Great Game to 9/11

A Concise History of Afghanistan’s International Relations

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The Engaging the World series focuses on U.S. involvement around the globe, primarily in the post-Cold War period. It includes peacekeeping and humanitarian missions as well as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom—all missions in which the U.S. Air Force has been integrally involved. It will also document developments within the Air Force and the Department of Defense.

Great Game to 9/11

Great Game to 9/11 was initially begun as an introduction for a larger work on U.S./coalition involvement in Afghanistan. It provides essential information for an understanding of how this isolated country has, over centuries, become a battleground for world powers. Although an overview, this study draws on primary-source material to present a detailed examination of U.S.-Afghan relations prior to Operation Enduring Freedom.

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Contents

INTRODUCTION

The Razor’s Edge 1

ONE

Origins of the Afghan State, the Great Game, and Afghan Nationalism 5

TWO

Stasis and Modernization 15

THREE

Early Relations with the United States 27

FOUR

Afghanistan’s Soviet Shift and the U.S. Response 39

FIVE

The Helmand River Valley Project and the Pakistan Question 51

SIX

Socialist Afghanistan and War with the Soviet Union 63

EPILOGUE

From the Soviet Withdrawal to 9/11 79

NOTES 85
In 1907, Lord George Nathaniel Curzon observed from his time in South Asia the precarious balance on the borderlands of Afghanistan and its impact on the world: “Frontiers are indeed the razor’s edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war and peace, of life and death to nations.” From the British-Russian “Great Game” rivalry that started in the nineteenth century to Operation Enduring Freedom in the twenty-first, Afghanistan, despite its remote location and often dysfunctional government, has continued to claim the attention of the world’s great powers.

In addition to the Europeans, for almost a century, U.S. leaders have considered economic and strategic interests and the careful balance of power in the South Asia region. These concerns returned to public view in the first decade of the twenty-first century, but the experiences of the past reveal patterns in Afghanistan of weak political regimes, tribal unrest, and diplomatic intrigue.

A review of modern Afghan history raises two important questions: how did ethnic politics shape Afghanistan’s national policy, and how did Soviet and U.S. strategic interests influence Afghanistan’s international affairs? To answer these questions, a narrow focus on Afghan history after the 1979 Soviet invasion or on U.S. links to the mujahideen is of limited utility. A broader, albeit concise, examination of the long-term structures of Afghan domestic politics and international diplomacy offers a fuller understanding of this complex region.

Afghanistan’s path from empire to nation-state in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries established enduring conditions for ethnic conflict and resistance to modernization in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Its turbulent history has been marked by recurring patterns of political centralization, then concessions to tribal authorities; resistance to foreign influence, then foreign intervention; and support for modernization, then reaction against it. These tensions have plagued Afghanistan throughout its history.
Long before the Cold War standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union and the subsequent conflicts between al-Qaeda and the West, Afghanistan endured centuries as a frontier zone between larger opposing empires: Persian in Western Asia; Mughal in South Asia; and Turkic in Central Asia. Economically, the area has remained on the margins. Even when Peshawar, Ghazni, Turquoise Mountain (Ghor), and Kandahar emerged as metropoles during the indigenous Kushan (first to third centuries), Ghaznavid (tenth to twelfth centuries), Ghorid (twelfth to thirteenth centuries), or Durrani (eighteenth to nineteenth centuries) Empires, their income was drawn from their Persian or Indian dominions.

Afghanistan was constrained by mountainous barriers that created particular ethnic and tribal allegiances. The foundation of the early Afghan state rested on confederations of core groups that projected power outward rather than establishing strong, centralized political rule from within. From the mid-tenth century to the mid-eighteenth century, the rulers of Afghanistan were of Turco-Mongolian origin or led a military dominated by Turco-Mongolians. Not until the Durrani Empire did ethnic Pashtuns emerge as a political force in Afghanistan. Thus it is crucial to consider Pashtun rule in the context of Afghanistan’s rich multiethnic heritage. In *Afghanistan’s Endless War*, Larry P. Goodson observed: “If Afghanistan has been marked by a history of invasion and conquest, no less has it suffered from almost continuous internal strife among the native peoples living in its remote mountain valleys.”

Complicating matters, the Pashtun ethnic group itself has historically been fractured and subjected to shifting alliances. Pashtun rivalries, particularly between the Durrani and Ghilzai tribes, remain an important feature of a multifaceted ethnic battlefield. While the rivalries subsided after the rule of Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880–1901), the socialist experiment after 1978 reignited them. Ghilzais and eastern Pashtuns played leading roles in the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, Hizb-e-Demokratik-e-Khalq-e-Afghanistan), in several mujahideen groups, and in the Taliban. Durranis returned to power with Hamid Karzai at the end of 2001.

In addition to the Pashtuns and their ongoing competition for power, other ethnic groups have used their leverage and geographic advantages to play key roles in Afghan history. In particular, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Aimaks, Turkmen, Balochs, Nuristani, and Kuchi have made contributions to the viability of the Afghan state. Their involvement in military, economic, and political enterprises in Afghanistan has been important, and so has their drive to establish an enduring Afghan nation-state, despite deeply rooted ethnic ties and trade across its borders. Rather than continued existence as a buffer zone created by imperious neighbors—Russian, Persian, British,
and later Pakistani—Afghanistan emerged as a confederation of tribes with a developing national identity.

Returning to the realities on the ground, mapping and understanding the intricacies of ethnic ties in Afghanistan remain difficult. Intermarriage, bilingualism, and shared local identity (manteqa), to mention but a few factors, have consistently undermined the idea of solidarity along ethnic lines.⁵ The modern Afghan state reveals the complexities of its role as ruler and as subject of successive frontier empires.
Origins of the Afghan State, 
the Great Game, 
and Afghan Nationalism

In the early eighteenth century, the territory that came to be known as Afghanistan was divided between the Safavid (Persian) and Mughal (Turco-Mongol) Empires. Ahmad Shah commanded a military unit under the ascendant Persian ruler Nadir Shah in his campaigns against the Mughals. When Nadir Shah was assassinated in 1747 and the Safavid Empire collapsed, Ahmad Shah (r. 1747–72/73) established an independent city-state around Kandahar. He adopted the name “Dur-i-Durran,” or “Prince of Pearls,” and used the term “Durrani” to distinguish the tribes affiliated with him. According to an early-nineteenth-century British account, Afghanistan after Ahmad Shah became an “orgy of intrigue, treachery, torture and murder . . . [an] ever-shifting kaleidoscope of betrayal.”1 Ahmad Shah Durrani and his son Timur Shah Durrani (r. 1772/73–93) expanded their domain, conquering territories from Kashmir to the Arabian Sea and from the Amu River (da Amu Sind) to the Indus River (Abasin). The Durrani realm at the end of the eighteenth century included modern-day Afghanistan and most of Pakistan, making it the second-largest Muslim empire of its day.

Ahmad Shah Durrani, poet, warrior, and king that he was, wrote of his nostalgia for Afghanistan during ten campaigns to expand his rule over Kashmir, Punjab, and Sind:

Whatever countries I conquer in the world,  
I would never forget your beautiful gardens.  
When I remember the summits of your beautiful mountains  
I forget the greatness of the Delhi throne.2

This fondness for his Afghan homeland provided a lasting challenge to his heirs. Unlike the rulers of other Central Asian empires who moved their capitals to strategic and economically viable locations, Ahmad Shah consolidated power in the Pashtun bases of Kandahar, Kabul, and Peshawar. Thus the Durrani Empire was “a coat worn inside out,”
according to Thomas J. Barfield. Kandahar, Kabul, and Peshawar were poor and sparsely populated compared to the rest of the Durrani Empire. The wealthiest territories remained on frontiers in every direction.

British penetration into South Asia in the eighteenth century created another layer of challenges for future Afghan leaders. Afghans unintentionally aided British occupation of the Pashtun borderlands and, more critically, allowed the rise of Sikh power in Punjab. Once Durrani’s descendants destroyed the Mughal Empire, they could not maintain such a vast and diverse empire and prolong their dominance over Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, the Hindu Kush, Peshawar, Punjab, Kashmir, Baluchistan, and Sind. Moreover, each time the Durrani leader left his seat of power in Kandahar, emerging plots from rival Pashtun tribes and other ethnic groups threatened to depose him. Afghan rulers slowly lost their territories to the Sikhs and the British: Punjab (1801), Kashmir (1819), Sind (1820s), Peshawar (1834/1879), and Baluchistan (1879), until Abdur Rahman Khan focused his authority in Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and the northern Afghan provinces in the 1880s. As of this writing, four urban centers remain: Kandahar in the south, Herat in the west, Balkh in the north, and Kabul in the east. Peshawar and the North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) make a fifth region, which the British gave to Pakistan in 1947. Peshawar was historically important to Afghan rulers as their summer capital and continues to be strategically significant as the eastern gateway to the Khyber Pass, the link between Central and South Asia.

Hoping to counter both internal and external threats, Afghan ruler Dost Mohammad Khan (r. 1826–39, 1842–63) attempted to ally himself with the British as early as the 1820s and curtailed relations with Persia and Russia. However, the inability of the British to agree on the return of Peshawar to Afghanistan impeded Anglo-Afghan cooperation. Sikhs maintained de facto rule over Peshawar after 1818, and while British forces could not quell Pashtun violence on the northwestern frontier, they preferred a Sikh alliance with an emphasis on Punjab territories. Ultimately, Dost Mohammad could not accept the permanent loss of Peshawar and British intransigence, and he turned to the Russians for help in 1838. At the same time, British government agent Alexander Burnes had been negotiating to restrain the maharaja of the Sikh Empire, Ranjit Singh, from taking more territory as an inducement to convince Dost Mohammad not to join a Russo-Persian alliance. The British, however, did not provide adequate assurances to protect Afghanistan against Russia. A Russian military mission took advantage of Dost Mohammad’s failure to gain concessions from the British and offered to defend Afghan territory against Ranjit Singh.
The negotiations were not completed by the time British forces invaded Afghanistan to secure geopolitical interests in South Asia, resulting in the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–42). The conflict ended with an inglorious British withdrawal, while Afghanistan abandoned its Russo-Persian ties. This was the first gambit in the Anglo-Russian rivalry—the “Great Game”—that would plague Afghanistan during the nineteenth century.

External pressures from Persia, Russia, and British India forced Afghanistan to focus on consolidating power in the provinces between those empires. Afghan rulers sought to strengthen their own rule while deterring the territorial interests of their neighbors. An example of the latter occurred when Dost Mohammad wrote to Sir John Lawrence, viceroy of India, in 1867, noting, “We have men and we have rocks in plenty, but we have nothing else.” In a 2011 study, Joseph J. Collins observed that “in a great political paradox, Afghan rulers were strongest within their nation when they were supported by foreign subsidies.” British funding and arms ultimately provided the cornerstone of a defensive bulwark against Russia in Afghanistan.

Dost Mohammad was the first Afghan ruler to consult with foreign military advisors. During Burnes’s visits in the 1830s, Dost Mohammad

This Punch political cartoon from November 30, 1878, shows the “Great Game” at its fullest, with the Afghan amir caught between the Russian bear and the British lion.
sought his guidance on conscription. Although he failed to recruit Burnes, he invited a menagerie of American, French, English, Persian, and Indian adventurers and military deserters into his retinue. Josiah Harlan, a West Point graduate from Pennsylvania, was one of the first and most prominent Americans known to have maintained residency in Afghanistan. Historian Sir John William Kaye described Harlan in 1851 as “an American adventurer, now a doctor and now a general, who was ready to take any kind of service, with any one disposed to pay him.” Having previously served Ranjit Singh, Harlan moved to Afghanistan and quickly became involved in several revolutionary and military intrigues. Ultimately, he became an aide de camp for Dost Mohammad and helped prepare the Afghan infantry for the Battle of Jamrud (1837) and the defense of the Khyber Pass against Ranjit Singh.

After Dost Mohammad, the Afghan leader most associated with military modernization was his grandson, Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880–1901). Historian Vartan Gregorian observed that “Abdur Rahman relied heavily on a military autocracy to guarantee his absolutism. Perhaps the ‘Iron Amir’s’ greatest single achievement was the creation of a standing and centralized Afghan army.” By the 1880s, Abdur Rahman had a standing army of 50,000 to 60,000 men. He also positioned grain in Herat, Kandahar, and Kabul to support expeditionary missions against recalcitrant tribes. Barnett R. Rubin described his rule as a “coercive-intensive path to state formation.” While his campaign aimed to establish a modern state that circumvented tribal rule, Abdur Rahman faced seventeen major rebellions in a fifteen-year period. Expressing a sentiment that would be repeated several times hence, Abdur Rahman cautioned: “I had to put in order all those hundreds of petty chiefs, plunderers, robbers and cut-throats, who were the cause of everlasting trouble in Afghanistan. This necessitated breaking down the feudal and tribal system and substituting one grand community under one law and one rule.”

Anthropologist Thomas J. Barfield noted that Abdur Rahman “abolished the decentralized governmental system in which tribes and regions maintained a high degree of autonomy in exchange for submitting to the legal authority of the Kabul government. When faced with numerous revolts by his own relatives and regional groups, he waged war against his own people until he and his government had no rivals of any type.” To establish his authority throughout Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman singled out Ghilzai Pashtuns and Hazaras during punitive campaigns in the 1880s and 1890s. He was particularly brutal in reprisals against Hazaras, who sought to guard their autonomy while Abdur Rahman centralized state power and checked the influence of local chiefs. As Abdur Rahman explained, “I am
quite wearied of the behaviour of these people. They should take with them their families and household property and go out of the country, and I will populate their country with Afghans.”

Ghilzai Pashtuns, the traditional rivals of the Durranis, also suffered from forced migrations in the late 1880s and early 1890s. Abdur Rahman moved thousands of Ghilzai from the south and east to north of the Hindu Kush, depriving them of a Pashtun base in the south and creating a pro-Pashtun population amid the Tajiks, Turkmen, Uzbeks, and Hazaras in the central and northern parts of Afghanistan. This action weakened the ability of Ghilzai Pashtuns to coalesce and further diluted the economic and political influence of non-Pashtuns, whose land was often seized. Ultimately, Abdur Rahman established Durrani Pashtuns as the privileged ethnic group in Afghanistan, and a pattern of their over-representation in the government began. These actions would have significant strategic and political implications for the twentieth century.

In the early 1890s, while Afghan identity remained localized and regional, rather than national, Abdur Rahman created a centralized state bureaucracy that placed Afghans into one consistent governmental system.
of taxation, administration, and military recruitment that drew them into a nascent Afghan state. Abdur Rahman centralized his authority by keeping his sons in Kabul and dispatching loyal followers as provincial governors. He created a supreme council and a general assembly (loya jirga) with representatives from the royal family (sardars), local elites from around the nation (khawanin mulki), and religious leaders (mullahs). He also created new provinces that undermined traditional ethnic and tribal boundaries.

Abdur Rahman did not offer much in exchange for the divestiture of power from the regions and the supremacy of the elite in Kabul, however. He did not invest in infrastructure, education, communication systems, or transport networks. “Afghanistan’s level of urbanization was higher in the fifteenth century under the Timurids, when Herat and Balkh were international centers of culture and commerce,” Barfield noted, “something that late-nineteenth century Kabul (with a population of only fifty thousand) never came close to achieving.”

Returning to the international arena and following his defeat in the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–80), with the subsequent occupation of his territory by the British, Abdur Rahman became well aware of the new geopolitical realities of the Great Game. In his memoir, he asked the rhetorical question: “How can a small power like Afghanistan, which is like a goat between two lions, or a grain of wheat between these two strong millstones of the grinding mill, stand in the midway of the stones without being crushed to death?” His answer was to develop an isolationist policy and reject commercial ties with his neighbors. “The greatest safety of Afghanistan lies in its natural impregnable position,” Abdur Rahman wrote, for “Allah has given us every peak of the mountains for a fortress of nature, and foreigners know that the Afghans, being born warriors, can go on fighting for ever and ever, as long as they can hide themselves behind the stones and do not have to face the enemy in the open field.” Abdur Rahman’s observation proved to be an enduring one, as Coalition forces in Afghanistan reported the use of these same tactics by Afghan insurgents in the twenty-first century.

Dost Mohammad and Abdur Rahman confronted their limited resources and began to define the Afghan nation as a coherent political unit in the second half of the nineteenth century. Both leaders rearranged military and political structures to meet the challenges of modernity with a mix of isolationism, authoritarianism, militarism, and diplomatic skill. Yet while they initiated reforms to manage the diverse territories that remained in Afghanistan, they institutionalized commercial backwardness, ethnic and regional antagonism, and political compromise, leaving the country ill-prepared for the challenges of the twentieth century.
One of the defining events in Abdur Rahman’s rule was the concession of the Durand Line, which has persisted as an international boundary by agreement since November 12, 1893. This territorial compromise between Britain and Afghanistan confirmed the Treaty of Gandamak, signed on May 26, 1879, by Mohammad Yaqub Khan, son of Sher Ali Khan and, briefly, amir of Afghanistan. Yaqub Khan ceded autonomy of foreign relations to Britain; consented to a British mission in Kabul and deeper commercial relations; and transferred the Khyber Pass, Kurram Valley, the Pishin Valley, including the Bolan Pass, and Sibi in Balochistan, to British India. He did this in exchange for an annual monetary subsidy.

