

Audit



Report

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING
AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

Report No. 94-160

June 30, 1994

Department of Defense

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Acronyms

ADP	Automatic Data Processing
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
JDS	Joint Deployment System
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPS	Joint Operation Planning System
WAM	WWMCCS Automatic Data Processing Modernization
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-2884



June 30, 1994

**MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
(FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER)
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF**

**SUBJECT: Audit Report on the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
(Report No. 94-160)**

We are providing this report for your review and comments. The report discusses the development and use of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, a joint, conventional command and control system. Comments on a draft of this report were considered in preparing the final report.

DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, we request that the Departments of the Army and Navy provide comments on the unresolved recommendations by August 30, 1994. DoD Directive 7650.3 also requires that comments indicate concurrence or nonconcurrence in each recommendation addressed to you. If you concur, describe the corrective actions taken or planned, the completion dates for actions already taken, and the estimated dates for completion of planned actions. If you nonconcur, state your specific reasons for each nonconcurrence. If appropriate, you may propose alternative methods for accomplishing desired improvements.

The courtesies extended to the audit staff are appreciated. If you have any questions on this audit, please contact Mr. Harlan M. Geyer, Audit Program Director, at (703) 604-9593 (DSN 664-9593) or Mr. George J. Sechiel, Audit Project Manager, at (703) 604-9477 (DSN 664-9477). The distribution of this report is listed in Appendix C. The audit team members are listed on the inside back cover of this report.

David K. Steensma

David K. Steensma
Deputy Assistant Inspector General
for Auditing

Office of the Inspector General, DoD

Report No. 94-160
(Project No. 3RA-0029)

June 30, 1994

THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is a command and control system for the joint planning community.* The JOPES was developed as a unified planning and execution system that would integrate the planning capabilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Operation Planning System and the Joint Deployment System.

Objectives. The audit evaluated whether JOPES satisfied the informational needs of senior-level decision makers involved in deliberate and crisis planning and operations. In addition, the audit evaluated the capabilities and performance of JOPES in relation to established criteria and the effectiveness of applicable internal controls.

Audit Results. The informational needs of senior-level decision makers are not satisfied by JOPES. As a result, the information provided to decision makers has the potential to be untimely and inaccurate.

Internal Controls. The audit identified no material internal control weaknesses. See Part I for a description of controls assessed.

Potential Benefits of Audit. This report identifies no potential monetary benefits; however, other benefits are described in Appendix A.

Summary of Recommendations. We recommended that one Joint Staff official be responsible for JOPES, that the use of JOPES be mandatory for all operations, and that the interoperability of JOPES be maintained during and after the transition to the Global Command and Control System. We also recommended identifying and tracking personnel trained in JOPES operations.

Management Comments. The Joint Staff's response indicated that corrective actions have been accomplished. The Navy concurred with the report, but did not provide information on corrective actions. The Air Force concurred and stated that the corrective actions were in process. The Marine Corps concurred and stated that corrective actions were in process. The Army had not provided comments.

Managements' comments and audit responses are detailed in Part II of the report. The full texts of managements' comments are in Part IV. We ask that the Navy provide information on planned corrective actions and completion dates and that the Army comment on the finding and recommendations by August 30, 1994.

*The joint planning community usually consists of the Joint Staff; Military Departments, and certain major commands; unified commands and their subordinate commands; and the Defense agencies, as appropriate.

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This report was prepared by the Readiness and Operational Support Directorate, Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, Department of Defense.

Part I - Introduction

Background

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is a conventional command and control system composed of policies and procedures for deliberate and crisis action planning. The Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) provides automatic data processing (ADP) support for the JOPES. The policies and procedures to be provided by JOPES were to help decision makers improve their ability to:

- o develop operation plans;
- o deploy forces and resources;
- o execute, monitor, and sustain military operations;
- o access and analyze mobilization information that would assist in timely, prioritized decisions; and
- o manage and access information needed to determine global and theater strategies.

