OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Evaluation Report

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

INSPECTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT MANPOWER PROCESS

Report No. 96-029

November 29, 1995

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Acronyms

ASD(RA) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
CINC Commander in Chief
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DoD Department of Defense
IMA Individual Mobilization Augmentee
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDA Joint Duty Assignment
JDAL Joint Duty Assignment List
JDAMIS Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System
JMAS Joint Manpower Automation System
JMP Joint Manpower Program
JPM Joint Professional Military Education
JSO Joint Specialty Officer
JTD Joint Table of Distribution
JTMD Joint Table of Mobilization Distribution
MOP Memorandum of Policy
MRCP Manpower Requirements Change Package
USAISAFISA U.S. Army Force Integration Support Agency
USD(P&R) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
COMMANDERS IN CHIEF, UNIFIED COMMANDS
DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Report on Inspection of the Department of Defense Joint Manpower Process
(Report No. 96-029)

This is the final report on the inspection of the Department of Defense Joint Manpower Process. The inspection objectives were to evaluate the processes and mechanisms used to determine, validate, approve, assign, and manage manpower resources at joint organizations. We found systemic problems in each of the five issue areas we inspected. The specific issues, findings and recommendations are in Part II of the report. Management comments on a draft of this report were considered in preparing the final report and were incorporated into Part II.

Department managers responded to the issues, findings and recommendations in the draft report in very positive and constructive terms. DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, we request that you provide the completion dates for actions already taken, or the estimated dates for completion of planned actions by February 5, 1996. The specific requirements for that additional information are listed at the end of Part II.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesies extended to the inspection team. If you have any questions on this inspection, please contact Col. Timothy T. Turner, USAF, or Mr. Dennis J. Cullen, Readiness and Operational Support Directorate, Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, at (703) 604-9555 or DSN 664-9555. The distribution of this report is listed in Appendix D. The inspection team members are listed inside the back cover.

Robert J. Lieberman
Assistant Inspector General
for Auditing
The Inspector General, Department of Defense, conducted a functional inspection of the processes and mechanisms used to plan for and manage manpower at joint organizations. The scope of the inspection included organizations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, eight of the nine unified commands, six Defense Agencies, the Joint Electronic Warfare Center, the Allied Command Europe, and the Allied Air Forces Central Europe. We also interviewed joint officers serving in the Offices of Defense Cooperation at the United States Embassies, Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany and at Brussels, Belgium. The on-site portion of the inspection was conducted during the period May 31 - October 14, 1994.

We assessed the processes and mechanisms used to determine, validate, approve, assign and manage manpower at joint organizations. We also assessed the ability of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Military Departments to monitor the careers of officers serving in the joint arena with emphasis on those officers designated as Joint Specialty Officers under the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433). Additionally, we reviewed the processes in place to employ reserve component Individual Mobilization Augmentees within joint organizations, to include the provision of joint training and education necessary for those reserve officers to augment twenty-four hour operations or back-fill deployed headquarters personnel.

Based on analysis of program data collected and statements from management officials, we identified systemic deficiencies requiring management attention and action in the following five major program areas:

1. The processes and mechanisms used to determine manpower requirements for joint organizations are inefficient, ineffective, and inadequate.

2. The processes and mechanisms used to validate and approve manpower requirements for joint organizations are inadequate.

3. The Military Services are unable to satisfy the manpower requirements for joint organizations.

4. Support from the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretaries of the Military Departments in monitoring the careers of Joint Specialty Officers and other officers who serve or have served in Joint Duty Assignments is inadequate.

5. Joint policy, education and training of reserve officers assigned to joint organizations are inadequate.
Additionally, our analysis of the program data led us to conclude that there were several factors that contributed to these systemic deficiencies. We identified the following as the principal contributing factors:

**Joint Manpower Policy Guidance**

The Department of Defense has not issued a DoD Directive establishing policy for joint manpower management that covers both military and civilian positions. A draft directive for joint officer management has been in coordination for over six years. Provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433), that relate to management of military officers assigned to joint organizations, are implemented through policy memoranda and Joint Staff publications. However, we found significant gaps in those implementing instructions that should be filled through DoD-wide policy directives.

Limited DoD manpower management guidelines provide senior DoD managers, commanders of the unified commands and directors of defense agencies flexibility in their approach to manpower management issues. However, such flexibility makes it difficult for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff to hold joint organizations accountable for manpower management practices. The Military Services and joint organizations are not required to rely on any benchmark that provides common criteria to effectively and equitably determine the manpower needed to meet mission requirements.

We recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness develop, coordinate and submit for approval comprehensive DoD Directives on Joint Manpower Management and Joint Officer Management.

**Joint Billet Criteria**

Even though the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 imposed specific statutory requirements on the Secretary of Defense to define a Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) and publish a list of those positions, we found no Department-wide published guidance that defines what constitutes an accredited JDA. We also found no Department-wide guidance that provides adequate measurement criteria for determining how joint-unique mission requirements incorporate the many military occupational skill requirements necessary to accommodate JDA positions. While some JDA positions are particularly oriented to a specific Military Service (by the nature of the skills required) others are not clearly Service-unique. Because there is no specific criteria to follow, managers have no guidance to apply when determining required grade levels or what Military Service should fill positions. Lacking those guidelines, managers also have problems determining the level of jointness associated with each position. The Department has no assurance that all joint organizations consistently apply similar baseline criteria.

The Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) is a compendium of all billets in the Department of Defense that meet the DoD policy criteria for providing significant experience in joint matters. We found the compilation of the JDAL arbitrary, based on organization of assignment rather than duties actually performed. There is a statutory requirement that at least 1,000 JDAL billets be designated as "critical" assignments. We found that joint organizations designated positions as "critical" based on the availability of a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) rather than the duties of the position as contemplated by the statute. The critical designation is regarded as an arbitrary requirement rather than a means for ensuring that key positions are
filled with officers already trained in and oriented toward joint matters. We found that critical positions are distributed on a pro rata basis in response to Joint Staff guidance that requires each joint organization to designate 11 to 15 percent of all their JDA billets as critical.

We recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establish criteria for the JDAL so that JDAs are designated based on level of experience in joint matters required by each position, rather than simply the organization in which the billet is located. In addition, we recommended a comprehensive analysis of JDAL skill and grade requirements against Military Service capacity to fill those billets, with special emphasis on critical joint duty billets.

**Manpower Requirements Determination and Validation**

There are wide variations in the processes used by joint organizations to determine manpower requirements. There is no standard baseline methodology or criteria for joint organizations to use in determining and validating joint manpower requirements. We found that joint manpower requirements determination and validation procedures are conducted inconsistently, without a developed model or a quantitative analysis process. The lack of DoD policy allows each joint organization and each Military Service to define how it will implement joint manpower programs in ways that tend to serve their interests versus an overall DoD solution to joint manpower issues. Conflicting interpretations and interests are not easily resolved because there is no common benchmark or adjudicator of disputes.

Most organizations used ad hoc processes to respond to an event such as major mission change, reorganization or staff reduction. Two key deficiencies arise when ad hoc processes are used. The first is that it is difficult to ensure consistency across organizations in their assessment of skills and number of people needed for similar functions. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff reviewers have no sound basis upon which to compare competing demands among joint organizations, set priorities or determine whether their guidance is honored. The second deficiency is that the lack of documented criteria used and data relied upon within a joint organization makes it more difficult to respond to future demands for manpower. With the regular turnover of military personnel, especially in the unified commands, reliance on institutional memory is a poor substitute for a written record of the factors that led to a given manpower decision. Future managers must recreate the ad hoc process and make decisions without a full understanding of their predecessor’s actions. That creates the unnecessary risk of inadvertently recreating the conditions that the predecessor sought to change.

Inefficient manpower determination, validation and approval procedures force joint organizations to work off-line with the Military Services to facilitate assignment actions in anticipation of approved Joint Manpower Program changes. To facilitate timely Joint Duty Assignment actions, the Military Services must simultaneously coordinate official JDAL validation, approval and documentation with the Joint Staff, while unofficially recognizing undocumented Joint Manpower Program changes and requirements for immediate assignment accommodation actions. Furthermore, the process required by the Joint Staff to validate multiple manpower requirements determination procedures and coordinate non-standard Joint Manpower Programs is time consuming and inefficient.
We recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Joint Staff develop appropriate requirements determination and validation criteria, including a mechanism for comparative analysis, setting priorities among joint organizations, and allocating manpower among organizations.

**Joint Officer Assignment and Management Processes**

The mechanisms used by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Joint Staff and the Military Services to proactively manage the joint officer community need improvement. We reviewed the criteria used by the Military Services for identifying and selecting officers for JDAs and for designating officers as Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs). We also reviewed how the four Military Service Headquarters managed their JSO resource pool to meet the demands of the JDAL. During the transition period that expired October 1, 1989, the Secretary of Defense granted the JSO designation to more than 17,000 officers at the rank of Major or Lieutenant Commander and above. Since that time, the size of the JSO pool has shrunk by more than 10,000 officers. The Joint Staff reported that, as of October 1, 1995, the total number of JSOs on active duty was 6,964 (a loss of 59 percent). By comparison, the number of officers approved for JSO designation between October 1, 1989 and January 1, 1995 totaled only 672 (a replacement rate of only 6.7 percent).

All the joint organizations we visited indicated general satisfaction with the Military Services providing quality officers in a timely manner. The exception to that satisfaction occurs when the Military Services must coordinate assignments associated with shortage skills, critical joint billets (requiring JSOs), non-joint accredited billets in organizations that receive only 50 percent joint credit and billets involved in manpower document updates.

There are no career guidelines in place that describe the advantages or disadvantages associated with the timing of JDAs. The personnel officials we interviewed from each of the Military Services contended that timing of initial and subsequent critical joint duty assignments was crucial for an officer to stay competitive for promotion to the next higher grade. The legislatively mandated length of JDAs plays a significant role in the career timing for an officer to complete joint duty. An important part of that timing is the officer's participation in Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).

One aspect of JDA management requiring further guidance is tour length with respect to periods of temporary duty taken during a JDA. A conflict over legal interpretation exists between the OSD Office of General Counsel position and the practice endorsed by USD(P&R), Joint Staff, and Military Departments. According to the General Counsel, DoD, the current practice (of crediting the 12 weeks spent at the Armed Forces Staff College in a temporary duty status as qualifying joint duty time although specifically excluded under Title 5 USC 668(b)) violates statutory parameters. Consequently, the DoD has been reporting incorrect tour length averages in the annual reports to Congress since enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

We recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establish criteria for the JDAL that are based on duties performed and determine the current requirement for critical JDAs. We further recommended that the Secretary of Department seek
legislative relief from the arbitrary requirement that at least 1,000 JDAL billets be
designated "critical."

**Joint Professional Military Education**

The number of officers graduating from JPME schools each year, particularly
the Armed Forces Staff College, is insufficient for the Military Services to meet the
demanding requirements of the current Joint Duty Assignment List that includes
1,000 or more critical positions. The limitations on the number of students
attending JPME, Phase II, also impedes the ability of the Military Services to
adequately develop future JSOs in the required skill specialties needed to
accommodate all critical joint positions. However, we believe that the Military
Services can improve that process by giving attendance priority to officers with
military skill specialities for which there is a projected high demand for JSOs to fill
critical joint duty assignments.

We recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness incorporate policy guidance criteria in the DoD Directive 1300.19,
"Joint Officer Management Program," related to future JSO requirements for use
in identifying officers selected to attend JPME, Part II.

**Joint Officer Promotions**

The Goldwater-Nichols Act established promotion objectives with regard to
those officers assigned to the Joint Staff, JSOs and other officers assigned to joint
duty assignments. We found that there is a perception that the JSO designation
potentially enhances an officer’s future promotion chances. That belief exists
because the law requires officers who have the JSO designation to, as a group, be
promoted at a rate not less than the rate for officers serving on, or have served
on, the headquarters staff of their Service.

We found that the Services have had problems meeting the promotion
objectives set forth in Title 10 USC 662. We also found that the Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is not reporting JSO promotion rates
consistent with statutory requirements and that the Department of Defense does
not meet all the mandated promotion objectives. Our analysis of promotion results
revealed that each Military Service emphasizes future promotability in its screening
process for selections to JDAs. The quality screening initiatives by the Military
Services are improving the selection rates of officers who are serving in or have
served in JDAs.

We recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness report JSO promotion results consistent with the requirements set forth
in Title 10, USC 662(b) and 667(5).

**Education and Training of Reserve Officers**

We found that the DoD is not in compliance with Section 666 of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act which requires the Secretary of Defense to establish
personnel policies emphasizing education and experience in joint matters for
reserve officers not on the active-duty list. We were advised that current policy,
although unpublished, is that application of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to the
reserve components has proven thus far impractical.
We recommended that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy and the Joint Staff Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability, develop policy guidance that provides for the necessary training and education of reserve component officers assigned to joint organizations.

**Management Responses and Request for Further Comments**

To address the above-cited conditions and others documented in the report, we presented 17 recommendations in the draft report dated July 11, 1995. Management concurred or partially concurred with 16 of the recommendations. On the remaining recommendation, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness proposed alternative corrective action that satisfied the intent of the recommendation. We request estimated completion dates on the planned actions specified in Part II be identified in response to the final report.
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Joint Manpower Process
PART I - INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

History of Joint Manpower Management

Shortly before retiring as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1982, General David C. Jones, U.S. Air Force, proposed major changes in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their organization. General Jones was concerned about inadequate cross-Service and joint experience throughout the Armed Forces and the built-in conflict that the Service Chiefs faced in their dual roles as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as leaders of their respective Services. To address those concerns, General Jones proposed a greatly strengthened role for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, enhanced authority of the Chairman over the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of the unified and specified commands, improved processing of joint actions, and significantly broadened training and rewards for military members assigned to "joint" and "combined" organizations.

The Jones proposal launched a four-year appraisal by the Administration, Congress and academic community that grew beyond the issue of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reorganization to encompass reform of the entire defense establishment. Studies focused on organizational and personnel problems affecting joint U.S. military operations. The study of defense reorganization by the Senate Armed Services Committee, entitled "Defense Reorganization: The Need for Change," found inadequate quality of military personnel assigned to "joint duty." The Senate Armed Services Committee defined quality in the following three dimensions:

• the inherent skills and talents as professional military officers,

• the necessary education and experience, and

• a tour of sufficient length to become effective and provide continuity.

The October 1985 Senate Armed Services Committee report recommended that the system for military education, training and assignments should be changed to produce officers with a heightened awareness and greater commitment to DoD-wide requirements, a genuine multi-Service perspective, and improved understanding that a "joint duty" career specialty should be established in each service.
The report of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives on H.R. 4370, July 21, 1986, Bill Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, contained similar findings. The report described a weak joint organization structure that had existed for years accompanied by an, "... equally unsatisfactory personnel management system that fails to man joint positions with officers possessing the required capabilities in terms of talent, education, training and experience." Moreover, the problem was not limited to the members of the Joint Staff, but extended to "joint" positions. The foregoing reports provided the basis for the provisions in Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of October 1, 1986.

Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, "Joint Officer Personnel Policy," is codified in Chapter 38, of Title 10 of the United States Code. In addition to those goals just discussed, the provisions of the Act also required the Secretary of Defense to:

1. Establish policies, procedures and practices for the effective management of officers of the Military Services who are particularly trained in, and oriented toward joint matters. Such officers are to be designated (in addition to their principal military occupational specialty) as having, or as nominated for, the "joint specialty."

2. With the advice and assistance of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:

   (a) periodically review and revise joint education curriculum of joint military education schools to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters and,

   (b) establish rigorous standards for education of officers with the joint specialty.

3. Define the term "Joint Duty Assignment" (JDA) for management of officers in joint organizations and to document such positions.

4. Designate at least 1,000 JDA billets as critical.

5. Periodically (and not less often than every six months) report to Congress on the promotion rates for officers who are serving in, or have served in, JDAs; if such promotion rates fail to meet qualification objectives determined for officers assigned to JDAs, immediately notify Congress of such failure and of what action has been taken or plans to take to prevent future failures.
6. Include in the annual report to Congress, specific information and other information and comparative data considered appropriate to demonstrate the performance of the DoD and the performance of each Military Department in carrying out "Joint Officer Management" requirements.

Provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 also:

1. Provide for the Secretary of Defense to designate certain military occupational specialties involving combat operations as "Critical Occupational Specialties."

2. Stipulate minimum and average JDA tour lengths as well as authority for early release from a JDA.

3. Include requirements for joint duty and joint officer management which pertain specifically to General and Flag Officers."

The Office of the Secretary of Defense relegated the responsibility to develop joint officer management guidance to the Joint Staff. In 1986, the Secretary of Defense directed the composition of a General Officer Steering Group, chaired by the Vice Director of the Joint Staff and composed of selected Service Operations Deputies, Service Personnel Deputies and the Director of Manpower and Personnel, J-1, Joint Staff. That group formulated and recommended to the Office of the Secretary of Defense the initial policies and procedures to implement the requirements of Title IV. In 1987, the Joint Staff developed a consolidated document composed of approved Major/Lieutenant Commander (0-4) and above joint billets and called it the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). That document met the requirement stipulated in Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 for the Secretary of Defense to define a "Joint Duty Assignment" and document those positions.

To comply with the enactment of Title IV, "Joint Officer Personnel Policy," the Office of Secretary of Defense then formed a Title IV Working Group to continue the work of the initial Steering Group, and formulate the procedures for implementing joint policy guidance. The Title IV Working Group was established with two co-chairs and four Military Service representatives. The two co-chairs represented the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. All members of the Working Group were active duty officers.
at the Action Officer level of Major/Lieutenant Commander to Lieutenant Colonel/Commander (04/05). The Working Group functioned informally and viewed its role and function as a staff officer work group to address specific issues in an effort to address common goals, information sharing and keeping their respective chains of command informed on joint officer management issues; particularly the Colonel Policy Advisors to the Service Chiefs of Staff. The group initially met on a weekly basis. They wrote and staffed the various policy memoranda signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense that are related to joint officer management and the initial DoD Directive 1300.19, "Joint Officer Management Program."

The Draft DoD Directive 1300.19 "Joint Officer Management Program" has undergone staffing by the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Military Services for over 6 years without a final published version. In anticipation of added action items flowing from the JDAL study contracted with RAND Corporation for publication in early fiscal year 1995, and further input from the Services and joint organizations, the USD(P&R) is still revising the DoD Directive 1300.19 as comprehensive guidance for future publication. The USD(P&R) will ultimately publish the DoD Directive 1300.19 and the corollary DoD Instruction 1300.20 to meet the requirement for official DoD guidance over joint officer management. The directive will not address those issues associated with civilian personnel management within joint organizations.
PART I - INTRODUCTION

INSPECTION GOAL, OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

INSPECTION GOAL

The goal of our inspection was to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the processes and mechanisms used to manage Department of Defense manpower at joint and international organizations. In preparation for the inspection we identified four major objectives. During the course of the inspection we identified an additional issue that became our fifth objective, which focuses on reserve component issues. The five objectives were:

INSPECTION OBJECTIVES

• To evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the processes and mechanisms used to determine manpower requirements for the joint and international organizations.

• To evaluate the adequacy of the processes and mechanisms used to validate and approve manpower requirements for joint and international organizations.

• To assess the ability of the Services to meet manpower requirements for joint and international organizations.

• To assess the ability of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of the Military Departments to support and monitor the careers of Joint Specialty Officers, and other officers who serve or have served in Joint Duty Assignments.

• To assess the ability of the Department of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Military Departments to provide policy and direction regarding the joint training and education, where practicable, of the reserve component officers serving in joint organizations.

INSPECTION SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The inspection of the Joint Manpower Process was a functional review to assess the processes and mechanisms used to manage the Department of Defense joint manpower, and the processes and mechanisms used to determine, validate, approve, and assign that manpower to joint and international organizations. The inspection also assessed the ability of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Military Departments to monitor the careers of officers serving in the joint arena. The inspection included organizations in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, eight of the nine unified commands, six Defense Agencies, the Joint Electronic Warfare Center, the Allied Command Europe and the Allied Air Forces Europe. We also talked to officers serving in Joint Duty Assignments within the Offices of Defense Cooperation at the United States Embassies, Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany and at Brussels, Belgium.

To gain a comprehensive understanding of the issues, we interviewed representatives from the Joint Staff Directorate for Manpower and Personnel (J-1), the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness USD(P&R), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs ASD(RA), and officials from the manpower and personnel departments of all four Military Services. We gathered policy guidance from those offices and analyzed the impacts that directly effect the planning and implementation of the Joint Manpower Process.

With a more precise understanding of the policies and procedures involved in the planning and implementation of the Joint Manpower Process, we visited 17 joint commands and agencies and the two United States Embassies in Europe already mentioned to determine the adequacy of current joint manpower practices to satisfy the mission requirements. At those sites we interviewed key manpower and personnel managers and reviewed plans, policies, procedures and other related documents. A complete list of joint commands, organizations and activities visited and contacted is provided in Appendix C.

Our analysis of data collected and statements from officials interviewed surfaced conditions requiring management action in all five of our objectives. Some of those actions will require the Secretary of Defense to seek legislative changes to the current statutory mandates of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 to alleviate adverse impacts on the Joint Manpower Process. Other issues surfaced problems that require resolution through DoD oversight and publication of joint manpower policy guidance.
## PART II - ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
### INCORPORATING MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

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#### OVERVIEW

**Manpower Management**

The objectives of manpower management are to determine and authorize the minimum manpower each organization requires to accomplish its mission. The Future-Years Defense Program is the principal document used in the planning, programming and budgeting system. The DoD uses the document for managing Defense resources by projecting and linking costs and manpower with force structure.

**Requirements Determination**

The manpower requirements determination process is the basis for a command or agency to determine the number and skill level of manpower resources necessary to effectively and efficiently accomplish its mission. In support of the Future-Years Defense Program, each joint organization must identify its requirements annually, and project joint manpower requirements over a 6-year period. Aside from budgetary and manpower constraints, the ability of the Military Services to support the manpower needs of a joint organization is largely dependent on the timely and accurate identification of essential needs. In order for the Military Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Secretary of Defense to properly plan, program and budget joint manpower needs, the identification of joint manpower requirements must be a realistic reflection of known programmed changes in mission, functions and workload.

There are several elements that link together the manpower requirements determination process with the ultimate satisfaction of those requirements. This report will cover the many processes that exist to incorporate the equation variables of mission, workload, resources available and legislative constraints that culminate in a Joint Manpower Program document. Those variables must be thoroughly coordinated among all the players so that the Military Services can facilitate appropriate funding and assignment of qualified personnel.

**The Joint Manpower Program**

A Joint Manpower Program documents and communicates the functions, internal structure, current manpower authorizations, and projected manpower requirements of a joint command or Defense Agency's
mission. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 75, "Manpower for Joint and International Activities," April 2, 1993, contains instructions to joint organizations regarding the JMP. Publication of the CJCS MOP 75 eliminated the use of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manpower surveys, as previously outlined in the CJCS MOP 173, "Manpower for Joint and International Activities." With the issuance of CJCS MOP 75, the CJCS MOP 173 was cancelled.

Process Problems

During our inspection, we found several problems with the adequacy of the requirements determination process. First, we found the criteria used to determine Joint Duty Assignment billets are inadequate. Second, we found the policies, procedures and standards currently used for determining both military and civilian manpower requirements for joint organizations are inadequate. Third, we found problems with the process used to identify and maintain the list of critical Joint Duty Assignment billets. Additionally, we found that Military Service equity is not adequately considered when determining the Military Service to support a joint manpower requirement. The following section addresses those problems.
The following section outlines our analysis of the problems we found with the criteria, policies and procedures used to determine manpower requirements for joint organizations. Overall, we found that the criteria used by the 17 joint organizations we visited to be generally inadequate. That is, no consistent DoD wide baseline criteria exists to implement objective procedures for manpower requirements determination. The lack of developed and proven assessment criteria has generated many ad hoc processes that can not be adequately validated and coordinated in any comparative fashion. Furthermore, we found that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff have not published sufficient guidance to establish the necessary criteria for joint organizations to adequately assess their joint manpower requirements.

**TITLE IV, GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DoD REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986**

Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of October 1, 1986, "Joint Officer Personnel Policy," provided for actions and procedures to increase the prestige and rewards for joint duty. The Act sought to increase joint perspective and thinking among officers, improve the quality of officers assigned to joint duty and increase their education preparation and experience level. Among other things, the provisions of the Act required the Secretary of Defense to define the term "Joint Duty Assignment" (JDA) for management of officers in joint organizations.

Title IV required the Secretary of Defense to define a JDA and publish a list of assignments that would provide officers with significant experience in joint matters. The Act defined joint matters as matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea and air forces, including matters relating to national military strategy, strategic and contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under unified command.

**DOD DEFINITION OF JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS**

To comply with Title IV, in November 1986, the Department developed an initial definition of a JDA and began developing a Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). Included on the list were positions at or above Captain/Navy Lieutenant in the operational organizations. Operational organizations are those organizations involved in force employment or planning force employment and consisted primarily of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the unified and specified commands. In addition, agencies that support force employment (e.g., the Defense Logistics Agency,
the Defense Intelligence Agency) nominated positions for the list based on the following definition:

"...an assignment in a multi-Service or multi-national command or activity which is involved in the integrated employment of land, sea and air forces of at least two of the four Armed Services. Such involvement includes, but is not limited to, matters relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine or policy, strategic planning, contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under unified command."

Throughout our inspection, we found problems relating to that definition.

We found that joint billet determination criteria is not formalized. Although there are statutory requirements placed on the Secretary of Defense to define Joint Duty Assignments, we found no Department of Defense-wide published guidance defining what constitutes an accredited JDA. We also found no DoD-wide guidance that provides adequate measurement criteria for determining how joint-unique mission requirements associated with the development of the Joint Duty Assignment List incorporate the many military occupational skill requirements necessary to accommodate those positions. While some JDA positions are particularly oriented to a specific Service by the nature of the skills required, others are not clearly Service-unique. Because there are no DoD-wide published guidelines or specific criteria to follow, managers have no guidance to apply when determining required grade levels or what Military Service should fill positions. Lacking those guidelines, managers also have problems determining the level of jointness associated with each position. Therefore the Department has no assurance that all joint organizations consistently apply baseline criteria.

The second problem area we found relates to the process used by the Department to determine both military and civilian manpower requirements for joint organizations. We found that the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense do not enforce the use of a standard manpower determination process. We recognize that the USD(P&R) does not want to dictate detailed, step-by-step procedures in formalized policy. However, without establishing some common criteria, there is no guarantee that joint organizations will produce standardized requirements.

We found no mandate for joint organizations to use common criteria to determine manpower requirements.
PART II - ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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Thus, each organization we visited used various methods and procedures to determine civilian and military manpower requirements. The use of multiple, varying methods and procedures to determine manpower requirements has resulted in the inconsistent application of manpower determination criteria throughout the Department.

The Joint Staff Discontinues Manpower Surveys

Until November 1990, the Joint Staff Joint Manpower Survey and Evaluation Division (J-1) was responsible for conducting manpower surveys for all joint organizations that reported to or through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, with the elimination of the CJCS MOP 173, the Director for Manpower and Personnel (J-1) disestablished the survey and evaluation division to satisfy internal manpower reductions associated with downsizing.

The CJCS MOP 173 described the purpose and scope of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "limited scope/limited duration" manpower survey capability. The JCS originally designed the manpower survey to assess the joint manpower utilization of an activity, or element of an activity, and to identify the minimum manpower resources needed to effectively accomplish essential assigned missions. The JCS did not intend for that survey capability to be an alternative to, nor to detract from, the responsibility of the activity commander or agency director to conduct internal and subordinate on-site manpower surveys.

General Guidance Does Not Address JDAL Criteria

The Department of Defense Instruction 5010.37 "Efficiency Review, Position Management, and Resource Requirements Determination," November 17, 1987, provides specific guidelines for performing efficiency reviews, work measurement, labor and staffing standards development, resource requirements determination and position management throughout the Department of Defense. However, neither the DoD Instruction 5010.37 nor any other directive or instruction provides adequate measurement criteria for determining military, joint-unique mission requirements that encompass multi-Service skill requirements, statutory joint officer management requirements or identification of critical joint billet requirements.