According to Amin Saikal, Abdur Rahman never accepted the Durand Line “as more than a line delineating the Afghan and British responsibilities in the Pashtun tribal areas. He contended that the line could not constitute a permanent border between Afghanistan and British India.” Abdur Rahman expressed serious reservations about the agreement with Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, foreign secretary of British India, and other British officials. In a letter to the viceroy of India, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, Abdur Rahman recalled that Pashtuns in the North-West Frontier Province “being
brave warriors and staunch Mohamedans, would make a very strong force to fight against any power which might invade India or Afghanistan. I will gradually make them peaceful subjects and good friends of Great Britain.” He cautioned, however, that “if you should cut them out of my dominions, they will neither be of any use to you nor to me: you will always be engaged in fighting and troubles with them, and they will always go on plundering.”

Although Abdur Rahman was aware of the potential consequences of his concession, he did not have many alternatives. He knew that unrest in the frontier regions would continue to undermine British authority, but he wanted to avoid direct conflict with Britain. The British viewed the Durand Line as an opportunity to secure high passes into India and to curb Afghan interests in Baluchistan. Abdur Rahman, on the other hand, understood that his rise to power and authority within Afghanistan rested on British support and subsidies. Abdur Rahman later argued that the British “had not the sense to understand that taking and keeping under British possession all these barren lands on the borders of Afghanistan was a very unwise step, by which they burdened the exchequer of India with the heavy expense of keeping an army on the spot to maintain peace in these territories.” To complicate matters, Abdur Rahman extended the practice used by rulers since Dost Mohammad of criticizing the British in public while allying with them in private, advocating jihad against the British while collecting their subsidies. Abdur Rahman believed, however, that his actions slowed imperial encroachment and provided the necessary stability for reforms in Afghanistan.

Responding to the Durand compromise, Abdur Rahman predicted the sustained significance of Afghan unity: “The first and most important advice that I can give to my successors and people to make Afghanistan into a great kingdom is to impress upon their minds the value of unity; unity, and unity alone, can make it into a great power. All the royal family, nobility, and people must have one mind, one interest, and one opinion, to safeguard their homes.” Abdur Rahman was indeed concerned that the Durand Line would undermine the consolidation of power he had begun a decade earlier: “In your cutting away from me these frontier tribes who are people of my nationality and my religion, you will injure my prestige in the eyes of my subjects, and will make me weak, and my weakness is injurious for your Government.”

Although the notion that Afghanistan would function as a buffer between Russia and Britain would take hold a decade later, Abdur Rahman understood Afghanistan’s importance to the stability of the region and its strategic place in Asia. In the end, the Durand Line would have lasting implications for the Pashtun borderlands. As a result of the exodus of
Afghan refugees that began during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, almost twice as many Pashtuns lived in Pakistan as in Afghanistan by the end of the 1990s.\textsuperscript{34}
Stasis and Modernization

After Abdur Rahman Khan, Afghanistan entered into a period of sustained stasis, or civil strife. A conventional interpretation of stasis is the balance of equal and opposing forces that results in a kind of stability. In his descriptions of ancient Greece, Thucydides offered a more apt understanding of the political dissolution and violence that accompanies such a stalemate: “In times of peace, neither side had the excuse or the willingness to call in the two great powers, but when the war was on, alliances were easily obtained by those on both sides who, plotting a new order of things, sought through calling in outsiders both to harm their opponents and to acquire power for themselves.” As a shifting war between individuals and parties, Thucydides viewed stasis as a cause of social and political disintegration.1

When Abdur Rahman died, his eldest son, Habibullah Khan (r. 1901–19), who had been groomed to rule, was prepared to succeed him. In Barnett R. Rubin’s words, the “peaceful succession was an event with no precedent and so far, no sequel.”2 Habibullah was not as imperious as his father. He eased restrictions on the tribal elites, reducing their conscription requirements and allowing them more control over local affairs. Habibullah still understood the value of a well-armed, modern standing army, but he viewed economic development as a subsidiary function of military needs.3

Seeking allies in his father’s former rivals, Habibullah invited back many Afghan exiles, including Peshawar and Naqshbandi (Sufi) elites. Mahmud Beg Tarzi, an intellectual influenced by the nationalist and modernist “Young Turk” movement, was the most influential to return. He founded Afghanistan’s first newspaper, Siraj al-Akbar Afghaniyah (The Lamp of the News of Afghanistan), which was pan-Islamist and anti-imperialist in orientation. Tarzi believed that the newspaper was “one of the most essential tools of modern civilization.”4 It became a forum for realistic views of Afghanistan’s situation. As historian Vartan Gregorian explained, “Tarzi singled out the disunity of the Afghans and their anarchic concept of freedom and law as other factors that had contributed to the...
backwardness of the country. The disunity was such, he declared, that it had calamitously set city against city, village against village, street against street, tribe against tribe, brother against brother.” Gregorian continued:

In Tarzi’s view, one important result of this disunity was that the majority of Afghans had developed a negative concept of freedom, equating freedom with the absence of restraint or governmental authority. He saw lawlessness as historically regressive and as alien to the spirit and elevated ethics of Islam. True freedom, he wrote, lay in adherence to a positive concept of law, a concept in which law is seen as a cohesive and constructive social force contributing to the development of religion, national genius, and civilization.5

Using his position, Tarzi sought to root out the causes of social and political disintegration and to address Afghanistan’s backwardness.

Influenced by Tarzi, Habibullah pursued the soft power of Afghan nationalism and international recognition of the Afghan nation. In 1901, soon after his succession, he sent envoys to Great Britain, Russia, France, Germany, Japan, China, the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, Persia, and the United States. He followed Abdur Rahman’s model of neutrality, using Afghanistan’s natural boundaries to his advantage while impeding Russian and British trade concessions.6

During this period of internal stability, Habibullah oversaw the development of schools, the construction of the first hospital and hydroelectric plant, and the appearance of wealth in the cities. This latter development marked the beginning of the great social divide between the cities and the countryside. Habibullah also identified the importance of a well-funded, centrally managed, modernized army. In 1904, he founded the Royal Military College (Madrasse-e Harbi-e Sirajieh) for the Durrani Pashtun elite.7

Alongside his military reforms, Habibullah invited foreigners to assist and lead several infrastructure development projects. An American, A. C. Jewett, formerly an engineer with the General Electric Company, moved to Afghanistan in 1911 when he was hired by a British company to build an electric generating plant for Habibullah’s summer palace at Jabal Saraj in Parwan Province, north of Kabul. By his niece’s account, Jewett “soon discovered what later generations of aid providers did—that it is not easy to help Afghans. Jewett’s original two-year tour stretched out to seven years while he struggled with physical difficulties, bureaucratic delays, and cultural obstacles.”8
Habibullah Khan’s measured reforms encountered the harsh realities of foreign affairs with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Alarmed by the rising power of Germany, Russian and British leaders sought to end their conflict in Central Asia and to reaffirm Russia’s 1873 vow not to invade Afghanistan. According to the 1907 Convention, the British would “exercise their influence in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense,” while the Russians, on their part, declared that they “recognize[d] Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence.” Thus the European powers agreed to consult with each other on all matters pertaining to Afghanistan, and they stipulated that Afghanistan would remain neutral. Afghan leaders were incensed when their input was ignored and they had no place in negotiations between Russia and Britain regarding interests in Afghanistan. The Kabul elite developed a severe distrust of both Russia and Britain and rejected, as a threat to national integrity, their requests to expand trade.

When the Ottoman caliphate called for a global jihad against the British and their allies during World War I, Afghanistan sided with the Young Turks. Many in Afghanistan were driven to arms with a feeling of intense resentment of British imperialism. In 1915, a Turkish-German mission arrived in Kabul to prepare an invasion of India, but Habibullah gave only
tentative backing to the plans while practicing a policy of neutrality. Before the Treaty of Versailles was signed, however, Afghanistan had a new ruler. In February 1919, unknown assailants assassinated Habibullah while he was on a hunting expedition. Habibullah’s third son, Amanullah (r. 1919–29), who was then in charge of the army and treasury in Kabul, seized power. He eliminated dissent and gained the loyalty of his chief rival and uncle, Nasrullah Khan, who was supported by the ulema (legal scholars) and Pashtuns along the Indian border. When Amanullah declared independence at the beginning of his reign on February 28, 1919, he set in motion events that led to the Third Anglo-Afghan War. This conflict lasted from May 3 to August 8, 1919, and consisted of a series of border skirmishes.

To prevent an escalation of the conflict, the British Royal Air Force bombed targets in Jalalabad and Kabul in an early example of air superiority. Using a Handley Page V/1500 heavy bomber developed during World War I, the British dropped one and a half tons of bombs on Jalalabad in a single day and targeted several military installations, an armaments factory, the royal palace, and Abdur Rahman’s tomb in Kabul. Combined with the disarray of the Afghan army and the lack of popular support in Pashtun areas of British India, the British aerial offensive forced Amanullah to make a quick concession for peace.

The war ended with the Treaty of Rawalpindi, signed on August 8, 1919, which guaranteed sovereignty to Afghanistan. The agreement confirmed Amanullah’s diplomatic independence and freed Afghanistan from British interference in its foreign affairs for the first time since the 1870s. As the price for this independence, Amanullah agreed to uphold the Durand Line, although he continued to support Pashtun disobedience and revolts in British India. For its part, the British Indian government was well aware of the need for pragmatism with Afghanistan. As Lord Chelmsford, viceroy of India, stated in a report to London in October 1919:

We have to deal with an Afghan nation, impregnated with the world-spirit of self-determination and national freedom, inordinately self-confident in its new-found emancipation from autocracy and in its supposed escape from all menace from Russia, impatient of any restraint on its absolute independence. To expect the Afghanistan of today willingly to accept a Treaty re-embodying our old control over her foreign policy is a manifest impossibility. If we were to impose it at the point of the sword, to what end? The Treaty would have to be torn to shreds the moment the point of the sword was withdrawn.
Afghanistan initiated official foreign relations with Turkey, Persia (Iran), Germany, France, Italy, and, most significantly, the newly formed Soviet Union, which was the first state to recognize Amanullah’s government in March 1919. Vladimir I. Lenin decreed Amanullah the leader of “the only independent Muslim state in the world,” believing that Afghanistan held great importance as a potential model for Asia. Leon Trotsky, then people’s commissar for military and naval affairs, wrote that “the road to Paris and London lies through the towns of Afghanistan, the Punjab, and Bengal,” declaring that imperialism alone preserved the capitalist system. Soviet support for Amanullah in 1919 cemented the relationship through the 1920s. As Afghans endeavored to strengthen their independence, the Soviets consolidated power in Central Asia, and anti-British sentiment rose in the region.

The Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, signed on September 13, 1920, and ratified on February 28, 1921, was the new Soviet government’s first international accord. Both parties agreed to refrain from entering agreements with third parties against the interests of the other. As part of the treaty, the Soviets promised to return territory from the Panjdeh oasis seized in 1885, but ultimately they returned little land. The Soviets also offered limited aid to build a radio station in Kabul and a telegraph line from Kabul to Kandahar and to Serhetabat (Kushka), Turkmenistan.

During the 1920s, Afghanistan and Persia were strategically important to the Soviets as a defensive bulwark against the British and as a potential font of anti-British nationalism along the Indian frontier. The Afghan-Soviet relationship, however, was soon tested by competing interests in Central Asia: the Soviets were actively propagating their revolutionary ideology in the region, while Amanullah sought to build a confederation of Islamic states there. The Basmachi Revolt in Soviet Central Asia became a focal point in this rivalry. The **basmachi**, an Uzbek term for bandits, were armed militias led by **kurbashi**, or local chiefs, and inflamed by widespread famine, political uncertainty, and the nationalization of cotton and food production. They were loosely organized groups that became a popular counterrevolutionary and anti-Soviet movement, based in Bukhara, Khiva, and the Fergana Valley.

By December 1921, basmachi forces numbered 20,000 and identified themselves as mujahideen (holy warriors). The Soviets sent Enver Pasha, a former Young Turk, to quell the revolt, but he joined it instead. Amanullah also decided to support the basmachi and sent his best troops with Gen. Mohammad Nadir Khan, the future king, to fight alongside them in Muslim solidarity. In July 1922, Nadir Khan declared to the Soviets that “if the hostile activity of the Bolsheviks against Bukhara does not cease,
the Government of Afghanistan will be forced to annex Bukhara. This is the only way to assist a Muslim state in the center of Asia to stand up against Bolshevik intrigues.” Enver Pasha led the capture of Dushanbe as the rebellion peaked in 1922, but he could never unify the movement or generate international support. Ultimately, Amanullah’s concern over Soviet expansion in Central Asia was less than his fear of civil war caused by British intrigue and Pashtun tribes in the southern and eastern provinces. Amanullah finally agreed in November 1922 to Soviet demands that he withdraw Afghan troops, and he continued a careful balancing act to appease British, Soviet, and pan-Islamic interests.

While Afghan-Soviet relations deteriorated during the revolt, Fedor Raskolnikov, a Red Navy officer, civil war hero, and architect of the Soviet Republic of Gilan, arrived in Kabul in July 1921 as the first all-Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan. He supported increasing aid to check British influence and to promote his country’s anti-imperialist credentials. An important cornerstone of the Afghan-Soviet relationship in the 1920s was the creation of the Royal Afghan Air Force. After the success of British air power during the Third Anglo-Afghan War, Amanullah sought to build air capabilities for his own national army. The Soviet air force arranged for aircraft and weapons to be sent from Italy and flew the first five aircraft to Kabul in 1924. Later, the Afghan government acquired three Junkers from Germany and two British aircraft. By the end of the 1920s, the Royal Afghan Air Force had twenty-five pilots: three Afghan, four German, and eighteen Russian.

When the Khost Rebellion, initiated by Mangal and Ghilzai Pashtuns resisting Amanullah’s domestic reforms, broke out in March 1924, the Soviets sent technicians and pilots to help Amanullah subdue the rebels. The Soviets also donated Polikarpov R–1s, Soviet copies of Airco DH–9As, on the condition that Russians would fly them. “From a psychological point of view,” Gregorian argued, “the Amir’s use of airplanes piloted by Russians and Germans against the rebels was at the least ill-advised. The intrusion of ‘infidels’ into an internal feud was not only regarded as a sign of weakness but considered irreligious as well.” Despite the political ramifications, the use of foreign planes and pilots against the rebels had a positive effect on the growth of Afghan air power. French journalist Maurice Pernot observed at the time that “at the end of October 1924, Russian pilots crossed the Amu Darya, flew over the mountains through the gap at the Bamyan River, and brought their planes up to Kabul. The impression was considerable. Soon after, twenty-five young Afghans departed to Russia in order to learn the craft of aviation.” With profound foresight, Pernot wrote in 1927 that Afghan aviation henceforth would
depend on Russian matériel and personnel. British sources agreed that the Afghan air force was essentially “a Russian service.” By 1928, the Soviets had established an air link with Central Asia and the first flights between Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat.25

While the birth of Afghan air power was a small but impressive accomplishment, Amanullah’s social reforms proved an important milestone in Afghan history. His efforts to modernize Afghanistan exceeded those of his predecessors, Abdur Rahman and Habibullah. Amanullah embraced European advances in education, improved conditions for women, and supported the press. Beginning in the early 1920s, he introduced new taxes, universal conscription, an expansion of the educational system, and changes to family law, including family affairs and marriage customs, as part of a systematic reconstruction of Afghan society.26 Amanullah directly challenged local traditions and ways of life, prompting rebellions that began in the southeastern city of Khost in 1924.27

After the early uprisings subsided, Amanullah and his wife, Soraya, who was the daughter of Mahmud Tarzi, set out on a grand tour in late 1927 that included visits to India, Egypt, Italy, France, Germany, Britain,
the Soviet Union, Turkey, and Iran. Amanullah received honorary degrees from Oxford and Berlin Universities, the Collar of the Annunziata from King Victor Emmanuel of Italy, and the Order of the Golden Spur from Pope Pius XI. As he embarked on his travels, Amanullah launched a campaign to end Afghanistan’s isolationism and foreign dependency and to transform its political and economic institutions.28

In a series of major initiatives from 1927 to 1929, Amanullah presented a secular constitution based on the Turkish model; attempted to define the relationship between religion and the secular establishment while both groups refused to compromise; created an independent judiciary; invested in schools for girls and teachers from Europe and India; expanded legal rights for women; reorganized the tax and budget systems; established a national bank (Bank-e Milli); and set in motion a campaign against nepotism and corruption. This was the most ambitious improvement program in Afghan history, but it was ill-fated from the start. Amanullah’s embrace of modernization met with strong reactions from tribal and religious leaders, the traditional power brokers in Afghanistan. According to cultural historian Senzil Nawid, Amanullah sought to “purge the practice of Islam in Afghanistan of its folk ways, traditional taboos, and superstitions, which he claimed were espoused by ignorant and self-interested clergy.”29 Ultimately, his reforming zeal was not supported by political acumen, and his social programs continued to antagonize the tribal elites, religious leaders, and the army.

