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AIR OPERATIONS
IN THE LEBANON CRISIS OF 1958

(U)

By

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October 1962
USAF Historical Division Liaison Office

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
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FOREWORD

Air Operations in the Lebanon Crisis of 1958 is one in a series of studies on air operations in international incidents prepared by the USAF Historical Division Liaison Office at the request of the Directorate of Plans, Headquarters USAF. Written in 1959, this study is based chiefly on the raw materials of historical writing--messages and correspondence--and command and unit reports on the operations available at that time. State Department, JCS, Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps materials were used in its preparation. Originally prepared in a very few copies, the study has nevertheless been extensively used within the Air Staff, the JCS, and in the Department of Defense. In response to many requests for wider dissemination of the study, DCS/Plans and Programs, Headquarters USAF, has concurred in its reproduction for a larger distribution.

Written by Dr. Robert D. Little and Mrs. Wilhelmine Burch, this study is of special significance in connection with planning and preparations for local wars and incidents. In this operation the American forces experienced no combat action, but the possibility of action was constant and the deployment of forces to the objective area was of first importance. To achieve a meaningful historical context for the military operations, the political and diplomatic background has been presented in some detail.


JOSEPH W. ANGELL, JR.
Chief, USAF Historical Division
Liaison Office

NOTE

Local time is used throughout this study. Since Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) was in force in Washington, D.C., during the time of the Lebanon operation, this time is used for all action originating on the U.S. east coast. The EDT zone is minus 4 hours from Greenwich, England (Z time). Lebanon and Turkey are both in the plus 2 zone east of Greenwich. Therefore the difference in time between Washington and Lebanon is 6 hours during EDT. The Navy uses an ABC system of time in which B time means plus 2 hours from Greenwich.

The footnotes in this study express time through the use of the date time group (DTG). In this system the first two figures denote the day of the month, and the next four give the hour of that day at Greenwich, England (Z time). In other words, 151800Z Jul means 1800 hours on 15 July at Greenwich.

C O N T E N T S


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LEBANON

+++++ RAILROADS
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I. THE CRISIS IN LEBANON

Lebanon is a small country of about 4,000 square miles. Except for a short common boundary with Israel to the south and a sea frontage on the Mediterranean, it is surrounded by its much larger neighbor, Syria, which in February 1958 joined with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic.

The population of Lebanon, like that of the other Levant countries, is highly mixed in nature, but it is unique among the countries of the Middle East in that no one ethnic group constitutes a decided majority. Christians and Mohammedans are roughly about equal in number, with both claiming a preponderance which the lack of a formal census since 1942 makes impossible to establish. Because of much heavier emigration by the Christians and a higher rate of natural increase by the Moslems, it appears inevitable that the latter will soon constitute a majority, if they have not already done so. Further complicating the picture are more than 100,000 Palestinian refugees, of whom 80 percent are Moslem. These entered the country during the Israeli-Arab war of 1948-49, in which Lebanon participated.

The most numerous of the Christian sects are the Maronites, who in 1958 numbered about 422,000 of the approximate 1,500,000 population. Like several other Uniate groups, the Maronites recognize the primacy of the Pope but retain privileges and procedures of their own. Other important Christian sects are the Greek Orthodox (198,000), the Greek Catholics (90,000), the Armenian Orthodox (58,000), and the Armenian Catholics

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(14,000). The most numerous Moslem sects are the Sunnis, or Sunnites, also considered the most orthodox, who number about 274,000; the Shiah, or Shiites (225,000); and the Druzes (88,000), the last-named regarded as pronounced heretics. In many cases these Christian and Moslem sects are tightly bound social groupings, sometimes located in long-established geographical enclaves.¹

Lebanon, with an estimated population of about 400 per square mile, is a crowded country and becoming increasingly so. Arabic is the principal and official language; French is an important secondary language. Educationally, the country is far ahead of the other Middle Eastern Arab countries. Two thirds of the school-age population are actually attending, and several colleges exist in Beirut, including the well-known American University founded by missionaries in 1866.

Long a part of the Turkish Empire, Lebanon was declared a League of Nations mandate after World War I and placed under the French. It was granted a constitution and became officially a republic in 1926 but actually remained under close French control, receiving full independence only in 1944. The French period served to accelerate the Westernization and modernization of the country to a degree unsurpassed in the Arab Middle East. Nevertheless, the country remained politically immature, and true political parties existed only in embryo form. After the 1953 election no party controlled more than four votes, and the great majority of the 44 deputies in the single-house legislature were independents.

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The attempt to preserve a religious balance in the country was reflected in the political custom that the president be a Maronite and the prime minister a Sunni Moslem. By custom also, the cabinet included representatives of various other religious faiths. In addition to the religious differences, the country was divided by the advocacy of Western or Arab orientation in government, not always following strictly religious lines.²

The earliest Lebanese parties, appearing in the 1930's, were the Constitutional Bloc, led by Bishara al-Khuri, and the National Bloc, led by Emile Edde. The principal difference between the two perhaps lay in the fact that Khuri, although a Maronite, proposed a policy of maximum cooperation with Arab countries and a struggle against Western "imperialism," while Edde, who had served as president under the French mandate, opposed identification with the Arab countries and advocated a Western orientation of policy. By 1952, Khuri, who was serving as president, found himself in a position in which he had lost much support because of revelations of inefficiency and malfeasance in his government and was virtually forced to resign by popular demand. He was succeeded in September 1952 by Camille Chamoun, a Maronite leader with Sunni Moslem support, who later secured a large majority in the legislature elected in 1953.³

During the six years of his term Chamoun faced increasing opposition within the country, particularly from Moslem elements of the population, largely as a result of the emergence of Nasser and the incorporation of

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Syria within the United Arab Republic. The pan-Arabic Moslem elements objected to the Chamoun government's Western orientation of policy and demanded a larger share of political control. It is obvious that Chamoun, while maintaining a large majority of support in the legislature, developed serious personal differences with various influential leaders, both Moslem and Christian. During the same period there was a rapid growth in organized political movements of various sorts. In May 1957 Chamoun again won an overwhelming majority of support in the elections for the assembly.⁴

The May Rebellion

Agitation against Chamoun culminated on 9 May 1958 in the outbreak of an armed rebellion. The rebels quickly secured control of most of the outlying sections of the country as well as considerable parts of the cities of Beirut and Tripoli. They were plentifully supplied with arms, apparently from Syrian sources, and Syrian volunteers also entered the country to join the rebel forces. The rebel leaders were well supplied with funds, probably received from Nasser, enabling them to recruit additional forces from both local and foreign sources by paying a daily wage. Despite these advantages, the rebels failed to make important headway after the first week of the uprising, and a condition of stalemate persisted thereafter.⁵

There were several reasons for this. Although strongly pan-Arabic in inclination, the rebel leaders had some dissimilar aims, their common denominator being opposition to Chamoun. The latter also had solid

sources of support, as will be explained, including considerable armed groups or partisans. Furthermore, the national army, though small, was loyal and well disciplined and proved more than a match for the rebels in open conflict. However, Gen. Fouad Chehab, its commander, contended that its varied religious composition made it too brittle an instrument to employ in an all-out campaign against the rebels and proposed to let the rebellion, once contained, die out of itself. Undoubtedly an important factor in the minds of both sides was that Chamoun's term of office would end in September 1958. Presumably a compromise successor could compose differences and end the stalemate.⁶

The progovernment and antigovernment groupings were quite complex, in some cases cutting across religious lines. Supporting the revolt were such political organizations as the Progressive Socialists, principally Druze in composition; Najjadah, the militant pan-Arabic youth movement; the Muslim Brotherhood, extreme Islamic; and the League of National Action, milder pan-Arabic. More important were the personal followings of the principal leaders. Saeb Salaam, political boss of the Basta, the Moslem section of Beirut, was perhaps the most extreme. Kamal Jumblatt, a feudal aristocrat who had founded the Progressive Socialist Party and given away part of his family lands, held sway among the Druzes of the Chouf, an area some miles southeast of the capital. Rashid Karami, leader of the Tripoli opposition, was considered relatively moderate. A 37-year-old lawyer educated in Cairo, he was a Sunni Moslem deputy who had served for a time during 1955-56 as prime minister under Chamoun.⁷

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Probably the strongest organized political group supporting Chamoun was the Phalange (Les Phalanges Libanaises), militant nationalists who were predominantly Maronites though officially disclaiming confessional leanings. Led by Pierre Gemayel, they dominated the Ashrafiye, the Christian quarter of Beirut, and fielded an armed body of partisans organized along military lines. Chamoun was also supported by the PPS (Parti Populaire Syrien), an armed and organized youth group that had been outlawed in 1949 because of its belligerency. Standing for complete separation of church and state, it placed Syrian nationalism (including Lebanon as a part) ahead of the pan-Arabic movement. It had thus opposed absorption of Syria within the UAR and now opposed the revolt led by Nasser's followers in Lebanon. Chamoun himself, despite his large popular and legislative following, led no organized party, though he did organize the National Liberal Union Party before leaving the presidency in September 1958. Further confusing the picture was the support of Chamoun by the Sunni Moslem prime minister, Sami Solh, and the bitter opposition to Chamoun by the Maronite Patriarch Meouchi, who advocated appeasement of Nasser.⁸

Between the extremes were various figures who advocated compromise and who were sometimes loosely grouped together as the Third Force (also ironically termed the Third Farce by its critics). These included Henri Pharaon, a wealthy Greek Orthodox landowner and financier, and Raymond Edde, son of the former president under the French mandate. Leader of the largest party in the national assembly, the National Bloc, which controlled 4 of the 66 seats, Edde became principal leader of the Third

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Force movement. He was later to become a key figure in working out a compromise cabinet. Even more important than these was General Chehab, a Maronite, who had served briefly as provisional president in 1952 and now as commander of the army advocated a policy of compromise that would minimize bloodshed. Generally acceptable to all sides as a compromise president, he seemed reluctant to allow himself to be named.⁹

During the entire period of late May, June, and early July the situation remained essentially static, despite sporadic violence. Bombing, sniping, and occasional armed clashes took place, but there were no extensive and prolonged aggressive movements by either side. Street barricades defended the large sections of Beirut and Tripoli that were in opposition hands, and the army made no sustained efforts to take them. At the same time, the rebels made no important headway toward welding their forces throughout the country into a cohesive whole. The Lebanese Air Force, composed of 16 jet planes (mostly British Vampires) and 18 pilots, helped to prevent such moves on the few occasions when rebel forces, particularly Jumblatt's Druzes, ventured into open country.

As it became obvious that fighting might continue indefinitely and the rebels in Tripoli suffered heavy casualties in attempts to take over complete control of the city, the enthusiasm of Syrian volunteers for joining the rebels apparently waned. On the other hand, some desertions occurred from both the army and gendarmerie.

Chamoun's support in the National Assembly and among most of the Christian elements of the population remained firm, but his Moslem

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support undoubtedly weakened as the result of pressure of all kinds exerted by the opposition, including the assassination of several minor leaders and threats to major ones. Nevertheless, Chamoun continued to receive some Moslem support, since this was frequently tied to personalities, and Moslem leaders like Sami Solh remained in the cabinet.¹⁰

The Lebanese government decided to place its problem before the Arab League.* At a meeting in Bengasi, Libya, beginning 31 May, the League considered the Lebanese complaint that the United Arab Republic had instigated and was supporting the revolt. The League took no action, since the United Arab Republic refused to accept even a mildly worded resolution of 6 June 1958, which the Lebanese government itself found completely inadequate.¹¹

Meanwhile, on 22 May, Lebanon had requested a meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations to consider its charge that the United Arab Republic had instigated the rebellion and was supporting it with arms and "volunteers," but, later, Lebanon asked that the meeting be postponed to permit prior consideration by the Arab League. When it became clear that nothing effective could be expected from that source, the Security Council meeting was scheduled for 11 June.¹²

Although the UAR representative denied the Lebanese charges, the Security Council voted to adopt a Swedish resolution, which was supported by both the United States and United Kingdom, that a UN observer group be dispatched to Lebanon to report on outside intervention. The vote was

*The regional organization of Arab states.

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10 to 0, the Soviet Union abstaining. The vanguard of the UN observer group, consisting of five men, arrived in Lebanon the following day, 12 June, in the midst of an intensified phase of the fighting. By 18 June about 50 UN observers were in Lebanon, with 75 more expected soon. The following day Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of the United Nations, arrived in Lebanon for a two-day visit during which he conferred with President Chamoun and received preliminary reports from the observers.¹³

The arrival of the UN observers and the visit by Hammarskjold apparently had some effect in quieting the fighting. Another effect noted was the replacement on the street barricades in Beirut of UAR flags and pictures of Nasser by Lebanese flags and pictures of rebel leaders. The influence of the observers, who had risen to about 100 men by 29 June, was essentially psychological, since it was impossible in most cases to gain access to the rebel-held frontier areas, where arms and recruits were most likely to be moved in. Nevertheless, on 4 July, Secretary General Hammarskjold ventured to state that the charge of "massive infiltration" was not warranted at that time. The following day the first report of the UN observer group, which was headed by former President Galo Plaza of Ecuador, stated in essence that no significant movement of personnel or supplies into the country had been observed and that the rebellion must be regarded as a civil conflict. Galo Plaza admitted, however, that his group had been able to gain access to only 18 of the 278 kilometers of frontier.¹⁴

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Sporadic violence continued to erupt, but there were indications that the rebel factions were tiring of the struggle and inclined to seek a compromise that would involve no serious loss of face. Increasing attention was focused on the scheduled election of a new president by the parliament on 24 July. The economic repercussions of the rebellion increasingly pinched the business community, and the executive council of the Lebanese Industrial Association passed a unanimous resolution on 9 July threatening to close all factories unless the election was held as scheduled and a new president chosen. The Lebanese constitution forbade the reelection of a president but at the same time gave him very great powers. After the victory of his supporters in the election of May 1957, Chamoun was accused by the opposition of planning to amend the constitution to permit his reelection and even of planning to continue in office illegally. After the outbreak of violence in May 1958 Chamoun stated his intention to leave office at the expiration of his term on 23 September. There is little doubt, however, that some of his supporters wanted to postpone the presidential election until after the suppression of the rebellion. The opposition, on the other hand, demanded that Chamoun step out as a first condition for negotiating a settlement. Actually, the rebel opposition appears to have felt that it was insufficiently represented in the national assembly, which elected the president, and hoped to influence it to select a man not aligned with Chamoun.¹⁵

The Decision to Send Military Aid

The uprising in Lebanon in May 1958 eventually had far-reaching consequences for the United States. In previous statements of policy

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in 1956 and 1957, the United States had served notice that it was "prepared to use armed forces" in response to the appeal of any victim of armed aggression in the Middle East. The American policy of supporting stable, friendly, progressive governments in the area was directly challenged by the rebellion in Lebanon, which sought to overturn a pro-Western government and replace it with a pro-Nasser, anti-Western regime.