Each Joint Organization Develops Its Own Process

In the absence of clear definition from the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Staff, each joint organization we visited developed its own process for determining its own manpower requirements. A general statement in CJCS MOP 75 provides that, "... Each joint activity should develop a manpower requirements methodology to use in programming future manpower requirements. Activities should employ a validated..."
manpower requirements determination process to identify manpower requirements." The CJCS MOP 75 does not describe the components of an acceptable manpower requirements determination methodology, leaving the unified commands and combat support agencies (the Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Mapping Agency, and the Defense Nuclear Agency) to define those components for themselves. Other Defense Agencies, such as the Defense Logistics Agency and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, are not obliged to follow even the limited guidance of the CJCS MOP 75 because they are not subject to oversight by the Joint Staff.

We found wide variations in the processes used by joint organizations to determine manpower requirements. Most used ad hoc processes to respond to an event such as major mission change, reorganization or staff reduction. The most common approach was to task the cognizant managers to define their requirements and then subject the manager’s analysis to review by an informal board. We found limited in-house manpower analysis capability (except at the Defense Information Systems Agency), and limited use of outside experts, such as the Army Force Integration Support Activity. The following examples illustrate a sampling of the various processes we found.

**THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND**

The U.S. Strategic Command follows CJCS MOP 75 and the JCS Administrative Publication 1.2. The command issued local regulatory supplementation through the USSTRATCOM Administrative Instruction 104-1 "Joint Manpower Management Program," August 1, 1992. That instruction details the command’s joint Manpower Program. We found that the USSTRATCOM also developed a manpower validation process that serves as an excellent model.

The U.S. Strategic Command has on-site capability to perform the manpower determination process intended by the CJCS MOP 75. The command’s manpower requirements determination and validation process is a two step process consisting of a functional review and a manpower validation board chaired by the Deputy CINC or designee. The process requires organizational functional analysis (work performed by each work center) and workload or task accomplishment times for all tasks done by an activity. The results of that analysis is called Process Oriented Measurements.

The DCINC or designee chairs the manpower validation board where USSTRATCOM manpower adjustments are deliberated. Process Oriented Measurement studies are presented to the board with
manpower recommendations. The targeted activity undergoing change can also present their case with any compelling evidence required for consideration. After all information and criteria is reviewed, the DCINC makes a final decision and the J1 staff initiates the required documentation. The USSTRATCOM used this process to determine total manpower requirements during the reorganization of the command and identified a 23 percent reduction in manpower requirements from fiscal year 1992 through 1997.

THE UNITED STATES ATLANTIC COMMAND (USACOM)

The U.S. Atlantic command reorganized in October 1993. The Command used a time phased implementation plan (published in January 1994), the CJCS MOP 75 and the JCS Administrative Publication 1.2, "Joint Officer Management," for general manpower management.

The Joint Staff assisted the U.S. Atlantic Command with the achievement of its initial stand-up transition. During the official establishment of the command, the manpower structure was determined as follows:

- The U.S. Atlantic Command J-1 staff gathered Manning documentation from the respective Military Services on the functions to be assumed by the command.

- That documentation was passed to a team of core U.S. Atlantic Command personnel to write position descriptions for each position within the Command. The team developed offices, branches, divisions structures and identified the grade and skills required to accomplish the mission.

- That data was then presented to a Joint Staff approval board. The Joint Staff J-1 chaired the approval board, and Military Service representatives at the Lieutenant Colonel/Commander level reviewed the data. The U.S. Atlantic Command brought in functional area representatives to articulate and defend the command position.

- The Joint Staff Review Board made decisions to fill a position as requested or make any grade and skill adjustments (e.g., changing the skills from 53A, Army Lieutenant Colonel position to a 51D, Navy Lieutenant Commander position). In some instances, it was decided not to fill the position, or to civilianize the position. Those decisions were made by representatives of the board and were based on first-hand experience factors rather than any formalized manpower determination criteria.
To add continuity, the Joint Staff played a mediating role over the process.

- The Joint Staff approved and funded 324 military joint billets for the U.S. Atlantic Command for fiscal year 1993. The review board approved an additional 70 military joint billets for fiscal year 1994 for expanding mission responsibilities of the U.S. Atlantic Command. The U.S. Atlantic Command then submitted JMP justifications back to the Joint Staff for an additional 105 military joint billets for fiscal year 1995, elevating the Commands total military manpower requirement to 499.

Although the overall process was cumbersome and management intensive, it served its purpose by staffing the manpower requirements of the U.S. Atlantic Command as it transitioned through reorganization. However, because the process did not produce any documented evidence of the criteria used, the Joint Staff and the Command produced no baseline for determining future manpower estimates. Without a historical requirements determination baseline or an objective criteria-based process, the Joint Staff and other joint organizations will experience difficulty with future application of the process.

DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY (DISA)


For the past 4 years, the Defense Information Systems Agency has produced summary reports of its efficiency reviews, manpower studies and management studies. Our analysis of each report revealed a comprehensive joint manpower requirements determination process independently established in the organization, in lieu of DoD guidance. The Agency budgeted $1.6 million to accomplish efficiency reviews (5-year cycle), position management studies (desk-side audits, personnel classifiers) and resource determinations (dollars).

The Defense Information Systems Agency places significant emphasis on its manpower requirements
process. The importance and extent of the in-depth effort place by the agency on formalizing its manpower determination process is illustrated by the fact that the Army Management Engineering Agency, Huntsville, Alabama, has 20 personnel funded by the Defense Business Operations Fund and 12 appropriated staff personnel dedicated to performing those tasks for the Defense Information Systems Agency.

There are two key deficiencies in the ad hoc processes used to establish manpower requirements. One is that it is difficult to ensure consistency across organizations in their assessment of skills and number of people needed for similar functions. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff reviewers do not have a sound basis for comparing competing demands among joint organizations, setting priorities or determining whether their guidance is honored.

The second deficiency is that the lack of documentation of criteria used and data relied on within a joint organization makes it more difficult to respond to future demands for manpower. With the regular turnover of military personnel, especially in the unified commands, reliance on institutional memory is a poor substitute for a written record of the factors that led to a decision. Future managers must recreate the ad hoc process and make their decisions without a full understanding of their predecessor's actions. That creates an unnecessary risk of inadvertently recreating the conditions that the predecessor sought to change.

We also found throughout our inspection that rather than implementing criteria designed for reviewing the efficiency of operations, the 17 joint commands and agencies we visited managed their workload, organization and workforce primarily on the level of funds they received. Several of the joint organizations we visited identified only the "Joint Manpower Program" requirements that their budget could support rather than what the mission required. Generally, those organizations projected current manpower requirements by reviewing their historical authorizations and the costs associated with that data. However, those budget-driven projections did not reflect the actual staff needed to perform the organization's mission.

Because military manpower is funded from the Military Personnel Appropriation and not the operating funds of the Defense Agencies, the use of military manpower allows the Defense Agencies to forego programming and budgeting fiscal resources for the military portion of their manpower strength. All of the Defense Agencies we visited relied heavily on military
manpower that did not impact directly on the agency's budget. All eight unified command manpower and personnel staff officials we interviewed outlined for us how they independently developed internal, fiscally constrained mechanisms that met the specific needs of the command. With the exception of the Defense Intelligence Agency, military manpower is considered a free resource by the Defense Agencies because it is already programmed into the fiscal guidance of the Military Services. By using military manpower, the Defense Agencies can alleviate civilian manpower end strengths and agency budget constraints to accomplish their missions.

We found one manpower problem common to all Defense organizations: Military Service downsizing. Downsizing normally calls on the organizational experts to evaluate the mission and prioritize the functions and then determine what functions will receive a reduction in personnel. Managers and supervisors normally determine some of those reductions based on factors such as attrition, difficult-to-fill hiring lags and pending retirements. Thus, downsizing normally bypasses all the traditional mechanisms for determining organizational manpower, (i.e., staffing standards, efficiency reviews, workload studies, etc.).

In spite of the overriding effects downsizing has on the traditional mechanisms for implementing staffing standards and other manpower management practices, we found that seven of the eight unified commands we visited had published supplemental guidance governing their internal Joint Manpower Program, to include procedures for efficiency reviews and manpower survey capabilities. However, because the effects of downsizing contribute to the ineffective use of those mechanisms, we only found verifiable evidence at the U.S. Strategic Command that supplemental guidance was ever effectively implemented. We could not find evidence among the remaining commands that internally published supplemental guidance was effectively implemented, or that the guidance significantly enhanced the command's ability to apply effective manpower determination criteria to their processes.

We also found problems with the lack of operational guidance. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the Joint Staff, prepared and staffed the draft DoD Directive 1300.19, "Joint Officer Management." The USD(P&R) solicited comments from the Military Services through various iterations over a 6-year period, but those efforts have not resulted in a published final directive. The USD(P&R) officials we interviewed stated that the Office of the
Secretary of Defense does not intend to get deeply involved developing detailed directives and guidance for joint officer management. That statement is supported by the fact that the USD(P&R) delegated authority to the Joint Staff Manpower and Personnel Directorate, (J-1), to develop and staff the DoD Directive 1300.19 on behalf of the USD(P&R).

In August 1994, the Joint Staff completed another detailed "final draft" version of the Directive and forwarded it to the USD(P&R) for review, coordination and publication. That document is currently undergoing further review and staffing. At the time of our draft report, the USD(P&R) was unable to provide us with the anticipated publication date for that directive.

Without other guidance available, all four Military Services reported to us that they are currently using the most current version of the draft DoD Directive 1300.19 for the "Joint Officer Management Program" as the best available statement of DoD policy. All eight of the unified commands we visited referenced proposed guidelines in the unpublished draft directive and recommended the directive as the appropriate place to disseminate joint manpower management guidance to all Military Services, (i.e., DoD guidelines for designating critical Joint Duty Assignment billets, and DoD criteria for civilian or reserve manpower requirements determination processes).

Consensus is that limited guidance offers increased flexibility

Additionally, all four of the Military Service Headquarters related to us that the lack of DoD policy presented them with an environment of increased flexibility for managing joint manpower. However, we found that the so called increased flexibility generates inconsistent processes impacting on each of the major issues addressed in this report to include:

- developing manpower requirements determination and validation criteria, (as discussed throughout issues 1 and 2),

- managing critical joint billets, (as discussed in issues 1, 3, and 4),

- equitable management of assignment accommodation rates for JDAs on the JDAL versus non-JDAL positions, (as discussed in issue 3)

- managing Joint Specialty Officers, (as discussed in issue 4) and
- the management of Individual Mobilization Augmentee positions for reserve component officers (as discussed in issue 5).

During our interviews with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Requirements and Resources, the Director for Requirements stated that the manpower determination process has ebbed and flowed over the years. At one time the Military Services identified joint manpower requirements, (i.e., the who, where and when to make cuts in manpower). Later, the joint organizations took the lead in the joint manpower determination process. The Director also stated that no one method has proven to be applicable to all the Military Services and scenarios. Furthermore, we found during our interviews with managers at the U.S. Air Force Military Personnel Center, the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center, the U.S. Marine Corps Military Personnel Office, the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Defense Security Assistance Agency, that those managers prefer the increased flexibility of limited guidance.

However, in contrast, managers we interviewed at the Bureau of Naval Personnel, said that the functional oversight performed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, USD(P&R), as it relates to the Joint Manpower Program was no more than a "rubber stamp" effort. In addition, those same Navy personnel managers expressed concerns over the fact that no single manpower focal point exists within the USD(P&R) to set joint manpower requirement priorities.

The limited DoD manpower management guidance makes it difficult for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff to hold joint organizations accountable for their manpower management practices. One of the costs of "flexibility" is the inability of the Military Services and joint organizations to rely on a common benchmark that provides the necessary criteria to effectively and equitably determine manpower requirements. The lack of DoD policy allows each joint organization and each Military service to define how it will implement joint manpower programs in ways that tend to serve the interests of components at the expense of an overall DoD solution. Conflicting interpretations and interests are not easily resolved because there is no common benchmark or adjudicator of disputes.

Civilian Manpower Requirements Policy is Also Fragmented

During our visits to 17 joint organizations, we found that guidance concerning civilian manpower management is also fragmented. No consolidated DoD guidance is used in the management of civilian personnel assigned to joint organizations. We found no guidance outlining the
procedures for determining the appropriate level of military-civilian mix, or for cross-leveling skills from one joint organization to another.

Five of the eight unified commands we visited are located on Air Force installations, two are on Navy installations, and the U.S. European Command is hosted by the Army. The host Military Service is designated as the "Executive Agent" for certain support functions, including civilian personnel management. In the absence of comprehensive DoD joint manpower requirements determination policy, the manpower and personnel staffs of those respective commands follow the supporting host Military Service regulations for determining civilian manpower requirements. We surfaced one significant problem concerning an executive agent's reluctance to adapt Military Service practices to the needs of a joint organization.

The Air Force, as the executive agent for the U.S. Transportation Command, restricted the pool of applicants for joint civilian positions to employees who worked for the Air Force. Vacant positions at the Command were announced to Air Force civilian employees only. The fact that U.S. Transportation Command civilian personnel count against Air Force end strength targets provided an incentive to fill command vacancies by hiring Air Force civilian personnel. However, the U.S. Transportation Command has requirements for skills and expertise in matters related to ground transportation and sealift. People with those skills and expertise are more likely to be found among the staffs of the Army and Navy components of the U.S. Transportation Command. We believe the actions of the Air Force, as the executive agency, to restrict competition to Air Force civilian personnel adversely impacts the U.S. Transportation Command's ability to fill its positions with the best qualified applicant.

Annual Review of Mission and Workload Required

The DoD Manpower Authorization and Operating Guidance for fiscal year 1993 and 1994 as disseminated by the ASD(FM&P) (now USD(P&R)) on June 30, 1993, calls for an annual review of mission and workload by the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the joint organizations. That memorandum states: "The purpose of the review is to identify specific program objectives, project manpower requirements that are based on quantitative workload measurement techniques, and establish program priorities for purposes of allocation of both military and civilian personnel. That kind of objective analysis will begin to establish, for the joint organizations, a much needed, consistent measurement criteria for determining joint manpower.
requirements that can then be validated against a standard baseline."

During our inspection of the joint manpower process, we found the various requirements determination processes used by the DoD activities we visited to be systemically fragmented and inefficient. The results of those processes were not supported by documented evidence of any quantitative or objective measurement criteria. Those conditions are allowed to exist because the Joint Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness have not established the necessary operational guidelines needed or provided sufficient oversight to ensure procedures were implemented uniformly.

During our interviews with officials from the Joint Staff Manpower and Personnel Directorate, we confirmed that there is no consensus with the unified commands and Defense Agencies on a process for determining joint manpower requirements. We found that a lack of such a consensus hinders the Joint Staff’s ability to evaluate all joint organizational missions, their relative priority, and track how military manpower is equitably distributed among competing organizations.

We recognize that the development of engineered work standards, manpower surveys, and other force sizing tools is extremely costly, labor intensive and time consuming. We also recognize that in times of reduced funding and reduced personnel strength, it becomes more difficult to fund and facilitate those procedures. However, in today’s downsizing environment, unified commanders and Defense Agency leaders are challenged to continue accomplishment of increased missions with less funding and less manpower. Under those conditions, cogent and objective analysis is necessary to ensure that the highest priority needs are met, and that decisions to eliminate or defer tasks are based on analysis - not by default.

The lack of comprehensive manpower determination guidance needed to establish a consistent or standard criteria contributed to the inability of the Joint Staff to accurately determine the manpower requirements of the Unified Commands and the Defense Agencies. As discussed in the following issue, the Joint Staff must validate all JMP through technical review and coordination with the Military Services to ensure that the proposed Joint Duty Assignment lists for military positions are supportable. It is a formidable task for the Joint Staff to review and validate multiple JMPs in a consistent and comparable way when program submissions range from no process other than a
subjective analysis, to in-house board of director reviews, to contracted studies. The difficulties experienced by the Joint Staff in the accomplishment of that task, void of any formally established evaluation criteria, can be attributed to the following factors:

- The publication of the CJCS MOP 75 in April 1993 eliminated the use of Joint Manpower surveys as was previously established in the cancelled CJCS MOP 173.

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness charged each joint organization to independently develop a manpower determination methodology to use in programming future manpower requirements. That decision perpetuated the use of fragmented, non-standard manpower requirements determination processes throughout the joint arena.

- The Joint Staff did not require accountability from those joint organizations for their manpower requirements determination systems or methodologies to ensure that the organizations met minimum standards or criteria for their decisions.

While we recognize that each joint organization has a unique mission with unique requirements, we believe the manpower requirements determination process should be measurable against a proven criteria and that the criteria should be consistently applied. Under the current procedures, the JMP cannot achieve that objective because each joint organization uses a different approach or process. Those processes are comprised of various non-standard criteria used to identify mission workload. Thus, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense do not have adequate visibility of the JMP and, therefore, cannot exercise the necessary oversight of the program across all joint organizations. We found manpower managers at the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have limited their management of the JMP to issuing broad, general policy guidelines and have not followed up to ensure those guidelines are effectively implemented.
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ADMINISTRATION OF CRITICAL JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT BILLETS

The following section outlines our analysis of how joint organizations employ processes and mechanisms to identify and continually maintain the list of critical JDA billets. Overall, we found that those processes and mechanisms did not employ a proven set of measurement criteria or a baseline to identify and manage those critical joint positions.

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT REQUIRES IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL JOINT BILLETS

The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act (Public Law 99-433, Title IV, Chap 38, Sect 661) states "The Secretary of Defense shall establish policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of officers ... who are particularly trained in, and orientated toward, joint matters." The Act further states, "The Secretary shall designate not fewer than 1,000 Joint Duty Assignment positions as critical Joint Duty Assignment positions. Such designation shall be made by examining each Joint Duty Assignment position and designating under the preceding sentence those positions for which, considering the duties and responsibilities of the position, it is highly important that the occupant be particularly trained in, and orientated toward, joint matters." We believe Congress intended for the Secretary of Defense to provide the Military Services with the necessary guidance to develop a resource pool of qualified Joint Specialty Officers who were adequately trained in joint matters to fill those 1,000 critical joint positions.

Compliance With Public Law 99-433

To comply with Public Law 99-433, the Joint Staff developed a consolidated document that shows all military Major/Lieutenant Commander and above joint billets, less professional and reserve duty billets not on the active duty list. That document is called the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). The Joint Staff updates the JDAL annually and submits the document to the USD(P&R) for publication in the fourth quarter of each fiscal year. Changes to the JDAL are normally submitted through the Joint Staff via JMP submissions. Changes to JMP documents are submitted to the Joint Staff for approval via the Joint Manpower Automation System (JMAS).

JDAs Assigned JDAMIS Numbers

All approved Joint Duty Assignments are assigned an identification number, known as a Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS) number. That number indicates that the joint billet is approved for assignment accommodation by the Services. The JDAMIS supplements existing Military Service manpower and personnel information systems by providing
automated files reflecting the approved JDAL and personnel data pertaining to officers who are serving in or have served in joint positions.

During our visits to 17 joint organizations, we consistently noted two situations that cause problems when trying to balance an organization's JMP documentation against the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). The first situation occurs when an officer is carried on a unit manning document that differs from what a unit shows on its JDAL. For example, the JDAL might show all critical JDA billets as filled by Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs), while the unit manning document reflects the critical JDA position as filled by another officer who is not a JSO. In the second instance, we found organizations portraying manpower accurately on both the unit manning document and the annually published JDAL. However, both the unit manning document and the JDAL may differ from the approved organizational JMP document. That occurs because the Services review and approve positions on JMP documents on unsynchronized time-tables, (either quarterly or semiannually depending on the Service). Therefore, the JMP documents are generally published out of synchronization with the JDAL. Since the Services only recognize joint positions for requisition against approved JDAL documents, both situations are problematic and require extensive input from the joint organizations into the JMAS to keep the two systems compatible and synchronized. To further compound the problem, the Services do not have on-line access to the JMAS system and do not have immediate visibility of changes as they occur.

The CJCS MOP 75 "Manpower for Joint and International Activities," April 2, 1993, outlines the process and procedures for management of the JMP and the JDAL. The CJCS MOP 75 states, "... By Joint Staff policy, critical Lieutenant Colonel/Commander and Colonel/Captain JDA billets should be distributed equitably among Joint Duty Assignment organizations." Distribution of the Congressionally mandated requirement for 1,000 critical joint billets on the JDAL is managed through a "fair share quota" methodology by the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Staff required the joint organizations to designate 11 to 15 percent of their JDA positions as critical. No additional guidelines are published, nor are there any standard procedures to follow when designating JDA positions as critical. We found six of the eight unified commands we visited well within that required range. The U.S. Special Operations Command and the U.S. Strategic Command did not meet that quota at the time of our inspection.
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Issue 1

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<th>&quot;Equity&quot; Emphasized, Not Goldwater-Nichols Criteria</th>
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<td>While the law refers to positions requiring training and orientation toward joint matters, the Joint Staff implementation addresses only the &quot;equitable&quot; distribution of critical joint billets. We found that &quot;equity&quot; principles are followed at all 17 joint organizations we visited, with minimal attention to the statutory criteria. Critical joint positions are distributed on a pro rata basis to joint organizations through Joint Staff guidance requiring critical designation of 11 to 15 percent of JDA positions. Joint organizations routinely designate positions as critical based on the availability of the incumbent to meet JSO criteria rather than the duties of the position. The critical designation is regarded as an arbitrary requirement rather than as a means for ensuring that key positions are filled with officers particularly qualified for joint duty.</td>
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<th>Lack of Guidance for Designating &quot;Critical&quot; Joint Billets</th>
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<td>The emphasis on equity and the lack of guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Staff regarding Goldwater-Nichols Act criteria for critical joint billets led to inconsistent identification of those billets. Some positions are identified as critical in one command and identical positions in another command are not identified as critical. We also noted instances where commands changed critical joint duty billets to accomplish &quot;by name&quot; personnel fill requests when requested individuals did not possess the required joint specialty designation. All eight of the unified commands we visited told of &quot;work-around&quot; procedures they established with the Services to meet the critical Joint Duty Assignment List report criteria.</td>
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<th>Congress Intended Critical Billets Be Filled By JSOs</th>
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<td>Critical JDA billets are intended by Congress to be, at a minimum, those that would significantly benefit the joint organization by being filled with a Joint Specialty Officer to bring heightened knowledge and experience of the joint arena to the organization. While the intent of Congress was clearly to develop a resource pool of such officers, the Military Services have not programmed a sufficient number of officers within the appropriate skills to fulfill all the requirements of the joint arena. That problem is exacerbated by the lack of sufficient guidance available to joint organizations to correctly identify and stabilize critical joint billets.</td>
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We found that two of the eight unified commands we visited did not meet the required Joint Staff quota for critical joint billets, but were striving to do so. Both commands report problems applying the Goldwater-Nichols Act criteria and the quota.

- The U.S. Special Operations Command designated 18 critical JDA billets and requires 36 critical billets to meet the Joint Staff quota. The J-5 staff
manpower officials we spoke to explained that they had difficulty identifying 36 billets that met the letter of the definition for a critical joint billet. However, the manpower staff was working to identify additional billets that qualified as critical based on a broader definition.

The U.S. Strategic Command identified 23 critical JDA billets and requires 61 critical Joint Duty Assignment billets to meet the Joint Staff quota. The manpower staff officials at the command also related to us that they found the process of identifying that many critical joint billets a difficult task. Furthermore, USSTRATCOM officials believe that the assignment of critical designation to JDA billets should be requirements driven vice a "fair share" spread throughout the Joint commands. If it becomes necessary to impose a non-requirements based approach to achieve the 1,000 joint critical billets, the "fair shares" should be based on the activities' 0-5 and 0-6 JDA population only, not on the JDA list population as a whole. Currently the Joint Staff uses all JDA billets to access the 11-15% ratio of critical JDA billets, which makes this number difficult to achieve for commands (like USSTRATCOM) with a disproportionate number of 0-4 billets. However, they recognized the need to support the Joint Staff policy and were in the process of stretching the joint critical definition to meet the quota requirement imposed by the Joint Staff.

At the U.S. Central Command, the Manpower Division could not explain to us how the Command originally designated the 48 critical joint billets within its headquarters. In the last year the Command was able to apply the critical designation to only one additional joint billet. The U.S. Central Command meets the 11 to 15 percent critical JDAL quota, although, without tested criteria for selecting critical joint positions, the validity of the position criticality is questionable.

Designation of critical joint billets is also complicated by the unsynchronized information systems used to keep track of Joint Duty Assignment billets. The Joint Staff noted in April 1993 that the quota and the fair share distribution goal was not being met. In response to a request from the Joint Staff, the U.S. Strategic Command identified additional positions as "critical," and in October 1993 submitted changes through the Joint Manpower Automation System. However, the Military Services would not accept the changes to the Joint Duty Assignment List (updated in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year), and advised all joint organizations to change
critical JDAL designations only when requisitioning a replacement for an incumbent officer.

We found that situation problematic because the two systems (the JDAL and the JMAS) are not updated simultaneously, and the Services do not have on-line access to the JMAS. Therefore, the potential exists for improper requisitioning of replacement personnel. That problem is further exacerbated because the Services have difficulty developing an adequate resource pool of qualified Joint Specialty Officers, with the appropriate skills, because they cannot adequately plan against an unstable list of critical billets.

Both the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command have local procedures and informal working relationships with Military Service personnel centers that circumvent the problem associated with JMAS delays and the identification of critical JDAs. Without that working rapport and those informal contacts, the potential for assignment gapping exists, or personnel could be assigned to billets where a speciality skill change is "pending" in the JMAS that is not visible to the Services. The latter process ultimately results in the assignment of officer with an inappropriate skill designator for the position.
The following section outlines our analysis of joint manpower requirements distribution among the Military Services. The distribution of obligations to fill joint manpower billets to the Services affects their ability to meet Service demands for personnel. This issue is particularly acute for the Joint Duty Assignment List billets, because the Goldwater-Nichols Act requires that JDAL billets be filled with high quality officers. Thus, we examined consideration of Service equity by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the Services when making decisions about Service manpower contribution to the joint arena. Overall, we found that the issue of Military Service equity is not adequately considered within the processes and mechanisms used for joint manpower requirements determination.

During our inspection, we found that issue to be a very controversial topic among the Military Services. Each of the four Service Headquarters manpower and personnel offices we visited brought up the topic and each wanted the Joint Staff to address the matter for resolution. The respective Service positions, as they related them to us, are briefly outlined below:

- The Army wants relief on end-strength.
- The Navy is standing firm on not wanting to pick up a larger share of joint billets at the expense of reduced manning of internal operational billets.
- The Marine Corps supports the status quo.
- The Air Force wants a lesser share of the joint billet structure. The Air Force stands by its opinion that it supports 44 percent of all joint requirements, with 26 percent of the total DoD force structure.

The Manpower and Personnel officials that we interviewed at the Air Force Military Personnel Center believe that the Air Force supports a disproportionate number of joint service billets when compared to the other Military Services and relative end-strengths. Those same officials expressed a need for the other Military Services to assume more of the manning responsibilities for those joint billets. According to an Air Force analysis conducted in March, 1994 the level of Service support to joint organizations at that time was as follows:
SERVICE SUPPORT TO JOINT ORGANIZATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force:</td>
<td>5608</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>9211</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>14,819</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army:</td>
<td>4314</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>5304</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>9,618</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy:</td>
<td>3035</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>4486</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>7,521</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>05.1</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>04.3</td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>13,650</td>
<td></td>
<td>19,857</td>
<td></td>
<td>33,507</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1

NOTE: The total number reflected for officers includes officers on the JDAL and all other officers in joint organizations not receiving joint credit.