An uprising of Shinwari Pashtun tribesmen expanded to widespread revolt in 1928, forcing Amanullah to abdicate in January 1929. At the same time, Ghulam Nabi Charkhi, Afghan ambassador to the Soviet Union, crossed the Amu Darya with Soviet forces and briefly occupied Mazar-i Sharif, where his brother had been governor. He found little support for his faction, however, and the Soviets continued to support Amanullah.30

The crisis provided an opportunity for Habibullah Kalakani, derided by Pashtuns as “Bacha Saqao” or “son of the water carrier,” to seize power. An ethnic Tajik army deserter and charismatic bandit in the style of Robin Hood, he ruled Afghanistan from January to October 1929. As Shinwaris revolted in the east, Wazir tribes arrived from the southeast, and Habibullah Kalahani’s group of Tajiks and Ghilzai Pashtuns moved from the north and occupied Kabul. Amanullah, with his attempt to regain power having failed, fled from Kandahar to India in May. Habibullah Kalakani reversed many of Amanullah’s reforms, banning western clothing and closing the schools for girls. He also began preparing for battle against another rival, Nadir Khan.31
The earliest rulers of Afghanistan were Sadozai-Popalzai Pashtuns, including Ahmad Shah Durrani and Timur Shah. This order changed in 1826 when Dost Mohammad of the Barakzai clan emerged as the sovereign of Afghanistan. Traditionally, the Barakzai clan served as viziers, the power behind the Sadozai-Popalzai princes. When Dost Mohammad became ruler, many Afghans viewed him as a usurper to the throne. He used the lesser title of amir, rather than shah, in deference to his forebears, a tradition maintained until Amanullah declared himself *malik* in 1926.32

After Amanullah abdicated, Mohammad Nadir Khan (r. 1929–33) enlisted the support of the British and raised an army to remove Habibullah Kalakani from power. Nadir Khan had been a renowned general and former minister of war, but he had been exiled as the Afghan minister to France because of disagreements with Amanullah and Tarzi over the pace of reforms. To secure his succession, Nadir Khan allied with conservatives and arrived in Kabul at the front of a coalition of Amanullah’s relatives. Nadir Khan also benefitted from the military leadership of his brothers, Shah Mahmud Khan and Shah Wali Khan, who returned from exile in France with him. Although Nadir Khan had little personal interest in ruling Afghanistan, he acknowledged both his popularity as well as Amanullah’s lost mandate when he took the crown.33

In 1929, because the Afghan government was weak and bankrupt and the national army had ceased to exist, Nadir Khan made concessions to appease local unrest. He annulled almost all of Amanullah’s reforms, confirmed Habibullah Kalakani’s enforcement of Islamic law, and reintroduced gender segregation (*purdah*) and the wearing of the veil (*chadri*). He promulgated a new constitution in 1931 that entrenched religious values.

On the international front, Nadir Khan pursued a policy of neutrality and sought to curb Soviet economic and political influence in Afghanistan. He renegotiated the neutrality pact of 1926 and concluded the Treaty of Mutual Neutrality and Non-Aggression with the Soviet Union in June 1931. One clause declared that each state would prevent activities within its territory that “might cause political or military injury.”34

With respect to military affairs, Nadir Khan moved away from Amanullah’s efforts to centralize control of the armed forces. He returned the recruitment process to tribes and clans, even excepting the entire Paktia region from mandatory military service in recognition of its support in ousting Habibullah Kalakani. Nadir Khan also promoted the inclusion of Hazaras, Mangals, and Mohmands in the army.35
In 1933, Nadir Khan founded the Maktab-i-Ihzariah, a military preparatory school for the sons of tribal chiefs. This was a distinct departure from the promotion of Durrani elites by Afghan rulers since Abdur Rahman. Nadir Khan’s remarks at the launch of the school underlined the renewed importance of the army to uphold stability in Afghanistan:

> An era marked by discords and civil wars has ruined and weakened our native land, and it is only after a series of coordinated efforts that it will be possible to reestablish its might and prosperity. I hope, with the help of almighty God, that Afghanistan may possess a strong and well-organized army that will constitute a beautiful rose on the head of its friends and a thorn in the eye of its enemies—an army that would assure peace and prosperity in our country.\(^{36}\)

Nadir Shah and his successor Zahir Shah (r. 1933–73) made a lasting, ultimately devastating deal with religious conservatives to curtail the changes instituted by Amanullah. Low literacy and government withdrawal from social reforms meant that educational advances were limited to Kabul, furthering a divide between urban and rural areas. In small steps, Nadir Shah formed commercial ties with Britain and Russia, introduced financial planning, and improved roads through the Hindu Kush.

Nadir Shah was assassinated in Kabul by Abdul Khaliq, son of a Hazara servant of Ghulam Nabi Charkhi, who avenged the killing of his master by Nadir Shah.\(^{37}\) With Nadir’s death, his three surviving brothers rallied around Nadir’s nineteen-year-old son, Zahir Shah, who functioned first as a figurehead while his uncles—Mohammad Hashim Khan as prime minister, Shah Wali Khan as minister of war, and Shah Mahmud Khan as minister of the interior—played major political roles in the 1930s and 1940s. In particular, Hashim Khan led Afghanistan toward neutralism and gradualism in foreign policy and provided the foundation for bi-tarafi, literally “without sides,” the nonalignment strategy of the 1950s and beyond.\(^{38}\)

As prime minister, Hashim Khan continued the efforts of Nadir Shah to strengthen the army and the economy with foreign assistance. He looked beyond his Soviet and British imperial neighbors to find additional allies to counter their bipolar influences. To this end, Hashim Khan invited German experts and business interests to build hydroelectric and industrial plants. He also forged ties with Japanese and Italian businesses with little British and Soviet awareness of these activities.\(^{39}\) He used the fear of Soviet aggression to generate loans from the British and Germans
to buy arms and confront tribal revolt. Despite the global economic crisis, Afghan leaders avoided enacting heavy taxes by extracting revenue from foreign governments in the form of loans and foreign assistance from the Soviet Union, Britain, Germany, and Japan in the 1930s and 1940s, and then the Soviet Union and the United States after World War II.40

In a theme for the era, and an enduring pattern, Afghan leaders not only balanced disparate and competing foreign interests, they also regulated the popular mistrust of outsiders to encourage foreign assistance. Afghanistan’s experiences with British military invasions and political hegemony for the better part of a century caused general distrust of Europeans. At the same time, however, the king and his uncles decided that European modernization strategies could fix Afghanistan’s political and economic backwardness.41 As geologist Ernest Fox explained after his time there in the 1930s: “Afghanistan still dislikes the foreigner. The mountaineer’s natural love of independence, their strong militant religious sentiment, and centuries of unpleasant experiences with foreign invaders have bred this feeling. But the present Afghan leaders realize that they can employ to advantage the technical achievements of the West.”42

Afghanistan embraced a more globalized outlook before World War II, becoming a member of the League of Nations on September 27, 1934. On July 8, 1937, Afghanistan joined Iran, Iraq, and Turkey to sign the “Eastern Pact of Friendship and Nonaggression,” also known as the Saadabad Pact, which established the inviolability of mutual frontiers and abstention from interference in each other’s internal affairs.43 In seeking these alliances, Afghan leaders positioned themselves as a political force in the Middle East.44 They also affirmed their diplomatic independence, which had been constrained for a century by the Great Game. On November 6, 1941, as the growing war became more widespread, the Grand Assembly released this statement:
The Afghan nation has at no time been under any obligation to a foreign government, nor will she ever be. The nation has always been free, and will also in the future maintain its free and independent existence. By the help of God, the people of Afghanistan are unanimously prepared to live a life of honor by defending their rights with all their material and spiritual forces, even to the point of shedding the last drop of blood.\textsuperscript{45}

While Afghanistan did not endure the same wartime fate as Iran, which was occupied by Soviet and British troops, it did face rampant inflation, abandoned development projects, and reduced foreign trade, which resulted in major economic upheaval.\textsuperscript{46} The experience demonstrated to the young ruling elites the vital necessity of economic reform and modernization. When Hashim Khan resigned as prime minister in May 1946, his brother, Shah Mahmud Khan, embarked on an ambitious new modernization plan that would have long-term implications for Afghanistan.

A new challenge also arose in the diplomatic sphere when Afghanistan could no longer play equal sides against each other. There were many among the Afghan elites with German sympathies, but the Afghan government had recognized the consequences of Iran’s friendship with Germany and instead chose to remain neutral during the war.\textsuperscript{47} Afghanistan’s experience during World War II would soon make the United States a key yet elusive ally.
When Amanullah Khan began his foreign policy initiatives in the 1920s, he included an effort to open relations with the United States. The U.S. Department of State, however, delayed the discussion of diplomatic recognition. U.S. officials viewed Afghanistan as part of Great Britain’s sphere of interest, and they were skeptical of Afghanistan’s acceptance of Soviet aid.1

Despite these reservations, relations between the United States and Afghanistan remained cordial. In July 1921, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes wrote to President Warren G. Harding, “There is a Mission here from Afghanistan apparently with full powers and desirous of having American participation in the development of that country.”2 Harding met the mission, led by Gen. Wali Khan, on July 26, 1921, at the White House. A few days later, he wrote to Amanullah, “It is my wish that the relations between the United States and Afghanistan may always be of a friendly character, and I shall be happy to cooperate with Your Majesty to this end.”3 Relations, however, never progressed beyond epistolary pleasantries during the Harding administration.

In 1925, the Afghan government submitted a draft “treaty of friendship” to renew the discussion of diplomatic relations with the United States.4 In response, Wallace S. Murray, chief of the State Department division for near eastern affairs, argued that “Afghanistan for centuries has been a cockpit of Anglo-Russian struggle over the control of the principle gateway to India, the Khyber Pass, and there is no reason to believe that this struggle will cease now that Russia is controlled by the Bolsheviks. No foreign lives in the country can be protected and no foreign interests guaranteed.”5 Afghanistan’s inability to safeguard foreigners and its prohibition of missionaries meant that U.S. visitors were limited to adventure travelers. Two such men, Theodore Roosevelt Jr. and Kermit Roosevelt, sons of Theodore Roosevelt, wrote that “the Afghanistan route was very difficult, and the natives uncertain, to put it mildly. We did not wish to be ‘collected’ ourselves before we had a chance to collect any animals.”6
Despite U.S. apprehension, Afghan desire for formal diplomatic relations never waned. Mohammad Zahir Shah framed a letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in April 1934 with the opening remarks, “My Dear and Most Honoured Friend: In view of the friendship and goodwill, which, since the extraordinary embassy of Afghanistan of 1921, are established between the two great States of Afghanistan and the United States of America.” Zahir Shah informed Roosevelt that his father had died and that he had ascended the throne. He continued, “We are pleased to notify the desire of the Afghan Government to strengthen the political and economic relations, which he had and has still now with the High Government of the United States.”

Several factors combined to delay U.S. recognition in the 1920s and early 1930s. In 1934, Acting Secretary of State William Phillips wrote to Roosevelt:
Our failure to recognize the Government of Nadir Shah was due largely to the fact that this Government was never formally notified of the abdication of Amanullah and the accession of Nadir Shah; moreover, we have been naturally conservative on the subject of establishing relations with Afghanistan owing to the primitive condition of the country, the lack of capitulatory or other guarantees for the safety of foreigners, and the absence of any important American interests."8

Thus informed, Roosevelt offered a polite reply without intending to change the status quo: “I cordially reciprocate the sentiments which you express and, in extending recognition to Your Majesty’s Government, take this opportunity of assuring you of my hope that friendly relations will always exist between the United States and Afghanistan.”9

Mohammad Zahir Shah’s April 1934 letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, in the original Dari. Zahir Shah expressed Afghanistan’s desire “to strengthen the political and economic relations” with the United States. National Archives.
Roosevelt initiated a deliberate process to establish U.S. relations with Afghanistan that culminated in the “Provisional Agreement regarding Friendship, Diplomatic and Consular Representation between the United States and Afghanistan,” which was signed in Paris on March 26, 1936. The slow progress toward recognition reflected the economic isolationism and noninterventionist foreign policy of the United States in the 1930s. But a few U.S. commercial interests began to recognize Afghanistan as a potential market. In one such case, U.S. officials supported the first Afghan military purchases from the United States, beginning in February 1935 when the Caterpillar Tractor Company sold fifty tractors to the Afghan army.

A significant expansion of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan took place when the Afghan government offered oil concessions to a U.S. consortium that included Seaboard Oil Company, Texas Oil Company (later known as Texaco), Case, Pomeroy & Company, and Fisher Brothers. The Afghan government granted this group access to oil deposits throughout Afghanistan, with an option for mineral deposits, on November 20, 1936. The agreement called for additional measures and certain infrastructure investment to be completed within the first year after signature. The oil exploration was not fruitful, however, for a number of reasons. Murray, the State Department’s chief of division for near eastern affairs, recounted that despite three years of negotiation, which obtained extensive oil concessions in both Afghanistan and Iran, the Seaboard Oil Company suddenly and unexpectedly withdrew from both agreements. Afghan officials did not understand why the United States gave up so quickly, after only one year, despite growing concerns over the global oil market and increasing security concerns in the late 1930s. Although the venture failed, U.S. officials began to realize the need to formalize relations with Afghanistan. Murray had written in July 1937 that “I do not see how we can avoid much longer establishing a permanent legation at the Afghan capital.”

Afghanistan’s strategic location during World War II prompted the United States to bolster diplomatic relations. When Louis G. Dreyfus Jr., the U.S. minister to Iran, visited Kabul in June 1941, he noted that “the Afghans have a sincere and deep-rooted desire, in the absence of a friend or neighbor to whom they can turn, to have a disinterested third power friend to assist and advise them, and they have always hoped that the U.S. would be willing to fill such a role.” Dreyfus believed that “this is an opportunity which should not be missed of establishing ourselves solidly in a strategic position in Asia.” When the United States entered the war, Murray expressed an interest in developing a treaty of friendship to replace the provisional accord of March 1936, but he did not pursue that goal.
The requirements of war did result in the establishment of an American legation in Kabul on June 6, 1942. From 1942 to 1945, the first U.S. envoys to Afghanistan included Cornelius Van H. Engert, Ely L. Palmer, and Dreyfus, all experienced diplomats with extensive backgrounds in the region. They directly confronted pro-German sentiments in the Afghan government that could have destabilized the British Indian frontier during the war.

In July 1942, Engert arrived as the first U.S. minister to Afghanistan. In 1922, Engert, then serving as the second secretary of the American legation in Tehran, Iran, had been the first U.S. diplomatic officer to visit Afghanistan. During his subsequent assignment to Washington, he published a confidential study, *A Report on Afghanistan*, about his travels there. This work remained a key reference for U.S. officials until Engert returned during the war, twenty years later. Upon his arrival in Kabul, he informed Secretary of State Cordell Hull that the king of Afghanistan “had for many years harbored feelings of great sympathy, confidence and admiration for the United States.”

On the other side of the globe, President Roosevelt welcomed the first Afghan diplomat accredited to the United States, Abdul Hussein Aziz, in 1943. While U.S. officials considered the strategic implications of Afghanistan’s geographic location in Asia, including a secret plan for an alternate Lend-Lease route to the Soviet Union and China through Afghanistan and India, Afghan leaders viewed the United States as a potential counter to British and Soviet interests in Asia. Writing to Hull, Engert clarified in November 1943 that “from the Afghan point of view, the U.S. would be the ideal powerful friend to whom to cling especially as pro-British elements are still afraid to give public expression to their feelings.”

U.S. officials soon perceived the complexities of Afghanistan’s foreign policy challenges. On one hand, Engert optimistically told Hull that “Afghanistan is ready to exercise a stabilizing influence in Central Asia and on the northwest frontier of India provided only that she can be reasonably certain that she will not be ground between the upper and nether millstones of rival powers struggling for supremacy.” On the other, U.S. diplomats were aware of Afghan leaders’ fear of a return to the nineteenth-century Great Game as the Soviets emerged as a military power during the war. “It is certain that as [a] result of spectacular Russian military successes, Afghan officials have been trying to improve relations with [the] Soviets and to cultivate closer official and social contacts,” Engert observed in February 1943. He added that “there are as yet no indications of [the] future course of Soviet policy toward Afghanistan, but Russia has long been a most uncertain neighbor, and little trust is placed here in Soviet
promises and undertakings.” In a letter to Hull in April 1943, Engert wrote, “The Afghans are convinced that when the war is over Russia will demand substantial territorial concessions of her neighbors and that neither the U.S. nor Great Britain will be able to stop her.”

The Afghans’ attitudes toward the Soviet Union proved no less problematic than their relations with Great Britain and British India. Following a meeting with the Afghan minister, Aziz, in Washington in November 1943, Hull recounted the official Afghan position: “The Afghan-Indian frontier presented no problem in so long as the British remained in India, but that the Government of Afghanistan would never permit that the Afghan tribesmen along the present northwest frontier of India should be subject against their will to the control of the Indians.” Anticipating challenges that would plague Afghanistan in the future, Aziz concluded, according to Hull, that “if the tribesmen in question should by any chance prefer to remain with the Mussulmans [Muslims] of India, Afghanistan would come to them.”

The United States and its allies were able to keep foreign conflict from reaching Afghanistan’s borders during World War II, and U.S. officials remained interested in the country’s potential strategic value. Engert fought to send aid to Afghanistan during the war, despite its neutral status. He also facilitated the export of karakul wool, Afghanistan’s primary export commodity, to the United States. This was an extraordinary feat during the privation of war, and it inspired cordial relations with the Afghans over the next decade.

