



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

MAR - 6 2008

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6225

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in final response to your letter of February 13, 2008, requesting we review an allegation that Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, U.S. Army, Retired, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Affairs, [REDACTED]

We concluded the allegation was not substantiated and warranted no further investigation. Enclosed is an executive summary that provides additional details concerning our inquiry into the matter.

Because information in this letter and the executive summary may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), they are designated "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY." As such, this letter and the enclosed executive summary are provided to you in your role as the Chairman of a committee of jurisdiction with respect to the subject matter and for the exclusive use of your committee. Therefore, we ask that you coordinate any additional users or releases with the FOIA Requester Service Center/Privacy Act Office, Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202-4704. Should you have any questions please contact me at (703) 604-8324.

Sincerely,

John R. Crane
Assistant Inspector General
Communications and Congressional Liaison

Enclosure: As stated

cc: The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Member

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
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

MAR - 6 2008

Brigadier General Mark T. Kimmitt, U.S. Army, Retired
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Affairs
2400 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-2400

Dear General Kimmitt:

We recently completed an inquiry to address an allegation that you



We did not substantiate the allegation. We interviewed several witnesses who were knowledgeable of the matter at issue. Their testimony, along with the lack of specificity in the allegation, led us to conclude there is insufficient basis to warrant further investigation of the allegation. We consider the matter closed.

By separate correspondence we provide the results of our inquiry to Chairman Joseph R. Biden, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). If you have any questions, please contact me or [REDACTED] Director, Investigations of Senior Officials, at (703) 604-[REDACTED]

Sincerely,

Donald M. Horstman
Assistant Inspector General for
Administrative Investigations

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

MAR 5 2008

ACTION MEMO

FOR: INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE


THRU: Principal Deputy Inspector General
Deputy Inspector General for Investigations


FROM: Donald M. Horstman, Assistant Inspector General for Administrative Investigations

SUBJECT: Inquiry into Allegations Involving BG Mark Kimmitt, U.S. Army, Retired, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Affairs)

- Please sign the attached memorandum (Tab A) to Mr. Edelman that provides the results of our inquiry into an allegation that BG Kimmitt [REDACTED]
- By letter dated February 13, 2007 (Tab B), Senator Biden requested that we review the allegation in conjunction with BG Kimmitt's nomination for a position in the State Department.
- We concluded the allegation was not substantiated and warranted no further investigation. The complaint to Chairman Biden provided [REDACTED]
Accordingly we interviewed BG Kimmitt and five other witnesses (including Ambassador Edelman) who would be aware of [REDACTED] had they occurred as alleged. [REDACTED]
- After you approve, OCCL will sign a letter (Tab C) to Chairman Biden that provides results and additional detail in an "executive summary." I will provide the results to BG Kimmitt (Tab D).

COORDINATION:


OGC 3/4/08


OCCL 3/4/08

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: [REDACTED] 604- [REDACTED] OCCL # 2008-024 BIDEN

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

MAR - 6 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Inquiry into an Allegation Involving Brigadier General Mark T.
Kimmitt, U.S. Army, Retired, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Near East and South Asian Affairs)

We recently completed an inquiry to address an allegation that Brigadier General (BG) Mark T. Kimmitt, U.S. Army, Retired, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Near East and South Asian Affairs) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The inquiry was initiated in response to a letter request dated February 13, 2008, from Chairman Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in connection with BG Kimmitt's nomination to be Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs.

We concluded the allegation was not substantiated and warranted no further investigation. We interviewed BG Kimmitt and five other individuals whom we believe would have known of the [REDACTED] had they occurred. All witnesses confirmed that BG Kimmitt [REDACTED]

By separate correspondence, we provided the results of our inquiry to Chairman Biden and BG Kimmitt. We consider the matter closed. Should you have any questions, please contact me or [REDACTED] at (703) 604-[REDACTED]

Donald M. Horstman
Assistant Inspector General for
Administrative Investigations

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Alleged [REDACTED]
Brigadier General (BG) Mark Kimmitt, U.S. Army, Retired
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Affairs

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

We initiated the inquiry to address an allegation that BG Kimmitt, who is nominated to be Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

We concluded the allegation was not substantiated and warranted no further investigation. We interviewed BG Kimmitt and five other individuals whom we believe would have known of the [REDACTED] had they occurred. Witness testimony confirmed that BG Kimmitt [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]


This executive summary sets forth our findings and conclusions based upon a preponderance of the evidence.

II. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE

[REDACTED]


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III. FACTS, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSIONS

Facts



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Discussion and Conclusion

We concluded that the allegation is not substantiated and does not warrant further investigation. In reaching that conclusion, we note that the complaint provided no details that would convey credibility to the allegation: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Sworn testimony from witnesses in a position to observe BG Kimmitt's activities was persuasive in denying that BG Kimmitt [REDACTED] Those witnesses acknowledged that BG Kimmitt discussed [REDACTED]

Testimony by BG Kimmitt's superiors disclosed BG Kimmitt [REDACTED] Ambassador Edelman emphasized that BG Kimmitt followed his instructions. Ms. Long corroborated Ambassador Edelman's testimony, stating that [REDACTED]

Testimony by BG Kimmitt's subordinates disclosed they were aware [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] by BG Kimmitt.



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

FEB 27 2008

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6225


Dear Chairman Biden:

This is in response to your letter dated February 13, 2008, forwarding allegations from an anonymous source that BG Mark T. Kimmitt; USA (ret.) "[REDACTED]"

Your letter requests this office to "review the allegation set forth in this letter . . . and report back to the Committee as promptly as possible." We have opened an investigation into the matter and expect to provide the results to you in the near future.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (703) 604-8324.

Sincerely,


John R. Crane
Assistant Inspector General
Communications and Congressional Liaison

cc: The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Member

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JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DELAWARE, CHAIRMAN

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

February 13, 2008

The Honorable Claude M. Kicklighter
Inspector General
Department of Defense
400 Army Navy Drive
Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Dear General Kicklighter:


The Committee has received another letter from an anonymous source regarding Brig. Gen. Mark T. Kimmitt, USA (ret.), who has been nominated to be Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. This letter alleges that Gen. Kimmitt has discussed '[REDACTED]

I write to request that your office review the allegation set forth in this letter, a copy of which is enclosed, and report back to the Committee as promptly as possible. The Committee had scheduled a meeting to consider the nomination this week, but I have decided to delay it until this issue can be reviewed.

I hope your office can act quickly so that the Committee may consider the nomination in the coming weeks. I very much appreciate the diligent work of your office on this matter to date.

The staff contact is [REDACTED], the Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel; he may be reached at 202-224-[REDACTED]

Sincerely,


Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman

Enclosure

b(6)

January 30, 2008

[REDACTED]

Senate Foreign Relations Committee
439 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-6225

[REDACTED]

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

JAN 15 2008

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6225

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in final response to your letter dated September 5, 2007, forwarding anonymous allegations received by your Committee concerning Brigadier General Mark T. Kimmitt, USA (retired) who has been nominated to be Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs.

We have completed our investigation. A copy of our report is enclosed. The report is designated "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY," in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act of 1972. The report is provided to you in your role as the Chairman of a committee of jurisdiction with respect to the subject matter and for the exclusive use of your committee. Therefore, we ask that your staff coordinate any additional release of this report with the FOIA/PA Office, Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia, 22202-4704.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (703) 604-8324.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John R. Crane", is written over the typed name.

John R. Crane
Assistant Inspector General
Communications and Congressional Liaison

Enclosure: as stated

cc: The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Member

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Report No. [REDACTED]

January 8, 2008

Inspector General

United States

Department of Defense



**ALLEGED DEFICIENT LEADERSHIP:
BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK T. KIMMITT
U.S. ARMY, RETIRED
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS**

Warning

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JAN - 8 2008

ALLEGED DEFICIENT LEADERSHIP:
BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK T. KIMMITT, U.S. ARMY, RETIRED
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

We initiated the investigation to address allegations that Brigadier General (BG) Mark T. Kimmitt, U.S. Army, Retired, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Affairs (DASD-ME), demonstrated leadership deficiencies that compromised his suitability for assignment to a senior Government position.¹ According to a complaint referred to this Office, BG Kimmitt was often physically intimidating; yelled at subordinates for minor grooming matters; used personally insulting phrases such as "[REDACTED]" "[REDACTED]" and "tough broad"; and angrily and publicly rebuked subordinates. Additionally, the complaint alleged that BG Kimmitt sought [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We investigated the complaint at the request of Chairman Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in connection with BG Kimmitt's nomination to be Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs.

