51,389

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Jan 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,523 Total Sorties (Cumulative 27,294)

USAF—1,670 (Cumulative—17,886)

Offensive Counterair 123

Defensive Counterair 100

Interdiction 607

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 75

Tanker Refueling 253

Intratheater Airlift 417

Other Support 95

MARCENT—223

NAVCENT—200 (Fleet Defense—252)

ALLIED—430

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Jan 91.]

January 1991

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—13

USAF—6

F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	3

USN—5

A-6	2
F-14	1
F/A-18	1

Non-combat

F/A-18	1
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USMC—2

OV-10	1
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Non-combat

AV-8	1
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Allied Aircraft—9

A-4 (KU)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	5

Non-combat

Tornado (SA)	1
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Tornado (UK)	1
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Iraqi Aircraft—35

Air to Air

MiG-21/Fishbed	2
MiG-23/Flogger	8
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	8

On Ground

Il-76/Candid	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	1

Tu-16/Badger	4
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Tu-22/Blinder	1
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Non-combat losses	2
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[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 28 Jan 91.]

29 January 91 (C plus 175/D plus 12)

POLITICAL

In the latest congressional attempt to soften the financial burden of the war on reservists, the House of Representatives voted 414 to 0 for legislation

Gulf War Chronology

to protect military personnel from evictions, civil suits, and loss of health insurance while they were deployed in the Persian Gulf region. The current law stated that families of active duty personnel could not be evicted from apartments or homes if their monthly rent was less than \$150. The new bill raised that threshold to \$1,200. The measure also provided that individuals called to active duty would automatically have health insurance reinstated upon return to civilian life, and it delayed any civil actions by creditors until 1 July. Additionally, physicians called to active duty would be able to have their malpractice insurance suspended and coverage reinstated once they returned from active duty. [Tom Kenworthy, "House Votes to Aid Reservists, Veterans," *The Washington Post*, 30 Jan 91, p 4.]

The United States and the Soviet Union announced that a cease-fire in the Gulf was possible. The joint statement, issued by Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh, was the first U.S.-backed cease-fire offer since the war began. [Bill Nichols and Johanna Neuman, "U.S., Soviet Cease-Fire Plan Offered," *The Washington Times*, 30 Jan 91, p 1.]

Iran insisted that it had impounded, for the duration of the war, the planes flown from Iraq. Army Lt. Gen. Thomas Kelly, the Pentagon Operations Chief, said that most of the Iraqi planes were leaving from bases in northern Iraq and were not using radio communication until they were at or near the Iranian border. [R.W. Apple, "Iran Promises Iraqi Planes Won't Rejoin the Fighting: Bush Says U.S. Is Prevailing," *The New York Times*, 30 Jan 91, p 1.]

France's Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement resigned under fire. Chevenement insisted that French military operations be limited to Kuwaiti territory in keeping with his declared aim to employ force solely to liberate Kuwait and not to destroy Iraq. He contended that his view was consistent with UN Security Council resolutions that France was committed to defend. Earlier, French President François Mitterrand overruled Chevenement's position, saying French air and ground forces would launch forays inside Iraq. [William Drozdiak, "French Defense Minister Resigns Amid Dispute over Military Aims," *The Washington Post*, 30 Jan 91, p 26.]

Germany announced that it would give an additional \$5.5 billion to the United States to help support the Persian Gulf War, send antiaircraft systems and nearly 600 extra soldiers to Turkey, and comply with Israel's request for military aid. According to Dieter Vogel, spokesperson for Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the \$5.5 billion pledge "is proof beyond words how firmly we support the United Nations resolutions" against Iraq. [Marc Fisher, "Germany Pledges \$5.5 Billion More Toward Gulf War," *The Washington Post*, 30 Jan 91, p 23.]

January 1991

MILITARY

Thirty-six packages were flown (two by Proven Force). Ten packages (seven included B-52s), and two more with B-52s only, struck the Republican Guard "around the clock." Hundreds of additional ground attack missions attacked the Republican Guard and Iraqi Army targets in Kuwait. Eight packages and Scud airborne alert aircraft struck Scud sites and production facilities. Seven packages struck petroleum storage and production targets. Three packages, along with F-117s, hit bridges to cut off supplies to the KTO; air strikes were ongoing to destroy the convoys that were stalled by this effort. Two large logistic truck parks (100 to 200 vehicles) not previously reported were observed by pilots in western Iraq and were destroyed. USAF A-10s, MARCENT A-6s, and F/A-18s engaged three logistics convoys, a free rocket over ground (FROG) site, an infantry brigade compound, a convoy carrying twenty-eight armored personnel carriers and tanks, and numerous artillery positions in southern Kuwait. All were reported destroyed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Jan 91.]

Radio and psychological operations (PSYOPS) broadcasts continued in the KTO. The PSYOPS-B-52 bombing campaign began. The four-phased campaign was executed in two cycles. The target audience for the first cycle was the Iraqi 20th Infantry Division; the 21st Infantry Division was targeted by the second cycle. Phase 1 began with an MC-130 leaflet drop over the targeted division which featured a personalized leaflet: "This is your first and last warning. Tomorrow, the 20th Infantry Division will be bombed. Flee this location now. Tomorrow, bombs will rain on the 20th Infantry Division. If you want to live, leave now. Do not allow anyone to stop you. Save yourself by fleeing south. If you choose to stay, you choose death." Phase 2 was the bombing by four B-52s of the targeted division more than eighteen hours after the leaflet drop. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Jan 91.]

USAF aircraft mission capable rate was 92.9 percent. Due to "hangfires" by HARM air-to-surface missiles, nine LAU-118 launchers had been jettisoned. A "tiger team," made up of contractors and representatives from Air Force Logistics Command, was formed to investigate the problem. An F-117 sustained damage to nose and wing sections from a web catcher barrier. With parts from its home station, the unit could repair the aircraft in the AOR. [Paper, Lt. Col. Roan, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 29 Jan 91.]

Moderate damage was done to Iraqi Air Force runways, taxiways, and aircraft shelters. Runway repairs were made only at strategically important bases. The assessment of thirty-seven airfields of major interest was: three were non-operational; five were 50 to 75 percent degraded, eleven were 25

Gulf War Chronology

to 50 percent degraded, and eighteen were minimally degraded. At least 83 (15 percent) of Iraq's 557 detected hardened shelters were damaged or destroyed. The Defense Intelligence Agency believed approximately twenty-five fixed Scud launchers were operational. Missile production and modification capabilities were degraded. The destruction of a liquid propellant plant eliminated Iraq's ability to produce fuel for its missiles. Air strikes against railroads and bridges began to impact Iraqi transportation capabilities. They were forced to use alternate routes and transload shipments to bypass damaged areas. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Hill, AF/XOWF, "BDA DESERT STORM: Operator's Look," 29 Jan 91.]

Another two Iraqi aircraft crossed into Iran, bringing the total to eighty-two. Due to coalition attacks on hardened shelters, Iraq appeared to be dispersing aircraft at different points on the airfields themselves. Some of these dispersal points were near buildings housing civilians. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Jan 91.]

Analysts believed Iraq would probably employ chemical weapons if Saddam Hussein thought his ground forces were being rendered combat ineffective. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Jan 91.]

At 2146 in the KTO, Iraqi forces initiated three separate engagements against the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and Joint Forces Command, East. Some Iraqi elements moved as far south as Khafji, Saudi Arabia. One attack was preceded by a feigned surrender. Beginning at 2200, U.S. A-10s, AV-8s, F/A-18s, and OV-10s flew more than 110 sorties in support of the engagements in southern Kuwait. None of the probing attacks into Saudi Arabia were supported by close air support aircraft. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—495,734 (29,773 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—51,696

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Jan 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,555 Total Sorties (Cumulative—29,849)

USAF—1,723 (Cumulative—19,609)

Offensive Counterair 97

Defensive Counterair 98

Interdiction 634

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 70

Tanker Refueling 244

Intratheater Airlift 479

January 1991

Other Support 101
MARCENT—176
NAVCENT—219 (Fleet Defense—228)
ALLIED—437
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Jan 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—14

USAF—6

F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	3

USN—5

A-6	2
F-14	1
F/A-18	1
<i>Non-combat</i>	
F/A-18	1

USMC—3

OV-10	1
AV-8	1
<i>Non-combat</i>	
AV-8	1

Allied Aircraft—9

A-4 (KU)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	5
<i>Non-combat</i>	
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1

Iraqi Aircraft—35

Air to Air

MiG-21/Fishbed	2
MiG-23/Flogger	8
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	8

On Ground

Il-76/Candid	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	1
Tu-16/Badger	4
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	2

[Brig, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 29 Jan 91.]

30 January 91 (C plus 176/D plus 13)

MILITARY

Twenty-six packages were flown (two by Proven Force). Twelve packages and seven additional cells of B-52s struck the Republican Guard "around the clock." Hundreds of additional ground attack missions attacked Republican Guard and other Iraqi Army targets in Kuwait. Another five packages struck Republican Guard vehicle assembly areas. Tactical air assets continued to be redirected as a result of 100 to 200 enemy vehicles moving forward to an area north of Khafji and a large reported convoy along the coastal highway; 140 U.S. A-10, AV-8, A-6, and F/A-18 sorties were retasked to support this effort. JSTARS, Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center, and the Direct Air Support Center were airborne to control the aircraft and identify convoy movement. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Jan 91.]

USAF analysts believed Iraq was in "serious trouble." Its air force was unable to prevent allied bombing. Communications were "severely degraded." Electric power throughout the country was shut down. Oil refining capability was reduced by 87 percent. Defense industries and nuclear-biological-chemical production facilities were "crippled for years." And, the Republican Guard was under "heavy air attack." Iraq's objective was to break up the allied coalition by drawing Israel into the war with Scud attacks, and to prolong the campaign by fostering public disillusionment which would force the United States out of the war. The prospects for Iraq's strategy to involve Israel were assessed to be "not good." The "Scud strategy" was failing because Israel, encouraged by strong actions taken by President Bush and Secretary of Defense Cheney, showed restraint. Iraq's air strategy—possibly being to preserve its air force, "then inflict unacceptable damage" on the allies—was failing. The allied strategic air campaign was destroying Iraq's air force. However, drawing the United States into a "costly ground battle," analysts believed, "could work" to force the United States out of the war. This was based on the premise that the American public would not tolerate massive casualties. The cross-border probes (i.e. Khafji), designed to pull the U.S. into a ground counterattack, were expected to intensify. Analysts said that Iraq "will probably employ chemical weapons against U.S. ground forces." [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 30 Jan 91.]

At least 91 (16 percent) of Iraq's 570 detected hardened shelters were damaged or destroyed. [Point Paper, Maj. New, AF/XOWF, "BDA DESERT STORM: Operator's Look," 30 Jan 91.]

January 1991

A reassessment of the Iraqi ground order of battle in the KTO reflected a continued defensive posture in depth with elements of forty divisions: twenty-three committed, nine reinforcing, and eight as theater reserve. There was no change in the strength or composition of Iraqi ground forces in the KTO. While two of the Iraqi attacks along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border returned north, the attack toward Khafji continued. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Jan 91.]

Six to ten Iraqi aircraft of unknown type were detected moving between Iranian airfields. The total number of Iraqi aircraft taking safe haven in Iran was assessed to be eighty-nine. Iraqi aircraft were being dispersed on airfields, outside hardened shelters, in central and southern Iraq. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Jan 91.]

The Iraqi aircraft fleeing to Iran carried no munitions, limited fuel, and flew at 3,000 to 5,000 feet. [Brig, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 30 Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—501,600 (31,602 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—51,876

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Jan 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,312 Total Sorties (Cumulative—32,161)

USAF—1,421 (Cumulative—21,030)

Offensive Counterair 93

Defensive Counterair 104

Interdiction 592

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 61

Tanker Refueling 248

Intratheater Airlift 229

Other Support 94

MARCENT—262

NAVCENT—228 (Fleet Defense—226)

ALLIED—401

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Jan 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—14

USAF—6

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 3

Gulf War Chronology

USN—5	
A-6	2
F-14	1
F/A-18	1
<i>Non-combat</i>	
F/A-18	1
USMC—3	
OV-10	1
AV-8	1
<i>Non-combat</i>	
AV-8	1
Allied Aircraft—9	
A-4 (KU)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	5
<i>Non-combat</i>	
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft—38	
<i>Air to Air</i>	
MiG-21/Fishbed	2
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	8
<i>On Ground</i>	
Il-76/Candid	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	2

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 30 Jan 91.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	7,042
Boarded	848
Diverted	37
Warning Shots Fired	11
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Jan 91.]

January 1991

31 January 91 (C plus 177/D plus 14)

POLITICAL

In a speech before the Air Force Association in Orlando, Florida, Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill A. McPeak, said that, despite the phenomenal success in the bombing raids against Iraq, air power alone would not win the Persian Gulf War. General McPeak stated, "We've delivered the 'one punch.' The other fellow is not punched out yet. It's very likely it will take the Army and Marines to deliver the 'two punch.'" [Roger Roy, "Air Chief Expects Land Fight to End It," *Orlando Sentinel*, 1 Feb 91]

A senior Iraqi official arrived in Tehran, Iran, along with envoys from France, Algeria, and Yemen in an apparent attempt to discuss ways of ending the Persian Gulf War. Saadoun Hammadi, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, headed an Iraqi delegation whose arrival coincided with visits by François Scheer, Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry; Sid Ahmed Ghazali, Algerian Foreign Minister; and a deputy foreign minister from Yemen. Hammadi indicated that the main purpose of the delegation's visit to Iran was to discuss the presence in Iran of nearly ninety Iraqi warplanes. [Nora Boustany and William Drozdiak, "Possible Peace Bid Afoot as Envoys Arrive in Iran," *The Washington Post*, 1 Feb 91, p 23.]

An Israeli military official announced that his country's pilots lacked crucial electronic identification codes that would allow their planes to conduct an air raid on Iraqi targets without being accidentally targeted by nearby U.S. and allied warplanes. [R. Jeffrey Smith, "Israeli Pilots Lack Key Code, Attache Says," *The Washington Post*, 1 Feb 91, p 24.]

MILITARY

Twenty-nine packages were flown (one by Proven Force). A Proven Force package was canceled due to poor weather conditions in the target area. Nineteen packages and five additional cells of B-52s struck the Republican Guard "around the clock." Over 500 ground attack sorties struck the Republican Guard and another 200 sorties struck Iraqi Army targets in Kuwait for battlefield preparation. Other packages hit airfields, surface-to-air missile sites, Scud facilities, bridges, command-control-communications centers, and chemical warfare bunkers. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Jan 91.]

JSTARS and Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center assets continued to play key roles in targeting enemy forces in the Khafji area. Initial reports indicated forty vehicles, five artillery pieces, and at least sixteen tanks and armored vehicles were destroyed. A USAF AC-130 was shot down by a surface-to-air missile (SA-16) at 0622 Riyadh time. Special

Gulf War Chronology

Operations Forces were conducting operations to find the crew. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Jan 91.]

USMC, Saudi, and Qatari forces mounted a battalion-sized night counterattack to retake the town of Khafji. USMC reconnaissance teams had remained in Khafji when it was evacuated to direct air strikes against Iraqi forces. The counterattack was reinforced to brigade-size at daybreak, and Khafji was declared liberated at 1400 in Riyadh. Approximately 160 enemy prisoners of war were taken. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Jan 91.]

After the liberation of Khafji, no other ground incidents were noted. The Iraqi incursion in the Khafji area was seen as an attempt to locate the disposition of coalition forces opposite the Kuwaiti border and to improve Iraqi morale after the two weeks of allied bombings. The remainder of the Iraqi forces continued in defensive positions while conducting resupply and repositioning operations at night. Prisoner of war interrogation reports suggested that Iraqi mechanized forces moved by individual vehicle during the day and in column formations at night. Also, prisoners stated that Iraqi armored vehicles had diesel jugs attached to the outside of the vehicle to be ignited when coalition aircraft approached. The burning fuel was intended to give pilots the impression that the vehicle was on fire. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Jan 91.]

Phase 3 of the psychological operation-B-52 bombing campaign was conducted. A second MC-130 leaflet drop over the 20th Iraqi Infantry Division was made. The broadside read: "Yesterday, we demonstrated the power of the multinational forces. Once again, we offer you survivors the chance to live. Two days ago, we told you we would bomb the 20th Infantry Division. Yesterday, we did. Tomorrow, the 20th Infantry Division will again be bombed. Your choice is to stay and die or to accept the Joint Forces' invitation to live." [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Jan 91.]

During combat operations, F-16 aircraft experienced "severe wing fluttering and flexing" when configured with heavy fuel and four slant-loaded CBU-87s on 9A triple-ejection racks. The problem existed with both F-16A and F-16C models. The fluttering was severe enough to impair use of the heads-up display. Although the problem corrected itself as fuel was burned away, there was concern that damage was occurring to the rail and wing. As an interim solution to the problem, AIM-9s were moved from the wingtips—stations 1 and 9—to stations 2 and 8. The issue was being worked by Headquarters Aeronautical Systems Division (Air Force Systems Command), the Ogden Air Logistics Center, and General Dynamics. Data

January 1991

gathering, flight testing, and analysis was ongoing. [Paper, Lt. Col. Kolpin, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 31 Jan 91.]

The Spanish government expressed concern that increased runway deterioration at Moron AB would occur if an additional twelve B-52s were deployed there. Prior to approving the deployment, the Spanish officials wanted a U.S. commitment to repair Moron's runway. The estimated cost was \$3 million. [Paper, Lt. Col. Kolpin, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 31 Jan 91.]

At least 120 (21 percent) of Iraq's 570 detected hardened shelters were damaged or destroyed. The leadership command and control bunkers were still being attacked. The large number of hardened bunkers provided sanctuary for the Iraqi leaders, but there were indications that the regime was concerned for its survival. A coup attempt reportedly resulted in the execution of the Iraqi Air Force Chief, and only loyal troops were allowed to remain in Baghdad. Analysts believed the Iraqi fiber optics network was broken by the air attacks. The destruction of mobile Scud launchers could not be confirmed. General Schwarzkopf used "gun camera" film and claimed, at a press conference, that eleven mobile launchers were destroyed. Some analysts believed the mobile launchers were really flatbed trucks. Due to bomb damage and voluntary closures, 87 percent of Iraq's oil refining capability was shut down. Civilian gas distribution was greatly disrupted, with long gas lines existing in several cities. Analysts' belief that morale problems were effecting Iraqi troops in Kuwait were substantiated by reports of radios being confiscated from the ground forces. [Point Paper, Maj. New, AF/XOWF, "BDA DESERT STORM: Operator's Look," 31 Jan 91.]

Iraqi air defense degradation reached the point where elimination of radar platoons would finish the most capable remnant of the Iraqi early warning radar system. No Iraqi aircraft were detected flying into Iran. This was partly due to the presence of coalition combat air patrols which were freely flying over central Iraq. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Jan 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—504,825^{*}
Total CENTAF Personnel—52,103

^{*}Total women deployed was not given.
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Jan 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,406 Total Sorties (Cumulative—34,567)
USAF—1,520 (Cumulative—22,550)
Offensive Counterair 154
Defensive Counterair 66
Interdiction 544

Gulf War Chronology

Close Air Support	0
SEAD	67
Tanker Refueling	240
Intratheater Airlift	329
Other Support	120
MARCENT—237	
NAVCENT—246 (Fleet Defense—203)	
ALLIED—403	

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—15

USAF—7

AC-130	1
F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	3

USN—5

A-6	2
F-14	1
F/A-18	1
<i>Non-combat</i>	
F/A-18	1

USMC—3

OV-10	1
AV-8	1
<i>Non-combat</i>	
AV-8	1

Allied Aircraft—9

A-4 (KU)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	5
<i>Non-combat</i>	
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1

Iraqi Aircraft—38

Air to Air

MiG-21/Fishbed	2
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	8

On Ground

Il-76/Candid	1
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January 1991

Su-17/22/Fitter	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	2

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 31 Jan 91.]

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February 1991

1 February 91 (C plus 178/D plus 15)

POLITICAL

The Pentagon identified Army Specialist 4 Melissa Rathbun-Nealy as the first American woman soldier to be listed as missing in action. ["2 Missing Soldiers Identified by U.S.," *The New York Times*, 2 Feb 91, p 5.]

France announced that American B-52s based in Britain would be allowed to fly over its territory on bombing raids against Iraq and refuel at a French military base en route from Britain to the Persian Gulf war zone. The French action came at the United States' request and eliminated the need for British-based B-52s to make costly and time-consuming detours around French airspace. [Alan Riding, "France Says U.S. Bombers Can Now Use Airspace," *The New York Times*, 2 Feb 91, p 6.]

MILITARY

General Schwarzkopf remarked that the performance of coalition forces against the Iraqi assaults 29-31 January demonstrated their ability to "conduct ground and air operations together and in support of each other." A "coalition signal" was sent to Iraq. The engagements were seen as a series of probing attacks to inflict casualties, gain intelligence of force disposition, and entice the coalition into a premature offensive thrust. "I am confident," stated General Schwarzkopf, "we will continue to defeat any further Iraqi attacks. We will maintain the initiative, stick to our campaign plan, and take the ground war to the Iraqis at the time and place of our choosing. . . ." [Msg. USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Feb 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

Allied air forces focused their attacks on Republican Guard positions in and near Kuwait while continuing their strategic campaign against Iraq. They flew thirty-three strike packages (two by Proven Force). According to one report, a B-52 strike on some 100 Iraqi armored vehicles sheltered in the Kuwaiti National Forest was "Like turning on a light in a cockroach infested room. . . . The strike sent vehicles scurrying for survival only to find that their movement was awaited by other [tactical air assets] eager to squish them like bugs." [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Feb 91.]

Ongoing efforts to locate the downed AC-130 were fruitless. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Feb 91.]

Seven of Iraq's estimated thirty fixed Scud launchers were confirmed losses. Fourteen of the estimated thirty-six mobile launchers were listed as possible losses. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 1 Feb 91.]

At least 143 (25 percent) of Iraq's 570 detected hardened shelters were confirmed as damaged or destroyed. The Defense Intelligence Agency reported nineteen of twenty primary Iraqi national command authority bunkers sustained at least moderate damage. Lines of communication in Kuwait were interdicted by the air campaign. Traffic backups were targeted. [Point Paper, Maj. New, AF/XOWF, "BDA DESERT STORM: Operator's Look," 1 Feb 91.]

The ALE-40 chaff dispenser installed in the F-16 experienced a problem with the programmer unit. The unit would "hang fire" until the button was released, but it would function as programmed thereafter. Warner Robins Air Logistics Center and the Tactical Air Warfare Center (Eglin AFB) were looking for a solution to the problem. In the meantime, crews were instructed to "hit and immediately release" the chaff button. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Roan, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 1 Feb 91.]

According to USCENCOM intelligence, "Iraq continues a nonexistent air campaign against coalition air strikes in the Kuwait theater of operations (KTO) and over central Iraq." On the ground, the Iraqis remained in their defensive positions with elements of forty divisions in the KTO. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—501,269 (31,445 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—52,561

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Feb 91.]

February 1991

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,431 Total Sorties (Cumulative—36,998)

USAF—1,522 (Cumulative—24,072)

Offensive Counterair	161
Defensive Counterair	54
Interdiction	573
Close Air Support	0
SEAD	71
Tanker Refueling	231
Intratheater Airlift	321
Other Support	111

MARCENT—238

NAVCENT—273 (Fleet Defense—174)

ALLIED—398

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—15

USAF—7

AC-130	1
F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	3

USN—5

A-6	2
F-14	1
F/A-18	1

Non-combat

F/A-18	1
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USMC—3

OV-10	1
AV-8	1

Non-combat

AV-8	1
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Allied Aircraft—9

A-4 (KU)	1
Tornado (IT)	1

Tornado (UK)	5
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Non-combat

Tornado (SA)	1
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Tornado (UK)	1
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Iraqi Aircraft—39

Air to Air

MiG-21/Fishbed	2
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MiG-23/Flogger	9
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Gulf War Chronology

MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
<i>On Ground</i>	
Il-76/Candid	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	2

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 1 Feb 91.]

2 February 91 (C plus 179/D plus 16)

POLITICAL

Iran was reported to have rejected appeals by Iraq for the return of warplanes that flew to Iran in quest of sanctuary from allied air strikes. [Alan Cowell, "Iran Said to Reject Warplanes' Exit," *The New York Times*, 3 Feb 91, p 17.]

MILITARY

Allied air forces flew forty strike packages (two by Proven Force). In addition, B-52s flew eight strikes. KTO interdiction sorties demonstrated the flexibility of tactical aircraft to observe troop concentrations and convoys as they formed and strike them before they could mass for an potential offensive operation. Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center and JSTARS were key factors in real time targeting. F-15s, F-16s, and A-6s showed excellent results from nightly Scud missions in western and eastern launch zones. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Feb 91.]

The strong ground defensive positions were all that remained of Iraq's strategic defensive potential. The integrated air defense system and naval forces were degraded to the point of being "ineffective." The "Scud campaign" received the highest priority in allied efforts to destroy Iraq's strategic offensive potential. At the same time, the air campaign focused on the KTO. Morale was down and desertions were up among enemy ground forces in Kuwait. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 2 Feb 91.]

Six of the fourteen possible losses to Iraqi mobile Scud launchers were confirmed. Twenty of the estimated total of sixty-six launchers were confirmed losses. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 2 Feb 91.]

Iraq's military support and production capabilities sustained 10 to 15 percent damage. Due to the pressure from coalition bombing attacks, Iraqi forces were dispersing ammunition stored in the KTO. The air attack began

February 1991

to reduce the strength of some Republican Guard divisions; two of them were down to 84 percent capability. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Hill, AF/XOWF, "BDA DESERT STORM: Operator's Look," 2 Feb 91.]

Iraq's command-control-communications and intelligence capabilities had been substantially disrupted. Its strategic surface-to-air missile systems had been rendered ineffective primarily due to the destruction of sector operating centers. Except for two helicopters detected in south central Iraq, no air operations were noted. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Feb 91.]

Analysts believed Saddam Hussein would use the intelligence obtained from the Khafji action to redirect ground efforts in the KTO. Iraqi probing and reconnoitering activity to identify the coalition main effort and induce an early commitment of coalition ground forces was expected to continue. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—500,452 (31,272 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—52,835

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,417 Total Sorties (Cumulative—39,415)

USAF—1,492 (Cumulative—25,564)

Offensive Counterair 164

Defensive Counterair 68

Interdiction 616

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 82

Tanker Refueling 245

Intratheater Airlift 207

Other Support 110

MARCENT—263

NAVCENT—251 (Fleet Defense—147)

ALLIED—411

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—17

USAF—8

A-10 1

AC-130 1

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

Gulf War Chronology

F-16	3
USN—6	
A-6	3
F-14	1
F/A-18	1
<i>Non-combat</i>	
F/A-18	1
USMC—3	
AV-8	1
OV-10	1
<i>Non-combat</i>	
AV-8	1
Allied Aircraft—9	
A-4 (KU)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	5
<i>Non-combat</i>	
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft—56	
<i>Air to Air</i>	
MiG-21/Fishbed	2
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
<i>On Ground</i>	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
U/I	16
Non-combat losses	2

[Brfg. AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 2 Feb 91.]

3 February 91 (C plus 180/D plus 17)

POLITICAL

U.S. officials confirmed that seven Marines killed in the firefight on 30 January died from friendly fire. An allied pilot fired a Maverick antiarmor missile that penetrated the left rear side of the Marine's light armored vehicle and shattered the engine compartment, spraying the Marines with

February 1991

fragments. When asked about the "friendly fire" losses, Lt. Gen. Charles Horner, the senior U.S. Air Force officer in the Gulf, said he had placed 2,000 coordinators with ground troops "to work this integration." He added, "But any time you put people with live weapons, there's always the possibility of mishap. And it is very, very disturbing when it happens and it's something we all take very seriously." [Rick Atkinson and Barton Gellman, "U.S. Confirms 'Friendly Fire' Killed 7 Marines," *The Washington Post*, 4 Feb 91, p 1.]

