

Inspector General

United States
Department *of* Defense



Inspector General

United States Department of Defense

Vision

One professional team strengthening the integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Department of Defense programs and operations.

Mission

Promote integrity, accountability, and improvement of Department of Defense personnel, programs and operations to support the Department's mission and serve the public interest.



The Department of Defense Inspector General is an independent, objective agency within the U.S. Department of Defense that was created by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. DoD IG is dedicated to serving the warfighter and the taxpayer by conducting audits, investigations, inspections, and assessments that result in improvements to the Department. DoD IG provides guidance and recommendations to the Department of Defense and the Congress.



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

May 24, 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE
FORCE/UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE
FORCE JOINT COMMAND
COMMANDER, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
TRAINING MISSION-AFGHANISTAN/COMBINED SECURITY
TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN

SUBJECT: Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise
the Afghan Border Police (Report No. DODIG-2013-081)

We are providing this final report for review and comment. This is a continuation of a series of reports published by the Office of Inspector General's Special Plans and Operations directorate that focus on the train and equip missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. We considered client comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report.

We request additional comments and information by June 25, 2013, as follows:

- Commander, International Security Assistance Force – Recommendations 2.a and 5.c.
- Commander, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan – Recommendations 3.c, 7.b, 8.b, 9, and 13.b.

Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We are unable to accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. Please direct questions to Mr. William G. Jackson at (703) 604-9113, William.Jackson@dodig.mil, or William.Jackson@dodig.smil.mil.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "K. P. Moorefield", is positioned above the printed name.

Kenneth P. Moorefield
Deputy Inspector General
Special Plans and Operations

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK



Executive Summary—Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan Border Police

Who Should Read This Report?

Personnel within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the U.S. Central Command and its subordinate commands in Afghanistan, the military departments, and agencies responsible for and engaged in mentoring, partnering, training, equipping, and other aspects of the development of the Afghan Border Police should read this report.

Background

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A), in coordination with the Ministry of Interior and the Afghan National Police, have committed to the development of the Border Police force. The Afghan Border Police is one of the eight police force pillars that comprise the Afghan National Police. It consists of personnel recruited, trained, and assigned to provide security to the border security zone that extends 50 kilometers into Afghan territory, as well as at border crossings and ports of entry, such as airports and rail crossings. This mission entails significant shared responsibilities and capabilities on the part of Coalition forces. ISAF is the executive agent responsible for planning and executing the Border Police program. ISAF Joint Command is responsible for the general support of the program and the Border Police units operating within their battle space. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan has the responsibility for managing the use of U.S.C. Title 10 fiscal resources for equipping the Border Police and for building the capacity of the Ministry of Interior in support of the Afghan National Police and the Afghan Border Police.

The mission of the Afghan Border Police has been broken into two broad categories: green and blue. The green border mission encompasses paramilitary and counterinsurgency functions in the border security zone, such as safeguarding the national boundaries against external aggression, taking immediate action against border incursions, and deterring insurgency and criminal activities within the vast terrain between the established border crossing points. The blue border mission focuses security functions at ports of entry and includes controlling the entry and exit of individuals at borders and international airports, preventing all types of smuggling (weapons, ammunition, goods, drugs, historical artifacts, humans, etc.) and controlling the entry and exit of refugees and emigrants. Additionally, the Afghan Customs Police, a separate security force jointly managed by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Interior, collects customs duties at border crossing points and ports of entry, with security at the crossings provided by the Border Police.

The Afghan Border Police are responsible for providing border security along 5,529 kilometers of international borders, 5 main airports, and 15 land and rail ports of entry. In coordination with

NTM-A, the Afghan government authorized a Border Police end-strength of 23,090 personnel, and the Ministry of Interior approved 43 *kandaks*¹ in 6 zones and the capital region. Each zone has unique terrain, cultural characteristics, and challenges. As of January 2013, NTM-A reported 23,086 Border Police on duty.

Notable Progress

Although work remains to be accomplished, there were several noteworthy areas of progress identified by the assessment team discussed in detail in Part I. These areas included:

Coalition Coordination – IJC hosted weekly synchronization meetings between ABP points of contact from IJC, regional commands, NTM-A, the International Police Coordination Board, U.S. Border Management Task Force, and other international police organizations associated with Afghan Border Police development. We considered this a best practice for other ANSF development points of contact.

Joint Border Coordination Centers – The Joint Border Coordination Centers at Khyber Pass and Wesh-Chaman provide a meeting place for personnel from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and U.S. forces to coordinate issues and provide open communication between the entities.

Ministry of Interior Logistics System Development – Although the MoI logistics system is still not fully matured and does not fully support the ABP’s logistics requirements, the DoD IG noted progress has been made, since our “Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National Police,” dated March 3, 2011.

Female Border Police Recruitment and Professional Development in the North – ABP Zone 5 employed approximately one-third of the females working for the ABP. The leadership was recognized for their efforts to integrate females into the zone and for establishing support programs. For example, the Zone 5 Headquarters established a child development center to support the women and their children.

Development and Use of Afghan Trainers – Afghans training Afghans throughout the ANSF is critical for the continued building of ANSF capacity. At all of the police regional training centers we visited, courses were being taught by Afghans instead of Coalition advisors or contractors.

Challenges—Areas of Concern

Planning

Border Strategy – The Afghan Border Police often share mission space with other elements of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), including the Afghan National Army and other Afghan National Police elements. However, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense do not have a plan to fully integrate the Border Police into a common border defense strategy

¹ A *kandak* is a battalion-sized unit within the Afghan National Security Forces, both ANA and ANP.

that would enable the ANSF to sustainably provide border security without the assistance of Coalition forces. Specifically, Afghan government and ANSF officials have not taken steps to ensure other ANSF forces would support the Border Police with firepower, logistics, or shared intelligence. Without the development of a common border defense strategy which includes the Afghan National Army and all relevant Afghan National Police personnel, the government's ability to maintain border defense in the future as U.S. and Coalition forces drawdown is uncertain.

Enablers – Coalition forces currently provide key enabling support to the Border Police in the areas of engineering, intelligence, logistics, and casualty/medical evacuations. Border Police capabilities in these areas are unlikely to mature before the scheduled 2013/2014 drawdown of Coalition forces. ISAF, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior, has not completed the planning to ensure the development or sustainment of these enablers. Without these enablers in place, Border Police mission accomplishment will be at risk.

Tashkil Authorizations – Each zone has its own *Tashkil*² that establishes the requirements for weapons, specialized personnel, and other equipment. However, the equipment levels established in the *Tashkil* do not reflect the unique characteristics and requirements of each zone, such as mission, enemy, or terrain. As a result, the zones were either over- or under-resourced. In zones where equipment levels were above operational needs, Border Police officials were unlikely to move excess equipment to areas where it was needed more, creating the risk for waste or abuse of materiel. In zones that were under-resourced, zone commanders do not have the resources to meet their operational needs.

Funding for Canine Program – Coalition forces and German Police Training Teams worked with the Border Police to develop a canine program to search for explosives and narcotics at airports and border crossing points. The program has achieved some stability and has been moderately successful. However, neither Coalition forces nor the German Police Training Teams had planned funding post-2014 to continue the program. As a result, Border Police commanders at airports and major border crossings did not know if their canine teams would be available post-2014, which prevented planning for effective security screening in the future.

Execution

Corruption at Border Crossings – Afghan Border Police personnel support the work of the Afghan Customs Police in collecting customs fees by providing security at border crossing points and at major airports; however, alleged corrupt activities by the Customs Police was not being investigated by the Border Police. This occurred because a Memorandum of Understanding between the ministries of Interior and Finance was not being enforced. As a result, Coalition forces estimate that the Afghan government's ability to generate revenue at major airports and border crossing points has been significantly impacted by suspected corrupt

² A *Tashkil* is the Afghan document that authorizes personnel and equipment for an organization, similar to a U.S. military Modified Table of Organization and Equipment.

Customs Police practices and Border Police inability, or unwillingness, to eliminate or reduce such activity.

Zone Commander Authority – Zone commanders cannot remove or appoint certain personnel without approval from MoI. The Border Police adhere to a centralized military command and control model for personnel issues, but this management model impedes the ability of the zone commander to professionalize his forces by removing corrupt individuals and appointing those with proven leadership abilities and potential. It also potentially fostered corruption, cronyism, and nepotism by individuals at the highest levels of the Border Police and the Ministry of Interior.

Logistics – Although improving, the Ministry of Interior logistics processes in support of the Border Police were not capable of supplying them on a timely and sufficient basis. The highly centralized logistics system required unnecessarily high levels of approval for issuance of minor items of supply, and logisticians were either reluctant or unable to forecast requirements. Locations of outposts, poor road conditions, and dangerous terrain required a route clearance capability which was not organic to the Border Police. In cases where equipment was damaged or destroyed, the logistics system was slow to investigate and issue replacement items. As a result, some Border Police units did not receive authorized or replacement equipment and supplies in a timely manner, hindering the zone commander's ability to perform the mission.

Vehicle Maintenance – The Border Police conducts much of its green mission in remote areas across very difficult terrain, and the current vehicle maintenance contract was not sufficient to support their needs. For example, the contract did not require damaged or inoperable vehicles to be retrieved by the contractor, requiring the Border Police unit to move the vehicle to the contract maintenance site, delaying vehicle repair and impeding mission performance. Vehicle maintenance facilities did not exist within a reasonable proximity of many outposts, and trained mechanics were not readily available in rural areas where Border Police are located. The lack of routine vehicle maintenance and timely vehicle repair created operational readiness and logistics system issues.

Negligence – In cases where negligence or accidents resulted in damage, destruction, loss, or theft of vehicles or other equipment, Border Police commanders did not enforce Ministry of Interior policies or decrees that required a determination of accountability. The concept that individual ABP are responsible for equipment damaged, lost, or stolen was not institutionalized and, as a result, equipment was being damaged or destroyed at unacceptable and unsustainable levels.

Identification Cards – Although the Ministry of Interior has made progress in re-vetting and providing identification cards to Border Police personnel deployed throughout the country, personnel in remote or dangerous locations had not been fully vetted. The Ministry of Interior has a team responsible for re-vetting Afghan National Police units; however, the team had not demonstrated the capability or desire to complete re-vetting of all Border Police personnel. Inconsistent re-vetting processes provide the opportunity for fraudulent practices by allowing

corrupt officials to pay personnel who are not active on the rolls. Furthermore, failure to complete re-vetting increases the potential for green-on-blue or green-on-green attacks.³

Intelligence Training – Less than 20 percent of Border Police Intelligence personnel had received classroom training at the Police Intelligence Training Center. Although billeting and dining facilities were available at the training location, intelligence students were not authorized to use them. As a result, Border Police commanders would not send students to receive the training.

Border Police Training – Although Border Police recruits were required to attend police basic training, which included introductory training in police operations, rule of law, human rights, etc., approximately 15 percent of patrolmen had not attended. Zone commanders, Border Police headquarters officials, and NTM-A differ on the actual number of personnel that have received training. This raises concerns that not all Border Police will receive basic training. Failure to provide a basic level of training to all personnel has hampered the professionalization of the Border Police and, therefore, limited its mission effectiveness.

Gender Integration – Ministry of Interior recruiting goals and criteria for Border Police gender integration did not reflect the unique mission requirements or societal limitations across the zones. Some zones, such as Zone 5 in the north, have been able to integrate female Border Police into their operations. But in other zones, the same effort to integrate females was not occurring and did not appear to be socially acceptable. The gender integration goals set by the Ministry of Interior will not be reached in most Border Police zones by the end of 2014. The absence of female Border Police available for search and inspection of females at crossing points and points of entry increases security risks and the possibility of continued revenue loss.

³ Green-on-blue—an attack by an ANSF soldier or policeman on Coalition personnel; green-on-green—an attack by an ANSF soldier or policeman on other ANSF personnel.

Recommendations Table

Office of Primary Responsibility	Recommendations Requiring Additional Comment or Information	No Additional Comments Required at This Time
Commander, ISAF	2.a, 5.c	1.a, 2.b, 5.a, 5.b
Commander, IJC		11.c
Commander, NTM-A	3.c, 7.b, 8.b, 9, 13.b	1.b, 1.c, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, 6, 7.a, 7.c, 8.a, 10, 11.a, 11.b, 12.a, 12.b, 13.a, 13.c

Please provide comments by June 25, 2013.

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	i
INTRODUCTION.....	1
Background.....	1
Public Laws.....	1
Objectives	1
Afghan Border Police Program.....	1
Report Organization.....	2
PART I – NOTABLE PROGRESS	3
PART II – PLANNING	7
Observation 1. Border Defense Strategy	9
Observation 2. Afghan Border Police Enablers Post-2014.....	13
Observation 3. Afghan Border Police Tashkil Authorizations Versus Actual Requirements	17
Observation 4. Afghan Border Police Canine Program Post-2014.....	21
PART III – EXECUTION.....	23
Observation 5. Allegations of Corruption at the Major Border Crossings	25
Observation 6. Afghan Border Police Zone Commander Authority	31
Observation 7. Afghan Border Police Logistics	33
Observation 8. Automotive Management Services Maintenance Contract Supporting the Afghan Border Police.....	37
Observation 9. Accountability for Damaged, Destroyed, Lost, or Stolen Vehicles and Equipment	43
Observation 10. Minister of Interior Identification Card and Vetting Team	45
Observation 11. Intelligence Training for Afghan Border Police.....	47
Observation 12. Afghan Border Police Basic Training	51
Observation 13. Afghan Border Police Gender Integration.....	55
APPENDIX A. SCOPE, METHODOLOGY, AND ACRONYMS	59
APPENDIX B. SUMMARY OF PRIOR COVERAGE	61
APPENDIX C. CRITERIA – MOI/ANP POLICY.....	63
APPENDIX D. ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED AND VISITED.....	65
APPENDIX E. MANAGEMENT COMMENTS	67
APPENDIX F. REPORT DISTRIBUTION	81

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Introduction

Background

This is a continuation of a series of Congressionally-mandated, command-requested, and/or self-generated reports published by the Office of Inspector General's Special Plans and Operations Component that focus on the train-and-equip missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. General areas discussed in these reports include:

- accountability of weapons transferred to the Iraq and Afghan Security Forces,
- accountability of night vision devices transferred to the Iraq Security Forces,
- effectiveness and responsiveness of the Foreign Military Sales system in support of the Iraq and Afghan Security Forces,
- logistics development of the Iraq and Afghan Security Forces, and
- review of the Coalition Support Fund Program and other DoD security assistance and cooperation programs with Pakistan.

Previous reports on these subjects may be viewed at <http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm>.

Public Laws

Congress appropriated \$46.34 billion to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund in Public Laws 109-13, 109-234, 109-289, 110-28, 110-161, 110-252, 111-32, 111-118, 112-10, and 112-74. These public laws specify that the funds will be used to provide assistance to the security forces of Afghanistan, to include the provision of equipment and training.

Objectives

On August 21, 2012, the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD IG) announced the "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan Border Police," (Project No. D2012-D00SPO-0210-000). The objectives of this assessment were to determine whether planning and operational implementation of efforts by U.S. and Coalition forces to recruit, train, advise, and assist in the development of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) were effective.

