

Headquarters USAF Reorganization

1947-1990

**Air Staff Historical Study
Center for Air Force History
1992**

Preface

This study surveys the changes in the size and functions of Headquarters United States Air Force (USAF) since its inception in September 1947. It examines both the external and internal factors that influenced the Headquarters USAF organization. Additionally, it surveys and evaluates the many reorganizations that were implemented over time.

Divided into three sections, this study begins with a consideration of the external influences that have shaped the Headquarters USAF organization. The second section addresses Air Force internal changes. The third section considers the statistical jumble that invariably accompanies any work dealing with administrative reorganization and also compares Air Force Headquarters strength with that of other Services. Several appendices are included to illustrate the intricacies of reorganization and to suggest some of the difficulties associated with tracking change in a bureaucracy. Finally, a select bibliography is included for those who may wish to delve into this topic in greater detail.

Several members of the Office of the Air Force Historian conducted most of the research and writing: Janet Daly Bednarek, Richard G. Davis, and Perry Jamieson. Karen A. Fleming, of the HQ USAF Division, compiled the pre-1962 statistics and helped edit the study. George Watson, Historian for the Air Force Surgeon General, provided information on the Secretariat.

JACOB NEUFELD, Director
Center for Air Force History

Contents

Preface	i
Key Events	iii
External Influences	1
Major Reorganizations Since 1947	8
Tracking the Numbers	15
Appendices	
A. Headquarters USAF Assigned Personnel, 1948-1990	19
B. DOD Management Headquarters, 1973-1989	27
C. Support Manpower, 1956-1990	28
Notes	30
Glossary	36
Bibliography	37

Key Events

- Jul 1947** **National Security Act** (PL 253) did not specify Headquarters USAF organization in detail; it thereby enabled USAF to organize its headquarters on a completely functional basis.
- Aug 1949** **National Security Act Amendments** (PL 216) established the Department of Defense as the successor to the National Military Establishment and reduced the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to military rather than executive departments.
- cAug 1950** **Public Law 655** suspended the Air Force's peacetime strength limitations until 31 July 1954.
- May 1951** **Internal Reorganization** divided the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Civil Affairs) into two new Assistant Secretaries: (Materiel) and (Management).
- Sep 1951** **Air Force Organization Act** (PL 150) limited the Air Staff to five Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCSs) and established a numerical limit of 2,800 officers on the size of the Air Staff.
- Jun 1953** **DOD Reorganization Plan No. 6** provided for the establishment of six additional Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the transfer of several boards to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- Mar 1955** **Internal Reorganization** added a fourth Assistant Secretary (Research and Development).
- Jul 1957** **Internal Reorganization** split the DCS/Operations into DCS/Plans and Programs, DCS/Operations, and Assistant Chief of Staff (ACS)/Intelligence.
- Aug 1958** **DOD Reorganization Act** changed optional lines of command throughout the Defense Department.
- Apr 1961** **Internal Reorganization**, paralleling the creation of Air Force Systems Command and Air Force Logistics Command, realigned the Air Staff with a DCS/Research and Technology and a DCS/Systems and Logistics.
- Feb 1963** **Internal Reorganization** separated DCS/Plans and Programs into DCS/Plans and Operations and DCS/Programs and Requirements. This was designed to reunite the operations deputy (who handled Joint Chiefs of Staff matters) with the operations section of the Air Staff. To this end, the Directorate of Operations combined with staff planning agencies, while the remainder of

DCS/Programs and Requirements joined the Dir/Programs inherited from DCS/Plans and Programs.

- 1965** **Internal Reorganization** moved the requirements function several times between the Operations and Development areas. Finally transferred from DCS/Programs and Requirements to DCS/Research and Development. As a result, DCS/Programs and Requirements was renamed to DCS/Programs and Resources.
- 1973** **Management Headquarters Program** was established at the behest of Congress to ensure uniformity throughout the Department of Defense in headquarters organizations and in their personnel strengths.
- Jul 1978** **Restructure** sponsored by the Secretary of Defense imposed reductions of ten percent each year for 1976-1978. This resulted in Headquarters USAF reductions of 232, 177, and 306, respectively. In 1979, 282 positions were "realigned" as a measure to reduce presence in the National Capital Region.
- FY 1982** **Internal Air Force 5% reduction** caused the MAJCOMs to lose 413 spaces, although Headquarters USAF was excluded.
- FY 1984** **Congressional 5% reduction** produced a "real" reduction of 7.45% on Air Force management headquarters.
- FY 1985** **Congressional 2% reduction** deleted 523 spaces.
- FY 1986** **Freeze** at FY 1985 level.
- 1986-1987** **Goldwater-Nichols Act** led to the migration of several functions from the Air Staff to the Secretariat. Thus, three major offices were affected: the Assistant Secretary (Acquisition and Logistics) was renamed (Acquisition) — SAF/AQ; Assistant Secretary (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Installations) was renamed Manpower and Reserve Affairs) — SAF/MR; and the Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) was dissolved and its duties assumed by the Comptroller. The latter was transferred to the Secretariat. So, too, was the Deputy Chief of Staff (Research, Development and Acquisition), which was absorbed by the SAF/AQ. The Air Force Inspector General was also transferred to the Secretariat, except for certain military functions — safety, security, and operational readiness evaluation — which remained the responsibility of the Chief of Staff. Finally the Act imposed a 15 percent personnel reduction on the Headquarters.

"[The] mission of Headquarters is one of planning, formulation of policy, and overall guidance and supervision. Any function that is purely operational and which can be performed by our field elements should be transferred to the appropriate command."

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Air Force Chief of Staff, 1948¹

External Influences

During the past forty-three years the number of personnel assigned to the Headquarters, United States Air Force (USAF), has responded to two sets of countervailing influences. One set, in response to the escalating complexity of weapon systems, modern warfare, and reporting requirements, demanded augmented staffing. The other set attempted to prevent growth and promote a smaller staff by stressing economy and centralization of function, either within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Five factors, in descending order of importance, tended to limit the expansion of the Air Staff.

One was congressional pressure for lower ratios of staff to line (or combat) officers throughout the services and congressional desires to make the service headquarters staffs smaller and less obtrusive in the Washington, D.C. area (also known as the National Capital Region). To achieve this, Congress has passed strict limitations on the number of civilians and military personnel assigned to HQ USAF.

The issue of economy versus efficiency in allocating the service's resources was a second factor. In times of peace, economy — in terms of personnel as well as of acquisition — tended to predominate over readiness or efficiency. During the 1970s the Secretaries of Defense (SECDEFs) forced cutbacks in service staffs.

Third, both the SECDEF and the Secretary of the Air Force have at times tried to tighten civilian control of the service by increasing the administrative and resource allocation authority of the service secretary, while decreasing or freezing the size of the headquarters staff.

A fourth factor saw the SECDEF and his secretariat, the OSD, constantly seeking to increase its control of the administration and resource allocation within the Department of Defense (DOD). On occasion, more control by the SECDEF has resulted in reduction for the service management headquarters.

Finally, defense reformers and others have consistently sought to increase the power and authority of the CJCS at the expense of the service

chiefs and the military departments. This included increasing the functions and size of the Joint Staff, while lessening the role of the military departments in operational planning and resource allocation. Military reformers have also consistently questioned the "tooth-to-tail" ratio of staff versus combat related positions in the armed services.