We concluded that BG Kimmitt's leadership style was occasionally inconsistent with the standards expected for senior Government leaders as expressed by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in its "Guide to Senior Executive Service (SES) Qualifications," and DoD 5500.7-R, "Joint Ethics Regulation (JER)." With few exceptions, witnesses generally corroborated the leadership style attributed to BG Kimmitt by the complaint. No witness testified that he was physically intimidating, whether in personal stance, hand gestures, or other means. However, witnesses described him as a demanding, confrontational manager, occasionally displaying anger that demeaned subordinates and caused them to minimize their interaction with him. Some witnesses further indicated that BG Kimmitt resorted to threats of job loss or career harm as a "motivational" tactic and made demeaning comments when criticizing individual work products.

Although some witnesses heard BG Kimmitt use profanity, they noted that he used it to express frustration and did not direct profanity at anyone on a personal basis. In that regard, we found no evidence that BG Kimmitt resorted to "name calling" (that is, no witness heard him refer to an individual as a "[REDACTED]" or "[REDACTED]" as alleged), however, testimony corroborated that he referred to a State Department representative as a "tough broad." Moreover, testimony indicated that morale in BG Kimmitt's organization was negatively affected by BG Kimmitt's leadership style, combined with the heavy workload and long hours. Finally, we found that BG Kimmitt's leadership style discouraged subordinates from free and open communication with him. Witnesses indicated that the resultant lack of guidance and direction from BG Kimmitt caused subordinates to take action or produce a work product that later generated his criticism. While some witnesses, to include his supervisors and several detractors, viewed BG Kimmitt as "effective," we also found credible witnesses who told us that they obtained other employment to escape the unpleasant work environment.

¹ BG Kimmitt is currently a non-career member of the Senior Executive Service (SES).

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[REDACTED]

We did not substantiate the allegation that BG Kimmitt [REDACTED]

Although BG Kimmitt [REDACTED]

Rather, we found that the [REDACTED]

We recommended that the Army Inspector General review the matter further.

By letter dated November 28, 2007, we provided BG Kimmitt the opportunity to comment on the initial results of our inquiry: that his leadership style was inconsistent with standards expected for senior Government leaders. In his initial response by e-mail on that date, BG Kimmitt provided the names of 11 additional witnesses he recommended we interview. By letter dated December 10, 2007, BG Kimmitt provided a written response² in which he disagreed with our tentative conclusions on his leadership. In his response, BG Kimmitt asserted that the "Facts" section in our tentative conclusions letter was premature because we had not yet interviewed the additional witnesses he identified; that his current performance should be considered in the context of previous evaluations and his career as an Army officer; and that some of the facts within the tentative conclusions were disputable. He contended that the OPM Guide to SES Qualifications was a guideline only, and that our use of the phrase "inconsistent with the standards expected for senior government leaders" erroneously implied that his behavior "repeatedly and habitually violate[d] standards." In conclusion, BG Kimmitt wrote,

I acknowledge that a number of the incidents recounted in these investigations are inconsistent with the expectations of a member of the Senior Executive Service, and I further acknowledge that my leadership style should take great account of the human dimensions of my position. I recognize that my leadership style is tough, but I do not believe that it is generally inconsistent with the standards set out in the SES Guide or the Joint Ethics Regulation. However, I am aware that my leadership style needs to strike a better balance between the military axiom "Mission First" and empathizing with those that would accomplish the mission, and I have consistently worked to improve that balance.

After carefully considering BG Kimmitt's response, interviewing 14 additional witnesses (to include the 11 recommended by BG Kimmitt), and reevaluating the evidence, we slightly modified our initial conclusions in the matter to its current form: that BG Kimmitt's leadership style was *occasionally* inconsistent with applicable standards. Additionally, we obtained testimonial evidence that tended to mitigate the adverse impact of BG Kimmitt's leadership lapses. In that regard several witnesses, primarily BG Kimmitt's superiors, emphasized that BG Kimmitt brings superb qualifications and intellect to his position; that he has strengthened the overall performance of his office; and that he operates in a stressful, demanding environment, which could trigger confrontation. Notwithstanding BG Kimmitt's qualifications and

² While we have included what we believe is a reasonable synopsis of BG Kimmitt's response, we recognize that any attempt to summarize risks oversimplification and omission. Accordingly, we incorporated comments from BG Kimmitt's response throughout this report where appropriate and provided a copy of his response to the cognizant management official together with this report.

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[REDACTED]

accomplishments, we believe that cognizant management officials should continue to monitor his leadership style and provide corrective counseling as warranted.

This report sets forth our findings and conclusions based on a preponderance of the evidence.

II. BACKGROUND

BG Kimmitt has been assigned as DASD-ME since September 18, 2006, when he was on transition leave pending his January 1, 2007, retirement from active duty. His last position on active duty was Deputy Director of the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate (J-5), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). BG Kimmitt's current office is staffed by 35 people of various backgrounds, ranging in age from mid-20s to over 60, and includes political appointees, prior and current military officers, and DoD civilian employees. His office's area of responsibility covers issues for 14 Middle East nations: 20 personnel work solely Iraq issues under the management of the [REDACTED] while the remaining countries, including Egypt, Iran, and Yemen, are within the purview of the Gulf/Egypt/Levant Division consisting of ten personnel under the direction of [REDACTED]. BG Kimmitt's Chief of Staff is [REDACTED] who tracks taskers and liaises between staff and BG Kimmitt. Prior to BG Kimmitt's arrival, the DASD-ME position had been vacant for 18 months and the office was run piecemeal by the Principal Director and the Directors of the Iraq and Gulf Divisions.

In January 2007, after BG Kimmitt became DASD-ME, the office was restructured. As a result, several countries for which the office previously had oversight were removed from the responsibility of DASD-ME. At the time of the restructuring, individuals were given the choice of remaining with DASD-ME or going to the newly established sections.

On July 11, 2007, BG Kimmitt was nominated by the President to be the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on September 5, 2007. Also on that date, Senator Biden forwarded an anonymous complaint dated August 15, 2007, to this Office for investigation.

III. SCOPE

We interviewed BG Kimmitt and 26 other witnesses with knowledge of the daily events within the Office of the DASD-ME. We also interviewed three witnesses from the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, two from the Army G-3 Directorate of Mobilization, one from the State Department, and two from CENTCOM. We reviewed organizational documents, Army Regulations, Officer Evaluation Reports (OERs), BG Kimmitt's Army Senior Rater Profile, and mobilization papers from September 2006 through August 2007.

Additionally, we checked with the Office of the Army Inspector General to determine whether any [REDACTED]

The Army Inspector General had [REDACTED]

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IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

A. Was BG Kimmitt's leadership style consistent with standards established for senior leaders?

Standards

OPM "Guide to Senior Executive Service (SES) Qualifications"

The Guide sets forth "essential leadership qualifications" and underlying competencies for members of the SES within the Federal Government. The introduction to the Guide states that leaders must be able to apply "people skills" to motivate their employees, build partnerships, and communicate with their customers.

Accordingly, OPM has identified five Executive Core Qualifications for SES personnel: Leading Change, Leading People, Results Driven, Business Acumen, and Building Coalitions/Communication. The Appendix to the Guide sets forth underlying competencies that demonstrate each such qualification. The "Leading People" section emphasizes leadership techniques such as "inspiring, motivating, guiding . . . empowering . . . sharing power and authority . . . coaching and mentoring . . . attending to morale and organizational climate issues." It requires, in part, SES competence in

Fostering commitment, team spirit, pride, trust and group identity; taking steps to prevent situations that could result in unpleasant confrontations. Resolving conflicts in a positive and constructive manner.