The U.S. Department of War shared little of the State Department’s interest in Afghanistan. Col. Harold R. Maddux, chief of the liaison section, War Department General Staff, argued in June 1944 that “the War Department is unable to foresee any military benefits that will accrue to the United States as a result of increased effectiveness of the Afghan army.” Two years earlier, Engert had sent a telegram to Hull requesting the placement of several bomber squadrons in northwest India or northeast Persia (Iran) “to bolster his Afghan allies.” Engert argued that “in view of immediate urgency of military situation I venture to make a practical suggestion to raise morale of Afghan Government: Arrival of a few American bomber squadrons even if only for purely temporary duty in North and Northeastern Persia would make profound impression in Afghanistan.” In May 1943, Engert and the military attaché to Afghanistan had managed to present a Stearman trainer plane to the Royal Afghan Air Force. The proximity of the China-Burma-India theater provided additional opportunities for military cooperation.

A year later, more substantial military-to-military interaction ensued. On December 29, 1944, a C–47 carrying members of the Afghanistan military mission arrived at Hijli Air Base in northern India to visit Maj.

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay and XX Bomber Command as part of a tour of the China-Burma-India theater. The mission toured two B–29s at the base, developing rapport and enjoying a halal meal together.30 Toward the end of the war, Lt. Gen. Mohammad Daud Khan, the king’s cousin and commander of the Kabul Army Corps who would become prime minister in the next decade, requested military training for Afghan officers, envisioning a training mission in Afghanistan run by U.S. rather than Turkish advisors. U.S. government officials refused the request, as they did not view Afghanistan as a military ally because it had maintained its neutrality throughout the war.31

Since the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of 1931 was still in force at the end of World War II, Afghans would have abrogated their treaty by pursuing deeper ties with the United States, as that would have constituted a third-party alliance. Yet during a visit in November and December 1948, Abdul Majid Zabuli, minister of national economy, requested U.S.-manufactured weapons to maintain internal security in the face of persistent tribal revolt. Zabuli also articulated Afghanistan’s potential aid to President Harry S. Truman’s containment policy in two official meetings. According to meeting notes, Zabuli asserted that “properly armed and convinced of U.S.
backing, Afghanistan could manage a delaying action in the passes of the Hindu Kush, which would be a contribution to the success of the armed forces of the West.” At a meeting three weeks later, he added that “when war came, Afghanistan would of course be overrun and occupied. But the Russians would be unable to pacify the country. Afghanistan could and would pursue guerrilla tactics for an indefinite period.”

The United States continued to deny military aid to Afghanistan through the late 1940s and early 1950s as U.S. interests in South Asia began to focus on newly created Pakistan as an increasingly important ally. U.S. diplomat Leon D. Poullada and some others believed that the United States had an “Afghan blind-spot” where “Afghanistan was always mysteriously overlooked or deliberately ignored.” More likely, however, the U.S. foreign policy establishment made pragmatic decisions on U.S.-Afghan relations based on what it considered to be reasonable geopolitical and strategic expectations of the region. At that time, Afghanistan remained on the margins of the Cold War, a situation that would change dramatically a few decades later.

POSTWAR GEOPOLITICS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE PASHTUNISTAN DEBATE

While the United States demonstrated little interest in supplying aid to Afghanistan at the end of World War II, Great Britain was more open to the idea. Under the Lancaster Plan, the British started to provide the Afghans with equipment and training and, by 1947, the Afghan army and air force had become dependent on British training and supplies. The partition of India in that same year, however, quickly altered the political landscape of the region.

Through an act of Parliament in July 1947, Great Britain officially partitioned British India into the two independent “dominions” of India and Pakistan. Afghanistan immediately abrogated its treaties with British India and challenged Pakistani claims to British territory along the northwest frontier. Afghanistan specifically rejected Pakistan’s intention to uphold the Durand Line as the new international border. On September 30, 1947, Afghanistan was the only United Nations member to vote against the admission of Pakistan. On July 26, 1949, an Afghan _loya jirga_ (national council) denounced all Anglo-Afghan frontier accords and ceased to recognize the Pakistani-Afghan boundary. Thus began a prolonged dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the mounting question of “Pashtunistan,” the “land of the Pashtuns” that stretches from the Hindu Kush to the Indus River.
From the British perspective, diplomat Sir William Kerr Fraser-Tytler explained, “The British did not solve the problem of the tribes, and when in August, 1947, they handed over the control of India’s North-Western defences to the untried Government of Pakistan, they handed over likewise a fluid, difficult situation, fraught with much danger.” When the British held a 1947 referendum for the autonomous tribal agencies, including Malakand, Khaibar, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan, they offered two alternatives: annexation to India or to Pakistan. The British did not include Afghanistan as a choice since they were aware that the tribal areas of the northwest frontier had entered into international limbo in August 1947. In legal terms, the tribal areas were part of British India rather than India and thus did not become part of either India or Pakistan at independence. British officials determined that “Pakistan would not have been able to raise any legal objection if the tribes had placed themselves under the protection of Afghanistan or if, with the consent of the tribes, the tribal areas had been annexed by Afghanistan.”

In the end, the inhabitants of the North-West Frontier Province overwhelmingly chose to remain with Pakistan, although many boycotted the referendum.

Afghanistan disputed Pakistan’s claims to the frontier provinces, but Pakistan effectively excluded Afghanistan from frontier discussions and responded with a series of partial blockades in 1948 that would last intermittently for more than a decade. In the most severe cases, open conflict arose, as in March 1949 when the Pakistani air force bombed Moghulgay in Khost Province as part of a territorial dispute. For its part, the Royal Afghan Air Force dropped anti-Pakistani leaflets in border areas. In addition, Afghan tribal forces staged unofficial cross-border raids in 1950 and 1951 that were supported by the Afghan National Army. These efforts had little impact other than to antagonize the Pakistani government. On the domestic front, Mohammad Daud Khan, as minister for tribal affairs, in November 1949 established the Khushal Khan Khattak School for Pakistani Pashtuns to study in Kabul. During this formative period, Daud became the leading advocate for Pashtunistan, and his policies as prime minister (1953–63) and president (1973–78) were a major obstacle to normalizing relations with Pakistan.

Despite the efforts of Afghan politicians, the United States did not take an active role in the Pashtunistan dispute. Prince Mohammad Naim, after he left his post as chargé d’affaires in Washington in July 1949, announced that he was “deeply disappointed” because he found U.S. policy on Pashtunistan and toward Afghanistan in general “one of complete disinterest and indifference,” according to State Department cables. On the contrary, U.S. policy makers were deeply concerned with the strategic implications
of the territorial conflagration. Louis Dreyfus, U.S. ambassador in Kabul from 1949 to 1951, feared that the dispute could push Afghans toward the Soviets. The official policy as of February 1951 read:

Our interests would be seriously prejudiced by the failure of Afghanistan and Pakistan to reach an accord on matters of tribal status and treatment. . . . We should continue to encourage Afghanistan to settle its differences with Pakistan and to promote the regional cooperation which will preclude its excessive commercial dependence upon the USSR which has obvious implications for Afghan independence.45

Out of public view, U.S. officials tried to broker a deal as they developed Pakistan into a strategic ally, but Pakistan would not commit. Meanwhile, the Afghan government pursued two public and concurrent diplomatic maneuvers. On one hand, Zahir Shah, Prime Minister Daud, and ex-Prime Minister Shah Mahmud encouraged support of the Pashtunistan course. On the other, Foreign Minister Naim and his deputy Aziz worked with the United States and European nations to normalize Pakistani relations.46 Complicating matters further, the U.S. chargé d’affaires in Afghanistan, John Evarts Horner, wrote that “complete retreat by the Government of Afghanistan from its admittedly unreasonable stand on this issue would represent dangerous loss of prestige to the Kabul Government.”47

At the onset of the Cold War, the United States was much more interested in pursuing regional security arrangements to check Soviet expansionism than it was in resolving border issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the Middle East and South Asia, those efforts focused on Turkey and Pakistan. As the National Security Council (NSC) framed this discussion in 1954, “The best prospect for creating an indigenous regional defense arrangement in the Near East lies in the concept of the ‘northern tier,’ which would include Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq. The Turkish-Pakistan Pact is the first step in this direction.”48 James S. Lay Jr., executive secretary for the NSC, had noted in a coordinating memorandum that “in determining to extend aid to Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey, the U.S. has chosen states which are most keenly aware of the threat of Soviet Russia and which are located geographically in the way of possible Soviet aggression.”49 Planners in the United States ignored Afghanistan as part of these regional security arrangements due to indefensible northern territories, lack of economic and defense infrastructure, and political instability.50

The Pashtunistan question would remain a key issue in Afghanistan’s foreign policy during the 1950s and 1960s. Daniel Balland argued that
it “continuously poisoned relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It even led to serious tension in 1949–50, 1955, and 1959, each instance leading to a partial blockade of the common boundary and a progressive shift of Afghan foreign trade to new transit outlets.” Then, from September 3, 1961, until May 29, 1963, a full-scale Pashtunistan crisis resulted in the severing of diplomatic relations and the closure of the Afghan-Pakistani frontier to traffic in both directions. This action confirmed a pro-Soviet shift in Afghanistan, further entrenching trade dependence and forging military ties that would constrain Afghanistan’s relationship with the United States and Europe until the end of the twentieth century.
Afghanistan’s move to closer relations with the Soviet Union was a long time coming. Prince Mohammad Naim, then deputy prime minister and minister for foreign affairs, argued in 1954 that “the sending of military aid from the U.S. to Pakistan had created an immediate Soviet reaction and the resulting situation presented one of the chief difficulties faced by Afghanistan today.”¹ One of the opening gambits by the Soviets involved oil drilling in northern Afghanistan. In August 1952, the Soviet chargé d’affaires at Kabul delivered an aide-mémoire to the Afghan government stating that the Afghan plan to allow a French firm, under the auspices of the United Nations, to pursue oil drilling in northern Afghanistan was a violation of the Afghan-Soviet Neutrality and Non-Aggression Treaty of 1931. The Soviets protested that these explorations by a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member would endanger the safety of the Soviet-Afghan frontier and undermine friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.²

Initially, the Afghan government rejected the protest, but it later yielded to Soviet pressure and canceled the French project when it became clear that the United States would not increase aid to offset any potential impact on Soviet trade. John Evarts Horner, first secretary and consul at the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan, voiced timely concerns in October 1952 that the State Department “seriously underestimates present and future potentialities [of Soviet] pressure on this country, and utterly neglects regional aspects. Further, no account seems to have been taken of Afghan psychology or existence of important elements here willing to come to terms with [the Soviets].”³

As a hedge against Soviet influence in the early 1950s, U.S. officials focused on diplomacy and aid projects in Afghanistan.⁴ Horner suggested a “Kabul-Kandahar Road and assistance to Afghan Air Force towards purchase of and facilities for medium transport aircraft which would provide regular government air service to [northern Afghanistan from Kandahar] and at [the] same time greatly strengthen government military
strength as against subversion and tribal uprising without giving justifiable cause for alarm to either Pakistan or Soviets.”

While U.S. officials quickly moved to fill the British void in southwest Asia and expanded economic and military ties with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, Afghanistan was largely left out of that process. The Cold War context here was important; notably, the National Intelligence Estimate, “Outlook for Afghanistan,” for October 1954 indicated that “Soviet economic penetration may well result in a gradual shift of Afghanistan toward the Soviet orbit. . . . However, we do not believe that the USSR will actually gain control of Afghanistan at least within the next few years.”

In December 1953, Vice President Richard M. Nixon and his wife, Patricia, visited Afghanistan. Upon his return, Nixon asserted, “I feel that Afghanistan will stand up against the communists.” He noted that he had discussed the Pakistan aid problem with the prime minister and the king, “who suggested that it would be a good idea if Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey entered into something like an ‘Atlantic alliance,’ with aid going to these countries as a group instead of individually where they might be a threat to each other.” Not surprisingly, “The Pakistanis had the opposite view.”

U.S. ambassador Henry A. Byroade later observed that “the cold war, as seen from Afghanistan, is only a metamorphosis of an older pattern of conflict.” Anglo-Russian competition, which had created a balance of power in South Asia, became more complex by the mid-twentieth century with Iranian, Pakistani, Soviet, British, and American interests competing for shifting sands. Byroade added a further dimension to the question of Afghanistan’s development: “Some of the most traditionalist Afghans probably would be willing to go on paying the price of underdevelopment in return for a kind of cocoon-like independence behind mountainous barriers.”

The same National Intelligence Estimate of October 1954 offered a sobering account of the increasing Soviet economic pressure on Afghanistan caused by the lack of foreign trade and economic development, as well as by a desire to counter U.S. strategic gains in South Asia and the Middle East. Rather than showing indifference to or ignorance of Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence review anticipated Afghanistan’s lasting quandary:

Afghan leaders will attempt to obtain additional Western economic aid to counterbalance that received from the USSR and will probably display continuing interest in the idea of participating in Western-backed military aid programs. However, it is unlikely that the Afghans would actually accept membership in a Western-backed area defense arrangement since they could almost certainly realize that
no foreseeable arrangement could furnish them sufficiently realistic protection against Soviet attack to compensate for the increased hostility toward them which would almost certainly ensue.10

A new generation of Afghan leaders came to power while their country confronted the emerging Cold War competition and marched slowly toward modernization.11 Mohammad Daud Khan replaced Shah Mahmud Khan as
prime minister in 1953 and ended the supremacy of Mohammad Zahir Shah’s uncles. Daud, a former army general, was well connected with the military: he had been commander of the Kabul Army Corps, minister of war, minister of the interior, and commander of the Central Forces (Quwar-i-Markazi). In addition to his support for rapid modernization and economic development, Daud was a Pashtun nationalist and key advocate for Pashtunistan. As minister of war in the late 1940s, Daud had prepared Afghanistan’s request for U.S. arms that had been rejected. Although he preferred to work with the Americans, he had no trouble turning to the Soviets with a similar appeal in the mid-1950s.

A series of events in March 1955 that came to be known as the “Flag Incident” provided the stimulus for deeper Afghan-Soviet ties. On March 27, 1955, Pakistan announced a reorganization of provinces, states, and tribal areas of West Pakistan into one unit. Daud denounced the move, which undermined the autonomy of the frontier provinces. Three days later, an Afghan mob invaded the Pakistan embassy in Kabul and consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad and burned the Pakistani flags. Pakistani groups responded on April 1, attacking the Afghan consulates in Peshawar and Quetta. The violence forced yet another closure of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Pakistani leaders ignored any trade implications and used the crisis to advocate with U.S. diplomats for the removal of Daud from power. The United States, however, encouraged Pakistan to open its borders since U.S. aid to Afghanistan depended on this access. U.S. officials correctly feared that decreased aid and curtailed trade through Pakistan would result in increased requests from Afghanistan for Soviet assistance. When Pakistan joined two U.S. security alliances—the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954 and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955—Daud approached the Soviet Union for military hardware. He convened a loya jirga on November 15, 1955, to support self-determination in Pashtunistan and to accept Soviet military support. Ignoring their own contributions to the crisis, Pakistani leaders blamed the United States when Afghanistan turned to the Soviet Union.

On December 19, 1955, Nikita S. Khrushchev, first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Nikolai A. Bulganin, premier of the Soviet Union, concluded a five-day visit to Kabul with the offer of a $100 million loan for Afghan development. This loan included credits for building hydroelectric plants, industrial complexes, irrigation projects, modern airports, and a highway system north to the Soviet border. It was the Soviet Union’s first major postwar economic agreement and the largest loan outside the Warsaw Pact at the time. From Khrushchev’s perspective,
The amount of money we spent in gratuitous assistance to Afghanistan is a drop in the ocean compared with the price we would have had to pay in order to counter the threat of an American military base on Afghan territory.”18 The Soviets also renewed the 1931 Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Non-Aggression and agreed to supply equipment to the Afghan military.

While the United States focused on agricultural and irrigation projects in Afghanistan, the Soviets built long-term strategic infrastructure, including hardened all-weather highways, airports, and airstrips, and expanded ports along the Amu Darya. Khrushchev later noted that the highways that the Soviets built for Afghanistan in the 1950s and 1960s were designed for Soviet military transport and supply “in the case of war with Iran or Pakistan.”19 The Salang Tunnel, along the highway north from Kabul through the Hindu Kush to Termez, and Bagram air base north of Kabul were, and continue to be, particularly important for strategic and commercial reasons.

