

Inspector General

United States
Department of Defense



Special Plans and Operations

Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to
Develop Leaders in the Afghan National Army

Inspector General

United States Department of Defense

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

June 24, 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE
FORCE/UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE
FORCE JOINT COMMAND
COMMANDER, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
TRAINING MISSION-AFGHANISTAN/COMBINED SECURITY
TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN

SUBJECT: Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop Leaders in the
Afghan National Army (Report No. DODIG-2013-094)

We are providing this final report for review and comment. We considered client comments based on a draft of this report.

We request additional comments and information by July 24, 2013, as follows:

- Commander, International Security Assistance Force – Recommendations 6.a., 6.b., and 6.c.

Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We are unable to accept the //Signed// symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. Please direct questions to Mr. Michael McClellan at (703) 604-9145, michael.mcclellan@dodig.mil or michael.mcclellan@dodig.smil.mil.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "K. P. Moorefield", is positioned above the typed name.

Kenneth P. Moorefield
Deputy Inspector General
Special Plans and Operations

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Results in Brief: Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop Leaders in the Afghan National Army

What We Did

Our purpose was to assess the sufficiency and the effectiveness of the Coalition’s programs for developing Afghan National Army (ANA) officers and non-commissioned officers. We conducted interviews with selected leader development subject matter experts in the U.S. In Afghanistan, we conducted extensive interviews with U.S. and Coalition advisors, as well as their Afghan principals, at the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, and ANA training schools and operational units.

What We Found

We found that the Coalition’s programs for the ANA leader development were generally effective and on track for transition to the Afghans. The establishment of a non-commissioned officer corps, and the roles and responsibilities accompanying this enlisted leadership position, was not completely embraced by senior ANA and General Staff personnel. The lack of a true merit-based personnel promotion and assignment system negatively impacted the further development of a new generation of ANA leaders.

We found that among Coalition advisors to the ANA, at both training schools and operational units, there was a wide variation in the selection for assignment and specific advisor training preparation. Coalition Command data assessment practices and categories did not appear to have been updated to reflect the change in mission emphasis from building the ANA to improving its quality.

Of special note was the ANA literacy program. In a country with a very low national literacy rate, this educational program serves not just as an immediate benefit to the ANA, but also eventually the larger nation of Afghanistan by, as one senior officer said, “...allows Afghans to be more discerning...”.

What We Recommend

- Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan:
 - Coordinate with the General Staff to validate roles, responsibilities, and authorities for non-commissioned officers and ensure the publishing of appropriate policy and guidance.
 - Assist the ANA in ensuring both officer and non-commissioned officer training is synchronized regarding the mission of the non-commissioned officer.
 - In conjunction with the ANA, establish roles and responsibilities, and enforce appropriate personnel policies and practices, specifically regarding personnel records, promotions, assignments, pay, and retirement.
 - Encourage the MoD and ANA to plan to sustain, and even expand, the literacy program.
 - Commander, NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, update the data collection and information sharing practices to better reflect the current mission
- Commander, NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan, develop standardized selection and training requirements for all advisors.

Comments

All required commands responded. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan's comments were all responsive. We require additional comment from International Security Assistance Force Joint Command on three recommendations.

Recommendations Table

Client	Recommendations Requiring Additional Comment	No Additional Comments Required at This Time
Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan		1.a., 1.b., 1.c.; 2.a., 2.b., 2.c, 2.d, 2.e; 3.a., 3.b.; 4.a., 4.b.; 5.a., 5.b.; 6.a., 6.b., 6.c; 7.
Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command	6.a., 6.b., 6.c.	

Please provide comments by July 24, 2013.

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Introduction

Background

The goal of the United States in Afghanistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, and to prevent its return to Afghanistan or Pakistan. Specific U.S. objectives in Afghanistan are to deny safe haven to al-Qaida and deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).¹ Developing Afghan National Army (ANA) leaders is important to enabling this strategy.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its subordinate commands have sought to grow the capacity and capability of the ANSF in order to provide a secure environment for a sustainable peace. The mission of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) has been to support GIRoA in generating and sustaining the ANSF, developing ANSF leaders, and establishing enduring institutional capacity to enable accountable, Afghan-led security. The mission of ISAF Joint Command (IJC) in full partnership with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), has been to conduct population-centric comprehensive operations to neutralize the insurgency in specified areas, and to support improved governance and development in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure environment for sustainable peace.

The two key challenges to developing effective leaders in the ANA were its rapid growth rate and lingering effects of long-term instability in Afghanistan. The ANA grew rapidly, from a strength of 95,000 in October 2009 to an end-strength of just over 182,000 as reported in September 2012, approaching its funded end-strength ceiling.

While the ANA planned to continue to generate enabling forces through 2014 and beyond (including airpower, engineer, signal, and other combat support units), as of the middle of 2012, the Coalition had shifted its primary emphasis from recruiting and force generation to improving the overall quality, training, and preparedness of the ANA force. Increasing the quality and capacity of ANA officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) training was integral to this effort, and in November 2011, the NTM-A Commander stated that developing Afghan leaders was one of his top priority. Despite this commitment, in both the April and December 2012 DoD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan (Section 1230) reports “leadership deficits” was cited as a continuing challenge.

Thirty-plus years of instability and war in Afghanistan had impacted the development of effective ANA officers and NCOs. After almost two generations of political instability and internal conflict, the resulting lack of military professional education and training seriously degraded the available leadership recruiting pool (human capital). It is impossible to be an effective leader in a modern military without being able to read, write, count, or understand simple math. The Coalition understood this challenge and made literacy training and, as necessary, testing mandatory for all ANA recruits.

¹ Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan (Section 1230 Report), December 2012, pg.11.

More specifically, the demographics of the ANA provided a foundational challenge for developing the leadership of the officer and NCO corps. There were currently three generations of leaders in the ANA. The oldest and usually the most senior in rank tended to be Soviet trained and served in the military during the Soviet occupation. The youngest were the U.S. and Coalition trainees. The middle group can overlap with the first, but the difference tended to be this cohort did not have the resources, or perhaps the inclination, to leave the country during the Taliban times. Hence, many of them stayed and fought with the mujahedin. This group tended to be less formally educated than the other two groups, but they were sometimes regarded as very strong tactical leaders.

The ANA was challenged to identify the best leaders among these groups and advance them on merit, remove those who did not meet the standards of effectiveness, while providing opportunity for advancement for the best of the newest generation. This constituted a significant challenge for any military organization, especially one recently created and confronting an ongoing insurgency while their external support draws down.

Objective

On February 28, 2012, the DoD OIG announced the “Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop Leaders in the Afghan National Army.” The primary objective of this assessment is to assess the sufficiency and effectiveness of the Coalition's programs for developing ANA officers and NCOs.

The ANA Leader Development Training Enterprise

The Coalition and the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) had designed, approved, and built the ANA training enterprise² comprised of two major commands: the Afghan National Defense University (ANDU) and the Afghan National Army Training Command (ANATC). Both commands worked in coordination with the G-7 (Training and Education) of the ANA GS. This robust ANA training enterprise was built in response to the need to quickly generate Afghan security forces.

Overview of the ANA Training Commands

The schools comprising the ANA training enterprise were assigned to either the ANDU or ANATC. See Appendix E for a more detailed description of the ANA training enterprise.

ANDU was responsible for the professional military education of the ANA and the development of future military and civilian leaders through its academic and military programs. The ANDU consisted of the following schools:

- National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA),
- Command and Staff College,
- ANA Sergeants Major Academy,
- Counter Insurgency Training Center,

² Throughout this report we use the term “ANA training enterprise” to refer collectively to all ANA schools, regardless of their particular organization of assignment. See also Appendix E.

- Kabul Military High School,
- ANA Officers' Academy (not established as of October 2012), and
- Afghanistan Foreign Language Institute (not established as of October 2012).


ANATC was primarily responsible for building and sustaining the ANA, training the soldiers and officers of the ANA, and development of doctrine. ANATC facilities were located in Kabul and throughout the country.

- Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) – Basic Warrior, Basic Officer, Female, and NCO training.
- Branch Schools -
 - Combat Arms (Infantry, Armor, Artillery),
 - Combat Support (Engineer, Signals, Military Police),
 - Combat Service Support (Logistics, Human Resources & Financial),
 - General Services (Legal, Public Affairs, Religious and Cultural Affairs).
- Regional Military Training Centers (RMTC) – aligned with ANA Corps–
 - RMTC-North, Mazar-e-Sharif,
 - RMTC-East, Khowst/Gardez,
 - RMTC-South, Kandahar,
 - RMTC-Southwest, Shorabak, and
 - RMTC-West, Shindand/Herat.

ANA Recruit Training Flow

In 2012, recruits received basic soldier, branch specific, and unit collective training prior to assignment in the field force (See Figure 1-1). After enlistment, recruits attended Basic Warrior Training (BWT) at either the KMTC or one of the five RMTCs, or in the case of recruits with sufficient education and aptitude, a combined Basic Warrior and NCO course (1 Uniform Course). Individuals selected for NCO training at the completion of BWT attended the four-week Team Leader Course. All officer, NCO, and enlisted graduates then attended functional branch school training. During ANA force generation, enlisted graduates, with their leadership, were assembled into units and trained for seven weeks as a unit at the Consolidated Fielding Center. The complete unit was then assigned to an ANA Corps.

Figure 1-1. ANA Training Process During Force Generation



Source. NTM-A. Note: BWT is now 8 weeks in duration. The Intelligence Branch School is not assigned to ANATC.

Additional Issues of Concern

We found several issues of concern for NTM-A which will be discussed in more detail throughout the report.

Although the Coalition forces and Afghan leadership had established a robust training enterprise to support the ANA, its continued success depended on many factors.

- The enterprise was training NCOs based on the U.S. Army model, but it was unclear if the ANA officer corps were willing to accept the chosen model or if developing support systems would support their proper use.
- The underdeveloped ANA personnel system, including assignments, promotions, recordkeeping, and retirements, hindered the growth of the new generation of leaders.
- The availability and control of funding raised the question of long-term sustainability of the training enterprise.
- The feedback regarding graduates and programs of instruction was required to keep the enterprise relevant to field units.