There was no actual loss of American lives during the rebellion, and the damage to privately owned property of Americans was negligible, although the U.S. Information Agency's reading rooms in Tripoli and in the Basta section of Beirut were looted and burned on 11 and 12 May near the beginning of the uprising. Such rebel leaders as Saeb Salaam and Kamal Jumblatt strongly declared that they had no hostile intentions toward Americans or their property. Nevertheless, the statements in the rebel newspapers and over the rebel broadcasting stations were highly derogatory and inflammatory with regard to the United States.¹⁶

As early as 11 May, Charles Malik, Lebanon's foreign minister, tentatively suggested to U.S. Ambassador Robert McClintock that it might be appropriate to make plans at once for the possible deployment to Lebanon of a division of U.S. Marines in the event that the intervention of the United Arab Republic became more overt. McClintock replied that such action might be extremely harmful to Chamoun's position. The United States wished to avoid military intervention in Lebanon, preferring to limit its role to supplying the Lebanese government with a limited quantity of munitions and economic aid. The State Department believed that

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it would be better for the Chamoun government to sustain itself by its own efforts. Direct U.S. military assistance would provide the Nasserites with the argument that Chamoun's was a discredited government propped up by foreign arms.

At the same time, prudence dictated a certain amount of military precaution in the event of a more serious crisis in Lebanon. On 14 May both the Air Force and the Navy initiated measures to insure the ability of their forces to deal with any eventuality in the eastern Mediterranean. On 16 May the JCS directed Gen. Lauris Norstad, Commander in Chief, Europe (CINCEUR) and Adm. James L. Holloway, Jr., Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) to be prepared to airlift one battle group to Lebanon within 24 hours. Tactical Air Command, Strategic Air Command, and Air Materiel Command were informed of this action. On the 17th, Headquarters USAF ordered TAC to bring 24 fighter aircraft to 24-hour alert for possible deployment to USAFE and directed Military Air Transport Service to send 26 C-124's and 5 support aircraft to USAFE to augment theater airlift. The MATS planes arrived in Germany on 18-20 May.

On 19 May the USAFE airlift planes and the Army battle group were standing by ready to deploy to the Middle East within 24 hours. On the 22d, U.S. naval units were sufficient for landing operations and evacuation. By then the situation in Lebanon had eased, with Chamoun and Chehab both indicating that intervention was not desired, and on 23 May the JCS recognized the relaxation of tension by canceling the alert.¹⁷

News of the military coup d'etat in Baghdad in the early hours of 14 July, resulting in the overthrow of the government of Iraq and the deaths of the principal leaders, reached Beirut almost at once. Although

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the rebels in the city celebrated the event, which was interpreted as a great victory for Nasser and pan-Arabism, no definite aggressive new moves against the Lebanese government materialized. Whether increased intervention by the Nasserites would have resulted is impossible to say, since the American landing on 15 July had the effect of freezing the political situation. Ambassador McClintock could find no visible evidence within Lebanon of an increased military threat, and he reported to the State Department his belief that the decision on intervention should be based on political and strategic considerations affecting the entire Middle East.¹⁸

Nevertheless, President Chamoun asked Ambassador McClintock to call at his office during the forenoon of 14 July and officially requested military aid from the United States within 48 hours. Chamoun stated that he was making a similar request of the British and French ambassadors. McClintock found Chamoun highly excited and insistent on the arrival of the Sixth Fleet within the stated time period. By 1248 Lebanon time the message was on its way to Washington.¹⁹

Chamoun's appeal for aid was received in Washington that morning (14 July) at 0835 Eastern Daylight Time and remained under consideration for approximately 10 hours. At 1848 hours, following the President's decision to dispatch military aid, the Chief of Naval Operations, as executive agent for the JCS, directed the commander in chief of the newly activated Specified Command, Middle East (SPECOMME), to execute the operational plan for action in the Middle East, CINCAMBRITFOR 1-58, code name Blue Bat.

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This plan for combined Anglo-American operations was to be executed only in part because there was still discussion as to the role that the British would play: whether they would follow the Marines into Beirut or go directly into Jordan, where still another crisis appeared imminent. Since no command headquarters existed at the moment, the Commander, Sixth Fleet, who would furnish a part of the command, was ordered to proceed at best speed to land Marines in Lebanon. Meanwhile, the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, and the Commander, Tactical Air Command, were alerted for immediate action in the Middle East. Thus began Operation Blue Bat, the first integrated airborne-amphibious operation to be executed by the United States in peacetime.²⁰

In carrying out the Presidential order to give military aid to the government of Lebanon, the JCS ordered five principal military actions. Most of these were already provided for in the Blue Bat plan, but some modifications were made. These actions were as follows:

1. Amphibious landing of the Marine task force beginning at 0900 EDT (1500 Beirut time) on 15 July 1958.
2. Readying one U.S. Army airborne battle group in Europe, capable of airlanding at Beirut airport within 24 hours of an execution order or by airdrop within 36 hours.
3. Preparation for the follow-up airlift of a second battle group from Europe to Lebanon.
4. Deployment of 26 C-124's by MATS to Europe as an augmentation airlift for USAFE.
5. Authorization of the substitution of TAC's Composite Air Strike Force Bravo as outlined in TAC Oplan 52-58 (Double Trouble) for the USAFE forces required in CINCAMBRITFOR Oplan 1-58 (Blue Bat).²¹

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
Thus three major USAF commands would participate in the operation: USAFE would airlift Army paratroopers from Germany to the Middle East; MATS would provide C-124's to augment the USAFE airlift capability; and TAC would provide a composite air strike force as a major combat element of the Specified Command, Middle East. By direction of the President, who feared that a security leak might compromise the success of the operation, only the USAF commands directly involved were informed of the action until after the landing, although the JCS did direct the North American Air Defense Command and the Strategic Air Command to increase their alert posture.²²


II. THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING

CINCAMBRITFOR Oplan 1-58, or Blue Bat, had been prepared during May 1958 when the situation in Lebanon first became serious. At that time the Joint Chiefs had directed the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM), to prepare in coordination with United Kingdom representatives a combined operational plan for Anglo-American military intervention in Lebanon and Jordan should it become necessary.¹

Blue Bat called for the employment of two U.S. Army airborne battle groups, reinforced, on station in Germany; the U.S. Navy's Sixth Fleet and an amphibious task force in the eastern Mediterranean; tactical air and transport elements of the U.S. Air Force; and forces of the British army, navy, and air force. The U.S. naval flotilla would include two attack aircraft carriers, and the British would provide an additional one. The U.S. Air Force would provide one air division headquarters, two fighter-bomber squadrons, one fighter-interceptor element, one composite reconnaissance squadron, one air rescue element, one air refueling element, and medium and heavy transports as required. The RAF support of the plan included six Canberra, one Meteor, and two Hunter squadrons, all based on Cyprus and Malta.²

The plan provided for initial operations to establish control of the airspace over the area of operations and to secure the Beirut airfield and the rest of the city for use as a base. It was considered necessary, prior



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to operations, to obtain authorization to overfly Turkey and to utilize the Adana air-base complex as a staging area; also to overfly and stage through Libya, France, Italy, and Germany. Later air operations would include the air surveillance of adjacent frontiers in order to control both friendly and unfriendly forces. Fighter escort and close air support would be provided as needed for the combined forces. When the airborne battle groups deployed, they would be airlifted to Beirut and either airdropped or airlanded.³

Blue Bat was based on a unilateral U.S. limited war plan for operations in Lebanon (CINCSPECOMME Oplan 215-58) that had been prepared in November 1957. The older unilateral plan had been used by the individual USAF commands concerned as a basis for their own operational plans, but there had been insufficient time by 14 July to convert these to accord with the new combined plan, which was available to them only in outline form. The situation was further complicated by the decision that the British would not participate in Blue Bat--at least for the time being. CINCSPECOMME accordingly notified his subcommanders on 16 July to delete the word "British" or its abbreviated equivalent from all the command titles in Oplan 1-58 and to follow CINCSPECOMME Oplan 215-58 for detailed unilateral U.S. operations.⁴

On 14 July the force most immediately available to provide the desired military aid in Lebanon was the Second Provisional Marine Force, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic. Organized in January 1958, this force had moved to the Mediterranean in May, when the rebellion in Lebanon began, to

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participate in a training maneuver with British Royal Marines and the Italian navy. It functioned under the Sixth Fleet, being designated Combined Task Force (CTF) 62. It was composed of three transphibrons, each consisting of one battalion landing team, associated equipment, and attack transports and cargo ships. At the time of receipt of orders to land in Lebanon, the nearest of these was Transphibron-6 with Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/2 in Area Yankee, south of Cyprus, about 160 miles from Beirut. The other two were considerably more distant: Transphibron-2 with BLT 3/6, en route from Suda Bay, Crete, to Athens, and Transphibron-4 with BLT 1/8, en route from Suda Bay to Gibraltar. But Transphibron-6 was without its landing and beach parties and important equipment because its LSD Plymouth Rock, which carried these important elements, was en route to Malta for repairs.⁵

The first indication received by CTF-62 (the Marine force) of the probability of a landing came on 14 July at 1715 Beirut time in a message from Vice Adm. Charles R. Brown, Commander, Sixth Fleet. Some hours later, at 2350Z, Admiral Brown directed the commander of CTF 61 (the Navy force) to land Marines at Beirut on 15 July, beginning at 1500 Beirut time (0900 EDT). It was estimated that BLT 2/2 would arrive at H-hour, BLT 3/6 at 0530 on the 16th, and BLT 1/8 at 1800 on the 18th. The Chief of Naval Operations notified Admiral Brown that it was urgent to make the first landing at the scheduled time and that all possible information on the operation be in the hands of the JCS by 15 July at 0800 EDT, since President Eisenhower was to address the United Nations on that day at about 0900 EDT, presumably to announce and justify the landings.⁶

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The Marines of BLT 2/2 went ashore on schedule at 1500 on 15 July in an area south of the city designated Red Beach. Their air support did not arrive until approximately 15 minutes after H-hour, when seven Navy AD-6's appeared overhead. These had been staged through Cyprus from the CVA Essex, which was about 360 miles west of Beirut. Meanwhile naval gunfire support had been available. According to a member of the British training mission, six Lebanese planes were in the air during the landing and had been ordered by the Lebanese G-3 to resist but had refused on the ground that the order had not come through their squadron commander.⁷

If resistance had been encountered it would have been impossible to reinforce the troops ashore for 16 $\frac{1}{2}$ hours because BLT 3/6 did not reach the area until 0730 on the 16th. Three tanks for the support of BLT 2/2 landed on Red Beach over a pontoon causeway at 1602 on 15 July. These had been stored on board an LST that was unable to beach because of the gentle offshore gradient characteristic of the eastern Mediterranean. The absence of the LSD Plymouth Rock delayed full logistic support for several days and deprived the Marine unit of two tanks and some artillery.⁸

Slightly more than an hour after landing, at 1610, the Marines entered and secured Beirut Airport. Commercial air traffic was only briefly interrupted, resuming at 1820. It was not until the following day, at 0812, that the naval task force, CTF 61, took control of all air traffic in the area. Meanwhile, unloading difficulties at Red Beach had been eased by the arrival at 2000 on the 15th of the LST Fort Snelling from one of the two transphibrons still en route.⁹

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During the afternoon and evening of the 15th, the arrival of Marines within the city of Beirut was anxiously awaited by President Chamoun and Ambassador McClintock, who had received vague information of a possible coup by the Lebanese army and doubted General Chehab's willingness or ability to scotch it. Chamoun, in fact, had concealed from Chehab any information that he had appealed to the United States, and apparently the latter's first intimation of the landing was news of the arrival of the ships. Chehab urged McClintock to dissuade the American commander from disembarking the troops, stating that he feared losing control of the Lebanese army, with subsequent disintegration along religious lines. Chehab stated "with an air of infinite sadness" that the army had been the only factor holding the country together and that Lebanon was now doomed "either to become a Christian Israel or be inundated in the Sea of Islam." McClintock agreed to pass on to the American commander Chehab's opinion about the landing of troops but warned him that they had arrived to support the established government and that if the army ventured to arrest the President, as was rumored, there would be "most disagreeable consequences." Chehab then promised to "recommend" that the plot against the President be stayed.¹⁰

The immediate visible reaction to the landings was jubilation among nearly all the Lebanese Christians and some Moslems. Governmental circles, with the exception of the army leadership and one or two notables, were highly elated. Opposition forces seemed stunned into inaction except for denunciatory articles in their newspapers and violent statements over their clandestine radio transmitters.¹¹

On the night of the 15th the Marines remained at the airport. Ambassador McClintock complained in an angry telegram to Washington that four hours after the landing he was still unable to contact the Navy commander of the landing operations and that his requests and suggestions were coldly ignored by the Marine officer (Lt. Col. Harry A. Hadd) in local command. Apparently the principal matter at issue was the desire of President Chammoun, who still feared a last-minute army coup, for a Marine guard with tanks at the presidential palace. Chehab had also complained that the Marines had offended the Lebanese military at the airport by telling them to pack up and go home. McClintock requested that immediate instructions be sent to the American commander, still unknown to him, to follow the ambassador on all political questions.¹²

Admiral Holloway, CINCSPECOMME, arrived with his staff by air at 0400 on the morning of the 16th and set up his headquarters on the USS Taconic, which was moored 1,000 yards off Red Beach. His arrival was opportune, as important developments were impending. Transphibron-2 with a second Marine battalion, BLT 3/6, arrived off Red Beach and began landing at 0730 under a precautionary air cover from the carrier Essex. Brig. Gen. Sidney S. Wade, commander of the Marine units, also went ashore at 0730 and assumed personal command of the Marine troops. The operational plan called for BLT 3/6 to move at once to the Beirut Airport and relieve BLT 2/2, which would then enter the city to secure the beaches and the harbor area. BLT 1/8 would be unloaded two days later over Yellow Beach to the northeast of the city to consolidate control of the Beirut area and for possible use in Tripoli, on the coast some 40 miles to the north.¹³

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By the morning of the 16th General Chehab had apparently not yet resolved the conflicting points of view within the Lebanese army as to the attitude to be taken toward the Americans. At 0900 he called Ambassador McClintock to protest the proposed movement of American troops into the city and to ask that this be delayed at least until further conferences. McClintock obtained General Wade's consent to a delay and then the two met with President Chamoun at the presidential palace, where Chamoun expressed his approval of the plan to secure the port area. The ambassador was recalled alone to a second conference with Chamoun and Chehab a few minutes later, and Chehab again repeated his objections to the Marine deployment in Beirut.