In contrast to those factors that limited the size of the Air Staff and other service staffs, another set of pressures worked to raise them.

First, the growing complexity of organizing, training, and equipping modern combat forces (a function belonging solely to the military departments) necessitated additional management and coordination at the departmental headquarters level.

Second, the increasing complexity of research and acquisition in an era of rapidly changing technology and the increasing complexity of the bureaucratic aspects of the research and acquisition process — imposed by both Congress and OSD on the services — has justified increases in the headquarters.

The natural tendency of a bureaucratic organization to grow with age and maturity was a third factor. Congress, OSD, and the services themselves adopted business management practices for the military departments to enable them to cope with the growing complexity of oversight as well as fiscal and contingency planning responsibilities. However, these business methods of the 1950s and 60s were developed at a time of American manufacturing and management dominance. They left many American companies burdened with top-heavy management and white-collar "feather bedding," which, in turn, made them less competitive in the 1970s and 80s. The military staffs that were run on the same principles, may have suffered from some of the same faults.

Fourth, the implementation of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) in 1961 increased service authority, expertise, and control of fiscal information. It also tended to centralize final fiscal planning in the military department headquarters and to increase their size, in order to deal with a more detailed budget and budget process.

A fifth factor, the expansion of OSD, has produced mirror imaging in the military departments as the services sought, or were required, to create counterpart organizations to new OSD organizations and functions.

Finally, the so-called congressional "micro-management" of the services has resulted in vastly multiplied reporting requirements from the services to Congress. Consequently the service staffs have had to devote more resources to congressional compliance.²

The interplay of the above factors plus the normal increases and decreases associated with beginnings and ends of the wars in Korea and South East Asia can be seen in the waxing and waning of the military staffs.

In the National Security Act of 1947, the U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) gained its long-sought goal of administrative separation from the U.S. Army. At last the newly established Department of the Air Force enjoyed equal status with the Departments of the Navy and Army. Although the Department of the Air Force was an executive department, whose secretary had direct access to the President and sat in the cabinet and the National Security Council, it was not an independent department as were the pre-1947 War and Navy Departments. Instead, all three service departments became part of a National Military Establishment, headed by the SECDEF.

In the legislative bargaining which preceded the passage of the act, the size and function of the service and secretariat staffs received close attention. President Harry S. Truman and Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall advocated the creation of a unified military, with a single budget, commanded by a Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, with access to the President and direct authority over the services and Unified Commanders. The Navy rejected this view, instead advocating coordination rather than administration, through continuation of the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, no overall military commander, and separate service departments and budgets. The Navy, which wished to ensure the continuation of the separate ground and air forces under its own command, hoped for a weak SECDEF. The Navy view prevailed.³

In 1947 the SECDEF had a staff of only 173 persons to assist him in his ill-defined coordination of the National Military Establishment. The retention of executive level service departments perpetuated the traditional relationships between the military and the civilian leadership within the Navy and Army, which the Air Force duplicated. Similarly, the civilian service secretaries had small staffs and relied heavily on their military headquarters staff. They were easily susceptible to co-option by their military services. In 1941 the War Department secretariat numbered 23 civilians and 4 military, versus a headquarters staff of 36 civilians and 172 officers. In 1948 the Army secretariat numbered 891 civilians and 114 officers, while the Army staff numbered a staggering 12,266 civilians and 3,849 officers. For the Air Force in 1948, the figures were 234 civilians and 148 military in the secretariat and 2,595 civilians and 2,279 military in the Air Staff.

These figures for the Air Force demonstrated two trends that have held true for its entire history. First, the Air Force secretariat was the smallest of the service secretariats in absolute numbers and in relationship to its associated military headquarters staff. Second, the Air Force secretariat has had the highest ratio of military to civilian positions assigned to it of all the staffs. This high ratio of uniformed to civilian personnel gave the Air Force secretariat at least the appearance of being dominated by its military service.⁴

The National Security Act of 1947 rejected the idea of a single overall military commander-in-chief for the armed services, in large part because of a fear of military dictatorship. It also rejected a unified armed services general

staff manned by a selected corps of staff officers. Some air and naval officers, who feared army domination of the staff, opposed such a unified staff, based on German precedents and already adopted by the Soviet Union. Congress feared a unified staff would promote militarism (as the German/Prussian General Staff purportedly did). Instead, the National Security Act of 1947 specified a joint staff and a chief of staff for each service.⁵

The creation of the Department of the Air Force permitted the service to build its own organizations, free of the dead hand of past Army practice and tradition. The Air Staff pre-dated independence, however. On 20 June 1941, Army Regulation 955 created the U.S. AAF and gave its commanding general a staff, called the Air Staff. The new Air Staff's organization mirrored the pre-existing War Department General Staff. This organization, with additions for training and public relations, remained intact throughout World War II. After the war, air officers, such as Maj Gen Hugh Knerr and Lt Gen Nathan F. Twining, strongly advocated jettisoning the French General Staff system, which had served as the model for the War Department General Staff, and substituting a system in which Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCSs), would possess full responsibility and authority, to manage the large, functionally-congruent sections of the service. A pure deputy system would require a steady supply of exceptionally qualified and experienced senior officers. General Carl A. Spaatz, the first Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), and also the first Chief of the Air Staff in 1941, had broad operational and staff experience. In 1944-45, he personally employed the deputy system in organizing the staff of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe. Conversely, as the second Commanding General of the AAF, 1946-47, he rejected the deputy system in the post war reorganization of the Air Staff. Spaatz felt such a radical reform could wait until the establishment of a separate air force. After the passage of the National Security Act, Spaatz had his deputy, Lt Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, draw up a plan revising the organization of the Air Staff. Vandenberg's plan adopted a modified deputy system as the organizing principle of the Air Staff. Under a DCS/Operations, the plan grouped the major functions of intelligence, training, operations, and plans — each of which had previously reported directly to the Commanding General of the AAF. Likewise, the DCS/Materiel headed directorates of Research and Development, Procurement and Industrial Planning, Installations, and Supply and Services.⁶

The result also conformed to General Spaatz's personal predilection for minimum spans of control for senior officers. It opted for an Air Staff organization that had only nine individuals reporting directly to the Chief of Staff. General Spaatz firmly believed that senior officers should keep their desks free of the "administrivia" generated by bureaucratic over-reporting in order to have the time to make decisions. In September 1947 the 4,874 members of the first USAF Air Staff oversaw a service of 368,348. The 539,998 members of the Army required a staff of 16,115, while in 1950 the 455,817 members of the Navy and Marines needed 4,480.⁷

Since 1947 the Chief's span of control has mushroomed. In 1985, 21 senior military officials reported directly to the Chief and the Vice Chief. The

other service chiefs had similar spans of control. In 1985, 23 senior military officials reported directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, a like number to the Commandant of Marines, and 25 senior military officials reported directly to the Army Chief of Staff. Spaatz ran a force of 3,000 heavy bombers and 1,500 escort fighters with only one man reporting directly to him. This centralized day-to-day control in his staff and left him free to command.