There were two significant issues facing both NTM-A and IJC.

- Dated assessment practices hindered NTM-A and IJC from reliably gauging leader development impacts since there was no adjustment to their data collection and

information sharing practices to reflect the shift in mission emphasis from building force strength to improving the quality of the ANA.

- Among U.S. advisors at NTM-A institutional schools, courses, and training programs, we observed a wide variance in aptitude and competence for their mission to help institutionalize leadership training across the ANA. The lack of standardized selection and training requirements for advisors from all sources working at NTM-A institutional schools, courses, and training programs created a pool of advisors whose skill sets and interests were not necessarily suited to the advising mission.

Literacy Program

The ongoing literacy program deserves mention with regard to the development of ANA leadership. The success of this program was essential to improving nearly all aspects of the ANA and was critical to leader development. Literacy remains an enabler for soldier and NCO development, and creates a more discerning citizen for Afghan society. Despite challenges, the program had achieved impressive results and appeared to be well received throughout the ANA.

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Observations and Recommendations

Observation 1. The Role of Non-Commissioned Officers in the Afghan National Army.

NCOs in ANA units were not officially delegated the authority and responsibility they had come to expect from their training and were capable of conducting.

This occurred because: 1) the officer/NCO relationship model taught to NCOs during instruction was not presented in ANA officer training; 2) policy and guidance defining roles, delegating responsibilities, and granting authorities for ANA NCOs was not completed and approved; 3) the enhanced role for NCOs envisaged was not consistent with the traditional ANA officer-NCO relationship and required a cultural change in officer attitudes to be accepted.

As a result, in spite of significant efforts invested in by the training establishment to train and develop NCOs, they were significantly underutilized and unable to perform the roles intended that could benefit their units' effectiveness.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix D, Number 1, 6, and 8, for additional details.)

- ANA 6-22, *Army Leadership*, August 1, 2007.
- Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) Document, *The Afghan National Security Forces - Advisor Guide*, Sections 2 and 6, June 2012.
- MoD Directive 5001, *Ministry of Defense Organization and Functions Manual*, March 29, 2011.

Discussion

Interviews with ANA senior officers, unit commanders, staff officers, and NCOs generally provided a common understanding of the appropriate role for NCOs according to which NCOs should train soldiers, be technical specialists, and act as the “bridge between officers and the soldiers.” However, actual field implementation of NCO roles designed for the ANA and taught in NCO schools fell substantially short of what was intended and required. Senior NCOs expressed frustration at their inability to exercise authority, which officers still retained, and to be able to provide for their soldiers' basic personnel and logistical needs.

ANA officials and Coalition advisors interviewed stated that officer training and instruction did not include specific lessons on the role of the NCO for several reasons. First, the Afghan officer corps had not agreed on a common position regarding the specific responsibilities and authorities for NCOs. Second, Afghan military history lacked a precedent for a more modern-style officer/NCO relationship, further complicated by cross-ethnic/tribal friction. Third, the role of the NCO in the ANA had not been codified in its policy and effectively transmitted to field units. All of this made it difficult for Coalition advisors to effectively emphasize the officer/NCO concept that was accepted, in principle, by senior MoD and GS officials.

ANA 6-22, “Army Leadership,” established “fundamental principles for all officers, sergeant/senior sergeant corps, and army civilians across all components.” ANA 6-22 included a vision for the NCO corps, and stated overarching expectations concerning the responsibilities of NCOs in the ANA. However, as of October 2012, the ANA had not promulgated policy that specifically defined NCO roles and authorities and their relationship to officers and army civilian leaders. Senior NCOs stated that, without signed policy, they had no authority in the field to challenge actions by superiors that contradicted lessons learned in NCO development courses.

The training and development of NCOs was an integral part of the ANA leader development enterprise. Most MoD officials and senior ANA officers interviewed agreed that the various ANA NCO schools were important to develop leadership and technical skills and pointed to the progress made in producing trained NCO leaders. But, ANA officer attitudes tended to reflect their education and experience. Junior officers were more accepting of a more effective NCO corps but mid-career officers, especially those whose formative experience was with the Soviet army or mujahedin, had not embraced fully the more robust military NCO role. Therefore, in spite of NCO training efforts, the employment of NCOs as small unit leaders was not a common practice within the ANA.

Coalition officials concurred that acceptance of the roles and responsibilities of NCOs, as taught in the training enterprise, was hindered by the lack of Afghan-suitable policy and guidance that defined roles, delegated responsibilities, and detailed the legal authorities for NCOs in the performance of their duties. Verbal endorsement from the ANA Chief of the General Staff (CoGS) was not sufficient to overcome Afghan military history and tradition, and lack of written ANA official verification concerning the empowerment of NCOs. Coalition advisors expressed uncertainty over ANA acceptance and institutionalization of expanded NCO roles and responsibilities in the future.

Conclusion

Senior ANA officials supported a strong NCO corps, and the training enterprise reflected this support. These NCO training programs intended to prepare them to be small unit leaders and technical experts managing other ANA soldiers. Nevertheless, there was no official requirement for ANA commanders to embrace, enforce, practically apply and positively act to empower NCOs with leader authority. Until and unless ANA policy and command guidance clearly establish the enhanced role for NCOs envisaged by the Coalition forces and accepted in principle by senior MoD and ANA officials, NCOs will not have the support to receive and perform small unit leader responsibilities and roles.

Recommendations

1. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command:
 - a. Assist the Chief of the General Staff, Afghan National Army to complete, approve, and publish policy and guidance defining the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of an Afghan non-commissioned officer.
 - b. Assist the Chief of the General Staff, Afghan National Army to ensure that officer instruction includes appropriate lessons addressing non-commissioned officer roles, responsibilities, and authorities.
 - c. Assist Afghan National Army Commanders of headquarters, institutional organizations, and fielded units with implementing, supporting, and complying with approved Afghan National Army non-commissioned officer policies and guidance, while ensuring that all Coalition mentor and adviser teams are trained on these policies upon their arrival in theater.

Client Comments

NTM-A concurred with comment to Recommendation 1.a., noting the planned June 2013 review of MoD Directive 50012, the Organization and Functions Manual, and the opportunity to include NCO position descriptions developed by the Sergeant Major of the ANA and his working group. Support from senior ANA leaders will be important to the Organization and Functions Manual's modification and subsequent distribution of the manual to training schools and field ANA units.

NTM-A concurred with comment to Recommendation 1.b., noting the opportunity to modify appropriate courses of instruction.

NTM-A concurred with comment to Recommendation 1.c., suggesting a rewording for clarity of the recommendation and noting the addition of changes to the Organization and Functions Manual detailing duties and responsibilities of NCOs in the ANA will assist Coalition advisors to have a common point of reference for NCO performance.

Our Response

NTM-A's comments to Recommendation 1.a. were responsive. In six months, we will request a copy of the updated Organization and Functions Manual.

NTM-A's comments to Recommendation 1.b. were responsive. In six months, we will request a copy of the officer training plans of instruction meeting the intent of the recommendation.

NTM-A's comments to Recommendation 1.c. were responsive. We accepted their suggested revision to the wording of this recommendation. In six months, we will request a copy of the updated Organization and Function Manual.

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Observation 2. Afghan National Army Personnel Management

The ANA lacked a comprehensive and effectively functioning personnel management system to support merit-based promotion and assignments.

The ANA personnel system in place in late 2012:

- was paper-based with individual personnel files missing and many files incomplete;
- centralized decision authority for virtually all personnel actions (promotions, assignments, nominations for schools and other training);
- provided incomplete records of service and school and training attendance to separating personnel;
- included a functioning retirement system that was viewed as unattractive; and
- allowed favoritism and nepotism to taint the assignment, promotion, and other selection processes with no effective countermeasures.

This caused uncertainty for many soldiers, NCOs, and officers regarding career development and retirement prospects, and limited the ANA's ability to reduce personnel attrition and increase retention. Furthermore, the lack of a meaningful and attractive retirement system also contributed to a backlog of older less effective, or ineffective, personnel, remaining on active duty in the ANA, hindering upward mobility for younger, better educated, institutionally trained officers and NCOs.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix D, Number 2 and 3, for additional details.)

- *BLUEPRINT – ANA Personnel System*, NTM-A, dated 13 November 2012.
- Combined Training Advisory Group – Army, *Development Plan for the Afghanistan National Army Training & Education Command 2011 – 2014*, version 2.1, 1 April 2011.

Discussion

ANA Personnel System

The ANA could not maintain accurate personnel records and thus achieve personnel accountability using their manual ledger system. The manual system only accounted for a portion of all personnel records and did not facilitate branch wide assignment management procedures. It did not capture accurately school, training, or performance data. There was no centralized database of disciplinary actions, award information, medical qualifications, or literacy scores. The existing system limited data interchange, compilation, and analysis, hindering effective human resource decision making.

Moreover, MoD and ANA senior leadership had no systematic process to counteract the reportedly entrenched cultural practice of rewarding family, friends, and tribal allies with positions and promotions. These practices effectively perpetuated a non-merit based system of assignment and promotion that undermined effective personnel management and leadership development.

Further, it was noted that in order to support the goal of ethnic balancing across the ANA, a highly centralized command and control of the personnel system was in place. Therefore, only the most senior leaders at the MoD and the ANA GS were empowered to ensure deserving personnel received merit-based promotions and appropriate assignments to field units, schools, and other training. But, on the other hand, this high level intervention in determining promotions and assignments discouraged high performers who were not so well politically connected. Some personnel expressed frustration with this, discouraging them from pursuing a merit-based military career and negatively impacting the development of the most effective ANA leadership.

In some cases, soldiers and junior NCOs provided specialized skills training were assigned duties inconsistent with their training. For example, soldiers trained as medics had been assigned to administrative duties on headquarters staffs because of their literacy and competence. In addition to those improperly utilized soldiers, the high operational tempo of fielded units has limited the ability to accommodate a rotational training cycle for their personnel. This resulted with some leaders in combat units operating for years without any breaks for institutional military training, affecting unit performance and morale.

ANA personnel had little confidence in the ability of the government to continuously pay benefits after ones retirement. Therefore, the ANA retirement system was inadequate as an enabler in the development and sustainment of an effective military force.