Afghan Border Police Program

The ABP is one of eight Afghan National Police (ANP) pillars reporting to the Ministry of Interior (MoI), Deputy Minister for Security, and is a part of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).⁴ The ABP is divided into six separate zones of responsibility for command and control, plus the Capital Region, where the ABP Headquarters is located. They are tasked with varied missions that, by definition, often occur at remote outposts along the 5,529 kilometers of border that Afghanistan shares with six other nations.⁵ Insurgent activities, large criminal

⁴ The eight ANP pillars include: Afghan Uniform Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police, Afghan Border Police, Afghan Anti-Crime Police, Enabling Forces, Afghan Public Protection Force, Judiciary Police, and Afghan Local Police.

⁵ Afghanistan shares borders with China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

patronage networks, opium smuggling, corruption, low literacy rates among personnel, and poor communication capabilities across vast swaths of remote territory are challenges that require the ABP to work closely with and be supported by the other ANP pillars and ANSF units to achieve mission success. This is particularly true in areas of logistics coordination, air mobility, weapons repair, and vehicle maintenance and repair.

The ABP conducts two types of missions, green and blue, with the green border security mission being the much larger of the two using the majority of ABP resources. The green border mission is primarily conducted over vast, often remote, terrain between established border crossing points, whereas the blue mission is primarily conducted at border crossing points and airports.

Green border units in most zones are authorized to have automatic weapons, heavy mortars, and recoilless rifles to defend against threats along the international borders with other countries and throughout the Border Security Zone – an area extending 50 kilometers inland from the Afghan border. Border threats include organized insurgent activity and sophisticated criminal smuggling networks, which often occur in the very remote, difficult to access regions. ABP in these areas were utilized to observe border incursion and coordinate the prevention of such incursions. And from the Afghan point of view, the majority of the border checkpoints were there to prevent border incursion and/or territorial expansion by neighboring countries.

The ABP blue border mission has a direct impact on Afghan national security and income generation, yet the mission comprises more traditional border policing functions and requires fewer ABP resources than the green border mission. The ABP blue border mission directly contributes to Afghan national security through the interdiction of illicit items crossing borders at border crossing points, such as fertilizer used for making explosive devices or narcotics, the sale of which funds insurgent activities. In addition, ABP security at border crossing points and airports enables collections of customs revenue by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) through the Afghan Customs Police (ACP). According to Afghan MoF data, this revenue accounted for nearly 50 percent of the Afghan domestic revenue in Solar Year 1390,⁶ the latest year for which data were available.⁷ Other important ABP blue mission activities include immigration screening, cargo inspection, local area intelligence, biometric scanning, and personnel searches at border crossing points and airports.

Report Organization

This report consists of three separate sections addressing ABP:

- Notable Progress,
- Planning, and
- Execution.

⁶ The Solar Hijri calendar is the official calendar of the government of Afghanistan. Solar Year 1390 runs from March 21, 2011 to March 19, 2012.

⁷ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, Office of the Deputy Minister for Administration, Reform Implementation & Management Unit, “Annual Performance Review Report 1390 On Strategic Plan,” May 2012.

PART I – NOTABLE PROGRESS

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Coalition Coordination

The primary commands involved in ANSF development and, more specifically, the Afghan Border Police, are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A) and the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command (IJC). NTM-A oversees the training and equipping of Afghan forces, including advising at the ministerial level and at the police training centers. IJC is responsible for operations throughout Afghanistan, including advising the ABP on operations in the ABP battle space. In previous assessments, our DoD IG teams had observed that the two commands did not always coordinate or communicate effectively towards one objective. However, on this ABP assessment, IJC leadership hosted weekly synchronization meetings with ABP points of contact from IJC, the regional commands, NTM-A, the International Police Coordination Board, U.S. Border Management Task Force, and other international police organizations associated with Afghan Border Police development. Briefings included overall status of ABP forces throughout the theater and provided an avenue for all participants to share operational, training, and ministerial development updates and lessons learned. The DoD IG team recognized this as significant to developing the ABP and believes it is a best practice other ANSF development points of contact would benefit from.

Joint Border Coordination Centers

The Joint Border Coordination Centers at Khyber Pass and Wesh-Chaman provide a meeting place for personnel from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and U.S. forces to coordinate border issues. The

Figure 1. Coalition, Afghan, and Pakistani Officials at the Khyber Pass Joint Border Coordination Center



Source: DoD IG

DoD IG team recognized the challenges Coalition commanders at the coordination centers face daily while performing this difficult mission, which contributed significantly to U.S. and Coalition efforts in Afghanistan to implement the broader Combined Comprehensive Border Strategy developed by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). According to Coalition force advisors, representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the coordination centers work together, side by side, to enable communications, gather information on incidents and

reported incidents, mitigate cross border fire, develop trust and confidence, and, ultimately, minimize border incidents and prevent escalation of force by either country.

Ministry of Interior Logistics System Development

Although the capabilities of the Ministry of Interior logistics system lag behind the Ministry of Defense logistics system, the progress we observed since our “Assessment of U.S. Government

Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National Police,” dated March 3, 2011, was noteworthy. In that assessment we stated, “The ANP logistical system is in a nascent state of development and lags operational needs.” During this assessment, the Coalition force advisors we interviewed reported Afghans using the logistics system, as designed, to request or “pull” supplies using the MoI Form 14 Materiel Request,⁸ instead of waiting for a “push” of material, an improvement that demonstrates an increasing capacity for managing logistics.⁹ Although the system is still not fully matured and does not yet fully support the ABP’s logistics requirements, Coalition personnel, ABP leaders, and the DoD IG team noted that progress has been made.

Female ABP Recruitment and Professional Development in the North

According to MoI data, ABP Zone 5, in Northern Afghanistan, employed approximately one-third of the females working as ABP across all of Afghanistan. During the DoD IG’s visit to the zone, ABP officials and Coalition advisors reported that women were working in the ABP headquarters, as well as at the border crossing sites. An ABP official from Zone 5 reported that female non-commissioned officers had been promoted into officer ranks. Additionally, to support the women further, a child development center had been established at the Zone headquarters offices for women with preschool-aged children, plus females were provided separate training courses from males, when deemed appropriate.

Figure 2. Female ABP Officers in Zone 5 (RC-North)



Source: DoD IG

Development and Use of Afghan Trainers

Afghans were training other Afghans throughout the ANSF, including at regional police training centers formerly staffed by Coalition force advisors and contractors. All three of the regional police training centers we visited demonstrated courses taught by Afghan trainers. NTM-A and IJC officials consistently spoke of the growth in “train the trainer” courses in order to build ANSF capacity. As Coalition forces continue to transition training functions to the ANSF, this method of instruction will be critical for the continued building of ANSF capacity, including that of the ABP.

⁸ MoI Form 14 Materiel Request is the document used by all MoI organizations and units to order all commodities of materiel using the MoI supply system.

⁹ Under a “push” logistics system, planners estimate the supply requirements and arrange to have the supplies delivered or “pushed” to the supported elements. Under a “pull” system, supply requests are generated by the supported elements so that they “pull” the necessary supplies.

PART II – PLANNING

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Observation 1. Border Defense Strategy

The MoI and ABP do not have an effective and sustainable border defense strategy that is coordinated with the MoD.

The Ministries of Interior and Defense have failed to fully integrate the Border Police with ANP and Afghan National Army (ANA) forces so as to create an effective, reinforcing, in-depth defensive strategy. The government of Afghanistan and the MoI have come to rely on U.S. and Coalition resources to support the ABP and compensate for its border security limitations.

Without the development of a common border defense strategy that includes both ANA and all relevant ANP personnel, the Afghan government's ability to maintain border defense in the future as U.S. and Coalition forces draw down will increasingly be jeopardized.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Number 4, for additional details.)

- Ministries of Interior and Defense and National Directorate of Security, *Joint Order 179*, September 13, 2012.

Discussion

Differing Border Defense Strategies

After discussions with Coalition, U.S., and Afghan officials, we determined that each side has differing views on how to approach border defense. For Afghan officials, their primary concerns were related to the incursion of neighboring countries across the border and filling as many gaps as possible between border crossing points and checkpoints. One MoI official stated that an additional 11,300 ABP personnel would be needed to cover all the open spaces on the border that are currently not controlled: "We must protect our borders with Pakistan and Iran." In the north, the zone commander requested nearly 90 additional checkpoints in his zone and the requisite associated personnel to guard the northern borders with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. And another MoI official commented on the "eastern border security problems with Pakistan" and recommended that the ABP more than double its current size in order to adequately defend all of Afghanistan's porous borders.

U.S. officials, on the other hand, are promoting a layered, defense-in-depth strategy to provide for Afghanistan's border defense. Defense-in-depth is the coordinated use of multiple security countermeasures to protect assets and is based on the principle that it is more difficult for an enemy to defeat a complex and multi-layered defense system than to penetrate a single barrier. Therefore, the defense strategy proposed by the U.S. doesn't focus solely on building up personnel and checkpoints on the borders; instead, it relies on a coordinated, layered security effort from all pillars of the Afghan National Security Forces¹⁰ and involves establishing not only border security, but also provincial, district, and local (village) security. One Coalition official stated that "[w]e made a mistake in Iraq by concentrating on the borders, away from the population centers. A COIN [counterinsurgency] war must focus on the people or you lose... This war should be 'population-centric' and borders [should be] secondary."

¹⁰ The ANSF includes the ANA and all elements of the ANP.

Cooperation Between the Afghan Border Police and Afghan National Army

In order for a layered defense strategy to be successful, there needs to be a coordinated effort between all pillars of the ANSF. At present, there does not appear to be any regular support and cooperation between the ABP and ANA. One of their primary challenges, according to most of the ABP commanders we interviewed, was the lack of consistent ANA support in road clearing operations. Counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) units were not authorized on the ABP *Tashkil*; therefore, the ABP did not have trained C-IED personnel capable of clearing roads of explosive devices prior to any troop and equipment movement. As such, the ABP relied on the ANA for almost all road clearing activities. In discussions with the various zone commanders, we found that ANA assistance was inconsistent across zones and was primarily dependent on the ABP zone commanders' personal relationships with ANA commanders. The Zone 1 commander said he had close personal relationships with many of the ANA commanders in his area of operations and, therefore, had no problems coordinating with the ANA for assistance with road clearance. Coalition advisors in Zone 5 stated that the army and police worked well together in the north. Other ABP commanders in other zones, however, did not have the benefit of such relationships and struggled to coordinate C-IED activities with the ANA.

Casualty evacuations also presented a problem for the ABP. In the five zones visited, we found that the ABP were able to evacuate certain non-life-threatening casualties via ground transportation; however, serious casualties, especially those with the potential for the loss of life or limb, almost always required Coalition forces to provide medical evacuation services via air. Not only did the ABP lack access to the necessary air transportation assets, but the medical training and equipment provided on the *Tashkil* was inadequate. Only in a few instances in Zones 1 and 2 did we find evidence of the ANA providing assistance with casualty evacuation. Both Coalition and Afghan officials in those zones stated that the ABP had been more successful getting casualty evacuation assistance from the Pakistan military across the border than from the ANSF.

Coalition force-generation efforts focused initially on the ANA; therefore, the ANA has more well-established weapons, intelligence, and logistics capabilities than the ANP and its pillars. Afghan Joint Order 179 is an Afghan-prepared document which takes this fact into consideration and directs the coordination of operations between the ANA and ANP, to include route clearing and evacuation activities. After speaking with Afghans and Coalition advisors, it appeared they were aware of Joint Order 179 and its provisions; however, the provisions were not being enforced. Joint Order 179 was not signed by the Ministers of Interior or Defense and, historically, we have been informed that the Afghans will not adhere to some orders or ciphers if not actually signed by the Ministers.

Recommendations

1.a. Commander, International Security Assistance Force, with assistance from North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, coordinate with the Ministers of Interior and Defense to develop a Combined Comprehensive Border Strategy that emphasizes an integrated, layered-security plan between the Afghan Border Police, Afghan Uniformed Police, and Afghan National Army.

1.b. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, advise the Ministers of Interior and Defense to reissue the Joint Order 179 with their respective signatures, granting authority for coordination of support between the Afghan Border Police and Afghan National Army to commanders at the *kandak* level.

1.c. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, advise the Ministers of Interior and Defense to enforce the provisions of Joint Order 179.

Client Comments

ISAF partially concurred with Recommendation 1.a. ISAF asked us to revise the recommendation by incorporating more specific language regarding the Combined Comprehensive Border Strategy.

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 1.b. NTM-A agreed that Joint Order 179 should be reissued by the MoI and MoD to their respective organizations.

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 1.c, noting that in order for this recommendation to be implemented, the Ground Forces Command will need to be empowered by the MoD and, to a lesser extent, the MoI. NTM-A stated that they will encourage ANSF elements to pursue opportunities for cooperation from the ministerial level down to the *kandak* level, with a particular focus on the role and coordinating authority vested in the commander of the Ground Forces Command, in both urgent operational situations and in order to realize efficiencies in training and equipping opportunities.

Our Response

ISAF comments to Recommendation 1.a were responsive. We accepted ISAF's proposed revision to the recommendation and will request an update in six months on the status of the Combined Comprehensive Border Strategy between the Afghan Border Police, Afghan Uniformed Police, and Afghan National Army.

NTM-A comments to Recommendations 1.b were responsive. In six months, we will request a copy of the reissued Joint Order 179, signed by the Ministers of Interior and Defense.

NTM-A comments to Recommendations 1.c were responsive. We will request an update in six months.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Observation 2. Afghan Border Police Enablers Post-2014

Key enabling capabilities that are essential to the support of ABP operational effectiveness, such as C-IED and explosive hazard reduction, engineering, heavy weapons, quick reaction forces, intelligence, logistics, and casualty/medical evacuation, may not be mature by the end of 2014.

This occurred because of the U.S. and Coalition forces' decision to generate operational forces first, prior to the development and fielding of enabling forces and capabilities. Furthermore, ISAF, in coordination with the MoI, has not yet completed the planning for development of those enablers that have not matured by the end of 2014.

Failure to develop necessary post-2014 ABP enablers or to provide mitigating U.S. and Coalition force capability pending development of ABP or Afghan government organic capabilities could put the ABP mission at risk.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Numbers 7 and 8, for additional details.)

- MoI Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy, "National Police Plan for Solar Years 1390-1391," February 2011.
- MoI Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy, "National Police Strategy," March 2010.

Discussion

During the initial planning phases of ANSF fielding and development, a conscious decision was made to initially focus on developing the ANSF combat capability, thus delaying the development of enabling forces and capabilities. In the interim, ISAF has provided the enabling support to the ANSF. This force generation model was also the basis of ABP fielding and development. Consequently, key enabling capabilities essential to the ABP mission may not be mature by the end of 2014.

The Afghan National Police Plan of 2012 states that protecting the borders of the country is one of the primary objectives of the National Police. The Afghan National Police Strategy for 2012 states, "[t]he border police face major problems in maintaining the security of the borders because of the lengthy borders of the country, a series of recent natural disasters, and the lack of required capabilities. The key to solving these issues is enhancing the border police capabilities."

