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Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

April 20, 2010
Report No. SPO-2010-002

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Review of Intra-Theater Transportation Planning, Capabilities, and Execution for the Drawdown from Iraq (Project No. D2009-D00SPO-0310.000)

We are providing this report for information and use. The report discusses intra-theater planning for the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq by the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and its subordinate and supporting organizations.

Objective. The objective of the assessment was to determine whether USCENTCOM and its supporting and subordinate organizations' intra-theater logistical planning and selected capabilities were sufficient to support and manage the movement of materiel being drawn down from Iraq.

General Background. On November 17, 2008, the governments of the United States and Iraq signed the "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq" (the Security Agreement). The Security Agreement entered into force on January 1, 2009, and stated in Article 24 that all U.S. forces shall withdraw from Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.

On February 27, 2009, in remarks delivered at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, President Obama announced that the United States' combat mission in Iraq will end by August 31, 2010. He pledged to remove all combat brigades from Iraq by that date and to change the mission from combat to "supporting the Iraqi Government and its Security Forces as they take the absolute lead in securing their country." The President's strategy requires U.S. force levels to decline to no more than 50,000 troops by August 31, 2010.

Further, General Raymond Odierno, Commanding General, United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I),¹ stated in a letter dated February 27, 2009, to the personnel of the then Multi-National Force-Iraq that, "As of 31 August 2010 our combat mission in Iraq will end."

Results-In-Brief. We determined at the December 17, 2009, conclusion of our Iraq field review that USCENTCOM and its subordinate and supporting organizations' intra-theater logistical planning and selected capabilities appeared to be sufficient to effectively manage and support the movement of materiel being withdrawn from Iraq. Additionally, we observed that the logisticians in these organizations were continuing to gain efficiencies in their planning processes, which we

¹ On January 1, 2010, the Multi-National Force-Iraq, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq, the Multi-National Security and Transition Command-Iraq, and Task Force 134 were merged into the now established "United States Forces-Iraq."

anticipate will progressively improve and enhance intra-theater transportation capabilities. Therefore, we are not making specific recommendations in this report.

Nevertheless, there were still challenges identified by the team that continue to require close management attention to ensure the most efficient, effective, and timely execution of U.S. drawdown operations. We will continue to monitor these challenges as drawdown operations continue.

See the Observation for further discussion on USCENTCOM planning initiatives as well as additional challenges to drawdown operations identified. Attachment A provides the report distribution, Attachment B explains the scope and methodology, and Attachment C provides the management comments we received in response to a draft of this report.

Observation. Intra-Theater Logistical Planning for the Drawdown of Materiel from Iraq

We determined at the December 17, 2009, conclusion of our field review in Iraq that USCENTCOM and its subordinate and supporting organizations' intra-theater logistical planning and selected capabilities appeared to be sufficient to effectively manage and support the movement of materiel being withdrawn from Iraq. Additionally, we observed that the logisticians in these organizations were continuing to gain efficiencies in their planning processes, which we anticipate will progressively improve and enhance intra-theater transportation capabilities.

However, while overall planning and its ongoing adjustments appeared to be sufficient to accommodate the drawdown from Iraq, there were still logistical challenges identified by the team that continue to require close management attention to ensure the most efficient, effective, and timely execution of drawdown operations.

These challenges included:

- Transitioning from the pending expiration of the contracts for transportation services issued under the Heavy Lift VI program to the contracts to be issued under the Heavy Lift VII program²
- Gaining further accountability of “green” and “white”³ materiel in Iraq
- Gaining further accountability of shipping containers in Iraq
- Determining the plan for disposition of some white materiel in Iraq

Drawdown efforts may be hindered if these challenges are not managed and addressed in a timely manner.

