

Audit

Report



OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

NAVAL RESERVE REINFORCING AND SUSTAINING UNITS

Report Number 92-116

June 30, 1992

Department of Defense

The following acronyms are used in this report.

CAI	Cross-assigned In
CAO	Cross-assigned Out
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
IAP	In-assignment Processing
IRAD	Individual Readiness Assessment Designator
M-DAY	Mobilization Day
M+1	Mobilization Day plus 1 Month
RBTP	Reserve Billet Training Plan
R-TRACK	Reserve Training Track
RUAD	Reserve Unit Assignment Document
SELRES	Selected Reserve
SORTS	Status of Resources and Training System



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June 30, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT)

SUBJECT: Audit Report on Naval Reserve Reinforcing and
Sustaining Units (Report No. 92-116)

This is the final report on the Naval Reserve Reinforcing and Sustaining Units segment of our audit of Early Deploying Guard and Reserve Units. The report addresses conditions on the requirements for and the training of Naval Selected Reserve reinforcing and sustaining units. Comments on a draft of this report were considered in preparing the final report.

Recommendations and potential monetary benefits are subject to resolution in accordance with DoD Directive 7650.3 in the event of nonconcurrence or failure to comment. The Directive requires that audit reports be resolved promptly. The "Status of Recommendations" section at the end of each finding identifies the unresolved recommendations and the specific matters to be addressed in your comments on this final report. It is requested that the Department of the Navy comments on this final report be provided within 60 days of the date of this report.

The courtesies extended to the audit staff are appreciated. If you have any questions on this audit, please contact Ms. Mary Lu Ugone at (703) 692-3320, (DSN 222-3320) or Mr. Harrell Spoons at (703) 692-2846, (DSN 222-2846). The distribution of this report is listed in Appendix D.

Robert J. Lieberman
Assistant Inspector General
for Auditing

cc:
Secretary of the Navy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force
Management and Personnel)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
Director, Joint Staff

Office of the Inspector General

AUDIT REPORT NO. 92-116
(Project No. ORB-0012.02)

June 30, 1992

NAVAL RESERVE REINFORCING AND SUSTAINING UNITS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction. This report addresses Naval Selected Reserve reinforcing and sustaining units, which are intended to augment operational units and activities. Only personnel comprise these units--no equipment. The members of reinforcing and sustaining units may mobilize and deploy as units or as individuals, but they are integrated into the organizations that they augment and lose their Selected Reserve unit identity. The Navy estimated that funding for personnel and for the operation and maintenance of reinforcing and sustaining units was about \$655 million in fiscal year 1990. As of August 1990, more than 85,000 personnel were authorized in reinforcing and sustaining units.

Objective. The objective of the overall audit on Early Deploying Guard and Reserve Units (Project No. ORB-0012) was to evaluate the capabilities of early deploying Guard and Reserve units. The objective of this segment of the audit was to evaluate the status of Selected Reserve units that were excluded from reporting in the Status of Resources and Training System, specifically, Naval reinforcing and sustaining units, because senior DoD management's visibility over those units was limited. We evaluated the planning and conduct of training and how training status was reported to senior management. Operation Desert Shield started while the audit was in progress; therefore, we also determined how reinforcing and sustaining units and personnel were used to augment active Naval forces during that crisis. We also evaluated internal controls germane to the audit objectives.

Audit Results. The audit showed that reinforcing and sustaining units were operated as personnel pools and that billets were authorized to compensate for unresourced Active Component billets without due consideration of alternative sources. The audit also showed that the effectiveness of training was diminished by personnel assignment policies and by limited training capabilities at Reserve Centers that were remote from Active Component Naval installations. Finally, although the bulk of Naval Selected Reservists was assigned to reinforcing and sustaining units, the training status of those personnel and units was not made available to managers outside the Navy.

o Naval requirements for reinforcing and sustaining units and individuals may be overstated. The establishment of billets without due regard to urgency of need and for skills that could be satisfied by alternative sources could result in resource expenditures on personnel and facilities that are not needed (**Finding A**).

o The management of training for personnel assigned to reinforcing and sustaining units needs to be improved. Because of volatility in personnel authorizations and assignments and limited training capability at some Reserve Centers, the adequacy of training in reinforcing and sustaining units cannot be assured (**Finding B**).

Internal Controls. We evaluated internal controls over training and the reporting of training status and concluded that controls over training for cross-assigned personnel needed to be improved. Furthermore, reports of training status did not include all assigned personnel and did not reach all officials who needed that information. These weaknesses were deemed not to be material.

Potential Benefits of Audit. Improved procedures for determining new billet requirements and revalidating existing billets should result in a need for fewer Selected Reserve billets. Potential monetary benefits will result from reduced billet requirements; however, until the billets to be eliminated are identified, the amount of monetary benefits is undeterminable. Other, nonmonetary, benefits are detailed in Appendix B.

Summary of Recommendations. We recommended revised procedures for establishing reinforcing and sustaining billets and a revalidation of the need for existing billets. We also recommended a change in personnel assignment policy to eliminate cross-assignments, better resourcing of Reserve Centers that do not have access to nearby Active Component Naval installations, and dissemination of training status information to DoD management.

Management Comments. The Navy nonconcurrent that procedures for establishing Selected Reserve billets need to be revised or that urgency of need or extended early warning times should be considered when validating mobilization billet requirements. The Navy did agree that each Selected Reservist should be assigned to a valid mobilization billet.

The Navy also nonconcurrent that cross-assignments should be eliminated or that each Reserve Center should develop a capability to train all assigned personnel in the skills required of their billets. The Navy agreed that the training status of

augmenting Selected Reserve should be more widely reported to management levels. The Navy also agreed that internal controls over the training of cross-assigned personnel should be improved. The Navy did not concur that monetary benefits would be realized.

Audit Response. Based on management's comments, we have revised Recommendations A.1. and A.3. in the final report. We request that the Department of the Navy provide final comments on the unresolved recommendations and potential monetary benefits within 60 days of the date of the date of this report.