The DoD reported in their December 2012 "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan" that while positive momentum is evidenced by the ABP's mission at the regulated points of embarkation, including 5 airports and 14 border control points, the ABP made slow progress toward self-sufficiency during the reported period. Its mission is difficult with a number of inherent factors that prevents rapid progress toward self-sufficiency. Given its challenges, the ABP's progress towards self-sufficiency specifically required completing the development of critical enabling capabilities.

NTM-A identified the following shortfalls in required ANSF enabling capabilities, which are also applicable to the ABP:

- C-IED and explosive hazard reduction,
- engineering,

- heavy weapons (82mm mortars and recoilless rifles),
- bio-metrics capability at major airports and border crossings,
- quick reaction forces,
- intelligence,
- logistics, and
- casualty/medical evacuation.

Coalition force advisors reported that the ABP are able to plan and conduct successful operations, both offensive and defensive, in their assigned battle space, in coordination with other elements of the ANSF, but with Coalition forces enabling assistance. Providing this support will become increasingly difficult as the Coalition forces reduce their “boots on the ground” in Afghanistan.

During interviews, the ABP commander, ABP staff officers, ABP zone commanders, and Coalition/U.S. advisors informed the assessment team of the importance of developing these enablers in order for the ABP to become self-sufficient. The ABP will probably not have developed a stand-alone capability in several of these enablers by the end of 2014.

ISAF is working to develop plans and resourcing options to mitigate identified ABP enabler short-comings. These plans will require Coalition forces to provide tailored enabling support post-2014 until the ABP develops their own capabilities in these areas.

NTM-A is working through the Afghan Requirements and Resourcing Validation Process¹¹ to plan for and resource development of the critical ABP enabling capabilities required. The MoI and ANP are full participants in each step of the process. Requests for requirements consideration are not accepted without the approval of the ANSF at the two-star general officer level.

Completing development of ABP enabling capabilities will be challenging, given pending changes in the Coalition mission and in-country footprint. However, failure to develop necessary enablers, whether pre- or post-2014, could put the ABP mission at risk.

¹¹ A process/working group, chaired by NTM-A, with representation by IJC and MoI, which determines the validity of requests for additional ANSF personnel and equipment authorizations. The group considers various factors before making a recommendation to a General Officer Steering Committee, including funds available to support the request, both now and in the future, supportability by the Afghans, and possible alternatives.

Recommendations

2. Commander, International Security Assistance Force, in coordination with Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and the Minister of Interior:

- a. Identify Afghan Border Police enablers that will not be mature by the end of 2014.
- b. Complete development of Coalition force mitigating plans/actions to generate, advise, and assist an Afghan National Security Force-led effort to provide interim, post-2014 enabler support until Afghan Border Police enabler capability is sufficiently developed.

Client Comments

ISAF concurred with Recommendation 2.a, as written, providing no additional comments.

ISAF partially concurred with Recommendation 2.b. ISAF asked us to revise the recommendation to incorporate language more specific to the development an ANSF-led effort towards improving ABP enabler capability.

Our Response

ISAF comments to Recommendations 2.a were partially responsive. We request a list of the enablers that will not be mature by the end of 2014.

ISAF comments to Recommendation 2.b were responsive. We modified Recommendation 2.b based on ISAF's comments and no further action is required at this time. Another DoDIG assessment on Coalition planning for the development of critical ANSF enablers was announced on December 18, 2012, with the fieldwork conducted in Afghanistan in March 2013.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Observation 3. Afghan Border Police Tashkil Authorizations Versus Actual Requirements

The ABP *Tashkil* authorizations for the six ABP zones did not clearly establish the requirement for weapons, specialized personnel, and other equipment specifically necessary to support each individual zone's mission consistent with their unique characteristics and needs.

This appears to have resulted from a failure to update the original ABP *Tashkil*, which allocated resources to each zone without consideration given to their differing terrain, insurgent, and cross-border criminal activity. Unequal fielding of specific types of equipment has worsened this situation, in some cases.

As a result, zones were either over- or under-resourced since the *Tashkil* had not been adjusted to the actual requirement for specific types and numbers of weapons, equipment, or personnel in each zone. The current *Tashkil* in effect thus prevents zone commanders from having the resources to adapt forces effectively to operational needs.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Number 2, for additional details.)

- Afghan National Police, "Solar Year 1391 *Tashkil*," January 2013.


Discussion

***Tashkil* Authorizations Do Not Accurately Reflect Requirements in Each Zone**

According to the most recent DoD "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," the percentages of reported enemy-initiated attacks¹² throughout Afghanistan from April 2012 through September 2012, by regional command (RC), were as depicted in Figure 3. The regional commands in the east, south, and southwest accounted for 92 percent of all enemy-initiated attacks during the reporting period. Given the volatility and based on the amount of enemy activity in these regional commands, it would be prudent for the ABP in these areas to have the numbers of equipment, weapons, and personnel resources aligned with their actual requirements; however, the *Tashkil* authorizations did not appear to accurately reflect these requirements.

For example, the *Tashkil* authorized RC-N and RC-W 60 percent more ambulances and nearly 35 percent more grenade launchers, machine guns, and personnel than RC-S and RC-SW, where insurgent activity and ABP casualties were greatest. There were also 150 percent more fuel and water trucks authorized in RC-N and RC-W than in RC-E, RC-S, and RC-SW combined, where water was the most hard to find. Additionally, the *Tashkil* authorized RC-N a heavy weapons company and the associated equipment and weapons, such as mortars, while RC-S and RC-SW were not authorized heavy weapons companies. This was despite the fact that RC-N and RC-W only accounted for nine percent of enemy-initiated attacks in Afghanistan.

¹² Enemy-initiated attacks are defined as enemy action (enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, and surface-to-air fire) and explosive hazard events, including executed attacks only and not potential or attempted attacks.



Source: DoD "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," December 2012.

We also found that the *Tashkil* did not authorize any zone certain specialized personnel. Improvised explosive devices still represent a serious threat in Afghanistan and many border policemen are killed by IEDs each year, but there were no C-IED positions identified on the *Tashkil*. In each zone we visited, Coalition and ABP officials stressed the need for a C-IED capability to be included on the *Tashkil*. Without any C-IED personnel or equipment authorized on the *Tashkil*, Border Police could not receive the C-IED training necessary to detect and neutralize IEDs. Therefore, the ABP relied on the ANA for help in clearing routes of IEDs, even though the relationship between the ABP and ANA in some zones was tenuous and the assistance provided inconsistent (see "Observation 1. Border Defense Strategy"). In addition, facilities engineering and mechanic positions were not authorized on the *Tashkil*. Without these personnel, Coalition advisors expressed concern that the ABP would not be able to maintain the facilities and vehicles allocated to them once Coalition forces draw down.

Authorized *Tashkil* Quantities Do Not Match Fielded Quantities

Throughout the ABP, we found that actual quantities of equipment and weapons fielded did not match the quantities authorized on the *Tashkil*:

- One zone fielded 300 percent of their *Tashkil*-authorized 9mm pistols, whereas another zone only had 60 percent of their authorized pistols.
- Some zones fielded more than 125 percent of their authorized shotguns, while another zone had only fielded 60 percent.
- One zone reported having 250 percent of their *Tashkil* authorization for one type of up-armored tactical vehicle, but only 25 percent of another type of similar vehicle.
- Certain zones which were authorized mortars on the *Tashkil* had none, while other zones, which were not authorized mortars, reported having them in their inventory.

A practical solution would be the cross-leveling¹³ of equipment and weapons, both across and within the zones, in order to redistribute excess materiel in accordance with the *Tashkil*;

¹³ Cross-leveling is the authority and ability to shift materiel inventory from one owner to another in order to meet the requirement of another.

however, our discussions with Coalition advisors in each zone visited indicated that the ABP did not appear to be receptive to the concept:

- Zone 1: “The ABP will not cross-level – they will ask for more equipment first.”
- Zone 2: “There is inequity in the distribution of equipment, but the *kandak* commanders will not give anything to another *kandak*. The culture here is tied to hoarding and having equipment is a form of power.”
- Zones 1 and 2: “Afghan commanders have a hoarding mentality and are unwilling to transfer any excesses.”
- Zone 3: “There has not been any success in getting the ABP to cross-level in this region.”
- Zone 5: “Cross-leveling is not happening.”
- Zone 6: “Without a cipher,¹⁴ the ABP will hold on to the excess equipment and there will be no cross-leveling.”

Without cross-leveling, the zones and *kandaks* will continue to have over- and under-resourced quantities of materiel, thus hindering their ability to conduct successful operations.

Recommendations

3.a. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, advise the Minister of Interior to conduct a mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available analysis across the Afghan Border Police zones to determine mission, personnel, and equipping requirements specific to each zone.

3. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, advise the Minister of Interior to:

b. Update the Afghan Border Police *Tashkil* personnel and equipment authorizations based on the above analysis.

c. Issue a cipher signed by the Minister of Interior directing the cross-leveling of personnel and equipment between zones and *kandaks* to meet new *Tashkil* authorizations.

Client Comments

NTM-A concurred with Recommendations 3.a, 3.b, and 3.c. NTM-A stated the Command Plan Review is conducted every solar year and this process is the primary means by which the ABP initiates and influences *Tashkil* changes at the ministerial level. NTM-A also noted that Coalition assistance is required to guide the process, translate the analysis into *Tashkil* adjustments, and initiate direction for cross-leveling between zones and subordinate commands.

¹⁴ A cipher is the Afghan written equivalent of a U.S./Coalition written operations plan or order.

Our Response

NTM-A comments to Recommendations 3.a and 3.b were responsive. We will request an update in six months on how the latest Command Plan has captured the results of the mission analysis across ABP zones.

NTM-A comments to Recommendation 3.c were responsive. We request a copy of the signed MoI cipher directing the cross-leveling of personnel and equipment between zones and *kandaks* to meet new *Tashkil* authorizations. We will request an update in six months on the status of cross-leveling between the ABP zones and the *kandaks*.

Observation 4. Afghan Border Police Canine Program Post-2014

Neither NTM-A nor the German Police Project Team (GPPT) have developed plans for post-2014 to support the canine unit program at Afghan airports and selected border crossing sites.

This has resulted because GPPT and NTM-A have no current plans to fund the program post-2014 and of the failure to identify alternative funding sources.

As a result, ABP commanders at the airports and major border crossings may not have a canine capability post-2014, which would degrade security screening at key crossing sites.

Applicable Criteria

None

Discussion

The ABP canine unit program at Afghan airports and selected border crossing sites is the result of a bilateral agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the government of Afghanistan; however, the program did not appear to have long term support. As of this report, NTM-A and the GPPT had not committed any financial resources beyond 2014.

The ABP canine program currently has 26 dogs, and Afghan dog handlers are being mentored by the GPPT. The goal is to have 50 dogs fielded by the end of 2014. NTM-A officials have advocated continued operational use of the canine program to ABP leadership because of its perceived strong detection and deterrent effects and relatively low sustainment costs.

Should the German sponsorship not go beyond 2014, the MoI and the ABP leadership will need to determine how much of this capability can be retained within their overall ANSF budgetary constraints.

Recommendations

4. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

a. In coordination with Embassy Kabul and the German Police Project Team, conduct a requirements review with the Minister of Interior to determine whether the continued use of canine units by the Afghan Border Police at officially controlled points of entry into Afghanistan post-2014 is practicable.

b. If deemed operationally necessary, determine an appropriate funding source to support the Minister of Interior canine program.

Client Comments

NTM-A concurred with Recommendations 4.a, but provided no further comments. They also concurred with 4.b. stating that funding source options are recommended to include the development of an Afghan-led requirements and resource validation and approval process to mirror the current Coalition process.

Our Response

NTM-A comments to Recommendations 4.a were responsive. In six months, we will request a status of the requirements review to be conducted with the MoI to determine whether the continued use of canine units by the ABP at officially controlled points of entry into Afghanistan post-2014 is practicable.

NTM-A comments to Recommendation 4.b. were partially-responsive. The intent of the recommendation was for NTM-A to identify/determine a funding source specifically to support the canine program within the MoI/ABP should the determination be made to continue the ABP canine unit program. We will request an update in six months.

PART III – EXECUTION

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Observation 5. Allegations of Corruption at the Major Border Crossings

Alleged corrupt practices by the Afghan Customs Police (ACP) at the border crossing points, possibly in collusion with elements of the ABP, have impeded the Afghan government's ability to effectively generate significant government revenue at those crossing points.

This has occurred because the current agreement between the Ministries of Interior and Finance establishing authorities over customs-related activities at border crossings was not being enforced.

As a consequence, the Afghan government was estimated to be losing several billions of dollars annually from customs fees that were not collected for the Ministry of Finance (MoF) at major border crossings.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Number 5, for additional details.)

- Ministries of Interior and Finance, "Memorandum of Understanding on Managing the Border Crossing Points," July 2009.

Discussion

Per the DoD December 2012 "Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan," corruption remained a critical issue, especially in the MoI and its subordinate police organizations—a condition that threatened to undermine public perception of the security ministries and ANSF as capable and legitimate security providers for Afghanistan. Widespread corruption continues to limit the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Afghan government.

Transparency International's "Corruption Perceptions Index"¹⁵ scores countries on how corrupt their public sectors are perceived to be. Of the 176 countries ranked in the latest index, Afghanistan ranked last, tied with North Korea and Somalia in terms of public perception of corruption. In 2010, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime¹⁶ issued a report on the prevalence of bribery in obtaining public services in Afghanistan. The report noted that ACP officers were most likely to request the highest bribe values for those incidents of bribery reported by victims, as shown in figure 6.

According to MoF data for Solar Year 1390, customs revenue accounted for nearly 50 percent of Afghanistan's total domestic revenue;¹⁷ however, it has also been reported that up to 70 percent

¹⁵ The "Corruption Perceptions Index" uses a combination of polls to gather the perceptions of country analysts, business people and the general public in order to develop a reliable estimate of the nature and scope of corruption in a given country. See the 2012 results at <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results>.

¹⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Corruption in Afghanistan – Bribery as reported by the victims," January 2010.

¹⁷ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, Office of the Deputy Minister for Administration, Reform Implementation & Management Unit, "Annual Performance Review Report 1390 On Strategic Plan," May 2012.

of potential border revenue may be lost to corruption¹⁸. The annual domestic revenues of the Afghan government were approximately \$2 billion for the year ended March 19, 2012. Therefore, the estimated loss at border crossing points would comprise a significant source of additional revenue.


During our visit to Afghanistan, the DoD IG team visited the border crossings at Torkham and Wesh-Chaman, the two largest and busiest border crossings in Afghanistan which generate the majority of the country's approximately \$1 billion in customs revenue. Coalition advisors at Torkham and Wesh-Chaman agreed that two to three times the amount of customs revenue actually collected for the Afghan government was probably lost to corruption. The government

garners almost half its total revenues from

customs fees and tariffs.