The "Building Coalitions/Communications" qualification requires competence in "considering and responding appropriately to the needs, feeling, and capabilities of different people in different situations; being tactful and treating others with respect."

DoD 5500.7-R, JER, dated August 30, 1993

Chapter 12 of the JER, Section 5, "Ethical Values," states that ethics are standards by which one should act based on values. Values are core beliefs such as duty, honor, and integrity that motivate attitudes and actions. Ethical values relate to what is right and wrong and thus take precedence over other values when making ethical decisions. DoD employees should carefully consider ethical values when making decisions as part of official duties. Of interest in this case are JER provisions regarding fairness, caring, and respect:

- Fairness. Open-mindedness and impartiality are important aspects of fairness. DoD employees must be committed to justice in the performance of their official duties. Decisions must not be arbitrary, capricious or biased. Individuals must be treated equally and with tolerance.

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- Caring involves compassion, courtesy and kindness to "ensure that individuals are not treated solely as a means to an end. Caring for others is the counterbalance against the temptation to pursue the mission at any cost."
- Respect requires that employees "treat people with dignity." The lack of respect "leads to a breakdown of loyalty and honesty."

Facts

We interviewed witnesses who were in a position to observe BG Kimmitt's behavior or had frequent interaction with him. Many of the witnesses, particularly those assigned to the Iraq directorate, generally corroborated the leadership style attributed to him in the complaint. No witness testified to BG Kimmitt's being physically intimidating, whether in personal stance, hand gestures, or other means. However, witnesses described him as a demanding, confrontational manager, occasionally displaying anger that caused subordinates to feel intimidated, and, as a result, to minimize their interaction with him. Representative comments from witnesses follow:

- One witness told us that BG Kimmitt berated her for "45 minutes" challenging her to explain "who did I think I was" in an aggressive tone because of her approach on a particular project. The witness recalled that BG Kimmitt told her, "[REDACTED]" She told us that BG Kimmitt later apologized by noting that just as she could not control her face turning color when she was upset, he could not control the tone of his voice when he was upset.
- Two witnesses independently described the office as "walking on eggshells" to avoid incurring BG Kimmitt's displeasure. One witness testified that BG Kimmitt used anger to assert control. A second witness described BG Kimmitt as "[REDACTED]" which made subordinates "[REDACTED]"
- A witness testified that there was "sort of a permanent fear" in the office, while two other witnesses added that the environment was one in which good-faith actions were criticized as having been made in bad faith if they were not what BG Kimmitt wanted.
- A witness told us BG Kimmitt accused him of being "a traitor" after an incident in which the witness had accidentally received a high priority document meant for BG Kimmitt.
- Another witness testified to an atmosphere of fear, but noted that that the way in which BG Kimmitt registered his displeasure was not profane or abusive. This witness hypothesized that if BG Kimmitt "devoted more time to the carrots" he would receive better products. As it stood, however, the witness believed people were simply afraid of BG Kimmitt. The witness observed that the office situation was

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exacerbated by communication issues between BG Kimmitt and his subordinates, because BG Kimmitt believed he expressed his desires clearly but the subordinates did not properly interpret those desires and submitted unacceptable work products. The witness opined that if BG Kimmitt nurtured people more, he would "get a better product sooner."

While other witnesses were less critical in describing BG Kimmitt's management style, their comments were not inconsistent with those above. That is, they confirmed that BG Kimmitt's intense, demanding nature was upsetting to some employees, but noted that the significance of the work coupled with high operating tempo also contributed to employee anxiety. Although several witnesses used the term, "yell" to describe BG Kimmitt's method of communicating, testimony established that BG Kimmitt raised his voice to subordinates infrequently. A witness who also used the term "yell" explained that in so doing BG Kimmitt did not necessarily raise his voice far above normal, but spoke intensely and forcefully, "spitting the words out."

We confirmed that BG Kimmitt did use the phrase, "tough broad" at the conclusion of a meeting at the State Department, in which he had been engaged in negotiations with a State Department representative, [REDACTED]. Upon leaving the room, BG Kimmitt reportedly said to [REDACTED] "I really enjoy arguing with a tough broad," or words to that effect. There were several people present when the comment was made. One witness stated that BG Kimmitt intended his comment to be a joke, but that [REDACTED] appeared taken aback by the comment as well as by BG Kimmitt's aggressive tone during the meeting. However, we received no evidence that BG Kimmitt used personally insulting language at any other time. That is, no witness corroborated the allegation that BG Kimmitt called a member of his staff a "[REDACTED]" or "[REDACTED]" or otherwise resorted to profanity in a personally degrading manner.

Several witnesses recalled being present when BG Kimmitt used extensive profanity in a telephone conversation with a State Department employee that BG Kimmitt conducted during a staff meeting. Because he was upset with an unresolved manning issue involving DoD and the State Department, BG Kimmitt used extremely profane terms several times. The State Department employee testified that, although the matter had become an "urban legend" at the State Department, he himself was not concerned about it, and had since forgotten the substance of the call. A witness to the conversation who was present at the staff meeting testified that BG Kimmitt later apologized to those who may have been offended. BG Kimmitt also recalled the conversation, and, while admitting to profanity, stated that he intended to be joking with the State Department employee, whom he knew from previous dealings.

Witnesses told us that BG Kimmitt threatened to fire employees on occasion. In one instance, testimony indicated that BG Kimmitt established an office rule that no person in the office could speak with someone outside their pay grade: that is, military assistants could only be contacted by the Chief of Staff; people in the Middle East office could not contact anyone of higher rank than themselves in an outside organization's structure. BG Kimmitt allegedly told a subordinate, who had spoken to a person BG Kimmitt considered outside the subordinate's grade level, that perhaps the subordinate [REDACTED]

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Similarly, BG Kimmitt told another subordinate, "[REDACTED]" after BG Kimmitt discovered that the subordinate had -- erroneously, but through no fault of his own -- received an important document that should have been given directly to BG Kimmitt.

According to a witness whom we consider credible, BG Kimmitt made similar job-threatening comments to that witness on three occasions. The witness testified that he took those comments seriously, stating that BG Kimmitt was "[REDACTED]"

"[REDACTED]" After the third perceived job threat, the witness told us that he confronted BG Kimmitt and that he then assured the witness that BG Kimmitt had "[REDACTED]" and that he "[REDACTED]" After that, the witness testified that BG Kimmitt did not threaten him again.

A former employee, who stated that BG Kimmitt's management style caused the employee to find other employment, told us that BG Kimmitt would say, "[REDACTED]" That employee identified five former subordinates who obtained other employment because of the "miserable office environment."³ He added that the situation may have been exacerbated by the fact that BG Kimmitt had a "domineering personality" and the former employee's own supervisor was weak, with the result that the supervisor would eventually "throw them to the wolves" when BG Kimmitt "rolled over" the supervisor.

Likewise, a witness testified that he found one of BG Kimmitt's subordinates in tears not less than five times after meeting with BG Kimmitt. On two of these occasions, that subordinate had the impression that her job was at risk. The subordinate later indicated to the witness that BG Kimmitt had apologized and reassured her that she was not going to be separated. The subordinate also told the witness that she was considering leaving because of the way she was treated and the way feedback was conveyed. Although the subordinate recalled the alleged job threat as a "misunderstanding," she was extremely guarded when providing testimony to us and hesitant to answer questions directly.

One witness, who was a supervisor, testified to disparate treatment of office personnel, citing the case of a political appointee who routinely wore sneakers with his business suit and a civilian employee under the witness' supervision who wore his tie loose. According to the supervisory witness and another witness, BG Kimmitt excoriated the civilian employee, while the political appointee was not likewise censured for his attire. The supervisory witness stated that BG Kimmitt did not allow the civilian employee to sit down during a confrontational meeting in which BG Kimmitt characterized the employee as slovenly, and threatened him in an angry manner with firing.⁴

³ Witness testimony corroborated that at least five employees left the organization when the opportunity arose because they did not want to work in the environment established under BG Kimmitt.

⁴ The employee, who subsequently left for other employment, corroborated this account.