Background. USCENTCOM and its subordinate and supporting organizations issued detailed operational plans for the drawdown of U.S. forces by August 31, 2010, predicated on the Security Agreement, U.S. presidential guidance, and on-the-ground decisions made by the Commander, USF-I. A common operating picture of the magnitude of the drawdown, according to information provided by USF-I officials, follows:

- U.S. Forces – There were more than 143,000 U.S. military forces in Iraq in January 2009. General Odierno has reported that there were about 110,000 U.S. forces in Iraq at the beginning of January 2010 and that by March 7, 2010, there would be roughly 100,000 remaining. The presidential strategy, previously cited, is to reduce U.S. forces to 50,000 by August 31, 2010.
- Equipment – There were an estimated 3.4 million pieces of equipment in Iraq at the start of the drawdown, of which approximately 2.8 million pieces were “green” and 651,000

² The Heavy Lift VI program contracts are a U.S. Army Central initiative, managed through the 1st Sustainment Command (Theater), that provide commercial transportation services for the movement of materiel primarily within Kuwait and Iraq. The Heavy Lift VII program contracts, once awarded, will be the follow-on to the Heavy Lift VI program contracts.

³ “Green” equipment is generally synonymous with standard military equipment; and “white” equipment is generally synonymous with non-standard military equipment, Government-Furnished-Equipment (to contractors), or Contractor-Managed/Government-Owned equipment.

were “white.” USF-I projected that 1.2 million pieces of equipment would remain in Iraq after August 31, 2010, to support of the transition force, and 2.1 million pieces would be withdrawn from Iraq during the drawdown. USF-I estimated that, as of October 31, 2009, 1.8 million of the 2.1 million pieces of equipment remained to be withdrawn from Iraq.

- Bases – There were 495 U.S. bases and facilities in Iraq at the start of the drawdown. USF-I stated that they had closed or transferred 260 bases and facilities between January 2008 and January 2010,⁴ with 235 remaining in operation. USF-I believes that the base closures and transfers were on track to meet the projected drawdown footprint.
- Contractors – There were approximately 149,000 contractors in Iraq supporting U.S. forces, in January 2009, to include U.S. contractors, third country nationals, and local nationals. USF-I estimated that approximately 100,000 contractors remained in Iraq as of December 31, 2009. The USF-I goal was to have approximately 50,000 to 75,000 contractors remaining in Iraq by September 2010, to support the U.S. transition force.

Work Completed in Kuwait. In November 2009, our assessment team visited the U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) and the 1st Sustainment Command (Theater [1st TSC]) at their headquarters in Kuwait to determine their respective roles and responsibilities in support of the drawdown.

In discussions with our assessment team, a number of officers from ARCENT and 1st TSC responsible for drawdown operations expressed concerns regarding their lack of sufficient visibility over the requirements for materiel required to be moved out of Iraq during the drawdown. We therefore preliminarily concluded that ARCENT and 1st TSC officials did not have, at that time, all of the Multi-National Force-Iraq and Multi-National Corps-Iraq requirements for materiel that they needed to plan the transportation assets to be used for the operation.

Additionally, based on our review of key drawdown operational plans and orders, we concluded that ARCENT and 1st TSC officials did not have a clearly defined end-state date by when all materiel associated with the drawdown to 50,000 troops must be removed from Iraq.

As a result, we issued a draft report in November 2009 noting these apparent shortfalls. We recommended that the “green” and “white” materiel requiring movement out of Iraq be recounted and revalidated by the Multi-National Force-Iraq and Multi-National Corps-Iraq and that the end-state date for the withdrawal of materiel be clearly defined by the Multi-National Force-Iraq and Multi-National Corps-Iraq, in coordination with USCENTCOM.

Work Completed in Iraq. In December 2009, we visited USF-I organizations and officials in Iraq, subsequent to the issuance of our draft report that resulted from our Kuwait visit. We also attended the ARCENT and 1st TSC “rehearsal of concept” (ROC) drill⁵ held in Kuwait, in December 2009, to observe briefings and discussions concerning the drawdown from Iraq.