In 1949 Congress made several substantial amendments to the National Security Act of 1947. These stemmed, in part, from recommendations of both the Hoover and Eberstadt Commissions on government efficiency and of the SECDEF, James V. Forrestal. The amendments replaced the National Military Establishment with DOD and greatly strengthened the power of the SECDEF. It clearly defined the SECDEF as the head of DOD and authorized a staff for him, OSD. The amendments further reduced the service departments from the status of executive departments to the new status of a military department, whose secretary no longer sat in the President's cabinet or the National Security Council and could no longer appeal directly to the President or the Director of the Budget (now called the Office of Management and Budget). Finally, the amendments created the post of CJCS and provided him a joint staff of 210 officers.⁸

The amendments fixed the pattern of future staff sizes. The service secretariats would remain relatively small, while the service secretaries were reduced in stature and would find it difficult to find new roles. On one hand, if they became the spokesmen of their services, they lost influence with the SECDEF. On the other hand, if their services perceived them to be merely creatures of the SECDEF, they would meet resistance or, at least, non-cooperation. For the past forty years, reformers of the U.S. military have tended to regard the service secretaries as an unnecessary layer of management between the services and the SECDEF. In contrast, the staffs and accompanying organizations of the SECDEF and the CJCS would continue to grow (as noted above). Here again, this reflected the views of some critics of the U.S. military organization who have called for the strengthening of both the SECDEF and CJCS in order to ensure unified management of resources and unified planning for operations and contingencies.⁹

These amendments and subsequent defense reorganizations attempted to reduce the so-called parochial and separatist tendencies of the armed services, particularly their service headquarters and their chiefs. To outside observers, the service chiefs and their large staffs appeared to be too closely identified with their service, at the expense of joint cooperation. Critics saw the staffs as organizations so imbued with their own service's mind-set and career patterns that they appeared to have difficulty in judging the nation's good independent of their own service's good. The Korean War, 1950-53, and President Eisenhower's New Look defense policies resulted in large increases in personnel for the three armed services. Although they flew at a lesser percentage rate than most portions of their respective services, the three military headquarters staffs reached post-World War II numerical highs in 1955, with combined military and civilian totals of 17,540 for the Army

(1,109,296 total personnel), 5,422 for the Navy and Marines (865,865 total personnel), and 8,229 for the Air Force (959,946 total personnel).¹⁰

President Eisenhower reorganized the Defense Department in 1953 and Congress passed a Defense Reorganization Act in 1958. These actions further centralized the administration of DOD under the SECDEF. In Defense Reorganization Plan No. 6, dated 30 April 1953, the SECDEF gained the authority to appoint six new Assistant Secretaries of Defense and a General Counsel. Second, the plan approved the appointment of a Director of the Joint Staff to be managed by the CJCS. The 1958 reorganization vested control and direction of military research and development in the SECDEF and authorized him to create single agencies to conduct any service or supply activity common to two or more services. This landmark reorganization act repealed the authority of the service chiefs to command their own services and instituted two new chains of command. Operational command flowed from the President and the SECDEF through the corporate JCS, while non-operational command flowed from the President and the SECDEF through the secretaries of the military departments. The act also enlarged the Joint Staff.¹¹

The 1958 changes survived for almost 30 years without major alteration. They had greatly increased the SECDEF's authority to manage his department and to direct military operations. This, in theory, assured civilian control of the U.S. military. But the new legislation included a potentially fatal structural flaw. As critics have pointed out, the law elevated the SECDEF, an office filled for the past 40 years by men with little, if any, professional military experience, to the position of being second to the President in determining strategy, planning, allocating resources, and giving operational orders.

Since 1958 the size of all the service staffs has fallen steadily. The war in Southeast Asia resulted in some increase (less than five percent for the Air Force), but by 1974 the staffs were smaller than ever. By 1985 the Air Staff had fallen to 2,800 positions. While the Army and Navy staffs also declined in the late 1970s, unlike the Air Staff, they showed a slight increase between 1981 and 1983. The Army and Navy had large force structure additions and concomitant acquisitions to manage. But by 1985 the Army Staff had fallen below its 1980 numbers to a figure of 3,200, as had the Marines to 503 personnel. And in 1985 the Navy, with 2,029 personnel, still exceeded its 1980 staff strength by over 15 percent. Although the service secretariats showed some growth immediately after the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, they showed a steady loss of authorized positions until 1979 when they hit all-time lows in the last year of the Carter Administration: Navy 790, Army 334, and Air Force 299. Then, after total increases of about ten percent in the first Reagan Administration, their authorized positions declined by 1985 to close to the final Carter numbers: Navy 806, Army 368, and Air Force 304.¹²

In 1986 Congress passed another defense reorganization act. Named for its two congressional sponsors, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 greatly strengthened the position of the CJCS by making him the sole military advisor to the President, the SECDEF, and the National Security

Council. In addition, it gave the JCS a Vice Chairman, who out-ranked the other service chiefs. In an attempt to improve the operational effectiveness of the armed forces, the Goldwater-Nichols Act also enhanced the role of the specified and unified commanders in planning, programming, and budgeting, while creating a joint officer career path and requiring joint experience in all new general officers. The service secretaries and chiefs lost all remaining operational responsibility and the financial management functions of the service staffs were transferred to the service secretariats. In fact, the services barely averted the merging of the staffs and secretariats, which had been proposed in the preliminary legislation. Goldwater-Nichols also capped the size of the service military headquarters (2,639 for the Air Staff) and ordered a 15 percent reduction. As it had done 40 years earlier, the Congress again rejected a single armed forces staff.¹³

The consequences of this reorganization act have not yet been fully felt by the nation. The service staffs have continued to decline in numbers of assigned personnel. But the transfer of the financial management function and the inclusion of the unified commanders in the PPBS does not seem to have significantly diluted the importance of the service staffs. The CJCS continues to be an officer, like many others, who serves at the pleasure of the President and SECDEF, with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Major Reorganizations Since 1947

In March 1946, more than a year before the creation of the United States Air Force and the initial organization of Headquarters USAF, General Spaatz established the Air Board. Made up of the leading commanders of the AAF, retired officers, and selected civilians, this organization convened several times each year and played a role similar to that of a board of directors for a large corporation. Free from the press of day-to-day business, the Air Board advised the AAF Commander on questions of long-term policy. It helped to determine the initial organization of Headquarters USAF, to define the AAF's position on unification of the services, and to address many other fundamental issues which the young Air Force faced during the late 1940s. The Air Board provided the senior leadership of the new service a vehicle for expedient decision-making.¹⁴

The Air Board conducted studies which, along with others done by the Air War College and the AAF Air Staff, shaped the initial organization of the Headquarters USAF Air Staff in October 1947. This was an essentially lean framework of four DCSs: Air Comptroller (soon shortened to Comptroller), Personnel and Administration, Operations, and Materiel.¹⁵ One observer commented that this initial Air Staff organization had been "designed for efficiency of operation according to the highest standards of American business."¹⁶

The Air Staff's original structure remained unchanged until January 1950, when a DCS/Development was added. This depute, like those it joined, traced its beginnings to the Headquarters AAF. In December 1945 General Henry H. Arnold established a Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development, which was not a DCS. (This organization was short-lived: the Air Technical Service Command, and its successor the Air Materiel Command, continued to serve for years as the field agency responsible for R&D programs, but Headquarters AAF's research and development function survived for only twenty-two months.) In the Air Staff organization created during the autumn of 1947, R&D became one among four directorates assigned under the DCS/Materiel.¹⁷

