Frank M. Andrews: Marshall’s Airman
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Foreword

As we conclude our year-long recognition of the 100th anniversary of powered flight, we take this opportunity to recognize and pay tribute to airmen of the past and present. We do this with an eye toward inspiring airmen of the future.

General Frank M. Andrews was an inspirational figure in our history and it is fitting that we highlight his accomplishments and contributions in the creation, shaping, and development of the United States Air Force. As the organizer and commander of the prewar General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force, he was the first airman to have centralized nationwide command of Air Corps bombardment, attack, and pursuit units. The advent of GHQ Air Force marked one of the first decisive steps on the road to the birth of a separate air service. Nevertheless, likely due to his personal modesty and untimely death in a B-24 crash in May 1943, while commanding the European Theater of Operations, he has been a background figure in our history. General George C. Marshall, wartime Chief of Staff of the Army, captured the magnitude of his tragic loss to the Allied war effort by characterizing Andrews as one of the nation’s “few great captains.”

As we celebrate the Centennial of Flight, I’d like to encourage the use of upcoming venues to spread the word about lesser-known, selfless warriors, such as General Andrews, who epitomize the values we highlight to airmen today. On March 7, 2003, we formally named the Air Combat Command headquarters building after General Andrews. We are also close to establishing an endowed scholarship fund in his memory for Air Force Academy Preparatory School Cadets and creation of a permanent “Andrews” exhibit in the USAF Museum at Wright-Patterson AFB. Additionally, we plan to integrate his story into our professional military education programs.

Memorializing General Andrews is one example of how we can commemorate the Centennial of Flight, emphasizing the tremendous impact an individual’s efforts and contributions can have on aviation and the Air Force. Thank you for your support of this important project for aviation, the United States Air Force, and our nation.

JOHN P. JUMPER
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Frank M. Andrews: Marshall’s Airman

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In war nothing is so commonplace as sudden death. But when the victim is a high-ranking officer of recognized brilliance, his loss can be shattering and the ironies of what could have been linger amidst the engulfing emptiness of unfulfilled promise. So it was on the afternoon of May 3, 1943, when the B–24 Liberator in which Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews was flying crashed against a fog-shrouded promontory while making a landing approach to Meeks Field near Keflavik, Iceland. Andrews was commanding general of all U.S. forces in the newly formed European Theater of Operations (ETO). He had held his post for just three months, having arrived in England on February 4, the day after his fifty-ninth birthday. The decision to transfer him from his command of U.S. Middle East Forces had been approved by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Casablanca Conference in January.

It was U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall who had summoned Andrews to the conference from Andrews’s headquarters in Cairo, Egypt. Privately, however, Marshall had previously informed Andrews of what was afoot, for between them lay a tacit bond of understanding and mutual appreciation that dated back to their first meeting in August 1938. At that time, Andrews was a temporary major general in his third year as Commander of General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force, the combat arm of the Army Air Corps that had been established in 1935. Marshall, a permanent brigadier general who had once served as chief of staff to Andrews’s father-in-law, Maj. Gen. Henry T. Allen, had just been appointed head of the Army General Staff’s War Plans Division (WPD).
Andrews, in that last summer of European peace, was having a difficult struggle, trying to prevail on Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring and War Department leaders to build up the country’s air strength. In confidence, Andrews had told Eugene Meyer, publisher of *The Washington Post*, that every major country in the world was better prepared than the United States to defend itself. Helping to prove the point, Secretary Woodring had decided to cancel any further production of the Flying Fortress, the Boeing B–17, around which Andrews was determined to establish U.S. air supremacy.

What Andrews confided to Meyer, he told Marshall in far greater detail when the new Chief of WPD spent a day with him at Langley Field, Virginia, GHQ Air Force headquarters. Following their initial get-together, Marshall wrote his host: “I think I learned quite a bit about the problem and will look forward to some further meetings when I have better coordinated my thoughts with the information available . . . .” The further meetings quickly followed. Andrews invited Marshall to accompany him on a comprehensive nine-day inspection of the GHQ Air Force and aircraft production facilities. No ground officer in such a high level and important post had ever been given a more complete tour, and no airman was better equipped to play host than Andrews.

They traveled aboard Andrews’s Douglas DC-2, with Andrews often at the controls and Marshall riding in the copilot’s seat. What Andrews introduced Marshall to in their coast-to-coast sweep was an eye-opener for the fifty-eight-year-old War Plans Chief. The production, servicing, training, and quality of an air force could not be achieved with the same equations that were used for ground forces. It was an axiom few ground officers had ever understood. As Andrews put it:

> If it takes three months to train an artilleryman and ten months to build a cannon, then you have got to have a reserve of cannon. But when it takes a year to build an airplane and up to three years to train
the crews to operate and maintain that airplane, then there is not quite such a big argument for a reserve of airplanes, particularly where aeronautical advancement in types is as rapid as it is today. We cannot afford to equip the air force of tomorrow with the airplanes of yesterday.

What Andrews had to say about air power and the potential of its strategic use with the B–17, his position on the need for air independence from War Department control, and what he believed must be done in all these areas, was also of prime interest to Marshall. He listened, he observed, he asked questions. The journey and its impact—air maneuvers to air depots, experimental aircraft design to outdated operational models—was a unique experience for Marshall. In retrospect, there is little doubt that Andrews’s career was to be directly affected by it while Marshall’s understanding and appreciation of air power was strongly influenced.

An astute judge of character, Marshall obviously came away impressed by the clarity of Andrews’s thought and the genial yet firm assurance of the airman’s manner. Both came from southern backgrounds. Andrews was born in Nashville, Tennessee, on February 3, 1884, and though Marshall was born in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, on December 31, 1880, he had graduated from Virginia Military Institute in 1901. Marshall was reserved and outwardly cool by nature, his sense of humor well concealed; Andrews’s warmth was nicely balanced by his directness and the quality of his intellect. Both men shared an inbred, old-world courtesy. Andrews’s deft touch in seeing to it that his guest, wearing one less star than Andrews, was shown the deference and respect of a senior at all their stops could not have been lost on Marshall.

When the tour was over, Marshall wrote to his old mentor, Gen. John J. Pershing, expressing his enthusiasm, describing the itinerary, and remarking: “Altogether I had a most interesting trip professionally and a most magnificent one personally.” To Andrews he declared: “I want to thank you again . . . for the splendid trip you gave me, and especially for your personal efforts to make it a pleasant one and highly instructive. I enjoyed every minute of the trip and my association with you, and I really think I acquired a fair picture of military air activities in general. A little study will help me to digest something of all I saw... With warm regards.”

What Marshall was looking for was an orderly plan by which the country’s defenses could be built, with the focus on production and training. No such plan existed, and he appreciated having the benefit of Andrews’s thoughts, particularly as they applied to the lack of a realistic program for building U.S. air power.

Three and a half years earlier, in December 1934, another Army officer of equal stature had directly influenced Andrews’s career. The officer was Chief of Staff Gen. Douglas MacArthur. The two had not flown anywhere together, but MacArthur selected Andrews to command the airmen’s long-sought GHQ Air Force. MacArthur never offered a public explanation for his choice of Andrews for this most important of air commands. But a quick look at some of Andrews’s
previous activities offers insight into the forward reach of his thinking at a time when the military was economically and strategically constrained, locked into the rigidity of the status quo.