Representatives from in-theater commands involved in the drawdown, as well as staff from organizations located in the United States, attended the ROC drill to brief and review drawdown plans with commanders and senior DoD officials in attendance. The discussions and briefings

⁴ A number of bases and facilities were transferred to the control of the Government of Iraq.

⁵ “Rehearsal of Concept” is a colloquial term not found in Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (as amended through 31 October 2009). However, a 1st TSC representative explained it as a synchronization of plans, in this case, for the responsible drawdown from Iraq.

during our visits in Iraq and our attendance at the ROC drill in Kuwait indicated that our primary drawdown observations from the team's November 2009 draft report had been addressed.⁶

Specifically, the results of the ROC drill enabled logistical planners to gain better visibility of the volume of materiel requiring movement out of Iraq, as well as the transportation requirements for moving that materiel. In addition, the end-state date was defined by senior logistical planners present as "the majority of equipment out of Iraq by August 31, 2010, with the residual materiel to be withdrawn by October 2010."

Status of Planning for Drawdown Operations. We determined that USCENTCOM and its subordinate and supporting organizations' intra-theater logistical planning and selected capabilities, based on our review of planning documents and an on-the-ground in-theater assessment, appeared to be sufficient to effectively manage and support the movement of materiel that had to be withdrawn from Iraq.

Moreover, U.S. military logisticians continued to gain efficiencies in their planning processes, which were contributing to further improvements and clarity in defining intra-theater transportation requirements and capabilities. However, while planning for the drawdown continued to be refined, there remained several logistical challenges that still required close management attention to ensure the most efficient, effective, and timely execution of drawdown operations.

Below, we discuss both the planning initiatives and additional challenges to drawdown operations.

Initiatives Associated with Drawdown Operations. While not all inclusive, we believe that the following initiatives, some of which have already begun to be implemented, will significantly assist in the drawdown efforts.

Operation Clean Sweep. Operation Clean Sweep was a Multi-National Corps-Iraq initiative directing units to "begin the identification, segregation, accountability, and turn-in of non-mission essential supplies and equipment ... in order to expedite the draw down process." Command officials from the 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), headquartered at Joint Base Balad, were coordinating Operation Clean Sweep throughout Iraq and had established April 2010 as the goal for completing this operation.

Multi-National Corps-Iraq Fragmentary Order 1022, "Operation Clean Sweep," October 26, 2009, states that Multi-National Corps-Iraq units will support Operation Clean Sweep and that Multi-National Divisions' tracking for 100 percent of subordinate unit participation at forward operating bases, joint security stations, and combat outposts would be the key to success. We believe that to be fully successful, Multi-National Division commanders need to ensure that all units at U.S. bases and facilities cooperate and turn-in all excess items. Otherwise, requirements for the movement of the materiel may be understated.

"Thin the Lines." General Odierno stated during testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on September 30, 2009, that "as we go forward, we will thin our lines across Iraq in order to reduce the risk and sustain stability through a deliberate transition of responsibilities to the Iraqi Security Forces." A senior official working at the office of the Joint

⁶ Because the primary drawdown observations based on the team's November 2009 visit to Kuwait had been addressed, we did not finalize the draft report issued in November 2009.

Chiefs of Staff further explained this concept to mean U.S. forces would be redeploying brigade combat teams and battalions one-by-one through the summer of 2010 to ensure that the remaining U.S. forces could maintain their Iraqi partnerships.

In our judgment, this initiative will enable the flow of troops and equipment out of Iraq to be staggered over months instead of requiring a massive push in July and August 2010. U.S. forces will therefore be able to progressively reduce to 50,000 troops, thus also alleviating the stress on the infrastructure base and intra-theater logistical support capabilities in Iraq and Kuwait by spreading the drawdown over a longer time period.

Door-to-Door Movements.⁷ According to Marine Corps officials, door-to-door materiel movements were conducted in Iraq to support its forces in their Iraq drawdown operations. Using this method, commercial transport carriers moved a large majority of the Marine Corps' non-lethal equipment from forward operating bases in western Iraq, to the port of Aqaba in Jordan, and then to designated destinations in the United States.