Iraq responded to the relentless allied bombing by renewing threats to hit American and western targets worldwide. Baghdad Radio reported, "The interests of the United States everywhere in the world will also be the target. There is a difference between terrorism and struggle. This is a legitimate act." [Rick Atkinson and Barton Gellman, "U.S. Confirms 'Friendly Fire' Killed 7 Marines," *The Washington Post*, 4 Feb 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Allied air forces continued to pound the Republican Guard and placed increased emphasis on battlefield preparation targets in the KTO. They flew forty-six strike packages (three by Proven Force). Seven B-52 strikes and more than 600 additional sorties hit either the Guard or battlefield preparation targets in the KTO. Strategic targets continued to be hit in Iraq, but at a reduced rate. A-10 daylight and F-15E, F-16, and A-6 night hunting missions provided effective suppression and retaliation against the Scud threat. A B-52 was lost fifteen nautical miles northwest of Diego Garcia while returning from a combat mission. It had not reported any battle damage. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Feb 91.]

A total of ninety-three Iraqi aircraft were in Iran. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 3 Feb 91.]

At least 162 (28 percent) of Iraq's 570 detected hardened shelters were confirmed damaged or destroyed. Analysts believed Iraq's transportation capacity into the KTO was 126,000 metric tons, down from a prewar level of 206,000. Once the capacity was taken below 45,000 metric tons, resupply for KTO forces engaged in combat would be insufficient. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Hill, AF/XOWF, "BDA DESERT STORM: Operator's Look," 3 Feb 91.]

No significant Iraqi air activity was reported. Iraqi ground forces continued their defense in depth with elements of forty divisions. Analysts noted, during the attack on Khafji, Iraqi vehicles moved in small groups to deceive intelligence collection efforts. Large-scale movement was not detected until after the attacking force moved from its attack position. They expected that future incursions or large-scale attacks would be executed in the same manner. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Feb 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—501,174 (31,284 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—(not listed)

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, Sitrep," 03/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,635 Total Sorties (Cumulative—42,050)

USAF—1,689 (Cumulative—27,253)

Offensive Counterair 107

Defensive Counterair 66

Interdiction 624

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 79

Tanker Refueling 221

Intratheater Airlift 489

Other Support 103

MARCENT—301

NAVCENT—238 (Fleet Defense—141)

ALLIED—407

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—18

USAF—9

A-10 1

AC-130 1

B-52 1

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 3

USN—6

A-6 3

F-14 1

F/A-18 1

Non-combat

F/A-18 1

USMC—3

AV-8 1

OV-10 1

Non-combat

AV-8 1

Allied Aircraft—9

A-4 (KU) 1

Tornado (IT) 1

Tornado (UK) 5

February 1991

<i>Non-combat</i>	
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft—56	
<i>Air to Air</i>	
MiG-21/Fishbed	2
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
<i>On Ground</i>	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
U/I	16
Non-combat losses	2

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 3 Feb 91.]

4 February 91 (C plus 181/D plus 18)

POLITICAL

The Bush administration ruled out any diplomatic solution to the Persian Gulf War, and rejected an offer by Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to broker a deal between Baghdad and Washington. White House spokesperson Marlin Fitzwater stated, "Our purpose is to get Iraq out of Kuwait, and we have gone through twelve UN resolutions and are engaged in a military conflict to do that. That's where our focus is and we don't expect to change that." [Paul Bedard, "U.S. Says No to Diplomacy," *The Washington Times*, 5 Feb 91, p 1.]

Secretary of Defense Cheney refused to characterize how much progress was made in hurting the fighting ability of the well-entrenched Iraqi Army. The Pentagon, he said, had "assumed that at some point we would have to send in ground forces in order to liberate Kuwait." [Patrick Tyler, "Cheney Cautious on Claiming Early War Success," *The New York Times*, 5 Feb 91, p 13.]

According to the government-owned newspaper *Al Ahram*, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak met with his Defense Minister, Chief of Staff, and all senior commanders of the armed forces to examine Egypt's role in Saudi Arabia. Indications surfaced that the estimated 45,000 Egyptian troops stationed in Saudi Arabia would go into action against Iraqi forces should

Gulf War Chronology

a ground offensive be mounted to recapture Kuwait. When the troops were originally dispatched, Cairo said little about the forces beyond the fact their task was to defend Saudi Arabia. [Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Egypt Appears More Likely to Join in Ground Combat," *The New York Times*, 5 Feb 91, p 14.]

MILITARY

Coalition air forces flew sixty-four strike packages (three by Proven Force) and seven B-52 strikes. In addition, more than 600 sorties hit Republican Guard and battlefield preparation targets in the KTO. Poor weather conditions around Baghdad hindered attacks on strategic targets in that area. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Feb 91.]

USCENTCOM analysts reported that "Iraqi naval and air forces pose no challenge to coalition operations." Air defense command-control-communications were "sorely degraded." Coalition airstrikes degraded the ability of second-echelon units to move during the day or in large groups at night. Reconnaissance reports showed that only small groups of fifteen to twenty Iraqi vehicles were moving in the KTO. Iraq's armored units were digging tank revetments deeper, piling sand as high as the tanks' roadwheels, then placing sandbags around the tank turret. This protective measure increased the response time for Iraqi heavy units to conduct offensive counterattack actions. Also, external fuel tanks were drained on armored vehicles, reducing the operational range of the units. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Feb 91.]

Iraq was expected to increase reconnaissance in the tri-border area and to the west as the Iraqis attempted to find the coalition main effort and logistical sites. Theater air defense assets were expected to reposition to better protect forward units. The Iraqi leadership wanted to force the coalition to commit ground forces as soon as possible, and it would continue trying to draw Israel into the war. Analysts believed if Iraq could mount an offensive operation in the west, the attack would occur within a week, while moonlight was available. Also, analysts believed Iraq was preparing to escalate the war with chemical munitions. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Feb 91.]

At least 206 (36 percent) of Iraq's 570 detected hardened shelters were confirmed damaged or destroyed. Five of six major telephone switching centers in the Baghdad area suffered severe damage. Most of Iraq's major petroleum refineries were damaged, 25 percent were confirmed destroyed. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Hill, AF/XOWF, "Checkmate Strategic Assessment," 4 Feb 91.]

A total of ninety-nine Iraqi aircraft were in Iran. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 4 Feb 91.]

February 1991

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—501,717 (31,414 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—53,072

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, Sitrep, "04/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,705 Total Sorties (Cumulative—44,755)

USAF—1,734 (Cumulative—28,987)

Offensive Counterair 72

Defensive Counterair 68

Interdiction 657

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 73

Tanker Refueling 229

Intratheater Airlift 523

Other Support 112

MARCENT—266

NAVCENT—308 (Fleet Defense—112)

ALLIED—397

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—18

USAF—9

A-10 1

AC-130 1

B-52 1

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 3

USN—6

A-6 3

F-14 1

F/A-18 1

Non-combat

F/A-18 1

USMC—3

AV-8 1

OV-10 1

Non-combat

AV-8 1

Allied Aircraft—9

A-4 (KU) 1

Tornado (IT) 1

Tornado (UK) 5

Gulf War Chronology

<i>Non-combat</i>	
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft—56	
<i>Air to Air</i>	
MiG-21/Fishbed	2
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
<i>On Ground</i>	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
U/I	16
Non-combat losses	2

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 4 Feb 91.]

5 February 91 (C plus 182/D plus 19)

POLITICAL

President Bush announced that he was skeptical that air power alone could win the Persian Gulf War. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell planned to visit Saudi Arabia to take a last look at when the ground attack should begin. [Rick Atkinson and Ann Devroy, "Bush 'Skeptical' Air Power Can Prevail Alone in Gulf," *The Washington Post*, 6 Feb 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

A total of forty-five packages and six additional B-52 strikes were flown. The major emphasis—twenty-five packages and more than 200 sorties—was against the Republican Guard. After six Iraqi aircraft flew to Iran, the F-15 combat air patrol near Baghdad was reestablished. Real-time targeting of F-15Es with JSTARS continued to provide excellent results. A-10s and MARCENT tactical aircraft continued their successful attacks on Iraqi assembly areas and small convoys in the KTO. F-16s were being employed as fast forward air controllers—Killer Scouts—to improve the effectiveness of battlefield bombing operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Feb 91.]

February 1991

The average USAF F-16 strike package included: twenty F-16s, four F-15s, four F-4Gs, two EF-111s, and seven KC-135s. The average USAF F-111 strike package included: sixteen F-111s, four F-15s, three F-4Gs, two EF-111s, and eight KC-135s. [Brfg, AF/XOXWP to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Air Campaign: Blue Sortie Analysis," 5 Feb 91.]

U.S. ground forces were repositioning along the Saudi-Kuwaiti and Saudi-Iraqi borders in preparation for combat. Command emphasis was on safety and operational security. Maintenance efforts were emphasized to achieve maximum operational readiness prior to moving to tactical assembly areas. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 5 Feb 91.]

The Iraqi Mother of Battle radio station was knocked off the air and was replaced by USCINCENTOM's psychological operations radio, Voice of the Gulf. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Feb 91.]

At least 228 (39 percent) of Iraq's 590 detected hardened shelters were damaged or destroyed. Transportation capacity to the KTO from Iraq was degraded by 54 percent. Thirty key bridges were targeted: eleven were destroyed and nine damaged. The daily Iraqi force demand of 10,000 to 12,000 metric tons of supplies and equipment for the KTO caused backlogs and slowed convoys. Civilian gas distribution in Iraq was stopped. [Point Paper, Maj. New, AF/XOWF, "Checkmate Strategic Assessment," 5 Feb 91; Point Paper, Maj. New, AF/XOWF, "Checkmate Strategic Assessment," 6 Feb 91.]

Iraq had an estimated 2,668 artillery pieces, 3,633 tanks, and 2,487 armored vehicles in the KTO. Iraqi forces continued to dig in and use deceptive measures in an effort to blunt the impact of coalition air attacks. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—503,041 (31,510 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—53,192

[Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,760 Total Sorties (Cumulative—47,515)

USAF—1,729 (Cumulative—30,716)

Offensive Counterair	55
Defensive Counterair	74
Interdiction	709
Close Air Support	0
SEAD	84
Tanker Refueling	222
Intratheater Airlift	448

Gulf War Chronology

Other Support 137
 MARCENT—234
 NAVCENT—225 (Fleet Defense—145)
 ALLIED—472
 [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—18
 USAF—9
 A-10 1
 AC-130 1
 F-4G 1
 F-15E 2
 F-16 3
 Non-combat
 B-52 1
 USN—6
 A-6 3
 F-14 1
 F/A-18 1
 Non-combat
 F/A-18 1
 USMC—3
 AV-8 1
 OV-10 1
 Non-combat
 AV-8 1
 Allied Aircraft—9
 A-4 (KU) 1
 Tornado (IT) 1
 Tornado (UK) 5
 Non-combat
 Tornado (SA) 1
 Tornado (UK) 1
 Iraqi Aircraft Lost—59
 Air to Air
 MiG-21/Fishbed 2
 MiG-23/Flogger 9
 MiG-25/Foxbat 2
 MiG-29/Fulcrum 6
 Mirage F-1 9
 On Ground
 An-2/Colt 1
 Il-76/Candid 1

February 1991

Su-17/22/Fitter	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
U/I	19
Non-combat losses	2

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 5 Feb 91.]

Major Iraqi Equipment in the KTO: Overall and (Republican Guard)

Resource	Original	Destroyed/ Captured	% Remaining
Tanks	4,280 (986)	647 (197)	85 (80)
Armored Vehicles	2,870 (603)	383 (85)	87 (86)
Artillery	3,110 (630)	442 (18)	86 (97)

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 5 Feb 91.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	7,112
Boarded	862
Diverted	41
Warning Shots Fired	11
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Feb 91.]

6 February 91 (C plus 183/D plus 20)

POLITICAL

Baghdad severed diplomatic ties with the United States and other countries in the multinational force. [Gerald F. Seib and David Rogers, "Baghdad Cuts Diplomatic Ties to the West," *The New York Times*, 7 Feb 91, p 16.]

Secretary of Defense Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Powell, in a closed-door report to Congress, left a strong impression that an allied ground offensive was not imminent. The nation's top two military advisors offered no timetable for a ground attack and assured lawmakers that the Bush administration was not eager to change the course of the war from the air to land. [Rick Atkinson, "Gulf Ground War Not Felt Imminent," *The Washington Post*, 7 Feb 91, p 1.]

Iraq claimed that an allied raid killed 150 civilians—the highest raid toll reported so far. U.S. officials insisted that the war was being waged only against military targets and that civilians were not deliberately being

Gulf War Chronology

bombed. [Nora Boustany, "Iraq Charges High Civilian Toll in Air Raids," *The Washington Post*, 7 Feb 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

A total of fifty-two packages and six additional B-52 strikes were flown, concentrating their attacks on the Republican Guard. Good weather increased the effectiveness of the around-the-clock attacks. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Feb 91.]

Two B-52s experienced early weapon detonation with light damage resulting to the aircraft. The weapon was a MK-82 with a FMU-139 fuze. This weapon and fuze combination was restricted from use. Units were awaiting new fuzes. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 6 Feb 91.]

Air Force Special Operations Forces dropped the first two BLU-82 (15,000-lb) bombs. The bombs, dropped by MC-130s, hit a minefield and an Iraqi battalion headquarters. [Ltr, AFSOC/HO to CAFH/DRE, "Gulf War Chronology," 24 Jan 92.]

The 2,000 BLU-109 hard-case bomb was in short supply. Eighty-three of the bombs had been expended, 129 were on hand in the AOR, and 500 were scheduled for shipment in two days. There were insufficient FMU-143 fuzes—peculiar to the BLU-109—to match all the bombs scheduled for shipment. Factory production quantities were flown to the AOR as they became available. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 6 Feb 91.]

Despite reconstitution, Iraq was not able to duplicate an air defense network similar to the system that existed prior to the start of the coalition air offensive. The extent of command-control-communication breakdowns dictated a shift in air defense strategy to specifically supporting ground operations. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Feb 91.]

There were indications that the Iraqis could not supply their troops in Kuwait City with basic necessities. Prisoners of war reported Iraqi soldiers in southern Kuwait were forced to buy food from private vendors. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Feb 91.]

Deception and survival efforts by the Iraqi Air Force included aircraft dispersal to Iran, aircraft dispersed around the airfields, aircraft completely surrounded by temporary earthen berms, "dummy" bomb craters, paint on runways to resemble bomb damage, and external repair on bunkers to cover bomb damage. [Point Paper, Maj. New, AF/XOWF, "Checkmate Strategic Assessment," 6 Feb 91.]

February 1991

Additional Iraqi aircraft flew to Iran; included was the first deployment of ground attack aircraft. Three of the fighters crashed attempting to land. The estimated total Iraqi aircraft in Iran was 118. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 6 Feb 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—503,747 (31,620 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—53,399

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, Sitrep," 06/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,460 Total Sorties (Cumulative—49,975)

USAF—1,537 (Cumulative—32,253)

Offensive Counterair 79

Defensive Counterair 66

Interdiction 631

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 72

Tanker Refueling 222

Intratheater Airlift 337

Other Support 130

MARCENT—125

NAVCENT—353 (Fleet Defense—100)

ALLIED—445

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—20

USAF—9

A-10 1

AC-130 1

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 3

Non-combat

B-52 1

USN—8

A-6 3

F-14 1

F/A-18 1

Non-combat

A-6 1

A-7 1

F/A-18 1

Gulf War Chronology

USMC—3	
AV-8	1
OV-10	1
Non-combat	
AV-8	1
Allied Aircraft—9	
A-4 (KU)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	5
Non-combat	
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft—59	
Air to Air	
MiG-21/Fishbed	2
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
On Ground	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
U/I	19
Non-combat losses	2

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 6 Feb 91.]

7 February 91 (C plus 184/D plus 21)

POLITICAL

Secretary of Defense Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Powell departed for Saudi Arabia to gauge the war's progress and discuss the timetable for starting the ground war. [Rick Atkinson, "Gulf Ground War Not Felt Imminent," *The Washington Post*, 7 Feb 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Allied air forces flew forty packages concentrating on the Republican Guard and other Iraqi forces in the KTO. They were supplemented by three B-52 strikes and more than 600 sorties in the KTO for battlefield preparation. Forty F-111 sorties were retasked due to weather to complete GBU-12 strikes against revetted armor. More than fifty tanks and twelve bun-

February 1991

kers/storage areas were reported destroyed. Remaining packages attacked enemy weapons support facilities, surface-to-air missile sites, naval bases, airfields, bridges, and command-control-communications facilities. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Feb 91.]

Iraq's nuclear-biological-chemical weapons production was nearly destroyed. Electricity and oil production were shut down. The Iraqi Navy was "out of the war." Objectives that remained included detection and destruction of Scuds, systematic destruction of the Republican Guard, elimination of biological-chemical weapons and stored ammunition, and destruction of command-control-communications nodes and leadership bunkers. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 7 Feb 91.]

A review of postmission reports indicated that A-10 pilots were engaged by antiaircraft artillery from a residential area of Ahmadi, Kuwait. The pilots reported receiving 37-mm and 57-mm fire while attacking Iraqi ground force equipment and vehicles. This was the first report of Iraqi antiaircraft fire coming from residential areas in Kuwait or Iraq. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Feb 91.]

USAF aircraft mission capable rate was 92.4 percent. Four A-10s received heavy battle damage. One aircraft had significant damage to its left engine, wing, and nacelle. The others had assorted holes in the elevators, tabs, and rudders. A KC-135 flew into a "cell-mate's" jet wash, and experienced excessive wing rock (90 degrees of bank, side-to-side) while it lost 4,000 feet of altitude. Engines one and two departed the aircraft, and 11,000 pounds of fuel leaked from the wing tank. The aircraft recovered, dumped 120,000 additional pounds of fuel, and landed at Jeddah. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 7 Feb 91; Accident Report, Maj. Proctor, AF/XOOS, "KC-135E Incident," 6 Feb 91.]

There was a decrease in the Iraqi air defense threat and early warning activity, mostly around Baghdad. Also, a marked decrease in Iraqi surface-to-air missile launches was noted. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 7 Feb 91.]

USCENTCOM increased the count of Iraqi ground forces in the KTO to elements of forty-two divisions: twenty-five committed, nine reinforcing, and eight theater reserve. The primary emphasis of Iraqi ground force activity was repositioning by small unit elements, resupply attempts, and defensive improvements. Republican Guard heavy divisions remained in prehostility defensive positions. Heavy ground forces were protecting their armor by placing steel nets around the vehicles and igniting tires near individual tanks to improve survivability. The steel nets were intended to

Gulf War Chronology

impede wire guided missiles, and the burning tires were to disrupt heat-seeking missiles. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—505,228 (31,766 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—53,436

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, Sitrep," 07/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,584 Total Sorties (Cumulative—52,559)

USAF—1,543 (Cumulative—33,796)

Offensive Counterair 72

Defensive Counterair 78

Interdiction 684

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 69

Tanker Refueling 423

Intratheater Airlift 274

Other Support 123

MARCENT—308

NAVCENT—299 (Fleet Defense—106)

ALLIED—434

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Feb 91; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 08/0800z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—21

USAF—9

A-10 1

AC-130 1

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 3

Non-combat

B-52 1

USN—9

A-6 3

F-14 1

F/A-18 2

Non-combat

A-6 1

A-7 1

F/A-18 1

USMC—3

AV-8 1

February 1991

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Gulf War Chronology

OV-10	1
<i>Non-combat</i>	
AV-8	1
Allied Aircraft—9	
A-4 (KU)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	5
<i>Non-combat</i>	
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft Lost—66	
<i>Air to Air</i>	
MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
U/I	1
<i>On Ground</i>	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	3
Su-17/22/Fitter	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
U/I	19
Non-combat losses	2

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 7 Feb 91.]

8 February 91 (C plus 185/D plus 22)

POLITICAL

President Bush stepped up pressure on Jordan's King Hussein not to join forces with Iraq's Saddam Hussein. King Hussein had previously made a speech that indicated Jordan's allegiance was with Iraq. Administration officials sensed that Jordan was preparing for the postwar Middle East when Arab radicals might take revenge against Arab leaders who aligned themselves with the United States. [Thomas L. Friedman, "President Increases Pressure on Jordan to Stay Neutral," *The New York Times*, 9 Feb 91, p 8.]

MILITARY

Allied air forces flew forty-three packaged strikes that were supplemented by five B-52 strikes. Because of their success on 7 February in

February 1991

attacking revetted armor, F-111s began flying dedicated "tank plinking" missions in the KTO. Allied tactical air forces, operating at lower altitudes because of decreased threats, increased their effectiveness in killing enemy armor. Over 600 battlefield preparation sorties were flown in the KTO, with priority given to attacks on armor and artillery concentrations plus related logistics and ammunition sites. Air attacks also continued against strategic targets in Iraq such as bridges, petroleum sites, and military production facilities. A total of fifty-four Scud hunting missions were flown, but no missiles were found. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF logistics placed increased emphasis on infrared-guided Maverick air-to-surface missiles (AGM-65D). The sixty-day requirement increased from 5,600 to 6,600. The airlift command post shifted 1,000 Mavericks from "surface to air" by taking airlift initially scheduled for HARM (AGM-88) movement. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 8 Feb 91.]

U.S. ground forces were completing movement into tactical assembly areas. Some had consolidated all combat elements and were moving into forward assembly areas and attack positions. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 8 Feb 91.]

At least 80 of Iraq's 594 detected hardened shelters were destroyed, and 180 were damaged. Analysts believed 125 aircraft, including 100 frontline fighters, were dispersed to Iran. The Iraqi national command authority was able to exercise operational control of forces, though in some instances the use of couriers was necessary. Moderate to severe damage was done to Iraq's nuclear-biological-chemical warfare capability. No near-term capability to build a militarily significant nuclear weapon existed. Biological warfare research and production capability was reduced by 80 to 90 percent. Chemical warfare production systems were reduced 60 to 70 percent. Air strikes were taking a toll on railroads and bridges: seventeen (fifteen highway, two railroad) of twenty-four key bridges were inoperative. Analysts believed transportation capacity to the KTO was degraded by 50 percent, from approximately 200,000 to 100,000 metric tons per day. Although this capacity was available, Iraqi was having trouble moving 12,000 to 15,000 metric tons per day. [Point Paper, Maj. New, AF/XOWF, "Checkmate Strategic Assessment," 8 Feb 91.]

Of the twelve Iraqi SA-6 surface-to-air missile batteries previously identified in the KTO, only four battery locations could be identified. The remaining eight were unlocated, but were believed to be moved to protect high-value targets or lines of communication that were under coalition air attack. Iraqi aircraft remained dispersed in the open around airfields in the

Gulf War Chronology

southern and central portions of the country. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Feb 91.]

To date, Iraq had launched fifty-eight Scuds: twenty-nine towards Saudi Arabia and twenty-nine towards Israel. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—508,730 (32,715 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,104

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, Sitrep," 08/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,591 Total Sorties (Cumulative—55,150)

USAF—1,547 (Cumulative—35,343)

Offensive Counterair 52

Defensive Counterair 72

Interdiction 707

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 63

Tanker Refueling 226

Intratheater Airlift 303

Other Support 124

MARCENT—275

NAVCENT—294 (Fleet Defense—85)

ALLIED—475

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Feb 91; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 09/0800z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—21

USAF—9

A-10 1

AC-130 1

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 3

Non-combat

B-52 1

USN—9

A-6 3

F-14 1

F/A-18 2

Non-combat

A-6 1

February 1991

A-7	1
F/A-18	1
USMC-3	
AV-8	1
OV-10	1
<i>Non-combat</i>	
AV-8	1
Allied Aircraft-9	
A-4 (KU)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	5
<i>Non-combat</i>	
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft-47*	
<i>Air to Air</i>	
MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
U/I	1
<i>On Ground*</i>	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	3
Su-17/22/Fitter	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	2

*As of this date U/I on ground attrition numbers were no longer reported in the Iraqi aircraft attrition total. This explains the reduced total.
[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 8 Feb 91.]

9 February 91 (C plus 186/D plus 23)

MILITARY

Allied air forces flew thirty-nine packaged strikes (three by Proven Force). The major emphasis was against the Republican Guard (more than 200 strike sorties) supplemented by nine B-52 strikes. More than 700 additional battlefield preparation sorties were flown in the KTO against Iraqi armor, artillery concentrations, and logistics and ammunition sites. Over 200 sorties struck airfields, bridges, petroleum sites, command and

Gulf War Chronology

control facilities, and other strategic targets. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Feb 91.]

ARCENT forces continued to refine their plans, train for combat, and maintain equipment while moving to assembly areas and attack positions. MARCENT forces were preparing for offensive operations. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 9 Feb 91.]

A total of thirty-one surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were launched by Iraqi ground forces. This was a significant increase over the previous day's total of four. Most of the launched SAMs were from mobile systems and were infrared-guided. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 10 Feb 91.]

Although Iraq's forces in the KTO maintained sufficient combat assets to conduct multi-brigade operations, their lack of intelligence information and air cover precluded the massing of combat power and sustainment of offensive operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Feb 91.]

To date, Iraq had launched fifty-nine Scuds: twenty-nine at Saudi Arabia and thirty at Israel. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—509,976 (32,752 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,174

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,633 Total Sorties (Cumulative—57,783)

USAF—1,619 (Cumulative—36,962)

Offensive Counterair 64

Defensive Counterair 68

Interdiction 706

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 77

Tanker Refueling 233

Intratheater Airlift 321

Other Support 150

MARCENT—266

NAVCENT—293 (Fleet Defense—100)

ALLIED—455

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Feb 91; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 10/0800z Feb 91.]

February 1991

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—21

USAF—9

A-10	1
AC-130	1
F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	3

Non-combat

B-52	1
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USN—9

A-6	3
F-14	1
F/A-18	2

Non-combat

A-6	1
A-7	1
F/A-18	1

USMC—3

AV-8	1
OV-10	1

Non-combat

AV-8	1
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Allied Aircraft—9

A-4 (KU)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	5

Non-combat

Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1

Iraqi Aircraft—49

Air to Air

MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	2
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
U/I	1

On Ground

An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	3

Gulf War Chronology

Su-17/22/Fitter	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	2

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 9 Feb 91.]

10 February 91 (C plus 187/D plus 24)

POLITICAL

Defense Secretary Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Powell returned from Saudi Arabia after meeting with American field commanders. Secretary Cheney stated that the allies needed to continue their bombing campaign before a ground attack opened against Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait. [Michael R. Gordon, "Cheney Returning to Washington with the Call for More Bombing," *The New York Times*, 11 Feb 91, p 1.]

For the first time since the American Revolution, the United States accepted contributions from other countries to finance a war. Thus far, the United States had received more than \$50 billion in pledges to pay for war expenses through the end of March. Saudi Arabia pledged \$16.8 billion; Kuwait, \$16 billion; Japan, \$10.7 billion; and Germany, \$6.6 billion. [David E. Rosenbaum, "U.S. Has Received \$50 Billion in Pledges for War," *The New York Times*, 11 Feb 91, p 13.]

In his first public address in weeks, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein urged his compatriots to practice "patience and steadfastness" and assured them that Iraq would win the Persian Gulf War. [Alan Cowell, "Hussein, in Speech, Urges the Iraqis to Be Steadfast," *The New York Times*, 11 Feb 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Relentless attacks on Iraqi ground forces in the KTO continued, as did strikes on strategic targets. Allied air forces flew thirty-three packaged strikes (three by Proven Force). They also flew twelve B-52 strikes and over 600 additional battlefield preparation sorties in the KTO. A total of forty-nine Scud-hunting missions were flown by F-15Es over western Iraqi launch zones. Three Scuds and their launchers were reported destroyed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Feb 91.]