The elevation of research and development to the DCS-level in January 1950 was related closely to the establishment of a major command for R&D. In 1949 Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt S. Vandenberg asked a working group from the Scientific Advisory Board, chaired by Dr. Louis N. Ridenour, for advice about how the Air Force should manage its research and development efforts. The Ridenour committee replied in September of that year, recommending the establishment of a Research and Development Command, to function independently of the Air Materiel Command. During the same autumn the Air University (AU) conducted a related study, chaired by AU Commandant Maj Gen Orvil A. Anderson. In November the Air Staff received the Anderson Report, which, like the Ridenour Report, advocated removing

R&D activities from the organizational control of the Air Materiel Command and also proposed an independent DCS/Research and Development. "We can hardly bury the responsibility for the Air Force of the future," the Anderson Report contended, "under the logistic responsibility for the Air Force of the present."¹⁸ On 3 January 1950 Vice Chief of Staff General Muir S. Fairchild announced the establishment of the Air Research and Development Command and of the DCS/Development.¹⁹

Another decision which had enduring significance was General Vandenberg's 26 April 1951 creation of the Air Force Council, composed of the Vice Chief of Staff, the five DCSs, and the Inspector General. "Perhaps the most important development in Air Force organization [and] did not even appear on the charts," wrote one Air Force historian in 1958. Like the Air Board, the Air Force Council was used to speed the process of making basic decisions and setting fundamental policies. General Vandenberg insisted that the Council's members were to wear "the hat of the Chief of Staff," and "leave the interests of their own particular shops back at their shops."²⁰

Changes in the organization of the Air Staff should be considered within the context of changes in the organization of the Secretariat, because Headquarters USAF historically has served as a single management-headquarters, with the functions of the Secretariat and Air Staff closely related. In July 1951 the Assistant Secretary of the Air Staff stressed the point that Air Force officers newly-assigned to the Pentagon "should not infer. . .that the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. . .[was] completely separate and distinct from the Air Staff." During 1956, Administrative Assistant John J. McLaughlin supervised a thorough study of Air Staff-Secretariat relationships, based on the obvious fundamental assumption that the two must work "closely and efficiently together."²¹ In 1963 Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert commented on the relationship in yet another way: "The Air Staff is the staff of both the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff."²²

Like the Air Staff, the Secretariat originally had a relatively simple organization. The 1947 National Security Act provided for a Secretary of the Air Force, an Under Secretary, and two Assistant Secretaries — one for Management, and a second for Civil, Military, and Diplomatic Affairs. (The latter was shortened to Civil Affairs in October 1949.) The early Secretariat also included a General Counsel, an Administrative Assistant, and an Office of Information (redesignated the Office of Public Affairs in 1979).²³

This organization remained basically the same until May 1951, when the Office of the Assistant Secretary (Civil Affairs) was divided into an Assistant Secretary (Materiel) and an Assistant Secretary (Management), replacing the office with the same title which was then already in place. At the time of this reorganization, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Zuckert told an Air War College audience: "Our real difficulty in the development of organizational policy within the Air Force has been our failure to analyze the way that the work has to flow; to analyze the relationships that must exist in order to get the particular task done." The May 1951 changes underscored the logic of the

assignment of responsibilities among the Under Secretary and the two Assistants. Prior to this reorganization, some materiel responsibilities were assigned to the Under Secretary, and others to one of the Assistants. After May 1951, all materiel functions came under the Assistant Secretary (Materiel) and management functions under the Assistant Secretary (Management).²⁴

The new organization was consistent with the Air Force Organization Act of 1951, which became law on 19 September of that year. This statute provided for a Secretary, Under Secretary, and two Assistants, and also limited the Air Staff to five DCSs.²⁵ Considerable debate accompanied the 1951 legislation, most of it focusing on how much of Headquarters USAF's organization should be codified in law at a time when the service was still so young and its organizational experience so limited. Another issue was whether the CSAF should be said to "supervise," or to "command," the Air Force.²⁶ This latter question was resolved with a provision that the CSAF would "exercise command over the air defense command, the strategic air command, the tactical air command, and such other major commands as may be established by the Secretary."²⁷ As for the codification issue, Air Force leaders believed that the Organization Act of 1951 was sufficiently flexible. While it limited the Air Staff to five DCSs, it placed no restrictions on either their titles or functions.²⁸ (In later years the Air Force assigned DCS status to the Comptroller and Inspector General, while also maintaining five other formal DCS positions.) And although the law fixed the number of Assistant Secretaries at two, it allowed the Secretary to assign any of his "functions, powers, and duties." One report, prepared by the Secretariat two months after the law took effect, commented that the new legislation "impose[d] a few restrictions which create no serious difficulties at present."²⁹

This same report also noted that with "the passage of the Air Force Organization Act [of 1951], [the] principle of flexibility must be reemphasized. . . . If we should desire change in these provisions, it would be necessary to seek to have the law amended." Within a few years, senior leaders of the Secretariat did exactly that. In May 1954 H. Lee White, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Management), reminded Secretary of the Air Force Harold E. Talbott that the congressional hearings and discussions which had accompanied the passage of the 1951 act had emphasized the importance "of retaining a flexible organization," and he advocated the addition of two new Assistant Secretaries. Mr. White contended that his own office should be divided in two, because it held "powers and responsibilities so broad and so time-consuming since [it] is not only the financial manager of the Air Force but also is responsible for manpower, personnel, reserves, organization, and security matters." White proposed splitting the Office of the Assistant Secretary (Management) into an Assistant Secretary for Financial Management and an Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve Forces. He also believed that a fourth Assistant should be created and devoted either to installations or to research and development. Secretary Talbott favored the second choice, noting that the Air Force's R&D program might well "determine the future security" of the nation. Following congressional approval in August 1954, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Management) was redesignated

Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) and Assistant Secretary (Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve Forces). In March 1955 a fourth Assistant Secretary, (Research and Development), was added. One internal study explained this growth in the Secretariat up through 1955 with the observation that expanding "Air Force-wide operations, as related to the Office of the Secretary [had required] more supervision of broader programs."³⁰

The same could be said of the Air Staff during the 1950s. The DCS/Operations, for example, had gained responsibility for so wide a variety of functions that Vice Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White considered the position overburdened. In March 1957 General White proposed dividing this deputation into a DCS/Operations and a DCS/Plans, creating "a rough division of these major staff duties [between] the fellow who deals with futures and the other with the day to day operation of the Air Force." A majority of the DCS/Operations's directors and assistants at the time opposed this proposal and the DCS/Operations, Lt Gen Frank F. Everest, also expressed reservations about it. General Everest argued that dividing the DCS/Operations would mean returning to the pre-October 1947 organization, in which Headquarters AAF had an ACAS-3 (Operations and Training) and an ACAS-5 (Plans). He recalled that rivalries between these two offices had been the major reason for combining them into a single DCS/Operations in the original 1947 organization of Headquarters USAF. Additionally, Everest cautioned that if Operations and Plans were separated, the Vice Chief of Staff would have to allocate resources and arbitrate disputes between these two functions, adding to his own work load.³¹

General White decided in favor of his own original proposal, and accompanied it by a provision to remove the Directorate of Intelligence from under the DCS/Operations and establish it as a separate Assistant Chief of Staff (ACS). The Air Force Judge Advocate General advised that the reorganization posed no legal problems. However, since there already were five DCSs — the limit under the 1951 Organization Act — the DCS/Comptroller was redesignated simply as the Comptroller of the Air Force. General White placed the new organization into effect on 1 July.³²

While the Air Staff split its DCS/Operations, the Secretariat entered a twenty-year period in which the chief organizational questions concerned the number of Assistant Secretaries and their responsibilities. In March 1955 there were four Assistant Secretaries: Financial Management; Manpower, Personnel and Reserve Forces; Materiel; and Research and Development. The milestone DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 strengthened the powers of the SECDEF, changed the lines of command of the unified and specified commands, and created the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. The 1958 law also included a lesser provision requiring all three military departments to reduce to three assistant secretaries. The Army conformed to the new law by lowering the status of its Assistant Secretary (Civil Affairs) and the Navy did so by reorganizing the functions of two of its Assistant Secretaries.³³ The Air Force complied by redesignating its Assistant Secretary (Manpower, Personnel and Reserve Forces) as a special assistant position.

Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy commented at the time that such decisions were made independently by the services, "rather than to achieve arbitrary uniformity throughout the Department of Defense."³⁴

The manpower function on the Air Force Secretariat moved from Special Assistant status to Deputy Under Secretary status during 1966, and then returned as an Assistant Secretary after the December 1967 adoption of Public Law 90-168. Air Force Secretary Harold Brown implemented this statutory change in January 1968 by restoring Manpower and Reserve Affairs as a fourth Assistant Secretary.³⁵

Secretary Brown used this same directive to elaborate on the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary (Financial Affairs). Automatic data processing systems had grown considerably because of increased use of computers during 1960 and the Financial Affairs Deputy Assistant Secretary (Audit, Data Automation and Finance) began to play an expanded role as the focal point for computer issues, including selecting, acquiring, and managing both hardware and software. In August 1969 the Under Secretary of the Air Force was assigned "overall direction, guidance, and supervision" of the Air Force's space programs, another area of tremendous growth during the 1960s.³⁶

The four-Assistants organization prevailed until May 1977, when the Secretariat again was reduced to three Assistant Secretaries. On 27 May Air Force Secretary John C. Stetson reassigned the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary (Installations and Logistics), with those for installations going to the Assistant Secretary (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Installations) and logistics to the Assistant Secretary (Research and Development). In this 1977 reorganization, the Air Force and Army each pursued their own courses while the Navy followed the model of the OSD, adding the logistics function to the Assistant Secretary (Manpower and Reserve Affairs).³⁷

This realignment of the Secretariat was followed a year later by a restructuring of both the Secretariat and Air Staff, intended to reduce the number of authorized Air Force manpower positions in the Washington, D.C., area by about 1,500 billets. Within the Secretariat, this action cut the Assistant Secretary (Research, Development and Logistics) from eight deputies to six; realigned a number of smaller offices; and eliminated one Special Staff Office, the Assistant to the Secretary (International Affairs).³⁸ Within the Air Staff, restructuring reduced the Chief of Staff's span of control from thirteen Special Staff Offices to six, elevated the status of the Inspector General from a Special Staff Office to that of a deputate and redesignated five other DCSs.³⁹ As in the Secretariat, several subordinate functions were also realigned. The Directorate of Manpower and Organization, for example, joined three personnel directorates to form the DCS/Manpower and Personnel. In another case, the ACS/Studies and Analysis gained some functions from the former DCS/Plans and Operations, and it became the Directorate of Concepts and Analysis, under the DCS/Programs and Analysis. This reversed the following year with the re-establishment of the ACS/Studies and Analysis.⁴⁰

The organization of Headquarters USAF remained relatively static for nearly ten years, until the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, called the Goldwater-Nichols Act, after its sponsors Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona and Representative William Nichols of Alabama. This legislation represented another milestone in the administrative history of the military departments. In the past, Congress had legislated on only the most general aspects of DOD's organization, such as the number of Assistant Secretaries. However, in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Congress concerned itself for the first time with the details of the Secretariat's and Air Staff's organization.

Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act after a national debate of several defense issues, including the need to redefine the roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Unified Commanders to reform the PPBS, and to streamline the weapons acquisition process.⁴¹ Several studies of these proposals emerged during the mid-1980s. In October 1985 the Senate Armed Services Committee received a staff study on "Defense Organization: The Need for Change." Among its twelve specific recommendations this report advocated "fully [integrating] the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs in the Departments of the Army and Air Force." Also during 1985, the Defense Science Board (DSB) conducted a summer study on the weapons acquisition process, which it reported to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in April 1986. The DSB recommended fundamental changes in Defense Department procedures and organization including assigning Chief Executive Officers, of four-star or equivalent rank, to manage the service's largest acquisition programs. That proposal, and others from the DSB summer study, were incorporated into the June 1986 report of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, commonly called the Packard Commission, after its chairman, industrialist David Packard. The commission adopted the DSB's concept of Chief Executive Officers, called them Program Executive Officers, and incorporated them into its proposal for an Acquisition Executive System, with an Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) and comparable positions in all of the military Departments. The Packard Commission also called for a reduction in the number of DOD personnel working on acquisition programs.⁴²

In the context of these studies, the Goldwater-Nichols Act became law in October 1986, affecting in considerable detail the organization of Headquarters USAF. The new statute identified specific responsibilities which had to be assigned to the Secretariat. The Air Force already was in compliance in the cases of Legislative Liaison and Public Affairs, but three other functions — the Comptroller, Inspector General, and Acquisition — required transfer from the Air Staff to meet the law. Accordingly, the Comptroller of the Air Force and the Inspector General (excepting safety and discipline functions which remained the responsibility of the CSAF) shifted to the Secretariat.⁴³

The acquisition function posed a more complicated case than either the Comptroller, or Inspector General, because its realignment had to comply with both the Goldwater-Nichols Act and President Ronald Reagan's decision to implement the Packard Commission's Acquisition Executive system.

Accordingly, the office of the Assistant Secretary (Research, Development and Logistics) gave up its logistics responsibilities and became the Assistant Secretary (Acquisition), to serve as the Air Force's counterpart to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition). The DCS/Research, Development and Acquisition, was retitled the Military Deputy for Acquisition, transferred from the Air Staff to the Secretariat, where it came under the newly-created Assistant Secretary (Acquisition).⁴⁴

Other examples of the level of detail in the Goldwater-Nichols Act were the provisions limiting the Air Staff to five deputates and three ACSs. The service needed to make no changes to meet these provisions. Before the adoption of the law, the Air Staff had five DCSs and afterwards it had four: Personnel; Programs and Resources; Plans and Operations; and Logistics and Engineering. It also remained in comfortable compliance with the three-ACSs provision, having the same three before and after the realignment.⁴⁵

The restructuring under Goldwater-Nichols — the first reorganization of Headquarters USAF which simultaneously made substantive changes in both the Air Staff and Secretariat — reiterated the historical theme of Headquarters USAF as a single management headquarters. The Goldwater-Nichols realignment treated the Air Staff and Secretariat as inseparable organizations. A summary paper prepared by the Directorate of Plans at the time of the reorganization referred to the relationship between the Air Staff and Secretariat and to the importance of ensuring the "continued cooperation and support for [the] senior leadership." In July 1986 Air Force Secretary Edward C. Aldridge, Jr. emphasized: "We will continue the strong and positive working relationship between the Air Staff and the Secretariat."⁴⁶

The Goldwater-Nichols changes represented one effort, among many proposed during four decades, to improve the organization and efficiency of Headquarters USAF. The recurring fundamental theme in the history of the organization of the Secretariat has been the movement between frameworks using three and four Assistant Secretaries. The larger pattern has been determined by statute, while leaving the Air Force to decide how functions would be assigned among the Assistant Secretaries. As for the Air Staff, one theme has been the enormous growth in the CSAF's span of control, from 1947's essentially simple four-deputate structure to today's complex organization which includes four DCSs, three ACSs, and nine Special Staff Offices. Another historic trend has been the remarkably close relationship between the Air Staff and Secretariat underscored in the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization.