Afghanistan was the second nonaligned nation after Egypt to receive Soviet arms. From 1955 to 1979, the Soviet Union sent Afghanistan more than $1.25 billion in military aid.20 The first arms deal between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, a $3 million sale of Czechoslovak weapons, occurred in mid-1955. In August 1956, Daud accepted a further $32.4 million in Soviet military aid, repayable in cotton, wool, and oilseed. From October 1956
until the end of 1958, the Afghan military received one Il–14 cargo plane, three Il–28 bombers, six MiG–15 and seven MiG–17 fighters, ten Yak–11 and six Yak–18 trainers, ten An–2 utility aircraft, six Mi–1 helicopters, twenty-five T–34 tanks, mobile radios, and small arms.21

Along with the equipment, the Soviet military provided technical training and weekly courses in Marxism-Leninism to more than 4,000 Afghan officers between 1956 and 1978.22 One observer in the 1960s noted that the Afghan armed forces had “become almost completely dependent upon the Soviets, not only for equipment but also for logistic support.”23 This support included deliveries of gasoline, ammunition, and spare parts, giving the Soviets control over Afghan military operations. The Soviet military had particular influence over the Royal Afghan Air Force because of its dependence on Soviet-bloc aircraft and advisors. Most Afghan air crews also trained in the Soviet Union.24

The military and economic modernization enabled by the Soviets was complemented by Soviet support on the controversial Pashtunistan issue. Following his 1955 visit, Khrushchev recommended that “the Pushtun people should decide by a free plebiscite whether they want to remain within the borders of Pakistan, to form a new and independent state, or to unite with Afghanistan.”25 A 1956 National Intelligence Estimate stated that Daud’s acceptance of extensive Soviet aid “is motivated by his desire to strengthen Afghanistan in its controversy with Pakistan over the Pashtunistan issue and also to develop Afghanistan economically.” The authors continued, “Daud has won effective support for his policies in the limited circle of potentially significant Afghans, and he is not likely to be ousted in the foreseeable future. So long as he remains in power he will probably continue to seek Soviet aid and support.”26

U.S. RESPONSE

The goodwill built between the United States and Afghanistan during World War II by Cornelius Van H. Engert was quickly lost during the Cold War. In the 1956 National Intelligence Estimate cited above, U.S. intelligence analysts identified the need to increase aid to counter the growing Soviet presence.27 Ambassador Sheldon T. Mills suggested a further corrective in 1958: “During the past two years our economic aid policy with respect to Afghanistan has been formulated as [a] reaction to Soviet policy. What we are suggesting is that at that crossroads in Afghanistan’s history we reach positively, rather than drift and have our next major policy decision with respect to Afghanistan come as [a] reaction to some Russian move.”28 Throughout the postwar era, U.S.
officials rejected Afghan requests for military aid and displayed favoritism toward pro-western Pakistan and Iran, both of which Afghanistan viewed as rivals. While U.S. aid finally arrived in the 1950s, U.S. planners did not focus on intrinsic strategic interests in Afghanistan, but rather on limiting Soviet efforts there.  

One of the challenges faced by U.S. aid officials in competing with the Soviets was their different approach to financing assistance projects. The Soviets funded their projects on credits that created long-term economic dependence for Afghanistan, and they offered small investments with immediate dividends. U.S. aid programs, on the other hand, supported long-term development in education and the massive Helmand Valley project (discussed in chapter 5), which was chronically underfunded and slowed by Pakistani blockades. Thus Afghans recognized the new Soviet-funded roads and military hardware more easily than the intangible benefits that the U.S.-backed initiatives would offer in the future. Ambassador Byroade observed in 1961 that “the delays in some of these projects have been such as to cause many an Afghan to question the whole policy of the United States toward their country.” Noting the disparity of development
in areas assisted by the United States and the Soviet Union, Byroade added the warning that “Afghanistan is a sort of ‘economic Korea.’”

In the first rounds of funding, the U.S. government extended aid through the Export-Import Bank of $21 million on November 23, 1949, and $18.5 million on May 4, 1954, under President Harry S. Truman’s Mutual Security Program. This cash infusion supported a variety of programs, including Helmand Valley agricultural projects, transportation and road projects, language and technical education, and wheat purchases from U.S. farmers. Through the end of the 1950s and peaking in the mid-1960s, the U.S. government invested heavily in two ventures in southern Afghanistan that did not generate returns: one involved civil aviation and the expansion of the Kandahar airport, and the other continued funding for an extensive hydroelectric and irrigation project in the Helmand Valley.

On June 23, 1956, U.S. ambassador Mills and Afghan foreign minister Naim signed an agreement in Kabul for $14.5 million to fund the construction of Kandahar International Airport and to formalize an agreement for Pan American World Airways to offer training and operational assistance.
Pan American would ultimately purchase 49 percent of the Afghan Ariana Airline through this arrangement and participate in goodwill exercises that transported Afghan pilgrims during the annual hajj. The International Cooperation Administration (ICA) allocated these funds “to give Afghanistan a fast and economical air transportation system which is particularly suitable to the country.” The plan was to curb Afghanistan’s aviation dependence on the Soviet Union by expanding domestic air service and building new airports to support it. Kandahar International Airport was completed in March 1960, but the world-class facility was soon bypassed by jet aircraft that could fly directly from Europe to South Asia without a stopover. In addition to its financial assistance, ICA also helped Ariana Airline acquire a DC–6B passenger aircraft, its sixth Douglas aircraft, on May 2, 1960. The aircraft flew from Washington, DC, National Airport to Newark, New Jersey, and then to Afghanistan in time to support the hajj.

**President Eisenhower’s Visit to Afghanistan**

In the late 1950s, Zahir Shah intensified his diplomatic profile in the world and promoted his *bi-tarafi* (literally “without sides,” or nonaligned) philosophy. As he stated during Afghan Independence Day celebrations in 1957, “The country’s foreign policy is based on the continued safeguarding of...
48

and strengthening of good relations with friendly States. Efforts are being made to establish and strengthen these ties with all the peoples and nations of the world.” He then embarked on a two-year campaign to engage U.S. leaders at the highest level of government and demonstrate Afghanistan’s political and economic independence from the Soviet Union.

As part of this initiative, Prime Minister Daud visited the United States as an “official guest” of the government from June 24 to 27, 1958. During one of their meetings, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles expressed that he understood the motives that led Afghanistan to accept Soviet assistance, mentioning specifically “the fact that Afghanistan is a land-locked country and its transit difficulties with Pakistan naturally led Afghanistan to seek a route for its commerce to the north.” Meetings focused on affirming Afghanistan’s “independence” while seeking additional ways the United States could support Afghanistan’s economic development projects.

A little over a year later, President Dwight D. Eisenhower returned the favor of a state visit when he landed at Bagram air field and remained in Kabul for six hours on December 9, 1959, as part of his “Flight to Peace” goodwill tour of eleven nations. This trip was the first official use of Air Force One, the new VC–137 aircraft, and this stop was the first presidential visit to Afghanistan. Upon his arrival, Eisenhower addressed the crowd “to convey
the warm and friendly greetings of the American people to Afghanistan and its people.” 45 During a luncheon at Chilston Palace, Eisenhower underlined the two countries’ shared values of peace and prosperity, adding that “most importantly, we share with the Afghan people a sense of the great spiritual values deriving from our respective religious heritages. We are drawn together in devotion to the abiding values of religion.” 46 As they had during Daud’s visit to the United States, public pleasantries abounded, while meetings focused on confirming Afghanistan’s neutrality and finding ways to maintain U.S. financial commitment to Afghanistan. 47

Of note, Eisenhower recalled his concern when Air Force One was first “accompanied by Russian-built MIGs—part of the Afghan Air Force” in Afghan air space, adding that “our pleasure in our reception was dampened by the presence of MIG aircraft on the field.” 48 Yet the genuine outpouring of goodwill from the Afghan people surprised Eisenhower:

[We] experienced for the first time in the tour the excitement of a mob bursting out of control. Suddenly, and without warning, we found our vehicles unable to move, almost sinking in a sea of strange faces. But the faces were friendly in spite of the inconvenience and unavoidable delay; I was heartened to see such a spirit in people of whose sympathies we had been doubtful. 49
After his visit to Kabul, Eisenhower privately expressed his reservations about Soviet influence in Afghanistan. According to the record of a conversation between Eisenhower and Spanish head of state Francisco Franco in late December 1959,

The Afghans say that they can remain independent and that their purpose is to remain neutral. The President doesn’t see how this can be done, for while the royal family may continue to stay on in power, the Soviets are gradually bringing roads through and around the country and through other construction are also getting more and more of a grip on the nation and in time the President thought it would be likely to become Soviet dominated.50
The Helmand River Valley Project and the Pakistan Question

Far and away the most substantial U.S. involvement in Afghanistan from the end of World War II until the Soviet invasion in 1979, with a particular emphasis in the 1950s, was with various projects intended to develop the Helmand River Valley in the southern half of the country. The Helmand River is the largest in Afghanistan, providing 40 percent of the country’s water resources. The Arghandab River serves as the major tributary to the west and continues to the Sistan Basin. Adequate water has never been an issue for the Helmand River Valley; however, the inability to properly control and distribute the river’s resources has plagued the region for centuries.¹

In 1910, Afghans began work to reconstruct irrigation canals around Seraj, south of Musa Qala, that dated back several centuries. Engineers completed the first functional canals by 1914. In the 1930s, Germany and Japan provided technical assistance for additional improvements. The Japanese built nine miles of new canals at Boghra from 1937 to 1941. During the war, Dr. S. W. Shah, a Cornell University-educated Afghan engineer, led the expansion to twenty-five miles.²

When the war ended and its German and Japanese partners were gone, the Afghan government turned to the United States for assistance. Due to the strength of its trade in wool during the war, Afghanistan had accumulated a $20 million trade surplus and allocated $17 million to agricultural development plans in the Helmand and Arghandab River Valleys.³

In 1945, the Afghan government began negotiations with Morrison-Knudsen, the U.S. construction company that had built the Hoover (Boulder) Dam, to build two diversion dams, one on the Helmand River and the other on the Arghandab River, and to improve the irrigation canals and roads in both areas. They reached an agreement in 1946, forming Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan (MKA), headquartered in San Francisco, California. The Morrison-Knudsen dams were the first major U.S. development projects in Afghanistan, and the overall Helmand River Valley project remains the largest single aid endeavor there to date.⁴ Prime
This map from *Report on Development of Helmand Valley, Afghanistan* (1956) shows the project as it was envisioned; the lower section below Khairabad was never completed. The Kajakai Dam on the Helmand River is in the upper right, and the Arghandab (Dahla) Dam on the Arghandab River is about twenty miles north of Kandahar. From early in the project in the late 1940s, Iran claimed that the development was reducing the amount of water it received via the Helmand River, a dispute that the U.S. mediated for two decades.
Minister Shah Mahmud Ghazi Khan wrote in 1946: “America’s attitude is our salvation. For the first time in our history, we are free of the threat of great powers’ using our mountain passes as pathways to empire. Now we can concentrate our talents and resources on bettering the living conditions of our own people.” He continued: “I propose to reduce the army in size to that of a small but well-trained internal security force charged with maintaining order among the nomadic tribesmen. Money once used in maintaining a large army will find better use in the already started national improvement program.”

The Americans initially envisioned the Helmand project as a replica of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for Afghanistan that included farms for nomads, agricultural products for export, hydroelectric power, and flood mitigation, all generating revenue to pay for the endeavor. President Harry S. Truman was an enthusiastic supporter of hydroelectric diplomacy in general, advocating for “a TVA in the Yangtze Valley and the Danube.”

There were, however, problems with the Afghanistan project from early in the process. Ambassador Louis G. Dreyfus Jr. cabled the State Department in September 1949 that “present widespread criticism of [Morrison-Knudson] and American efficiency voiced by [Abdul] Majid [Zabuli] seriously undermining U.S. prestige. For approximately $20,000,000 spent

Dahla Dam on the Arghandab River north of Kandahar was completed in 1952 and originally known as the Arghandab Dam. It was built by Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan, a subsidiary of the American firm that had built the Hoover Dam, among other large-scale projects. Photo (2012) by Mark Ray. Department of Defense.
the only tangible returns Afghanistan has are one short road, one diversion dam, and one incomplete canal.” Nevertheless, Dreyfus favored approval of a pending Export-Import Bank loan to “avoid reduced U.S. prestige and cooling of present cordial Afghan-U.S. relations.”

On February 11, 1949, the Afghan economic mission to the United States had requested $55 million from the Export-Import Bank of the United States to finance Helmand Valley development. Minister Abdul Majid Zabuli, a successful businessman in Afghanistan, insisted that the development plan represented an integrated series of interdependent agricultural and industrial projects. The Export-Import Bank, however, approved less than half the requested amount—a $21 million loan—in November 1949 to fund only MKA’s Arghandab, Kajakai, and Boghra canal projects. MKA responded by cutting costs, including ground-water surveys, road paving, and other support projects.

Afghan officials recognized the economic and diplomatic importance of the Helmand Valley initiative and made efforts to fortify it. In 1951, the Afghan government gave more authority to MKA and created the Helmand Valley Authority in December 1952 to oversee the project, elevating the authority to cabinet status. Engineers built the Dahla Dam on the Arghandab River between June 1950 and January 1952 and completed the Kajakai Dam on the Helmand River in April 1953. American and Afghan officials alike were aware of the growing costs: the Afghan government had already spent $95 million by the mid-1950s, with $39.5 million financed by the Export-Import Bank.

Publicly, the United States continued to praise the Afghanistan projects. A State Department Bulletin noted in July 1952 that “help in overcoming effects of ravages during the twelfth and fourteenth centuries by Genghis Khan and Tamerlane on vital irrigation works in the Helmand Valley of southwest Afghanistan is among provisions” of the Point Four funds. Maj. Gen. Glen E. Edgerton, USA (ret.), managing director of the Export-Import Bank, said in 1954, speaking of the overall effort, that “this great project constitutes a basic feature of the economic development program of Afghanistan and, when completed, will stand as an enduring monument to the enterprise of the Afghan people and to the friendship and cooperation of Afghanistan and the United States.”

Out of public view, however, concerns grew. Nearly a year before Edgerton’s statement praising the project, a report to the Export-Import Bank noted that the effort was underfunded for the scale of the endeavor and hindered by Pakistani border politics and low educational levels of the Afghans it would employ and eventually benefit. According to the report, both locals and U.S. aid groups experienced a cultural disconnect.
and could not overcome a lack of appreciation of this “America in Asia” project.\(^{13}\)

There were also U.S. concerns that “the failure of the project for any reason would be a severe blow to American prestige and American relations in this part of the world,” as one official put it in 1953.\(^{14}\) Secretary of State John Foster Dulles cabled the embassy in Pakistan in 1955 that the “Morrison-Knudsen Corporation activities in Afghanistan must be discontinued in [the] near future if [Pakistan’s] embargo of their shipments continues. This company is one of [the] chief influences which maintains Afghan connections with [the] West. Its departure would create [a] vacuum which [the] Soviets would be anxious to fill.”\(^{15}\)

In a report published in 1955, economist Peter G. Franck noted that although a United Nations preparatory mission had “recommended that the UN provide assistance to Helmand Valley projects already started, UN headquarters entertained doubts about the economic soundness of the projects proposed and the Government’s administrative capacity to complete them.” As Louis Dupree observed, “Neither the Afghan government nor the American engineering company understood the monumental problems of
enfolding an entire region in the embrace of a single project.”16 Infrastructure and local interest were almost entirely absent. Costs quickly escalated, and officials realized how difficult it was to ship U.S. equipment halfway around the world, with Pakistan hindering deliveries through transit fees and closed borders.