We also learned of issues relating to the command and control of the ACP and their revenue collection duties. This was also noted in the January 2013 "Quarterly Report to Congress" from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, in which the State Department

Figure 6. Average Value of Bribes Paid by Respondents to Different Categories of Public Officials (in U.S. dollars)



Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Corruption in Afghanistan," January 2010

commented that the main problem in fighting corruption and fraud in customs was resolving the issue of which Afghan government agencies should be present at the border and what specific authority they should have to impose duties or other fees. There is a Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministries of Interior and Finance which establishes the authorities of each ministry regarding the ABP and ACP and directs the ministries to work together to coordinate and support the activities of the Border and Customs Police. According to the memorandum, the ACP is organizationally part of the Ministry of Interior. Although we were informed that the MoI has little or no control over the employment of the ACP, the MoI is responsible to:

- approve, employ, and dismiss ACP personnel with MoF written recommendations,
- provide ACP with salaries and other incentives, and

¹⁸ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, January 30, 2013.

- recruit ACP candidates and maintain records.

The MoF is responsible for directing and managing the ACP with respect to:

- determining ACP duties, scope of authority, and location of work,
- providing additional training as necessary, and
- recommending to the MoI remunerations and punishment for ACP personnel.

Based on discussions with ABP officials and Coalition advisors, it did not appear that the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding were being enforced. Further, we were informed that the Memorandum of Understanding concerning the ACP was not a feasible approach and does not allow the MoI to enforce its personnel authority over the ACP. The lack of clarity regarding the MoI's enforcement of its personnel authority over the ACP lies in the practice of MoF determining ACP duties, scope of authority, and location of work, as well as recommending to the MoI remunerations and punishment for ACP personnel. The ACP was currently staffed with about 600 personnel, all of whom were effectively under the control of the MoF. The ABP Commanding General reported that the ACP was stood up using ABP patrolmen that were reassigned to the MoF as Customs Police. Coalition advisors also reported that the lack of training and oversight of the ACP could potentially lead to corruption.

The ACP are responsible for collecting customs revenue on goods crossing the border into Afghanistan, while the ABP are responsible for nearly every other operational requirement for the border crossings, yet the ABP appeared to have no authority over any customs activities. At Torkham, the ABP commander and Coalition advisors confirmed that they had no visibility over the ACP's work there. Coalition advisors reported that their Afghan partners said that an ACP customs officer at the Torkham customs yard was recently relieved of his duties for allegedly skimming more than \$20,000 in customs revenue each week for himself and others. We were also advised of corruption taking place at the checkpoints along the routes leading to and from the border crossings to Afghanistan's major cities. One Coalition advisor estimated that it took around \$600-\$1,000 in bribes to get a truckload of commercial goods from Torkham to Kabul.

According to discussions with ABP advisors, the Customs Police appeared to be one of the least trained and supervised police groups and, therefore, the most susceptible to corruption. The Memorandum of Understanding needed to be enforced to encourage the MoI and MoF to work in tandem to provide proper training and oversight of the ACP. Another potential solution offered was to have the ACP brought under operational control of the MoI.

Recommendations

5. Commander, International Security Assistance Force:

a. In coordination with United States Embassy Kabul and the Minister of Interior, complete development of the Combined Comprehensive Border Strategy and support international community and interagency efforts in the development of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan institutions that will significantly reduce diversion of Afghan government funds at major border crossing points.

b. In coordination with United States Embassy Kabul, advise the Minister of Finance to enforce the provisions of the current Memorandum of Understanding, specifically those requiring coordination of activities and responsibilities with the Ministry of Interior and Afghan Border Police.

c. In coordination with United States Embassy Kabul, the Minister of Interior, and the Minister of Finance, devise a method to clearly separate administrative and operational control of Afghan Border Police and Afghan Customs Police in a manner conducive to reducing corruption at the airports and major border crossing points.

Client Comments

ISAF partially concurred with Recommendation 5.a. ISAF requested that we revise the recommendation. Instead of ISAF executing a plan to significantly reduce diversion of Afghan government funds at major border crossing points, ISAF recommends they should provide support to the international community and interagency efforts in the development of GIROA institutions that will significantly reduce the diversion of funds at the major border crossing points.

ISAF concurred with Recommendation 5.b, as written, providing no additional comments.

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 5.c. However, they asked us to revise our observation and recommendation. NTM-A provided clarifying information addressing the Memorandum of Understanding between the MoI and the MoF, stating it was not workable and does not allow the MoI to enforce its personnel authority over the ACP. NTM-A offered a revised recommendation which would bring the operational control of the ACP under the MoI, or if that would not work, a second option of splitting the Customs mission, with the ABP performing search and evidence collection, and the Afghan Customs Department, under the MoF, performing customs collections.

Our Response

ISAF comments to Recommendations 5.a and 5.b were responsive. We will request an update in six months on the implementation of both recommendations.

NTM-A comments to Recommendation 5.c were responsive. The options offered by NTM-A require an update/change to the current relationship between the MoI/ABP and the MoF/ACP. We adjusted the recommendation to give ISAF primary responsibility, rather NTM-A, in

coordination with Embassy Kabul. We request ISAF comments on this redirected recommendation.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Observation 6. Afghan Border Police Zone Commander Authority

ABP zone commanders did not have the authority to remove certain ABP personnel within their zone, nor could they appoint key ABP leaders without approval from ABP Headquarters.

The ABP, like the rest of the ANSF, still adheres to the centralized military command and control model instilled by the Soviet military during its occupation and retains authority regarding key personnel hiring and firing decisions of leaders at the highest levels of the organization.

This management model directly impedes the ability of the zone commander to professionalize his forces by removing corrupt individuals and hiring those with proven leadership abilities and potential. It also potentially fosters corruption, cronyism, and nepotism by individuals at the highest levels of the ABP and MoI.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Number 6, for additional details.)

- MoI Deputy Minister for Policy and Strategy, “Assignment, Reassignment (Cyclic) of ANP Generals and Officers,” 2010.

Discussion

Senior commanders within the ABP almost uniformly shared the opinion that the limitations imposed on their authority to assign personnel, and perhaps more critically, to remove or suspend incompetent or incapable officers, impaired their capability to command. In one instance, a zone commander reported that a *kandak* commander had been relieved of a *kandak* command, but was reappointed to a second *kandak* command within the zone, after possibly purchasing the position through an MoI official. In another zone, ABP officials reported that unqualified candidates presented themselves for officer positions using letters of introduction from MoI, while the qualified officer candidates the zone leadership presented to MoI for appointment or promotion were not advanced. The ensuing dysfunctional personnel system and command relationships had a palpably negative effect on morale.

The MoI policy “Assignment, Reassignment (Cyclic) of ANP Generals and Officers” establishes the transfer and reassignment procedures for all officers and NCOs within the MoI police structure, which includes the ABP. However, this policy was not discussed at any time during our fieldwork, so there is uncertainty as to whether or not ABP commanders were aware of the policy. Specifically, the policy holds the authority to transfer or reassign officers within the police forces at the MoI level and only gives zone commanders the authority to reassign or replace NCOs. To be effective, ABP zone commanders must have the authority to remove subordinate commanders and officers who are ineffective or corrupt.

Recommendation

6. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, advise the Minister of Interior and the Afghan Border Police Commander to delegate authority to zone commanders for hiring and removal of subordinate commanders and officers, when just cause has been established.

Client Comments

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 6, requesting minor clarifying changes in the observation and recommendation.

Our Response

NTM-A comments to Recommendation 6 were responsive. We will request an update in six months on the status of the MoI delegating authority to zone commanders for hiring and removal of subordinate commanders and officers when just cause has been established.

Observation 7. Afghan Border Police Logistics

MoI logistics processes in support of the ABP, although improving, were still not capable of providing adequate support to the ABP in their operating areas on a timely and sufficient basis.

This situation exists because of:

- a logistics policy that contains elements of the Soviet logistics model that withholds approval authority for requisition of minor items of supply at unnecessarily high levels,
- reluctance or inability of Afghan logisticians to forecast supply requirements and plan sufficiently ahead,
- distances and danger involved in travel to remote ABP locations to complete investigations/deliver or pickup supplies and equipment,
- disincentives to replace destroyed vehicles and remove them from property books, and
- failure of ABP zone and *kandak* logisticians to follow-up with the Regional Logistics Centers on MoI-14 supply requests.

As a result, ABP units are not receiving their authorized/replacement equipment and supplies in a timely manner, hindering the ABP zone commanders' ability to perform their mission and adversely affecting unit personnel morale.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Number 9, for additional details.)

- MoI Logistics Management Directorate, "Process for the Management of Logistics," January 6, 2009.

Discussion

Background and Prior Coverage

As one of the pillars of the ANP, the ABP relied on the MoI/ANP logistics system for logistics support. The MoI logistics policy, "Process for the Management of Logistics," prescribes common procedures, formats, forms, and time standards for the logistics management processes of the MoI and movement of logistic information between supporting and supported organizations and activities of the ANP/ABP.

The DoD IG assessment team had previously assessed the MoI/ANP logistics system and, during fieldwork for this assessment, saw evidence of improvement in the system. However, the MoI logistics processes in support of the ABP were still not capable of adequately supplying the ABP in their operating areas on a timely and sufficient basis. Previous coverage by the DoD IG SPO assessment team included:

- SPO-2009-007, "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces," September 30, 2009. In this report we stated, "The Afghan National Security Forces' logistics systems that support the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, respectively, remained institutionally immature and insufficiently effective. Army and Police personnel have not become proficient in

applying the established logistical model and did not demonstrate a high degree of confidence in the logistics system's capacity to perform as designed. To ensure the supply system worked somewhat effectively, the ANA and ANP often depended upon U.S. mentors and trainers to 'push' them needed equipment and supplies by mobilizing the support of U.S. counterparts in the ANSF supply chain."

- SPO-2011-003, "Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National Police," March 3, 2011. We stated, "The ANP logistical system is in a nascent state of development and lags operational needs. ANP operational commanders and their logistics personnel lack confidence in the supply process, which does not provide visibility of the status of their MoI 14 request in the supply chain."
- SPO-2012-109, "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan Local Police," July 9, 2012. Our assessment was, "The MoI logistics system did not provide timely support to the ALP program. Specifically, it did not provide ALP units with authorized equipment upon completion of their ALP training, timely re-supply them with fuel and ammunition or provide them with other critical items of other supplies, such as winter uniforms."

ABP Logistical Impacts

Although progress was noted in the development of the MoI logistics system, concerns we had in previous assessments continued to impact the ABP efforts. There was near universal agreement by Coalition advisors and Afghan personnel that the logistics system was not sufficiently reliable, responsive, or sustainable.

The MoI logistics policy establishes procedures for submitting MoI-14s and, per the policy, the "Support Activity Commander's" signature is required to validate requested materiel. This appeared to be appropriate for requisitions of significant items or quantities of supplies. However, the policy was often carried to extreme levels, requiring general officer signatures to requisition items such as toilet paper and, in one case, 2 general's signatures were required for 48 tubes of toothpaste. Reminiscent of the Soviet style logistics model, which was centralized and required high levels of command approval, the MoI logistics policy/model did not enable logisticians to request minor items of supply or recurring items without senior commanders' signatures. This contributed to delays in reorder and resupply and created an atmosphere of mistrust among the Afghans.

Another example where the centralized logistics policy appeared to have a large impact was the approval process for investigations into combat-loss of equipment and its replacement. Zone commanders reported losses and submitted equipment replacement requests to the ABP Headquarters for approval at that level and then ABP Headquarters forwards the requests to MoI for final approval. In three zones, commanders submitted paperwork requesting replacement vehicles following damage assessments and, in two of the zones, the commanders complained of long periods of time waiting for approval and replacement. In the third case, the Coalition advisors explained that, over an unspecified period of time, paperwork requesting replacement of about 90 destroyed vehicles had been forwarded to the MoI. Very few had been replaced.

The ABP have become accustomed to receiving supply items almost automatically because of the supply (“push”) logistics methodology used to initially stand up the ANSF, and transitioning them to the demand (“pull”) system was challenging. The reluctance of Afghans to forecast supply requirements, or inability to do so, was evident throughout the ABP. One NTM-A official stated that the primary logistics challenge was transitioning the Afghans from a hoarding culture to a “pull” system. During our fieldwork, we were informed by Coalition advisors that the ABP generally did not forecast requirements, despite the advisors efforts to stress the importance of that task.

Due to the remote locations of some of the ABP units and the dangers presented by insurgent activity, the ABP had difficulty receiving supplies and equipment. In some areas, they depended on animal transportation due to poor road conditions, or no roads at all. Vast distances to reach regional logistic centers and restricted terrain limited travel and provided opportunity for insurgents to ambush, attack, and place IEDs to impede transport and travel. The ABP did not have helicopters and it was reported that some locations had gone up to five months without resupply.

Moreover, there were no incentives to turn in broken or unserviceable vehicles. Fuel was allocated to the ABP based upon the number of unit operational vehicles, so when a broken vehicle was reported to the MoI, the fuel allocation was terminated. However, there was a lengthy delay in receiving replacement vehicles, so there was an additional disincentive to report or turn in broken vehicles. Furthermore, Coalition advisors and ABP commanders reported that, in some instances, the ABP had more vehicles than they required; therefore, there was no reason to hurry and report an unserviceable vehicle and lose the fuel allocation.

In four of the zones visited, it was reported to the team that the inability to track submitted MoI-14s was hindering the logistics system and, in some cases, ABP *kandak* logisticians didn’t know the status of MoI-14s or would not attempt to track them. In RC-East, one Coalition advisor said, “the regional logistics center could be likened to a black hole—requests go in, but they don’t come out.” The team did learn that the MoI-14 process was better understood overall by Afghan security forces and Coalition advisors than what we had heard on previous assessments. However, not tracking or being able to track supply requisitions was still a significant impediment to the logistics system.

The DoD IG team recognized that the U.S. and Coalition advisors were working hard to address significant challenges in training and mentoring logisticians in the *kandaks* and at the regional logistics centers in all of the zones we visited. Furthermore, the team understood that the early focus for ANSF development was growth of kinetic capability through force generation and not logistics. However, with ongoing transition of security to ANSF lead, a refined MoI logistics policy, updated with lessons learned from the field, and the development of a MoI-14 tracking mechanism should be completed as soon as possible.

Recommendations

7. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, advise the Minister of Interior to:

- a. Revise the ministry's logistics policy in order to decentralize approval authority for selected Afghan Border Police items of supply.
- b. Develop standards for the combat-loss replacement process, setting time-lines for each step in the process.
- c. Revise the ministry's logistics policy in order to establish and enforce MoI-14 tracking and follow-up procedures from the *kandak*-level, through the zone and Regional Logistics Center, to the Ministry of Interior National Supply Depots.

Client Comments

NTM-A concurred with Recommendations 7.a, 7.b, and 7.c.

NTM-A stated that the approval authority for supply items should be decentralized for the entire ANP and not be exclusive to the ABP.

Regarding recommendation 7.b, NTM-A reported that two policies had received MoI approval: (1) policy to drop equipment from property books and (2) vehicle disposal process.

