The Enlisted Experience

A Conversation with the Chief Master Sergeants Of the Air Force

edited and with an introduction by Janet R. Bednarek
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Air Force History and Museums Program
1995
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The enlisted experience: a conversation with the chief master sergeants of the air force / edited and with an introduction by Janet R. Bednarek.

p. cm. — (Special Studies)
Includes bibliographical references and index.

UG823.E53 1995
358.4'110973—dc20 93-42973
CIP

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328
ISBN 0-16-048692-0
Foreword

The Enlisted Experience: A Conversation with the Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force offers a vivid, candid, and highly personal account of military life by four of the first five Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force. Their recollections, captured in a 1987 interview at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C., cover a period of over thirty years—from the early 1940s to the late 1970s. The position of Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force (held by only ten individuals since its establishment in 1966) has given all enlisted service members a representative who has direct access to, and the ability to advise, the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force. It has also imparted to each of the interviewees broad and insightful perspectives on the issues discussed.

The careers of the Chief Master Sergeants and the experiences that shaped them reveal that throughout its brief but eventful history the U.S. Air Force has been able to rely completely on the competence, dedication, and absolute professionalism of its enlisted force. Again and again, this force has met the host of challenges that have confronted it at home and around the globe: It tirelessly maintained the aircraft and supported the air crews of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam; it integrated its ranks and welcomed women as equals into the workplace; it has obtained a better quality of life for its members and their families; and it has pursued increasingly demanding education and training programs in fast-changing social and technological service milieus.

The stories of the Chief Master Sergeants point to an essential fact: The service would be unable to carry out its missions successfully in a dangerous world without the genuine cooperation of a motivated enlisted corps. That the Air Force almost flawlessly achieved its objectives in Operation DESERT STORM is in no small measure the result of that corps’ tradition of striving and excellence.

RICHARD P. HALLION
Air Force Historian
Acknowledgments

Many people helped bring this work to completion. When I was first assigned it, I was new to the Air Force history program. Fortunately, I shared an office with Lt. Col. Vance Mitchell, USAF (Ret.). He generously acquainted me with the culture of the Air Force and the world in which the Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force have served. Mr. Bernard C. Nalty introduced me to the Marine Corps' archives and considerable holdings on the Korean War. Maj. William S. Borgiasz, USAF (Ret.), provided thorough explanations of Strategic Air Command's historic missions. Mr. Mark A. Grandstaff offered many critical reviews, and Messrs. William C. Heimdahl and Sheldon A. Goldberg helped me find my way into the voluminous files and microfiched documents at the Office of Air Force History, since redesignated the Air Force History and Museums Program.

Dr. Richard H. Kohn, then Chief, Office of Air Force History, conducted the interview and provided me with wonderful material. Once I completed my part of this work, I left it in the very capable hands of Ms. Mary Lee Jefferson, writer, editor, and researcher with the Air Force History Support Office. She further edited and ably shepherded it through the publication process. Mr. David Chenoweth helped acquire photographs. Mr. Nick Mostura of Headquarters Air Force Graphics then designed and executed the cover, portraits, and photographic layouts.

Finally, Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force Paul W. Airey, Donald L. Harlow, Thomas N. Barnes, and Robert D. Gaylor made this work possible. Not only did they give of their time for the initial interview, they also graciously offered, despite their busy schedules, any help I might need. As I read their stories and talked with them and found out what they had been doing since their retirements from the service, I was truly impressed by their dedication and professionalism. Their careers within and outside the Air Force are inspiring examples for today's enlisted force.

J.R.B.
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NCOs: Pride and Professionalism

The following interview with four of the first five Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force (CMSAF)—Paul W. Airey, CMSAF from 1967 to 1969; Donald L. Harlow, CMSAF from 1969 to 1971; Thomas N. Barnes, CMSAF from 1973 to 1977; and Robert D. Gaylor, CMSAF from 1977 to 1979—highlights clearly that, first, professionalism within the enlisted force, especially among non-commissioned officers (NCOs), has grown over the decades, and, second, that the environment in which the enlisted force serves has been and continues to be marked by dramatic technological, social, and Air Force policy changes.

Because the four subjects of this interview rose to serve in the highest position available to an enlisted member, a position which to-date only ten men have held, their careers were not typical of those of most Air Force non-commissioned officers.1 Their experiences with the Air Force began in the 1940s and stretched into the 1970s. Chiefs Airey and Harlow both served with the Army Air Forces (AAF) during World War II. Chief Airey spent time in a German prisoner of war (POW) camp during the war; Chief Barnes participated in one of the last segregated basic training flights in 1949.2 Although their stories may not reflect life within the Air Force's enlisted ranks at the dawn of the 1990s, they do illuminate much of the history and heritage surrounding the ranks since 1940.

"Profession" and "professionalism" have been controversial words when applied to the military context. Over the years sociologists, political scientists, and historians, among others, have interpreted them quite


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differently. Political scientist Samuel Huntington and sociologist Morris Janowitz, for example, have defined them rather narrowly; to them military professionals are primarily "managers of violence." They failed, however, to take into account changes over time in technology, in military education, and in the roles and responsibilities of officers and enlisted personnel. Historian Allan Millett, by contrast, has allowed for these changes, defining his terms more broadly. To him, a profession involves specialized education, self-regulation, life-long commitment, and a great deal of autonomy. All three scholars agreed, though, that a profession exhibits, in general, three characteristics—expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.

Professionalism, in Millett's terms, clearly has been a significant trend among America's working people, military as well as civilian, during the past century. Doctors and lawyers professionalized to an extremely high degree very early, but specialists in other areas—education, health care, financial management—have raised their level of professionalism over the last generation.

The NCO corps of the Air Force has done likewise over the last thirty to forty years, although perhaps not as much as has the officer corps. Certainly the careers of the four men interviewed, weighed according to Millett's criteria, demonstrate strongly that non-commissioned officers (especially in the top three grades) have become increasingly professionalized since World War II.

A career in the Air Force is "a full-time and stable job, serving continuing societal needs" and those who serve for twenty to thirty years regard it as a life-long calling. During the interview it was obvious that the retired Chief Master Sergeants were proud of their achievements and identified themselves strongly as NCOs whose roles differed decidedly from those of officers. Since the advent of the All-Volunteer Force in 1974, it can be argued that enlisted members who have chosen a career in the Air Force have done so, at least in part, out of a desire to serve.

NCOs' jobs reflect their ranks. What holds true for officers holds true for NCOs, that "rank inheres in the individual and reflects his professional

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4Huntington and Janowitz wrote their seminal works over thirty years ago. Although Huntington mentioned land, sea, and air officers, he drew his examples in stressing his points from only the Army and the Navy.

achievement measured in terms of experience, seniority, education, and ability. Although NCOs, unlike officers, are not required to hold a college degree, they are better educated than in the past and are expected to complete several levels of military education, acquiring both technical and managerial skills as prerequisites to advancement.

Although complete statistics for the period since World War II were not available, the trend has been toward a more highly educated enlisted force. From the 1940s on, the AAF and the Air Force received a large proportion of the most highly qualified young men and women available for service. The percentage of the enlisted force holding a high school diploma grew and generally stood significantly higher than that of the Army and the Navy. Senior NCOs, especially, witnessed a growing percentage of individuals among their ranks who had attended college. In the mid-1950s, 4.4 percent of all enlisted personnel had completed two years or more of college and 9 percent had graduated. By 1980, 5.2 percent had completed two years or more of college and 2.1 percent had graduated.

Beyond these more traditional measures, the continuing professional military education offered enlisted personnel has also grown. Recognizing that NCOs needed more than just their stripes to serve as effective leaders, the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and then the Strategic Air Command (SAC) opened the first NCO Academies to prepare their sergeants for greater responsibility. The first NCO Academy on record opened in 1950 in Wiesbaden, Germany. General John K. Cannon, Commander-in-Chief, USAFE, ordered it established to improve NCO leadership and management skills. The school closed in March 1951. SAC began a more sustained educational effort and in November 1952 opened its first academy in West Drayton, England. Other commands soon followed SAC's example.

NCO Academy curricula have changed over the years. In 1955 the Second Air Force's NCO Academy offered "ten hours of Military Management (Organization Phase), twelve hours of Military Instructor Training, twenty-two hours of Speech, and ten hours of Problem Solving" out of a

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6 Huntington, pp. 16–17.

7 The Department of Defense has published a series of Selected Manpower Statistics. These annual volumes contain information concerning, among other things, the educational levels of the enlisted force. Information dates back only to the mid-1950s. For a sense of change over time see volumes for 1958, 1969, and 1980.

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total of 265 hours. In 1958 its major subjects were World Affairs, Air Force History, Communicative Skills; Supervision and Management; Human Relations and Leadership; Drill and Ceremonies; Military Customs, Courtesy, and Protocol; Physical Training and Conditioning; Training; and Military Justice. By 1976 the academy’s curriculum was being built around four major areas: communicative skills, the military environment, military management, and electives. In the 1990s the academy had expanded its course of study to include the Code of Conduct, National Security, the Role of the NCO Manager, Leadership and Management for the Manager, and Substance Abuse and Human Relations Issues.9

As those serving in the “top three” enlisted ranks (master sergeant, senior master sergeant, and chief master sergeant) began to take on more duties in leadership and management, the Air Force responded with the opening of a Senior NCO Academy at Gunter Air Force Station in Montgomery, Alabama.10 The academy’s current curriculum includes instruction in Military Professionalism, Leadership Planning, Civil Service Personnel Management, Executive Decision Making, and Organizational Management.11

The Air Force also offers its enlisted members other opportunities for professional development. The Extension Course Institute, established in 1950, provides correspondence programs. Its nearly 400 listings include professional military education courses that closely parallel those offered at the NCO Academies. The Air Force founded the Community College of the Air Force in 1972. It offers two-year degree programs to “broaden the non-commissioned officer as a technician, manager and citizen.” Its graduates must complete not only technical course requirements but general education and management course requirements as well.12

A better educated enlisted force has emerged to fill the Air Force’s need for greater skills and leadership throughout its organization. NCOs perform tasks in more than forty career fields as widely varied as aircrew operations and protection; visual information; logistics planning; paralegal services; personnel; morale, welfare, and recreation; and education and

12Fact Sheet, United States Air Force, Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs, subj: Extension Course Institute, No. 87–42; Fact Sheet, United States Air Force, Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs, subj: Community College of the Air Force, No. 86–1.
training. The many missions performed by NCOs demand both technical and "people" skills, essential in the day-to-day operations of the service.

The Air Force's recognition of the importance of human relations skills sharpened gradually over the decades, becoming vital during the turbulent 1960s and 1970s when "people" and "quality of life" issues first came dramatically to the forefront. Beginning in 1971, for example, Chief Robert Gayler spent six years teaching management and leadership to NCOs throughout the service.

Growing Expertise

Computers and increasingly sophisticated aircraft and other weapon systems necessarily pushed the enlisted force to develop ever more complex technical skills. The days of the legendary World War II-vintage crew chief who kept his bombers and fighters in the air with a measure of skill, intuition, and a healthy dose of elbow grease, and who often improvised when needed parts failed to materialize, have for the most part long since passed (although Air Force NCOs during Operation DESERT STORM proved themselves just as able to innovate as their predecessors of the 1940s). Today's hardware demands highly skilled, highly specialized technicians. They, in turn, depend on the support of a host of individuals who know how to manage information and keep supplies and personnel flowing.

Although it is difficult to determine which came first—growing expertise or increased responsibility—both have shaped the evolution of the NCO corps over the last decades. The Air Force's usually higher percentage of officers in comparison with the other services sparked complaints early on that officers were doing work that could and should have been done by NCOs. Over the last two decades, however, many more challenging new positions have opened up to enlisted members. In these positions NCOs have been more than the traditional "top kick" or First Sergeant or the Non-Commissioned Officer In Charge (NCOIC).

In 1970 the Air Force established Senior Enlisted Advisors within the various commands. An NCO now serves as commandant of the Senior NCO Academy and all eighteen Major Command (MAJCOM) NCO Academies. In 1966 the Air Force, under pressure from Congress, followed

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14 Senior Enlisted Advisors are generally senior NCOs chosen as advisors to commanders primarily on enlisted matters.
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the Marine Corps' example and created a new billet whose occupant was responsible for advising the Chief of Staff on all matters affecting the enlisted force. In the Marine Corps this individual is known as the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps; in the Army, the Sergeant Major of the Army; in the Navy, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy; and in the Air Force, the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force.

In 1961, in the spirit of corporateness and with pride as the holders of special and highly developed skills, the Air Force's NCOs founded their own professional organization, known as the Air Force Sergeants Association (AFSA). The AFSA is open to all active duty and retired enlisted members of the Air Force, Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve. Over the years this organization has become a strong and vocal advocate for the rights and entitlements of Air Force enlisted personnel, especially in the halls of Congress. In addition, the organization publishes its own magazine, administers a scholarship program, conducts seminars to aid individuals in making the transition from military to civilian life, and works to develop a museum dedicated to the heritage of the Air Force enlisted force.

Along with growing professionalism, an environment of significant, often turbulent, change influenced the experiences of everyone who served in the Air Force over the past four decades. In the decades of technological revolution, jets replaced propellers, computers and hand-held calculators replaced typewriters and slide rules, and advances in telecommunications made instantaneous worldwide communications a reality. Society, as well, went through a series of near revolutionary changes—the civil rights movement, the antiwar, antimilitary sentiments of the Vietnam era, and the women's movement. All of these made their marks on the armed services.

When Chief Paul Airey entered the Army Air Corps, the most sophisticated air weapon was the four-engine, propeller-driven heavy bomber, the B-17, and its most technologically innovative component was the Norden bombsight. Over the course of his career the Air Force acquired an all-jet force, missiles capable of delivering their payload half a world away, and a mission in space. Within a decade of his retirement in 1970, the Air Force began experimenting with new stealth technology that promised to enhance survivability and mission accomplishment in a way that those who flew the B-17s could scarcely have imagined.

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16 Air Force Sergeants Association, "Fact Sheet, September 1989" (International Headquarters, P.O. Box 50, Temple Hills, Maryland).
As generation after generation of weapon systems came on the scene, the Air Force technicians responsible for maintenance and repair were compelled to augment their skills through constant training and retraining. They proved willing and able to adapt to new technologies. Chief Thomas Barnes flew as a flight engineer on aircraft as varied as the B–25, C–47, and B–52. He also served on the maintenance crew of an F–4. The computer touched virtually every job and everyone in the Air Force during the past two decades. Old methods of writing and record keeping had to be adjusted by new specialists to the new tool. Computer literacy became a must.

Spectacular technological changes were more than matched in scope by dramatic social changes sweeping through America. The civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, and the women’s movement particularly affected the armed services, each of which was forced to reflect on and reform many long-standing policies.

The armed forces were formally integrated during the late 1940s and early 1950s. The Air Force had already started to break down racial barriers when President Harry S. Truman signed Executive Order 9981 in 1948, and signaled the end of segregation within the military establishment. By most accounts, despite some unpleasant incidents, integration by the Air Force proceeded fairly smoothly. Many officers and enlisted personnel employed tactics later adopted by civil rights advocates when they insisted that local businesses serve blacks stationed at nearby bases.17

The advent of integration, however, did not mean immediate full equality. The young black men and women who entered the services in the 1960s and 1970s often brought with them the anger and frustration that were so much a part of the communities in which they were reared. As blacks continued to press their demands, the services had to respond. The Air Force did so by introducing, for example, its Social Actions programs in 1969 and the Defense Race Relations Institute in 1971.18 In the final analysis, the NCOs who had the most direct day-to-day contact with these

17On occasion during the 1950s, black and white servicemen would enter segregated local businesses and insist on being served. Chiefs Barnes and Harlow both recall incidents arising from this practice which foreshadowed the sit-in strategy popular after 1960. Gropman, pp. 86–142.

18The Air Force’s Social Actions programs, established in 1969, came about largely in response to growing problems with race relations within the military. These problems ranged from overt racial hostility to misunderstandings caused by a lack of cultural awareness. Chief Barnes recalled difficulties caused by misinterpretations of black slang. See Sgts Craig Pugh and Robert K. Ruhl, “Up Front—Where the Action Is,” The Airman (February 1981), pp. 37–42.
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young black service members were challenged to provide the special leadership needed to see the Air Force through that period of transition.

Throughout this era of profound social upheaval, the services also struggled with the tensions and frustrations arising out of U.S. participation in the war in Vietnam. On the home front, an undercurrent of antimilitarism became widespread, particularly on college campuses, and those in uniform often bore the brunt of public anger and disgust over U.S. policy on the conflict.\textsuperscript{19} The armed forces, especially during the last four years of U.S. involvement, from 1968 to 1972, were confronted by rebellious young servicemen who resented being sent off to fight that most unpopular of American wars. Morale continued to decline during the 1970s as a post-Vietnam backlash set in and questions about the proper role of U.S. armed services in the world surfaced. The anti-military feelings born of the war were slow to subside. Again, as the most immediate supervisors of the enlisted force, the NCOs were challenged over and over, their leadership tested to the utmost.

More Opportunities for Women

As blacks agitated and pushed the services to provide equal treatment, so did women. After the initiation of the All-Volunteer Force and the entrance of women into the services in greater numbers, all military departments attempted to integrate women more fully into their force structures. During most of the 1960s, the Air Force limited women, both officers and enlisted, to a narrow range of specializations, predominately in the clerical, administrative, personnel, information, and medical fields. Women were no longer allowed to perform intelligence, weather, flight attendance, equipment maintenance, and control tower duties, even though they had done so during World War II and into the 1950s.\textsuperscript{20} The proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution in 1972 represented the beginning of a concerted effort by members of the feminist movement in the United States to tear down the obstacles that prevented women from


advancing socially and economically. Here again, the services had to respond. The Air Force opened many hard-to-fill technical fields, even those involving work on the flight line, to enlisted women. Once again, as each of the Chiefs recalled, the Air Force called upon its NCOs to apply their special talents to meeting this responsibility.

Long-term Air Force members were often throughout their careers affected by significant changes in personnel policies. The changes over forty years were, of course, legion, and encompassed many areas—housing, health care, promotions, pay, retention, and drug and alcohol abuse. Several personnel policy changes stand out—the introduction of the E-8 and E-9 ranks, the Weighted Airman Promotion System (WAPS), the Total Objective Plan for Career Airmen Personnel (TOPCAP), the appointment of Senior Enlisted Advisors, and the creation of the position of Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force.

By the late 1950s the Air Force had to contend with two related personnel problems—promotion stagnation and the sometimes less-than-clear status of its warrant officers. The first problem, which burdened the Army and the Navy as well, was caused by the massive influx of personnel during the Korean War build-up (known later as the Korean Hump). It touched most career fields and had a severely detrimental effect on morale. The second problem was the result of the Air Force's inability to categorize its significant number of warrant officers. Were they to be treated as officers or as enlisted personnel? To address both problems, the Air Force in 1958 supported the creation of two new enlisted ranks, the senior master sergeant (E-8) and the chief master sergeant (E-9). Promotions into the new ranks opened up positions below. From then on senior supervisory NCOs were not warrant officers but senior and chief master sergeants. Heavier responsibilities did not come immediately with the new ranks but were incorporated gradually over the following decades.21

The creation of E-8s and E-9s helped alleviate some, but not all, promotion stagnation. By the late 1960s the Korean Hump was again causing problems. In addition, the Air Force's promotion system had proved neither systematic nor well understood by enlisted personnel.22 Despite efforts to explain the system and improve it, complaints mounted and finally captured the attention of Congressman L. Mendel Rivers,

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Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. He held a series of
hearings and as a result the Air Force (and the Army) initiated a major
promotion policy revision. The Air Force adopted the Weighted Airman
Promotion System (WAPS) in 1970, making promotion contingent on a
number of clearly defined, weighted criteria such as time-in-grade and test
scores. This more objective system significantly reduced the number of
complaints.23

To reduce the Korean Hump, the Air Force then adopted TOPCAP
(Total Objective Plan Career Airmen Personnel). Implemented in 1973,
TOPCAP initiated an “up or out” career path for NCOs similar to one in
place for officers. TOPCAP set a high-year-of-tenure mark for the various
enlisted ranks. Under the original TOPCAP plan, for example, E-5s could
serve for twenty years before having to retire, while E-9s could serve for
thirty years.24 The combination of WAPS and TOPCAP aimed at creating
an ideal enlisted force structure which balanced experience levels with
opportunities for advancement.25

At about the same time the Air Force was looking into the issue of
increased responsibility for senior NCOs. E-8s and E-9s had, ever since
their ranks were established in the late 1950s, expressed dissatisfaction
over having been denied the responsibilities that they believed should
come with their higher status. A number of commanders adopted individu-
ally a practice which became policy Air Force-wide in 1970—choosing a
Senior Enlisted Advisor. These advisors worked with commanders and
counseled them on all matters relating to the enlisted force.

Congressman Rivers became convinced that the Air Force should
follow the examples of the Marine Corps and the Army. The Marine Corps
had created the position of the first Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps
in 1957. The Army had created the position of the Sergeant Major of the
Army in 1965. As early as 1964 the Air Force Association’s (AFA) Airman
Council had proposed that the Air Force appoint a Senior Enlisted
Advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Believing that such a
position might undermine the formal chain of command, the Air Force
rejected the AFA’s suggestion but began to feel mounting pressure after
the Army appointed a top enlisted member. It did not act until 1966, when

23See Maj Thomas A. Kustelski, “Our Goal: Promote the Best with the Best
System,” Air University Review, Vol. XXI, No. 6 (September-October 1970),
pp. 6-13; MSgt Loren B. Leonberger, “A New Look at WAPS,” Airman (June


25See Maj Norbert R. Kaus, “They Call It TOPCAP,” Airman (September
Congressman Rivers introduced a bill which mandated the appointment by each of the services of a senior NCO. Although the Rivers bill never became law, the Air Force realized that tremendous enthusiasm for the proposal existed throughout its ranks. On October 24, 1966, Chief of Staff General John P. McConnell announced the creation of the position of Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force. In April 1967, Chief Airey became the first to wear the unique insignia with a wreath around its star. Over the next decade, through the efforts of the first CMSAFs, support for the office grew among both officers and enlisted members of the Air Force.

The office has continued to grow in importance as succeeding Chiefs brought their own particular talents to it. Through their competence and dedication they have invested it with true professionalism over a time of rapid social and technological change. The theme of change punctuated by rich and colorful anecdotes runs through this interview and touches on other facets of life in the enlisted force. Chief Airey’s career reached back into the Army Air Corps. He recalled the danger of flying B-24s on missions deep into Europe, of being shot down, and of being taken prisoner. Chief Harlow also remembered the Army Air Corps and the commitment of those who chose the career it offered before pay-raises with cost-of-living adjustments, before adequate housing, and before CHAMPUS (the Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services).

Chiefs Barnes and Gaylor entered the service after World War II. Chief Barnes, the only black CMSAF to date, recalled landmarks in the Air Force’s long process of integration and the hardships of service in Korea. Chief Gaylor, who spent most of his career as a security policeman, described the difficulties of building a strong sense of “one Air Force.”

They all spoke bluntly of their impressions and opinions developed over long years of service and were not shy about discussing aspects of military life that never get mentioned on recruiting posters. They were quick to point out, however, the many advantages to Air Force service.

At the end of the interview, Chief Gaylor lamented the lack of colorful heroes in today’s “corporate” Air Force. Although these four Chiefs may not be heroes in the classic military sense, their impressive careers stand as fine examples of achievement and professionalism to which the enlisted force can look for inspiration.


27For a summary of the gradual improvements in the quality of life of the enlisted force see Maj Lewis Allen, “Genteel Poverty—Gone But Not Forgotten” (Air Command and Staff College Research Paper).
CMSAF Paul W. Airey was born December 13, 1923, and entered the Army Air Forces in 1942. He trained as an aerial radio operator at Scott Field, Illinois, and then moved to Fairmont Field, Nebraska, where he trained for service on the B-24. In March 1944 Sergeant Airey was sent to North Africa but was soon transferred to the 485th Bomb Group based in Italy. Flying as a radio operator-aerial gunner, he saw action over Romania, Germany, and Austria. In July 1944, while on his twenty-eighth mission, he was captured by the enemy after flak brought down his B-24 over Austria. He remained a prisoner of the Luftwaffe until May 1945. Weighing only 100 pounds at the time of his release, he returned to the United States for three months of recuperative leave. Once he regained his health, he reported to the radio school at Scott Field as an instructor.

After six years at Scott, Airey moved to Naha Air Base, Okinawa. There he made another of his many important contributions to the Air Force. Working with improvised and salvaged parts, he devised a much-needed corrosion control assembly for use on aircraft radio and radar equipment. His resourcefulness, which resulted in great savings to the Air Force, earned him the Legion of Merit, the nation’s fifth highest military decoration.

Returning to the United States in 1953, Airey began his first assignment in the position that he rated second only to that of the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force. He served, once again at Scott, as First Sergeant. He went on to several other duty posts as First Sergeant. His responsibilities over the years also included a tour as the NCOIC of the Airmen Section, Directorate of Personnel, of the 478th Fighter Group and later as Personnel Sergeant Major. His last tour as First Sergeant came in 1964 at the 4756 Civil Engineering Squadron, Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. On April 3, 1967, he began his tenure as the first Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force. According to those who followed him, during twenty-seven months in office he built the position into one of undeniable importance and influence. Chief Airey remained on active duty after stepping down as CMSAF—the only former CMSAF to do so—from a desire to complete thirty years of service to the Air Force. Once he retired, he went on to enjoy varied career opportunities, even working for local television in Florida. Primarily, however, he has been associated with the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, setting something of another precedent for subsequent CMSAFs. Most who followed him have moved from the Air Force into important middle management positions in corporate America. That accomplishment stands as a tribute to the skills and abilities cultivated by these men during their long years of service to the Air Force.
CMSAF Donald L. Harlow, born September 22, 1920, entered the Army Air Corps at age 22 in 1942. He served throughout the war as an instructor in the Aircraft Armament Ground School. In 1946, after rising to the rank of staff sergeant, he briefly left active duty, but remained with the Air Force Reserve. Before being recalled to active duty in 1950, Chief Harlow attended the California College of Commerce where he also taught. He left school in 1948 to take a job as an Assistant Sales Training Instructor for the Clary Multiplier Corporation.

Once back on active duty, Chief Harlow served as the Personnel Chief Clerk, 5th and 9th Maintenance Squadrons, Travis Air Force Base, California. After a brief tour at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, he transferred to the 5th Air Division in Rabat, Morocco. There he served in a number of capacities including Personnel Sergeant Major, Custodian of the NCO Club, and as steward of the Officer’s Club.

Returning to the United States in 1954, he embarked on a number of assignments in the personnel field. Along the way he earned a bachelor of science in business administration from Southern Methodist University in 1955. He continued his professional military education at the Strategic Air Command NCO Academy where he graduated with several honors—the Student Commander Trophy, the Gold Key for Academic Achievement, and the Drill and Ceremonies Award. In 1963, after only sixteen years of active duty service, he attained the rank of chief master sergeant.

After his promotion he moved to Headquarters, U.S. European Command, as Personnel Sergeant Major, Air Force Element, and then, in July 1965, he went to the Pentagon to serve as Sergeant Major, Executive Services Division, Office of the Vice Chief of Staff. While serving there he was named Headquarters Command Outstanding Airman of the Year, 1967. He assumed the position of Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force on August 1, 1969, and retired from the Air Force on September 30, 1971. In addition to serving as chairman of the Richard D. Kisling Fund (a memorial to the third CMSAF who died in 1985), Chief Harlow is also a member of the board of directors of SOVRAN Bank of Virginia, a member-at-large of the USAF Retiree Council, and he travels extensively speaking at various Air Force functions.
CMSAF Thomas N. Barnes, born November 16, 1930, entered the Air Force in April 1949. After completing basic training at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, he went on to both Aircraft and Engine School and Hydraulic Specialist School at Chanute Technical Training Center, Illinois. Chief Barnes's subsequent career in the Air Force clearly illustrates the role of changing technology and the necessity of training, retraining, and adapting to change.

Following brief service at McChord Air Force Base, Washington, Chief Barnes transferred to the 4th Troop Carrier Squadron based at Ashiya, Japan, a unit charged with supporting the Korean War. Chief Barnes completed on-the-job training there as a flight engineer and subsequently served as both a flight engineer and a hydraulic specialist.

He returned to the United States in 1952 and went to the 30th Air Transport Squadron, Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts, where he received transition training as a flight engineer on the C–118. He volunteered for temporary duty with the 1708th Ferry Group, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, and served on crews ferrying aircraft between various Air Force depots and Hawaii, Japan, and the Northeast Air Command. In 1952 he transferred to Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. There he served as Crew Chief/Flight Engineer on a number of aircraft including the B–25, T–11, C–45, and C–47. In 1958 he left Andrews and went to Loring Air Force Base, Maine where he served as a B–52 Flight Chief and Senior Controller.

In 1966 he trained for service with yet another aircraft, the F–4, and in December of that year went to Southeast Asia. There he served as the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing NCOIC, Reparable Processing Center, as a Senior Controller, and as the NCOIC, Maintenance Control. Upon his return to the United States, Chief Barnes went to Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas, where his duties included T–38 section Line Chief, NCOIC of Maintenance Control, and Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Commander of the 3646th Pilot Training Wing. He left Laughlin Air Force Base in 1971 to serve as the Command Senior Enlisted Advisor, Air Training Command Headquarters, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.

The Air Force chose Chief Barnes as its fourth CMSAF and he began his duties on October 1, 1973. He received two extensions of his tenure and, therefore, served longer in that office than anyone else. He retired from the Air Force on July 31, 1977, and currently works as a Vice President and Director of Employee Relations, Association Corporation of North America.

In 1965 Chief Gaylor was the honor graduate from the Strategic Air Command NCO Academy. As honor graduate he was invited to remain there as an instructor and did so until the Academy closed in April 1966. After briefly returning to the security police field, he returned to Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, at SAC’s request, to help reopen the Academy in 1968. He then was named the Second Air Force Senior Enlisted Advisor.

In 1971 Chief Gaylor went to Europe, serving at Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). He toured bases within the command, conducting classes in management techniques. In 1972 he established the USAFE Command Management/Leadership Center where USAFE NCOs could receive a sixty-hour, in-residence course in management and leadership. He left the center in 1973 when he was named USAFE Senior Enlisted Advisor. Later, he returned to the United States to serve at the Air Force Military Personnel Center. While there he continued to travel and act as a Management/Leadership instructor. He became the fifth CMSAF on August 1, 1977, and retired from that post on July 31, 1979. He is now the Quality Programs Administrator for United Service Automobile Association.
Interview Participants

CMSAF Paul W. Airey
CMSAF Donald L. Harlow
CMSAF Thomas N. Barnes
CMSAF Robert D. Gaylor
Richard H. Kohn, Chief, Office of Air Force History

June 24, 1987
Bolling Air Force Base
Washington, D.C.
Volunteering and Fighting in World War II

Kohn: First, let me thank you all for taking the time and making the effort to come to Bolling Air Force Base to share your experiences with the Air Force. I thought we’d start the discussion early in your careers with the 1940s. Chief Airey and Chief Harlow, what were your experiences coming into the Army Air Forces [AAF] during World War II? What was life like at that time? The air forces were part of the Army then, but certainly back in World War II, and at times in the late 1940s, it must have been a different experience for all four of you than it would be today.

Harlow: Yes, it was. Going back even prior to 1940, I remember when I was a young man in school we had in the town what were called vagrants; today they’re called either street people or derelicts. The police would pick them up at night and put them in jail. The next morning they’d have to go before a judge, and the judge, depending on how many times they’d been picked up, would say, “Thirty days in jail, or join the Army.” There were quite a few of those individuals in the Army. Some of them turned out to be excellent soldiers; others were the same sort of vagrants in the Army as in their towns and, eventually, they were kicked out. In those days we had a cross section of America in the Army Air Corps.2

When I was inducted, I went to Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Of course, it was strictly Army. I remember about the seventh or eighth day

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2 During the early 1920s some members of the Army Air Service led by Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell called for the creation of an independent Air Force. More moderate airmen wanted the Air Service to gain a status similar to that of the Marine Corps in the Navy Department. President Calvin Coolidge appointed a committee under the leadership of Dwight W. Morrow to study the issue. The committee reported in late 1925. Congress accepted its recommendations and incorporated them in the Air Corps Act of 2 July 1926. That act renamed the Air
THE ENLISTED EXPERIENCE

we'd fallen out in formation and were waiting to do some drilling when the corporal, two stripes, came down the row and said to each individual: "You're going into the Air Corps; you're going into the Air Corps; you're going into the Infantry." Whether he really knew I don't know, but he said to me, "You're going into the Army Air Corps." Well, I didn't know it until three days later when the orders came out, but I was going to go to Atlantic City for basic training because I was going into the Army Air Corps.

Airey: I think you have to go back before the war. If you recall, back in 1939 and 1940, when the draft started and before we went into World War II, the United States Army Air Forces only had something like 40,000 officers and men, and then suddenly we were in a war. There's no way we can compare the United States Air Force today with the old Army Air Corps of yesterday. Then, the whole idea was predicated on winning that war. We went into a total expansion, from 40,000 people until we finally ended up with something like 11 or 12 million people in the services. As I


Since 1775 the Army has created numerous basic and special branches. As the Army developed, it needed officers with special skills (engineers, medical doctors, supply experts). For each evolving skill the Army created a branch or corps of specialized officers. The basic branches included: Infantry, Adjutant General's Corps, Corps of Engineers, Finance Corps, Quartermaster Corps, Air Defense Artillery, Field Artillery, Armor (which replaced the Cavalry), Ordnance Corps, Signal Corps, Chemical Corps, Military Police Corps, Transportation Corps, and Military Intelligence. The special branches included: the corps of the Army Medical Department (Medical Corps, Army Nurse Corps, Dental Corps, Veterinary Corps, Medical Service Corps, and Army Medical Specialist Corps), the Judge Advocate General's Corps, and the Chaplain's Branch. From May 14, 1942, until October 20, 1978, the Army also had a Women's Army Corps and from 1926 until 1941, the Army Air Forces (the Army Air Forces was established in June 1941). Army officers were commissioned into one of the branches or corps. Enlisted personnel were members of the Regular Army and were assigned to the various branches or corps. The Department of the Army Manual (April 1982), pp. 5-1–5-22, 5-47, 6-3.

say, you can't compare it. In my own case, even before the war I had an inclination toward a military career. In those days the area that I grew up in was predominately Navy. In Quincy, Massachusetts, we had the huge Fall River Shipyard which produced many capital ships for the Navy, such as the famous carrier, Wasp, and the cruiser, Quincy. Both ships went down fighting the Japanese later in the war. In addition, Boston was a great Navy town. My plans as a young boy were to eventually go into the United States Navy.

I haven't told this story very often, but in 1942 I went into the Navy recruiting office and there was an old chief petty officer sitting there. He gave me a bad time, said he couldn't fool with me that day. "We want only men, we don't want to screw around with you today, come back later"—just one of those belligerent types that really turn you off, the type that we try and keep away from recruiting offices now. So I went down the street and joined the Army Air Forces. I owe that petty officer much for what he did for me by making me change my mind.