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Shortly after MacArthur was appointed Army Chief of Staff in November 1930, Andrews developed an intense interest in instrument flying. It had been aroused by the Mount Shasta affair of 1931, in which he had been a principal planner and organizer while serving as Chief of Training and Operations (G-3) in Air Corps Chief Maj. Gen. James Fechet’s office. This was a Billy Mitchell-type test in which bombers of the 2d Group, led by Maj. Herbert A. Dargue, would fly out to sea from their base at Langley Field and sink the Mount Shasta, an old freighter. After two days of searching in bad weather, the bombers finally located the ship and scored one hit out of forty-two bombs dropped. Navy guns sank the target, much to the chagrin of the airmen. The claim that the Air Corps was capable of defending U.S. coastal waters took a beating. Andrews, not looking for excuses, weighed the causes of failure and arranged to take the three-week instrument training course, inadequate at best, at the Advanced Flight School, Kelly Field, Texas.

A year later he got permission from Air Corps Chief Maj. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois to publicize air mobility by making an epic journey. He led a flight of
five aircraft from San Antonio, Texas, to France Field in the Panama Canal Zone. Previously, Andrews had flown coast to coast numerous times in everything from DH-4s to the new all-metal Northrop Alpha, but the long operation of shepherding antiquated Keystone bombers and a pair of Douglas amphibians on a 2,200-mile jaunt down through Central America stimulated ideas on all-weather flying.

In June 1933, Andrews graduated from the Army War College and was assigned to command the 1st Pursuit Group at Selfridge Field near Detroit, Michigan. He was resolved to eradicate the belief of most pursuit pilots that when the weather was bad you did not fly if you could avoid it. At Selfridge, he found there was not a single gyro compass or gyro horizon-standard equipment on commercial aircraft-amongst the planes of his three squadrons. His letters to the chief’s office brought no direct response. Close friends in the Materiel Division at Wright Field told him that orders from above were to not parcel out the gyros because they were in such short supply and must be held against the far distant day when new aircraft would be coming off the line.

Although Andrews made very little progress in establishing an instrument program at Selfridge, Foulois did set up two small “aviation” schools at Langley and at Rockwell Field, California, in the fall of 1933. Brig. Gen. Oscar Westover, Assistant Chief of the Air Corps, was a prime mover in that development. He and Andrews had been classmates at West Point, and through him, Andrews’s letters may have had an effect. Andrews knew only too well that inadequate instrument training was dictated as much by the War Department attitude as by lack of funds.

Immediately after Andrews arrived at Selfridge, an event occurred that strongly reinforced his thinking about instrument flying, logistics, and navigation. He became host at an internationally publicized aviation venture. In July 1933, Italian Air Marshal Italo Balbo led a flight of twenty-four twin engine Savoia Marchetti torpedo bombers on a 6,000-mile flight from Orbetello, Italy, to North American cities. Andrews led two squadrons of the 1st Pursuit Group to greet the Italian flyers in the air as they crossed the U.S.-Canadian border near Detroit and to escort them to a landing at Chicago’s World Fair.

The colorful Italian air marshal went on to a presidential welcome at the White House, completing the longest mass flight in aviation history. The War Department classed the undertaking as an aerial stunt with little military meaning, but Andrews, and most airmen, recognized the obvious significance of the mission. Balbo and his men had clearly demonstrated that with proper aeronautical equipment and training, airmen-soon would be able to fly long distances in adverse weather to reach any adversary’s industrial heartland. If the War Department failed to recognize what military leaders of other countries foresaw, U.S. air power could not. keep pace. Andrews was determined to see that this did not happen.

It was several months after the Balbo flight, in October 1933, that the Drum Board, appointed by MacArthur and named for its chairman, Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, endorsed creating a consolidated combat air arm, the GHQ Air
Force. While reaffirming the Air Corps’ mandate of coastal defense, this fell short of Air Corps’ aspirations for greater independence from War Department control. The only airman on the five-man board was Foulois. The others were ground-bound General Staff officers whose view of air power and its potential was fixed not so much on the sky as on the trench. Further, the Drum Board scoffed at the meaning of the Balbo epic, and to Andrews and other like-minded airmen the message was clear. The Air Corps would never realize its potential until it gained independence.

There was nothing new in the belief, nor in the concept of a combat arm for the Air Corps. It had been forced into being by political circumstances rather than War Department willingness to accept a long-sought military necessity. The plan for an air force with its own command and staff within the Army Air Corps had first been proposed in 1923 by the Lassiter Board (named for its chief, Brig. Gen. William Lassiter), that examined the role of U.S. military aviation. The board recommended that while the main purpose of an air arm was to directly support the ground forces, some units not so engaged could be used against other targets as a separate strike force. The idea had originated with Col. Edgar S. Gorrell during World War I and was tried out with considerable success by Billy Mitchell against the Germans in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne campaigns in 1918. Five years later, the Lassiter Board approved assembling such a peace-time force, but it took more than a decade and a gaggle of additional boards before MacArthur gave his blessing. This was not so much a blessing as a recognition that the War Department was caught between fractious congressional demands supporting a separate air force and the War Department securing a coastal defense mission for the Air Corps over Navy objections.

When, by the end of the year, nothing had been done to implement the Drum Board’s recommendations establishing a GHQ Air Force, the impatience of those who believed that a separate air force was imperative grew, and with it a determination to make a new bid for independence. Such a bid must come through congressional action, and Selfridge Field in Michigan was somewhat far afield to exert political influence. Yet Andrews did. His ability to do so was fostered by his good friend., Lt. Col. Walter H. Weaver, who was serving on Foulois’s staff as G-2, Chief of Information. Their friendship dated back to West Point days. They corresponded frequently, and Weaver’s letters reflected the general spirit of insurrection within the chief’s office. Associates such as Maj. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz and Capts. George C. Kenney and Robert Olds had had their fill of what they saw as War Department stultification and were determined to risk whatever was necessary to get free of it.

Weaver sent an advisory to this effect not only to Andrews but also to Lt. Col. Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, commanding at March Field; to Maj. Hugh J. Knerr, Chief of the Field Service Section in the Engineering Branch at Wright Field; and to Lt. Col. Horace M. Hickam, commanding the 3d Attack Group at Fort Crockett, Texas. Weaver declared that the Air Corps was “in a rather crucial position. I don’t know if anyone is going to help it unless we do something for ourselves.”
The “doing something” would be to draft a bill for independence and put it in the hands of a congressman powerful and persuasive enough to hold open hearings. At the hearings, a host of airmen would testify and support the bill’s passage. In the midst of a shattering depression and an unsympathetic administration, it hardly seemed likely that many congressmen or much of the public would be interested in creating a new branch of the service. But the airmen had a champion in Congressman John J. McSwain of South Carolina, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. The War Department saw him as a threat; Benny Foulois’s conspirators regarded him as a friend.