The Defense Fuel Region (Middle East) Quality Assurance Representative from Bahrain determined that the cause of the fuel quality problem at King Fahd International Airport was the newly activated pipeline from the Ras Tanura refinery to the base. The pipeline was formerly used to push heavy oils. This accounted for the high sulfur content in the fuel.

February 1991

New fuel coming through the line was now "on spec," and it was believed the problem had corrected itself. "Off spec" fuel in the tanks was not blended with that "on spec," but it was pumped back to Ras Tanura and replaced with "on spec" fuel. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Knox, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 10 Feb 91.]

Iraqi ground activity remained focused on force sustainment and survivability measures. Local small unit repositioning and improvements of defenses continued. Based on prisoner of war reports and other intelligence sources, analysts believed Iraqi forces in Kuwait had a desertion rate of at least 20 percent. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—511,227 (32,779 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,341

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,695 Total Sorties (Cumulative—60,478)

USAF—1,600 (Cumulative—38,562)

Offensive Counterair 48

Defensive Counterair 68

Interdiction 730

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 84

Tanker Refueling 231

Intratheater Airlift 278

Other Support 161

MARCENT—305

NAVCENT—340 (Fleet Defense—90)

ALLIED—450

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Feb 91; Msg, USCENAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 11/0800z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—23

USAF—9

A-10 1

AC-130 1

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 3

Non-combat

B-52 1

Gulf War Chronology

USN—9	
A-6	3
F-14	1
F/A-18	2
Non-combat	
A-6	1
A-7	1
F/A-18	1
USMC—5	
AV-8	3
OV-10	1
Non-combat	
AV-8	1
Allied Aircraft—9	
A-4 (KU)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	5
Non-combat	
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft Lost—59	
Air to Air	
MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	10
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	4
Su-25/Frogfoot	3
U/I	1
On Ground	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	3
Su-17/22/Fitter	2
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	7

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 10 Feb 91.]

Major Iraqi Equipment in the KTO: Overall and (Republican Guard)

Resource	Original	Destroyed/ Captured	% Remaining
Tanks	4,280 (986)	713 (200)	83 (80)

February 1991

Armored Vehicles	2,870	627	78
	(603)	(92)	(85)
Artillery	3,110	649	79
	(630)	(39)	(94)

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 10 Feb 91.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	7,194
Boarded	876
Diverted	42
Warning Shots Fired	11
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Feb 91.]

11 February 91 (C plus 188/D plus 25)

POLITICAL

President Bush said he had no immediate plans to authorize a ground offensive in the Persian Gulf War. Soviet envoy Yevgeny Primakov arrived in Baghdad to discuss a possible cease-fire with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Primakov's mission came after sharp criticism from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that the massive allied bombardment of Iraq threatened to exceed the UN's mandate to eject forces from Kuwait. [Rick Atkinson, "Bush: No Immediate Plan to Start Ground War, U.S. Will Rely 'For a While' on Air Power Against Iraqis," *The Washington Post*, 12 Feb 91, p 1.]

Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens, in a hastily arranged one-day visit to Washington, D.C., told President Bush that Israel was suffering heavy "destruction" from Iraqi missile attacks and that its willingness to refrain from retaliating was wearing thin. Sources said Arens made a new request for greater U.S.-Israeli coordination, including sharing of identification friend or foe recognition codes to avoid conflict between the two countries' warplanes. Without such codes, Israeli planes could be shot down, unrecognized by U.S. jets or gunners. ["Israeli Tells Bush of Missile Damage," *The New York Times*, 12 Feb 91, p 1; John M. Goshko and Al Kamen, "Visiting Israeli Seeks Military Coordination," *The Washington Post*, 12 Feb 91, p 14.]

MILITARY

Coalition air forces flew twenty-eight strike packages aided by eleven B-52 strikes. The emphasis remained on the Republican Guard. Night attacks against tanks continued to be successful with forty F-111s reported to have destroyed seventy-nine of those armored vehicles. Weather was favorable; however, smoke from the oil well fires reduced visibility to less

Gulf War Chronology

than four miles in the heavily targeted areas of the KTO and southern Iraq. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Feb 91.]

USCENTCOM psychological operations (PSYOP) radio, Voice of the Gulf, was broadcasting on three AM and two FM stations. PSYOP messages included an appeal from a captured Iraqi soldier to his comrades to come south to safety. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Feb 91.]

The Iraqi command-control-communication network was degraded, but it remained effective. Its air force was 30 percent destroyed or in Iran. Analysts believed that Iraq's ground forces were 10 percent destroyed and had supplies for fifteen days of combat. Maintenance and production support for the military was limited. Oil refining was shut down and lines of communication were "just" meeting requirements. Scud operations were sporadic—only eight launches in the last fifteen days—and the short-range ballistic missiles had proved to be of "limited military value." It was believed Iraq still hoped to strike a political blow by prolonging the war and inflicting heavy casualties during ground operations. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 11 Feb 91.]

Chemical decontamination elements were located with two Iraqi divisional artillery batteries. Iraq deployed this equipment earlier, but this was the southernmost deployment noted for decontamination elements. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—513,641 (32,915 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,512

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,583 Total Sorties (Cumulative—63,061)

USAF—1,543 (Cumulative—40,105)

Offensive Counterair 54

Defensive Counterair 50

Interdiction 675

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 75

Tanker Refueling 235

Intratheater Airlift 318

Other Support 136

February 1991

MARCENT—272
NAVCENT—322 (Fleet Defense—128)
ALLIED—446

[Msg. USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Feb 91; Msg. USCENTAF to AIG 9671,
"Sitrep," 12/0800z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—22

USAF—9

A-10	1
AC-130	1
F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	3

Non-combat

B-52	1
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USN—9

A-6	3
F-14	1
F/A-18	2

Non-combat

A-6	1
A-7	1
F/A-18	1

USMC—4

AV-8	2
OV-10	1

Non-combat

AV-8	1
------	---

Allied Aircraft—9

A-4 (KU)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	5

Non-combat

Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1

Iraqi Aircraft Lost—59

Air to Air

MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3

Gulf War Chronology

Su-25/Frogfoot	2
U/I	1
On Ground	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-25/Foxbat	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	7

[Brig. AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 11 Feb 91.]

12 February 91 (C plus 189/D plus 26)

POLITICAL

Defense Secretary Cheney invoked the Civil War-era "Feed and Forage Act" which allowed war commanders to pay for medicine, transportation, fuel, and expenses without congressional approval. Although allies pledged over \$40 billion for the war effort, less than \$6 billion had been received. [Rick Atkinson, "Baghdad Bombed: Saddam Sees Soviet," *The Washington Post*, 13 Feb 91, p 1.]

Heavy bombing shook downtown Baghdad, triggering fireballs and badly damaging two government ministries. Iraqi officials claimed the heavy bombardment was an attempt to affect the peacemaking efforts of the Soviet envoy, Yevgeny Primakov. Saddam reportedly told Primakov that Iraq was prepared to help the Soviet Union and other nations find a peaceful end to the conflict. [Rick Atkinson, "Baghdad Bombed: Saddam Sees Soviet," *The Washington Post*, 13 Feb 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Allied air forces flew forty strike packages (three by Proven Force), eleven B-52 strikes, and hundreds of additional sorties against Iraqi positions in the KTO. Sixteen packages attacked Republican Guard divisions, while eight others bombed Guard logistics and ammunition storage sites. Smoke from the oil well fires continued to restrict visibility over parts of the KTO. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Feb 91.]

The strategic objectives of U.S. and coalition forces were to incapacitate and isolate the Saddam Hussein regime. The assessment was that the objectives were only partially accomplished. The conditions likely to lead to an overthrow of the regime were not yet established. To reinforce the

February 1991

strategic focus of allied operations, analysts concluded that emphasis should be placed on the following: suppress, not destroy, the Iraqi civil infrastructure; minimize civilian casualties; destroy offensive capabilities, but leave defensive forces to ensure a postwar regional balance of power; and, continue the air campaign until its full impact was achieved. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 12 Feb 91.]

Vehicle priorities for CENTAF, i.e. HUMMVs and forklifts, remained backlogged awaiting airlift. The vehicles would have arrived in the AOR sooner if they had been slated for delivery by sealift. Military Airlift Command expressed concern for the lack of use of sealift for sourced USCENTCOM vehicle requirements. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 12 Feb 91.]

ARCENT forces continued preparing for offensive operations. There was no significant contact with the enemy. MARCENT forces, while preparing for offensive operations, were conducting coordinated deception operations. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 12 Feb 91.]

Confirmed losses to Iraqi fixed Scud launchers totaled fifteen of the estimated twenty-eight. Eight of the estimated thirty-six mobile launchers were listed as possible losses and six were confirmed as destroyed. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 12 Feb 91.]

Reconnaissance photos showed two Iraqi MiG-21/Fishbed aircraft dispersed in the middle of the ruins of the ancient Sumerian city of Ur. That site was off-limits to allied attacks because of its historical value. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Feb 91.]

Iraqi soldiers were billeted in schools, office buildings, and private residences in Kuwait City to minimize the danger from coalition air attacks. Analysts believed Iraqi command posts had also moved into urban civilian buildings for protection. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—514,304 (32,934 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,537

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,621 Total Sorties (Cumulative—65,682)

USAF—1,616 (Cumulative—41,721)

Offensive Counterair 50

Defensive Counterair 50

Interdiction 718

Gulf War Chronology

Close Air Support	0
SEAD	74
Tanker Refueling	244
Intratheater Airlift	347
Other Support	133

MARCENT—247

NAVCENT—299 (Fleet Defense—no longer reported)

ALLIED—459

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Feb 91; Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 13/0800z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—22

USAF—9

A-10	1
AC-130	1
F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	3

Non-combat

B-52	1
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USN—9

A-6	4
F-14	1
F/A-18	2

Non-combat

A-7	1
F/A-18	1

USMC—4

AV-8	2
OV-10	1

Non-combat

AV-8	1
------	---

Allied Aircraft—9

A-4 (KU)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	5

Non-combat

Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1

Iraqi Aircraft—59

Air to Air

MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9

February 1991

MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
U/I	1
<i>On Ground</i>	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-23/Flogger	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	7

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 12 Feb 91.]

13 February 91 (C plus 190/D plus 27)

POLITICAL

Two U.S. laser-guided bombs killed hundreds of Iraqi civilians in an attack on what Iraqi authorities called a suburban air raid shelter, but which U.S. officials insisted was a hardened bunker used as a military command center. [Rick Atkinson and Dan Baltz, "Bomb Strike Kills Scores of Civilians in Building Called Military Bunker by U.S., Shelter by Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 14 Feb 91, p 1.]

American military officials said that Iraq had hidden a major military communications center in the basement of a hotel used by foreigners in Baghdad, but they were reluctant to bomb the hotel for fear such attacks might cause further civilian casualties and bring about more negative world reaction. [Eric Schmitt, "Iraq Said to Hide Key War Center in a Baghdad Hotel for Foreigners," *The New York Times*, 14 Feb 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Coalition air forces flew twenty-four strike packages (three by Proven Force) and eleven B-52 strikes. The attacks concentrated on battlefield preparation and strikes against the Republican Guard. JSTARS continued to perform well in detecting and targeting enemy movements at night. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Feb 91.]

The USAF aircraft mission capable rate was 90.8 percent. One A-10 sustained battle damage to the right engine and nacelle. Proven Force reported that because F-4Gs were awaiting repair parts, the Wild Weasel

Gulf War Chronology

mission capable rates were affected. CENTAF and USAFE decided to leave vehicle assets in the queue for airlift due to the expected priority shift away from munitions. Airlift was expected to be available for vehicles within three days. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 13 Feb 91.]

All major combat ARCENT elements were in place. MARCENT units conducted an artillery and close air support raid. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 13 Feb 91.]

At least 96 of Iraq's 594 detected hardened shelters were destroyed and 242 were damaged. Analysts believed 148 aircraft were dispersed to Iran, including 122 fighters. Some helicopters were being dismantled, perhaps to be reconstituted later. Centralized control of Iraq's air defense network was severely degraded and possibly eliminated. Air defense assets operated with radars available to local surface-to-air missile or antiaircraft artillery batteries; however, early warning radars operated only a few minutes at a time and in limited sector sweeps. Some information on coalition aircraft tracks was passed by voice from Iraqi visual observer posts. The air strikes were methodically attriting Baghdad's command and control capability—twenty-one of twenty-two primary national command authority targets had been attacked. Severe damage was done to seven of nine major communications switching centers. Iraq lost 90 percent of its international AM broadcasting capability. Chemical warfare (CW) production systems were reduced 70 percent, and all CW munitions filling lines were destroyed. All known Iraqi biological warfare research and production capability was eliminated. Twenty-four of fifty-four vital railroad and highway bridges were inoperative, and Iraqi forces in the KTO were not being supplied at sustainment levels. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Hill, AF/XOWF, "Checkmate Strategic Assessment," 13 Feb 91.]

Sixteen of Iraq's estimated twenty-eight fixed Scud launchers were confirmed losses. Six of the estimated thirty-six mobile launchers were confirmed losses, and eight were listed as possible losses. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 13 Feb 91.]

Chemical warfare preparations—decontamination vehicles and trenches—suggested to analysts that Iraqi ground forces anticipated an impending allied attack. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 13 Feb 91.]

To date, Iraq had launched sixty-two Scuds: thirty at Saudi Arabia and thirty-two at Israel. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Feb 91.]

February 1991

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—516,677 (32,639 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,568

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,702 Total Sorties (Cumulative—68,384)

USAF—1,542 (Cumulative—43,263)

Offensive Counterair 58

Defensive Counterair 54

Interdiction 679

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 75

Tanker Refueling 217

Intratheater Airlift 346

Other Support 113

MARCENT—266

NAVCENT—416

ALLIED—478

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—22

USAF—9

A-10 1

AC-130 1

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 3

Non-combat

B-52 1

USN—9

A-6 4

F-14 1

F/A-18 2

Non-combat

A-7 1

F/A-18 1

USMC—4

AV-8 2

OV-10 1

Non-combat

AV-8 1

Allied Aircraft—9

A-4 (KU) 1

Gulf War Chronology

Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	5
<i>Non-combat</i>	
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft—59	
<i>Air to Air</i>	
MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
U/I	1
<i>On Ground</i>	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-23/Flogger	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	7

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 13 Feb 91.]

14 February 91 (C plus 191 /D plus 28)

POLITICAL

Bush administration officials said that they were standing firm on their assertion that the Baghdad building where Iraqi civilians were killed was a legitimate military target. While expressing remorse that hundreds of Iraqi civilians perished during the attack, U.S. officials also made clear that they were not going to investigate the incident further. [Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Stands Firm on Bomb Attack and Says Investigation Is Closed," *The New York Times*, 15 Feb 91, p 1.]

The U.S. State Department imposed a ban on travel by Americans to Iraq and Kuwait and said U.S. passports would no longer be valid for either country. State Department travel advisories stated that "all U.S. citizens are strongly urged to avoid all travel" to Kuwait and Iraq and "are advised to depart as soon as possible" from either country unless special permission had been received. ["U.S. Imposes Travel Curbs," *The New York Times*, 15 Feb 91, p 14.]

February 1991

The U.S. Department of Defense released figures that showed the Persian Gulf War left children from 17,500 families without the custodial parent who usually cared for them. [Dana Priest, "GIs Left 17,500 Children," *The Washington Post*, 15 Feb 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Coalition air forces flew twenty-seven strike packages (three by Proven Force) and eleven B-52 strikes. Two-thirds of all ground attack sorties flew battlefield preparation missions, while 15 percent flew attacks against the Republican Guard. Special Operations Forces (two MC-130s) dropped two BLU-82s on Iraqi positions in the southern and western KTO—the Army Corps' tri-border area. This was the second use of BLU-82s. F-15Es maintained continuous combat air patrols and struck Scud targets in western Iraq throughout the night. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Feb 91.]

Strategic Air Command requested increased emphasis on moving the aircraft spares backlog to and from Riyadh. Strategic bomber and tanker mission capable rates were down over the last two days from 89 to 83 percent. Mission impaired capability awaiting parts aircraft increased from 107 to 170 during the same time period. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 14 Feb 91.]

Detected activity by Iraq's air defense showed seven of sixteen intelligence operations centers and five of fifty-seven reporting posts active. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 14 Feb 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—520,544 (33,359 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,635

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,576 Total Sorties (Cumulative—70,960)

USAF—1,468 (Cumulative—44,731)

Offensive Counterair	42
Defensive Counterair	54
Interdiction	659
Close Air Support	0
SEAD	71
Tanker Refueling	222
Intratheater Airlift	298
Other Support	122

Gulf War Chronology

MARCENT—279

NAVCENT—396

ALLIED—433

[Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—23

USAF—10

A-10	1
AC-130	1
EF-111	1
F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	3

Non-combat

B-52	1
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USN—9

A-6	4
F-14	1
F/A-18	2

Non-combat

A-7	1
F/A-18	1

USMC—4

AV-8	2
OV-10	1

Non-combat

AV-8	1
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Allied Aircraft—10

A-4 (KU)	1
F-5 (SA)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	5

Non-combat

Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1

Iraqi Aircraft Lost—58

Air to Air

MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3

February 1991

Su-25/Frogfoot	2
U/I	1
<i>On Ground</i>	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-23/Flogger	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	6

[Brfg. AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 14 Feb 91.]

15 February 91 (C plus 192/D plus 29)

POLITICAL

Iraq said it was prepared to discuss compliance with the UN Security Council resolution calling for withdrawal from Kuwait if numerous conditions were met. President Bush, Prime Minister John Major of Britain, and President François Mitterrand of France all rejected the Iraqi offer. President Bush refused the offer as a "cruel hoax" and urged Iraq's military leaders to "take matters into their own hands" and force Saddam Hussein out of power. Iraq's conditions were that:

Coalition forces must stop attacking Iraqi targets, and allied soldiers and weapons sent to the region after the invasion of Kuwait, including arms sent to Israel, must be withdrawn within a month. The region must become "a zone free of foreign military bases and from any form of foreign military presence."

Israel must withdraw from the occupied territories, as spelled out in the UN resolutions, as well as from the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon, or "face the same resolutions" passed against Iraq.

The UN Security Council must repeal the eleven resolutions that condemned the Iraqi invasion, imposed economic and military sanctions on Iraq, and authorized the use of force.

The future Government of Kuwait must be based on "the people's will" and not on the "rights acquired" by Kuwait's ruling family.

Nations taking part in the war against Iraq, or helping to pay for it, must "undertake to rebuild what the aggression has destroyed." In addition, Iraq's debts to the allies must be forgiven.

Gulf War Chronology

Debts owed to the allies by Arab or Muslim nations that did not join the coalition against Iraq must also be forgiven.

Countries in the Gulf, including Iran, "Should be given the task of freely drawing up their own security arrangements in the region." [Patrick E. Tyler, "Iraqis Speak of a Withdrawal but Impose List of Conditions: Bush Denounces 'Cruel Hoax,'" *The New York Times*, 16 Feb 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

The allied air campaign continued with emphasis on attriting Republican Guard and frontline forces in the KTO. Coalition air forces flew eighteen strike packages (two by Proven Force) and ten B-52 strikes. Five packages and six B-52 strikes hit enemy ground force concentrations. F-111s, F-16s, and F-15Es patrolled rivers in Iraq and destroyed numerous pontoon bridges. Night F-111 and F-15E tank-busting continued with good success. A summary of pilot reports listed 167 tanks, 48 armored personnel carriers, 53 artillery pieces, and over 200 assorted vehicles and buildings destroyed during the 24-hour period. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Feb 91.]

USCINCCENT/J-3 requested that another ten BLU-82s be shipped to CENTAF. This made a total of twenty-five bombs requested to date. A total of eighteen BLU-82s were eventually shipped, of which eleven were dropped. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Roan, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 15 Feb 91; Ltr, AFSOC/HO to CAFH/DRE, "Gulf War Chronology," 24 January 92.]

Armed reconnaissance by U.S. ground forces, up to thirty miles inside Iraqi territory, resulted in negative contact with Iraqi forces. The mission confirmed USCENCOM's assessment of Iraqi troop displacements. Intelligence sources detected that air defense, artillery, and ground forces located in southern Iraq were experiencing shortages in petroleum-oil-lubricants, food, and other supplies. Prisoner-of-war reports confirmed that conditions in southern Iraq were leading to desertions and poor morale among the deployed units. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Feb 91.]

To date, Iraq had launched sixty-four Scud missiles: thirty-two at Saudi Arabia and thirty-two at Israel. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—523,640 (33,361 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,699

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Feb 91.]

February 1991

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,769 Total Sorties (Cumulative—73,729)

USAF—1,543 (Cumulative—46,274)

Offensive Counterair	42
Defensive Counterair	60
Interdiction	693
Close Air Support	0
SEAD	78
Tanker Refueling	216
Intratheater Airlift	313
Other Support	141

MARCENT—284

NAVCENT—491

ALLIED—451

[Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—23

USAF—10

A-10	1
AC-130	1
F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	3

Non-combat

B-52	1
EF-111	1

USN—9

A-6	4
F-14	1
F/A-18	2

Non-combat

A-7	1
F/A-18	1

USMC—4

AV-8	2
OV-10	1

Non-combat

AV-8	1
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Allied Aircraft—12

A-4 (KU)	1
F-5 (SA)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	6

Gulf War Chronology

<i>Non-combat</i>	
F-15 (SA)	1
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft—58	
<i>Air to Air</i>	
MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
U/I	1
<i>On Ground</i>	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-23/Flogger	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	6

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 15 Feb 91.]

Major Iraqi Equipment in the KTO: Overall and (Republican Guard)

Resource	Original	Destroyed/ Captured	% Remaining
Tanks	4,280	1,253	71
	(986)	(201)	(80)
Armored Vehicles	2,870	821	71
	(603)	(78)	(87)
Artillery	3,110	1,174	62
	(630)	(48)	(92)

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 15 Feb 91.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	7,228
Boarded	896
Diverted	43
Warning Shots Fired	11
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Feb 91.]

February 1991

16 February 91 (C plus 193/D plus 30)

MILITARY

Allied air forces continued to pound the Republican Guard and frontline Iraqi armor and artillery units in the KTO. They flew twenty-one strike packages (three by Proven Force) and ten B-52 strikes. F-117s attacked surface-to-air missile sites in Baghdad and breached oil pipelines used to supply Iraqi fire trenches in the KTO. F-111s, F-16s, and F-15Es continued to interdict lines of communication with attacks on bridges, pontoon construction, and barge traffic. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Feb 91.]

Analysts believed Saddam Hussein's strategy still was to hold out for the ground war. If Iraq could inflict significant casualties, the Arab world would see the war as a victory for Hussein, and the coalition would be in turmoil. They also believed Hussein would play a "propaganda card." He could call Iraq a victim of "imperialist aggression" and make himself appear as an Arab hero. Publicized and exaggerated reports on the horrors of the bombing campaign worked well to promote this propaganda effort. A concern of the analysts was that the coalition would give up its game plan. They warned against the "Vietnam mentality" of halting the air campaign with "Paris Peace Talks"-type meetings to negotiate a peace settlement. Analysts emphasized that the air plan was "correct and working" and that bombing halts would cause the allies to lose the initiative. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 16 Feb 91.]

To date, Iraq had launched sixty-five Scuds: thirty-three at Saudi Arabia and thirty-two at Israel. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Feb 91.]

General Schwarzkopf stated that in the last month 20 percent of the USCENCOM personnel strength increase (71,800) was not in the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). Those individuals were "therefore unplanned and invisible to this headquarters." He admitted that some units and elements not in the TPFDD were identified for short-notice deployment to the AOR, but "they account for only a small part of the increase." "I am certain," he said, "that much of the flow of unplanned units and individuals is the result of unilateral decisions by in-theater commands to expand their force levels to satisfy a perceived need that has not been validated by this headquarters." The general was also certain "that some enterprising individuals are simply finding ways to get to the war by any means." "I understand the motivation," he remarked, "but we simply cannot do business this way." General Schwarzkopf's solution to this problem was to impose a theater ceiling of 530,000 troops. This total was apportioned as follows: ARCENT—292,964; MARCENT—92,371;

Gulf War Chronology

NAVCENT—83,286; CENTAF—55,221; SOCCENT—4,725; and Headquarters—1,433. [Msg, USCINCCENT to COMUSCENTAF, et al., "Force End-Strength Ceiling," 16/1230z Feb 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—525,918 (33,861 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,850

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,378 Total Sorties (Cumulative—76,107)

USAF—1,382 (Cumulative—47,656)

Offensive Counterair	29
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Defensive Counterair	48
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Interdiction	637
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Close Air Support	0
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SEAD	46
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Tanker Refueling	191
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Intratheater Airlift	302
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Other Support	129
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MARCENT—271

NAVCENT—309

ALLIED—416

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—27

USAF—13

A-10	3
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AC-130	1
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F-4G	1
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F-15E	2
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F-16	3
------	---

Non-combat

B-52	1
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EF-111	1
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F-16	1
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USN—10

A-6	5
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F-14	1
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F/A-18	2
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Non-combat

A-7	1
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F/A-18	1
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February 1991

USMC—4	
AV-8	2
OV-10	1
Non-combat	
AV-8	1
Allied Aircraft—12	
A-4 (KU)	1
F-5 (SA)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	6
Non-combat	
F-15 (SA)	1
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft—58	
Air to Air	
MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
U/I	1
On Ground	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-23/Flogger	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	6

[Brig. AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 16 Feb 91.]

17 February 91 (C plus 194/D plus 31)

POLITICAL

Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz arrived in Moscow for a meeting with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Moscow hoped to discern whether Iraq's conditional offer for withdrawal from Kuwait represented an opening bid to end the war. [R.W. Apple, "U.S. Troops Clash with Iraqi Forces On Saudi Frontier," *The New York Times*, 18 Feb 91, p 1.]

Gulf War Chronology

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) complained that Iraq had, without justification, prevented Red Cross representatives from meeting allied prisoners of war. Mr. Cornelio Sommaruga, President of the ICRC, said there was no credible figure on how many prisoners of war Iraq was holding and no information about the conditions of their confinement. [Clyde Haberman, "Red Cross Is Frustrated on Prisoners in Iraq," *The New York Times*, 18 Feb 91, p 6.]

MILITARY

Twenty-seven packages and ten B-52 strikes were flown. Four Proven Force packages were canceled due to poor weather. Although hampered by weather, 111 sorties were flown specifically against the Scud threat. F-15Es reported getting large secondary explosions from an attack against a Scud launch site in western Iraq. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Feb 91.]

The air operations were shifted from strategic and operational interdiction to the tactical preparation of the battlefield for a ground offensive. The focus of the campaign was on the destruction of frontline forces. Primary targets were the Republican Guard, armor, artillery, and chemical-biological weapons. The USCENCOM leadership was confident that the Iraqi forces they would meet during an offensive would be attrited to the overall goal of 50 percent. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Feb 91.]

Analysts believed the Iraqi leadership would continue its strategy of defense in depth. Iraq was striving to retain lines of communication in the KTO through the use of pontoon bridges, bypasses, and ferries. Also, analysts believed that the Iraqi leadership thought its theater forces could survive the coalition air campaign with sufficient combat power to achieve a battlefield stalemate. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Feb 91.]

Iraqi air defense activity was extremely light. Only one of sixteen intelligence operations centers and four of fifty-seven reporting posts were detected active. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 17 Feb 91.]

To date, Iraq had launched sixty-eight Scud missiles: thirty-three at Saudi Arabia and thirty-five at Israel. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—526,878 (34,117 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,781

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Feb 91.]