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This report was prepared by the Readiness and Operational Support Directorate, Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, DoD. Copies of the report can be obtained from the Information Officer, Audit Planning and Technical Support Directorate, (703) 614-6303, (DSN 224-6303).

PART I - INTRODUCTION

Background

The mission of the Naval Reserve is to provide trained units and qualified personnel for active duty in the Naval forces in time of war or national emergency or when otherwise authorized by law. The Selected Reserve (SELRES) consists of those units and individuals considered so essential to initial wartime tasks that they have priority over all other Reserves.

The Naval SELRES comprises about 20 percent of the total Naval force. The Naval SELRES has approximately 3,000 units that are categorized as commissioned, reinforcing, or sustaining units. Commissioned units are operational units that have organic equipment such as aircraft, ships, etc. Upon mobilization, they would be employed as discrete units retaining their individual unit identity. When called to active duty, Naval SELRES commissioned units expand the active force structure. Reinforcing and sustaining units are intended to augment operational units and activities. They have only personnel--no equipment. The members of reinforcing and sustaining units may mobilize and deploy as units or as individuals, but they are integrated into the units that they augment and lose their SELRES unit identity. Reinforcing SELRES augment Naval commissioned units such as ships and squadrons. They also augment Marine Corps units. Sustaining SELRES augment fleet and force activities that require a surge of activity during increased operational tempo. Fleet and force activities include intelligence, security group, communication, and maintenance units, as well as bases, stations, and other support functions.

Members of the SELRES receive pay for participating in both inactive and active duty training. They may also qualify for promotion and for retirement with full military retirement benefits commencing at age 60.

Fiscal year 1990 funding for Naval SELRES was \$2.47 billion. The Navy estimated that funding for personnel and the operation and maintenance of reinforcing and sustaining units was about \$655 million. More than 85,000 personnel were assigned to Naval SELRES reinforcing and sustaining units as of August 1990.

Objectives

The objective of the overall audit was to evaluate the capabilities of early deploying National Guard and Reserve units. Personnel issues unique to the Naval SELRES were addressed in audit Report No. 91-021, "Manpower and Personnel Management in the Naval Selected Reserve," December 14, 1990. Issues concerning Naval SELRES commissioned units were included in audit Report No. 91-108, "Early Deploying Guard and Reserve Units," July 3, 1991. The objective of this segment of the audit was to evaluate the status of SELRES units that are excluded from being

reported in the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) because senior DoD management's visibility over those units is limited. We evaluated the planning and conduct of training and how training status was reported to higher management levels. Because Operation Desert Shield started during the audit, an added objective was to determine how the Naval SELRES reinforcing and sustaining units were used to augment the active forces in that crisis. We also evaluated internal controls germane to the audit objective.

Scope

The audit focused on Naval SELRES reinforcing and sustaining units because those units were excluded from SORTS reporting, yet they comprised more than 60 percent of Naval SELRES strength, and their status was not routinely reported outside the Navy. We visited 2 Reserve Centers, 2 Reserve Readiness Centers, and 2 Reserve Air Facilities that collectively were responsible for administering 218 reinforcing and sustaining units with about 8,700 personnel. The activities visited included sites located near major concentrations of active Naval forces on the east and west coasts and sites in the upper Midwest that were remote from active component Naval forces. Site visits were made during October and November 1990.

At the sites visited, we determined unit missions, personnel authorizations, and assigned strengths. We reviewed training plans, records, and reports; evaluated training facilities; and observed the conduct of training in progress. We also determined how the reinforcing and sustaining units were used in support of Operation Desert Shield. This program results audit was made in accordance with auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States as implemented by the Inspector General, DoD, and accordingly included such tests of internal controls as were considered necessary. The activities visited or contacted are listed in Appendix C.

Internal Controls

We evaluated internal controls over training and over the reporting of the training status of reinforcing and sustaining units. Internal controls were assessed by examining records, observing procedures, and discussing results with responsible officials. We compared the results achieved to the requirements and objectives promulgated in governing regulations and directives. Although we did not find material weaknesses as defined by DoD Directive 5010.38, controls either were not established or were not effective to ensure that cross-assigned personnel were trained in their ratings or to ensure that the training status of SELRES personnel assigned to reinforcing and sustaining units was accurately reported to proper authorities.

Recommendations B.1. and B.3. in this report, if implemented, will correct the weaknesses. A copy of this final report will be provided to the senior official responsible for internal controls within the Department of the Navy.

Prior Audits and Other Reviews

Office of the Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 91-021, "Manpower and Personnel Management in the Naval Selected Reserve," December 14, 1990, states that Naval SELRES personnel without valid mobilization billets received pay for inactive duty training, although Navy policy required that all SELRES in pay status be assigned to a mobilization billet. Contributing factors were billet structure volatility and the Navy's policy of recruiting nationally to meet end-strength goals rather than recruiting locally to fill local billet vacancies. The Navy agreed to reduce the number and frequency of SELRES billet structure changes, reduce the number of personnel without mobilization billet assignments, and terminate drill pay for personnel who remained unassigned for more than 60 days. Billet structure volatility and recruiting policies also contributed to the conditions cited in the findings of this report.

PART II - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. REINFORCING AND SUSTAINING REQUIREMENTS

Naval requirements for SELRES reinforcing and sustaining units and individuals may be overstated. Requirements may be overstated because unresourced active component Navy billets are routinely assigned to the SELRES, because the immediate need for all reinforcing and sustaining billets is not confirmed and because mobilization billet assignments have little validity. As a result, the Navy may be expending resources on personnel and facilities for which no need exists.