Weaver was welcome in the upper social circles of the military hierarchy, his father having risen to command the Coast Artillery. Through such association, he had come to know McSwain. Since the congressman had never met Andrews, but suddenly made a special flight to Selfridge Field in January 1934 to spend a weekend at the Andrews’s home, there is little doubt that the meeting had been arranged by Weaver.

The first thing McSwain did upon arriving back at the Capital was to write Andrews a letter of appreciation and thanks. On February 2, 1934, directly after his visit to Selfridge, McSwain threw the War Department into a tailspin by offering a bill to his committee that embodied everything separate air force proponents were seeking. Just the day before, the War Department had placed before McSwain its long overdue recommendation that incorporated the creation of a GHQ air force. But it failed to include any of the burning wants of the airmen, such as a separate promotion list. Some could see in the McSwain bill a counter-demand aimed at forcing more concessions from the General Staff, knowing full well the bill itself would never pass. MacArthur, who referred privately to the Military Affairs Chairman as “McSwine,” was not inclined to offer anything further, and it appeared that a battle royal was in the making. At that moment the entire issue was overshadowed and held in check by an unexpected event.

On February 9, 1934, through a piece of political misjudgment, President Roosevelt stripped the commercial air carriers of their franchises to carry the mail and assigned the task to the Air Corps. Air Corps Chief Foulois had agreed that in ten days’ time he could have his planes equipped and ready to take on the specialized task of maintaining a major share of the nation’s airmail routes. There were three factors militating against the success of the Air Corps mission, which used the acronym AACMO-Army Air Corps Mail Operation: its ill-equipped aircraft, its pilots who were ill-trained for instrument flying, and the worst nationwide winter weather on record.

In the ten days between Roosevelt’s decision and the start of AACMO, Foulois, who had given considerable lip service to the need for instrument training but had been prevented by lack of funds from doing much about it, launched a frantic campaign to equip his planes with radios and rudimentary flight instruments, and to give the pilots some instrument training. It was too late. In March, Roosevelt was forced by a series of weather-related crashes to ground the operation for ten days.
As the winter weather abated and pilots gained experience in weather and night flying, the Air Corps’ performance improved. Nevertheless, the public generally, and the War Department and certain congressmen specifically, considered the 78-day AACMO a dismal failure. In truth, despite the loss of a dozen pilots and crewmen and 66 accidents, crews delivered more than 770,000 pounds of mail without losing a single letter and completed more than 65 percent of all scheduled flights.

During the airmail operation, Andrews continued to push for instrument equipment, but with little success. Thirty-eight of his sixty-two pilots were assigned to AACMO, among them Lts. Curtis E. Lemay, Earle E. Partridge, and Mark Bradley. The 1st Pursuit Group was so stripped of men and equipment that it no longer could be considered operational, but Andrews could take heart in the fact that during AACMO the Air Corps established its first blind flying school at Wright Field. Capt. Albert R Hegenberger, a pioneer along with Jimmy Doolittle in the development of military instrument flying, was the school’s first director.

The Air Corps’ improving performance after AACMO’s disastrous beginning did not dispel the outcry within the War Department and Congress for investigation of air preparedness. A new board was formed—the fifteenth in sixteen years—to be chaired by and named for former Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. It served the same old purpose: on the surface, to chart a course for the Air Corps, and beneath it, to assure that the course was not directed toward independence. It, like the Drum Board, whose members were a part of the Baker Board, was in favor of a GHQ air force.

On May 23, 1934, even before the Baker Board had made known its recommendations, Andrews was ordered to report to the War Department to chair a committee that was, he told his father, “to make recommendations on organization of the Air Corps for greater mobility.” Serving with him were such keen thinkers as Spaatz, Hickam, Knerr, and Kenney. Their work was completed by mid-June. What they had created was the organizational structure for a combat air arm.
Andrews learned in October that he was to return to Washington to serve in the War Department Operations and Training Section, G-3, charged with working out the tables of organization for a GHQ air force he and his committee had put together in June. In the two months that followed, he realized that his duties might well come to naught. Congressional hearings and board recommendations notwithstanding, the formation of a GHQ air force was in no way assured, since General MacArthur’s continuance as Army Chief of Staff was in doubt. Andrews saw that, without MacArthur’s determination, powerful elements within the faceless General Staff would see to it that the concept of an air force remained just that, smothered in words and grounded by committees. Fortunately, President Roosevelt stopped playing coy and let it be known that he wanted Douglas MacArthur to remain as Chief for another year.

Thereupon, the biggest question in town was who would command the nascent air force. Benny Foulois was out, in political trouble on all fronts. His assistant chief, General Westover, who had been AACMO’s titular commander, was considered a contender. So were some seventy other officers, many of them senior to Andrews. It was MacArthur alone who made the final decision to name Frank Andrews Commander of the GHQ Air Force with a two-grade promotion to brigadier general. That Andrews, a “heretofore obscure field officer,” as Time magazine put it, was selected was a tribute to his demonstrated ability as a commander and staff officer. It was also, to some degree, a result of fortuitous circumstances.

Following graduation from West Point in 1906, Frank Andrews had served eleven years as a cavalry officer in the Philippines, Hawaii, and the States. In 1917, he transferred to the Signal Corps for duty with the Aviation Division. Three years earlier, Andrews had married Josephine “Johnny” Allen, daughter of General Henry Allen, and had moved into the all-important social inner circle of the War Department, where his father-in-law was a power. Both Andrews and his wife also were champion polo players.

From August 1920 to February 1923, Andrews commanded the U.S. Army Air Service’s European air force of thirteen DH-4s under his highly popular father-in-law, who was in charge of all U.S. occupation forces in Germany. On his return to the States, Andrews spent four years at Kelly Field, Texas, in flight training assignments, followed by attendance at the Air Corps Tactical School, then at Langley Field, Virginia, and the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Since he was not in Washington when Billy Mitchell was fighting his battles of the 1920s, Andrews had never been considered one of “Mitchell’s Boys,” although he was a confidant of Mitchell after the latter’s resignation in 1926.

Deputy Chief of Staff Hugh Drum, in a letter to Newton Baker, explained the reasoning behind Andrews’s selection to head the GHQ Air Force: “We all feel he [Andrews] will be able to meet the situation and develop the force along the lines contemplated. Furthermore, in addition to being an efficient flyer, he has been in harmony with all the War Department has been trying to do.”
On March 1, 1935, Andrews officially assumed command of GHQ Air Force at Langley Field. Permitted to name his own principal staff, Andrews chose Majs. Hugh Knerr as his chief of staff; Harvey B. S. Burwell as G-1; Follett Bradley as G-2; Capt. George Kenney as G-3; and Maj. Joseph E. McNarney as G-4. All were vintage airmen; Bradley, Kenney, and McNarney combat veterans. Knerr, Bradley, and Kenney had long been strong independence advocates. Knerr was a bomber-first zealot, a stubborn visionary who not only foresaw but also played a direct role in developing the long-range bomber. Kenney’s three years at MIT helped to stimulate ideas that encompassed everything from aeronautical experimentation to correcting the translation from French to English of the strategic bombardment theories of Giulio Douhet. Bradley, like Knerr, was a graduate of Annapolis. He had taken his first airplane ride as an observer with pilot Lt. Hap Arnold in 1911. Most recently, he had hand-carried an air independence petition coast to coast getting the signatures of airmen who were in favor of a separate air force. Burwell had flown with the 1st Aero Squadron on the Mexican border in 1916. Later he served as operations officer for Andrews in Germany. McNarney, who commanded observation squadrons in France during the war, had written a book on air tactics and was well regarded in the War Department. Noted for the caliber of his intellect and the dourness of his manner, McNarney kept his own counsel on the issue of independence.