February 1991

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,143 Total Sorties (Cumulative—78,250)

USAF—1,320 (Cumulative—48,976)

Offensive Counterair	47
Defensive Counterair	62
Interdiction	469
Close Air Support	0
SEAD	75
Tanker Refueling	220
Intratheater Airlift	320
Other Support	127

MARCENT—146

NAVCENT—397

ALLIED—280

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—27

USAF—13

A-10	3
AC-130	1
F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	3

Non-combat

B-52	1
EF-111	1
F-16	1

USN—10

A-6	5
F-14	1
F/A-18	2

Non-combat

A-7	1
F/A-18	1

USMC—4

AV-8	2
OV-10	1

Non-combat

AV-8	1
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Allied Aircraft—12

A-4 (KU)	1
F-5 (SA)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	6

Gulf War Chronology

<i>Non-combat</i>	
F-15 (SA)	1
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft—58	
<i>Air to Air</i>	
MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
U/I	1
<i>On Ground</i>	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-23/Flogger	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	6

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 17 Feb 91.]

18 February 91 (C plus 195/D plus 32)

POLITICAL

In Moscow, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev launched a personal diplomatic initiative to end the Persian Gulf War and presented Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz with a detailed plan for a political settlement. The Gorbachev plan, which was not discussed with President Bush or other leaders of the anti-Iraq coalition, provided for a full Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait in accordance with UN resolutions. Aziz left Moscow, only sixteen hours after his arrival, to return to Iraq and brief President Saddam Hussein on the peace plan. [Michael Dobbs, "Gorbachev Offers Peace Plan to Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 19 Feb 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Weather conditions over parts of Iraq and the KTO hampered air operations. While over 1,000 sorties hit targets, over 400 attack sorties were canceled due to unfavorable weather. Aircraft from Proven Force flew four packages hitting nuclear and missile production facilities. B-52s flew eight

February 1991

mine-breaching strikes. The UAE Air Force flew its first combat sorties of the war, employing Mirage 2000 aircraft against targets in southern Kuwait. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Feb 91.]

Three MC-130s each dropped one BLU-82 (15,000-lb) bomb on targets at Faylaka Island. These missions, the third use of BLU-82s, were flown with support from USAF and NAVCENT air assets. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Feb 91.]

ARCENT forces conducted artillery raids with multi-launch rocket systems and eight-inch field artillery. Aerial reconnaissance and attack helicopter raids were also conducted. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 18 Feb 91.]

A total of forty-two Iraqi bridges were damaged and forty-five destroyed. Destroyed bridges included thirty-four highway, seven pontoon, three railroad, and one highway ferry. Among the damaged bridges were five highway bridges that remained passable. Iraq's oil refining operations were shut down: 79 percent was lost due to bombing, and the remainder voluntarily closed. Conventional weapons production was degraded by 20 to 25 percent. The available ammunition supply to divisions in the KTO equated to fourteen to sixteen days of high-intensity combat. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Howey, AF/XOWF, "Checkmate Strategic Assessment," 18 Feb 91.]

To date, Iraq had launched sixty-nine Scud missiles: thirty-three at Saudi Arabia and thirty-six at Israel. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—527,613 (34,092 women)
Total CENTAF Personnel—54,898
[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,957 Total Sorties (Cumulative—81,207)

USAF—1,718 (Cumulative—50,694)
Offensive Counterair 44
Defensive Counterair 64
Interdiction 709
Close Air Support 2
SEAD 90
Tanker Refueling 241
Intratheater Airlift 423
Other Support 145

Gulf War Chronology

MARCENT—283

NAVCENT—475

ALLIED— 481

[Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—27

USAF—13

A-10 3

AC-130 1

EF-111 1

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 3

Non-combat

B-52 1

F-16 1

USN—10

A-6 5

F-14 1

F/A-18 2

Non-combat

A-7 1

F/A-18 1

USMC—4

AV-8 2

OV-10 1

Non-combat

AV-8 1

Allied Aircraft—12

A-4 (KU) 1

F-5 (SA) 1

Tornado (IT) 1

Tornado (UK) 6

Non-combat

F-15 (SA) 1

Tornado (SA) 1

Tornado (UK) 1

Iraqi Aircraft—58

Air to Air

MiG-21/Fishbed 4

MiG-23/Flogger 9

MiG-25/Foxbat 2

MiG-29/Fulcrum 6

February 1991

Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
U/I	1
On Ground	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-23/Flogger	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	6

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 18 Feb 91.]

19 February 91 (C plus 196/D plus 33)

POLITICAL

In a ninety-minute interview with the media, General Schwarzkopf said that Iraq's military machine was on the verge of collapse. General Schwarzkopf also said that Iraq's military capabilities were probably overrated from the start. [David Lamb, "Schwarzkopf Says Iraqi Military Is Losing Tanks, on Verge of Collapse," *The Washington Post*, 20 Feb 91, p 1.]

President Bush said that Moscow's formula for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait "falls well short of what would be required" to stop the war with Iraq. A detailed U.S. response to the proposal was sent to the Soviets. [Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Criticizes Soviet Plan as Inadequate to End War: Iraqi May Revisit Moscow," *The New York Times*, 20 Feb 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Improved weather allowed allied air forces to resume full-scale air operations. Forty-six packages and fifteen B-52 strikes were flown against a full range of targets in Iraq and the KTO, including the Republican Guard, armor, artillery, airfields, lines of communication, and command and control. Proven Force flew four packages against targets in northern Iraq and B-52s again flew numerous mine breaching missions against defenses along the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border. Over ninety dedicated anti-Scud missions were flown. F-15Es also began laying minefields at probable Scud launch sites with CBU-89s. Over 800 air-to-ground sorties were dedicated to battlefield preparation in the KTO. Over seventy sorties with precision-guided munitions were targeted specifically against tanks. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Feb 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

Psychological operations (PSYOPs) radio, Voice of the Gulf, broadcast Iraqi prisoner of war appeals, invitations to surrender, and descriptions of the favorable treatment prisoners received. MARCENT tactical PSYOP teams employed a 2,700-watt loudspeaker for the first time to broadcast surrender appeals across the forward lines. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Feb 91.]

ARCENT forces conducted "dismounted" cross-border patrols and counter-reconnaissance operations. The 82d Airborne conducted a deep attack against Iraqi tanks, artillery, and bunkers. These limited operations produced no responses by enemy forces. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 19 Feb 91.]

The combat capability of the Iraqi Air Force (IZAF) was as low as 20 percent due to the number of destroyed aircraft, aircraft in Iran, destroyed hardened shelters, dispersed aircraft, damage to runways, and degraded command-control-communications centers. The IZAF could not be effectively employed, but its capability to deliver chemical weapons—as demonstrated during the Iran-Iraq War—kept it a serious threat. Aircraft were the only accurate and proven platform Iraq had to deliver chemical weapons to the coalition rear area. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Feb 91; Msg, USCENAF INTEL to AIG 12929, "CENTAF DESERT STORM Intelligence Summary 91-067," 19/0438z Feb 91.]

Morale within Iraq's committed infantry divisions was poor. Recent diplomatic initiatives indicated the Iraqi leadership was considering a withdrawal. While analysts believed withdrawal was more likely than attack, unless Iraq gained a commitment to international talks on the Palestinian issue, defense of Kuwait would continue. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Feb 91.]

Sources indicated that elements of Iraqi forces in Kuwait were augmented by SA-1six (surface-to-air) missile teams. These teams were believed to be made up of six personnel with up to twelve missiles per person. The SA-16 greatly enhanced the low-to-medium air defense umbrella. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Feb 91.]

Kuwaiti resistance elements reported that Iraq imposed a 24-hour curfew on all Kuwaiti citizens in Kuwait City. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Feb 91.]

February 1991

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—530,208 (35,165 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,887

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,882 Total Sorties (Cumulative—84,089)

USAF—1,655 (Cumulative—52,349)

Offensive Counterair 38

Defensive Counterair 56

Interdiction 693

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 74

Tanker Refueling 230

Intratheater Airlift 410

Other Support 154

MARCENT—303

NAVCENT—484

ALLIED— 440

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—29

USAF—15

A-10 3

AC-130 1

EF-111 1

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 4

OA-10 1

Non-combat

B-52 1

F-16 1

USN—10

A-6 5

F-14 1

F/A-18 2

Non-combat

A-7 1

F/A-18 1

USMC—4

AV-8 2

OV-10 1

Gulf War Chronology

<i>Non-combat</i>	
AV-8	1
Allied Aircraft—12	
A-4 (KU)	1
F-5 (SA)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	6
<i>Non-combat</i>	
F-15 (SA)	1
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft—62	
<i>Air to Air</i>	
MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
U/I	1
<i>On Ground</i>	
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-23/Flogger	2
Su-17/22/Fitter	4
Su-25/Frogfoot	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
U/I	3
Non-combat losses	6

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 19 Feb 91.]

20 February 91 (C plus 197/D plus 34)

POLITICAL

The U.S. and Britain told Moscow that the Persian Gulf cease-fire proposal was unacceptable because it lacked a tight timetable for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and did not compel Baghdad to accept all UN Security Council Resolutions on the crisis. [Paul Lewis, "U.S. and Britain Insist on Deadline," *The New York Times*, 21 Feb 91, p 1.]

February 1991

MILITARY

Coalition air forces attacked selected strategic targets with twenty-seven packages (two by Proven Force) and nine B-52 strikes. Over 800 sorties were dedicated to attacking armor, artillery, and vehicle and troop concentrations in the KTO. Initial battle damage assessments from pilot reports indicate 80 tanks, 84 artillery tubes, 157 vehicles, 42 armored personnel carriers, and numerous miscellaneous targets were destroyed. B-52s again concentrated on breaching defenses, although one cell hit an ammunition dump with spectacular secondary explosions reported. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Feb 91.]

The fourth BLU-82 operation was against two Iraqi Army divisions' logistics points. The two bombs were dropped from 21,000 feet rather than 16,000 feet above ground level because of thunderstorms. Both MC-130 aircraft flew into violent weather, without radars, and successfully dropped their bombs. Due to the violent storms, USCENTCOM was unable to get any bomb damage assessment from that mission. [Ltr, AFSOC/HO to CAFH/DRE, "Gulf War Chronology," 24 Jan 92.]

The USAF aircraft mission capable rate was 92.9 percent. CENTAF supply priorities were: munitions, spare aircraft engines, petroleum-oil-lubricants, resupply, and war readiness spares kits. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Kolpin, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 20 Feb 91.]

ARCENT forces were making final preparations for offensive operations. MARCENT units continued with cross-border reconnaissance missions and combined arms raids. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 20 Feb 91.]

ARCENT reconnaissance operations resulted in the capture of up to 400 Iraqi prisoners. A document of oath was recently found on an Iraqi lance corporal prisoner of war. In it, the lance corporal agreed that he would personally be responsible for the defection of troops under his command. This document was the first indication that Iraqi leaders in the KTO were being held personally responsible for the defections of subordinates. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Feb 91.]

Iraqi air defense activity was extremely light. None of the sixteen intelligence operations centers were active and only five of fifty-seven reporting posts were detected active. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 20 Feb 91.]

Resistance reports indicated that Iraq was using civilian vehicles for resupply in the KTO. Yellow or blue Kuwaiti governmental vehicles, including garbage trucks, were being used to transport ammunition and

Gulf War Chronology

other items to the southern front and coast. The use of civilian vehicles was a common practice by the Iraqi Army during the Iran-Iraq war. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Feb 91.]

To date, Iraq had launched seventy Scud missiles: thirty-three at Saudi Arabia and thirty-seven at Israel. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—532,482 (34,670 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,723

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,385 Total Sorties (Cumulative—86,474)

USAF—1,399 (Cumulative—53,748)

Offensive Counterair 82

Defensive Counterair 50

Interdiction 546

Close Air Support 0

SEAD 78

Tanker Refueling 218

Intratheater Airlift 296

Other Support 129

MARCENT—164

NAVCENT—417

ALLIED— 405

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft Lost—30

USAF—16

A-10 3

AC-130 1

EF-111 1

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 4

OA-10 1

Non-combat

B-52 1

F-16 2

USN—10

A-6 5

F-14 1

February 1991

F/A-18	2
<i>Non-combat</i>	
A-7	1
F/A-18	1
USMC—4	
AV-8	2
OV-10	1
<i>Non-combat</i>	
AV-8	1
Allied Aircraft—12	
A-4 (KU)	1
F-5 (SA)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	6
<i>Non-combat</i>	
F-15 (SA)	1
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft—62	
<i>Air to Air</i>	
MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
U/I	1
<i>On Ground</i>	
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-23/Flogger	2
Su-17/22/Fitter	4
Su-25/Frogfoot	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
U/I	3
Non-combat losses	6

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 20 Feb 91.]

Major Iraqi Equipment in the KTO: Overall and (Republican Guard)

Resource	Original	Destroyed/ Captured	% Remaining
Tanks	4,280 (986)	1,477 (346)	65 (65)

Gulf War Chronology

Armored Vehicles	2,870	864	70
	(603)	(118)	(80)
Artillery	3,110	1,324	57
	(630)	(66)	(90)

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 20 Feb 91.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	7,339
Boarded	916
Diverted	45
Warning Shots Fired	11
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Feb 91.]

21 February 91 (C plus 198/D plus 35)

POLITICAL

Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz returned to Moscow with Saddam Hussein's response to the Soviet proposal for ending the Gulf War. [Maureen Dowd, "Soviets Say Iraq Accepts Kuwait Pullout," *The New York Times*, 22 Feb 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Coalition air forces attacked selected strategic targets with fifty-one packages (two by Proven Force). Eleven B-52 strikes were also scheduled. Weather in Iraq and the KTO caused the cancellation of over 500 tactical sorties. Although hindered by weather in the morning, fighters in the afternoon were able to strike KTO targets with emphasis on artillery and armor positions. Navy packages concentrated on airfields, bridges, railroad yards, and targets within the KTO. MARCENT air focused on priority artillery positions in its sector and dropped napalm on three Iraqi flame trenches to test its effectiveness to ignite and burn off the oil. Results were very positive. B-52s concentrated on breaching defenses, artillery positions, logistic and fuel sites, and one Scud support mission. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Feb 91.]

General Schwarzkopf requested an additional ten BLU-82 (15,000-lb) bombs be delivered no later than 2 March. The bombs would be used to clear minefields. To date, fifteen had been shipped to the AOR and twenty were being prepared for shipment. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Roan, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 21 Feb 91; Ltr, AFSOC/HO to CAFH/DRE, "Gulf War Chronology," 24 January 92.]

February 1991

A 35-meter section of the Spanish pipeline providing fuel for Moron, Torrejon, and Zaragoza Air Bases was blown up by saboteurs. The pipeline was fixed before the problem impacted on flying operations. [Point Paper, Maj. Draper, AF/LGXX, "Spanish Pipeline Sabotage," 21 Feb 91.]

A tactical psychological operations (PSYOPs) loudspeaker team supported ARCENT forces during a cross-border raid. Upon hearing PSYOP appeals taped by prisoners of war, over 400 Iraqi soldiers surrendered. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Feb 91.]

Iraqi ground forces were less responsive to allied probing maneuvers. MARCENT artillery raids against enemy positions in the border area resulted in secondary explosions and no returned fire. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 21 Feb 91.]

For the tenth consecutive day, there was no Iraqi fixed-wing flight activity. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 21 Feb 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—532,489 (34,494 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,543

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,627 Total Sorties (Cumulative—89,101)

USAF—1,511 (Cumulative—55,259)

Offensive Counterair 48

Defensive Counterair 52

Interdiction 678

Close Air Support 2

SEAD 85

Tanker Refueling 215

Intratheater Airlift 287

Other Support 144

MARCENT—257

NAVCENT—435

ALLIED—424

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—30

USAF—16

A-10 3

AC-130 1

EF-111 1

Gulf War Chronology

F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	4
OA-10	1
<i>Non-combat</i>	
B-52	1
F-16	2
USN—10	
A-6	5
F-14	1
F/A-18	2
<i>Non-combat</i>	
A-7	1
F/A-18	1
USMC—4	
AV-8	2
OV-10	1
<i>Non-combat</i>	
AV-8	1
Allied Aircraft—12	
A-4 (KU)	1
F-5 (SA)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	6
<i>Non-combat</i>	
F-15 (SA)	1
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft—69	
<i>Air to Air</i>	
MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
<i>On Ground</i>	
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-21/Fishbed	3
MiG-23/Flogger	2
MiG-25/Foxbat	4
MiG-29/Fulcrum	3

February 1991

Su-17/22/Fitter	5
Su-25/Frogfoot	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	6

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 21 Feb 91.]

22 February 91 (C plus 199/D plus 36)

POLITICAL

After a meeting between Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and President Mikhail Gorbachev, Moscow announced that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein gave a "positive" response to the Soviet peace plan and agreed to withdraw from Kuwait. [Serge Schmemann, "Soviets Say Iraq Accepts Kuwait Pullout Linked to Truce and an End to Sanction: Bush Cites 'Concerns' and Puts Off Reply," *The New York Times*, 22 Feb 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Allied air forces took advantage of improved weather to continue hammering Iraqi ground forces. Overall, 89 percent of combat sorties targeted Iraqi ground forces and the Republican Guard in southeast Iraq and Kuwait. Twenty-four packages (two by Proven Force) and fourteen B-52 strikes were flown. Special Operations MC-130 aircraft dropped two BLU-82 (15,000-lb) bombs on targets in southern Kuwait. This was the fifth and final use of BLU-82s. Initial battle damage assessment estimates for the day include 59 artillery, 193 armor, and 137 vehicles destroyed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Feb 91.]

General Schwarzkopf noted that, with the arrival of the 196th Field Artillery Brigade, the closure of all combat forces dedicated to Operation DESERT STORM was completed. "I am extremely proud of all those who contributed to bringing this powerful force to bear against our enemy," he stated. "The individual and collective effort that has taken place to deploy, train, and tactically position this force has been magnificent." In six months, more than six million short tons of equipment and supplies was moved into Saudi Arabia along with more than 500,000 U.S. and 240,000 allied troops. He concluded by stating, "We are now in position to attack and destroy the enemy and will do so when ordered." [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Feb 91.]

Most Iraqi airfields were severely disrupted. Moderate damage was done to 60 percent of the maintenance facilities. Ninety of Iraq's 594 detected hardened shelters were destroyed and 282 were damaged. There

Gulf War Chronology

were 137 aircraft dispersed to Iran, including 111 fighters. [Point Paper, Maj. Cullen, AF/XOWF, "Checkmate Strategic Assessment," 22 Feb 91.]

Iraqi air defense activity was extremely light. Only three of sixteen intelligence operating centers and ten of fifty-seven reporting posts were detected active. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 22 Feb 91.]

To date, Iraq had launched seventy-four Scud missiles: thirty-six at Saudi Arabia, thirty-seven at Israel, and 1 at Bahrain. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—533,608 (34,510 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,595

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 22/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,906 Total Sorties (Cumulative—92,007)

USAF—1,614 (Cumulative—56,873)

Offensive Counterair 44

Defensive Counterair 62

Interdiction 685

Close Air Support 24

SEAD 80

Tanker Refueling 208

Intratheater Airlift 362

Other Support 149

MARCENT—402

NAVCENT—445

ALLIED—445

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—30

USAF—16

A-10 3

AC-130 1

EF-111 1

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 4

OA-10 1

Non-combat

B-52 1

F-16 2

February 1991

USN—10	
A-6	5
F-14	1
F/A-18	2
<i>Non-combat</i>	
A-7	1
F/A-18	1
USMC—4	
AV-8	2
OV-10	1
<i>Non-combat</i>	
AV-8	1
Allied Aircraft—12	
A-4 (KU)	1
F-5 (SA)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	6
<i>Non-combat</i>	
F-15 (SA)	1
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft—70	
<i>Air to Air</i>	
MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
<i>On Ground</i>	
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-21/Fishbed	3
MiG-23/Flogger	2
MiG-25/Foxbat	4
MiG-29/Fulcrum	3
Su-17/22/Fitter	6
Su-25/Frogfoot	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	6

[Brfg. AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 22 Feb 91.]

23 February 91 (C plus 200/D plus 37)

POLITICAL

President Bush made the following statement at the White House:

Yesterday, after conferring with my senior national security advisers and following extensive consultations with our coalition partners, Saddam Hussein was given one last chance, set forth in very explicit terms, to do what he should have done more than six months ago: withdraw from Kuwait without condition or further delay and comply fully with the resolutions passed by the UN Security Council.

Regrettably, the noon deadline passed without the agreement of the government of Iraq to meet demands of United Nations Security Council Resolution 660, as set forth in the specific terms spelled out by the coalition to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait.

To the contrary, what we have seen is a redoubling of Saddam Hussein's efforts to destroy completely Kuwait and its people.

I have therefore directed General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, in conjunction with coalition forces, to use all forces available, including ground forces, to eject the Iraqi Army from Kuwait.

Once again, this was a decision made only after extensive consultations within our coalition partnership. The liberation of Kuwait has now entered a final phase. I have complete confidence in the ability of the coalition forces to swiftly and decisively accomplish their mission.

Tonight as this coalition of countries seeks to do that which is right and just, I ask only that all of you stop what you were doing all day and say a prayer for all the coalition forces, and especially for our men and women in uniform, who this very moment are risking their lives for their country and for all of us.

May God bless and protect each and every one of them and may God bless the United States of America.

Thank you very much. [“One Last Chance,” Now “the Final Phase,” *The New York Times*, 24 Feb 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Good weather in the KTO allowed packaged and unpackaged missions to hit selected airfields, bridges, surface-to-surface missile production, nuclear-biological-chemical, and command-control-communications tar-

February 1991

gets in the KTO. Twelve B-52 strikes breached defenses and hit infantry positions. U.S. A-10s and AV-8s, along with F-16s, F/A-18s, and AE-6s, pounded armor, artillery, and troop positions. Saudi F-5s and Tornados, Kuwaiti A-4s and F-1s, and UAE Mirage 2000s attacked artillery, rocket launcher, and infantry positions. British Tornados and Buccaneers struck airfields while Jaguars hit targets in the KTO. French Jaguars and Mirage 2000s, and Italian Tornados concentrated on logistic sites and other kill-zone targets. F-15Es, A-10s, and F-16s flew almost ninety sorties against the Scud threat, with one F-15E attack on a Scud site resulting in secondaries that lasted for three minutes. F-111s and F-15Es targeted artillery as well as tanks with precision guided weapons. A rough estimate of the day's battle damage assessment from pilot reports indicated that 178 tanks, 97 armored personnel carriers, 202 trucks and vehicles, 201 artillery and multiple rocket launchers, 66 revetments, buildings, bunkers, and 2 anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles destroyed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Feb 91.]

The USAF aircraft mission capable rate was 91.5 percent. The total USAF mission impaired capability awaiting parts aircraft was 316. On D-day (17 January) the total was 216. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Roan, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 23 Feb 91.]

USCENTCOM psychological operations radio, Voice of the Gulf, broadcast news, information, and messages encouraging surrender and emphasizing futility. Instructions for surrendering after a ground offensive began were also given to Iraqi forces. MARCENT and ARCENT tactical elements used loudspeakers during cross-border reconnaissance and probing missions. An MC-130 leaflet drop was canceled due to unfavorable winds. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Feb 91.]

Coalition cross-border operations were opposed by light Iraqi resistance. Iraqi forces were expected to continue their defensive posture within the KTO. Analysts believed field commanders were reviewing and refining their counterattack plans in anticipation of the coalition ground offensive. To increase the reliability of first-echelon regular infantry, Iraqi General Headquarters was expected to position reliable fighting units—Republican Guard infantry or commandos—to the rear of the first echelon. Within the next forty-eight hours, analysts believed decontamination units and chemical munitions would be deployed to final positions within forward divisions and brigades. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Feb 91.]

To date, Iraq had launched seventy-five Scud missiles: thirty-seven at Saudi Arabia, thirty-seven at Israel, and one at Bahrain. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Feb 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—535,967 (34,510 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,552

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—3,041 Total Sorties (Cumulative—95,048)

USAF—1,643 (Cumulative—58,516)

Offensive Counterair 46

Defensive Counterair 104

Interdiction 590

Close Air Support 128

SEAD 70

Tanker Refueling 247

Intratheater Airlift 297

Other Support 161

MARCENT—484

NAVCENT—436

ALLIED—478

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—30

USAF—16

A-10 3

AC-130 1

EF-111 1

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 4

OA-10 1

Non-combat

B-52 1

F-16 2

USN—10

A-6 5

F-14 1

F/A-18 2

Non-combat

A-7 1

F/A-18 1

USMC—4

AV-8 2

OV-10 1

February 1991

<i>Non-combat</i>	
AV-8	1
Allied Aircraft—12	
A-4 (KU)	1
F-5 (SA)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	6
<i>Non-combat</i>	
F-15 (SA)	1
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft—70	
<i>Air to Air</i>	
MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
<i>On Ground</i>	
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-21/Fishbed	3
MiG-23/Flogger	2
MiG-25/Foxbat	4
MiG-29/Fulcrum	3
Su-17/22/Fitter	6
Su-25/Frogfoot	1
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
Non-combat losses	6

[Brfg. AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 23 Feb 91.]

24 February 91 (C plus 201/D plus 38)

POLITICAL

The ground assault against Iraq began after President Bush's deadline for the start of an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait slipped by with no sign in word or deed that Saddam Hussein would comply. [R.W. Apple, "Intense Bombardment, Then Thousands Attack," *The New York Times*, 24 Feb 91, p 1.]

Allied troops drove into Iraqi-occupied Kuwait, reaching the outskirts of Kuwait City in the biggest American-led assault since World War II. The

Gulf War Chronology

onslaught by the allies touched off one of the largest battles in decades, as opposing troops fought for occupation of Kuwait's capital city. Allied losses were reported to be extremely light. [R.W. Apple, "Allies Report Fast Advances in Iraq and Kuwait, with Little Resistance and Thousands of Iraqis Prisoners," *The New York Times*, 25 Feb 91, p 1.]

To protect the security of American troops, Defense Secretary Cheney announced that no details on the ground operations would be given until several hours after the events transpired. The daily briefing schedules in both Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and Washington, D.C., were suspended as part of the news blackout. [Patrick E. Tyler, "Cheney Cancels News Briefings on Gulf Assault," *The New York Times*, 24 Feb 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

The ground campaign against Iraq began at 0400 Riyadh time (23 February at 2000 Washington, D.C., time). The mission of the ground offensive was to neutralize Iraq's national command authority, eject Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait, destroy the Republican Guard, destroy Iraq's ballistic missiles, destroy Iraq's nuclear-biological-chemical capability, and assist in the restoration of the legitimate government in Kuwait. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 24 Feb 91.]

General Schwarzkopf's execute order read, in part: "The ground offensive must be conducted with the same speed and efficiency that coalition forces have exhibited so far in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM operations. We must quickly and effectively close with and destroy the Iraqi forces to our front while minimizing coalition casualties. We will soundly defeat the enemy and restore the sovereignty of Kuwait. I have total confidence in each and every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine. What you do today will shape the world for years to come. Godspeed. We are going home through Kuwait." [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 24 Feb 91.]

Over 3,000 sorties were flown as a prelude to the start of offensive ground operations. A total of 1,905 combat sorties were flown in good weather with only minor deviations due to smoke over parts of the KTO. Over 1,200 coalition ground attack sorties hit armor, artillery, infantry, and other KTO targets, while others targeted selected airfields, bridges, arms plants, nuclear-biological-chemical plants, and command-control-communications sites. Forty-three B-52s flew fourteen strikes on defenses and infantry positions in the KTO. A rough estimate of the day's battle damage assessment from pilot reports indicated that 77 tanks, 58 armored personnel carriers, 245 trucks and vehicles, 133 artillery and multiple rocket launchers, 53 revetments, buildings, and bunkers, and 4 antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles destroyed. Allied counterair assets initiated a revised

February 1991

counterair plan to seal off the KTO to any reemergence of an Iraq air-to-ground threat. U.S. and Saudi F-15s, Navy F-14s and F/A-18s, U.K. and Saudi Tornados, Canadian CF-18s, Bahraini F-16s, and French Mirage 2000s manned continuous combat air patrols from the Red Sea to the Gulf and throughout Iraq. With the start of the ground campaign, allied air power swung to full support of the air-land battle, with over 400 close-air support sorties planned. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Feb 91.]