DISCUSSION OF DETAILS

Background

Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 1000.16G, "Manual of Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures" (the Manual), June 11, 1990, issued policies and procedures and assigned responsibilities for managing Naval personnel resources. The size and composition of the Naval SELRES are to be based on mobilization requirements. Required forces are determined first, then personnel requirements to support the planned forces are determined. Billet requirements that are not authorized to be filled by active duty personnel become mobilization billets. The Director of Naval Reserve is required to structure the SELRES units based on mobilization requirements generated by Naval activities and approved by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel and Training). According to the Manual, only those mobilization requirements that require military personnel, must be filled within the first 10 days, and require premobilization training may be designated as SELRES billets.

The Manual provides that all ships, squadrons, and mobile or deployable units that could reasonably be expected to deploy within the first 10 days of a mobilization decision should reach full organizational staffing by M+1 (within 1 month of the day of mobilization [M-Day]). Mobilization billet requirements are based on a short-notice global war at sea scenario; however, with limited exceptions, the Navy does not plan to call up Reservists for short-term contingencies. The Naval SELRES exists primarily to support full mobilization.

Discussion

Billet requirements. The Manual states that mobilization billets that are required to be filled by M+1 must be filled by active component or SELRES personnel. Thus, based on the assumption that all mobile or deployable units must be prepared for immediate employment in a short-notice global war scenario, unresourced active force M+1 mobilization billet requirements are designated as SELRES billet requirements without consideration of

alternative solutions. The prospect of a short-notice global war is remote; therefore, SELRES mobilization billet requirements that are based on the assumption that the entire Navy must be staffed for immediate deployment could be overstated.

Urgency of need. SELRES reinforcing and sustaining billets are created without determining whether the billets are essential to initial wartime tasks. In practice, SELRES reinforcing and sustaining units are organized to provide the difference in personnel between the gaining command's peacetime strength and its full authorized wartime strength. The linkage between active force and SELRES billets is direct. Changes in an active component unit's authorized billets cause a change in SELRES authorized billets. Essentiality to initial wartime tasks is assumed.

Operation Desert Shield showed that the need for augmentation during a crisis is not certain. For example, the SELRES units assigned to augment four active Navy ships (U.S.S. WADDELL, U.S.S. THORN, U.S.S. SAN JACINTO, and U.S.S. STANDLEY) were not activated when the ships deployed to Operation Desert Shield. We were told that it was the prerogative of the ships' captains to request SELRES augmentation. A Navy spokesman stated that the SELRES augmentees for those ships would have been activated during full mobilization, but the use of Presidential call-up authority for Operation Desert Shield did not constitute a mobilization. The deployment of the largest U.S. Naval armada that has been assembled in recent history to support Operation Desert Shield was the most taxing scenario that the Navy is likely to face. If the personnel who were intended to augment those ships were not required, we question whether those units should be in the Naval SELRES.

During the audit, only 568 of the more than 8,000 members of the units we sampled had been activated. Furthermore, as of November 5, 1990, only 3,027 of the more than 85,000 members of Naval SELRES reinforcing and sustaining units had been activated. Although those figures are consistent with the Navy's intentions of relying primarily on active component forces for short-term contingencies, we believe that the experience of Operation Desert Shield showed that relatively few Naval SELRES reinforcing and sustaining augmentees would be required in crises short of full mobilization. The OSD had estimated that it would take the former Soviet Union from 1 to 2 years to regenerate the capacity to mount a threat that might require mobilization. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact make the threat even more remote. Therefore, critical examination of the urgency of need for SELRES reinforcing and sustaining billets should enable the Navy to reduce Reserve personnel costs without adverse effects on needed capability.

Essential functions. The military specialties of certain Naval SELRES reinforcing and sustaining billets may not require premobilization training or be so essential that they must be filled within the first 10 days of mobilization. For example, military specialties such as yeoman, storekeeper, draftsman, writer, camp messenger, customer liaison, administrative supervisor, postal clerk, and internal information officer were among the SELRES billets authorized as being essential to initial wartime tasks. Administrative functions do not represent unique military skills that require repetitive training to maintain proficiency. Since, with some exceptions, the Navy does not plan to use the SELRES unless there is a full mobilization, it should be able to meet requirements for administrative skills from the Individual Ready Reserve or from civilian sources during mobilization. Accordingly, we question whether billets for these functions warrant inclusion in the SELRES.

Billet structure. The Navy has established administrative SELRES billets for which there are no corresponding mobilization billet requirements. The incumbents of those billets are intended to provide administrative support for the other Reservists assigned to the unit and would not be called to active duty with the unit. Additionally, the Navy has established SELRES billets for individuals and units that are assigned only a mobilization station (an active force unit or activity), but no specific mobilization billet assignments. For example, 21 of 28 personnel assigned to the U.S.S. STANDLEY and 40 of 50 personnel assigned to the U.S.S. WADDELL were not assigned to a specific mobilization billet in the ships' companies. We question whether there is a need for a SELRES billet for which there is no specific mobilization billet. Reinforcing and sustaining billets for which there are no mobilization billets should be eliminated. Incumbents of such billets should be reassigned to valid mobilization billets, transferred to the Individual Ready Reserve, or released.

Conclusion. Procedures used by the Navy to meet mobilization requirements for reinforcing and sustaining augmentees favor establishing SELRES billets even though less costly alternative solutions may suffice. OSD expects an extended period of warning for any threat of sufficient magnitude to warrant mobilization, and the Navy plans only limited use of SELRES augmentees during crises short of full mobilization. Nonetheless, the Navy has established SELRES billets to support full mobilization. Mobilization billets that are not required for initial wartime tasks and mobilization billets for non-critical military specialties indicate that Naval SELRES reinforcing and sustaining requirements may be overstated. Likewise, SELRES billets for which there are no corresponding mobilization billets may not be valid requirements. Adoption of procedures to preclude automatic assignment of mobilization

requirements to the SELRES, to validate existing SELRES billet requirements, and to eliminate SELRES billets that have no corresponding mobilization billets may enable the Navy to meet force objectives at lower cost.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs):

1. Establish policy to prevent automatic assignment of unresourced active component Navy M+1 mobilization billets to Naval Selected Reserve reinforcing and sustaining units.