Meanwhile, word had arrived that Lebanese tanks and artillery had taken up a position blocking an advance into the city by the Marine column, which General Wade had now got under way. Chehab, having reluctantly agreed to a passage into the city by the Marines in detachments of three vehicles escorted by Lebanese vehicles, agreed to go with the ambassador to the blockade point. There they found that the Marine column had halted after a Lebanese officer had asked that this be done pending resolution of the higher-level conferences; otherwise his orders were to resist. After a further conference among McClintock, Chehab, and Admiral Holloway, who had now arrived at the scene, Chehab agreed to rescind the orders to his forces. Under additional urging, Chehab's insistence on movement in groups of three vehicles at intervals of 10 minutes also went by the board, and the Marine column moved into the city at 1530 with an automobile containing Ambassador McClintock, Admiral Holloway, and General Chehab at its

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head. The Lebanese army became increasingly friendly, and the entrance of the Marines was loudly cheered by the local populace.¹⁴

As the Marines prepared to move into Beirut on the 16th, ample air cover was available from the aircraft carriers Essex, Wasp, and Saratoga in the waters south of Cyprus. Naval aircraft were scheduled for a fly-over at 0900 of western Jordan, where there were large camps of rabidly pro-Nasser Arab refugees from Palestine. This was postponed at the request of the British so as not to interfere with their movement of paratroops to Amman. Carrier planes from the Saratoga made the flyover successfully at the same hour on the following day. This carrier had moved farther down the coast than the other carriers and stood ready to evacuate King Hussein by air from Amman in case of need.¹⁵

Throughout the Lebanon operation, tactical air support needs, consisting of show-of-force flyovers, leaflet drops, and reconnaissance, continued to be met by carrier-based aircraft of the Sixth Fleet and to a lesser extent by USAF aircraft stationed at Adana, Turkey. The primary employment of tactical aviation was for visual and photographic reconnaissance and for on-station alert for possible close air support missions. Air operations in the Beirut area followed Navy-Marine Corps control procedures and were under the overall control of the CTF 61 tactical air commander aboard the USS Pocono. The Air Force maintained no air control capability closer than Adana. The only Marine air activity was concentrated in Helicopter Sub-Unit 1, which operated eight helicopters in the immediate area. Embarked on the Wasp, the unit landed at the Beirut Airport on 19 July. Although useful for liaison and reconnaissance, it had a lift

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capacity of only 32 combat-loaded Marines. The Marine commander considered that his lack of fixed-wing tactical Marine aviation support would have been a serious weakness in the event of combat.¹⁶

Transphibron-4 arrived and began to unload BLT 1/8 over Yellow Beach northeast of Beirut at 0400 on 18 July. At 1150 on the same day the first airborne troops began to arrive at Beirut. These were 850 men of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, who had been airlifted from the United States via Port Lyautey, Morocco, in 36 Marine transport aircraft. They moved directly from the airport to ships via Red Beach and then moved to Yellow Beach where they remained as a reserve force afloat. Unloading of the three transphibrons continued for a total of 7½ working days (24 hours each), and 10,397 short tons were put over the Lebanon beaches. During the first three days slightly more than 6,000 Marines landed in Lebanon, either over the beaches or by airlift.¹⁷

Altogether, the Marines put ashore 15 M48 medium tanks and 10 ontos (antitank vehicles mounting six 110-millimeter recoilless guns). This force was considered probably inadequate to meet the armored strength of either Lebanon (estimated at 58 tanks) or Syria (estimated at 207 tanks). There was some slight uneasiness on this score until 27 July, when the U.S. Army landed one tank battalion including 72 M48's plus 17 M75 armored personnel carriers.¹⁸

Meanwhile, one Army battle group and a large support force had been airlifted from Germany to Lebanon. USAFE troop carriers landed 1,749 paratroopers of Task Force Alpha, commanded by Brig. Gen. D. W. Gray, at Beirut Airport on 19 July, after a two-day holdover at Adana, Turkey,

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by order of Admiral Holloway. By 26 July the troop carriers had delivered Task Force Charlie, consisting of 1,632 men. The second Army battle group, Task Force Bravo, remained on alert in Germany, while Task Force Delta, consisting of 4,411 support personnel, and Task Force Echo, a 90-millimeter gun battalion (668 men), began movement to embarkation ports in France and Germany. The arrival of the last Army units during the first two weeks of August brought the Army forces to a strength of about 8,700 and the total ground force strength, Army and Marine, to about 15,000.¹⁹

Because of the size of the above force, which went beyond the Blue Bat concept, Admiral Holloway requested the Joint Chiefs to assign an Army or Marine Corps two- or three-star general as Commander, American Land Forces. This was approved and Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, USA, then serving in the European theater, was designated to the new post on 23 July. Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe was to assist by supplying personnel, equipment, and headquarters units. General Adams arrived to establish his joint headquarters on 24 July.²⁰

The Military Sea Transport Service diverted 15 of its cargo vessels to the Lebanon operation during the initial period, and these brought from Bremerhaven alone 3,851 persons and 12,500 long tons of cargo. This included 88 tanks, 1,906 combat and general-purpose vehicles, 3 fixed-wing aircraft, and 6 helicopters. These ships were insufficient, however, and soon had to be supplemented by a large number of leased commercial vessels, many of foreign ownership.²¹

By 27 July it was obvious to Admiral Holloway that the saturation point in the Beirut area was near, and he reported to Admiral Burke that

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no further augmentation was required in addition to Task Forces Delta and Echo, already embarked and en route. Army Task Force Bravo was thus never called on to move to Lebanon.

The deployment to Lebanon of the Honest John missile battery of Task Force Delta raised questions of far-reaching significance for the U.S. defense establishment. On 22 July, CINCUSAREUR notified CINCSPECOMME that the missile unit would depart Bremerhaven about 24 July and arrive in Beirut about 3 August. He requested concurrence on shipping nuclear warheads by air to arrive one day after the personnel and equipment. This information came as a surprise to Admiral Holloway, who had apparently not contemplated the possible use of atomic weapons in the area. He therefore asked that the nuclear warheads be withheld and conventional warheads be sent instead. He was informed, however, that the unit was not equipped with conventional warheads. In view of this situation, Holloway ordered the unit returned to Germany by air immediately upon its arrival.²²

By 19 July the Navy had assembled a considerable force in the area immediately adjacent to Beirut. In addition to the 17 ships, which had transported the three amphibious squadrons and their equipment, there were 1 heavy cruiser, 6 destroyers, and 4 minesweepers. At a distance of approximately 160 miles southwest of Beirut--33° N, 33° E--were 2 attack aircraft carriers, 1 antisubmarine aircraft carrier, 1 guided missile cruiser, 16 destroyers, and 6 destroyer escorts. CINCLANT had also received orders to be prepared on four hours' notice to steam for Gibraltar. Meanwhile, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered the Commander in Chief, Pacific to load and sail to the Persian Gulf one Marine battalion

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landing team and to be prepared to augment it. The Navy force in the Persian Gulf consisted of only one small seaplane tender and one destroyer.²³

During these operations by U.S. forces, other nations were also engaged in military movements as a result of the Lebanon crisis. One French cruiser and three destroyers arrived off Beirut early 17 July in response to the appeal received from President Chamoun. Since American troops had already landed, the French took no further action. While reserving the "right to give orders to land," the French government informed the United States that it would not take sudden action. The government of Turkey several times expressed willingness and even eagerness to join the United States and Britain in intervening to suppress the revolt in Iraq. Turkey, however, did not receive any encouragement along this line, and its only military action was to move military units, including one cavalry division, to the frontier area near Syria.²⁴

The Soviet Union took immediate action following the Iraq revolution to encourage the new government and deter intervention by establishing diplomatic relations and issuing warnings to the Western Powers. It also announced military maneuvers in Bulgaria, the Black Sea, Transcaucasia, and Turkestan, which seemed designed to dampen any enthusiasm for action by members of the Baghdad Pact. None of these actions or statements was regarded by the United States as particularly threatening; it was considered unlikely that Russia would risk war for its limited stake in the Middle East economy. There was obviously no threat to Russian security involved. It was also pointed out by Air Force intelligence that Soviet diplomatic and propaganda reaction, while prompt and energetic, was not as aggressive as in the Suez crisis of 1956 and that no specific course of action was discernible.²⁵

III. DEPLOYMENT OF AIR UNITS

The Air Force was assigned a major role in four of the five deployments (the fifth was by Sixth Fleet) ordered by the JCS after the President's decision to send military aid to Lebanon. The Tactical Air Command was to send its Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) Bravo to the Middle East. USAFE was to prepare for two separate airlifts of two U. S. Army battle groups from Germany to Lebanon; and in the fourth action, the Military Air Transport Service was to dispatch 26 C-124 transports to augment USAFE's airlift.¹

On the morning of 15 July, when the first Marine BLT was landing south of Beirut and USAFE transport units were preparing for an airlift to Beirut, the Tactical Air Command was hastily readying CASF Bravo for deployment overseas to Adana, Turkey. Near midnight of the 14th, Chief of Staff Gen. Thomas D. White had notified Gen. Otto P. Weyland, TAC's commander, that the JCS had approved the substitution of his CASF Bravo force for USAFE units originally scheduled to deploy to Adana in support of Blue Bat. The substitution was being made in order to provide immediate augmentation to USAFE in event of the spread of hostilities. Further instructions would be sent to TAC after 0900 EDT on 15 July. Insofar as possible TAC's troop carriers would replace MATS transports in airlifting CASF Bravo because the MATS planes might be required to airlift the U. S. Army Strategic Army Corps (STRAC). General White instructed Weyland not to alert any units concerning these instructions and to hold the information "closest," but he sent copies of the message to USAFE and MATS.²

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In the early hours of the 15th, Weyland reported that the following CASF Bravo units were on readiness alert as indicated in Nineteenth Air Force's Oplan 52-58:

| | | | |
|--------|---|----------------------------|---------------------|
| 2 sqs. | 24 F-100D/F tactical fighters | 832d Air Div. | Cannon AFB, N. Mex. |
| 1 sq. | 12 B-57 tactical bombers | 836th Air Div. | Langley AFB, Va. |
| 1 sq. | [4 KB-50 tankers] | 429th Air Re-fueling Sq. | Langley AFB, Va. |
| 1 sq. | composite recon., composed of 6 RF-101, 6 RB-66B, 3 RB-66C, 3 WB-66D aircraft | 837th Air Div. | Shaw AFB, S.C. |
| | communications & control element | 507th Tactical Control Gp. | Shaw AFB, S.C. |
| | command element | 19th Air Force | Foster AFB, Tex. |

Eight tankers were preparing for deployment to Lajes, in the Azores, and 24 F-100's would depart from Cannon AFB about 0500 hours for England AFB, La., for further deployment as necessary.³

Later in the day, at 1300 hours, TAC notified Headquarters USAF that the units at Cannon AFB could not launch their planes with full loads because of construction work on the runways. To replace them, the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing at Myrtle AFB, S.C., would dispatch 24 F-100D/F's as soon as possible. The 24 F-100D/F's from Cannon AFB would proceed to the east coast as a backup force. The three RB-66C's would not be included in the reconnaissance group.⁴

A little later, TAC notified Headquarters USAF that CASF Bravo was being deployed as planned, with the exceptions noted above. The tankers would not deploy to Adana but would remain at route positions. T/C

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C-130's would provide the support airlift of this force to its destination. The commander of the Ninth Air Force would control the deployment from his movement control center at Shaw AFB.⁵

The first CASF planes to leave the United States--the 12 B-57's--got off from Langley for Lajes beginning at 1420 hours on 15 July. At 1650 hours, the first flight of fighters--12 F-100's--departed Myrtle Beach nonstop for Adana. TAC later reported that 6 RF-101's, plus 2 spares, had taken off from Shaw AFB for Chaumont, France, via Lajes, at 1805 hours and that the Nineteenth Air Force command element was en route.

The second flight of 9 F-100's departed Myrtle Beach early the next morning, at 0235 hours, 16 July. The 6 RB-66's left Shaw AFB for Chateauroux via Lajes at 0852 hours that morning, and the 3 WB-66's got off at 0922 on the same route. A third flight of 8 F-100's departed Myrtle Beach at 1618 hours on the 16th. The first TAC transports had taken off at 1530 on 15 July, and by the end of the day there were 17 C-130's en route to Lajes, moving the command element, the communications and control element, and other support elements as rapidly as possible.

The first 4 F-100's landed at Incirlik Air Base, Adana, at 1125 hours on 16 July after a nonstop flight of $12\frac{1}{2}$ hours, with three refuelings en route. By the night of the 17th the CASF had 15 F-100's and 10 B-57's in place at Adana. On the 18th, 2 additional B-57's and 6 RF-101's arrived, bringing the total of TAC combat aircraft to 33 (of 54 committed), plus 2 C-130 transports (and 40 others in Europe held en route by CINCSPECOMME because of saturation at Adana). MATS had 36 C-124's at Rhein-Main

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to augment the USAFE airlift, and USAFE had 58 transports on the Germany-Adana airlift, as well as 9 F-86D's on air defense at Adana.

On the night of 20 July the CASF at Adana was complete, with 26 F-100's, 12 B-57's, 7 RF-101's, 7 RB-66's, and 3 WB-66's, totaling 55 combat aircraft.* Personnel totaled about 1,100. By the morning of the 21st, all of the TAC C-130's, except 3, had departed the Middle East on their return to the United States.⁶

In the meantime, USAFE's 322d Air Division had airlifted the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry (Force Alpha) from Germany to Lebanon, with a stopover at Incirlik. The USAFE transports began the airlift at 0900 on the morning of 16 July and brought the last element into Incirlik at 1250 hours on the 17th. MATS augmented the USAFE airlift with 10 C-124's that were already in Germany on temporary duty with USAFE and with 26 additional ones that arrived at Rhein-Main on 15-16 July.[†]

On the 18th the 322d began the airlift of Task Force Charlie from Germany to Adana. Charlie was a support force for Alpha, and it was large enough to support also Task Force Bravo, the second airborne battle group waiting in Germany for orders to deploy by airlift to Lebanon. While some transports were landing Force Charlie at Adana on the 19th, others began the lift of Alpha from Adana to its objective at Beirut Airport, Lebanon. They completed the movement to Beirut just after midnight of 19 July (0039 hours on 20 July).⁷

* USAFE's report, Support of the Lebanon Operation, gives 60 aircraft, counting 9 F-86's. It lists only 23 F-100's and 6 RB-66's.

† See section on MATS, pp. 44-46.