They further recommend that the ABP headquarters be included in the MoI-14 tracking process in order to allow the ABP Logistics Director to hold zones accountable for adherence to the MoI policy. The ABP headquarters could further monitor developing trends of equipment shortfalls, training gaps, or non-compliance with supply procedures.

Our Response

NTM-A comments to Recommendations 7.a, 7.b, and 7.c. were responsive.

For Recommendation 7.b, we request a copy of the policies: (1) to drop equipment from property books, and (2) vehicle disposal process.

We will request an update in six months on all three recommendations.

Observation 8. Automotive Management Services Maintenance Contract Supporting the Afghan Border Police

The Automotive Management Services (AMS) maintenance contract did not adequately meet the maintenance needs of the ABP.

This occurred because:

- The ABP were often unwilling to bring unserviceable vehicles over extended distances and difficult, dangerous terrain to an AMS facility.
- Some AMS satellite maintenance facilities have been closed, mostly due to withdrawal of U.S. and Coalition forces from the area and the perceived degradation in security.
- The contract did not require AMS to retrieve unserviceable vehicles.

As a result, the lack of routine vehicle maintenance and timely vehicle repair has or will lead to:

- reduced operational readiness rates,
- “parking” of serviceable vehicles (saving them until really needed—leading to an additional set of maintenance issues),
- unserviceable vehicles being stockpiled (undocumented “bone yards”),
- uncontrolled cannibalization of parts, and
- increased maintenance costs.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Number 3, for additional details.)

- Automotive Maintenance Services Contract AMS W52P1J-11-C-0014.

Discussion

All vehicle maintenance for the ANP, including the ABP, was contracted under Contract AMS W52P1J-11-C-0014 to Automotive Management Services. The contract includes 2011 as the base contract year, with four option years through 2015. The contract specifies AMS will maintain fleet operations and operational readiness for all ANP vehicles at maintenance sites throughout Afghanistan and the operation of a Central Maintenance and Supply Facility in Kabul.

During our fieldwork, feedback on the performance of AMS maintenance support was mixed. Generally, with only a few exceptions, opinions on the quality of AMS maintenance and services were favorable. The quality of AMS maintenance work was generally described as “adequate,” “good,” or “working well.” However, there were numerous complaints about availability of AMS services from leaders, staff, and advisors. The most common complaints heard and discussed during the assessment included lack of an AMS recovery capability, the risks and resources associated with bringing vehicles to AMS maintenance sites, and AMS facility closures.

Lack of AMS Recovery Capability

As per the contract, AMS does not retrieve unserviceable ANP vehicles. Unless a maintenance contact team visits a unit to perform basic organizational level maintenance repairs,¹⁹ ABP must tow or transport non-mission capable vehicles to AMS maintenance facilities. Although ABP had sufficient wreckers and flat-bed trucks to tow and transport non-mission capable vehicles, we were told that, due to the security threats and distances between AMS locations, it was a challenge for the ABP to get those vehicles to the AMS facilities. AMS forward support teams were stationed at some smaller forward bases to conduct organizational level maintenance and AMS also employed 21 maintenance contact teams in 2011-2012 to travel to remote ABP locations to service and conduct organizational level repairs of ABP vehicles. Some customers complained that these contact teams rarely visited units at the more remote or dangerous ABP locations, of which there were many, and there were some complaints that the teams that did visit failed to bring the right parts or tools.

In response, NTM-A and AMS modified the AMS contract to add more contact teams for organizational level repairs, increasing the number of teams from 21 to 43 by December 2012. AMS changed the contact team composition to employ Afghan local nationals and outfitted them with typical Afghan vehicles to help them blend in with the local population. As local nationals, their movements were exempted from Coalition force protection restrictions. AMS also acknowledged that coordination between units and contact teams had been a problem, so the company increased efforts to coordinate and prepare the units and the contact team for visits. The purpose was to agree upon which vehicles needed to be repaired or serviced, and to coordinate parts, tools, and other information with the AMS facility supporting the team. AMS contact teams were authorized to stay at a unit for up to 30 days, if needed.

Travel to AMS Facilities: Distance, Risks, and Resources

AMS requires repairs above the organizational level to be performed at an AMS fixed site, which requires the ABP to deliver the vehicles requiring service. Several ABP units resisted bringing vehicles to AMS fixed maintenance facilities for services and repairs because of the insurgent threat, attacks, IEDs, and the long distances between units and repair facilities, especially in some of the larger zones and more remote areas. One Coalition advisor believed that releasing ABP personnel to accompany maintenance convoys was a manpower issue for the ABP, potentially affecting the border mission, plus an ABP officer stated that securing maintenance movements was a “big problem” for the ABP. Additionally, the ABP did not always have enough fuel to run the transport vehicles back and forth to the fixed maintenance facilities, according to some Coalition advisors.

Closure of AMS Facilities

Compounding the challenges the ABP already had with vehicle recovery and travel was the closure of some of the AMS fixed maintenance facilities. Security concerns were cited as the reason for work slow-downs and the eventual closure of some maintenance sites. In the summer of 2012, NTM-A mandated the use of armed guards for contractors, which reportedly caused a

¹⁹ Organizational level maintenance consists of the lowest level of maintenance requiring a mechanic. Functions at the organizational level include minor repairs, replacement of minor damaged body parts, and preventative maintenance such as oil/filter changes, top off of fluids, replace mirrors/wiper blades, etc.

temporary drop in AMS services because there were no U.S. forces or third-country nationals trained or available to provide force protection. According NTM-A, 11 AMS sites were closed or consolidated between January 2011 and December 2012. Five of those closed as a direct result of security incidents or threats that raised doubts about the safety of the workers at those particular sites. Other AMS facilities continued their operations, whether or not they were in compliance with NTM-A's armed guard requirement.

Another circumstance contributing to the closure of AMS maintenance sites was the de-scoping of the AMS maintenance contract in preparation for MoI's planned takeover of all ANP maintenance and supply chain operations by December 2014. Some satellite maintenance centers that closed for security reasons, and were already scheduled to be de-scoped in 2013, remained closed. Also, while NTM-A and AMS added 22 contact teams in 2012, they also demobilized 8 forward support teams. Higher-level maintenance staff officers and AMS managers estimated that AMS mechanics had physically inspected, repaired, or serviced only about 50 percent of the vehicles belonging to the ABP and ANP. So it was determined that increasing the number of contact teams was a way to reach more vehicles and fulfill the terms of the contract, which required them to maintain the entire ANP fleet.

Problems Related to Lack of Maintenance

Problems related to the lack of routine vehicle maintenance and service was cited by many of the stakeholders interviewed.

With the lack of visibility on an estimated 50 percent of the ABP and ANP fleet, there was no way to determine a fleet operational readiness rate. As stated previously, it is anticipated that the 22 contact teams added in 2012, which will travel to the ABP units, will provide the ability to establish an operational readiness rate for the fleet. Furthermore, because ABP units had no automotive tools other

Figure 5. Vehicles Being "Saved" for Future Use at the Regional Training Center in Zone 2 (RC-East)



Source: DoD IG

than basic issue items, few mechanics, few trained vehicle operators, and very few spare parts, there were reports of vehicles being temporarily repaired at the units rather than being repaired to maintenance standards. There were also reports of non-mission capable vehicles being used for spare parts by the units, and there were reports of vehicles that were never driven, serviced, or even started—being saved for when they are really needed. This practice will lead to additional maintenance issues—dead batteries, flat tires, cannibalized parts, and other problems.

Some advisors tried to assist by teaching ABP personnel operator maintenance at the unit level, but this was not the norm. Additionally, some ABP staff officers discussed establishing local contracts for organizational-level repairs, especially in remote areas, but there were differing opinions regarding the feasibility of this course of action.

Future of ABP Maintenance

NTM-A's fielding plans show the following proposed ANP maintenance system, completely operated with MoI/ANP organic assets in 2015 and beyond:

- National Level: An MoI support command, including a transportation brigade and a National Logistic Center (National Training Center) at Wardak,
- Regional Level: Seven regional logistics centers—each with a maintenance company and a recovery platoon—and eight MoI supply points, and
- a number of maintenance support teams at the provincial and district levels reporting to the regional maintenance companies and the MoI supply points.

ABP and other ANP units are likely to face many of the same issues with MoI's proposed organic maintenance system that they face now with the AMS system, including lengthy travel distances to service facilities and enemy-initiated attacks en route. The plans for MoI maintenance included some centralized recovery assets at the regional level, with regional logistics centers, maintenance support teams, and contact teams slated to perform operator and organizational level maintenance tasks. There was no known plan for AMS managers and mechanics to facilitate the transition of ANP maintenance to MoI, although funds for that purpose were thought to be available. In support of the ANP and ABP, AMS currently manages an authorized parts stockage list of more than 3,000 vehicle parts and trains and supervises a workforce of more than 1,000 mechanics. By the current proposal, MoI has limited time to field a similar trained and experienced maintenance work force and build a functioning vehicle supply chain management system.

Recommendations

8. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

a. Advise the Minister of Interior to prepare for transition from the Automotive Management Services Maintenance contract by determining how long-term Afghan Border Police comprehensive vehicle maintenance, training, and provisioning requirements will be met (post-2014).

b. In coordination with the Minister of Interior, ensure contracts are in place for comprehensive vehicle maintenance requirements, to include training of Afghan Border Police units/mechanics on basic vehicle maintenance and Minister of Interior procedures to procure spare parts.

Client Comments

NTM-A concurred with Recommendations 8.a and 8.b. NTM-A stated that Professional Architects & Engineers (PAE) are currently contracted to provide vehicle maintenance training

to the ABP and other ANP personnel. NTM-A recommended that the comprehensive maintenance, training, and provision of spares contract bid be offered through approved contracting processes and not assumed to be an amendment to the current AMS contract.

For recommendation 8.a they requested that we revise the recommendation with minor changes, which did not change the intent of the recommendation.

Furthermore, based on recent developments relating to the contracting process and the performance of the contractor referenced since Observation 8 was originally drafted, NTM-A also requested that we change recommendation 8.b. Instead of modifying the current contract to include training mechanics and procuring spare parts, NTM-A recommended that a comprehensive maintenance, training, and provision of spare parts contract bid should be offered through the approved contracting process.

Our Response

NTM-A comments to Recommendations 8.a and 8.b were responsive. We accepted their proposed revision to the recommendations.

For Recommendation 8.b, we request a copy of the section of the PAE contract with the requirement to train Afghan Border Police units/mechanics on basic vehicle maintenance and MoI procedures to procure parts.

We will request an update in six months on the status of both recommendations, along with a copy of any contracts which are put in place for the comprehensive vehicle maintenance requirements, to include training of ABP units/mechanics on basic vehicle maintenance and MoI procedures to procure spare parts.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Observation 9. Accountability for Damaged, Destroyed, Lost, or Stolen Vehicles and Equipment

When negligence or accidents resulted in damage, destruction, loss, or theft of ABP vehicles or other military equipment, ABP commanders had not uniformly enforced existing MoI logistics policy that required determination of accountability.

The concept of individual soldier responsibility for equipment damaged, lost, or stolen was not commonly understood or accepted. Although ABP field commanders generally understood that MoI logistics policy required accountability, they often did not implement the intent of the policy.

As a result, there existed a general perception among individual ABP soldiers and commanders that there were no consequences for negligent destruction or loss of ABP equipment and supplies. This attitude has contributed to damage and loss of equipment largely supplied by the U.S. and Coalition forces at an unacceptable and unsustainable level. Moreover, the absence of broad acceptance by ABP leadership of accountability as a critical requirement portends that the ABP may not maintain its core equipment at the required levels of operational readiness in the future.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Number 9, for additional details.)

- MoI Logistics Management Directorate, “Process for the Management of Logistics,” January 6, 2009.

Discussion

Through FY 2012, the U.S. has appropriated more than \$46 billion to train, equip, and sustain the ANSF. Understandably, the U.S. has focused on developing the ANSF to exercise due diligence in the use and care of provided equipment and vehicles. However, a number of Coalition advisors reported that they had not seen evidence that established procedures for individual accountability were routinely enforced. In one instance, a patrolman was sentenced to three years in prison for damaging a vehicle. Yet in another situation, a patrolman damaged a vehicle, only to badly damage it again driving it out of the repair facility, and was not held accountable at all. In addition, some Coalition advisors reported that accountability for missing winter uniform items, such as coats, was not

Figure 7. Destroyed Vehicles at a Regional Training Center in RC-Southwest



Source: DoD IG

enforced and these items frequently had to be replaced.

The MoI has established policies and procedures that provide commanders the authority to hold their personnel accountable, both uniformed and civilian. The MoI logistics policy establishes a requirement to document the circumstances concerning the loss, damage, or destruction of Class VII items,²⁰ including a mandatory initiation of a materiel investigation, if negligence is suspected.

Given the sufficiency of MoI policy and procedure regarding equipment accountability, the apparent failure to enforce the proper use and upkeep of ABP equipment would seem, in part, to be a lack of leadership understanding and/or commitment to the operational importance of maintaining and sustaining core equipment. This situation was aggravated by the shortage of well-trained logistics personnel to consistently carry out these functions.

The future operational readiness of the ABP will be increasingly dependent on the commitment and ability of commanders to account for and maintain unit equipment, sustained by the ABP logistical system. Therefore, MoI and ABP commanders must proactively apply their existing MoI policies regarding equipment accountability.

Recommendation

9. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, advise the Minister of Interior to establish a timely process for ensuring that a verifiable determination of command and personal responsibility and accountability occurs when Afghan Border Police equipment is damaged, destroyed, or missing as a result of negligence.

Client Comments

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 9, stating that the process was published following the initial observation and it is currently in the implementation phase.

Our Response

NTM-A comments to Recommendation 9 were responsive. We request a signed copy of the published document outlining the process to ensure timely investigation and follow-up in the event of negligence. Additionally, we will request an update in six months on the status/effectiveness of implementation of the process.

²⁰ Class VII items are major end items of supply, such as trucks, that have a high dollar value relative to other supply items. Because of their cost and importance to force readiness, major end items are usually controlled through command channels.

Observation 10. Minister of Interior Identification Card and Vetting Team

Although the MoI has a team of officials responsible for re-vetting and providing new identification (ID) cards to ABP personnel deployed throughout the country, the team has not fully performed their mission at many ABP locations or executed it at all at certain sites.

This occurred because:

- The MoI team did not stay on location long enough to re-vet and issue MoI ID cards to all the ABP present.
- The MoI team perceived that travel to and staying at remote ABP locations was too time consuming and/or dangerous, and therefore would not travel to those sites.

Failure to complete the process to issue MoI ID cards to all ABP prevented ABP personnel from receiving their pay, increased the risk of corruption and, even more importantly, increased the potential for green-on-blue or green-on-green attacks.

Applicable Criteria

None

Discussion

In the early stages of ANP force development, large numbers of personnel were recruited. However, many were never vetted properly and many were never issued identification cards. At the time, ANP force generation was accomplished under a recruit and assign model because of the need to grow the force rapidly. Over time, vetting procedures were re-designed and improved and, in 2010, a new force generation model of recruit, train, and assign was adopted for the ANP. DoD IG reported on this new model in DoD IG report SPO-2011-003, March 2011.