General frustration with ANA personnel system practices discouraged some personnel, contributing to soldiers leaving the ANA before completing their initial enlistment, as well as mid-grade officers and NCOs leaving the ANA prior to reaching retirement eligibility. The loss of junior soldiers reduced retention and increased attrition rates, recruiting and training requirements, and associated costs. The departure of mid-grade personnel with training and combat experience also cost the ANA needed expertise and the loss of investment made in their professional development.


According to ANA officers, existing personnel management practices virtually prevented commanders from eliminating incompetent or ineffective leaders. The advisor to the ANA Chief of Administration believed that implementation of an automated system for personnel management could help address this problem, if it included effective oversight controls and decentralized approval authority for some actions.

Specific to the retirement system, according to interviews with ANA officers and Coalition advisors, its lack of credibility and uncertain funding negatively impacted older mid-level officers and NCOs (over the age of 50) with service pre-2002. These individuals generally lacked education, had limited prospects for employment after retirement, and no confidence that their retirement pay would enable them to maintain their military standard of living. As a group, these older mid-level officers and NCOs believed they had little prospect of post-military service upward economic mobility, notwithstanding their military education and training.

Based on these disincentives and lack of incentives, as well as no objective processes in place to manage the right people in the right job at the right time, the ANA appeared to perpetuate a degree of inefficiency that will severely limit professionalization of the army in the future.

Coalition Efforts

In late 2012, with Coalition planning and facilitation assistance, the ANA issued the “BLUEPRINT – ANA Personnel System”, as shown in Figure 2-1. The system proposed a concept for integrating enlisted, NCO, and officer recruiting targets, training systems, branch management, career progression, and the transition of personnel out of the ANA through separation or retirement. This comprehensive reform plan for the ANA personnel system promised to foster continued military professional education and meritorious performance and to provide enhanced incentives to remain in military service to retirement.



Source. NTM-A.

Full implementation of the BLUEPRINT would likely serve to foster long term professionalization of the ANA. The success of the system depended on the ANA developing, promulgating, and enforcing comprehensive doctrine and policy, and fielding and using the

automated Afghan Human Resources Information Management System which was transitioned to Afghan authority in December 2011.

Conclusion

Introduction of the “BLUEPRINT – ANA Personnel System,” demonstrated that ANA with strong support from the Coalition, had planned and begun implementation of potentially enduring improvements necessary to establish an effective and sustainable ANA personnel system. Universal acceptance of such a system by ANA leadership would be critical and reportedly remained a challenge.

Senior Coalition/MoD/ANA leaders interviewed agreed that the new personnel system being implemented would fundamentally improve ANA personnel and operational performance and sustainability if it:

- accurately tracked, projected, and accounted for relevant personnel data and branch requirements,
- instituted an objective merit based assignment and promotion system,
- ensured that all personnel were trained in their duties and responsibilities by competent and experienced instructors,
- established a positive incentive program to move older less effective members out of the ANA, and
- funded a benefits and retirement system that retained and motivated with appropriate incentives ANA personnel that met performance measures.

Recommendations

2. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, assist the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff to establish and implement comprehensive personnel management policies and systems that will:
- a. Accelerate implementation of the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System.
 - b. Incorporate a merit based promotion and assignment system that accounts for Afghan cultural norms and is compatible with Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan policies on ethnic balancing.
 - c. Establish personnel rotation policies that ensure all personnel are properly trained and assigned.
 - d. Include a program to separate non-productive personnel from the Afghan National Army that still encourages their loyalty to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
 - e. Fund a credible benefits and retirement system that provides incentive for personnel to make a career in the Afghan National Army that at the same time allows for future shaping of the force.

Client Comments

NTM-A concurred with comments to Recommendation 2.a. They described some limitations of AHRIMS, anticipated changes with a new AHRIMS support contract, and problems with the supporting infrastructure. NTM-A suggested the continued use of paper-based system until country-wide infrastructure improvements are adequate to support AHRIMS.

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 2.b. The Command noted that cronyism and nepotism influence promotions and assignment at all levels. However, efforts are underway to support the November 2012 ANA promotion policy with appropriate regulation for its implementation.

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 2.c., citing the Sergeant Major of the ANA's proposed modification to the soldier and NCO assignment policy.

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 2.d., providing no additional comments.

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 2.e., adding comments on the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled military retirement handbook detailing officer and NCO retirement procedures.

Our Response

NTM-A's comments to Recommendation 2.a. were responsive. We request an update on any changes to the existing, or the completion of a new, AHRIMS support contract.

NTM-A's comments to Recommendation 2.b. were responsive. In six months, we will request an update on efforts to implement the November 2012 ANA promotion policy.

NTM-A's comments to Recommendation 2.c. were responsive. We request the Command provide a copy of any proposed or implemented changes to officer assignment policies.

NTM-A's reply to Recommendation 2.d. were responsive. In six months, we will request an update on efforts to meet the intent of the recommendation.

NTM-A's comments to Recommendation 2.e. were responsive. In six months, we will request an update on the development of a credible ANA benefit and retirement system.

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Observation 3. Budgeting for Afghan National Army Schools

Commanders of the ANA schools comprising the training enterprise had a limited ability and almost no authority to control and execute organization budgets.

This occurred because the MoD and ANA GS maintained authority/approval over budgeting and the distribution of funds for execution. Also, Coalition Forces had not transferred complete budget authority for ANA operating funds to the Afghans.

Reluctance by the MoD to allow lower echelons to program and execute budgets hampered the development of training enterprise budgeting and accounting expertise. The lack of expertise led to limited ability to plan for actual projected costs, to include sustainment of facilities, and to request appropriate funding. Finally, centralized distribution of money caused training organizations located outside Kabul to be dependent on operational commanders for their support.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix D, Number 3, for additional details.)

- Combined Training Advisory Group – Army, *Development Plan for the Afghanistan National Army Training & Education Command 2011 – 1014*, version 2.1, 1 April 2011.

Discussion

During interviews with training enterprise organizations, Afghan leadership stated that they were only provided funds for immediate expenses and only after requesting the funds from higher headquarters. The senior leadership at the National Military Academy Afghanistan (NMAA) stated they had no budget and that annual funding had to be requested through the Afghanistan National Defense University (ANDU) to the MoD. Coalition advisors reiterated the message, highlighting the Afghan system of funds allocation as a weakness. Budgeting and funding execution for all but immediate needs was held at the MoD.

However, it was clear that Coalition Force procedures contributed to Afghan lack of expertise. Funding support for ANSF operations was provided by international donors, with the DoD Afghanistan Security Forces Fund providing a major part. As of October 2012, many key finance functions were performed by NTM-A advisors, not MoD officials. Representatives from the NTM-A Comptroller explained that they controlled the direct contribution of funds to the Afghan MoD and also performed all programming, planning, budgeting, and execution actions. NTM-A was developing a joint spending plan with the Afghan MoD in order to transition responsibility for all financial transactions now performed by Coalition Forces.

The primary consequence of Coalition control and Afghan MoD fiscal centralization was a lack of budgeting and accounting expertise development throughout the ANA. During interviews, commanders and staff of ANA training facilities focused primarily on the cost of operating the schools, consisting of items needed for instruction and support of the resident students. Facility operating and maintenance costs were generally not part of the discussion. Both the commander and the advisor for the Construction & Property Management Department in the MoD stated that

the lack of attention paid to facility sustainment costs was not unique to the ANA training enterprise.

The institutional training organizations comprising the ANDU were located in Kabul. In contrast, ANATC had authority over the five regional military training centers (RMTC) plus the Engineer Branch School outside the Kabul area, creating additional challenges. Each of the training centers was aligned with an ANA Corps headquarters, and Coalition advisors reported that it was not uncommon for Corps commanders to regard aligned training centers as “theirs”, that is, belonging to their command. The inability of ANATC to provide financial support to the training centers encouraged commanders of the training centers to request resources from the nearby Corps. This dependency increased the influence of the local commander, at the expense of ANATC, and did nothing to improve the accounting and programming abilities of the ANA schools.

While the lines of command and control authority over regional training centers were crossed, the commander of the ANA Engineer Branch School described it as an actual problem that his organization did not have a local Corps “sponsor.” The commander stated that he had no budgeting authority to disburse funds for the simplest of items necessary for running an effective school. He was required to request all basic supplies (desks, paper, printers, etc.) as well as specialized equipment (explosives, transportation, etc.) previously supplied by the Coalition advisors through the ANA logistics system. The commander reported that logistical support was uneven at best. The school was expected to occupy a new \$30 million facility in 2013, but he expressed no confidence that the school would receive financial resources to sustain the facilities and equipment or be able to purchase necessary supplies for instruction.

Conclusion

The inability of ANA training enterprise schools and training centers to control and execute budgets hindered effective operation and their mission of leader development. Changes to MoD budget practices were necessary to ensure sustained, effective operations after complete transition to Afghan lead.

Recommendation

- | |
|---|
| <p>3. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, assist the Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff, Afghanistan National Army to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a. Develop operating budget estimates for the Afghan National Army training enterprise – by specific location or local command.b. Develop and implement an MoD process to delegate and maintain oversight over essential operating and maintenance funding to training centers. |
|---|

Client Comments

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 3.a., adding comments detailing the institutional challenges in implementing budgetary authority and control below the MoD level.

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 3.b., adding details about the coordination between the Coalition's Engineering division and the MoD's Construction and Property Division.

Our Response

NTM-A's comments to Recommendation 3.a. were responsive. We recognize the long-term nature of this recommendation and acknowledge the initiatives cited in the comments such as NTM-A CJ8's support to ANDU and ANATC to develop budget estimates for the coming years.

NTM-A's comments to Recommendation 3.b. were responsive.

In six months, we will request an update on the status of both recommendations.

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Observation 4. Afghan National Army School Course Quality

None of the schools comprising the ANA training enterprise were making systematic qualitative changes in the programs of instruction based on the:

- performance in the field of their graduates,
- recent lessons learned transmitted to them by field commands, and
- the experience of recent field soldiers as instructors.