At the time of our fieldwork in Iraq, we were informed that the Army also planned to use door-to-door movements through Jordan for the non-lethal equipment of four brigades as drawdown operations continued. According to a USF-I official, these door-to-door movements will reduce the stress on the logistical capabilities of the 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) and the 1st TSC, thus freeing their assets for other sustainment, support, and drawdown missions. Using the port of Aqaba will also reduce the flow of materiel through Kuwait and its ports.

Rehearsal of Concept Drill. ARCENT and 1st TSC co-hosted a Responsible Drawdown ROC drill in Kuwait, on December 14, 2009, at which logistics planners briefed their December 2009 to August 2010 drawdown plans to commanders and senior DoD officials. Major DoD organizations that had an involvement and interest in the drawdown of troops and equipment from Iraq attended.

The ROC drill included briefings and discussions on a variety of topics ranging from weather predictions, threat trends, and customs operations; to the withdrawal timelines of specific units and ammunition, and the numbers of shipping containers to be used.

In our judgment, the ROC drill was key to identifying specific and shared roles and responsibilities of the many military commands and DoD civilian organizations engaged in directing and supporting this exceptionally complex drawdown operation. In addition, it should significantly facilitate synchronization of their logistical support efforts so that execution can proceed on a responsible and timely basis.

Challenges to Drawdown Operations. We identified certain logistical challenges that require close management attention to ensure the most efficient, effective, and timely execution of drawdown operations.

Transition from the Heavy Lift VI Program to the Heavy Lift VII Program. The Heavy Lift VI program was established to provide cargo line haul and heavy lift, along with

⁷ A "door-to-door" movement in international transport logistics is commonly understood to mean the movement of cargo from its point of origin to its destination. Door-to-door movements involve the *intact* movement of a particular cargo and are often associated with a single transaction in which a logistics service provider assumes responsibility for the cargo for the whole journey.

personnel transportation services in Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, using multiple-award contracts to three companies. The contracts were awarded in July 2005, with a base year and up-to four 1-year option periods (used to extend the contract), all of which have been exercised.

Army acquisition and contracting officials were working to award the Heavy Lift VII program contracts as a follow on because the Heavy Lift VI contracts were due to expire on June 30, 2010, at the beginning of the peak drawdown period. We were informed that the Heavy Lift VII contracts were to include the same transportation services as did the Heavy Lift VI contracts, be multiple-award contracts for up-to four companies, and were to have a base year contract with four 1-year options. U.S. Army Contracting Command officials noted the following considerations and challenges in the process to award the Heavy Lift VII contracts:

- Kuwaiti, Iraqi, and Saudi laws, policies, and customs
- Recruiting, retaining, and training a large, multi-national workforce
- Potential problems in timely issuance of badges at the time of transition from the Heavy Lift VI contracts to the Heavy Lift VII contracts because of known limitations in processing new contractor personnel badges
- Uncertainties due to volatile, unpredictable requirements
- Harsh operating conditions

Contracting officials also explained that all contracted drivers would have to obtain multiple new badges under new Heavy Lift VII contracts. Based on known processing capabilities, they estimated that it could take approximately four months to re-badge approximately 4,000 drivers. Therefore, if the Heavy Lift VII contracts were not awarded with sufficient lead-time, there could be a shortage of drivers with the appropriate badges to conduct transportation services once the Heavy Lift VI contracts expire. U.S. Army Contracting Command officials were aware of these challenges and were working to award the Heavy Lift VII contracts on a timely basis with minimal disruption to drawdown operations.

Materiel Accountability. During our visit to Iraq, command officials stated that they would continue to identify unaccounted for property and bring it to record through certain planning initiatives and ongoing drawdown operations. A specific planning initiative focused on this objective was Operation Clean Sweep, as previously discussed in this report.