At the outset, independence became a moot question for Andrews. Calling the sixty-seven officers of his staff together, he said, in effect: This is the best we can get. Separation from the Army will come some day, but for now we have a five-year mandate to build a combat air force, and we are going to do that. We have three wings—the 1st at March Field, commanded by Brig. Gen. Hap Arnold; the 2d here at Langley, commanded by Brig. Gen. H. Conger Pratt; and the 3d at Barksdale, Louisiana, commanded by Col. Gerald Brant. We have a service test to prepare for in December. Let us get to it.

What they had to work with was considerably less than what had been recommended by the Drum and Baker Boards and approved by MacArthur. Instead of a force of 980 aircraft, Andrews had 446, with only 176 classed as modern. Instead of 1,245 pilots, he had less than half that number, and his enlisted strength was equally inadequate. But if the numbers did not add up, the spirit and professionalism to make the combat air force fly was fully there. There was enormous enthusiasm throughout the Air Corps for Andrews and for the new organization.

In those first few months of shakedown and preparation there was only one sour note, and it was sounded privately between Andrews and MacArthur. Prior to taking command, Andrews had testified in executive session before McSwain and his Military Affairs Committee. He had been asked questions concerning U.S. response to the very remote possibility of an attack by Canada, Great Britain, or France. He used as the basis of his answers War Department contin-
emergency plans for such an eventuality. Several weeks later, through not untypical carelessness, his testimony and that of War Plans Division Chief Brig. Gen. Charles E. Kilbourne were released to the press. The headline results embarrassed Roosevelt, who demanded of McSwain and Secretary of War George H. Dern that something be done to prevent such leaks. Dern agreed, and replied that the officers had given their private opinions, supposedly in secrecy.

Andrews explained that his testimony “represented views on an abstract military study with no concrete political thoughts or reference.” He believed that would be the end of it, in spite of outcries by peace groups calling for his and Kilbourne’s dismissal. Instead, he was stunned by a harsh letter of admonition from MacArthur. Certainly the Chief of Staff was fully aware of the circumstances surrounding the incident and knew that Andrews’s statements before the committee were given on the basis of War Department policy.

Andrews called on MacArthur, seeking an answer to what he believed to have been a mistake, and with the knowledge that the letter would become a part of his official record. He came away from the meeting angry and disappointed. MacArthur had brushed the admonition aside, telling Andrews to forget it. Andrews never would. Loyalty up-and-down was an inviolate principle. The fact that MacArthur had selected him as GHQ Air Force Commander made no difference.

Between the time of Andrews’s falling out with General MacArthur and his getting to know George Marshall some three years later, profound political and military changes were in progress on a global scale. There had been Italian
aggression against Ethiopia, Japanese aggression against China, and a border war between Russia and Japan. There was civil war in Spain in which the Fascist and Communist dictators were testing their weaponry. And in Europe, Hitler was expanding the boundaries of the Third Reich, annexing the Rhineland and Austria, with the Sudetenland and then all of Czechoslovakia threatened next. In all these moves the importance of air power had grown, particularly among the aggressors, and was recognized as a critical weapon in their military-political planning.

Such recognition was much slower within the Roosevelt administration. The reasons are well known: the President’s belief in the fleet, a policy of isola-
tionism which the public supported in the belief that Europe and Asia should be left to fight their own wars, the geography of oceans protecting the hemisphere from attack, and at root, a continuing failure within the War Department to understand fully or to accept the meaning of strategic air power.

Only in retrospect and with the above in mind is it possible to realize the towering importance of Andrews in his role as GHQ Air Force Commander. It was not so much a matter of the size of his command as it was his view on how the forces must be employed. Any air officer who had passed through the doors of the Air Corps Tactical School knew the doctrine of offensive strategic air power: defeat of an enemy by destroying his industrial capacity to wage war through long-range, high-altitude, precision daylight bombing. Andrews was in a position to translate doctrine into strategy and tactics, no matter the lack of understanding or the opposition in the War Department.

At Selfridge, Andrews had not been able to put through his plan for instrument flight training. At Langley the word went out that all pilots in the GHQ Air Force were to be instrument rated. And soon they were. Mobility was the action word. Instrument flying enlarged mobility as did ever-extending aircraft range, altitude, and speed. Somewhat providentially they coalesced in October 1935 with the production of the first long-range bomber worthy of the name—the four-engine Boeing B–17 Flying Fortress. And then with so much hanging in the balance, when the long-awaited aircraft was ready for competitive judging, it crashed on its maiden test flight at Wright Field. The result was that the Douglas B–18, a mediocre twin-engine plane with far less mobility, was selected to form the backbone of U.S. bomber power for the next five years.

Andrews, recognizing the severity of the loss, acted swiftly. With the support of Brig. Gen. Augustine W. Robins, Chief of the Materiel Division, and the approval of the new Air Corps Chief, Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover, he was able to gain reluctant War Department agreement to purchase thirteen of the big Boeings on an experimental basis.

The first of the B–17s was flown into Langley Field from Seattle, piloted by Maj. Barney Giles and a proud crew, on March 1, 1937. She was a sleek and majestic beauty in the eyes of the beholders. But by then Andrews realized that a modern air force worthy of the name could not be built within the existing command mold—a mold that placed GHQ Air Force and the Air Corps in a competitive, often acrimonious association, controlled by a War Department whose antiquated organizational structure acted as a ponderously held bridle on the need for change.

Secretly, with Hugh Knerr, Andrews had drafted a new bill for Congressman J. Mark Wilcox of Florida, a member of the House Military Affairs Committee who had long championed the concept of a separate air force. The Wilcox bill proposed “to create an Air Corps under the Secretary of War, to be known as the United States Air Corps.” As Andrews put it, “The bill would recognize air power as being on an equal footing with military and naval power… . The Chief of Aviation would be placed on an equal status under the Secretary of War with the Chief of Staff of the Army…”
When Army Chief of Staff Malin Craig sent Andrews a copy of the bill and asked for his comments, Andrews, with a perfectly straight face, wrote a detailed critique in support. Later, when Craig called him to talk about the bill, the Chief of Staff, with an equally straight face, admitted he had not taken the time to read it. Craig already knew that the President and powerful congressmen, not to mention the Secretary of War, were against even holding hearings on H.R. 3151. Voices crying out in the wilderness of fixed concepts are quickly silenced. If nothing else, Andrews’s attempt illustrated the change in his thinking. His desire and determination to seek mobility was horizontal as well as vertical.