Barnes: Let me talk for a moment about my impressions with regard to World War II. I was born and raised in an industrial town, Chester, Pennsylvania. The principal industry was shipbuilding. Before the war, the city had done commercial shipbuilding in four yards; during the war they were doing full-time Navy production. There was a Ford Motor Company plant within a half mile of my home that also turned to full war production of Jeeps and halftracks for the Army. These things were parked outside, so there was a military presence in the town. As a school child—my father having died when I was fourteen—I worked to help support my family in the Sun shipbuilding system nights and weekends as a summer worker. I was not in the actual shipbuilding yards, but out in a support area, so I had contact with the war activity. I was impressed with what was going on and I grew restless and sought some way to relate myself to what seemed a very patriotic effort at the time in the military.

The surprise for me came in 1948 when I left home and entered the Air Force's basic training system. I left home with a rather mixed group from the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station, which was at the Schuylkill Arsenal in Philadelphia. We traveled by train to San Antonio, which in and of itself was an experience, since we picked up people along

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5In June 1940 command strength of the Army Air Corps stood at 51,165. Total military strength stood at 458,365. At its highest in June 1945, American military strength stood at 12,123,455, with 2,282,259 in the Army Air Forces. Selected Manpower Statistics, 1980, p. 80.
the way. Friendships developed on that train ride. Some of the people that I met and the ones that I'd left Chester with, we all ended up having our bubbles burst, for when we arrived at Lackland there was a separate military training element for blacks and for non-blacks. So for me the change began right then.

I saw the waning days of the Army Air Forces, but it didn't wane very rapidly. It waned only to the degree that the kinds of things that were becoming distinctly Air Force were noticeable. Basic training for me was a little longer in that it took nearly a month to get enough blacks together to create a flight and begin the training. I had a little casual time at Lackland prior to actually beginning training, waiting on the flight to fill. What this allowed as the people came in was the chance to make some very deep friendships. We grew into it, and we were used in a casual duty sense.

Airey: During World War II we needed all the people we could get, and personnel from all walks of life were coming in with the draft or from enlistments. One of the differences I see today is that if you walk into a barracks now all you will see are very young people. I was very young also. However, we had a wide spread of ages from the very young up to and including men in their forties. This had a stabilizing effect on us younger troops. On the other hand, we had a wide variance in educational levels. We had college graduates and those who couldn't read or write. I can still

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6 Until after the presidential order to desegregate the military in 1948, the Army and subsequently the Air Force operated segregated training facilities and bases, especially in the South, where local law mandated strict racial segregation. The military fought as it trained—segregated. Chief Barnes left for basic training from his home in the North (Pennsylvania) where segregation was not mandated by law. Evidently, since he and the others traveled on a military train, they crossed into the South without having to comply immediately with local segregation ordinances. They were not required to segregate themselves until their arrival at Lackland. Had Chief Barnes been on a non-military train, once he crossed into the South local law would have demanded that he and any other blacks move into separate all-black railcars and his experience with segregation in the South would have occurred earlier. For a more complete discussion of blacks in the military and the conditions they faced prior to desegregation, see Alan M. Osur, Blacks in the Army Air Forces in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1977); Alan L. Gropman, The Air Force Integrates (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1981); Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1989); Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight (New York: The Free Press, 1986).

7 A "casual" was a military person in transit awaiting transportation to or from a duty station, or awaiting orders to a duty station. Gregory R. Clark, Words of the Vietnam War (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1990), p. 88.
see the First Sergeant writing the words "his mark" beside an "X" someone had made signing the payroll. We had people we had to write letters for in order to help them. This would be unthinkable in today's Air Force. However, these people did contribute towards winning the war by doing much of the menial labor, such as sweeping the hanger floor, keeping the fires going in the barracks, and many other tasks.

You have to keep in mind, too, in those days we had people that were let out of jail to come into the armed forces. We had people who were in military prisons for felonies, including murder, who, when World War II broke out, were paroled in order to come on active duty. One of them that I knew retired some thirty years later as a master sergeant with an excellent record.

There was also a common purpose, plus the fact that there were more mature people around, grown, mature, family men who were drafted or enlisted. We were drafting up to age thirty-five. In fact, I think we drafted above thirty-five, if they didn't have any dependents—and later they reduced it to thirty-five. Of course, discipline was harsh. It was what they called the "old brown shoe days."  

I believe that at the time we had much more respect for, or fear of, authority. The thought of being placed in the Spartan barracks kept many of us straight. Spartan barracks were a form of punishment that was passed out for many different reasons—failure to obey, [being] late for duty, missing a formation, that kind of thing. You were put in a special barracks, and you double-timed to chow. You double-timed every place. You were restricted to a particular barracks, and your day was monitored. In other words, you did your duties and the rest of the time you spent listening to lectures and double-timing and exercising. It was pretty damn rough.

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8The draft age during the World War II era varied over the course of the war. During 1940 and 1941 the draft age ranged from twenty-one to thirty-five. During 1942 and 1943 the draft age was expanded to include men aged eighteen to thirty-seven. In the last two years of the war, 1944 and 1945, the draft was limited to men eighteen to twenty-five. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part II (Washington, D.C., 1975), p. 1143.

9According to Chief Airey, the "old brown shoe days" referred to the time when the air forces were still part of the Army and the airmen wore the Army uniform brown shoes. Any practice or idea that harks back to the days of the Army Air Corps or Army Air Forces was referred to as being "old brown shoe." For example, thinking that harsh discipline was the way to control the troops would be considered "old brown shoe." Telephone Interview, Janet R. Bednarz with CMSAF Paul W. Airey, Ret.
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Harlow: Going back to the early days—1943, 1944—I was stationed at Matagorda Island, Texas. I was in the ground school teaching gunnery, teaching the students how to take apart .50-caliber and .30-caliber machine guns and how to synchronize them through the aircraft propeller. When I got assigned to the school, there was a tech sergeant in charge. I thought, “Gee, this guy’s an old guy.” He looked old. He was a tech sergeant in the Army. Soon after I was there for a while, I found out that he was about five years younger than I was. I couldn’t understand it until payday came around. He and a bunch of the other troops would go into the boiler room of the barracks. They had a big table set up, with a bottle of whiskey and cards. They’d gamble the whole weekend and wouldn’t even go to bed.

While at Matagorda Island, I was teaching some classes to second lieutenants just out of flying school. I love teaching, and it was a great challenge. During my tour there, I also wrote and prepared tests. They’d never had any real lesson plans or tests in those days. Everything was fast and furious because of the rush to get into combat. They were more concerned with the mission than training so I wrote the first test that was ever given at Matagorda Island to second lieutenants. I took it over to the OPS [operations] officer, a lieutenant colonel, and I’ll never forget his comment. He looked at it and said, “Sure glad I don’t have to take this test.” That’s when I got interested in academics, because I found out there was so much opportunity there. There was so much you could do to help people.

Then in the spring of 1945, a hurricane came along and we got blown off the island. We had to evacuate. At that time we got transferred to Victoria Field in Victoria, Texas. I thought I was pretty smart; I finagled a

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11 During World War II the Army enlisted rank structure included the rank of private, private first class, corporal, sergeant, staff sergeant, technical (tech) sergeant, and master sergeant.

12 During the 1930s flight training took place on two Army Air Fields located near San Antonio, Texas. Air cadets received their primary training at Randolph Field, headquarters of the Air Corps Training Center, and advanced training at Kelly Field. After 1940 the Air Corps opened a number of new training bases in southern and southwestern states, taking advantage of the favorable year-round flying conditions. During World War II, once pilots earned their wings, they then underwent transition training in the planes they would fly in combat. Finally, they received training as parts of organized units. Goldberg, pp. 37, 50–51, 95, 173.
couple of three-day passes so they couldn’t catch up with me and put me on KP [Kitchen Police]. When I came back from the second one, I decided I’d better do something, so I went to the sergeant major in personnel and told him I’d like to go to work in personnel. They put me in the personnel processing section.

At that time we had the old Form 20, the service record, the medical record, and others. There were twelve different records.\textsuperscript{13} I had one desk, and was handling the Form 20. I wanted to find out what they did with all the other records, so I visited around—I had two stripes at the time, a corporal—and I found out what all the other people did with each one of their records. It so happened that about three or four months later, as the war started to wind down, the staff sergeant in charge of the section was going to be reassigned. The captain, our boss at the time, called me in and said, “I understand you’re the only one who knows all of the desks here.” I said, “Yes. I don’t know if I’m the only one, but I do know what everybody does.” He said, “Fine. When the staff sergeant leaves you’re in charge.”

In those days—it’s interesting compared to today—the captain was a pilot; he was assigned to us as the officer in charge of processing. He spent most of his time in the training phase and in flying, and he used to come into the office at 9 o’clock in the morning and leave at 10. He was there to sign papers or answer any questions or anything else. Then, he’d come back in the afternoon, maybe about 1:30 or 2, and he’d stay until about 3. He said, “This is where you can always get in touch with me. In the meantime, you’re in charge.” Well, there I was with two stripes, and I was in charge.

I only recall one time when I had a problem. A colonel from the hospital came in and raised a little hell, and when I couldn’t satisfy him I had to call the captain. Otherwise, everybody knew I was in charge, but I didn’t overextend myself on that point, and we got the job done.

During the early days of the Army Air Corps, the officer was a policy decision-maker, and the NCO [Non-Commissioned Officer] ran the pro-

\textsuperscript{13} During World War II, the service record (War Department, Adjutant General’s Office Form No. 24) was a multi-page document containing a series of different records regarding induction, immunization, designation of beneficiary for insurance, prior service, military qualifications, special duty, furloughs, foreign service, trial by courts-martial, clothing account, endorsements, and final endorsement. According to a World War II-era manual, War Department, Adjutant General’s Office (W.D., A.G.O.), Form No. 20 was a soldier’s military qualifications card, listing training he had received and duties for which he was prepared. See Lt Col C. M. Virtue, Company Administration Including Supply and Mess Management and Personnel Records Including Personnel Office Organization and Procedure (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Military Service Publishing Company, March 1943), pp. 167–202.
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gram. I remember many a time that the officer would say, “What do you think?” And I’d say, “According to the Army regulation, we’re supposed to do it this way.” He wasn’t that much concerned with the details. He was concerned about making the decision, and he depended on me to provide him with the facts on which he could base that decision. We had very few line officers. They were mostly pilots and navigators. They had a secondary job, but they depended on NCOs to do it, and they tended to their primary job of flying. It was an opportunity that we had as young people that’s very difficult to give to our young NCOs today because of the number of officers we have.

Airey: My experience in World War II was different. After graduating from aerial gunnery school, my class was sent by troop train to Salt Lake Army Air Base in Utah, for crew assignment and refresher training in radio operation. When this training was completed, we received a ten-day leave. When I returned, the crew that I was assigned to went to Gowen Field in Boise, Idaho, for B–24 transition training. Evidently, that’s where Jimmy Stewart, the movie actor, had trained some months ahead of us. Stewart, they say, was the only famous movie actor that actually rose

14 In classic military terms a line officer is a member of the chain of command or line of command. Presently, all Air Force officers except those serving as chaplains, judge advocates, nurses, in the medical service and bio-medical service are defined as line officers or line of the Air Force. Air Force line officers serve in rated operations, non-rated operations, or in mission support.

15 During transition training a student pilot, after winning his wings, learned to fly the plane he would fly in combat. At that time, as well, the other crew members, having received training in their specialties, learned to work with the pilot and each other as a combat team. Training missions were performed by full crews so that the members of the crew could learn to work with one another as individuals as well as specialists (bombardier, navigator, gunner). The idea was to instill a clear sense of teamwork before the crew was sent into combat. Arthur R. Kooker, “The Foundations of a War Training Program,” in Craven and Cate, Volume VI, p. 454; Thomas H. Greer, “Combat Crew and Unit Training,” in Ibid., p. 606.

16 Jimmy Stewart, already a famous Hollywood film actor, enlisted in the Army as a private in March 1941. He received flying training in California and New Mexico and did his B–24 transition training at Gowen Field, Idaho, and Sioux City, Iowa. He was commissioned a first lieutenant in July 1942 and within a year rose to the rank of captain. From November 23, 1943, until March 30, 1944, he flew with the 445th Bomb Group. After promotion to the rank of major, he served as Operations Officer for the 453rd Bomb Group until being named Chief of Staff of the 2nd Combat Wing under the Eighth Air Force in June 1944. He continued to advance, attaining the rank of colonel in March 1945. During the war he flew twenty combat missions. After the war he remained in the reserve and in July 1959 attained the rank of brigadier general.
to a command position of leadership in the war. Later he led the entire Eighth Air Force on missions into Germany. After Boise we reported to Fairmont Army Air Base in Nebraska and helped activate the 485th Bomb Group, which, after completion of training, was assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force then operating in the Mediterranean [May 1944]. First, we flew to a base in North Africa, via the southern route—Puerto Rico, British Guyana, Brazil—then across the Atlantic to West Africa, and from there into the North African base. While I waited in North Africa for our base to be completed in southern Italy, something happened that had a profound effect on me. As it turned out, for the first time, the war struck close to home. It started out as a rumor that the convoy which most of my squadron was coming over on was hit by German planes in the Mediterranean Sea and the whole shipload was lost. This was very strongly denied as a vicious rumor. Rumors aided the enemy. Those who spread rumors could be court-martialed. However, as later verified, it was all true; we lost the entire squadron. The ship was carrying gasoline and explosives and received a direct hit shortly after nightfall. There were no survivors. My entire squadron had disappeared—all the ground crews, the orderly room—there was no one left. Members of the bomb group who were on the other ships said they'd just begun to relax after crossing the Atlantic and they felt they were home safe when the disaster struck. I always had the feeling that it was one hell of a way to go, as you didn't even have the opportunity to fight back. It was an air attack. Planes came out and got them. All were lost. The Luftwaffe was still pretty strong up until that time.

My initial B-24 combat missions were into the Balkans and into Germany, Austria, Hungary, Romania. I went to Ploesti once, but not on

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17Jimmy Stewart did not lead the entire Eighth Air Force, but he could have flown combat lead at the wing, squadron, or group level.

18The mission of the strategic bombers of the Fifteenth Air Force, as part of the combined bomber offensive, was "the progressive destruction of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance [was] fatally weakened." In carrying out that mission, the Fifteenth Air Force concentrated on the destruction of the German Luftwaffe, Axis oil refineries, supply installations, the ball bearing industry and "other centers of vital military production." The Fifteenth Air Force flew missions over Germany, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, Italy and southern France. See "The Statistical Story of the Fifteenth Air Force," Center for Air Force History.
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the famous first low-level raid. Flak was the most frightening or the most frustrating thing because you could do nothing about it except watch it come at you. Many tales and jokes have been told about flak being so thick that you could walk on it; however, I've seen it so thick that it darkened the sky, almost blotted out the sun. Take a heavily defended target, such as Wiener Neustadt—New Vienna—which was an industrial area with oil refineries and aircraft plants; it could really put out a massive amount of flak. In other words, they shot a large amount of flak up into an area and let you fly into it. Once a formation hit the initial point, there was no evasive action. You just held formation and flew to the target. Flak took a terrible toll, and many thousands of casualties could be attributed to it. Thousands of POWs [Prisoners of War] could testify that flak was what got them.

I was shot down on a mission to hit the Florisdorf oil refineries [July 1944], which were on the outskirts of Vienna also. The aircraft was hit by flak shortly after bombs away. I can recall the pilot feathering one engine and then another. By this time, we were well across the Danube over Hungary. Of course, Hungary was an ally of the Germans. I can remember when the oil pressure in the third one started going down, the pilot said, "Get out. If that third engine goes, this thing's going down like a lead sled." We all bailed out. I'd seen other planes go down over a target. I'd seen B-24s go into a spin. I'd stood at the waist window praying for the chutes to come out, and no chutes would come out. Centrifugal forces

19In August 1943, B-24 bombers from the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) in Operation Tidalwave targeted the vital oil refineries in Ploesti, Romania. According to historian Albert F. Simpson, it was "the first large-scale, minimum-altitude attack by Army Air Force heavy bombers upon a strongly defended target and the longest major bombing mission, in terms of distance from base to target, undertaken up to that time." The AAF lost 54 planes with 532 airmen dead, captured, missing or interned. The cost was very high, but the damage done to the refineries was considered severe. For example an estimated 42 percent of the total refining capacity was destroyed, 40 percent of the cranking capacity knocked out for up to six months, and the production of lubricating oils greatly reduced. See Albert F. Simpson, "Sicily and Southern Italy," in Craven and Cate, Volume II: Europe: Torch to Point Blank, August 1942 to December 1943, pp. 482–83.

20Wiener Neustadt was the site of a huge Messerschmitt airplane manufacturing complex. Together with the factories at Regensburg, these two production centers fabricated 48 percent of all German single-engine fighters. See Alfred Goldberg and Arthur B. Ferguson, "POINTBLANK," in Craven and Cate, Vol. II, p. 683.

21The initial point is a point on the ground (identified visually, by navigational aids, or by dead reckoning) over which an aircraft begins a bomb run.
prevented them from bailing out. You figured that the Fifteenth Air Force put up 500 to 800 planes on a maximum effort raid, and they could lose 25 or 30 or 40 aircraft on a mission. You'd say to yourself, "The odds are pretty good." But, when you multiplied that by the number of missions you had to fly, the odds start going down.²² So, what I had always said to myself was, "This could very well happen to me. I just hope and pray that if we do get hit, we'll have the opportunity to get out." So when that pilot said, "Go," there was no hesitation on my part. Right out the camera hatch I went.

We all got out [with] one broken leg—the copilot's—no direct wounds from flak or fighters. We all bailed out at a fairly high altitude. One of the reasons we went down is we went over the target at only 18,000 feet, as that was all the altitude the lead ship could get, so we all went over at that height. The pilot was the last to leave the ship, and on landing we were scattered over a mile or so radius. I remember getting the "psycho card" from my flight suit leg pocket and tearing it up in small pieces and scattering it to the wind. This card, of course, was the code that radio operators used to encode and decode messages.²³ I had no sensation of falling as we'd bailed out so high. I also remember reaching in my pocket, finding my smokes and lighting a cigarette. Then the ground started coming up, coming up fast. I could see the woods off in a distance, and that's where I planned to go. As I got down closer, I could see them [Hungarian farmers] coming from all over. I never got out of the chute. I landed, and they were waiting, all the farmers, and I got the hell beat out of me. They were irate, angry. We were rounded up and taken to a local town jail for the night. The next day we were taken to Budapest, Hungary, and incarcerated in a larger civilian prison.

We were interrogated, to a degree. I was placed in solitary for a few hours and then placed in a room with many other POWs, including my crew. It seems as though our air losses were so heavy that they were in a hurry to process us and get us on trains to Germany. This prison was the collection point for airmen shot down all over the Balkans and the Mediterranean area. A point to remember is that all air force POWs became automatic prisoners of the Luftwaffe. Ground troops became POWs of the German Army. The Germans even considered [those who

²²The Fifteenth Air Force flew 152,542 bomber sorties and 89,835 fighter sorties. The costs included 2,703 killed, 12,359 missing in action, 4,352 POWs or internees, and 2,553 wounded. See "The Statistical Story of the Fifteenth Air Force."

²³The nickname "psycho card" was probably a corruption of cypher card or cypher-code card.
fired] antiaircraft artillery as air prisoners as the German Air Force handled antiaircraft guns. This caused some confusion over who belonged to whom.

After processing we were placed into groups of about thirty men and then taken by train to Stalag Luft IV in Germany, a journey that took several days. We changed trains several times and crowds would gather... many of them wearing black armbands, and calling out “luf gangster” and “terror fyer” and such expressions as “Al Capone.” It wouldn’t take long before we had a pretty rowdy mob. The guards weren’t needed to keep you from getting away, escaping, but to keep the local population away. They were a pretty upset group of people. You can understand. The air forces were the ones that were doing the damage, the RAF by night and, of course, [the USAAF] by day.

We knew more or less what camp conditions would be like because there’d been a couple of escapees from the German prison camps. We got some pretty good briefings on that. We knew pretty well what to expect, that the Germans would live up to the Geneva Convention after a fashion, except for certain individuals. The main job was to try to keep alive, try to keep from catching pneumonia or dysentery or some other sickness.

The Germans had a favorite expression. “For you the war is over.” I heard it many times from them. I was in Stalag Luft IV up at Grosstychow near the Baltic. It must have had 10,000 Allied prisoners, maybe 8,000. They had four lagers [sections] which must have had 2,000 or 3,000 apiece. In the camp the only officers were medics. We had a British doctor, an American doctor, and a British chaplain. If we were prisoners of war today, the ranking man would automatically assume command. But then, it was very difficult for the Americans to pick—we didn’t have any old soldiers with us, so we had an election and voted officers in. There were no master sergeants; the highest rank, to the best of my knowledge, was tech.

We did have military discipline in the camp. Our orders were to have a total, hands-off policy vis-à-vis the Germans. The decision was made: “You do not fraternize with them. If they ask you questions, give them a military answer. When they try to get close to you—they had guards specifically assigned for that purpose, ferrets—don’t barter with them, don’t offer them a cigarette from your Red Cross package, don’t give them any, and keep away from them.” This was the policy we had. Later, I got to a camp that was mostly British. They had the Germans under their thumb, totally corrupted them. The Germans were afraid that if they said any-

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24 Stalag Luft IV was a prison where the Germans interned enlisted members of the U.S. Army Air Corps. It was located near Grosstychow in the northern part of what was, until 1990, East Germany. David A. Foy, For You The War Is Over (New York: Stein and Day, 1984), pp. 62, 70.
thing, they’d get shot. There’s another thing you have to keep in mind: the Americans, for the most part, were pretty new at this prisoner-of-war bit. We had Englishmen who were going on their fifth year. Theirs was an entirely different situation. I know we marched into this one British camp, and the British had the Germans so screwed up that they didn’t know how many prisoners they really had.

I don’t think there was a doubt in anyone’s mind that we were going to win the war. It was a matter of surviving...which was unlike other wars. Unlike the Korean War or Vietnam War where people were prisoners for six or seven years and didn’t have any idea of what was happening, there was no doubt in my mind, or in the mind of any other POW that I knew, that we were going to win the war in a matter of months or a year. That was all there was to it; I think that was the big difference. I was a prisoner for ten months.

The 1940s and Segregation

Kohn: Was the experience of coming into the military from the civilian world a shock for those of you who entered after World War II? Chief Barnes, it was your first experience with segregation. I assume that in Chester, Pennsylvania, the schools and other institutions were partially segregated, but that legal segregation did not exist.\(^{25}\)

Barnes: That’s correct. I came from a mixed neighborhood. The high school was certainly a mixed high school. School was a quasi-segregated place, though more by choice than by requirement. So I experienced it first when I entered the service, and it was a shock. It was very different.

\(^{25}\)Blacks in the North and the South both faced the hardships of racial segregation. However, prior to the 1960s, the segregation experience was different for each. In the North, blacks faced informal social and residential segregation, while in the South segregation was enforced by law and extended across a much broader range of activities. In the North, blacks lived in segregated neighborhoods and attended segregated schools. No law, however, stated explicitly where blacks could or could not live nor did any law dictate the formation of all-black schools. Segregation existed in fact but not in law. In the South, in addition to a certain level of social and residential segregation, blacks also faced segregation mandated by law. Most southern states had “Jim Crow” laws which required the strict segregation of all public transportation, schools, and public accommodations. For example, blacks and whites could not share taxi cabs, eat in the same room in a restaurant, or sit in the same section of a theater. There were separate schools—primary through professional—for blacks and whites.
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Gaylor: What I vividly remember about entering the Air Force... in my case was that everything that happened was an exciting adventure, something new and something different, even the three-day train ride from Indiana through Parsons, Kansas, and getting off the train to eat a meal because they didn't serve you on the train. From the moment we arrived at Lackland, we were told: "Get in this line, now this line." We had to get haircuts and shots, and they gave us a Bible and all of that business. Everything to me was just exciting, like being at a playground park or something. I recall thinking that it was fun; it was so different in 1948. The song then was, "Nothing Can Stop the Army Air Corps." We still sang that. We wore the OD [Olive Drab] uniforms, but we had an Air Force patch, of course, on our shoulder to identify that we were in the Air Force.

Commenting on the issue of segregation, Tom and I went through basic training about the same time, in the 1948-era. I lived in a single-story, tar-paper barracks. Basic training was twelve weeks long. One of the most exciting things was when we were on a ten-minute break, and somebody would say, "Here they come now," and here would come a flight of the black airmen, marching by on their way to the firing range down toward Kelly Air Force Base.²⁶ We'd all rush out to the edge of the street to watch them march by because of their cadence, their marching skill, and their ability. It was really something to watch. One time a guy in my flight yelled something that was probably racially derogatory. The TI [Technical Instructor] heard it, and that kid got stood and braced and told, "You will not say anything as they march by." There was a lot of redneck-ism. Believe me, there were a lot of the guys from north and south who strongly believed that segregation was, in fact, the right thing. Later, when they sent me to Waco Air Force Base, Texas, segregation still existed. The blacks had their own guard house, their own motor pool, their own dining hall. When integration took place in the summer of 1949, there was

²⁶Blacks were excluded from the Air Corps until 1939. In that year the Air Corps was authorized by law to expand and mandated to accept blacks within its ranks. Once in the Air Corps, blacks were assigned to segregated units. Only reluctantly did the service allow them to pursue flying or technical training. Mirroring the pattern in the Army, black airmen were, by and large, relegated to what were known as "pick and shovel" menial tasks. Generally, black units were commanded by white officers. Despite the often outstanding performance of black flyers in World War II (the 99th Fighter Squadron won three Distinguished Unit Citations and no bomber entrusted to the 332d Fighter Group was ever lost to German interceptors), Army Air Forces and then Air Force leaders proved reluctant to accept their contributions. The strict segregation of the races within the service continued until after the issuance and implementation of Executive Order 9981 in 1948. Osur, pp. 20–38; Gropman, pp. 1–127.
considerable aggravation. I know that where I was, we were told that the first one of us that caused any problem that was racially-oriented would be subject to court-martial, and I think, for the most part, we got the word.

It was interesting to me because I grew up in Mulberry, Indiana, where I'm not sure I'd ever seen blacks. I'd never lived with them. I'd never gone to school with them. To me, they were different in appearance, but I had no reason to feel different toward them personally, so I couldn't accept why this segregation was taking place. To me personally, integration was somewhat of a natural thing. I couldn't understand why there was opposition, since I was an MP [Military Policeman] and by then had established some friendships with some of the black MPs. I can still recall vividly black airmen marching by and drawing comments. I remember one guy said, "Well, they might march good, but I understand they don't learn too quick. You know, academically they're slower and behind." That was the belief of many.

**Barnes:** I can support Bob in the things he's described to you. Both of us experienced different childhoods, mine in a mixed neighborhood and his with no exposure to any blacks. My first exposure to real segregation was in basic training; tech school was another experience. Friendships that developed in tech school on the base were shattered immediately outside the gate as establishments in the community were unwilling to accept blacks. As a black, you either lived with that attitude well or you didn't live with it well, and that shaped your success at the time. If you let discrimination become an internal issue for you, then early failure in the Air Force was a certainty. [Discrimination] affected your work. It wasn't so much that learning was difficult for blacks; instead, it was the stereotyping and the very real feeling that no matter what one did, it would have no real bearing

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27On July 26, 1948, President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 9981. The document did not directly call for the integration of the armed services; rather it declared "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Armed Services without regard to race" as national policy. When asked a few days later if this meant integration, Truman simply replied, "Yes." Even before the order was issued, the Air Force studied the possible ramifications of integration. The service already recognized the limitations and waste associated with a segregated force structure. Issued on May 11, 1949, Air Force Letter No. 35-3 spelled out the new policy of integration. Over the next several years, all-black units were disbanded and their members reassigned. The last all-black unit disbanded in June 1952. By most accounts integration of the troops proceeded rather smoothly. By the 1950s the Air Force was one of the most fully integrated institutions in American society. Gropman, pp. 86–142. See also McGregor, especially pp. 270–342, and Nalty, especially pp. 204–269.
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anyway. Thus, it tended to affect one's learning ability early on. So, jobs and/or duties were decided on that basis—educational performance. Hence, the feeling and the actual fact that blacks tended to get the dirty kinds of jobs. While AFSCs [Air Force Specialty Codes] were not a factor at that time—MOSs [Military Occupational Specialties] were the thing—it was the source for what were later called, "Ghetto AFSCs."²⁸ Ghetto AFSCs were jobs of servitude, service-oriented jobs, and this is where blacks went.

Gaylor: If I might—just a quick story, jumping all the way to 1958. By then we were eight years into integration, and by then, for the most part, it had settled into the Air Force, at least in people accepting one another. In 1958 I managed the Lackland [Air Force Base, Texas] baseball team. We left Lackland on a bus to go to Alpine, Texas, to play three baseball games. I had three black baseball players. At a restaurant in Uvalde, Texas, we stopped to eat, and the guy said, "I'll feed the blacks, but they have to come around to the back door. They cannot come into the main restaurant. I'll gladly feed them. I hope you can understand that I can't allow them in." Once again, that was a surprise to me because by then acceptance of the racial situation in the military was far along, but this was happening in 1958. I said, "Then none of us will eat there, and you'll lose about fifty or sixty dollars of business." We got back on the bus and drove on into Del Rio and found a place to eat.

I remember, too, that when blacks did move into our dormitories, things changed. The music changed. Everybody had their own little record player with the seventy-eight RPM, and I was hearing different music than I had ever heard before. I was hearing Billie Holiday and Billy Eckstein. The smells changed. I just mean the cosmetics, for example, the shaving lotions. Noxema was very popular then. It was very common for blacks to have it. I remember some of them going to bed at night with Noxema on their faces and cloths over them. I'm not sure what the reason was.

Barnes: I can explain that later, and I will.

²⁸ When the Air Force first became independent, it inherited the Army's Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) system used during World War II. The new Air Force, however, realized that the old Army system did not fit the newly independent service, with its many highly technical specialties and few enlisted combat specialties. In 1951 the Air Force introduced a revised system of Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC), which eliminated unneeded Army jobs and defined new technology-based Air Force specialties. Bruce D. Callender, "The Evolution of the Air Force NCO," *Air Force*, September 1986 (Vol. 69, No. 9), p. 169.
Gaylor:  Go ahead. I just wanted to say it was interesting.

Barnes:  What Bob touched on turned out to be a major problem and a part of the turbulence in the sixties. For blacks the frequent requirement for shaving was, early on, a problem because of pseudo-folliculitis.

Gaylor:  Which in the fifties we knew nothing about.

Barnes:  We didn't know about it. Noxema was the only medicating cream that tended to soothe it to some degree. The shaving process was one that tended, given the natural tendencies of black hair to curl inward, to make the freshly shaven hair come out and turn in—the two ends of the hair went down into the face, the follicle end and the other end turned inward. That caused a razor bump. Shaving cut the bump, and the two ends of the hair were down. There was scar tissue which in time built up, and every time you shaved, you actually bled. But the requirement was to shave. Because this situation was little understood, when "mixed" TIs got into the picture; it was brutal. So the Noxema cream and the cloth over it, generally a hot cloth, was an effort to soothe the pain, but it hardly ever did.

The smells Bob talked about earlier probably had at one point a sulphur-like smell, maybe like rotten eggs. This was an early effort at a shaving powder, a depilatory powder, called Magic. Now it was scented and came in several strengths. It didn't shave; it drew the hair out. It was preferred as opposed to shaving. That was little understood and tended to become a part of the already strained relationship between the races, and an association of smells with blacks.

Gaylor:  It gave ample opportunity for those who chose to comment to do so.

Barnes:  It was really a rugged situation. Commanders and First Sergeants were very removed from this issue simply because of the authority figure of the corporal—like Don described—who was God Almighty.

Gaylor:  You have to appreciate that we were in an open bay barracks. That point has not been made. We are not talking about rooms. We're talking about thirty-eight guys thrown together in one large room, with absolutely no privacy whatsoever. Even in the latrines, there were no stalls. My God, you sat knee to knee, six of you, in there, and that's where the phrase "——house rumor" started—a latrine rumor. It was a commu-
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nity of sorts. You could sit there on your footlocker shining your shoes and look across and see what the guy was doing that was different, and say to yourself, “Isn’t that unusual?” There were fights, sure there were, but, for the most part, they were covered up because you knew everybody would get into trouble. There were fisticuffs and shovings and the what-have-you-here when somebody would get a little too much to drink and come in and turn the lights on late at night with everybody else trying to sleep. I’m surprised we made it through as well as we did. I think there was a tolerance and an acceptance that at the time we didn’t appreciate as we look back now.

Airey: When this whole integration program started, I was a master sergeant. We were briefed and warned that it would be our duty to suppress any type of racism. I think the Air Force handled it well, and it was a very smooth operation. First of all, no organization would have at that time a strength of over 10 percent black. Then it slowly developed into what we know today. It just did not happen overnight. We went to lectures and briefings prior to its happening.29 That’s why, I think, integration went into effect in rather a smooth transition.

Enlisted and Officer in the New Air Force

Kohn: What was the relationship in those times between officer and enlisted? Is there a way to describe it? Also, I think we would all be interested, too, in the relationship between new airmen or new privates and the TIs [Technical Instructors] and the NCO. Can you talk about that a little bit?

Gaylor: I know in 1948 a corporal was God [laughter]. Our TI was a corporal. And officers, my gosh, when they said the lieutenant or captain was coming, that was the same as saying the Pope was coming. In my early

29During the time between the issuance of Executive Order 9981 and Air Force implementation, all officers and NCOs were required to attend special orientations on race relations. Entitled “Negro Manpower,” the lectures dealt with such subjects as encouraging those involved to “make it easy,” brotherhood, and the contributions blacks had made and were making to the Air Force. Telephone interview, Janet R. Bednarek with CMSAF Paul W. Airey, Ret.
days there weren’t that many officers, and they were really something. You never thought that some of them might have been idiots. It turned out some of them were, but you never thought that.

Kohn: You mean you never said it, or you never thought it?

Gaylor: You just assumed an officer was sharp—until you got to know him better. Then you found out that a lot of them didn’t have their act together. The guys have heard me tell a story, and it’s a true story. Sitting out on the back steps of our dormitory there at Waco, Texas, those NCOs who’d seen action in World War II did the talking and we listened. They used to tell me, “Shut up and listen, Gaylor.” I remember being told, “The only way you can learn is to listen.” One guy one time said, “What possibly could you add to this conversation that would be of any significance?” For the most part, when you were around those seasoned NCOs, they did the talking and you listened. I even fantasized that someday I’d get to do the talking. Then I went to the NCO Academy, and they told me the one thing NCOs have to do is shut up and listen. I remember raising my hand and saying, “I got cheated. I never got to talk when I was an airman; I was told to shut up, and now that I’m an NCO I’m told to shut up.”