Additionally, JOPES was to provide simulations and analysis techniques to aid strategy and plans development. The development of the overall JOPES was to be accomplished incrementally with versions released about every 6 months. Those versions would either enhance the current JOPES or provide a new capability.

Objectives

The overall objective of the audit was to determine whether the JOPES satisfied the informational needs of senior-level decision makers conducting joint* planning and operations. Specific objectives were to evaluate the present capabilities and performance of JOPES in relation to established criteria and to evaluate the effectiveness of applicable internal controls.

Scope and Methodology

We reviewed the operations of JOPES as it is currently configured. In addition, we reviewed system documentation dated from June 1986 to February 1994 to

*Joint connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of more than one Military Department participate.

determine whether JOPES satisfied the informational needs of senior-level decision makers within the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and the unified commands. We did not rely on computer-processed data to develop conclusions on this audit.

The audit was made from March 1993 through February 1994 at the organizations listed in Appendix B. This program audit was made in accordance with auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States as implemented by the Inspector General, DoD, and included such tests of internal controls as were considered necessary.

Internal Controls

The JOPES encompasses the procedures for deliberate and crisis action planning and uses the WWMCCS for ADP support. Internal controls related to the development and approval of operational and crisis action plans were reviewed during the audit, including JOPES's ability to develop and evaluate military options and courses of action; allocate forces and resources; develop military estimates; present and disseminate timely, accurate, and properly aggregated information; and identify, evaluate, and resolve resource shortfalls. The audit identified no material internal control weaknesses related to those functions.

Prior Audits and Other Reviews

No other audit coverage has occurred in the last 5 years directly related to the JOPES program.

Part II - Finding and Recommendations

Use of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

The JOPES does not satisfy the informational needs of senior-level decision makers conducting joint planning and operations. The Joint Staff, the Defense Information Systems Agency, and other organizations that share the management of the development of the JOPES program have used different approaches in satisfying the JOPES' required operational capability. In addition, the age, complexity, and security requirements of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, used to support the JOPES, and a shortage of trained personnel contributed to the problems in meeting information requirements. Also, previous crisis situations have demonstrated a shortage of personnel trained in JOPES operations. As a result, the information provided to decision makers has the potential to be untimely and inaccurate.

Evolution of the Joint Planning System

In May 1981, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff formed a committee under the direction of the Joint Staff J-3 Directorate and tasked the committee to oversee a review of the joint operation planning and execution process to correct deficiencies found in previous command post exercises. In July 1982, the Joint Staff formed the Operation Planning Steering Group to give direction in developing the follow-on system (JOPES) to replace the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) and the Joint Deployment System (JDS).

Joint Operation Planning System. The joint planning community used the JOPS to conduct joint planning during peacetime and in crises. The JOPS provided a plan of operation to complete assigned tasks. The JOPS supported the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his role as the principal military advisor to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council and established procedures for developing, reviewing, and executing global and regional operational plans. The JOPS was oriented toward solving the complex strategic mobility problem associated with force and support deployment and sustainment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, developed a standardized ADP system (the JOPS ADP) that could be used with WWMCCS to support the standardized joint planning procedures.

Joint Deployment System. The JDS was a part of WWMCCS and interfaced with other command and control systems. The JDS supported the joint planning and execution community during its planning process through the capability to build, refine, and maintain time-phased force and deployment data. The JDS was predominantly a crisis planning tool to allow rapid translation of existing operation plans and their associated time-phased force and deployment data into executable operation orders. Further, the JDS allowed deployment movements to be monitored during execution.

Worldwide Military Command and Control System. The WWMCCS was established as a global command and control system. The primary mission was to support the national-level command and control function and to establish effective connectivity among the DoD Components. WWMCCS provides secure communications to transmit tactical warning and intelligence information to the President and the Secretary of Defense and to provide direction from them to the U.S. combatant commanders. WWMCCS is composed of other systems that support commanders from the national to theater levels. With the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network, users can communicate with other users, review and update data at other WWMCCS locations, and transfer data between computers. In addition, the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network permits real-time top secret communications through the use of land lines and satellite communications.