Since the political and military emphasis was on defense, it was not possible to speak in terms of offense. But a bomber like the B–17 with a cruising speed of 230 miles an hour, a service ceiling of 25,000 feet, and a range of 2,200 miles, was obviously a defensive-offensive weapon of great promise. And while Secretary of War Woodring was calling, in 1938, for a balanced air arm with a promised 2,320 planes by June 1940, based on the belief that two or three smaller planes could be bought for the price of one large one, Andrews concentrated on building a strategic air force around the power and promise of the B–17. What he hoped to do was convince Westover and the War Department that over the next three years ninety-eight of the Boeings should be purchased, enough to equip his Air Force with two groups.

He demonstrated the B–17’s promise time and time again, in maneuvers and long-distance flights. For example, in August 1937, during war games with the Navy, the 2d Bomb Group’s B–17s, operating under almost impossible ground rules, sought out and soaked the USS Utah with water bombs 285 miles off the California coast. The Navy insisted that the outcome of these games be kept from the public. It was not.

Matters dealing with the promise of aircraft came to a head in May 1938. Conducting the largest aerial maneuvers on record, Andrews sent three of his B–17s out to sea some 700 miles in very stormy weather to intercept the Italian liner Rex, which represented an attacking task force. The photograph of two of the B–17s flying past the Rex, taken by Capt. George W. Goddard in the third bomber, made the front page of newspapers around the world. It sent a message to friends and to potential adversaries alike. The message bounced off the War Department, and Craig, instead of praising Andrews for the performance, informed him that henceforth his planes were not to venture more than a hundred miles off the coasts. When Andrews passed this order to Colonel Robert Olds, Commander of the 2d Bomb Group, Olds informed his crews that from now on all practice missions over open water would remain within the hundred-mile limit but courses would be plotted north and south.

The continuing effort by Andrews to augment the strength of his B–17s fell on deaf ears; cost and necessity were the principal barriers. When he let it be known that ultimately he wished to build his bomber strength to 244 B–17s, or one-quarter of his promised total while phasing out the inferior B–18, opponents began to refer jokingly to the Boeing as “Andrews’s folly.”

In a letter to Hugh Knerr, who had been transferred to Fort Sam Houston,
Andrews wrote: “The situation with reference to our strategic mission and the proper equipment with which to perform it, seems to be getting progressively worse, and we have no court of appeal that I can think of . . . .” Then came the August 1938 meeting with Marshall. The War Plans Division Chief, upon returning from his nine days of air power indoctrination, found that, indeed, the airmen had no real representation on the General Staff. He was to become Andrews’s court of appeal.

On October 18, 1938, Andrews sent Marshall congratulations on his becoming Deputy Chief of Staff. He enclosed a copy of a talk he had recently given at the War College, saying it expressed the views of practically the entire operating personnel of the Air Corps . . . [who] believe in a larger percentage of high performance, large capacity bombers . . . . In every test or exercise we have ever had . . . this plane stands out head and shoulders above any other type; yet for 1940 and 1941 our estimates do not include a single one. For the support of the Monroe Doctrine on the American Continent such a plane would be of inestimable value. In the control of three important defiles of the world, Singapore, the Mediterranean, and Panama . . . the large capacity plane is easily the outstanding weapon.

He continued in considerable detail: “. . . any program of increasing our air power that does not provide us with an increase of equipment, a practical personnel plan concurred in by the men who, in peace and war, are responsible for the operations, is a half-baked plan and will prove a disappointment when the emergency arises.”

Andrews then confessed with characteristic frankness,

I have only a few months [left] in this job of mine, and I will be glad to get out of it for, as it works out, I carry the responsibility and very
little authority. I don’t even know who my principal assistants are to be until their selection is announced. There is no future in it, and it is like sitting all the time on a powder keg. But in these few remaining months I hope to be included in the discussions and conferences on future plans and policies for the development of our air force… .

He was not included, possibly as a result of the meeting he had been invited to attend the previous month. On September 21, 1938, Air Corps Chief General Westover was killed in a crash at Burbank. The next day Andrews was asked by Army Chief of Staff Malin Craig to report to him in Washington. He found himself in a meeting with Craig and all the assistant chiefs. Craig informed him they were prepared to recommend to the President that Andrews succeed Westover on the condition that he stop trying to promote the B–17. Andrews politely refused to accept the condition, and a few days later it was announced that General Hap Arnold was to be the new Air Corps Chief, a choice Andrews and many other airmen hailed as an excellent one.

In view of his position, Andrews knew that when his tour of duty as GHQ Air Force Commander was up on March 1, 1939, his tenure would not be extended. He hoped that he would be assigned to head the Training Command, and if not that, the Air Corps Tactical School. Instead, with no prior warning, he was given the Billy Mitchell treatment: reduction in rank to his permanent grade of colonel and exile to Fort Sam Houston as District Air Officer. There can be no doubt that Secretary of War Woodring approved the action, whether he originated it or not. The last straw for Woodring had been a public declaration by Andrews at the National Aeronautic Association convention on January 16, 1939, that the U.S. was a sixth-rate air power. This made headlines across the country, just at the time Woodring was assuring the public of the nation’s aerial strength.

When Andy Andrews, wearing mufti, was given a farewell review at Langley, there were few dry eyes. The mail that flooded in, reflecting sorrow, anger, frustration, and praise for him, came from admirers high and low, military and civilian. Truth be known, Andrews was not all that downcast by the vindictive action. He was confident that his isolation would be of short duration, partly because he could see the direction of world events and partly, perhaps, because he knew that Marshall would not let him go to seed.

* * * * *

On July 1, 1939, George Marshall became Acting Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. His first move was a formidable one. He appointed as his new Assistant Chief of Staff for Training and Operations (G-3), Frank M. Andrews, promoting him to a brigadier general of the line. Later Marshall was to say that when he submitted his choice to Woodring, Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson, and outgoing Chief of Staff Malin Craig, he knew he had a fight on his hands. He added it was probably the only time in the trio’s association they had ever
been in full agreement on anything. Nevertheless, Marshall prevailed and the appointment was announced. It was the first time in U.S. military history that an airman had been appointed one of the four assistant chiefs of staff on the Army General Staff.

Andrews received word of it while on leave. The telegram recalling him was followed by a sustained roar of approval from airmen everywhere. Not since F. Trubee Davison had been Assistant Secretary of War for Air (1926-33) had an air officer felt there was anyone “up there” who knew what they were all about. As Andrews had said to Marshall in a previous letter: “Under our present scheme of organization the operating personnel have very little contact with the powers that be. We know our stuff, but we cannot get it across.” Now, thanks to the new Chief of Staff, the “stuff” was going to get across. With Marshall’s encouragement, Andrews would bring other air officers into G-3 with him. The point was not lost on anyone.

The fifteen months Andrews served as Army G-3 was a period of turmoil. In Europe the Allied and Axis powers went to war, and relations between the U.S. and Japan grew increasingly tense. Trying to build U.S. defenses in a strongly isolationist atmosphere produced political conflict and made increases in military strength difficult and slow. Andrews’s job of developing the method and policies of buildup covered all the component parts of the Army, not just the air, and measured against these demands were the military needs of England and France. It was a time of great effort and greater shortages.