Harlow: The relationship between officer and enlisted at that time was structured. Unless you were a supervisor or a First Sergeant, you very seldom saw an officer or you very seldom talked to an officer.

Gaylor: What about the pay line?\textsuperscript{30}

Harlow: In the pay line, sometimes you might. Yes.

Gaylor: If you had to report to one, that was serious.

\textsuperscript{30}During the 1940s and into the 1950s, enlisted personnel received their pay (in the early years in cash) once a month from the paymaster. Airmen would line up, then approach the pay table. Four feet from the table they would stop, salute, and, upon request, give their name and identification number. Depending on the size of the unit, this activity could take up an entire day. The pay line eventually gave way to twice-a-month pay, bank checks, and, finally, direct deposit into personal bank accounts. Interview, Janet R. Bednarek with Lt Col Vance Mitchell, USAF, Ret.
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Barnes: I would support that. The officer-enlisted relationship was practically nonexistent.

Harlow: But they had fewer line officers in those days.

Barnes: That’s correct. The mission was so different at that time, and there were so few jobs in which both worked together. On the other hand, going back to the NCOs, I certainly agree with Bob about the awesome impact of a two-striper, a corporal.

Gaylor: You had to call, “Attention!” when he came in the door.

Barnes: Yes. He was for all practical purposes something just completely beyond belief. But I think it was at that very early point that the desire for growth and attainment of corporal became every airman’s, or private first class’s, goal. Then, in reaching that plateau, the buck sergeant had still another stripe. The staff sergeant was, as far as the NCO corps went, a plateau.31

The officer-enlisted relationship for me became a reality after I got onto flying status in the C–54, which was a crew airplane.32 I had to interface with officers. I found it to be, depending on the crews that I worked with, extremely good or extremely bad.

Gaylor: I would say extremely good, normally, in the air.

Barnes: Extremely good or extremely bad. There was no middle ground. When you had a crew that you learned to trust, and they learned to trust you because of the job you did, it was consistently good in the air and on

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31 From 1947 until 1952, the Air Force’s enlisted ranks were, like the Army’s, private, private first class, corporal, sergeant, staff sergeant, technical sergeant, and master sergeant. In 1952 sergeant changed to airman first class (A/1C), corporal to airman second class (A/2C), private first class to airman third class (A/3C), and private to basic airman.

32 The C–54 or Skymaster, a modified version of the Douglas DC–4, was used by the Air Force as a troop or cargo transport. This four-engine plane first went into production in 1942. In 1950 Douglas modified thirty of the planes to serve as air ambulances and the Military Air Transport Service used them to evacuate U.S. Korean War casualties from Japan to the United States. The C–54 carried a crew of six. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 1951–1952 (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, Ltd., 1951), pp. 231c–232c.
the ground. You were in that kind of relationship that continued even with other enlisted crew members. The radio operator, particularly, and the flight engineer were very close. Everybody worked together harmoniously in the airplane.

I found in other kinds of flying later on, where there were not opportunities for a crew—for example, a period when the pilot had the crew chief flying in the right seat; this was during T–11 and C–45 flying—that it was a different story.\textsuperscript{35} That kind of mission only involved the officer getting from point A to point B, and [the crew chief was] ancillary to that. Once you landed, he’d jump out. In those days the quarters situation for enlisted and officers was just drastically different. It was unbelievable. It was like the difference between living in a house and in a dog house.

\textbf{Gaylor:} When you went for your TDY [Temporary Duty] pay, there was a very definite difference.

\textbf{Kohn:} Enlisted got less TDY reimbursement?

\textbf{Barnes:} Absolutely.

\textbf{Gaylor:} Serving as crew in the air, there was tremendous teamwork and comradeship, but once you landed and went to sign into billeting, if you were at a foreign base, I guarantee you the quarters were different. The eating facilities were different. And the TDY reimbursements were different.

\textbf{Airey:} I’m going to take a little bit of exception to this discussion. In World War II, I ended up in a heavy bomb wing. I was an aerial

\textsuperscript{35}The Beechcraft T–11 Kansan served as a training plane for bombardiers and air-gunners beginning in World War II. It carried a crew of three or four and was similar in configuration to a C–45A. Also built by Beechcraft, the C–45 Voyager served as a military light transport aircraft. The twin-engine, six-to-eight-passenger monoplane could also be outfitted for vertical and oblique photography and had a range of 900 to 1,000 miles. \textit{Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 1942} (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1943), pp. 143c–146c. Chief Barnes spoke on the differences between serving as a member of a flight crew and riding as the crew chief in the right seat of a T–11 or C–45. On a crew airplane, each crew member had a mission in flight—flight engineer, radio operator, gunner. In the T–11 or C–45, the crew chief “went along for the ride.” While in flight, the crew chief had no mission. His mission was maintenance of the airplane on the ground.
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gunner/radio operator in a B–24, with six enlisted men and four officers. By the standards of today, we had a very formal relationship and atmosphere between us. Of course, I liked it that way, personally.

Gaylor: Yes, but Paul, you used the word “exception.” You’re talking about the early forties, and we’re talking about the fifties.

Airey: I think it was as I said. If you compare standards of flying crews, it was a very formal atmosphere compared to what we have today, and it continued to be that way. It just wasn’t informal on my crew. I think it was formal in the majority of them.

Kohn: Despite the fact that this was a combat airplane and you all fought together, depended on each other in a combat situation, it was quite formal?

Airey: That’s correct. I think it is, as I said before, very difficult to compare the past and the present.

Kohn: Let me ask you to turn to the period when Chief Barnes and Chief Gaylor were just coming into the Air Force. Chief Airey, you were then a senior NCO with World War II combat experience. What’s your perspective on that relationship between the veterans and the new airmen? I’m speaking about the late 1940s, in terms of taking these kids who had no experience in war, and perhaps not even the foreign travel that you had. You had been in combat. You had been shot at. You had been shooting at people. What was your opinion of these new airmen?

34 The B–24 Liberator developed by Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation was a four-engine bomber used by the United States Army Air Forces, the United States Navy and the British Royal Air Force during World War II. It initially carried a crew of six or nine. During the war, the B–24 was modified to include a top turret gunner for a crew of ten. A modified “Liberator III” served as a transport. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 1942, pp. 161c–162c; John W. R. Taylor, ed., Combat Aircraft of the World from 1909 to the Present (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1969), pp. 462–464. On the B–24 every crew member but the pilot served as an aerial gunner during an attack. When not under attack, the radio operator, among other things, operated the radio direction finder and radio compass and communicated with ground personnel. The Official Guide to the Army Air Forces: A Directory, Almanac and Chronicle of Achievement (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), pp. 43–44.
Airey: That I can compare. The vast difference is that today we're taught to lead people. It was General George Patton who said, "Wars are fought with weapons, but they are won by men." This is why we're trained in leadership. In those days it was more of a harsh, "Do It!" type of thing. There was a certain amount of fear... rule by fear, yelling and screaming, where today we're taught to lead people. It's a vast change and for the good as far as I'm concerned.

Harlow: Let me tell you a story about the old Army and how it used to be. When we left Fort Devers in 1942 and were going to basic training in the Air Corps at Atlantic City, New Jersey, they woke us up at 4 o'clock in the morning—there were some 250 of us going on the train. We had breakfast at 5, and were at the railroad station with our duffle bags and everything packed at 6 o'clock. The train came in at 9:30. Between 6 o'clock and 9:30, it started to rain. We had blue duffle bags because they were making them fast in those days to handle so many conscripts. When we got to Atlantic City, New Jersey, and got to the hotel, it was beautiful. You know, we stayed in hotels in World War II. We walked into our rooms, and found a surprise; they were stripped of everything—no beds, no dressers, no rugs, nothing but a footlocker and a GI cot.

Well, we got into the rooms, opened up our duffle bags, and every one of the uniforms, our underwear, everything, had streaks of blue. The duffle bag had gotten wet and all of the colors had run. So, of course, we had an inspection the next morning. It took them about two weeks before they issued us new uniforms. You don't have that today. We don't have the troops waiting three and a half or four hours for a train or something else.

Kohn: In the leadership style at that time, did you have to establish a physical prowess over the men that you dealt with?

Gaylor: In some cases, some did. They might not have had to, but they did. "If you can whip me, you can be the First Sergeant." I've heard that.

Harlow: There was a master sergeant who was the crew chief in one of the first units I was in. One of the one-striper's, a PFC [private first class], was always late. This master sergeant didn't have to go to the First Sergeant for discipline; he just grabbed this kid one morning when he was late and said, "Come with me." He walked him across the field and went to the mess sergeant and said, "I want you to put this kid to work on the dirtiest job you've got for two weeks." He turned around to the kid and said, "Now if I catch you goofing off again, I'm going to get you court-
martialied." That kid stayed there for two weeks. All the master sergeant
did was to call up the First Sergeant and tell him what he did.

**Gaylor:** In 1948 and 1949 World War II had been over about three or
four years. "This was the war to end all wars."35 There weren't going to be
any more wars. So I think we have to ask, "Who was in the enlisted ranks
in those days?" We had, I think, two categories of people: those who chose
to stay in because for some reason they preferred to, and those young'uns
like Tom and myself who were looking for a chance to travel, mature, and
grow up a bit. Then we'd probably return to where we were from and settle
down. I think we had those two categories—the crusty veterans like Paul,
who'd seen action in World War II, and then the young kids like us.36 In
many cases we were looked upon as young, snot-nosed kids who really had
never seen anything. "You've never been out of Peoria, Illinois." That's
why I think we were told, "Shut up and listen. You've never done anything,
and you've never been anywhere."

It might not be statistically correct, but I recall that in my unit in
Waco, Texas, of about seventy people, few had a high school diploma. It
was less than 20 percent; 18 sticks in my mind. I think, in fairness to those
who did not, many of them left high school to fight in the war and then
never had a chance to go back and get their diplomas. Later they did
through GED [General Equivalency Diploma]. Many of them even went
on and got their college degrees. But I think that it is important to ask:
Who was in the military at that time? Then, of course, when Korea broke
out in 1950, the force went from a rather small peacetime force to pretty
close to two million within a year. Tent cities were opened at Sheppard
and Lackland in Texas, at Parks, California, and up in Samson, New York.
Then the force changed dramatically.37 In 1948 and 1949 it was a little old

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35 Although that phrase was usually used in connection with World War I,
many felt that World War II would accomplish what the earlier conflict had not.

36 In 1948 and 1949 the newly independent Air Force began to expand. The
number of active duty enlisted personnel had reached a post-war low in June 1947,
standing at 263,029, as a result of the post-World War II rapid demobilization.
During the next two years, as the military in general expanded in the light of the
dawning Cold War, the number of Air Force enlisted personnel expanded to
337,435 and then to 359,636. *Selected Manpower Statistics, 1980*, p. 84.

37 Numbers of Air Force Enlisted Personnel, Korean War:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1950</td>
<td>352,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1951</td>
<td>678,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1952</td>
<td>847,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1953</td>
<td>837,667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Selected Manpower Statistics, 1980*, p. 84.
sleepy Air Force. The most exciting thing going on was the Berlin Airlift, and unless you were a part of that you weren't really affected by it. So, to me, there was a very dramatic change in mid-1950 when the Korean conflict broke out.

Airey: I'd like to back up something that Bob said. Suddenly we'd won World War II. By early 1945 we'd already won the war in Europe, and a couple of months later the bomb was dropped in Japan. All of a sudden the war was over.

Gaylord: There was nothing to do, no wars to fight.

Airey: The main thing was that the United States Army Air Forces suddenly realized that we were going to have to become part of an army of occupation. Anyone who'd said in 1945 that in 1987 we'd still have several hundred thousand troops overseas, would have been thought to be out of his gourd. We suddenly found out that we were going to have to keep a fair-sized standing armed force in peacetime. So, immediately, a reenlistment bill came out. You got out, Don. They offered men the chance to reenlist with the rank they held previously. We all had temporary ranks. The Air Force went on a major pitch to get people to stay in. Of course, I always had a liking for it. I wanted to stay in, and I did. What I'm leading

38 After World War II the Allies divided Germany into four zones of occupation: American, British, French, and Soviet. Berlin, the former capital, while in the Soviet zone of occupation, was similarly divided among the four powers. In June 1948, attempting to force evacuation of the city by the Western forces, the Soviets cut off all rail, barge, and highway traffic into the American, English and French parts of the city. The only remaining contact was by air, through three twenty-mile-wide air corridors. Immediately, the United States, England and France resolved to supply the city by air. From June 1948 until September 30, 1949, U.S. and British crews flying C-47 and C-54 transports airlifted 2.325 million tons of food, fuel, and supplies. Despite the round-the-clock schedule and adverse flying conditions, only thirty-one Americans lost their lives in twelve crashes. In addition to lives lost, Operation VITTLES, as it was named, cost $181.3 million. See Goldberg, pp. 235–241, and Roger D. Launius, "The Berlin Airlift: Constructive Air Power," Air Power History (Spring 1989), pp. 8–22.

39 The United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, August 6, 1945, and the second bomb on Nagasaki, Japan, August 9, 1945.

40 As part of the massive post-World War II demobilization, most servicemen and women chose to separate or join the reserves. In August 1945, Army Air Forces active duty personnel stood at 2,253,182 officers and enlisted personnel. By June 1946 the total had dropped to 455,515. It reached a post-World War II low of 303,614 in May 1946. Selected Manpower Statistics, 1980, p. 80.
THE ENLISTED EXPERIENCE

up to is this: In order to get these people to reenlist, there would be no quality control programs. There were a lot of people who stayed and reenlisted who we were stuck with for the next twenty years, and who, by today’s standards, would never be allowed to stay in the United States Air Force.

Gaylor: Some of them were criminals.

Airey: As I said, there were no quality control programs. Many of these people never did anything that you could court-martial them for or throw them out for, but they never did anything the other way either. We were stuck with a lot of them. The quality control program that Bob started talking about, came in at about the time of the Korean War. We started getting more selective.41

Harlow: I remember another thing about the officer corps. Between the end of World War II and, say, 1949—before the Korean War—officers were mostly pilots, and they had a few extra administrative jobs. But when the Korean War broke out, they took a lot of these pilots and gave them a specific job, like director of personnel in small units, and things like that. I remember that when I got recalled in 1950 and went to Travis Air Force Base [California], I was amazed at how little was actually being done in the personnel field. We used to have what was called the personnel report, the P-3 report.42 When I got in there the captain I was working for at that time said, “You know, we’ve submitted a P-3 report for the last nine

41In response to the critical manpower needs brought on by the Korean conflict, Congress significantly lowered the mental standards for induction. None of the services was pleased with that action. After 1953 each service apparently reinterpreted the standards, and rejection rates rose dramatically. In 1953 Congress further modified the standards to exclude more Class IV individuals from induction. The Selective Service divided potential draftees into four broad classes based on age, mental abilities, number of children, prior service, being a sole surviving son, and being a conscientious objector. Class I individuals were the most desirable to the services—young, single, healthy and with an above-average mental aptitude. Class IV were the least desirable—older, married, with dependents, and with certain physical or mental limitations. This measure, along with better pay and benefits, allowed the services to be more selective and helped increase retention. James M. Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement, 1945-1970 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971), pp. 219–221, 236–237.

42According to Chief Harlow, the P-3 report was a monthly personnel report compiled from the daily reports.
months and we've never got one right yet." I had to get the personnel troops to work at night. We'd take the morning report and the P-3 report and start going down the page name by name before we finally got it straightened out. Before that war, everyone was relaxed. There was no war to fight, so it was "close enough." But then all of a sudden the Korean War started, and they started recalling those second lieutenants. I remember the first officer I had assigned to me after I got recalled was a second lieutenant, John Hood. He turned out to be a fine officer.

Kohn: Before we discuss Korea, I want to raise just one other early question, and that is family life. People weren't married, were they, Chief Airey?

Airey: Oh, yes.

Harlow: Lots of people were married.

Gaylor: No. Most enlisted people didn't marry. My gosh, you had to be a tech or a master. I don't remember a corporal or a buck sergeant getting married in 1948.

Airey: I think you're right, but let's break it down. Actually, in World War II, there were thousands and thousands of married people who got drafted or enlisted. But when we went into the peacetime years, very few of the young people were married. It was a different situation.

Barnes: Quite frankly, marriage was discouraged. It was also a barrier to flying, to OCS, or OTS at that time. If you were married, OTS pay would not support you and a family.43

43 The Army's first Officer Candidate School (OCS) opened in February 1941 to train exceptional enlisted personnel for commissions. It remained a primary route for advancement to the officer ranks until it closed in 1963. Between 1959 and 1963 the Air Force introduced a new system of training enlisted college graduates for the officer ranks. The Airman Education and Commissioning Program (AECP) paid for two years of college education. After completion, AECP-sponsored graduates and enlisted personnel who had otherwise received a college degree could go through the new Officer Training School (OTS) opened in 1957. OTS also provided training for civilian non-ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) college graduates. Col Donald J. Ferris, "Texas Training Ground for USAF Leaders," Air Force, March 1968 (Vol. 51, No. 3), pp. 96–100.
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Gaylor: You had to get permission from your squadron commander. He had to approve, and he had to sign. Two guys that I joined with, Clyde Beaver and Eldon Skyles—we all signed up for three-year enlistments—got married to Indiana girls a year after they enlisted and were immediately let out of the service. There was a provision that if you got married and you were a one-striper, you could leave the service. And they did. They each served a year and have never been back in since.

Barnes: Marriage really was discouraged. Quite frankly, while we haven’t said it, we’ve talked around it. I remember the old saying: “If they wanted you to have a wife, they’d have issued you one.” That was the general feeling about marriage and family. So, there was little family life, in a direct answer to your question, during that period.

Kohn: Then, if you were a married airman or junior NCO, there was no housing for you, was there? Did you have to live off base?

Barnes: Yes. There was no housing.

Harlow: There was no housing to begin with. In 1943 I went back to Massachusetts and got married. The commander told me, “Now if you want to bring your wife down here, it’s up to you. You’ve got to find a place to live, and she’s got to find a place to live. There’s nothing else. You make an allotment out to her. That’s fine.” That was it. They provided nothing.

Barnes: The allotment was the only provision. It was a big deal.\footnote{The allotment system allowed a portion of a serviceman’s pay to be disbursed to a designated individual. There were several classes of allotments, including Class B for the purchase of U.S. savings bonds, Classes D and N for payment of premiums on life insurance policies, Class Q for support of a dependent (spouse or child), and Class QP for support of a dependent parent. For airmen, Class Q allotment payments were mandatory if the airman had a spouse or child; for officers, it was voluntary. The United States Air Force Dictionary (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: The Air University Press, 1956).}

Gaylor: Keep in mind the allotment was also an authoritarian action. The thinking was, “There’s no way that we can trust an authoritarian to receive all his money and take it home to his family.” So the wife got an allotment check on about the third of the month that only she could cash.

\footnote{The allotment system allowed a portion of a serviceman’s pay to be disbursed to a designated individual. There were several classes of allotments, including Class B for the purchase of U.S. savings bonds, Classes D and N for payment of premiums on life insurance policies, Class Q for support of a dependent (spouse or child), and Class QP for support of a dependent parent. For airmen, Class Q allotment payments were mandatory if the airman had a spouse or child; for officers, it was voluntary. The United States Air Force Dictionary (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: The Air University Press, 1956).}
Kohn: Simply because the institution did not trust the enlisted person?

Gaylor: Yes. The institution didn’t trust you with the money.

Barnes: It was a mandated thing.

Gaylor: There’s something else I think is very important. I spoke of the year 1948 as being different from 1950 when Korea broke out. My experience is a good example of the difference. I joined in 1948, made corporal in May 1949. I made corporal in eight months. I made buck sergeant three months later, in July 1949. Then Korea broke out, and everybody that was present for duty and breathing got promoted to make way for this mass influx of new people. I made staff in two years. Now, you talk to a guy who came in 1950, and you’ll find that rank slowed down. As a matter of fact, the police career field froze in 1956. So timing was important. You say, “My goosh, Bob, you moved up the ladder fast.” But I was sitting there, and they said, “Bob, here’s another stripe.”

At the small base that I was at—James Connally [Texas], which was changed from Waco to James Connally in 1949—everybody got promoted simply for being present for duty.

Kohn: Chief Gaylor, did that cause any problems?

Gaylor: Yes. There was the problem of having a very young NCO force at the time when the Korean War broke out. Here we were: I’m running around with four stripes on my arm and I’m twenty years old. There were no leadership schools and no leadership training, so the only way to go would be to stand up and say, “I’m the staff sergeant. You’ve got to do what I say.” The old “count-the-stripes-on-my-arm” business. You had to

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45 Recognizing that NCOs needed more than just their stripes to effectively serve as leaders, the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and the Strategic Air Command (SAC) opened the first NCO academies to prepare the new sergeants for roles of greater responsibility. In 1950 Gen John K. Cannon, Commander-in-Chief, USAFE, established the first NCO Academy in Wiesbaden, West Germany, to improve NCO leadership and management skills. The school closed, however, in March 1951. SAC began a more sustained effort at providing academies in November 1952 when it opened its first school in West Drayton, England. Other commands soon followed SAC’s example. TSgt Harold L. Craver, “Schools for Air Force Sergeants,” The Airman (October 1958), pp. 12-13.
literally inherit and practice the authoritarian approach because you didn't have the knowledge and the skills to use another approach.

Airey: Let me give you some of the rationale and the history behind that, Bob. When World War II finished, and Don will remember, they allowed every commissioned officer—pilot, bombardier, navigator—whatever his specialty was—to reenlist as a master sergeant, automatically.\textsuperscript{46} This played havoc with promotions. There were no promotions until the Korean War broke out, or close to that time. Bob, you fell right into that period. But from 1945 until 1950, that five-year period, it was starvation. Then all these master sergeants who were officers got recalled back to their jobs as pilots or navigators.

Kohn: So they had been master sergeants for five years in the enlisted force and then...

Gaylor: Yes. The highest rank was master. Nobody could make master; it was all sealed up.

Harlow: Even all the warrant officers became master sergeants.

Kohn: We had warrant officers then, too?

Gaylor: They stopped making warrant officers in 1959 when the super grades came out.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{46}In 1948 the Air Force announced a program which permitted all veterans of any service to reenter the armed forces as part of the Air Force. If they qualified in any needed skills, they could reenlist directly in grades as high as technical sergeant. Former officers could re-enlist as high as master sergeant. \textit{Air Force} (January 1948), after p. 48, inside back cover.

\textsuperscript{47}When the Air Force became an independent service, it inherited the Army's career system which included the warrant officer (WO), enlisted personnel who had moved into top (supervisory) positions. The creation of the “supergrades,” E-8 and E-9, in 1958 did not end the warrant officer system. However, nine months after those grades were introduced, the Air Force stopped promotions to warrant officer. In November 1958, the Air Force had 4,445 warrant officers, grades W-1 through W-4. The numbers diminished gradually over the next two decades and the last Air Force warrant officers retired in the late 1970s. Callender, pp. 168–173; \textit{Selected Manpower Statistics}, 1959, p. 29; 1980, p. 74.
Airey: Only warrant officers, flight officers, and officers were allowed to reenlist as master sergeants, and that really—I don't want to use the other term—"flubbed" things up badly.

Gaylor: We had one in our squadron. He was a master sergeant, and he had wings and ribbons.

Harlow: I got discharged in 1945 as a staff sergeant. Of course, I was in the Reserves.

Gaylor: You see, here's the difference. Don chose to get out, as most did. Paul chose to stay in, as few did. He explained that he liked, as they used to say, "Three hots and a cot." You got three meals and a place to live, whereas Don said, "The war's over; I'm now going back to what I was doing previously." Then along came Korea, and guys like Don got a letter saying, "You are welcome to come back in. Please do." Many of those guys were immediately sent off to Korea, and those of us on active duty stayed in the States. A lot of the guys who went to Korea were out of Guard and Reserve units. I guess the Air Force figured they had previous experience and were best prepared to fight the war. So they were on their way to Pusan. Those of us on active duty said, "Let them go to those 'far away places with strange sounding names.'"

The Korean War

Kohn: Let's talk about Korea. You've already described some massive changes in the character of the enlisted force, the expansion, the change in ranks.

Harlow: That's when the officer corps started to proliferate. That's when we got a lot of line officers on board.

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Gaylor: Initially, Korea was a gnat on a mule's butt. Everybody said, "What's going on over there? Send a few people over there and quell that disturbance." America—the general population—never accepted Korea. It was just as I said, a gnat: "Go over there and swat it." Most people don't realize we lost thousands and thousands of men over there to death and injury.49 It was the first war that we never won. The only people who cared about it were those who fought there, or the families of those who were there. The rest just sort of laid back and said, "What the hell."

Barnes: I think I can add some to what Bob has said about the attitudes concerning Korea since the organization I was in, which was a troop carrier squadron, prepared for a thirty-day TDY to Japan in support of U.S. forces in Korea. We were to fly from southern Japan, from Ashiya Air Base, to all of the Korean "K" designations, K-whatever.50

Kohn: We designated our bases by "K"?


Gaylor: Kimpo was K-14; K-55 was Osan.

Barnes: The preparations to move the entire organization were smooth. [They] took into consideration tools and equipment needed to support the airplanes, supplies necessary to support the airplanes, and personal belongings to carry one for the designated period. Thirty days, as Bob said, was the "attitude." That was what we went to do. Unfortunately for some, they took only thirty days' worth of belongings. Personally, I hate to leave anything behind. That's why I brought my bag today. I hate to leave

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49 In Korea 33,629 Americans died in combat and another 20,617 in non-combat situations. Of those, Air Force personnel made up about 1,200 of the battle dead and 5,884 of other casualties. In addition, 102,284 were wounded (368 from the Air Force) and 5,866 were missing in action (859 from the Air Force). Selected Manpower Statistics, 1980, p. 153.

anything. I took everything I had at the time. Now, one of the major
differences at that time was that in an overseas deployment, there were no
civilian clothes permitted. That cut your baggage right in half. The civilian
clothes that you could wear in the States, of necessity, needed to be sent
home, stored, or something. I took my military belongings in toto, which
was all I could take. At the end of thirty days there was an extension of
another thirty days to deal with this action that Bob described, and then at
the end of that, another extension. This went on for eleven months. Then
they made my squadron return to the States “on paper” and sent another
squadron over “on paper.” We stayed in Korea. At the end of the eleventh
month, the TDY ended and a PCS [Permanent Change of Station] went
into effect, and my TDY overseas had become a very realistic overseas
tour.

Harlow: Let’s talk about the politics of that, too.

Barnes: That lay in the mindset of the Congress, the military services,
and our society in general as regards the Korean War.

Gaylor: We never planned for that war. We fought it day to day, really.
We never sat down and planned for it. As Tom said, we did after-the-fact
stuff to justify what had already happened. If you were caught up in it, you
said, “Goodbye, I’ll see you later,” to your loved ones, and you didn’t know
when that “later” might be because you might just end up at Okinawa.
They flew some activities out of Okinawa and Japan.

Kohn: It must have been hard duty because the support structure wasn’t
in place, and that’s a pretty harsh climate and a pretty harsh place.

Gaylor: It was harsh because nobody appreciated it. I was in Korea, and I
went to Japan for a three-day TDY and the good life. They had $2,000
bingo jackpots and slot machines and 25¢ steaks, Kobi beef! Then you
went back to Korea, and you didn’t have any equipment. You froze to
death. You brushed your teeth out of a canteen. Nobody knew there was a
war going on except those who were immediately associated with it.

51 “Kobi beef” was a slang term for a generous prime cut of grain-fed,
pea-raised beef. “Kobi” was a corruption of the name of a Japanese city, Kobe.
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Harlow: I was in charge of the personnel records for the 5th and 9th Maintenance Squadrons. The word came down that the 5th Maintenance Squadron was going to go to Korea, so we had to prepare what they called mobility records—boxes to put the assignments in, orders, and everything else—and get them ready to go. Forty days later the word came down that, no, it was going to be the 9th Maintenance Squadron. So we go through the whole personnel process again, take the records out to issue new orders, sign the records off, put them back in the boxes, and get them ready to go. That occurred four times. The problem was that the officers and NCOs were being transferred from the 5th to the 9th, from the 9th to the 5th, from the 5th to the 9th.

Kohn: To avoid going?

Harlow: Yes. They didn't want to go.

Harlow: We had them all set up. The 9th was the one to go! I got a call at 6:30 one night. I was just getting ready to go home. They said, “The 5th Maintenance is leaving. Get their records ready.” No time to transfer anybody. And that’s what happened.

Gaytor: A point that may be of interest is that in June of 1950 when Korea erupted, there were those in the military who appreciated and enjoyed a good fight, a good skirmish, a good war. Some people thrive on it. It's the very reason for which they joined. They're disappointed if there isn't one. I happened to have a boss like that at Waco, Texas—our provost marshal, Maj. Albert Fallon. Shortly after the conflict broke out, we guarded the base water tower. We guarded the water pumping station. We guarded the fuel storage area. He convinced the base commander to supplement the police force with clerks and food service people. In addition to their duties they pulled guard duty. We fortified Waco. You could never have captured us. You could've overrun Taegon, Korea, but you would never have captured Waco, Texas. He was so excited and caught up in it. I'll never forget him. He used to hold briefings on "A slip of the lip might sink a ship," and "When you're downtown having a beer, don't say anything that would indicate troop movements." He was really excited that we were back into an actual war. I'll never forget it. Many of us said, especially if we walked around the water tower for eight hours, "Why are we doing this?" He said, "Because, you know, this could escalate into a war." That was a reality, and I don't think that Waco was the only place
where that happened. There were many who sort of got caught up in it; it was the opportunity to do their thing.

Barnes: I was away at a school when the announcement came for the organization I was in, the troop carrier squadron, to go to Korea. I was a hydraulic specialist at the time and had gone from McChord Air Base [Washington] to Great Falls Air Base [Montana] to learn the C-54’s hydraulic systems. When I got back to McChord, following that school, the announcement to go to Korea came in mid-week, I think on a Wednesday morning. The squadron was assembled in a hangar, and our commander stood up on a B-4 maintenance stand and told us that Saturday morning the airplanes would be loaded and take off for Korea.

That was all the lead time you had. My point in mentioning this is that if you had a family, wherever it was, you had from Wednesday to late Friday night to settle whatever you needed to settle—to get the wife a power of attorney, which is about the only thing you had, and let her handle things.

Gaylor: If you had a family, you were the only one who cared. Nobody else did.

Barnes: Yes, you really had a problem and they gave you just that long. Saturday morning at the designated time, the first airplanes began taking off. Between that announcement and Saturday the entire priority of that squadron was in banding up equipment, getting it in, and getting our clothes stored and put away. In whatever time was left, you [handled] your personal affairs. I want to highlight and underscore my point: That Wednesday we got the notice and Saturday we moved out.

Kolin: It was a different time, a different Air Force, and...a different attitude then towards our people.

Barnes: Precisely that, a difference in attitude about people.

Gaylor: “Your butt belongs to Uncle Sam,” was fairly well the motto, and you had to respond to it. It’s interesting that none of us actually rebelled against it. We accepted it. I accepted it. I don’t recall ever considering mutiny.
**THE ENLISTED EXPERIENCE**

**Barnes:** I don't either, and I don't recall hearing anybody complain.

**Gaylor:** There was the griping, what I call the healthy griping—"Hurry up and wait," "Here we go again"—but there was an acceptance. "You signed on. You are here because you indicated you wanted to be. Now, get on with what we've told you to do."

**Barnes:** I think, too, that our acceptance, which was different from what would come later, was the product of our society. I think it had to do with school. I think it had to do with parent-child relationships, and of not questioning what you had to do. You just got on with the job. I think some things happened in our society later that caused a change. That's why there was no complaining. The product was reflected in the acceptance of the job at hand. Otherwise the country, militarily, would not have been as successful as it has been.

**Harlow:** In those days, many of the troops that came into the service lived better, some of them, than they did at home. They didn't have their own bedrooms. They didn't have a lot of things that they got in the Air Force.

**Gaylor:** One thing we haven't addressed is that in 1948 there was a provision that you could come in for one year and then you had a five-year reserve commitment. I would say half of my flight at Lackland in basic training in 1948 were one-year men. They were called one-year men—"Oh, you're a one-year guy." A lot of them were in my unit at Waco, and after a year they disappeared. The one-year program with the five-year commitment continued until Korea. Then they went from the three-year enlistment to the four-year enlistment. So, there were a lot of guys who came in, spent their year, barely began to wear their uniforms out a bit, and then left the service and went back into a Reserve component.

**Harlow:** They also went into the indefinite enlistment, too.

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52 The Selective Service Act of 1948 allowed a limited number of eighteen-year-olds (the draft age was then nineteen) "to enlist for one year of active training and service, to be followed by four years of compulsory service in an organized reserve unit (or six years in a reserve pool)." Gerhardt, p. 105.
Gaylor: Well, yes. You couldn’t get out. You had the Truman year. You could either reenlist, or you were extended.\textsuperscript{53} I reenlisted because the $150 bonus enticed me. I was able to buy a car.

Kohn: You figured you would get extended year-to-year anyway.

Gaylor: Yes. I was a Republican, and I wasn’t going to let Truman put anything over on me! I said, “I’ll fix him; I’ll reenlist!” I did and bought a 1939 Chevy and lived happily ever after. That’s another point. In 1949 in my unit at Waco there were four cars out of eighty people. The commander had a car. The First Sergeant, John McKay, had a car. A master sergeant, Buff Howard, had an old beat-up Buick. There was a staff sergeant with a Cadillac, and to this day I’ve never figured out how he got it. For a quarter a person he gave us a ride into Waco; it was seven miles [away]. Four or five of us would chip in a quarter apiece, and he—Sergeant Daniel was his name—would take us into Waco, but not bring us back. He’d take us in, and then we’d hitchhike back or get back the best we could. There were no cars, and there were no families to speak of.

Harlow: There were a lot of camp followers.

Gaylor: Now that was the exciting part.

Barnes: Is that what you called them?

Harlow: In those days we called them camp followers.

Kohn: They were around every base?

Gaylor: Sure. You knew where they hung out. We got paid on the last day of the month. We were told, “Buy your toilet articles as soon as you get paid.” Almost invariably you ran out about halfway through. Also, they

\textsuperscript{53}In order to expand the manpower pool rapidly, the Truman administration made several proposals including extending for one year enlistments due to expire during fiscal years 1951 and 1952. Other, more controversial, proposals included lowering the induction age from nineteen to eighteen and extending the involuntary service obligation from twenty-one to twenty-seven months. Gerhardt, p. 149.
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told us, “Buy your cigarettes, so that you’re not begging. And shoot whatever’s left, after you pay your GI laundry, give a dollar to the Red Cross, and pay your jawbone poker debts.” The rest was yours, and that amounted to maybe about twelve bucks, so you went to a lot of base movies at a quarter each and you played a lot of sports. That’s when I got caught up in literally every competitive sport.