A Tudor Engineering Report that evaluated the Helmand River Valley project in 1956 anticipated added income to the Afghan economy from the increase in arable land. One State Department official noted that “the project is using the waters of the Helmand River to irrigate lands some of which have not been extensively cultivated in more than 2,000 years. It also includes industry, power, and transportation features.”17 But hoped-for revenues that would eventually make the project self-sustaining and profitable never materialized. Indeed, in a later study, economist Nake M. Kamranly found “no signs of its financial liquidity.”18

In the later 1950s, the Afghan Ministry of Interior funded the development of villages around Nad-e Ali in Helmand Province to settle Pashtun, Uzbek, and Baluch nomads. But the logistics and impact of resettling the local nomadic
population were not well considered. These problems, combined with poor soil conditions, led to the new villages being abandoned by 1960.\textsuperscript{19}

There were other issues as the project developed. Geographer Aloys A. Michel observed in the late 1950s that “United States interest centers on the Helmand Valley and has, wittingly or not, taken the position of favoring Kandahar over Kabul as the transportation and commercial center of the nation.” He cautioned that this stance “ultimately is untenable, for the Durrani Afghans long ago decided, despite their personal attachment to the South, that the only way to rule Afghanistan was from Kabul.”\textsuperscript{20}

In a concluding observation in his 1959 work, Michel stated that “at present the ICA [U.S. International Cooperation Administration] agricultural program in the Helmand [Valley] has practically collapsed, and no amount of United States Government support for the Kandahar International Airport or Industrial Center or for Arghandab power can offset the damage done to American prestige by the failures in Nad-i-Ali.”\textsuperscript{21} Kamrany later noted that “of the seven major objectives of the project, . . . only one objective was successfully accomplished, i.e., the project provided protection against floods; but at a very high cost!”\textsuperscript{22}

The Afghan government released Morrison-Knudsen from its contract in 1959, with recriminations on both sides. As Ambassador Henry A. Byroade observed:

\begin{quote}
I am normally against a proliferation of projects, and feel that a few big projects are better in the long run than a scattering of effort. This is an unusual situation, however, and if we can double our effect here by new things with a bit of flair, then it seems we should do so. The new Minister of Agriculture stated we were putting too many eggs in one basket in the Helmand Valley and that there was a feeling that too many of our subsequent projects had been designed simply to make that successful.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

Major U.S. investments in the Helmand and Arghandab River projects continued into the 1970s, despite the lack of infrastructure, the diplomatic challenges of Pashtunistan, and a growing awareness of opium poppy cultivation in the region. “While the concept of the Helmand Valley development is basically Afghan,” Ambassador Byroade explained in 1961, “U.S. financing and the employment of a U.S. contractor by the Afghans have tended to identify the United States closely with it.” Even into the 1960s, American officials held onto the idea that the “most effective instrument available to maintain an effective U.S. position in Afghanistan is our aid program.”\textsuperscript{24} But the ongoing struggles and financial burdens of the project imperiled U.S. influence.
THE PAKISTAN QUESTION

When the Afghan government accepted massive Soviet funding for development projects during the 1950s, Afghan officials cited U.S. support of Pakistan as a major factor in its decision.25 The Afghan government was so concerned with Pakistan’s growing military strength that it even began funding its defense at the expense of agricultural programs, which resulted in poor decisions on the Helmand River Valley project and a new reliance on U.S. wheat imports to feed its people.26 Despite this assistance, U.S. support for Pakistan continued to plague its relationship with Afghanistan.27

U.S. officials were aware that prosperity in Afghanistan relied on a partnership with Pakistan. A National Security Council assessment in 1957 reported that “Afghanistan has already incurred so heavy a burden of debt to the Communist bloc as to threaten its future independence,” noting that the Afghans were also “willing to accept Western assistance and technical advice and hope to have the best of both worlds.” The United States wanted to assist “the improvement of communications through Pakistan to Afghanistan, to bring about closer and more amicable Afghan-Pakistan relations and also give Afghanistan an alternative to its dependence on the USSR.” The desire was to “encourage Afghanistan to minimize its reliance upon the Communist bloc for military training and equipment, and to look to the United States and other free world sources for military training and assistance.”28

The following year, however, Afghan-Pakistani relations further deteriorated. While Pakistani president Iskander A. Mirza had presided over a détente on the Pashtunistan issue, Gen. Muhammad Ayub Khan reignited tension when he seized power in Pakistan in October 1958. Ayub Khan, himself an ethnic Pashtun of the Tarin tribe, demanded that Afghanistan yield on the Pashtunistan issue. That was not going to happen with Mohammad Daud Khan as Afghanistan’s prime minister. As his brother the foreign minister, Mohammad Naim Khan, explained to Dwight D. Eisenhower during the president’s brief visit in 1959, the Pashtunistan dispute “had deep roots in history and in the mentality and emotions of the people; anything that went wrong in Pushtun Pakistan reacted strongly here, causing bitterness, tenseness and difficulties in their relations.”29

When Nikita S. Khrushchev, then premier of the Soviet Union, visited Afghanistan in early March 1960, he supported Afghanistan’s position on Pashtunistan and reiterated the Soviet desire for a plebiscite in Pakistan’s tribal regions to determine their future.30 On September 23, 1960, the U.S. embassy in Kabul reported a “threatening situation” in Bajaur, Pakistan,
where pro-Afghan and pro-Pakistan groups had escalated hostilities. Prime Minister Daud met with Ambassador Byroade and indicated that Afghanistan would be forced to protect local tribes if Pakistani troops quelled the violence. From the Afghan point of view, the Durand Line was not an issue since local tribes did not observe the international boundary of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Instead, Daud focused discussion on the fact that Afghanistan supported Pashtun tribes irrespective of their location. A month later, President Eisenhower informed Mohammad Zahir Shah that the United States would not mediate and expressed hope that Afghanistan and Pakistan would engage in bilateral negotiations to resolve their conflicts. The Soviets exacerbated the situation again in March 1961 when Khrushchev publicly declared that “Pushtunistan has always been part of Afghanistan.” Tensions continued to mount until September 3, 1961, when Afghanistan closed its border and Pakistan shut Afghanistan’s consulates. The borders remained closed until May 29, 1963.

While U.S. officials hoped to mediate the Afghan-Pakistan dispute, they were hindered by their position as Pakistan’s ally. Importantly for broader U.S. strategic interests, Eisenhower had reached an agreement with Pakistani prime minister Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy in 1957 to
build a secret base for U–2 aircraft, located at the Peshawar Air Station in Badaber, Pakistan. The base was also used by the 6937th Communications Group, U.S. Air Force Security Service, for a communications link between Karamursel, Turkey, and Peshawar, Pakistan. Understanding the importance of the U–2 base in Peshawar to the United States, Pakistani officials leveraged the issue. According to one analysis in 1964, “The
Pakistan’s President knows that the strongest card he holds is the U.S. communications facilities at Peshawar. . . . He almost certainly calculates that closing the facilities would bring a drastic reduction in the U.S. military and economic assistance on which Pakistan is so heavily dependent and for which there is no alternative in sight.”39 At the same time, the border closing placed increased pressure on U.S. aid programs to Afghanistan. The Afghan government requested an alternate transportation route through Iran, but the United States preferred the less costly passage through Pakistan and decided to wait. U.S. policy makers continued to make their Afghanistan policy conditional upon improved relations with Pakistan and hoped for a resolution to the differences.

In the end, the solution arose in Afghanistan. The closed borders wreaked havoc on the Afghan economy, and mediation to open them was slow and arduous. The royal family, fearful of Daud’s pro-Soviet policies and autocratic rule, had been moving toward his removal. Zahir Shah asked Daud to step down as prime minister, and Daud resigned on March 10, 1963. Mohammad Yusuf, a physicist, became the new prime minister (1963–65), followed by Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal (1965–67). They led Afghanistan toward a more cosmopolitan society and a constitutional monarchy. They also improved relations with Pakistan, and the Pashtunistan issue was sidelined until the mid-1970s.
Outwardly, Afghanistan enjoyed a relatively stable period in the 1960s and the early 1970s as world leaders focused their Cold War attentions elsewhere. When President Lyndon B. Johnson invited Prime Minister Maiwandwal to Washington in March 1967, he remarked: “Historically, the relations between our countries have been close and cordial. Today they are warmer than ever before.” Unquestionably, the Afghan-U.S. relationship continued to focus on development aid. Prime Minister Maiwandwal specifically noted in his reply Afghanistan’s appreciation for American help “in building our infrastructure,” mentioning the Kabul-Kandahar highway and another under construction. He also highlighted U.S. help developing “our educational systems, our agriculture, our water resources, and our transportation system.”

From the late 1940s until the late 1970s, Afghan officials balanced Cold War competition in Afghanistan. As Daud once quipped, “I feel the happiest when I can light my American cigarette with Soviet matches.” However, a new and increasingly unstable period began on July 17, 1973, when Daud overthrew Zahir Shah in a nearly bloodless coup d’état while the king was abroad for medical treatment. Daud abolished the monarchy and declared himself the first president of Afghanistan. Pakistan, playing on fears of Soviet influence in Afghanistan and concerned about a return of the Pashtunistan debate, immediately pressed the United States for more military aid. In fact, following Daud’s return to power, he was much more moderate on the Pashtunistan question than he had been during his previous rule and more focused on modernization. As Amin Saikal explained, Daud’s intentions “were two-fold: to reduce his dependence on local communists and the Soviet Union as well as military expenditure, and expand economic and trade ties with Pakistan.” By the mid-1970s, Afghanistan’s relationships with Pakistan and Iran had greatly improved. But Daud gradually lost control of relations with the Soviets, ultimately with devastating results.
Socialist Afghanistan and War with the Soviet Union

In the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet scholars developed a concept of a native “military intelligentsia” to confront the weakness of socialist revolutionary movements in developing nations. In Afghanistan, Soviet planners hoped this new military elite would assume leadership positions in future national movements. Accordingly, the socialist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, Hizb-e-Demokrati-k-e-Khalq-e-Afghanistan) started actively recruiting Afghan officers trained in the Soviet Union. By the early 1970s, the strategy began to demonstrate success. A communication to Washington from the U.S. embassy in 1971 observed that there was “no effective organization within the military to counter or even catalog the long-term, possibly subversive effects of Soviet training of the many military officers who go to the USSR for stints as long as six years.”

In 1973, 1978, and 1979, Soviet-trained officers played pivotal roles in Afghan political change. Without a popular base supporting the leaders, however, the rapid succession of coups led by mid-level officers introduced political disarray in Afghanistan. As foreign minister in 1971 and as prime minister in 1972, Mohammad Musa Shafiq sought reconciliation with Pakistan on the Pashtunistan issue and agreements with Iran on the use of the Helmand River. When Afghanistan suffered a drought in 1972, Iran offered $2 billion in aid over ten years. Soviet leaders quickly responded to the Iranian overture, using their military ties to engineer a coup in 1973 led by former Prime Minister Mohammad Daud Khan and the military. The officers intended Daud to be a figurehead, but he subsequently outmaneuvered and demoted many of them.

After the 1973 coup, the Soviet military increased shipments of equipment, including T–54 and T–55 tanks, Il–28 bombers, armed personnel carriers, and light and medium field artillery pieces. Despite this augmentation in the Afghan military’s inventory of arms and equipment, Daud moved to decrease the number of Soviet advisors in Afghanistan. In 1976, he reassigned Soviet advisors from the company to the battalion level.
Daud turned away from the Soviet training monopoly in 1974 when he sent military officers abroad to India and Egypt, nations that also used Soviet weapon systems. Still, Daud never cut military ties with the Soviets, and Afghanistan remained dependent on their hardware and training.\(^6\)

Daud also included PDPA members in his new government, where they continued their strategy of recruiting military officers. At the time, the PDPA was divided between two factions, both with military links. The first of these, Parcham, was dominated by Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Dari-speaking Kabulis. The members of Khalq, its rival, were largely Pashtuns from the provinces. Generally, the Soviet Politburo supported both sides, establishing ties with whichever group prevailed. But the Soviet military apparatus had specific links to each group: Soviet military intelligence (GRU) supported Khalq, while the Committee for State Security (KGB) supported Parcham.\(^7\)

During the 1970s, Khalq increased its influence within the Afghan military, asserting that military promotions should be based on ability rather than family and tribal connections. Daud, however, returned family members to the military elite. By the late 1970s, despite differences between the two factions, the PDPA became a significant political force.

Daud began more openly eschewing the Soviets in 1978. His domestic economic reforms had proven unsuccessful, and he pursued new support and new regional allies in Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, and China. His seven-year economic plan, outlined for 1976 through 1983, followed Soviet models but was based on massive financial aid from Iran.\(^8\) A new reordering of alliances would not take place, however. As Daud was organizing the visit of the Shah of Iran to Kabul and his own visit to Washington, a series of events led to another coup, his own downfall, and the preservation of Soviet ties.

Unrest at the funeral of Parcham activist Mir Akbar Khyber sparked massive demonstrations and a confounding series of events in Kabul. Shocked by the power of the socialist movement, Daud ordered the arrests of PDPA leaders Nur Muhammad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, and Babrak Karmal. On April 27, 1978, Amin, who was merely under house arrest, ordered army officers loyal to the Khalq faction to initiate a coup d’état, later known as the Saur Revolution.\(^9\) At seven o’clock on the evening of April 27, Col. Abdul Qadir Dagarwal, a Soviet-trained pilot, announced in Dari and Mohammad Aslam Watanjar in Pashto on Radio Afghanistan that a revolutionary council of the armed forces would replace the Daud government.\(^10\) Only the 7th Division at Rishkor, the 15th Armored Brigade, and the Republican Guard remained loyal to Daud.\(^11\) Henry Bradsher, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, observed that “whatever the genesis of
the downfall of [Daud], it was accomplished by a small number of military men . . . at the air base side of Kabul International Airport. Only some 600 men, 60 tanks and 20 warplanes were involved in approximately nineteen hours of rebel action against the more numerous loyalist forces.” By the morning of April 28, Daud and his brother Mohammad Naim Khan were dead, and new rulers controlled Kabul.

Examining both Soviet and Afghan sources, Bradsher raised questions about the level of direct Soviet involvement in the coup. The Soviet embassy in Kabul seemed to be as surprised as other embassies, but Soviet leaders acted quickly to publicize their close ties and maintain their record as the first capital to recognize the new Afghan government. U.S. officials hedged in their responses, avoiding terms that would trigger the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which prohibited assistance to “any Communist country.”

From April 27, 1978, until the Soviet invasion on December 24, 1979, the new Afghan leaders demonstrated little capacity to govern. Rapid economic and social changes, the increasing number of Soviet advisors, and political infighting among Afghan communists led to instability and
greater dependency on the Soviets. On May 1, 1978, Taraki became prime minister, and he promptly carried out a purge of Parcham supporters in the military and the government. Bradsher recorded that “many foreign observers felt that the Communist coup was greeted by most Afghans with relief. . . . Those hopes were quickly shattered.”

Taraki established PDPA offices at each level of the Afghan armed forces, and he made Soviet training a requirement for elite units in Kabul. Soviet advisors, newly assigned to the platoon level, proliferated. Soviet advisors numbered 350 in 1977; 2,000 in May 1978; 7,000 in August 1978; and more than 10,000 in December 1979. Soviet advisors could even wear Afghan military uniforms and assume combat and leadership roles in the Afghan National Army.

During the summer of 1978, Moscow officials attempted a low profile in Afghan relations—despite providing $250 million in Soviet weapons to the Afghan army—and focused on developing relations with the PDPA. In news conferences, the PDPA deliberately rejected Soviet ties and communist nomenclature, asserting nonaligned status.

When Taraki visited Moscow from December 4 to 7, 1978, he and Soviet General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev signed the “Treaty of Friendship,
Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation” on December 5. Their ties were then undeniable. Article 4 of the treaty underlined the importance of “security, independence, and territorial integrity” and reaffirmed the military connections between the two countries. Although the Soviets did not commit themselves to prevent the downfall of the PDPA, many have argued that this treaty effectively established Afghanistan as a Soviet satellite. With Soviet support secured, Afghan leaders then embarked on a campaign of arrests of secular and religious leaders not aligned with the new regime. Prisons grew overcrowded, and there was a surge of executions.21

Journalist Edward Girardet described the administrative inexperience of the new Afghan cabinet members, observing that “most of them had been lower or middle rank civil servants.” He added that “it was even worse in the provinces, where those who took control of government offices had few if any qualifications whatsoever. Many were quite simply ignorant thugs or opportunists who used their newly acquired positions to improve their social standing, settle old rivalries, or feather their nests through self-bestowed privileges and bribes.”22

The year 1979 proved pivotal for U.S. interests in Afghanistan. On February 14, four armed militants kidnapped the U.S. ambassador, Adolph “Spike” Dubs, and demanded the release of imprisoned members of the National Oppression Party (Settem-e Melli) in exchange. The Afghan government refused negotiations, then organized a rescue attempt by Afghan police and Soviet security force advisors that failed and resulted in the death of Ambassador Dubs.23

U.S.-Afghan relations quickly deteriorated following the “Dubs Affair.” Publicly, Harold H. Saunders, the assistant secretary of state for near east affairs, testified to Congress: “For its part, the U.S. Government seeks no special position in Afghanistan. We look for a relationship based on mutual respect and shared interests in regional stability, the independence and territorial integrity of all states in the area, and nonintervention.”24 President James E. Carter Jr. curtailed aid programs that were impossible to fulfill with the growing unrest, withdrew aid workers who could not be protected, and began providing radio equipment, medical supplies, and money to the Afghan resistance movement.25 President Ronald W. Reagan continued and later expanded this assistance after he took office in 1981.26

In the face of unforgiving land reforms and government interference in daily life dictated by the new socialist government, popular armed resistance burgeoned, starting in Nuristan and Badakhshan. Similar revolts followed in Paktia, Paktika, Ningrahar, Kapisa, Uruzgan, Parwan, Badghis, Balkh, Ghazni, Farah, and Herat. In March 1979, Capt. Ismail
Khan, later an influential mujahideen and governor of Herat, led a revolt of the 17th Infantry Division in Herat against the PDPA and Russian advisors based there. This revolt was unique in that power fell entirely into the hands of local insurgents. According to press reports, mutineers went door to door hunting and executing Soviet advisors. Dissidents cut telephone communication, blocked the road from Kandahar to Herat, closed Shindand air base, and attacked Soviet citizens for ten days until armored Afghan military units arrived and Soviet MiGs carried out air strikes in Herat.

Yuri V. Andropov, chairman of the KGB, told a crisis section of the Politburo on March 17, “Bearing in mind that we will be labeled as an aggressor, but in spite of that, under no circumstances can we lose Afghanistan.” The Soviets responded immediately with increased military aid: light tanks, armored personnel carriers, and Mi–24 Hinds, the most advanced Soviet helicopter gunship at the time. In early April 1979, Gen. Alexei A. Yepishev, chief of the main political directorate of the Soviet army and navy, visited Kabul to evaluate the military and
political situation and to express Soviet concerns to Prime Minister Taraki. Yepishev had experience putting down political unrest in Soviet satellites, having played a key role in the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. After his visit, Soviet advisors made all major military decisions. Soviet pilots routinely patrolled Afghan air space, and a Soviet division moved to the Afghan border. In the summer of 1979, the Soviet air force took over Bagram and Shindand air bases. The Soviet Union also increased arms deliveries to Afghanistan, including T–62 tanks, MiG–21 and MiG–23 fighters, Su–20 bombers, Mi–24 helicopter gunships, and Mi–16 helicopter transports. Despite increased arms shipments in the summer, the Politburo viewed intervention as less advisable, choosing to preserve détente and hoping for the best in Afghan stability.