The ANA had no formal mechanism to collect feedback on field performance from the ANA Corps concerning the quality of performance of training school graduates. School faculty lacked an awareness of what adjustments to make in the training curriculum and the schools did not have sufficient instructor staff with field experience to draw on in this regard. Moreover, recent field lessons learned were not being collected and integrated into programs of instruction on a regular basis.

As a result, the training programs were missing the opportunity to improve the capability of graduates by incorporating the most effective tactics, techniques, and procedures and thus prepare them to become the most effective leaders.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix D, Number 3, for additional details.)

- Combined Training Advisory Group – Army, *Development Plan for the Afghanistan National Army Training & Education Command 2011 – 1014*, vers. 2.1, 1 April 2011.

Discussion

Interviews with senior ANA officials and Coalition advisors indicated that there was little systematic coordination between the ANA training enterprise and field Corps to update course curricula to reflect unit battlefield reality and needs. This was the case with schools under the authority of the ANDU and ANATC. (See Appendix E.)

Feedback on Graduate Performance

Commanders and Coalition advisors at two institutions within the ANDU reported that there was no formal means of assessing graduate performance in the field. The commander of the NMAA stated that, while no formal process was in place, he received informal feedback from Corps commanders through personal contact with the CoGS. The Commander of the Command Staff College also reported that his instructors visited units and adjusted the program of instruction as necessary.

Interviews with senior leaders of ANATC branch schools and training centers yielded similar responses. There was no comprehensive system to collect information on graduate performance or to update the programs of instruction based on recent operational unit experiences. Staff officers assigned to the ANATC stated that they were unable to conduct site visits to ANA Corps due to a lack of transportation. In addition, the Commander of the Junior Officer Course said that while there was no formal system, on at least one occasion, his instructors visited ANA unit commanders to solicit recommendations for course curriculum changes.

Senior Coalition advisors interviewed showed awareness of the absence of a systematic feedback loop to update program of instruction curriculum. In addition to school advisors, the advisor to the CoGS and the NTM-A Deputy Commander-Army (DCOM-A) cited a need for an effective process to support the preparation of ANA leaders by providing them the most current lessons learned from field units.

The explosive ordnance specialty provided an example of success worth noting. They used an informal network of Coalition advisors to keep track of explosive ordnance disposal school graduates and their performance in field units. However, the small number of graduates and reliance on Coalition support likely made this model unique and not readily exploitable or sustainable by other career fields.

School Instructor Assignments

Absent a comprehensive graduate assessment feedback process, assigning instructors with recent operational experience to schools could encourage changes and improvements to training programs. However, interviews with ANA training enterprise leaders and advisors indicated that this was not a common practice.

The Commander of the NMAA cited a shortfall in experienced qualified instructors. Coalition advisors noted that there were too many staff instructors with limited or no military background and only token academic credentials. While there were faculty development programs ongoing, 60 instructors on contract were programmed to reach the end of their term in 2013. Some of these slots were expected to be filled with new NMAA graduates retained as instructors, continuing a practice that reflected the shortage of trained, educated Afghans, or a system to assign instructors from field units. Retaining graduates as instructors served a short term need, but did not increase the knowledge and experience base of the instructor staff and denied recent graduates operational experience.

The Commander of the Command and Staff College Junior Officer course said the school had a policy to rotate instructors every three years. Because the school had been in existence less than three years, the policy had not been fully implemented. Coalition advisors added that those instructors who had departed usually rotated from the school to an assignment in the MoD and then returned.

The branch schools in the ANATC had the same problem, but for a different reason. Commanders of the Infantry, Military Police, and Engineer Branch Schools all said that the GS or MoD managed the instructor assignment, screening, and selection process without their input. Professional qualifications were not necessarily the deciding factor.

School faculty were therefore unaware of the need for necessary adjustments to training curriculum, missing the opportunity to disseminate combat lessons-learned and potentially allowing the curriculum to become out-of date. The ANA was at war and needed qualified, informed instructors to prepare graduates to be effective in the field. Teaching less effective tactics, techniques, and procedures puts soldiers at risk and burdens field commands with re-training requirements.

At the end of 2012, the ANA was rapidly taking the operational lead and had an increasing need to gain and transmit the most useful tactics through their training schools. Arguably, the most effective way to prepare soldiers, NCOs and officers would be to ensure recent lessons learned were disseminated throughout the organization at the training base using combat experienced instructor staff. While this might create a short-term impact on the unit losing combat-experienced personnel to become instructors, the ANA overall, and the field units in particular, would gain in professionalism as a fighting force in the medium-term.

Conclusion

The ANA training enterprise lacked a systemic process for assessing graduate field adaptation and capturing lessons learned, and generally did not assign instructors with field experience. Better communication between the Corps and the ANA training enterprise regarding personnel performance in their units after graduation, field unit training needs, coupled with the Corps furnishing combat veterans to the schools as instructors, would enable the necessary progressive improvement of ANA training courses' quality and further leader development.

Recommendations

4.a. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, advise the Commander, Afghan National Army Training Command to develop and institute a feedback mechanism with the Afghan National Army Corps Commanders regarding the performance of training school graduates, and lessons learned that need to be embedded in the programs of instruction.

4.b. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, advise the Chief of the General Staff, Commander, Afghan National Defense University, and Commander, Afghan National Army Training Command to develop and enforce an assignment policy that selects the best qualified instructors with field experience for Afghan National Army schools.

Client Comments

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 4.a., noting that validation is a necessary step in ensuring effective training.

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 4.b., commenting on the need for including within the MOS career paths such items as practical experience and instructional training and prerequisites for instructor assignment.

Our Response

NTM-A's responses to Recommendations 4.a. and 4.b. were responsive.

In six months, we will request an update on the status of both recommendations.

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Observation 5. Afghan National Army Literacy Training

ANA officers and NCOs did not always meet established requirements for education and literacy and occasionally lacked literacy required for their duties.

This situation existed because the ANA sometimes assigned rank as a reward for past service or individuals obtained assignments through non-merit-based mechanisms and, in either case, the personnel system's requirements for education and literacy for ANA leaders were circumvented. Also, Afghanistan lacked a viable public education system for more than a generation leaving much of the military-age population illiterate and innumerate.

Officers and NCOs who were not literate at the level required to attain that rank diminished their credibility with enlisted personnel and the trust and confidence of better educated subordinate junior officers and NCOs. Without having the essential literacy, officers and NCOs would have difficulty with, or not even be eligible for, more advanced training. Also, ongoing operations and tactical success achieved by leaders without required education allowed some ANA leaders to view literacy training as a distraction to war fighting.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix D, Number 3, for additional details.)

- Combined Training Advisory Group – Army, *Development Plan for the Afghanistan National Army Training & Education Command 2011 – 1014*, version 2.1.1 April 2011.

Discussion

Not all ANA leaders met the rank-specified literacy and education standards established in ANA policy and regulation. After initial literacy testing and training during BWT, ANA advanced schools and line units provided follow-on literacy training with the goal of every soldier achieving literacy and numeracy to the third grade level. Soldiers selected or promoted to become NCOs were required to achieve a ninth grade education. Officers were supposed to have completed twelfth grade level education, as a minimum, and demonstrate progress toward a college diploma upon commissioning. Senior officers were supposed to meet higher academic proficiency standards prior to selection for attendance at senior staff schools.

However, many former mujahedin fighters and Soviet-era officers and NCOs joined the ANA at a rank that rewarded earlier service and battlefield experience. And, some gained their rank and position through personal influence, family connections, or ethnic loyalties. These officers and NCOs were generally older, and were for the most part, uneducated or under-educated for the rank they held. It was reported that, in some cases, commanders had to rely on their subordinates to read and relay orders received from higher headquarters.

Achieving desired education standards was also a challenge because, for over a generation, Afghanistan lacked a viable public education system. Many Afghans, especially those in rural areas, never attended school. This resulted in a literacy rate of less than 15 percent of new ANA recruits, as of 2011. Therefore, NTM-A has devoted a substantial effort to providing these new ANA recruits with basic literacy and numeracy.

Some Afghan leaders interviewed reported that ‘legacy’ officers and NCOs that were not literate at the level expected of their rank diminished the trust and confidence of subordinate leaders. This was particularly true for those junior officers and NCOs that joined the ANA with the rank-requisite education, who had been developed by Coalition partners and advisors, and understood the regulations.

Support for continued literacy training was not absolute across the ANA leadership. While almost all Afghan leaders interviewed voiced support for the program, some Coalition advisors indicated that ANA unit commanders below Corps viewed literacy training as a distraction to war fighting. The same advisors reported that some ANA commanders believed that the time spent in the classroom would be better spent training soldier skills or in the field conducting combat operations. Another reported objection to the ongoing literacy program was that soldiers achieving sufficient literacy increased turnover in the force by seeking other employment immediately after or even during their enlistment. The counter to this concern, stated by one senior ANA officer, is that the literate ANA who left the service raised the educational level and economic capacity of the society as a whole.

In terms of its importance to professional development, both ANA and NTM-A senior leadership actively promoted basic literacy training for soldiers as an enabler and force multiplier for the ANA. Recruits were tested, and if necessary, enrolled in literacy classes during basic training. The goal for basic training was that soldiers achieved rudimentary skills during 64 hours of literacy instruction. In order to improve ANA soldier proficiency and overall ANA efficiency, the Coalition funded continued literacy training in all ANA units.

With minor exceptions, virtually all ANA leaders and Coalition advisors interviewed acknowledged the value of literacy in the ANA and the connection between increased literacy and professionalization. They understood that the ability to read, write, and count had enabled ANA soldiers to better grasp basic military skills and to use assigned weapons and equipment more effectively. A soldier’s performance was reported to be more consistent and productive when they had the ability to read operator and other training manuals.

Several senior Afghan and Coalition leaders believed that literate soldiers fostered secondary benefits for the nation of Afghanistan. Any literate soldier that returned to the civilian sector invariably had greater employment prospects than he did before he entered the ANA. Also, literate Afghans had the ability to seek alternate sources of information, to objectively assess the quality and accuracy of that information, and in the end, to discern what was right or wrong for them and to ultimately make better decisions on which course of action they would or would not follow. One senior Coalition official stated that basic literacy, “...allows Afghans to be more discerning...,” less vulnerable to Taliban and other insurgent influences.