The following illustration depicts the inequity of the Service joint officer contribution to the JDAL as represented by the fiscal year 1994 Goldwater-Nichols Implementation Report and the Joint Staff published desired future goal:
PART II - ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Issue 1

SERVICE JOINT MANPOWER CONTRIBUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Contribution*</th>
<th>Joint Staff Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2**

Military Service commitments to manpower resources in the joint arena are based on historical commitments between the Services and the unified commands. For example, the Air Force manpower officials we interviewed reported to us that the 44 percent contribution of resources funded in the joint arena results from the belief that:

- the Air Force was initially more committed to resourcing the joint arena than the other Services, and
- functional or mission transfers to the joint arena resulted in manpower transfers.

Currently, new Military Service specific manpower requirements must be compensated from existing resources in the joint arena. The Military Services are strictly controlling joint billet growth. Therefore, if a joint command or joint organization is unbalanced, leveling of Service billets is accomplished by transferring billet authorizations from one joint organization's JDAL to
another. For example, the U.S. Atlantic Command has over 50 percent Navy billets and the U.S. Central Command has only 15 percent Navy billets. The U.S. Central Command Plans and Manpower Division contacted both the Joint Staff, J-1 and the U.S. Atlantic Command manpower offices in May 1994 to discuss a swap of 6 or 7 Navy billets. In turn, the U.S. Central Command offered Army or Air Force JDAL billets assuming it would have no impact on incumbents and not cause gaps in assignments.

In a September 1992 Joint Staff message, "Air Force Contribution to Joint Commands and Staff," the unified commands were asked to "...review command Joint Manpower Programs (JMP's) and determine which billets must be Service specific and for all other billets, recommend another Service affiliation, where possible, to reduce Air Force contribution," (as depicted in the Service Joint Manpower Contributions chart above).

The CINCs of the unified commands complied with the Joint Staff request and made recommendations of 1,553 billets that could be converted from Air Force to Army, Navy, or Marine Corps. However, the other Military Services did not want to increase their commitment to the joint arena at the expense of degrading their ability to meet in-Service manpower demands. The Joint Staff and the Services did not reach a decision on that issue.

The Services elevated the controversy of "fair share distribution" of joint duty billets to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff scheduled a closed "tank session" for mid August 1994 to discuss the matter. That session, which is normally defined as a closed conference of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss pressing issues effecting the DoD, did not occur as planned. A Joint Staff manpower official confirmed for us that the Chairman understood the issue, but based on the limited information at hand and the lack of sufficient data to support the issue, there was no immediate solution to the problem. The Chairman reportedly expressed his opinion that it might take 10 years to bring the matter under control and that there were other, more pressing issues that required attention. Based on that sentiment, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff returned the issue to the Military Service level for further data gathering, analysis, and development of short-term and long-term remedies.
The manpower and personnel officials we interviewed at each of the Military Service Headquarters all expressed the opinion that the Defense Agencies have grown beyond the point where the Military Services can support them adequately without adversely impacting the Service infrastructure. Although the Services actively screen their best officers for JDAs and Service Headquarters positions, the joint organizations generally enjoy a higher priority for assignment. An example of that problem is perhaps illustrated by the results of the promotion list for Army Colonel [06], Army competitive category for fiscal year 1994. That promotion list indicates that the in-the-primary-zone promotion average for the Army Service Headquarters was significantly below the Army board average and the average for the Joint Staff as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>SELECTION RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Service Headquarters</td>
<td>30.0 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
<td>58.6 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Joint Duty</td>
<td>54.0 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Specialty Officers</td>
<td>41.3 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Board Average</td>
<td>42.0 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the Defense Agencies grow, they often maximize the use of military manpower, further straining the impact on the Services to support an ever-growing JDAL and adequately meet in-Service demands for quality officers. During our visits to six Defense Agencies, manpower officials expressed to us their views that military manpower, as a free resource from the Services, does not directly impact their fiscal manpower authorizations and serves to lessen the impact of imposed civilian manpower end-strengths. Conversely however, increasing demands on the Services to fill higher priority joint positions hinders their ability to maintain appropriate fill percentages with quality officers for internal operational requirements.

CONCLUSION

During the process of interviewing manpower and personnel officials at 17 joint organizations, we found the roles and responsibilities for determining and approving joint manpower requirements to be fragmented and vague. Furthermore, lack of definitive joint manpower management guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Staff promoted confusion among the joint organizations as they
developed independent processes and ad hoc criteria for determining manpower requirements. Joint organizations are also frustrated, as evidenced by our examples, by attempting to respond to the Joint Staff's arbitrary policy of identifying an 11 to 15 percent fair share quota for critical joint billets against JDALs, rather than determining legitimate critical joint positions based on statutory definitions.

All 17 joint organizations we visited related examples of insufficient manpower management guidance and arbitrary policies that conflict with statutory mandates. Those problems contribute to an excessively slow and cumbersome joint manpower requirements determination and Military Service coordination process. That conflict, combined with a lack of sufficient on-line automation capability between the Joint Staff and the Military Services, further slows the joint manpower requirements determination and authorization processes, thereby inhibiting:

1. synchronization between the validation of the JMP, the JMAS and the JDAL;
2. access by the Military Services to the JMAS;
3. final recognition by the Services of an updated JDAL; and
4. stabilization of the critical joint duty billet list that allows the Services to program for the appropriate Joint Specialty Officers.

Recommendation 1 [Revised]  
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness develop, coordinate and submit for approval a DoD Directive on Joint Manpower Management that incorporates a baseline methodology and criteria for joint organizations to determine military and civilian manpower requirements against standardized processes.

In our draft report we recommended that:

"The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness develop, coordinate and submit for approval a DoD Directive on Joint Officer Management that incorporates a single baseline methodology and criteria for joint organizations to determine valid manpower requirements against standardized processes. The U. S. Strategic Command manpower determination "Process Oriented Model" was the most comprehensive
methodology we found, and could be the model for a DoD-wide methodology."

This recommendation has been modified to reflect all joint positions, not just officer billets. The change was made based on analysis of management comments to the draft report.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) partially concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"We agree that some standardization of operational processes is needed to provide consistency in managing manpower. Personnel and Readiness has begun to work with the Joint Staff to develop a system that will assist in determining manpower requirements for the common or similar functions within the Unified Command. However, in an organization as diverse as DoD, no single work force requirements determination technology is best for all locations. Industrial engineering studies, efficiency reviews, process reengineering, best-practice benchmarking, et.al. work successfully in varying circumstances. Commanders and agency executives need the flexibility to use operational management methods most appropriate to their organization’s mission and culture. The Chairman, the CINCS, and joint operational commanders should not be constrained to a single methodology. In addition, we do not support including this guidance in the draft DoD Directive 1300.19, "Joint Officer Management Program. In light of joint manpower requirements pertaining to officer, enlisted, and civilian positions, we support a separate directive for clarifying any additional requirements. DoD Directive 1300.19 and its corollary, DoDI 1300.20, only apply to officers."

Although not specifically tasked to respond to the recommendation, the following organizations concurred with the recommendation:

The Director, Joint Staff concurred stating,

"The Joint Staff supports efforts to develop manpower determination methodology. Within the Unified Commands there are many similar functions and processes that could be analyzed against a common methodology. Whether such a methodology could also be applied to Defense Agencies and could encompass both military and civilian positions will require further
study once a Unified command methodology is developed. Efforts have been initiated to develop this methodology with an intent to test it in one or more Unified Commands by FY 97."

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) concurred with the recommendation stating that the unique sea-shore requirements of the Sea Service must be a consideration in the methodology.

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command also concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"The title of the proposed DoD Directive, Joint Officer Management, addresses only one category of joint manpower. The intent, as discussed in this report of the proposed directive, is to address methodology and criteria for determining all categories of manpower requirements (officer, enlisted, civilian, and reserve). Therefore, recommend title be changed to Joint Manpower and Personnel Management."


Evaluation of Management Comments

We consider all management comments responsive to the recommendation. Based on those comments and the overwhelming response to the recommendation, we believe there is a need for more definitive policy guidance on the manpower requirements determination process for all positions—not just officer billets. Therefore, we revised our recommendation to reflect all joint positions and deleted the reference to the U.S. Strategic Command Model.

Regarding the USD(P&R) concerns over our statement that the U.S. Strategic Command manpower requirements "Process Orientated Model" could be used as the model for a DoD-wide methodology, we acknowledge the USD(P&R) comments that in an organization as diverse as the DoD, no single work force requirements determination technology is best for all locations. However, the intent of our recommendation was not to suggest that the U.S. Strategic Command
methodology be adopted for use at all joint organizations. Our intent was to give the U.S. Strategic Command credit for their initiative and point out to the joint community that only at the U.S. Strategic Command did we find a fully staffed and clearly documented joint manpower resource management process at work.

Further Action Required

We request the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness provide the IG, DoD, a time line for anticipated publication of additional manpower requirements determination guidance for use by all joint organizations.

Recommendation 2

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness issue additional, more instructive guidance on military-civilian requirements determination criteria and procedures, and take action to protect the funding of positions identified for conversion of military positions to civilian positions.

Management Comments

The Under Secretary of Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) nonconcurred with the recommendation, stating:

"The Department's policy is clear. Civilian personnel will be used in positions which do not require military incumbents. Inspectors and staff analysts may quibble over individual judgments, but operational commanders best understand how to most effectively structure their work force. It is not in the Department's (or a particular command's) best interest to fence payroll dollars, even temporarily, from the effects of general budget adjustments. Such action would encourage a mix of labor and capital that tends to become less productive and efficient."

Other Management Comments

Although not specifically tasked to respond to the recommendation, the following organizations provided comments:

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"Detailed guidance that standardizes manpower determination processes would greatly enhance the overall joint manpower management program. Civilian increases resulting from military conversions should be protected through corresponding increases in the civilian workyear and endstrength ceilings."
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command also concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"USCENTCOM has the lowest percentage of civilian billets of the Unified Commands. This military/civilian mix is driven by the requirements to deploy a significant amount of the headquarters. Desert Shield/Storm demonstrated the need for a rear headquarters element. During deployments, the rear element will oversee the day-to-day activities in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) and provide augmentation and personnel replacement for the deployed element as required. However, it is to our advantage to ensure we maintain the maximum number of civilian billets that our mission allows."

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command also concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"The USD(P&R) should also issue guidance on programing and funding validated manpower requirements."

The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Environment) also concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"The Air Force strongly supports efforts to convert military positions to civilian where it makes sense to do so. Conversions to civilians would help alleviate the Air Force's disproportionate military contribution to joint manpower requirements while maintaining mission capability. Past efforts to determine military essentiality and conversion candidates have been forestalled by the lack of assurance that requisite workyears and funding would be provided to support the civilian positions. Implementation of Recommendation 2 must be predicated not only on the protection of funding, but also the provision of necessary workyears to replace military positions."

Although not specifically tasked to respond to the recommendation, the following organizations concurred with the recommendation without comments: the Joint Staff, U.S. European Command, Department of the Navy, Central Imagery Office, Defense Nuclear Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency, and Defense Security Assistance Agency.
PART II - ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Issue 1

Evaluation of Management Comments

Although the USD(P&R) may believe its broad policy statement is clear on the subject of military versus civilian positions, we found there has been no effective oversight to ensure consistent implementation. The Air Force comment above succinctly identifies the root cause. Past efforts to enforce military essentiality criteria have been forestalled by the lack of any assurance that requisite workyears and funding would be provided to support the additional civilian requirements resulting from the conversion from military to civilian incumbency. Management officials at the joint commands and other organizations visited told us they have billets (filled by military personnel) that do not require military incumbency. Commanders and managers of joint organizations see no advantage to converting military billets to civilian billets unless they have some assurance that their civilian endstrength will be increased and necessary funding will be provided for current and future years to meet mission requirements. The current fiscal constraints placed on the DoD by Congress essentially force maintenance of the status quo and disregard of the "clear" policy referred to by the USD(P&R).

Even though the USD(P&R) staff nonconcurred with this recommendation, they reported in briefings to us that they have initiated collaborative efforts with the Joint Staff to develop a systematic process for determining the manpower needs of the unified commands and Joint Staff activities. They reported that once the prototype system has been refined and tested, it could be adopted for use at all activities that employ joint manpower.

We consider all management comments and reported initiatives responsive to the recommendation. No further action required.

Recommendation 3

The Commanders in Chief of the Unified Commands and Directors of the Defense Agencies revalidate manpower requirements using the methodology established by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

Management Comments

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"Concur with the need for all joint organizations to validate their manpower requirements using methodology and criteria to be developed in recommendation 1. While this approach will provide validation of joint manpower requirements, will Services support validated increases in
manpower requirements? Identifying manpower requirements is necessary, but if the Services maintain a "zero-growth policy" for the "joint world" and require commands to realign existing resources, then the validations process is only a command internal tool."

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command concurred with the recommendation but commented that:

"To ask the CinCs to revalidate manpower requirements within 12 months may be too short of period to implement new policies and procedures in revalidating manpower requirements."

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command concurred with the recommendation and suggested that the unified command manpower and personnel staffs actively work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness in determining and establishing the validation methodology.

Other Management Comments

Although not specifically tasked to respond to the recommendation, the following organizations provided comments:

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) concurred with the recommendation but expressed a concern that the self-validation of manpower requirements by unified commands and Defense Agencies could create unconstrained requirements that compete for limited resources with no correlation to the Defense Planning Guidance.

The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Environment) also concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"The Air Force would welcome an improved methodology for validating joint manpower requirements. Such a methodology should focus on the military essentiality criteria, particularly in the Defense Agencies. Air Force analysis of Defense Agency wartime deployment requirements indicate a significant potential for replacing Agency military with civilians. As noted in Recommendation 2 above, funding and workyears must be provided to maintain capability in the Agencies."
PART II - ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Issue 1

The Director, Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"The Joint Staff supports this initiative once the required methodology is developed and tested in at least one Unified Command."

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) partially concurred with the recommendation. The USD(P&R) agreed that the CINC's and Defense Agencies should periodically evaluate their manpower needs. However, the USD(P&R) believes the method used to determine those needs should be the prerogative of the operational commander.

Evaluation of Management Comments

We consider all management comments responsive to the recommendation.

Recommendation 4

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Joint Staff, Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1) develop a comparative analysis capability of Unified Command and Defense Agency missions, priorities, funding, and manpower levels for use in aiding the decision making process for reprioritizing and reallocating limited joint manpower assets.

Management Comments

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially concurred with the recommendation stating,

"It is appropriate for the Joint Staff to advise the Chairman regarding resource allocations for those activities under his cognizance. Work force analysis is a normal requisite for participation in the Department's resource management process, the Defense Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Personnel and Readiness is working with the J-1 staff in more effective participation in the PPBS, the Department's system for resource management."

The Director, Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"The Joint Staff has started to document a requirements validation procedure that identifies the manpower resources associated with programmatic decisions and brings them before a corporate decision making body in coordination with USD(P&R). Until the limitations imposed by current JDAL management restrictions are
resolved, the reprioritizing and reallocating of limited joint manpower assets will be very difficult to implement."

Other Management Comments

Although not specifically tasked to respond to the recommendation, the following organizations provided comments:

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"Requirements should be prioritized but changes to these priorities (due to world events or US policy) and resultant manpower changes must be made quickly. While rapidly providing unprogrammed manpower increases to joint organizations is difficult at best for the Services, unprogrammed decreases in joint manpower could affect mission accomplishment."

The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Environment) concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"The Air Force supports new joint missions that are staffed equitably by all the Services (see comments on Recommendation 5, below). However, in an era of shrinking manpower resources, mission adjustments in the Unified Commands and Defense Agencies must be satisfied from within existing joint resources, just as requirements for growth within the Services must be offset from existing resources. Currently, there is no mechanism for reprioritizing manpower within the joint community. The Air Force endorses development of a prioritization and allocation analysis capability for Unified Command and Defense Agency manpower."

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) concurred with the recommendation without comment. In addition, the Central Imagery Office, the Defense Security Assistance Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency and the Defense Information Systems Agency concurred with the recommendation.

Evaluation of Management Comments

We consider all management comments responsive to the recommendation.
Recommendation 5

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, establish a time phased plan to realign Military Service contributions to joint manpower. The plan should place Military Service "equity" in the context of requirements and ability to meet those requirements, rather than a simplistic, "proportionate share analysis." In that regard, the following elements should be evaluated:

(a) which positions must be filled with Service-unique specialists;

(b) of the remaining positions, what specialty and rank is required;

(c) for each specialty and rank identified, determine the distribution, among the four Services, of personnel who meet those criteria; and

(d) determine if proportionate distribution among the Services of requirements by specialty and rank result in critical shortages of personnel to meet in-Service requirements.

Management Comments

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"We do not agree that a plan to realign Military Service contributions to joint manpower is either necessary or desired. We feel that the distribution of joint personnel should be based on a variety of criteria that are mentioned in this recommendation. However, an enduring, rational realignment is more likely to emerge from changing work force incentives than from externally imposed bureaucratic processes such as those recommended. For example, allowing CINCs and agencies to equitably share occupation and grade shortages would motivate joint operations to adjust their work force mix. These sort of adaptive "market mechanisms" would also alter the civilian-military mix, a critical element not addressed by the recommended process. In addition, the formulaic approach advocated by the IG which bases the manning of joint organizations solely on requirements may not ensure sufficient joint representation in certain unified commands."
The Director, Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"We will continue to coordinate with Services and USD(P&R) on this contentious issue. As part of the requirements determination and validation methodology development process, they will address the allocation of JDAL and other joint billets among the Services. This effort must also include provisions dealing with the distribution of civilian spaces among the Services so that the overall contribution, rather than just the military billet portion, focuses on validated requirements. Implementation of this effort will be included in the CINC and Defense Agency revalidation of manpower requirements using the requirements determination methodology being developed by USD(P&R)."

**Other Management Comments**

Although not specifically tasked to respond to the recommendation, the following organizations provided comments:

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"Concur with Service equity for military positions, but civilian positions should not be included when determining Service equity. Service affiliation for civilians is determined by "Executive Agency" and since five of the eight [sic] nine Unified Commands are located on Air Force installations, the number of Air Force civilians could skew any perceived distribution."

The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Environment) concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"The Air Force has advocated a more equitable distribution of joint manpower for several years. In discussions with the J-1 and the other Services, we made the case that the Air Force's contribution to joint manpower should reflect our 26% portion of all DoD military vice the approximately 44% of joint authorizations currently filled by Air Force people. We recognize, however, that the circumstances leading to the disproportionate contribution included the conversion of Air Force units to joint commands (such as USSTRATCOM and USTRANSCOM) and the creation of Joint Intelligence Centers which were predominantly Air Force. We also recognize there are compelling
reasons not to migrate Air Force authorizations to the Services, primarily the infrastructure costs of accessions and training, and the time needed to grow senior populations needed in the joint community. With these factors in mind, the Air Force receded from our insistence on transfers of authorizations to the other Services. Instead, we believe that a concerted effort to civilianize Defense Agency and Unified Command manpower, combined with a fair distribution of new joint requirements, will bring the Air Force contribution to equitable levels."

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) concurred with the recommendation without comment. In addition, the Central Imagery Office, the Defense Security Assistance Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency and the Defense Information Systems Agency concurred with the recommendation.

**Evaluation of Management Comments**

We consider all management comments responsive to the recommendation. Management concurrence on this recommendation is consistent with the initiatives reported in the USD(P&R) and Joint Staff comments to Recommendations 1, 2 and 4 above. No further action required.
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The processes and mechanisms used to validate and approve manpower requirements for joint and international organizations are inadequate.

OVERVIEW

The mechanisms used to validate manpower requirements are intended to be a separate and distinct set of processes from those used for manpower requirements determination. A validation process is intended to be a check and balance for those decisions made by joint organizations for manpower requirements. However, our analysis of the ad hoc processes observed throughout the 17 joint organizations visited did not reveal two separate and distinct processes. Instead, we found that those two functions were generally part of a single process.

We found three basic problem areas that caused us to conclude that the processes and mechanisms used to validate and approve manpower requirements for joint and international organizations are inadequate. First, we found that the roles and responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness for validating and approving joint manpower requirements are not clearly defined. Second, we discovered that the processes and mechanisms in place to review and validate the Joint Manpower Program requirements at the local or Joint Staff level are not adequately defined as separate and distinct from the requirements determination process. Finally, we concluded that the automated data processing system used for coordinating and validating joint manpower requirements is inefficient and ineffective.

The joint manpower validation process incorporates how the joint organizations, the Military Services, the Joint Staff, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) review and approve manpower resource requirements to best satisfy the needs of the Department of Defense. A manpower authorization is a billet or position approved by a resource manager for filling a personnel assignment. An authorization is based on a requirement, but not all requirements are authorized for personnel assignment. We analyzed how joint organizations reviewed, validated, and approved manpower requirements for final authorization.

We assessed existing joint manpower requirements validation guidance for completeness and clarity. We also assessed joint manpower requirements prioritization and coordination among competing demands. Finally, we
examined the validation processes and mechanisms to ensure that they were established and implemented; were coordinated with the Joint Staff, the USD(P&R) and the Services; were inclusive of total force management; and were monitored by the Services, the Joint Staff, and the USD(P&R).
THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR VALIDATING AND APPROVING JOINT MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT CLEARLY DEFINED

| Unclear Joint Manpower Program Roles and Responsibilities | Not all joint organizations are required to develop and report a Joint Manpower Program to the Joint Staff. Joint organizations such as the Defense Logistics Agency, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the Defense Security Assistance Agency report to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and are not obligated to follow CJCS MOP 75 guidance as it pertains to JMP criteria. According to the CJCS MOP 75, which is the only published joint manpower management policy, "[t]he Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff requires the concurrence of the resource manager before approval of any growth, reduction, or change to joint manpower authorizations." Thus joint organizations subject to CJCS MOP 75 must submit manpower requirements to an outside validation process. However, there is no comparable guidance for joint organizations that coordinate manpower authorizations through the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The CJSC MOP 75 also states that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the "primary military adviser to the Secretary of Defense and serves as the honest broker among the joint organizations, and the intermediary between the joint organizations and the resource managers."

| Military Services Are Primary Manpower Resource Managers | The Military Services, the U.S. Special Operations Command, the Defense Security Assistance Agency, and the General Defense Intelligence Program Manager are resource sponsors for the joint organizations, with the Services as the primary military personnel resource manager. Both the JMP and non-JMP organizations [joint organizations that do not report joint manpower requirements through the Joint Staff] compete for Military Service billets from the same resource pool.

| 78% of the JDAL Billets are in JMP Organizations | Most of the joint organizations (37 out of 66) on the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) do not report through the Joint Staff. However, 78 percent of the JDAL billets are in JMP organizations, which do report to or through the Joint Staff. The organizations reporting through the Joint Staff are:
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Unified Commands
- U.S. Atlantic Command
- U.S. Central Command
- U.S. European Command
- U.S. Pacific Command
- U.S. Southern Command
- U.S. Space Command
- U.S. Strategic Command
- U.S. Transportation Command
- U.S. Special Ops Command

International Activities (U.S. Contributions)
- U.S. Delegation to NATO Military Committee
- Allied Command Europe
- Allied Command Atlantic
- U.S. Element, International Military Staff
- U.S. Contribution to Independent NATO Activities

Miscellaneous Joint Activities
- Defense Courier Service
- Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center
- Inter-American Defense Board
- Joint Doctrine Center
- Joint Electronic Warfare Center
- Joint Force Command
- Joint Planning and Exercise Activity
- Joint Task Force Six
- National Defense University

Joint Manpower Program Defense Agencies
- Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
- Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)
- Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)
- Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)

Combined Activities
- North American Aerospace Defense Command
- United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command

PPBS Drives Authorizations for Non-JMP Organizations

For the non-JMP organizations, manpower authorizations are approved by their respective Office of the Secretary of Defense sponsor as part of the Program Objective Memorandum process that is an essential element of the DoD Planning, Programming and Budget System (PPBS). The requirement for Service concurrence in support of the manpower authorizations is distinctly different for JMP organizations. For a JMP organization, should the Military Services nonconcur with a requirement, the process does not allow any challenge by the joint organization to the nonconcurrence, and the request for authorization is disapproved.

During that POM process, the Joint Staff and the Military Services have no visibility or opportunity for review of non-JMP manpower planning documents. Separate and distinct processes are required for the coordination and approval of military and civilian manpower requirements in four categories. Flow charts for those four categories are illustrated at Appendix B.

Military Services Are Concerned About Inability to Review Non-JMP Requirements

All four of the Military Service Headquarters Staffs we visited raised concerns over the fact that they do not have the opportunity to review or provide adequate input to the budget planning stage of the PPBS cycle, or before the non-JMP Defense Agencies receive the final Program Budget Decisions. Therefore the Services are
forced to live with the impact of those decisions. Receipt of the Program Budget Decision constitutes an approved and funded requirement and takes place with or without Military Service concurrence.
The Components of the Joint Manpower Program Requirements Validation Process

We found that the processes and mechanisms in place to review and validate the Joint Manpower Program requirements of joint and international organizations are not adequate. The Joint Manpower Program consists of three basic parts:

- an organization's mission and functions;
- a Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) that shows current and future manpower authorizations; and
- a Joint Table of Mobilization Distribution (JTMD) that shows mobilization [wartime] requirements.

The difference between a JTD and a JTMD is that the JTD shows authorizations (funded requirements) only, and a JTMD shows both funded and unfunded requirements. Because a JTD has no grade levels identified for civilian positions listed, oversight and validation efforts by the Joint Staff and the USD(P&R) are difficult. There is no requirement for non-JMP organizations to have either a JTD or a JTMD. As a result, we found the manning document format and the systems maintained by them varied with each non-JMP organization.

No Documented Evidence of Joint Manpower Validation

With the exception of the Defense Information Systems Agency, the U.S. Strategic Command, and the U.S. Special Operations Command, we found no documented mechanism to ensure that joint manpower validation occurred within the 17 joint organizations that we visited. Of those 17 joint organizations, only three had any written results of a recent validation effort. All three organizations conducted manpower validations in a unique and independent way as illustrated below.

- The Defense Information Systems Agency used manpower surveys and efficiency reviews to determine the most efficient organization for each work center. A most efficient organization defines the function or workload of a work center and states the minimum required manpower to accomplish that workload. The Joint Staff is the intermediary for the DISA Joint Manpower Program document. The DISA sends its out-of-cycle Manpower Requirements Change Packages (MRCPs) directly to the Military Services for review and coordination. From October 1993 to August 1994 the DISA submitted approximately 114...
The manpower requirements of the U.S. Special Operations Command are driven by the demands of the theater Special Operations Commands. The U.S. Special Operations Command uses three standing review boards and an executive review board chaired by the DCINC for validating those decisions. Manpower requirements validation decisions are reviewed for final approval by the DCINC in his role as the chairman of the executive review board.

The U.S. Strategic Command uses a three-step process consisting of a function review done internally by the Command's organizational element followed by an internal formalized manpower validation board review. The command then conducts a process oriented manpower measurement based on the need for further analysis. That process measures the amount of manpower required to perform various missions or tasks and results in Command level validation of manpower.

According to the CJCS MOP 75, manpower requirements are to be consistent with the Unified Command Plan, the National Military Strategy Document and any Secretary of Defense special review programs. Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not a resource manager responsible for any portion of the Future Years Defense Plan, the Chairman does "recommend to the Secretary of Defense military strategy that serves as the framework for prioritizing joint manpower requirements." For the Commanders-In-Chief of the unified commands, the primary means of conveying programming concerns to the Chairman is through the Integrated Priority List. However, the Joint Staff does not allow the Integrated Priority List to be used as a substitute means to identify new or additional manpower requirements. We believe that the Integrated Priority List could be an effective vehicle for identifying new requirements in view of the fact that there are no other mechanisms to do so.

We also found the rationale for having civilians at the Unified Commands is inconsistent and varies with every joint organization. The following examples best illustrate those inconsistencies:

- The original concept of operations at the U.S. Central Command was to suspend operations in an emergency situation and deploy the entire
Headquarters. Because civilians are not generally deployable, the Command established very few civilian requirements in the headquarters. Less than 8 percent of the positions at the U.S. Central Command Headquarters are civilian. However, lessons learned from Desert Shield/Storm indicated that it was not practical to deploy the entire headquarters. The assumption that formed the basis for the civilian-military mix at the U.S. Central Command has proven to be invalid, but there has been no significant reexamination of that mix.