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The key to the Air Force movements and the airlift was Incirlik Air Base, the best military airfield in Turkey, located a few miles from the city of Adana. Only 80 miles from the Syrian border and about 215 miles north of Beirut, it offered a base from which aircraft could reach most of the Middle East capitals. The U.S. Air Force leased it from the government of Turkey, but it also served as a Turkish flying training center under Turkish command. Incirlik had a 10,000-foot concrete runway, 21 hardstands, and 6 aprons. Navigational aids, global communications, a weather station, and a floodlighting system were provided, and USAF units were assigned to the base.⁸ But Incirlik was still a small base, and saturation of its facilities was inevitable with the simultaneous arrival, beginning on the 16th, of the CASF Bravo aircraft from the United States and the USAFE transports from Germany.

The CASF Components

The Fighters⁹

It was 0910 EDT, 15 July, at Myrtle Beach AFB, S.C., when the commander of the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing received an order to send one squadron of F-100's to Adana, Turkey, within seven hours, followed by a second squadron nine hours later.

The 354th's commander was surprised, for the wing's mission had been changed only on 1 July from that of day fighter to fighter-bomber, and the pilots had no overwater experience and very little night refueling experience. Exercise Tradewind, begun just previous to the Lebanon

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crisis, had shown immediately that the 354th needed considerable unit training in squadron formation and in full-load refueling, both by day and night. Furthermore, the wing had received its flyaway kits only five days earlier.

According to the Nineteenth Air Force's Oplan 52-58, two squadrons of the 832d Air Division at Cannon AFB, N. Mex., were scheduled as the first tactical units for deployment of a CASF to the Middle East. But the condition of the runways at Cannon had made it necessary to substitute the 354th's squadrons.

The 355th Tactical Fighter Squadron was the unit assigned for the first flight deployment, the 352d Squadron was assigned for the second, and the third section was a makeup unit composed mostly of pilots whose planes had aborted in the first two flights. Launch hour for the first F-100's was 1618 hours EDT 15 July but actual takeoff occurred at 1650 hours. In all, 29 F-100's and 37 pilots deployed on direct flight from the United States to Adana. Of the 29 aircraft, 8 were F-100F's with 2 pilots apiece, while 21 were of the 1-place D series.

A severe operational test en route awaited the pilots of the first squadron of 12 F-100's as they took off from Myrtle Beach late on the afternoon of 15 July. The principal problem was air refueling, and the first test of this skill occurred over the Atlantic southeast of Nova Scotia at 39° 40' N, 61° 51' W. Toward this point, KB-50 tankers had taken off from Langley AFB well before the F-100's left Myrtle Beach.

The F-100's had been about 30 minutes late in taking off, and they were about 20 minutes late at the first refueling. This placed a

serious handicap on the tankers, which had a limited endurance. Only five tankers were on station whereas eight had been scheduled originally. The problems that these F-100 pilots met at the first rendezvous point, as well as those encountered by them and by the other two sections at the two later rendezvous points, included night weather conditions, insufficient number of tankers, inadequate communications, and malfunctioning equipment.

At the first rendezvous, nine F-100's refueled successfully, but three aborted. Two of the three landed at Greenwood, Nova Scotia, but the third ran out of fuel, and the pilot bailed out safely over land between Yarmouth and Greenwood.

On the flight to the Azores, the aircraft became separated and experienced navigation difficulties. They arrived at the second refueling point in poor weather at night. Five pilots had to land their aircraft at Lajes, but four successfully refueled and continued on to Adana, executing a third refueling from USAFE tankers over Caritat (near Orange), southern France. The lucky four landed at Incirlik Air Base at 1125 on 16 July after about $12\frac{1}{2}$ hours in flight.

The second section of nine F-100's deployed more smoothly early on the 16th, owing to better preparation. Even so, the number had been reduced from 12 because one tanker had aborted and one fighter aborted on takeoff. They carried through the first and second refuelings successfully but had to land at Chateauroux when there were no tankers to refuel them on arrival over Caritat in the afternoon. Eight of these F-100's resumed their flight the next morning and, after one additional refueling stop at Wheelus Air Base, in Libya, arrived at Adana on the afternoon of 17 July.

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The third section of eight F-100's, composed chiefly of pilots whose planes had aborted earlier, was intended to make up for the aborts of the other two sections and to supply two spares. In spite of pilot fatigue, the takeoffs on the afternoon of the 16th and the initial refuelings were successful. But tanker troubles stopped four of the pilots at Lajes; canopy failure and oxygen shortages caused the remaining four to land at European bases.

The full complement of 26 F-100's was on hand at Incirlik by the 20th. The CASF replaced its 8 F-100F's with as many F-100D's near the end of the month. After the D's arrived, there were 34 Super Sabres at Adana for a few days until the last 6 F's departed for the States on 26 July.

The Tactical Bombers¹⁰

The 498th Bombardment Squadron, Tactical (345th Bombardment Wing), furnished 12 B-57 bombers to the strike force. The first pair of B-57's took off from Langley AFB at 1420 hours on 15 July--two and a half hours before the first fighters got off. The first C-130 support aircraft for the bombers departed at 1800 hours that evening.

The intended route to Adana was via Lajes and Chateauroux (Deols Air Auxiliary Field there). Mechanical or communication difficulties forced eight B-57's to land at Ernest Harmon AFB, Newfoundland. Nevertheless, the first B-57 touched down at Incirlik at 0105 on 17 July. On the evening of the 16th, when the first two bombers were a few hours out of Adana, two more were nearing Chateauroux, six were at Lajes, and the last two were en route to Lajes.

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All 12 B-57's were in place at Adana by 1150 hours of 18 July. The average en route time for the deployment was 40 hours and 7 minutes. The average en route time for the C-130 support aircraft was 47 hours and 55 minutes, the last of these arriving on the evening of 18 July. Among the problems encountered in the deployment was the lack of "Duckbutts" in the flights from Langley to Lajes. The bombers expected at least two such rescue aircraft to be at stationary points en route to facilitate fix positions. In their absence, only airplot information was available for determining geographical location.

The Reconnaissance Planes¹¹

The 363d Composite Reconnaissance Squadron, upon arrival at Adana, was composed of 7 RF-101, 7 RB-66B, and 3 WB-66D aircraft. Support personnel and equipment were deployed by TAC C-130's. The personnel of the squadron came from 10 or more units at Shaw AFB, principally the 363d and 432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wings and the 837th Air Base Group.

The first of eight RF-101's departed from Shaw for Adana, via the Azores, Chaumont, and Wheelus, at 1800 hours on 15 July. The support aircraft departed that night and early on the 16th and were routed through Bermuda, the Azores, and Chateauroux. The RF-101's refueled in the air northeast of Bermuda. By 1220 hours of 16 July, five of the Voodoos had made successful landings at Chaumont, but three had aborted before reaching Lajes and returned to Shaw AFB. Two replacements departed from Shaw on the 16th and arrived at Chaumont at 0550 the next morning. Six RF-101's were in place at Adana on 18 July, seven on the 19th.

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Six RB-66's and three WB-66's departed from Shaw early on the morning of the 16th. One RB-66 aborted and returned to Shaw, while two others had refueling difficulties and landed at Kindley, but by 1800 hours of that day, five RB-66's and three WB-66's were at Lajes. These eight reached Chateauroux on the 17th and were directed to remain there because of saturation of the Adana base. They departed, however, for Wheelus on the 18th and arrived at Adana on the afternoon of 19 July. Two more RB-66's arrived on the 20th.

The Fighter-Interceptors¹²

The Nineteenth Air Force's plan for CASF Bravo did not include fighter-interceptors because the original deployment plan had called for USAFE to provide them. On 15 July, USAFE therefore offered to deploy eight of its F-86D's with TAC's CASF. The 512th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, 86th Fighter-Interceptor Wing, stationed at Sembach Air Base, Germany, was selected for the deployment. This addition to the CASF was ordered on the 16th, and the squadron departed at noon that day. By 0300 hours of 17 July, USAFE had nine F-86D's in place at Adana, plus two T-33's. The entire force of 69 airmen and 14 officers was on hand with equipment by 1700 hours. The route had been via Austria, Italy, and Greece, with three refueling stops.

The CASF Support Lift¹³

For the airlift of CASF support personnel and equipment, the Ninth Air Force made available the 463d Troop Carrier Wing (M), Ardmore AFB, Okla., assisted by the 314th Troop Carrier Wing (M), Sewart AFB, Tenn. TAC used 43 C-130's for this lift, although the initial commitment was for 37 aircraft in direct support plus 5 to lift command and en route maintenance elements.

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The 463d received verbal directions to go on Category I Double Trouble alert at 1900 hours (CST) on 14 July. At 1045 (CST) on the 15th, after the aircraft had started taking off for Cannon AFB as directed, the Ninth Air Force advised that the staging base had changed to Myrtle AFB and, at 1100 hours, that the C-130's would be going "all the way." By this hour the number scheduled for deployment was 43.

The transports took on their loads at Myrtle, Shaw, and Langley AFB's. The C-130's started taking off for Adana at 1530 hours on 15 July, the first ones arriving there early on 17 July. The route of the C-130's to Adana was through Kindley and Lajes to France (Evreux, Chateauroux, or Chaumont). Although 18 were at Adana on the 19th, most of them were held up at European bases, at the direction of Admiral Holloway, because of saturation of Incirlik facilities when the C-130's began arriving there on 17 July. In some cases the delay in landing was as long as 70 minutes per aircraft. The routing of the entire CASF over the southern route caused extreme congestion at all terminals, making it necessary to deny the use of Wheelus AB to the C-130's. The redeployment of C-130's by way of Evreux, either direct or through Wheelus, began from Adana on 19 July.

The Airlift of Army Task Force Alpha¹⁴

On 15 July, while the CASF aircraft were taking off from U.S. bases for Adana, the USAFE troop carriers were preparing to lift Army troops into Lebanon to relieve the Marine amphibious landing teams. The 322d

Air Division (Combat Cargo), at Evreux/Fauville Air Base, France, which was charged with the airlift of two Army groups from Germany to Lebanon, had been through a preview of Blue Bat only two months earlier. On 16 May it had received orders to be prepared to airlift within 24 hours troops of the 11th Airborne Division from the Bavarian airfields of Fürstenfeldbruck and Erding. By late 18 May, it had 56 transports loaded for airdrop and ready for deployment from these fields. At that time, MATS also sent 31 C-124's from Donaldson AFB, S.C., to Europe as augmentation for USAFE. This crisis in the Middle East abated, however, and the JCS authorized a relaxation in the alert status on 23 May. Following the May emergency the 322d had been placed on 24-hour, and later 48-hour, alert.

At 1010 hours on 15 July the 322d received an order to execute its mission as outlined in USAFE Oplan 100-58. A few hours later, USAFE directed the commander of the 322d to airlift Army Force Alpha (the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry) from Fürstenfeldbruck and Erding* to Beirut. It was to be prepared to land or airdrop the troops within 24 or 36 hours, respectively, after receipt of orders. The first aircraft were to arrive at Fürstenfeldbruck about 1500 hours. The 322d was to assume control of 26 MATS C-124's, plus spares, scheduled to arrive at Rhein-Main Air Base on 15 and 16 July, and it was to set up a joint command post with the 24th Infantry Division.¹⁵

USAFE had the following planes available in the theater for the Blue Bat airlift mission: 48 C-130's of the 317th Troop Carrier Wing at Evreux;

*The 187th Infantry was assigned to the 24th Infantry Division. Departure bases were Fürstenfeldbruck Air Base and Erding Air Station, both near Munich, Germany.

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about 50 C-119's of the 60th Troop Carrier Wing at Dreux Air Base, France; some 27 C-123's being phased out of the inventory; and 10 C-124's of the MATS 3d Troop Carrier Squadron stationed at Rhein-Main under the operational control of the 322d Air Division. The first 8 C-124's of the MATS augmentation, arriving on the 15th,* immediately became available for the airlift.¹⁶

At 1700 hours of the 15th, USAFE sent a warning order to its task organizations to prepare to deploy for Blue Bat within four hours. About the same time it directed the Seventeenth Air Force, at Wheelus AB, to increase readiness, but covertly, and to prepare for traffic to and from Adana for the CASF and the Army airlift. The commander of the Third Air Force, at South Ruislip, England, was told to double the number of strike aircraft on strip alert.¹⁷

At 1740 hours USAFE flashed to its units an "alert and movement order" calling for deployment of base support personnel to Adana, airlift for refueling operations and equipment to Germany and Greece, provision of staging capability in Greece and Italy, provision for tactical air control, preparation for deployment of special weapons equipment, and increase in communication services in the Middle East.¹⁸

For the airlift of Army Force Alpha, USAFE scheduled the transports as follows: 30 C-130's and 5 C-124's would load from Fürstenfeldbruck between 1520 and 2010 hours of the 15th; 24 C-119's would load from Erding between 2020 and 2320 hours. Later, the MATS C-124's would replace the C-119's.¹⁹

*Air transports, en route in the theater, were diverted to Rhein-Main. See pp. 44-45.

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By early evening of 15 July, the 322d had 59 transports at the two German fields: 32 C-130's, 8 C-124's, and 19 C-119's. The first C-130 departed with the advance party at 0900 the next morning. Then the troop carriers began the lift of the 1,749 paratroops of Task Force Alpha, the last one clearing for Adana by 1430 hours. The transports completed the lift to Adana in 72 sorties by 1250 hours on the 17th.