With the new recruit, train, and assign model in place, new ABP personnel, for the most part, attended basic training, were vetted properly, were biometrically enrolled in the MoI database, and then received ID cards. As the ABP force approached full end strength, the focus shifted towards professionalizing the force with increased personal accountability requirements. MoI realized that a significant portion of the force already assigned throughout the country had never received basic training and required re-vetting, biometric enrollment, and ID cards. Additionally, green-on-blue and green-on-green attacks were becoming more common and many of the attackers had not been properly vetted and were not easily identifiable, which further justified timely action. The MoI put together re-vetting/ID teams to travel around Afghanistan to re-vet and issue ID cards to all ABP personnel.

During our fieldwork, we discussed the MoI re-vetting teams with U.S. and Coalition advisors and ABP leaders in four of the six ABP zones. One zone reported they were satisfied with re-vetting and ID card issue; however, they also reported that they were satisfied with the process because, as advisors, they had put a concerted effort into getting it completed themselves. The

other three zones reported problems with the MoI teams. We were informed:

- The MoI team stayed for approximately one week, performed their duties at the zone headquarters, the airport, and one of the seven *kandaks*. The MoI team said traveling to the other *kandaks* was too dangerous, requiring security and transportation that was not available. Furthermore, the MoI team did not stay long enough for the outlying ABP personnel to report to their headquarters for processing.
- The MoI team showed up and only stayed for three days, not nearly long enough to complete processing of the ABP personnel in the vicinity of the zone headquarters, let alone those in more remote locations. Of the 10 MoI team members that arrived, 7 said they were leaving early because the area was too dangerous.
- The MoI team issued ID cards to personnel close to the headquarters, but with some *kandaks* inaccessible because of poor road conditions or security concerns, they did not complete their work. Additionally, in this zone, the MoI teams would only issue ID cards to ABP personnel having a bank card. The advisor had been informed by the MoI team that the bank card was necessary because everyone required some form of identification to prove who they were prior to receiving an ABP ID card.

Identification cards will reportedly be mandatory by January 2014 because the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System and the Electronic Pay System requires the use of a service number which comes off of the ID card and ties the two data systems together. Per the implementation schedule, as briefed to the DoD IG team, pay will only be distributed to those in the Human Resource Information Management System as of January 2014. Furthermore, with the increase in green-on-blue and green-on-green attacks, there is a compelling reason for having all ANSF personnel vetted properly and carrying proper identification.

Recommendation

10. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, advise the Minister of Interior to place priority emphasis on the re-vetting/identification card process at each Afghan Border Police unit location, mandating on-site issuance to all Afghan Border Police and after-action reporting of completion to the Ministry of Interior, prior to departure of the Ministry of Interior identification card team.

Client Comments

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 10, as written, providing no additional comments.

Our Response

NTM-A comments to Recommendation 10 were responsive. We will request an update in six months on the status of ABP re-vetting and on-site issuance of ID cards to the ABP.

Observation 11. Intelligence Training for Afghan Border Police

Training for ABP intelligence personnel has not been conducted.

This has occurred because billeting and dining facilities for ABP students were not available for their use at the Police Intelligence Training Center (PITC).

As a result, ABP commanders would not send students to PITC to attend training. According to NTM-A, the ABP intelligence capability cannot reach Capability Milestone 2B without resolution of this issue.²¹

Applicable Criteria

None

Discussion

The Afghan Border Police intelligence community is comprised of almost 450 officers and non-commissioned officers. Of those personnel, less than 75 had received formal intelligence training at PITC in Kabul. PITC is recognized as the intelligence training center for the MoI, the Directorate of Police Intelligence, and all police pillars including ABP. The reported class size for the basic course was 20 students; however, PITC offered more than 30 courses with a total capacity of around 90 students per week. The basic course is a prerequisite to advanced intelligence training courses, so advanced courses do not occur on a regular basis either.

Sending personnel from outside the Kabul area to training was not an option because prospective students did not have adequate billeting and dining facilities available to them at the training center. PITC is located at the Afghan National Targeting and Exploitation Center (Center), which is a functional command with operations ongoing 24 hours a day. Although billeting facilities did exist, we were informed that the Center commander had not allocated enough billeting or rations for the PITC students. There were no other training commands located at the Center.

Overall, the ABP intelligence capability was at Capability Milestone 3, and they could not progress to Capability Milestone 2B without increasing the number of trained personnel to greater than 50 percent of their section. Furthermore, Coalition advisors noted that the ABP Intelligence Section did not have the capability to analyze information and produce useful intelligence due to a lack of training.

Although a formal process was in place for reporting, the intelligence personnel reported up and down their chains of command, but there was almost no lateral flow of information between ABP zones or among other members of the ANSF. This problem was not necessarily a training issue only, but appropriate training could facilitate better coordination.

²¹ A Capability Milestone is component of the Ministerial Development Plan that measures the capability of the MoI to conduct autonomous operations across 47 functional areas.

Reportedly, the ABP leadership would like to have full classes, but PITC does not run full time because of the billeting issues. Because PITC did not have regularly scheduled classes, ABP zone commanders could not effectively schedule their intelligence personnel for training and, instead, waited for an invitation to the class, which rarely, if ever, occurred.

We asked advisors in three of the six ABP zones if their Afghan (ABP Intelligence) partners had attended the intelligence basic training course in Kabul. In one of the zones, the Coalition intelligence advisor had no idea training was available, and he did not know if any of the intelligence personnel had any training. In the other two zones, advisors told us they knew a formal course existed; however, the Afghan intelligence personnel in their zones had only received informal training provided by the advisors themselves.

Training was not occurring because billeting and meals were not available, and scheduling classes was nearly impossible because the course is not run on a full time basis. Zone commanders would not send their personnel to PITC without proper facilities available and without knowing when the course would be presented, they could not plan appropriately.

Recommendations

11. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

a. Assist the Minister of Interior to find an alternative location for the Police Intelligence Training Center that can accommodate student billeting and rations and move the course to that location or resolve the issue of sharing and staffing the facility in Kabul.

b. Advise the Minister of Interior regarding the necessity to have the zone commanders informed as to when the courses would be presented at the Police Intelligence Training Center.

11.c. Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, in coordination with Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, inform United States and Coalition advisors working with the Afghan Border Police regarding the availability of training at the Police Intelligence Training Center, determine who needs the training in their Border Police units, and advise those units to schedule the training and send the personnel.

Client Comments

NTM-A concurred with Recommendations 11.a and 11.b. NTM-A stated that due to competing requirements of the Network Targeting Exploitation Center and the compound Security Force, and a lack of operational dining facility to support students at PITC, the ABP Basic Intelligence Course is now conducted at an alternate site arranged by ABP and instructed by Mobile Training Teams provided by PITC.

IJC concurred with Recommendation 11.c, as written, providing no additional comments.

Our Response

NTM-A comments to Recommendations 11.a and 11.b were responsive.

For Recommendation 11.a, we will request an update in six months regarding the number of Border Police personnel that have received basic intelligence training and the status of the Mobile Training Teams to be provided by PITC.

No further action is required for Recommendation 11.b.

IJC comments to Recommendations 11.c. were responsive. We will request an update in six months on the implementation of this recommendation.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Observation 12. Afghan Border Police Basic Training

Nearly 18 percent of ABP patrolmen have not received basic training.

This has occurred because:

- Officials from NTM-A, ABP Headquarters, and ABP regional training centers differed on the number of ABP who had not received or still needed basic training.
- Although training seats were available, ABP commanders were reluctant to send their patrolmen to training during the fighting season.
- Terrain and weather often make it difficult for patrolmen to attend training during the winter months.
- Some ABP personnel had served in their positions for years and commanders no longer believed there was a requirement to send them to this training.

Failure to provide a basic level of training to all ABP personnel has hampered the professionalization of the ABP, limiting its mission effectiveness and, thus, general acceptance of the ABP by the Afghan populace as a legitimate security pillar of the government of Afghanistan.

Applicable Criteria

None

Discussion

As of November 2012, NTM-A officials reported that nearly 18 percent of ABP patrolmen had not received basic training, which still represents a high percentage of the ABP force that has not received instruction, in particular, on the rule of law or human rights—issues covered in classroom training that are unlikely to be conveyed in on-the-job training.

During this assessment, we found regional police training centers using an approved program of instruction from MoI.²² We also found that many of the centers used Afghan instructors or were in the process of training Afghan instructors to deliver the program of instruction.

However, when our team requested training numbers, officials from NTM-A, ABP Headquarters, and regional police training centers all reported different numbers of ABP who have not received and still required basic training, thus raising concerns about the reliability of NTM-A's reported training completion rates. In November 2012, NTM-A reported that approximately 80 percent of patrolmen completed basic training, yet Coalition advisors at the zone level said they reported higher rates of untrained patrolmen to NTM-A. Some regional training centers we visited reported that up to half of the seats in basic police training were unfilled or had high rates of students that did not finish the basic course, raising further concerns about the reliability of NTM-A's data on basic training completion.

²² In 2009, we reported that the ABP did not receive a standardized program of instruction in the Focused Border Development training program. See DoD IG report, SPO-2009-007, "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces," September 30, 2009.

Regional training centers were reportedly required to keep a training file on the patrolmen receiving training; however, according to NTM-A officials, this practice was not enforced across all the zones and a written policy codifying this requirement did not exist. In addition, the only personnel records kept at the ministerial level were for officers and non-commissioned officers. Each zone was responsible for keeping personnel records for patrolmen and no policy regarding

Figure 8. ABP Patrolmen at Basic Training Course at the Regional Training Center in Zone 2 (RC-East)



Source: DoD IG

documentation of their training existed at the ministerial level. NTM-A and MoI were in the process of implementing an electronic records management system. However, this system would utilize the current training files containing faulty data on personnel who had received and/or completed training. Although training seats were available, Coalition advisors reported that ABP commanders with whom they worked were reluctant to send their patrolmen to training for a number of reasons. Some did not feel they could spare the patrolmen for the eight-week course during the fighting season, but also found that terrain and weather often made it difficult for patrolmen to attend training during the winter months. Other Coalition advisors reported that the ABP personnel in their zones had served for years without basic training and that commanders did not think there was a need to send them to this training.

Uncertainty regarding the basic training status of patrolmen across the ABP raises concerns about the ABP's ability to maintain the rudimentary records that document the training element of force professionalization. In addition, the failure to provide a basic level of training to all ABP personnel further hindered the professionalization of the ABP, limited its mission effectiveness, and impeded acceptance of the ABP by the Afghan populace as a legitimate security pillar of the Afghan government.

Recommendations

12. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, advise the Minister of Interior to:

a. Develop a program to verify and document training received for all Afghan Border Policemen.

b. Develop and implement a plan that will identify and reduce the number of Afghan Border Policemen who have not completed basic training.

Client Comments

NTM-A concurred with Recommendations 12.a and 12.b, as written, providing no additional comments.

Our Response

NTM-A comments to Recommendations 12.a and 12.b were responsive. We will request an update in six months on the implementation of both recommendations, along with an estimate of ABP personnel who have not completed basic training.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Observation 13. Afghan Border Police Gender Integration

Coalition forces and MoI planning has resulted in unrealistic gender integration goals for many of the ABP zones.

This situation exists because the current Coalition and MoI goals and criteria for ABP gender integration were developed without taking into consideration the societal limitations imposed on the use of female ABP personnel.

As a result, gender integration goals will not be reached in most ABP zones by 2014, which will impede conducting inspections of women, or men dressed as women, crossing the border. This will increase security risks and could result in a loss of significant government revenue at border crossing sites.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix C, Numbers 1 and 2, for additional details.)

- Afghan Border Police, “Ministerial Development Plan,” September 9, 2012.
- Afghan National Police, “Solar Year 1391 *Tashkil*,” January 2013.

Discussion

The “National Defense Authorization Act of 2012” authorized \$1.9 billion of the Afghan Security Forces Fund to support the development of the MoI and the ANP. Between 2002 and 2012, the U.S. contributed \$759 million from this fund to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA)—the multilateral mechanism for coordinating donor contributions to build the ANP. One of LOTFA’s priorities is increasing the participation of women in the ANP. In conjunction with the MoI, NTM-A redeveloped their Ministerial Development Plan to include gender integration as a priority for the ANP. The plan established metrics for evaluating ABP progress on gender integration issues and required Coalition advisors to be assigned to the MoI to assist the ABP commanders with gender integration matters. Aligning with the plans, LOTFA provided funds for female ANP positions, including ABP personnel, which appeared on the MoI *Tashkil*. Since 2011, these funds have been designated to fund female ABP salaries.

As of December 2012, MoI officials reported that approximately 25 percent of the MoI *Tashkil* positions for women had been filled. Eighty-three percent of the filled positions were located at the ABP headquarters in Kabul, at airports, or in zones 4 and 5, and about 10 percent of the positions filled were for an officer’s rank. Despite having positions set aside on the *Tashkil*, NTM-A officials reported there were more positions authorized on the *Tashkil* than MoI could fill, especially in zones 1, 2, 3, and 6. Several factors contributed to the positions going unfilled, but according to NTM-A officials, the prevailing obstacle was the societal limitation on women’s roles in Afghan society, which varied across Afghanistan’s ethnic cultures and regions.

While positions for female ABP appeared on the *Tashkil*, the facilities and resources to support them did not. To meet the standards of Afghan culture, female ABP members require separate facilities, including toilets, changing rooms, and prayer rooms, which were not present in most ABP facilities and not listed on the *Tashkil*. ABP Headquarters for example, where 17 percent of female ABP personnel worked, did not have separate facilities for women. The training centers we visited did not have separate facilities to accommodate female recruits and many of the

Coalition advisors at the zone level with whom we spoke, all male, had little or no contact with the few female ABP in their region.

Many of the Coalition zone-level advisors, and the NTM-A ABP advisor to the MoI with whom we spoke, were unable to confirm whether female ABP had been included in the MoI vetting process. As a result, the number of ABP positions held by women could not be confirmed despite having funds designated by LOTFA for these positions. In general, Coalition and NTM-A officials reported that few female ABP received training, and accurate data on the number of female ABP who completed training were unavailable. NTM-A officials also reported that, in practice, Afghan recruitment guidelines for female ABP were more stringent than for men, requiring women applying for patrolmen positions to have a 12th grade education, while, for men, a 12th grade literacy rate was a requirement for receiving an officer's appointment.

ABP leadership in Zone 5 (RC-N) created a professional space for female ABP that met regional cultural norms and allowed the women to contribute to the ABP mission. Additionally, the ABP in Zone 5 ran separate training courses for female ABP and operated a child development center in the headquarters office for preschool-aged children of ABP. To ensure the safety of female

Figure 4. Zone 5 Child Development Center



Source: DoD IG

ABP, the command provided transportation to and from work. While the social climate in Northern Afghanistan may have allowed more participation for women in the ABP, some of the relatively innovative practices used in zone 5 could be adapted for use in other zones.