- Two Unified Commands have budget controls that are significantly different from the other Unified Commands. The U.S. Transportation Command operates as a Defense Business Operations Fund activity, using a revolving fund to manage charges to "customers" and the cost of serving those "customers." The U.S. Special Operations Command operates with resource management and funding authority under Major Force Program 11, essentially managing funds available for special operations forces. In the past, both Commands bought civilian manpower when military resources were not available. However, current civilian end-strength ceilings force manpower caps regardless of funds available to the Commands. Both Commands have civilian position levels that exceed 35 percent because of that previous management philosophy. That policy does not reflect a validated civilian-military mix based on deployability, technical skill requirements or mission workloads. Instead, it reflects the funding flexibility afforded to those Commands.

The eight Unified Commands we visited had civilian position levels that ranged from 8 to 39 percent of their total manpower authorizations. At the six Defense Agencies we visited, civilian position levels ranged from a low of 66 percent (Defense Information Systems Agency) to a high of 97.5 percent (Defense Logistics Agency). Only one of the 17 joint organizations we visited had a set civilian to military ratio. The Defense Logistic Agency attempts to maintain a 2 percent military position level. The Defense Logistics Agency reported that it had compiled military and civilian position level information from other Defense Agencies that showed the military position level averages 7 percent.

Policies that govern civilian personnel management at the Unified Commands are dependent on which Military Service acts as the servicing civilian personnel office. The Unified Command end strengths are managed by the
executive agent for the Unified Command. That recently caused problems for the U.S. Transportation Command and the U.S. Special Operations Command when the Air Force levied unilateral cuts on its high grades (GS-14, 15, and SES positions). The Air Force reduced the civilian high grade authorizations across all Air Force activities and included the U.S. Transportation Command and the U.S. Special Operations Command in the reduction. The Air Force denied the petitions from both commands for relief from reduction. Both commands then appealed to the DoD for relief from those reductions and successfully had the Air Force decision overturned.

The U.S. Atlantic Command, the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Special Operations Command, and the U.S. Pacific Command all use multiple Service civilian personnel offices and regulations. The Joint Staff has no oversight of civilian positions at JMP organizations. The JMP does not reflect civilian grades and skills. The host Military Service executive agent provides the management and oversight for the assigned civilian personnel. The Joint Staff defers all oversight responsibilities for civilian positions and personnel to the respective host Military Service civilian personnel office. As a result, the Joint Staff has no authority or visibility over the civilian manpower validation processes in the JMP or non-JMP organizations to monitor a joint organization's size, responsibilities and level of military-civilian mix.
ANALYSIS OF THE JOINT MANPOWER AUTOMATION SYSTEM

The Joint Manpower Automation System (JMAS) is an automated information system used to produce Joint Manpower Program documents for joint organizations required to report to or through the Joint Staff for validation of manpower resources. We found the automated data processing system used for coordinating and validating joint manpower requirements to be inefficient and ineffective because it is not responsive to all joint organizations or the Military Services.

The JMAS is the means by which the unified commands submit changes to their JMP to the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff then submits the JMP changes to the Military Services for coordination and approval. One benefit of the JMAS is that it standardizes the method and codes used by each unified command when submitting Manpower Requirements Change Packages (MRCP) to the Joint Staff. It also ensures the Joint Staff, Military Services and unified commands are working from the same data base. However, one problem we found is that response time from the Joint Staff for MRCPs is historically 6 to 18 months.

The JMAS does not effectively streamline the joint manpower validation and approval process because the Military Services and the Defense Agencies do not currently have on-line access to the automated system. Thus, the validation process relies on manual efforts from the point the Joint Staff gets the MRCP from the unified commands. Delays resulting from a manual process are often a year or more, causing the joint organizations to experience assignment gaps of several months. We believe the problem could be avoided by a more efficient automated system that provides connectivity between the Services, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Joint Staff.

The Joint Staff is unable to make changes to the MRCP that the unified commands submit through the JMAS, even if there is a minor error, because of the design limitations of the system. Normally, the Joint Staff will not return the package for minor errors without coordinating with the Services first. Once the Joint Staff obtains Service concurrence, the Joint Staff will note that the package is approved pending receipt of a revised MRCP that reflects the corrected errors. However, the Military Services are normally reluctant to respond to filling those authorizations until corrections are made and
final manual documentation is updated on the approved JDAL.

As a result of the reduced connectivity between the Joint Staff, the joint organizations and the Services, we found that the U.S. Special Operations Command, the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Central Command were forced to maintain two sets of books -- the JMAS data base and an internal automated data base. The U.S. Strategic Command developed its own personnel data system that integrates the central Air Force personnel data base and the JMAS.

**The Joint Staff Contracted the SETA Corporation to Study JMAS**

The Joint Staff contracted with the SETA Corporation to conduct a systems analysis and provide recommendations to correct the JMAS problems. The SETA Corporation completed the study in July 1994. Using recommendations from the study, the Joint Staff was planning to completely reengineer the JMAS and hoped to have the Military Services on-line by the end of summer 1996. However, at the time of our inspection, the lack of on-line capability and system responsiveness adversely impacted the efficiency of the validation and approval process.

**Out-Year Versus Execution-Year Joint Manpower Program Changes**

Officials at all four of the Military Service Headquarters complained that the Unified Commands manage only to execution-year requirements and do not consider the out-year requirements. That process makes it difficult for the Services to manage, prioritize and program personnel for future assignment to joint organizations.

The Joint Staff’s data base requires execution-year changes for tracking and managing joint manpower. While the Joint Staff was transitioning from the Joint Manpower Data System to the JMAS, it did not accept JMP changes for about 6 months. The U.S. Pacific Command best illustrated the impact of that action when they withheld all changes and realignment actions during the transition period. When the JMAS finally came on-line, the Joint Staff had to construct an audit trail of all the U.S. Pacific Command realignments and changes that occurred during the period. The U.S. Pacific Command then submitted those changes to be effective for fiscal year 1994. The Military Services reported they were experiencing difficulty making 1994 personnel fills based on those changes because, at that time, they were already making fiscal year 1995 personnel assignments. The Services would prefer to make out-year resourcing decisions in the execution year because their personnel distribution and assignment decisions are normally made 6 months to a year in advance.
CONCLUSION

As previously highlighted above, the roles and responsibilities of the USD(P&R), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Military Services need clearer definition in comprehensive DoD-wide guidance covering manpower requirements validation processes that addresses:

- prioritizing competing needs for resources,
- management and oversight of resource utilization to ensure consistency, and
- quantitative criteria.

A credible requirements determination, validation and documentation program is essential to identify and justify manpower required to accomplish a mission. Various manpower requirements documentation processes and a wide variety of analytical techniques may be used to document manpower resources and assess manpower requirements and changes to workload or mission. The USD(P&R), the Joint Staff and the Military Services have not developed manpower standards for joint organizations to measure those changes.

The current JMAS design limitations, and the fact that the Military Services and the joint organizations are not on-line with the system, results in costly and inefficient manual processing of manpower change requests. That inefficiency also causes an adverse impact on joint organizations that rely on timely manpower requisitioning response from the Services. Reengineering of the system requires the attention and highest priority of the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Their efforts should streamline the timeliness of manpower change validation and documentation, and Military Service responsiveness to supported joint organizations with a design that encourages out-year changes.

Recommendation 6 [Revised]

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness ensure that the DoD Directive on Joint Manpower Management contains joint manpower validation guidance that would:

(a) Ensure consistency in approving manpower authorizations to joint organizations;

(b) Establish effective and consistent joint manpower validation criteria for both military and civilian positions; and
(c) Effectively prioritize competing demands for joint manpower by joint organizations.

In our draft report we recommended that:

"The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness ensure that the DoD Directive on Joint Officer Management contains joint manpower validation guidance that would: (a) Ensure consistency in approving manpower authorizations to joint organizations; (b) Establish effective and consistent joint manpower validation criteria for both military and civilian positions; and (c) Effectively prioritize competing demands for joint manpower by joint organizations."

This recommendation has been modified to be consistent with Recommendation 1 that calls for the publication of a DoD Directive on Joint Manpower Management.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"This issue and recommendation erroneously assumes a two stage process where manpower requirements can ultimately be "validated" against predetermined criteria. This construction of "requirements" is misleading as it implies a definite result without alternate solutions. The actual process is much more dynamic and ambiguous. Even rigorously engineered work force estimates assume an unspecified level of quality and efficiency--both factors obviously vary. Supervisors and managers at successive organizational levels scrutinize work force estimates and adjust methods and standards which alter the original "requirement." With such a system, uniform "validation guidance" is not appropriate; however, the Chairman and the USD(P&R) should work together to provide some standardization of process as discussed in Recommendation 1."

Although not specifically tasked to respond to the recommendation, the following organizations provided comments:

The Director, Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"The Joint Staff is working with USD(P&R), the Unified Commands, and the Services to document
a requirements validation procedure that identifies the manpower resources associated with programmatic decisions for both military and civilian positions. One of the ongoing challenges associated with this effort are the limitations imposed by JDAL management restrictions. Until these JDAL issues are resolved effective and consistent joint manpower validation criteria will be difficult to implement."

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"USTRANSCOM follows basic DoD manpower guidance which directs civilian resources be utilized whenever possible. Military manpower is used only when deemed absolutely essential. The DoD IG raises the concern that USTRANSCOM, because of its operations at Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) activity, bases its military and civilian mix on funding flexibility vice deployability, technical skill requirements, or mission workloads. Civilian resources comprise over 35% of our total strength which is an appropriate mix since USTRANSCOM Headquarters as a whole is not a deployable command. Also, USTRANSCOM has unique management responsibilities that other CINCs do not, such as financial management over component resources, Joint System development, etc. Some of these functions are more appropriately staffed with civilians. DoD IG discussion continues to state this command has "bought civilian manpower when military resources were not available." This is a false statement. The primary increase in civilian billets to USTRANSCOM since the inception of DBOF-T was to support our Joint Transportation Corporate Information Management Center. Approved requirements to support this function were determined to be 20 military and 28 civilian billets. Military essentiality was primarily due to technical skill and operational knowledge requirements. We were successful in attaining 28 civilian billets through our budget process. Three of the military billets were resourced from within existing manpower and the remainder requested through the Service POM processes. We were not successful in attaining this manpower through the Services; however, we continue to research avenues for sourcing. At no time were civilian billets bought to meet these military requirements."
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command concurred with the recommendation but stated that "...the recommendations only address validation. A recommendation is needed to address what happens after validation. A validated but unfunded manpower billet is useless. After validation, there should be a standardized process to get the adjustments programmed and funded. We believe these procedures should be included in the USD (P&R) directive."

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) concurred with the recommendation without comment. In addition, the Central Imagery Office, the Defense Security Assistance Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency and the Defense Information Systems Agency concurred with the recommendation without comment.

Evaluation of Management Comments

We consider all management comments responsive to the recommendation. However, based on those comments we believe there is a need for more definitive policy guidance on the manpower requirements determination process for all positions—not just officer billets. Therefore, we have revised our recommendation to reflect validation guidance for all joint positions not just officer billets.

Recommendation 7

The Joint Staff, Manpower and Personnel Directorate, (J-1), and Military Service personnel centers work together and set milestones for upgrading the capabilities of the Joint Manpower Automation System to bring all the Military Services on-line prior to publication of the next Joint Duty Assignment List. The Joint Staff could then update the approved Joint Duty Assignment List, providing the Military Services access for verification and enhancing assignment accommodation [fill] for the unified commands and other joint organizations.

Management Comments

The Director, Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"The Joint Staff contracted for a reengineering of the Joint Manpower Automation System in August 1994. The new version will be on-line in the fall of 1995, incorporating 260 enhancements to the original JMNAS data system. Efforts to continue to bring this system on line with services to allow access to an updated JDAL. Other joint staff automation initiatives may provide this capability by the end of 1995."
The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"Again the problem lies in the Joint Activities' desire for immediate resourcing; in operating in the 'year of execution,' and not in the lack of automation. If the Activities budget and program their manpower changes, the systems would have time to reconcile. While we agree that bringing the Services on-line in the JMAS/JDAL automated process would be beneficial, the Army's concerns, as stated in above, must be adequately addressed prior to connectivity."

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) concurred with the recommendation to increase access to and enhance the capabilities of the Joint Manpower Automation System. He commented that the time line suggested appears unrealistic in view of the hardware, software, training and policy guidance that will be required to bring the desired capabilities on-line.

The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Environment) commented:

"The recommendation is based on the finding that the lack of on-line capability at the Services is costly and inefficient manual processing of manpower change requests. While we agree that having JMAS capability would be beneficial, time savings would only be a matter of a few days at best. Delays in processing changes to Air Force authorizations are driven by the need to coordinate with the applicable functional OPRs, and in waiting for full agreement from all Services, not on the lack of automation. Once a coordinated position is reached, the actual processing of the changes in the Air Force manpower and personnel systems is usually accomplished within 30 to 60 days."

We consider all management comments responsive to the recommendation.
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The Military Services are not able to fully satisfy the manpower requirements for joint organizations.

OVERVIEW

The initial steps to determine and validate the need for manpower positions are of little value if qualified personnel cannot be assigned to the appropriate positions when required. Requisitioning personnel against outdated or improperly classified positions results in wasted valuable resources. The manpower and personnel assignment aspects of the Joint Manpower Program are intertwined, and we found recurring instances where one process adversely impacted the other.

Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 as codified in Chapter 38, entitled "Joint Officer Management," of Title 10 USC, Sections 661 through 668, requires the Secretary of Defense to define, by regulation, the term "Joint Duty Assignment." The Act limits the definition to assignments in which the officer gains significant experience in joint matters. The Act also specifically excludes assignments for joint training or joint education, and assignments within an officer's own Military Department. The Act further defines "joint matters" as those matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea and air forces, including matters relating to

1. national military strategy;
2. strategic planning and contingency planning; and
3. command and control of combat operations under unified command.

The Joint Duty Assignment List

As mandated by statute, the Secretary of Defense publishes the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) designating all active-duty positions meeting the Secretary's definition of a "Joint Duty Assignment." Thus, the term "Joint Duty Assignment" applies only to officer billets designated on the JDAL. A JDA is currently defined by the Secretary of Defense as:

An assignment to a designated position in a multi-Service or multinational command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three Military Departments. Such involvement includes, but is not limited to, matters relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine and policy, strategic planning, contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under a unified command.
Joint Duty Assignments to 100 Percent Versus 50 Percent Joint Organizations

The Secretary of Defense designated the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the unified/combined commands as organizations involved in planning and directing the integrated employment of joint forces. Those organizations are referred to as "100 percent" joint organizations because all Major/Lieutenant Commander [04] and above billets are included in the JDAL. All but one of the Defense Agencies are considered "support" organizations. No more than one-half of the authorized Major/Lieutenant Commander and above billets are included in the JDAL, and the agencies are referred to as "50 percent" joint organizations.

Decision for 50 Percent JDAL Representation

The decision to limit support organizations to no more than 50 percent representation on the JDAL is discussed in several documents. The earliest, a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) memorandum issued April 14, 1987, indicates that the Joint Staff, the Military Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense staffs reviewed various options for the size of the JDAL. The result of those reviews determined that a low-end option of less than 6,000 would not provide an adequate resource pool of officers from which to later select General or Flag Officers, and a high-end option of more than 11,000 would drain high quality officers from key in-Service operational requirements and ultimately impact on readiness. The Services, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the participating joint organizations agreed to a mid-sized option of approximately 9,000 Joint Duty Assignments as meeting the intent of Congress. The participants of the review also agreed that the 9,000 JDAs provides a reasonable allocation of JDAs to all out-of-Service organizations.

That rationale is echoed in a February 25, 1988 memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) [now the USD(P&R)] to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, which states, "The main reason for that limit was to hold the JOA list to a number (now approximately 8500 billets) that we could reasonably aspire to sustain in the steady state."

In his April 14, 1987 memorandum, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also indicated a concern over the dual status created in "50 percent" organizations. He cited that as a major concern raised by the Defense Agencies. The Deputy Director of the Defense Logistics Agency described that concern in a December 22, 1986 memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel). In that memorandum he states, "... we firmly believe that officers assigned to the Defense Logistics Agency are major players in the joint arena, especially since our business directly supports both the Military Services and the CINCs..."
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worldwide. Up to this time our officers have been treated as performing joint duty. From an individual's career perspective, if an officer is not assigned within his parent Service and is not filling a joint billet within a joint activity, what is he?'

The allocation of joint duty assignment billets is based on the general nature of the organization's mission rather than the duties performed and skills required for each billet. That approach may be administratively convenient, but it has an impact on the officers and the organizations affected. Officers must complete a Joint Duty Assignment to be eligible for promotion to flag rank. They must also satisfy their Service career path expectations, including a combination of command, staff and school assignments. If they are assigned out of Service to a joint organization, but do not receive joint credit, they must complete another out of Service, joint assignment.

Organizations have a problem identifying which billets will be designated Joint Duty Assignments and which will not. The Joint Electronic Warfare Center has officers who perform the same basic functions on different teams. Only 50 percent of those officers receive Joint Duty Assignment credit. The USD(P&R) and the Joint Staff have not provided guidance on how to allocate Joint Duty Assignment credit within "50 percent" organizations. The six Defense Agencies we visited described the process as "arbitrary," "no formal process," and "an equal distribution."

Sharing the Defense Agencies' concerns about the organizational basis of the JDAL, Congress directed a study (in Section 932 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993) to assess the appropriateness of the current allocation of "Joint Duty Assignments" and "Critical Joint Duty Assignments" with particular emphasis on the allocations to joint duty positions to each Defense Agency. On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness issued an interim JDAL study report in April 1994. That interim report presented the results of a pilot survey involving 2,000 positions, both JDAL and non-JDAL, which indicated that not all JDAL positions provide significant joint experience, while some non-JDAL positions do meet the requirement. The results of a larger survey of more than 15,000 positions will be included in the final JDAL study report. The findings of the study and its subsequent use by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff is expected to result in a revamping of the JDAL and DoD JDA policy.
The allocation of Joint Duty Assignment List billets among the joint organizations is used as the baseline for the assignment of officers to those billets. We used four criteria to assess the effectiveness of the current assignment process.

- the adequacy of coordination in transacting joint manpower assignments;
- the achievement of joint duty tour length requirements;
- the impact on Military Service infrastructures resulting from assignment priority given to manning joint billets; and,
- the adequacy of plans to ensure that all critical joint duty billets are filled by Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs).

We found that the joint assignments process is inadequate for specific categories of personnel, that tour length requirements are improperly calculated with regard to time spent in joint education, and that the Military Services claim priority staffing of joint positions adversely impacts Military Service infrastructure.
THE PROCESS FOR COORDINATING JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS IS INADEQUATE

**Four Conditions for Assessing Joint Assignment Coordination**

To assess coordination of Joint Duty Assignments, we interviewed manpower and personnel officials at eight unified commands and nine other joint organizations to determine if the following four conditions exist:

- A published and disseminated directive outlining guidelines for the Joint Duty Assignments process is used effectively,
- Joint duty positions are filled in a timely manner with appropriately qualified officers,
- "Service rotational" billets are appropriately filled without assignment gaps, and
- The joint assignment coordination process provides for timely resolution of conflicts.

**Inadequate Joint Duty Assignments Guidance**

Section 661 of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 requires the Secretary of Defense to "... establish policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of officers" of the Armed Services on the active duty list who are particularly trained in and oriented toward joint matters. The Office of the Secretary of Defense response to that charter is very limited regarding the process for officer selection and assignment to JDAL billets.

At the time of our inspection, we found that a series of eight Department of Defense implementing memoranda provide some definitions left to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. Those memoranda do not address the requisitioning and assignment process between the joint organizations and the Military Services, but repeat statutory requirements such as the necessity to assign Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs) to critical joint billets or JDAs following joint education. The Department of Defense will consolidate those interim policy memoranda with the publication of the draft DoD Directive 1300.19 "Joint Officer Management Program" and the corollary DoD Instruction 1300.20 "Joint Officer Management Program."

1320.5, July 26, 1978, "Assignment to Joint Tours of Duty," addresses assignments in the joint arena only in that it requires officers to serve a joint duty tour as a field grade officer before consideration for promotion to Brigadier General or Admiral (Lower Half) unless provided a waiver or exemption. That directive also tasked the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics) with oversight responsibility. The functions of that office have since become a part of the USD(P&R).

The USD(P&R) staff officials we interviewed acknowledged that DoD Directive 1320.5, July 26, 1978, "Assignment to Joint Tours of Duty," is obsolete, and stated they are pursuing cancellation of the Directive even prior to publication of a subsequent directive. While other DoD directives address assignments within certain organizations that possess JDAL billets (e.g., DoD Directive 1000.17, "Detail of DoD Personnel to Duty Outside the DoD," July 28, 1988; DoD Directive 2055.3, "Manning of Security Assistance Organizations and the Selection and Training of Security Assistance Personnel," March 11, 1985; and the DoDD 5158.1, "Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Relationships with the Office of the Secretary of Defense," May 1, 1985), none address the aspects of the requisitioning process associated with JDAs. Our inspection analysis revealed that the selection and assignment of qualified officers plays an integral part in effective joint officer management and deserves appropriate attention in DoD-wide policy. At a minimum, DoD policy should spell out general guidelines and responsibilities affecting JDAs and ensure implementation of the statutory requirements effecting joint officer management as set forth in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

During our inspection, we found no published DoD-wide guidance or policy outlining the guidelines for the JDA process. Despite a lack of DoD guidance specific to JDAs, 17 of the joint organizations we visited reported general satisfaction with support being provided by the Military Services regarding the requisitioning and assigning of quality officers in a timely manner. However, officials interviewed at those organizations cited categorical exceptions. The Military Services often permit vacancies to arise on positions (also referred to as assignment gaps) involving low density or shortage skills, "critical" JDAL billets, and billets entangled in manpower document change submissions.
The Joint Staff also issued various guidance documents pertaining to joint manpower and personnel actions. The Joint Staff published the JCS Administrative Publication 1.2, "Joint Officer Management," in June 1989. That document is designed as a reference to the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and does not establish policy. The document is self-described as "an administrative compendium of established policies and procedures pertaining to joint officer management," and references the eight Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandums previously discussed. Cancellation of that publication will occur with the issuance of DoD Directive 1300.19 and DoD Instruction 1300.20.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) also issued joint policy memoranda. The CJCS MOP 75, April 2, 1993, "Manpower for Joint and International Activities," provides general policy and issues broad responsibilities to applicable organizations, but primarily addresses manpower rather than personnel actions. The CJCS MOP 75 requires the Military Departments to coordinate personnel actions with commanders or directors of joint organizations and to give priority staffing to approved joint authorizations within a single budget-year. Likewise, it requires that commanders of joint organizations also coordinate with the Military Services on personnel actions resulting from validated and approved manpower authorizations. The Chairman is more specific regarding General and Flag Officer assignments in the CJCS MOP 55, and for assignment of officers (Colonel or Navy Captain and below) to the Joint Staff in the CJCS Instruction 1330.01. The Joint Staff addresses enlisted personnel assignments in the CJCS MOP 47.

The USD(P&R) has not issued policy governing the process for assigning officers to Joint Duty Assignments. The CJCS MOP 75 contains general statements about according priority to filling approved JDA billets, but does not address the mechanism for accomplishing the assignment. The only procedural guidance we found was for assignment to Flag and General Officer positions and to the Joint Staff. Thus, for the vast majority of assignment actions, joint organizations and the Military Services rely on the mechanisms used by each Service for assignments within the Service.

While the use of established Service personnel processes offers substantial advantages, we noted at least one area where a joint assignment mechanism is needed. Officer assignments to joint organizations are, in many ways, little different from assignments within the parent Service. Skill requirements, quality controls, and managing overseas tours are common to all assignment...
actions. However, the fact that some assignments qualify as "joint duty" and others do not means that some mechanism must exist to ensure that the correct officers receive joint duty credit. We found officers assigned in 50 percent joint organizations who were requisitioned against a JDAL billet, but were not working in a JDAL billet.

There are several problems that arise when an officer is assigned by his or her Service to a JDAL billet, but does not actually fill such a billet. For the officers affected, there is some confusion about who gets credit for the joint tour. The Service gives that credit to the officer assigned by the Service to the JDAL billet. As we will discuss in a later section of this report, the Services must account for the length of time officers serve in JDAL billets, must achieve certain promotion goals for officers serving in or who have served in JDAL billets and may only award joint duty credit to officers who meet the minimum tour lengths. Notwithstanding those statutory obligations, the Services have no mechanisms they can rely on to ensure that officers are not assigned out of a JDA to a non-JDA position within a 50 percent joint organization.

When an incumbent officer departs before his or her replacement reports for duty, the position is described as "gapped." Gaps are not desirable, but are sometimes unavoidable. They can occur because the officer retires unexpectedly, or because there is a shortage of officers who are qualified for the position. Personnel officials at all 17 joint organizations acknowledged the need to anticipate vacancies 9 to 13 months in advance (and even longer when there is a language training requirement). However, we found two factors that are unique to joint assignments and that could be better managed to reduce assignment gaps. Both factors have already been discussed in this report, but their impact on the assignment process should be highlighted.

We noted in our discussion of the requirements determination and validation processes that the information systems used to manage the JDAL are not responsive. The Military Services do not have access to the Joint Manpower Automation System and manual interface with that system is cumbersome. Tentative approval of a change to the JDAL can take 6 to 9 months to show up in the Joint Manpower Automation System and ultimately the JDAL. The net effect of that and other information processing delays is that the Service may not start action to fill a new or modified JDA for months, and assignment gaps result. Improvements in information systems would reduce those gaps.
PART II - ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Issue 3

Inefficiencies In Management of Critical Joint Duty Positions Also Create Assignment Gaps

We have also noted that the Goldwater-Nichols Act requires that 1000 positions on the JDAL be designated "critical," and that those positions may be filled only by Joint Specialty Officers or non-JSOs with a Secretary of Defense waiver. The distribution of those 1000 positions on a "fair share" basis, both among and within joint organizations, and the lack of oversight for critical billet designation, has resulted in instability in critical billet management. We previously described the practice of shifting critical billets within joint organizations to permit the assignment of officers who do not qualify as JOSOs. If the Services are not given sufficient time to identify officers who can meet the fluctuating demands for critical positions, assignment gaps are inevitable. Those gaps are compounded when the critical billet demands skills that are in short supply from the Services.

Additional Assignments Guidance Required

There are personnel actions and aspects of the assignment process outside of requisitioning procedures that are exclusive to JDAs, although not addressed in Military Service procedures. Those areas require guidance from above the Service level to preclude unnecessary conflict with the assignments process. Some examples of areas in need of additional guidance are:

- attendance at Phase II, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and JPME exempt billets;
- early release of Critical Occupational Specialty officers;
- tour length requirements to include early release with constructive credit;
- procedures for awarding cumulative joint duty credit for consecutive joint duty tours;
- Temporary Duty Status incurred during the performance of a joint tour and;
- Joint Specialty Officers in critical joint positions.

For guidance on actions specific to JDAs, each of the Unified Commands indicated reliance primarily on the limited guidance found in the CJCS MOP 75, the JCS Administrative Publication 1.2, and local reference to the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986. While the majority of the Defense Agencies coordinate personnel actions directly with the Services, the Washington Headquarters Services coordinates the personnel actions for two of the six Defense Agencies we visited. The Washington Headquarters Services personnel staff also rely on the JCS Administrative
Publication 1.2 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act for questions specific to JDAL billets. The Washington Headquarters Services is not bound by Joint Staff policy as disseminated in the CJCS MOP 75.