Overall, U.S. policy went under the heading of Hemispheric Defense, and nowhere was this defense seen as more vulnerable than in the Panama Canal Zone. Military and naval shortages in the Zone were endemic. The President of Panama, Arnulfo Arias, was pro-Nazi. So were numerous military and political leaders of other Latin American countries; still others were on the fence. South
America was webbed with 20,000 miles of German-run airlines, some flying Junkers aircraft that could be converted quickly to bombers. There were large populations of German, Italian, and Japanese residents throughout Central and South America. French Guiana as well as the islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique were viewed as critical danger points following the fall of France. To further heighten White House concerns, British intelligence was working round-the-clock, anxious to create in Washington the fear of Nazi action in the hemisphere. Toward that end, the British sent Roosevelt a supposedly authentic secret German map, showing the Third Reich’s partitioning of South America.

The fall of France shook U.S. political and military leaders hard. In September 1940, the President revealed that fifty World War I destroyers had been turned over to the desperate British in return for permission to build bases on their Caribbean islands. In October, it was announced that Andrews would be going to Panama to command the newly established Panama Canal Air Force (PCAF).

When Andrews, now a major general, arrived in the Canal Zone in early December, just a year before Pearl Harbor, he saw air power as the backbone of both Canal and U.S. coastal defense. He thought he had a fairly good picture of the Zone’s existing air strength, but four months later he was writing Marshall, . . . you probably know that we do not have a modern combat air-plane in the entire area . . . . Fifty fighter airplanes, with an effective warning service and complete communications, could accomplish far more in the Canal defense than could five hundred such fighters, operating under present conditions. The warning service planned, with its communications, fails to meet our needs as does also the inter-airdrome communications.

This last involved a fundamental problem of which Marshall was acutely aware. The Commander of the Panama Canal Department, Lt. Gen. Daniel Van Voorhis, was a sixty-two-year-old artillery officer who believed an air force should be used as an adjunct to his artillery and not much else. It was Andrews’s job to convince him otherwise and to present a plan of air defense that would encompass the Canal Zone and the Caribbean basin, aiming toward what would eventually become a Caribbean Defense Command. Marshall knew this. Andrews knew this. But somehow Van Voorhis failed to get the message. He was senior in grade to Marshall. His view from Quarry Heights was fixed. Andrews’s plan was ignored. What Andrews had in mind was to divide the Caribbean into three regional commands—Panama, Trinidad, and Puerto Rico—each having its own bomber and interceptor forces, each commander having considerable freedom of action, with a central headquarters at Howard Field on the west side of the Isthmus.

The principal defense in Van Voorhis’s mind was to be built around coast artillery and antiaircraft units. In April 1941, Andrews was to write Marshall: “Drawing upon all the tact and diplomacy that I possess I feel that I have failed
to gain Van Voorhis’s complete confidence, consequently, I have made slow progress in selling him my ideas on the organization and operating of the Air Forces in the Caribbean .... Things seem to move so slowly and time is now a precious commodity.” Marshall knew how precious, and shortly thereafter Von Voorhis received direct orders from the War Department which jarred him into action. The PCAF became the Caribbean Air Force (CAF), and implementation of Andrews’s plan was begun in earnest.

That same month, Brig. Gen. Follett Bradley, who was in overall command of Andrews’s skimpy air units in Puerto Rico, was threatening to resign. Andrews flew to Puerto Rico to investigate the problem. The problem was Maj. Gen. Edmund L. “Mick” Daley, in command of the Puerto Rican Department. Daley, an engineer, had been a classmate of Andrews at West Point. Daley’s policy was that he commanded all CAF troops while they were on the ground, and Bradley and his staff had control only when the planes were airborne. This was not often, as Daley used the airmen for duties that had nothing to do with building air power. Andrews heard this from Bradley and several squadron commanders and then paid a call on Daley, accompanied by his aide, Lt. Hiette S. Williams, Jr. They were ushered into Daley’s vast office, which was furnished with a huge bare desk, a chair, and nothing else. When its owner made no effort to have chairs brought in for his guests, Williams left the room to find one for his CO.

Once Andrews was seated, he inquired mildly, “Mick, where is your paper work?”

“I don’t need any, Andy. I make all the decisions myself,” Daley said.

“How do you keep your staff informed?” Andrews asked.

“I don’t need a staff. I don’t trust them anyway.”
“What happened to the letter I wrote you? I never received an answer.” Andrews sounded matter-of-fact.

Daley opened a drawer in his desk, pawed around, and came up with the unanswered correspondence. After a few more questions and equally blase responses, Andrews signaled Williams to follow him out of the office. In the hall he instructed his aide: “Send this message to General Marshall. ‘Am relieving Daley this date. Future assignment immaterial.’” He then told Williams to transmit the message outside the normal traffic flow via a direct frequency from San Juan to the War Department.

The significance of Andrews’s unique summary action was twofold. Both men were major generals but Daley ranked Andrews on the permanent list. Although Andrews was Chief of the Caribbean Air Force, Daley was not under his command but took his orders from Van Voorhis. Yet Andrews relieved him. He could not have done so without authority from Marshall that outflanked the normal military chain of command. In a letter to Lt. Col. Thomas R. Philips, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence of the Puerto Rican Department, Andrews later wrote: “There is no question but that we have too many congealed minds in responsible positions and that one of our biggest problems is how to correct the existing situation and prevent recurrence in the future.” He added that General Marshall was both aware of and worried about the same problem.

During an important diplomatic venture in mid-July 1941, Andrews represented Marshall in making delicate state visits to Latin American capitals, principally Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro. While Andrews was in Rio, Marshall informed him he was to succeed Van Voorhis as Caribbean Defense Commander. With the appointment would come promotion to lieutenant general, the first airman to attain such a rank and the first airman to head a joint command. Amid a deluge of congratulatory messages came one from his wife, Johnny: “You’re the brightest star of them all,” she cabled. “What took you so long?”

In the last three months before Pearl Harbor, Andrews continued to convert the Caribbean into an “American lake.” From the time of his arrival in the Canal Zone Andrews had adopted the belief that war could come at any time, and he impressed the same awareness on all who served with him. He knew that in time, if there was time, all the shortages would be filled; that his organizational structure for the Caribbean was sound and workable. His most serious doubt was the role of the Navy in an area that was largely water but where his own land and air forces, slim as they were, dominated. It all came down to the issue of unity of command and the old sore point of who was in charge beyond land’s end. The point was never really resolved before the war came.

In December 1941, Andrews was sent the same alerts from the War Department as commanders in Hawaii and the Philippines, but his airmen had their planes camouflaged and dispersed on outlying jungle strips. When war did come, Andrews’s forces were as prepared as they could be under circumstances that left much to be desired: one radar station on the western side of the Canal, a half-dozen B–17s his total heavy bomber strength.
With Pearl Harbor, all attention in Washington was focused on the Pacific. But until the Battle of Midway in June 1942, the Caribbean, generally, and the Canal, particularly, were considered a critical theater of operations where enemy action was anticipated momentarily.