Initially, the C-130's flew directly over the Alps from Germany via Austria to Italy and then to Adana, but after Austria protested against the flights, they took the longer route used by the slower C-119's and C-124's, generally via Marseilles, Naples, and Athens. The principal difficulty resulted from the denial of staging rights in Greece after the 16th. As a result, nine C-119's had to take on additional fuel in Italy in order to fly around Athens, thus diminishing the cabin load and delaying their arrival at Adana. There were also difficulties at departure airfields until an Air Force component was established to coordinate the loading, dispatch, unloading, and dispersal of aircraft.²⁰

By the morning of 17 July, when the situation in Lebanon seemed well in hand to Admiral Holloway, the traffic at Adana was becoming a problem. He asked CINCEUR not to deploy Army Task Force Bravo to Adana but to hold it in Germany on a 24-hour alert until he requested otherwise. Bravo consisted of 1,723 officers and men of the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 503d Infantry.²¹

On the evening of the 17th, Admiral Holloway directed Army Force Alpha to land at Beirut Airport commencing at 0600 hours of the 19th and to bivouac in the vicinity of the airport. Blue Bat had required

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readiness for either an airdrop or airlanding at Beirut, and the initial Army elements had been loaded at Fürstenfeldbruck in preparation for an airdrop. Between 16 July and midnight of 18 July, Admiral Holloway conferred with Lebanese officials and ultimately obtained approval for airlanding the U.S. troops at the Beirut Airport. The airdrop loading, the holdover at Incirlik, and the possibility of a second airdrop at Tripoli complicated the movement.²²

The troop carriers lifted Task Force Alpha from Adana to Beirut on the 19th, making the first landing at 0549 Beirut time and the last soon after midnight. The Alpha airlift force consisted of 30 C-130's, 7 C-124's, and 19 C-119's, totaling 56 transports. USAFE returned all the C-130's and 9 of the C-119's to the continent from Beirut on the 19th and committed them to the lift of Task Force Charlie, after crew rest and maintenance. The remaining 10 C-119's returned to Adana. The C-130's returned to Evreux, France, via Wheelus AB. Of the C-124's, 4 were scheduled to return to Rhein-Main, via Naples, but 3 stayed at Adana for shuttle operations.²³

USAFE had begun the airlift of Task Force Charlie from Germany to Adana at 0200 hours on 18 July. This force was to furnish support for Alpha, and it included field artillery and other heavy equipment. Task Force Charlie was moved simultaneously with Alpha resupply. Together with other resupply, these operations involved approximately 198 C-124 and C-130 sorties, carrying 1,818 Army personnel and 2,290 tons of cargo. After the first 7 C-124's reached Adana, the others were delayed until the saturation there could be alleviated. When the Alpha force began departing

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Adana for Beirut early on the 19th the lift of Charlie to Adana was resumed. The transports began lifting this force from Adana to Beirut at 0700 on the 20th; the lift was completed on 26 July with the delivery of the 58th Evacuation Hospital in 13 C-124 loads from Rhein-Main. After 20 July the transports operated directly from Germany to Beirut, eliminating the stop at Adana. By 21 July, Blue Bat transports were again authorized to land at fields in Greece when westbound, but only during darkness when eastbound.²⁴

On 26 July, USAFE directed its units not on the Blue Bat operation to revert to the alert status of 14 July. Beginning 27 July the 322d Division, including the MATS planes, could curtail its operations to permit it to perform deferred periodic inspections and to rest its aircrews.²⁵

In addition to lifting Task Forces Alpha and Charlie to Beirut and providing a fuel lift in response to Jordan's appeal and a supply lift to the British forces in Jordan, the USAFE transports performed continuous support missions for the American forces in the Middle East. By 7 August they had carried on these support flights 1,269 tons of cargo and 505 passengers. The missions included such special lifts as 125 tons of U.S. Army water pipes to Adana and refueling trucks to Amman for the British.²⁶

As the airlift continued, the 322d Division moved a total of 8,227.8 tons of equipment and 7,934 passengers by 12 August. After that, resupply and administrative support continued until the withdrawal of

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forces between 18 and 25 October. For the withdrawal operation, the division airlifted 1,136.5 tons of freight and 2,579 passengers back to Fürstenfeldbruck.

In its report on the operations, USAFE listed the major problems encountered. First, there was the difficulty in obtaining overflight authority from Austria and Greece. Next, it listed the lack of joint air-ground operations procedures, not directly affecting the airlift but of great importance.

MATS Airlift²⁷

At 1840 hours (CDT) on 14 July, Headquarters MATS received orders to provide 26 C-124's to augment the USAFE airlift. Within three hours the first C-124's took off from Donaldson AFB, S.C., and thereafter two aircraft departed every hour. The first aircraft arrived at Rhein-Main at 0120 on 16 July, and all 26 C-124's arrived that day, ahead of schedule. In response to a USAFE request on 17 July, the 63d Troop Carrier Wing dispatched an additional 10 C-124's from Donaldson by 2206 on that day. Five replacements were dispatched later.

The night order of 14 July found the 63d Troop Carrier Wing with 21 of its 84 C-124's scattered over the Pacific, Caribbean, and Atlantic or supporting Army exercises; another 10 were already on temporary duty with USAFE. Only 9 aircraft were on alert status with crew in place at Donaldson. Even for these, changes had to be made to meet requirements for personnel airdrop before they could be dispatched.

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Besides the 36 MATS C-124's arriving in the European theater, USAFE had the MATS squadron of 10 C-124's already on temporary duty in the theater, diverted to Rhein-Main AB for the Blue Bat crisis. Seven aircraft of this squadron (the 3d Troop Carrier Squadron, 63d Wing) performed missions in direct support of Blue Bat. After lifting 700 paratroops of Task Force Alpha to Beirut on 19 July, they were assigned to lift POL to Amman, Jordan.

When the crisis occurred on 14 July, the 1607th Air Transport Wing had 13 C-124's en route in the European theater. These were intercepted and directed to Rhein-Main to support the task force; all but one arrived there in the next two days. These aircraft departed for normal duties after the troop carriers arrived from the United States and replaced them. On 15 July, MATS dispatched 3 additional C-124's from Dover AFB to enter the pool at Rhein-Main. The 1607th at Dover had two crews, nicknamed ARAB, held in readiness for departure on one-hour alert at all times. At Charleston AFB, S.C., and McGuire AFB, N.J., other units were kept on alert.

In mid-August the 1607th Wing deployed the 31st Air Transport Squadron with 12 C-124C's, equipped for troop carrier missions, from Dover to Rhein-Main, where it replaced the 3d Troop Carrier Squadron. Between 13 August and 8 September the 31st flew 44 sorties, most of them to the Middle East.

As of 8 September (the last day of operations) MATS aircraft had moved 5,486 tons of cargo and 5,316 passengers to the Middle East. They had flown 314 sorties in 6,954 flying hours. The operation lasted 56 days, the last four C-124's departing for the United States on 11 September.

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The MATS air-base wings at Kindley and Lajes provided refueling and maintenance support to the CASF deployment and redeployment forces as they staged through Bermuda and the Azores. The peak flow occurred on 15 July when 100 military aircraft arrived at Kindley with very little forewarning. On 15-16 July, 49 C-130's arrived within a 24-hour period. On 16 July, 151 military aircraft were refueled at Kindley. Lajes serviced more than 300 aircraft during 15-18 July, while some 3,000 troops staged through the field.

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IV. AIR OPERATIONS

Operations conducted by the units of all the services during the Lebanon crisis were a "show of force"; there was never any actual combat. Air support over Lebanon came from the carrier-based planes of the Sixth Fleet and to a lesser extent from the USAF units at Adana. But since the arena of potential conflict was much greater than Lebanon itself, the Composite Air Strike Force and the USAFE interceptors remained on the alert over a broad area of the Middle East.

The geographical divisions of responsibility for air defense of the Lebanon area were clearly marked. COMMAIRFOR had the mission of defending the northern area, centered on Incirlik Air Base at Adana. This area extended in a semicircle northward around the base into Turkey for about 150 miles, to Turkey's border on the south, then out over the Mediterranean southward to 35° N and westward to a point in the Mediterranean midway between the coast and Cyprus. COMAMNAVFOR had the mission along the Lebanon coast from 35° N to 33° N and out over the Mediterranean to the midway point, where Sixth Fleet took over to the south and the British to the north. The Sixth Fleet kept vigil all the way from COMAMNAVFOR's area to the coasts of Israel and Egypt. The British area, centering on Cyprus, included all the Mediterranean between 34° N and 36° N beginning at the midway point indicated. The combat reporting center at Adana, set up on 17 July as soon as the F-86's arrived, operated a crisscross telling system with the British forces on Cyprus, and it effected a tie-in with the Turkish defense net.¹

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Aside from show-of-force missions over Lebanon and the alert and training missions, USAF aircraft flew area cover for Army troop movements to Beirut, executed a leaflet drop mission over Lebanon, and put on air demonstrations for foreign and national dignitaries at Adana.²


The psychological warfare missions were planned and conducted jointly by the U.S. military services and the U.S. Information Service and were controlled by the American ambassador at Beirut. Air Force and naval aircraft periodically conducted flyovers of Lebanon, publicized as "Salute to Lebanon" missions. The CASF participated in these operations on 23, 26, 28, and 29 July and 7 and 13 August.

On 21 July, two escorted USAF C-130's dropped 1,000,000 leaflets over the populated areas of Lebanon. The message told the people why foreign military forces had entered their country and that these forces would leave when the situation became normal and when requested by the Lebanese government to do so. Wide and favorable publicity was accorded this drop.³

Fighters⁴

Four F-100's were in place on the Incirlik strips by 1125 hours of 16 July. At 0800 hours of 17 July they went on a schedule of two on five-minute alert and two on standby. Fifteen Super Sabres had arrived by the 17th, and they flew their initial combat sorties on the 18th. Although only 6 F-100 sorties were flown that day, 16 were flown the following day (19 July) to escort the USAFE airlift from Incirlik to Beirut. By then, 23 F-100's were in place and capable of sustained

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


NOTE: AREAS ABOVE REFER TO AIR DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES

1 IN = 77 STATUTE MILES

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NOTE: *COMTASFMFME combined with COMAIAIRFOR.

Source: 19th AF, Blue Bat Consol Final Rpt, Vol I, Sec 1, Atch 1.

operations. From that date until the return to the United States of the CASF units on 19 October (except for the 12 F-100's retained in Adana on rotational status), the F-100's were employed as follows:

| | |
|--------------------------|-----------|
| Combat air patrols | 194 |
| Air defense | 97 |
| Scrambles | 205 |
| Flybys | 79 |
| Training | 141 |
| Aerial refueling | 60 |
| Local indoctrination | 19 |
| Ferry and administration | 59 |
| Engineering | <u>20</u> |

874 sorties

Tactical Bombers⁵

Ten of the 498th Bombardment Squadron's B-57's were combat ready by early 18 July and on 30-minute AOC alert, although fuel pits were not yet in operation. The unit assembled its own rockets and bombs and loaded five of the planes. Thereafter the highest priority was placed on armed standby alert.

The B-57's flew missions as follows: day and night visual reconnaissance; formation show of force; high- and low-altitude navigation training; gunnery, rocketry, and napalm training; firepower demonstration; close air support training; logistic support; courier, administrative, instrument, and test flights. Ten B-57's participated in show-of-force formations on 23, 26, and 29 July.

During the period of operations, an in-commission rate of 87 percent was maintained for the B-57's. One B-57 received minor damage from gunfire, probably .30 caliber, while flying a visual reconnaissance sortie over Lebanon on 9 August.

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The need for additional training in the use of conventional weapons was soon recognized. Many aircrews were untrained in the low-level delivery methods for conventional bombs, and few had fired guns or rockets for score. In early September an air-to-air range over the Mediterranean Sea became available for training in splash gunnery with conventional ordnance. From 22 September through 3 October the bombers used to good advantage for scored gunnery, rocketry, and napalm drops the air-to-ground range at Eskisehir, Turkey, about 240 miles northwest of Incirlik.

Air Defense⁶

The F-86 crews of the 512th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron from USAFE had the mission of air defense of the forces at Incirlik Air Base during hours of darkness. They assumed the first alert commitment 30 minutes after sunset on 17 July--the day of their arrival. Remaining on the operation for 97 subsequent days, they flew 506 sorties, which included air defense and training missions. Besides night alerts, the squadron augmented the day fighters at times and assumed the commitment during weather below the minimums for day fighter operations.

Reconnaissance⁷

For the CASF as a whole, reconnaissance bore by far the heaviest portion of the operations because of the Army requests. The entire 363d Composite Reconnaissance Squadron was in place at Incirlik Air Base on 19 July and ready for operations at 1900 hours, but missions did not begin until 21 July. These missions, generally routine and well within the capability of the unit, included weather, day photo, and visual

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reconnaissance, mostly low-level. The RB-66's did not fly night missions because of possible misunderstanding by the inhabitants of night illuminants and flash equipment. Weather reconnaissance missions were flown by the WB-66's until 20 August, but there was little need for them because of the prevailing fair weather.

Some doubt arose as to the effectiveness of the RB-66B for visual reconnaissance. For good vision, it had to be flown too low and too slowly to avoid being an excellent target for ground fire, and on four missions the RB-66's were hit by ground fire not larger than .30 caliber. The RF-101's were used effectively. Although one of these was also hit by ground fire, the RF-101's were of course less vulnerable because of their smaller size and greater speed.

Since aerial reconnaissance made up a major portion of the operations and both Air Force and naval aircraft were used by the Army for this purpose, problems arose concerning common procedures for requesting and reporting reconnaissance. Also there was need for a base map that all the services could use. When this problem became evident, representatives of the services met in Beirut on 4 August, devised joint procedures for directing and controlling air operations, and drafted an interim aerial reconnaissance plan.

The major deficiency in operations resulted from the deletion of the electronic reconnaissance aircraft (RB-66C), which had been in the plan at the beginning of the deployment. The CASF could not meet a requirement for precise information on radar capabilities within Syria because it did

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not have the RB-66C's. USAFE supplied one Q-54 sortie for this purpose. The Nineteenth Air Force commander agreed that three RB-66C's always should be included in a CASF.

Tankers⁸

No tankers were scheduled to deploy with the CASF to the Middle East, the tankers used for refueling the aircraft on the initial deployment remaining at route positions. Later, however, on 20 July, after the CASF was in place at Adana, four KB-50J tankers of the 429th Air Refueling Squadron deployed there through Lajes and Chateauroux, arriving on the 21st.

From 21 July through 7 September, the four tankers were on one-hour alert, the aircrews sleeping beneath their planes at first and later in nearby tents. They performed air refueling missions for training purposes and also flew transport missions. After two tankers returned to the United States on 7 September the other two remained on two-hour alert. The tanker operations, in general, showed the importance of close coordination between receiver and tanker units in all planning, briefing, and critiques.

Airlift to Jordan

The situation in Jordan, to which military aid was given by the United Kingdom in close coordination with the United States, differed in almost every respect from that in Lebanon except that both countries had been under heavy pressure from Nasser and his followers and the governments of both felt themselves directly menaced by the violent

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revolution in Iraq. Jordan closely resembled the other Arab countries in that the dominant religious group was Sunni Moslem, with other groups constituting only a small minority. Unlike Lebanon and some other Middle East countries, it had only a short national history, being an artificial country set up with the support of the British in 1920, in large part as a reward for the support of the Hashemite family against the Turks during World War I. For more than 30 years the British continued to pay an annual subsidy to Jordan and also detailed military officers to aid in organizing an army. As a result, Jordan was the only Arab country to emerge with any credit from the war with Israel, actually gaining new territory and population at the cost of additional economic and political problems.