"Tracking the Numbers"

Reconciling the numbers of personnel assigned to Headquarters USAF presents a monumental task, given the complex payroll and administrative systems in place. Basic to appreciating the difficulties with tracking the size of the headquarters, was the fact that from the beginning the size of the headquarters was not conceived through a planning process, but was based mainly on the Army's experience. Some observers speculated that the service's field population determined the size of the headquarters, while others claimed that it was driven by mission areas. Undoubtedly, these factors had some influence, and both have changed markedly over time. One example was the relatively new mission requirement for data processing. Even here, however, much of this work was done in the past by large numbers of programmers. In addition, Congress has periodically mandated fixed percentage reductions of the departmental headquarters — usually without much regard for individual service differences or requirements.

At the time of the establishment of the Air Force in September 1947, its headquarters comprised the Secretariat, Air Staff, and support functions. Furthermore, the Army continued to perform certain Air Force functions until 1949. Over the years the numbers and categories of personnel changed frequently to include consultants, special assistants, members of the National Guard Bureau, personnel of elements, or operating locations of major commands and field agencies assigned to the Pentagon, or elsewhere in the National Capital Region (NCR), and also Air Force personnel on duty at other defense or federal agencies in the NCR. Until enactment of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986, the only limitation on the number of personnel assigned to Headquarters USAF was a provision contained in the Air Force Organization Act of 1951 which established a ceiling of 2,800 officers for the entire headquarters.⁴⁷

Two caveats should remain uppermost in the reader's mind. First, the numbers given for the departmental staffs reflected only personnel assigned directly to those staffs. In the past, in order to comply with the staff ceilings and ensure the headquarters were only doing headquarters functions (DODD 5100.73), the services and OSD often reassigned functions to organizations affiliated with the staff, but not counting against their assigned strength. This has resulted in a proliferation of Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) and Separate Operating Agencies (SOAs). In the Air Staff, for instance, in the offices of the Directorate of International Programs in the Pentagon building, Air Staff officers and officers assigned to the Center for International Programs (which did not count against Air Staff billets) worked side by side performing virtually the same tasks. Likewise, while OSD grew from 173 positions in 1947 to 1,896 in 1983, Defense Agencies and Defense Field Activities, which reported directly to the SECDEF — and which did not exist in 1947 — contained 85,931 personnel in 1983. The Joint Staff of the JCS, limited to 400 positions from 1958 through 1986, sidestepped part of its limitation by

creating the Organization of the Joint Chiefs Staff, which, together with the Joint Staff, had a combined strength of 1,627 when they were merged by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reform Act of 1986.⁴⁸

Second, the size of the military headquarters staffs, which individually surpassed the size of OSD and overwhelmed their service secretariats, and the natural domination of the staffs by senior military officers, gave the military headquarters staffs control over most necessary planning information. Information equalled power; it allowed the services and their staffs to manipulate, subject to some OSD and congressional checks, the PPBS and the research and acquisition systems to their own advantage.

Consequently, any study of Headquarters USAF personnel figures would be fraught with questions and contradictions stemming from the complex technical nature of the numerical accounting involved. For example: did the number of personnel cited refer to those authorized, or assigned? How could one account for obvious overages? Did the effective date refer to beginning or end of a fiscal year? Did the figures represent personnel working only in the Pentagon? Or did they include support personnel? And if they included support, what type of support?

The USAF Program Reports, prepared by Manpower and Organization, represented the Air Force's most extensive and authoritative database. These reports provided several measurements of Air Force personnel, with computerized data since 1962 available. (Paper records for the period between 1956 and 1958 also existed; no records were extant prior to 1956, nor for the 1959 to 1961 period.) The first significant category enumerated personnel assigned to the NCR, encompassing basically all of metropolitan Washington, D.C., and certain functions at Andrews AFB, Maryland, and Ft Belvoir, Virginia. Comparative personnel figures for the 28-year period between 1962 (14,833) and 1991 (13,776) disclosed a relatively small difference of 1,100 positions.⁴⁹

One category, called Headquarters Air Force (HAF), comprised the Secretariat and Air Staff. Here we find major personnel reductions, some 5,100 positions, over the same period between 1962 (7,845) and 1991 (2,766). However, these figures must be considered together with those in another set: Support NCR/Support HAF. This was the most convoluted of the categories, as evidenced by numerous shifts in and out, as well as constant redefinitions of terms. Thus, it included Air Force billets supporting the headquarters and those supporting various other government agencies. At times some of these personnel were assigned to field agencies (SOAs and DRUs) or major Air Force commands. A study of these figures disclosed large, frequent shifts of personnel — at times more than a thousand per year — in and out of the category. The "dust settled" by 1986, as the Air Force District of Washington (AFDW) was created and absorbed disparate headquarters support functions; in 1991 it numbered 2,296 personnel.⁵⁰

Another useful measurement tool, maintained by the AFDW and its predecessor organizations, pertained to the number of personnel assigned to the headquarters (See Appendix A, "Headquarters USAF Assigned Personnel, 1948-1990"). Here, statistics were available for the last quarter of each year, from fiscal year 1948 to the present. The figures were broken down by the number of officers, enlisted airmen, and civilians annually. (At the end of FY 1969 the Air National Guard headquarters office was permanently included in the Air Staff total.) This database was valuable for its continuity, although its figures correspond only roughly with those of Manpower and Organization. Finally, the AFDW database provided a less cumbersome accounting of the status of certain irregular assignees.⁵¹

Beginning in the late 1960s Congress attempted to gain a better understanding and control over management headquarters. A common definition and standard reporting procedures for management headquarters was adopted. DOD Directive 5100.37 was developed as the directive to document the definition and the reporting procedures. (See Appendix B, "DOD Management Headquarters, 1973-1989.") As a result, in 1972 the Air Force eliminated all field extensions, including more than 15,000 spaces from the Air Staff, and reclaimed certain staff functions which had been farmed out to the field extensions. The latter were replaced by SOAs and DRUs. The motive behind this effort was to comply with the new definitions of management headquarters and to establish defensible headquarters definitions to meet congressional and OSD pressures for headquarters reductions. DODD 5100.73 defined management headquarters as an organization which exercised oversight, direction and control of subordinate organizations and units. Further, it was one which developed and issued policy/provides policy guidance; reviewed and evaluated program performance; allocated and distributed resources; and conducted mid- and long-range planning, programming and budgeting.⁵² Under these definitions, Headquarters USAF, Air Force Major Commands, and Numbered Air Force headquarters all qualified. Direct support of the headquarters referred to professional, technical, administrative or logistic support. As such it included both staff and operational support but excluded service-wide and base operating support.