The coalition members of the allied ground forces were Saudi Arabia (four mechanized infantry brigades and one armored brigade), Syria (one armored division), Egypt (one mechanized infantry division), and Kuwait, Bangladesh, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, and Qatar (each with one mechanized infantry brigade). [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 24 Feb 91.]

The Royal Canadian Air Force was scheduled to fly its first air interdiction sorties in support of Operation DESERT STORM. [Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 24/0800z Feb 91.]

General Horner said that, while the air campaign continued in full force, the "primary emphasis [was] on supporting maneuvering friendly ground forces." He added, "I have directed stringent target identification measures in [an] aggressive effort to ensure munitions are delivered only on enemy forces." [Msg, USCENTAF to AIG 9671, "Sitrep," 24/0800z Feb 91.]

Hard Target Penetrator Munitions (HTPMs) were moved to Eglin AFB, Florida, on two C-130s from Schnectady, New York. Tactical Air Command requested that twenty-six HTPMs be sourced for the AOR by 31 March. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Knox, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 24 Feb 91.]

There was no response to the ground offensive by the Iraqi Air Force. Iraqi ground forces responded with uncoordinated efforts. Deliberate sabotage of Kuwaiti resources continued, and use of chemical weapons by Iraqi forces was expected. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 24 Feb 91.]

Previous enemy prisoner-of-war reports, indicating that units would surrender en masse, appeared to be accurate as attacks by coalition forces resulted in the surrender or capture of over 5,200 prisoners. Iraqi forces in Kuwait made efforts to fire free rocket over ground (FROG) missiles. While the FROGs were chemical weapons-capable, there were no clear indications of impending Iraqi use of chemical weapons. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Feb 91.]

Analysts believed Iraqi forces would attempt to identify and halt the coalition's main attack with a defense in depth and local counterattacks.

Gulf War Chronology

Iraq's goal was to turn the ground war into a battle of attrition. Analysts expected Iraq to initiate chemical operations within twenty-four hours. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Feb 91.]

To date, Iraq had launched seventy-eight Scud missiles: thirty-nine at Saudi Arabia, thirty-eight at Israel, and one at Bahrain. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—536,687 (34,814 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,615

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—3,062 Total Sorties (Cumulative—98,110)

USAF—1,648 (Cumulative—60,164)

Offensive Counterair	28
Defensive Counterair	106
Interdiction	535
Close Air Support	193
SEAD	76
Tanker Refueling	259
Intratheater Airlift	296
Other Support	155

MARCENT—436

NAVCENT—442

ALLIED— 536

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—31

USAF—16

A-10	3
AC-130	1
EF-111	1
F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	4
OA-10	1

Non-combat

B-52	1
F-16	2

USN—10

A-6	5
F-14	1

February 1991

F/A-18	2
Non-combat	
A-7	1
F/A-18	1
USMC-5	
AV-8	3
OV-10	1
Non-combat	
AV-8	1
Allied Aircraft-12	
A-4 (KU)	1
F-5 (SA)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	6
Non-combat	
F-15 (SA)	1
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft-80	
Air to Air	
MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
On Ground	
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-21/Fishbed	5
MiG-23/Flogger	6
MiG-25/Foxbat	4
MiG-29/Fulcrum	3
Mirage F-1	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	6
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
U/I	2
Non-combat losses	6

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 24 Feb 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

Major Iraqi Equipment in the KTO: Overall and (Republican Guard)

Resource	Original	Destroyed/ Captured	% Remaining
Tanks	4,280 (986)	1,688 (422)	61 (57)
Armored Vehicles	2,870 (603)	929 (143)	68 (76)
Artillery	3,110 (630)	1,452 (115)	53 (82)

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 24 Feb 91.]

25 February 91 (C plus 202/D plus 39)

POLITICAL

A federal judge refused to order the military to allow the news media to photograph coffins of the Persian Gulf War dead when they were returned to the United States. The judge, Royce Lamberth, said he did not consider the government's refusal to allow media coverage of the war dead arrivals at Dover AFB, Delaware, to be "improper or irrational." The suit was brought by members of the media, veterans' groups, and a support group of military families who said the Pentagon was preventing the news coverage "to limit the emotional impact and significance of the fact Americans are being killed." ["Suit to View War Dead Fails," *Baltimore Sun*, 26 Feb 91, p 3.]

MILITARY

Low ceilings and rain showers over parts of the KTO hampered air operations early in the day. The rapid advance of ground troops into Iraq and Kuwait required retargeting of preplanned close-air support and battlefield air interdiction missions. B-52s en route to the KTO also were assigned new targets located deeper in enemy territory. Close-air support aircraft supported troops in contact when needed, with light resistance throughout the front relegating most air-to-ground sorties to "kill zone" targets well behind enemy lines. A rough estimate of the day's battle damage assessment from pilot reports indicated that 76 tanks, 66 armored personnel carriers, 151 trucks and vehicles, 98 artillery and multiple rocket launchers, 60 revetments, buildings, and bunkers, and 8 antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles were destroyed. In addition to direct battlefield support, allied aircraft continued to hit airfields, bridges, command-control-communications sites, leadership, and ammunition production and storage targets. Anti-Scud efforts continued with ten confirmed Scud launchers destroyed or damaged in western Iraq. Following the Scud launches, immediate attacks were made on both the launch sites

February 1991

with large secondary explosions reported. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Feb 91.]

There was no reaction by the Iraqi Air Force to the allied ground offensive. Air defenses showed some increase in early warning activity, but none of the sixteen intelligence operations centers and only two of the fifty-seven reporting posts were detected active. Eighty percent of the surface-to-air missiles fired by Iraq were infrared-guided systems. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 25 Feb 91.]

The Iraqi corps commander in Kuwait committed elements of armor and mechanized divisions in an attempt to stop the advance of coalition forces in the heel of Kuwait. Enemy brigades were committed piecemeal. It appeared that the corps commander could not execute a division-level counterattack and was controlling only the movement of brigades. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Feb 91.]

To date, Iraq had launched eighty-one Scud missiles: forty at Saudi Arabia, forty at Israel, and one at Bahrain. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—537,675 (34,838 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,611

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,881 Total Sorties (Cumulative—100,991)

USAF—1,518 (Cumulative—61,682)

Offensive Counterair 38

Defensive Counterair 68

Interdiction 354

Close Air Support 302

SEAD 69

Tanker Refueling 233

Intratheater Airlift 307

Other Support 147

MARCENT—382

NAVCENT—556

ALLIED—425

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Feb 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—31

USAF—16

A-10	3
AC-130	1
EF-111	1
F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	4
OA-10	1

Non-combat

B-52	1
F-16	2

USN—10

A-6	5
F-14	1
F/A-18	2

Non-combat

A-7	1
F/A-18	1

USMC—5

AV-8	3
OV-10	1

Non-combat

AV-8	1
------	---

Allied Aircraft—12

A-4 (KU)	1
F-5 (SA)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	6

Non-combat

F-15 (SA)	1
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1

Iraqi Aircraft—80

Air to Air

MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2

February 1991

On Ground

Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-21/Fishbed	5
MiG-23/Flogger	6
MiG-25/Foxbat	4
MiG-29/Fulcrum	3
Mirage F-1	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	6
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
U/I	2
Non-combat losses	6

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 25 Feb 91.]

Major Iraqi Equipment in the KTO: Overall and (Republican Guard)

Resource	Original	Destroyed/ Captured	% Remaining
Tanks	4,280	1,722	59
	(986)	(425)	(57)
Armored Vehicles	2,870	948	67
	(603)	(145)	(76)
Artillery	3,110	1,474	52
	(630)	(129)	(79)

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 25 Feb 91.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	7,515
Boarded	947
Diverted	48
Warning Shots Fired	11
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Feb 91.]

26 February 91 (C plus 203/D plus 40)

POLITICAL

Baghdad Radio announced that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had ordered Iraqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait. The announcement came only hours after an Iraqi Scud missile killed twenty-seven and injured ninety-eight U.S. soldiers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. White House spokesperson Marlin Fitzwater stated, "We have no evidence to suggest the Iraqi Army is withdrawing. In fact, Iraqi units are continuing to fight." Regarding Iraq's pullout offer, Fitzwater said, "There has been no contact with our

Gulf War Chronology

government. There has been no authoritative contact with the UN that we're aware of. We don't consider there to be anything to respond to. He [Saddam Hussein] can agree to the UN resolutions at any time. Our offer is the UN resolution." [Robert Ruby, "U.S. Dismisses Iraq Pullout Order," *Baltimore Sun*, 26 Feb 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Coalition air forces continued to hammer Iraq's remaining military capabilities throughout the theater, as ground forces continued their rapid advance. Marginal weather in the KTO and much of Iraq worsened as the day wore on, hampering air operations with increasing frequency. Coalition ground attack fighters hit enemy armor and artillery convoys found moving south, and continued to pound lucrative targets in "kill zones" beyond the fire support coordination lines. Over 500 close-air support sorties provided direct support to the fast-moving ground forces. B-52 strikes ranged from infantry units to military production plants. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Feb 91.]

ARCENT operations were well executed. The advance against Iraqi forces was ahead of schedule. MARCENT forces penetrated to within ten miles of Kuwait City. Coalition forces made significant advances but were slowed by the large number of enemy prisoners of war. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 26 Feb 91.]

USCENTCOM psychological operations (PSYOPs) radio, Voice of the Gulf, instructed Iraqi unit commanders to call on a specific high frequency to surrender their units. Other PSYOP appeals encouraged Iraqi soldiers to surrender for the sake of their children. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Feb 91.]

A Scud struck a U.S. Army barracks at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing twenty-seven and wounding ninety-eight. The missile was in the envelope of two Patriot batteries, but neither system launched against it. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 26 Feb 91.]

Twelve Iraqi Army divisions were rendered combat ineffective. The collapse of the ground forces occupying Kuwait was believed to be imminent. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 26 Feb 91.]

Iraqi frontline infantry divisions offered little resistance to advancing coalition attacks. Heavy elements of the Iraqi forces in Kuwait appeared to be fighting a withdrawal under pressure west of Kuwait International Airport. The lines of communication from Kuwait City to Basra were reported to be jammed with Iraqi forces trying to withdraw to Iraqi terri-

February 1991

tory. Elements of the Republican Guard were reacting to the coalition attack from the west. There were no indications of Iraqi intentions to employ chemical weapons. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Feb 91.]

Iraq launched a Scud missile at Saudi Arabia. According to USCENCOM reports, Iraq had launched a total of eighty-three Scud missiles: forty-two at Saudi Arabia, forty at Israel, and one at Bahrain. According to the USAF Chief of Staff briefing, Iraq had launched a total of eighty-six Scud missiles: forty-six at Saudi Arabia and forty at Israel. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Feb 91; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 26 Feb 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—538,417 (34,955 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,629

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—3,159 Total Sorties (Cumulative—104,150)

USAF—1,673 (Cumulative—63,355)

Offensive Counterair 52

Defensive Counterair 106

Interdiction 490

Close Air Support 280

SEAD 47

Tanker Refueling 280

Intratheater Airlift 280

Other Support 138

MARCENT—405

NAVCENT—664

ALLIED—417

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—34

USAF—16

A-10 3

AC-130 1

EF-111 1

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 4

OA-10 1

Non-combat

B-52 1

Gulf War Chronology

F-16	2
USN—10	
A-6	5
F-14	1
F/A-18	2
<i>Non-combat</i>	
A-7	1
F/A-18	1
USMC—8	
AV-8	5
OV-10	2
<i>Non-combat</i>	
AV-8	1
Allied Aircraft—12	
A-4 (KU)	1
F-5 (SA)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	6
<i>Non-combat</i>	
F-15 (SA)	1
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft—80	
<i>Air to Air</i>	
MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
<i>On Ground</i>	
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-21/Fishbed	5
MiG-23/Flogger	6
MiG-25/Foxbat	4
MiG-29/Fulcrum	3
Mirage F-1	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	6
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
U/I	2

February 1991

Non-combat losses 6
[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 26 Feb 91.]

Major Iraqi Equipment in the KTO: Overall and (Republican Guard)

Resource	Original	Destroyed/ Captured	% Remaining
Tanks	4,280 (986)	1,865 (403)	56 (59)
Armored Vehicles	2,870 (603)	992 (168)	65 (72)
Artillery	3,110 (630)	1,462 (82)	52 (87)

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 26 Feb 91.]

27 February 91 (C plus 204/D plus 41)

POLITICAL

UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar accepted a statement from Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz stating that Iraq would comply with all twelve UN resolutions. [Frank J. Murray, "Iraq Says It Will OK Cease-Fire," *The Washington Times*, 28 Feb 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Over 450 close-air support sorties were flown as Iraqi units crumbled under the combined air-ground assault. Tactical air assets patrolled rivers and roads, taking out bridges and causeways, and attacked bottled-up convoys of retreating Iraqi forces. Low ceilings and rain again caused reliance on aircraft radar delivery systems in much of the KTO. Ground attack aircraft working under low ceilings reported cases of heavy antiaircraft artillery and numerous shoulder fired surface-to-air missile launches. A B-52 sustained battle damage when two of four SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (probably fired ballistically) exploded 1,000 feet below the aircraft. By late in the day, most of southern Kuwait was in allied hands, and Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center aircraft moved their orbit into Kuwait to facilitate communications. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Feb 91.]

ARCENT forces continued attacks to penetrate and envelop enemy forces. Forces were postured to destroy the Republican Guard. MARCENT advanced against moderate resistance. They controlled key road intersections west-northwest of Kuwait and moved to secure Kuwait International Airport for special operations forces to land. A "pan-Islamic" force prepared to enter Kuwait City. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 27 Feb 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

Four Iraqi Corps were no longer combat effective. The Hamurabi Republican Guard's armor division with its three armor brigades and two mechanized infantry brigades made up the final defensive and reserve force of the Iraqi Army in the KTO. A north-south defensive line existed approximately seventeen miles west of Basra. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—539,282 (35,355 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,544

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—2,940 Total Sorties (Cumulative—107,090)

USAF—1,651 (Cumulative—65,006)

Offensive Counterair 16

Defensive Counterair 118

Interdiction 443

Close Air Support 267

SEAD 79

Tanker Refueling 248

Intratheater Airlift 297

Other Support 183

MARCENT—147

NAVCENT—671

ALLIED— 471

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Feb 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—35

USAF—17

A-10 3

AC-130 1

EF-111 1

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 4

OA-10 2

Non-combat

B-52 1

F-16 2

USN—10

A-6 5

F-14 1

F/A-18 2

February 1991

<i>Non-combat</i>	
A-7	1
F/A-18	1
USMC-8	
AV-8	5
OV-10	2
<i>Non-combat</i>	
AV-8	1
Allied Aircraft—12	
A-4 (KU)	1
F-5 (SA)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	6
<i>Non-combat</i>	
F-15 (SA)	1
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1
Iraqi Aircraft—91	
<i>Air to Air</i>	
MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
<i>On Ground</i>	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-21/Fishbed	7
MiG-23/Flogger	6
MiG-25/Foxbat	5
MiG-29/Fulcrum	3
Mirage F-1	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	7
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
U/I	8
Non-combat losses	6

[Brfg. AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 27 Feb 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

Major Iraqi Equipment in the KTO: Overall and (Republican Guard)

Resource	Original	Destroyed/ Captured	% Remaining
Tanks	4,280 (986)	2,040 (404)	52 (59)
Armored Vehicles	2,870 (603)	1,009 (172)	65 (71)
Artillery	3,110 (630)	1,505 (91)	52 (86)

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 27 Feb 91.]

28 February 91 (C plus 205/D plus 42)

POLITICAL

A House Appropriations subcommittee approved President Bush's request for \$15 billion to pay the U.S. share of the Persian Gulf War costs. The subcommittee also authorized the Defense Department to spend \$38 billion from an account holding foreign countries' contributions to the war effort. However, the panel rebuffed the administration's request to spend the foreign monies as it wished, subjecting the gifts to congressional approval. [John E. Yang, "Panel Backs \$15 Billion for the War," *The Washington Post*, 1 Mar 91, p 33.]

Saudi and U.S. military officials began registering more than 50,000 Iraqi prisoners and searching for war criminals. Some of the prisoners held by the allies eventually would be tried in Kuwaiti tribunals for crimes committed during the Iraqi occupation, while others were expected to be given sanctuary from the Iraqi government. [R. Jeffrey Smith, "Flood of 50,000-Plus Iraqi Prisoners Clogs Allied Processing Machinery," *The Washington Post*, 1 Mar 91, p 28.]

MILITARY

Allied offensive operations were suspended by President Bush, effective 0800 Riyadh time (27 February 2400 in Washington, D.C.). CENTAF forces stood down before beginning the 28 February air tasking order. USCENTCOM forces assumed a defensive posture, but remained prepared to resume offensive operations. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 28 Feb 91.]

Allied air forces concentrated on killing enemy hardware and supporting ground troops in the final battles before the cease-fire went into effect. Poor weather again produced low ceilings and limited visibility in the northern KTO area. Tactical air assets relied on all-weather systems to hit bridges and causeways, keeping the Republican Guard and other remaining Iraqi ground units bottled up. Often with stiff resistance, ground attack

February 1991

fighters targeted armor and heavy vehicle movements in the areas of northern Kuwait and southeastern Iraq not occupied by coalition ground forces. Deep strikes hit ammunition storage, chemical/biological storage, railroad yards, missile production facilities, and numerous airfields. Ba'ath Party headquarters and other military targets in Baghdad were struck. As the day progressed, close-air support and battlefield air interdiction missions were canceled due to lack of targets. At the cease-fire, little resistance remained in the KTO area. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Feb 91.]

U.S. AWACS surveillance flights continued. Combat air patrols continued over Baghdad, over coalition-occupied Iraq, over Kuwait, and in protection of AWACS and naval assets. The Scud combat air patrol over western Iraq also remained in place. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Feb 91.]

The USAF aircraft mission capable rate was 92.8 percent. A B-52 sustained damage to its aft section with holes in the left and right wings, flaps, and stabilizers. An F-16 sustained battle damage to the underside—forty holes in the fuselage—and fuel line damage. [Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 28 Feb 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—539,321 (35,355 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,531

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Feb 91.]

CENTAF Flight Activity—992 Total Sorties (Cumulative—108,082)

USAF—575 (Cumulative—65,581^{*})

Offensive Counterair 0

Defensive Counterair 86

Interdiction 32

Close Air Support 25

SEAD 0

Tanker Refueling 143

Intratheater Airlift 215

Other Support 74

MARCENT—30

NAVCENT—187

ALLIED—200

^{*}65,247 sorties were flown from 17 January (D-day) to 28 February at 0800, the date and time the cease-fire took effect in the AOR.

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z March 91]

Gulf War Chronology

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—35

USAF—17

A-10	3
AC-130	1
EF-111	1
F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	4
OA-10	2

Non-combat

B-52	1
F-16	2

USN—10

A-6	5
F-14	1
F/A-18	2

Non-combat

A-7	1
F/A-18	1

USMC—8

AV-8	5
OV-10	2

Non-combat

AV-8	1
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Allied Aircraft—12

A-4 (KU)	1
F-5 (SA)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	6
<i>Non-combat</i>	
F-15 (SA)	1
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1

Iraqi Aircraft—97

Air to Air

MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2

February 1991

On Ground

An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-21/Fishbed	9
MiG-23/Flogger	8
MiG-25/Foxbat	5
MiG-29/Fulcrum	3
Mirage F-1	1
Su-17/Fitter	11
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22/Blinder	1
U/I	6
Non-combat losses	6

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 28 Feb 91.]

Major Iraqi Equipment in the KTO: Overall and (Republican Guard)

Resource	Original	Destroyed/ Captured	% Remaining
Tanks	4,280	2,040	52
	(986)	(404)	(59)
Armored Vehicles	2,870	1,009	65
	(603)	(172)	(71)
Artillery	3,110	1,505	52
	(630)	(91)	(86)

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 28 Feb 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

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March 1991

1 March 91 (C plus 206/D plus 43)

POLITICAL

President Bush announced that allied and Iraqi commanders would meet on the battlefield to make arrangements for a permanent cease-fire. He said the meeting would focus on the details of the release of prisoners, allied demands that Iraq disclose the location of all land and sea mines, and the coalition's insistence that the Iraqi Army give up any hope of reclaiming the armor and artillery it left behind on the battlefield. The allies would be represented by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf and senior commanders from other coalition countries. [Andrew Rosenthal, "Allied General and Iraqis to Meet Soon on Cease-Fire: Bush Stresses P.O.W. Return," *The New York Times*, 2 Mar 91, p 1.]

Edward W. Gnehm, the new U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait, arrived in Kuwait City. Ambassador Gnehm replaced Nathaniel Howell, who left the embassy on 13 December 1990. [Donatella Lorch, "Old Glory Returns to Kuwaiti Capital," *The New York Times*, 2 Mar 91, p 6.]

MILITARY

Surveillance orbits and defensive combat air patrols continued over northern Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Six A-10s were scrambled around midday due to the threat of a possible confrontation on the battlefield. Tensions subsided and the situation was under control by the time the aircraft arrived. Reconnaissance as well as A-10, F-15E, and F-16 Scud response missions continued. The 43-day air war ended with an overall

Gulf War Chronology

aircraft mission capable rate of 93.4 percent. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Mar 91.]

ARCENT forces were in blocking positions to control Iraqi ground forces ingress and egress. MARCENT continued to hold objectives at the limits of its advance. Coalition forces worked security missions in Kuwait. [Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 1 Mar 91.]

USCENTCOM psychological operations (PSYOP) radio, Voice of the Gulf, broadcast news and information pertaining to President Bush's announcement of the cease-fire. Other PSYOP messages were calls for Iraqi soldiers to abandon their equipment, and surrender appeals to unit commanders isolated in the KTO. Tactical loudspeakers conducted vehicle- and helicopter-mounted operations throughout the theater to announce the cease-fire, induce surrender from remaining Iraqi units, and prevent civilian interference in military operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Mar 91.]

Composed of Support Command elements and the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force, Task Force FREEDOM arrived in Kuwait City. The mission of the task force was to conduct civil military operations to support and assist the government of Kuwait in its restoration and reconstruction efforts. Also, assessment teams from the International Committee of the Red Cross, Kuwaiti Red Crescent, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees departed Dhahran and were en route to Kuwait City. The teams would assess requirements for medical and humanitarian relief operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Mar 91.]

Small elements of enemy forces continued to exist. There was a pocket of approximately eight armor battalions and three mechanized battalions located to the southwest of Basra that appeared to be organizing themselves into some type of coherent unit, possibly establishing a small defense of the city. Other Iraqi forces still trapped in the KTO were expected to attempt to reconstitute and withdraw to the north of Basra. These forces were expected to try to salvage their equipment and extricate themselves. The Iraqi Army was attempting to establish communications with Basra in order to control withdrawing forces. National authorities were expected to attempt to reestablish control over the civilian infrastructure and to coordinate civil and military reconstitution efforts. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Mar 91.]

March 1991

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—540,396 (35,355 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,632

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Mar 91.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—37

USAF—18

A-10 3

AC-130 1

F-4G 1

F-15E 2

F-16 5

OA-10 2

Non-combat

B-52 1

EF-111 1

F-16 2

USN—10

A-6 5

F-14 1

F/A-18 2

Non-combat

A-7 1

F/A-18 1

USMC—9

AV-8 6

OV-10 2

Non-combat

AV-8 1

Allied Aircraft—12

A-4 (KU) 1

F-5 (SA) 1

Tornado (IT) 1

Tornado (UK) 6

Non-combat

F-15 (SA) 1

Tornado (SA) 1

Tornado (UK) 1

Iraqi Aircraft—97

Air to Air

MiG-21/Fishbed 4

MiG-23/Flogger 9

Gulf War Chronology

MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9
Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
<i>On Ground</i>	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-21/Fishbed	9
MiG-23/Flogger	8
MiG-25/Foxbat	5
MiG-29/Fulcrum	3
Mirage F-1	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	11
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22 Blinder	1
U/I	6
Non-combat losses	6

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief" 1 Mar 91.]

Major Iraqi Equipment in the KTO: Overall

Resource	Original	Destroyed/ Captured	% Remaining
Tanks	4,280	3,008	30
Armored Vehicles	2,870	1,856	35
Artillery	3,110	2,140	31

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 1 Mar 91.]

2 March 91 (C plus 207/D plus 44)

POLITICAL

Allied officials and refugees reported that Basra, Iraq's second largest city, had been engulfed in chaos by the arrival of troops and vehicles driven from Kuwait in the last days of the war. Civil government had completely broken down, and foes of Saddam Hussein were taking advantage of the anarchic conditions to foment a popular revolt. [R.W. Apple, "Chaos Is Reported in Iraqi City: U.S. Said to Win New Tank Fight," *The New York Times*, 3 Mar 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Allied air forces maintained an active air defense posture and full readiness to resume offensive operations. Four continuous AWACS orbits and ten combat air patrols were being manned along borders and over

March 1991

friendly positions within Iraq. A continuous F-15 combat air patrol was maintained over Baghdad and F-111s helped show allied presence over that city during the night hours. Twenty-eight A-10s maintained thirty-minute and two-hour ground alert status, and 25 percent of ground attack and support aircraft maintained a two-hour posture. A-10s and F-15Es flew Scud response combat air patrols in western Iraq while F-16s provided airborne response capability in the east. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Mar 91.]

An estimated ten heavy battalions remained in the Basra salient (seven tank battalions and three mechanized battalions). Those forces continued to withdraw to the north of the city, but in some cases they appeared to lack cohesive leadership. The lack of effective military control led to a hostile engagement in the ARCENT sector. Several large traffic jams were created by units trying to cross the Euphrates River east of Basra. Six hundred vehicles were lined up at a pontoon bridge. The vehicles consisted of tanks, armored personnel carriers, buses, trucks, and sedans. A second site had 200 civilian and military vehicles lined up waiting to transit at a ferry crossing site. A third cluster was located near a destroyed bridge where seventy-five trucks were snarled in a traffic jam at the road intersection when the drivers realized that the bridge was impassable. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—540,758 (35,321 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,706

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Mar 91.]

Maritime Interception Operations—(Totals to Date)

Ships Challenged	7,673
Boarded	963
Diverted	49
Warning Shots Fired	11
Refused to Stop	3

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Mar 91.]

3 March 91 (C plus 208/D plus 45)

POLITICAL

The cease-fire meeting between coalition and Iraqi commanders was held at Safwan Airfield, Iraq. General Schwarzkopf, USCINCCENT, and Lt. Gen. Khalid bin Sultan, Commander Joint Arab Forces, met for two hours with Lt. Gen. Sultan Hashim Ahmad, Chief of Staff of the Iraqi

Gulf War Chronology

Ministry of Defense, and Lt. Gen. Sala Abud Mahmud, the Iraqi III Corps commander. Prisoner of war exchange was the first issue discussed. Both sides agreed to let the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) handle the logistics of the trade. This agreement included Kuwaiti civilians (over 5,000) who were taken to Iraq and coalition troops still listed as missing in action. General Schwarzkopf made the recommendation that an immediate symbolic release of prisoners be accomplished by using ICRC aircraft. Another topic raised was the coalition desire for information on minefields in Kuwait and mines placed in coastal or international waters. The Iraqis immediately presented maps having the desired information. General Schwarzkopf then stated, "We would also like to know the location if there are any chemical, biological, or nuclear munitions stored in anywhere within Kuwait [sic]." General Ahmad replied, "There are no such things. There are some munitions, but they are just on the ground. . . . Nothing is hidden. Not chemical or biological. Just ammunition for artillery and the rest." The Iraqis agreed to provide information on munitions storage areas that their forces established in Kuwait. Regarding flight activity, General Schwarzkopf stated that coalition forces had control of the air over Iraq "and we intend to keep that until the cease fire is called." The purpose of the flights was safety, "to make sure that we do not have any hostile aircraft attack us." General Ahmad cited the poor condition of Iraqi roads and bridges and said, "We would like to agree that helicopter flights sometimes are needed to carry some of the officials, government officials, or any members that [need] to be transported. . . ." General Schwarzkopf agreed, ". . . military helicopters can fly over Iraq." But he added, "Not fighters, not bombers." [Transcript, "Cease Fire Discussions with Iraqis at Safwan Airfield, Iraq," USCENTCOM Command Center, 3 Mar 91.]