The importance of the need for this particular initiative was underscored by the experience of Multi-National Forces-West, whose senior Marine Corps' logistics officers explained that at the completion of drawdown operations, they estimated that their units had turned in approximately 25 percent more equipment than was previously recorded on their property books. It is not certain that this phenomenon is also applicable to U.S. Army units, although it may be indicative. However, we did not assess this issue.

As materiel accountability continues in Iraq for both green and white equipment, logistical planners, in our judgment, will need to identify and monitor any significant increases in materiel to ensure that enough containers, trucking assets, and other logistical requirements are identified and resourced.

Container Accountability. The Integrated Booking System-Container Management Module (IBS-CMM) is an Army-approved automated Web-based container management database that provides inventory, tracking, visibility, accountability, and management support to commanders in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. Army personnel informed us, after our

visit to Iraq, that the Army Container Asset Management System⁸ was the system of record for container management worldwide for DoD and that IBS-CMM was only used in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.

USF-I officials stated that at the beginning of their drawdown planning efforts, they queried IBS-CMM data for the number of containers. This data indicated that there were approximately 90,000 containers in Iraq. The command subsequently conducted a physical inventory of containers in Iraq and the resulting count was approximately 60,000 containers. According to USF-I officials, the command performed further analysis and concluded that the approximately 60,000 container count was a more accurate number and this figure was thereafter used as a planning factor to support drawdown operations. It is likely that as containers were moved into or out of locations in Iraq, the data in IBS-CMM had not been updated.

It appeared, nonetheless, that commanders in Iraq may not be able to depend on the reliability of IBS-CMM data regarding container accountability in Iraq. As a consequence, they would not be able to determine whether they had developed accurate transportation requirements based on the number of containers available to execute drawdown operations. USF-I officials stated they were confident that the container count at the 60,000 level was accurate and could be used as a transportation planning factor.⁹

Disposition Instructions. According to USF-I officials during our visit to Iraq, the disposition of certain materiel in Iraq had not yet been determined. Specifically, it had not been decided whether some white equipment would be sent to Afghanistan or would remain in Iraq. In our opinion, until this disposition is known, transportation requirements cannot be fully determined and, therefore, logistical planners cannot allocate transportation assets accordingly.

This issue has been under review by a DoDIG team conducting an audit on the “Controls Over the Accountability and Disposition of Government-Furnished-Property in Iraq.” The overall objective of this audit is to determine whether DoD has adequate controls over government-furnished property as it prepares to draw down forces from Iraq. Specifically, the audit team has been determining whether DoD has properly accounted for government-furnished property; whether policies and procedures existed for the proper transfer, reset, or disposal of government-furnished property; and whether those policies and procedures were being executed adequately.

The Office of Special Plans and Operations will continue to work closely with its Office of the Inspector General counterparts to monitor the accountability and disposition of white equipment in Iraq.

Conclusion. USCENTCOM and its subordinate and supporting organizations are engaged in one of the largest and most complex movements of personnel and materiel in recent U.S. military

⁸ The Army Container Asset Management System is a web-based software application used to assist the Army Intermodal and Distribution Platform Management Office with the management, inventory, accountability, readiness, and condition data of all Army owned or leased International Organization for Standardization containers, flatracks, and container roll-in roll-out platforms.

⁹ According to CENTCOM and USF-I personnel, “containers are now labeled as assets and not expendable military equipment. The Container Management Element (CME) located at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, has been tasked to assist ARCENT (Container Management Executive Agent) in managing container accountability via monthly inventories and system updates on container locations. This process was found to be effective in determining container ownership and usage/requirements.”

history. We commend the significant efforts and accomplishments to-date of the responsible organizations and their personnel managing the extremely challenging drawdown from Iraq.

We determined that USCENTCOM and its subordinate and supporting organizations' intra-theater logistical planning and selected capabilities appeared to be sufficient to effectively manage and support the movement of materiel being withdrawn from Iraq. Additionally, we observed that the logisticians in these organizations continued to gain efficiencies in their planning processes, which we anticipate will progressively improve and enhance intra-theater transportation capabilities. Therefore, we are not making specific recommendations in this report.