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Moreover, testimony established that morale in the Iraq Directorate was poor. Witnesses testified to long duty hours, some testifying to a typical day in excess of 12 hours, "spending all day and half the night there." This was not due entirely to the wartime operations tempo; according to one witness, BG Kimmitt added steps to the coordination process which required action officers to put additional memos on top of action memos, which extended project completion time and kept the witness in the office until 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. In addition, BG Kimmitt made acetate templates to measure document formats and required that the document be reaccomplished if it were a quarter or a tenth of an inch off specification. The witness noted that BG Kimmitt would always tell them to "get out of the office early," but would then call staff meetings at 5 p.m. In his testimony to us, BG Kimmitt stated that he did not know and would not hazard a guess as to what his staff's typical duty hours were, but pointed out that he did tell them not to work on weekends.

Some of the witnesses, who were generally complimentary of BG Kimmitt's leadership style, told us they considered BG Kimmitt to be an "effective leader," but still acknowledged negative aspects. One of those witnesses testified that, compared to one year ago, each of the action officers was stronger in his particular area because BG Kimmitt required them to reaccomplish work and look at it more carefully. A former subordinate at CENTCOM told us that he found working for BG Kimmitt a "painful experience" but stated that if asked to work for him again, he might give a "demented yes," describing BG Kimmitt as a very sharp person. BG Kimmitt's former supervisor at CENTCOM, Major General (Maj Gen) Vern M. Findley, U.S. Air Force, Director of the Strategy, Policy, and Plans Directorate (J-5), characterized BG Kimmitt as "very demanding, sometimes beyond reason." Two witnesses explained that BG Kimmitt's experience in Army artillery caused him to "always look for perfection." Another complimentary witness described BG Kimmitt as "respected by subordinates," even though subordinates may perceive his critical comments as insulting.

In BG Kimmitt's testimony to us, he described himself as a "demanding but fair" leader who was results oriented. He acknowledged that he spoke in a "direct" manner that some subordinates may perceive as harsh, but that he did not consider himself "a screamer." BG Kimmitt recalled one incident where his question to a subordinate regarding her employment status may have been perceived as a job threat, but stated that he did not intend it to be such and apologized later for the misunderstanding. BG Kimmitt did not recall ever threatening employees with firing or otherwise suggesting they seek other employment. Indeed, BG Kimmitt told us that he considered terminating an employee a "failure of leadership" and that doing so reflects badly on the supervisor as well as a sub-performing employee.

However, BG Kimmitt acknowledged, "there is something about my tone and my facial expressions that sometimes is off-putting to people." Further, he told us that he was "working on" his leadership style to adjust it to a civilian environment, as opposed to his previous active duty environment. BG Kimmitt stated that he did not consider himself a "charismatic leader," noting that he was probably not the type of person who would be thought of as a "wonderful guy" by subordinates. He emphasized that the work products completed by his organization were used by top DoD officials and that demands on his office were heavy, which required him to balance "the need to produce, which is what is demanded of this shop, and the need to maintain high morale."

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Discussion

We initially concluded that BG Kimmitt's leadership style was inconsistent with guidance provided by the standards expected for senior Government leaders as expressed by OPM in its "Guide to Senior Executive Service Qualifications" as well as standards for ethical conduct described by the JER. Those standards require that leaders treat subordinates with dignity, respect, tolerance, and tact. Members of the SES are expected to demonstrate competence in "fostering commitment" on the part of subordinates, in preventing "unpleasant confrontations," and in "resolving conflicts in a positive and constructive manner." Leadership techniques should include "inspiring, motivating, guiding . . . empowering . . . sharing power and authority . . . coaching and mentoring . . . attending to morale and organizational climate issues." The testimonial evidence indicated that BG Kimmitt occasionally fell short in these areas. We noted, in particular that an organizational unit permeated by a sense of fear -- a common thread in testimony we received -- does not reflect the type of leadership skills expected from senior leaders.

We concluded that BG Kimmitt's leadership approach, as described above, contributed to management and morale problems within the Middle East office, specifically the Iraq division. The preponderance of witness testimony indicated that although BG Kimmitt's authoritative leadership may have been well intended, he failed to appreciate the impact of that style on individuals who were unaccustomed to strict office hierarchical procedures, a harsh leadership style, occasional aggressive manner, and lack of constructive feedback. In particular, BG Kimmitt failed to identify situations where an alternative leadership approach was needed to elicit cooperation, and persisted in a manner that was perceived by several employees as threatening. Unfortunately, BG Kimmitt's forceful, decisive style appears to be counter-productive -- it resulted in the loss of trained employees, hesitancy on the part of some employees to seek guidance, and perceptions of inconsistency, unfairness, and fear in his organization.

In our view, a leadership style that induces employees to continually evaluate their employment situation is inconsistent with OPM leadership guidelines for members of the SES who are expected to foster "commitment, team spirit, pride, trust and group identity." Overall, the witnesses seemed to receive constructive feedback infrequently, and when given, it appears to have been provided in a manner that the recipients considered intimidating and counterproductive, to the point that few of them felt comfortable in asking for guidance at all. Employees spent valuable time, effort, worry, and Government resources to re-accomplish tasks that might have been done well initially, had BG Kimmitt followed the "coaching and mentoring" guideline.

We found no evidence to corroborate allegations that BG Kimmitt used disparaging terms to or physically intimidated employees within the Middle East office. His "tough broad" comment, although intended as a joke, was perceived as insulting and demeaning. However, we note that BG Kimmitt recognized that the comment was inappropriate and evidence indicated the instance was isolated.

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We do not seek to diminish BG Kimmitt's accomplishments during his tenure as DASD-ME or disregard the testimony of several witnesses who were unconcerned with his intense, demanding manner. However, we considered credible the testimony of individuals who described BG Kimmitt's leadership style as contributing to the persistent state of apprehension among many employees in the Middle East office.

Response to Tentative Conclusions

By letter dated November 28, 2007, we provided BG Kimmitt an opportunity to comment on the initial conclusions of our investigation. By e-mail on that date, BG Kimmitt provided a list of 11 additional witnesses that he believed could provide information relevant to our investigation. On December 10, 2007, BG Kimmitt provided a written response, in which he disagreed with our initial conclusions regarding his adherence to SES and JER standards for conduct.

BG Kimmitt pointed out that his Executive Pay and Performance Appraisal preliminary evaluation as an SES provided him a perfect score, giving an employee who supported his leadership style greater credence than one who did not. He also cited his 30 years of Army service and commendable command history. He added that none of his Army assessments indicated a leadership style inconsistent with the organizational norm. BG Kimmitt also denied that certain of our facts were correct, and that he had not spoken to employees in the manner to which they testified. He reiterated that he had not fired a single employee from his office, and that he had made it known he did not fire employees.

BG Kimmitt contended that he was neither harsh nor demeaning to his employees, asserting that the sustained and significant results of the Middle East team during his tenure were a credit to the team effort and his leadership of that team. He stated that the few isolated incidents noted in two of the five core qualification areas did not substantiate an allegation that his leadership style was "inconsistent with the standards expected for senior Government leaders." BG Kimmitt disagreed that his actions were not fair, caring, or respectful, as mandated by the JER.

Finally, BG Kimmitt noted the extenuating circumstances associated with his recent change from military active duty to civilian work. In that regard, he explained that transition from an "Airborne-Ranger toughness" leadership style honed over the course of 30 years to one more oriented toward civilian sensitivities was a gradual process. He stated that he had requested advice and additional training opportunities on human relations in a civilian context. Also, he pointed out that the witnesses testified that he would generally apologize after the fact when he realized that his forcefulness had been off-putting. He contended that this indicated that he was sensitive to his management style and that he was aware of the issues raised and was willing to address them.

In response to BG Kimmitt's request, we interviewed the 11 additional witnesses identified to us, as well as three additional witnesses we believed to be knowledgeable about events at issue.

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BG Kimmitt's supervisors, Ambassador Eric Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Ms. Mary Beth Long, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, testified that they knew of BG Kimmitt's "tough" reputation before hiring him. Ms. Long was aware that BG Kimmitt's reputation had been as a "difficult and demanding supervisor, perhaps abusive." Ms. Long had discussed this reputation with BG Kimmitt, and satisfied herself that he would adjust. She contended that that toughness was a critical component in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. She considered BG Kimmitt "exceptionally talented," and challenged anyone to find a better performing organization in the Pentagon, noting that the Secretary of Defense had been very pleased with his work.