Conclusion

The assessment of all senior Coalition and senior ANA leaders interviewed was that, although there were challenges to its implementation, the literacy program is one of the best ANA success stories because it produced positive results for the ANA as a fighting force and for Afghanistan’s progress as a country.

Recommendations

5. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan:
 - a. Advise the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff to ensure that new noncommissioned officers and officers have attained the literacy levels required by regulation.
 - b. Advise the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff to maintain the literacy program in the future and explore means for its expansion through additional cooperative nation programs and support from international non-governmental organization and/or partnerships with educational institutions.

Client Comments

NTM-A concurred with Recommendations 5.a. and 5.b. without comment.

Our Response

NTM-A's replies to Recommendations 5.a. and 5.b. were responsive.

In six months, we will request an update on the status of both recommendations.

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Observation 6. Gauging Leader Development

Dated assessment metrics and practices, and divergent IJC and NTM-A mission focus hindered their reliably gauging the impact of ANA leader development efforts.

NTM-A and IJC needed to shift their data collection criteria from force generation (quantity) metrics to those measuring the quality and capability of ANA leaders and units. In addition, while the primary concern for NTM-A was ANSF institutional development, IJC field commanders were primarily engaged in operations and assigned lower priority to continuing ANA leader development through the schooling system.

Assessment shortfalls by ANA subordinate commands impeded ISAF from effectively gauging progress and systematically developing ANA leaders essential to transitioning to Afghan-led security on scheduled timelines. Lack of clarity in assessing ANA leadership capabilities and shortcomings could impede the ability of senior leaders to make transition training and other key decisions based on reliable data and thus negatively impact mission success.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix D, Number 4, 5, and 7, for additional details.)

- DoD Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, September 16, 2009.
- *Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform*, Unified Action Handbook Series Book Five, June 13, 2011.
- *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE), A Metrics Framework*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., June 4, 2010.

Discussion

In 2012, the Commander, NTM-A received a monthly information brief that tracked ANSF unit leader development and the Commander, IJC relied on the Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT). These data points, primarily based on quantitative measures, including personnel strength, equipment on hand, training attendance, and literacy graduation rates, were indicative of previous command emphasis on gauging force generation.

Impact of the Shifting Mission Emphasis

During 2012, the ANA, with the assistance of Coalition advisors, made steady progress in fielding units that were planned for in the program of record. The priority of NTM-A and IJC began to shift to ANA force professionalization. As a result, the general assessment emphasis for the Coalition and its ANA advisors needed to shift from quantitative measures associated with generating ANA forces to measuring capabilities of ANA units and the quality of their leaders. NTM-A had not yet adjusted their assessment practices or measures to reflect this major change in ANA development. IJC did gather some subjective data on the quality of ANA leaders in operational units.

NTM-A remained largely oriented toward establishing and maximizing institutional school and education course capacity, and training program throughput. Its assessed measures of progress continued to stress quantitative metrics:

- numbers of recruits,
- officer and NCO qualifications,
- percentage of personnel and equipment on hand,
- infrastructure completed,
- course fill rates,
- ethnic balance, and
- numbers of personnel educated to defined levels of literacy.

The CUAT used by IJC included, but went beyond, numbers of personnel and equipment. Specifically, the tool collected advisor assessments of critical unit functions, one of which was leadership. The assessment of leadership required subjective consideration of four qualitative characteristics: Competence, Honesty, Influence, and Loyalty. However, the command had not sufficiently defined and developed these measures.

US Joint Forces Command guidance states that assessment reliability depends on identifying in advance key interrelationships and specifying the evaluation criteria and data gathering methodology. Assessment criteria and methodology used by IJC in the CUAT were developed in advance, but were just applicable to newly formed units. In late 2012, criteria and methodology did not reflect emerging requirements to assess ANA qualitative performance.

Analysts should stress the need to minimize and anchor subjectivity by carefully describing the proposed relationship between qualitative indicators and the conditions of interest. Best practice suggests considering relationship strengths and weaknesses and identifying desired weights prior to aggregating qualitative metrics.³ Effective use of qualitative measures requires a written, well-defined statement of the relationship between qualitative indicators and target conditions, and an established range of estimated relative importance for each individual indicator.

Responses varied considerably regarding the priority and relative importance of the four qualitative characteristics for leadership. This suggested that subjectivity had not been effectively minimized and that interrelationships and relative weights among the four leadership criteria used for assessment in the CUAT (i.e., Competence, Honesty, Influence, and Loyalty) were not sufficiently detailed or uniformly applied. Effectively assessing leader quality required that relationships between indicators and target conditions be redefined and restated.

Inconsistencies in assessment criteria and methodology impeded NTM-A and IJC from reliably gauging the effectiveness of leader improvement efforts, which limited their ability to effectively inform senior decision makers about critical near-term transition decision points and evaluate the longer-term implications of progress, or lack thereof, in developing ANA leadership that will impact ANA effectiveness and success.

³ For a more detailed discussion see: “Best Practices Guide for Conducting Assessments in Counterinsurgencies,” Dave LaRivee, *Small Wars Journal*, August 17, 2011, pages 25 and 26; smallwarsjournal.com.

Support of Institutional Leader Development Efforts

The primary mission of IJC commanders was ongoing combat operations, not assessing ANA capabilities. They viewed NTM-A as responsible for institutional ANA leader development efforts. As a consequence, there was limited incentive to systematically share information relating to ANA leader development. IJC did not regularly schedule cross-command conferences or other leader development information exchanges, and shared only a portion of the total ANA leader performance information and awareness they possessed with NTM-A. IJC and NTM-A officials interviewed supported this assertion. As the ANA matured, the limited exchange of information increasingly deprived NTM-A of information essential to gauging progress and systematically improving the quality of institutional ANA leader development schools, training programs, and formal curriculums. As the IJC mission increasingly shifts to an advise and assist role, feedback on leadership quality in operational forces is critical if NTM-A is to advocate for adjustments in institutional professional development training.

Conclusion

As of mid-2012, command assessment measures had been developed to track ANA force strength, including numbers of NCOs and officers generated. While those practices and measures were useful, they were increasingly inadequate for gauging progress and systematically improving the quality of longer-term ANA leader development efforts, especially institutional ANA schools, training programs, and formal curricula.

Recommendations

6. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, and Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command:
- a. Update data collection criteria to reflect the shift in emphasis from building the Afghan National Army to improving its quality.
 - b. Systematize sharing of Afghan National Army leader development information between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan and the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command.
 - c. Promote improved use of qualitative measures by carefully identifying proposed weights and relationships between key indicators and the conditions of interest.

Client Comments

IJC concurred with Recommendation 6.a. without comment.

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 6.a., adding the need for several intermediate steps prior to full implementation of this recommendation. These steps include: 1) full fielding of the ANA, 2) ANA leadership at MoD and the General Staff be well-versed in the analytical techniques used in performance measurement, and 3) a written and approved plan for the enduring post-2014 mission that allows quality assessments to be supportive of the plan's mission.

IJC concurred with Recommendation 6.b. without comment.

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 6.b., adding that with the coming reorganization of NTM-A and IJC this goal will get increasing attention.

IJC concurred with Recommendation 6.c. without comment.

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 6.c., adding that this recommendation be implemented as part of a methodical plan, along with that of Recommendation 6.a.

Our Response

IJC's replies to Recommendations 6.a., 6.b., and 6.c. were partially responsive. Since IJC will be the senior Command with the upcoming reorganization, please provide information on how this recommendation will be implemented in coordination with NTM-A.

NTM-A's replies to Recommendations 6.a., 6.b., and 6.c. were responsive.

In six months, we will request an update on all three recommendations.

Observation 7. Training Standards for NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan Advisors

U.S. and Coalition advisors at NTM-A institutional schools and training programs demonstrated a wide variance in aptitude and competence for the advising mission.

The lack of standardized training did not sufficiently clarify NTM-A expectations of the skills, techniques, and cultural competencies necessary to effectively advise senior ANA leaders.

The resulting unevenness of advisor preparation limited advisor effectiveness and may have delayed the professional development of ANA leaders.

Applicable Criteria (See Appendix D, Number 6, for additional details.)

- Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) Document, *The Afghan National Security Forces - Advisor Guide*, Section 2, June 2012.

Discussion

NTM-A was responsible for leadership training and leader development at the MoD, GS, and ANA institutional training sites. The command depended on a cadre of U.S., NATO, and other Coalition advisors to provide instruction and support. Advisors provided from U.S. sources included military Service members (active duty and reserves), DoD civilians, and civilians under contract. NTM-A officials stated that each of the national and service-level components that provided advisors had its own selection and training criteria.

Specifically, U.S. Military Services provided rosters of available personnel to fill validated requirements for advisors. The consolidated roster included personnel from all Service branches, with the U.S. Army providing the majority of candidates. Unfortunately, one of the primary U.S. Army criteria for selection as an advisor was availability for deployment. As a result, NTM-A officials described the process by which they selected advisors for institutional schools and training programs as a "best match," based on criteria established by NTM-A. Depending on specific advisor position requirements, some U.S. military personnel selected as advisors attended the Combat Advisor Course at Fort Polk, Louisiana, prior to deployment to Afghanistan.

In contrast, NTM-A selected advisors to the MoD using a process that included screening for qualifications and pre-assignment training. Officials explained that NTM-A validated advisor positions for each rotation, interviewed candidates prior to acceptance, and sent those selected to a seven-week training course before assignment. The NTM-A DCOM-A also drew advisors from the MoD program support contract. The contractor selected and trained civilians, many with prior military experience, according to the statement of work developed by NTM-A.

From July to December 2011, NTM-A required incoming advisors to attend a five-day training course upon their arrival in country. In 2012, the commander restructured NTM-A, delegating the training to deputy commanders, after which programs of instruction and training status were

not tracked by NTM-A. However, NTM-A officials were aware that the DCOM-A provided three-day advisor courses in May and August 2012, concurrent with significant personnel rotations. They said the command developed the course using existing advisors as subject matter experts.