Manpower and personnel assignment procedures and systems in use by the Military Services are slow to respond to changes submitted by joint organizations. That is, after notification of approval on a MRCP submission, joint organizations experience additional delays while waiting on the Service's internal manpower documents to be updated. The Unified Commands expressed various degrees of success in working informally with the Service personnel centers to process assignments involved in change submissions, but indicated that the Military Services are taking an increasingly harder stance until their manpower documents reflect an approved and funded billet before they initiate assignment actions. As a result, six of the eight Unified Commands we visited reported assignment gaps due to delayed manpower procedures. The U.S. Central Command reported the most severe case of billet gapping we observed with a Marine Corps billet gap of 24 months. That action occurred while waiting on the Marine Corps to reflect an updated JMP document. Again, that type of delay is exacerbated by the lack of Service capability to access the JMAS.

The officials we interviewed at each of the four Military Service personnel centers agreed that the lack of on-line JMAS capability delays the assignment process. The officials we interviewed at the Bureau of Naval Personnel specifically cited the current manual process as causing "significant delays" between JMP submissions to JDAL approval, and increases the level of frustration between the Navy and the JMP organizations. The Navy is considering internal funding for the procurement of JMAS to alleviate the delays caused by insufficient automation.

The disparity in the assignment accommodation rate and quality of officers assigned to JDAL versus non-JDAL billets in the "50 percent" organizations encourages those organizations to circumvent the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Act intended joint duty credit for officers in positions providing significant experience in joint matters. Recognizing the priority given to filling JDAL billets with quality officers over non-JDAL billets, three of the four "50 percent" organizations visited indicated they maximize the number of JDAL billets allowed to take advantage of the assignment accommodation rate, without regard to the level of joint experience provided. For example, officials interviewed at the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization stated that
when directed to convert 12 military positions to civilian positions in fiscal year 1992, they intentionally converted only non-JDAL billets that were not receiving high priority from the Services for support and were vacant at that time.
MANAGEMENT OF JOINT TOUR LENGTH REQUIREMENTS IS INADEQUATE, BUT BASED IN PART ON AN INCORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW

During our visits to 17 joint organizations, we found that adequate processes and mechanisms are in place to ensure that Joint Duty Assignments are meeting tour length requirements, as those requirements are understood by the USD(P&R) and the Military Services. We reviewed the statutory requirements set forth for JDA tour lengths, the methods used by the Military Services to calculate joint tour length and the processes used to credit officers with JDA completion. We assessed the adequacy of the processes and mechanisms to ensure that JDAs are meeting tour length requirements by seeking evidence that the Military Services consistently determine joint tour length based on guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff that ensures compliance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act. We found that the Services consistently determine and report joint tour length. However, time spent by officers attending Joint Professional Military Education Phase II at the Armed Forces Staff College while in "temporary duty and return" status is based on an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law.

In accordance with the provisions of Title 10 United States Code 664, as amended in 1988 by Public Law 100-456 Section 514(1), the length of a JDA for General and Flag Officers shall not be less than two years, and for other officers shall not be less than 3 years. The Secretary of Defense has the authority to waive tour lengths in the case of any officer.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act also provides for certain exceptions and exclusions from tour lengths without the requirement for a waiver from the Secretary of Defense. Officers who possess military occupational specialties that are designated by the Secretary of Defense as critical occupational specialties, who are in initial JDAs, and who are JSO nominees may be released from their joint assignment after completing 2 years. A 60 day early drop is normally allowed under a provision called constructive credit, thereby making that initial assignment only 22 months. Excluded from tour length standards are JDA tours not completed due to retirement, release from active duty, suspension from duty for cause, or a qualifying reassignment.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act defines three categories of "qualifying reassignments." One category covers unusual
personal reasons (including extreme hardship and medical conditions) beyond the control of the officer or Service. Assignments to another JDA for officers promoted beyond the grade of any available billet within an organization are also qualifying reassignments, as are reassignments to another JDA when a reorganization results in elimination of the position to which the officer was originally assigned. Exclusions from tour length requirements are also provided in the Goldwater-Nichols Act for overseas (outside the United States or in Alaska and Hawaii), assignments prescribed at less than the mandated joint tour length and for assignments that bring an officer’s cumulative service up to the mandated joint tour length.

The DoD Directive 1315.7, "Military Personnel Assignments (FM&P)," January 9, 1987 prescribes tour lengths for overseas locations for all service members. Exceptions are for Defense Attaches, based on Congressional guidance in the House of Representatives Report No. 99-81 and the Senate Report No. 99-176. That Congressional guidance directs that tour lengths for overseas assignments shall be 36 months for accompanied officers and 24 months for unaccompanied officers unless the Military Departments provide evidence that specific tours should be shorter. To qualify as a full tour of duty and receive credit for completion of an overseas JDA, the Goldwater-Nichols Act requires that the officer must serve the normal accompanied tour length and that it be no less than 2 years. The published JDAL documents the accompanied tour length, unless only an unaccompanied tour is available, for each billet. Officers completing the unaccompanied tour length receive only cumulative credit to build toward a full tour of joint duty unless provided a Secretary of Defense waiver for full credit.

Cumulative Joint Duty Credit

An officer serving in a subsequent JDA that extends cumulative credit up to the mandated tour length (2 years for General or Flag Officers and 3 years for all other officers), may depart the subsequent JDA prior to completing a full tour provided:

- that one of the tours used in calculating the officer’s cumulative credit was performed overseas, or

- the officer terminated the joint tour due to a qualifying reassignment.

No other assignment may be counted toward cumulative credit unless the officer served at least 2 years in the assignment. Also, no assignment may be used to calculate cumulative credit in which an officer
served less than 10 months. The Goldwater-Nichols Act allows the Secretary of Defense to accord constructive credit in the case of an officer, except a General or Flag Officer, reassigned for reasons of military necessity within 60 days of completing:

- the mandated joint tour length (not less than 2 years),
- an initial Critical Occupational Specialty tour as described above,
- an overseas tour, or
- the final cumulative credit tour.

**Average Joint Duty Tour Length Is Regulated**

The Goldwater-Nichols Act also requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the average tour length of JDAs ending during any fiscal year after 1990 is 2 years for General Flag Officers and 3 years for all others. Those assignments excluded from the mandated tour lengths are also excluded in calculating the tour length average prescribed by statute, but no more than one-half of the maximum allowed Critical Occupational Specialty officer initial assignments on the JDAL may be excluded (12 1/2 percent of the JDAL). Additionally, the statute stipulates that constructive credit accorded by the Secretary of Defense shall not be included in the calculation of the joint tour length average.

Although the joint tour length average required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act is a DoD-wide average, the Deputy Secretary of Defense imposed the same tour length average reporting requirements on each of the Military Services. Averages for each Service and the DoD average are reported in the Secretary of Defense annual report to Congress. The requirements of the annual report to Congress are specified in Title 10 USC 667. The Secretary of Defense is to include the average length of tours of duty in JDAs ending during the year for General or Flag Officers and all other officers, shown separately for assignments to the Joint Staff and other JDAs.

**Calculation of Joint Tour Length**

The average tour length for JDAs reported to Congress is calculated within the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS). The JDAMIS is an automated management information system database maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center and managed by the Joint Staff Director for Manpower and Personnel (J-1). Each of the Military Service personnel centers update the JDAMIS database via modem with a file containing the dates of arrivals to, and departures from, joint duty positions. The JDAMIS
calculates tour length average using assignments with a "stop date" input by the Services during the fiscal year.

The average tour lengths, in months as reported to Congress for fiscal years 1991 - 1993, are listed in Table 4 below:

MILITARY SERVICE AVERAGES FOR JOINT TOUR LENGTH (MONTHS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GO/FO*</th>
<th>FY91</th>
<th>FY92</th>
<th>FY93</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JS</td>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>TOT</td>
</tr>
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<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD AVG</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIELD GRADE

|        | JS   | OTHER | TOT | JS | OTHER | TOT | JS | OTHER | TOT |
| USA    | 35   | 39    | 39  | 36 | 40    | 39   | 36.3| 38.4 | 38.1 |
| USN    | 35   | 41    | 40  | 34 | 39    | 38   | 34.6| 38.9 | 38.3 |
| USAF   | 38   | 41    | 40  | 37 | 41    | 41   | 37.1| 40.0 | 39.7 |
| USMC   | 38   | 39    | 39  | 35 | 39    | 39   | 37.8| 38.7 | 38.6 |
| DOD AVG| 36   | 41    | 40  | 36 | 40    | 40   | 36.3| 39.2 | 38.9 |

* GO/FO = General Officers/Flag Officers  JS = Joint Staff  TOT = Total

TABLE 4

As noted in the table above, the DoD reported meeting the statutory minimums in each category for fiscal years 1991 through 1993. It is important to recall that statutory requirements are in place only to capture DoD-wide averages for General or Flag Officers of 24 months and an average of 36 months for all other joint officers, even though the averages must be broken out by Joint Staff and other joint assignments for reporting purposes. Although not required by law, each of the Services indicated meeting or exceeding the minimum tour length averages for each category with the exception of the Marine Corps for General Officers. Marine Corps General Officers failed to meet the DoD imposed tour length average in fiscal years 1991 and 1993.
The number of Marine Corps General Officers departing JDAs early is statistically insignificant with regard to the impact on the DoD-wide tour length average. For example, of the 109 General and Flag Officers who departed JDAs in fiscal year 1993, only seven (or 6 percent of the total) were Marine Corps officers. While four of those seven General Officers departed early, the Marine Corps maintained a tour length average of 22.2 months. Although that average fails to meet the Secretary of Defense imposed requirement on the Services, the Goldwater-Nichols Act allows for tour length waivers to be approved by the Secretary of Defense, or his designated representative. Since each request for a tour length waiver is required to address the impact on tour length average, the Secretary of Defense approval indicates relief from the imposed requirement.

Inaccurate DoD Definition of Accredited Joint Duty Assignment Tours

The Secretary of Defense is reporting to Congress that the DoD meets the statutory requirements for tour length averages. However, the definition of a "Joint Duty Assignment" as used consistently throughout the DoD in calculating tour lengths is incorrect, according to the Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense.

Section 668(b) of the Goldwater-Nichols Act states that the Secretary of Defense shall define the term "Joint Duty Assignment" and that it "shall exclude- (A) assignments for joint training or joint education; and (B) assignments within an officer's own military department." Officials we interviewed from the USD(P&R) and the Joint Staff concurred that the joint tour length calculation is based only on the arrival and departure dates to and from the JDA. The Services schedule officers for attendance at the Armed Forces Staff College for Phase II of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). The duration of that course is 12 weeks as prescribed in Section 663 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Services are consistent in calculating joint tour lengths with regard to Phase II JPME. We found that if an officer attends Phase II JPME prior to reporting to a JDA, the temporary duty period at Phase II JPME is not included as part of the JDA, is not included in calculating tour length and is not applied toward joint duty credit. Conversely, if an officer attends Phase II JPME after reporting to a JDA (in temporary duty and return status), the temporary duty period is counted toward the minimum tour length to qualify as a full tour of duty.

Although not published, the draft of DoD Instruction 1300.20, "Joint Officer Management Program," issued by the USD(P&R) for coordination, is specific on the matter. It states, "An officer is to accrue joint duty credit
The USD(P&R) staff believes that the Goldwater-Nichols Act exclusion of assignments for joint training or joint education is intended to preclude the Services from granting joint duty credit for officers attending the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the National War College, both of which are Permanent Change of Station moves, not temporary duty. The USD(P&R) staff officials we interviewed do not consider temporary duty as an "assignment" with regard to Section 663 of the Act, and emphasized that JPME is necessary preparation for the JDA. The USD(P&R) provided the Office of the Secretary of Defense interpretation of how joint duty credit is calculated, during periods of temporary duty, in the proposed DoD Instruction 1300.19. That proposed directive addresses the issue as follows:

"5. Joint Duty Credit During Periods of Temporary Duty. a. In order to provide for the stability of joint organizations and preclude jeopardizing an officer's JDA credit, temporary duty for an officer serving in a JDA to attend schools, conferences, seminars, training, or other duties should be limited to those when attendance is required by the joint organization. Such temporary duty required by the joint organization is considered as service in a JDA."

To clarify proper interpretation of the statute, we sought an opinion from the General Counsel, Department of Defense, regarding the relationship between Phase II JPME and the exclusion of assignments for joint training or joint education from the definition of a JDA. The reply we received from the Office of Deputy General Counsel (Personnel and Health Policy) stated:

"Whatever merit the Services' technical construction of the term "assignment" may have, it is apparent that Congress did not intend to grant joint duty tour credit for periods of joint education whenever taken. The Secretary of Defense does not have inherent authority to override statutory mandates by his own regulation (in this case in the form of a DoD Directive). Therefore, an objective integrated consideration of all the statutes referred to above leads to the conclusion that the three-month period of JPME phase II schooling should
not be counted as part of the duration of an uninterrupted joint duty tour."

The General Counsel position is in direct conflict with the interpretation endorsed by the USD(P&R) in the proposed directive and the practices of all four Military Services.

Legal Interpretation Affects Computation of Average Tour Length, and Minimum Tour Length

In a memorandum to the USD(P&R) and the Joint Staff, J-1, the DoD Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Inspections requested impact assessments of the General Counsel's interpretation of the law. The Joint Staff, J-1 response expressed concern over the implications of the General Counsel's official position. The USD(P&R), in an interim memorandum dated February 16, 1995, advised they were awaiting additional review of the opinion of the General Counsel. The General Counsel has not completed their final review of this issue. The Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense cannot determine the statistical impact on the reported tour length averages without an exhaustive search of the JDAMIS. That review must include a record-by-record check comparing all JDA start and stop dates to Phase II JPME completion dates.

Field grade officers currently serving in JDAs, who have attended or will attend Phase II JPME during their current joint assignment, will require an additional 3 months on station to complete the mandated tour length, unless they are granted a waiver or some other statutory exemptions or exclusions apply. Compliance with the law may cause burdens on the Services with regard to reassignment funding, and could possibly throw off the cycle of summer rotations, further impacting adversely on military personnel and their family members.
ASSIGNMENT PRIORITY FOR JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS HAS NOT BEEN ADJUSTED TO ACCOUNT FOR SERVICE END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS

During the course of our inspection, we assessed the impact of joint duty assignment priorities on Military Service infrastructures. Several comments from the Service headquarters expressed concern that the demands for high quality officers to fill Joint Duty Assignments made it difficult to fill in-Service assignments that also require exceptional officers. We found some evidence of adverse impact on Service infrastructures, especially in positions where special skills are needed. One key factor in this analysis is the fact that the JDAL has grown while Service end strengths have declined.

Assessment of Joint Duty Impact on Service Infrastructure

To assess the impact on the Military Service infrastructures of providing assignment priority to joint duty, we first had to define the term "adverse impact." After extensive analysis and interviews with officials from the manpower and personnel offices of all four Military Services, we found an adverse impact to be present when the following three conditions exist:

- a shortage of specific manpower requirements exists that creates an undesirable condition for conducting mission operations (i.e., insufficient resources of a Military Service specialty, pay grade or other special qualifier limitation degrades the ability of the Military Service to support joint duty positions);

- previous attempts to resolve conflicts were unsuccessful; and

- no proposed solution is evident in the process.

The manpower and personnel officials we interviewed from the four Military Services indicated that they previously presented a JDAL supportability briefing to the Joint Staff, J-1 in March 1994. We obtained copies of that briefing data. While all of the Services addressed the number of joint billet requirements versus internal Service requirements, the Air Force also addressed the demand for quality in the joint arena versus internal Service needs.
**Military Service Concerns Regarding Support to Joint Duty Assignments**

We found that each of the Military Services have great concern about the military manpower demands of the joint organizations and the resultant impact on in-Service manning. While the majority of Service specialty skills are not adversely impacted, each Service cited examples of low density specialty skills that are in direct competition for both joint and in-Service needs. The Military Intelligence career field is an example of one such shortage skill that is common to each Service and in high demand by joint organizations.

Congress charged the Secretaries of the Military Departments with the responsibility to recruit, train and equip interoperable forces for assignment to unified and specified commands. The CJCS MOP 75 directs the Services to give priority staffing to approved joint authorizations. The promotion policy objectives mandated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act and a subsequent Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum add another parameter that requires the Services to not only give priority staffing consideration to joint billets, but to do so with quality [promotable] officers.

**JDAL Not Affected By The DoD Drawdown**

Since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Military Services executed drawdown plans to reduce the military force to mandated end strengths. However, no corresponding reduction of manpower requirements in the joint arena has taken place. In fact, the current JDAL size is approximately 700 billets larger than when initially established. While some of that growth resulted from transfers of function from the Services to joint organizations, most of the growth resulted from new and changing missions. Throughout the DoD drawdown, there has been no relief from the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, DoD policy or CJCS policy related to supporting the joint arena. The Services must still give priority staffing, with quality officers, to a growing JDAL, with a substantially smaller resource pool of officers. For example, the DoD directed the Navy to meet officer personnel reductions of 12,600 between fiscal years 1991 and 1995. After meeting that mandate, the Navy still had to satisfy increased requirements for assignments to joint organizations.

Each of the Services cited specific specialty skills that are adversely impacted by the policy of priority staffing to joint organizations. For example:

- Officials from the Bureau of Naval Personnel told us they are closely managing in-Service and joint demands for shortage specialties in aviation and submariner fields.
Personnel officials from the Marine Corps Headquarters consider a military occupational specialty to be critically short if higher priority JDA requirements cause in-Service requirement fill rates to fall below 85 percent. They identified nine military occupational specialties that met that criteria for both the Major and Lieutenant Colonel ranks. The Marine Corps listed an additional six military occupational specialties as short in one grade or the other. Among those critically short in both ranks was the Military Intelligence career field.

The officials we interviewed at the Army Personnel Command identified twelve military occupational specialties within each grade from Major to Colonel in which they cannot fully meet in-Service requirements, even if they were not required to fill joint positions. That list also includes the Military Intelligence career field.

The Air Force personnel officials we interviewed also told us of management challenges to accommodate both in-Service and joint needs with respect to the demand for quality officers. Their analysis first set out quality indicators or criteria for officers that included (1) below-the-zone promotions, (2) Professional Military Education in residence, or (3) service in a command billet, as signs of likely success in achieving the next promotion. After establishing a resource pool of officers meeting those criteria, the Air Force compared the demand for such officers across the Service (positions at Service Headquarters, Major Commands, etc.) and in the joint arena (JDAL and critical JDAL billets). The Air Force reported nine specialties that do not have an adequate resource pool of quality officers to meet demand. Included among those specialties is the Military Intelligence career field.

An interim report on a Joint Staff contracted JDAL study of the Joint Duty Assignment List said force reductions, coupled with a relatively stable if not expanding JDAL brought on by new or changing missions, is causing a disproportionate shift of quality officers from the Services to the joint organizations. That results in an increasing challenge for the Services to meet both joint and internal demands.

The U.S. Army Headquarters, Chief of Manpower Policy, Plans, and Management Division, described the situation as follows, "There is no off-setting increase in the Services' end strength to compensate for new Joint Manpower Process
missions. Since the Services have little opportunity to reduce the Joint Account, those new missions adversely impact on the Service combatant forces and infrastructure which are subsequently reduced to remain within Congressionally mandated end strength ceilings."

In discussions with the Chief of Manpower Programs Division for the Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, he indicated that the disproportionate contribution by the Air Force to the joint community, combined with the drawdown and shortages within some specialty skills, will require a cut in infrastructure rather than create a hollow force.

The drawdown also impacted the ability of the U.S. Navy to meet joint requirements. As stated in a Chief of Naval Operations Message, July 15, 1994, the drawdown has resulted in a disproportionate grade structure between junior and senior officer (Lieutenant Commander through Captain) billets that does not comply with the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA). Until the officer inventory and billet grade imbalance could be corrected, the Chief of Naval Operations implemented the U.S. Navy Manning Plan for Officers. That plan gives top priority to manning sea duty and recruiting activities, and sets manning ceilings of 95 percent for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, and 90 percent for the Unified Commands. A subsequent appeal from the Unified Commands raised the level for Unified Commands to 95 percent, but also created temporary assignment gaps of about 50 billets throughout the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Unified Commands.

As stressed by the Military Services, end strength reductions without a decrease in JDAL requirements adversely impacts certain specialty skills more than others. The Military Intelligence career field across all Services is a prime example. The joint community requires a significant quantity of Army Military Intelligence (MI) officers at the Major and Lieutenant Colonel levels. The Army also has significant internal requirements for Military Intelligence officers in those same grades, but has relatively few requirements in company grades (Second Lieutenant to Captain). To program and grow a sufficient quantity of Military Intelligence field grade officers to meet both internal and joint requirements, the Army would have to considerably overman the company grades in that career field. With end strength ceilings, the Army would then have to force the reduction of another specialty skill to make up the difference. Officials at the Headquarters, U.S. Army staff responded to our query about the use of company grade Military Intelligence officers in lieu of field grade officers.
CONCLUSION

In general, the 17 joint organizations we visited indicated satisfaction with the Military Services in providing quality officers in a timely manner, except when associated with shortage skills, critical joint billets, and billets involved in manpower document updates. All three of those problem areas are centered in manpower requirement determination and validation issues, not personnel related actions. However, those manpower issues adversely impact personnel actions and the availability of personnel for assignment to joint organizations. Consequently, the joint organizations entered into a routine shuffling of positions on paper to affect personnel assignments. That was particularly noticeable with critical joint billets, and JDAL billets involved in lengthy manpower document change and approval procedures.

Until those manpower issues are resolved, actions taken by the personnel offices to counter assignment gaps and shortages of appropriately skilled officers will continue to meet with limited success. A cycle has evolved in which personnel and manpower actions taken by joint organizations create a moving manpower target for the Services, while they are attempting to develop resource pools of appropriately qualified officers. However, the Services initially contributed to that problem by not generating a sufficient resource pool of qualified officers to meet both the needs of the joint organizations and in-Service requirements.

Developing a resource pool against a moving target makes it difficult to meet the demanding needs of the joint organizations that enjoy a high priority for personnel support. That, coupled with a shortage of high demand occupational specialty skills, causes the Services to encounter difficulties meeting both joint requirements and in-Service requirements.

While the use of Service-specific requisitioning procedures was not cited as a significant problem during the inspection, guidance for personnel actions exclusive to JDAs is needed. That need is recognized by the Office of the Secretary of Defense as demonstrated by the development of the draft DoD Directive 1300.19 and corollary DoD Instruction 1300.20 that are currently under review for publication by the USD(P&R).

One of the aspects of JDAs requiring further guidance is tour length with respect to periods of temporary duty taken during a JDA. According to the General Counsel,
DoD, the current practice of allowing attendance at Phase II JPME during a JDA to be included in calculating the tour length of that assignment violates the statutory parameters established for the definition of a "Joint Duty Assignment." Consequently, the DoD has been reporting incorrect tour length averages in the annual reports to Congress since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986.

Faulty application of the definition of a "Joint Duty Assignment" is also implied in the Congressionally directed study referenced in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993. That followed the Secretary of Defense establishment of an initial JDAL that was organizationally based rather than position dependent. As a result, positions within "100 percent" organizations are designated as JDAs without regard to the level of experience in joint matters provided to officers. Furthermore, positions within the "50 percent" organizations that provide a significant level of experience in joint matters are currently excluded from the JDAL. The "50 percent" organizations also indicated that no effective guidance is published to fairly make distinctions in designating JDAL versus non-JDAL positions.

Recommendation 8

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, with the assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff revise the Joint Duty Assignment List to correspond with Congressional intent that Joint Duty Assignments be designated based on the level of experience in joint matters required by each position, rather than on the organization in which the billet is located. The use of "100 percent" and "50 percent" organizational quotas for joint duty credit should be eliminated.

Management Comments

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"We have just completed the Joint Duty Assignment study required by the 1993 NDAA. As a result of this study, the Department is considering a number of options for building a JDAL that better fulfills the requirements of Goldwater-Nichols Act. One of the alternatives under consideration is using the joint manpower requirements determination process to also assess the amount of joint content resident in the position. This mechanism would be used then to identify whether the position requires an officer, enlisted, or civilian member. It would also be used..."
to determine the skill and experience required, the grade level, and whether the billet has the joint content required for placement on the JDAL. The end result would be JDAL that more fully complies with law and policy."

The Director, Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"The Joint Staff, working with OSD, the Services, unified commands, and defense agencies, has been actively involved in formulating and evaluating a number of JDAL management options, some of which utilize an individual approach as a basis. Each of these options was designed to further improve the Department's capability to fulfill the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Joint Staff continues to work toward fashioning options which will improve JDAL functionality, remain supportable within the current constraints, and can be successfully administered. The Joint Staff's current effort, the ninth proposed revision to the JDAL methodology since 1990, has been aggressively staffed. Coordination indicates this current effort, like the previous eight, will apparently also fall short of achieving consensus despite vigorous efforts by the Joint Staff. We will continue to evaluate and recommend improvements to joint officer management that best meet the nation's security needs and comply with law and policy."

Other Management Comments

Although not specifically tasked to respond to the recommendation, the following organizations provided comments:

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command nonconcurred with the recommendation stating that based upon his assessment the quality of inbound personnel will decrease when the 100 percent organizational quotas for joint duty credit are eliminated.

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"Perhaps, we need to revisit the intent of the Joint Duty Assignment process and determine at what grade level we want to manage the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). Currently, the rules for JSO status, critical joint duty positions, and so on apply to 0-4s and above. If we changed the rules to apply to 0-6s and above, it would allow the Services 20 years to produce the officers needed. This production process would include specific
service experience, joint experience and professional military education."

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command concurred with the recommendation and in his comments expressed the view that unified commanders should decide which billets are to be designated on the Joint Duty Assignment List.

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"The services working with OSD, the Joint Staff, the unified commands, defense agencies and activities are considering options for revisions to the joint duty assignment list in order to meet the nation's security needs and the requirements of legislation."

The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Environment) concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"The Joint Staff recently conducted an extensive Joint Duty Assignment study which looked at different ways of designating positions as joint requirements. The Air Force concurs with the central tenent of this study which attempted to measure the joint content of individual billets. Successful implementation of the results of this study would permit identification of the true JDA requirements, rather than designating authorizations as joint based solely on the organization of the position."

Evaluation of Management Comments

We consider all management comments responsive to the recommendation.

Recommendation 9 [Revised] The Joint Staff, Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1), in conjunction with each Military Service Headquarters, establish a process action team to review and streamline the Joint Manpower Program change process with emphasis on updating Service manpower documents.

In the draft report we recommended that:

"The Joint Staff, Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1), in conjunction with each Military Service Personnel Center, establish a process
action team to review and streamline the Joint Manpower Program change process with emphasis on updating Service manpower documents."

This recommendation has been modified to reflect the Military Service Headquarters, not the Military Personnel Centers should work on streamlining the change process.

The Director, Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"This recommendation is a subset of recommendations 6 and 7 and should be incorporated into them. The J1 conducted a conference on revising JMP guidance contained in MOP 75 in April 95 which identified a number of systemic opportunities to improve JMP change process. During the development of the requirements validation methodology, we will establish a Process Action Team to attempt to resolve issues with updating the Services’ different manpower systems."

The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) commented that:

"For the Army, the Military Service Personnel Center (i.e. PERSCOM) should not be the lead on the recommended process action team. PERSCOM's role in the Joint Manpower Program change process is limited to assigning soldiers once changes have been approved by coordination among the Army Staff and Secretariat. Among the Army Staff, the ODCESPER is responsible for approval of changes at the military occupational skill level, grade level, and number of JDAL positions level of detail. The ODCSOPS is responsible, through its FOA (USAFISA), for updating Army manpower documents. The ASA(M&RA) is the overall Army lead of joint manpower actions. The OASA(M&RA) [i.e. SAMR-MBA] should be listed as the Army lead on the recommended process action team.

The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Environment) commented that:

"For the Air Force, the Air Force Military Service Personnel Center (AFMPC) should not be the Air Force lead in a process action team. AFMPC's role in the Joint Manpower Program change process consists primarily of assigning personnel to approved authorizations. The Manpower Programs
Division of the Programs and Evaluation Directorate (AF/PEP) is responsible for staffing changes to joint manpower documents and is the overall lead on joint manpower programming."