Ms. Long believed that BG Kimmitt's organization operated under some of the most intense pressure in the Pentagon. Given the demands on his organization and the importance of his work, Ms. Long did not consider him inappropriately demanding. Ms. Long stated that two of BG Kimmitt's subordinates had come to her with complaints of his conduct, and that in response to those complaints she had twice counseled BG Kimmitt. She hypothesized that a lot of the criticism against BG Kimmitt was from subordinates who were either complacent or not performing up to expectations.

Similarly, Ambassador Edelman recalled that BG Kimmitt had a reputation for being "hard charging" and "tough on people." However, Ambassador Edelman stated that he did not consider such a reputation unusual for a former military officer and emphasized that BG Kimmitt's former superiors endorsed him for the position. According to Ambassador Edelman, the work of the Middle East Office has improved both in quality and timeliness since BG Kimmitt took over. Additionally, he emphasized that BG Kimmitt was an "excellent briefer" and an "effective diplomat." Although Ambassador Edelman was aware of ongoing complaints regarding BG Kimmitt's leadership style, he believed subordinates could "manage it," opining that BG Kimmitt's behavior was not outside the typical parameters of a "tough boss."

Two witnesses, from BG Kimmitt's secretarial and administrative staff, provided favorable testimony concerning his leadership style, describing him as "direct."

BG Kimmitt also provided the names of six Iraq directorate action officers, with whom we spoke. Like a witness we interviewed previously, one of those actions officers testified to BG Kimmitt's "definite tendency to take something out on the action officer." She noted that he reassigned actions saying it was not "being done efficiently enough," rather than simply remarking that the matter might need higher-level attention. The action officer observed that BG Kimmitt's affect had changed significantly for the better since this investigation began in September, describing it as a "bit of a charm offensive." She testified that the office environment was frustrating, although not all "dysfunctional" areas were necessarily attributable to BG Kimmitt. She stated that while some chose to leave the organization, others, like her, decided to "stick it out" in the hope of better days. When asked if she benefited from BG Kimmitt's leadership style, she responded that she did not, noting that "██████████" She added that she preferred to have a supervisor with her if she did see BG Kimmitt, not only to keep a supervisor informed of

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business, but, since BG Kimmitt had gotten angry at her several times, "[REDACTED]"

Other desk officers identified BG Kimmitt as "assertive," "directive," a "stern taskmaster" and occasionally, "condescending." One related an incident in which BG Kimmitt had observed an active duty Air Force general's demanding conduct during a negotiation and BG Kimmitt stated that he had learned a lesson from that conduct because it did not produce the desired results. A [REDACTED] in the Iraq Directorate testified that BG Kimmitt was "extremely demanding," and that for someone who had not had experience with someone like BG Kimmitt it could be a "huge setback" and a "brick wall." He stated that when they worked 12 or 13 hours a day and still BG Kimmitt was not happy, it could be "offputting" and demoralizing. He explained that although he was appointed to his position by Ms. Long and felt a certain degree of freedom to approach BG Kimmitt, such was "definitely not" the case for the rest of the directorate because of prior experience and BG Kimmitt's directness, which "instills a sense of fear."

A [REDACTED] in the Iraq Directorate noted that "[REDACTED]" of what the officer described as "[REDACTED]" adding that some adapted to it better than others. He conceded that it was an area in which BG Kimmitt could probably improve, but testified that he did not consider BG Kimmitt's leadership style inappropriate. While the templating of documents to which previous witnesses referred was considered to be a frustration, several witnesses accepted the templates as a necessary step to produce a professional end product in a format higher authority found helpful.

An employee of the Iraq Directorate, who had experienced the office prior to BG Kimmitt's arrival, considered BG Kimmitt to be more effective than the previous leaders in some areas, but pointed out that "[REDACTED]" had created problems with the State Department. He explained that the State Department deputy assistant secretaries and assistant secretaries, frustrated by BG Kimmitt, asked him what "what's going on" with his boss. The employee testified that, because of BG Kimmitt's style, State Department personnel "share information with me. They don't share with him."

Mr. Paul Hulley, the previous Principal Director, DASD-ME, worked with BG Kimmitt from BG Kimmitt's arrival through August 2007. Mr. Hulley testified that, while BG Kimmitt was indisputably a difficult person to work for, the question was not whether or not that difficulty was acceptable, but what BG Kimmitt actually contributed to the organization. Mr. Hulley emphasized BG Kimmitt's exceptional contributions to the organization, and stated that the attrition rate was not necessarily indicative of BG Kimmitt's leadership capabilities. He generally identified people previously attached to the Defense Reconstruction Support Office and subsequently reorganized into the Office of the DASD-ME -- some of whom testified to BG Kimmitt's harsh style -- as "malcontents."

Mr. Hulley told us that he interfaced for BG Kimmitt in terms of translating BG Kimmitt's instructions to an action officer "more so than anybody else [he] had ever worked for" and letting BG Kimmitt know when he had been unduly harsh. Mr. Hulley testified that BG Kimmitt occasionally made a task more difficult when it was sent back to be re-done than it

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[REDACTED]

had originally been. Mr. Hulley explained that when he perceived these situations, he usually interceded with BG Kimmitt. He testified that he would speak with BG Kimmitt about the latter's abrasive aspect 3 or 4 times a month, but noted that his need to do so diminished over time.

Brigadier General (Brig Gen) Robin Rand, U.S. Air Force, Mr. Hulley's successor as Principal Deputy, DASD-MB, testified that he would adjust to any commander's style that was not "illegal, immoral, or fattening." He characterized BG Kimmitt as "fair." He testified that there are no morale-building activities in the office, and that, while duty hours approach 13 hours, he felt that characterization of days as "consistently" 14 hours long would be "a bit of an exaggeration." Brig Gen Rand stated that he had never been approached by an action officer with a complaint. However, he testified that both Directors had come to him, and their "gripe" was typically that BG Kimmitt was going directly to the action officers without keeping the Directors informed. Regarding the Directors' concerns, he noted, "We're the subordinates, so you got to give the boss a little bit of leeway." Brig Gen Rand testified that BG Kimmitt could bring discipline to the State Department.

[REDACTED] testified that BG Kimmitt had been fair to him and, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He characterized BG Kimmitt as "demanding," but noted that in some ways, BG Kimmitt had elevated work product standards, so in those ways he believed the job was getting done better. He felt that some people left the office because they felt "constrained" with BG Kimmitt's manner of doing things, but asserted that the field was highly competitive and that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

After carefully considering BG Kimmitt's response, interviewing 14 additional witnesses, and reexamining the evidence, we slightly modified our initial conclusions. We do not dispute that BG Kimmitt has an exemplary military record, nor that his office has been effective and has produced consistently excellent work. Likewise, many staff members, even those who expressed

⁵ [REDACTED]

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reservations about BG Kimmitt's leadership style, characterized him as a remarkably smart and intelligent individual. However, based on the preponderance of the evidence we conclude that on occasion BG Kimmitt failed to meet standards expected for senior Government leaders. His actions on those occasions did not foster commitment, team spirit, trust, or group identity; nor did he take steps to prevent situations that could result in unpleasant confrontations. Likewise, making tasks more difficult for action officers already struggling, speaking in such a manner as to cause subordinates to groundlessly fear for their jobs, whether or not intentional, demonstrates a lack of care for others.

Likewise, dismissing the worries and stresses of subordinates to the duty hours necessitated by the important work being accomplished in the office, without efforts to ameliorate those factors, suggests that the leadership of the organization was uncaring of the cost to the individuals in the pursuit of the mission. The JER cautions against treating individuals "solely as a means to an end," noting that "[c]aring for others is the counterbalance against the temptation to pursue the mission at any cost."