JOPES Development

As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, which changed the organizational roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Joint Staff J-7, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, was formed and was named the proponent for the JOPES, the follow-on system to JOPS and JDS. JOPES, a joint conventional command and control information system, was developed for the National Command Authority; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Joint Staff; and the combatant commanders. JOPES was developed as a unified planning and execution system that would capture and integrate planning capabilities in JOPS and JDS. When fully developed, JOPES was to be the single joint planning and execution system, forming the foundation of the U.S. conventional command and control system. When completed, JOPES would provide policies and procedures for both deliberate and crisis planning using a single upgraded and modernized ADP system that would support the Joint Staff, Military Departments, supported and supporting commanders, their components, and appropriate Defense agencies.

JOPES Operation

As a software application, JOPES is run on the WWMCCS computer system. Since access to the WWMCCS requires a top secret security clearance, only personnel with a definite need to use the WWMCCS are granted JOPES access. In order to use the JOPES software, the WWMCCS ADP System Security Officer must grant access to the WWMCCS. Each WWMCCS site establishes administrative procedures for requesting and granting access. Further, a functional database manager or a technical database manager must grant access to the various JOPES data bases. Controlled access ensures that an individual can perform only those functions required to fulfill operational requirements and for which an individual is qualified by training, experience, and understanding

of the system. Approved access to perform certain functions varies with each JOPES data base. The functional approval can also vary among WWMCCS sites. Therefore, someone granted access for use of a data base through one WWMCCS site may not be able to use that approval to use the same data base through WWMCCS at another site.

WWMCCS Operation and Procedures

WWMCCS Programs. The WWMCCS is a command and control system that has been in existence since the 1960s. It is the communications system that supports the ADP portion of JOPES. Some users consider WWMCCS ADP difficult to learn and operate. WWMCCS ADP is based on mainframe technology and, therefore, lacks the speed and flexibility available in more modern ADP systems. In addition, JOPES transactions are batch processed, which results in an even slower response time. The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff made efforts to improve the operation of WWMCCS through the WWMCCS Information System Program and the WWMCCS ADP Modernization (WAM) Program. The part of the WWMCCS Information System Program concerned with the modernization of JOPS and JDS became the WAM Program. However, those programs have not been entirely successful as discussed below. If changes to WWMCCS hardware and software are not made carefully, the age and interrelationship of the various parts of the WWMCCS could cause overall system problems. A change to one element may have a major effect on other elements of the WWMCCS. Additionally, WWMCCS is a top secret system that requires restrictions on access and on system location.

Processing JOPES Information. Generally, WWMCCS terminals that can be used to process JOPES information are located at the major command level and not at the unit level. Because WWMCCS is top secret, terminals must be located in secure facilities and must be operated by personnel with the proper security clearances. The Military Departments rely on major command personnel to input unit data or on the interface between the Military Department automated systems and JOPES.

Unit Information Input to JOPES. For JOPES to be effective, decisions must be based on accurate information. The needed, detailed information on unit personnel and equipment is maintained at the unit level. Although the unit information may be input to JOPES through the major commands or the Military Department systems, the unit information may not be current before the start of the planning process. Further, during the planning process, standardized data bases, which include information on types of units, but not specific units, are used to configure potential forces for a planned operation. Since unit data may not be current or actual, the potential exists for JOPES to contain inaccurate data on which critical decisions will be based.

JOPES and WWMCCS Integration

The interrelationship of JOPES ADP and WWMCCS makes problems related to the JOPES harder to solve since JOPES cannot be accessed without using WWMCCS. JOPES ADP was planned for use on WWMCCS. JOPES development was also planned to be evolutionary. Once an initial baseline was established, additional versions of JOPES would be added incrementally to the command and control system. The evolutionary process was dependent on the WAM Program. WAM was to upgrade the WWMCCS, which would have supported current and future capabilities needed for command and control requirements. However, users who tested JOPES version 4 were dissatisfied with the results. The users stated that version 4 offered less capability than in prior versions of JOPES. At the same time, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) expressed concern over problems within the WAM Program. Problems in the WAM Program included obsolete hardware, schedule slippages, user community dissatisfaction, and difficulty in correctly determining and controlling software and hardware requirements. As a result, in September 1992, the then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition terminated the WAM Program. Development work on the additional versions of JOPES also stopped until a decision could be made on the future command and control system.