2. Validate all Naval Selected Reserve billets in reinforcing and sustaining units for urgency of need against an M+1 requirement.

3. Require that extended early warning of hostilities be considered when justifying Naval Selected Reserve reinforcing and sustaining billets.

4. Eliminate all Naval Selected Reserve billets in reinforcing and sustaining units for which there are no specific mobilization billets.

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS AND AUDIT RESPONSE

Management comments. In response to the finding, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) stated that the auditors had used an outdated version of the Manual; therefore, the premise of Finding A was based on invalid mobilization times. The Navy's response stated that all Naval SELRES billets must be filled within 10 days of mobilization; however, the auditors assumed that the Naval SELRES was intended to meet mobilization requirements from M-Day through M+10 months. The Navy's comments also confirmed that existing Naval SELRES billets were based on full mobilization requirements for a global war at sea. Although the Navy acknowledged that full mobilization to support a global war at sea is no longer considered to be a plausible scenario, the Navy planned to maintain the SELRES force structure until a new Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is issued by the Joint Staff with updated planning guidance. The complete text of the Navy's comments is in Part IV of the report.

Audit response. The Navy's comments reinforce the audit conclusion that requirements for Naval SELRES reinforcing and sustaining billets are overstated. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on February 7, 1991, the Secretary of Defense stated that DoD is planning to eliminate those forces--active or Reserve--whose justification has been based on the previous threat of short-notice global war. Although the Navy acknowledged that the planning basis for the Naval SELRES billet

structure was outdated, no proactive management role to trim the force to current needs was mentioned. As a result, we believe that the Navy is using scarce resources to support unneeded SELRES billets. Finally, the Navy's nonconcurrence is inconsistent with plans reported in the FY 1993 DoD Manpower Requirements Report, published in February 1992, which states that the strength of the Naval Selected Reserve is being reduced for the reasons cited in this report, e.g., the reduced threat of global war and longer warning times.

Recommendation A.1. The Navy nonconcurred that unresourced active component Navy billets are automatically assigned to the SELRES.

Audit response. We have revised the recommendation to reflect current Navy policy governing designation of a mobilization billet as SELRES. We believe the recommendation is valid and request that the Navy reconsider its position. Paragraph 3.b. of the Manual mandates that all M+1 billet requirements must be resourced either by active duty or SELRES personnel. Thus, in accordance with Navy staffing guidance, M+1 requirements must automatically be resourced by SELRES if the active component does not fill the requirement. The Navy response indicated that all existing SELRES billets are required to be filled by M+10 days. As stated in the finding discussion, active component ships deployed without SELRES augmentation, by their captains' choice, during Operation Desert Shield. This fact is evidence that the need for SELRES augmentation of early deploying units is not certain. Furthermore, we believe that the probability of a contingency occurring in the current world environment that would require the immediate employment of all Naval mobile or deployable forces is too remote to warrant the expenditure of scarce resources.

Recommendation A.2. The Navy nonconcurred with the recommendation, stating that there are no M+1 SELRES requirements, rather, all SELRES must be ready to mobilize within 10 days.

Audit response. We believe the recommendation is valid and request that the Navy reconsider its position. The Navy's response is inconsistent with staffing guidance promulgated in the Manual. In a contingency, the Navy plans to meet the M-Day through M+3 months surge in work load at shore-based activities by increasing the number of hours in the work week. Section 7, paragraph 5.b. (1) of the Manual states:

"Personnel onboard at M-Day provide a considerable "surge" capability, when working a 60 hour week. Therefore, augment billets for support activities are normally few at M+1 months, "as necessary" at M+2 months, and in greatest number at M+3 months."

The Navy plans to meet initial surge requirements at support activities by requiring personnel onboard to go to a 60-hour work week. Furthermore, the Navy's comments state that M+1 and later requirements are filled by the Individual Ready Reserve. Given those facts, all SELRES reinforcing and sustaining billets assigned to support activities should be considered for elimination or transfer to the Individual Ready Reserve.

Recommendation A.3. In nonconcurring with the recommendation to require consideration of extended early warning times when establishing SELRES billets, the Navy stated that there are no current SELRES requirements programmed to be activated at or after M+1.

Audit response. Based on the Navy's comments, we have revised the recommendation to delete the M+1 parameter. We believe that the Navy's policy of designating as SELRES only those mobilization billets that are required to be filled within 10 days of mobilization makes the recommendation even more compelling. Accordingly, we request that the Navy reconsider its position and provide comments on the revised recommendation. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the former Soviet Union have invalidated the basis for determining Naval SELRES billet requirements, i.e., full mobilization to support a global war. Even before the final collapse of the Soviet Union, Defense officials had advised the Congress that a year or more of advance warning of a Soviet attack was anticipated. Without a serious naval threat and given extended early warning of impending hostilities, we believe that SELRES reinforcing and sustaining billet requirements are overstated and should be reviewed to identify billets that could realistically be filled by the individual Ready Reserve or by new accessions to maintain needed capability at reduced cost.

Recommendation A.4. The Navy concurred with the recommendation to eliminate SELRES billets for which there was no mobilization billet and stated that an implementing plan would be developed within 6 months.

Audit response. The Navy's comments are considered to be partially responsive to the recommendation. We request that the Navy identify any monetary benefit realized from the elimination of SELRES administrative billets that do not have mobilization billet assignments.

STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Response to Final Report Should Include*

<u>Number</u>	<u>Reconsideration of Position</u>	<u>Proposed Action</u>	<u>Implementation Date</u>	<u>Related Issues</u>
1.	X	X	X	NR
2.	X	X	X	NR
3.	X	X	X	M
4.	NR	NR	NR	M

* NR = No Response Required; M = Monetary Benefits

B. TRAINING

The management of training for personnel assigned to Naval SELRES reinforcing and sustaining units needs to be improved. The effectiveness of training was diminished by volatility in mobilization billet assignments and by fragmented responsibility for training Reservists who had no authorized billets in the local commuting area. Furthermore, training support at Reserve Centers in locations remote from active component Naval bases was not adequate, and reports of training status were based on incomplete data. As a result, the adequacy of training in reinforcing and sustaining units cannot be assured.