Subsequently, Congress separated management headquarters functions into four levels: the Air Force Secretariat, Air Staff and National Guard Bureau, Headquarters USAF departmental support, and functional and combat commands not addressed in this study. As expected, considerable fluctuation of personnel appeared at these levels throughout the period. The Secretariat declined steadily from 535 personnel in FY 1973 until FY 1988 when it rose to 851 as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act changes. Similarly, the Air Staff declined throughout over the same period, from 5,003 to 1,788. There were also dramatic changes at the departmental support level, which numbered only 338 positions in FY 1973, jumped to 1,614 in FY 1983, and declined thereafter until reaching 246 positions in FY 1989.⁵³

However, Congress found it more difficult than anticipated to develop a uniform standard for the services. First, each military department possessed

distinct missions; for example, the Air Force had a unique requirement to manage space systems. Second, the Navy Department's "dual service" structure, composed of the Navy and Marine Corps, obliged it to be organized differently than the Army or Air Force. Third, legislation granted the service secretaries broad executive authority to manage and administer their departments as they saw fit. This enabled the Air Force and Army to employ organizations outside their secretariats to provide civilian personnel services.⁵⁴

Additionally, any comparison of the departmental management headquarters staffs had to consider dissimilar arrangements; for example, the disparate placement of the installations function within each secretariat. Further, each department emphasized its programs and functions differently. Finally, the sizes of the respective departmental staffs had to be viewed from individual perspectives to appreciate the unique interrelationships behind each organization. One factor considered the relative size of the active military and civilian work force overseen, thus the smallest management headquarters staff did not necessarily correspond to the lowest active force ratio.

The size of the departmental support staff constituted another important factor. Since each service had unique missions and operational requirements, it was unrealistic to expect perfect uniformity. Instead, it seemed more reasonable to compare the services' departmental staffs to their overall force levels. For example, in FY 1984 the USAF force totaled 838,000 personnel, with a departmental management staff of 3,105. These figures translated to a 0.37 percent "overhead." Separate calculations for the Army and Navy showed that the services differed by only 6/100th of one percent!⁵⁵ However, it would be naive to conclude from this evidence that the tendency of management headquarters to grow has been resolved.

Historically, the size and organization of the headquarters has responded to two sets of countervailing influences: one demanding increased numbers to accommodate new technologies, new functions, or new reporting requirements; the other set demanding lower numbers because of the stress on economy and centralization. This account of Headquarters USAF reorganization suggests that the future is likely to continue to be marked by continuing refinements, adapted to ever-changing needs.

Appendix A

Headquarters USAF Assigned Personnel, 1948-1990*

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY 4/48				
CSAF	1527	406	2030	3963
OSAF	<u>130</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>228</u>	<u>376</u>
Total	1657	424	2258	4339
FY 4/49				
CSAF	2157	579	3347	6083
OSAF	<u>107</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>286</u>	<u>424</u>
Total	2264	610	3633	6507
FY 4/50				
CSAF	1798	483	3302	5583
OSAF	<u>99</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>268</u>	<u>397</u>
Total	1897	513	3570	5980
FY 4/51				
CSAF	2469	720	4719	7908
OSAF	<u>135</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>422</u>	<u>616</u>
Total	2604	779	5141	8524
FY 4/52				
CSAF	2445	703	4315	7463
OSAF	<u>138</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>320</u>	<u>490</u>
Total	2583	735	4635	7953
FY 4/53				
CSAF	2480	718	4235	7433
OSAF	<u>124</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>307</u>	<u>463</u>
Total	2604	750	4542	7896

* Rpt (U), 1947th ASG, "Departmental Personnel Strength Report," vols 1948-1990.

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY 4/54				
CSAF	2489	729	4434	7652
OSAF	<u>121</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>290</u>	<u>446</u>
Total	2610	764	4724	8098
FY 4/55				
CSAF	2610	711	4836	8157
OSAF	<u>158</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>348</u>	<u>546</u>
Total	2768	751	5184	8703
FY 4/56				
CSAF	2667	667	5040	8374
OSAF	<u>146</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>353</u>	<u>536</u>
Total	2813	704	5393	8910
FY 4/57				
CSAF	2663	653	5039	8355
OSAF	<u>150</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>353</u>	<u>540</u>
Total	2813	690	5392	8895
FY 4/58				
CSAF	2367	609	4399	7375
OSAF	<u>141</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>330</u>	<u>504</u>
Total	2508	642	4729	7879
FY 4/59				
CSAF	2365	607	4471	7443
OSAF	<u>141</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>325</u>	<u>502</u>
Total	2506	643	4796	7945

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY 4/60				
CSAF	2161	541	3947	6649
OSAF	<u>151</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>323</u>	<u>513</u>
Total	2312	580	4270	7162
FY 4/61				
CSAF	2140	515	3885	6450
OSAF	<u>175</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>342</u>	<u>561</u>
Total	2315	559	4227	7101
FY 4/62				
CSAF	2186	496	4112	6794
OSAF	<u>190</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>350</u>	<u>595</u>
Total	2376	551	4462	7389
FY 4/63				
CSAF	2086	369	3097	5552
OSAF	<u>185</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>234</u>	<u>445</u>
Total	2271	395	3331	5997
FY 4/64				
CSAF	2117	381	2971	5469
OSAF	<u>189</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>352</u>	<u>571</u>
Total	2306	411	3323	6040
FY 4/65				
CSAF	2094	285	2848	5227
OSAF	<u>174</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>344</u>	<u>538</u>
Total	2268	305	3192	5765

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY 4/66				
CSAF	2122	247	3015	5384
OSAF	<u>171</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>340</u>	<u>533</u>
Total	2293	269	3355	5917
FY 4/67				
CSAF	2131	238	3109	5478
OSAF	<u>169</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>353</u>	<u>543</u>
Total	2300	259	3462	6021
FY 4/68				
CSAF	2218	272	2964	5454
OSAF	<u>173</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>337</u>	<u>533</u>
Total	2391	295	3301	5987
FY 4/69				
CSAF	2201	276	2787	5264
OSAF	168	23	333	524
ANG	<u>35</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>86</u>
Total	2404	301	3169	5874
FY 4/70				
CSAF	1931	267	2414	4612
OSAF	157	26	301	484
ANG	<u>35</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>85</u>
Total	2123	295	2763	5181
FY 4/71				
CSAF	1856	254	2231	4341
OSAF	150	24	291	465
ANG	<u>47</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>67</u>
Total	2053	279	2541	4873

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY 4/72				
CSAF	2076	302	2356	4734
OSAF	173	33	285	491
ANG	<u>49</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>65</u>
Total	2298	336	2656	5290

FY 4/73				
CSAF	2057	296	2366	4719
OSAF	170	31	291	492
ANG	<u>51</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>65</u>
Total	2278	328	2670	5276

FY 4/74				
CSAF	2077	293	2246	4616
OSAF	170	31	280	481
ANG	<u>51</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>65</u>
Total	2298	325	2526	5149

FY 4/75				
CSAF	1837	260	1991	4088
OSAF	162	25	259	446
ANG	<u>51</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>65</u>
Total	2050	286	2250	4586

FY 4/76				
CSAF	1823	242	1831	3896
OSAF	160	24	261	445
ANG	<u>51</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>65</u>
Total	2034	267	2092	4393