WWMCCS Follow-on System Development

Global Command and Control System. Since 1982, efforts have been made to upgrade the WWMCCS; the WAM Program was the most recent effort. The WAM termination memorandum also required that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) develop new alternatives and recommendations for command and control acquisitions that would meet critical mission needs for the nineties and beyond.

To meet future command and control needs, the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) is being developed by the Joint Staff. The objectives for the GCCS Program are to provide:

- o a common operating environment for the National Military Command Structure, the Commanders in Chief, the Military Departments, and the Commanders of Joint Task Forces;
- o the ability to move mission applications between sites without converting the software or data; and
- o the ability of the warfighter to rapidly adapt to changing world situations and battlefield conditions.

Use of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

Additionally, the GCCS is to provide a user friendly system with growth potential. The Joint Staff plans for the GCCS to eventually replace WWMCCS, resulting in JOPES transitioning to the GCCS.

The GCCS will have an open architecture using hardware from systems used by the Commanders in Chief and the DoD Components and selected software that meets GCCS system standards. The GCCS project manager has not made specific plans on when the transfer will occur and the form that JOPES will take.

Since JOPES is currently used in the overall planning process, certain planning functions have been integrated for the continuity of the planning process. Those functions used to support planning must be maintained when the JOPES transfer to GCCS is made. Although JOPES software improvements may be made before or after the transfer process, software changes should not be made without consideration of the effects on the overall planning process. If the overall planning process is not considered, the effort made in developing the JOPES program and the funds expended will have been wasted.

Military Department Systems that Interface with JOPES

Each Military Department uses an automated system to link with JOPES.

Army. The Army WWMCCS Information System will be used to support the Army's implementation of JOPES. Although the Army WWMCCS Information System has not been fully developed, the interface with JOPES is being taken into consideration during the development process. The Army WWMCCS Information System will be used to extract Army-related information, such as the Army portion of an operation plan from the JOPES data base, and to make the information available to Army users through the Army WWMCCS Information System data base. Updated or revised Army information will be input to JOPES through the Army WWMCCS Information System interface.

Air Force. The Air Force Contingency Operation/Mobility Planning and Execution System serves as the interface between the Air Force planning systems and JOPES. The Contingency Operation/Mobility Planning and Execution System provides the Air Force a standard planning system for contingency planning and execution. The system's Operation Planning Module assimilates aggregate data from the Major Command Manpower and Personnel Module and the Major Command Logistics Module and converts the data into the required format to update JOPES.

Navy. The Navy command and control system is the Operations Support System. The Operations Support System is being developed in increments. The initial increment of the Operations Support System has been fielded with additional increments to be fielded through 1999. Navy personnel indicated that the Operations Support System does not interface with JOPES, but that it would interface with the planned GCCS.

The Marine Corps uses the Marine Air Ground Task Force II system as a bridge between the Marine Corps family of automated information systems and JOPES. The Marine Air Ground Task Force II system is used to update unit-level information in JOPES and to extract data from JOPES. The Marine Corps uses WWMCCS to link the systems together and to perform both functions. Marine Corps personnel stated that during contingency operations, the use of the Marine Air Ground Task Force II caused fewer problems for its personnel than experienced by the other Military Departments.

Training and Tracking of JOPES Operators

Training Personnel. Two courses are used to train personnel in JOPES operation. The Armed Forces Staff College is responsible for the 3-day Joint Planning Orientation Course, which covers JOPES processes and procedures. The JOPES Users Course is taught by the JOPES Training Organization of the U.S. Transportation Command. The objective of the 9-day JOPES Users Course is to train personnel responsible for using JOPES ADP and associated WWMCCS capabilities. The course includes briefings and practical hands-on training and requires a top secret clearance because of the WWMCCS interface. The JOPES Training Organization trains about 800 personnel annually in the JOPES Users Course. However, the U.S. Central Command reported that a shortage of trained personnel is one cause of inaccurate JOPES data. A shortage of trained personnel has been encountered by the U.S. Central Command in the early stages of major deployments. For example, in the initial stages of Operation Desert Shield, the U.S. Transportation Command provided some of its personnel, trained in JOPES ADP, to augment the U.S. Central Command operational staff.