DISCUSSION OF DETAILS

Background

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) establishes policy for Naval Reserve training programs. The Commander, Naval Reserve Force, is responsible for the training of all Naval Reservists. All Naval SELRES units and individuals are assigned to either the Naval Surface Reserve Force or to the Naval Air Reserve Force.

The Naval Surface and Air Reserve Forces have made commendable efforts to develop detailed guidance for the training needed to attain and maintain the skills required of every member of their respective commands. Systems to track and report the strength of each unit and the training status of each member and reinforcing and sustaining unit have been developed.

The Reserve Billet Training Plan (RBTP) and the Reserve Training Track (R-TRACK) are used by the Naval Surface and Air Reserve Forces, respectively, to define the training requirements for each mobilization billet. The RBTP and R-TRACK provide billet descriptions and specific minimum training requirements that must be accomplished by each Reservist. These training requirements are the baseline for accessing training proficiency. The Reserve Centers and units compute an Individual Readiness Assessment Designator (IRAD) for each assigned Reservist. The IRAD reflects the percentage of required training that the Reservist has completed. Naval SELRES unit training readiness is an average of the IRAD values attained by assigned personnel who occupy mobilization billets.

Discussion

Billet volatility. Volatility in the Reserve billet structure detracts from training. The Reserve Unit Assignment Document (RUAD) denotes the authorized rating and grade and identifies the incumbent for each SELRES mobilization billet.

Changes in billet structure and in SELRES members' billet assignments are commonplace. The Navy has estimated that there are as many as 2.25 SELRES billet changes per unit per hour. SELRES units' training schedules are based on the training required for the billets listed in the RUAD. Changes in the RUAD cause turbulence in personnel assignments and in training schedules. Those changes create an administrative burden from which no real benefit is derived. Furthermore, it is difficult, if not impossible, to develop effective training schedules when the requirements for skill training are in a state of constant flux.

Cross-assignment. SELRES members may be assigned to any vacant billet for which they are qualified or rated, regardless of the geographical location of the unit that owns the vacant billet. SELRES members are recruited without regard for local billet vacancies. If no suitable billet is available in a Naval SELRES unit that is located within commuting distance of a member's place of residence, the member may be cross-assigned. The SELRES member is identified on the RUAD of the local unit as cross-assigned out (CAO) and on the RUAD of the unit that owns the billet as cross-assigned in (CAI). Cross-assigned personnel attend unit training assemblies in their areas of residence. However, training schedules are based on the training requirements of locally assigned personnel, and training in skills not required by the local unit might be ignored. Also, our examination of individual training records indicated that the records of locally assigned personnel were generally kept more up-to-date. Unit commanders are responsible for training CAO personnel who are affiliated with their units for training, but CAO personnel are not included in the local unit's training readiness reports.

Personnel assigned to a unit as CAI are required to be included in reports of that unit's training readiness. However, the unit that a member is affiliated with for training maintains the training records used to compute the IRAD. Unit commanders and training officers that we interviewed said that they rarely received information about the training status of the CAI personnel assigned to their units. Furthermore, CAI personnel are automatically displaced from mobilization billets when qualified Reservists who reside within commuting distance of the unit are assigned to those billets. Navy personnel stated that CAI personnel were virtually ignored because the average tenure in a CAI billet was only about 3 months, CAI personnel were not physically present with the unit, and little or no information concerning them was available other than the data listed on the RUAD.

The chart in Appendix A shows the status of personnel at the Reserve Centers we visited. About 48 percent of the reinforcing and sustaining personnel affiliated with those Centers, either for training or for training readiness reporting, was not assigned to a mobilization billet in a unit within commuting

distance of their residences. Accordingly, those personnel were either CAO, CAI, or were placed in in-assignment processing (IAP) status and had no permanent mobilization billet or training requirements. We believe this situation prevails throughout all reinforcing and sustaining units, placing the training status of about 45,000 Naval SELRES personnel in doubt.

Training requirements. With limited exceptions, Naval SELRES reinforcing and sustaining units are not organized and trained to be deployed as units. The members of reinforcing and sustaining units are mobilized as individual augmentees. As a result, training in reinforcing and sustaining units must be geared to the requirements of each authorized rating. In addition, training must accommodate the needs of CAO personnel whose ratings are not authorized at the local unit. To meet the training needs of all personnel, each Reserve Center should have the training literature, training aids and devices, and qualified instructors for every authorized and affiliated rating. Because of frequent changes in authorized billets, personnel turbulence, and diverse training requirements created by cross-assignments, it was virtually impossible for a unit or a Reserve Center to satisfy all training needs.

During unit training assemblies, skill training for authorized ratings could not be accomplished because of the difficulty in meeting training requirements for each assigned rating, the lack of adequate training equipment or training facilities, and a lack of personnel qualified to certify that rating-unique training requirements were fulfilled. Therefore, units without regular access to active component Naval Facilities during unit training assemblies were forced to rely on the Reservists' annual 2-week period of active duty training to accomplish specific rate training required for mobilization billets. However, Reservists were required to perform active duty training with their gaining command, or a similar activity, only once every 3 years. The locale for active duty training in the intervening years was negotiable. For example, we found records showing that Reservists had performed annual active duty training at their home Reserve Centers whether or not training in their ratings could be provided. If training requirements cannot be met at the Reserve Center, a member should not be permitted to perform annual active duty training there.