**Harlow:** The other reason for the ladies around the camps was they’d heard about the allotments. They were looking to get married, and then they’d get the allotment.

**Gayelor:** And some of them were just prostitutes. Oh, yes, you could fall in love. I had one guy who worked for me who was from Brooklyn. Every payday, he got a three-day pass. It would take him just that long to spend his money. When his time was up, he’d sober up and come back and work hard for twenty-seven days. He was our gun room man, our armorer. We facilitated things by giving him a three-day pass. He had a standing pass authorized so that every payday he was off for three days. He’d go do his thing and then come back and work like crazy the rest of the month.

In the 1948–1949 era you were able to do those things because we weren’t fighting anybody. There was no threat of war, so the attitude was, “Don’t get too heated up about it; take things easy.” If a guy came to work drunk, you indicated he’d been given the night off. I remember that was a frequent occurrence—unless you didn’t like him. Then you reported him unfit for duty: Article 104. What is now Article 15, the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] hadn’t come out yet. So you really had to goof

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54 Article 104 under the *Articles of War* and Article 15 under the *Uniform Code of Military Justice* both outline a commanding officer’s authority in the area of non-judicial punishment. They indicate what punishments a commanding officer may impose for minor offenses. The Continental Congress adopted the first *Articles of War* in 1775. These did not deal with non-judicial punishment. Despite a frequent concern over whether such action was legal, all summary punishment from 1775 until 1916 was imposed without Congressional sanction. Congress added Article 104 in 1916 after concern was raised once again over the legality of summary punishment without statutory authority or due process. Article 104 essentially outlined the types of punishment that might be meted out for minor offenses. A revision in 1920 limited the duration of punishments to one week. After World War II Congress held a number of hearings on the military justice system and as a result adopted the *Uniform Code of Military Justice* in 1950. The provisions of Article 104 were incorporated in Article 15. The revised Article 15 contained a more detailed list of punishments, a provision extending the duration of punishments to two weeks, several exceptions for Naval personnel attached to or em-
up to get into trouble. They used to post on the bulletin board, “So-and-so, seven days restriction.” That meant, “The rest of you read this so you know that you can be punished.”

**Barnes:** I think what was interesting, too, at that time was that there was no double jeopardy. You could go in town and really screw up, and if you got back in the base gate, you were clean as a whistle. You had no relationship with the town. I’m serious. There were many dead heats in races with local authorities to the gate.

**Gaylor:** You may have had to lay low for a while, but you dared not go downtown.

**Barnes:** I need to clarify that I’m only making a point. I’m not saying that I did that! If I can digress a little bit, we’re still talking about the late 1940s and early 1950s. I’d gone through basic training and been overseas and back. I didn’t come back to McChord; I ended up at Westover, Massachusetts. The Air Force got new airplanes and I got out of C-54s and into C-118s. I had one of the first C-118s in the Air Force. They were so new, as a matter of fact, that there was no school, no FTD [Field Training Detachment], and I went for training to a Navy school. The Navy called the thing an R6D, if I’m not mistaken.\(^5\)

At some point I got a TDY back to Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio [Texas]. San Antonio, because of the Spanish influence, became a place I liked. I was fluent in Spanish, so I really kind of enjoyed that freedom in the community. That became an asset to me later on. When I went back, I was in the 1708th Ferry Group, which ferried airplanes


\(^5\) Douglas modified its DC-6 as a transport for the Air Force (C-118) and the Navy (R6D 1). In production until 1955, the military versions could carry 74 passengers, 60 stretchers, or 27,000 pounds of cargo. It featured controlled cabin pressurization and air conditioning, making possible the transport of perishable cargo at high altitudes. *Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 1959–1960* (New York: The McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959), pp. 295–296.
THE ENLISTED EXPERIENCE

around, and I made friends with a number of people, plus the other crews. The significance of this point is that instead of a First Sergeant, your crew commander was your direct overseer, your direct supervisor.

One day we went into San Antonio, down to Broadway near Breckenridge Park, which has been there a long time and has always been an attraction. There was a hamburger stand on Broadway, and I was riding in a 1949 Ford convertible with three flight engineers, and we drove in to get a hamburger. The carhops hooked the tray on the side of the car with the milkshakes and the hamburgers on it. As we sat there eating, we began talking generally about our jobs and the next mission. We went out on a rotational basis and picked up an airplane from a depot and delivered it to a command that needed it. You could dead head back—fly a commercial airplane back—or pick up another airplane that needed to go to the depot. We used Chico, California, and Tinker [Air Force Base, Oklahoma] and Davis-Monthan [Air Force Base, Arizona] as the three places where we dropped off airplanes and/or picked them up.

Then, the waitress's shift changed as we sat there eating. Our second order of hamburgers led to one of the biggest shocks in my life. While things, I thought, had settled down, the new waitress told the guy who was driving the car, “I can't serve you with him in the car.” We just ate! It was ridiculous. “Why was this?” She answered, “I don't make the rules; I just carry them out.” That was her attitude, different than the previous waitress, who made no issue of it. I said to my friends, “Rather than spoil it, I'll get out of the car and just wait for you guys.” “No,” they said, “don't do that. Stay in the car.” I thought, well, we'll leave and go somewhere else, but that didn't happen either. They tried to order again, and she said, “I'm sorry; I can't serve your car.” Then they said to me, “Tom, get out and go wait for us over there.” I went right to the corner of the lot. I was standing right there on the edge of the parking lot when she brought the hamburgers and milkshakes and was going to hook [the tray] on the side of the car. I saw trouble coming. One of the guys hit the tray, and it spilled all the stuff on the girl. We didn't pay, obviously, and we wheeled out.

They called the police, who stopped us on Broadway for two things—that incident and speeding. The guy in the right front of the car got out, went around to the police officer, and said, “Do you see that bump on my nose?” This guy did have a bump on his nose. The police officer looked at him and said, “Yes.” Then the guy said, “I'm going to put one on yours just like it,” and hit him in the nose and knocked him down on the ground. That's when I learned about dual carburetors and three-quarter racing cams! I didn't know that kind of power was in that little Ford, but it was really hot. We got back to Kelly, and it all stopped right there at the gate. I remember that incident. It gave me some concerns about going back into town for a while.
Gaylor: I think you're still wanted, Tom, in San Antonio. I recall now reading, "Wanted For Assault on a Policeman."

Barnes: There were very bad relationships between installations and communities that surrounded them.

Gaylor: They put Wichita Falls, Texas, off limits once to the Sheppard Air Force Base people in the early fifties. The relationship was very strained—"GIs and Dogs Stay Off the Grass."

Airey: Do you remember that to improve things they started paying the troops in two-dollar bills, to prove to the local civilians the impact of the money all over town?

Kohn: They issued two-dollar bills to the troops?

Airey: It wasn't every place, just a couple of commanders tried it. It silenced a lot of people because they saw all the two-dollar bills going through town.

Gaylor: Something else a little different that the airmen of today do not experience—and here they are sort of missing something—was the thrill of being at a processing place like Parks, California, for about six days, waiting to go overseas. It was the same at Camp Stoneman [California] or

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56 Problems between Sheppard Air Force Base and the community of Wichita Falls, Texas, began during World War II. During the war, Sheppard housed thousands of young airmen, yet the base lacked recreational facilities. So, every weekend up to 20,000 young airmen left base for town. There they came into conflict with locals, especially young men, who resented the airmen's presence. Trouble continued after the base reopened in 1948 as a major training center. In 1959 retired officer and Rotarian Lt Col Floyd Taylor suggested that local businesses adopt the squadrons stationed at Sheppard. At his suggestion, the Rotarians adopted the 3767th Student Squadron. They invited members of the squadron to attend Rotary luncheons and purchased a television for the squadron's day room. Other local groups and businesses followed and by the program's twenty-fifth anniversary, fifty-eight local adopters were participating. Although the fact that Sheppard Air Force Base became the town's largest employer may have helped improve relations, the Squadron Adoption Program undoubtedly played a major role in turning around what had been a very unpleasant situation. TSgt Jim Katzaman, "The Growing Legacy," Airman Vol. XXIX, No. 6 (June 1985), pp. 32–35.
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Fort Dix, New Jersey. That was an experience you would never forget. People today now report to Philadelphia and get on a big jet and fly to Europe for their assignment. But to lie around a processing center, a “repo depo,” for six days was an absolute thrill. You talk about a dehumanizing situation. You had four roll calls a day where you had to fall out to [prove] you were still there. They'd take the biggest idiot in the world and make him First Sergeant and roll call chief of that unit. You'd be subjected to things ... like inspections of your barracks. The guy would take the mirror to look down into the commode where it bends underneath to look and see if there was any rust down in there—I'm not exaggerating. [He'd look at] the buttons on your clothes. The harassment—you couldn't do anything to stop it. You actually prayed to be shipped. You prayed for your line number to be called, so you could get out of there. Then, when you arrived in Japan you went to Yamato Air Station for five days of processing before going on to Korea.

Barnes: Let me amplify that because I was at Camp Stoneman, California, in my “repo depo” thing. It followed my tech school. I had orders for an assignment called the MAJPAC [Major Air Command, Pacific]. Beyond that I didn’t know what the end destination was, but that was what my orders read, MAJPAC. While I was there at Camp Stoneman, I drew the clothing necessary for that assignment. I got to work in supply and issued arctic gear to the guys going over. I never saw so many different kinds of clothing in my life. It was during this period that Mr. Truman issued the desegregation order. So, I ended up going from Camp Stoneman to McChord in the integration spearhead. I went into that transport squadron as one of the first blacks; it was a real experience.

Kohn: You were in a “repo depo” at the first executive order on desegregation. Were there any experiences for you then that stand out?

Barnes: None that manifested at the “repo depo.” They really came after I arrived at McChord in the organization. It was an experience for them, and an experience for me, needless to say.

57 “Repo depo” was a slang term for a replacement center. During World War II it was also known as a “repple depple.” At replacement centers new troops (replacements) were processed before continuing on to their permanent duty assignments. Clark, Words of the Vietnam War, p. 432.
Kohn: Can we go back chronologically for a bit to the fifties? We've talked about the forties and then the changes in the Korean War. Let's discuss the changes in the fifties; did we have another postwar slump in the personnel ranks in 1953, 1954, and 1955?

Gaylor: It was a societal thing. Again, my own experience is an example. In 1954 my first child was born, in 1955 my second child was born, and in 1956 my third child was born. This was not uncommon. Americans had a lot of catching up to do, and we were doing it. The parents of that era, the Tom Barneses, the Paul Aireys, and the Don Harlows, said, "My kids are going to have it better. My kids are going to have things that I didn't have." There was nothing wrong with saying, "I never had a tricycle, but my kids are going to have one, and I'm going to save a little money away. They're going to go to college; I couldn't." That was a societal thing, and we were simply caught up in it.

Later in the 1960s, we went to Project 100,000 where somebody in Washington decided that every service had to take its share of those who didn't measure up aptitudinally to requirements.\(^\text{58}\) That was going on and the permissiveness that Don spoke of. Discharges went up. Article 15s went up. There were more AWOLs [Absent Without Leave]. There was a breakdown.\(^\text{59}\)

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\(^\text{58}\) Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara ordered the implementation of Project 100,000 in response to the high draft rejection rate among men from disadvantaged and minority backgrounds. McNamara expressed the belief that military training and discipline would help these individuals rise out of poverty once they returned to civilian life. He hoped that, eventually, up to 100,000 a year might be brought into the services under this "new standards" program. During the "pilot" year (1967), 49,000 entered the services, including 3,400 into the Air Force. Although the program had social merit, it taxed the recruiting and training efforts of all of the services and proved not very cost effective. Project 100,000 ended with the advent of the All-Volunteer Force. Robert McNamara, *The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 127–138; Warren A. Trest and Jay E. Hines, "Air Training Command's Support of Forces in Southeast Asia, 1961–1973" (History and Research Division of the Chief of Staff, HQ ATC, January 1978), pp. 21–23; William Leavitt, "Project 100,000: An Experiment in Salvaging People," *Air Force Magazine*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (January 1968), pp. 59–64.

\(^\text{59}\) The Office of Judge Advocate General did not keep records of Article 15 actions involving personnel in Project 100,000. The general impression was that Article 15 actions did increase during the late 1960s, but how much as a result of Project 100,000 and how much as a result of growing dissatisfaction with U.S. involvement in the Southeast Asian conflict cannot be easily ascertained.
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Airey: McNamara\textsuperscript{60} started one [of several reforms] during the Vietnam war, but the one Bob talks about was...


Harlow: This [Project 100.000] was when the hippies came in and everybody wanted long hair.

Gaylor: I got a bunch of cops in Laredo Air Force Base, Texas, that you couldn’t believe. They’d come to work, and I’d put them on base patrol, riding with one another. You’d see them driving by, and one would have his head on the window asleep. You’d call him in, and he’d say, “What’s wrong with that?” We were taking people into the force under Project 100,000—each service had to take so many Category IVs.\textsuperscript{61} Before, we were handpicking and culling the volunteers; we now had to take these men, and they were being placed in the soft-core [non-technical] career fields, like the cops, the cooks, and the civil engineers. We ended up with problems. When was the Code of Conduct established?

Harlow: After 1956.

Gaylor: Sure. Why was it that we didn’t need a code of conduct in World War II? Why all of a sudden did we need a fighting man’s creed and code? Because society was becoming more permissive.

\textsuperscript{60}Robert S. McNamara was Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968 under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. While secretary, McNamara introduced a series of comprehensive management reforms, collectively known as the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the Department of Defense. The idea was to eliminate duplication of effort in order to produce more defense with fewer resources. After becoming disillusioned with the war effort in Vietnam, McNamara left the Johnson administration in March 1968 to become the president of the World Bank. David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, Inc., 1969), pp. 214–240; McNamara, pp. 87–104.

\textsuperscript{61}The armed services divided inductees into four categories based in part on mental ability. Category I individuals scored the highest on the exams; Category IV, the lowest. Generally, the services, especially the Air Force with its great need for technically trainable people, accepted Category IV individuals with reluctance.
**The Korean War**

**Kohn:** Well... the Code of Conduct came out of the perceived behavior, or poor behavior, of our prisoners in the Korean War.

**Gaylor:** Exactly, but it was a reflection of society.

**Airey:** Eleven prisoners of war decided to stay.

**Gaylor:** More than that, twenty-five or twenty-six.\(^{62}\)

**Barnes:** Let me address that point about the prisoners because the attitude [of people] in Korea was very different from the [attitude] of people involved in World War II. What I mean is that we had a military capability in World War II and there was both the will and the commitment to use that capability as it developed. It wasn’t a latent capability. It was a developed capability, ending, as Paul said earlier, in the dropping of the bomb on Japan. The American public has always been attuned to a return for its investment, and Bob described the investment as one that cost in lives in Korea. The investment was high, but the return was the armistice at the 38th parallel which is still there today. There was nothing that people could say, “This is what I got for losing my son, my daughter, my father, my husband, or my brother in that conflict.” The American people as Korea went on were not supportive at all, and their attitude

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\(^{62}\) Following the Korean conflict, the American public believed that American prisoners of war (POWs) had proven ill-trained to withstand the rigors of incarceration and interrogation. Press reports insisted that few POWs had demonstrated remarkable valor and gave great weight to the fact that twenty-one prisoners finally refused repatriation, choosing instead to remain with their communist captors. Later investigations disproved many allegations and sought to dispel misconceptions. However, at the time most Americans believed there was a serious problem. In 1954 Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson appointed an all-service committee to investigate. The following year Brig Gen S.L.A. Marshall, USA, Ret., with assistance from other members of the committee, wrote a new Code of Conduct which detailed how American servicemen (and now women) were expected to behave while in captivity and went beyond the ambiguous “give only name, rank, serial number and date of birth” instructions in effect before the conflict. President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued the text of the code as part of Executive Order 10631 on August 17, 1955. See Albert D. Biderman, *March to Calumny: The Story of American POWs in the Korean War* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1963), especially pp. 1–26 and Maj G. S. Moakley, “U.S. Army Code of Conduct Training: Let the POWs Tell Their Stories” (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 11, 1976), especially pp. 21–50, 101–122.
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impacted on the behavior of the prisoners. I think there were disgraceful acts that occurred.

Gaylor: It was a different war. There was an inhumaneness over there from the people we were fighting.

Barnes: It differed from the kind of clear-cut lines in World War II.

Gaylor: If you’d gone to Korea in the fifties, you’d have sworn that the fighting was to have “the other guy take it.” You couldn’t imagine fighting to win that land. Korea was a desolate place. It was a horrible place. There was nothing there. It was just cold and barren and desolate and horrible and ugly.

Barnes: That’s what caused the change in attitude towards the prisoners and the breakdown. It was truly different.

Gaylor: “I didn’t come over here to get shot. I just want to get out of here.”

Barnes: The Airdift Times showed a PIO [Public Information Officer] sign on the side of an airplane after a salvage was done, and you had people right over there in the middle of the war, typing and reporting day by day. This influenced the fathers of the kids who later came along and gave us disciplinary problems. The fathers felt bad about their own involvement in a no-win war, knowing about [our] capability, [our] hands tied behind our backs. We couldn’t cross the Yalu River. We could chase airplanes to that point but couldn’t follow them across.63 This generated a mindset in America that partially carried on into Vietnam. As we hit a second war where we weren’t using all of our military capability, it got worse. The kids

63In order not to widen the war, the Truman administration restricted the air battle to Korea. For example, Chinese bases were strictly off-limits even though they provided sanctuary to attacking MiGs. U.S. bombers were confined to targets south of the Yalu River, the border between China and North Korea, and had to exercise extreme caution. Few restrictions, however, were placed on the types of targets that could be hit within North Korea; an exception was the dam system (used for both irrigation and power generation). Policy makers felt that an attack against the irrigation dams would be an attack on the food supply and, hence, an attack on the civilian population. Gen William M. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars (WWII, Korea, Vietnam) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 5, 56; Futrell, Korea, pp. 667–669.
were vehement about not going or getting involved in somebody else's war for nothing. It was the Spock era.\textsuperscript{64} We believed in the "betterment of my kids compared to me." All of this together served to create a reaction in a generation of people that went through the military; it was a problem.

The 1950s and Strategic Air Command

\textbf{Kohn:} Could I ask you about what peacetime conditions were like in the Air Force from 1953 to the early sixties, how it was different from what you remembered in 1948, 1949, and 1950?

\textbf{Harlow:} These were very trying times because of the lack of promotional opportunities.

\textbf{Gaylor:} What happened was that the Air Force appreciated the hard-core career fields, those that were related to the mission, like maintenance, while the soft-core, like the cops, were a turn-off. When they said to you, "You're in a soft-core career field;" they were sort of saying, "You're not as important as this guy over here." What they did to the police field, for example—and in others too—was they simply froze it. They said no one will be promoted to staff, tech, or master until this freeze is lifted. In some cases it lasted two or three years.

\textbf{Harlow:} Six or seven years in some fields.

\textbf{Gaylor:} Had I not made master when I did, in April 1956, I may never have made it because right then it froze. Once again, timing. That was

\textsuperscript{64} Dr. Benjamin M. Spock, physician and educator, wrote one of the most influential guides for parents ever published. \textit{Baby and Child Care} appeared in 1946 and deeply influenced the generation of parents who raised the so-called baby boomers (children born between 1946 and 1964). The permissive style of child rearing outlined in the book drew both critical acclaim and condemnation, especially as many of the children raised "according to Dr. Spock" joined the youth movement in the 1960s. During that decade, Dr. Spock gained increased notoriety as he participated in the anti-war movement on the nation's college campuses. He was arrested and convicted of conspiracy "to counsel Selective Service registrants to unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly neglect, fail, refuse, or evade service in the armed forces of the United States." See Jessica Mitford, \textit{The Trial of Dr. Spock} (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), especially pp. 1–17, 195–205.
something that had to be faced. It was a dilemma that the Air Force couldn't handle. Another thing, a lot depended on what command you were in. I was in Air Training Command, and it was sort of soft, the good life. If you were in SAC [Strategic Air Command], that wasn't the good life. You had ninety-day TDYs to North Africa. You had ORIs [Operational Readiness Inspections], and you had other commitments.\(^{65}\) So, there were almost different air forces within the Air Force. It just happened that you were affected by where you were.

**Harlow:** General LeMay said that SAC was the Air Force.\(^{66}\)

**Barnes:** In the mid-fifties, I was at Andrews in a mission called CRT, which was Combat Readiness Training. The mission at Andrews supported Pentagon pilots who were desk-bound. The unit also supported the Air Research and Development Command, which was headquartered at Friendship Airport, near Baltimore. In support of that there were B-25s, C-45s, T-11s, and "Gooney Birds" at Andrews's 1402d and 1403d Flightline Maintenance Squadrons.\(^{67}\) I was doing maintenance in that period, supporting those organizations. The flying in the Combat Readiness Train-

\(^{65}\) Strategic Air Command (SAC) in the 1950s constituted much of the nation's nuclear deterrent and as a result maintained a state of mobility and constant readiness. In order to be prepared to go to war at a moment's notice, it trained frequently and intensely. Every SAC unit rotated overseas for a period of ninety days every year and frequent Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI) kept the command at a high state of readiness at all times. Goldberg, pp. 126–127. See also Walton S. Moody, *Building a Strategic Air Force* (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995).

\(^{66}\) General Curtis E. LeMay entered the Air Corps in 1928 as a flying cadet and received his regular commission on February 1, 1930. In October 1948, he became Commander-in-Chief of Strategic Air Command. During his nine-year tenure he built it into the world's finest long-range bomber force. In July 1957, he left to serve as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Four years later he rose to the position of Chief of Staff. He retired from active duty on February 1, 1965. Gen LeMay died on October 1, 1990.

\(^{67}\) Named for the famed proponent of air power, Brig Gen William "Billy" Mitchell, the B-25 Mitchell first flew in 1940. Built by North American, the B-25 could reach a top speed of 322 miles per hour. The plane's firepower was steadily increased throughout World War II. One version of the plane carried a 75mm M-4 cannon, "the largest weapon ever installed on an American bomber" up to that time. Gen James "Jimmy" Doolittle flew a B-25 on his historic carrier-based raid on Japan in April 1942. Lloyd S. Jones, *U.S. Bombers, B-1 to B-70* (Los Angeles, California: Aero Publishers, Inc.), pp. 84–87. The C-47 transport, developed by Douglas, was known officially as the Skytrain and popularly as the Gooney Bird. A modified version of the DC-3, the twin-engine plane carried a crew of three.
ing was tied to this difference in air forces that Bob mentioned earlier. I
think that's a key point. Don mentioned that SAC was building up then,
and it was becoming renowned as the command it is today. On the other
hand, ATC [Air Training Command], during that period was referred to in
terms of the acronyms, "American Toy Company," "Allergic to Combat."
It had that kind of reputation. It was a Sunday kind of an operation; on
Sunday everything just closed up.

On the other hand, the ninety-day TDYs that Bob referred to were
simply caused by the airplane's structure. Non-global airplanes... required
a posturing or positioning in a forward location. It was the same for many
of the other commands. Yet, at the same time, because of that require-
ment, SAC experienced some very bad things along with the good. For
example, it had at that time the Air Force's highest divorce and separa-
tion-from-the-service rates and family problems because of these TDYs.
Also TAC [Tactical Air Command], as it became global and its capabilities
turned around, inherited these problems. TAC still has to do the posturing
of its airplanes in some forward locations, and its forces must operate on
an extended away-from-home basis. That kind of experience beset the Air
Force in this interim time period.

Then, abruptly in 1958, we got into what was then commonly referred
to as the Lebanon crisis, and the whole world went on alert. In that year I
left the maintenance effort at Andrews and went to SAC

three and could handle 6,000 pounds of cargo or twenty-eight fully armed para-
troopers. The C-47 and a modified gunship version, the AC-47, saw service in the
Southeast Asian conflict. The reliable "Gooney Bird" is still in service in parts of
234e-235e; Carl Berger, ed., The United States in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973: An
Illustrated Account, pp. 5-6, 8-9, 12, 18-19, 22, 25-26, 28-29, 40, 44, 56-57, 61,

68 In early 1958 a rebellion broke out in Lebanon culminating in general
political unrest and rioting by May of that year. The stability of the Middle East
was further imperiled when on July 14 forces favoring the Egyptian leader Gamal
Abdel Nassar assassinated the king of Iraq. The President of Lebanon and the
King of Jordan both requested U.S. assistance. The United States responded on
July 15 by sending naval units, a battalion of Marines and Army airborne, tank, and
combat engineer troops to Lebanon. The Air Force provided airlift and logistics
support. In addition, two F-100 squadrons, one B-57 tactical bomber squadron,
and one RF-101/RB-66 composite tactical squadron deployed to Incirlik Air
Base, Turkey. The situation stabilized and U.S. forces were withdrawn by October
for Military History, Army Historical Series, United States Army), p. 580; Robert
Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United
University Press, 1989), pp. 610, 612; Roger J. Spiller, 'Not War But Like War': The
The Enlisted Experience

at Loring, Maine. I went from the kind of flying I was talking about earlier into B–52s. There were airborne missions of an alert nature which were coded HARD HEAD and CHROME DOME. They were twenty hours and thirty minutes in length on the one hand, and twenty-four hours on the other hand. The airplanes took off, went to an orbit point, orbited, and then were refueled. They flew in extra crew members to keep them there. The expansiveness of our air capability was really developed during that period.

Gaylor: That was when they built the DEW [Distant Early Warning] Line, the early warning system across Canada; millions and millions of dollars were paid for it. Thule, Greenland, was an exciting place to be. Sondrestrom [Greenland] and Goose Bay, Labrador—those were all SAC assignments that were classics.

Barnes: They were the places to be. That was a very interesting period between 1953 and 1965.

Kohn: At this time all of you were then becoming senior NCOs. I want to ask Chief Airey, since by now you were an experienced First Sergeant, whether you saw a change in the kind of leadership style that was necessary from the 1940s. While you were in a peacetime Air Force, SAC was faced with a very tough, demanding “peacetime” mission. Earlier, you spoke of the permissiveness in society. The service contained draftees in


69 HARD HEAD and, more commonly, CHROME DOME were nicknames for SAC’s twenty-four-hour airborne alert. In part a response to the Cuban missile crisis (October 1962) SAC began a program of “24–hour flights and immediate replacement of every aircraft that landed. All bombers . . . were armed with nuclear weapons.” The airborne alert continued until 1968. Office of the Historian, HQ SAC, “The Development of Strategic Air Command, 1946–1986” (September 1, 1986), pp. 107–108, 153.

70 In an effort to improve the air defense system of the United States a series of radar lines were built across Canada to warn of approaching Soviet aircraft and missiles. These radar lines included the Pinetree Line just north of the U.S.-Canadian border, the Mid-Canada Line, and the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line near the Arctic Circle along the 69th parallel. Construction began in 1955, and the DEW Line became operational August 1, 1957. The Pinetree Line, built by the United States, was completed in 1955. Canada completed construction of the Mid-Canada Line in 1957. See Goldberg, pp. 133–135.
the fifties, or draft-induced volunteers—not the volunteer force of today. And we were drawing away from the Army; that is, the Air Force was gaining its own character and beginning to build its own enlisted culture. Can you recount some experiences?

Airey: Of course...the forefathers of the United States Air Force were very smart people. When the service was formed, we became the United States Air Force. There was no corps of engineers, no medical corps, no quartermaster corps.\(^{71}\) We were one United States Air Force. We had these people who did these various jobs, but there was just one Air Force. From that period on to the period you’re leading up to, slowly but surely, the United States Air Force was formed, getting its own ideas, its own customs, its own traditions. In this period, and once again it was a very traumatic time, we had people who retired or got out because they couldn’t stand the differences. Overnight you went from soldiers to airmen. Slowly but surely the stripes changed.\(^{72}\) There were several other changes. Once again, some people couldn’t stand [them] and they left. When you look back, it wasn’t that long a period of time. From that time on we started opening the NCO Academies, and we started our management and leadership training. About this time, the late 1950s, we started the United States Air Force as we know it today. We started to lead people, not drive them, and it was a decided change that slowly but surely evolved.

Kohn: You and Chief Barnes were or had been flying crew. In the fifties the enlisted force was heading towards a force in which the predominant flying crew, the predominant people in combat, were officers as opposed to a mixed force of officers and enlisted. What changes did this cause? Chief Harlow, you were in the personnel business, was there a change, and did it cause any leadership challenges, or differing identifications within the enlisted ranks?

\(^{71}\)As the United States Army developed, it needed officers with special skills—engineers, medical doctors, supply experts. For each evolving skill the Army created a branch or corps of officer specialists. When the Air Force became independent in September 1947, it adopted a “One Air Force” organization in which officers were commissioned into and enlisted personnel were members of the Air Force. Although they performed specialized jobs, they were all part of “One Air Force,” not a specialized branch or corps.

\(^{72}\)In 1948 the Air Force adopted a V-type grade insignia, replacing the Army stripe. In 1949 a new blue uniform was approved. The new uniform also eliminated the shoulder patch common to Army uniforms. Callender, p. 169.
**THE ENLISTED EXPERIENCE**

**Barnes:** I think it caused differing perceptions as crew airplanes became a factor. When B–52s got into the system, gunners were a factor; as the KC–135s entered, boomers were a factor; and as the cargo airplanes got into the force with loadmasters and flight engineers, the inclusion and the acceptance of crew members created, quite frankly, an elite class of enlisted people. The difference was the additional pay. You drew some additional pay, the hazardous duty pay which you were eligible for per diem, bad as it was, nevertheless, you got it. Then there was always something about a different kind of garb, and flying suits, as opposed to fatigues, were distinct. [They] kind of placed you in another category. So, yes, the perception was there that flying crews were something a little apart from the rest of the corps.

**Gaylor:** You pulled an alert if you were in SAC, and that made you different.

**Barnes:** So, there were some differences in... the uniform. [We had] the ability to wear more emblems and to display other things, for instance, ascots. They were all distinctive marks, and they were quite prideful things, to be very honest. But I think that the leadership wasn't necessarily different. There was an allegiance to the crew commander. There was a distinct separation where the First Sergeant was managing the rest of the organization and the operations officer was managing the flying part. It tended to separate squadrons. There was a better relationship with opera-

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74 "Pulling an alert" meant being assigned alert duty.
tions, I think, with flying crews that had enlisted people on them, than with administration, who really ran things.

However, if you were in field maintenance in a support organization, what did start to happen was that these NCOs gained comparable rank to the First Sergeant. There were some awkward leadership dilemmas for First Sergeants, particularly in organizations after the grades E-8 and E-9 came. You had maintenance superintendents at E-8 and E-9 levels and the First Sergeant was at the E-7 level. The commander had to really look carefully at how he supported his maintenance superintendent, for example. If the First Sergeant said, “Kohn, get Barnes back up here to clean up his room,” and the Wing Director of Operations [DO] or the Director of Maintenance [DM] or somebody else might say, “He’s got an airplane to fix down here.” The airplane was the mission. This created some leadership challenges.

**Gaylor:** Now imagine, if you will, a SAC wing. I’m at Columbus, Mississippi where, of course, the emphasis is on the crews. They’re the reason the base is there. Everything is dedicated toward launching that airplane and rightfully so, but in building that elite feeling among the group, whether you realize it or not, you’re downplaying the importance of the others. As a result, a lot of the crews resented my cops. They saw them as a barrier to getting on their airplane. They had to show their line badge—“What the hell, we come out here every day. You know us.” “You have to show your line badge.” “If you people would get out of the way...” A lot of my guards felt, “I hope somebody blows up your aircraft. I don’t care.” There was no feeling of solidarity. In 1964 we tried something at Columbus, and I don’t know if it had been tried elsewhere, but it was meeting with the crews to attempt to share with them our role as policemen. We wanted the policemen to be an extension of the crew, ground members of the crew, if you will. We enjoyed some success in bridging the gap that existed. But I’m sure that divisions throughout the Air Force where the emphasis was on the crews, somewhat inadvertently created a feeling...

**Barnes:** You alienated a lot of people.

**Gaylor:** “Alienated.” That’s a good word. You did, and not purposely, but it happened. In your attempt to promote the distinctive importance of the crew, you created that. Leadership, in many cases, wasn’t able to cope...

**Barnes:** It was a problem. In direct answer to the question that you asked about leadership challenges, yes, that caused one.
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Harlow: We had another problem there, too. We lost some good flight engineers and some good people on the aircrews. We lost a lot of good maintenance people, especially during Vietnam. The crew members were pretty well taken care of in promotions. On the maintenance side, if you had a reciprocal engine specialty as a secondary, and yet you had a primary specialty in jet engines, the engine people kept going back to Vietnam. The ones who stayed here in the jets were getting promoted, so, that created a problem which had to be fixed—and it was fixed in a hurry because after a year of that we lost a lot of people who came back from Vietnam and said, “The hell with this; I’m going.”

Kohn: In the late 1950s the grades of E-8 and E-9 were created. Do you remember that occurring in 1958? What was the purpose of [creating those grades] from your perspective at the time, and what impact did it have?

Harlow: It was started to open up promotional opportunities, number one—which were pretty slim at that time. Even though it was intended to give more responsibility and some authority, that really didn’t occur for a long time. All that resulted was more pay and so forth. There were still warrant officers in the Air Force. In fact, one of the questions asked of me right after I retired was, “Why do we still have morale problems in the Air Force?” My perception was that we had colonels who were doing the jobs of chief master sergeants, lieutenant colonels doing the jobs of senior master sergeants, and majors doing the jobs of master sergeants in many areas. It took a long while before some of these things changed. Today we have a commandant of the Senior NCO Academy and we have commandants of many of the NCO Academies that are chiefs. That is a change.

Airey: The E-8s and E-9s were hailed as a major breakthrough, of course. I’d been a master sergeant for many years when Congress finally approved these two grades [and caused] some very serious complications. Number one, “they,” the people that run the United States Air Force, decided that these promotions were going to be slanted toward certain career fields. In some career fields people had absolutely no chance of getting promoted. One of them was the First Sergeant. Now, heretofore, and Tom alluded to this fact, the First Sergeant was pretty much the top gun in any outfit, and all of a sudden he finds out he can’t even make senior master sergeant because the new senior grades are going to go to all the electronics types. The cops were also left out. Once again, we lost some people who couldn’t take it. I go back to the theory that everyone is needed to make one United States Air Force: cook, baker, candlestick maker, cop, crew chief, gunner, or whatever. But sometimes we fouled up
those programs. I, of course, was not eligible, which upset me. I was a First Sergeant. I had to qualify myself as a personnel man and pass that personnel AFSC in order to make senior master sergeant three cycles later.

Barnes: Where there were jobs needing very, very high grade structures, i.e. talent, the Air Force could get the job done for less money [by using NCOs]. But to NCOs it meant more money.

My perception of the warrant grade is that it was... caught in the middle. The problem was where this guy lived and recreeted and all that. He kind of vacillated...

Harlow: He was neither fish nor fowl.