In August 1979, Gen. Ivan Pavlovskii, deputy minister of defense and commander in chief of Soviet ground forces, led a sixty-three-person Soviet military delegation, including eleven general officers, to evaluate the crisis in Afghanistan. When Pavlovskii returned to Moscow in November, he advised against military intervention. Consensus within the Politburo to invade was building, however. Taraki and Amin made at least sixteen formal requests for Soviet troops between mid-April and mid-December 1979, reinforcing the push in Moscow for intervention. Three key Soviet officials in Kabul—the Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan, Alexander

The remains of a Soviet aircraft (probably a MiG–21) at Bagram air base outside Kabul, February 2002, with U.S. Army UH–60 Black Hawk helicopters in the background. The Soviets took control of the air bases at Bagram and Shindand in the summer of 1979. National Archives.
M. Puzanov, chief of the KGB mission in Afghanistan; Lt. Gen. Boris Ivanov; and Lt. Gen. Lev N. Gorelov, the chief Soviet military advisor to Afghanistan—argued that “in view of possible stepped-up activity by the rebel formations in August and September . . . it is essential to respond affirmatively to the request from the Afghan friends and to send a special brigade to Kabul in the immediate future.”

The state of affairs rapidly disintegrated in September 1979 after Amin took control of the government from Taraki. Within the Soviet Politburo, leaders began to shift toward intervention, citing Amin’s erratic behavior and the strategic importance of Afghanistan. The KGB responded by launching Operation Zenith in October, dispersing special forces across Afghanistan to determine popular reaction to a Soviet intervention. In November and December, the Soviet military began to orchestrate it. A Soviet special forces battalion of Central Asian airborne troops deployed to Afghanistan on November 9. Soviet conventional ground forces moved to the Afghan border in late November.

On November 28, Lt. Gen. Viktor S. Paputin, first deputy minister of internal affairs, arrived in Kabul on a mission to pressure Amin to step down or to invite Soviet troops to assist in stabilizing Afghanistan. Amin refused, but the Soviet military continued with its plan. Two more Soviet battalions landed at Bagram air base north of Kabul in early December. On
December 12, the Politburo met and approved a handwritten resolution, “Concerning the Situation in A.” On December 18–19, Soviet troops cleared the highway to the Salang Pass.

By the end of 1979, the entire country was in revolt. Based on extensive firsthand contacts, Nake M. Kamrany described a broad-based Afghan movement against the Soviets: “It is not one person or one group that is resisting the Soviet system in Afghanistan. It is every Afghan in every village. And these villages do not have the means to communicate with each other. They have no system or means of communication.” He continued: “What happens in Afghanistan is that each village has its own resistance in its own way. Some of them knock out a Soviet tank, some of them just wait and shoot at soldiers, some of them burn down a government building. In whatever form, it is a resistance from within.”

Louis Dupree observed four key struggles at the time:

- uncoordinated, generalized guerrilla war against the Kabul regime;
- competition, mainly in Peshawar, between conservative and moderate religious leaders in the Pashtun area to monopolize funds from friendly Arabs;
- attempts by mujahideen to establish local bases of power (Nuristan, Hazarajat, and Badakhshan) so that any new regime in Kabul would have to grant regional autonomy to the various ethnolinguistic groups; and
- the internal struggle for power within the Khalq leadership.


Officially, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began on December 24, 1979, when tens of thousands of ground troops crossed the Amu Darya into Afghanistan and 7,700 more flew to Bagram, Kabul, and Shindand air bases. The Soviet military brought exiled Parcham leaders, including Babrak Karmal, with them to install as the heads of a new pro-Moscow government. On December 27, a combined Soviet special forces group, with GRU, KGB, Ministry of Defense, and airborne elements, stormed Tajbeg Palace and killed Amin as part of Operation Storm 333.

Less than two weeks after the incursion, President Carter declared that “the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War.” Carter added a few weeks later that “the Soviets
have seriously misjudged our own nation’s strength and resolve and unity and determination and the condemnation that has accrued to them by the world community because of their invasion of Afghanistan.” The United States halted grain exports to the Soviet Union and led a boycott of the Summer Olympics in Moscow in 1980. Brzezinski told the president that, with American help to Afghan forces, the Soviets might become ensnared in Afghanistan the way the United States had been in Vietnam. The Reagan administration expanded this effort. In the early 1980s, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director William J. Casey developed a wide-ranging international coalition to fund and train the mujahideen movements. Karmal’s new government proved unable to consolidate power with Soviet troops on the ground and, increasingly, the PDPA began shunning Soviet activities in Afghanistan. The Soviet military did little to win goodwill, carrying out massive reprisals and forcing hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees into Iran and Pakistan. For its part, the Afghan National Army suffered extensive desertions as troops left to join the mujahideen. The force, numbering 80,000 men at the beginning of 1979, declined to 50,000 in December 1979 and 25,000 at the end of 1980. Extended age limits and service terms stabilized the force at 40,000 by 1986 despite the continued difficulties to conscript, organize, and mobilize troops. The Soviet Union brought a new generation of young Afghan “volunteers” to train, with ever more limited results.
Strategically, the Soviet army focused on securing Kabul and the Afghan highway system linking Kabul to Kandahar, Herat, and Termez. Much of the countryside remained outside government control throughout the 1980s. Soviet forces in Afghanistan operated under the command of the Fortieth Army headquarters in Kabul, with operational control and support in Termez. The original rules of engagement permitted Soviet soldiers only to return fire or to liberate captured Soviet advisors. After a major antigovernment and anti-Soviet demonstration in Kabul on February 21, 1980, Moscow ordered the Fortieth Army to “begin active operations together with the Afghan army to defeat the detachments of the armed opposition.” Soviet troops were unprepared for local Afghan resistance and the resilient guerrilla force.

From 1979 until 1989, the Fortieth Army conducted 220 operations and 400 combined operations. Increasingly frustrated with the lack of long-term success against an elusive insurgent enemy, the Soviets turned to using aerial “butterfly” mines, chemical weapons, and even booby-trapped toys. Afghan forces were under Soviet operational control throughout the war.

President James E. Carter Jr. and his national security advisor, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. Carter called the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the “greatest threat to peace since the Second World War.” Brzezinski speculated that the Soviets might become ensnared in Afghanistan the way the U.S. had been in Vietnam. National Archives.
The conflict resulted in inestimable damage to Afghanistan’s already poor infrastructure and economy. By January 1980, growing unrest had driven more than 400,000 Afghan refugees to Pakistan and more than 30,000 to Iran. On “Afghanistan Day,” March 21, 1982, President Reagan implored:

The tragedy in Afghanistan must not be allowed to drag on endlessly. This conflict imperils the stability of the region. It has seriously poisoned the international environment. Afghanistan itself is being brutalized. The suffering of the Afghan people is immense. I earnestly hope that the Soviet Union will join with us in an urgent effort to bring a swift withdrawal of its forces to end this needless conflict.

Two years later, Vice President George H. W. Bush visited a refugee camp in Peshawar, Pakistan, and told his audience: “My dear Afghan brethren, you and your people have suffered greatly. You have shown courage and fortitude beyond the usual measure. You have my heartfelt admiration and that of my countrymen. You have earned the admiration of free men everywhere.” At the same time, U.S. leaders made a concerted effort to thank Pakistan for its support of Afghanistan and Afghan refugees.
Soviet military leaders had advocated withdrawal once Karmal’s new government was in place in 1980. When the Afghan army proved unable to provide the necessary security, however, Soviet political leaders wavered and did not make a decision. In general, Soviet leaders lacked commitment to resolve the crisis in Afghanistan as they dealt with a host of domestic issues from 1981 to 1985. Not until Mikhail S. Gorbachev came to power, and following a yearlong attempt at a military solution, did the Soviets advocate the National Reconciliation Campaign and put a new Afghan leader in place to facilitate a Soviet departure. On May 5, 1986, Karmal resigned and Dr. Mohammad Najibullah, head of the paramilitary Government Intelligence Service (Khadamat-e Etela’at-e Dawlati, or KHAD), succeeded him. The Soviets gave him two years to prepare for their military withdrawal. When the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, Eduard A. Shevardnadze, and long-time Soviet ambassador to the United States Anatoly F. Dobrynin visited Kabul in December 1986 to evaluate the political situation, they observed, “Of friendly feeling toward the Soviet people, which had existed in Afghanistan for decades, little remains. Many people have died, and not all of them were bandits. . . . The state apparatus is functioning poorly. Our advice and help is ineffective. . . . Everything that we have done and are doing is incompatible with the moral character of our country.”

In some instances, the U.S. Air Force flew Afghan rebels to the United States or Europe for treatment, such as these arriving at Norton Air Force Base, California, in 1986. They were transported by a 375th Aeromedical Airlift Wing C–9A Nightingale. At left is Col. Marvin Ervina, commander of the 63d Military Airlift Wing. Department of Defense.
The United States continued to express support for the anti-Soviet Afghans. President Reagan told Afghan resistance leader Burhanuddin Rabbani during a White House visit in June 1986 that “in your struggle to regain your nation’s independence, the American people stand with you. This policy has broad and deep bipartisan support; it is an unshakeable commitment. Your goal is our goal—the freedom of Afghanistan. We will not let you down.”

One of the signature details of the U.S. campaign to undermine the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was the CIA effort to supply Stinger missiles to the mujahideen. “Charlie Wilson’s War,” as it came to be known, was a riveting yarn with covert intrigue, but it had little impact on the war itself. Rodric Braithwaite observed that “Gorbachev took the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan a full year before the first Stinger was fired.”

There is little doubt that the Stinger missile affected tactics—night flying, combat landings, high-altitude bombing, and the deployment of flares—but it did not undermine Soviet air power. “While the Stinger, first introduced in combat in September 1986, did give the mujahideen an important antiaircraft tool,” Kalinovsky explained, “it hardly changed the course of the war.”

On May 15, 1988, Soviet troops began to withdraw, and the commander of the Fortieth Army, Gen. Boris V. Gromov, crossed the Friendship Bridge into the Soviet Union on February 15, 1989, as the last Soviet combatant to leave Afghanistan. On the pullout, Soviet journalist Alexander Prokhanov wrote, “The departure of our troops is not a defeat. The army is in excellent fighting form. The morale of officers and men is high. It is an organized departure from a country that we did not intend to occupy, did not intend to destroy and subjugate. The troops are leaving as the vector of politics changes into reverse, and the army follows that vector.” After the Soviet withdrawal, the Afghan government maintained a weekly 600-truck convoy to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet air force continued to airlift supplies.

Despite their enthusiasm for the success of the mujahideen resistance, many U.S. officials held reservations about its viability as a political movement. In 1988, Robert B. Oakley, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, observed that “the fight against ‘heroin-Kalashnikov culture’ is almost as critical to the future of Pakistan’s security as the fight against Soviet domination of Afghanistan has been.” It remains an open question why U.S. officials invested so little in the so-called moderate mujahideen, particularly groups led by Pir Ahmed Gailani and Pir Sibghatullah Mojaddedi.

Instead, U.S. policy makers focused on ousting the Najibullah government. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs John H. Kelly released a statement in March 1990: “We believe that no stable political settlement is achievable as long as the Najibullah regime remains in power. The Resistance is both united and passionate on this point: a transfer of power away from the present regime and to a new government is necessary for this chapter, with all its attendant tragedy, to be brought to a close.” In September 1991, U.S. secretary of state James A. Baker III and Soviet foreign minister Boris N. Pankin released a joint statement agreeing on the cessation of hostilities, support for elections during the transition period, the repatriation of refugees, and the prompt reconstruction of Afghanistan. Both parties pledged to cut off arms supplies by January 1, 1992.

When the Soviet Union formally dissolved in December 1991, however, its military support to Afghanistan vanished. Najibullah’s government lasted until April 27, 1992, when mujahideen forces entered Kabul and a new civil war commenced. As Thomas J. Barfield explained, “In retrospect, it was clear that the resistance had been given a task they were
incapable of accomplishing. The mujahideen had no previous experience in assaulting heavily defended cities, and their forces had never been integrated into a common defense structure.74

As the 1990s progressed, Russia proved disinterested in playing an influential role in Kabul.75 Meanwhile, U.S. relations with Pakistan, its Afghan partner, frayed as Pakistan sought nuclear armament. Conflict in Afghanistan shifted from guerrilla warfare supported by international actors to more conventional and territorialized war.76
In his study of the Soviet withdrawal, historian Artemy M. Kalinovsky argued that Mohammad Najibullah “found ways to sabotage Soviet-led outreach when he felt it suited his interests. After the Soviets withdrew, the PDPA took more courageous steps in terms of opening up the government and society, establishing links with tribal leaders, and shedding its communist image.” Still, challenges existed that continued to undermine the already weak Afghan government. Corruption pilfered 85 to 90 percent of Soviet aid at the end of the 1980s. Even more ominously, well-funded, Pakistani-supported military-political organizations were waiting for the collapse of the PDPA to establish their own government in Afghanistan.

On March 18, 1992, mujahideen forces led by Abdul Rashid Dostum, with support from Ahmad Shah Massoud, an influential Tajik mujahideen leader, captured Mazar-i Sharif without resistance. By April 14, Massoud occupied Charikar, Jabal ul-Seraj, and Bagram air base. Najibullah unsuccessfully attempted to flee to India but instead took refuge at the United Nations offices in Kabul.

While several military factions descended on the capital, mujahideen party leaders met in Peshawar, Pakistan, to devise a political solution. The Peshawar Accords, a peace and power-sharing agreement among the major Afghan mujahideen parties, created the new Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and established an interim government, under the leadership of Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, to be followed by general elections. Mojaddedi became president on April 28; Pakistan, the European Economic Community, and the United States recognized the new state on the same day. On April 29, Massoud entered Kabul with his army. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Islamic Party (Hizb-e Islami), however, refused to participate and continued its assault on Kabul.

In early May, Dostum, Hekmetyar, and Massoud began to articulate their competition for Kabul. Mojaddedi requested an extension to his power-sharing agreement but was refused by the other mujahideen leaders. On June 29, Mojaddedi stepped down and handed power to Burhanuddin
Rabbani, leader of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (Jamiat-e Islami). Rabbani chose Massoud as his minister of defense. For the next two years, Massoud’s forces waged continuous warfare against Hekmatyar and his allies, and the conflict regionalized within Afghanistan. Kabul remained the epicenter of war throughout this period.⁶

Since the early 1980s, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had supported Afghan parties that shared President Zia ul-Haq’s view of Islamizing Pakistani society.⁷ With the failure of Pakistan’s primary ally, Hekmatyar, to capture Kabul, Pakistani intelligence and military leaders invested in a new militant political group of young Afghans and veterans of the anti-Soviet jihad, the Taliban. It had initially focused on gaining influence in the area around Kandahar and securing transportation networks for legal and illegal commerce, but the Taliban soon began a campaign to occupy other parts of Afghanistan. Martin K. Evans described the group’s impressive arrival to the civil war: “The Taliban forces that proceeded to advance through Afghanistan in the winter of 1994–1995 were equipped with tanks, APCs, artillery, and even aircraft.”⁸

Pakistan’s official supporters were not the only advocates for the Taliban. As journalist Gretchen Peters explained, “Mullah Omar’s movement—almost from its inception—was highly dependent on and intertwined with the opium network spanning the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Drug traffickers and tribes growing poppy were critical to the Taliban’s swift and astonishing rise to power.” According to Peters, “Fueled by drug money and joined at the hip with al-Qaeda, the Taliban turned Afghanistan into the world’s first fully fledged narco-terror state.”⁹

The Taliban succeeded in providing security to the Afghan people where other mujahideen movements failed. Mullah Muhammad Omar led the initial Taliban group in southern Kandahar Province as a response to local banditry, brutality by local militias, and broad social malaise.¹⁰ While the two major mujahideen groups, Hizb-e-Islami and Jamiat-e Islami, had an antagonistic relationship with young Talibs, Omar was associated with the moderate group, Islamic Revolution Movement (Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami) that was part of the Peshawar Seven, supported by the United States and Pakistan.¹¹ That moderation proved to be an illusion. Anthropologist Olivier Roy argued in 1998 that “the problem with the Taliban is that they mean what they say. . . . The Taliban are not a factor for stabilization in Afghanistan.”¹² Conversely, Kalinovsky observed, “The Taliban earned Pakistan’s support because they held the promise of restoring order and of being useful to the ISI. Similarly, the United States largely turned a blind eye to the Taliban and their excesses.”¹³ This stabilization was a mirage.
Direct Russian support for the Afghan government ended with the rise of the Taliban in 1994. After this point, the Russian government engaged in complex proxy battles in a new phase of the Afghan civil war alongside other regional powers, including Pakistan, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Uzbekistan. Faced with the prospect of Islamic revolution in Central Asia, the Russian government began to support militias with anti-Soviet pasts. In 1996, Massoud and Dostum, two former rivals, joined to resist the growing Taliban threat and formed the United Islamic Front, also known as the Northern Alliance. Massoud had played a major role in the resistance against the Soviet Union during the 1980s, earning him the distinctions the “Lion of Panjshir” and the “Afghan who won the Cold War.” Dostum, considered the leader of Afghanistan’s Uzbek community, had fought on the Soviet side until the collapse of Najibullah’s government in 1992 and shifted alliances on several occasions thereafter. This pair and their forces proved little match for the well-equipped Taliban.14

In May 1996, Osama bin Laden, under pressure from the Saudi, Libyan, and Egyptian governments, shifted the base of al-Qaeda operations from Sudan to Afghanistan. Bin Laden thus returned to his jihadist roots, where his leadership during the battles of Jaji was lauded by Arab journalists and served as his introduction to the power of the press.15 As Peter L. Bergen observed, “The Afghan war changed bin Laden. The humble, young,
monosyllabic millionaire with the open checkbook who had first visited Pakistan in the early 1980s would, by the middle of the decade, launch an ambitious plan to confront the Soviets directly inside Afghanistan with a group of Arabs under his command. That cadre of Arabs would provide the nucleus of al-Qaeda."16 While the Saudis had cut off his wealth in Sudan, bin Laden benefitted from his return to Afghanistan, forging a mutually advantageous relationship that drew upon Arab financial contributions to the Taliban in the Afghan civil war and buttressed the Taliban’s international reputation.17

From Afghanistan, bin Laden declared war against the United States in August 1996, citing the continuing presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia five years after the Persian Gulf War and declaring that “the walls of oppression and humiliation cannot be demolished except in a rain of bullets.”18 Despite multiple international efforts to dislodge him from Afghanistan, bin Laden and the Taliban remained codependent: bin Laden supported the Taliban’s military and political efforts to consolidate Afghanistan as an “Islamic state,” while the Taliban provided protection for bin Laden.19 Ultimately, bin Laden’s public vitriol clashed with Mullah Omar’s political interests, and the latter “invited” bin Laden to Kandahar in 1997.20

The Taliban had brought much of northern Afghanistan under its rule by 1998, buying off rivals, carrying out systematic attacks on civilians, and forcing Dostum into exile in Turkey. Only Massoud proved able to defend his territory in northeastern Afghanistan from Taliban militias, but that success ended with his assassination, at the hands of al-Qaeda members posing as journalists, on September 9, 2001.21 Two days later, al-Qaeda
terrorists launched an assault on the United States that led to direct U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan.