Training facilities. Naval SELRES personnel assigned to Reserve Centers near active component Naval facilities had ready access to needed training facilities, simulators, and expertise. In those situations, active component support of Reserve training was excellent. However, Naval Reserve Centers that were not located near active component Naval installations were not equipped to adequately support the training needs of assigned personnel. For example, the Reserve Center at Omaha, Nebraska, was not equipped to offer hands-on skill training for any rating. The Reserve Center at Rock Island, Illinois, was equipped with simulators that could be used for tactical training and training

in shipboard operations, damage control, and message center operations, but the Center could not support the full range of RBTP training required for the assigned ratings.

Inadequate training capability caused inefficient use of available - training time during unit training assemblies. Examination of records of the training conducted at the Omaha Reserve Center over a 4-month period showed that only 43 percent of the training time was devoted to RBTP requirements. The remaining 57 percent of available training time was used for administrative purposes or for general military training. The records at the Rock Island Reserve Center showed that 63 percent of the available training time was devoted to RBTP requirements, and only 37 percent was devoted to administrative activities or general military training. However, the Reserve Center Commander stated that as much as 50 percent of the overall training time was spent on training in general military subjects directed by higher headquarters, such as equal employment opportunity, sexual harassment, first aid, and physical readiness testing.

Training in general military subjects does not prepare Reservists for particular assignments and is not focused on mobilization billet requirements. The Navy has made the need for peacetime training a prerequisite for establishing SELRES billets. Establishing billets where no capability exists to train the mobilization skills required of each rating compounds the training problem.

Training readiness. The training readiness of Naval SELRES reinforcing and sustaining units was not reported outside Navy channels. Even within the Navy, the training readiness of reinforcing and sustaining units, or of individual augmentees, was not consistently reported to the active component gaining command. Furthermore, personnel in IAP were excluded from all training readiness reports. As a result, the training status of about 85,000 Naval SELRES personnel was not known to the OSD officials who are responsible for developing Reserve Component policies or to the commanders of the Naval units and activities that would be augmented by those personnel. Senior management should have information on the benefits realized from the expenditures of resources on Naval reinforcing and sustaining units.

Conclusion. Responsibility for training should be assigned to and the status of training readiness should be reported by the unit that does the training. Cross-assignments create an unnecessary administrative burden and detract from the effectiveness of training plans and from the management and quality of training for cross-assigned personnel. No real benefit is derived from cross-assignments; therefore, the practice should be eliminated. Furthermore, compliance with the Navy's criteria for establishing SELRES billets requires the capability to train members in the mobilization skills for each rating. We believe that to be effective, the requisite training

should be available to each member during unit training assemblies. Finally, the training status of Naval SELRES reinforcing and sustaining units should be reported to the gaining commands and to senior management.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs):

1. Eliminate cross-assignment of reinforcing and sustaining SELRES members.
2. Develop and implement a plan to provide skill training in the ratings of all assigned reinforcing and sustaining SELRES mobilization billets at each Reserve Center.
3. Require that the status of training in reinforcing and sustaining units be reported periodically to gaining commands (and ultimately to the Joint Staff) and to senior management levels, including the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel).

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS AND AUDIT RESPONSE

Recommendation B.1. The Navy nonconcurred that cross-assignment of SELRES should be eliminated. The Navy stated that actions taken in response to IG, DoD, Audit Report No. 91-021 have improved the readiness and training of cross-assigned personnel, and that the Navy must continue to recruit nationally to meet end-strength goals and total force strength.

Audit response. Cross-assignments detract from training effectiveness by creating temporary mobilization billet assignments for SELRES personnel that may be terminated at any time. Each change in mobilization billet assignment may require different skills within the same rating, thus training requirements will vary. Furthermore, cross-assigned personnel train with units that are not responsible for monitoring and reporting their training status and, as a result, they are likely to be ignored. Cross-assignments also create an avoidable administrative burden that consumes support services. Personnel assigned to Naval SELRES reinforcing and sustaining units mobilize and deploy as individuals rather than collectively as cohesive, functional elements. Therefore, the SELRES reinforcing and sustaining units, per se, exist primarily for the administrative control of assigned and attached personnel. Since unit association has little real meaning to individuals in the Naval SELRES reinforcing and sustaining force structure, we believe that the stability in mobilization billet assignments to be achieved by eliminating cross-assignments would enhance training effectiveness and reduce administrative overhead costs.

We believe that the recommendation is still valid and request that the Navy reconsider its position in response to the final report.

Recommendation B.2. The Navy nonconcurred that each Reserve Center should provide skill training for all assigned ratings, asserting that it would be cost prohibitive and impractical to do so. Instead, the Navy periodically sends SELRES personnel from their home Reserve Center (feeder center) to one of the 14 Reserve Readiness Centers located throughout the nation for needed skill training.

Audit response. The August 12, 1986, version of the Manual stated that: "Only those billets for which there is a demonstrable need and capability for peacetime training may be authorized as SELRES billets." Although that language was not included in the June 11, 1990, version of the Manual, the Manual does make the need for premobilization training a prerequisite for designating a mobilization billet requirement as SELRES. If premobilization training is required, it follows that the capability to provide needed premobilization training is also prerequisite, since all SELRES billets are planned to be mobilized by M+10 days. However, we found SELRES members who routinely trained on systems that were not compatible with the systems used by the active component unit they were scheduled to augment. Furthermore, we found no evidence that all SELRES members who were assigned to feeder centers participated regularly in skill training off-site at Reserve Readiness Centers. We interviewed unit commanders at feeder centers who said that they relied almost exclusively on the annual 2-week active duty training period for skill training for assigned ratings. The Navy faces a herculean task in providing effective skill training to members of Naval SELRES reinforcing and sustaining units, but we believe that monthly reinforcement of skills at the home Reserve Center would be more effective in the long run than uncertain, periodic training while the member is in a travel status. We believe that the recommendation is still valid and request that the Navy reconsider its position in response to the final report.

Recommendation B.3. The Navy concurred that the status of training in reinforcing and sustaining units should be reported periodically to gaining commands and to senior management levels. Reporting procedures have been implemented that will provide the status of training to commanders and managers who request that data.