Following the assassination of King Abdullah in 1951, the throne ultimately passed to his grandson, Hussein, who assumed power in 1953. Three years later, Hussein dismissed Lt. Gen. John B. Glubb, the British officer who had built the Jordanian army into an effective fighting force. A few months afterward, during the Suez crisis, Jordan broke off the long-standing alliance with Britain and renounced its annual subsidy in return for promised financial assistance from Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This help failed to materialize, and a series of political crises, military conspiracies, and mob disorders, instigated by extreme Arab nationalists and Communists, racked the kingdom. Only repeated purgings of conspirators from the officer corps, the loyalty of the army rank and file, and the support of his cousin, Faisal of Iraq, had enabled Hussein to hold on to his kingdom. The coup in Iraq on 14 July threatened to dislodge him from his throne.⁹

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Two days after President Chamoun's appeal for aid, at 1900 local time on 16 July, Hussein appealed to the United States and the United Kingdom for military assistance. There is every indication that Hussein would have preferred that the United States share in the Jordan movement, but the two governments decided that the British alone would send troops into Jordan. Since the Lebanon operation was already under way, however, and the U.S. carrier task force was much closer to the scene, the commander of the Sixth Fleet did receive contingent instructions to prepare to evacuate King Hussein. The carrier Saratoga was sent farther down the eastern Mediterranean coast, and plans were made to use two planes plus air cover for the evacuation, if it became necessary.¹⁰

On receipt of Hussein's appeal and with the concurrence of Jordan, the British immediately requested and obtained permission from the government of Israel to overfly the country, the only stipulation being that Israel be notified of the timing of the flights. The nearest British force of any size capable of land operations was about 250 miles northwest of Amman, on Cyprus, where the 16th Parachute Brigade and 1st Guards Brigade were located. Early on the morning of 17 July, 500 British paratroopers left Cyprus aboard 14 Hastings and 8 Beverley transports. By 2122 local time they were taking up defensive positions outside the Amman airport. Six Hawker Hunters from No. 66 Squadron on Cyprus provided fighter cover.¹¹

The first phase of the British movement into Jordan was completed by 21 July, when about 1,800 troops were on hand (the 16th Parachute

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Brigade less one battalion). The number of British troops in Jordan ultimately rose to 3,500. The British made precautionary deployment of additional forces in North Africa and the Arabian peninsula. Headquarters 3d Infantry Division was airlifted from Britain to Cyprus, while Headquarters 24th Brigade began movement to Bahrein, where 1,000 British troops were already stationed. Several hundred additional British Marines landed in Tobruk, bringing the number of British troops in Libya to 3,500. The 1st Guards Brigade remained on alert in Cyprus, for movement to Jordan or Kuwait as might be necessary. A number of British troops also moved to Aden.¹²

The serious shortage of POL in Amman from the beginning prompted a hurried appeal to the United States for aid. The nearest source of supply was at Bahrein, and shipment was first planned in C-124's via the American air base at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The latter country, however, refused to give overflight clearance. On a long-term basis the problem was dealt with by the shipment of fuel by ship tanker through the Suez Canal to Aqaba, without challenge from the Egyptian government. But the immediate need on 17 July was pressing and could be solved only by airlift.

CINCSPECOMME met the crisis by flying in fuel from Beirut. In this first U.S. lift to Amman, completed on 26 July, 7 C-124's carried 361 tons of fuel, and 13 C-130's, diverted from the support of Task Force Charlie, lifted 247 tons. Israel permitted the planes to fly over its territory but specified a minimum altitude of 14,500 feet, which precluded the use of C-119's, considered more efficient on short runs.

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In the meantime the British had requested another airlift of supplies from Cyprus to their forces in Amman. This airlift, to run from 24 July to 1 August, was needed because land transportation from Aqaba to Amman was totally inadequate. The United States agreed to this assistance on 24 July, and Israel notified Secretary of State Dulles on the same day that U.S. planes had clearance to overfly Israel.

For this lift CINCSPECOMME requested 9 C-119's to add to the aircraft already being used on the Amman POL lift. Subsequently, USAFE provided 16 C-119's for the Jordan lift.* The transports picked up empty drums in Beirut, hauled them to Nicosia on Cyprus, and filled them up there for the lift to Amman. More than 1,600 empty drums were found in Beirut and, with 23 rubber collapsible fuel containers, these were sufficient for the lift. By 31 July the U.S. transports had airlifted 1,572 tons of cargo to Amman.

On 28 July the British also requested a daily airlift of 102 tons of cargo for an indefinite period after 1 August. On 27 July the British had in Amman a 21-day supply of stocks and a 37-day supply of POL. The JCS authorized Admiral Holloway to assist the British on a temporary basis to 6 August but advised that there were not enough transports to permit a continuing airlift. CINCSPECOMME expected the overflight agreement with Israel to extend through this period, but on 2 August the Israeli government denied overflight rights and operations were suspended. The lift was resumed on 6 August when Israel again granted clearance.

*Smart memo of 8 August says 23 C-119's.

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On 1 August, 6 C-124's arrived in Cyprus to take over the haul to Amman from the C-119's and continue the resupply through 10 August. By 6 August the British in Amman had sufficient POL supply for 57 days. Counting the initial lift, the U.S. transports carried a total of 2,277 tons of cargo to Amman.¹³

The Command of Air Units

The command arrangements for the American forces evolved substantially in accordance with plans as the operation in Lebanon unfolded. The Commander American Air Forces (COMAMAIRFOR) and the naval and ground commanders (COMAMNAVFOR and COMAMLANFOR) took their orders from Admiral Holloway, the overall commander of the operation (CINCSPECOMME). But the title COMAMAIRFOR did not carry with it the command of air units belonging to the U.S. Navy, although COMAMLANFOR embraced all ground troops after 24 July. The air commander had only TAC's CASF Bravo directly under him and exercised operational control of the USAFE units when they arrived in Turkey and Lebanon (the area east of 28° E). He was also the coordinator with the British Middle East Air Force and the Turkish Air Force.*

An advance staff for the air commander established itself at Adana by 1000 hours of 16 July, and the TAC CASF command element arrived there at 0800 hours the next morning. On 21 July, Admiral Holloway called for the activation of the land commander's headquarters ashore in Beirut and directed that advance elements of the air commander's staff be located adjacent to the former.¹⁴

*See chart facing p. 49.

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At the beginning of the Blue Bat operation, Brig. Gen. James E. Roberts, from USAFE headquarters, held the position of COMAMAIRFOR, but Maj. Gen. Henry Viccellio, commander of the Nineteenth Air Force and CASF Bravo, replaced him on 21 July. Soon afterward the advance element of a small air headquarters was established in Beirut near the land force headquarters.¹⁵

The need for standardized joint doctrine and procedures for air missions became apparent as soon as the Air Force brought the Army troops to Beirut. Since joint use was made of Air Force and naval aviation for aerial reconnaissance, close support, air defense, and other air operations, it was necessary to coordinate requests for missions and to develop procedures that would be satisfactory to all the services and could be coordinated with the RAF on Cyprus. At a conference on 4 August, joint procedures were devised and an interim aerial reconnaissance plan was drafted. According to Admiral Holloway's report, this proved adequate for the purpose, but future plans would provide for joint control and coordination of all aspects of air operations.¹⁶

COMAMAIRFOR and COMAMNAVFOR (Rear Adm. Charles R. Brown) agreed upon a plan whereby the air support responsibilities in Lebanon would be rotated between them. On 5 September, General Viccellio assumed this duty from the naval commander, and on 22 September it was rotated again. On 27 September the responsibility for control of air operations was shifted from CTF 61 on the Pocono to COMAMAIRFOR. Admiral Holloway informed the two sub-commanders that General Viccellio would assume from Admiral Brown the


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complete responsibility for tactical and transport air operations in the Lebanon area. This meant that Viccellio would provide air defense warning to the land forces; maintain active air defense alert at Adana; maintain two aircraft on 30-minute AOC alert for close air support and the remainder of the aircraft on 2-hour alert; provide reconnaissance and training aircraft as agreed with COMAMLANFOR; assume full responsibility for search and rescue in the Lebanon area; and provide required communications.¹⁷

Cooperation between the American and British forces brought appreciative words from the commander of the Middle East Air Force on Cyprus. RAF Air Marshal Sir Hubert Patch discussed air coordination with Admiral Holloway at Beirut and with General Viccellio at Adana. Patch spoke of the splendid U.S. cooperation in the airlift to Jordan, so essential to the success of the British forces there.¹⁸

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V. CONCILIATION AND WITHDRAWAL

During their stay in Lebanon the American forces remained prepared to protect Beirut from attack, but they took no aggressive action against rebel forces inside or outside the city. In general, the Americans were posted in the vicinity of the airport to the south of the city, at Yellow Beach to the northeast of the city, and along the harbor frontage. All units stayed on the alert and conducted patrols, and Air Force and Navy units executed a number of low-level flyovers.

The ground forces were to fire only if fired upon. Then they could return fire, employing the next larger weapons if available. No significant actions resulted, although several minor exchanges of fire occurred. Desultory firing from the ground against low-flying American aircraft occurred on a number of occasions, and several planes were hit, but no significant damage or casualties resulted. Actually, the only serious American casualty caused by hostile rebel action was an unarmed soldier, who was shot and wounded in the left shoulder on 23 August while walking near a barricade outside the Basta section of Beirut. In response to Admiral Holloway's vigorous protest, General Chehab had the barricade destroyed.¹

Lebanese who supported Chamoun, as well as those who feared the destruction of life and property that might result from a continuation of the rebellion, greeted the newly arrived American troops with relief

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and enthusiasm. This included virtually all the Christians, except for a few politicians leagued with the rebels, and a certain number of Moslems. According to Admiral Holloway, this feeling was maintained and even increased during the operation. The good deportment of the troops and the improvement of business resulting from the more stabilized situation and from the presence of the Americans were doubtless important factors.²

The American command was concerned about concluding a status of forces agreement with the Lebanese government, but for various reasons, particularly the greater interest of the Chamoun government in more pressing matters, this was delayed for some time. The Lebanese foreign ministry finally consented on 6 August to a status of forces agreement, effective on the 8th, that gave the Americans the rights and exemptions normally provided by such arrangements.³

Although the rebel radio and newspapers violently denounced the Americans, after the first few days the rebel leaders and their organized forces became increasingly circumspect in their attitude. A few American patrols that wandered into rebel-held territory were captured and disarmed, but the members were quickly released together with their vehicles. The rebels became less truculent as the operation progressed, although some of the clandestine radio transmitters continued to be intensely belligerent. It was reported that on 20 July rebel leaders had decided to "avoid activities which might enable Chamoun [to] provoke fighting between U.S. forces and [the] opposition." On the 22d, Saeb Salaam, chief rebel leader

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in the Basta, issued a press and radio statement cautioning his forces not to fire on American troops, and on the 24th he sent word to the American ambassador that he had no hostility toward Americans or the troops that had arrived in Lebanon.⁴

The arrival of the Americans had stimulated intense political activity by all sides to find a compromise solution of Lebanon's internal problems. Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, who arrived from Washington on 17 July, joined with Admiral Holloway and Ambassador McClintock during the first days of the intervention in urging President Chamoun and General Chehab to drive the rebels out of their stronghold in Beirut--the Basta. Chamoun favored the operation because he desired a military success to restore his prestige prior to leaving office; he also claimed that it would enhance Chehab's. Holloway was unwilling to use the American forces for aggressive action, but he offered to take over guard duties that would free Lebanese units for action. Chehab, while not positively refusing, managed to delay and evade the issue. Because he was necessary to a successful compromise, he could not be dealt with in summary fashion, although Holloway and McClintock seriously considered it at one time.

Murphy quickly became convinced that only a political settlement was practicable, and he and McClintock conferred with most of the rebel chiefs and secured indications of their willingness to compromise. The proposal to attack the Basta was allowed to drift until finally dropped. As time passed, Holloway and McClintock became increasingly friendly to Chehab and less so to Chamoun. Eventually, both became convinced of Chehab's wisdom and patriotism and spoke of him in the highest terms.⁵

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By 23 July, Chamoun, while postponing the election from 24 to 31 July, indicated that he was ready to accept Chehab as his successor, as were almost all the other leading figures on both sides. The election was almost postponed again as the result of an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Prime Minister Sami Solh on 30 July, which Solh blamed on Chehab.⁶

The election of Chehab on 31 July did not have an immediately perceptible effect on the situation in Lebanon. The rebels insisted that Chamoun resign immediately after the election, but he declined to do so. As a result the period between 31 July and the inauguration on 23 September was one of uneasy waiting, with barricades remaining up and the general strike continuing. Chehab remained as head of the army.

Meanwhile, on 21 August the possibility of stabilizing the situation in the Middle East was greatly enhanced by the passage in the United Nations Assembly of a resolution unanimously approved by the members of the Arab League. Without going into details, the resolution was a compromise declaration made possible by a distinct retreat from the extreme stand formerly taken by the United Arab Republic.*⁷

During early September, despite a second attempt on the life of Prime Minister Sami Solh, the outlook for a settlement remained favorable. Meanwhile, there was much political activity in preparation for the change of administrations, with both Chehab and the American leaders involved in repeated conferences with the leaders of the opposition to

*See above, p. 8.

Chamoun. Dissension and even fighting broke out among the rebels over the question of accepting a compromise, but it was significant that a steady stream of Syrian "volunteers" began to leave the country. As the date of the inauguration approached it became obvious that Chehab's choice as the new prime minister would be Rashid Karame, Moslem leader from Tripoli, who was considered the most moderate of the opposition. It was worth noting, however, that even he had publicly stated that he regarded Nasser as a superman.⁸

On 19 September, when military activities seemed to be giving way to political in preparation for Chehab's inauguration on the 23d, the trend was interrupted by the kidnaping and presumed murder of Fouad Haddah, an employee of the Phalangist newspaper, who had written critically of Nasser. Wild disorder swept over Beirut as a result, with the pro-Chamoun Phalange carrying out reprisal attacks and erecting barricades that sealed off the Asrafiya, the Christian quarter of the city, and blocked many of the main roads leading into Beirut. Although the inauguration of Chehab took place without incident and the general strike came to an end, the Phalange called a new general strike of indefinite duration. Contrary to expectation, it was generally successful outside the purely Moslem section.