However, there were still logistical challenges identified by the team that continue to require close management attention to ensure the most efficient, effective, and timely execution of drawdown operations. Although the challenges could develop into potential impediments to the drawdown, logistical planners were aware of and attempting to manage them on an ongoing basis.


We will continue to monitor these challenges as drawdown operations continue. To aid our efforts, we will request updates on the progress of the transition to Heavy Lift VII program contracts; the efforts to gain accountability of both "green" and "white" materiel; and the determination of disposition of some materiel in Iraq, specifically "white" equipment.

Additionally, we will be monitoring the results of the DoDIG audit report on "Controls Over the Accountability and Disposition of Government-Furnished Property in Iraq," as it addresses accountability and disposition of white equipment in Iraq. We may initiate additional work based on the command response to this report and additional updates on the progress of drawdown operations during the ensuing months. Further, we may conduct additional work to assess the impact of using multiple container accountability systems on overall container management within DoD.

Management Comments

Although formal comments were not required, we provided the Commander, U.S. Central Command; Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq; Commander, U.S. Army Central; Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command; and the Commander, U.S. Army Contracting Command the opportunity to comment on a draft of this report. In a joint response, USCENTCOM and USF-I concurred with the draft report and provided technical comments, which we considered when developing the final report. The joint USCENTCOM and USF-I response can be reviewed in Attachment C. No additional comments are required.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct your questions to Mr. Robert M. Murrell at (703) 604-9074 (DSN 664-9074), robert.murrell@dodig.mil, or robert.murrell@dodig.smil.mil.



Kenneth P. Moorefield
Deputy Inspector General
Special Plans and Operations

Attachment A: Report Distribution

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House Committee on Appropriations

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House Committee on Armed Services

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs

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Attachment B: Scope and Methodology

Scope and Methodology. We performed this assessment from September 10, 2009, through the conclusion of our fieldwork in Iraq on December 17, 2009, in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspections*. We planned and performed the assessment to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our observations, conclusions, and recommendations, based on our objectives.

We evaluated whether U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and its supporting and subordinate organizations' intra-theater logistical planning and selected capabilities were sufficient to support and manage the movement of materiel being drawn down from Iraq.

We reviewed operations plans and orders for USCENTCOM, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, Multi National Corps-Iraq, U.S. Army Central, and the 1st Sustainment Command (Theater) and conducted site visits within the United States and the USCENTCOM area of operations.

Specifically, we visited Qatar and Kuwait from October 27 to November 9, 2009, and Iraq and Kuwait from December 7 to 17, 2009. During our site visits, we visited or contacted individuals – ranging from general officers, unit commanders, and staff officers, to civilians and contractors – from the following organizations:

- U.S. Central Command
- U.S. Forces-Iraq
- U.S. Army Central
- U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central
- Multi-National Forces-West
- 1st Sustainment Command (Theater)
- 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary)
- II Marine Expeditionary Force
- 4th Infantry Division
- U.S. Marine Corps Logistics Command-Forward
- CENTCOM Deployment Distribution Operations Center
- Army Materiel Command/401st and 402nd Army Field Support Brigades
- 593rd Sustainment Brigade
- Surface Deployment and Distribution Command/595th Transportation Terminal Group
- Army and Air Forces Exchange Services
- Kellogg, Brown, and Root, Inc.

During our site visits in Kuwait, we visited the:

- Kuwait-Iraq border (Khabari crossing) to review border crossing procedures and interview customs inspectors
- Wash racks and staging areas to determine whether those functions could support increased throughput of materiel
- Ports at Kuwait Naval Base and Shuaiba to review the processes to prepare materiel for ocean transport

During site visits in Iraq, we visited the:

- Victory Base Complex to discuss drawdown plans and oversight of the drawdown process with USF-I officials

- Al Asad Air Base to observe the execution of drawdown operations and discuss lessons learned with officials from Multi-National Forces-West
- Joint Base Balad to discuss intra-theater transportation planning, capabilities, and execution with officials from the 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary)

Finally, we visited Kuwait in December 2009 to attend the “rehearsal of concept” drill, hosted by the U.S. Army Central and the 1st Sustainment Command (Theater). We attended to observe logistics planners brief their December 2009 to August 2010 drawdown plans to commanders and senior DoD officials and to obtain details on the accomplishments of the ongoing drawdown execution through early December 2009.