Despite societal limitations, female ABP play a key role in the ABP mission to secure borders and ports of entry by conducting searches of women. In the Afghan culture, only women may conduct searches of other women. At ABP sites, women, or men dressed as women to avoid detection, have been reported carrying contraband goods across the border, including narcotics,

weapons, and fertilizer used to make improvised explosive devices. This reportedly has been particularly the case in regions where insurgent activity is highest. The absence of women at ABP sites creates security vulnerabilities, allows opportunities for smugglers to avoid paying customs fees on legal goods, and limits the ability of Coalition forces and ABP to provide security for women conducting legitimate business.

As Coalition forces prepare to transition full responsibility for border security to the ABP, it is critical that realistic gender integration and recruitment level goals be established and funded, both for the accomplishment of the ABP mission and for the safety of the female ABP already at work.

Future gender goals must balance several factors:

- the female personnel required to execute the ABP mission,
- the regional variances in the role of women in public life and societal limitations on women that occur at the zone level, and
- the level of ABP and NTM-A leadership commitment to ensuring engagement and training of female ABP for the ABP mission.

Recommendations

13. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, advise the Minister of Interior to:

a. Conduct a review to determine what mitigating actions can be taken to make professional participation by women in the Afghan Border Police more feasible on a zone by zone basis.

b. Conduct an assessment of what gender integration goals can be realistically reached in each ABP zone after any mitigating actions identified have been taken and modify the *Tashkil* and Ministerial Development Plan accordingly.

13.c. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, determine what additional resources, if any, can be made available to support gender integration activities in an adjusted Ministerial Development Plan.

Client Comments

NTM-A concurred with Recommendations 13.a, 13.b, and 13.c. NTM-A stated that the ABP's Ministerial Development Plan was amended and endorsed by NTM-A Deputy Commander-Police and the ABP Commanding General, to include gender-balanced recruiting, specific career paths for female police, and fair training opportunities for women within the ABP. Goals are recommended to be set along these three lines of effort.

Our Response

NTM-A comments to Recommendations 13.a, 13.b, and 13.c were responsive.

For Recommendation 13.b, we request a copy of the referenced Ministerial Development Plan.

We will also request an update in six months on the status of all three recommendations.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Appendix A. Scope, Methodology, and Acronyms

We conducted this assessment from August 2012 to March 2013 in accordance with the standards published in the “Quality Standards for Inspections.” We planned and performed the assessment to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our observations and conclusions, based on our assessment objectives. Site visits in Afghanistan were conducted from October 22 to November 8, 2012.

We reviewed documents such as Federal laws and regulations, including the “National Defense Authorization Act,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions, DoD directives and instructions, and appropriate U.S. Central Command, NATO/ISAF, IJC, NTM-A, and MoI/ABP guidance.

The objectives of this assessment were to determine whether the planning and operational implementation of efforts by U.S. and Coalition forces to train, advise, and assist in the development of the ABP were effective. This included visiting various ABP locations around Afghanistan to determine the effectiveness of U.S. and Coalition involvement in developing the capability of the MoI to manage ABP requirements. To ensure a thorough basis for our conclusions and recommendations, we visited ABP logistics, training, personnel, and headquarters officials in five of the six Afghan National Police zones. We did not visit Zone 4/Regional Command-West due to the difficulty in arranging transportation and the limited presence of Coalition advisors in that zone.

We also visited or contacted organizations and individuals in the U.S. and Afghanistan that were directly responsible for, or advised the commanders responsible for, developing the ABP based on our previous work in the area of Afghan police development and the advice of DoD IG personnel permanently stationed in Afghanistan with NTM-A and IJC. We reviewed the programs and processes used in developing the sustainable operational and logistical capability of the ABP and spoke with appropriate U.S., Coalition, and Afghan leaders and managers at all levels.

The ABP development assessment chronology was as follows:

August–October 2012	Research and fieldwork in CONUS
October 22–November 8, 2012	Fieldwork in Afghanistan
November 10, 2012	Out-brief to IJC and NTM-A
November 2012–March 2013	Analysis, report writing, and reviews
March 5, 2013	Draft report issued
April 4, 2013	Management comments received, evaluated, and reviewed
May 24, 2012	Final report issued

Limitations

We limited the scope of this review to DoD- and NATO-funded programs and international donation programs supporting the development of the ABP.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this assessment.

Use of Technical Assistance

We did not use technical assistance to perform this assessment.

Acronyms Used in this Report

The following is a list of the acronyms used in this report:

ABP	Afghan Border Police
ACP	Afghan Customs Police
AMS	Automotive Management Services
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
C-IED	Counter-Improvised Explosive Device
DoD IG	Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
GPPT	German Police Project Team
ID	Identification Card
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoI	Ministry of Interior
NTM-A	North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
PITC	Police Intelligence Training Center
RC	Regional Command

Appendix B. Summary of Prior Coverage

During the last four years, the DoD, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the Commission on Wartime Contracting, the Congressional Research Service, and the DoD IG have issued a number of reports discussing the development of the MoI and ANP.

Unrestricted DoD reports can be accessed at <http://www.defense.gov/pubs>.

Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>.

Unrestricted SIGAR reports can be accessed at <http://www.sigar.mil>.

Unrestricted Congressional Research Service Reports can be accessed at <http://www.crs.gov>.

Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm>.

Prior coverage by other agencies includes:

Department of Defense

Report to Congress in accordance with Section 1230 of the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181),” as amended, and Section 1221 of the “National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81),” “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” December 2012

Report to Congress in accordance with House Resolution 2219 (Report 112-110) and Section 1230 of the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181),” as amended, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces,” April 2012

Government Accountability Office

GAO-12-951T, “Afghanistan Security: Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces,” July 24, 2012

GAO-11-710, “Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Improve Accountability of U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan Government,” July 20, 2011

GAO-09-280, “Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation,” March 9, 2009

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR-Audit 13-1, “Afghan National Security Forces Facilities: Concerns with Funding, Oversight, and Sustainability for Operations and Maintenance,” October 30, 2012

SIGAR-Audit 11-10, “Despite Improvements in MoI’s Personnel Systems, Additional Actions Are Needed to Completely Verify ANP Payroll Costs and Workforce Strength,” April 25, 2011

Congressional Research Service

“Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” April 4, 2012

“Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance,” December 12, 2011

“War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress,” June 8, 2010

Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

SPO-2012-109, “Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan Local Police,” July 9, 2012

SPO-2011-003, “Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National Police,” March 3, 2011

SPO-2009-007, “Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces,” September 30, 2009

Appendix C. Criteria – MoI/ANP Policy

1. **Afghan Border Police, “Ministerial Development Plan,” September 9, 2012.** The purpose of the plan is to identify mission critical capabilities necessary to transition the ABP to autonomous operations. It establishes tasks and outputs which will enable NTM-A advisors and ABP staff to work together toward common goals.
2. **Afghan National Police, “Solar Year 1391 Tashkil,” January 2013.** This is the Afghan document that authorizes personnel and equipment for an organization, similar to a U.S. military Table of Organization and Equipment.
3. **Automotive Maintenance Services Contract AMS W52P1J-11-C-0014.** The contract that requires Automotive Maintenance Services to perform all maintenance, except operator level maintenance, on ANP vehicles.
4. **Ministries of Interior and Defense and National Directorate of Security, “Joint Order 179,” September 13, 2012.** This document directs the ANA, ANP, and National Directorate of Security to coordinate and synchronize security and logistic operations, to include route clearance and casualty evacuation, in anticipation of the withdrawal of ISAF combat forces by the end of 2014.
5. **Ministries of Interior and Finance, “Memorandum of Understanding on Managing the Border Crossing Points,” July 2009.** The purpose of this document is to describe the respective roles and responsibilities of Afghan Customs Authorities, Customs Police, and the ABP at the border and to provide the framework for the development of cooperative working arrangements between the Ministries of Interior and Finance.
6. **MoI Deputy Minister for Policy and Strategy, “Assignment, Reassignment (Cyclic) of ANP Generals and Officers,” 2010.** The purpose of this policy is to create a system or procedure for reassignment and transfer of officers and non-commissioned officers in all levels of the police force.
7. **MoI Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy, “National Police Plan for Solar Years 1390-1391,” February 2011.** This document provides planning guidance for the continued development of MoI/ANP operational capabilities to meet Afghanistan's current and future challenges of stabilization, civil order, law enforcement, and security. It assigns major tasks for each of the deputy ministers and independent departments to complete during the next two years according to the National Police Strategy.
8. **MoI Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy, “National Police Strategy.”** The purpose of this document is to provide strategic guidance for the continued development and operational capability of the MoI to meet Afghanistan's current and future challenges of stabilization and security. This strategy specifies the objectives for continued development of the police, law enforcement activities, and associated systems.
9. **MoI Logistics Management Directorate, “Process for the Management of Logistics,” January 6, 2009.** This policy prescribes common procedures,

formats, forms, and time standards for the logistics management processes of the MoI and movement of logistic information between supporting and supported organizations and activities. The policy applies to all civilian and police activities and organizations of the MoI.

Appendix D. Organizations Contacted and Visited

We contacted, visited, or conducted interviews with officials (or former officials) from the following U.S., NATO, and Afghan organizations:

Afghanistan

U.S./NATO Commands in Afghanistan

- Commander, ISAF and selected staff
- Commander, NTM-A and selected staff (including Ministry Advisors)
- Commander, IJC and selected staff (including ABP Advisors in each zone visited)
- Deputy Commander-Police, NTM-A and selected staff (ABP Development)
- Deputy Commander-SPO, NTM-A
- Commander, RC-E and selected staff
- Deputy Commander, RC-E
- Commander, RC-S and selected staff
- Commander, RC-SW and selected staff
- Commander, RC-N and selected staff
- Commander, RSC-E and selected staff
- Commander, Joint Border Coordination Center Khyber Pass
- Commander, Joint Border Coordination Center Wesh-Chaman

U.S. Embassy-Kabul

- Political/Military Advisor
- Border Management Task Force Afghanistan

Bilateral Organizations

- European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan staff
- German Police Project Team

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Ministry of Interior

- Minister of Interior Chief of Staff
- Deputy Minister of Interior for Security
- ABP Commanding General (Headquarters)
- ABP Operations Officer (Headquarters)

ABP Zone 1

- Zone Commander
- Zone Personnel Officer
- Zone Logistics officer
- Commander, Regional Logistics Center
- Khyber Joint Border Coordination Center

ABP Zone 2

- Zone Commander
- Zone Logistics Officer
- Commander, Regional Training Center
- Commander, Regional Logistics Center

ABP Zone 3

- Zone Commander
- Zone Personnel Officer
- Zone Logistics Officer
- Wesh-Chaman Joint Border Coordination Center

ABP Zone 5

- Zone Commander
- Zone Executive Officer
- Zone Logistics Officer
- Commander, Regional Training Center
- Commander, Regional Logistics Center

ABP Zone 6



- Zone Commander
- Zone Personnel Officer
- Zone Logistics Officer
- Commander, Regional Logistics Center

Airports

- Kabul International
- Kandahar
- Mazar-e-Sharif

Appendix E. Management Comments

ISAF Response

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED		
	HEADQUARTERS International Security Assistance Force Kabul, Afghanistan	
ISAF HQ/COS		3 April 2013
TO:	USFOR-A Inspector General	
SUBJECT:	ISAF Response to DODIG draft report, "USG and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise the Afghan Border Police"	
REFERENCE:	A. Project No. D2012-D00SPO-0210.000, DODIG Draft Report, "Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise the Afghan Border Police."	
<p>1. In response to the request for Commander, International Security Assistance Force to offer concurrence or non-concurrence on the Draft DODIG report recommendations, we offer the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a. Point 1a. We offer partial concurrence with recommended changes to read, "Commander, International Security Assistance Force, with assistance from North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, coordinate with the Ministers of Interior and Defense to develop a Combined Comprehensive Border Strategy that emphasizes an integrated layered-security plan between the Afghan Border Police, Afghan Uniformed Police, and Afghan National Army.b. Point 2a. We offer concurrence with report recommendations.c. Point 2b. We offer partial concurrence with recommended changes to read, "Complete development of Coalition force mitigating plans/actions to generate, advise, and assist an ANSF-led effort to create immediate improvements in security until Afghan Border Police enabler capability is sufficiently developed."d. Point 5a. We offer partial concurrence with recommended changes to read, "In coordination with United States Embassy Kabul and the Minister of Interior, complete development of the Combined Comprehensive Border Strategy and support international community and interagency efforts in the development of GIRoA institutions that will significantly reduce diversion of Afghan government funds at major border crossing points."e. Point 5b. We offer concurrence with report recommendations.		
1 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED		

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

2. Point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned and questions can be addressed to SIPR: [REDACTED]



Jeffrey L. Milhorn
COL, USA
Assistant Chief of Staff
International Security Assistance
Force - Afghanistan

IJC Response



Headquarters
International Security Assistance Force Joint Command
Kabul, Afghanistan
APO, AE 09320



IJC IG

03 Apr 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Inspector General Special Plans and Operations

SUBJECT: IJC Response to DOD IG Draft Report D2012-D00SPO-0210.000

1. IJC has reviewed the DOD IG Draft Report (D2012-D00SPO-0210.000) "USG and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip and Advise ABP." IJC concurs with recommendation 11.c. and also provides the attached comments for the draft report.

2. Point of contact for this issue is Col Lawrence Nixon at [REDACTED]

//signed// [REDACTED]
LAWRENCE A. NIXON, Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

Attch:
(U/FOUO) IJC Comment Matrix

Comment Matrix – available upon request

NTM-A/CSTC-A Response



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF
NTM-A/CSTC-A

HEADQUARTERS
NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

21 Mar 2013

MEMORANDUM THRU United States Forces - Afghanistan (CJIG), APO AE 09356
United States Central Command (CCIG), MacDill AFB, FL 33621

FOR: Office of the Department of Defense – Inspector General, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria,
VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise
the Afghan Border Police (Project No. D2012-D00SPO-0210.000).

REFERENCE: ABP DoD IG SPO Draft Report, dated 5 Mar 13

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide comments regarding the reference ABP DoD IG SPO
draft report. This response represents a coordinated effort between DCOM-P, DCOM-SPO, DCOM-A,
and bilateral partners.

2. Point of contact for this action is [REDACTED], or via e-mail at
[REDACTED]

Carol C. Yannarella
COL, DCOM-P
Director, Police Development

Enclosure:
NTM-A/CSTC-A Response to DoD IG SPO Draft Report

NTM-A/CSTC-A
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT

“Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise
the Afghan Border Police” (Project No. D2012-D00SPO-0210.000)

1. Recommendation 1.b states:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, advise the Ministers of Interior and
Defense to reissue the Joint Order 179 with their respective signatures, granting authority for
coordination of support between the Afghan Border Police and Afghan National Army to
commanders at the *kandak* level.

a. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 1.b:

Concur. It is agreed by DCOM-A and DCOM-P advisors that Joint Order 179 should be reissued by
MoD and MoI to their respective organizations.