MILITARY

Allied air forces maintained an active air defense posture and full readiness to resume offensive operations. Four continuous AWACS orbits and ten combat air patrols were manned along borders and over friendly positions within Iraq. A continuous F-15 combat air patrol was maintained over Baghdad and F-111s helped show allied presence over that city during the night hours. Thirty-eight fighters maintained thirty-minute ground close-air support alert while an additional 250 aircraft stood on two-hour ground alert. Reconnaissance and intelligence collection flights continued. A-10s and F-15Es flew Scud response combat air patrols in western Iraq. Numerous fighter and command and control aircraft would be airborne to support the military talks at Safwan Airfield. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Mar 91.]

Kuwait City was placed under martial law with Kuwaiti Major General Jaber in command. Coalition forces turned their zones over to Kuwaiti

March 1991

forces at 1200 Kuwait City time. Kuwaiti resistance fighters were replaced by Kuwaiti military forces. The military government's priorities were to disarm the resistance and civilians and identify Palestinians. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Mar 91.]

Approximately 1,000 displaced Kuwaiti civilians, who left the Baghdad area in private automobiles, were intercepted on Highway 8 and detained in an assembly area. The highway south to Kuwait was reported to be mined and impassable. U.S. forces were instructed not to allow civilians to use the roads. MARCENT, ARCENT, and British forces were working to clear Highway 8. ARCENT was stockpiling food and water rations for up to 350,000 displaced civilians for nine days at Kuwait International Airport. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Mar 91.]

Reports from Kuwait City indicated that the principal emergency services problem was lack of electrical power. This problem affected the water distribution system and other necessary public utilities. There was no estimate available on how soon power could be restored. There were no critical water or food shortages. Hospitals were being cleaned. The ministry of health released a convoy from Dhahran with medical supplies, generators, and vehicles for use by the hospitals and clinics in Kuwait City. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Mar 91.]

Iraqi helicopter activity continued in the vicinity of Basra. Eight Mi-17/HIP sorties were flown as well as nine additional unidentified sorties. The activity may have been related to crowd control. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—540,466 (35,192 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,626

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Mar 91.]

4 March 91 (C plus 209/D plus 46)

POLITICAL

The wreckage of the Air Force AC-130 that was missing for more than a month was located in the Persian Gulf, one mile off the coast of Kuwait's southern border. Pentagon officials believed all fourteen crewpersons to be dead. [Mary Jordan, "Wreckage of Gunship Found in Gulf: 14 Believed Dead," *The Washington Post*, 7 Mar 91, p 25; Ltr, AFSOC/HO to CAFH/DRE, "Gulf War Chronology," 24 January 92.]

Gulf War Chronology

Iraq freed ten allied prisoners of war, including six Americans. U.S. officials believed six Americans were still held as prisoners, and listed thirty-two as missing in action. [Dan Balz and Lee Hockstader, "Iraq Releases 10 POWs, 6 Americans," *The Washington Post*, 5 Mar 91, p 1.]

Supporters and foes of Saddam Hussein clashed in Basra and up to a dozen other cities in southern Iraq, marking the worst civil unrest of the Iraqi president's reign. Defeated soldiers joined Shiite fundamentalists, long opposed to Saddam Hussein's rule, in an effort to bring down his government. Troops from the elite Republican Guard were said to back the Iraqi leader, and used their tanks and artillery on the protesters. [R.W. Apple, "Iraqi Clashes Said to Grow as Troops Join in Protests: First Allied Captives Freed," *The New York Times*, 5 Mar 91, p 1.]

Army Lt. Gen. Thomas Kelly, Operations Director for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced his retirement. General Kelly delivered daily press briefings at the Pentagon during the Persian Gulf War. ["Kelly Exits with Praise For Media," *The Washington Post*, 5 Mar 91, p 14.]

MILITARY

Allied air forces continued an active air defense posture and full readiness to resume offensive operations. Four continuous AWACS orbits, one continuous Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center orbit, and ten combat air patrols were manned along borders and over friendly positions within Iraq. F-15s maintained a presence over Baghdad. Reconnaissance and intelligence collection flights continued. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Mar 91.]

Task Force FREEDOM and its component civil affairs and support command elements were located in the vicinity of Kuwait International Airport. Damage assessment survey teams were dispatched to survey critical services and facilities. The restoration of electrical power throughout the city was given priority. Power restoration was critical to the reinstating water and sewage systems and other services. Team members were also concentrating on cleaning hospitals and renewing medical services. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Mar 91.]

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was working with both the Iraqi and coalition forces in coordinating enemy prisoners of war (EPW) exchange. Iraqi EPWs were being interviewed by the ICRC to confirm their desires for repatriation. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Mar 91.]

March 1991

Initial surveys of the oil well fires started by Iraqi forces in Kuwait would be conducted by contractors who arrived from Houston. Preliminary information led contractors to believe that one-quarter to one-third of the fires could be extinguished by capping fires at the wellhead. This could occur as early as the end of March. Other fires could take much longer to extinguish. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Mar 91.]

Iraqi ground forces continued to focus their efforts on withdrawing forces from the Basra salient. Approximately six heavy battalions remained in this sector. Movement continued to be impeded by traffic jams and lack of crossing sites. Also, indications were that the volume of civil unrest incidents continued to increase in various cities of southern Iraq. Analysts believed domestic problems would be further exacerbated when captured Iraqi soldiers returned home. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—540,565 (35,146 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,553

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 04/2115z Mar 91.]

Iraqi Equipment in the KTO: Overall

Resource	Original	Destroyed/ Captured	% Remaining
Tanks	4,280	3,089	28
Armored Vehicles	2,870	1,961	32
Artillery	3,110	2,145	31

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 4 Mar 91.]

5 March 91 (C plus 210/D plus 47)

POLITICAL

Baghdad radio announced that Saddam Hussein had voided the annexation of Kuwait. Iraq released thirty-five more prisoners of war, including fifteen Americans, and turned them over to the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Iraqi government also agreed to return seized Kuwaiti assets, including gold, currency, airliners, and the contents of the Kuwaiti art museum. [R.W. Apple, "Iraq Disavows Annexation, Pledging to Repay Kuwait: Rebellion May Be Subsiding," *The New York Times*, 6 Mar 91, p 1.]

Republican Guard troops, still loyal to Saddam Hussein, continued to battle insurgents in Basra and at least four other cities. President Bush announced that the United States had no plans to fuel the unrest in Iraq.

Gulf War Chronology

[Nora Boustany, "Republican Guard Reported Battling Insurgents in Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 6 Mar 91, p 1; Bill Gertz, "No U.S. Plan to Agitate Iraq," *The Washington Times*, 6 Mar 91, p 1.]

At least twenty-eight Western journalists were missing, including four Americans. They were last seen traveling toward Basra, an area of fierce fighting between supporters and opponents of Saddam Hussein. The journalists were traveling independently, as the Defense Department "pool" reporting system was disbanded after fighting ended. [Howard Kurtz, "28 Journalists Missing after Driving into Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 6 Mar 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Full readiness to respond to any contingency was maintained. Three continuous AWACs orbits and seven continuous combat air patrols were manned along borders and over Kuwait. F-15s maintained a presence over Baghdad. Scud response missions were discontinued. Air-to-air and ground attack fighters continued various levels of ground alert status. Reconnaissance and intelligence collection flights continued. Selected units began preparing for redeployment. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Mar 91.]

Redeployment Phase I (first 22 days) proposed service airlift was as follows:

Service Component	Passengers/ Day	Short Tons/ Day
ARCENT	3,200	100
MARCENT	1,200	500
CENTAF	1,000	600
SOCCENT	150	300
NAVCENT	225	50
EUCOM	50	200
CINCCENT	<u>25</u>	<u>200</u>
Total	5,850	1,950

[Point Paper, Lt. Col. Fisher, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Logistics Update," 5 Mar 91.]

Iraqi ground forces continued to focus their efforts on withdrawing from the Basra salient. Approximately five heavy battalions remained in this sector as well as elements of a free rocket over ground (FROG) battalion and an artillery brigade. Movement across the Euphrates River continued to be impeded by traffic jams and lack of crossing sites. Elements of several Republican Guard divisions were reportedly placed under the command of regular army corps. If true, analysts believed the new task organization could serve two possible purposes: to ensure the loyalty of regular army

March 1991

units and to assist in quelling the domestic unrest in southern Iraqi cities. Military units were being used to contain internal rebellion, and in Basra, small groups of military vehicles and support units were positioned along roads. A number of checkpoints were established throughout the city. The government appeared capable of controlling the unrest at its present level. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—540,721 (35,068 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,379

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 05/2115z Mar 91.]

6 March 91 (C plus 211/D plus 48)

POLITICAL

Thirty-five allied prisoners of war, including fifteen Americans, were flown from Baghdad to Riyadh. Two International Red Cross airplanes, that earlier in the day had carried 294 Iraqi prisoners to Baghdad, were used for the flight. [Rick Atkinson, "15 Americans among Second Group of POWs Flying to Freedom," *The Washington Post*, 7 Mar 91, p 25.]

Despite a violent revolt in Basra by Iraqi rebels, Saddam Hussein's forces were reported to be regaining control, although fighting continued in some areas. Iraqi Kurdish guerrilla commander Masoud Barzani, who hesitated to join the uprising, decided to commit thousands of his troops to the rebellion. Barzani's hesitation stemmed from fears of renewed repression by Baghdad, which in the past two decades involved razing 4,000 Kurdish villages, displacing hundreds of thousands of Kurds, and killing thousands of civilians with poison gas. [Robert Ruby, "Forces Loyal to Hussein Gain Control," *Baltimore Sun*, 7 Mar 91, p 1; Jonathan C. Randal, "Kurdish Troops Reported Set to Join Rebellion," *The Washington Post*, 7 Mar 91, p 31.]

Japan's Diet gave final approval for an additional \$9 billion to help pay allied expenses of the Persian Gulf War. The new contribution brought Japan's total contribution to about \$13 billion. [T.R. Reid, "Japan Pledges \$9 Billion for Gulf War," *The Washington Post*, 7 Mar 91, p 18.]

MILITARY

Three continuous AWACS orbits and seven continuous combat air patrols were manned along borders and over Kuwait. F-15s maintained a presence over Baghdad. Air-to-air and ground attack fighters held various levels of ground alert status. Reconnaissance and intelligence collection

Gulf War Chronology

flights continued. Selected units began preparing for redeployment. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Mar 91.]

The Iraqi Air Force began making initial attempts to reconstitute. Dispersed aircraft, fixed-wing and helicopters, were noted returning to their home bases. Runways at Saddam International Airport were cleared of obstacles, while repair efforts were noted at several air fields. Also, as many as thirty-five helicopters were active in Iraq. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Mar 91.]

Iraqi ground forces focused their efforts on withdrawing from the Basra salient. Remaining elements were impeded by traffic jams and lack of crossing sites. According to an enemy prisoner of war, four additional Republican Guard divisions may have been formed during the war. This Iraqi lieutenant colonel identified units that conceivably would facilitate Saddam Hussein's attempts to maintain his hold on power. Civil unrest continued in cities in southern Iraq, but Iraqi forces appeared to be gradually gaining control. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—540,331 (35,028 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—54,090

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 06/2115z Mar 91.]

7 March 91 (C plus 212/D plus 49)

POLITICAL

Secretary of State James Baker began his trip to visit leaders of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Turkey, Israel, and the Soviet Union to discuss matters pertaining to regional security, arms control, economic cooperation, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Baker did not visit Jordan's King Hussein nor the Palestine Liberation Organization's Yasser Arafat because of their support for Saddam Hussein during the Persian Gulf War. [Johanna Neumann, "Baker Won't Propose Any Postwar Plan," *USA Today*, 4 Mar 91, p 1.]

The first wave of 5,188 American troops returned home from the Persian Gulf. At Langley AFB, Virginia, Air Force Secretary Donald B. Rice and Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill A. McPeak presided over a ceremony honoring all men and women who served in the Gulf. The ceremony coincided with the arrival of 520 members of the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing in three waves of F-15, C-141, KC-130, and TR-1 aircraft. [Barton Gellman, "Troops Begin Coming Home," *The Washington Post*, 8 Mar 91, p 23.]

March 1991

The House of Representatives voted to appropriate \$15 billion to pay for the Persian Gulf War, after warning other countries to fulfill their pledges of aid. The \$15 billion measure also spelled out procedures for using the contributions from other countries first and U.S. dollars last. [Adam Clymer, "House, Voting \$15 Billion for War, Warns Allies to Pay Their Part," *The New York Times*, 8 Mar 91, p 11.]

MILITARY

Coalition air forces continued to maintain an active air defense posture with reductions consistent with relaxation of tensions. Two continuous AWACS orbits and six continuous combat air patrols were manned along borders and over Kuwait. Air-to-ground alert posture was reduced to 25 percent of available aircraft loaded with ordnance, and 10 percent of the aircraft and crews were on two-hour alert. Reconnaissance and intelligence collection flights continued. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Mar 91.]

The State Department was concerned about the well-being of Iraqis and other nationalities fleeing intra-fractional fighting in southern Iraq. The State Department recommended encouraging the International Committee of the Red Cross to establish emergency accommodations on the Iraqi side of the border for those fleeing Iraq. State's assessment was that the situation inside Kuwait was too fragile to assure the well-being of the Iraqis. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Mar 91.]

USCENTCOM revised the airlift allocation for Phase I of the redeployment as follows:

Service Component	Passengers/ Day	Short Tons/ Day
ARCENT	1,200	100
MARCENT	450	500
CENTAF	400	600
SOCCENT	150	300
NAVCENT	225	50
EUCOM	50	200
CINCCENT	<u>25</u>	<u>200</u>
Total	2,500	1,950

The affected components—ARCENT, MARCENT, CENTAF—were alerted to be ready to reinstate the original allocation (5 March) on short notice.

[Point Paper, Maj. Whicker, AF/LEYX-LRC, "Redeployment Update," 7 Mar 91]

Iraqi ground forces continued to focus their efforts on withdrawing forces out of the Basra salient. Remaining elements continued to be impeded by traffic jams, lack of crossing sites, and lack of coordination and

Gulf War Chronology

command and control. Internal civil disturbances continued in cities in southern Iraq, but Iraqi forces appeared to be gradually gaining control through sheer volume of firepower with artillery, armor, and helicopters. At least 130 Iraqi helicopters were flown in southern Iraq. Over one-half of these sorties consisted of Mi-24/Hind and SA-342/Gazelle ground attack sorties against insurgents in various cities. This activity demonstrated the regime's determination to destroy the insurgency despite the potential heavy damage to southern cities. Some unrest and violence also was reported in Kurdistan. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Mar 91; Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—539,075 (34,920 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—53,647

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 07/2115z Mar 91.]

Iraqi Equipment in the KTO: Overall

Resource	Original	Destroyed/ Captured	% Remaining
Tanks	4,280	3,700	14
Armored Vehicles	2,870	2,400	16
Artillery	3,110	2,600	16

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 7 Mar 91.]

8 March 91 (C plus 213/D plus 50)

POLITICAL

In a revival of public hostility toward Iraq, Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani called for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's resignation. "The majority of the Iraqi people are saying they do not want these leaders anymore, and now want to govern themselves." The Iranian president also said, "If the people say they are ready to accept the ruins which you will leave them, you [Saddam Hussein] should take this offer from the people." [Alan Cowell, "Iran's Leader Calls on Hussein to Quit," *The New York Times*, 9 Mar 91, p 6.]

Reportedly, allied intelligence agencies intercepted communications from Iraq's military command in Baghdad authorizing the use of chemical weapons against antigovernment rebels. A Bush administration official stated, "They [the Iraqis] were authoritatively warned." However, the official did not say what steps the administration might take if the Iraqis used the poison gas. [Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Warns Against Using Gas to End Rebellion," *The New York Times*, 9 Mar 91, p 1.]

March 1991

MILITARY

Allied air forces maintained a full readiness to respond to any contingency. Two continuous AWACS orbits and six continuous combat air patrols were manned along borders and over Kuwait. Reconnaissance and intelligence collection flights continued. Three AWACS, sixteen C-130s, and forty-six F-15s redeployed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Mar 91.]

Both the Environmental Protection Agency and the Office of the Army Surgeon General agreed to dispatch teams from Washington, D.C., to test the environmental quality and health effects caused by the oil fires in Kuwait. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Mar 91.]

Internal civil disturbances continued in southern Iraqi cities. Military forces continued to attempt to gain control of the situation, and increased the number of helicopter sorties in an attempt to accomplish this mission. Helicopters reportedly were firing rockets into the cities. Artillery was employed against rioters in the Basra area. Reports of unrest and violence in the Kurdistan region also persisted. Insurgents seized checkpoints and terminated communications. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—537,484 (35,055 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—52,743

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 08/2115z Mar 91.]

9 March 91 (C plus 214/D plus 51)

POLITICAL

Rulers of Kuwait told Secretary of State James Baker that they intended to democratize their country in the near future, but they added that until Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was ousted, there would never be peace or stability in the Persian Gulf. [Thomas L. Friedman, "Kuwaiti Leaders Tell Baker Democratization Is Coming," *The New York Times*, 10 Mar 91, p 15.]

MILITARY

Coalition air forces continued to maintain an active air defense posture. Two continuous AWACS orbits and six continuous combat air patrols were manned along borders and over Kuwait. Reconnaissance and intelligence collection flights continued. One B-52, four HC-130, and seventeen KC-135 aircraft were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Mar 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

The Iraqi Air Force continued to support ground operations against the insurgents. Approximately seventy helicopter sorties were flown to suppress civil unrest throughout Iraq. The Air Force also continued reconstitution efforts and flew heavy helicopter and limited fighter sorties. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Mar 91.]

Domestic clashes between government forces and insurgents continued throughout southern Iraq and Kurdistan. Hoping the government would be preoccupied with events in the south, Kurdish groups exploited the situation in the north. Chemical agents did not appear to have been used against the rebels; however, the Iraqi Army did increase the use of helicopters and artillery. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—532,188 (34,922 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—51,491

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 09/2115z Mar 91.]

10 March 91 (C plus 215/D plus 52)

POLITICAL

Twenty-one former prisoners of war returned from the Persian Gulf to Andrews AFB, Maryland. [Sue Anne Presley and Mary Jordan, "'Someday' Arrives for Former POWs," *The Washington Post*, 11 Mar 91, p 1. 10 March was designated Repatriation Day (R-Day).]

Phase Echo, the redeployment of 545,000 U.S. troops participating in Operation DESERT STORM, officially began. [Rick Atkinson, "Having Hurried Up to Win, GIs Now Wait," *The Washington Post*, 19 Mar 91, p 1.]

American military officials said that Iraqi forces loyal to President Saddam Hussein were having difficulties quelling more than two dozen revolts in Iraq. Senior Iraqi diplomats in Washington and New York were summoned by State Department officials and warned that the United States would not tolerate chemical strikes on the insurgents. [Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Says Iraqi Troops Have Edge, Despite Problems Handling Rebels," *The New York Times*, 11 Mar 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Two continuous AWACS orbits and four continuous combat air patrols were flown along the borders of and over Kuwait. Reconnaissance and intelligence collection flights continued. Limited training flights were flown by all CENTAF components in order to conduct required maintenance and

March 1991

prepare for redeployment. Three B-52, five KC-10, and twelve KC-135 aircraft were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Mar 91.]

Kuwaiti officials told Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm that instructions were issued to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to all police stations and detention centers in Kuwait. The ICRC wanted to investigate, in particular, the condition of Palestinians detained by authorities for security reasons. The ICRC was designated as the collection point for names of missing persons. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Mar 91.]

Domestic clashes between government forces and insurgents continued throughout southern Iraq and Kurdistan. Chemical agents did not appear to have been used against the rebels. Reports indicated that a tank battalion, supported by artillery and helicopters, attacked rebel strongholds. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—524,708 (34,461 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—50,149

[Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 10/2115z Mar 91.]

11 March 91 (C plus 216/D plus 53)

MILITARY

Coalition forces continued an active air defense posture and maintained readiness to respond to contingencies. Two continuous AWACS orbits and three continuous combat air patrols were manned along borders and over Kuwait. Reconnaissance and intelligence collection flights continued. Training flights were flown as units prepared for redeployment. Twenty B-52s, two Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center aircraft, eight KC-10s, and twenty KC-135s were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Mar 91.]

According to intelligence estimates, 66 percent of the total Iraqi aircraft inventory was intact, with fixed-wing combat aircraft at 56 percent. Air Force Intelligence thought these percentages were an overestimation. Also, the capabilities of Iraq's Air Force were degraded by the lack of flying activity—no fixed-wing flights were detected since 24 February. [Memo, Maj. Gen. Clapper, AF/IN, to SECAF, "Current Status of the Iraqi Air Force," 11 Mar 91.]

After debriefing nine senior Iraqi officers (seven of them generals), U.S. analysts "painted a picture" of Operation DESERT STORM as seen by the Iraqi

Gulf War Chronology

field leaders. War weariness, harsh conditions, and lack of conviction in the justice of the Kuwait invasion caused widespread desertion in the Iraqi Army prior to the air campaign. However, "the genuine foot race north really commenced when the bombs began to fall." The average division-sized unit deployed about 7,500 men and was attrited to approximately 4,100 by 24 February (G-day). Equipment losses exceeded personnel losses because Iraqi forces heeded psychological operations leaflet warnings to stay away from their vehicles, and Iraqi soldiers quickly learned that tanks and armored personnel carriers were not safe places to sleep. The Iraqi officers believed their defensive strategy, which worked well in the Iran-Iraq War, failed because of U.S. superiority in intelligence collection and precision weapons systems. "Most of the Iraqi generals were convinced that we could see everything with our satellites, hear and DF [direction find] everything with our SIGINT [signals intelligence], and hit anything with our weapons," stated one analyst. "The air campaign validated their worst fears." The Iraqis were unanimous in their assertion that there was no intent to employ chemical weapons, and they asserted that no chemical weapons existed in their divisions. They believed Saddam Hussein recognized the United States would "react in a manner unacceptable to Iraq" if he ordered the use of chemical munitions. Finally, the Iraqi Army had a logistical system that provided spartan, but livable, rations to its soldiers until the advent of the air campaign. The loss of transport vehicles and attacks on the country's infrastructure stressed the system to the breaking point, according to the Iraqi officers. "Several of our sources," wrote the analysts, "stated openly that the ground campaign was unnecessary, and that, had the air campaign continued two or three weeks longer, the Iraqi Army would have been forced to withdraw due to logistical strangulation." [Msg, 513 MIBDE FWD to CMO ARCENT/G2, "The Gulf War: An Iraqi General Officer's Perspective," 11/0503z Mar 91.]

The repatriation of Iraqi prisoners of war, originally scheduled for 11, 14, and 17 March, was rescheduled for 13, 16, and 18 March. Five hundred Iraqi prisoners were scheduled to be repatriated on each of those dates. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—522,997 (34,185 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—49,411

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 11/2115z Mar 91.]

Iraqi Air Force Order of Battle (AOB)

	Fixed-Wing Combat	Helos/Misc	Total
Starting AOB	831	484	1,315
• Confirmed Losses	106	52	158

March 1991

• In Iran	112	26	138
Remaining	613	406	1,019
Estimated Losses in Shelters*	141		141
Estimated Remaining	472	406	878
Percent remaining	56	83	66

* Since 375 of 594 shelters (63 percent) were damaged or destroyed, 141 aircraft destroyed in shelters was believed to be a conservative estimate.

[Memo, Maj. Gen. Clapper, AF/IN, to SECAF, "Current Status of the Iraqi Air Force," 11 Mar 91]

Major Iraqi Equipment in the KTO: Overall

Resource	Original	Destroyed/ Captured	% Remaining
Tanks	4,550	3,956	13
Armored Vehicles	2,880	2,166	25
Artillery	3,257	3,092	5

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 11 Mar 91.]

12 March 91 (C plus 217/D plus 54)

POLITICAL

The United States and Kuwait agreed to open an allied air base on Bubiyan Island, Kuwait. The joint American-British base was one of three established in the Persian Gulf region as part of a broad new postwar security arrangement. Allied air facilities also were to be set up in Oman and either Bahrain or Qatar. [Rowan Scarborough, "Kuwaitis Agree to Allied Air Base," *The Washington Times*, 13 Mar 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Two continuous AWACS orbits and three continuous combat air patrols were manned along borders and over Kuwait. Reconnaissance and intelligence collection flights continued. Training flights were flown as units prepared for redeployment. Six B-52s, two EC-130 (COMPASS CALL), twenty-four F-16s, one U-2, twenty-one KC-135s, two MC-130s, and the USS *Saratoga* air wing were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Mar 91.]

The Iraqi Air Force continued to support ground operations against the insurgents. At least 111 helicopter sorties were detected in cities of central and southern Iraq. Most were used to suppress civil unrest. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Mar 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

Domestic clashes between government forces and insurgents continued throughout southern Iraq and Kurdistan. The government focused its efforts on the south and appeared to have made some progress against the insurgents. However, the Kurds and some open-press reporting continued to claim rebel successes in various regions of Kurdistan. The government was expected to begin shifting some forces to that area after the situation in the south against the Shiites was stabilized. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—512,668 (33,782 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—48,985

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 12/2115z Mar 91.]

13 March 91 (C plus 218/D plus 55)

POLITICAL

President Bush warned Iraqi President Saddam Hussein not to use combat helicopters to suppress internal rebellions. "I'm warning them not to do this," Bush said, adding that Iraq's use of helicopters for combat missions inside its territory would violate the terms of the temporary cease-fire ending the Persian Gulf War. [David Lauter, "Bush Warns Iraq against Using Copters, *Los Angeles Times*, 14 Mar 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Coalition forces continued an active air defense posture and maintained readiness to respond to contingencies. Two continuous AWACS orbits and three continuous combat air patrols were manned along borders and over Kuwait. Reconnaissance and intelligence collection flights continued. Training flights were flown as units prepared for redeployment. Twenty-four F-16s, twelve F-111s, twenty-three KC-135s, one TR-1, three AC-130s and the USS *Midway* and *John F. Kennedy* air wings were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Mar 91.]

The Iraqi Air Force continued to support counterinsurgency operations against the insurgents. Limited Iraqi fighter activity took place, including Mirage F-1 and MiG-23/Flogger aircraft flying training missions. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Mar 91.]

Domestic clashes between government forces and insurgents continued throughout southern Iraq and Kurdistan. The government focused its efforts on the south and consequently was faced with mounting difficulties in Kurdistan. Insurgents surrounded the northern city of Kirkuk on three

March 1991

sides. A successful attack on this important city, according to analysts, represented a major symbolic defeat for the Iraqi government. Armor, artillery, and attack helicopters continued to be used against the rebels, but there was no evidence of chemical agent use. In the south, fighting once again became intense and resulted in large numbers of refugees moving south. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—503,380 (33,446 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—48,296

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 13/2115z Mar 91.]