Barnes: I guess... when housing became more available, it was hard to figure where this guy really fit in the picture. He'd lived in officer quarters, lived in NCO quarters, and as quarters and families became more important, the warrant officer became a handicap to the Air Force, in my opinion. So, this shift to E-8s and E-9s was driven by the budget and by an internal social situation that needed fixing. It did create alienation. It also created an aspiration; here was somewhere to advance. But, again, Paul's route in getting there was, as he described it, the same for many others. So, it wasn't readily accepted by everybody. On the other hand, it was there as bait, a rank to get to. It was an incentive.

Harlow: If you look at anything that the services do, or ask for, on Capitol Hill today, programs are created to attract and retain the specialties needed in the particular service, at the time. The only problem is those specialties change constantly because of the change in weapon systems.

Kohn: It's a dynamic concept and you change the personnel system to respond.

Gaylor: I look at it from a personal angle—I made master in April 1956. I'd had seven years, seven months service, which was somewhat unheard of—to be a cop and advance that fast. A lot of it I attribute to what I said earlier about being at the right place at the right time. There I was looking at thirteen years, at least, in the same grade. I had gone as high as I could go, so in 1958 at Lackland Air Force Base an officer said to me, "You don't want to be a master sergeant the rest of your career. Apply for warrant officer." I took the test for warrant, and my name went into the
hopper. I received the answer, “You’ve qualified; however, we aren’t making any more warrants. Some new grades are coming out.”

That was the first I heard of it and then, appearing on the scene in 1959, came the senior and chief. To me, it was, “Wow! I may not be a master all of my life.” I didn’t really want to be a warrant because I didn’t like the term “Mister.” I wanted to have a military rank. I thought at the time that this new system [would] open another door. In 1963, with seven years in grade, I made senior. I think, like we are all saying, the intent of the grades was to [let] people assume additional responsibilities. That didn’t happen for a considerable period of time. Had it not been for Vietnam, I don’t know when it would have happened.

Harlow: And you didn’t get any more authority.

Airey: Chief master sergeants—E-9s—were supposed to take the place of the warrant officers, and doing away with the warrant officer program was one of the smartest things the United States Air Force ever did. I still get questioned about it. A certain segment would like to see it come back, and it’s ridiculous.

Kohn: What did the warrant officers do, basically?

Gayelor: They were absolute experts in their area of endeavor. If you saw a warrant officer in the finance business, he could recite the manual to you. In the Air Police, we had Mr. Anderson, a walking book of knowledge, primarily because of his long tenure. He’d been working for twenty or twenty-five years in one field.

Kohn: Did they rotate assignments as often as other enlisted grades?

Gayelor: They replaced other warrant officers.

Kohn: Did they stay at a base? Did they homestead much more?

Harlow: Not necessarily. In World War II they were the specialists for the commander on special projects.

Gayelor: In World War II nobody stayed in the same place. It was a mobile force.
HARLOW: That was the role of warrant officers. They were specialists for the commanders.

GAYLOR: Yes, they found another use for them. It really downplayed what a warrant officer was. It was simply a grade that they assigned to helicopter pilots because the Army didn’t quite know what else to do with them.

KOHN: May I ask some other questions about the 1950s? Didn’t conditions improve? We started to have a stable base structure, started to get some family housing, and started to solidify the service. Can you remember much from that period?

GAYLOR: That’s one thing LeMay did. LeMay said, “If you’re in SAC, you’ll be taken better care of.” When he opened the bases in the northern tier, they had better housing. It was good housing then. Now, some of it is antiquated. That’s when we began to hear, “I’ll work your butt off, but I’ll take care of you.” I’ve always felt that LeMay did a tremendously good thing for enlisted people by building up the SAC bases. Paul can comment on that better because he was at Grand Forks. On trips that I made from ATC bases to SAC bases, I found, for the most part, better facilities.

KOHN: Recreational facilities too?

GAYLOR: Yes, because General LeMay was an outdoorsman—[he liked] pistol ranges and fishing lakes and that type of thing, racquet ball courts, anything that stimulated you physically.

BARNES: Let me answer the question from another perspective because some other things happened during that period. There began to be more humane treatment of families. Medical care for families in the mid-to-latter fifties was bad [with] long waits, and really not very good attention to family needs. Wives would wait inordinate amounts of time to be seen, no matter what their illness. Family medical care and dental care had no priority, and there had been very little focus or interest on it. As the other things began to develop, some attention got focused on it. Quite frankly, medicine for Air Force people, other than flying crews, who were seen by the flight surgeon, was a different kind of medicine, believe me, and a different kind of physical exam each year. If you had regular sick call, you just went and sat and waited until somebody called your name and you got seen. You may get the cursory tongue depressor and the venerable aspirin and go home. It wasn’t even an aspirin at the time. It was an APC; you didn’t get an aspirin. An “all purpose capsule,” they called it.
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Kohn: A placebo?

Barnes: No, it was an aspirin-type thing, but it was called an all purpose capsule, and they gave it to you for everything.

Gaylor: Rarely was anything called by what it really was.

Airey: And it cured gonorrhea, too, didn’t it?

Gaylor: Oh, it cured everything, even ingrown toenails! “GI Gin” was the expectorant that would break up everything you had in your chest.

Barnes: That was the kind of medicine at the time, I think it’s important to recall. On the other hand, the guy who got flying crew attention—the flight surgeon really looked at him. I shifted from one kind of medicine to the other when I really got into flying. There was absolutely a difference in the treatment.

Gaylor: My first two kids were born in civilian hospitals. My third was born in a military hospital, all in the same location. To back up Tom’s point, in 1954 medical care for dependents was not available. In 1956 it became available at that same base…primarily on the doctor’s whim. Some doctor would say, “Yes, I’ll take a few civilians.” But, other than that, it was, “Go downtown.” There was no CHAMPUS.75 I paid out of pocket for my first two children.

Airey: I want to make a point about medics and medical treatment. I can remember the perception that there were many people who were malingering, riding the sick book, and goldbricking. This type of person was rather rare. I can remember at one outfit I was with, anyone going on sick call had to go to the supply room with his mattress, his bedding, and his pillow,

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75 CHAMPUS (Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services) grew out of the Dependents' Medical Care Act of 1956 which first gave the services responsibility for providing medical care for dependent members of the armed forces. In 1966 that program expanded to include not only dependents of active duty armed forces members, but also retired members, their spouses and children, and the spouses and children of members who died while on active duty or while entitled to retire. CHAMPUS provided civilian health care services and came about largely because of overcrowding at military hospitals and clinics. Ted Sturm, “Don’t Overlook CHAMPUS,” The Airman (April 1970), pp. 27–31.
and turn them in, regardless. You might have a broken finger or a fever. The idea was that putting you to all that trouble would keep you from going on sick call. We had many guys deathly sick with fevers or [other] illnesses. But that was the attitude some of the people had who were running things in those days. Certainly, you couldn’t get by with something like that today, thank God.

**Barnes:** I think medical care was a major issue as things improved for the military. Medicine was very key, and it was kind of the first indication that somebody was really taking a look at what was happening.

**Gaylor:** Commissaries, BXs [Base Exchanges], it was just a very gradual upgrading. What it took was for somebody to start it at one base, and then the others said, “Why don’t we have what they have?” It wasn’t the whole Air Force at once that was upgraded.

**Kohn:** There was no Air Staff directive.76 “There will be improvements in conditions?”

**Gaylor:** No.

**Barnes:** Another thing that took place in that period was the change—somebody will have to help me with the specific year—from [getting paid] once a month to getting paid twice a month. Everybody in the Air Force did it mandatorily for six months to see if it would work, and then after that the NCOs had the option of being paid once a month. Everybody else, once they really locked in the system, had to take their pay twice a month.

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76Army Regulation 95–5, which created the Army Air Forces on June 20, 1941, also created an Air Staff which dealt with aviation matters and policy. The Air Force Air Staff came into existence with the independent Air Force in September 1947. The job of the Air Staff is “planning, programming, policy-formulating, and budgeting for the Air Force and assisting the Secretary and the Chief of Staff in managing Air Force resources.” It acts basically as a planning staff, but also has responsibility for “supervising the implementation of Air Force plans and policies by operating commands and agencies.” Gen John C. Meyer, “The Air Staff,” *Air University Review*, Vol. XXI, No. 2 (January–February 1971), pp. 3–9; Herman S. Wolk, *Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force, 1943–1947* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1984), pp. 21–22.
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Gaylor: We stopped reporting for pay. First, it came in check fashion, then eventually, direct deposit.

Barnes: That was one of the improvements.

Kohn: Why was that done? What is the significance of that?

Gaylor: You could manage your money better. You knew you had some money coming in.

Barnes: Early on we said, if you recall, you got that check, and for the first three days of the month you were raising hell, and then for the next twenty-six or twenty-seven days you could be broke.

Gaylor: You cut your cigarettes in half so you'd have two.

Barnes: Yes. I never did take the twice a month deal. I got paid once a month even while I was stationed at the Pentagon. I just liked it better. But it was a big thing. The twice-a-month pay was highly sought after.

Harlow: Yes. But I remember, too, in the pay line that the manager of the NCO club sat in that line, and everybody who went through paid his bill at the NCO club. That's what the commander insisted upon.

Airey: I know it's old fashioned brown-shoe thinking, and, of course, I've changed, but at the time I was opposed to the twice-a-month pay plan.

Gaylor: Do you recall why?

Airey: With the organizational missions of the squadrons, it had always been difficult to get everyone together at any one time. But this once-a-month mandatory pay day gave us the perfect chance for everyone to get a good inspection and for the commander to see everybody. There were some troops, due to the shifts they were working on, that you never got to know unless you made a point of it. So, once a month at least you got to see them and make corrections on the spot because everyone came for his money.
Gaylor: I played the game from the other side. I could say, “They’re going to see me once a month. Look sharp at that time, and say the right things.” So, it became a game of “us” against “them.” When the boss is around, look busy, look sharp, and do the right thing. That was one of the problems of leadership that had to be overcome. There wasn’t trust. There weren’t expectations. For the most part leadership’s attitude was, “If we don’t look at them once a month, they’ll screw up,” instead of, “If we don’t look at them, they’ll do it right because they’ve been trained right.” It was an institutionalized fallacy.

Airey: It was a time to get together with people. Quite often on paydays we’d have a squadron function, get together, ball games, beer parties.

Gaylor: You’ve tempered it now with that follow-up comment, but at the time not everyone saw it that way. The First Sergeant said, “I’ve got to look at them.” It was the same way with the clothing shakedown.

Kohn: What was a clothing shakedown?

Gaylor: That was an inspection in which you had to display your total issue of clothing. What we used to do, believe me, was relay a fatigue cap the length of the barracks. The First Sergeant would go along and say, “Everybody’s got to have a fatigue cap,” when, in fact, one fatigue cap stood the same inspection for the whole barracks. It was game playing, “us” against “them.” It frequently went on because there was no communication of trust. It was the same with pay. “We can’t trust them to make it home with their pay.” Unfortunately, a lot of First Sergeants labored under that belief.

Barnes: Bob, why don’t you explain for the record and history what that clothing shakedown was like when you did it in a hangar.

Airey: It was once a year, wasn’t it?

Barnes: It depended on the organization. Sometimes it was spontaneous.

Harlow: It depended on the commander. Sometimes we’d have it once a quarter.
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Kohn: We don’t do it now, do we?

Gaylor: Oh, no. We don’t even do it when we go overseas. That used to be one of the fun things at the port of debarkation. You had to have your clothes stamped, the black things with a white stamp, and the other things on the shirttail. Basically, it was an inspection to insure that you had those clothes that you were required to have in your issue—three pairs of fatigues, six pairs of drawers, knee-socks, and all of that business. At that time in the fifties, if you knew the supply sergeant, you had more than enough clothes. You could go down to supply and say, “I need another khaki shirt.” But, otherwise, you had to turn one in to get one. You were required to have a standard issue of clothing. Normally, they’d blend the clothing inspection in with a stand-by inspection... so they could look at you and your clothes all at the same time. If you had all of your clothes, you passed. If you didn’t, you had to buy them, bring them in and show your purchase.

Barnes: It was a real pain. In the hanger, you laid them out, and then they had the men standing by in productive work time displaying clothes. It was ridiculous.

Kohn: For hours on end?

Barnes: Until it was done.

Airey: It was particularly tough for that married person who lived downtown and had to haul every single thing out to the base.

Barnes: Everybody had to bring it in and display it.

Kohn: When did these inspections go out?

Gaylor: When I went to Thailand in 1966, we had a clothing inspection.

Barnes: It was that late; you’re right.

Airey: But that was only when going overseas.

Gaylor: We used to have medical inspections.
The Enlisted Experience

From the 1940s through the 1970s the U.S. Air Force faced unprecedented technological and social changes. With the full and enthusiastic support of its enlisted personnel the service met every challenge. This photograph of a stateside B-50 bomber crew during the Korean War captures what is so critical to the success of every mission in peace as well as in war—a spirit of camaraderie between both the enlisted and officer corps.
Technological Changes

From 1940 to 1980 Air Force weapons increased spectacularly in complexity and capability. Successive generations of enlisted personnel met the task of maintaining a host of systems such as B-24 Liberator, B-29 Superfortress and B-52 bombers, C-54 and C-118 transports, the F-4 Phantom jet, and the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile. The ingenuity and skills applied by enlisted personnel from World War II through the Korean and Vietnam Wars to such sophisticated systems resulted from a commitment to learning and excellence.
Social Changes

By the 1950s the Air Force, to retain its competent enlisted force, began offering more opportunities for professional advancement. It established NCO Academies to prepare promising applicants for new positions in such career fields as personnel, administration, and security. Over the years, NCO Academies have introduced enlisted personnel to an ever-broadening curriculum whose courses now include military supervision and management, instructor training, communications skills, problem solving, military justice, world history, national security, human relations, and recognition and treatment of substance abuse.
Social Changes

The official end of the segregation of blacks within their own units by the armed services, typified in this group portrait of Army military police at Fort Benning, Georgia, was declared officially ended in 1948 by presidential decree. The two Air Force enlisted men pictured working together demonstrate that racial integration in the military services proceeded far more smoothly than in society as a whole. Shown during World War II are enlisted men loading a B-25 with ammunition and operating a microphone and blinker light at the control tower of the Tuskegee Army Flying School in Alabama. With the Vietnam War, blacks and whites shared both the risks and rewards of military service as demonstrated by armormen loading Mk 117 bombs on an F-105D Thunderchief.
Social Changes

Women have served the nation's military air mission with distinction. During World War II their dedication was amply demonstrated by unprecedented numbers of women joining the fight, such as those shown in the central photo. Somewhere in England during World War II enlisted members of the Women's Army Corps (WAC) plot the courses of lost or damaged bombers, maintaining direct communications and guiding them safely back to base. The Air Force's restriction of professional opportunities for women imposed after the war depleted the ranks of what had become in the mid-1950s the Women's Air Force (WAF). By the mid-1970s, however, the service, reflecting growing social trends, began to open up a number of career fields to women. Enlisted women have proved up to the demands entailed by the varied duties pictured here.
Social Changes

The greatest frustrations faced by the Air Force as well as the Army and Navy from the 1940s through the 1970s lay in the erosion of public support for the U.S. military services. The photograph of a World War II-era mobile recruitment display, evoking the solidarity of the nation as the Army Air Forces attracted enlistees in countless American towns, stands in sharp contrast to the scene of radical activists outside the Pentagon in 1967 protesting the Vietnam War. The enlisted force itself increasingly mirrored the discord and conflict that swept the nation.
A Great Way of Life

When the Air Force was part of the Army and later a young independent service, any amenities were extended solely to its uniformed personnel—not to their dependents. The quality of those amenities varied greatly from base to base, as new recruits discovered on inspecting their tent accommodations at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, a key in-processing center during the rapid buildup for the Korean War. Eventually, Air Force families were allowed housing, clinics and hospitals, schools, exchanges, commissaries, libraries, theaters, churches, and social, recreational, and child care facilities at installations throughout the world. Buildings shown here and on the next page reflect the architectural styles popular in the United States from the 1940s through the 1970s.
Community Outreach

Enlisted personnel have, as good neighbors, seen to it that the Air Force installations to which they are assigned are more than just economic assets to the localities surrounding them. Such outreach activities as the base tours, neighborhood clean-ups, pictured on this page and the next and even rescue missions have become traditions, cementing the friendship between civilian and military communities to ensure the smooth functioning of base operations.
Barnes: They'd check you for communicable diseases and vermin. Before you came back from overseas, you had to have a certificate that said, "Paul W. Airey has been inspected this day and found free of communicable diseases and vermin." That was the truth. Everybody had to have those little slips every time.

Gaylor: There was no Social Actions office, either, in this era. There was no recourse. I once said to Captain Holowinski, "Sir, I have a problem." He said, "It's not your day to have a problem. When it's your turn to have a problem, your name will be on the bulletin board." I thanked him and walked out. There was no recourse to these mandatory things, so, you simply accepted them and went along with them to the best of your ability. There was no IG [Inspector General] complaint system.

Gaylor: Writing your congressman was almost a sin. If you wanted to become known around the base, you'd write your congressman and everybody'd say, "That's the guy who wrote his congressman."

Harlow: You had what was called a CI file, Congressional Influence.

Airey: You, Don, saw those as a personnel NCO?

Harlow: Yes. Way back in those days they were identified. They'd stamp them. That's all they did—no letters or anything—just stamp them "CI."

Kohn: This raises the question of the informal authority structure within the enlisted force, that is, those areas where you took care of yourselves, and it never saw the light of day. I'm not just talking about "behind the barracks." I'm talking about the informal nets. You remember the "Sergeant Bilko" TV show. The theory was that there was a separate

77 Comedian Phil Silvers debuted as Sergeant Ernest G. Bilko in the CBS situation comedy You'll Never Get Rich on September 20, 1955. The popular show, renamed The Phil Silvers Show, focused on the ever-scheming Bilko, head of the motor pool, and his gang of enlisted accomplices at fictional Fort Baxter somewhere in Kansas. Week after week Bilko developed elaborate cons he hoped would help him leave the Army as a wealthy man. As the show portrayed life on the fort, Bilko practically ran things because the commander, Colonel Hall, proved virtually powerless to stop him. The show ran until July 19, 1959. Donald F. Glut and Jim Harmon, The Great Television Heroes (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 141-144.
culture out there that the officers didn’t know about, didn’t care about, and which the system did not deal with—but you did as senior NCO leaders. You maintained it; you kept it going; and it was functional within the force. Would you talk about that?

**Harlow:** If people got drunk at the NCO club or anywhere, somebody would always take care of them, either get them back to the barracks or put them on the bus. Then that changed in the middle fifties. Nobody cared.

**Barnes:** I think there was such a culture. Senior non-commissioned officers began to appear in different organizations... recognized for taking care of situations. People would have a need, for whatever reason, so, everybody contributed each month a couple of bucks to a slush fund. If I got into trouble, then Don Harlow would give me twenty or twenty-five bucks out of it, and I had to pay it back. That was one of the things I had to do. And, yes, the commander never knew. I don’t think breaches of integrity or security were tolerated. But I do think there were some disciplinary things that from time to time were handled within that informal system. It was kind of severe when we did it ourselves because the inference was, “This one is on me, but the next one is your ______,” and we meant it. You got that message clearly and emphatically, and you got your act together. “If I have to deal with this with you again, you’re on it.” You did the correcting yourself. It really was a healthy thing. There were differences depending upon the organization and the kinds of things that took place, but I think there was an NCO system of sorts.

**Harlow:** I’ll give you an illustration. I left Matagorda Island [Texas] in 1944 to go home and get married. It was wintertime, and when we came back, there was a terrific snowstorm, and we got held up in St. Louis. I was a day late, actually AWOL for a day, so I had to go and report to the commander. I told him what happened, and he said, “You have a responsibility. When you know that the weather can cause you to be late, you have a responsibility to leave earlier to make sure you don’t become AWOL. I’ll forgive you this time, but don’t let it happen again. Just remember, you’ve got to plan ahead.” That was it.

**Kohn:** In this kind of informal system, what was the role of the Security Police? The Security Police are a separate enlisted group that is responsible for the authority structure, and, traditionally, in military literature there is a division between the cops and other folks.
Gaylor: I was thinking about that as they were talking. In the late fifties, part of the key to my success as the senior cop on one base was the relationship I established with the First Sergeants and one that I enjoyed very much. It was an informal structure. I took it upon myself to call a First Sergeant and say, “I’ve got a person here who was in violation—traffic or uniform—but I think his intent was good. I think he meant well, and I simply wanted to turn him over to you informally.” I’d do that frequently, and later, when I’d run into the First Sergeant and he’d say, “Bob, you’d never believe, that young man volunteered, insisted, on mowing the yard in the entire unit area for two weeks.” That meant the kid was told, “Either do it or we process you formally.” Of course, the kid chose to do it. I enjoyed that relationship.

[The system] was informal, and like Tom said, it was probably beneficial because it helped salvage a lot of people who might have gotten into trouble. Let’s face it. When something gets on your record, it becomes a stigma. It might have kept somebody from eventually turning into a poor airman, so I enjoyed that. Also, it created a feeling that if I needed something from that First Sergeant, a gallon of paint or so, I could get it. Now, you have to be careful because it can become extremely political. You begin to do it for some and not for others. Eventually, it could explode and cause investigations.

Barnes: I want to address again the authority structure and put it in a little different perspective. There was at one time, as far as the police went, a carry-over from World War II when all of the military police forces combined to police sections of the cities. These military police forces were particularly prevalent in the “repo depo” areas in Pittsburgh and in California, as an example, where Camp Stoneman was located. You’d get an Air Force policeman working with Army and Navy cops.

Gaylor: It was called the Armed Services Police.

Barnes: The three of them went together. They kept order in the town, and they kind of started pulling together the town-base relationship. They were authority figures. When they came, they got everybody’s attention.

Gaylor: MPs [Military Police] more than anyone. The SPs [Shore Patrol] didn’t carry weapons.

Barnes: They’d yank you right out of a bar when the controls began on the ages for unauthorized drinking in certain places.
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Gaylor: Off-limits establishments.

Barnes: Yes, they'd yank you right out. They were authority figures. The police image really got made in those settings where the guys were non-compromising in their job. I didn't like it then because they made me leave my change on the bar, and I didn't get it, but I got the picture later.

Gaylor: The thought was, "I'd arrest my mother if she were violating the law." There was somewhat of a blind dedication to the job. There was rather minimal tolerance. There were other things that happened that I didn't like. For example, we'd let fifty cars park at a certain place on the base for months, and then one day, we'd decide that it was an improper place to park in—maybe it was on a grassy area—and we'd write fifty tickets. Then the fifty people would come. "I've been parking there." We'd respond, "But it's wrong; it's a no-parking area." I was always opposed to that attitude—"I have the power to do it, whenever I want to do it." I always used to fight that, and sometimes my peers would take exception.

Kohn: Speaking of the authority structure, you explained your relationship with the First Sergeant. I want to ask Chief Airey about the perspective of the First Sergeant. You said in an earlier oral history interview that your favorite job in a long, distinguished career was being First Sergeant, and that you were a First Sergeant many times. What was your impression of this informal network from the First Sergeant's perspective?78

Airey: First Sergeant was my favorite job next to Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force. I was a First Sergeant for many years. Like Bob brought out, I had a good, working relationship with the head cop, the medics, and the chaplain, because I worked with those people. I like to think we treated people, as much as possible, with fairness. We started to take on family problems and so forth. Yes, I had a good working relationship with all of those people because I knew they would help me get a job done.

Gaylor: A good First Sergeant was worth more than his weight in gold, a good First Sergeant who really cared about people. He'd rip your knickers if you were out of line, but if you had a problem, he was the one to go to. I was fortunate to have some of each. Matt Krouz is still one of my heroes,

78Chief Airey was interviewed in March 1981 by Hugh N. Ahmann, USAF Historical Research Agency's Oral History Division. (K239.0512-1267)
and I still correspond with him at Christmas. In 1954, 1955, and 1956 Matt was a people-oriented First Sergeant before that was popular. You appreciated what a good First Sergeant was like. The other kind who just enjoyed throwing his weight around and letting you know that he was the First Sergeant just made you appreciate the good ones all the more.

Airey: I want to make one quick point here. Let's go back to World War II, when we talked about those leaders, the autocratic NCOs. Some of the NCOs and officers I served under in that war came out of World War I.

Kohn: World War I?

Airey: Yes, the NCOs and officers were World War I people, some of them. Keep in mind some of them were fine, outstanding, who were people-conscious too. Not as a rule, because it was a different era.

Kohn: Different era, different style, different culture. It's that sense of change that we're interested in investigating.

Airey: I just want to make a point that they weren't all totally authoritarian.

Kohn: I hope we make that point, and we can come back to it later. It's not a question of good or bad. It's a question of different times and different philosophies. It worked in its era.

The 1960s and the Vietnam War

Kohn: When we went to war in Vietnam we were in the sixties, with all of its social turbulence. We had draftees who really resented being dragged into the war. Do you remember thinking that the war generation had an impact on what you were facing as senior NCOs?

Airey: We're only a segment of our society. What happens in civilian life is going, somehow or other, to rub off into the military. I can remember when I was in the Chief's job in the Pentagon—in 1967, 1968, and 1969—when the hippies were coming in and flooding the doorways, the halls, the steps, and finally Secretary McNamara chased them all outside
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after several days. The type of activity can't help but have an effect on some people. Someone once said the last popular war was World War II.

Gaylord: It'll probably be the only popular war. I think we need to go back further, so we don't miss something. The Southeast Asian War happened in the late sixties. In 1963 I was in Tachikawa, Japan, in the police field. We had green alert teams, white alert teams, and red alert teams. It was all extremely classified. They received a certain issue of clothing that they had to maintain on an alert basis. The idea was that any minute the entire team—maybe there were twenty-eight to a team—would be called up and sent out, Lord knows where. It did, in fact, happen in 1963 that a couple of these teams were sent. It was only when they came back—if your buddy was sent, he'd tell you where they'd gone. They'd gone to Vietnam or Thailand. While they were there, they couldn't communicate with their families. They couldn't send out any letters. We were there as advisors. The American public was totally unaware that this was even going on. So, we have to appreciate that American activity built up in 1962, 1963, 1964, and 1965, and it was a gradual escalation, not sudden like December 7, 1941, until eventually we were committed to it. The American people were four or five years behind. It was 1967 or 1968 before we began to see the campus activities, the riots in the streets, the protests, and the flights to Canada of those who didn't want to be drafted. I think we have to appreciate that it was very insidious.80


80Between 1960 and June 1965, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations gradually built up forces in Vietnam. At the end of 1960 only about 900 Americans served in Vietnam; among them were 68 from the Air Force. The numbers then gradually rose over the next few years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>11,300</td>
<td>2,400</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>16,300</td>
<td>4,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>23,300</td>
<td>6,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>59,900 (June)</td>
<td>10,700 (June)</td>
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Following a Johnson administration decision to increase the American military commitment in Vietnam in July 1965, the numbers of U.S. servicemen in Vietnam
Harlow: It was during that period that the permissiveness took place. Congress put the pressure on the military to do something about it. Eventually, it filtered down that the commander had to get personally involved. That’s when the NCO corps lost a lot of its authority, because the young troops could call the commander with a problem and get an answer back through one of his staff members and completely bypass the senior NCOs.

Gaylor: The phrase “open-door policy” came in in the early 1960s. Supposedly, you could walk in and discuss what was bothering you with the commander.

Barnes: It was a mirror of the social system and precisely that, and it came so quickly and in such a variety of ways, that the services were ill-prepared to deal with the kinds of things that occurred.

Gaylor: When it finally exploded like it did, it happened, “bam!”

Barnes: Unfortunately, with Vietnam ongoing, the internal turmoil, and then, the memory of the Korean commitment, it all built up to a very, very difficult situation. We had also experienced a bad budget change. We didn’t get the kinds of money we needed.

rose tremendously. By December 1965, the United States had committed 184,300 troops, 20,600 of which were from the Air Force. Peak U.S. involvement came in April 1969 with 543,400 serving, 51,400 of which were Air Force. After that time the United States began a de-escalation of forces. By December 1970 the number serving had dropped to 334,600 (43,100 Air Force); 1971, 156,800 (28,800 Air Force); 1972, 24,200 (7,600 Air Force). In 1973 total U.S. forces in Vietnam numbered less than 250. Selected Manpower Statistics, 1980, p. 151. Mass demonstrations against the war began with the escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam in 1965. The 1965 march in Washington attracted between 15,000 and 20,000; the march in October 1967, 100,000; and on November 15, 1967, between 250,000 and 300,000 demonstrators converged on the nation’s capital. The protests climaxd on May 4, 1970, when National Guard troops at Kent State University, Ohio, fired on students protesting the invasion by U.S. forces in Cambodia, killing four and wounding nine. Following that traumatic event, and the reductions of U.S. troops in Vietnam, protests against the war became less frequent and smaller. In 1972, in response to renewed U.S. bombing of North Vietnam (LINDBACKER 1), campus protests erupted, but failed to attract much attention or support. Kendrick, pp. 193, 242–244, 263–268, 354, 368. For a recent history of the antiwar movement in the U.S., see Charles DeBenedetti, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1990).
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Gaylor: You tend not to get the money in peacetime, right?

Barnes: That’s right.

Gaylor: They say if you’re not fighting anybody, you don’t need a lot of money.

Barnes: We got really a little behind the power curve in a number of areas. We had a very, very bad mix of social problems and a great need for some facilities and programs for dependents. The surprise, reaction, and anger at the fact that we’d been supporting this buildup, and now we were in the war and we were committed to another conflict that the American people didn’t know anything about—that really made problems for us.

Gaylor: In April 1966, I was teaching at the SAC NCO Academy at Barksdale. We had a student retreat, and an announcement was made by a member of the faculty, “There will be a faculty meeting immediately following the student retreat.” It was in the spring of 1966, and we thought the commander was going to announce promotions. As we were going back to the building, guys were saying, “I bet you made chief.” “No, I don’t think so this year, I think you did.” There was an excitement in the air because we thought he was going to announce promotions. We walked in, and he said, “I have a message from SAC Headquarters. I’ll read it to you, and you’ll then know everything I know: ‘Upon graduation of this class, 66–B, the academy is closed until further notice. All those assigned will be reassigned back to their career fields wherever they can find a slot available. Further information will follow.’”

It was right then that the Vietnamese War was escalating and funds were being taken from things like academies and being diverted to the war. So, they closed the Fifteenth Air Force, Eighth Air Force, and Second Air Force NCO Academies, and I found myself back in the police career field. All of a sudden it came to a head. We need the money. We’re building up in Southeast Asia. The war had been going on for four years,

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but we weren’t prepared. We hadn’t anticipated it. It began what became known as the seven-year crisis.

Airey: I don’t know if this tells you something, but SAC was the only command to do that.

Gaylor: To do what?

Airey: Close its academies.

Gaylor: It was General John D. Ryan who did it. General Nazzaro reopened it in 1968.\footnote{Gen John D. Ryan served as Comander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command, from 1964 to 1967. Gen Joseph J. Nazzaro served in that position from 1967 to 1968.}

Barnes: SAC was the strongest command with the academies. Other commands didn’t even have them.

Gaylor: We had three with 120 students each.

Barnes: Other commands didn’t even have them, so we had an absolute absence of PME [Professional Military Education].

Gaylor: ATC didn’t have any.

Airey: That was a surprise to everyone. SAC was supposed to be the leader in these academies and allegedly had the best ones. What happened? The rest of the commands, no matter how bad things got, continued to have them.

Gaylor: SAC was picking up what became known as an ARC LIGHT commitment, where they had to rotate flights from Barksdale over to Guam [Andersen Air Force Base] to do some bombing, and so, I guess, Ryan needed the money to do that and he simply closed the academies.\footnote{Beginning in June 1965 and continuing until August 1973, SAC B–52 bombers modified for conventional warfare launched 126,615 sorties against targets in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. See Berger, pp. 149–167.}
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Kohn: Are you saying, then, that a crisis occurred within the enlisted force, beginning perhaps in 1967 and lasting to the mid-1970s, a seven-year crisis in discipline, and perhaps in effectiveness and retention? What were its causes? Earlier, you all suggested that discipline problems were partly a spill-over from society. Were there not other causes, structural problems in the enlisted force that had never been addressed and that were now surfacing? We talked earlier about the three major things that the troops were always concerned about—pay, medical care, and housing—but there were also issues of promotion, of the rank structure, of assignments, of the personnel systems.

Gaylor: The Korean Hump was coming down through the years, that big influx of people in 1950, 1951, and 1952. Those people were now techs, masters, E-8s, and E-9s. Here came the hump, and we didn’t have the necessary numbers of one-, two-, three-, four-, and five-striper.

Kohn: So you had an enlisted force with an unbalanced rank structure?

Gaylor: That caused TOPCAP.\(^4\) That’s when that program hit the scene to try to smooth out and even out that Korean Hump that was riding down through the years.

Harlow: TOPCAP was designed to enhance the promotion flow.

Kohn: By removing people up or out at a certain number of years?

Gaylor: Yes; twenty for staff, twenty-three for tech, \textit{et cetera}. If you hadn’t advanced beyond those grades, you got out. It was an attempt to smooth out the hump over a period of time as opposed to doing it all at once.

Kohn: Let’s go back and talk about the 1967 to 1974 period. Is it fair to characterize that era as a kind of a crisis of the enlisted force, or a crisis of the Air Force?

Harlow: I would say for the NCO supervisor, it was a crisis.

Gaylor: Suddenly hundreds of us found ourselves winging toward Southeast Asia to a place we'd never heard of. What's Thailand? We used to call it Siam. What's Vietnam? It used to belong to the French. We found ourselves thrust into situations that we didn't anticipate. That's what happened to me. I was notified in August of 1966, and in January 1967 I was on a plane.

Kohn: In other words, you went to war, and you were unprepared to go to war from the psychological standpoint, not from the standpoint of training or discipline.

Gaylor: One reason was that it wasn't being called a war. It was being called a conflict. So we were all asking, "Why are we going?" Nobody seemed to care that we were going. The American people weren't at the pier with bands playing. [They weren't] waving, "Goodbye, GI Bob." Oh, no! They were saying, "You dumb SOB. Go! I'm not going; you can go." The colleges were rising up in protest [with] the hippies, and there were marches into Washington. As I'm sailing off to Vietnam, they're wailing that we shouldn't be going. Toward the latter stages of that conflict there were many military people who questioned, "Why are we here, and what are we doing?" There was no question that we were trying to hold our heads high. But there were many, believe me, who would not wear their uniforms on leave for fear of being spat at and being called baby killers. The media had a tremendous influence. For the first time you had a war in American living rooms. Here's the 6 o'clock news; here are some Marines at Khe Sanh; let's watch them turn their flamethrowers on and burn those huts down. That had never happened in World War II; we used to get the news a week later. So, the American public just rose up against the war.

Airey: I'd like to make note that at this time—I'm talking about 1967, 1968, and 1969—I held the Chief's job. I got to Vietnam and Southeast Asia on four different occasions. Morale during that entire period was great—tremendous—in the entire theater. It started to deteriorate.