Audit response. The Navy's comments are considered to be responsive to the recommendation; however, we request that a completion date on the implementation of reporting procedures be provided in response to the final report.

STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Response to Final Report Should Include*

<u>Number</u>	<u>Reconsideration of Position</u>	<u>Proposed Action</u>	<u>Implementation Date</u>
1.	X	X	X
2.	X	X	X
3.	NR	NR	X

*NR = No Response Required

PART III - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Appendix A - Status of Personnel

Appendix B - Summary of Potential Benefits Resulting
.. from Audit

Appendix C - Activities Visited or Contacted

Appendix D - Report Distribution

APPENDIX A. STATUS OF PERSONNEL

The following chart shows the reinforcing and sustaining billet allowance and the number of personnel assigned by category at the Reserve Centers visited.

<u>Center</u>	<u>Allowance</u>	<u>Assigned Locally</u>	<u>IAP</u>	<u>CAO</u>	<u>CAI</u>
Alameda, CA	1,326	1,059	163	67	135
Little Creek, VA	2,047	1,360	359	230	509
Omaha, NE	296	197	93	50	68
Rock Island, IL	220	140	14	50	38
San Diego, CA	2,396	1,583	90	369	309
Washington, DC	<u>1,866</u>	<u>1,553</u>	<u>236</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>67</u>
Totals	<u>8,151</u>	<u>5,892</u>	<u>955</u>	<u>789</u>	<u>1,126</u>

APPENDIX B. SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL BENEFITS RESULTING
FROM AUDIT

<u>Recommendation Reference</u>	<u>Description of Benefit</u>	<u>Amount and/or Type of Benefit</u>
A.1. and A.2.	Program Results. Improves management of the Reserve billet structure.	Nonmonetary
A.3. and A.4.	Economy and Efficiency. Reduces personnel costs by eliminating billets from the Naval Selected Reserve that are not needed or that would not be required in the early stages of a crisis.	Monetary. Funds put to better use are undeter- minable, until the billets to be eliminated are identified.
B.1.	Internal control. Enhances training and reduces administrative burden by eliminating cross-assignments.	Nonmonetary.
B.2.	Program Results. Improves training capa- bility at remote Reserve Centers.	Nonmonetary.
B.3.	Internal control. Improves management of the Naval SELRES by providing training status to all responsible management echelons.	Nonmonetary.

APPENDIX C. ACTIVITIES VISITED OR CONTACTED

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs),
Washington, DC

The Joint Staff

Office of the Director, Operational Plans and Interoperability
(J7), Washington, DC

Department of the Navy

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and
Reserve Affairs), Washington, DC

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations/Chief of Naval Personnel,
Washington, DC

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and
Operations, Washington, DC

Commander, Naval Reserve Forces/Director of Naval Reserve,
Washington, DC

Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Forces, New Orleans, LA

Commander, Naval Air Reserve Forces, New Orleans, LA

Commander, Naval Reserve Recruiting Command, New Orleans, LA

Naval Reserve Personnel Center, New Orleans, LA

Naval Air Reserve Alameda, Naval Air Station, Alameda, CA

Naval Air Facility, Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, DC

Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Omaha, NE

Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Rock Island, IL

Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Readiness Center, Little Creek, VA

Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Readiness Center, San Diego, CA

APPENDIX D. REPORT DISTRIBUTION

Department of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
Comptroller of the Department of Defense
Director, Joint Staff

Department of the Navy

Secretary of the Navy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management)
Director of Naval Reserve
Naval Audit Service

Non-DoD Activities

Office of Management and Budget
U.S. General Accounting Office, NSIAD Technical Information Center

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Following Congressional Committees

Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Committee on Armed Services
Senate Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability and Support, Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
House Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Armed Services
House Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Armed Services
House Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation, Committee on Armed Services
House Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services
House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Government Operations
House Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, Committee on Government Operations

PART IV - MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

Department of the Navy

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Department of the Navy Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
(MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)
WASHINGTON D.C. 20350

8 OCT 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ASSISTANT INSPECTOR
GENERAL FOR AUDITING (READINESS AND
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT DIRECTORATE)


Subj: DRAFT AUDIT REPORT ON NAVAL RESERVE REINFORCING AND
SUSTAINING UNITS (PROJECT NO. ORB-0012.02) - ACTION
MEMORANDUM

I am responding to the draft audit report forwarded by
TAB A concerning Naval Reserve reinforcing and sustaining
units.

The Department of the Navy response is provided at TAB B.
We agree with the audit findings in the area of identifying a
valid mobilization requirement for all SELRES billets and the
area of SORTS reporting. We do not agree in the following
areas:

- Establishing a policy to prevent automatic assignment
of unresourced active component Navy billets to SELRES
reinforcing and sustaining units, recommendation A.1.
- Validation of all SELRES billets in reinforcing and
sustaining units for urgency of need against an M+1
requirement, recommendation A.2.
- Consideration of extended early warning of hostilities
when justifying SELRES billets that are programmed to
be activated after M+1, recommendation A.3.
- Elimination of cross-assignment of reinforcing and
sustaining SELRES members, recommendation B.1.
- Development and implementation of skill training in
the ratings of all assigned billets at each Reserve
center, recommendation B.2

As outlined in the enclosed comments, the Department has
taken or is planning to take specific action to address other
concerns identified in the audit.


BARBARA SPINDLER POPE
Assistant Secretary - The Navy
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

TAB A - DODIG memo of 3 Jul 91
TAB B - DON Response to Draft Audit Report

Department of the Navy Comments
on
DOD IG Draft Report of July 3, 1991
on
Naval Reserve Reinforcing and Sustaining Units
PROJECT NO. ORB-0012.02

A. Finding A: Reinforcing and Sustaining Requirements

1. The following general comment is provided to clarify the Department of the Navy position:

The DODIG team used the old version of OPNAVINST 1000.16, Manual of Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures (OPNAVINST 1000.16F) as opposed to the current version (OPNAVINST 1000.16G) which was signed into effect on 11 June 1990. On page 8 of the draft audit report, the IG states that "The Manual provides that all ships, squadrons, and mobile or deployable units that could reasonably be expected to deploy within the first ten weeks of a mobilization decision should reach full organizational staffing by M+1." It should correctly read 10 days. It also stated that "The Manual also states that valid mobilization billets that must be filled from M-day to M+10 months will be considered for designation as SELRES billets." It should correctly read 10 days.