Conclusion

NTM-A institutional schools, courses, and training programs filled an important role in institutionalizing leadership training across the ANA. Advisors staffed to these programs directly impacted ANA leader development and professionalism. Standardized training prior to assumption of duties would better prepare selected individuals for a successful advising mission.

Recommendation

7. Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, reinstitute standardized training for all advisors who will perform duties at the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Afghan National Army institutional training sites.

Client Comments

NTM-A concurred with Recommendation 7, commenting on the benefit of the job descriptions that will be added to the ANA Organization and Functions Manual in allowing advisors of different nations to share a common standard of NCO performance.

Our Response

NTM-A's reply to Recommendation 7 was responsive. In six months, we will request a copy of the updated Organization and Function Manual.

Appendix A. Scope, Methodology, and Acronyms

We conducted this assessment from February to November 2012 in accordance with the standards published in the *Quality Standards for Inspections*. We planned and performed the assessment to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our observations and conclusions, based on our assessment objectives. The assessment team conducted site visits in Afghanistan from June 11–30, 2012.

The objectives of this assessment were to determine the sufficiency of Coalition leader development programs for ANA officers and NCOs in support of the goal of enabling Afghan-led security by the end of 2014. This included the evaluation of the level to which ANA leaders demonstrate practical application of leadership qualities taught in the leader development programs as well as the ANA leader selection, career development processes, and the likelihood of the sustainment of effective leader development post-2014. To ensure a thorough basis for our conclusions and recommendations, we visited ANA institutional training locations, personnel, and headquarters officials in the Kabul area and two of the six Coalition Regional Commands.

We reviewed documents such as Federal Laws and regulations, including the National Defense Authorization Act, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions, DoD directives and instructions, and appropriate U.S. Central Command, NATO/ISAF, IJC, USFOR-A, NTM-A, and MoD guidance.

We also visited or contacted organizations and individuals in the U.S. and Afghanistan that were directly responsible for, or advise the commanders responsible for, developing ANA officers and NCOs. We reviewed the programs and processes used in the development ANA officers and NCOs and spoke with appropriate U.S./Coalition and Afghan leaders and managers including general officers, staff officers, senior NCOs, junior NCOs, and Coalition force embedded advisors in the ANA training enterprise and fielded units. We chose this methodology based on our previous work in the area of ANSF development and the advice of DoDIG personnel permanently stationed with NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC.

The ANA Leadership Development assessment chronology was:

January–early–June 2012	Research and fieldwork in CONUS
June 11–30, 2012	Fieldwork in Afghanistan
June 27, 2012	Out Brief to IJC and NTM-A
July 2012–November 2012	Analysis, report writing, and reviews
April 2013	Draft report issued
May 2013	Management comments received and evaluated
June 2013	Final report issued

Limitations

We limited the scope of this review to DoD-funded programs, NATO-funded programs, and international donation programs supporting the development of the ANA leadership.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this assessment.

Acronyms Used in this Report

The following is a list of the acronyms used in this report.

ANA	Afghan National Army
ANATC	Afghan National Army Training Command
ANDU	Afghan National Defense University
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
BWT	Basic Warrior Training
CoGS	Chief of the General Staff
CUAT	Commander's Unit Assessment Tool
DCOM-A	Deputy Commander-Army
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GS	General Staff
IJC	International Security Assistance Force Joint Command
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KMTC	Kabul Military Training Center
MoD	Afghan Ministry of Defense
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NMAA	National Military Academy of Afghanistan
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
RMTC	Regional Military Training Center

Appendix B. Summary of Prior Coverage

During the last four years, the DoD, the Government Accountability Office, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, the Commission on Wartime Contracting, the Congressional Research Service, and the DoD OIG have issued a number of reports discussing the development of the Afghan MoD and the ANA.

Unrestricted DoD reports can be accessed at <http://www.defense.gov/pubs>. Unrestricted Government Accountability Office reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction reports can be accessed at <http://www.sigar.mil>. Unrestricted Commission on Wartime Contracting reports can be accessed at <http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/index.php/reports>. Unrestricted Congressional Research Service Reports can be accessed at <http://www.crs.gov>. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports>.

Some of the prior coverage we used in preparing this report has included:

Department of Defense

Report to Congress in accordance with sections 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” April 2012.

Report to Congress in accordance with sections 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” October 2011.

Report to Congress in accordance with sections 1230/1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” and “United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces,” April 2011.

Report to Congress in accordance with sections 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” November 2010.

Report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” April 2010.

Report to Congress in accordance with section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), “United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces,” April 2010.

Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” June 2009.

Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” January 2009.

Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” June 2008.

Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1231, Public Law 110-181), “United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces,” June 2008.

Government Accountability Office

GAO-12-951T, “Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces,” July 24, 2012.

GAO-11-760, “Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to Support the Advising Mission,” August 2, 2011.

GAO-11-66, “Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined,” Jan 27, 2011.

GAO-10-842T, “Preliminary Observations on DoD’s Progress and Challenges in Distributing Supplies and Equipment to Afghanistan,” June 25, 2010.

GAO-10-655R, “Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan,” June 15, 2010.

GAO-08-661, “Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces,” June 18, 2008.

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)

SIGAR Audit-10-11, “Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments,” June 29, 2010.

Commission on Wartime Contracting

Interim Report to Congress, “At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,” June 10, 2009.

Second Interim Report to Congress, “At what risk? Correcting over-reliance on contractors in contingency operations,” February 24, 2011.

Special Report to Congress, “Sustainability: hidden costs risk new waste,” June 6, 2011.

Final Report to Congress, “Transforming Wartime Contracting—Controlling costs, reducing risks,” August 2011.

Congressional Research Service

“Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” February 6, 2012.

Department of Defense Inspector General

DoDIG Report No. SPO-2009-007, “Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces,” September 30, 2009.

DoDIG Report No. D-2007-039, “DoD Support to NATO International Security Assistance Force,” February 5, 2007.

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Appendix C. Organizations Contacted and Visited

We visited, contacted, or conducted interviews with officials (or former officials) from the following NATO, U.S., and Afghan organizations:

United States

Department of Defense

Faculty and Staff at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point

Afghanistan

International Security Assistance Force - Afghanistan

- Deputy Commander-Army, NTM-A and selected staff
- Deputy Commander-Support, NTM-A
- Selected staff from IJC
- Deputy Commander, Regional Command North and selected staff
- Commander, Training Advisor Group for the RMTC in Regional Command North and selected staff

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Ministry of Defense

- Assistant Minister of Defense for Personnel and Education
- Assistant Minister of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
- Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy and Policy
- ANA Chief of the General Staff
- ANA Command Sergeant Major
- ANA Chief of Administration (GS/G1)
- ANA Chief of Operations (GS/G3)
- ANA Chief of Logistics (GS/G4)
- ANA Chief of Training (GS/G7)
- Commander, Ground Forces Command, and selected staff
- Commander, KMTC, subordinate commanders, and selected staff
- Commander, ANATC, subordinate commanders, and selected staff
- Commander, National Military Academy of Afghanistan, and selected staff
- Commander, Command Staff College, and subordinate commanders
- Commander of the RMTC in Regional Command North
- ANA Commanders/Leaders in Regional Commands North and East

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Appendix D. Afghan/U.S. Policy, United States Code, Federal Regulations, and DoD Policies

1. ANA 6-22, “Army Leadership,” August 1, 2007. This manual is the keystone leadership manual for the ANA and establishes leadership doctrine, the fundamental principles by which Army leaders act to accomplish their mission and care for their people. This manual applies to officers, sergeants, and enlisted Soldiers of all Army components, and to Army civilians. From Soldiers in basic training to newly commissioned officers, new leaders learn how to lead with this manual as a basis.

2. BLUEPRINT – ANA Personnel System, NTM-A, dated 13 NOV 2012. This blue print is an illustration of the “System of Systems” design by which the ANA will Attract, Retain, and Professionalize its force.

3. Combined Training Advisory Group – Army, Development Plan for the Afghanistan National Army Training & Education Command 2011 – 2014, vers 2.1, 1 April 2011. This Development Plans serves as the primary development document for the ANATC. It sets out the path by which ANATC’s Coalition Force advisors in the Combined Training Advisory Group-Army (CTAG-A) will transition full responsibility to ANATC. It is reviewed quarterly in order to respond to changing conditions, adjust guidance and maintain relevance.

4. DoD Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations, September 16, 2009. This instruction updates policy and assigns responsibilities for the identification and development of DoD capabilities to support stability operations, to include identifying analytical gaps and ensuring that DoD analytical tools, including models and simulations, address stability operations activities and capabilities.

5. Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform, Unified Action Handbook Series Book Five, June 13, 2011. This handbook provides fundamental guidance, planning considerations, techniques, procedures, and other information for rule of law (ROL) issues that the joint force commander (JFC) and his staff may encounter in joint operation/campaign planning and in executing military operations such as theater security cooperation, foreign humanitarian assistance, stability operations, and peace operations. It explains the interrelationship between ROL, governance, and security; and outlines the role of security sector reform (SSR) in building partner capacity to strengthen stability and ROL. It is designed primarily for commanders and planners and is a practical guide that provides templates, tools, best practices, and lessons learned for planning and execution at the theater-of-operations level and below. It provides a template to analyze foundations essential to successful stability operations.

6. Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) Document, “The Afghan National Security Forces - Advisor Guide,” June 2012. This document is a reference for currently serving or deploying U.S. and Coalition partners. As a reference, it describes and illustrates the historical context, forces, and force structures of the ANSF across DOTMLPF-P domains. Likewise, this guide provides perspective

and relationships of the Security Force Assistance (SFA) structure that exists within the ISAF and its subordinate organizations like NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) and the IJC.

7. Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE), A Metrics Framework, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., June 4, 2010. MPICE was designed by and for policymakers, analysts, planners, and program and project implementers in conflict areas around the world. It enables policymakers to establish a baseline before intervention and track progress toward stability and, ultimately, self-sustaining peace. Its intention is to contribute to establishing realistic goals, focusing government efforts strategically, integrating interagency activities, and enhancing the prospects for attaining an enduring peace. This metrics framework supports strategic and operational planning cycles and provides best practices for dealing with qualitative measures.