The Phalange gained additional support following Chehab's appointment of Karame as prime minister, the latter's ill-timed remarks about "reaping the fruits of the revolution," and the appointment of a cabinet made up entirely of former oppositionists (revolutionists) plus two

Third Force adherents. The situation was now completely reversed, with the former opposition supporting the government and much of the former government support behind the barricades. The possibility of a religious war seemed to hang in the balance for a short time, but the disorders quickly subsided into a new stalemate, with the Phalange demanding the punishment of Haddah's murderers, the resignation of Karame, and representation of the Chamoun faction in the government.⁹

Several factors made a settlement possible. Both sides were tired of the struggle and, once the momentary excitement passed, were willing to discuss a compromise. The American forces doubtless helped restrain all-out warfare, and the Lebanese army took increasingly vigorous action in suppressing disorder. It also was obvious that Karame's one-sided cabinet could not command a majority in the national assembly and, to avert the turmoil of a new election, would have to provide more equitable representation of the political factions, particularly the powerful Chamoun bloc. With Ambassador McClintock acting as an intermediary among Gemayel, the Phalangist leader, Karame, and Chehab, a formula of "peace without victory" was agreed on, and a new and more broadly representative cabinet, though still headed by Karame, was installed on 14 October. There immediately followed the calling off of the Phalange's general strike, a removal of barricades, and a return to normalcy by 20 October. The army attempted to carry out a collection of weapons held by civilians, but most were probably stored for later possible use. Chehab later confided to the American ambassador that the strike of the Christians had been a good thing because it showed the Moslems that mutual concessions were necessary.¹⁰

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Withdrawal of Ground Forces

The American movement into Lebanon, as has been seen, occurred not so much because of the situation within the disturbed country itself as the possibility that the sudden and violent revolution within Iraq might engulf the other Middle Eastern countries. Within a few days it became obvious that the upsurge of violence would be confined to Iraq. On 25 July, Headquarters USAF notified all concerned commands that the peak of the crisis had passed and that they could reduce the alert status to permit necessary combat crew training.¹¹

The situation continued to improve, and by 5 August the JCS directed Admiral Holloway to submit recommendations concerning reductions in his forces and to begin planning for an orderly but prompt withdrawal of troops and materiel following Chehab's assumption of the presidency. Pressure for a token withdrawal of part of the force at an early date had come from the Department of State, which believed it politically desirable in order to influence world opinion. After a conference with Ambassador McClintock and General Chehab, Admiral Holloway agreed that a token withdrawal would have a beneficial effect within Lebanon, since it would deprive the opposition elements of one of their chief propaganda weapons. Chehab had altered his original opposition to the presence of American forces to suggest that the bulk of the forces be left intact until peace was assured in Lebanon.¹²

Accordingly, Holloway requested discretionary authority to withdraw at least one and possibly two battalions of Marines with maximum publicity

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during the following week. After further discussions with Chehab, the withdrawal movement of Marine Battalion Landing Team 2/2 began at 0700 on 13 August and was completed two days later. The withdrawal was loudly criticized by most Christian elements of the population, but it was received with satisfaction by the opposition.¹³

The main phase of the withdrawal got under way on 15 September, when other Marine units, including principally BLT 1/8, were embarked. On the following day the first Army unit, the 299th Engineer Battalion, began loading its heavy equipment on board the USS Lieutenant Craig. The last Marine battalion, BLT 3/6, was loaded on 28-30 September despite the renewed disturbances within the country. This left only U. S. Army forces in Lebanon, primarily the airborne task force. Marine BLT 3/6 remained in the vicinity at sea and was available for relanding in an emergency.¹⁴

The withdrawal continued during most of October as shipping became available, with heavy equipment preceding the tactical units. Supplies and equipment of selected logistical elements were loaded beginning 6 October, tanks of the 3d Medium Tank Battalion beginning 12 October, personnel of the same battalion and of other units on 16 October, and the sea-tail of the airborne troops on the same day. The airlift of Army troops began on 19 October and was completed on the 25th, when the Commander American Land Forces, General Adams, also departed. Admiral Holloway had shifted his headquarters to London two days earlier after a farewell reception given by President Chehab.¹⁵

Earlier, on 16 September, Admiral Holloway had proposed that a U. S. Army training mission of 11 officers and 60 men be left behind to

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reorganize the Lebanese army, which he described as ill prepared to cope with internal or external contingencies. He further proposed that a small American force of 1,200 men be left behind. This would be supported by a USAF tactical air squadron at Adana, by two destroyers of the Sixth Fleet on patrol in the Beirut area, and by one transphibron with a Marine BLT embarked no farther west than 20° E longitude. Although Ambassador McClintock concurred in this recommendation, it apparently did not receive favorable consideration.¹⁶

Withdrawal of Air Forces

The first element of the CASF to redeploy to the United States was the weather reconnaissance unit. The three WB-66's departed for the United States on 23 August, followed by the RB-66's on 5-6 September, leaving six RF-101's to handle reconnaissance activities. The fighters began their redeployment on 4 September, the first section of eight F-100's departing Incirlik that day for Myrtle Beach via Wheelus and Chateauroux. A second section of eight F-100's took off for home on 13 September. Also in early September, CINCUSAFE released the remaining MATS augmentation aircraft, and the last C-124 departed for the United States on 11 September.¹⁷

The 322d Air Division set up an airlift task force headquarters at the Beirut Airport on 16 October to coordinate the evacuation of airborne troops and certain ground personnel. For the return, permission was secured to overfly Austria, and an arrangement was made for notifying the Austrian government of the exact penetration time. The airlift of

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Army Task Force Alpha began at 0001 on 19 October. Most of the C-130's, which comprised the majority of the aircraft, returned to Fürstenfeldbruck by flying over the Austrian Alps after stopping at Brindisi, Italy, for refueling, although some went by way of Marseille. The C-124's returned to Fürstenfeldbruck by way of France, after stopping at Naples for refueling. When this airlift ended on 25 October the transports had lifted 1,136.5 tons of cargo and 2,579 passengers in 77 C-130 and 13 C-124 flights.¹⁸

The remaining CASF units began their departure from the Middle East on 19 October--6 F-100's, 12 B-57's, and 6 RF-101's leaving on that day. The F-86's of USAFE's 512th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron flew back to Sembach Air Base in Germany on 21 October.

On 16 October the JCS had given temporary permission to the Air Force to retain one F-100 rotational squadron at Adana after the withdrawal, but a final decision would be subject to the agreement of the Turkish government. The control of the squadron would pass to CINCUSAFE, who would delegate it to the Seventeenth Air Force. Twelve F-100's of the 353d Tactical Fighter Squadron arrived at Incirlik to replace the departing F-100's.

On 24 October the air headquarters was deactivated along with the land and naval headquarters. With the conclusion of the airlift back to Germany on the 25th, the Blue Bat operations came to an end.¹⁹

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VI. CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSIONS

Although the Lebanon crisis resulted in no combat action by the American forces, it constituted the most considerable emergency movement of U.S. forces since the Korean War and the first ever undertaken by this country in the Middle East proper. The rapid movement of troops and aircraft over thousands of miles in response to a critical local situation required widespread coordinated activities by the three military services in planning, operations, intelligence, and logistics. These activities were complicated by intricate diplomatic and political considerations. Under these circumstances it would have been remarkable if conclusions useful for the future had not been derived.

At the higher reaches of government, on 9 February 1959 the JCS approved for submission to the chairman of the National Security Council Planning Board a report that listed five principal lessons of the Lebanon operation as most suitable for consideration by the NSC:¹

1. The need for early determination of overflight and staging rights.
2. The need for early action to secure status of forces agreements.
3. The need to inform the American public quickly on reasons for intervention.
4. The need for adequate facilities to avoid congestion and delay during limited war operations that require rapid deployment of forces, equipment, and supplies by air.

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5. The need for a budget plan to cover joint emergency operations.

Most of the problems encountered by the Air Force resulted from the lack of adequate facilities and procedures to meet either scheduled or unscheduled requirements. Some problems also grew out of the abbreviated warning time received by units. For units previously scheduled to participate in the operation, the warning time was not unreasonable, but for the unscheduled and substitute units, it was inadequate. In large measure the overtaxing of already strained facilities resulted from changes in movements caused by the use of substitute and additional units.

The CASF Bravo fighters and TAC's C-130 transports were the chief victims of changes in the assignment of units to the operation. Two squadrons of the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing, substituted for squadrons of the 832d Air Division with only seven hours' notice, had difficulties in getting under way, especially the first flight. The last-minute changes were confusing, the time for preparation was too short, and the shortages were legion--maps, let-down books for foreign bases, radar facility charts, exposure suits, and communication information.

TAC's C-130's received short warning notice because the plans had named MATS to be responsible for airlifting the CASF support force, and it was only late on 14 July that TAC was told to use its own C-130's for this purpose. And on the morning of 15 July the signals were changed again when the main staging base was changed from Cannon AFB, N. Mex., to Myrtle Beach AFB, S. C. The C-130's were not told until 1100 hours (CST)

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on 15 July that they would have to go all the way to Europe and Turkey. They started taking off from the United States for Adana only two and a half hours later.

The C-130 crews underwent the hardship of performing straight-through flights without autopilots to the Middle East after having had their aircraft diverted from missions in progress. The tight time schedule, plus the inadequacy of loading plans and the complete absence of standardized loading procedures for the Hercules, caused confusion at the staging bases in the United States. Much on- and off-loading resulted when individual crews enforced different load maximums and cargo distributions. The C-130 en route maintenance crews found it almost impossible to get adequate rest during flight because of the size of the load and the noise of the engines. The crews did a good job, but fatigue was a serious deterrent to effectiveness.²

MATS, too, felt that the warning time had been inadequate. Although it had been scheduled to provide C-124's to augment the USAFE airlift, MATS believed that with more strategic warning time, it could have reduced its reaction time. When it received deployment orders, its C-124's were scattered far and wide, and it took 34 hours to get the first 26 to Germany from the United States.

USAF bases involved in the operation also suffered from the lack of adequate warning and the changes in plans. The MATS bases at Kindley and Lajes were not warned by either MATS or TAC that TAC C-130's would replace C-124's in the support lift of CASF Bravo. Accordingly, they

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were not prepared to support the movement as effectively as would have been desirable. Wheelus AB in Libya found itself unexpectedly overwhelmed by aircraft arrivals because the denial of overflight or staging rights by Austria and Greece made it necessary for many of the planes to fly by the southern route instead of more directly from bases in Germany and France.³

But these bases had simple problems by comparison with those of the Incirlik base at Adana. This was the only American base in the Middle East that could be used for the Lebanon operation, and it was quickly saturated with men and planes. The facilities at Incirlik proved inadequate to support the forces assembled there, and operations suffered accordingly.

Most of the units reported similar experiences. The lack of housing was especially acute, and the crews of the 363d Composite Reconnaissance Squadron and of the tankers from the 429th Air Refueling Squadron had to sleep on the ground until tents or some kind of housing could be made available to them. Other types of shelter--including those for operations and maintenance--also were severely limited. Utilities at Incirlik quickly proved inadequate, and the shortage of water was especially critical. Ground transportation and landline communications could not carry the load, nor could the radar for ground control of interceptors meet the needs of the 512th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron from USAFE. Supply shortages included AOC items and photographic items. Part of the trouble arose from the inadequacy of the flyaway kits the planes brought with them--especially the tankers and the reconnaissance planes.⁴

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The fundamental problem underlying the operational and logistical difficulties was the lack of bases in the operational area. Incirlik alone could not have supported a USAF force engaged in combat operations over Lebanon and other areas of the Middle East. The lack of operational bases is a problem that may well arise in other areas of the world where the United States has commitments. The problem should be given the most serious consideration in planning for emergency situations.

The difficulties encountered by the Air Force during this operation stemmed also from deficiencies in the key operations plan--CINCSPECOMME Oplan 215-58. There was no provision in the plan for control and coordination of joint air operations, and the procedures had to be worked out after the forces arrived. The absence of such procedures would have had grave consequences if combat operations had begun immediately on the arrival of the air units. The lack of more precise command arrangements in the plan would also have had serious effects had actual combat been necessary.

Administrative and logistical arrangements were slighted in Oplan 215-58, and the effects were felt by Air Force units, especially at Incirlik. The medical annex did not specify a representative of one of the services to be the surgeon on Admiral Holloway's staff; this omission resulted in a lack of coordination among the services that would have been most serious had there been combat operations. Much of the confusion of loading and unloading at air bases also could have been avoided had provision been made ahead of time for joint Army-Air Force control groups at the principal airfields.⁵

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Another oversight in the plans was the failure to provide for the assignment to the landing forces of officers who could speak Arabic and had some knowledge of Lebanon. Nor was there provision for rapid communication between the American ambassador and the landing forces. Apparently the Navy and Marine commanders of the initial landing were not instructed on the role of the ambassador with respect to their operations. This led to misunderstandings and irritations that could have had more fateful consequences had the landings been made under less favorable circumstances.

In the broadest sense, apart from the consideration of specific errors in performance or planning, the 1958 Lebanon operation may possibly be best considered under three headings: Was it necessary? What was its effect? Did the organization and composition of the force and the movements executed represent the most economical use of forces? None of these basic questions is considered specifically in any of the official military studies of the operation, although most of them assume or imply that the operation was a success because the situation became stabilized in both Lebanon and Jordan. The necessity for the operation is not questioned, probably because it was the result of a politico-diplomatic decision rather than a military one. The question of force composition and tactics, although likewise hypothetical, is on the other hand obviously a matter for military analysis and decision and might well have been examined at JCS level. The general conclusion in the JCS report of 19 April that the operation was conducted in an orderly and efficient manner hardly disposes of this matter.

The U.S. decision to send a military force to Lebanon was apparently based largely on the assumptions that the unexpected revolution in Iraq was directly stimulated by Nasser and that it could very possibly result

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in violent repercussions in Lebanon and Jordan by UAR military intervention or by direct instigation or sympathetic reaction of local Nasserites. The American ambassadors in Beirut and Amman did not believe that the danger to the existing governments was appreciably increased by the Iraqi developments. On the other hand, the chief executives of both Lebanon and Jordan were sufficiently alarmed to request military aid, and the United States granted it under the policy established in the Eisenhower Declaration of 1956.

It now appears that American intelligence was defective both in its failure to forecast the revolution in Iraq, which was considered to have a more stable government than either Lebanon or Jordan, and in analyzing the revolution's nature and sources after the event. Today it is clear that the events in Iraq, though supported by Nasser, were quite beyond his control, and an actual purge of the Nasserites followed within a few months.

From the above it might appear that in terms of forestalling the seizure of the governments of Lebanon and Jordan by Nasser supporters the military action in both cases was unnecessary. In a wider sense, however, it may be logically argued that it was desirable and necessary to give encouragement to friendly governments in the Middle East and to display a readiness and ability to deploy prompt and adequate military aid. This was particularly important with respect to the remaining three Asian nations of the Baghdad Pact--Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan--as well as to the countries considered to be directly menaced--Lebanon and Jordan--and to such vacillating Arab countries as Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Libya.