Tracking Trained Personnel. A high turnover rate is a major reason for the shortage of trained personnel. Most of the personnel with JOPES ADP training are in that position for only one assignment. Once those personnel have completed the assignment, they move to assignments that are not JOPES ADP- or WWMCCS-related. The Military Departments have not developed or instituted a program to identify and track personnel who have received training in JOPES ADP. A tracking system would help to identify personnel with the necessary training when JOPES ADP trained personnel are needed. Identifying and tracking trained personnel would alleviate shortages of trained personnel during a crisis and could alleviate some of the problems in the accuracy of the data. The Marine Corps uses an informal network to track personnel that have completed JOPES ADP training. Although the Marine Corps tracking system is informal, it produced the desired result of placing trained personnel in positions requiring experience in JOPES ADP when vacancies arose.

Mandatory Use of JOPES. Some of the problems associated with a shortage of trained personnel can be remedied by making the use of JOPES mandatory for planning and operating personnel. Mandatory use of JOPES could require that it be used during the planning and execution process of all operations by the Commanders in Chief and the DoD Components. Further, training will be

more effective if planning and operating personnel always use JOPES instead of just in a crisis. Mandatory JOPES use will increase familiarity, which should increase user proficiency and reduce the potential for errors in data provided to senior-level decision makers.

Conclusion

If used properly, JOPES can provide senior-level decision makers with needed information. As a tool for deliberate planning, JOPES can fulfill its expected role with one office responsible for its operation and development. Many of the problems associated with JOPES ADP are interrelated. If the use of JOPES is made mandatory for all operations, user proficiency could lead to improved reliability of the data.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit Response

1. **We recommend that the Director, Joint Staff:**
 - a. **Designate one official within the Joint Staff as responsible for the operation and future development of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.**
 - b. **Require the Project Manager, Global Command and Control System, to maintain the interoperability of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System during and after its transition from the Worldwide Military Command and Control System to the Global Command and Control System.**
 - c. **Require all DoD Components to use the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System for all joint planning and operations.**

Management Comments. The Joint Staff stated that the office of primary responsibility for JOPES was transferred to J-3, the GCCS project manager will work with J-6 on interoperability requirements, and on May 5, 1994, use of JOPES became directive for all joint planning and operations.

Audit Response. The actions taken by the Joint Staff meet the intent of the recommendations.

2. We recommend that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army; Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Department of the Navy; Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Department of the Air Force; and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps:

a. Identify the positions requiring personnel trained to operate the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.

b. Develop a system to identify and track personnel trained in operating the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.

Management Comments. The Navy concurred with the draft report, but provided no information on corrective actions. The Air Force concurred and stated that policy and procedures for identifying positions for JOPES training and tracking personnel experienced with JOPES will be completed by October 1994. The Marine Corps stated that positions requiring JOPES training are identified and that those personnel trained in JOPES are tracked.

Audit Response. The Air Force and Marine Corps comments are responsive. We request that the Navy provide comments on the final report, indicating the corrective actions to be taken and the planned implementation dates. The Army had not provided comments on the draft report. Therefore, we request that the Army provide comments on the final report.

Part III - Additional Information

Appendix A. Summary of Potential Benefits Resulting from Audit

Recommendation Reference	Description of Benefit	Type of Benefit
1.a.	Economy and efficiency. Provides better management oversight of the JOPES program and will correct internal control deficiencies.	Nonmonetary.
1.b.	Economy and efficiency. Provides for continuity of operations while JOPES is being improved.	Nonmonetary.
1.c.	Economy and efficiency. Provides JOPES use for all planning and operations.	Nonmonetary.
2.a.	Economy and Efficiency. Provides for the identification of positions requiring JOPES training.	Nonmonetary.
2.b.	Economy and Efficiency. Provides the ability to track and utilize JOPES trained personnel.	Nonmonetary.