Although not specifically tasked to respond to the recommendation, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred with the recommendation stating that he has provided J1 with the Forces and Manpower Information System (FORMIS) data base so the Joint Staff can monitor Service documentation of joint billets. This provides a vehicle to facilitate interaction between the Joint Staff and the Services regarding the timeliness and accuracy of billet changes.

We consider all management comments responsive to the recommendation.

**Recommendation 10**

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff publish joint personnel assignments guidance for all joint organizations.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred with the recommendation stating that in addition to the publications cited in the report, DoD Directive 1300.19, will provide guidance to the Services on assignment of officers to joint duty positions.

The Director, Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation stating that in addition to the publications cited in the report, the Joint Staff has provided direct input to OSD concerning DoD Directive 1300.19, "Joint Officer Management Program" (now in internal OSD coordination with its corollary Instruction, DoD Instruction 1300.20, "Joint Officer Management Program"). This directive will provide guidance to the Services on assignment of officers to joint duty.

Although not specifically tasked to respond to the recommendation, the following organizations concurred with the recommendation: the Department of the Navy, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Space Command, and the U.S. Transportation Command. In addition, the Central Imagery Office, the Defense Security Assistance Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency and the Defense Information Systems Agency concurred with the recommendation.
Evaluation of Management Comments

We consider all management comments responsive to the recommendation.

Recommendation 11

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness immediately stop including the temporary duty and return period of Phase II, Joint Professional Military Education in calculating joint tour length and modify the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System database to reflect that change. We further recommend that:

(a) the Secretary of Defense inform Congress of the General Counsel, Department of Defense interpretation and the impact on previously reported tour length averages;

(b) the Secretary of Defense process tour length curtailment waivers for those officers that completed previous Joint Duty Assignments with attendance at Phase II, Joint Professional Military Education in a temporary duty and return status.

(c) the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), in conjunction with the Joint Staff and the Military Departments, determine whether the impact of the General Counsel interpretation on joint officer management warrants a statutory change. Alternatives that should be considered include: exclusion of Phase II of Joint Professional Military Education from the definition of assignments for training and education, effectively reversing the General Counsel opinion; a change to the duration and location of Phase II of Joint Professional Military Education (as recommended in our report, Joint Professional Military Education, Inspection Report No. 93-INS-09, June 14, 1993); or a change in the statutory minimum tour length.

Management Comments

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially concurred with the finding and recommendation, stating:

"Per the DoD/IG's request that we review the General Counsel's opinion regarding crediting of joint credit, we requested further review by the General Counsel. The General Counsel is currently considering this issue and will provide us their review in the near future. We will take appropriate action based on that guidance."

Other Management Comments

Although not specifically tasked to respond to the recommendation, the following organizations provided comments:
The Director, Joint Staff nonconcurred, stating:

"The DoD General Counsel is currently reassessing its opinion that Phase II, Joint Professional Military Education must be excluded from tour length determinations. Consequently, the issue has not been finally resolved. If necessary the Joint Staff will coordinate with the Services and OSD to prepare appropriate legislative adjustments if warranted."

The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) nonconcurred, stating:

"Professional development of the Officer Corps is an implied task of leadership. To not calculate the 12 week JPME course as part of the total tour length will result in an increased number of families being subjected to extended tours within the Joint Community. With the quality of officers being assigned to joint positions this new policy would cause a ripple throughout the entire Army. For example, if JPME is not counted when determining the 22 months for COS takeouts, numerous battalion commands will have their dates changed from summer to fall. This will be considered on the front end of making assignments for high command potential officers."

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) nonconcurred, stating:

"The Navy does not concur with these recommendations and supports the view that periods of temporary duty, including AFSC's JPME Phase II, should be considered an "assignment" with regard to Title 10, U.S.C. Section 668. The Navy will comply with policy guidance issued by OSD and the Joint Staff concerning the issue of temporary duty."

The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Environment) commented on the recommendation, stating:

"We understand the DoD General Counsel is currently reassessing his opinion that JMPE Phase II must be excluded from tour length determinations. We will work with USD(P&R) on any action required based on the results of that review."
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command nonconcurred, stating:

"To immediately stop giving joint duty credit for TDY and return Phase II, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) would create major disruption in the assignment process. Perhaps, we need to consider shortening Phase II, JPME and/or sending more people enroute."


Even though the recommendation evoked mixed responses, we find all comments responsive to the recommendation. Whether or not time spent attending Joint Professional Military Education is creditable as joint duty time or excludable (as provided for in Section 668(b) of the Goldwater-Nichols Act) is dependent upon further action by the OSD General Counsel.
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ISSUE 4

Support from the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of the Military Departments in monitoring the careers of Joint Specialty Officers, and other officers who serve, or have served in Joint Duty Assignments is inadequate.

OVERVIEW

Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 requires the Secretary of Defense to establish policies, procedures and practices for the effective management of officers on the active duty list who are particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters. The term "Joint Matters" are defined in section 668 of the Act as "...matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea and air forces, including matters relating to:

- national military strategy;
- strategic planning and contingency planning; and
- command and control of combat operation under unified command."

The central purpose for the joint officer management provisions of Title 10 USC 661 was to develop a pool of qualified officers to draw upon for future joint operational needs, especially assignment to critical JDAs. For the purposes of the Act, the officers to be managed by such policies, procedures and practices are referred to as having, or having been nominated for, the "joint specialty." To become eligible for designation as a JSO, the officer must complete an appropriate program at a Joint Professional Military Education school and a full tour of duty in a JDA. To become a nominee for the joint specialty designation, an officer must either complete a program of joint professional military education or have a military occupational specialty that has been designated as a critical occupational specialty involving combat operations.

DoD Required to Develop Joint Specialty Officers

The size of the pool of joint specialty officers and nominees is driven by a statutory requirement that approximately one-half of the JDAs established by the Secretary of Defense be filled at any time by officers who have the joint specialty or are designated as joint specialty nominees. In addition, as of January 1, 1994, all joint duty positions identified as "critical" must be filled by Joint Specialty Officers or officers who have been granted a waiver. Prior to that date, a less stringent 80 percent requirement was in effect for filling critical joint positions with officers who held the joint specialty designation.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act included a transition period, during which the Secretary of Defense could waive one of the two statutory pre-requisites (either Joint Professional Military Education or a joint tour but not both) for joint specialty designation. Using that authority (which expired October 1, 1989), the Secretary of Defense granted the "Joint Specialty Officer" designation to more than 17,000 officers at the rank of Major/Lieutenant Commander [04] and above. The distribution of those transition period designations was:

- Army: 7,000*
- Air Force: 5,334
- Navy: 3,725
- Marine Corps: 1,217

*(Note: The Army number is approximate. An exact number was unavailable)

The size of the combined JSO pool has decreased from more than 17,000 officers designated during the transition era to about 7,000 at the start of fiscal year 1996. The Joint Staff, J-1 reported that as of October 10, 1995 the total number of JSOs on active duty was 6,964 (a loss of more than 10,000 or 59 percent, since October 1, 1989). By comparison, the number of officers approved for JSO designation between October 1, 1989 and January 1, 1995 totaled only 672 (which equates to a replacement rate of only 6.7 percent). Service selection of JSOs over the past 5 years is illustrated in Table 5 below:

<table>
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<th>FY</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>84</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5*
The explanation given by the Services for not recommending additional JSO designations to replace attrition among JSOs was that they saw no immediate need for more JSOs. The Services based that rationale on the large number of officers granted JSO status during the 1986 - 1989 transition period and the very small number of officers who met JSO eligibility requirements after the transition period ended.

Our analysis of DoD efforts to monitor and manage careers of officers assigned to joint duty addresses four main points. First, we examined the collection, analysis and reporting of data on officers assigned to joint duty. That data forms the basis for reports to Congress, as well as for determinations regarding achievement of goals set by law for joint officer management. We found the data collection and reporting generally meets the needs of the DoD and the Congress, but can be improved.

The second part of our analysis of joint officer management relates to problems already discussed in this report regarding designation of positions as critical joint duty assignments, and the impact of those problems on Military Service assignment processes. We also looked at the process for assessing the qualification of officers for joint duty assignments and joint specialty officer status. We found that instability in the Joint Duty Assignment List, especially as it relates to critical positions, adversely affects the ability of the Military Services to support joint organizations. Processes for selecting officers for joint duty are adequate, but the DoD has continuing problems in meeting statutory objectives related to joint specialty officer and joint specialty officer nominees.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act added joint education and joint duty assignments to the list of things that are normally expected of officers as they progress in their careers. The third part of our analysis of joint officer management addresses the steps taken to accommodate joint education and joint assignments in career paths. We also address the related matter of Joint Professional Military Education impact on joint organizations. The problems we identified in career path management have limited impact today, but could become more significant as the draw down of officer strength continues without comparable reductions in the Joint Duty Assignment List.

The last part of our analysis of joint officer management focused on achievement of statutory objectives for promotion of officers serving, or who have served, in joint duty assignments. The Goldwater-Nichols Act set promotion objectives for those officers, and
required the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the results of promotion boards to ensure that the goals are achieved. We found that each Military Service has had problems achieving the promotion objectives, and has taken steps intended to improve performance in the future. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has generally accepted the Military Service explanations when promotion goals have not been met.
COLLECTION AND REPORTING DATA ON JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT

The Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for monitoring the achievement of statutory goals for the management of officers assigned to joint duty. During our visits to 17 joint organizations, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the four Service headquarters, we found that there was adequate data available to satisfy statutory reporting requirements, and to exercise oversight responsibilities. However, we found some reports do not fully portray the data available, and may mask problems.

As previously stated, no single source of definitive and comprehensive guidance for joint officer management has been established. Similarly, there is no single source for data collection and reporting requirements. Each of the Services adapted existing personnel data systems that provide the data to satisfy joint officer management reporting requirements to the Joint Staff.

**The Air Force**

The Air Force Military Personnel Center uses the Air Force Personnel Data System to generate various reports regarding officers who are serving in or have served in JDAs. The Air Force Military Personnel Center generates automated reports on a monthly, or as-needed basis, for internal use in tracking specific joint officer program elements, assessing Air Force compliance with provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and preparing required external reports. The Air Force uses the reports to track such matters as average tour length, time-to-fill rates, location of critical joint billets and critical joint billets filled by non-JSOs. The Air Force transfers data from specified fields from its Personnel Data System via modem to the Joint Staff, J-1 for updating the JDAMIS files on Air Force officers.

**The Army**

The Army uses its Total Officer Personnel Management Information System and the JDAMIS to monitor its joint duty requirements and the assignment of officers to fill those requirements. The Army uses the reports to track such matters as average tour length, time-to-fill rates, location of critical joint billets and critical joint billets filled by non-JSOs. The Army provides data to the Joint Staff on disk format for updating the JDAMIS files on Army officers.
The Navy uses its Officer Assignment Information System to monitor all assignments to JDA billets and to ensure compliance with the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Navy also developed a Joint Specialty Officer Modeling System as a tool for analyzing options available for managing the joint officer population, particularly JSOs. Quarterly, personnel data is fed into a database from which various reports are generated to assess compliance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act (e.g., JSO/JSO nominee fill rates of JDAL billets, JSOs/non-JSOs occupying critical joint positions.)

The Marine Corps uses its Manpower Management Information System and the JDAMIS to monitor its inventory of officers and joint requirements, and to assess compliance with the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. On a quarterly or as-needed basis, the Marine Corps has the Joint Staff, J-1 generate specific reports from the JDAMIS to assist in monitoring joint assignments and satisfying periodic reporting requirements.

The Secretary of Defense is required by Title 10 USC 662(b) to submit semiannual reports to Congress with regard to promotion results for officers who are serving in, or have served in, JDAs, as follows:

"The Secretary of Defense shall periodically (and not less often than every six months) report to Congress on the promotion rates of officers who are serving in, or have served in, Joint Duty Assignments, especially with respect to the record of officer selection boards in meeting the objectives of clauses (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a)[662]. If such promotion rates fail to meet such objectives, the Secretary shall include in the periodic report required by this subsection information on such failure and on what action the Secretary has taken or plans to take to prevent future failures."

The Secretary of Defense is required by Title 10 USC 667 to submit an annual implementation report to Congress that provides eighteen elements of information regarding joint officer management. Specifically, the statute requires the annual report to provide promotion rate data as stipulated in Subsection (13), which states:

"In any case in which the information under paragraphs (5) through (9) [promotion statistics] shows a significant imbalance between officers serving in Joint Duty Assignments or having the joint specialty and other officers, a description of what action has been taken (or is planned to be taken) by the Secretary to correct the imbalance." The phrase "significant imbalance" is not
defined by the law or by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Although each Service has had problems in achieving the statutory promotion objectives, the Secretary of Defense's annual report to Congress does not highlight the Department's unfavorable promotion results and provide corrective actions to improve joint officer promotion imbalances.

DoD Established Requirement for Military Service Progress Reports on Promotions

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a May 21, 1987 memorandum, subject: "Title IV, DoD Reorganization Act of 1986," established reporting requirements from each Military Service to provide periodic progress reports on the promotion rates of each Service in relation to the promotion objectives in the law. The stated intent was that existing Defense officer promotion reports sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense by January 15th of each year would be modified to reflect the required information for each promotion board completed during the reporting period. The memorandum also established a new requirement for an additional semiannual report as of July 1 of each year.

Through discussion with officials at the Service Headquarters and at the Office of the USD(P&R) and the Joint Staff (J1), we learned that the Services no longer submit promotion reports required by DoD Instruction 1320.12, "Defense Officer Promotion Reports and Procedures." Instead, each Service provides statistical data when forwarding individual promotion board results. The USD(P&R) staff uses that data to develop the promotion statistics presented in the Secretary of Defense's annual report to the Congress, as well as the semiannual promotion report to Congress. The USD(P&R) staff questioned the benefit of, or value added by, the semiannual report on promotions when one considers that, as a general rule, promotion boards meet only once each year and the results are depicted in the annual implementation report to Congress.

Inconsistent and Incomplete Data Reported for JSO Promotions

Our analysis of Military Service promotion statistics compared to the data portrayed in annual reports to Congress revealed inconsistent and incomplete data for JSO promotion rates. For example, provisions in Title 10 USC, section 662b, as stated above, require the Secretary of Defense to report promotion statistics for all officers who are serving-in or who have-served in JDAs, especially with respect to the record of officer selection boards in meeting the objectives for promoting officers assigned to the Joint Staff, officers who are JSOs and those officers assigned to other JDA positions. However, we found that, starting with the fiscal year 1993 semiannual promotion report to Congress, the ASD(P&R) [now USD(P&R)] discontinued providing complete promotion statistics for all categories of officers. In that
report, the ASD(P&R) did not provide JSO promotion statistics for those officers who were serving-in or who have-served-in JDAs that incorporate in-the-zone, above-the-zone and below-the-zone categories. We found no evidence of any legislative change relieving the Secretary of Defense from the requirement to provide those rates for JSOs. That practice does not provide Congress with the promotion information required by statute, especially pertaining to JSO management.

Data Collection Process is Adequate

The DoD has an adequate process for collecting data that is relevant to joint officer management. Reliance on existing Service systems allows incorporation of joint-relevant data into Service oriented officer management processes, and allows consideration of both joint and Service issues in the management of officer career progression. However, the reporting of promotion data to Congress on a semi-annual basis appears to be excessive, since the data relevant to achievement of promotion objectives is based on results of annual promotion boards. We found no basis for discontinuing the reporting of available detailed information on Joint Specialty Officer promotion rates.
Joint Professional Military Education is one of the basic qualifications for designation as a Joint Specialty Officer, and completion of JPME qualifies and officers as a JSO nominee. The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires that all critical joint duty assignments be filled with JSOs, and that one half of all other JDAs be filled by JSOs or JSO nominees. We found that limitations on the capacity of the Armed Forces Staff College affect the ability of the Services to fill JDAs with JSOs or JSO nominees. We also found that some joint organizations could make better use of an available tool to limit the disruption of certain key functions caused by attendance at the Armed Forces Staff College while assigned to the joint organization.

The Military Services have reported to the Joint Staff that they have problems developing a sufficient number of officers to meet future JSO requirements. They cited quotas for JPME schools, the size of the JDA List and the statutory requirement to have at least 1,000 of the JDAL positions designated as "joint critical," and filled by JSOs as the key obstacles. Officials from the manpower and personnel offices of each Service Headquarters recommended that the joint curriculum at the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia, be reduced in length from the prescribed 12 weeks to accommodate more classes and a greater number of graduates each year. They further recommended as an alternative that the DoD determine the feasibility of moving the school to another location capable of handling more students.

The Joint Staff reported that, in response to Service concerns and continuing Congressional interest, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed a JPME Panel to conduct a review of JPME programs, with emphasis on the development of JSOs. The panel is made up of Senior Policy Advisors from each Service [one and two star level], representatives from the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Defense University and an independent education consultant. Officials from the Joint Staff indicated to us that they anticipate the panel will report its findings to the Chairman early in calendar year 1995.

The Inspector General, DoD Inspection Report 93-INS-09, "Joint Professional Military Education," June 14, 1993, documented the shortcomings of the JPME program. The principal finding of that inspection relative
to joint officer management was that "...Phase II of the Professional Military Education Program does not fully prepare students to perform their Joint Duty Assignments from the onset of those assignments..." A survey conducted as part of that inspection established that 92 percent of those surveyed believed that Phase II of the JPME did not meet their needs. The inspection report included recommendations on course curriculum modifications, and on steps to increase the student capacity of the program. The latter recommendation suggested relocation to existing DoD facilities as an available alternative.

Within the context of this inspection, we did not re-examine whether the JPME curriculum satisfies the education requirements for JSO designation. Our focus was on the length of the course of instruction at the Armed Forces Staff College (JPME Phase II), the limitation on the number of officers that the Military Services can schedule for attendance during any given year and the criteria for selecting the appropriate officers to attend.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act made JPME a prerequisite for designation as a JSO (unless the officer serves two joint tours), and established requirements with respect to assignments upon completion of JPME. All JSOs who attend JPME must be assigned to joint duty upon completion of the school. At least 50 percent of officers who are not JSOs must be assigned to joint duty in either their first or second duty assignment after graduation. We found that all Services assign virtually all graduates of the Armed Forces Staff College to a JDA after graduation, and thus are exceeding the objective set in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The reason all Services take this approach is that the quotas available for students in the Armed Forces Staff College are insufficient to meet Service needs, so no officers are sent to that school who are not serving in or enroute to a joint duty assignment.

The JSOs selected to attend the National War College or the Industrial College of Armed Forces are either identified for waiver of assignment to joint duty under Title 10 USC 663(d) or are slotted to go to a JDA upon graduation. The use of that waiver has declined steadily over the past 5 years, as follows: fiscal year 1990 - 70 waivers; fiscal year 1991 - 41 waivers; fiscal year 1992 - 36 waivers; fiscal year 1993 - 22 waivers; and fiscal year 1994 - 16 waivers.

Officials from the Air Force and the Army personnel offices told us that, given the current limit on the number of seats they are allocated at the Armed Forces Staff
College, the National War College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, they find it increasingly difficult to support the current number of JDAs, particularly critical joint positions. The Army proposes that the Secretary of Defense reduce the size of the JDAL by approximately 30 percent.

Officials from the Army Headquarters Personnel Command told us that if an Army officer does not get JPME Phase II enroute to a JDA, every effort will be made to get the officer into a class during the first year of the JDA. While the Army is sending about 1,000 officers to joint jobs each year, it only has 268 seats allotted for JPME Phase II annually. That dilemma is compounded by the fact that if an officer does not get into Phase II prior to selection for a JDA or enroute to that assignment, the officer enters into competition with an ever-expanding pool of eligibles for a limited number of available seats.

The Air Force also sends about 1,000 officers to JDAs each year. The Air Force has only 325 seats allotted for JPME Phase II each year. Existing Air Force policy is to assign all JPME graduates who are not already serving in a joint position to joint billets because the pre-screening process used to identify those officers who will be selected to attend professional military education on an in-resident basis is essentially the same criteria as the joint duty assessment. As with the Army, the Air Force has an ever-expanding pool of joint officers who cannot get into Phase II because of the limited number of seats. As indicated above, completion of JPME Phase II and a JDA are the qualifying prerequisites for an officer to be designated as a JSO.

The Marine Corps policy is to send only those officers to JPME Phase II who are identified against projected JSO requirements in the future. That policy is in place because of the limited number of available seats allocated to the Marine Corps in Phase II classes and the need to grow JSOs for future assignments. The Marine Corps has only 47 JPME Phase II authorizations each year.

Navy officers are screened at the Commander grade level for Senior Service School [National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces] by a reconstituted promotion board. The board completes its action on promotions, then reconvenes to examine the top 50 percent of those selected for promotion as candidates for in-resident Senior Service School eligibility. The selection criteria used by the Navy includes the officer's professional development needs, personal credentials [undergraduate and/or advanced
degree], personal preference and desire to attend, ability to perform at higher levels, potential for leadership and potential for promotion. That establishes the pre-screened pool of quality officers from which future selections for attendance at Senior Service Schools are made. The Bureau of Naval Personnel conducts a second administrative screen once a proposal is made to assign a specific officer to a National War College or Industrial College of the Armed Forces slot. Usually 6 months before graduation from the Senior Service College, assignment officials start working the issue of ensuring that at least 50 percent of the non-JSO graduates are assigned to a JDA. Up to that point, there is usually very little proactive consideration of future joint use of the officer.

The Navy has 236 JPME Phase II authorizations each year. Whereas in the Army system an officer has limited career advancement potential without in-residence professional military education, that is not the case in the Navy. The Navy assignment policy recognizes that attendance at an intermediate or senior school may not be possible for all its top officers because it gives higher priority to operational assignments, operational training, technical and even headquarters requirements.

The officials we interviewed at each of the Military Services reported that, if the number of JPME Phase II allocations were strictly used to meet future JSO requirements, they have adequate school quotas. However, given the dramatic shrinkage of the JSO resource pool over the past 4 years, the Services are forced to send officers to JPME Phase II solely for the purpose of increasing the number of JSO nominees serving in joint positions to satisfy the requirements of Title 10 USC 661(d)(1). That provision of the statute provides that: "The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that approximately one-half of the Joint Duty Assignment positions in grades above captain [03], or in the case of the Navy, Lieutenant, are filled at anytime by officers who:

(a) have the joint specialty; or

(b) have been nominated for the joint specialty and ...

(i) have successfully completed a program of education referred to in subsection (c)(i)(A) [JPME]; or

(ii) have a military occupational specialty that is designated under (c)(2)(A) as a critical occupational specialty involving combat operations."
Army and Air Force officials reported to us that, because there is no restriction on who can attend JPME Phase II, and due to the need for simply growing JSO nominees, many officers whose future use as JSOs is highly unlikely are scheduled to attend. Those officials stated that, if they were provided relief from the 50 percent fill rate requirement for JSOs and JSO nominees, they could manage the development of future JSOs more effectively.

We also examined the impact of JPME Phase II on the continuity of service in a joint duty assignment. Because of the limited capacity of the Armed Forces Staff College, only about one third of the officers who attend the Armed Forces Staff College can do so prior to reporting to their joint organization. Thus, joint organizations must release officers for a twelve week temporary duty assignment to the AFSC. The manpower and personnel management officials we interviewed at all 17 joint organizations expressed concern about mission impact of having assigned officers (especially those officers with Critical Occupational Specialties serving in their initial JDA) attend JPME Phase II in a temporary duty status after arrival.

The manpower and personnel officials we interviewed at the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command identified key mission-essential positions, requiring Critical Occupational Specialty officer assignees, who must undergo lengthy certification or specialized training programs lasting up to 5 months to become fully qualified to perform their joint duties. The Services routinely exercise the tour length provisions for critical occupational specialty officers that allow credit for a full joint tour after serving only 22 months. After 3 months attendance at the Armed Forces Staff College, and 5 months of specialized training in the joint organization, the Critical Occupational Specialty officer’s use is effectively reduced to 14 months.

In a July 13, 1989 Joint Staff Memorandum, subject: "Attendance at Phase II Joint Professional Military Education," the Director of the Joint Staff addressed the problem of insufficient capacity at the Armed Forces Staff College to accommodate all those officers who required completion of Phase II enroute to their JDAs. The Director recognized that the need for some priority allocation of "temporary duty-enroute" seats would be desirable and established criteria for exemption from "temporary duty and return" status. The Director intended that managers screen their JDA positions, identify those jobs that were one-of-a-kind, key and essential, or that had direct mission impact, and recommend that the incumbents of such positions be
exempted from attendance at JPME in a "temporary duty and return" status. The Joint Staff established a threshold of not more than 15 percent of a joint organization's JDAL as eligible for JPME exemption status. (While these positions are called "JPME exempt," the exemption applies only to the scheduling of the school).

Seven of the unified commands we visited exercised their authority to designate positions as "JPME exempt." The U.S. Strategic Command had not designated any positions as "JPME exempt." We found the use of the exemption authority in the other commands ranged from a low of 5 percent to a high of 29 percent as follows:

- U.S. Special Operations Command: 05%
- U.S. European Command: 10%
- U.S. Space Command: 13%
- U.S. Pacific Command: 14%
- U.S. Transportation Command: 14%
- U.S. Atlantic Command: 19%
- U.S. Central Command: 29%

We also found that the Allied Command Europe did not designate any positions as "JPME exempt." The U.S. officials at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe told us the decision not to consider positions within the Command for "JPME exempt" status was made by General Shalikashvili when he served as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Subsequent commanders have not altered that decision. We were told that Generals and Admirals from other NATO countries (for whom U.S. joint duty officers work) expressed displeasure with the loss of key staff officers for a period of 12 weeks to attend JPME Phase II.

Only two of the six Defense Agencies we visited exercised their authority to designate positions as "JPME exempt." Use of the exemption authority was 11 percent at the Defense Logistics Agency and 14 percent at the Defense Information Systems Agency. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, the Central Imagery Office, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Joint Electronic Warfare Center did not designate any positions as "JPME exempt."
PART II - ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Issue 4

IMPACT OF PROBLEMS IN DESIGNATION OF CRITICAL JOINT BILLETS, JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICERS, AND MECHANISMS USED TO PROACTIVELY MANAGE JOINT OFFICERS

The process for determining requirements for joint duty positions, and for validating those requirements, has been discussed in earlier sections of this report. The arbitrary nature of the requirements determination process, particularly with respect to designation of critical joint billets, limits the ability of the Military Services to develop officers to fill those positions. Operating within those constraints, each Service has applied its own criteria for selection of officers for assignment to joint duty assignments. We found those Service approaches are generally adequate. However, the DoD has had to continue to use waiver authorities to fill the "pipe line" of officers qualified for certain joint duty assignments because of the moving target of arbitrary critical joint duty billet designations.

We have already noted that the USD(P&R) has not established a standardized approach or adequate guidance for identification and designation of critical JDA positions that require fill by JSOs. Initial identification of positions as critical JDAs was driven more by availability of JSO designated officers to fill the jobs rather than actual requirements of the positions.

The Air Force, Army, and Navy personnel centers monitor the number of critical billets required by skill specialty code to maintain a proportional resource pool of JSOs. However, each Service personnel center expressed frustration with the constant movement of critical billets at joint organizations to accommodate assignments and to match up critical billets with JSOs already assigned in non-critical billets.

In the JCS Publication 1.2, "Joint Officer Management," June 30, 1989, there is discussion of what constitutes a critical JDA billet. Chapter II, paragraph 3 provides: "... Critical billets are normally required to be filled by joint specialists who contribute both Service and joint experience and perspective, bring greater continuity to the joint arena by virtue of multiple joint tours, and enhance leadership and mentorship within both joint organizations and Services as a result of their joint experience. ... The primary concern in selecting a billet for critical designation is whether it requires the incumbent to be previously educated and experienced in joint matters or, at minimum, whether the position will be greatly enhanced by such an incumbent. Such a determination is position-dependent and normally
should not change as incumbents change. Stability in critical billet selection is essential if the Services are to produce sufficient numbers of JSOs who possess the requisite skills to meet organizational requirements."