Following the Battle of Midway, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson visited Andrews and returned to Washington tremendously impressed with the Caribbean defenses and their commander. Shortly thereafter, Andrews was summoned by Marshall to report to the War Department for a talk. Part of what the talk was about jolted Andrews; in fact, angered him. MacArthur had informed the War Department and Hap Arnold that he was not satisfied with the performance of his principal airman, Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, and wanted a replacement. He suggested Andrews for the job. Ordinarily such a request would have brought a quick rejection because Andrews, like MacArthur, was a theater commander, and to come under MacArthur in any guise would be a step down the ladder of command. But these were not ordinary times. The war was in a swirling state of flux, Axis power at its high tide mark, Allied strategy not fully formulated or agreed upon and still badly lacking in necessary forces and equipment. Even so, it does not seem likely that Marshall would have wanted to shift Andrews to the Pacific unless he felt Andrews might be willing to accept the challenge to develop MacArthur's air power against Japan. Andrews said no to the offer and shortly thereafter returned to his Caribbean Command.

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When Andrews came again to Washington on October 20, 1942, he knew the purpose was for reassignment. But this time he arrived with a purpose of his own. Through his longtime friend and confidant, Hugh Knerr, who had retired from the Army and was working for Sperry Gyroscope, he had learned that a move was afoot to make the Army Air Forces that had been formed in June 1941 into a separate air force. He was disturbed by what he judged to be the mismanagement of air power at a crucial moment. Through Walter Weaver, he had been trying to get his opinions put before Roosevelt. The point of contact at the White House was the President's military aide, Maj. Gen. Edwin “Pa” Watson. Watson, however, warned Andrews that he was in danger of ruining his career if he persisted. FDR was dead set against any moves that did not come as a united recommendation from the top. Andrews was too astute to gamble on such a contentious position at such a time. He backed off, willing to accept the present arrangement because of Marshall.

The Chief of Staff had more immediate considerations on his mind, and he had again chosen Andrews to play a major role in them. Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa, was to be carried out principally by U.S. forces, its purpose to secure Tunisia and the Magreb while the British, driving westward out of Egypt, attacked Rommel’s Afrika Korps. Egypt was to be the eastward anchor in the nutcracker operation. U.S. units in the area, which encompassed the Levant, the Nile Delta, Eritrea, and Iran, were largely air and included four heavy bomb
Advocates of continued daylight bombing included (*above*): Ira Eaker, and (*right*): Carl Spaatz (left) and Hap Arnold.
groups and a scattering of service commands. The idea was to combine them all under one command—U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East, USAFIME. Marshall, with the Joint Chiefs’ approval, wanted Andrews to take over the disparate organizations, which were suffering from a lack of cooperation, unify them to support the British Eighth Army, and then use the bombers against Italian and Balkan targets. Additionally, he was to assist in improving the flow of U.S. equipment to the Russians via the Persian Gulf.

On October 30, two days after Gen. Bernard Montgomery launched his attack against Rommel and a week before U.S. forces went ashore in North Africa, Andrews took off for the last time from his Caribbean headquarters and for the first time in a B–24, heading for Cairo, Egypt. The plane was a B–24D, specially equipped with BTO, a newly developed radar device for bombing through the overcast at low level.

While he had served in the Caribbean for nearly two years, Andrews’s command of USAFIME was extremely brief, lasting only three months. In that short time he brought cohesion to the widely spaced service units under his control. Two weeks after his arrival he wrote Marshall a detailed account of his progress: no unity of command amongst the British but fine cooperation nonetheless. As to the future: “I am working now on some plans for the use of our bombardment when we get the Axis out of Africa. Now, of course, everything is devoted to that objective. I hope soon to be able to make contact with

![Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews](image-url)
Eisenhower’s forces in West Africa with a view to some joint planning in the North African area . . . .” He hoped, he told Hap Arnold, to be able to use his bombers of the Ninth Air Force, under the command of Maj. Gen. Lewis Brereton, against strategic targets. He was anxious to have Brereton’s B–24s employed on night raids against Italian shipping and port facilities, using BTO. The problem was that Brereton had only two crews trained to operate the radar equipment, and the British were dead against its use lest it fall into enemy hands. If nothing else, Andrews’s desire to use his bombers for low-level bombing by night through the overcast indicated his openness and flexibility in the method of attack. Like George Kenney, Andrews was not married to a single concept of bombardment but was willing to use any technique that would get the job done. He was impatient to get the enemy out of Africa, he told Arnold. “We must have the whole north coast of Africa as one air theater . . . .”

To Marshall, Andrews sent a two-page memo, titled: Thoughts on Allied Nations European Strategy in 1943. He began: “It is assumed that we have as yet no definite overall plan for combined Allied military action for 1943. I feel free, therefore, to advance my own ideas with, however, no claim of originality for them.” He foresaw “two main practical lines of action.” One was “to build up a force in England to invade . . . the Continent of Europe as soon in 1943 as possible.” The other was to “implement an all-out air offensive against the Axis.” To this he added corollaries that included a Middle East offensive against the Aegean, hoping to bring Turkey into the war, an invasion of Italy, the establishment of air bases there to attack Germany, and the possibility of operations against Norway to protect the northern shipping route to Russia. Of the two plans, he came down on the side of the second.

At Casablanca, two weeks later, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would, in the course of their historic ten-day conference, adopt much of what was in the second option proposed by Andrews. Andrews’s thoughts on future strategy combined viewpoints from both sides of the conference table, where the U.S. chiefs felt they were being mouse-trapped by the more carefully prepared and unified British. Agreement was finally reached on all major issues, including the mounting of a combined USAAF-RAF bomber offensive against the Third Reich.

In this regard, until the meeting at Casablanca on January 15, 1943, Eisenhower, Arnold, and Spaatz had taken the oft-repeated position that the bombing efforts of the Eighth Air Force in England and the operations of the U.S. Army and Air Forces in North Africa were all a part of one theater and the same command. At the meeting on the 15th, Marshall announced that he felt the time had come to establish a separate European theater of operations in the United Kingdom. He was proposing that Frank Andrews command it. Eisenhower arrived at Casablanca that same day, was informed by Marshall of his wishes, and agreed to the change.

Aside from considerations of geography and an as yet unresolved military campaign, Marshall’s motivation for the change is clear enough. The British were dragging their feet on agreement for an invasion of Normandy. Marshall wanted a commander in London who had the qualities of leadership and administrative
ability necessary to direct a buildup toward that end. He also wanted an airman on a high enough level to keep the bomber offensive on track—someone who could cooperate with the British but not be swayed by their adroitness and charm. Perhaps the most intriguing point in the sudden shift was that Andrews knew it was coming even before he received a message from Marshall asking him to be in Casablanca within forty-eight hours.

At Casablanca, Andrews received official word of his new assignment and found he had an immediate problem. The continuance of daylight bombardment was in grave jeopardy. Prime Minister Winston Churchill had decided to convince FDR that the strategy was not working and should be dropped for RAF type night operations. Arnold, learning of the danger, had sent for Maj. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, Eighth Air Force Commander, and Spaatz to support him in what he saw as a very real threat to a doctrine that had been twenty years in the making. Now Andy Andrews had arrived. The four airmen could join forces to fight for a belief that was the warp and woof of U.S. air power.