Appendix B. Organizations Visited or Contacted

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence),
Washington, DC

Joint Staff

Director J-1 (Manpower and Personnel), Washington, DC
Director J-3 (Operations), Washington, DC
Director J-4 (Logistics), Washington, DC
Director J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy), Washington, DC
Director J-6 (Command, Control, Communication and Computer Systems),
Washington, DC
Director J-7 (Operational Plans and Interoperability), Washington, DC

Department of the Army

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, DC
Office of the Project Manager, Army Worldwide Military Command and Control
System Information System Office, Fort Belvoir, VA

Department of the Navy

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC
Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, DC
II Marine Expeditionary Force, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, Camp Lejeune, NC
2nd Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, NC
2nd Force Service Support Group, Camp Lejeune, NC

Department of the Air Force

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, Washington, DC

Appendix B. Organizations Visited or Contacted

Unified Commands

U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL
U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Belleville, IL

Other Defense Organizations

Worldwide Military Command and Control Automatic Data Processing Project
Management Office, Defense Information Systems Agency, Sterling, VA
Global Command and Control System Project Management Office, Defense
Information Systems Agency, Alexandria, VA
National Military Command System Automatic Data Processing Directorate, Defense
Systems Support Organization, Washington, DC

Appendix C. Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Comptroller of the Department of Defense
Director, Joint Staff

Department of the Army

Secretary of the Army
Auditor General, Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Secretary of the Navy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management)
Auditor General, Naval Audit Service

Department of the Air Force

Secretary of the Air Force
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Auditor General, Air Force Audit Agency

Unified Commands

Commander, U.S. Central Command
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command

Defense Agencies

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency
Director, Defense Logistics Agency
Director, National Security Agency
Inspector General, Central Imagery Office
Inspector General, Defense Intelligence Agency
Inspector General, National Security Agency
Director, Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange

Appendix C. Report Distribution

Non-Defense Organizations

Office of Management and Budget
Technical Information Center, National Security and International Affairs Division,
General Accounting Office

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of Each of the Following Congressional
Committees and Subcommittees:

Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Subcommittee on Military Readiness and Defense Infrastructure, Committee on
Armed Services
Senate Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces, Committee on
Armed Services
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
House Committee on Appropriations
House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Armed Services
House Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Government Operations
House Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, Committee on Government
Operations

Part IV - Management Comments

Department of the Navy Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D C 20350-1000

JUN 16 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ASSISTANT INSPECTOR
GENERAL FOR AUDITING

SUBJECT: Draft Audit Report on the Joint Operation Planning and
Execution System (Project No. 3RA-0029)

Ref: (a) DODIG Memo of 4 May 1994

As requested by reference (a), the Department of the Navy
has reviewed and concurs with the subject report as written.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Dorothy M. Meletzke", is positioned above the typed name.

DOROTHY M. MELETZKE
Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
Acting

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Department of the Air Force Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE



1. 6 JUN 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FROM: AF/XO
1630 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1630

SUBJECT: Draft Audit Report on the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
(Project No. 3RA-0029) - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

This is in reply to your memorandum requesting the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) to provide Air Force comments on subject report.

FINDING: Use of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. Concur. In addition, the lack of close user involvement in the JOPES development was also a key contributing factor in the failure of the JOPES development effort.

FINDING: Evolution of the Joint Planning System. Concur.

FINDING: JOPES Development. Concur.

FINDING: JOPES Operation. Concur.

FINDING: WWMCCS Operation and Procedures. Concur. JOPES needs to be more responsive and accurate in feeding critical unit information (both actual and planning data) to MAJCOMs and into the JOPES data bases to better support critical decision making.

FINDING: JOPES and WWMCCS Integration. Concur, with change. The term "JOPES ADP" should be changed to read "JOPES" because JOPES is much more than an ADP system. Also, all references to WWMCCS in the document should be changed to "WWMCCS Standard ADP" because this is the portion of WWMCCS that JOPES resides on.