During establishment of the original JDAL, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) requested that all joint organizations provide a recommended list of billets for designation as critical. In his memorandum of December 4, 1986 he indicated that no more than 15 percent of an organization's Major/Lieutenant Commander through Colonel/Captain billets should be included, but did not specify any minimum. Several organizations replied that none of their billets should be designated critical.

DoD Cannot Fill 1,000 Joint Critical Billets

As the JDAL developed, it became clear that the DoD would not meet the required minimum of 1,000 critical joint billets, causing the Joint Staff to impose the quota of 11 to 15 percent on all joint organizations. With that imposition, joint organizations felt forced to designate billets as critical to fulfill their fair share of the statutory 1,000 critical joint billets rather than base the designation on a position-dependent assessment as intended by law. Therefore, we found that joint organizations arbitrarily designate joint billets as critical to meet a quota or to accommodate an assignment when a desired officer is not a JSO.

No Standardization for Identifying Critical JDA Positions

In fact, at the eight unified commands, the Joint Electronic Warfare Center, the Allied Command Europe, the Allied Air Forces Central Europe and the six Defense Agencies we visited, we found that no standardization existed in the identification of positions that were designated as critical JDAs. The manpower and personnel officials we interviewed at those joint organizations told us that, if given a choice in the matter, they would be hard pressed to find many, and at some locations any, jobs that truly meet the definition of a critical JOA alluded to in the law. Officials at each joint organization visited expressed the opinion that DoD should seek legislative relief from the requirement to have a minimum of 1,000 critical positions on the JDAL.

Army and Air Force Want Critical JDAs at Colonel Level

Army and Air Force personnel officials told us that, should the number of critical joint billets remain constant at about 1,000, the DoD should require that substantially more critical joint billets be filled by officers in the rank of Colonel rather than Lieutenant Colonel. That approach gives the Service more time to branch and command qualify junior field grade officers, enhance their promotion eligibility and prepare them for JSO qualification and designation before assigning them against a critical joint billet. Furthermore, if the DoD
established more critical joint billets at the Colonel level, those officers could provide more mentorship and leadership to junior officers in the joint arena because of their additional operational experience.

As an example of the inconsistencies we found with critical billet designations, we noted that only two of nine Unified Commands designated critical joint billets within the J1 staff, requiring the military manpower or personnel skill specialties. The U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Southern Command designated the Director of the Manpower and Personnel Staff J1, both Air Force JDAL billets, as critical joint positions. According to Air Force data dated June 1994, the Air Force had 34 JSOs at the rank of colonel that possessed the manpower or personnel skill specialties. While that indicates that the Air Force is over subscribed with JSOs in those skill specialties, we found that the J1 director at the U.S. Space Command recently redesignated a J1 deputy director position from critical to non-critical. The U.S. Space Command did not feel that it could justify the duties of positions within the J1 staff as critical joint positions under the statutory definition. Because the J1 staff positions in joint organizations have relatively the same responsibilities, we believe that this example illustrates a need for more consistent and better developed criteria for designating critical joint billets.

We found the following practices at eight Unified Commands and five Defense Agencies:

- The U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Atlantic Command submit JMP changes to move critical positions to reflect where JSOs are assigned. At the U.S. Strategic Command, the J-1 directorate was requested to facilitate the same action by another directorate.

- The U.S. Special Operations Command and the U.S. European Command assign JSOs against critical positions on unit manning documents only, while the JSO is actually working in a different non-critical position.

- The U.S. Central Command designated billets as critical that it does not believe warrant or qualify that designation.

- Following an administrative error designating a billet as critical, the U.S. Transportation Command was not permitted by the Joint Staff to change the designation to non-critical because, at that time, the DoD was below the minimum 1,000 critical joint billets required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the Defense Security Assistance Agency believed that none of their billets qualified as critical JDAs. Despite that assessment, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, directed the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to designate 11 to 15 percent of its billets as critical. The Washington Headquarters Services unilaterally designated three of 23 JDAL billets as critical in the Defense Security Assistance Agency. The Defense Security Assistance Agency manpower staff officials we interviewed claim that the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, designated those critical billets without input from the agency.

Even though 22 percent of the Defense Intelligence Agency's JDAL billets are already designated critical, the agency continues to submit JDAL changes to move critical billet designations to accommodate JSO assignments.

Following a Joint Staff request that the Defense Logistics Agency increase critical joint billet designation from 5 percent to the target quota of 11 to 15 percent, the agency selected and prioritized the additional billets. Subsequently, the Services nonconcurred with many of the additions because the incumbents were not JSOs. Negotiations between the Services and the Joint Staff resulted in notification to the Defense Logistics Agency of those billets that would be finally designated critical. Upon approval of the critical billets by the Joint Staff, the Services had to process waivers for non-JSOs filling critical joint billets.

The Defense Information Systems Agency moves critical joint billet designations to affect assignments if a qualified JSO is not available. During our interviews with agency staff officials, they recalled one instance in which a JSO was requested from the Army, but none were available. The Army personnel office then suggested that the Defense Information Systems Agency change the billet designation to non-critical or accept an assignment gap. The agency submitted a JMP request to change the billet designation to non-critical.

Arbitrary designations and movement of critical joint positions prevent the Military Services from developing the necessary resource pool of JSOs with the
appropriate technical skills. When a joint organization then submits a personnel requisition for a specifically skilled JSO, one may not be available. To hire a non-JSO against a critical joint position requires a waiver, or the joint organization often moves the critical position designation elsewhere on the manning document by submitting another JMP change. That action then generates reprogramming by the Services over the next 2 to 3 years to reflect a smaller target for JSO development in that specific skill.

At the end of the assignment for the non-JSO, the joint organization again requisitions for a JSO replacement. Now, however, the Service has even fewer JSOs with the requested skill because of the reduced target from the previous critical position change. We found that inefficient cycle to be consistent throughout all 17 joint organizations we visited and that it continues to cause the Services difficulty with the process of effective JSO development for needed skills.

Congress Directs Further Study of JDAL Composition

Section 932 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1993 directs the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct a study of military officer positions that focuses primarily on the composition of the JDAL. The JDAL study incorporates an assessment of the number and allocation of critical JDAs. In his Interim Report to Congress, June 1994, the USD(P&R) reported that, "... Although our analysis of the appropriateness of the designation of critical positions is incomplete, there is evidence that indicates there is a lack of standardization in the designation of critical Joint Duty Assignment positions." He also reported that the RAND Corporation is developing a rigorous methodology for use in objectively identifying critical JDA positions.

Criteria for Identifying and Selecting Officers for JDAs and JSO Designation

Based on our interviews with manpower and personnel officials at all four Service headquarters, we found that the USD(P&R) and the Joint Staff have not developed objective criteria for use in identifying, nominating and selecting officers for JDAs and JSO designation. The existing CJCS MOP 75 and JCS Administrative Publication 1.2 lack the necessary specificity on those topics to provide adequate guidance to the Military Services.

When selecting officers to serve in JDAs, each of the Military Services use joint assessment factors to evaluate an officer's performance, competence, leadership, achievements, education, promotion history and other factors. All four Services described efforts to ensure that high quality officers are assigned to joint duty assignment list positions. The joint organizations
expressed satisfaction with the quality of officers assigned.

The Air Force

The Air Force developed joint screening criteria to select officers for JDAs that addresses selection and attendance at in-residence Service schools, promotions below the primary zone and current service or previous service in a command billet. For joint duty positions at the Major and Lieutenant Colonel level, the Air Force uses its Officer Volunteer Assignment System to solicit applications for JDA vacancies. Should no officers volunteer for a given Major or Lieutenant Colonel joint position, the Air Force goes to a non-voluntary, select and assign process for officers who have more than 15 years on active duty. Selection for joint positions at the Colonel level are centrally managed by the Air Force Colonels Group, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters Air Force.

The Army

The Army, like the Air Force, also developed joint screening criteria designed to assess each officer’s competitiveness for future promotion. Those criteria are below-the-zone promotions, selection for in-resident Service schools, and previous or current command and staff assignments. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff returned the fiscal year 1992 Colonel promotion board report because promotion goals for officers who served in joint duty were not met. After that action, the Director of Officer Personnel Management, Total Army Personnel Command, developed specific assignment policies designed to ensure future joint promotion objectives are met. The policies call for the assignment of no fewer than 19 former battalion commanders to the Joint Staff, no fewer than 55 former battalion commanders to other joint duty, no fewer than 60 below-the-zone Majors to joint duty, and no fewer than 49 Industrial College of the Armed Forces or National War College graduates to JDAs each year.

The Navy

The Navy assigns responsibility to its placement officers to conduct a promotion assessment of all candidates nominated for a JDA. The Navy says that it tries to assign only those officers with demonstrated promotion potential to joint jobs to ensure that the promotion percentage in each joint category meets the objectives established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The placement officer is granted authority to reject those nominees whose assignment would drop the Navy’s promotion rates. Following staffing and approval through detailing and placement, the nomination is then submitted for Flag Officer approval prior to submission to the joint organization for acceptance.
The Marine Corps is the only Service that uses a formal board process to identify officers for assignment to JDAs. The board process associated with Intermediate Level School selection at the Major level is used to manage the assignment of officers to JPME Phase II and joint duty. The Marines Corps believes that the process institutionalizes the placement of its best Majors in joint jobs. Likewise, a formal board screens Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels for command assignments. The process is designed to select the best officers to lead the Marine Corps, and selection for command is taken as a clear indication of the high quality of an officer's overall performance. Given the board determination of superior performance and potential for future service, assignment monitors use the board results to identify those high quality officers available for assignment to joint duty positions.

The Marine Corps developed specific assignment goals designed to ensure future promotion objectives are met. The policy provides that JDAs for Majors will be filled from a pool of officers consisting of graduates from a resident intermediate level school (Phase I) and JPME Phase II graduates. At the Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel levels, it is Marine Corps policy to select from officers who have successfully screened for command. Officers serving in a command tour who have not completed a full JOA are assigned to a JDA immediately following the command tour. The policy also provides that officers selected for Senior Service School ("top level school") can have their JOA delayed until after completion of that school.

Congress recognized the need for flexibility in the management of JDAs by authorizing the Secretary of Defense to grant waivers in individual cases in the interest of sound personnel management and to address critical needs of the armed forces. The DoD Draft Directive 1300.19, "Joint Officer Management Program," sets forth guidance on the processing of waivers. Legislation allows for the Secretary of Defense [or his designee] to grant individual waivers for seven conditions:

1. The normal criteria for designation of officers as JSOs includes completion of Joint Professional Military Education Phase II, followed by a full joint tour. This sequence may be waived for up to 10 percent of officers designated as JSOs in any year.

2. The requirement to complete JPME Phase II prior to designation as a JSO may be waived for officers who complete two full tours of duty in a JDA.
3. The requirement that an officer assigned to a critical joint duty position on or after January 1, 1994 possess the joint specialty designation.

4. The requirement that each officer with the joint specialty who graduates from a JPME school be assigned to a JDA for that officer's next duty assignment after graduation.

5. The requirement that each officer selected for promotion to the rank of Brigadier General or Admiral (Lower Half), after such selection, attend a military education course designed to prepare new General and Flag Officers to work together with the other armed forces.

6. The requirement that an officer may not be appointed to the rank of Brigadier General or Admiral (Lower Half) unless the officer has completed a full tour of duty in a JDA.

7. The minimum length of a joint duty assignment.

Goldwater-Nichols Act Requires JSOs In Critical JDAs

The Goldwater-Nichols Act provides that after January 1, 1994 all critical joint positions will be filled by JSOs, unless the Secretary of Defense (or his designee) grants a waiver. Prior to fiscal year 1994, there was no waiver requirement as long as at-least 80 percent of all critical joint positions were filled by JSOs.

We reviewed the statistics on JSO fill of critical joint positions to determine whether the DoD is meeting the objective set by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The JDAMIS statistics as reported to Congress indicate that less than 80 percent of the critical joint positions on the JDAL were filled with JSOs from 1989 to 1994. We found a decrease in the number of non-JSOs occupying critical joint positions from fiscal years 1989 to 1994. We also found the number of JSOs filling critical joint positions averaged a decrease from fiscal years 1990 to 1994. Our interviews with manpower and personnel officials at the four Military Service headquarters revealed that competing demands between the joint arena and in-Service requirements for quality officers has led to an increase of critical joint position vacancies from 79 in 1989 to 180 in 1994.

We extracted the information provided in table 6 below from the annual "Goldwater-Nichols Act Implementation Report" for fiscal years 1990 through 1994. Table 6 illustrates that the Services were able to report compliance with the statutory requirement to fill all critical joint positions with JSOs only by excluding vacant critical joint positions from the equation. If all
critical joint positions are included, the actual JSO fill rate has been stable at about 70% for the last three fiscal years. Thus, the DoD faces a significant challenge in matching critical joint billet requirements and available JSOs to meet the 100% goal set by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. (Our analysis of data provided by the Services and the Joint Staff generated that portion of the table that reflects the "Actual JSO Fill" rates that are not provided in that annual report to Congress).

**JSO FILL RATES FOR JOINT CRITICAL BILLETS**

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRITICAL BILLETS</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>1025</td>
<td>1016</td>
<td>1030</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOs</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-JSOs</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BILLET VACANCIES</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPORTED JSO FILL</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTUAL JSO FILL</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:**
JSOs: (filling critical joint positions)
NON-JSOs: (filling critical joint positions under pre-1994 statutory allowance and post-1994 waiver)
REPORTED JSO FILL: The annual report to Congress only depicts the fill rates of occupied critical joint positions, (JSOs + non-JSOs assigned) and does not reflect billet vacancies.
ACTUAL JSO FILL: Figures represent our analysis of actual percentages representing the total number of JSOs versus the total number of critical joint positions.

**TABLE 6**
**JDA Waiver Usage Reported to Congress**

Information on JDA waiver usage is required in all Secretary of Defense's annual reports to Congress. Our review of the waiver use statistics showed the following noteworthy conditions regarding usage of JDA waivers:

- Waivers for non-JSOs occupying "critical joint" positions total 94. That number represents 9.4 percent of all critical joint positions or 11.9 percent of the presently filled critical joint positions. The necessity for the large number of waivers is a direct result of the Services' inability to develop sufficient JSO resources, combined with ineffective procedures for designating appropriate critical joint billets and competing in-Service demands for quality officers normally selected for JSO designation. USD(P&R) officials report that based upon discussions they had with Senate Committee staffers, agreement was reached that the 100 percent fill rate was probably unattainable and that a 95 percent fill rate was more realistic. At present, for the DoD to meet the 95 percent rate, it needs to reduce the number of waivers granted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by a minimum of forty-four.

- Tour length waivers for field grade officers increased from 97 in fiscal year 1993 to 132 in fiscal year 1994 (an increase of 36 percent). The program officials at the USD(P&R) reported that the upward trend is viewed as a positive sign of pro-active Service management of officer careers, especially in light of the fact that overall joint tour length averages continue to meet or exceed the minimum prescribed by law.
OFFICER CAREER PATH MODELS MUST ACCOMMODATE MULTIPLE JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

Each Service has established career paths for officers, with expectations regarding the type of assignments, education and other duty that officers should successfully complete in order to be competitive for promotion. The Goldwater-Nichols Act added joint duty and joint professional military education to those career paths. We found that the career path models can accommodate the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but that limitations on the "pipeline" through which officers must pass to qualify for joint duty assignments place additional demands on the officers in that pipeline. The practical consequence is that many officers will have to serve multiple joint duty tours, and will have difficulty meeting traditional Service career path expectations.

The General Accounting Office, in a June, 1988 Report, "Military Personnel--Impact of Joint Duty Tours on Officer Career Paths," analyzed the field grade assignments of officers who had operational specialities [combat arms] who were selected by the 1986 and 1987 promotion boards for Brigadier General and Rear Admiral (Lower Half). The GAO objective was to examine career paths of recently promoted flag officers to determine whether joint duty and education could have been accommodated in their careers. While the data relied on by the GAO is dated, we found that the findings and conclusions remain valid. The GAO found that for all Services there was enough time allotted for duty in non-operational positions, on average, to accommodate a year of professional military education and a single joint duty tour at the field grade level.

The personnel officials that we interviewed from each of the Military Services contend that timing of initial and subsequent critical joint assignments is crucial for an officer to stay competitive for promotion to the next higher grade. Those officials report that the limited time in an officer's career path at the field grade level [Major/Lieutenant Commander to Colonel/Captain] is strained to accomplish all the jobs an officer needs, especially filling key command and staff positions within their Service, to be competitive for promotion and higher level commands.

Although each Military Service career path model varies slightly due to Service specific assignment requirements, there is, on average, a 13-year period from promotion to field grade, Major/Lieutenant Commander, and first consideration for promotion to General and Flag
Officer [07]. During that 13-year period, an Army officer must successfully complete the following assignments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIELD GRADE</th>
<th>SERVICE CAREER PATH PROGRESSION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04/05</td>
<td>JPME [1.1 yr], (Intermediate Service School and Phase II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Branch qualification as BN XO/S3 [1 yr minimum]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/05/06</td>
<td>Initial Joint Duty [2 yr COS/3 yr non-COS]*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>BN Command [2 yr]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Senior Service School [1 yr]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/06</td>
<td>Division/Corps/Service Headquarters Staff [3 yr]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2 of 3 preferred for career progression)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Brigade Command [2 yr]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/06</td>
<td>Second Joint Duty Assignment - 3 yr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* COS: 11 - 15 + YRs; NON-COS: 12 - 16 + YRs

**ACRONYM NOTE:**
BN: Battalion
COS: Critical Occupational Specialty
XO: Executive Officer

**TABLE 7**

As illustrated, the key Army career field grade assignments leading to eligibility for promotion to Brigadier General total 11 to 15+ years for a Critical Occupational Specialty officer and 12 to 16+ years for non-Critical Occupational Specialty officers. There are similar career path demands on officers from the other Services. If an officer is assigned to a second JDA [3 additional years], that second assignment effectively displaces a Service specific assignment expectation in the career path. Actual staffing and management of the JDAL requires assignment of field grade officers to multiple joint tours because of the requirement for 1,000 critical, JSO-filled positions and the requirement that one half of all JDAL positions be filled by JSOs or JSO nominees.

The difficulties experienced by the Military Services, joint organizations, and officers themselves in applying the Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions relating to career management are the result of several factors that have already been addressed in this report. Instability in the JDAL, insufficient capacity at the Armed Forces Staff College, demanding officer career paths and arbitrary legal and regulatory requirements are the most significant of those factors. We believe a fresh look at each of those elements of the problem will be required before the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act can be fully realized.
PART II - ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Issue 4

MILITARY SERVICES HAVE PROBLEMS MEETING JOINT OFFICER PROMOTION OBJECTIVES

The Goldwater-Nichols Act established promotion objectives for officers who are serving on, or have served on, the Joint Staff, Joint Specialty Officers, and other officers who serve or have served in Joint Duty Assignments. We evaluated Service promotion board results and analyzed the Secretary of Defense semiannual and annual reports to Congress regarding promotion board results for each of the Services. We also reviewed the procedures used for JSO revalidation boards. We found that the Services have had problems meeting the promotion objectives established by law.

TITLE 10 PROMOTION OBJECTIVES

Our evaluation of promotion board results is based on criteria taken directly from Title 10 USC 662(a) that provides:

"The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the qualifications of officers assigned to Joint Duty Assignments are such that:

1. officers who are serving on, or have served on, the Joint Staff are expected, as a group, to be promoted to the next higher grade at a rate not less than the rate for officers of the same armed force in the same grade and competitive category who are serving on, or have served on, the headquarters staff of their armed force;

2. officers who have the joint specialty are expected, as a group, to be promoted at a rate not less than the rate for officers of the same armed force in the same grade and competitive category who are serving on, or have served on, the headquarters staff of their armed force; and

3. officers who are serving in, or have served in, Joint Duty Assignments (other than officers covered in paragraphs (1) and (2)) are expected as a group, to be promoted at a rate not less than the rate for all officers of the same armed force in the same grade and competitive category."

CJCS Must Review Promotion Board Results

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is charged by law to review promotion selection board reports to determine if the boards acted in a manner consistent with Secretary of Defense guidelines under Title 10 USC 615(b) and DoD Directive 1320.12, "Defense Officer Promotion Program," February 4, 1992. The Chairman reviews board results to determine if the boards gave
appropriate consideration to the performance in JDAs by officers who are serving in, or have served in, such assignments. The Chairman also reviews board results to assess the extent to which the board meets or fails to meet the promotion objectives set forth in the law.

We found, at the time of our inspection, that the Army was the only Service to have a promotion list returned by the Chairman for further action pursuant to Title 10 USC 618(b)(4). The promotion list in question was the fiscal year 1992 Colonel, Army Competitive Category, Promotion Selection Board Report. In his transmittal of the board results to the Chairman, the Secretary of the Army sought to attribute the poor results to past personnel management decisions made prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act and that had previously been briefed (as early as September 1989) as a problem area which would exist beyond the fiscal year 1992 Colonel's promotion board.

We evaluated the adequacy of Service actions planned and/or taken in instances where promotion objectives were not met to ensure that underlying causes were identified and remedied. We interviewed officials at the USD(P&R), the Joint Staff and the Military Service personnel servicing centers regarding the DoD's ability to meet legislated joint officer promotion objectives. We also reviewed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff comments to officer selection board results, to determine if the Chairman is providing appropriate oversight to the Secretaries of the Military Services to ensure compliance with the law.

To assess compliance with the promotion objectives, we obtained and reviewed the statistical analyses of promotion board results for the past 5 years as submitted by the Military Services to the Joint Staff and the USD(P&R) for the Secretary of Defense's annual and semiannual reports to Congress. The records show that the Services experienced mixed results in meeting the promotion objectives.

To visually illustrate joint officer promotion results, we constructed a table for each Service. The following four tables show promotion board results in comparison with the statutory objectives for promotions to the rank of Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel for the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps and to the rank of Captain and Commander [unrestricted line] for the Navy. The tables cover the 3-year window from fiscal years 1992 to 1994. The tables show percentage deviation (+ or -) from the promotion objective. Positive values exceed the objective, zero exactly meets the objective and negative values fall short of the objective.
ARMY JOINT PROMOTION RESULTS
TO THE RANK OF COLONEL AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL

% DEVIATION FROM STANDARD

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1. HEADQUARTERS PROMOTION RATE IS STANDARD
2. PROMOTION BOARD AVERAGE RATE IS STANDARD

TABLE 8

The Army

Overall, Army statistics show a substantial improvement in both the Joint Staff and Other JDA categories, but also show a significant shortfall in the JSO category at the rank of Colonel for fiscal year 1993. Even though the data shows recovery in fiscal year 1994, this is a lingering problem. The Army speculates that the JSO deficit problem at the Colonel level can be avoided in the future if it is permitted to take away the JSO designation from those transition era designees still on active duty who no longer meet the quality screen-out criteria for JDAs. The Army reports it will take 3-5 more years for them to consistently meet the promotion objectives for Colonels in all promotion categories. The results of the fiscal year 1995 colonel board show that all in-zone promotion objectives were exceeded for officers "serving-in" JDAs.

The headquarters officials we interviewed project that attrition, through voluntary retirements and selective early retirements, should have the effect of culling those officers who are no longer competitive for promotion and therefore a JDA. Those factors, coupled with the more indepth assignment screening process for joint duty and the more reasoned approach as to which officers are
recommended for JSO designation, are expected to result in improved promotion rates against statutory objectives.

**AIR FORCE JOINT PROMOTION RESULTS**

**TO THE RANK OF COLONEL AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL**

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1. HEADQUARTERS PROMOTION RATE IS STANDARD
2. PROMOTION BOARD AVERAGE RATE IS STANDARD

**TABLE 9**

The Air Force attributes its inability to meet the Joint Staff and JSO promotion objectives on past assignment practices and quality imbalances that held down the selection rates. The Air Force believes it has corrected the conditions that led to earlier shortfalls in JSO promotion rates at the Lieutenant Colonel level. It is noted that the results of the fiscal year 1995 Lieutenant Colonel board show that all "in-zone" promotion objectives were met or exceeded.
The Navy's internal analysis of the "Other Joint Duty" results for the 1994 Captain [06] board revealed that if the eligible officers in the category with approved retirement requests were factored out, the result would have been an 86 percent selection rate of those officers in the "Other Joint - Serving In" category (26 percent above the board average). Although those officers that have approved retirement dates are not considered by the board for promotion, they are still counted in the total pool of "other joint" officers "serving in or have served in" JDAs.

The Navy's internal analysis of the 1994 Commander board results revealed that post-transition period JSOs (5 of 9, for 55 percent) did not promote as well as the transition period JSOs (10 of 13, for 77 percent). The Navy conducted a detailed review of its JSO designation process and identified the need for more stringent selection criteria for the JSO selection boards. The Navy
JSO Selection Board precepts now provide more specific guidance that emphasizes future promotability.

### MARINE CORPS JOINT PROMOTION RESULTS

**TO THE RANK OF COLONEL AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL**

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1. HEADQUARTERS PROMOTION RATE IS STANDARD
2. PROMOTION BOARD AVERAGE RATE IS STANDARD

### TABLE 11

*The Marine Corps*

Even though the Chairman found that the fiscal year 1994 Colonel board gave appropriate consideration to officers assigned to joint duty positions, he attributed the shortfalls in meeting those promotion objectives to, "... a failure to assign quality officers [to the Joint Staff and other JDAs] so that the promotion objectives could be met." The Marine Corps projects that it will take at least three years for it to reach full compliance with the promotion objectives to the rank of Colonel. Given the small size of the Marine Corps officer community, the nonselection of only one officer changes the percentages significantly. In the Joint Staff category, two selections would have provided approximate equality with the Service headquarters selection rate and three selections would have exceeded the objective. In the case of Joint Staff category, one additional selection would have
exceeded the objective. On the fiscal year 1993 Lieutenant Colonel board, one more selection in the Joint Staff and JSO categories would have met or exceeded the promotion objective.

The Secretary of the Navy, in his transmittal of the fiscal year 1994 Colonel board results, commented that the average time in grade for officers considered by that Colonel board was 3.8 years. He stressed the point that 3.8 years is a very short time in which to try to fit a year of top level school, a command assignment, and joint experience. He commented that efforts were underway within the Marine Corps to increase the time-in-grade requirements at Lieutenant Colonel for promotion to Colonel. To accomplish that, the Marine Corps proposes to reduce the time-in-service requirement for promotion to Major to 10 years (a 2-year reduction) and add an additional year to the time-in-grade requirements for eligibility to Lieutenant Colonel. That is a long-range plan that will take at least 5 years to implement. Additionally, the Marine Corps reported that for the proposal to have the anticipated beneficial effect, it is proposing that Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels be exempted from further selective early retirement boards.

The officials we interviewed at each of the Military Service Headquarters attribute their inability to meet the JSO promotion objectives to the fact that many officers who hold or held the JSO designation were granted JSO status under transitional guidelines in effect during 1987-1989. The criteria for designating those transition era JSOs were less stringent than current joint screening criteria and did not encompass an assessment of each officer’s competitiveness for future promotion.

Based on that rationale, and in an effort to improve JSO promotion rates, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Army requested and received approval from the Secretary of Defense to hold JSO revalidation boards for the purpose of taking the JSO designation away from those officers who would not pass current screening criteria for a JDA. Neither the Navy or the Marine Corps identified a need to conduct a JSO revalidation board.

The Army and Air Force JSO boards reviewed the records of those JSOs that met the following criteria:

- currently serving in the grade of Major through Colonel and not on a promotion list,
- received JSO designation before September 30, 1989 based on a waiver issued by the Secretary of Defense, and
• had not completed JPME Phase II or served in, nor expected to serve in, a JDA.

The Air Force JSO revalidation board reviewed the records of 450 transitional era JSOs and recommended withdrawal of the JSO designation from 315 officers (70 percent). The board established no minimum revalidation requirement. The officers identified for withdrawal of JSO status never served in a position designated on the JDAL, had not attended intermediate or Senior Service School and had not been promoted "early" in their careers. The Air Force uses those key quality indicators to identify officers as competitive for a future or secondary JDA. Because those officers identified for withdrawal of JSO status did not meet those quality criteria, there was very little chance that the Service would approve them for future Joint Duty Assignments, particularly in critical joint positions.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the board recommendations and withdrew the JSO designation from 315 officers as follows; 120 Colonels, 117 Lieutenant Colonels and 78 Majors.