Eaker spent a critical half-hour of debate with the Prime Minister. Arnold took a twilight stroll with him, dined with him, and stressed the need to continue daylight operations. Spaatz, who wanted to return to England to resume command of the Eighth Air Force, reiterated the U.S. position in a talk with Churchill. Present also were Churchill’s air leaders and Arnold.

Andrews met with the British leader and Air Chief Marshal Charles “Peter” Portal to discuss the directive under which he would be taking command in the ETO. He told the Prime Minister flatly that he felt the main issue before them was daylight versus night bombing, and that it would be a mistake to create a command organization that would force U.S. bombers into night operations. Churchill brought up his earlier talk with Eaker. Later he was to write that Eaker had “almost” convinced him, but there can be little doubt that the convincing was also done by Andrews, Arnold, and Spaatz, not to mention Churchill’s Air Marshals Portal and Slessor. Had it been otherwise, there is no telling how profoundly the war in Europe would have been affected. What can be said is that a crucial U.S. air victory was won at Casablanca, not against the enemy but against an Allied leader.

In the three months remaining to Andrews, he established himself in London and began the organizational and logistical buildup for what in sixteen months would become Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of occupied Europe. His most immediate concern, however, was Ira Eaker’s Eighth Air Force. The Eighth had been practically disembowled by the demands of air power for the invasion of North Africa. Due to the needs of seven other theaters and to shipping losses to U-boats, promised replacements of crews and aircraft were not forthcoming. Arnold’s endemic impatience was making life miserable for Eaker, whose bombers were few and whose losses were mounting. Andrews provided a bulwark and a calm, steady influence. He knew that in time the promised men and equipment would arrive. His letters to Marshall show that the problems in England were a repeat of those he had faced in the Caribbean and the Middle East: shortages of equipment and trained personnel and the uncertain exigencies of combined leadership.
In late April, Andrews dispatched Eaker to Washington to resell the Combined Bomber Offensive that had been agreed upon at Casablanca but was in trouble due to War Department critics and demands by the Navy. This was Andrews’s final action in the long battle to use air power as the principal strategic weapon in the Allied arsenal.

Andrews’s most distant command was in Iceland and he decided to go there to inspect the troops and evaluate the men in command. Just before he took off on May 3 with key members of his staff, he wrote a letter to his son, Lt. Allen Andrews. In it he said,

Our air buildup is coming along nicely now but we continue to have a tough time with our daylight bombing. It is quite evident that we have not yet found just exactly the right combination. We should grow better at a faster clip. I am looking for the answers, our losses are running too high. Leadership and experience are two of the troubles. We will work it out.

Tragically, there was no more time for him to work it out.

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There are those who believe that Andrews’s flight to Iceland was the intended first stop on a secret summons to Washington by Marshall. In view of the relationship between the two and the circumstances of the moment, the belief does not seem illogical. The Trident Conference was about to begin in Washington. Hap Arnold had suffered a heart attack and would not be able to attend. Many issues thought resolved at Casablanca were coming unstuck, not the least of which was the Combined Bomber Offensive. That Marshall would want Andrews present for matters dealing with the invasion buildup and the British refusal to be tied down to it, makes sense. Yet, there is no official record of such a recall, even though Andrews’s widow was left by Marshall with the impression that such was the case.

Andrews’s failure to land, as instructed by air traffic control at Prestwick, Scotland, before proceeding to Iceland, is seen by some as an indication of his haste to reach Washington, but by others as simply Andy Andrews, an instrument pilot who reveled in bad weather and who would use the prerogatives of his rank to override what he considered an unnecessary delay. It is known that had he lived he was soon to receive his fourth star. And so, at the end, a degree of mystery hangs over his departure. He had said that when the end came he hoped it would be in the cockpit, and he got his wish. Everyone else who knew him or served under him deeply mourned his loss.

Marshall, who delivered the eulogy at the memorial service for Andrews in Washington, said of him that he was one of the Army’s few great captains. To Johnny Andrews, Marshall had written: “He was a great leader and in his post abroad was on his way to rendering a tremendous service to the Allied cause.”
History does not reveal its alternatives, and Andrews’s sudden death leaves some haunting questions. Had he lived, would he have commanded the Normandy invasion, as so many of his contemporaries believed? Certainly Marshall had placed him in the position to oversee the buildup for that then-unresolved strategy. And what then? Whatever his future might have been, Andrews’s star was in swift ascendancy when it was snuffed out, and all the bright promise of tomorrow became reflections on the ordeals of yesterday, the yesterday of a military leader whose name will ever by joined with strategic air power and the fight for air independence.

DeWitt S. Copp

1916-1999

The name DeWitt Copp is known within the Air Force community primarily as the author of the widely acclaimed two volume series on the development of air power before and during World War II, A Few Great Captains and Forged in Fire, first published in the early 1980s by the Air Force Historical Foundation. Earlier, Mr. Copp, known as “Pete” to his friends, had served as a pilot in the Army Air Forces during World War II and afterwards wrote a number of books and films on military and civilian aviation.

A onetime history teacher and global newsman, he worked in Europe and the Far East as a correspondent for the Washington weekly Human Events, and for the North American Newspaper Alliance. His novels Radius of Action and The Far Side won wide acclaim here and abroad, and his drama, The Long Flight, was featured on NBC television. He also served for several years as a member of the former Air Force Historical Advisory Committee. He lived in Manchester Center, Vermont, with his wife Susan, until his death in 1999.
Note on Sources and Additional Readings

Author DeWitt S. Copp’s essay on “Andrews and Marshall” rests primarily on the research conducted for his book on the development of prewar U.S. air power, *A Few Great Captains*, (Doubleday, 1980), and the sequel on wartime strategy and air operations in Europe, *Forged in Fire* (Doubleday, 1982). Together, they provide a general reference and contain bibliographies and a limited number or source notes, the latter due to restrictions imposed by the publisher. The Air Force History and Museums Program reprinted the first title in paperback.

The two books are based on the author’s use of the Frank M. Andrews papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., and a corresponding collection in the Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, Tennessee, as well as a large number of oral history interviews with persons now deceased. Other manuscript materials he consulted were in the personal papers of numerous other airmen deposited in the Library of Congress and in the United States Air Force Academy Library’s Special Collections, as well as official documentation in RG 338, Modern History Field Branch of the National Archives. He also obtained materials from General Andrews’s son, Allen Andrews of Dayton, Ohio, and received oral and written information from the late Col. Hiette S. Williams, aide to Andrews at Langley and in the Canal Zone.


In 1986, General Andrews was enshrined in the National Aviation Hall of Fame in Dayton, Ohio. A detailed biographical sketch can be found on their web site: www.nationalaviation.org. In February 2002, Air Force magazine published an article on the influence of Andrews in the development of air power, which can be accessed on line at: www.afa.org/magazine/Feb2002/0202andrews.asp.