FINDING: WWMCCS Follow-on System Development. Concur, with change. As an outgrowth of WAM termination, GCCS is targeted to replace **only** the WWMCCS Standard ADP element of WWMCCS on which JOPES resides. Therefore, to be more accurate, the sentence on page 10, line 18 should read, "...The Joint Staff plans for the GCCS to eventually replace the WWMCCS Standard ADP element of the Data Collection and Processing Subsystem of WWMCCS, resulting in JOPES transitioning to the GCCS."

Department of the Air Force Comments

FINDING: Military Department Systems that Interface with JOPES. Concur, with change. Change the Air Force portion to read: "Air Force. The Air Force Command and Control System (AFC2S) was to provide the Air Force interface to JOPES and migrate to the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). In February 1994, the Air Force canceled the AFC2S Program. A new strategy for migrating Air Force C2 applications to GCCS is under review."

FINDING: Training and Tracking of JOPES Operators. Concur.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Concur with all recommendations. AF/DP is putting finishing touches on the policies and procedures for identifying the positions requiring JOPES trained personnel, as well as identifying and tracking JOPES trained/experienced personnel. Planned implementation date is 31 October 1994.



RICHARD C. BETHUREM
Major General, USAF
Director of Plans, DCS/P&O

Marine Corps Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380 0001

IN REPLY REFER TO:
7500/3RA-0029
RFR-10/rfk
16 June 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, READINESS AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
DIRECTORATE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, DOD

Subj: DODIG DRAFT AUDIT REPORT ON THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING
AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) (PROJECT #3RA-0029)

Ref: (a) DODIG memo of 4May94

1. The reference transmitted the subject draft report for review
and requested Marine Corps comments.

2. The following comments are provided:

a. Recommendation 2a. "We recommend that the...Deputy
Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine
Corps identify the positions requiring personnel trained to
operate the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System."

(1) Concur.

(2) Positions requiring JOPES trained personnel are
identified within Tables of Organization of those organizations
with joint planning requirements.

b. Recommendation 2b. "We recommend that the...Deputy
Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine
Corps develop a system to identify and track personnel trained in
operating the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System."

(1) Concur.

(2) The Marine Corps has two MOSSs, 9909 and 9919, which
require JOPES training. This training is obtained at the Armed
Forces Staff College, the Air Force Education and Training
Command, or the JOPES training organization, U.S. Training
Command. Tracking has been successfully accomplished via
tracking of school completion codes contained within personnel
records.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. F. Kassel", is located below the text.

Robert F. Kassel
By direction of the
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Joint Staff Comments



THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

DJSM-661-94
16 June 1994

Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Subject: Draft Audit Report on the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (Project No. 3RA-0029)

1. The Joint Staff has reviewed the subject report and its recommendations. Comments on each of the three recommendations addressed to the Joint Staff are provided below. Additional comments on the draft report are provided in the Enclosure.
2. Recommendations for Corrective Action:
 - a. Designate one official within the Joint Staff responsible for the operation and future development of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). With the transfer of the office of primary responsibility from J-7 to J-3, which was completed in November 1993, J-3 now has total responsibility for JOPES.
 - b. Require the Project Manager, Global Command and Control System (GCCS), to maintain the interoperability of JOPES during and after its transition from the Worldwide Military Command and Control System to GCCS. Interoperability is a key factor in the GCCS. The management plan for GCCS contains many references to interoperability. The GCCS management structure calls for the J-6 to work with the GCCS Project Manager to implement program decisions, many of which will reflect interoperability requirements.
 - c. Require all DOD components to use JOPES for all joint planning and operations. On 5 May 1994, we approved the action to make the JOPES publications, which require JOPES use in all joint planning and operations, directive in nature.

3. The Joint Staff point of contact for this review is
Mr. Stuart Robinson, J-3, Command Systems Operations Division,
(703) 693-9677.