14 March 91 (C plus 219/D plus 56)

POLITICAL

The Senate Appropriations Committee unanimously voted to spend nearly \$16 billion to begin paying U.S. military and civilian costs of the Persian Gulf War. The twin supplemental spending bills provided \$15 billion to pay the military costs of the war until more of the pledges from foreign allies—in excess of \$50 billion—were fulfilled. The bill barred the use of any U.S. funds for rebuilding Iraq while Saddam Hussein remained in power, and it also granted a Bush administration request for \$200 million for Turkey's war costs. [John E. Yang, "Panel Votes \$16 Billion for War Costs," *The Washington Post*, 15 Mar 91, p 14; William J. Eaton, "Senate Approves \$500 Million in Benefits for Gulf Troops," *Los Angeles Times*, 15 Mar 91, p 6.]

The Emir of Kuwait, Sheik Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, returned to his country. [Thomas L. Friedman, "Kuwaiti Leaders Tell Baker Democratization Is Coming," *The New York Times*, 10 Mar 91, p 15; Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Anger Spreading among Kuwaitis," *The New York Times*, 17 Mar 91, p 17.]

By letter, Iraq told USCENCOM that it intended to fly fighter aircraft during the period 17–22 March. [Ltr, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USCINCCENT, to Maj. Gen. Ahmed, Commander VII Corps, "Cease Fire Violations," 15 Mar 91.]

MILITARY

Coalition forces continued an active air defense posture and maintained readiness to respond to contingencies. Two continuous AWACS orbits and three continuous combat air patrols were manned along borders and over Kuwait. Training flights were flown as units prepared for redeployment. Twelve F-111s, twenty-four F-16s, one TR-1, twelve KC-135s, and three AC-130s redeployed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Mar 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

At least sixty-two Iraqi helicopter sorties were detected. Most were involved in the counterinsurgency operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—489,600 (32,514 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—45,745

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 14/2115z Mar 91.]

15 March 91 (C plus 220/D plus 57)

POLITICAL

The United States sent American tank units to their forward-most positions along the cease-fire line. This movement was intended to send a cautionary message to Iraq. Bush administration officials said the troop movements did not signal any resumption of military operations, but were to remind President Saddam Hussein of the American presence in the region. The movements followed President Bush's warnings to Iraq not to use chemical weapons or helicopter gunships to suppress insurgents in Iraq. [Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Moves Units in Iraq Forward, Apparently as Message to Hussein," *The New York Times*, 16 Mar 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

General Schwarzkopf told Iraqi Major General Ahmed, VII Corps commander, that the United States was "greatly disturbed by your letter informing us of your intent to move fighter aircraft . . ." "We see this as a clearly provocative act," he stated, "and a violation of the Terms of Reference agreed upon by your representatives at Safwan on 3 March 1991." He told the Iraqis that coalition aircraft were "returning . . . to the airspace over Iraq." "Any of your fighters or bombers that attempt to fly will be shot down," he stated. [Ltr, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USCINCCENT, to Maj. Gen. Ahmed, Commander VII Corps, "Cease Fire Violations," 15 Mar 91.]

Four 24-hour combat air patrols using F-15s, F-15Es, and F/A-18s were established over Iraqi airspace due to Iraqi intentions to fly fixed-wing aircraft. F-16s (day) and Saudi F-15s (night) took over high-value air asset combat air patrol missions. Two continuous AWACS orbits and three continuous combat air patrols were manned along borders and over Kuwait. Eleven F-111, one U-2, three KC-135, thirty AV-8, and four C-2 aircraft were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Mar 91.]

The International Committee of the Red Cross monitored the first scheduled overland transfer of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) to Baghdad. Four

March 1991

hundred and ninety-nine Iraqis were transferred; one Iraqi was reportedly ill and was transferred to a local hospital. This brought the total number of Iraqi prisoners repatriated to 793. The next scheduled transfers of 500 EPWs each were expected to occur on 17 and 19 March. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Mar 91.]

Domestic clashes continued in southern Iraq and Kurdistan. At least 102 Iraqi helicopter sorties were detected, with most involved in counterinsurgency operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Mar 91.]

General Merrill McPeak, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, presented a news briefing when he presented the details of the air campaign that had been conducted against Iraq. The general referred to the campaign as "an American success story" and a "great victory against a strong enemy." "My private conviction," General McPeak stated, "is that this is the first time in history that a field army has been defeated by air power." [Brfg, Gen. McPeak to DOD Press Conf, "The Air Campaign," 15 Mar 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—474,139 (32,728 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—45,036

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 15/2115z Mar 91.]

16 March 91 (C plus 221/D plus 58)

MILITARY

Two continuous AWACS orbits and three continuous combat air patrols were manned along borders and over Kuwait. Four twenty-four-hour combat air patrols using F-15s, F-15Es, and F/A-18s were flown over Iraq. Two Iraqi PC-7 trainers were intercepted and visually identified but were not engaged. Twelve F-16 and two EC-130 COMPASS CALL aircraft redeployed. The twenty-four A-10s scheduled to redeploy were delayed twenty-four hours due to unfavorable weather at destination. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Mar 91.]

At least 112 Iraqi helicopter sorties were detected. Most were probably involved in the counterinsurgency operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Mar 91.]

The government continued to hold the upper hand in southern Iraq, while the Kurds gained the initiative in northeastern Iraq. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Mar 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—470,233 (32,447 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—43,888

[Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Mar 91.]

17 March 91 (C plus 222/D plus 59)

MILITARY

Two continuous AWACS orbits and three continuous combat air patrols were manned along borders and over Kuwait. Four 24-hour combat air patrols using F-15s, F-15Es, and F/A-18s were flown over Iraq. Six Iraqi PC-7 trainers were intercepted and visually identified but were not engaged. Twenty-four A-10, two EC-130 VOLANT SOLO, and six C-130 aircraft were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Mar 91.]

At least 125 Iraqi helicopter sorties were detected. Most were probably involved in the counterinsurgency operations. Possibly nine PC-7 fixed-wing aircraft operated over central Iraq. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Mar 91.]

Five hundred Iraqi enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) were transferred at the Saudi-Iraqi border transfer point north of Ar Ar, Saudi Arabia. The next transfer of 500 Iraqi EPWs was scheduled to take place on 19 March at the same location. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—468,177 (32,097 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—42,075

[Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 17/2115z Mar 91.]

18 March 91 (C plus 223/D plus 60)

POLITICAL

The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended a ban on arms sales to U.S. allies such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates unless they paid their multi-billion dollar pledges to help defray American costs in the Persian Gulf War. Saudi Arabia pledged \$16.8 billion and had paid more than \$6 billion. Kuwait pledged \$16 billion and had paid \$5.5 billion. The United Arab Emirates pledged \$3 billion and had paid \$2 billion. Germany pledged \$6.5 billion and had paid \$3 billion. Japan pledged \$10.7 billion and had paid \$1.3 billion. South Korea pledged \$385 million and had paid \$71 million. [William J. Eaton and Norman Kempster, "Senate Panel Ties Arms Sales to Gulf Pledges," *Los Angeles Times*, 19 Mar 91, p 1.]

March 1991

The German government announced plans to send a delegation to Washington, D.C., to discuss whether the United States really needed the entire German contribution to the cost of the Persian Gulf War. Germany's Social Democrats asked Bonn not to complete its \$11 billion pledge, contending that Washington would receive \$60 billion from other countries while the war cost only \$42 billion, leaving the United States with a profit. ["Bonn to Ask about Cutting War Payment," *The Washington Post*, 19 Mar 91, p 25.]

Iran's religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would fall shortly because insurgents had captured so many government weapons that they could not be defeated. [William E. Schmidt, "Iran Says Iraqi Leader Will Soon Fall to Rebels," *The New York Times*, 19 Mar 91, p 15.]

MILITARY

Two continuous AWACS orbits and three continuous combat air patrols were manned along borders and over Kuwait. Four 24-hour combat air patrols using F-15s, F-15Es, and F-14s were flown over Iraq. Twenty-four A-10, twenty-four F-16C, three EC-130 (ABCCC) and six C-130 aircraft were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Mar 91.]

At least fifty-seven Iraqi helicopter sorties were detected. Most were involved in the counterinsurgency operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—462,883 (32,007 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—41,428

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 18/2115z Mar 91.]

19 March 91 (C plus 224/D plus 61)

POLITICAL

Defense Secretary Cheney said that the United States would not limit the sales of sophisticated conventional weapons to America's allies in the Middle East when their security might be at stake. He said he was willing to consider some restraint, "but I think our first concern ought to be to work with our friends and allies to see to it that they're secure." [Patrick E. Tyler, "Cheney Wants No Limit on Arms for Gulf Allies," *The New York Times*, 20 Mar 91, p 13.]

The White House denied charges that the United States was making a profit on the Persian Gulf War. House Speaker Thomas Foley said there had been "apparently false reports that the Germans were attempting to rene-

Gulf War Chronology

gotiate their commitment." Foley stressed that the source for the rumor was "the opposition party in Germany and not the one responsible for the government." [Frank J. Murray, "White House Denies War-Profit Charge," *The Washington Times*, 20 Mar 91, p 10.]

MILITARY

Three continuous AWACS orbits and six continuous combat air patrols were flown along Saudi borders and over Iraq and Kuwait. Due to Iraqi intentions to fly fixed-wing aircraft, four air-to-air combat air patrols were flown in Iraqi airspace. Three C-130 aircraft were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Mar 91.]

Domestic clashes between government forces and insurgents continued in southern Iraq and Kurdistan. Armor, artillery, and attack helicopters were used against the rebels. At least 110 Iraqi helicopter sorties were detected. Government forces held the upper hand in southern Iraq, but the Kurds maintained the initiative in the North. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Mar 91.]

Five hundred Iraqi enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) were transferred at the Saudi-Iraqi border north of Ar Ar, Saudi Arabia. Since 6 March, 1,793 Iraqi EPWs were transferred. No additional transfers of EPWs were scheduled to take place until after meetings between the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), coalition forces, and Iraqi representatives on 21 March. At that time the coalition would press for increasing the number of EPWs at each transfer. The ICRC was working with the Kuwaiti, Saudi Arabian, and Iraqi governments to effect a transfer of Kuwaiti POWs on 21 March. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—456,163 (32,045 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—40,346

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 19/2115z Mar 91.]

20 March 91 (C plus 225/D plus 62)

POLITICAL

In an effort to punish Jordan's King Hussein for leaning toward Iraq in the Persian Gulf War, the Senate voted to eliminate U.S. aid to Jordan. President Bush said this provision would complicate efforts to bring peace to the Middle East. [John E. Yang, "Senate Halts Jordan Aid in Slap at King Hussein," *The Washington Post*, 21 Mar 91, p 4.]

March 1991

MILITARY

A U.S. F-15 engaged and destroyed an Iraqi Su-17/22/Fitter in the vicinity of Kirkuk. Three AWACS orbits and six combat air patrols were manned along Saudi borders and over Iraq and Kuwait. Four air-to-air combat air patrols were flown over Iraqi airspace. Twenty-three F-16 aircraft were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Mar 91.]

At least 152 Iraqi helicopter sorties were detected. Most were involved in the counterinsurgency operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—452,195 (31,856 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—39,463

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 20/2115z Mar 91.]

21 March 91 (C plus 226/D plus 63)

POLITICAL

The UN Security Council began considering a U.S.-proposed resolution that would formally end the Persian Gulf War in exchange for Iraq's offering to surrender its military power and pay war damages. The draft dictated terms of surrender that the Iraqi government would have to accept if it was to secure a cease-fire and the lifting of economic sanctions. The terms included the destruction or removal of all ballistic missiles and chemical, biological, and nuclear weaponry. [John M. Goshko, "U.S. Offers Strict Terms to End War," *The Washington Post*, 22 Mar 91, p 1.]

The Senate approved awarding congressional medals to Generals Colin L. Powell and H. Norman Schwarzkopf for their leadership in the Persian Gulf War. The House was also expected to approve the measures. ["Gold Medals for the Generals," *The Washington Post*, 22 Mar 91, p 23.]

Congressional Democrats and the Bush administration both addressed former American Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie's behavior in a 25 July 1990 meeting with Saddam Hussein. At a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, a transcript of Ms Glaspie's meeting with Hussein made it appear as if she had not conveyed a tough enough policy line to Hussein, thereby encouraging him to invade Kuwait. The Bush administration, in order to counter the impression that it callously left Ms Glaspie as a scapegoat for the invasion, said that it had known for the previous seven months that an Iraqi transcript of the Hussein-Glaspie meeting contained

Gulf War Chronology

errors and omissions. According to the State Department, the record was not corrected because officials did not want to divert attention from the effort to organize the anti-Iraqi coalition. ["U.S. Revises Image of Envoy to Iraq," *The New York Times*, 22 Mar 91, p 1; Richard C. Gross, "Glaspie Charged with 'Frighteningly Flawed Judgement,'" *The Washington Times*, 22 Mar 91, p 8.]

Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama met with President Bush and Secretary of State Baker and gave the United States \$5.7 billion as the first installment of its promised \$9 billion to defray the expense of the Persian Gulf War. [A] Kamen, "Japan to Pay First Part of Gulf War Pledge Today," *The Washington Post*, 22 Mar 91, p 21.]

MILITARY

Three AWACS orbits and five combat air patrols were flown along Saudi borders and over Iraq and Kuwait. Three air-to-air combat air patrols were flown in Iraqi airspace. A Saudi C-130 crashed on final approach, killing six crew members and ninety-five Senegalese passengers. Poor visibility from smoke existed at the time. Twenty-six A-10 aircraft were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Mar 91.]

The Kurds maintained the initiative in northeastern Iraq, but Baghdad started to intensify its efforts to control the rebels. At least eighty-three Iraqi helicopter sorties were detected. Most were involved in the counterinsurgency operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—447,125 (31,338 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—38,026

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 21/2115z Mar 91.]

22 March 91 (C plus 227/D plus 64)

POLITICAL

A U.S. Air Force F-15 pilot shot down another Iraqi jet warplane for violating the allied ban on flights within Iraq. White House spokesperson Marlin Fitzwater stated, "We will continue to take down any fixed-wing aircraft that come up." [Caryle Murphy, "U.S. Jet Downs 2nd Iraqi Plane," *The Washington Post*, 23 Mar 91, p 1.]

Congress passed two emergency spending bills, mostly relating to the Persian Gulf War. President Bush was expected to sign both measures. [J. Jennings Moss, "Congress Passes War Spending Bills," *The Washington Times*, 25 Mar 91, p 6.]

March 1991

23 March 91 (C plus 228/D plus 65)

POLITICAL

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Powell said that U.S. military forces in southern Iraq would seek to maintain pressure on President Saddam Hussein "for some months to come." He said the U.S. force would stay in Iraq until Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab nations were ready to replace it with their own security arrangements. He also disclosed that the United States was close to an agreement to move the headquarters of the U.S. Central Command from Tampa, Florida, to an unspecified site in the Middle East. [Patrick E. Tyler, "Powell Says U.S. Will Stay in Iraq 'For Some Months,'" *The New York Times*, 23 Mar 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Two AWACS orbits and five combat air patrols were flown along Saudi borders and over Iraq and Kuwait. Three air-to-air combat air patrols were flown in Iraqi airspace. Twelve F-4G and twenty A-6 aircraft were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Mar 91.]

At least nineteen Iraqi helicopter sorties were detected. Some were involved in the counterinsurgency operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—437,352 (30,447 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—35,174

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 23/2115z Mar 91.]

24 March 91 (C plus 229/D plus 66)

POLITICAL

The Iranian government stepped up their campaign to oust Iraqi President Saddam Hussein by supplying Shiite Muslim rebels and Kurdish dissidents in Iraq with more weapons, supplies, and moral support. [Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Teheran, Dropping Any Ambiguity, Intensifies Its Drive to Oust Hussein," *The New York Times*, 25 Mar 91, p 16.]

MILITARY

At least thirty-four Iraqi helicopter sorties were detected. Some were involved in the counterinsurgency operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Mar 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—425,222 (30,147 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—31,414

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 24/2115z Mar 91.]

25 March 91 (C plus 230/D plus 67)

POLITICAL

Administration officials said Iraqi President Saddam Hussein may be close to crushing the Shiite Muslim rebellion against his authority in southern Iraq. The officials also predicted that he would then prevail over the Kurdish uprising that still threatened control over northern Iraq. [Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Says Hussein Is Near a Victory over Shiite Rebels," *The New York Times*, 26 Mar 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

At least thirty-four Iraqi helicopter sorties were detected, at least twelve of which involved counterinsurgency operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—413,430 (29,638 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,823

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 25/2115z Mar 91.]

26 March 91 (C plus 231/D plus 68)

POLITICAL

Bush administration officials strongly reaffirmed U.S. neutrality in the battles raging in Iraq and said American military force would not be used to protect Kurdish and Shiite rebel groups seeking to topple the Iraqi government. Officials acknowledged that widespread civilian deaths and atrocities occurred in the conflict but said there would be no change in President Bush's decision to avoid getting directly involved in toppling Saddam Hussein. [Ann Devroy and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Neutrality in Iraq Reaffirmed by U.S.," *The Washington Post*, 27 Mar 91, p 1.]

In an interview with David Frost regarding the Persian Gulf War, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf stated that "my recommendation had been, you know, continue the march. I mean, we had them in a rout and we could have continued to wreak great destruction on them. We could have completely closed the door and made it a battle of annihilation." ["Stopped Short—Schwarzkopf," *The Washington Times*, 27 Mar 91, p 1.]

March 1991

MILITARY

At least forty-nine Iraqi helicopter sorties were detected, with fourteen involved in the counterinsurgency operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Mar 91.]

The Kurds gained the initiative in northeastern Iraq and captured Kirkuk. Baghdad continued its efforts to take the initiative away from the rebels and would probably attempt to retake Kirkuk soon. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—409,200 (29,391 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—30,287

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 26/2115z Mar 91.]

27 March 91 (C plus 232/D plus 69)

POLITICAL

President Bush said General Schwarzkopf was wrong in saying that the president ended the war when the general wanted to carry out the total destruction of Iraq's forces in the war zone. The rebuke came as the Bush administration was increasingly anxious about the situation in Iraq and concerned about criticism that the United States missed an opportunity to remove Saddam Hussein from power. [Patrick E. Tyler, "General's Account of Gulf War's End Disputed by Bush," *The New York Times*, 28 Mar 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

One continuous AWACS (eastern) was airborne with a second AWACS (western) airborne during daylight hours. Two combat air patrols were maintained over southern and central Iraq. A western high-value air asset combat air patrol was flown during daylight hours. Redeployments included sixteen C-130s, seven AV-8s, and six EA-6s. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Mar 91.]

At least forty Iraqi helicopter sorties were detected; one was involved in ground attack operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—403,063 (29,368 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—28,006

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 27/2115z Mar 91.]

28 March 91 (C plus 233/D plus 70)

POLITICAL

The White House announced that President Bush telephoned General Schwarzkopf and reassured him that he was not in trouble for questioning the decision to stop attacking Iraqi forces. [Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Tells Schwarzkopf 'Not to Worry,'" *The New York Times*, 29 Mar 91, p 7.]

MILITARY

U.S. air activity included one AWACS at night, two AWACS during the day, two 24-hour combat air patrols over Iraq, and one high-value air asset combat air patrol during the day. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Mar 91.]

The battle for Kirkuk began as government forces moved to retake the airfield from the Kurdish rebels. At least 125 Iraqi helicopter sorties were detected and 44 were involved in ground attack operations. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—397,311 (29,192 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—27,298

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 28/2115z Mar 91.]

29 March 91 (C plus 234/D plus 71)

POLITICAL

General Schwarzkopf said he apologized to President Bush for making a "poor choice of words" when he told David Frost he recommended American forces press on to "annihilate" Iraqi forces and suggested that he disagreed on the White House decision to end the war. [David B. Ottaway, "Schwarzkopf Apologizes for Remark," *The Washington Post*, 30 Mar 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

One continuous AWACS (eastern) was airborne with a second AWACS (western) airborne during daylight hours. Two continuous combat air patrols were maintained over southern and central Iraq. A western high-value air asset combat air patrol was flown during daylight hours. Twenty-five F-16 aircraft were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Mar 91.]

Government forces controlled Kirkuk. Government checkpoints, consisting of armor and mechanized platoons, were established throughout the

March 1991

city. Major elements of the armored forces which conducted the assault on Kirkuk advanced at least thirty miles northwest toward the city of Irbil. The recapture of Kirkuk was a major victory for government forces in their attempt to reassert control over the Kurdish north. The loss of Kirkuk seriously undermined the Kurdish insurgent's confidence in their ability to hold other key cities in the region. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Mar 91.]

At least eighty-two Iraqi helicopter sorties were detected, and twenty-six were involved in ground attack operations. The helicopter activity was due to the government's move toward Irbil. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—392,030 (28,382 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—25,969

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 29/2115z Mar 91.]

30 March 91 (C plus 235/D plus 72)

MILITARY

An RF-4 crashed after experiencing an engine fire on takeoff. Its two crewmembers ejected successfully. Sixteen F-117s were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Mar 91.]

At least sixty-eight Iraqi helicopter sorties were detected, mostly over central and northern Iraq. No ground attack missions or fixed-wing activity was detected. Helicopter activity continued to dominate the Iraqi air picture, but the lack of ground attack sorties indicated the government had gained more control over the insurgent situation or had limited missions for maintenance purposes. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Mar 91.]

Iraqi government forces remained in control of Kirkuk and prepared to assault Irbil. The insurgent situation in the south remained essentially unchanged. However, isolated pockets of resistance remained active. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—385,009 (28,071 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—24,963

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 30/2115z Mar 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

31 March 91 (C plus 236/D plus 73)

POLITICAL

U.S. Army commanders announced that they planned to begin withdrawing about 20,000 troops from southern Iraq. Officials said that Iraq's military had been so devastated by the war that there was no longer a need for the American deployment in Iraq. [Michael R. Gordon, "20,000 U.S. Troops to Be Withdrawn from South Iraq," *The New York Times*, 1 Apr 91, p 1.]

A senior Iranian official accused the United States of having misled the Iraqi people by encouraging them to overthrow President Saddam Hussein and then not supporting the rebels. [Judith Miller, "Iran Says U.S. Incited and Then Deserted Rebels," *The New York Times*, 1 Apr 91, p 8.]

MILITARY

Two E-3 AWACS aircraft were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Mar 91.]

At least sixty-two Iraqi helicopter sorties were detected, most over northern Iraq. At least thirty-six ground attack missions were detected. The increase in ground attack sorties indicated that the government had gained control over the insurgent forces in the vicinity of Irbil. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Mar 91.]

Government forces improved their defensive posture in and around Kirkuk by conducting "mop-up" operations inside the city as well as in the towns and villages in the vicinity. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Mar 91.]

U.S. forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—380,343 (27,660 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—24,891

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 31/2115z Mar 91.]

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April 1991

1 April 91 (C plus 237/D plus 74)

POLITICAL

Kurdish rebels, pressed hard by relentless attacks from government forces, retreated into the mountains of northern Iraq. Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani urged the United States, Britain, and France to stop the "genocide and torture" of the Kurds. Barzani said three million Kurds had fled into the mountains, where they had little food and inadequate shelter to battle the frigid nights. [John M. Goshko, "Kurd Urges West to Act in Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 2 Apr 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Twenty-four F/A-18 aircraft were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Apr 91.]

Iraqi helicopter activity continued at a moderate to high pace. At least seventy-nine helicopter sorties were detected throughout Iraq. A minimum of eleven ground attack missions were flown. Helicopters continued to be employed against the insurgents and helped government forces take control of southern, central, and most of northern Iraq. Ground attacks continued to be employed against major problem areas and pockets of resistance. No fixed-wing sorties were noted. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Apr 91.]

Government forces succeeded whenever they were assembled and applied against the comparatively ill-equipped and poorly organized insur-

Gulf War Chronology

gents. Although the insurgents, both in the north and the south, were not completely crushed, it was apparent that the government had the advantage and initiative. Baghdad media announced that classes at colleges and technical schools would resume on 20 April. Baghdad radio urged Iraqi citizens to conserve electricity. Despite problems such as the lack of sufficient electrical power, as evidenced by the government's call for conservation, the Iraqis indicated an intent to resume some semblance of normalcy. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Apr 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—375,422 (27,348 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—24,158

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Apr 91.]

2 April 91 (C plus 238/D plus 75)

POLITICAL

Saddam Hussein's crackdown against Kurdish and Shiite Muslim rebels continued and prompted Turkish President Turgut Ozal to call an urgent UN Security Council meeting to deal with the refugee problem. Approximately 220,000 Iraqi citizens, many of them women and children, were forced to flee to the Turkish border. France also called for UN condemnation of the Iraqi oppression of the Kurds and Shiites. [John M. Goshko, "UN Action Urged on Crisis in Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 3 Apr 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Combat air patrols and AWACs continued over Iraq twenty-four hours a day. Twenty-three F/A-18 aircraft were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Apr 91.]

Iraqi helicopter sorties declined. The overall number of ground attacks also declined. The total number of sorties was fifty of which four were ground attacks in the vicinity of Kirkuk. There was no fixed-wing activity. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Apr 91.]

Insurgent activity in Iraq was low. In the north, Iraqi government forces continued to maintain the initiative and expanded their area of control. The insurgent situation in the south remained essentially unchanged. Iraqi government forces continued their efforts to consolidate control. However, isolated pockets of resistance remained active. Numerous residences and commercial businesses were bulldozed and a five-block area was razed in the Kurdish town of Tuz Khurmatu. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi government forces systematically razed Kurdish villages along the Iranian-

April 1991

Iraqi border. It was possible that the entire village would eventually be razed in retaliation for insurgent activity. Government forces continued to conduct clearing operations in and around Kirkuk, as well as in other major towns and cities, to establish firm control. They increased their efforts to secure lines of communications from central Iraq to the north. Additional forces would be brought in as required to successfully perform these tasks. It was uncertain whether the insurgents would attempt to regain the initiative owing to the strength of the government forces. They would likely concentrate on regrouping and reassessing their options. The lack of heavy weapons could lead the Kurdish insurgents to become more involved in hit-and-run type activities. In time, government forces would be in a position to exercise a degree of control similar to that which was presently seen in the south, but the government would not be able to garrison sufficient troops to eliminate all pockets of resistance. In the south, government forces continued to conduct clearing operations in an attempt to consolidate control in the major population centers and the surrounding areas. They became more aggressive in attempting to seal off infiltration routes along the border with Iran. [Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Apr 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—371,441 (27,259 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—23,427

[Msg, USCINCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Apr 91.]

3 April 91 (C plus 239/D plus 76)

POLITICAL

The UN Security Council voted to formally end the Persian Gulf War. If the terms were accepted by Baghdad, they would establish an official cease-fire between Iraq and the allied forces that expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The cease-fire terms would transform Iraq from a country that had the world's fourth largest army at the onset of the crisis to an essentially demilitarized state. Principal points of the Security Council Resolution were that it:

- Recognized and guaranteed the international borders stated in a 1963 treaty signed by Iraq and Kuwait.
- Requested the secretary general to submit a plan for the immediate deployment of a UN observer unit to monitor the Khor Abdullah and a demilitarized zone extending six miles into Iraq and three miles into Kuwait.