2. Recommendation 1.c states:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander,
International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, advise the Ministers of Interior and
Defense to enforce the provisions of Joint Order 179.

a. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 1.c:

Concur. In order to allow for this recommendation to be implemented, particular efforts should be
placed in empowering the Ground Force Command (GFC). As such, GFC should be the level of
command where proper authority is given by MoD and, to a lesser extent, MoI for coordination,
command, and control for operations related to border defense which encompasses a defense-in-depth
as described in Joint Order 179. For this to be possible, a clear mandate must be given to GFCs and
at the MoD level, the General Staff (GS) must be focused on facilitating this mandate to optimize the
current approach.

NTM-A will encourage ANSF elements to pursue opportunities for cooperation and coordination
from a Ministerial level down to the Kandak level, with particular focus on the role and coordinating
authority vested in the Ground Force Commander, in both urgent operational situations and in order
to realize efficiencies in training and equipping opportunities.

3. Recommendation 3.a states:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander,
International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, advise the Minister of Interior to
conduct a mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available analysis across the Afghan
Border Police zones to determine mission, personnel, and equipping requirements specific to
each zone.

a. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 3.a:

Concur. This is already carried out as per the Command Plan Review (CPR) every solar year, albeit
not to the desired effect. The CPR process is the primary means by which the Afghan Border Police

NTM-A/CSTC-A
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT

“Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise
the Afghan Border Police” (Project No. D2012-D00SPO-0210.000)

(ABP) can initiate and influence Tashkil changes at the MoI level. Coalition assistance is required to guide the process, translate the analysis into Tashkil adjustments, and initiate direction for cross-leveling between Zones and subordinate commands.

4. Recommendations 3.b – 3.c state:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, advise the Minister of Interior to:

a. Recommendation 3.b:

Update the Afghan Border Police *Tashkil* personnel and equipment authorizations based on the above analysis.

b. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 3.b:

Concur. See para 3a.

c. Recommendation 3.c:

Issue a cipher signed by the Minister of Interior directing the cross-leveling of personnel and equipment between zones and *kandaks* to meet new *Tashkil* authorizations.

d. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 3.c:

Concur.

5. Recommendations 4.a – 4.b state:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

a. Recommendation 4.a:

In coordination with Embassy Kabul and the German Police Project Team, conduct a requirements review with the Minister of Interior to determine whether the continued use of canine units by the Afghan Border Police at officially controlled points of entry into Afghanistan post-2014 is practicable.

b. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 4.a:

Concur.

c. Recommendation 4.b:

If deemed operationally necessary, determine an appropriate funding source to support the Minister of Interior canine program.

NTM-A/CSTC-A
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT

“Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise
the Afghan Border Police” (Project No. D2012-D00SPO-0210.000)

d. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 4.b:

Concur. Funding source options are recommended to include the development of an Afghan-led requirements and resource validation and approval process to mirror the current Coalition process.

6. Recommendation 5.c states:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, advise the Minister of Interior to enforce
its personnel authority over Afghan Border Police personnel at border crossing points.

a. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 5.c:

Concur, however NTM-A recommends clarification of the recommendation as follows:

Revised Recommendation: Based on the limitation of police powers to the MoI inherent in the Afghan Constitution the Commander NTM-A / CSTC-A should advise the Minister of the Interior to bring Border Police personnel, also known as Afghan Customs Police (ACP) to whom MoF currently has authority, under operational control of the MoI. Establish an ACP sub-pillar, trained and administered by the MoI, or have customs security mission carried out by the ABP, thereby clearly demarcating those policing duties, including search and evidence collection, and customs collection as carried out by Afghan Customs Department (ACD) agents trained and administered by the MoF.

b. NTM-A/CSTC-A technical observations and recommended amendments:

Revised Observation: The existing Memorandum of Understanding between MoI and MoF concerning the ACP is not workable and does not allow the MoI to enforce its personnel authority over the ACP, not the ABP as indicated in the draft report. The MoI does enforce its personnel authority over ABP personnel at border crossing points. The lack of clarity regarding MoI's enforcement of its personnel authority over the ACP lies in the practice of MoF determining ACP duties, scope of authority, and location of work, as well as recommending to the MoI remunerations and punishment for ACP personnel.

MoI has no visibility or control over the “employment” of the ACP, yet is responsible to:

- approve, employ, and dismiss ACP personnel with MoF written recommendations;
- provide ACP with salaries and other incentives; and
- recruit ACP candidates and maintain records.

MoF is responsible for directing and managing the ACP with respect to:

- determining ACP duties, scope of authority, and location of work;
- providing additional training as necessary; and
- recommending to the MoI remunerations and punishment for ACP personnel.

7. Recommendation 6 states:

NTM-A/CSTC-A
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT

“Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise
the Afghan Border Police” (Project No. D2012-D00SPO-0210.000)

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, advise the Minister of Interior and the Afghan Border Police Commander to delegate hiring and firing authority to zone commanders and to hold zone commanders accountable for the actions of their subordinates.

a. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 6:

Concur, however NTM-A recommends clarification of the recommendation as follows:

Revised Recommendation: Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, advise the Minister of Interior and the Afghan Border Police Commander to delegate authority to zone commanders for hiring and removal of subordinate commanders and officers with just cause.

b. NTM-A/CSTC-A technical observations and recommended amendments:

Amend Observation para 1 (pg 33), to read “ABP zone commanders did not have the authority to remove certain ABP personnel within their zone, nor could they appoint certain key ABP leaders without approval from ABP Headquarters.”

Amend para 5 Discussion (pg 33), to read as follows: “However, this policy was not discussed at any time during our fieldwork, so there is uncertainty as to whether or not ABP commanders were aware of the policy.” Remove reference to the advisors’ level of knowledge of the policy, given that advisors have little influence on the fair management of this process.

8. Recommendations 7.a – 7.c state:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, advise the Minister of Interior to:

a. Recommendation 7.a:

Revise the ministry’s logistics policy in order to decentralize approval authority for selected Afghan Border Police items of supply.

b. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 7.a:

Concur, with the caveat that the recommendation must apply to the entire Afghan National Police (ANP) and not exclusively to ABP items of supply, as written.

c. Recommendation 7.b:

Develop standards for the combat-loss replacement process, setting time-lines for each step in the process.

d. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 7.b:

NTM-A/CSTC-A
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT

“Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise
the Afghan Border Police” (Project No. D2012-D00SPO-0210.000)

Concur. Two policies have received MINIT approval: (1) policy to drop equipment from property books and (2) vehicle disposal process.

e. Recommendation 7.c:

Revise the ministry’s logistics policy in order to establish and enforce Mol-14 tracking and follow-up procedures from the *kandak*-level, through the zone and Regional Logistics Center, to the Ministry of Interior National Supply Depots.

f. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 7.c:

Concur. Recommend that inclusion of the ABP Headquarters is required, even as information copy furnished, in order for the ABP Logistics Director to hold Zones accountable for adherence to the Mol policy and to monitor developing trends of equipment shortfalls, training gaps, or non-compliance with supply procedures.

9. Recommendations 8.a – 8.b state:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

a. Recommendation 8.a:

Advise the Minister of Interior to prepare for transition of the Automotive Management Services maintenance contract by determining how the Afghan Border Police maintenance requirements will be met in the long-term (post-2014).

b. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 8.a:

Concur. Recommended changes to the specific reference to AMS as follows:

Revised Recommendation: Advise the Minister of the Interior to prepare for transition from the Automotive Management Services (AMS) maintenance contract by determining how long-term ABP comprehensive vehicle maintenance, training, and provisioning requirements will be met (post-2014).

c. Recommendation 8.b:

In coordination with the Minister of Interior, modify the Automotive Management Services contract to include a requirement to train Afghan Border Police units/mechanics on basic vehicle maintenance and Ministry of Interior procedures to procure repair parts.

d. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 8.b:

Concur. Based on developments since the observation relating to the contracting process and the performance of the contractor referenced, changes to the recommendation are suggested as follows:

**NTM-A/CSTC-A
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT**

“Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise
the Afghan Border Police” (Project No. D2012-D00SPO-0210.000)

“In coordination with the Minister of the Interior, ensure contracts are in place for comprehensive vehicle maintenance requirements, to include training of ABP units/mechanics on basic vehicle maintenance and MoI procedures to procure spare parts.”

e. NTM-A/CSTC-A technical observations and recommendations:

Professional Engineers & Architects (PAE) is currently contracted to provide vehicle maintenance training to ABP/ Afghan National Police (ANP) personnel. It is recommended that the comprehensive maintenance, training, and provision of spares contract bid should be offered through approved contracting processes and not assumed to be an amendment to the current AMS contract.

10. Recommendation 9 states:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, advise the Minister of Interior to establish a timely process for ensuring that a verifiable determination of command and personal responsibility and accountability occurs when Afghan Border Police equipment is damaged, destroyed, or missing as a result of negligence.

a. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 9:

Concur. This process has been published following the initial observation and is currently in the implementation phase to ensure timely investigation and follow-up in the event of negligence.

11. Recommendation 10 states:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, advise the Minister of Interior to place priority emphasis on the re-vetting/identification card process at each Afghan Border Police unit location, mandating on-site issuance to all Afghan Border Police and after-action reporting of completion to the Ministry of Interior, prior to departure of the Ministry of Interior identification card team.

a. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 10:

Concur.

12. Recommendations 11.a –11.b state:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:

a. Recommendation 11.a:

Assist the Minister of Interior to find an alternative location for the Police Intelligence Training Center that can accommodate student billeting and rations and move the course to that location or resolve the issue of sharing and staffing the facility in Kabul.

b. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 11.a:

NTM-A/CSTC-A
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT

“Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise
the Afghan Border Police” (Project No. D2012-D00SPO-0210.000)

Concur. Due to the competing requirements of the Network Targeting Exploitation Center and the compound Security Force, and lack of operational DFAC to support students at PITC, the ABP Basic Intelligence Course (BIC) is now conducted at an alternate site arranged by ABP and instructed by Mobile Training Teams provided by PITC.

c. Recommendation 11.b:

Advise the Minister of Interior regarding the necessity to have the zone commanders informed as to when the courses would be presented at the Police Intelligence Training Center.

d. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 11.b:

Concur.

e. NTM-A/CSTC-A technical observations and recommendations:

The introductory para 3 should be amended to read, “According to NTM-A, the ABP intelligence capability cannot reach Capability Milestone 2B without resolution of this issue.” The accompanying footnote (21) should also be amended to read, “A Capability Milestone is a component of the Ministerial Development Plan that measures the capability of the Mol to conduct autonomous operations across 47 functional areas.”

13. Recommendations 12.a –12.b state:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the International
Security Assistance Force Joint Command, advise the Minister of Interior to:

a. Recommendation 12.a:

Develop a program to verify and document training received for all Afghan Border Police.

b. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 12.a:

Concur.

c. Recommendation 12.b:

Develop and implement a plan that will identify and reduce the number of Afghan Border Policemen who have not completed basic training.

d. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 12.b:

Concur.

NTM-A/CSTC-A
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT

“Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise
the Afghan Border Police” (Project No. D2012-D00SPO-0210.000)

14. Recommendations 13.a – 13.c state:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, advise the Minister of Interior to:

a. Recommendation 13.a:

Conduct a review to determine what mitigating actions can be taken to make professional participation by women in the Afghan Border Police more feasible on a zone by zone basis.

b. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 13.a:

Concur.

c. Recommendation 13.b:

Conduct an assessment of what gender integration goals can be realistically reached in each ABP zone after any mitigating actions identified have been taken and modify the *Tashkil* and Ministerial Development Plan accordingly.

d. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 13.b:

Concur. The ABP Ministerial Development Plan was amended and endorsed by DCOM-P and the Commanding General ABP, to include gender balanced recruiting, specific career paths for female police, and fair training opportunities for women within ABP. Goals are recommended to be set along these three lines of effort.

e. Recommendation 13.c:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, determine what additional resources, if any, can be made available to support gender integration activities in an adjusted Ministerial Development Plan.

f. NTM-A/CSTC-A response to Recommendation 13.c:

Concur.

15. Based on technical review of all observations, the following recommended changes are also encouraged:

a. Challenges – Area of Concern, Execution, Zone Commander Authority

Recommend the more generic use of “Zone Commanders cannot remove or appoint certain personnel without approval from MOI,” versus “Border Police zone commanders did not have the authority remove Kandak commanders within their zone and could not appoint Kandak commanders without approval from Border Police headquarters.” (pg iv, para 2)

NTM-A/CSTC-A
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT

“Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise
the Afghan Border Police” (Project No. D2012-D00SPO-0210.000)

- b. Part 1 – Notable Progress – Joint Border Coordination Centres (pg 7). The “Comprehensive Border Defense strategy” should be amended to read the “Combined Comprehensive Border Strategy (CCBS).”
- c. Observation 1. Border Defense Strategy (pg 13, para 1). “The MoI and ABP do not have an effective border strategy...” should be amended to reflect that the Afghan National Security Forces as a whole, including both MoI and MoD forces, do not have an effective border strategy. Cooperation Between the Afghan Border Police and Afghan National Army (pg14, para 2) should also be amended as follows: “Both Coalition and Afghan officials in those zones stated that the ABP had been more successful getting casualty evacuation assistance from the Pakistan military across the border than from the ANA or other ANSF.”

APPROVED BY:
Carol C. Yannarella
COL, DCOM-P
Director PD, [REDACTED]

PREPARED BY:

[REDACTED]

Appendix F. Report Distribution

Department of State

U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan
Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs
Inspector General, Department of State
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Secretary of Defense

Deputy Secretary of Defense
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L)
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Maintenance, Plans, and Programs, AT&L
Deputy Chief Financial Officer
Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation
Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy
Director, Joint Staff
Director, Operations (J-3)
Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5)

Department of the Army

Secretary of the Army
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command
Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command
Chief, National Guard Bureau
Chief, U.S. Army Reserve
Commander/Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Commander, Afghanistan Engineer Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Auditor General, Department of the Army
Inspector General of the Army

Department of the Navy

Naval Inspector General

Department of the Air Force

Inspector General of the Air Force

Combatant Commands

Commander, U.S. Central Command

Other Defense Organizations

Commander, International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces–Afghanistan*

Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command*

Commander, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition

Command–Afghanistan*

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director, Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance

Other Non-Defense Federal Organizations

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member

Senate Committee on Appropriations

Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations

Senate Committee on Armed Services

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

House Committee on Appropriations

House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations

House Committee on Armed Services

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

*Recipient of the draft report

Special Plans & Operations

Provide assessment oversight that addresses priority national security objectives to facilitate informed, timely decision-making by senior leaders of the DOD and the U.S. Congress.

General Information

Forward questions or comments concerning this assessment and report and other activities conducted by the Office of Special Plans & Operations to spo@dodig.mil

Deputy Inspector General for Special Plans & Operations
Department of Defense Inspector General
4800 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500



Visit us at www.dodig.mil

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

hotline

make a difference

800.424.9098

Defense Hotline, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1900

Report

www.dodig.mil/hotline

Fraud, Waste, Mismanagement, Abuse of Authority
Suspected Threats to Homeland Security
Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information



Inspector General Department of Defense