After weeks of unsuccessful negotiations with the Taliban to turn over al-Qaeda militants involved in terrorism in the United States, U.S.-led coalition forces initiated a campaign on October 7, 2001, to establish air superiority, destroy terrorist training camps, kill or capture al-Qaeda leaders, and eliminate terrorist activities in Afghanistan. As U.S. forces joined with the Northern Alliance and began to capture cities across Afghanistan in November and December, U.S. officials observed a complex system of strategic interests, challenges, and realities on the ground.
Reaching back to the history of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, Kalinovsky made an intriguing comparison, writing in 2011 that “Hamid Karzai, who took power after U.S. forces helped to topple the Taliban in 2001, now seems cast in the role of Babrak Karmal—distrusted by his patrons and by his countrymen, isolated and with little influence even over his supporters.” As U.S. forces continue their own withdrawal from Afghanistan, the lessons of the Soviet experience weigh heavily. Yet a longer view of the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan reveals a more nuanced and patient approach. The United States has long supported Afghanistan with economic aid and diplomatic friendship in measured terms and hopeful enthusiasm. This pattern will surely persist in the twenty-first century.

It is best to remember Winston S. Churchill’s poignant observation about the Afghans: “They, when they fight among themselves, bear little malice, and the combatants not infrequently make friends over the corpses of their comrades or suspend operations for a festival or horse race. At the end of the contest cordial relations are at once re-established. And yet so full of contractions is their character.”
Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. Giving the 1907 Romanes Lecture, Lord Curzon had just returned from the position as viceroy of India (1899–1905). He was very familiar with Afghanistan, and he had traveled extensively in Central and South Asia in the 1880s and 1890s. He had served as under-secretary of state for India (1891–92) and under-secretary of state for foreign affairs (1895–98). Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Frontiers (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 7, quoted in Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: Norton, 2009), 277.


4. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, 25. As Winston S. Churchill put it: “The people of one valley fight with those of the next. To the quarrels of communities are added the combats of individuals. Khan assails khan, each supported by his retainers. Every tribesman
has a blood feud with his neighbor. Every man’s hand is against the other, and all against the stranger.” Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force (1898; reprint, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2010), 3. According to a proverb, Pashtuns fight for three reasons: “zar, zan, zamin” (gold, women, and land).

5. Barfield, Afghanistan, 19; Gregorian, Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, 25–51; Dupree, Afghanistan, 57–65; Saikal, Modern Afghanistan, 20–21. For a color rendition of the map on p. 3, see http://www.loc.gov/item/92684507.

ONE

8. Capt. Arthur Conolly of the 6th Bengal Light Cavalry, a British intelligence officer, coined the term “Great Game” around 1831 to explain the competition between Russia and Britain in Asia. Conolly published a two-volume work, Journey to the North of India, Overland from England, through Russia, Persia and Afghaunistaun, in 1834 and was beheaded in 1842 in Bukhara (in current-day Uzbekistan) on the order of the Afghan amir. Rudyard Kipling widely popularized the term “Great Game” in his 1901 novel Kim. Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (New York: Kodansha America, 1994), 1–2, 123; Saikal, Modern Afghanistan, 287 n. 43.
14. Gregorian, Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, 139.


21. Abdur Rahman did, however, abolish the *samardeh*, a tax on non-Pashtuns.


30. An excellent historical study on the early stages of the frontier debate is Yapp, *Strategies of British India*.


32. Ibid., 2:171–72.

33. Ibid., 2:158, 178.


Two


5. Gregorian, *Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 166.


8. Leon B. Poullada and Leila D. J. Poullada, *The Kingdom of Afghanistan and the United States: 1828–1973* (Lincoln, NE: Center for Afghan Studies, University of Nebraska at Omaha, and Dageforde Publishing, 1995), 13. See also A. C. Jewett and Marjorie Jewett Bell, *An American Engineer in Afghanistan: From the Letters and Notes of A. C. Jewett* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1948). Various Afghans informed Jewett that he was the first American to visit their country in decades. One told him that the last American had been there in 1840; another said 1880. The Poulladas piece together stories of this and other early Afghan-American contact up through the 1930s in the first two chapters of their book.


11. For the Turkish-German mission to Habibullah, see Gregorian, *Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 220–23; for the entire period of the war, see Ludwig W. Adamec, *Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century: Relations with the USSR, Germany, and Britain* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), 15–41.


15. According to Saikal, the wording of the treaty “was so ambiguous as to allow the Afghans to read in it British acknowledgement of their full independence; and the British to find grounds in it still to make ‘sphere of influence’ claims on the country.” Ibid., 64. See also Adamec, *Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs*, 90–98; Sir Percy M. Sykes, *A History of Afghanistan*, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1940), 2:284, 358–59.


22. Adamec, *Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs*, 69–72; Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan*, 68–74; Gregorian, *Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 234–39. Saikal observed that “Amanullah’s inability to provide active support for the Central Asian Muslims, in particular the Basmachi Movement, markedly undermined his credibility. From the start, one of his main pillars of legitimacy was a claim to be, above everything else, an Islamic ruler; but when a real test came to substantiate this claim in the face of Soviet actions, he could not do so” (p. 74).


32. The title “amir” connoted a commander, general, admiral, or prince, while “malik” signified a king or chief.


35. Hazaras are Persian-speaking Shia Muslims in central Afghanistan; Mangals are a Pashtun tribe in Paktia and Khost; and Mohmands are Pashtuns in Kunduz, Nangarhar, and Kunar. Gregorian, *Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 297.

36. Ibid., 297–98.

37. Abdul Khalil was immediately apprehended and publicly executed. His relatives, fellow students, and teachers were executed as well. In Pashtun tribal code, *badal* (revenge) requires retribution for insults or the shedding of blood. The practice serves as a deterrent to lawlessness but often results in destructive cycles of violence. See Adamec, *Historical Dictionary*, 10, 71.

40. Ibid., 216–17; Gregorian, Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, 378–92.
43. Department of State Treaty Information, Bulletin No. 95, August 1937, 5, 33–35; Gregorian, Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, 376–78; Adamec, Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs, 233–34.
47. Adamec, Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs, 217–27, 238–43.

THREE


12. See correspondence in *FRUS, 1937*, 2:597–614, http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1937v02/reference/frus.frus1937v02.i0024.pdf. This deal, which was three years in the making, was finalized in Berlin without the participation, and largely without the knowledge, of the U.S. government.


20. “Reply of the President (Roosevelt) to the Remarks of the Minister of Afghanistan (Aziz), July 4, 1943,” in Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, eds., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. 5: July 1942–June 1943* (Boston, MA: World Peace Foundation, 1944), 605. Roosevelt stated: “You will find, I am sure, Mr. Minister, that the love of freedom upon which we in the United States so pride ourselves is similar to your own and that there is much in the mutual idealism of our two peoples to cement the friendship now being manifest.”


22. Ibid.

For Afghanistan’s balancing of German, Soviet, and British interests, see Ludwig W. Adamec, Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century: Relations with the USSR, Germany, and Britain (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), 244–47, 262–63.


34. Poullada and Poullada, Afghanistan and the United States, 4.

35. The U.S. military did provide some noncombat equipment at the end of the war. The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC), the precursor to the National Security Council, argued, “For all practical purposes Afghanistan is almost totally dependent on foreign sources for its military requirements. Up to now the Afghan Army has obtained from the U.S. only surplus hospital and non-combatant equipment, through the purchase for cash of U.S. surplus property in India in 1945.” See SANACC 360/14, “Appraisal of U.S. National Interests in South Asia,” April 19, 1949, FRUS, 1949, 6:23, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1949v06&isize=M&page=23.


37. Ibid., 120.


43. Khushal Khan Khattak (1613–89) was a *malik*, or chief, and warrior-poet who advocated for Afghan unity (in this case, Pashto speakers) to overthrow their Mughal rulers. Adamec, *Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan*, 220–21.


50. This sentiment was shared by the British since the mid-nineteenth century. It was then reinforced by the British Committee of Imperial Defence at the turn of the twentieth


52. Balland noted that there was an eight-week period from January to March 1962 when the import of American aid supplies to Afghanistan was permitted. Balland, “Boundaries of Afghanistan.”

FOUR


94

12. Mohammad Daud was ultimately an expansionist and sought the return of Pashtun lands to the east and Baluch lands to the south. Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan*, 115–16, 181.


31. Byroade, “Changing Position of Afghanistan in Asia,” 133; Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 526–30. On the other hand, Kamrany noted coexistence and even unintentional cooperation between Americans and Soviets on the ground in Afghanistan during the 1950s and 1960s. From a U.S. policy perspective, however, competition with the Soviets in Afghanistan was a concern, and aid projects were a political tool. Kamrany, *Peaceful Competition in Afghanistan*, 17, 58, 86–89, 104.
34. In a related move to generate public support, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) announced that it had contracted an aircraft from Pan American to make fifteen to twenty round-trip flights from Kandahar to Jeddah over a sixty-day period to help Ariana, the Afghan airline, transport pilgrims performing hajj. “U.S. Will Help Transport Afghan Pilgrims to Mecca,” *DOS Bulletin*, July 2, 1956, 25.
40. Ambassador Sheldon T. Mills reported that “Afghanistan’s foreign policy as it relates to position in struggle between free world and Communist bloc is no longer fixed in pattern of close collaboration with Soviet which was evidence of Khrushchev-Bulganin visit, December 1955, but now is in state of flux.” Mills to Department of State, January 3, 1958, *FRUS, 1958–60*, 15:215, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d100.
43. Eisenhower described the trip in his memoir, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956–1961* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 497–99. He spent relatively little time in Afghanistan compared with stops in India (five days) and Pakistan (three days).


47. The business elements of the trip were expressed in a joint statement: “President Eisenhower gave assurances of the American desire to continue to assist Afghanistan in its task of strengthening its economic and social structure.” “Joint Communique, Kabul, December 9,” *DOS Bulletin*, December 28, 1959, 934.


49. Ibid., 498.


Five

1. There are several extensive online collections that include documents related to development efforts in the Helmand River Valley covered in this section: Kabul University/University of Arizona Afghanistan Digital Collections (http://www.afghandata.org;8080/xmlui/handle/azu/1); Oregon State University Middle East Water Collection (http://oregondigital.org/digcol/mewaters/); Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/); and a collection posted by a retired analyst from the U.S. Agency for International Development (http://scottshelmandvalleyarchives.org/).


9. It was expanded and renamed the Helmand-Arghandab Valley Authority (HAVA) in 1965.


19. See Cullather, “Damning Afghanistan,” 529–30, for the ethnic and political implications; see also Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 503–4. The villages were ultimately abandoned by 1960 due to poor soil conditions, but during the early years of the project, there was palpable enthusiasm for it within the U.S. government. Kamrany, *Peaceful Competition in Afghanistan*, 36, mentions that 1,330 families moved as part of this project.


21. Ibid.

22. Kamrany, *Peaceful Competition in Afghanistan*, 32. The seven objectives were: 1) to provide new farms for nomads and landless villagers; 2) to raise the standard of living of peoples in the valley; 3) to produce agricultural and manufactured products for export; 4) to develop electric power; 5) to create government income to eventually pay off the
investment; 6) to provide protection against floods; and 7) to provide early uses of all waters
of the Helmand River except that portion to which Iran was entitled. Kamrany, Peaceful
Competition in Afghanistan, 29.

23. Henry A. Byroade to Department of State, April 14, 1959, FRUS, 1958–60, 15:266,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d126.

January 23, 1961, 130 (first quote); Dean Rusk to Embassy in Afghanistan, January 25,
frus1961-63v19/d246. For continuing U.S. aid, see Clapp-Wincek and Baldwin, Helmand
Valley Project in Afghanistan.

25. Samuel M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, eds., Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical
Analysis, 2d ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 147–73; Farooq N. Bajwa, Pakistan
Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 92–121.

26. The latter was striking since Afghanistan had always been an agricultural exporter
before the 1950s.

27. Ambassador Chester B. Bowles wrote to Dulles on December 30, 1953: “I believe
we will isolate Pakistan, draw the Soviet Union certainly into Afghanistan and probably
into India, eliminate the possibility of Pakistan-Indian or Pakistan-Afghan rapprochement,

further jeopardize the outlook for the Indian Five Year Plan, increase the dangerous wave
of anti-Americanism throughout India and other South Asian countries, open up explosive
new opportunities for the Soviet Union, greatly weaken the hopes for stable democratic
government in India, and add nothing whatsoever to our military strength in the area.” Quoted
from Bowles’s personal papers in Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The

frus1955-57v08/d5.

29. Memorandum of Conversation, Kabul, Afghanistan, December 9, 1959, FRUS, 1958–
60, 15:324, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d151. This comment was
repeated during Naim’s visit with Eisenhower eight months later. Memorandum of Conversation,
frus1958-60v15/d171.

University Press, 1964), 483–86.

frus1958-60v15/d172.

history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d173.

33. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Mohammad Zahir Shah, October 21, 1960, ibid., 15:366,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d177.

34. Nikita S. Khrushchev, speech, March 6, 1960, Moscow, USSR, American Foreign
(hereafter AFP Current Docs). Khrushchev viewed the Pashtunistan conflict as a means
to pressure Pakistan for its ties to Washington. See Roby C. Barrett, The Greater Middle
East and the Cold War: U.S. Foreign Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy (London: I. B.
Tauris, 2007), 403.


37. Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 185. Peshawar Air Station in Badaber was later used as a training camp for Afghan mujahideen as part of Operation Cyclone, the CIA program to fund the mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan war. Peter L. Bergen argues convincingly of the limited contact between CIA officers and Afghan and Arab mujahideen, as operational activities and training were ceded to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (New York: Free Press, 2001), 65–66.


42. There is no established source for this frequently cited remark.


Six


9. See ibid., 74–109, for an overview of the Saur Revolution.

10. Ibid., 77. This announcement was premature since the palace had not yet been captured.


13. Ibid., 82–85.


16. On May 1, 1978, the PDPA announced the names of the twenty-one cabinet members of the new government. There were eleven Khalqi and ten Parcham party members. Four had received training in the Soviet Union and spoke Russian, yet almost all spoke English. There were nine Pashtuns, eight Tajiks, two Hazaras, and two Uzbeks. See Louis Dupree, “The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, 1979: Rhetoric, Repression, Reforms, and Revolts” (Report No. 32, American Universities Field Staff, Hanover, NH, 1979), 2.

17. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, 89.


36. Quoted in Robert F. Baumann, *Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1993), 133.


61. Ibid., 93–121.

62. Ibid., 113–14.


67. This was a complex, heavily debated, and extended process for Soviet leaders. See Kalinovsky, *Long Goodbye*, 147–77; Igor Tsybul’skii, Boris Gromov (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2008), 218–27.


70. Quoted in Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror: How Drugs, Thugs, and Crime are Reshaping the Afghan Wars* (New York: Picador, 2010), 56.


75. Gen. Boris Gromov even wrote in a major Moscow newspaper in December 1999 that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a huge political mistake. See Tsybul’skii, *Gromov*, 227.


**EPILOGUE**


18. Rashid, Taliban, 133.


20. 9/11 Commission Report, 65; Rashid, Taliban, 133.


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