Gaylor: There was still a purpose. We guarded airplanes. The bombing was escalating. They were flying over at Korat [Air Base, Thailand]. There was a feeling that we were part of something. That escalation then began to wane. We were then told, "You can't bomb that. Draw back from that." We began to say, "Well, now wait a minute, if we're going to be here, let's
do it and do it right.” Then the feeling became, “I’m not sure I want to be here. I’m not sure I should be here.”

Barnes: We remembered the hands-tied situation in Korea—the Yalu River as a barrier—and it was the same in Vietnam. Again, the return on the investment was the issue in the minds of the people required to be there. But I think some other things impacted on us, as far as the nation was concerned. We did have very marked temperature indicators about public reaction in the schools. For example, one of the strongest ROTC [Reserve Officers’ Training Corps] institutions in the country, bar none, was at Brigham Young University [Utah]. Yet, it was almost suicidal to wear a uniform at Brigham Young during this period. People reacted violently. People who left the country and fled to Canada later were pardoned for that action, while returning servicemen, if they were getting out, couldn’t even get their jobs back. This news spread like a plague and began really to dampen the enthusiasm for that war.

At the same time, we unfortunately began to see some very political things taking place. We began to see some trends. Morale plummeted to an all-time low, as Paul said, after he left. It did for many reasons. When we withdrew in the fashion that we did, all of the expenditure and the high state of morale that Paul talked about that was present in the early years of the war were dashed.

85 During both the Korea and the Vietnam Wars, political considerations led to the placement of restrictions on Air Force bombing. In both cases, Chinese air bases were strictly off limits, even though they provided sanctuaries for enemy MiGs. During the Korean War, U.S. bombers were confined to targets south of the Yalu River, the border between China and North Korea. Few restrictions were placed against targets within North Korea, the main exception being the dam system (used for both irrigation and power generation). In contrast, during the Vietnam War, the rules of engagement and the target list both changed over time and tended to be much more restrictive than during the Korean War. For example, in 1965 the Air Force was restricted to targets below the 20th parallel in North Vietnam. When increased bombing of North Vietnam was later permitted, bombers were restricted to limited targets in a zone thirty miles around Hanoi and ten miles around Haiphong. Further, each city had a core restricted zone (ten miles around the center of Hanoi, four miles around the center of Haiphong) in which the bombers were not allowed to strike at all. In addition, targets had to be approved beforehand by Washington. Fighters were prohibited from firing upon SAM (surface-to-air missile) sites until being fired upon and had to visually identify aircraft before firing. LINEBACKER II (December 18–28, 1972) was the first time in the Vietnam War that the Air Force was fully able to employ its strategic bombing forces against the North Vietnamese. Momyer, pp. 5, 20, 25, 56, 133, 141, 147, 158, 172, 185, 207, 227, 237; Futrell, Korea, pp. 667–669.
Then at the same time that all of this occurred, we began to get some caps in our military pay. As I recall, the CLI [Cost of Living Index] at one point was 11 percent, and we got a 5 percent cap arbitrarily placed on the military pay increase.

Harlow: That’s when unionization came up.86

Barnes: Yes, and a muzzling of the Joint Chiefs to say nothing else about pay.

Airey: A lot of things cropped up; at the same time there was social unrest. Dope was really becoming a major problem while the war was so unpopular.

Gaylor: I relate some things together. Vietnam and the drug scene I relate together. I think that drugs were an escape for those who were over there and for those in the States who didn’t like what was happening. If we hadn’t had the Vietnam situation at all, we would’ve had the racial situation and women entering the service in large numbers as a consequence of the equal opportunity movement. The Vietnam War just created an atmosphere in which all of that unrest could be vocalized. It provided an opportunity. While somebody was yelling, “Down with Vietnam; I hate Vietnam,” others could say, “And what about us blacks, and what about us Hispanics, and what about us women, and what about drugs?” You talk about turbulence; I think the fact that we made it through is a credit to good leadership, because it was hectic.

Kohn: Do you remember the term “Let it all hang out?”

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Gaylor: "Let it all hang out," and "Tell it like it is." I remember once a provost officer, a legal officer, and a chaplain were up on stage talking about drugs when an airman stood up and asked, "Have you ever smoked a little pot, Reverend?" Everybody laughed, and the chaplain said, "Well, no, I haven't." The airman said, "Then how do you know? It might make you feel good." Everybody laughed, and you began to think, "How can they say that?" Suddenly there was a climate where people felt very comfortable about speaking out, there was a candor that didn't previously exist.

Barnes: It seems to me that this was happening in the other services also. There was the popularity of things like the "Z-grams" in the Navy.

Gaylor: From Admiral Zumwalt.⁸⁷

Barnes: They gave seamen an opportunity for direct interface with him as opposed to people who were in the Navy's management chain. We had a series of problems which grew out of that. I think that as far as blacks were concerned, there developed something called black awareness. It started perhaps in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the civil rights movement. Dr. King's assassination, then Malcolm X's, and then the Black Panther activity—all of those things began to spin around and take form.⁸⁸ Perceptions that were not present before began surfacing. Adding it all together, it was a very turbulent period for the military.

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⁸⁸ The modern civil rights movement swept across the nation from the mid-1950s until the early 1970s. Martin Luther King, Jr., an early leader of the movement, preached non-violent resistance to white racism. He led a successful boycott of the Montgomery, Alabama, transit system in the 1950s and then reached the zenith of his influence in 1963 with his "I Have A Dream Speech," delivered during the historic "March on Washington." He was a founding member of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), an organization of black clergymen dedicated to abolishing segregation and achieving racial justice. By the early to mid-1960s, however, many younger blacks grew restive with the seemingly slow pace of change. They looked for leadership to individuals like Malcolm X of
Harlow: That was the time when Ken Blaylock of the AFGE [American Federation of Government Employees] proposed publicly that the Air Force Sergeants Association and other associations ought to join AFGE and combine to be unionized. I was intimately involved in that. In fact, I went over and talked to Ken Blaylock. I took him to lunch about a month later, and I recorded his conversation and mine. Al Connors was there, the deputy for Ken Blaylock, and he promised not to release it. It was strictly for our benefit.

Later the president of the association wanted to have a meeting, and he wanted to invite somebody from the Pentagon. I went to OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] to invite a gentleman I knew who was pretty well up on this issue, but first I had to send him a transcript of that interview. He sent it through security review. The next thing I knew I got a call from a very good friend of mine, and he said, “Hey, Don, what’ve you been doing? I hear the Chief of Staff, the Admiral, and the services are all upset. They think you’re trying to unionize the military.” They had all gotten a copy. Somebody up in security review had made copies and sent them to the chiefs of the services. Of course, it was about three or four months later that Bob Nolan, Executive Secretary of the Fleet Reserve Association, and I testified before Congress in opposition to it, so it kind of died off.

Barnes: Unionization was a very serious thing. I’ll tell you—going beyond what Don said—that I went to a hearing of both the House and Senate Armed Forces Committees with General Rogers from the Army. I represented the Air Force. There were a Navy and a Marine representative, too. The issue of unionization got very strong. The Air Force’s interest at the time was somewhere about 35 percent. The Navy in San

the Black Muslim movement, who called for black separatism. The more radical turned to leaders such as Huey Newton of the Black Panthers, a paramilitary organization dedicated to revolution. Violence swept through America’s cities summer after summer from 1964 onward. In 1968 Martin Luther King, Jr., the one leader who might have been able to pull the many factions together, died, the victim of an assassination. Malcolm X had been killed by fellow Black Muslims a few years earlier and Huey Newton soon fled the country. Huey Newton eventually returned to the United States, and, after engaging in increasingly violent crimes, was murdered by an Oakland, California, drug dealer after an extortion attempt. Despite the passing of the leadership, social changes brought by the movement had fundamentally transformed American race relations.

89 Ken Blaylock was president of the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE).

90 Gen Bernard Rogers served as Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, from 1976 to 1979.
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Diego had actually had meetings with union officials on their installations. Air Force people at McGuire [Air Force Base, New Jersey], and Army troops at Fort Dix [New Jersey], had met in a joint effort. At an actual union meeting, we had a small gathering at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, and looked at the unionization that existed there in the civilian work force. Interest was growing, and I guess Senator Stennis’s declaration that there was a thin line of constitutionality probably broke the back of unionization and [forbade] commanders to deal with it. The constitutionality of people belonging to the union was an issue, and you couldn’t prohibit it.\(^9\)

**Harlow:** The German army became unionized.

**Barnes:** And the Dutch.

**Harlow:** Later on, the Swedish army enlisted corps was unionized. The officers corps wasn’t. Then one day one of their high ranking officers said, during a discussion with his fellow officers at the club, “I don’t know why we put in sixteen or eighteen hours a day. The regulations tell us what we can and can’t do. All we’re doing is applying and interpreting them.” So they formed their own separate union.\(^2\)

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\(^9\) John C. Stennis was a member of the U.S. Senate from 1947 to 1989. In 1977 he introduced a bill in Congress which, if passed, would have made it illegal for members of the armed services to unionize. He believed that unionization posed “a real and distinct danger to our military establishment and to military discipline” and that unions were “wholly incompatible with the operation of the military chain of command, would undermine the role, authority, and position of the commander, would raise the very real possibility of divided loyalties, and might very well make it impossible for our military organization to carry out the purposes for which it was created.” This bill did not become law. However, the law governing federal employee unions has a section (5 U.S.C. 7103A2Bii) specifically excluding active duty military from membership. *Congressional Record*, March 15, 1977, p. 7542.

Gaylor: Personally I don't think there would ever have been a union. I think they—the national leadership—said, "Let them talk about it." But a big hand would've come out and suppressed it, and rightfully so.

Barnes: A big hand did come out and suppress it. I think we probably know what we would've gotten. The lesson was very clear...in police and fire departments across the country who gave us the example of what happened when you unionized civil servants. We in the military are, to a degree, civil servants. I don't think it would ever have happened, but certainly the interest was there, for lack of a better place to turn, and it made for a very serious period in our service's history.

Airey: If I recall, the President of the United States signed an Executive Order barring any type of unionization of the FBI. He could've done the same thing for the armed forces.

Gaylor: I'd like to comment, Dr. Kohn, that there were some interesting things going on in leadership during this era that I think need to be addressed. By the late 1960s we were senior enlisted people and many of us had moved into key enlisted advisor positions. We used to go to meetings and talk about what we could do for the airmen. But we still hadn't become very good at asking the airmen themselves. We'd ask ourselves, "What do the airmen want?" I know, for example, that we decided that they all liked pizza and beer, so every base would have a pizza and beer place and we let the airmen have a contest to name it—The Pit, The Dungeon, The Pub. Also, we decided that since they liked to sit on the floor and read poetry, maybe they'd like to have a room where they could put slogans on the wall. The interesting thing was that as I watched the development of these activities, in some cases the airmen accepted them, and in other cases they didn't. We still hadn't learned to include them in the process by asking. I actually heard a lieutenant colonel say at a meeting in Ramstein, Germany, when somebody asked, "What do the airmen want?" and someone else said, "Let's ask the airmen," reply, "You don't have to. I can tell you what the airmen want." I wanted to say, "How do you know? How can you say that?" It was an era when leadership meant well, trying very much to meet the airmen halfway.

Kohn: Chief Gaylor, were the airmen in the late 1960s different from the airmen of the 1950s and the airmen of the 1940s?

Gaylor: No, I don't think so, except that there was a certain smugness—the feeling that "they're trying to retain me." Retention
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dropped; people were bailing out. Whenever you feel wanted you always feel pretty important. So there was a certain smugness in saying, "They're going to have to bend over backwards to try to reenlist me."

Kohn: Wasn't there a certain permissiveness in the services? As we talked earlier, expectations were different on the part of the airmen . . .

Gaylor: Because they were coming out of a society and had grown up in a home like mine, where they'd been given things.

Harlow: Their perceptions were worse than the real thing, the perceptions in their minds of the military—discipline and everything else.

Kohn: The perceptions in their minds of the conditions in the service, and the lack of support for the war?

Gaylor: During those years, we became "lifers." How many times were you called a lifer? Sometimes if you walked by a dorm and the airmen were up on a balcony—safety in numbers—they'd shout down, "Hey, lifer," or "There go three lifers." Suddenly, there was a separation between those who were career airmen and those who were not.

Kohn: Across the rank structure?

Gaylor: It was part of an open protest about what the military stood for.

Barnes: I think it did come out very strong at that period.

Gaylor: The hair, the wide wristband on the watch . . .

Barnes: That was true. I think there was a difference but societal changes inflamed and drove those changes. Part of it was an absence of discipline in society, a breakdown in the public education system, which

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63During the 1960s fashion often tended toward extremes—wide wristbands for watches, long hair, bright and bold patterns, bell-bottom pants and short (mini) skirts.

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you couldn't point a finger to but it was there if you really started to look at it. Earlier, Bob mentioned the Project 100,000 people. Those people came into the system simply because there was no way in their own communities to educate them beyond where they were. We took them on, and they were, in fact, a problem. Although they could not be taught, they could be led, but only if they picked who led them. We had little rebellions, and we had strong people emerge. We had groups of people who kind of wandered into things. I like Bob's description of them—sitting on the floor reading poetry. What he's talking about was the stripping away of everything. What was on the walls was suggestive of everything from drugs to non-religion. It became a real mess in some of the places as they got into their own little worlds. There was this manifestation of self and personality. It went beyond the wristbands. It went deeper into things.

Gaylor: Identity, individualism.

Barnes: Rings in ears and noses.

Gaylor: The "dap," the "greeting."94

Barnes: And name changes. I'm talking about changes of names to Muslim names.

Barnes: We really were not ready for that. Then we dealt with what was a simple thing, and I think from a police standpoint, you may recognize this because it was one of the big problems. It's still with our society today. In this group of Project 100,000 people, depending upon where they came from, there arose demands for some "comfort" in the midst of all this turbulence. Their requirements for "comfort" were principally to be out of and away from the work place. After work there was a need to address some of the commons things that these people needed, like music and food. Soul food developed out of this. Dining halls never before had had to address that kind of request. One reaction was, "Well, that's what I've been eating all my life. When did it get named soul food?"

94 During the 1960s and 1970s, blacks, reflecting a sense of racial pride and identity on meeting each other, frequently used a ritualistic handshake and the terms "brother" or "sister." The "dap" and the "greeting" refer to this practice.
Haircuts became a problem. Who could do Afro hairstyles? Let me tell you my experiences with the Afro hairstyle. When it first became a factor, and before we got people in to educate the First Sergeants and commanders, I got a call: “Tom, I've got a guy up here with a head of hair shaped like a lampshade.” I said, “How did he grow it without somebody seeing it and complaining about it before now?” We had a lot of people who were on the periphery of compliance and non-compliance for haircuts. No barbershop could deal with that. Who could do Afro haircuts? In a town like Rantoul, Illinois, where do you get a black barber who understood the regulations and who would cut their hair? So individualism and self-awareness became a real problem.

If I were to say casually to all of you sitting here at this table, “Hey, baby, let's you and I get my deuce and a quarter, get our hammers, and split for the killing floor.” Now, what would that mean to you? Do you understand that? The answer is no. There was a need to get together so they could do that on the base. Every time blacks would gather on the base—I remember that at Lowry Air Force Base in Denver especially, the school base, there was a bad problem. The Security Police would always rush in and break up this group of blacks, but it didn't break up any groups of other people. This thing then spilled outside the military. We sought help to bring people in and speak on establishing “conversational comfort.” That kind of language had to be learned so that people would understand what was going on and not be threatened by it, and not be threatened by groups of black people who were together. The town didn't have anything to solve it, and the base didn't have anything either. For example, soul music became a necessity. Well, if you're sitting up at Minot, North Dakota, the chances of getting a soul band in there were pretty remote.

How did commanders deal with that? Let me give you a prime example of two bases in similar locations, one where a commander worked the problem and another where he didn't: Laughlin and Laredo [Air Force Bases] in Texas. Laughlin got bold enough to ask, “What do the airmen want?” What they wanted was an opportunity for some social outlet. Laredo, on the other hand, never tended to address itself to the problem. Laredo had a dining hall incident. I went there and reviewed it. These were angry, frustrated airmen who had forced their way into that dining hall. They'd been in it most of the night, almost to the early morning hours, hadn't torn up a thing, had eaten what was out, and hadn't broken into anything to get food out. In general, they stayed within the confines of the mess hall. They were merely trying to get a message across, but the security police had surrounded the place. They had a D-8 Caterpillar bulldozer ready to smash the door. There were armed police in flak jackets all around it, waiting for an order. Nobody was going to come out in that environment. The answer was to get inside, see what the problem was, get some spokesmen, and get those spokesmen to the commander. But that
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had not happened. The community of Laredo was also a part of the problem because it refused to address the needs of these airmen. Del Rio, on the other hand, didn't do that, and it remained open while Laredo was later closed as an active base, in part, as a result of that incident. That was a very severe consequence of the situation, but it happened on other installations too.95

Gaylor: Wouldn't you agree, Tom, that meanwhile, a lot of the Project 100,000 people who'd come in earlier had become tech sergeants and master sergeants, but they hadn't lost the "follower" mentality and therefore weren't supportive of management? They were followers; many of them became part of the problem. We had to turn to our senior NCOs and say, "Tell that airman to get a haircut, and first stop off and get one yourself!" That's what we were up against. The turbulence of leadership was seen in the situation where our middle NCO grades had in many cases deserted us or had never joined us in the first place. Closing the NCO Academies was the worst thing that could've happened because [the airmen] weren't getting the leadership training that they should have been getting.

Barnes: The Navy was not without problems. It had riots on its ships. We had fights on our bases. It was a wicked thing.

Kohn: Let me ask you, then, about the response of the institution. We know that a number of steps were taken to change conditions—some basic structural changes in enlisted life. In 1967, the grade of E-4 became a sergeant rank. Promotion boards were established for ranks through E-7. There was TOPCAP. In 1970 came the WAPS, the Weighted Airman Promotion System, and in 1967, of course, the creation of the Office of

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95 In late 1971 a group of black airmen barricaded themselves inside a base dining hall at Laredo Air Force Base, Texas. They were frustrated and angry with the hostile racial atmosphere on the base and in the surrounding community. Chief Barnes, then the Senior Enlisted Advisor to the commander of Air Training Command flew to the base to meet with the airmen. He gained entry to the dining hall, spoke with the young men, and was credited with defusing a potentially violent situation. This was not an isolated incident. Similar protests erupted at many bases in the United States and overseas, involving all the services, during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
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Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force and the concept of enlisted advisors in the commands.  

Barnes: What the institution did about the conditions we just described was to develop the Social Actions system as we know it today. That's what the institution did to address these things. The WAPS, the sergeant E-4, and the other things were apart from that and they addressed another problem in the system. They were not a part of this correction.

Kohn: Thus, in your estimation, the kind of crisis that beset the Air Force in 1967 grew out of the momentary conjunction of events and not structural deficiencies in the conditions of enlisted service.

Barnes: I think Paul can probably speak to that better than any of us, but I'll start off and then get out of the way. I think retention became an issue at that time and had to be addressed. Commanders got busy with the things they were doing in order to get down into the enlisted corps. To reach them they developed the position of Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force. I think that over the years they found that [they couldn't reach them] any other way, and they needed a way to get some representative at the top level of the Air Force. At this point I have to stop, because Paul can speak to it better than any of us.

Airey: I think you've hit the bulk of it, and we could get long-winded about this because there's quite a story behind it. Basically, we were up to our tail bones in the Vietnam War. We were fighting to keep a 25 per cent enlisted force retention rate every year. In order to keep that 25 per cent, we lowered our standards quite a degree, for which we suffered later. It was General Horace Wade and some other Air Staffers who came up with the idea that [giving] the airman first class NCO status would have a definite effect on the retention rate.  

Also, there was the belief that these were the people who were getting the airplanes loaded, these were the

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57 Gen Horace Wade served as Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, from 1972 to 1973.
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guys who were getting the airplanes launched and doing NCO duties and they should be able to call themselves sergeants instead of airman firsts. I was the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force and I was opposed to it. I did not believe it was the right way to go. General Wade's theory was correct. After it was put into effect, the retention rate did go up. I will say that, but to this day I believe it was a mistake. If I had my way in the United States Air Force today, the first non-commissioned officer rank would be staff sergeant, like it used to be.

Harlow: Paul, didn't they also have a directive that a crew chief had to be an NCO?

Airey: I think that was a policy more than a directive. They convinced General John P. McConnell that that was the thing to do.98 Evidently, I was wrong because most people seem to believe that it was the right step.

Gaylor: I think the initiation of Social Actions and equal opportunity can somewhat be described as a replacement for poor management.99 If the leaders of that day, both enlisted and officer, had done their jobs there would not have been a need for those programs. They gave the weak leaders further reason to abdicate their responsibility. "It's none of my business; that's Social Action's job." When they were told, "Hey, this airman has a problem," they responded, "Don't talk to me; go to Social Actions."

So it became a cop-out, and one that poor leaders used to the hilt. It was unfortunate that there was a need to develop such a process to replace the leadership that existed. But poor leadership existed because we'd allowed it to exist.

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98 Gen John P. McConnell served as Chief of Staff, USAF, from 1965 to 1969.

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Kohn: What do you mean by poor leadership?

Gaylor: The non-acceptance of responsibility. If I have four airmen working for me—two blacks, one white, and one Hispanic—and I'm not attuned and sensitive to their needs and don't treat them with the respect and dignity they deserve, then I'm a poor leader. Many leaders did provide those sensitivities, so it was easy for me personally to move right on into the equal opportunity arena. I asked, basically, "What else is new? I've supported this all along." Those who were made insecure by it said, "Why are they doing this? What's coming? What will it do to me?" Those who were weak leaders said, "Good, now they can take that black I'm uncomfortable talking to and he can go see a Social Actions person and I don't have to mess with him." It was interesting to watch the reaction to the Social Actions program. At first, many of the people in it had personal axes to grind. Many of them had chips on their shoulders, and they moved into those positions with the desire to right the world, to straighten it out, to correct the Air Force.

Barnes: Bob, would you agree, at the same time, in developing the long view, that these people weren't really prepared?

Gaylor: Their intent was valid. Their sincerity was good, but their preparation was nil. It became shouting matches and emotional outbursts.

Airey: Tell about the mandatory courses.

Gaylor: You had to go to the twenty-hour race relations course, and some people abused it. At one base in England, for example, one liberal commander got the idea that in class it would be good to wear civilian clothes, and everyone would become Fred, Mac, Bill, George, and Mary. Here were colonels sitting with young, one-stripe airmen, and this was happening. When we found out about it in USAFE Headquarters, of course, we stopped it immediately. There were so many misinterpretations of the intent and philosophy behind that program. I look back now, and I'm surprised we made it through as well as we did. It's still getting the job done.

Barnes: It took it a little while for it to gain perspective. There were some people in it who were very, very effective in the beginning, but they splintered off from the early Social Actions movement into the drug and
alcohol thing. A chaplain, a Lt. Col. Jacob, was really instrumental in the
drug and alcohol area, and a Maj. Gen. Lou Theus was very effective in
the Social Actions area.\textsuperscript{100} Both were people who were qualified. But for a
long time this program picked up people who had axes to grind and who,
unfortunately, ground them very heavily, before we got a handle on it. But,
if nothing else, people came together and got their feelings and thoughts
out on the table, good or bad.

\textit{Gaylor}: It forced us to address the issue.

\textit{Barnes}: The sensitivity issue was addressed, and some of the experiences
in sensitivity training were just unbelievable. I can cite some humorous
examples of what sensitivity training amounted to when you had people
who were professing their sincerity. It got a little ridiculous in a number of
ways.

\textit{Gaylor}: May I give you an example? There were twenty of us, and one
guy brought in a plateful of fresh tomatoes, two loaves of bread, and a big
block of cheese and set them on the table. There were no plates or
utensils. There were napkins, of course. Here we sat, and he said, “There’s
your meal; eat.” The idea was that you were supposed to become comfort-
able taking a bite of the tomato and passing it to Tom, breaking off a piece
of bread or breaking off a piece of cheese. It was a sharing. We were
supposed to learn that we were all brethren, and it was a sharing. It was
also extremely unsanitary. At worst, it was poor eating. Yet, under the
guise of solidarity and sensitivity those things actually happened, caused by
people who meant well but who were surely not prepared to deal in the
appropriate way to develop sensitivities.

\textit{Barnes}: I went through one of those sessions Bob describes. They passed
around a common drinking vessel. It started with you, and you drank and
gave it to Paul, and he drank and gave it to Bob, and he drank and gave it
to me, and I drank. When it got to Paul, he dipped his fingers in it. He
thought it was a fingerbowl, after all the drinking. The chain of action
would break, and you’d see who wasn’t in the game. It would break right at

\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{100} Maj Gen Lucius “Lou” Theus held the post of Special Assistant for Social
Actions, Directorate of Personnel, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, HQ USAF,
from 1972 to 1974.
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a point, and you could see how this kind of thing went. Sensitivity came in lots of ways.

One thing developed that had a dumb name. It was called a “black IQ test.” It had black phrases on it or terms like the statement I just made to you a little bit ago. They gave it as a test. To explain to you what I said earlier—and it was common in black language—to say “Hey, Baby” was a common phrase for “Hey, Paul.” “Let’s get in my deuce and a quarter”—that was a Buick Electra 225, a deuce and a quarter. “Let’s get our hammers”—our girls—“and go to the killing floor,” which was a dance floor. This language was kind of common. If you didn’t understand it and I came up with a statement like that, you would be out in left field. They structured this big sheet of phrases—there may have been twenty-five or thirty—and they called it a black IQ test.

Gaylor: The Torrejón [Air Base, Spain] basketball team went to RAF Mildenhall, England, to play a basketball tournament. The English driver who picked them up at the Mildenhall airport, was a bloke, and you know blokes are friendly and outgoing. “I say, mate,” he said to this coach, “what a fine looking bunch of boys.” About six of the basketball players came toward him. They were going to grab him and rip him from limb to limb. The poor old bloke said, “What did I say?” So there were some innocent situations.

Kohn: The opportunities for misunderstandings were very great.

Gaylor: You could mean well and still get into trouble.

Kohn: Let me shift from this discussion to the structural issues of enlisted life, specifically, the introduction of the promotion boards for the ranks through E-7 in 1967 and the WAPS [Weighted Airman Promotion System] in 1970. Were you all in favor of those changes? Why were they so important?

Airey: The start of WAPS came during my time, 1967 to 1969. The unfairness of promotions was the most serious problem I faced when I went on the job in 1967; there were problems involving issues we’ve already talked about: frozen career fields, soft and hard-core areas, and proficiency pay. In other words, enlisted in some career fields drew pro-pay. They were certified proficient versus others who were not. Once again, we could talk about the problems associated with enlisted promotions for a long time. Congressman L. Mendel Rivers of the House Armed
Services Committee was getting 10,000 or 15,000 letters a year from ticked-off enlisted people about our promotion system.\textsuperscript{101}

**Kohn:** What was the problem?

**Airey:** They weren't getting promoted.

**Gaylor:** Because of favoritism primarily.

**Airey:** And the "fairhaired boy" system.

**Gaylor:** The unfairness, the perceived inequity.

**Airey:** There was the "fairhaired boy" system and all these things. What Congressman Rivers couldn't understand was why he wasn't getting letters from Army, Navy, and Marine Corps enlisted people. Of course, their turnover was great. He even formed a congressional committee that I testified before to look into the enlisted promotion systems of the armed forces, from which the Air Force came away looking very bad.\textsuperscript{102} The Air Force formed a committee. There were two colonels on it, some chief master sergeants, and some other ranks too. The committee was ordered to come up with a system. In no way shape or form do I want to give the impression that I had a lot to do with it, but I did have input and worked with these people. The end result was the Weighted Airman Promotion System.\textsuperscript{103} We know today that this is the best possible system of any of

\textsuperscript{101} L. Mendel Rivers won election to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1940 and served until his death in 1970. From 1965 until 1969 he was the Chairman, House Armed Services Committee. After receiving complaints from constituents about the Air Force's and the Army's promotion policies, Congressman Rivers convened hearings on the services' enlisted promotion policies. These hearings resulted in changes in the two services' promotion systems.

\textsuperscript{102} The House Special Subcommittee on Enlisted Promotion Policy Review, under the leadership of Congressman Rivers, held extensive hearings on promotion policy in all the services from August to November 1967.

\textsuperscript{103} Prompted by the results of those hearings, the Air Force introduced its Weighted Airman Promotion System (WAPS). That proposed program was reviewed in subcommittee hearings during July 1968 and reported on favorably September 20, 1968. Approved changes went into effect June 1, 1970. "Improvements in Enlisted Promotion Policy," Report by the Special Subcommittee on Enlisted Promotion Policy Review of the Committee on Armed Services,
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the armed forces, but that's what it goes back to. Congress even got into the act about our enlisted promotion system.

Kohn: Could I ask Chief Barnes and all of you, if the perceived unfairness in the promotion system exacerbated racial tensions? Did there seem to be, for example, lack of equity in promotions for minorities? In other words, did these problems combine together at that time?

Airey: No. First, in the promotion folders they took the photos out. A promotion board didn't know a man's color or religion or anything else.

Kohn: But you didn't have promotion boards up through E-7 until 1967.

Airey: We had local boards.


Barnes: There used to be oral boards where you went and physically met the board.

Gaylord: I made master meeting a board.

Kohn: You took an oral test, and they judged your military bearing?

Gaylord: They asked you questions—you never knew what [kinds]. One major asked me, "Do you read the paper and listen to the radio at the same time?" So, it was anything that they felt like asking.

Barnes: Let me describe the oral board problem. If you took two guys with the same AFSC—and that was generally the case in a squadron because AFSCs were pretty much alike, depending on the kind of squadron it was. If you took two people meeting in the same squadron and asked them questions on reading the paper well or listening to the radio—you


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see how it could be skewed. Bob got it right; one of the things they asked you about was current events, to see how up on the times you were. Let’s say you had a guy who answered all of that, but on his job he wasn’t worth a hoot, and the other guy kind of stumbled along through the current events issues because he didn’t listen, but he was a whiz on his job. Then you add to that the physical appearance of the individual at the board and mix in the current racial perception—Hispanic, black, white, whatever it was—you could begin to see how the boards skewed individual promotions. After an oral board you could always tell. But once a review process was set up with no indicators of race or physical appearance, it evened up and took away all that prejudice. I’m not saying the requirement not to be current wasn’t important, but the job was also very pertinent. It depended on what impressed the board.

Gaylor: Let me give you an example. Let’s say three of us are on a board, and each can award from 1 to 10 points, breaking down into tenths. You can review a record and give it 7.7, 7.9, or 8.2. Then you pass the record to me, and I rate it, and at the end we compare our ratings. This actually happened. One member of this board I was on exclaimed, “Wow! This guy has twenty-eight completed ECI [Extension Course Institute] courses.”

I’ve counted them. Twenty-eight ECI. What would you assume he was going to give in the way of points, high or low? High. You assume that. Then he said, “That tells me one thing. He’s not doing his job. He’s spending all his time taking these ECI courses—5.4. You were at the whim of, the folly of, the board member. In other words, here’s a guy who’s on the board who’s never taken an ECI course and isn’t that impressed with people who do. WAPS took out that subjectivity.

Harlow: One other thing. With the boards you didn’t have a percentage of people to promote to apply against specific AFSCs. You had an overall

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104 The Air Force established the Extension Course Institute (ECI) on May 1, 1950, at Gunter Air Force Station, Alabama, as part of a broader effort to improve professional military instruction for all Air Force members, especially the Air Force Guard and Reserve. Courses were available to both airmen and officers and paralleled those of the Squadron Officer School, the Air Command and Staff College, and the Air Force Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Academy. Curricula emphasized theoretical and managerial courses and supported the Air Force’s on-the-job training program. They also prepared airmen for their specialty knowledge exams used in the promotion process. In 1980 the Guinness Book of World Records named ECI the world’s largest school for having enrolled nine million and graduated five million students. Fact Sheet 87-42, United States Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs)
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quota for promotion, period. So, if you had a maintenance officer on the board, he was interested in maintenance people; if you had a personnel man on the board, he wanted his people to get promoted. So instead of merit, local boards could become almost a selection process by AFSC. WAPS tended to reduce drastically Congressional inquiries.

Gaylor: And it put the onus on the back of the guy trying to be promoted —his ability to know his job and to test.

Kohn: What about the TOPCAP program? That was the program of removing people at a certain year point, and that was just the hump issue. 105

Barnes: I think that was the Korean Hump we talked about.

Airey: You were on the committee that set it up.

Barnes: That’s right. The acronym was TOPCAP, Total Objective Career Airmen Promotion System, and it just stopped the careers of those people who didn’t grow. In a way, it forced people to make a decision about staying in the service and trying to get promoted.

Harlow: The problem was that we were losing young people. Our retention rate was dropping badly because we couldn’t promote. The master sergeants were staying. The top NCOs were staying because they had it

105 The Air Force implemented TOPCAP (Total Objective Plan for Career Airmen Personnel) in response to promotion stagnation in the late 1960s. The problem was the Korean Hump, a large number of E-7s through E-9s in the sixteen-to-twenty-years-of-service group. These individuals had joined the Air Force during the rapid expansion of the Korean conflict. By the mid-1960s they crowded the upper-levels of the NCO ranks. TOPCAP initiated “a policy of limited forced attrition” in order “to insure a continuous opportunity for advancement.” The Air Force achieved a limited forced attrition by setting a high-year-of-tenure for various ranks. For example, (until changes implemented in 1991) E-4s and E-5s had a high-year-of-tenure of twenty years, E-6s of twenty-three years, E-7s of twenty-six years, E-8s of twenty-eight years and E-9s of thirty years. Once you reached the high-year-of-tenure of your rank, unless you were promoted, you had to retire. TOPCAP, thus, outlined an “up or out” promotion path for airmen over a projected thirty year career. Maj Norbert R. Kaus, “They Call It TOPCAP,” Airmen (September 1971), pp. 11-15.
made, but all of these middle grades were sitting there unable to get promoted because the grades were not available.

**Kohn**: Was there much gnashing of teeth when this came in?

**Gaylor**: Only if you were caught up in it. If you were a staff with nineteen years of service, you didn't like it. But if you were a master with sixteen years, you thought it was great.

**Kohn**: But what about from the standpoint of managing an effective career force?

**Harlow**: It was done to the officer force to a degree, too. Up or out. Partly it interfered with management. It was basically a good program, but it's like all programs that have been in existence for a long time. You have to look at it constantly and determine how it's affecting people today.

**Barnes**: High maintenance at the higher end of the grade scale with higher pay for qualified people, and lower pay for junior grade people and keep the numbers the same. It switches, whatever is necessary at the time, so it's still in use.