R. C. MACKE
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosure

Joint Staff Comments

Final Report
Reference

ENCLOSURE

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: DRAFT AUDIT REPORT
PROJECT NO. 3RA-0029

1. Executive Summary

i a. First page, "Introduction," 2d line. Change as follows: ". . . joint planning and execution community. . . ."

REASON: This term is used in the JOPES volumes and more accurately reflects the intended audience.

i b. First page, "Audit Results." Delete, and substitute: "The current operational JOPES emphasizes exchange of information needed at the action officer level, with little support provided for senior decision makers. Further, much of the data that could be of use to the decision maker is untimely and potentially inaccurate."

REASON: More accurately reflects the current situation.

2. Part I--Introduction

2 Page 2, "Background," 5th and 6th lines. Change as follows: "JOPES. ~~The policies and procedures to be provided by JOPES were to help~~ JOPES development is evolutionary, building on the current capabilities, with the eventual goal of helping decision makers improve their ability to:"

REASON: Accuracy. Although the ROC certainly emphasizes decisionmaker support, virtually all the current capabilities reflect action officer needs.

3. Part II--Findings and Recommendations

6 a. Page 6, "Use of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System." Change as follows:

(1) Add the following sentence between the first and second sentences of the paragraph: "The current capability is based on earlier systems, which emphasized action officer support."

Enclosure

REASON: Accuracy. Although the ROC certainly emphasizes decision maker support, virtually all the current capabilities reflect action officer needs.

(2) At the end of the original second sentence, after the word "capability" replace the period with a comma and add the following phrase: "with its emphasis on senior-level support."

REASON: Same as (1) above.

b. Page 6, "Evolution of the Joint Planning System," 3d paragraph, 3d and 4th lines. Change as follows:
. . .~~during-its-planning-process~~ through the its capability. . . maintain online networked time-phased. . . ."

REASON: Original sentence could also describe JOPS. Fixes differentiate JDS from JOPS.

c. Page 7, "Worldwide Military Command and Control System," 2d line. Change as follows: ". . . ~~global~~ worldwide"

REASON: Avoids confusion between WWMCCS and GCCS.

d. Page 8, "WWMCCS Operations and Procedures," 5th through 7th lines. Delete or revise 4th sentence.

REASON: JOPS does not have a networking capability and hence transactions need to be batched for transfer to other locations. However, JOPEJ JDS transactions are processed online.

e. Page 9, "WWMCCS Operations and Procedures," 2d paragraph, 8th line. Change as follows: "planned operation. In addition, last minute changes are often made to the unit configuration that will actually be deployed. Since"

REASON: Accuracy.

f. Page 9, "JOPEJ and WWMCCS Integration," 10th line. Change as follows: ". . . capability particularly with respect to performance than in."

REASON: The users felt they could not perform their critical tasks as quickly and as easily as in the prior versions.

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Joint Staff Comments

Final Report
Reference

9 g. Page 10, "WWMCCS Follow-on System Development," 2d paragraph, 4th through 10th lines. Delete, and substitute.

"o the warrior with a fused, real-time true picture of his battlespace;

"o the warfighter with the capability to rapidly adapt to changing world situations and battlefield conditions; and

"o interoperability through an information exchange environment that does not require conversion of software or data."

REASON: Consistency with the content of the report. Revision is more technically correct than the original statement.

10 h. Page 10, 3d paragraph, 1st line: Delete, and substitute. "Additionally, through the establishment of a common operating environment, GCCS provides a user friendly, scalable system with growth potential."

REASON: Consistency with the content of the report. Revision is more technically correct than the original statement.

10 i. Page 10, 4th paragraph, 1st through 3d lines. Delete, and substitute. "The GCCS will have an open architecture using common hardware suites and selected software recommended by the Commanders in Chief and the DoD Components."

REASON: Consistency with the content of the report. Revision is more technically correct than the original statement.

12 j. Page 12, "Conclusion," 1st and 2d lines. Change as follows: "~~If Although~~ if . . . decision makers with some needed information, future JOPES versions need to directly address senior-level decision maker needs. As a"

REASON: Clarification. Reiterates lack of senior-level decision support in current system, but emphasizes need to address this in future.

Audit Team Members

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