We acknowledge that BG Kimmitt, in most cases, promptly took steps to resolve potential conflicts by apologizing. However, we also note that notwithstanding counseling by Ms. Long and Mr. Hulley concerning his abrasive aspect, on several occasions BG Kimmitt had not fully integrated their counsel into his leadership style. [REDACTED] testimony concerning BG Kimmitt's mercurial affect is consistent with the experiences of several other witnesses, and recent enough to lead us to conclude that BG Kimmitt's leadership style continues to warrant monitoring.

B. Did BG Kimmitt use his official position [REDACTED]

Standards



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
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Facts




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
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[REDACTED]

V. CONCLUSION

A. BG Kimmitt's leadership style was occasionally inconsistent with standards expected for senior Government leaders:

B. BG Kimmitt did not [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

That the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs continue to monitor BG Kimmitt's leadership style and provide feedback and counseling as warranted.

That the Army Inspector General review [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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Inspector General
Department of Defense

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

OCT - 9 2007

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6225

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in further response to your letter dated September 5, 2007, requesting that this Office review allegations concerning Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, U.S. Army (Retired).

We initiated an investigation on September 6, 2007, and are conducting fieldwork. We will provide you the results of our inquiry as soon as possible. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (703) 604-8324.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to read "John R. Crane", is positioned above the typed name.

John R. Crane
Assistant Inspector General
Communications and Congressional Liaison

cc: The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Member



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6225

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
Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is an initial response to your letter dated September 5, 2007, forwarding anonymous allegations received by your Committee concerning Brigadier General Mark T. Kimmitt, USA (retired) who has been nominated to be Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs.

We are currently examining the information provided in your correspondence. We will provide you the results of that examination and our course of action in the matter as soon as possible.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (703) 604-8324.

Sincerely,


John R. Crane
Assistant Inspector General
Communications and Congressional Liaison

cc: The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Member

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DELAWARE, CHAIRMAN

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

September 5, 2007

The Honorable Claude M. Kicklighter
Inspector General
Department of Defense
400 Army Navy Drive
Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Dear General Kicklighter:


The President has nominated Brig. Gen. Mark T. Kimmitt, USA (Ret.) to be Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. That nomination is pending before the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The Committee has received a letter from an anonymous source making several allegations regarding Gen. Kimmitt's management and interpersonal skills that would, if true, be relevant to the Committee's consideration of the nomination. The letter also alleges that Gen. Kimmitt sought to [REDACTED]

I write to request that your office review the allegations set forth in this letter, a copy of which is enclosed, and report back to the Committee as promptly as possible. The staff contact is [REDACTED] the Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel; he may be reached at 202-224-[REDACTED].

I appreciate your attention to this request.

Sincerely,



Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman


Enclosure

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August 15, 2007

The Honorable Joseph Biden
The Honorable Richard Lugar
Chairman and Ranking Member
Foreign Relations Committee
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Biden and Senator Lugar:



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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

FEB - 8 2008

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6225


Dear Chairman Biden:

This is in further response to your letter dated January 24, 2008, requesting "a copy of the transcripts of the interviews conducted during the course of your investigation and any of the supporting documents" regarding our investigation of allegations received by your Committee with respect to Brigadier General Mark T. Kimmitt.

[REDACTED] Senate Foreign Relations Committee Deputy Counsel, requested that our office conduct an additional interview to corroborate information that was discussed in one of the interview transcripts we previously provided to your Committee. We were unable to locate that individual during the investigation as he had left his position with DoD and was traveling overseas. In response to your request, we located the individual and conducted a telephone interview with him. A copy of the transcribed interview is enclosed.

The enclosed information is designated "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY," in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act. The information is provided to you in your role as the Chairman, and may not be released to the public. We ask that you coordinate any additional release with the FOIA/PA Office, Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia, 22202-4704. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (703) 604-8324.

Sincerely,


John R. Crane
Assistant Inspector General
Communications and Congressional Liaison

Enclosure: as stated

cc: The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Member

b(6)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INVESTIGATIONS

TAPE TRANSCRIPTION

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February 6, 2008

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Department of Defense, without the approval of the
Deputy Inspector General for Investigations, Office of
the Inspector General, Department of Defense.~~

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P R O C E E D I N G S

██████: Here we go. Today is the 6th of February 2008. The time is 7:50 in the morning eastern time. The interview is being conducted telephonically between ████████████████████ and the Department of Defense Inspector General in Arlington, Virginia. The persons present are ██████████ and the investigators ██████████ and ██████████.

This is going to be a little odd, but can you raise your right hand so I can administer an oath?

██████████: Identify who?

██████████: I said can you raise your right hand, please?

██████████: I'm sorry, what?

██████████: I'm going to ask you to take an oath.

██████████: Oh, an oath, okay sure.

██████████: Yeah, okay.

Whereupon,

████████████████████
was called as a witness, and having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION

BY ██████████:

Q Great. You can put your hand down and do you

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1 realize this interview is being recorded?

2 A Yes.

3 Q Okay since we haven't sent you out a copy of
4 the Privacy Act statement I will simply tell you that
5 for your testimony here today we're going to be putting
6 it into a transcript and it will be a written document
7 that is subject to the Freedom of Information Act.
8 However, it is also subject to the Privacy Act so any
9 documents which are released will have your personal
10 information removed from them so that you would not be
11 able to be identified.

12 A Okay.

13 Q You're [REDACTED] and where are you
14 currently located?

15 A In [REDACTED].

16 Q And when did you work for Mr. Kimmitt?

17 A I worked for Mr. Kimmitt from the time he
18 arrived, and I forget when that was, until [REDACTED] the end
19 of [REDACTED].

20 Q Okay and what did you do in that office?

21 A I was a [REDACTED] for the [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED].

23 Q All right, why did you leave that office?

24 A I decided to leave the government after [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED] of service and [REDACTED] with the

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1 [REDACTED].

2 Q Okay can you describe Mr. Kimmitt's leadership
3 style?

4 A He was a demanding leader, expected a high
5 level of quality of work from his staff, and he divided
6 that to us in (inaudible), and I think that he
7 developed basically, you know, an atmosphere of fear
8 and respect, and a little bit of love once in a while.

9 But I thought he was -- I thought -- I had a good
10 relationship with Mr. Kimmitt.

11 Q Okay. One witness -- and just to back up here
12 Mr. Kimmitt is currently under investigation for
13 various aspects of his leadership style which allegedly
14 do not meet the DOD standards for senior executives.

15 One witness in this investigation pointed out that at
16 one point you [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED] and Mr. Kimmitt responded, "This is a
18 Christian nation," or words to that effect.

19 Do you recall that?

20 A No.

21 Q Okay. Has Mr. Kimmitt ever discussed religion
22 with you?

23 A Not that I remember.

24 Q Okay. Did Mr. Kimmitt ever make remarks that
25 you considered to be inappropriate or of questionable

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1 propriety?

2 A No.

3 Q Did you perceive any others in the office to
4 be distressed or unhappy with Mr. Kimmitt's leadership
5 style?

6 A Yes.

7 Q Why would that be?

8 A Excuse me?

9 Q Why were they distressed?

10 A Oh, why were they distressed. I think they
11 were distressed because -- well, I'll try to explain
12 what -- let's see. They were probably distressed
13 because he demanded a lot but there wasn't a great deal
14 of positive reinforcement. I would say that he has a
15 style of leading if anything with negative
16 reinforcement, so I think it's distressing for some
17 people.

18 But I didn't think that -- so I think they
19 just not -- did not respond well to -- did not respond
20 well to his leadership style.

21 Q I'm sorry, didn't respond well to his? I lost
22 the last half --

23 A To his leadership style.

24 Q His leadership style, okay.

25 A Yeah, they didn't respond well to his

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1 leadership style. His was a very demanding style. He
2 asked you a lot of questions. He expects that you'll
3 know every single thing about the topic. He wants you
4 to have a command over your subject area. He was one
5 of the most demanding bosses I've ever worked for.

6 BY ████████:

7 Q Would you say more folks in the office had a
8 fear for him or would be half and half, or what would
9 you think?

10 A It didn't look -- I think it was the majority
11 of the people that are scared of him.

12 BY ████████:

13 Q As far as you know, did anyone leave --

14 A (Inaudible).

15 Q I'm sorry, what was that?

16 A I'm sorry. I don't think I -- we have a good
17 connection but it's not the best.

18 Q Yeah.

19 A What was your question again?

20 Q Did anybody that you're aware of, do you think
21 that anybody left the office because of Mr. Kimmitt's
22 leadership style?