The Army JSO revalidation board determined that the board should revalidate [retain] the JSO designation for at least 80 percent of those JSOs presented to the board, based on projected future needs for JSOs with specific skill requirements. As a result, the board recommended withdrawal of the JSO designation from 65 officers (20 percent of the records reviewed). The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved those board recommendations.

CONCLUSION

The absence of joint officer management guidance that is both comprehensive and directive in nature led the Military Services to recommend, and the Secretary of Defense to approve, the JSO designation of more than 17,000 active duty officers prior to October 1, 1989. Initially, the DoD placed more emphasis on quantity than quality factors in approving JSO designations. Many officers granted JSO status during the transition era subsequently failed to promote to the next higher grade. That resulted in the Services not meeting the JSO promotion objective of Goldwater-Nichols Act at one or more grade levels during the years since implementation.
In an effort to minimize any adverse impact on future JSO promotion statistics, the Services designated only 672 JSOs since October 1, 1989.

### 3-5 Years to Resolve JSO Promotion Problems

The Army contends that it will take more than 3 to 5 years to resolve its lingering JSO promotion problem, while the other Services appear to have succeeded in dealing with their JSO promotion problems. We found that the Army did not take sufficiently aggressive steps to address the JSO promotion problem through the 1992 JSO revalidation board process. By limiting the revalidation to not more than 20 percent of eligible officers, the Army's action had little effect on improving subsequent JSO promotion rates.

### Improper Critical JDA Billet Designation

The initial identification of JDAL positions as critical was driven more by the availability of JSO designated officers to fill the jobs than the actual requirements of those positions. Joint organizations are still moving the critical designation to accommodate qualified JSO availability rather than basing the designation on the work performance requirements of the particular position. That leads to instability in the management of JSOs because the Military Services cannot program for development of officers with specific skills and backgrounds if the critical joint billet designation continually moves from one position to another.

### JPME Allocations Do Not Support JDA Requirements

The program of JPME at the Armed Forces Staff College is being used to satisfy two competing statutory requirements. The DoD must designate at least 1,000 positions on the JDAL as critical joint positions, and fill them with JSOs. The DoD must also fill one half of all positions on the JDAL with either JSOs or JSO nominees. Given the current limitations on the number of seats available at the Armed Forces Staff College each year, the Services cannot support both statutory requirements. In an effort to satisfy the latter requirement, the Services select officers to attend JPME Phase II who are not necessarily potential JSOs, but become JSO nominees through completion of the education program. Development of JSOs is a secondary consideration, at least in part because the 1,000 minimum critical positions are regarded as arbitrary. Should the number of required critical positions remain at a minimum of 1,000, we believe that the Secretary of Defense should establish selection criteria related to JSO requirements for use in identifying officers permitted to attend the Armed Forces Staff College. We also believe that the requirement for filling critical joint positions with JSOs should take precedence, and officers should not be permitted to attend the Armed Forces Staff College unless there is a projected future need for their skills as a JSO in a subsequent JDA.
Many Officers Must Perform Two or More JDAs

Even though one of the underlying tenants of the joint officer management provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to ensure that all officers complete a JDA prior to selection to the grade of Brigadier General or Admiral (Lower Half), the reality is that demand from the joint organizations will require that officers assigned to joint duty will spend more than one tour in the joint arena. The Army and Air Force fill more critical joint billets at the Lieutenant Colonel level than at the Colonel level. As a result, they must program initial JDAs early enough in an officer's career to enable that officer to complete the JPME and JDA requirements necessary for JSO designation prior to assignment to a critical joint billet during a second joint tour as a Lieutenant Colonel. In the case of an Army Lieutenant Colonel JSO, the 3 years spent in a critical joint position is time the officer would otherwise spend in command or Service headquarters staff positions that are considered to be promotion enhancing assignments. Unless promotion boards give the same weight to multiple joint tours as is accorded to in-Service assignments to command or headquarters staff positions, JSO promotion rates will continue to be a problem area.

Recommendation 12

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness incorporate comprehensive policy guidance in the Department of Defense Directive 1300.19, "Joint Officer Management Program," that includes as a minimum:

(a) criteria for designating the appropriate joint duty billets as critical positions requiring assignment of officers who hold the joint specialty designation;

(b) more stringent requirements on movement of established critical joint billets to provide the Military Services with a stable target to program the development of appropriately qualified Joint Specialty Officers.

(c) career guidelines for military officers that address the timing of Joint Duty Assignments and the impact of those assignments on Service career advancement;

(d) a limitation on the designation of Lieutenant Colonel and Commander joint critical positions to the minimum needed to meet operational requirements, so that appropriate time is available for in-Service officer career development assignments at those ranks;

(e) a time-phased plan for reducing the number of waivers granted for filling critical joint positions with officers who are not Joint Specialty Officers;
(f) more stringent criteria for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to use in granting waivers for the assignment of non-Joint Specialty Officers to critical joint positions;

(g) criteria related to future Joint Specialty Officer requirements for use in identifying officers selected to attend Joint Professional Military Education, Phase II; and

(h) uniform Joint Specialty Officer selection criteria for use by the Military Service Joint Specialty Officer selection boards.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"The primary purpose of the DoD Directive 1300.19, "Joint Officer Management Program," and its corollary instruction DoDI 1300.20, is to provide the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Agencies and other joint organizations sufficient guidance to assist them in the efficient management of officers assigned to joint duty assignments and to ensure compliance with the law. This publication provides detailed guidance on the management of Joint Specialty Officers and other assigned to joint duty assignments. This directive was written with the advise and assistance of the JCS and the Services. It has also been reviewed and edited by appropriate offices in the Department, to include the DoD/IG, to ensure the directive provides for sound joint officer management. We are confident that once coordination of the directive is complete, the Department will have a comprehensive document that will enable the Services and the JCS to comply with legislative mandates and foster sound management practices to achieve the objectives set forth in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Although not specifically tasked to respond to the recommendation, the Director, Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"The Joint Staff and Services have coordinated on both DoD Directive 1300.19, "Joint Officer Management Program," and its corollary instruction DoD Instruction 1300.20. OSD has designed these two implementors to provide the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense agencies and other joint organizations specific guidance to assist them in the efficient management of officers assigned to joint duty
assignments and to ensure compliance with the law. Their publication will provide detailed guidance on the management of Joint Specialty Officers and others assigned to joint duty assignments. The Joint Staff is confident that, once these comprehensive documents are promulgated, OSD will have significantly enhanced the ability of the Services and the JCS to comply with legislative mandates, foster sound management practices, and achieve the objectives set forth in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Although not specifically tasked to respond to the recommendation, the following organizations concurred with the recommendation: U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Transportation Command, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force, Central Imagery Office, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Defense Nuclear Agency and Defense Information Systems Agency.

Evaluation of Management Comments

We find the management comments responsive to the recommendation.

Recommendation 13

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop a legislative proposal to:

(a) seek legislative relief from the requirement that the Department of Defense maintain an arbitrary minimum of 1,000 critical joint duty positions as set forth in Title 10 United States Code 661 (d)(2)(A); and

(b) seek legislative relief from the semi-annual promotion reporting requirement set forth in Title 10 United States Code 662(b).

In our draft report we recommended:

"The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop a legislative proposal to: (a) seek legislative relief from the requirement that approximately one half of the Joint Duty Assignment positions be filled by Joint Specialty Officers or Joint Specialty Officer Nominees as set forth in Title 10 United States Code 661(d)(1); (b) seek legislative relief from the requirement that the Department of Defense maintain an arbitrary minimum of 1,000 critical joint duty positions as set forth in Title 10 United States Code 661 (d)(2)(A); and (c) seek legislative
relief from the semi-annual promotion reporting requirement set forth in Title 10 United States Code 662(b)."

The recommendation has been modified based on analysis of comments received from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Director, Joint Staff to the draft report.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially concurred with the recommendation, stating:

"We agree with the recommendation to propose legislation to reduce the number of critical billets and have done so. The recently completed Joint Duty Assignment study provided the necessary justification to request legislative relief. We also agree that a legislative change is needed to delete the semi-annual promotion reporting requirement and replaced with an annual requirement. With regard to requesting legislative relief from the requirement to fill one half of the JDAL with JSOs or JSO nominees, we do not believe this would serve the Department's best interests. This report highlights systemic challenges we face in complying with this provision (e.g., insufficient JPME quotas), however, we are pursuing a course that would enhance our joint warfighting capability by providing joint education to larger number of officers. Once this objective is achieved, the ability to fill the JDAL with the appropriate number of officers who have completed joint PME will not be an issue."

The Director, Joint Staff nonconcurred with subparagraph (a) of the draft report and concurred with subparagraphs (b) and (c), stating:

"The requirement in current law requiring approximately one half of the JDAL be filled by JSOs or JSO Nominees is designed to ensure a base inventory of officers with joint education in resident in the aggregate list. The Joint Staff will carefully review recommendation 13 (a) but, at this time, it is unclear that this action would be in the best interest of the Department. The Joint Staff's legislative initiative, staffed through the Services, sought relief from the numerical floor for critical JDAs and was incorporated into the DoD Joint Duty Management legislative initiatives proposal delivered to the Speaker of the House on 9 June 1995."
### Issue 4

#### Other Management Comments


#### Evaluation of Management Comments

We consider all management comments responsive to the recommendation.

### Recommendation 14

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness report Joint Specialty Officer promotion results consistent with requirements set forth in Title 10, United States Code 662(b) and 667(5).

#### Management Comments

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred with the recommendation stating that the next annual report to Congress (February 1996) will include Joint Specialty Officer promotion zone data and will show rates for those serving in, and who have served in, Joint Duty Assignments.

#### Evaluation of Management Comments

We consider management's proposed action responsive to the recommendation.

### Recommendation 15

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness encourage joint commanders and heads of other joint organizations to:

- identify key positions that are adversely affected by interruption of a joint duty assignment to attend the Armed Forces Staff College; and

- designate those positions as "JPME Exempt," precluding interruption of a joint duty assignment to attend the Armed Forces Staff College.

#### Management Comments

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred with the recommendation stating that the DoD Instruction 1300.20, "Joint Officer Management Program" (in final coordination) provides guidance on designating key billets as JPME exempt.

#### Evaluation of Management Comments

We find the management comments responsive to the recommendation.
Recommendation 16

The Secretaries of the Military Departments hold Joint Specialty Officer Revalidation Boards for the purpose of identifying those transition era Joint Specialty Officers who do not qualify for future Joint Duty Assignments and recommending withdrawal of Joint Specialty Officer designation where appropriate.

Management Comments

The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and the Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) concurred with the recommendation stating that they will implement the guidance set forth in the DoD Instruction 1300.20, "Joint Officer Management Program," on revoking JSO designations. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Environment) made no specific comment pertaining to this recommendation.

Other Management Comments

Although not specifically tasked to respond to the recommendation, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Director, Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation. Both stated that they support the guidance set forth in DoD Instruction 1300.20, "Joint Officer Management Program," that provides for revocation of JSO designation when appropriate.

Evaluation of Management Comments

We find all management comments responsive to the recommendation.
ISSUE 5 Joint policy on education and training of reserve officers assigned to joint organizations is inadequate.

OVERVIEW

We found a number of problems with the adequacy of the joint training and education available to reserve officers assigned to joint organizations. First, we found that there is no DoD joint policy for the reserve components. As a result of that lack of DoD policy, we found wide variances among the Military Services on procedures for determining and validating manpower requirements for Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs). Second, we found that although IMA officers perform similar duties as their active duty counterparts within joint organizations, there are no provisions for the training and education necessary to prepare reserve officers to meet joint qualification standards. Third, we found by comparing Joint Tables of Distribution and Joint Tables of Mobilization Distribution that, in spite of the lack of appropriate training and education to prepare reserve officers to perform joint duties, joint organizations routinely augment critical JDA positions with IMAs.

Section 666 of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 states that "The Secretary of Defense shall establish personnel policies emphasizing education and experience in joint matters for reserve officers not on the active-duty list. Such policies shall, to the extent practicable for the reserve components, be similar to the policies provided by this chapter." However, we found no published DoD policies regarding joint education or training for reservists within the six Defense Agencies and the eight unified commands we visited. In a June 19, 1989 memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (ASD(RA)) with the responsibility for developing those policies. The memorandum also states that joint duty positions requiring fill by reserve component officers shall not be included in the JDAL for active components, but may be included in a reserve component JDAL.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) Has Not Published Joint Policy For Reserve Components

The USD(P&R) manpower and personnel staff officials we interviewed reiterated to us that, according to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it is the responsibility of the ASD(RA) to develop joint policy for reserve officers. The ASD(RA) issued a draft policy for comments in July 1989. The proposed policy addressed a wide range of issues, including joint education, monitoring of promotion rates and assignment of qualified reservists to critical JDA positions in the event of mobilization. Joint training was encouraged, but not a prerequisite for assignment to
The ASD(RA) did not issue that proposed policy because of unresolved concerns expressed by the Military Departments and joint organizations.

Subsequent to a study conducted in 1991-1992, the ASD(RA) determined that application of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to the reserve components was not practicable and recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the DoD seek legislative relief from Section 666 of the Act. The DoD did not pursue that recommendation.

In April 1993, the ASD(RA) initiated a contract study to evaluate all professional military education for reservists with emphasis on reservists in the joint arena. That contract period of performance spans from April 1993 to December 1995 and includes a review of the needs and qualifications of reserve component officers for JDAs. In the interim, the DoD policy guidance mandated by Congress in 1986 to address the education and training of reservists performing joint duties does not exist.

None of the Unified Command or Defense Agency staffs we contacted had knowledge of any DoD personnel policies required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act emphasizing education and experience in joint matters for reserve officers not on the active-duty list. The ASD(RA) official we interviewed stated that current policy, although unpublished, is that application of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to the reserve components is impracticable.

We found no DoD guidance for reserve components that specifies what constitutes an appropriate joint Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) requirement. All Unified Commands rely on Military Service regulations to manage their reserve programs. Each Military Service uses different terminology and publishes different requirements for reserve component management. As a result of that lack of joint guidance, negotiations between the Unified Commands and the Services for funding of IMA positions have varying degrees of success. For example;

- At the time of our inspection, the U.S. European Command did not have an approved Joint Table of Mobilization Distribution (JTMD). The Joint Staff and the Services have staffed that document for over a year. At the USEUCOM the reservists are used for both 24 hour augmentation and for deployment, operations backup. Each Command staff director determines their IMA requirements
Based on 24 hour operations. The USEUCOM had none of its Air Force IMA positions filled at the time of our on-site visit. The Air Force did not fund any of the officer IMA billets. The Navy funded only a small portion of the 121 officer IMA billets and prioritized that funding for the USEUCOM. The Army funded all officer IMA billets and agreed to increase reserve funding by 37 positions.

- At the U.S. Special Operations Command, we found that the Army and the Navy funded all of their respective IMA positions, but none of their Air Force IMA positions are funded.

- At the time of our inspection, Individual Mobilization Augmentees represented one half of the U.S. Central Command's reserve authorizations. The Air Force funded all U.S. Central Command IMA positions for fiscal year 1994. The Army initially cut 55 of the U.S. Central Command funded IMA billets. However, the U.S. Central Command J-1 staff was successful in a reclama to the Army that resulted in restoration of the 55 billets that were cut, plus an allocation of an additional 34 billets.

Lack of ASD(RA) Direction and Oversight

As a result of the lack of direction and oversight from the ASD(RA), we found no consistency among the Military Services on how they determine, validate and approve manpower requests from joint organizations for IMA requirements in the joint arena. Because of the lack of DoD guidance for reservists serving in joint organizations, all eight of the unified commands we visited were developing their own internal policies for reserve officer management and using a compilation of existing Service regulations for reserve program management. We found no evidence that the ASD(RA) was preparing further guidance to assist joint organizations with the reserve component requirements determination process.

Joint Organizations Develop Internal Reserve Component Guidance

While each of the eight unified commands we visited during the inspection are developing their own internal guidance and procedures for reserve manpower resourcing and negotiating with the Military Services, the reserve manpower determination process is fundamentally the same as that for the active duty requirements. However, requests for reserve assets are processed through the organization's reserve advisor before they are routed through the unified command, J-1 staff for review, and further negotiation with the Joint Staff and the Services for final authorization. As illustrated in the examples above, that informal process does not provide an adequate baseline for determining
required reserve manpower levels and produces inconsistent levels of success for the joint organizations.

Without proper guidance from the DoD to adequately determine valid reserve component manpower requirements or develop the necessary joint education to prepare those officers for joint duty, joint organizations can not effectively employ reserve component assets. We found that the majority of the Joint Table of Mobilization and Distribution documents we reviewed indicated that IMAs are positioned against comparable active duty counterpart positions that are designated as critical joint positions. By designating critical joint positions, the joint organization is stating that successful performance in that position requires previous joint experience and education, the prerequisites necessary for JSO designation of active duty officers.

We believe it is logical that similar prerequisites would apply to an IMA performing the same functions as the active duty counterpart, provided the duties that define the critical joint position remain the same. However, there is no provision for reserve component IMA officers to achieve JSO status even though they are often aligned on the organization’s Joint Table of Mobilization and Distribution in positions that parallel active duty critical joint positions. That assignment practice reemphasizes the need for the DoD to address the validation of critical joint billet designations and the definition of joint billet criticality.

None of the eight Unified Commands we visited had a process to review and match up the Joint Table of Distribution and Joint Table of Mobilization Distribution requirements to determine optimum use of reserve component personnel and maintain visibility of augmentation against critical joint positions. It is therefore difficult for the joint organizations to determine if reservists are filling or augmenting critical JDA positions that normally require formal joint education, completion of a prior JDA and board selection for JSO status.

CONCLUSION

Reserve component IMAs serving in joint organizations are expected to perform joint duties without the benefit of the formalized training and education that is provided to their active duty counterparts. In the event that the organization had to activate a 24 hour operation of its headquarters or deploy active duty JSOs performing duties in critical joint positions, the IMA officers aligned on the Joint Table of Mobilization and Distribution against that position would be expected to perform the same duties as that JSO. While the ASD(RA) recognizes the need for the training
and education of IMAs in preparation for joint duty, and attempted to canvass the Military Services and joint organizations for comments and resolutions, it has not met the 1986 legislative mandate to publish guidance on the subject.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 17</th>
<th>The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy and the Joint Staff Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability, develop policy guidance that provides for the necessary training and education of reserve component officers assigned to joint organizations.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred with the recommendation, stating:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>&quot;The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has initiated action to develop policy guidance to govern the education and personnel management of reserve component officers who serve in joint or coalition billets. The Logistics Management Institute (LMI) which played a key role in the JDAL review conducted in 1993-95, is under contract to the ASD(RA) to analyze reserve officer joint education and experience. The LMI work will include an inventory of duty positions in joint organizations that are filled by full-time and part-time reserve officers and identification of those whose incumbents require joint professional military education (JPME). The LMI study, which will also recommend joint assignment and personnel management policy, is expected to be completed in mid-1996. After further refinements in conjunction with other OSD elements, the Joint Staff, and the Military Departments, the ASD(RA) expects to issue approved DoDD/DoDI guidance on reserve component joint officer management early in 1997.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Management</td>
<td>Although not specifically tasked to respond to the recommendation, the Director, Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation and stated that the Joint Staff Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability will coordinate with the ASD(RA) as recommended policy guidance is developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>The management comments were responsive to the recommendation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td></td>
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Management Comments Required

Management is requested to provide the completion dates for actions already taken, or the estimated dates for completion of ongoing or planned actions on the items indicated with an X in Table 12 below.

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS REQUIRED

<table>
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<th>Recommendation Number</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Completion Date</th>
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<tr>
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<td>USD(P&amp;R)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>USD(P&amp;R)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>USD(P&amp;R)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>USD(P&amp;R)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>ASD(Reserve Affairs)</td>
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</table>

**TABLE 12**
APPENDIX A

Published Guidance on Joint Manpower Program and Joint Officer Management Program (Note: Those memoranda preceded with an asterisk below will be superseded by the publication of the DoD Directive 1300.19, "Joint Officer Management Program" and the corollary DoD Instruction 1300.20, "Joint Officer Management Program.")

PUBLIC LAWS


- Public Law 101-510, "Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act," October 1, 1990 (Sections 1201 through 1211 of Title 12, United States Code, as amended)


DOD GUIDANCE


* Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Joint Duty Requirement for Promotion to Brigadier General/Rear Admiral (Lower Half)," January 21, 1987


* Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Additional Guidelines for Administration of Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) Programs," August 22, 1988

* Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Revised Definition for Dual-Hat and Cross-Department Joint Duty Assignments," February 27, 1989


- DoD Instruction 5000.57, "Defense Acquisition University," October 22, 1991


- DoD Instruction 5000.55, "Reporting Management Information on DoD Military and Civilian Acquisition Personnel and Positions," November 1, 1991


- DoD Instruction 5000.58, "Defense Acquisition Workforce," January 14, 1992


**JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF GUIDANCE**

* Joint Chiefs of Staff Administrative Publication 1.2, "Joint Officer Management," June 30, 1989

- Director, Joint Staff Memorandum, "Attendance at Phase II Joint Professional Military Education," July 13, 1989

- Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Memorandum of Policy 55, "Manpower and Personnel Action Involving General/Flag Officers for Joint Duty Assignments and Key Assignments," February 4, 1991

- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy 75, "Manpower for Joint and International Activities," April 2, 1993
• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 1618-93, "Military Education Policy Document," March 23, 1993

• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1330.02, "Review of Promotion Board Section Results by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," January 7, 1994

• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1330.01, "Assignment of Officer (06 and below) to the Joint Staff," August 9, 1994
APPENDIX B

DoD Joint Manpower Requirements Change Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Billet or Position</th>
<th>Unified Commands and International Activities</th>
<th>JMP Defense Agencies</th>
<th>Non-JMP Defense Agencies</th>
<th>All (JMP and Non-JMP) Defense Agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military and Civilian</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I. Activity/Agency Identifies Requirement

1. Start
2. Forward to Joint Staff (J-1) for Approval
   - All Concur
     - No
       - B
         - OSD Approves
           - Yes

II. Review and Approval of Manpower Requirement

1. Joint Staff Reviews and Distributes to Joint Staff Functional Directorates & Each Service Staff
   - A
     - No
       - B
         - OSD Approves
           - Yes

2. OSD Reviews
   - A
     - No
       - B
         - OSD Approves
           - Yes

3. OSD Approves
   - Yes
DoD Joint Manpower Requirements Change Process


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Billet or Position</th>
<th>Military and Civilian</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III. Review Process at Service staff</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Staff Reviews and Distributes to Functional Staff</td>
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<td>Service Staff Reviews and Distributes to Functional Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Functional Staff Agree or Disagree</td>
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<td>Functional Staff Agree or Disagree</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSEDEP Votes and Returns to Joint Staff</td>
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<td>OSEDEP Votes and Returns to Joint Staff</td>
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### DoD Joint Manpower Requirements Change Process

#### Unified Commands and International Activities

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Billet or Position</th>
<th>Military and Civilian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV. If Manpower Requirements are not Approved or all do not Concur</td>
<td>J-1 Staff Coord with Function Dir &amp; Service Planners to Resolve Diff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Concur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Director J-1 Resolves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Concur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forward to Joint Chiefs of Staff TANK</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C or D</td>
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#### JMP Defense Agencies

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Type of Billet or Position</th>
<th>Military</th>
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<tr>
<td>IV. If Manpower Requirements are not Approved or all do not Concur</td>
<td>J-1 Staff Coord with Function Dir &amp; Service Planners to Resolve Diff</td>
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<td>All Concur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Director J-1 Resolves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Concur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Request Returned to Defense Agency Denied</td>
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<td></td>
<td>End</td>
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</table>

#### Non-JMP Defense Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Billet or Position</th>
<th>Military</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV. If Manpower Requirements are not Approved or all do not Concur</td>
<td>Joint Organization Receives Disapproval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OSD Approves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Request Returned to Defense Agency Denied</td>
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#### Defense Agencies (JMP and Non-JMP)

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<thead>
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<th>Type of Billet or Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV. If Manpower Requirements are not Approved or all do not Concur</td>
<td>Joint Organization Receives Disapproval</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</table>
Appendix B

DoD Joint Manpower Requirements Change Process
Unified Commands and International Activities

JMP Defense Agencies
Non-JMP Defense Agencies

Type of Billet or Position
Military and Civilian
Military
Military
Civilian

If Manpower Requirements are Approved

C
J-1 Updates JMP and Forwards to OSD

OSD Approves
No

D
J-1 Issues Implementer to Activity

End

C
J-1 Returns Approved Requirements to Joint Org

Joint Organization Inputs to FYDP

End

C
OSD Issues PBD

If Services Receive PBD They Can Submit Reclama

OSD Reviews Reclamas and Approves or Disapproves

If Approved, Budget Documents Updated

End

End

JMP/MRCP Returned to Cmd/Actv Denied

Position Authorized for Fill

End
# APPENDIX C

## ACTIVITIES VISITED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office of the Secretary of Defense</th>
<th>Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Pentagon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Pentagon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
<td>Director for Manpower and Personnel (J 1), Pentagon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint Electronic Warfare Center, San Antonio, Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified Commands</td>
<td>U.S. Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. European Command, Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offices of Defense Cooperation, United States Embassy, Bonn, Germany, and Brussels, Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International/Combined Commands</td>
<td>Allied Command Europe, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allied Air Forces Central Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### Military Departments

**Army**  
United States Army, Total Army Personnel Center, Alexandria, Virginia

**Navy**  
Headquarters, United States Navy, Pentagon  
United States Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Arlington, Virginia  
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Pentagon  
Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (Marine Corps), Arlington, Virginia

**Air Force**  
Headquarters, United States Air Force, Pentagon  
United States Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas

### Defense Agencies

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Pentagon  
Central Imagery Office, Vienna, Virginia  
Defense Intelligence Agency, Arlington, Virginia  
Defense Logistics Agency, Cameron Station, Alexandria, Virginia  
Defense Security Assistance Agency, Crystal City, Virginia
APPENDIX D

REPORT DISTRIBUTION

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer)
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Requirements and Resources)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Personnel Policy)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civilian Personnel Policy)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Department of Defense General Counsel

Joint Staff

Director, Joint Staff
Director for Manpower and Personnel (J1)

Unified Combatant Commands

Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command

Combined Commands

Headquarters, Allied Command Europe
Headquarters, Allied Air Forces Central Europe

Army

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
Inspector General
Chief of Staff, Army
Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel
Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command
Director, Officer Personnel Management Directorate
Auditor General, Department of the Army

Navy

Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
Naval Inspector General
Chief of Naval Operations
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower and Personnel)
Chief of Naval Personnel
Auditor General, Department of the Navy

Marine Corps

Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
Inspector General of the Marine Corps

Air Force

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Environment)
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Environment)
Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
Chief of Staff, Air Force
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
Commander, Air Force Military Personnel Center
Auditor General, Department of the Air Force

Defense Organizations

Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency
Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
Director, Central Imagery Office
Director, Defense Commissary Agency
Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency
Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service
Director, Defense Information Systems Agency
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, Defense Investigative Service
Director, Defense Legal Services Agency
Director, Defense Logistics Agency
Director, Defense Mapping Agency
Director, Defense Nuclear Agency
Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency
Director, National Security Agency
Director, On-Site Inspection Agency

Non-Defense Federal Organizations and Individuals

Office of Management and Budget
Technical Information Center, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office
Chairman and ranking minority member of each of the following congressional committees and subcommittees:

  Senate Committee on Appropriations
  Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
  Senate Committee on Armed Services
  Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
  House Committee on Appropriations
INSPECTION TEAM MEMBERS

Inspection Director

Phase I
Lt. Col. Duane A. Jones, USAF

Phases II and III
LTC John C. Snider, USA

Inspectors
Dennis J. Cullen
MAJ Mitchell J. Hailstone, USAF
Arthur J. Maurer
Vanessa D. Whitaker