**Gaylor**: If I might just suggest one thing to show you the total scope of personnel changes from 1948 to 1978—thirty years. I was at a meeting at the Pentagon; we were addressing the so-called inequities of WAPS because there were still some questions about it. A captain said, in all his wisdom, "Probably what we ought to do is just break the quotas up and give them out to the units and let the units hold promotion boards where people could meet and that way we'd be promoting those who were most qualified because the units know what their people can do." I said, "That is absolutely unbelievable. We have now come full cycle." He said, "Do you mean that you once did that?" I said, "That's how I made corporal in 1949." He said, "I thought I had a new idea." Everybody who hits the Pentagon thinks they've come up with something new.

**Harlow**: I'll tell you another recent problem because it was associated with the new GI bill, which, thankfully, finally got signed.106 When they

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106 The New Montgomery G.I. Bill, named for Congressman Gillispie V. "Sonny" Montgomery, or the Veteran's Educational Assistance Act of 1984,
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came to the idea of getting a new GI bill, knowing that the old GI bill was going to go out in 1989, somebody over in the Pentagon got the idea that in order to attract those skills and keep and retain those people who have special skills, [the Air Force] will give them the opportunity to transfer their educational benefits to their wife or children. Now can you imagine what that would do to the force if only those with the special skills would have that opportunity—plus the fact, that now they were going to go outside the spectrum of the military individual to the family member? You take some major or lieutenant colonel who’s got three boys; and he can transfer his educational benefits to them. That’s great. But how about the poor staff or tech sergeant?

Kohn: One of the themes that runs through our discussion is the issue of fairness in treating the enlisted force, a recognition of special needs—from equal TDY pay to discriminating between specialties to maintaining a promotion system that might favor certain AFSCs or certain types of people. That seems to be a driving factor behind a lot of the problems pertaining to enlisted service that we’ve considered.

Harlow: Let me give you a classic illustration of equity—the pararescue man. An officer jumps out of the aircraft in a parachute, and he gets $110 a month. The enlisted jumps out, and he gets $55. It took twelve years to get that changed.

Kohn: He lands at the same speed.

Harlow: And if his parachute doesn’t open, he’s just as dead as anybody else. But it took twelve years to get Congress to finally change that. Why?

replaced the Vietnam era G.I. Bill. Originally designed as a temporary trial program, it was made permanent in 1987. The new bill and its educational assistance benefits covered individuals who entered the service on or after July 1, 1985. In order to qualify for the benefits, a serviceman or woman had to serve at least three years and contribute $100 per month of their basic pay to the program. Veteran's Administration, Annual Report 1985 (Veteran's Administration, Washington, D.C., May 1986), pp. 81–83. Gillespie V, “Sonny” Montgomery first won election to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1966 and has won each subsequent election. He served on the Select Committee on Military Involvement in Southeast Asia, on the Committee on Veteran's Affairs and as chairman on the Select Committee on Missing in Action in Southeast Asia.

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Because there was an enlisted man who was killed down in Arkansas when a missile silo blew up. The senator from Arkansas got interested in the fact that the officers got more money for being down in that silo than the enlisted, and he said, "Why?" That's when the thing got changed, but it took twelve years.\footnote{During routine maintenance on September 18, 1980, a tool fell and punctured the first-stage fuel tank of a Titan II missile near Damascus, Arkansas. A fire ignited and, despite the best efforts of the crew at the scene, it resulted in an explosion of the fuel tank at 0302 on September 19, eight and one-half hours after the initial accident. SSgt David Livingston died and twenty-one other Air Force people, mostly enlisted, were injured. Edgar Ulsamer, "The Senate Honors Heroic Titan Crew," \textit{Air Force}, December 1980 (Vol. 63, No. 12), pp. 40–41.}

\textbf{Gaylor:} I think, Dr. Kohn, that maybe in many cases we, the enlisted, went about trying to change the system in the wrong way. In many cases we said, "I want what the officers have." What we should have said was, "I want that which I have coming to me and that which I deserve, and that's equality in these pay systems." When you start saying, "I want what the officers have," you're really whistling in the wind because the officers are very hesitant to relinquish those things.

\textbf{Harlow:} You've got to look back at the reports of 1937, 1938, and 1939 in which it was determined that the officers would get so much money in hazardous duty and the enlisted would get so much money because the officers had more responsibility.\footnote{During the late 1930s both Congress and the Air Corps studied the issue of extra pay for rated officers and enlisted crew members. Flight pay for enlisted crew members became especially crucial as crew planes, especially the B–17, came into the service. Just why officers received higher payments than enlisted crew members is not clear from the records, but it was standard practice to make smaller payments to enlisted personnel. Flight pay was based on base pay (for officers a 50 percent increase over their base pay) and since the base pay of enlisted personnel was smaller than that of officers, enlisted personnel would naturally receive a smaller amount. See Flying Pay of Officers, January 1937–November 1938; January 1925–December 1938, Records of the Army Air Corps, RG 18, 1917–1938, National Archives, Washington, D.C.}

\textbf{Kohn:} Or flying pay. And there were very few enlisted pilots.
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**Harlow:** But the thing is that the officers were getting more pay anyway. If you're up in an aircraft, maybe the officer in charge of that aircraft is responsible, but if something happens to the aircraft, you're all dead.

**Kohn:** The issue of fairness is not the same as equality. I was addressing the issue of fairness in equity—not equal pay for different jobs, but equal hazard pay for jumping out of the airplane. That's fairness; it's not equality.

**Gaylor:** It's a fairness issue among professionals. I think we were addressing it wrongly. Any time somebody says, "The officers have it; why don't we," it irks me because I always felt that being a sergeant had an extremely proud status, which, if anything, set me apart from the officer. To simply want to copy what the officer has and does turns me off.

**Barnes:** One of the things that we did to address some of the issues, too, was to undertake the AFMIG [Air Force Management Improvement Group] studies initiated by General Ken Tallman. These studies were set up to address a lot of these issues. Their work is found in the records of that AFMIG study.

**Gaylor:** Out of that effort grew the LMDC [Leadership and Management Development Center] at Montgomery, Alabama. Out of it also grew the

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109. Lt Gen Kenneth L. Tallman was Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, HQ USAF, from 1975 to 1977.

110. The AFMIG (Air Force Management Improvement Group) grew out of discussions in March 1975 between Gen David C. Jones, Chief of Staff, USAF, and Lt Gen Kenneth L. Tallman, shortly before the latter became Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, HQ USAF. General Jones was concerned about the quality of Air Force personnel management. He asked General Tallman to gather together people from all ranks and from all parts of the Air Force to discuss a wide range of management issues and propose possible solutions to problem areas. Among the issues discussed were management of the NCO force, what is an NCO, how does an airman become an NCO, and what kind of recognition, responsibility and authority should come with NCO rank. The AFMIG also suggested several ways to raise the prestige of senior and chief master sergeants. In addition, the AFMIG led to a number of management changes in facilities, billeting, and mess halls. Oral History Interview, Lt Col J. A. Maxwell with Lt Gen Kenneth L. Tallman, December 11-12, 1984, pp. 135-141.

111. The Air University's Leadership and Management Development Center (LMDC) at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, has gone through a series of name
distinctive insignia for the senior airmen, the blue star. All of that grew out of Tallman’s AFMIG study. It was held here at Bolling.

Kohn: You were on it?

Gaylor: I was called in as an advisor.

Airey: I was the only retiree on it as a former Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force.

Barnes: So there is some written history for that period, and I would suggest that it be studied.

Harlow: The Air Force opposed the hazardous duty pay increase for enlisted for the simple reason that it thought that the Congress would take the pay away from the officers to level it out between the two. I wrote, when I worked for the Air Force Sergeants Association, a Lobby Ledger about the kids who went out and defused the bombs, the EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal] people. They got $55 a month; the officer who stood back far enough to make sure he could see what went on received $110 a month. If that bomb goes off you know who’s going to get killed. Again, it took time to achieve this pay equity because they were afraid that someone was going to take it away from the officers.

Airey: I want to echo what Bob said. I’ve never been one to fight for things because an officer had them. The colonel should make one hell of a lot more money than the sergeant. He should have certain privileges. I’ll fight for that colonel and general to have those privileges, but what I want to see is that when things are not equitable, they are changed. It has nothing to do with what this officer, this colonel, or this general, has.

Gaylor: Abe Lincoln said one day, “By taking from the rich, it does not guarantee that the poor will be better off.” So it doesn’t make sense to take from them.

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changes. Currently the Ira C. Eaker Center for Professional Development, it offers professional development courses for individuals in various career fields, including, for example, enlisted members working in the Judge Advocate General, the Comptroller, and in Family Support Centers.
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Airey: Where were you when he said this?

Gaylor: I was at Appomattox right outside the courthouse.

Harlow: One time I testified before the Congress and I made the statement that I'd heard a lot of general officers and high ranking officials talk about how the NCOs were the backbone of the Air Force, but I said that when it comes to providing some of the benefits, some of the money, and the funding, like TDY reimbursements, it was all just rhetoric. Congress—and the Air Force—didn't like that, but it was true.

When General Dougherty was CINCSAC [Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command], and CMSAF Jim McCoy was SAC's Senior Enlisted Advisor at the time, Chief McCoy told Senator Armstrong, who helped to get the equal per diem for TDY for the enlisted into law, "In SAC, we all give our vouchers to the aircraft commander and he turns them in, gets all the money, and splits it between the officers and enlisted." That was the first time I'd ever heard of that.\textsuperscript{112}

Gaylor: But some commands were doing it on their own. I remember that going on when I was the Second Air Force Senior Enlisted Advisor in 1970 [to] 1971, working for General Dave Jones out at Barksdale [Air Force Base, Louisiana].\textsuperscript{113} In my travels around the command, with its sixteen bases and seven tenants, equal pay for TDY was the number one issue when I would meet with the enlisted people because so many of them were gunners and boomers. They'd say, "When is there going to be TDY equity?" There was even some petition-signing by the chief gunner and the chief boomer who'd gotten others to sign petitions. It was the singular point of irritation, the inequity that existed in TDY pay.

\textsuperscript{112}Gen Russell E. Dougherty was Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command, from 1974 until 1977. William Lester Armstrong was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1972, 1974 and 1976. In 1978 and 1984 he won election to the U.S. Senate. CMSAF Jim McCoy joined the Air Force in 1951. Most of his career was spent in the fields of training and education. His various assignments included Commandant of SAC's NCO Preparatory School and Chief of Military Training, HQ PACAF. General Dougherty chose him as SAC's first Senior Enlisted Advisor in 1975. He was selected as the sixth Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force in 1979 and retired from that position in July 1981.

\textsuperscript{113}Gen David C. Jones was Commander, Second Air Force, Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, from August 1969 to April 1971.
Harlow: We got the law, but the Appropriations Committee refused to appropriate the money for the BAS [Basic Allowance for Subsistence] portion.

Gaylord: I think a point needs to be made that maybe the others can amplify. Again, this is Gaylord's impression. It's that you have to yell rather long and loud before you can get someone's attention, even if you're able to show that there's an inequity and that it should be corrected. In other words, you can start, say, in 1960 saying this is not right, and you can even get agreement and consensus, but nothing will happen until it's time. It might take seven or eight or nine years. Our friend Leon Donnelly, bless his heart, used to say that. They'd bring him in and he'd go up to Congress and testify. He was an enlisted crew member. He'd go over on Capitol Hill, and they'd let him give his spiel. But until you get somebody in your corner, some champion of your cause, you're not going anywhere. To me it indicates a resistance to improving the plight of the enlisted person even when it's proven that it should be done.

Harlow: But the Air Force took no position on that until twelve years later, when they agreed that the law should be changed to equalize the TDY reimbursement.

Gaylord: That's the point that I'm making. What we don't know is why? Why won't that three-star personnel officer act? Who are the powers that be? One of the things that the enlisted people have had to accept, although they may not like it, is that we didn't always get the answer to the "why."

Barnes: That's the key to how things happen. I think there were some really inopportune moments for the Air Force leadership in trying to move that legislation through Congress. There were some similarities in the other services, but they weren't willing to push it at all. The Air Force kept bumping heads at DOD. Congress didn't listen because the Navy, the Army, and the Marines didn't support it, given the difference in their flying missions. But the requirements were there.

It also underscores the frustration of the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force's position throughout the 1960s and 1970s. I remember CMSAF

114 Leon Donnelly was a lobbyist on behalf of Navy enlisted personnel.
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Dick Kisling talking about it.115 I know Dick remembers Don talking about it. I know Bob remembers me talking about it, and he'd addressed it in his own right. It was just a persistent, irritating thing through all of our tenures.

Harlow: Let me tell you how the TDY equity bill happened to get onto the legislative calendar. There was a colonel, a former JAG [Judge Advocate General] officer in the legislative liaison office at Headquarters Air Force, who was getting ready to retire. I didn't have to go through OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] because I was with the Air Force Sergeants Association at that time. I got him interested, and he went with me over to Capitol Hill, to both the House and the Senate sides. We got one of the representatives and a senator to put that bill in the hopper. That's how it happened. You see, I could bypass OSD. Then, when CMSAF Jim McCoy came in and talked to Senator Armstrong about it, he told him what was going on, Senator Armstrong jumped on it.

Gaylor: You must get a congressional champion of your cause, and there have been some—Sonny Montgomery and, of course, our great hero Mendel Rivers. There have been those who've sort of occasionally taken a look at the enlisted force to see what should be happening that wasn't. But until you get somebody—a Nichols or a Montgomery, who indicate their concern...116


116 William F. Nichols was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1966 and won each subsequent election. He died in December 1989.
That's why one of my messages to the enlisted person of today is to hang in there. You just can't pull it off in a day, so don't despair. Sometimes people will ask me, "Bob, what did you accomplish while you were the Chief?" I said, "It was in the Air Force Times last week, didn't you read it?" "Bob, you've been out seven years." "Yes, but I was a part of what happened last week because we talked about it seven years ago."

You can't walk into the Pentagon and say, "This needs to happen tomorrow." They won't say, "Oh, thanks for pointing that out; it will." You just continue to talk and talk and give facts until finally it happens. Then you sit back on your own and say, "I was a small part of that." That's the way it works, and it's the obligation of key enlisted people to make that happen.

Establishing the Chief Master Sergeant

Kohn: You've brought up the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force position. It was established in 1967, at the beginning of these years of turmoil. Why was it created? How was it created? What was the need for it? Why was there opposition to it?

Airey: A lot has been said about this position. Of course, the basic job description of the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force is to aid and advise the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force in all matters pertaining to enlisted personnel. That job description is still in effect. Actually, I think you hit it, Dr. Kohn, by linking it to the turmoil of the 1960s. We were at the start of a period when the leadership realized suddenly that they needed better communications. Many people say that's the reason this job was established: to give enlisted people a route right to the top without going through the various channels, so that they would have somebody up there representing them. And I think that's correct. But I also think that one of the unwritten aspects—one I feel so very strongly about—is that it's a position that all enlisted people can look up to and say, "Maybe someday I could be the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force." To me, that means just as much, or counts for just as much, as anything else.

Harlow: I've always said that when Paul was in the position, Air Force leaders didn't really want the office. In fact, General McConnell told Congressman Rivers, "I don't need it; I don't want it." Rivers replied,
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"Well, you're going to have it. I'm going to put it into a statute." Congress didn't do that, but the job was created. Paul started it and did a fantastic job because he had to establish the office and establish the image. When I was there, there were colonels and generals who didn't want to talk to me. When I made a courtesy call on them, they asked all kinds of questions. There was also a lot of opposition out in the field. I remember that General Dixon was very much afraid when we were talking about the Senior Enlisted Advisor program.\(^7\) He didn't want it because he felt that we were trying to set up a separate communication chain on that level.

Kohn: One that would undermine the formal chain of command?

Harlow: Yes. One that would undermine the formal chain of command. So there was an awful lot of opposition. Even CMSAF Dick Kisling ran into it. It wasn't until later on that the leadership started to realize that it was a good position. We had no authority; we couldn't sign anything. When Paul and I were asked to comment on various issues, usually through staff summary sheets, we gave our input. As each one of us got into the position, the job increased in importance and significance. Those who followed served on more committees and got to go over to Congress to testify on various issues. The position became more visible, and I think that was great.

I think that the Senior Enlisted Advisor program, when it started off, was not what it is today for the simple reason that the commander, whether he wanted it or not, thought, "Well, I'll have one." Some of the senior advisors went out to do the job, and for some it was great to be a Senior Enlisted Advisor, going to all the banquets, the social functions, and things like that. But they weren't really into the program of doing something for the troops, or listening to the troops. With time, this position has increased in significance. There's an indoctrination course now for Senior Enlisted Advisors. I think the position itself is a very good one and very important today.

Barnes: I'd second those comments. I'd like to go back to the initial perception and subsequent acceptance of the position in terms of how each Chief of Staff developed it. Specifically, when General George Brown discussed it with me, he said, "There are places where it will be cosmet-

\(^7\)Gen Robert J. Dixon served as Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, HQ USAF, from 1970 until 1973.
ically good for you and me to appear together. I'll identify those.\footnote{Gen George S. Brown served as Chief of Staff, HQ USAF, from August 1973 to June 1974 and as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from June 1974 to June 1978.} That cut through the ice for me. He'd identified the pockets of resistance that apparently had surfaced. I saw where there would've been a great problem of my gaining acceptance had he not done that. Then, when he went on to become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General David Jones came in as the Air Force Chief of Staff—we've already talked about his leadership style—he had a broader perspective in that he had a way of explaining it to people.\footnote{Gen David C. Jones served as Chief of Staff, HQ USAF, from July 1974 until June 1978.} So, for me the ice had been broken.

Paul and Don and Dick had made the initial strong steps, so that, fortunately, you didn't have to dodge anything or put your head down when you walked in. I think, as the position developed and grew, each of us was able to increase that respect a little bit. We found, however, that there were a whole series of things to do, and that there are some things that have run continually through each of our tenures and they still aren't fixed. These things are perhaps beyond the purview of this position to fix, and they aren't going to be fixed until other matters are resolved.

By and large, the message to the enlisted force was that there was a representative at the Air Staff level who had some exposure in the policy-making shop. I think there exists a perception in the enlisted force that, "If I call the Chief and talk with him, things ought to change overnight." That's hardly going to happen, but there are things that I think can be pointed to that have changed directly as a result of actions by the men in this position. Each of us can name things that occurred during our tenures which changed fairly quickly as a result of our input to the Air Staff.

I think we maintained a cleaner slate, perhaps than the other services in this regard. I think the position has been better used by the Air Force Chiefs of Staff, than perhaps the Chiefs of Staff of the Army. I say that because of how the position has been used—as a staff level position as opposed to a position of authority. It's not authoritative. It doesn't establish authority, but it participates in policy formulation at certain points. The development of Senior Enlisted Advisors was, in my opinion, an extremely good thing because it made a network of immediate contact points for the person occupying the position of Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force. He could say, "I can get my hand on the pulse of this command, or at that base, with a call to the individual occupying the
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Senior Enlisted Advisor position.” I don’t, on the other hand, feel that the Senior Enlisted Advisor is a necessary step into the position of Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force. I think that this perception may cause us some problems downstream.

Kohn: In terms of a career pattern developing up towards the position?

Barnes: Yes, in terms of a career path. I think that right now the absence of a career path is a definite problem for this position. If one chooses as a goal to become the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, what career path does one take? If one is truly a Senior Enlisted Advisor, then we should recognize that there are great differences in how Senior Enlisted Advisors are used by their respective commanders—such differences that it is not, in my opinion, a viable career path to the CMSAF position. Let me be more specific. If you have a Senior Enlisted Advisor at a major air command level and the selection for the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force comes around, it has become almost automatic that if the senior enlisted person is the number one non-commissioned officer in that command, then he or she will be that command’s nominee. While that’s not always the case, it usually forces the commander, more or less, to nominate that individual whether he’s the best qualified or not.

Harlow: It also forces the commander to be more careful when he elects a Senior Enlisted Advisor.

Barnes: It should. That’s a problem that I see. I guess if there’s any problem at all, it’s in the absence of a distinct career path.

Kohn: Many of you have said that you oppose the term “Senior Enlisted Advisor.” Here I’m linking the Senior Enlisted Advisor system with that of the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force.

Airey: I think I’m the only one who ever voiced a strong opinion on it, isn’t that right?

Gaylor: I did, too, about the title.

Airey: I’ve always been opposed to it because I believe it’s got a distinctly nonmilitary terminology, and people, particularly civilians, don’t understand it.
THE CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT

Gaylor: It implies a junior enlisted advisor.

Airey: To me the person should be the Chief Master Sergeant of the 485th Bomb Group, the Chief Master Sergeant of the Fifteenth Air Force, or the Chief Master Sergeant of such and such.

Gaylor: I'm opposed to that.

Harlow: General Catton tried to get it, but General Ryan said "No."\textsuperscript{120}

Barnes: I think there was a lot of controversy. I remember discussions about it. I hadn't then, and I don't have now, any real strong feelings about it. I do not, Paul, understand the reference to civilians not understanding it. I don't know if that's significant—civilians understanding the position title. I don't know that they understand Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force. Civilians usually aren't knowledgeable about titles in the military. I don't know if that makes a difference.

Airey: They'd understand it a lot more than they do now.

Barnes: I don't understand where it would make an impact.

Gaylor: What do we care if they understand it or not?

Airey: I think there are a lot of times, for protocol reasons, that we should care.

Gaylor: I can think of a lot of titles in America that people don't understand.

Barnes: I guess I've never encountered a situation where it would've mattered to a civilian at all what the position was called. Senior Enlisted

\textsuperscript{120}Gen Jack J. Catton was Deputy Chief of Staff, Programs and Resources, HQ USAF, from 1967 until 1968, then Commander, Fifteenth Air Force and Military Airlift Command in 1968. Gen John D. Ryan became Vice Chief of Staff, HQ USAF, in 1968 and Chief of Staff the following year.
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Advisor replaced, I guess, the term “command sergeant major” or “sergeant major of the base.” The sergeant major connotation was more Army, and I think that was why we got into this advisor name, to get away from the term “sergeant major.”

Harlow: I’ll give you another illustration. During my watch, I submitted a request to General Ryan in writing that all Chief Master Sergeants be addressed as Chief, and when they responded over the phone to say, “Chief So-and-so.” I got the memo back and he wrote, “This could be done unofficially, but the regulation or directive will not be changed.” It wasn’t changed until after Chief Dick Kisling left office, but we started doing it within our own enlisted corps. Eventually, the regulation was changed. We were talking about the resistance to change. The Air Force didn’t want to move too fast.

Gaylor: What I strongly opposed was the title: “Chief Master Sergeant of Air Training Command, Chief Master Sergeant of Strategic Air Command.” I’m just totally opposed to that, and I don’t like the term “senior” either. I’m not saying that mine is the best, but what I fought for for two years and never did win was “enlisted advisor.” Just eliminate the term “senior.” The name tag would then read “3d Bomb Wing Enlisted Advisor.” More important than what they’re called is how they react and how they do their job. If they’re simply caught up with the title, then that’s something else. What’s always fascinated me in my travels were the questions from people who were really judging your prominence or importance. Certain things to me are just not valid. Example: “How often do you see the Chief of Staff of the Air Force? How far is your office from his? Do you ever travel with him?” Those things are inconsequential, because I could be across town and have tremendous rapport with my boss, or I could reside next door and have him not listen to a word I say. It’s amazing how people focus on the frequency of contact. Sometimes I’d tell them, “Oh, about every three weeks.” “Oh,” they’d reply, “He must not have much confidence in you.” I said, “He has such confidence that he only needs to see me about once every three weeks.”

Airey: Those are still the most-asked questions.

Gaylor: Yes, and they’re not even good questions.

Barnes: The concept is misunderstood. You are exactly right.
**The Chief Master Sergeant**

Gaylor: What happens out in the wings is that a lot of advisors tie themselves to their boss's tail and everywhere the boss goes, they go. How ridiculous! The boss goes into the BX and says, "I don't like what I see here," and the enlisted advisor echoes, "Neither do I, Sir." Then they go back and commiserate together, whereas they could be covering two things and meet occasionally to review them. Some enlisted advisors at local levels have completely misinterpreted what their charter is.

Barnes: I agree with that 100 percent.

Kohn: Chief Airey, when you started as the first Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, did you have an agenda? When you took the job in 1967, were you given an agenda?

Airey: Not really. I think the Chief of Staff was watching me and waiting for reports on me. It took about six months, and from then on, I couldn't ask for a better supporter. It's generally well known that General John Paul McConnell didn't really care about the position's being established. I was told by him to make my own agenda. I was told, "Don't upset the Air Staff." But the agenda was left to me, and I was given a pretty free hand.

Gaylor: I'm glad it happened that way. I think all of us had to establish our own agenda, I really do. Had it been dictated to us, we would've been merely pawns or mouthpieces of the Air Staff.

Harlow: And we would have been frustrated.

Gaylor: Yes, eventually we would have, so I'm glad they did it that way. I'm glad they said, "Okay, Chief Airey, go for it and we'll watch you."

Airey: I think I was observed and reports were sent back.

Gaylor: We all were. Constantly. We were in a fish bowl.

Kohn: In its formative stages was the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force caught in an ambivalent position between representing management—specifically, the Chief of Staff and the "system"—on the one hand and on the other representing the enlisted force?
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Airey: I made a statement once, and it's been quoted—even misquoted—several times. I said that I wasn't going to be a clearinghouse just for enlisted gripes. I was there to help the enlisted force with their problems and to try and help rectify those problems if they were bona fide, but I still expected people with the everyday complaints to go to their First Sergeant and their supervisor.

Kohn: You wouldn't be an ombudsman?

Airey: No.

Harlow: A lot of people ask me now in my travels, "What did you recommend when you were in the job?" You can't reveal to the field what you recommend, for the simple reason that if it worked, fine, but if it didn't work, they'd say, "You're not effective. You made the recommendation, and nothing has happened."

Airey: A perfect example is what we were talking about earlier—the buck sergeant's bit. I opposed that, but I had to go out in the field and sell it because it was my duty to back up what the Chief of Staff said.\footnote{121}

Harlow: Many things that Paul recommended never became policy until I got into the job.

Airey: The Senior NCO Academy was one thing I recommended.\footnote{122} The leadership said, "Absolutely not; there's no money for it." Then, lo and behold, General John Ryan with a stroke of a pen created one.

Harlow: We had to see the congressman from that district to get the funding.

\footnote{121} Chief Airey opposed making E-4s NCOs. He believed that NCO status should begin at E-5.

\footnote{122} The Air Force's Senior NCO Academy opened at Gunter Air Station, Alabama, in January 1973. It resulted from the realization that senior master sergeants and chief master sergeants, due to the supervisory and management nature of their jobs, needed much more advanced management training than was available at the NCO leadership schools and major command academies. Ted R. Sturm, "They Make Military Managers," \textit{Airman} (February 1976), pp. 16-17.
Barnes: I think one of the most, if not the most, challenging aspect of the job, was maintaining credibility with the enlisted force and credibility with the Air Staff. There was a middle ground you were placed in which required both. Unfortunately, this point was invisible to the enlisted force. [They didn’t see] you in the same light that the Air Staff saw you. But I think we all had the duty to touch those things that directly impacted the day-to-day lives of the enlisted force. Specifically, we were members of the Uniform Board. Very few things happened in uniform changes that we didn’t have a profound impact on. We were also members of the Army-Air Force Exchange Board. We were able to voice our opinions; and we saw the utilization of the money that went back into the Morale-Welfare-Recreation system as well. We had a profound impact on a lot of invisible things. Those activities often just went unnoticed.

There were the opportunities to initiate things. There were review activities associated with the budget cycle where the hardware and the people issues occurred. The Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force was not excluded. You went in and had a chance, if nothing else, to say your piece and understand the process. Also, you went to some of the classified briefings at the morning staff meetings that the Chief of Staff went to and saw the world in his mirror. Then you were debriefed on all those things that you couldn’t talk about outside that meeting or, in fact, after your retirement. In short, there was a totality of activities and programs that you understood. You went out and sold things, like Paul said, that you didn’t necessarily support in your own mind, but that you did support in the larger picture.

That was the most strenuous part of the job. We all have felt the strain associated with what actually happens to a guy when he knows all of the activities and risks associated with managing the Air Force. It would be traumatic for us to go out and discuss some of the things that we knew for a fact. I think somewhere in the process of selecting people for this job, somewhere in somebody’s wisdom, a perspective or concern existed. The Chief of Staff has to select people who can handle large issues, and who don’t break under pressure.

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124 The Army-Air Force Exchange Board manages and sets policy for exchanges on Army posts and Air Force bases.
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Gaylor: One thing I had to learn, and now that I look back, it was interesting. I worked for the Chief of Staff, so you’d think that on returning from a trip you’d brief your boss. So, down the hall I go with this knowledge that I’ve accrued visiting four bases and share it with the Chief of Staff. That makes sense. What you don’t know is that the Chief of Staff then calls the Director of Personnel on the phone and says, “Get down here. What do you plan to do about this problem?” Later in the afternoon my phone rings, and the Director of Personnel says, “Hey, Chief. Why didn’t you let me know? Whenever you go into the Chief of Staff, my buzzer rings. Give me a little advance notice.” I say, “That makes sense. I want to work with you, not against you.”

So, now I return from another trip armed with this knowledge, and the question is, “Who should I share it with first?” The IG [Inspector General] wants to know it; the LG [Director of Logistics] wants to know it; the DP [Director of Personnel] wants to know it; the Vice Chief of Staff wants to know it; the Chief wants to know it, too. Who do I give it to first? That’s a lesson that has to be learned.

Then you’ve got your staff officers. CMSgt. J. B. Wood came to me and said, “Bob, can I level with you? You’re causing a problem. We’re getting this stuff in the back door. All you’ve got to do is pick up the phone and alert us to it, and that way when the Chief yells, we’re already working the issue. We look good, and you look good.” So I learned. I come back from another trip and I’ve got this head full of knowledge, and I’m asking, who should I tell it to first. You want to get on the loudspeaker and say, “Attention! Attention everyone!” But you have to learn that even though you work for that Chief, you’d better be careful that what you share with him won’t in some way undermine the Air Staff or you’ll lose their support. They’ll hang you out to dry, baby, and you’re dead on the vine! I learned that in about one month.

Barnes: You’ve got to work with that staff. That is an absolute must.

Kohn: Does the Air Staff listen?

Barnes: Yes, they do.

Airey: Yes.

Harlow: Yes.
Gaylor: Because they know you could go to the Chief if they don’t! You’ve got a hammer. They appreciate that you come to them first. I used to say to General Bennie Davis, “I’ve not talked to anyone about this; I wanted to share it with you first.” I always got action. They appreciate your doing that so they don’t get “backdoored.”

Kohn: What happened on those issues—I assume there were some through the years—that you, as a group representing the leadership of the enlisted force, felt needed to be done, but that “the Air Force” didn’t want to do? How would you work that problem?

Harlow: You have to go to the Air Staff directorate that’s handling it or the OPR [Office of Primary Responsibility] and talk about it and explain what effect it’s having on the enlisted force and then see what they’re going to do about it. A classic illustration is those people who were jet mechanics during Vietnam who had a secondary specialty in reciprocal engines. They were going back and forth to Vietnam, but they weren’t getting promoted. The people in the States with the jet specialties were the ones who were getting promoted. What we found out was that the system was not giving a percentage of the promotions to those people.

Gaylor: What you’ve heard us all say is that we didn’t win them all. You’ve heard it at one time or another in this interview. Paul said it; Tom and Don said it, too. You have to be smart enough to know that you’re not going to win them all, but you speak your piece, and then you march on smartly. The Air Training Command commander in 1977 decided he was going to permit civilians to attend the command’s Non-Commissioned Officer Academy. I said, “You’ve got to be kidding. Tell me he doesn’t mean that.” I knew General John Roberts very well, so I simply picked up the phone and said, “Would you give me the benefit of your rationale?”

“Sure,” he said. When he finished I said, “I’m strongly opposed to that.” He said, “I’m not sure I care how you feel about it, Chief. I’ve thought it out, and that’s what I’m going to do.”

125 Gen Bennie Davis became Director of Personnel Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, HQ USAF, in 1975 and in 1977 was named Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, HQ USAF. He remained in that post until March 1979.

126 Gen John W. Roberts served as Commander, Air Training Command, from 1975 until his retirement April 1, 1979.
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Now, what do you do after that? You could run down the hall and say, if you wanted to, “Guess what General Roberts is doing down in San Antonio?” But it’s his command, and I respect that it is. I’d voiced my opposition; he didn’t listen. The whole thing lasted less than a year. The civilians themselves didn’t want to go. So, in less than a year they stopped it. The point is, that you don’t win them all, and you’ve got to be smart enough to know when to get off the stage or you’ll get your fingers whacked.

Barnes: I think we each have had a similar experience. Let me share one that got me into an arena that was beyond my control. The man who raised the issue was man enough to stand up for it. He was emotional about the conduct of airmen as prisoners in Vietnam and its influence on the Air Force in the seventies. He believed deeply that there was a need for some changes. Maj. Gen. John P. Flynn—his prisoner status was well known—came to Lackland as the commander.127 During one of my visits to Lackland to look at the basic training program, General Flynn talked about his disgust with the conduct of prisoners in Vietnam. He said, “If there’s any message you need to carry back, it’s this,” and then he proposed to change the code of conduct for all servicemen. This was a serious matter. I had to sit down and think, “Do I go to the Chief with that? Do I go to the Director of Personnel? There were some implications which were going to involve the Secretary of the Air Force and the Department of Defense. But General Flynn personally felt very strongly about it, so I called him back before I talked to anybody. I said, “I got to thinking about this thing. Whom do I approach?” He said, “Let me leave that to you, Tom, but I want whoever can do something about it to know that I want to be heard.” I thought about his remarks a little bit, and then I called him a second time and talked to him again beforesurfacing the issue. I don’t know if it ever became public.

I think all of you guys are aware of General Flynn’s feelings about the code of conduct. He just wanted to ingrain people in it in basic training.

Gaylor: He was very strong in his “ethic,” as he called it—duty, honor, and country.

127Col John P. Flynn was shot down in his F-105 over North Vietnam in October 1967, was captured, and was a prisoner of war for over five years. He commanded the Air Force Military Training Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, from 1974 until 1976. He became the USAF Inspector General in 1976 and retired as a lieutenant general from that post on October 1, 1978.
Barnes: Yes, and his code of conduct. He wanted something done at the training level. In any case, later, when General Flynn worked at the Pentagon, he was able to advocate his position, and it was shot down. I think it made it easier for him. It was a topic that was touchy enough that he knew by surfacing it from where he was on the Air Staff he was probably not going to get the audience he needed. So, as Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force you get used. I'm saying "used" in the way General Flynn did it.

Gaylor: You become the conduit.

Barnes: Yes, the job of picking your way through the Air Staff to a decision point is important.

On another issue, a hardware issue, when I visited the IAAFA [Inter-American Air Force Academy] facility in the Canal Zone, I saw two brand new A-37 trainer airplanes just sitting on a scaffold in a hangar, with no landing gear.128 My first reaction was, "Why is there no gear?" It seems that the Panamanians had this supply system which was a little bit antiquated. They'd ordered and back ordered the landing gear, but here they'd taken two brand new airplanes out of their crates and assembled them, yet they were sitting on a scaffold. I asked, "How have you gone about this ordering," and we got into the back-order process. When I got back to the Pentagon and started looking at what went wrong—the issue had gone to foreign military sales—the landing gear story was, "We can't get them because a priority went to the A-37s flying in Vietnam and to the Air Training Command."