23 A I know that -- let's see, did anyone leave
24 because of his style?

25 Q Well, his style being a factor in their

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1 leaving?

2 A Yeah, I'm sure. Yeah, I think there were some
3 people who left and Mr. Kimmitt was a factor in their
4 decision and they decided that they didn't like working
5 for him. But I don't know if anybody left because of
6 him. Does that make sense?

7 Q Okay yes, it does.

8 BY [REDACTED]:

9 Q Do you think he was aware of his leadership
10 style and his affect on folks who worked for him?

11 A Do I think what?

12 Q Do you think he was aware --

13 A I'm sorry, I didn't hear you.

14 Q Do you think he was aware of his leadership
15 style and there were folks who were afraid to work for
16 him?

17 A I'm sorry, can you just ask -- can you ask
18 that one more time?

19 Q Yeah, do you think that Mr. Kimmitt was aware
20 of his leadership style and the fact that it may have
21 had an affect on some folks who were afraid to work for
22 him?

23 A I think so. I mean it's hard to tell whether
24 or not he knows what he -- how he affects people.

25 Q Well, do you know if anybody brought it to his

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1 attention?

2 A Yeah. Yeah, I think so. I mean I told -- in
3 fact, I told Mr. Kimmitt on one occasion that people --
4 that he was, you know, very demanding and that some
5 people don't respond well to that. But I also added
6 that I do, so I felt that he challenged me and from one
7 of -- and I -- I respected that and accepted it. But
8 not everyone in the office fed off the challenge that
9 he gave them.

10 I mean because sometimes you'll be in an
11 office in the Pentagon. It's again, you tell your boss
12 what he wants to hear or you'll answer a question, your
13 boss says, "Thank you very much," and you walk out.
14 But you were always going to have a follow-up question
15 and that's not easy for people who have been working or
16 are not used to being challenged.

17 So -- and he wasn't -- and the way that he
18 would ask these questions were, you know, in a very
19 direct manner and that can be off-putting for somebody
20 who is used to a very congenial, relaxed, casual
21 atmosphere in the office. But he approached his job
22 with a different attitude.

23 So I -- I told him that there were some people
24 in the office who were put off by that and I said there
25 were some people who were not. I loved (inaudible). I

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1 thought I was thriving under that style of leadership.

2 BY [REDACTED]:

3 Q How did he get along with folks at the State
4 Department?

5 A I can't answer. I don't know.

6 Q You don't know?

7 A That's not -- kind of like above my level. I
8 only dealt with junior people in State and he didn't
9 deal with them, so I can't say how his relationship was
10 with other people at the State Department.

11 Q Do you remember a conversation he had once on
12 the telephone in a kind of -- in a telephone
13 conversation when the Middle East Division was there at
14 one of his meetings and it was a conversation with [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED] of the State Department in which
16 he allegedly used profanity throughout the
17 conversation?

18 A No, I don't think I was there for that.

19 BY [REDACTED]:

20 Q Did he use profanity in the workplace?

21 A Yes, but I also use profanity in the
22 workplace, so that wasn't something that would have
23 been --

24 Q Okay.

25 A The majority of the people I know in the

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1 Pentagon use profanity.

2 Q Overall, given Mr. Kimmitt's leadership style,
3 can you think of any areas that need improvement that
4 would make him a more effective leader?

5 A Yeah, I guess -- let's see. I'm trying to
6 think because it's not -- I don't know if positive
7 reinforcement is so important in a job. Maybe if you
8 had more positive reinforcement might make him a more
9 effective leader, but I think that more importantly
10 than that I would say that he would try to be -- I
11 don't know.

12 I guess that he has an intimidating way of
13 speaking to people who work for him, and I think it's
14 hard to quantify because intimidation is such an
15 abstract idea. But if he could be a little less
16 intimidating when he spoke to some people he may get a
17 more positive reaction from his staff.

18 But that is such a subjective element of the
19 workplace. I never -- I never felt intimidated by him
20 but I could see how others would. So I guess that's
21 how I would answer that question.

22 BY [REDACTED]:

23 Q All right, I'm just going to return briefly to
24 that -- you said you don't recall Mr. Kimmitt ever
25 making a comment concerning Christianity or Judaism or

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1 this being a Christian nation or anything of that
2 nature?

3 A Let me see exactly on this. I just -- it's
4 possible. I just don't remember. [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED]

10 But I can tell you an interesting fact. He
11 was in [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED]

16 Q Really?

17 A Yeah, so I -- you know I mean that's the
18 extent of the conversations that we've had during -- I
19 mean that just shows to you the extent of the
20 conversations or lack thereof that we've had about
21 religion in the workplace.

22 Q Yeah, all right. Well, given everything that
23 we've discussed here and the topic of Mr. Kimmitt's
24 leadership style, do you recommend that we speak with
25 anyone in particular besides yourself?

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1 A I'm sure you're talked to all the people who I
2 can tell you about. I just -- I worked very close
3 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (phonetic), [REDACTED]
4 [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]
5 Those are the people who I know that I have worked with
6 that would know -- that would be able to talk to you
7 with some experience about Mark Kimmitt.

8 Q All right, okay in that case, did you have any
9 questions or concerns about the conduct of this
10 interview?

11 A No, I thought the interview was great. But I
12 should just add that I work for -- I would work for
13 Kimmitt again. I mean he's a tough boss, but that's
14 kind of what I'd like to see.

15 Q Okay. All right, okay in that case, [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED] thank you very much for your assistance and we
17 do remind you this matter is extremely sensitive and we
18 consider it to be a priority. We ask that you not
19 discuss the substance of your testimony here today with
20 anybody, including your supervisors or Mr. Kimmitt
21 himself. Okay?

22 A Yeah, I promise not to do that.

23 Q Okay if you have anything else that crosses
24 your mind that you think we ought to know pursuant to
25 this investigation, please just drop me an email or

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1 something of that nature, okay?

2 A Okay can you explain -- I have a quick
3 question. You said this was subject to the Freedom of
4 Information Act.

5 Q Yes.

6 A When it's published they black out the names
7 of the people involved in the investigation?

8 Q Your testimony will never actually be
9 published. What could happen is that when the final
10 report is completed -- first of all the report does not
11 reference the witness names at all. In the odd
12 instance where someone -- it's necessary to discuss
13 someone then that name comes out.

14 Someone could request all the documents which
15 form a basis for our report and in that event they get
16 the entire volume and all of the personal information
17 is redacted from everyone's testimony.

18 A Okay.

19 Q So you're talking -- yeah, you're talking -- a
20 large volume of paperwork but some folks have expressed
21 a concern throughout this process that they could be
22 identified. Again, the Freedom of Information Act and
23 the Privacy Act work together to try and prevent that
24 sort of reprisal activity. Okay?

25 A Okay.

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1 Q All right, well, in that case it's 8:05 and
2 the interview is concluded. Again, thank you very much
3 [REDACTED]. I appreciate it.

4 A Yeah, feel free to contact me again if you
5 need to.

6 Q Thank you, sir.

7 A Thanks a lot.

8 (The interview was concluded at 8:05 a.m.)

9 * * * * *

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

JAN 30 2008

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6225

Dear Chairman Biden:

This is in response to your letter dated January 24, 2008, requesting "a copy of the transcripts of the interviews conducted during the course of your investigation and any of the supporting documents" regarding our investigation of allegations received by your Committee with respect to Brigadier General Mark T. Kimmitt.

The documents you requested are enclosed. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (703) 604-8324.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John R. Crane", is positioned above the typed name and title.