8. MoD Directive 5001, “Ministry of Defense Organization and Functions Manual,” March 29, 2011. The manual prescribes the command relationships from the President of Afghanistan, through the MoD and GS to all elements of the ANA. It also prescribes the organization and functions of all approved organizational structures (Tashkils) of the offices of the MoD and GS of the ANA. This manual, along with existing Ministerial Decrees, policies, standard operating procedures and ANA regulations serves as the basis for assigning and coordinating staff actions.

Appendix E. Organization of the ANA Training and Education Enterprise

Introduction

This Appendix is divided into two sections. The first section defines and distinguishes the organizational structures of the ANATC and the ANDU. The second provides the geographical locations of the various ANA schools.

Organizational Structure of ANATC and ANDU

As shown in Figure E-1, ANA has primarily organized its Training and Education enterprise into two separate commands. These commands are ANATC and ANDU.


ANATC- Develops training doctrine, establishes training standards, and trains soldiers in order to build and sustain the ANA. ANATC consists of the following entities:

- KMTC
- five RMTCs,
- Consolidated Fielding Center, and
- Branch Schools Directorate:
 - Infantry Branch School
 - Armor Branch School
 - School of Artillery
 - Engineer School
 - Signals School
 - Military Police School
 - Logistics School

ANDU- Provides professional military education to the ANA and develops future military and civilian leaders through its academic and military programs. The university consists of these schools:

- National Military Academy of Afghanistan (modeled after the United States Military Academy at West Point)
- Afghan National Army Officer's Academy (modeled after Sandhurst in the United Kingdom)
- Command Staff College
- Sergeants Major Academy
- Counter Insurgency Training Center
- Kabul Military High School
- Afghan Foreign Language Inst.

Figure E-1. ANA Training and Education Organizational Chart



Source. DoD IG – SPO

ANATC is the ANA’s training command and ANDU is the ANA’s educational focused organization.


Geographic Locations of ANATC and ANDU Schools

As shown in Figure E-2, the formal schools of the ANA are located throughout Afghanistan. The majority on these schools are located in the vicinity of Kabul. The primary facilities in the Kabul area include:

- ANDU located in the Qargha region to the west,
- ANATC headquarters located in the Darulaman region to the south, and
- KMTC (along with ANA facilities at Pol-e-Charki) located to the eastern section of the city.

However, in addition to the six RMTC, each geographically located within a Regional Command, the Engineer School is permanently located at Mazer-e-Sharif in Regional Command-North. Furthermore, the Signals School and the Military Police school are also slated to be permanently located at Mazer-e-Sharif.

Figure E-2. ANA Training and Education Enterprise Geographic Locations



Source. DoD IG – SPO

This map depicts the slated permanent locations of the ANA’s formal schools and training venues.

NOTE: There are some ADCON relationships between the ANDU, KMTC, or RMTC-N with several of ANATC’s branch schools. This is because, in the vicinity of Kabul, three branch schools are located on the ANDU grounds in Qargha, and five are located at KMTC (or the nearby Pol-e-Charki facility). Moreover, there are three other branch schools that are slated to be permanently located away from the vicinity of Kabul. These are the Engineer, Signals, and MP schools, which are located with and are ADCON to RMTC-N (209th Corps) in Mazar-e-Sharif. Additionally, both RMTC-W and RMTC-E each have two separate facility locations within their respective RCs.

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Appendix F. Management Comments

NTM-A Comments



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF
NTM-A/CSTC-A

HEADQUARTERS
NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

29 Apr 2013

MEMORANDUM THRU United States Forces - Afghanistan (CJIG), APO AE 09356
United States Central Command (CCIG), MacDill AFB, FL 33621

FOR: Office of the Department of Defense – Inspector General, Special Plans and Operation
4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: NTM-A/CSTC-A Response to the Draft Report “Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to
Develop Leaders in the Afghan National Army” (D2012-D00SPO-0090.000)

REFERENCE: Draft Report, dated 10 Apr 13, Department of Defense Inspector General.

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a response to recommendations 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, 2.e, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, 4.b, 5.a, 5.b, 6.a, 6.b, 6.c, 7 within the referenced DoD IG SPO Draft Report.

2. Point of contact for this action is [REDACTED]

Enclosure:
NTM-A/CSTC-A Response to Draft Report

NTM-A/CSTC-A
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT

“Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop Leaders in the Afghan National Army”
(D2012-D00SPO-0090.000)

1. Recommendation 1 states:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command:

a. Recommendation 1.a

Assist the Chief of the General Staff, Afghan National Army to complete, approve, and publish policy and guidance defining the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of an Afghan non-commissioned officer.

b. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 1.a:
NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs and adds the following comments:

The establishment, roles and responsibilities of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are not defined and senior ANA officers have not embraced the value of engaging and empowering NCOs. Since 2002, through formal training programs and mentoring, Coalition advisors have helped develop a well-trained corps of NCOs. The missing element is that a majority of ANA officers have not been trained and mentored on how to properly utilize these trained and experienced NCOs.

The ANA GSG1 advisor team includes an enlisted development team in support of the GSG1 Sergeant Major to specifically address execution of policy and guidance in defining the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of an ANA NCO. Although the NCO Management Policy has been in effect since 25 August 2004, the execution requires further implementation.

It is important that appropriate position descriptions be included in MoD Directive 5001, the Organization and Functions Manual (OFM). This Manual will come up for review in the June 2013 timeframe. The Sergeant Major of the ANA and his Intermediate Command Command Sergeants Major (ICCSMs) have developed NCO position descriptions that will be introduced for addition to the OFM. This Manual can then be widely distributed to field units for implementation. It can also be used as part of the curriculum for training officer candidates. Unfortunately, the effort to modify the OFM has failed in past years, since it did not receive the necessary authorization from senior ANA leaders. If added to the MoD 5001, the position descriptions will help ANA officers understand how NCOs can be an asset and force multiplier at all levels, from platoon, to Corps, and higher headquarters.

One of the most significant challenges to implementation of the NCO Management Policy has to do with the fact that most of the senior officers in the ANA come from a Soviet-trained and civil war experience. They share a concept of a highly centralized command and control approach to leadership, mainly directed by officers. Therefore, this influences their comprehension and implementation of official NCO policies.

c. Recommendation 1.b

Assist the Chief of the General Staff, Afghan National Army to ensure that officer instruction includes appropriate lessons addressing non-commissioned officer roles, responsibilities, and authorities.

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d. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 1.b:
NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs and adds the following comments:

This can be accomplished by adding relevant lectures to appropriate courses of instruction. It is important for ANA officers to understand the roles and responsibilities of NCOs and how to engage and empower them for success in a professional army, as opposed to a conscripted one. This is the only way the ANA will be able to sustain itself, now that it is equipped with modern, expensive weaponry and equipment.

e. Recommendation 1.c

Assist Afghan National Army Commanders of headquarters, institutional organizations, and fielded units with implementing, supporting, and complying with approved Afghan National Army non-commissioned officer policies and guidance, while ensuring that all Coalition mentor and adviser teams approach this effort with a common voice.

f. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 1.c:
NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs and adds the following comments:

In order to assure compliance with policies relating to ANA NCOs, advising at various levels in the command structure and cross-functional liaison with the ANA Sergeants Major Academy, the ANA Sergeants Major network, and the GSG1 Sergeant Major has been ongoing.

The addition of relevant NCO position descriptions to the OFM will help Coalition forces, whose own NCO corps differ in their duties and responsibilities, have a common reference to influence and support ANA commanders in the field.

2. Recommendation 2 states:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, assist the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff to establish and implement comprehensive personnel management policies and systems that will:

a. Recommendation 2.a

Accelerate implementation of the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System.

b. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 2.a:
NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs and adds the following comments:

AHRIMS is already deployed and is being populated with data at the Corps level. A review of AHRIMS progress indicated that data fields were insufficient to meet the primary requirements of accountability (strength reporting), MOS management (professionalization of the force) and support for a future Automated Payment System. Existing data were also deemed unreliable due to insufficient data entry parameters. Furthermore, no consideration had been given to the capturing of initial personnel records at point of entry into the ANA (MEPS in-processing), tracking personnel through the training system to their final unit and archiving attrition records. The existing AHRIMS contract has been extended while a new contract specification is agreed upon to 1) develop the AHRIMS software to meet the minimum requirements; 2) scrub existing data and; 3) facilitate contractor-supported batch entry of new data to ensure that the system can become operational as early as possible. The limited bandwidth of the existing internet/intranet system is the single largest

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constraint to AHRIMS effectiveness, however, the system and the resources behind it are being configured to work with the existing infrastructure.

While the more sophisticated computer systems such as AHRIMS evolve, and the ANA makes progress in assuring reliable electrical power in all areas where they are based, we recommend paper-based records as a redundant system that can be implemented and maintained under current conditions. A paper-based system is what they are used to, and in many cases they keep very good paper records. An addition to their Military Personnel Records Jacket (MPRJ) similar to the U.S. Army DA Form 2-1 would be beneficial until computerized records are improved. A hard copy of this form should be maintained at the kandak (battalion) level.

c. Recommendation 2.b

Incorporate a merit based promotion and assignment system that accounts for Afghan cultural norms and is compatible with Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan policies on ethnic balancing.

d. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 2.b:
NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs and adds the following comments:

The incorporation of a merit-based promotion system is a foundational element of a sustainable human resources (HR) system. In November 2012, the ANA promotion policy was approved. Current efforts with Coalition advisory support are underway to develop regulations in support of the policy for execution across the Corps. The assignment policy was also approved in November 2012, with future Coalition advisory support to aid the ANA in developing an assignment regulation for execution. These policies notwithstanding, the practice of promotion and assignment through cronyism and nepotism still occurs frequently at every level. For example, Members of Parliament frequently call upon the General Staff for "special assignments" on behalf of family members. This, in conjunction with the challenge of using both the criteria of ethnic balancing and merit in especially key leader positions, brings forth further challenges.