But, as a man sitting in a hanger in Panama looking at those airplanes on the scaffolds, I feared that if there'd been a fuel leak in the corner of the hangar—and if it had caught fire, there was no way they were going to get those two airplanes out. It took about eleven days before the gear for both airplanes arrived. You could go to the wrong place on the Air Staff and tell the Chief that story, and if it fell out, you might get a call back, "Hey, why didn't you let us know?" You do have to pick your way through these things. It requires savvy and persistence, and it requires learning pretty quickly.

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Gaylor: Working through the normal Air Staff channels with the generals is relatively easy because they're blue-suit oriented. The real excitement is working with those civilians who are working for the Secretary of the Air Force in political positions. I'm speaking now of the Secretary of the Air Force and his assistant secretaries. I worked with Antonia Handler Chayes, an extremely liberal woman, who was Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Activities in the Carter Administration. She'd call me to her office, kick off her shoes, tuck her feet under her legs, sit on the couch, and say to me, "Try and convince me, Chief, why a young airman, a one-striper, shouldn't have the same privileges and opportunities as you chiefs. Why, if you're a chief with three kids and they've all left home, and there's an airman with no kids who just got married, with one stripe, why can't he have the same housing you do? Probably he should have the good base housing and you should be living off base because you can afford it and that airman can't."

How do you deal with that logic? This person is not just someone you pass off; she's in a high position, and you have to give her an answer. That's excitement!

The 1970s and Women in the Air Force

Kohn: That raises the issue of women coming into the force, which occurred during your tenures as Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force.

Gaylor: They increased; but they'd already been there.

Kohn: Yes, but the tremendous growth, and the pressure for growth, and the widening of AFSCs into which women were both permitted and impelled, occurred then. Collectively, except for Chief Kisling, who is dead, you were Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force from 1967 to

129 Antonia Handler Chayes served as Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Installations, Department of the Air Force, from 1977 to 1979 and as Under Secretary of the Air Force from 1979 to 1981.

130 During most of the 1960s, the Air Force limited women, officers and enlisted, to a narrow range of specialties, predominately in the clerical, administra-
1979, a crucial period on women’s issues. Can you speak to the issue of the expanded role of women in the Air Force?

Airey: First of all, when I went on the job in 1967, there were only 5,000 authorized enlisted women slots in the whole United States Air Force. Certainly, the women were getting “ripped off.” Promotions were unfair. I can’t quote the source of this fact, but it was said that General LeMay as Chief of Staff even tried to do away with the WAFs [Women in the Air Force].

Gaylord: The attitude then was patronizing: “Throw them a bone,” and “We’ll let a few of them in.”

Harlow: “Put them in administrative jobs, and tell them to be quiet.”

Airey: Of course, there was a tremendous woman who was the director of the WAFs, who later became our first female general, Major General Jeanne Holm. I had the privilege of working with her. Step by step these things have changed to where we are today. Some of the demographic

tive, personnel, information, and medical fields. Women were no longer allowed to serve in intelligence, weather, flight attendant, equipment maintenance, and control tower activities, even though they had done so during World War II and into the 1950s. The roles played by women in the Air Force, as well as the other services, expanded with their numbers in the 1970s. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. constitution pushed the services into offering women more equal career opportunities. The Air Force opened AFROTC to women as well as hard-to-fill technical fields. Although women remained barred from combat roles, in 1975 the Air Force began training its first women pilots since World War II. See Maj Gen Jeanne Holm, Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1986), pp. 175–185, 246–288, 313–346.

According to General Holm, it is uncertain whether General LeMay opposed WAF (Women in the Air Force). One of her sources indicated that LeMay did support women officers, but not enlisted women. Nevertheless, after LeMay became Vice Chief of Staff in 1957, the Air Staff conducted a study on the subject. As a result, WAF was retained, but the number of career fields open to women contracted dramatically and enlistments fell to an all-time low of 4,700 by 1965. Holm pp. 171–174.

Maj Gen Jeanne Holm was appointed Director, Women in the Air Force, in 1965. Under her direction, the WAF grew in size and strength as the roles for women began to expand. In 1971 she became the first woman in the Air Force to hold the rank of brigadier general and in 1973 received promotion to the rank of major general. In 1973 she was appointed to serve as Director of the Secretary of the Air Force Personnel Council. She retired on June 1, 1975.
studies are saying that by the year 2000 that we, the enlisted force of the United States Air Force, may be 20 or 25 percent female because we won't have enough eighteen- and nineteen-year-old males to recruit from. Certainly changes were needed. The women were not getting a fair shake; but there are people who believe we've become too liberal.

Kohn: Some folks believe that, in fact, we never would've been able to staff an all-volunteer armed force, which began in 1973, without large numbers of women, that the force wouldn't have been as competent or as skilled if it hadn't included women. While the Air Force has always been an all-volunteer force, we know that many enlistees traditionally have been "draft induced" volunteers. Do you all believe that this is true?

Harlow: You know, a big argument came up when [Congress] wanted to establish a law to register for the draft. Some of the women said, "Why aren't we included?" Congress gnashed its teeth over that one.

Kohn: Did you all have to work women's issues as senior NCOs and as Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force?

Gaytor: Yes. The policy issues, plus the non-policy issues, like a guy saying, "Just what we need, a bunch of women walking up and down the flightlines." So we had to work the emotional issues, plus the policy issues. Yes, we were involved.

Harlow: We had a lot of [male] chauvinist pigs in the Air Force then!

Barnes: I think there's some evidence on this question, Dr. Kohn, in a publication called Commander's Digest. I think the most interesting period was the two years of 1974 and 1975. I don't know where you can find copies, but if you'll get those two years' issues, you'll not only get the Air Force's version of these non-traditional roles for women, but you'll get the Army's and the Marine Corps' versions as well. People who were in

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133 The Department of Defense and the Office of Information for the Armed Forces published Commander's Digest from 1960 until June 1978, when it was replaced by Command Policy. The bi-weekly publication focused on providing "official and professional information to commanders and key personnel on matters related to Defense policies, programs and interests, and . . . [creating] better understanding and teamwork within the Department of Defense."
office at the time were required to write articles and statements on the
topic.

The first thing that perhaps came to light was the very different
physiological and psychological issues which characterized and separated
men and women—specifically, in the Security Police field, where guards
with arms were positioned on B-52 ramps and were required to kill
anyone penetrating security, as opposed to being on guard duty on the
gate. There was a distinction between security and law enforcement. That
was an issue that got worked out—combat and non-combat. The flying
issue was another one, with crew airplanes and combat airplanes.

Then, the simplicity of things in the maintenance career field caused
some commanders to oppose women: "No, I don't want women on my
flightline. It'll cause me too many problems. The first thing I'll have to do
is to provide another latrine facility." Those who wanted it to work never
raised that issue. They put up a simple sign and a deadbolt lock—"oc-
cupied male or female"—turn the sign over and slide the bolt. It was a
simple deal, and it worked that way. Next, the dormitory issue came up.
Commanders who wanted to make it work, made it work; those who
wanted to fight it, fought it. There was an awful lot of emotion. Realisti-
cally, the women did a fine job.

There were some cases where there were petty complaints: over hand
dexterity, for one; small working space, for another. But the issue never
moved away from the inevitability of pregnancy, which men did not have to
face. When we looked at women in the manning picture, there were some
problems. The specific example I'm thinking of occurred at Holloman Air
Force Base [New Mexico] early one morning in an overseas deployment.
Holloman's mission was to support USAF forces in Germany. There the
importance of a crew chief for each airplane became significant that
morning as people reported. Three ladies came with babies in their arms;
they were unwed mothers who took leave to have them. They didn't take
any time away from their jobs, since they always left them with a friend on
an opposite shift or put them in a day care center. But at 3 o'clock in the
morning, that wasn't available. The problem was that there was an operati-

ional factor in launching these airplanes to Germany, and we had three
crew chiefs, with babies, who couldn't launch their airplanes, not to
mention the fact that they couldn't deploy, either. They couldn't go with
the C-130s that were going to take them, or with the C-141 that was the
support airplane.134

134 The C-130 Hercules, built by Lockheed, was a medium-range tactical airlift
aircraft. Variants of the C-130 perform such diverse missions as close-air support,
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These kinds of things became very real in placing some of the women in non-traditional roles. Then we got into a force posture that tended to expand with women on air crews and on missile crews in silos, and then the expansion went from the enlisted area into the officer area. Consequently, woman's issues became a concern for the Air Staff at large. So, yes, there were some very real issues with women coming into the force.

We were forward and foremost, I think, among the services. The Marines were dead opposed.

**Barnes:** The Army got into it some. The Navy experience was an altogether different problem in what women do, the kinds of ships women can go on, and the at-sea aspects of their duty. It permeated all of the services, the issue of women in the non-traditional roles. It was a very busy period for the Air Staff, particularly the directors of personnel, successively. If

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rescue and recovery, special operations and weather reconnaissance. The AC-130A/H gunship, "Spectre," was used extensively in the Southeast Asian conflict beginning in 1968. The C-130H is still in production. Fact Sheet, United States Air Force, 87-26. Also built by Lockheed, the C-141 Starlifter provided the Air Force rapid long-range airlift and was the first jet airlift aircraft. Along with the C-5 Galaxy, it was part of the Air Force's strategic airlift force. The Starlifter had an unlimited range with in-flight refueling and carried a crew of five. Fact Sheet, United States Air Force, 88-16.

The service of women in the armed forces, especially in combat, has been controversial at least since World War I. The issue became particularly heated during the 1970s as women entered the services in greater numbers and more jobs opened to them. The debate centered mostly on the possible effects on morale and readiness, on the social issues involved in integrating women into a traditionally male-dominated, male-oriented environment, and on women's perceived physical limitations. The issue remains current, especially in light of the roles played by women in each of the services, the Army in particular, in Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in December 1989. For a sense of the debate in the Air Force in the late 1970s see Kenneth P. Werrell, "Should Women be Permitted in Combat Zones? Yes," *Air University Review*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 5 (July–August 1977), pp. 64–68; Jacqueline Cochran, "Should Women be Permitted in Combat? No."

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you had heard General Dixon or General Isosue address those issues, then you got the picture.\textsuperscript{136}

\textbf{Kohn:} I just wanted your perspective as Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force, because you were important parts of the policy-making process and the implementing of the changes. Clearly, we were going to have more women and expand their roles. The issue was, could we make it work, and could we make it an enhancement of the Air Force as opposed to a problem that drove the institution crazy?

\textbf{Harlow:} Some commanders worked hard to make it work, and others didn’t want it to work.

\textbf{Gayelor:} So it comes right back down to the leadership on the spot. At the Pentagon, there’s always this attitude of “It didn’t happen on my watch.” I just wonder if so many of our Air Staff members are so guarded about making a sensible decision or of being the devil’s advocate, appropriately, to avoid getting undue press. I admire those who’ve taken a stand and survived. They have my utmost admiration because they have the courage to stand up and say what they wanted to say. Some are only concerned about making it through their watch without something happening that would adversely affect their career, even when they don’t agree with the policy. I think sometimes in Washington we tend to create those who conform quickly rather than those who have the courage to stand up for their convictions.

\textbf{Harlow:} You have them out in the field too.

\textbf{Barnes:} One of the things about the role and development of women in the Air Force is that the changes equate to developments in the civilian sector. The progress women make there tends to drag the services along. I think there’s still going to be that effect. The Air Force, as a matter of fact, has kept abreast of society [as regards] women. I’m optimistic that it will continue.

\textsuperscript{136}Gen Andrew P. Isosue became Deputy Director, Personnel Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, HQ USAF, in 1973. He was later named Director, Personnel Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, HQ USAF, and remained in that office until 1976.
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Kohn: I think that has been true of racial integration, too, and of equal opportunity. You can set national policy, and while it's easy to announce policy and assume it's implemented, that doesn't always happen. It can be worked from the top down in a hierarchical institution.

Airey: As the cigarette ad says, "You've come a long way, baby." I'll be the first one to that admit several years ago I probably was chauvinistic to some degree. I don't think I was a complete chauvinist. I will say I've met a heck of a lot of women whom I would rather have standing beside me in a time of emergency than a lot of men I've met in my life, and that women in the Air Force have proven themselves to be first class members of the team.

Gaylor: Basically, what we're saying is that people should have an opportunity to do that for which they've been trained and prepared, and which fits their desires.

It's when doors slam in your face or when you're never given a chance —"you can't come in here"— that would frustrate anyone. I think we just have to ensure that our people are given an opportunity. If they can't cut it, regardless of race, creed, color, or sex then someone else should get in there, but they should be given a chance to show whether they can or cannot do it.

Kohn: Let me shift the discussion to one last question about the 1970s: whether the conditions of service for the enlisted force deteriorated then —the pay, benefits, status, the authority structure for NCOs, medical service facilities, discipline, working conditions. Was there a chance to deal with the situation as Chief Master Sergeant?

Barnes: I was there. I want to say emphatically that as the administration changed, as the Carter administration came on board, we did decline. The entire concept of our importance in the nation's defense declined in that administration, specifically. I can't argue the merits of the B-1A against the B-1B, but the B-1 was a necessity, as a modernized combat weapon, and the neutron bomb, specifically, was an issue in neutralizing Soviet troop strength in Europe.\(^{137}\) Both were specific issues on Defense's plate at the time.

\(^{137}\) When President Jimmy E. Carter took office in 1977, he initiated a thorough-going review of U.S. military policies. As a result of this review, he
Pay was an issue, specifically the capping of military pay while the annual cost of living index was twice what the cap was. It was ridiculous. But what was incredible was that the Defense Secretary, at somebody’s behest, asked the service chiefs and service secretaries in Washington to discourage military people from working second jobs and to discourage their dependents from taking jobs in the Washington area so that other citizens could hold them to avoid being on welfare. That actually took place during that administration. It was the most debilitating thing that I had ever experienced. If I sound emotional, it’s because I got emotional then. I was so glad to see that we had a Chief and Secretary who said, “If you raise the pay to where it needs to be, then we can truthfully say to our people, ‘You don’t need to work the extra jobs.’” We had people leaving the Pentagon who’d take off their military shirts simply because they’d show above the window line and put on civilian shirts and drive buses in their military pants and shoes in a second job. They never even went home. There were businesses that hired them just like that because they wanted to work and they could work and they were using their skills. It was a period that just made me sick because we’d dropped so low from the progress we’d made. So, yes, there was a problem. I’m sure Bob stepped into some of that.

Gaylor: My chances of attaining sainthood are based on the fact that I served during the Carter administration and put up with everything that ensued. Simply by walking on stage in front of a group of enlisted people and saying, “I’m from the Pentagon,” I got the barrage of questions, and they all focused on that administration’s decisions. I think President Carter was a very honorable, sincere man, a very honest man. But he surrounded himself with people who advised him very poorly. The mass exodus of flight crews and skilled pilots that we’re now trying to overcome, the bail-out of

ordered many policy changes, including several in the area of personnel. However, perhaps his most controversial decision was to cancel production of the B-1 bomber. This decision left the Air Force unable to immediately modernize its strategic bombing force, still dependent upon the aging B-52 bomber first introduced in 1952. The Reagan administration reviewed this policy and decided to go ahead with production of a modified B-1, known as the B-1B, a multi-role, long-range strategic bomber. Built by a consortium of aviation companies, the plane can fly at supersonic speed (high subsonic for low-altitude penetration) and has an intercontinental range, unfueled. The B-1B entered the Air Force inventory in 1985 and represents a major improvement over the strategic capabilities of the B-52. The B-1B has a lower radar cross-section, can fly lower and faster with a heavier payload, and has an advanced flight control system. Fact Sheet, United States Air Force, 88–10.
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those we could ill afford to lose, was the payoff of that era. They [the administration] got what they deserved in the form of defeat in the next election. I, too, became very emotional because I was the one who had to answer and take the flak, which I didn’t mind doing.

Kohn: From the field, you mean?

Gaylor: Yes. One time at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, I said to the assembled troops, “Although I work for the Chief of Staff, I’d like to feel that I work for you: the enlisted men and women of the Air Force.” At that moment a guy in the back stood up and said, “If you’re working for me, you’re fired!” He continued, “If you can’t do any better than what you’re doing, we’d be better off with a statue.” Boy, there was emotion out there in 1978 on the 5.5 percent pay cap and the other associated activities related to the budget. I remember Secretary of Defense Harold Brown flew out of Russia or somewhere over in Europe and on his way back

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<tr>
<td><strong>Career</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977: 86.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978: 82.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979: 83.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980: 80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981: 83.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Pilot Retention [Percent], 1977–1981
(6–11 Year Group Cumulative Continuation Rate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pilot</th>
<th>Navigator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977: 47.9</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978: 38.5</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979: 25.7</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980: 42.2</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981: 54.2</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These statistics indicate retention problems among both pilots and the enlisted force. While the reenlistment of career airmen (from six to thirty years of service) remained fairly stable, reenlistments in that group decreased by over 6 percent between 1977 and 1980. In addition, first term reenlistments plunged during 1979 and 1980. The overall reenlistment rate fell by more than 10 percent between 1977 and 1980. The statistics clearly demonstrate the crisis in pilot retention. Pilot retention fell by nearly half between 1977 and 1979 and did not recover fully until 1981.
home, he stopped at Rota, Spain, I listened to him on the radio; I was in Torrejon Air Base, just outside of Madrid.\textsuperscript{139} He got off the airplane and went to the bottom of the steps. They had him on the radio, and he spoke for twenty-eight minutes. For twenty-seven minutes he spoke about his trip, bombs, that type of thing, and in closing said, “By the way, you people are doing a great job, too; hang in there.” That, to me, was extremely representative of the feelings toward the people at that time generated by that administration. Yes, we were somewhat sold down the river. The fact that we hung in there and persevered in spite of that is a tremendous tribute to the leadership of the United States Air Force.

\textbf{Airey}: I, of course, was out of office a long time by then, but I've always stayed very close to the Air Force, and I have to echo Bob's comment. To me, it was the lowest ebb in morale that I've seen in more than forty years I've been involved with the United States military.

\textbf{Kohn}: I am not disagreeing, but simply asking: Was this not also the result of the administration coming in the wake of the Vietnam war?

\textbf{Gaylor}: Sure, we were getting the backwash out of that.

\textbf{Barnes}: The other rents and tears had already happened.

\textbf{Gaylor}: Take The Singlaub incident in Korea.\textsuperscript{140} The administration ordered General Singlaub out of Korea and said, “You've said the wrong thing.” Once again, a war had ended and once again, the military were

\textsuperscript{139} Harold Brown served as Secretary of the Air Force from 1965 to 1969 and as Secretary of Defense from 1977 to 1981.


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being elbowed out of the way—"Step aside; you're not needed as you were anymore."

Airey: There were horror stories that actually happened. People passed the hat to buy parts and to keep airplanes going and to get typewriters fixed because there was no money to do it. It was a serious—and bad—time in our Air Force.

Barnes: Let me be even more specific than that. Let me say that during a visit to the 1st TAC Fighter Wing at Langley [Air Force Base, Virginia], which had F-15s, the maintenance hours per flying hour for the aircraft were just all out of proportion. The reason for that was they had cannibalized airplanes for parts. What Paul is saying is that we bought that airplane without being able to buy the spare parts. To get it into the operational inventory, they had to cannibalize some in order to fly others. What that distorted was the belief by the maintenance sections that they were being put upon by operations, who had to learn to fly the thing to get efficient in it, but at the cost of the cannibalization of other planes—which destroyed some of the interface with the electrical components in the airplane. That, to me, was a disheartening thing. I didn't know why I was seeing it; but the initial buy of those fighters was without spares. That's not common knowledge.

———

141 Maintenance problems for the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, first appeared in 1977. By mid-1979, the problems had become acute and in June 1980, the wing failed its Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI). A lack of spare parts and engines played key roles in the problems. The supply of F-100 engines for the F-15 and F-16 never met demand. Further, the F-100 demanded high maintenance, and spare parts were chronically in short supply. Spare parts for other key components were also frequently lacking. Throughout the period April 1979 through June 1980, the number of "hangar queens"—planes cannibalized for spare parts and not mission capable for an extended period of time—remained very high and the Mission Capability Rate (MCR) fell. In June 1980 it stood at 35.6 percent, meaning only twenty-three out of sixty-six F-15s were flyable. See 1st TFW Histories (April-June 1979), pp. 100–113; (July–September 1979), pp. 81–88; (October–December 1979), pp. 64–67; (January–March 1980), pp. 56–67; and (April–June 1980), pp. 28–31, 56–61.

142 The F-15 Eagle, built by McDonnell Douglas, is an all-weather tactical fighter. Its mission is to gain and maintain air superiority. It was designed with unprecedented maneuverability and acceleration. It can fly at Mach 2.5 and has a combat ceiling of 65,000 feet. The F-15 first entered the Air Force inventory in 1974 and is built in both single-seat and two-seat models. Fact Sheet, United States Air Force, 89–14.
Final Judgments

Kohn: Can I ask you all what was your greatest satisfaction and your greatest frustration in the job of Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force?

Gaylor: My greatest achievement was knowing I did the very best I could. I left the job with my head high saying, “You got the best Bob Gaylor had to offer. You may not agree it was the best, but it was the best. You got my total commitment, my total energy. I hit the ground running and never stopped. What more can you ask of anyone?”

My greatest frustration was wishing that I could’ve done more. Time and distance were my enemies. I wanted to go everywhere, be omnipresent, ubiquitous, and peripatetic. I was unable to be those things because of the time limitation. You look back and say, “I did the best I could; now let somebody else do it.”

Harlow: During my watch, anytime I visited a command I usually had a chief master sergeant as an escort. I always sat down with him before I left the command and wrote a report. A copy of that written report went to the major air commander and the Chief, with copies to the Air Staff, on any problems related to that visit. I knew in my mind, even though nobody told me, that when I left that command, anything I said or anything I liked or disliked about that command, someone was going to call the Chief. I wanted to make sure that the commander over there in the Pacific or Europe understood that what I put in the report was going to the Chief and there was no question about that. I felt that was something I had to do to be fair.

Airey: I think that’s probably one of the most asked questions: “What do you feel you accomplished?” I feel a lot like Bob Gaylor; you give it your best shot. I’d say if I had to look back and pick out one single accomplishment, I’m proud of the fact that I was on the ground floor of the Weighted Airman’s Promotion System. If you ask me, I’ll put it this way: Of all the things I was involved in, recommended, suggested, and fought for, I’ve lost more battles than I’ve won.

Barnes: For me, obviously, the high point was my two extensions, and principally the issues around which the extensions were necessary. I had been involved in those issues mentioned earlier as they had unfolded and I continued to work them. That was very satisfying. That period from 1975
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to 1977 was very frustrating. [We tried] to address what was a downhill slide in enlisted programs and certainly in morale. That was the toughest sledding because the airmen asked, “Why?” The Chief had been valiant in his efforts to do all he could with morale, and you defended the policies every way you could, but there just was no way to address it.

Gaylor: I’d like to cite one of my real concerns now. They may not make much sense, but I’ll share them anyway. I think we’ve created a force of everybody “in line,” who are somewhat synthetic. Where are the colorful heroes? Where are the characters? Where are the scroungers? Where are the officers who fly airplanes through hangars and under Golden Gate Bridges?

Airey: You can’t do that today.

Gaylor: Well, now wait a minute. You can in today’s time. You surely can’t fly an F-15 under the Golden Gate Bridge, but I’m talking about what you can do in some other fashion. You go to the Pentagon and confront any staff officer, major or higher, and you find the same people—articulate, good-looking, sharp, great briefers, polyester clean, and synthetic. They’re all from the same mold. Go to the Military Personnel Center in San Antonio. They’re all articulate, good-looking, versed, skilled, and trained. But you answer me: Why are there no heroes? Why don’t we say, “I remember Black Jack So-and-so or Sergeant So-and-so”? We don’t say that anymore because by making everything so proper, which for the most part is positive, we’ve lost a bit of the excitement, the history, the hero, the model, the guy that you create stories around. We’ve lost that. Do with that what you will. I’m concerned about it, and eventually I think the histories of 1995 will reflect that there are no “Tooy” Spaatzes and Curt LeMays and some of the Chiefs we talk about who retired in the sixties—colorful characters, dedicated, loyal, who worked hard, but they had a certain flair about them that just made them stand out. We’re now removing them from our teachings.

Kohn: It’s a corporate Air Force.

Gaylor: It’s a corporate Air Force, and that’s the only thing I don’t like about it. I’d like to have some heroes.
What would you say that our peer Chief Sam Parish is most famous for?\footnote{CMSAF Sam Parish entered the Air Force in 1954 at the age of seventeen. After completing the training course for ground weather equipment officers as the honor graduate, he went to Wiesbaden, Germany, as the NCOIC of Weather Communications. In 1960 he received further training as a weather observer technician, again completing the course as the honor graduate. After service in Massachusetts and Germany, he went to HQ Air Weather Service as the Command Chief Observer and then as Chief, Observing Services and Procedures Division, for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. He was in the first class at the Air Force Senior NCO Academy in 1973. Following graduation, he was chosen as the Senior Enlisted Advisor for the Air Weather Service. He was named Senior Enlisted Advisor for USAFE in 1977. In 1981 he became SAC's Senior Enlisted Advisor. He received an appointment as the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force in August 1983 and retired in June 1986.} What do you think of when you hear of Sam?

Airey: He speaks off the cuff and from the hip, and has the courage of his convictions. I believe he'll go down as a great CMSAF.

Gaylor: People used to say to me, "Bob, you haven't changed a bit." I'd say, "I hope not. Let me know if I act like I'm changing. I don't want to change a bit." I'm the same lovable guy that I was in 1948.

When you read history, you look for something that stirs you up a little bit, not something that just says, "He went along with this."

Kohn: What's your estimation of the attitude of the Air Force and its senior leadership in your experience toward the enlisted force? How is the enlisted force perceived?

Gaylor: By the senior officer force?

Kohn: The senior people you've known.

Gaylor: We're about to be forty years old as a service now, quite institutionalized. I think the enlisted force is perceived as the nucleus of the Air Force and is very important. The educational processes are better; basic training is better; the tech schools are better; and Professional Military Education is better. I think all of that has settled in and has been institutionalized.
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As to our enlisted leadership, we shoot ourselves in the foot a lot. We are our own worst enemy. I remember how angry General David Jones CINCUSAFE [Commander-in-Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe] would get when he met with a group of chiefs and enlisted advisors from USAFE, all in for a conference.\textsuperscript{144} He'd say, "Now, do you have any questions?" The first question: "When are we going to have prestige housing for chiefs?" Next question: "When do we get to sit in the VIP lounge at Rhein-Main Airport when we're waiting for a flight?" He used to say to me, "I'm very disappointed. Why don't they ask, 'What can I do to support the command? What can I do to promote the officer-enlisted relationship? What can I do for the airmen?' Why do they always say, 'What can I do for me?'"

So I used to put the word out in advance. I used to say, "I'm not going to tell you what to ask, but you may choose to ask some questions concerning your obligation as a chief before you start asking, 'What are you going to do for me?'" It's my belief that if the enlisted force does what it's supposed to do, then good things will happen. But if you want the good things first, and then say, "Now I'll do what I'm supposed to do," it'll hurt us. I just think we're damaging ourselves with that approach.

Harlow: "We need more chief parking spots."

Gaylor: That's what I detest. I'm thinking that if you do a good job they may come to you and say, "Hey, would you like a parking space?" Then say, "Thank you; that's nice." But if you go and say, "I want a parking space, so I can do my job better," officers are rightfully turned off. I think we've got to continually get our act together. If you say right away, "I demand; I want; why can't I;" it turns people off. It turns me off.

Airey: I've used this line many times, "Ask not what the United States Air Force can do for me, but what I can do for it. What's my duty and responsibility to the United States Air Force, to my country and to the enlisted force?"

Kohn: I have a general question about the change during your careers of the relationship between airmen and NCOs, NCOs and officers, and how you established credibility with young airmen.

\textsuperscript{144}Gen David C. Jones served as Commander-in-Chief, USAFE, from September 1971 to June 1974.
Harlow: I firmly believe and I’ve always believed, and I think the others share my feelings, that “familiarity breeds contempt.” I don’t believe that you must get so close to an officer that you start calling him by his first name, even if you play golf with him. All enlisted people have to appreciate that and adhere to it. That’s part of the discipline.

In the corporate world of today you have some of your junior executives and some of your senior executives who bring all employees in for a little reception or a little party. They can do that, but they don’t violate that Mr. So-and-so or Miss So-and-so protocol. They still don’t do that, and I think this is, again, a reflection on the military.

Barnes: If we’re going to have a military service, it has to be that way. There’s a limit to what relationships can be if you hope to nurture and continue that respect. The service is built on admiration and respect, which is earned. Earning it is the key for those who would command, but I don’t think we can ever get away from it and have a successful military force.

Airey: I concur fully. Let me make this historical analogy. In World War II a handful of regulars led us, but the war was really fought by amateurs. We expanded from 20,000 people in 1939 and 1940 to 2.5 million in finally winning the war. Of course, the people who fought it were draftees and enlistees from all walks of life. In my entire bomb group I think there were two regular officers and a handful of regular NCOs. The point I’m getting at is there was a different type of leadership needed then.

Today, the United States Air Force is professional. An airman comes out of basic training and then tech school, and we start sending him to leadership school and to the NCO academies. So the entire force, for the most part, is professional as opposed to amateur. These people need different leadership. We don’t need that harsh: “Do as I tell you, or we’re going to kill you.” I’ve actually seen people get slapped around and beaten up in my time. But we still need discipline; I’m a great believer in non-fraternization, and when I say “non-fraternization,” I keep officers at arm’s length, even to this day. I don’t call any officer by his first name. If he’s a lieutenant, I call him lieutenant. I think in many ways the NCO

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145 In June 1939, the Army Air Corps’ personnel strength stood at 23,455. At the war-time peak, July 1945, the Army Air Forces had a personnel strength of 2,262,092. Directorate of Information Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Manpower Statistics, November 24, 1969.
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force is far more intelligent and the Air Force more people-conscious than the Air Force I knew many, many years ago.

Gaylor: We surely didn’t “back into” that professionalism. It was developed. I think we are simply reaping the benefits. We now cannot rest on our laurels, but must continue to improve our professionalism. That, to me, is the name of the game.

Harlow: We’re grooming the younger people much better in many respects.

Airey: If I had to take a hundred chief master sergeants at random today versus a hundred chief master sergeants back in 1959 and compare them, there would be no comparison when it comes to overall education, overall attitude toward helping people, and in many other aspects. The hundred chiefs today would surface as better leaders overall, but this in no way detracts from the many great NCOs of the past.

Kohn: So we’re a stronger force?

Airey: Yes. With all our problems, we’re a stronger force today.

Gaylor: We’re doing with less, and better with less.

Kohn: What do you think the enlisted issues will be ten or twenty years from now, the issues that will be of concern to the enlisted force?

Gaylor: Fifteen years ago they were the same as now: pay, housing, medical. I think they’ll be the same.

Barnes: I think there’s an increasing opportunity now to recognize, as technology evolves and we get more technical in the kinds of jobs we do, that the same old problem of how one gets recognized for his contributions will continue. The educational process is pulling people in. I, quite frankly, see another period in which we’ll have to look at restructuring the grades, to separate people who are in the hard and soft-core fields, those who are technically competent, and those who don’t get into technology. I see this as a major problem downstream.
I think if we’re smart and can start addressing it now, we can get ahead of it. As an example, let’s look at the weather field and the sophistication in weather equipment; right now, people are using that equipment. Then we must see it as equivalent to a national network. Is a staff sergeant’s pay equal to [the salary of a civilian]? We’re going to have to address that. Otherwise, you’re going to see another exodus based on technology. You’re also going to see this same kind of exodus in our people who maintain the personnel system’s computers. If you look at the Gunter [Air Force Station] system, with all its computer sophistication which links who-knows-what together in the communications network, you’re going to see that this skilled manpower pool is drawn on heavily by industry. We’re going to have to address that. That’s what I see as a problem downstream.

Harlow: In 1986 the Congress changed the retirement system.\(^{146}\) It’s now going to be effective for those people who are going to retire twenty years from now. I told them recently at the NCO Academy, “The senior NCO leadership must be very careful, for if you start talking about that new system and tell them, ‘You’re going to get less pay than I get when I retire,’ it’s going to affect retention, morale, and everything else.” Twenty years from now there’s going to be an entirely new Congress; there are going to be new faces up there. Nobody knows what the economy is going to do; nobody knows what the technology is going to do and how it’s going to impact on the services, so don’t start pushing that now. Don’t even talk about it.

Airey: There are other things to think about. Out in Colorado Springs right now there are over a hundred enlisted men and women who are

\(^{146}\) In 1986 Congress revised the military retirement system. The changes penalized those joining the service on or after August 1, 1986, who retire before completing thirty years of active duty. Under the revised Act, the multiplier was reduced from 2.5 percent times years of service to 2.0 percent. This reduced the retirement pay from 50 percent of average basic pay after twenty years to 40 percent of average basic pay. The committee argued that this would be an incentive for those who had already served twenty years to stay in for ten years more. Once they reached the age of sixty-two, however, their retirement payment was recomputed without the penalty. See “Explanation of the Committee Amendment” (House Report 99–513), Session 99–2, 1986, vol. 15, pp. 21–29; Office of the Actuary, Department of Defense, DOD Statistical Report on the Military Retirement System (RCS No. DDM (A) 1375), p. 1.
working in brand new AFSCs that deal strictly with space.\textsuperscript{147} Who knows what that's going to lead to for these enlisted people in fifteen, twenty, thirty, fifty years? Will one of them be the first enlisted person in space? What overall effect will this have on our enlisted force? What changes are going to be made, like Tom alluded to? We don't know, and I don't think anyone is smart enough to know at this time.

\textbf{Gaylor:} Plus, ten years ago on the tip of our tongues were Thailand and Vietnam. They're now history. Now we talk about the Middle East and Iran. Ten years from now, who knows? We may be talking about Madagascar or Bolivia, so you've got to shift with the changing scene. You have to keep your fighting force geared to fight the type of war that you anticipate you might have to fight. It's an ongoing process that just never ends.

\textbf{Airrey:} Over 2,000 years ago it was said, "Only the dead have seen the end of war." I agree. In my lifetime, except for a handful of days, there's been some type of warfare, armed aggression, or conflict going on in some part of the world, just as there is today.

\textbf{Kohn:} Let me thank the four of you, on behalf of the Air Force, for your patience and candor today. You all have busy schedules and many commitments; your sharing of your experiences and perspectives is a special gift beyond the contributions you made on active duty, and since retirement. We in the history program believe that your thoughts today will benefit the men and women of the Air Force for many years into the future. Thank you again.

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