John R. Crane
Assistant Inspector General
Communications and Congressional Liaison

Enclosure: as stated

cc: The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Member

Table of Contents

Documents Supporting OIG DoD Report of Allegations Concerning Brigadier General Mark T. Kimmitt

1. Info Memo to Secretary of Defense regarding results of review
2. Letter to BG Kimmitt, providing results of review
3. Response from BG Kimmitt, providing comments on review
4. Interview with Mr. Mark Kimmitt
5. Interview with [REDACTED] and addendum Memo for the Record
6. Interview with [REDACTED] and log provided by [REDACTED]
7. MFR – interview with Ambassador Eric Edelman
8. MRF- telephone conversation with [REDACTED]
9. Interview with [REDACTED]
10. Interview with [REDACTED]
11. Interview with [REDACTED]
12. Interview with [REDACTED]
13. Interview with [REDACTED]
14. Interview with [REDACTED]
15. Interview with [REDACTED]
16. Interview with [REDACTED]
17. Interview with [REDACTED]
18. Interview with [REDACTED]
19. Interview with [REDACTED]
20. Interview with [REDACTED]
21. Interview with [REDACTED]
22. Interview with [REDACTED]
23. Interview with [REDACTED]
24. Interview with [REDACTED]
25. Interview with [REDACTED]
26. Interview with [REDACTED]
27. Interview with [REDACTED]
28. Interview with BG Robin Rand
29. Interview with [REDACTED]

b(6)
b(7)(C)



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

JAN 24 2008

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6225

Dear Chairman Biden:

This is an initial response to your letter dated January 24, 2008, requesting "a copy of the transcripts of the interviews conducted during the course of your investigation and any of the supporting documents" regarding our investigation of allegations received by your Committee with respect to Brigadier General Mark T. Kimmitt.

We are currently compiling the documentation that you requested, and will provide you the information as soon as possible. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (703) 604-8324.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John R. Crane", is written over the typed name.

John R. Crane
Assistant Inspector General
Communications and Congressional Liaison

cc: The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Member

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DELAWARE, CHAIRMAN

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

January 24, 2008

The Honorable Claude M. Kicklighter
 Inspector General
 Department of Defense
 400 Army Navy Drive
 Arlington, VA 22202-4704


Dear General Kicklighter:

Thank you for your letter of January 15, 2008, which included the results of your investigation of the allegations received by the Committee with respect to Brigadier General Mark T. Kimmitt in connection with his nomination to be Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs.

I write to request that your office provide a copy of the transcripts of the interviews conducted during the course of your investigation and any other supporting documents that you think would be useful in our review of this matter. The staff contact is [REDACTED] the Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel; he may be reached at 202-224-[REDACTED]

I appreciate your attention to this request.

Sincerely,



Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
 Chairman



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

JUL 24 2007

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6225


Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in further response to a July 12, 2007, facsimile from [REDACTED] of your Committee staff, requesting information concerning Mr. Mark T. Kimmitt, who has been nominated to be Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (Political-Military Affairs).

A check of records maintained by this office found a substantiated allegation that Mr. Kimmitt, while serving as a Brigadier General in the U.S. Army, failed to properly safeguard information, in violation of Army regulations.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (703) 604-8324.

Sincerely,


John R. Crane
Assistant Inspector General
Communications and Congressional Liaison

cc: The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Member

b(6)



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

JUL 16 2007

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6225


Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is an initial response to a July 12, 2007, facsimile from [REDACTED] of your Committee staff, requesting information concerning Mr. Mark Tracey Kimmitt, who has been nominated to be Deputy assistant Secretary of State (Political-Military Affairs).

We will check the records maintained by this office and notify you if we have any information to indicate if Mr. Kimmitt has been the subject of an investigation by a DoD agency. We will provide you the results of that examination as soon as possible.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (703) 604-8324.

Sincerely,


John R. Crane
Assistant Inspector General
Communications and Congressional Liaison

cc: The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Member

b(6)

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510-6225
PHONE: (202) 224-3951
FAX: (202) 224-0836



TO: [REDACTED] (and [REDACTED])
OFFICE: Inspector General's Office
Department of Defense
PHONE: 703-604-8324
FAX: 703-604-8325

FROM: [REDACTED]
OFFICE: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
4 page, including this cover sheet

DATE: July 12, 2007

SUBJECT: Mark Traevey Kimmitt, Nominated to be Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (Political-Military Affairs)

[REDACTED] I'm replacing [REDACTED] as executive clerk at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee -- [REDACTED] retired last Friday.

Mark Kimmitt has been nominated to the above-mentioned position at the Department of State. We would appreciate it if you would provide any data (investigative reports, etc.) or other information relative to Mark Kimmitt available to the Inspector General's Office. I am attaching a copy of Mr. Kimmitt's biographic summary for your information.

If you have any questions, please call me.

Thank you.

b(6)

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY
(Highlights)

NAME: Mark Traevey Kimmitt

POSITION FOR WHICH CONSIDERED: Assistant Secretary of State
(Political-Military Affairs)

PRESENT POSITION: Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense Middle East, The Pentagon

LEGAL RESIDENCE: Virginia

OFFICE ADDRESS: The Pentagon
Washington, DC

DATE/PLACE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]
Ft. Sill, OK

MARITAL STATUS: Married

NAME OF SPOUSE: [REDACTED]

NAMES OF CHILDREN: None

EDUCATION: National Defense University,
Masters of Science, 1996
U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College, Masters of
Military Art and Sciences, 1989
Harvard University, Masters of
Business Administration, 1984
U.S. Military Academy, Bachelors
of Science, 1976

MILITARY SERVICE: U.S. Army, Active Duty, June 1976
to December 2006

FOREIGN LANGUAGES: Spanish (limited)

EXPERIENCE:

2006 - Present Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense Middle East
The Pentagon

2004 - 2006 Deputy Director, Strategy, Plans
and Policy
U.S. Central Command
MacDill Air Force Base, FL

b(6)

| | |
|-------------|--|
| 2003 - 2004 | Deputy Director of Operations Combined Joint Task Force - Seven Baghdad, Iraq |
| 2002 - 2004 | Chief of Staff and Commander Corps Artillery XVIII Airborne Corps Fort Bragg, NC |
| 1999 - 2002 | Military Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe Mons, Belgium |
| 1997 - 1999 | Division Artillery Commander 1 st Armored Division Baumholder, Germany |
| 1996 - 1997 | Special Assistant - J5 Joints Chiefs of Staff The Pentagon |
| 1993 - 1996 | Battalion Commander 2/320 th Field Artillery Fort Campbell, KY |
| 1992 - 1993 | Division Artillery Executive Officer 1 st Armored Division Baumholder, Germany |
| 1991 - 1992 | 4/29 th Field Artillery Baumholder, Germany |
| 1989 - 1991 | Chief of War Plans 8 th Infantry Division Bad Kreuznach, Germany |
| 1984 - 1987 | Assistant Professor, Department of Social Sciences U.S. Military Academy West Point, NY |
| 1980 - 1982 | Battery Commander and Battery Executive Officer 9 th Infantry Division Fort Lewis, Washington |
| 1978 - 1980 | Fire Support Officer 2 nd Ranger Battalion Fort Lewis, Washington |
| 1977 - 1978 | Battery Executive Officer 1/15 th Field Artillery Camp Stanley, Korea |

HONORS/AWARDS:

Defense Superior Service Medal
Army Distinguished Service Medal
Minister of Defense Award, Kingdom
of the Netherlands
Legion of Merit (2)

Bronze Star Medal
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (5)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal (2)
Army Achievement Medal (3)
Joint Meritorious Unit Award (2)
National Defense Service Medal (3)
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Iraq Campaign Medal
Global War on Terror Expeditionary Medal
Global War on Terror Service Medal
Korea Defense Service Medal
Armed Forces Service Medal
Army Service Ribbon
NATO Medal (3)
Air Assault Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Pathfinder Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Identification Badge
Phi Kappa Phi, United States
Military Academy
Class Marshal, Harvard Business
School, 1984

PUBLICATIONS:

Opposing view: Our Strategy is
not static, USA Today Op Ed,
October 19, 2006

ORGANIZATIONAL
AFFILIATIONS:

Member, The Army and Navy Club,
Washington, DC, since 1996
Member, Association of the United
States Army, since 1982
Member, Veterans of Foreign Wars
of the United States, since
1993
Member, Association of Graduates,
United States Military Academy,
since 1976

May 2007