The lack of a true merit-based promotions system continues to hamper efforts at establishing fairness and balance. Part of the problem is MOS mismanagement. The Sergeant Major of the ANA is developing a modification to the soldier and NCO assignment policy that establishes criteria for the assignment of senior NCOs to billets at the one-star to four-star level. Additionally, there will be criteria for the assignment of NCO instructors to the schools under the cognizance of ANATC and ANDU.

e. Recommendation 2.c

Establish personnel rotation policies that ensure all personnel are properly trained and assigned.

f. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 2.c:
NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs and adds the following comment:

The proposal being put forth by the Sergeant Major of the ANA on soldier and NCO assignments (cited above), also addresses the time period that an NCO can stay in a position once assigned.

NTM-A/CSTC-A
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g. Recommendation 2.d

Include a program to separate non-productive personnel from the Afghan National Army that still encourages their loyalty to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

h. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 2.d:
NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs without comment.

i. Recommendation 2.e

Fund a credible benefits and retirement system that provides incentive for personnel to make a career in the Afghan National Army that at the same time allows for future shaping of the force.

j. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 2.e:
NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs and adds the following comments:

The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD) military retirement handbook states that officers and NCOs will contribute 5% of their monthly salary and allowances for pension benefits. (A copy of the handbook is attached as Tab C.) The handbook also states that the Organization (MoD, in this case) will contribute 11% of officer/NCO salary and allowances for pension benefits. CJ8 Financial Management Oversight Division (FMO) pay audits indicate that MoD is consistently deducting 5% of officer and NCO base salary (only) to fund retirement. MoD's stance is that all pay other than base salary is temporary (contingent on CSTC-A authorization/funding), therefore they do not include allowances in the deduction calculation.

According to the MoLSAMD military retirement handbook (page 6) pension amounts are supposed to be transferred to the pension treasury account. However, CJ8 Financial Management Analysis Branch (FMA) budget analysts verified that they do not have visibility into MoD pension account status. CJ8 FMA budget analysts also confirmed that there are no MoD direct contribution budget entries, chart of accounts or object codes reflecting ANA pension expenditures for any military rank.

MoD claims to have insight on the status of the officer and NCO internal pension account. MoD also claims that a working group has verified that there are funds available in the officer and NCO pension account. However, no information has been provided as to the allocation and balances of how much funding is available in the account, nor if the account is actuarially sound. The NTM-A/CSTC-A Inspector General continues to work with the MoD to resolve a number of questions on retirement pay discrepancies and accountability.

Assuming the existing benefits and retirement system identified above is considered credible, provides adequate incentives to make the ANA a career, and allows for future shaping of the force, the question of how to fund the system remains. There are three potential options to funding the existing retirement system: first, have it funded through GIRoA; second, have it funded by the individual soldier through payroll deductions; or third, a combination of the first two options.

In the ANA, there are currently over 300 senior sergeants major promoted before 2009 who have an average of 8 to 11 years of service. Since this group can't retire until 2034, it not only disincentivizes them from remaining in the ANA it will also create future promotion opportunity challenges in the senior enlisted ranks.

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3. Recommendation 3 states:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, assist the Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff, Afghanistan National Army to:

a. Recommendation 3.a

Develop operating budget estimates for the Afghan National Army training enterprise – by specific location or local command.

b. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 3.a:

NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs and adds the following comments:

The lack of operating budgets at local ANA training institutions presents some challenges, but it is not a situation that will change in the near future despite Coalition advice. ANA organizational inertia and cultural preferences for centralized control continue to impede progress in this area.

MoD's ANDU and ANATC training enterprise organizations do not have control of their budgets, hence, their dependence on centralized support from the MoD. The proximity of ANDU's training organizations within Kabul simplifies centralized funding requirements, to some extent. ANATC's geographically dispersed Regional Military Training Center (RMTC) facilities operate differently. ANATC currently develops a budget, and then requests funds from the MoD organization that can provide their requirements, for example, office supplies and military training materials.

Advisors from ANDU-ANATC TAG and KMTC TAG (with CJ8 support) are working with ANATC to develop budget estimates for SY 1393-95. ANATC is in the process of identifying dedicated resource management and procurement personnel. CJ8, in coordination with MoD Finance, is working to establish ANATC as an independent resource manager. AMoD AT&L is working with ANATC to provide procurement training and procedures for contract requirements definition/submission and small purchases.

Part of the long-term solution is for ANDU and ANATC training organizations to develop their own cadre of financial management staffs to plan, program, budget and execute funds requested through their respective chain of command to the General Staff and up through the MoD. A model of this is shown on the DoDIG Draft Report, Appendix E., Figure D-1. However, the level of literacy, lack of staff trained in financial management, and deeply-embedded cultural mores and practices prevent this end-state from being quickly realized.

In the short-term, Coalition Advisors can be most effective by emphasizing what is already in place, such as the MoD14 requisition process, as well as ANA CIPHER 214, which directs Corps commanders to provide support to all training institutions located on their garrisons, even if these do not report directly to them. (A copy of CIPHER 214 is provided as Tab D.)

c. Recommendation 3.b

Develop and implement an MoD process to delegate and maintain oversight over essential operating and maintenance funding to training centers.

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d. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 3.b:
NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs and adds the following comments:

CJENG in coordination with the Construction and Property Management Division (CPMD) has implemented a plan to provide operations and maintenance support (organic or contracted) for ANA facilities. The key initial step of re-aligning garrison facilities engineers under CPMD is complete. CPMD has allocated base operations and maintenance funds. To be even more effective, CPMD should delegate budget authority. Nonetheless, MinDef can direct CPMD and MoD Finance to delegate funding authority, if CPMD is unwilling.

4. Recommendation 4.a states:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, advise the Commander, Afghan National Army Training Command to develop and institute a feedback mechanism with the Afghan National Army Corps Commanders regarding the performance of training school graduates, and lessons learned that need to be embedded in the programs of instruction.

a. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 4.a:
NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs and adds the following comment:

The development of validation of training is a necessary step to ensure that the training is effective and fed into the career path (MOS structure) that Branch Managers within the GSG1 will ultimately manage.

5. Recommendation 4.b states:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, advise the Chief of the General Staff, Commander, Afghan National Defense University, and Commander, Afghan National Army Training Command to develop and enforce an assignment policy that selects the best qualified instructors with field experience for Afghan National Army schools.

a. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 4.b:
NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs and adds the following comments:

The assignment policy and MOS policy (the latter currently under development) should include the development of career maps for each MOS where criteria such as practical experience and training in instructional techniques would be prerequisites prior to assignment as an instructor. Initiatives are ongoing to develop career maps for each MOS that should include the recommended prerequisites for ANA instructor assignment.

6. Recommendation 5 states:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan:

a. Recommendation 5.a

Advise the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff to ensure that new noncommissioned officers and officers have attained the literacy levels required by regulation.

b. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 5.a:
NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs without comment.

**NTM-A/CSTC-A
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT**

“Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop Leaders in the Afghan National Army”
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c. Recommendation 5.b

Advise the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff to maintain the literacy program in the future and explore means for its expansion through additional cooperative nation programs and support from international non-governmental organization and/or partnerships with educational institutions.

d. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 5.b:
NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs without comment.

7. Recommendation 6 states:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, and Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command:

a. Recommendation 6.a

Update data collection criteria to reflect the shift in emphasis from building the Afghan National Army to improving its quality.

b. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 6.a:
NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs and adds the following comments:

Although we concur with this as a long-term goal, there are several intermediate steps that must be achieved first. The ANA should be completely fielded before the recommended shift in emphasis takes place. Additionally, the ANA leadership at the MoD and General Staff levels must not only be well-versed in the analytical techniques currently in use, but must replicate them on their own. Finally, at the very least, the enduring post-2014 mission should have a written and approved plan so that quality-oriented assessments are consistent with and support the plan. This final point also implies that this shift in emphasis should be driven by the highest levels of the in-theater Coalition leadership, to wit, ISAF Headquarters, since it would entail significant changes at multiple commands that would need to be synchronized.

c. Recommendation 6.b

Systematize sharing of Afghan National Army leader development information between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan and the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command.

d. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 6.b:
NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs and adds the following comment:

As the leaders and headquarters staffs of both organizations plan for their forthcoming reorganization, this is a goal that will get increasing attention.

e. Recommendation 6.c

Promote improved use of qualitative measures by carefully identifying proposed weights and relationships between key indicators and the conditions of interest.

f. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 6.c:
NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs and adds the following comment:

**NTM-A/CSTC-A
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT**

“Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop Leaders in the Afghan National Army”
(D2012-D00SPO-0090.000)

In accordance with our comments to Recommendation 6.a above, we propose working towards the achievement of Recommendation 6.c in a deliberate, methodical manner that takes into account the post-2014 plan and the ability of the ANA to support this shift in emphasis, since ultimately they must provide the raw data that will form the basis for refined analyses.

8. Recommendation 7 states:

Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, reinstitute standardized training for all advisors who will perform duties at the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Afghan National Army institutional training sites.

a. NTM-A/CSTC-A Response Comments to DoD IG SPO Draft Report Recommendation 7:
NTM-A/CSTC-A concurs and adds the following comments:

In addition to standardized training, which continues to improve, increased standardization in the ANA would also help. The ANA have been advised and mentored by several different Coalition forces throughout the years, including American, German, French, Canadians, Mongolians, and Italians, among others. Although the intentions of these mentors have been positive, each of them has brought a different style of leadership and views on the roles of officers and NCOs. This has caused some confusion among the ANA. Establishing job descriptions in the ANA Operations and Functions Manual would assist in avoiding some of this confusion. Advisors from different backgrounds would then have a common standard within the ANA to work towards.

APPROVED BY:



PREPARED BY:



IJC Comments



Headquarters
International Security Assistance Force Joint Command
Kabul, Afghanistan
APO, AE 09320



IJC IG

02 May 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR USFOR-A

SUBJECT: IJC Response to DOD IG Draft Report D2012-D00SPO-0090.000

1. IJC has reviewed the DOD IG Draft Report (D2012-D00SPO-0090.000) "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop Leaders in the Afghan National Army." IJC concurs with recommendations 1.a., 1.b., 1.c.; 6.a., 6.b., 6.c and provides no additional comments.

2. Point of contact for this issue is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Inspector General

Appendix G. Report Distribution

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House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations

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* Recipient of draft report

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General Information

Forward questions or comments concerning this assessment and report and other activities conducted by the Office of Special Plans & Operations to spo@dodig.mil

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