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Although Ambassador McClintock at first doubted the need for the American landing in Lebanon, he became convinced before the withdrawal that it had been highly effective, as did Admiral Holloway. Both emphasized that the operation exerted a calming influence on the warring factions and enabled the negotiation of a compromise settlement with a minimum of further bloodshed. They were gratified that no casualties of consequence resulted from the operation and that the leaders of the task force parted on excellent terms with the new heads of the government as well as with the officer corps of the Lebanese army. The last two contentions were easily demonstrable and represented no mean achievements. The success in calming the rival factions is less demonstrable, since fighting continued on some scale after the arrival of the Americans and even intensified in late September. Although the American military used direct force only in a few brief exchanges of small-arms fire, the presence of the units clearly had its effect. On several occasions the threat of possible American military action was raised in discussions by Ambassador McClintock with leaders of recalcitrant factions, and in each instance the threat was effective.⁶

On the question of whether the composition of the military force and its movements were of optimal nature, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S. Army Chief of Staff at the time, stated that the circumstances of the operation were so favorable that it was not prudent to draw general conclusions from it, technically successful as it was. He mentioned the advance planning permitted by adequate warning, the limited force required, and the absence of combat operations. To these factors might

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be added the convenient geographical situation, which permitted quick access by both sea and air, and the favorable attitude of at least half the population together with the government officials of the country. In other words, the character of the operation was not such as to create any particular strain on the existing force structure of the United States for limited war.

Conveniently available ground forces proved sufficient for the operation, all units coming from the European and Mediterranean areas except for the 850 Marines flown from the United States and kept afloat as a reserve. The United States easily met Chamoun's condition that help arrive within 48 hours; the first Marines landed $24\frac{1}{2}$ hours after the request for aid was received in Washington. To do this, however, Admiral Brown had to send forward ahead of his main force a single battalion landing team of 1,600 men. Only two tanks were put ashore with this force, and the very limited air cover did not appear until 15 minutes after the first landing. Furthermore, it would not have been possible to reinforce significantly the first landing group for at least 15 hours. The full Marine force of 6,000 men was not unloaded until three days after the first landing, and even then included only 15 tanks. By then, more adequate air support was available, since aircraft from three carriers and from the Air Force units at Adana (29 combat planes) were available. Air Force transports landed the first contingent of Army troops--more than 1,700 men--on 19 July, but no Army tanks arrived until 27 July.

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Actually, of course, U.S. ground, naval, and air forces turned out to be more than adequate. The area was cut off by the cordon sanitaire of the Baghdad Pact nations from direct contact with the Soviet Union and its satellites, and only the Syrian portion of the UAR was adjacent to Lebanon. It is even possible that, short of Russian intervention, the American force could have dealt with any organized armed force that might have been mustered against it in the immediate vicinity, although the occupation of large areas would have undoubtedly required many more troops. Had further prompt extensive reinforcements been required, beyond the limited number on alert in Germany, they could have come only from the United States by air transport.

The Nineteenth Air Force report on Blue Bat pointed out that the operation had been of the "lightest requirement." The objective area--Beirut--was only a little more than 200 miles from the base--Adana--and only a small force was deployed from the United States. The problems and deficiencies that did arise would have been greatly magnified by a graver situation.⁷

Any extension of operations undoubtedly would have called for additional tactical air support and air transport, placing a heavy burden on the Air Force. The air support could have come at first only from the one crowded base at Adana. The Air Force was in the position of a backstop for operations in which the Army and, more particularly, the Navy were playing the leading roles. Although the Air Force underwent no great test, what would have been the effect had the Taiwan Strait crisis

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occurred simultaneously with the Lebanon crisis instead of later? Certainly, both TAC and MATS might have found their resources either inadequate or seriously strained. Probably, the Air Force would have had to draw on long-range transports earmarked for the support of the Strategic Air Command or to conscript them from civilian airlines, which would have required the declaration of a national emergency. MATS tried to contract with the civilian airlines for additional lift during the Lebanon crisis, but the airlines would not be persuaded of the necessity without declaration of a national emergency.⁸

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G L O S S A R Y

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|---------------|--|
| AACS | Airways & Air Communications Service |
| AFCIN | Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Hq USAF |
| AFOOP | Director of Operations, Hq USAF |
| AOC | Air Operations Center |
| BLT | Battalion Landing Team |
| CASF | Composite Air Strike Force |
| CINCAMBRITFOR | Commander in Chief, American-British Forces |
| CINCEUR | Commander in Chief, Europe |
| CINCLANT | Commander in Chief, Atlantic |
| CINCNELM | Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic & Mediterranean |
| CINCSPECOMME | Commander in Chief, U.S. Specified Command, Middle East |
| CINCUSAFE | Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces in Europe |
| CINCUSAREUR | Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe |
| CNO | Chief of Naval Operations |
| COMAMAIRFOR | Commander, American Air Forces |
| COMAMLANFOR | Commander, American Land Forces |
| COMAMNAVFOR | Commander, American Naval Forces |
| COMTASFME | Commander, Tactical Air Strike Force, Middle East |
| CSUSAF | Chief of Staff, USAF |
| CTF | Combined Task Force |
| DA | Department of the Army |
| DAF | Department of the Air Force |
| DEPTAR | Department of the Army |
| dtd | dated |
| EAME | European-African-Middle East |
| MEAF | Middle East Air Force |
| MSTS | Military Sea Transportation Service |
| Oplan | Operations Plan |
| POL | petroleum, oil, lubricants |
| Sitrep | Situation Report |
| USAIRA | U.S. Air Attaché |
| USAREUR | U.S. Army, Europe |
| USARMA | U.S. Army Military Attaché |
| USEUCOM | U.S. European Command |

Appendix

[REDACTED]

SUMMARY OF REPORT BY J-3 to JCS ON
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE LEBANON AND QUEMOY OPERATIONS
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO LEBANON

The most detailed analysis of the "lessons" of the Lebanon operation appeared in the JCS J-3 report approved 16 April 1959. These lessons were grouped under seven headings--Politico-Military, Intelligence, Plans, Operations, Logistics, Communications, and Command--and may be summarized as follows:

1. Politico-Military

a. The American public should be fully informed and conditioned as to the necessity of intervention in another country and the role of U.S. forces on such an occasion. More positive pronouncements are needed by political and governmental leaders. During the Lebanon operation a part of the press was apathetic.

b. Early action should be taken to establish a status of forces agreement when operations are to be conducted in a country whose sovereignty the United States recognizes. In Lebanon the American Embassy was asked to negotiate such an agreement on 18 July, but despite the favorable attitude of the government it was not concluded until 6 August. Efforts at amendment were even slower.

c. Overflight and staging rights should be determined early for the benefit of planners and operators. In some cases it may be necessary to overfly without permission. Overflight problems with Austria, Switzerland, and Greece affected USAF operations.

d. If at all possible, the designated commander should be in the objective area prior to the beginning of operations in order to establish prompt contact with U.S. representatives and indigenous officials.

2. Intelligence

a. In joint operations, the services should establish common procedures for requesting and reporting reconnaissance and for use of agreed base maps. During the first operations in Lebanon aerial reconnaissance missions were conducted by the Navy under standard Navy and Marine Corps amphibious doctrine. With the arrival of the USAF tactical air units it became necessary to devise mutually agreeable procedures and draft a joint interim aerial reconnaissance plan.

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b. Adequate maps and charts should be available in advance. These were initially inadequate.

c. Basic and current intelligence should be available at all command levels. Extensive deficiencies existed here.

d. Standardized procedures for reporting and disseminating intelligence should be established. Dissemination of intelligence on the political and military situation to subcommanders needed great improvement; on the other hand, reports by subcommanders were of substantial value.

e. Contingency plans should provide for necessary intelligence personnel and linguists to aid the commander, and joint service personnel should be specified by positions.

3. Plans

a. Formal check lists should have been maintained within the Joint Staff for actions required by Blue Bat. This would have improved Joint Staff operations during the early hours of the operation, when some confusion existed.

b. Interpretation of security restrictions by military commanders should be uniform, both to prevent disclosure of details of the operation and to lessen the possibility that other governments might miscalculate our intentions.

c. Plans must consider more closely the possibility of congestion at forward airfields and provide for alternate air bases or phasing in of forces. Because the air base at Adana could not handle the peak loads, the arrival of the full USAF tactical air strength was delayed.

d. Planning for a special joint command should provide in detail for the organization and functioning of J-1. CINCSPECOMME Oplan 215-58 did not have a distinct administrative section.

e. Where ground forces of more than one service are involved an overall ground force headquarters should be established. Representation should be specified by position, and personnel should be provided from the theater or the United States rather than from participating units. The joint ground force headquarters established on 26 July necessarily drew on participating units.

f. Plans for joint air operations should specify physical and procedural means for control and coordination. Joint armed forces doctrine giving guidance for all services participating in a given theater was not in existence.

g. Support forces should be closely fitted to combat forces and deployed as the situation dictates. Task Force Charlie, designed to support two battle groups, was airlifted to Lebanon in support of only one, thus reducing the available airlift for other units.

h. Airborne units should receive a periodic forecast of aircraft availability by type in order to keep loading tables and training exercises current. This would have facilitated deployment of the airborne task forces.

4. Operations

a. All unified and specified commands should be informed of impending operations in order to be ready to assume the proper alert posture for possible participation in the operation.

b. Amphibious operations should include sufficient tanks and helicopter support with the assault forces. The helicopters are needed to permit the rapid deployment of troops.

c. Adequate personnel and equipment for airport operations in the objective area should be provided.

d. A joint Army-Air Force control group should be established at the principal departure and arrival airfields to coordinate loading, dispatch, unloading, dispersal, and services. In this way much of the confusion existing at Fürstenfeldbruck and Adana could have been avoided.

5. Logistics

a. A more effective system of transition from "automatic" to "on call" resupply should be developed.

b. Plans for listing and outloading the initial sea-tail for the Army task force should be revised in order to avoid unnecessary delay in restoring operational readiness of ground force units after arrival in the objective area.

c. When procurement other than that associated with normal combat operations is required, personnel qualified in local procurement should be provided and planning should provide for contractual authority and funding by local commanders.

d. In medical planning for joint forces, responsibility for the provision of hospital support should be clearly fixed and the needs of all forces determined. USAREUR Emergency Plan 201 provided for hospitalization for Army units only.

e. The mounting-out plans for the Atlantic Fleet should provide for adequate Marine ammunition stocks. These were inadequate in the operation.

[REDACTED]

f. Planning should provide [REDACTED] for offloading MSTTS commercial ships where local labor is lacking or inefficient. Indigenous port labor in Lebanon was short because of the unsettled conditions.

g. The JCS commander must assume priority control over the movement of all aircraft assigned to him, with the JCS determining priority for the use of air bases in case of conflicts, as at Adana when tactical air units en route from the United States were forced to divert to Europe and North Africa. A Joint Military Transport Board would have provided better utilization of transport, particularly airlift.

h. It should be recognized that the timely employment of U.S. forces is dependent on strategically located base complexes and on adequate planning of logistic support. An additional base in Turkey may be necessary to support future planning.

i. Lack of funds should not delay the issuance of necessary supplies in unprogrammed and unfunded operations.

6. Communications

a. A detailed low-classification theater-area communication SOP should be provided. The communication annex of the CINCSPECOMME plan had many provisions not known to lower echelons because of its Top Secret classification.

b. The capacity of the existing Army worldwide communication system for connecting with a deployed task force during a limited combat situation must be improved. During the Lebanon operation, long delays were not overcome until additional equipment was brought from the United States and placed in operation.

c. To facilitate command control, additional equipment should be placed at strategic locations and maintained ready for use in case of tactical deployment.

d. Augmentation communication equipment should be prepositioned at forward staging bases to reduce the need for airlift after the operation commences.

e. Adequate communication personnel and equipment should be provided for MSTTS ships used for fleet marine forces.

f. All aircraft participating in joint operations should be equipped to operate on common frequencies to facilitate traffic control and direction. Some aircraft were limited to VHF while overall operations were controlled by UHF.

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7. Command

a. Contingency plans must specifically delineate the authority and responsibility of the commanders concerned. Many questions of authority arose during the operation.

b. Provision should be made for an orderly funding of joint emergency operations without major disruption of programmed activities.



DISTRIBUTION OF LEBANON STUDY

| <u>Headquarters</u> | | <u>Major Commands</u> | | | |
|---------------------|-----|-----------------------|-----|--------------|--------------|
| SAFS | - 1 | AFCAS | - 1 | ACIC | - 1 |
| SAFUS | - 1 | AFCIG | - 5 | ADC | - 2 |
| SAFFM | - 1 | AFCIN | - 5 | AFCS | - 2 |
| SAFIE | - 1 | AFCJA | - 1 | AFLC | - 5 |
| SAFMA | - 1 | AFCOA | - 1 | AFSC | - 5 |
| SAFMP | - 1 | AFCRF | - 1 | ATC | - 2 |
| SAFRD | - 1 | AFCSA | - 1 | AU | - 2 |
| SAFAA | - 1 | AFOCC | - 1 | AFAFC | - 1 |
| SAFLL | - 1 | AFOCE | - 1 | AAC | - 1 |
| SAFOI | - 1 | AFODC | - 2 | CAIRAC | - 1 |
| AFCCS | - 1 | AFOMO | - 1 | CONAC | - 2 |
| AFCVC | - 1 | AFOOP | - 2 | HEDCOM | - 1 |
| AFCAV | - 1 | AFORQ | - 2 | MATS | - 5 |
| AFCSS | - 1 | AFOWX | - 1 | OAR | - 1 |
| AFAAC | - 1 | AFPCH | - 1 | PACAF | - 5 |
| AFAAF | - 1 | AFPCH | - 1 | SAC | - 7 |
| AFABF | - 1 | AFPDC | - 2 | TAC | - 5 |
| AFAMA | - 1 | AFDPD | - 1 | USAFE | - 5 |
| AFASC | - 1 | AFPDW | - 1 | USAFA | - 1 |
| AFAUD | - 1 | AFPMP | - 1 | USAFSS | - 3 |
| AFCAC | - 1 | AFPTR | - 1 | ASI | - 2 |
| AFRAE | - 1 | AFRDC | - 1 | ASI(HAF) | - 5 |
| AFRDP | - 1 | AFRST | - 1 | ASI(HA) | - 5 |
| AFSDC | - 2 | AFSLP | - 1 | | |
| AFSME | - 1 | AFSMP | - 1 | | |
| AFSMS | - 1 | AFSPM | - 1 | <u>Other</u> | |
| AFSSA | - 1 | AFSSS | - 1 | RAND | - 3 |
| AFSSV | - 1 | AFSTP | - 1 | WESEG | - 2 |
| AFTAC | - 1 | AFXDC | - 2 | AFCHO | - 49 (Stock) |
| AFXPD | - 5 | AFXPR | - 1 | | |
| AFCC | - 1 | | | | |
| | | | | TOTAL | - 200 |