Gulf War Chronology

- Decided that Iraq shall "unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless" of all chemical and biological weapons, related components and facilities, and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, related components and facilities. This would be conducted under international supervision and guaranteed by on-site inspections. Iraq would provide UN inspectors with locations, numbers, and types of weapons, components, and facilities covered.
- Forbade Iraq from using, developing, or acquiring these weapons, and requested the secretary general to develop a plan for ongoing monitoring and verification.
- Decided that Iraq must destroy or render harmless any nuclear weapons, and must agree unconditionally not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or related components.
- Requested the secretary general to report on steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq.
- Reaffirmed that Iraq was liable under international law for losses and damage (including environmental) associated with the invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
- Created a fund to compensate claims, and established a commission to administer the fund.
- Directed the secretary general to recommend the appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the fund, based on a percentage of its oil exports.
- Lifted the prohibition against the sale of foodstuffs to Iraq.
- Directed the Security Council to review sanctions against Iraq every sixty days to determine whether they should be modified or lifted.
- Retained sanctions against selling or supplying arms and materiel to Iraq, pending further notice.
- Decided that Iraq would aid the International Committee of the Red Cross in its search for missing Kuwaitis and other victims of war.
- Required Iraq to condemn and renounce terrorism, halt support for international terrorism, and forbid any organization committing terrorism from operating on Iraqi territory.
- Declared that a cease-fire would become effective when Iraq officially notified the secretary general and the Security Council

April 1991

that it accepted these terms. [John M. Goshko, "UN Enacts Resolution To Formally End Gulf War," *The Washington Post*, 4 Apr 91, p 1.]

MILITARY

Eight F-117s and the USS *America* air wing were redeployed. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Apr 91.]

The number of Iraqi helicopter sorties decreased due to unfavorable weather conditions in northern and northeastern Iraq. Only seventeen sorties were noted, of which two were ground attacks. The bulk of the flying activity took place in the central region of the country. No fixed-wing activity was noted. In other activity, Iraq appeared to be in the process of reconstituting its air force. Reconstitution of the Iraqi Air Force would undoubtedly be a lengthy process, not only in terms of maintenance, but also with regard to the pilot force as well. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Apr 91.]

In the north, Iraqi government forces continued to maintain the initiative as they further expanded their area of control. The insurgent situation in the south remained essentially unchanged. Armed helicopter reconnaissance missions continued to figure prominently in government forces' operations. It was likely that most, if not all, civilian vehicular movement was targeted, thus significantly reducing the insurgents' freedom of movement. According to the press, the general conscription department issued a statement calling on conscripts inside and outside the country who were born in 1973 to report to their conscription centers during the period 6 to 12 April in order to perform their compulsory service. This indicated that the military felt it required additional personnel to successfully carry out its counter-insurgency campaign. [Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Apr 91.]

U.S. Forces in AOR:

Total Military Personnel—367,600 (27,142 women)

Total CENTAF Personnel—23,318

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 03/2115z Apr 91.]

Gulf War Chronology

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Epilogue

On 7 April 1991 Iraq accepted the United Nations' terms for a formal cease-fire of the Persian Gulf War. While Iraq deemed the terms unjust, it conceded it had no alternatives.¹ Though the war was officially over, hundreds of thousands of Kurdish and Shiite Muslim refugees continued to flee from Iraq and Saddam Hussein, mainly to Iran and to Turkey. U.S. troops eventually crossed the border from Turkey into northern Iraq on 17 April to establish refugee camps for the Kurds. UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar said Iraq's consent and a UN vote were needed to permit this action. President Bush asserted that UN Resolution 688, which provided international aid for Iraqi Kurds and Shiite Muslim refugees, gave sufficient authority to set up the camps.² Iraq also agreed to permit 400 UN security guards to enter Northern Iraq in May to ensure no Iraqi military personnel, equipment, or fortifications were maintained there. This action, however, did not signal the withdrawal of coalition troops. The allied troops remained there until the guards were in place and the Kurds felt secure with the transition.³ On 13 May, the United Nations took administrative control of the main Kurdish refugee camp in Iraq, relieving U.S. and other coalition forces. The allied troops, whose countries were eager for their departure from the region, were to remain there because the UN contingent had no military component to protect themselves or the refugees.⁴ Later, on 15 June, the allied forces participated in a flag-lowering ceremony to mark the end of the three-month relief operation for the Kurdish refugees in Iraq. Though problems with the Iraqis were not anticipated, Army Lt. Gen. John Shalikashvili, the commander of allied forces, assured the Kurds of U.S. protection by stating, "We'll be just a phone call away."⁵

Gulf War Chronology

Caring for refugees was not the only postwar problem. UN Resolution 687, which required Iraq to destroy weapons of mass destruction and pay war damages, also encountered its share of difficulties.⁶ The United Nations furthered its sanctions on Iraq by approving a detailed plan for denying Baghdad military supplies and said that Iraq had to pay for the destruction of its own dangerous weapons. Iraq's acting representative to the Security Council said that his nation would not pay for destroying its own weapons unassisted, but would perform the task itself with UN supervision.⁷ The UN plan also called for the destruction of Iraq's chemical and biological arsenal in forty-five days. This time frame was considered unrealistic by arms control and biological weapons experts. Short of open-pit burning or ocean dumping, the disposal would entail construction of destruction facilities, far exceeding the 45-day restriction.⁸

The allies did not know for certain about the extent of Iraq's nuclear program. Iraq informed the International Atomic Energy Agency that it had relocated some of its nuclear materials during the allied bombings, but it would not disclose their locations unless the agency guaranteed the materials would not be destroyed.⁹ Iraq relented on 17 May and allowed the inspections only because the UN Security Council made Iraq's cooperation in eliminating weapons of mass destruction a condition for lifting economic sanctions.¹⁰ Following the first round of inspections, UN investigators returned to Iraq in June to look for evidence that Saddam Hussein was secretly trying to build a nuclear weapon.¹¹ Iraqi soldiers later fired upon the inspectors as they videotaped what they claimed was uranium-enrichment equipment being trucked down a highway.¹² Iraq later acknowledged that it did possess nuclear material and equipment but it did not admit to having a weapons program. Iraq reluctantly disclosed the information after heavy pressure from the Security Council for an explanation why the UN inspection team was barred from locating and inspecting nuclear-related equipment. (The United States had also threatened a military strike if Iraq did not supply the requested information.)¹³

In the matter of culpability for war damages, the Security Council created a fund into which Iraq would pay part of its future oil revenues. A governing board in Geneva, composed of representatives from the fifteen countries on the Security Council, would administer the fund. Resolution 687 also threatened to indefinitely retain sanctions imposed on Baghdad after the invasion of Kuwait, if Iraq did not abide by the Council's decisions. Iraqi UN Ambassador Abdul Amir Anbari, protesting the war reparations, branded the action illegal and charged that the United States was dominating the Council. However, he announced that Iraq would agree to the compensation because, once again, it had no other choice.¹⁴ The U.S. representative on the Geneva panel rejected the UN recommendation that

Iraq pay 30 percent of its future oil earnings to victims of the Persian Gulf War, preferring a 50 percent rate which struck most of the UN countries as an extremely high request.¹⁵ Iraq also asked the United Nations for a five-year delay for paying UN-sanctioned war reparations so it could focus on restoring its economy. America's UN Representative, Thomas Pickering, said the Security Council was not likely to suspend that part of the cease-fire agreement to accommodate Iraq.¹⁶

Even as the United States basked in the thrill of victory, some Americans criticized their government's hands-off approach toward Iraqi rebels attempting to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The sentiment existed that we had encouraged the Iraqi rebels to revolt, but had abandoned them quickly once the revolution began. President Bush stated that the U.S. goal had been only to liberate Kuwait, not to oust Saddam Hussein.¹⁷ Thus, Saddam was not deposed; instead the Iraqi government awarded him Iraq's highest honor for recognition of his "historic role" and "noble services to Iraq."¹⁸ His primary concern after the war was to distance himself from those who could be blamed for Iraq's defeat in Kuwait. Consequently, Saddam reorganized his cabinet, placing trusted subordinates close to him and removing those who could be blamed for the conflict.¹⁹

For the future of the region, postwar negotiations between the United States and Persian Gulf countries were promising. Defense Secretary Cheney, after meeting with leaders of Gulf nations, announced on 9 May that the United States had reached general understandings with Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf nations on keeping a long-term American military presence in the Gulf. The details of the agreement would be kept secret because of Arab sensitivities toward being publicly identified with the United States.²⁰ At the end of May, Kuwaiti Defense Minister Sheik Ali al Salim al Sabah told reporters that "Kuwait has no intention of granting a permanent base to the United States or to allied troops, but friendly countries will definitely have a role in maintaining the security of the region and the defense of Kuwait."²¹

Notes

1. Alan Cowell, "Baghdad Formally Agrees to 'Unjust' UN Conditions for Permanent Cease-Fire," *The New York Times*, 7 Apr 91, p 1.

2. John E. Yang and Barton Gellman, "U.S. Forces to Set Up Refugee Camps in Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 17 Apr 91, p 1; Barton Gellman and William Drozdiak, "U.S. Troops Enter Northern Iraq to Set Up Camps," *The Washington Post*, 18 Apr 91, p 1.

3. Trevor Rowe, "UN Authorized Unit for Iraq, Kuwait," *The Washington Post*, 10 Apr 91, p 27; William Branigin, "Firefight Erupts in North Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 14 May 91, p 1.; "UN and Iraq Sign Agreement to Allow Entry of 400 Guards," *The New York Times*, 24 May 91, p 8.

Gulf War Chronology

4. Clyde Haberman, "UN Takes Over From U.S. At the Kurdish Camp in Iraq," *The New York Times*, 14 May 91, p 10.
5. John Murray Brown, "Allies Finish N. Iraq Withdrawal," *The Washington Post*, 16 Jul 91, p 14.
6. "Cease-Fire Effective Today in Gulf War," *The Washington Times*, 11 Apr 91, p 8.
7. Paul Lewis, "UN Punishes Iraq Further for Kuwait Invasion," *The New York Times*, 18 Jun 91, p 5.
8. Frank J. Priol, "Plan on Iraqi Arms Is Faulted," *The New York Times*, 9 May 91, p 15.
9. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq Withholding Location of Nuclear Material," *The Washington Post*, 1 May 91, p 23.
10. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Inspectors Find Iraq's Nuclear Material," *The Washington Post*, 23 May 91, p 46.
11. Lewis, *The New York Times*, 18 Jun 91, p 5.
12. Caryle Murphy, "UN Officials, Iraq Talk on Nuclear Arms," *The Washington Post*, 1 Jul 91, p 13.
13. John M. Goshko, "Iraq Gives Information to UN on Extensive Nuclear Program," *The Washington Post*, 9 Jul 91, p 1.
14. "Fund Created by UN to Pay War Damages," *The Washington Post*, 21 May 91, p 16.
15. John M. Goshko, "U.S. Seeks Fast Payment from Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 4 Jun 91, p 10.
16. Frank J. Priol, "Iraq, Citing Need to Rebuild, Asks UN for Reprieve on Reparations," *The New York Times*, 7 May 91, p 17.
17. John M. Goshko, "UN Near Accord on Iraqi Killings," *The Washington Post*, 5 Apr 91, p 1.
18. "Saddam Receives High Honor," *The Washington Post*, 30 Apr 91, p 16.
19. Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep (U)," 06/2115, Apr 91.
20. Michael R. Gordon, "Cheney Reports Gulf Accepting Presence," *The New York Times*, 10 May 91, p 1.
21. "Kuwait Bars Permanent American Base," *Los Angeles Times*, 28 May 91, p 4.

Glossary

AB	Air Base
ABCCC	Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center
ACM	Air combat maneuvers
ADA	Air-defense artillery
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AGL	Above ground level
AMRAAM	Advanced medium air-to-air missile
AOB	Air order of battle
AOR	Area of responsibility
APOD	Aerial port of debarkation
AWACS	Airborne warning and control system
AWS	Airborne warning system
C ³	Command-control-communications
C-day	Closing day, 7 August
CAS	Close-air support
CCRC	Combined Control and Reporting Center
CENTAF	U.S. Air Forces, Central Command (9th Air Force)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency

Gulf War Chronology

CINCMAC	Commander-in-Chief, Military Airlift Command
CINCTRANS	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Transportation Command
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CONUS	Continental United States
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CSAR	Combat search and rescue
DACT	Dissimilar aerial combat tactics
D-day	Date of commencement of hostilities (air war), 17 January 1991
DF	Direction fired
DFSC	Defense Fuel Supply Center
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
EAC	Eastern Area Command
ECM	Electronic-countermeasures
EDT	Eastern Daylight Time
EPW	Enemy Prisoner of War
EST	Eastern Standard Time
FROG	Free Rocket Over Ground
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
G-day	Date of commencement of hostilities (ground war), 24 February 1991
HTPM	Hard target penetrator munitions
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IZAF	Iraqi Air Force
JSTARS	Joint surveillance target attack radar system
J-2	Intelligence Directorate (Joint)
J-4	Logistics Directorate (Joint)
KFIA	King Fahd International Airport
KTO	Kuwaiti Theater of Operations

LimDis	Limited Distribution
LG	Logistics
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MAJCOMS	Major Commands
MARCENT	Marine Central Command
NAC	Northern Area Command
NAVCENT	Navy Central Command
NC	No Contractors
NBC	Nuclear-biological-chemical
OC	Originator controlled
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PSYOPS	Psychological operations
Red Horse	Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAM	Surface-to-air missile
SEAD	Suppression of enemy air defenses
SIGINT	Signals intelligence
SLAM	Standoff land attack missile
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TFS	Tactical Fighter Squadron
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
TLAM	Tomahawk land attack missile
TPFDD	Time-phased force and deployment data
TSC	Top Secret Codeword
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
USCENTCOM	Central Command
USCINCCENT	U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Central Command

Gulf War Chronology

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Gulf War Chronology

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Appendices

United Nations Security Council Resolutions

Resolution		Summary
Date	No.	
2 Aug 90	660	Condemned invasion. Demanded withdrawal. Adopted 14-0-1, Yemen abstaining.
6 Aug 90	661	Imposed a trade and financial embargo. Established special sanctions committee. Called on UN members to protect Kuwaiti assets. Adopted 13-0-2, Cuba and Yemen abstaining.
9 Aug 90	662	Declared Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void. Adopted unanimously.
18 Aug 90	664	Demanded immediate release of foreigners from Kuwait and Iraq. Insisted Iraq rescind its order closing missions in Kuwait. Adopted unanimously.
25 Aug 90	665	Called on UN members cooperating with Kuwait to enforce sanctions by inspecting and verifying cargoes and destinations. Adopted 13-0-2, Cuba and Yemen abstaining.
13 Sep 90	666	Reaffirmed Iraq was responsible for safety of foreign nationals. Specified guidelines for delivery of food and medical supplies. Adopted 13-2, Cuba and Yemen against.
16 Sep 90	667	Condemned Iraqi aggression against diplomats. Demanded immediate release of foreign nationals. Adopted unanimously.
24 Sep 90	669	Emphasized only special sanctions committee could authorize food and aid shipments to Iraq of Kuwait. Adopted unanimously.
25 Sep 90	670	Expanded embargo to include air traffic. Called on UN members to detain Iraqi ships used to break the embargo. Adopted 14-1, Cuba against.
29 Oct 90	674	Demanded Iraq stop mistreating Kuwaitis and foreign nationals. Reminded Iraq it is liable for damages. Adopted 13-0-2, Cuba and Yemen abstaining.

Gulf War Chronology

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|-----------|-----|---|
| 28 Nov 90 | 677 | Condemned Iraq's attempt to change Kuwait's demographic composition and Iraq's destruction of Kuwaiti civil records.
Adopted unanimously. |
| 29 Nov 90 | 678 | Authorized UN members to use "all means necessary" to enforce previous resolutions, if Iraq does not leave Kuwait by 15 January 1991.
Adopted 12-2-1, Cuba and Yemen against, China abstaining. |
| 2 Mar 91 | 686 | Demanded Iraq cease hostile action, return all POWs and detainees, rescind annexation, accept liability, return property, and disclose mine locations.
Adopted 11-1-3, Cuba against, Yemen, China, and India abstaining. |

[*Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: An Interim Report to Congress*, (Pursuant to Title V), Jul 1991.]

**USAF Aircraft Deployed to the AOR—1,131
16 January 1991**

<i>Combat</i>		<i>Support</i>	
A/OA-10	144	C-20	1
AC-130	4	C-21	8
B-52	20	C-130	128
EC-130(CC)	5	E-3 (AWACS)	10
EC-130(VS)	2	EC-130E	6
EF-111	18	HC-130	4
F-4G	48	JSTARS	2
F-15	96	KC-10	30
F-15E	48	KC-135	194
F-16	210	MC-130	4
F-111	64	MH-53	8
F-117	36	MH-60	8
		RC-135	6
		RF-4C	18
		TR-1	4
		U-2	5

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 16/2115z Jan 91; Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "Desert Shield Brief," 16 Jan 91.]

**Allied Aircraft Deployed to the AOR—638
16 January 1991**

Bahrain	
F-15	12
F-16	12
Britain	
Tornado	68
Jaguar	11
Canada	
CF-18	18
Egypt	
F-4	32
France	
Mirage F-1	25
Mirage 2000	8
Jaguar	8
Italy	
Tornado	8
Kuwait	
A-4	20
Mirage F-1	15
Hawk	5
Oman	
Jaguar	22
Strikemaster	12
Hunter	10
Qatar	
Mirage F-1	12
Alpha	6
Hunter	3
Saudi Arabia	
F-5	85
F-15	82
Tornado	49
Strikemaster	32
Hawk	30
United Arab Emirates	
Mirage 2000	25
Mirage III	14
Mirage 5	14

[Brfg, "DESERT SHIELD CSAF Briefing," 11 Jan 91. No changes in these numbers were briefed between 11 January and 16 January.]

Iraqi Air Order of Battle (AOB)

	Fixed-Wing Combat	Helos/Misc	Total
Starting AOB	831	484	1,315
• Confirmed Losses	106	52	158
• In Iran	112	26	138
Remaining	613	406	1,019
Estimated Losses in Shelters*	141		141
Estimated Remaining	472	406	878
% remaining	56%	83%	66%

Since 375 of 594 shelters (63%) were damaged or destroyed, 141 aircraft destroyed in shelters was believed to be a conservative estimate.

[Memo, Maj. Gen. Clapper, AF/IN, to SECAF, "Current Status of the Iraqi Air Force," 11 Mar 91.]

Iraqi Military Equipment in the KTO

Resource	Original	Destroyed/ Captured	% Remaining
Tanks	4,550	3,956	13
Armored Vehicles	2,880	2,166	25
Artillery	3,257	3,092	5

[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 11 Mar 91.]

DESERT STORM Cumulative Sorties:

CENTAF—108,082

USAF—65,581

[Msg. USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Mar 91.]

CENTAF Daily Sorties

1 September 90–28 February 91

1 September 90	290	3 October 90	581
2 September 90	485	4 October 90	647
3 September 90	412	5 October 90	478
4 September 90	505	6 October 90	623
5 September 90	370	7 October 90	437
6 September 90	410	8 October 90	617
7 September 90	N/A	9 October 90	602
8 September 90	562	10 October 90	448
9 September 90	494	11 October 90	571
10 September 90	635	12 October 90	492
11 September 90	598	13 October 90	546
12 September 90	624	14 October 90	471
13 September 90	627	15 October 90	579
14 September 90	471	16 October 90	652
15 September 90	494	17 October 90	682
16 September 90	624	18 October 90	593
17 September 90	492	19 October 90	381
18 September 90	616	20 October 90	500
19 September 90	655	21 October 90	472
20 September 90	607	22 October 90	628
21 September 90	519	23 October 90	615
22 September 90	551	24 October 90	633
23 September 90	528	25 October 90	669
24 September 90	666	26 October 90	496
25 September 90	650	27 October 90	378
26 September 90	685	28 October 90	411
27 September 90	493	29 October 90	632
28 September 90	313	30 October 90	644
29 September 90	539	31 October 90	691
30 September 90	440	1 November 90	559
1 October 90	585	2 November 90	415
2 October 90	672	3 November 90	607

Gulf War Chronology

4 November 90	409	18 December 90	651
5 November 90	632	19 December 90	640
6 November 90	580	20 December 90	565
7 November 90	529	21 December 90	450
8 November 90	541	22 December 90	604
9 November 90	433	23 December 90	455
10 November 90	403	24 December 90	428
11 November 90	404	25 December 90	408
12 November 90	645	26 December 90	630
13 November 90	566	27 December 90	609
14 November 90	430	28 December 90	583
15 November 90	878	29 December 90	668
16 November 90	865	30 December 90	562
17 November 90	805	31 December 90	502
18 November 90	537	1 January 91	451
19 November 90	660	2 January 91	567
20 November 90	617	3 January 91	689
21 November 90	435	4 January 91	762
22 November 90	167	5 January 91	771
23 November 90	305	6 January 91	551
24 November 90	409	7 January 91	975
25 November 90	451	8 January 91	983
26 November 90	532	9 January 91	784
27 November 90	535	10 January 91	555
28 November 90	570	11 January 91	788
29 November 90	528	12 January 91	770
30 November 90	406	13 January 91	476
1 December 90	652	14 January 91	524
2 December 90	311	15 January 91	605
3 December 90	614	16 January 91	443
4 December 90	593	17 January 91	2,388
5 December 90	626	18 January 91	2,200
6 December 90	488	19 January 91	1,875
7 December 90	460	20 January 91	1,842
8 December 90	540	21 January 91	1,907
9 December 90	458	22 January 91	1,982
10 December 90	551	23 January 91	2,424
11 December 90	643	24 January 91	2,811
12 December 90	657	25 January 91	2,407
13 December 90	553	26 January 91	2,672
14 December 90	443	27 January 91	2,263
15 December 90	609	28 January 91	2,523
16 December 90	489	29 January 91	2,555
17 December 90	688	30 January 91	2,312

Gulf War Chronology

31 January 91	2,406	15 February 91	2,769
1 February 91	2,431	16 February 91	2,378
2 February 91	2,417	17 February 91	2,143
3 February 91	2,635	18 February 91	2,957
4 February 91	2,705	19 February 91	2,882
5 February 91	2,760	20 February 91	2,385
6 February 91	2,460	21 February 91	2,627
7 February 91	2,584	22 February 91	2,906
8 February 91	2,591	23 February 91	3,041
9 February 91	2,633	24 February 91	3,062
10 February 91	2,695	25 February 91	2,881
11 February 91	2,583	26 February 91	3,159
12 February 91	2,621	27 February 91	2,940
13 February 91	2,702	28 February 91	992
14 February 91	2,576		

*Indicates the highest sortie numbers for DESERT SHIELD and STORM.

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Sep 90 to 28/2115z Feb 91; Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Sep 90 to 09/2115z Sep 90. Sorties flown before 16 January were for training only. Also, post-20 January sortie totals include Joint Task Proven Force flight activity.]

Cumulative Aircraft Attrition

U.S. Aircraft—37*

USAF—18

A-10	3
AC-130	1
F-4G	1
F-15E	2
F-16	5
OA-10	2

Non-combat

B-52	1
EF-111	1
F-16	2

USN—10

A-6	5
F-14	1
F/A-18	2

Non-combat

A-7	1
F/A-18	1

USMC—9

AV-8	6
OV-10	2

Non-combat

AV-8	1
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Allied Aircraft—12

A-4 (KU)	1
F-5 (SA)	1
Tornado (IT)	1
Tornado (UK)	6

Non-combat

F-15 (SA)	1
Tornado (SA)	1
Tornado (UK)	1

Iraqi Aircraft—97

Air to Air—35**

MiG-21/Fishbed	4
MiG-23/Flogger	9
MiG-25/Foxbat	2
MiG-29/Fulcrum	6
Mirage F-1	9

Gulf War Chronology

Su-17/22/Fitter	3
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
On Ground—62***	
An-2/Colt	1
Il-76/Candid	3
MiG-21/Fishbed	9
MiG-23/Flogger	8
MiG-25/Foxbat	5
MiG-29/Fulcrum	3
Mirage F-1	1
Su-17/22/Fitter	11
Su-25/Frogfoot	2
Tu-16/Badger	6
Tu-22 Blinder	1
U/I	6
Non-combat losses	6

*No U.S. or allied aircraft were downed in air-to-air combat.

**The following kill confirmation criteria for air-to-air combat victory claims were provided for use during DESERT STORM:

- Aircraft is considered destroyed if it crashes, disintegrates, loses a vital flying component, catches fire, or is abandoned by the pilot.
- Claims of aircraft destruction would be confirmed by at least one of the three primary references: witness statements, gun camera film, or sighting of aircraft wreckage. Electronic indications from AWACS, E-2, and other such capabilities such as SIGINT [signal intelligence], COMINT [communications intelligence], and other intelligence could be used if the three primary methods were not available or were not conclusive. [Msg, USCINCENT to Joint Staff, "Air-to-Air Kill Confirmation Criteria," 062052z Feb 91.]

***This figure does not include aircraft destroyed in shelters.
[Brfg, AF/XO to CSAF, "DESERT STORM Brief," 1 Mar 91.]

Mobilization and Demobilization of U.S. Forces

Date	Total Military	Women	Total CENTAF	Women
10 Aug 90	25,317		6,143	
21 Aug 90	52,836	1,000	12,284	727
3 Sep 90	103,446	2,731	23,489	1,152
13 Sep 90	153,113	4,882	29,900	1,875
10 Oct 90	200,079	8,655	32,333	2,013
9 Nov 90	235,904	12,972	30,991	1,956
5 Dec 90	252,131	14,463	32,043	2,036
22 Dec 90	300,264	18,662	35,724	2,330
6 Jan 91	358,326	22,228	41,995	2,661
17 Jan 91*	454,128	25,814	48,679	
30 Jan 91	501,600	31,602	51,876	
24 Feb 91	536,687	34,814	54,615	
2 Mar 91**	540,748	35,321	54,706	
13 Mar 91	503,380	33,446	48,296	
20 Mar 91	452,195	31,856	39,463	
27 Mar 91	403,063	29,368	28,006	
4 Apr 91	350,352	26,342	23,078	
12 Apr 91	300,113	23,622	18,928	
21 Apr 91	256,370	21,270	16,212	
30 Apr 91	197,315	16,137	14,877	
10 May 91	148,669	11,161	14,054	
20 May 91	92,159	9,061	10,552	
28 May 91	75,463	8,182	8,875	
6 Jun 91	64,913	6,194	7,441	

*After 17 January, numbers of CENTAF women were no longer reported.

[Msg, USCINCCENT to AIG 904, "Sitrep," 01/2115z Sep 90 to 28/2115z Feb 91; Msg, USCINCCENT to JCS, "Sitrep," 02/2115z Sep 90 to 09/2115z Sep 90.]

DESERT SHIELD Strategic Airlift Deployment
Mission Summary By Aircraft Type
7 August 1990—10 March 1991

Date	C-5	C-141	KC-10	Comm	C-9	Total
August	415	1,041	17	195	0	1,668
September	510	952	89	322	0	1,873
October	440	676	57	246	0	1,419
November	426	729	48	269	0	1,472
December	567	1,391	118	606	0	2,682
January	699	1,666	50	720	73	3,208
February	552	1,560	0	757	126	2,995
March	<u>161</u>	<u>294</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>194</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>659</u>
Total	3,770	8,309	379	3,309	209	15,976

Total Air Passengers: 500,720 (99 percent)

Total Air Cargo: 542,759 Short Tons (14 percent)

(including DESERT EXPRESS and EUROPEAN EXPRESS)

[Msg, MAC/CAT "Sitreps" as of 312208z Aug 90; 302210z Sep 90; 312133z Oct 90; 302105z Nov 90; 312136z Dec 90; 312155z Jan 91; 282134z Feb 91; 102043z Mar 91; Msg, USTRANSCOM/CAT "Sitreps" as of 050400z Sep 90; 010400z Oct 90; 010400z Nov 90; 010400z Dec 90; 010400z Jan 91; 010410z Feb 91; 010400z Mar 91.]

Military Airlift Command C-130s
In Operation DESERT SHIELD-DESERT STORM

Missions Flown	More than 13,900
Sorties Flown	More than 47,600
Hours Flown	More than 76,000
Passengers	More than 242,000
Cargo	More than 174,000 tons

[MAC News Service *Command Post*, (Scott AFB), 19 Apr 91, p 8.]