Recommendation A.1: Establish policy to prevent automatic assignment of unresourced Active Component Navy billets to Naval SELRES reinforcing and sustaining units.

Department of the Navy Position: Non-Concur.

Policy currently exists on this subject. Unresourced Active Component Navy billets are not "automatically" assigned to the SELRES without due consideration of alternative manpower sources, urgency of need/essentiality to initial wartime tasks, and skill requirements. Manpower planning guidance requires that we plan and program for the most cost efficient manpower resources (minimum quantity and quality) that can adequately perform the required functions. Mobilization manpower requirements are analyzed against mission requirements, and designated SELRES only when the criteria specified in OPNAVINST 1000.16G and the NAMMOS users manual are met.

Recommendation A.2: Validate all Naval SELRES billets in reinforcing and sustaining units for urgency of need against an M+1 requirement.

Department of the Navy Position: Non-concur.

There are no M+1 SELRES requirements. SELRES train to be completely ready to mobilize within 10 days. M+1, M+2,... requirements are filled by members of the IRR.

Recommendation A.3: Require that extended early warning of hostilities be considered when justifying Naval SELRES reinforcing and sustaining billets that are programmed to be activated after M+1.

Department of the Navy Position: Non-concur.

There are no current SELRES requirements programmed to be activated at or after M+1.

Recommendation A.4: Eliminate all Naval SELRES billets in reinforcing and sustaining units for which there are no specific mobilization billets.

Department of the Navy Position: Concur.

The Naval Reserve will identify a valid mobilization requirement for all Selected Reserve billets in reinforcing and sustaining units. A Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) will be developed detailing actions to accomplish this alignment of mobilization requirements to billets. The POA&M will be completed within 6 months of the date of this report.

B. Finding B: Training.

Recommendation B.1: Eliminate cross-assignment of reinforcing and sustaining SELRES members.

Department of the Navy Position: Non-concur.

As resolved in OIG Report No. 91-021, "Manpower and Personnel Management in the Naval Selected Reserve," the Navy has realigned units and billets to more closely match the demographics of the Selected Reserve population and stabilized the billet structure. These actions have resulted in improved readiness and training of cross assigned personnel. Because of unique skill requirements and demographics, the Department of the Navy must recruit nationally to meet end-strength goals and total force strength.

Recommendation B.2: Develop and implement a plan to provide skill training in the ratings of all assigned reinforcing and sustaining SELRES mobilization billets at each Reserve Center.

Department of the Navy Position: Non-concur.

Providing skill training for all assigned mobilization

NWP 10-1-11 (SORTS Manual), request "AUC Readiness Reports" via their fleet commanders from COMNAVAIRESFOR or COMNAVSURFRESFOR. A proposal is under development by COMNAVRESFOR (Code 422) to provide readiness data directly to the SORTS data base file on a quarterly basis. This would simplify the accessibility of augment unit information and strengthen Total Force policy.

In February 1990 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Readiness and Training) requested readiness data be supplied on reinforcing and sustaining units. Chief of Naval Operations (OP-095) currently supplies this readiness data on a recurring basis and could be provided to ASD(FMP).

C. Internal Controls: Controls were not established or effective to ensure that cross-assigned personnel were trained in their ratings or to ensure that the training status of SELRES personnel assigned to reinforcing and sustaining units was accurately reported to proper authorities.

Department of the Navy Position: Concur.

As resolved in OIG Report No. 91-021, "Manpower and Personnel Management in the Naval Selected Reserve", the Navy has realigned units and billets to more closely match the demographics of the Selected Reserve population and stabilized the billet structure. These actions have resulted in improved readiness and training of cross assigned personnel. Additionally, COMNAVRESFOR requires the unit to which the SELRES is drilling to include in its readiness reporting data the training status of cross-assigned out personnel.

The status of training of reinforcing and sustaining units is currently reported monthly in WWMCCS and on a recurring basis to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Readiness and Training). COMNAVRESFOR is pursuing a more accessible method of reporting readiness data directly to the SORTS data base.

D. Summary of Potential Monetary Benefits Resulting from the Audit

Department of the Navy Position:

Recommendations A.3, and A.4 suggested that there were potential savings associated with reduced SELRES requirements. We do not concur with the finding in recommendation A.3. Implementation of recommendation A.4 will improve efficiency in SELRES mobilization billet assignments, rather than reduce any valid billet requirements. Hence, we do not concur that monetary benefits will be realized.

Data Accounting System (NMDAS) and appearing on activities' Manpower Authorizations (OPNAV 1000/2s) have been developed using the planning guidance contained in the current versions of the JSCP and NCMP, which called for full mobilization to support a global war at sea. Although Operations Desert Shield/Storm involved the largest deployment of U.S. Naval forces in recent history, it was not a full mobilization, nor was it sea intensive. However, as we saw, over 21,000 SELRES were called to active duty to support this short term contingency.

As a result of the Soviet Union diminishing as a global adversary, and the experience gained in Operations Desert Shield/Storm, new planning guidance is forthcoming. Both the JSCP and the NCMP are under revision at this time and are expected to be complete and distributed by the end of the year. When the new versions are completed, it will be necessary to update subordinate planning guidance (e.g., ROC/POE, LSMP, OPLANS) and revalidate mobilization manpower requirements. Whereas previous planning was for full mobilization future planning will be responsive to increased warning time and will concentrate more on crisis response, contingency response, regional conflict and mutual/peacetime support.