Prior Coverage. There has been no prior coverage on drawdown operations specific to intra-theater transportation in the last three years. However, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has provided testimony on DoD’s planning efforts for the drawdown. Concerning the testimony, GAO issued GAO-10-179, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on DoD Planning for the Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq,” a statement by GAO before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan on November 2, 2009. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.gao.gov>.

Attachment C: U.S. Central Command and U.S. Forces-Iraq Comments




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7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

16 April 2010

FOR: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: United States Central Command Response to DODIG Draft Report "Review of
Intra-Theater Transportation Planning, Capabilities and Execution for the
Drawdown from Iraq". (DODIG CODE D2009-D000LC-0240.001)

1. Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the recommendations presented in the DODIG draft report.
2. USCENTCOM and USF-I concur with the draft report and provide the attached technical comments to the report. These changes are recommended to more accurately and fully reflect the current situation on the ground.
3. The Point of Contact is Colonel Mario V. Garcia, Jr., USCENTCOM Inspector General, (813) 827-6660.


JAY W. HOOD
Major General, U.S. Army

Enclosure:
CENTCOM Response

DODIG Draft Report Review

(DODIG D2009-D00SPO-0310.000)

“Review Intra-Theater Transportation Planning, Capabilities and Execution for the Drawdown from Iraq”

CENTCOM AND USF-I GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE REPORT

1. (U) Page 4. The report states that, “The USF-I goal was to have approximately 55,000 contractors remaining in Iraq by September 2010, to support the U.S. transition force.” Recommend modifying the sentence to read: “The USF-I goal was to have approximately 50,000 to 75,000 contractors remaining in Iraq by September 2010, to support the U.S. transition force.” The goal, which has been reflected on several briefs and reports, is expected to be between 50,000 and 75,000 contractors by September 2010. The ratio of contractor to military personnel in Iraq has historically ranged between 1 to 1 and 1.5 to 1. Based on these ratios, and if the military force structure is reduced to approximately 50,000, the number of contractors in Iraq is expected to be between 50,000 and 75,000. The range in numbers is due to several factors. First, there is not an immediate direct correlation between the reduction in the military footprint and the reduction in contractors. Specifically, there is normally a time gap, as much as 90-days, before an associated contractor reduction results. Secondly, as military forces are reduced, residual and base operating support functions are still a requirement. In fact, there may be a slight increase in certain contractor categories, such as transportation, to facilitate troop and equipment withdrawals. As of February 2010, the number of contractors in Iraq was 90,000.”

2. (U) Page 6. With regard to the “Heavy-Lift VI” and “Heavy-Lift VII” programs, recommend that it be annotated that these are ARCENT, Kuwait initiatives managed through the 1st Theater Support Command (TSC).

3. (U) Page 8. The report states that, “It appeared, nonetheless, that commanders in Iraq may not be able to depend on the reliability of IBS-CMM data regarding container accountability in Iraq. As a consequence, they would not be able to determine whether they had developed accurate transportation requirements based on the number of containers available to execute drawdown operations. USF-I officials stated they were confident that the container count at the 60,000 level was accurate and could be used as a transportation planning factor.” Recommend replacing this statement with, “Containers are now labeled as assets and not expendable military equipment. The Container Management Element (CME) located at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait has been tasked to assist ARCENT (Container Management Executive Agent) in managing container accountability, via monthly inventories and system updates on container locations. This process was found to be effective in determining container ownership and usage/requirements.”

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