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY 4/77				
CSAF	1799	224	1767	3790
OSAF	150	23	239	412
ANG	<u>51</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>138</u>	<u>190</u>
Total	2000	248	2144	4392
FY 4/78				
CSAF	1726	201	1596	3523
OSAF	150	23	242	415
ANG	<u>52</u>	<u> </u>	<u>138</u>	<u>190</u>
Total	1928	224	1976	4128
FY 4/79				
CSAF	1499	148	1200	2847
OSAF	120	19	182	321
ANG	<u>54</u>	<u> </u>	<u>119</u>	<u>173</u>
Total	1673	167	1501	3341
FY 4/80				
CSAF	1481	141	1140	2762
OSAF	120	18	182	320
ANG	<u>54</u>	<u> </u>	<u>116</u>	<u>170</u>
Total	1655	159	1438	3252
FY 4/81				
CSAF	1484	143	1133	2760
OSAF	117	19	184	320
ANG	<u>54</u>	<u> </u>	<u>116</u>	<u>170</u>
Total	1655	162	1433	3250

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY 4/82				
CSAF	1489	144	1127	2760
OSAF	118	20	182	320
ANG	<u>54</u>		<u>116</u>	<u>170</u>
Total	<u>1661</u>	<u>164</u>	<u>1425</u>	<u>3250</u>

FY 4/83				
CSAF	1493	144	1123	2760
OSAF	123	20	177	320
ANG	<u>54</u>		<u>116</u>	<u>170</u>
Total	<u>1670</u>	<u>164</u>	<u>1416</u>	<u>3250</u>

FY 4/84				
CSAF	1429	145	1050	2624
OSAF	117	16	171	304
ANG	<u>54</u>		<u>116</u>	<u>170</u>
Total	<u>1600</u>	<u>161</u>	<u>1337</u>	<u>3098</u>

FY 4/85				
CSAF	1433	146	1062	2641
OSAF	116	16	172	304
ANG	<u>54</u>		<u>116</u>	<u>170</u>
Total	<u>1603</u>	<u>162</u>	<u>1350</u>	<u>3115</u>

FY 4/86				
CSAF	1436	148	1004	2588
OSAF	117	16	171	304
ANG	<u>54</u>		<u>116</u>	<u>170</u>
Total	<u>1607</u>	<u>164</u>	<u>1291</u>	<u>3062</u>

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY 4/87				
CSAF	1315	156	804	2275
OSAF	163	20	171	354
ANG	<u>47</u>		<u>86</u>	<u>133</u>
Total	1525	<u>176</u>	1061	2762

FY 4/88				
CSAF	811	93	401	1305
OSAF	385	42	424	851
ANG	<u>54</u>		<u>84</u>	<u>138</u>
Total	1250	<u>135</u>	909	2294

FY 4/89				
CSAF	892	106	397	1395
OSAF	386	42	415	843
ANG	<u>54</u>		<u>91</u>	<u>145</u>
Total	1332	<u>148</u>	903	2383

FY 4/90				
CSAF	854	98	441	1393
OSAF	379	44	355	778
ANG	<u>54</u>		<u>73</u>	<u>127</u>
Total	1287	<u>142</u>	869	2298

DoD Management Headquarters 1973-1989

	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	FY 76	FY 77	FY 78	FY 79	FY 80	FY 81	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89
Internat'l Mill HQ	4,498	3,104	3,484	2,847	3,366	3,267	3,671	4,192	3,462	3,733	3,701	3,423	3,178	2,845	2,852	2,922	2,924
Defense-Wide Mgt HQ	20,161	19,036	18,115	17,411	15,447	15,034	14,501	14,252	14,767	14,729	15,155	14,620	14,889	15,741	15,870	16,613	16,781
OSD	2,240	2,160	2,270	2,284	1,685	1,543	1,589	1,646	1,739	1,696	1,799	1,752	1,691	1,759	1,741	1,896	1,922
OJCS	1,674	1,582	1,493	1,355	1,279	1,239	1,257	1,291	1,320	1,356	1,413	1,450	1,542	1,628	1,587	1,667	1,640
Dept'l Supt	-	-	-	-	336	323	411	420	550	643	699	614	662	674	813	811	811
U/S Cmd HQ	12,385	11,400	10,628	10,271	8,740	8,881	8,193	7,727	7,756	7,651	7,826	7,652	7,800	8,267	8,427	8,768	8,937
Def Agencies/ Activities	3,862	3,894	3,724	3,501	3,407	3,048	3,051	3,168	3,402	3,383	3,418	3,152	3,194	3,413	3,302	3,471	3,471
Army Mgt HQ	31,712	27,747	21,803	20,445	20,505	19,704	19,334	20,325	20,436	23,264	23,139	22,340	21,558	21,477	20,302	21,273	19,671
Secretariat	423	376	358	340	378	333	334	359	372	424	416	391	363	377	405	372	948
Staff	4,723	3,843	3,583	3,558	3,538	3,330	3,306	3,319	3,422	3,473	3,412	3,391	3,336	3,187	2,955	3,131	2,157
Dept'l Supt	1,922	1,704	1,317	1,309	1,127	400	426	439	409	1,239	1,157	1,237	1,112	675	665	674	732
Functional & Combat Cmts	24,644	21,824	16,545	15,238	15,462	15,641	15,268	16,208	16,233	18,128	18,154	17,321	16,747	17,238	16,277	17,096	15,834
Navy Mgt HQ	28,592	26,324	25,103	24,009	17,767	17,667	17,518	17,677	18,977	19,119	19,368	18,248	17,972	16,952	16,689	16,022	16,024
Secretariat	1,005	1,017	1,055	1,074	1,059	979	820	807	914	851	850	832	827	786	787	780	780
CNO	2,031	1,858	1,872	1,899	1,747	1,659	1,651	1,729	1,846	2,016	2,021	1,991	1,969	1,860	1,749	1,609	1,609
CMC	2,605	2,877	1,663	1,698	609	525	535	508	536	557	579	553	512	514	504	477	477
Dept'l Supt	-	-	538	527	403	705	764	761	1,006	1,301	1,304	1,202	1,175	1,361	1,329	1,395	1,416
Functional & Combat Cmts	22,951	20,572	19,975	18,811	13,949	13,799	13,748	13,872	14,675	14,394	14,614	13,670	13,489	12,431	12,320	11,761	11,742
Air Force Mgt HQ	30,214	25,776	23,014	21,601	20,229	19,794	19,937	20,225	20,101	20,215	20,756	19,920	19,522	19,494	19,206	17,464	17,464
Secretariat	535	510	495	477	348	325	299	320	320	320	320	305	300	305	354	851	851
Staff & NGB	5,003	4,720	4,421	4,207	3,767	3,151	2,895	2,930	2,930	2,930	2,930	2,800	2,776	2,775	2,461	1,788	1,788
Dept'l Supt	338	271	259	153	100	392	981	1,001	1,576	1,576	1,614	1,131	1,094	1,098	299	246	246
Functional & Combat Cmts	24,338	20,275	17,839	16,764	16,014	15,926	15,762	15,974	15,275	15,389	15,892	15,684	15,352	15,316	16,092	14,579	14,579
Total Mgt HQ	115,177	101,987	91,519	86,313	77,314	75,466	74,961	76,671	77,743	81,060	82,119	78,551	77,119	76,509	74,919	74,294	72,864

NOTE: 1. Figures for FY 73 thru FY 87 are compiled from the actual employment column of the annual PB -22 exhibit prepared for the President's Budget. Figures for FY 88 and FY 89 are estimates from the amended FY 88-89 PB-22 exhibit.

2. Actual emolvement includes full-time part-time and intermittent personnel employed as of the end of each FY.

Appendix C

Support Manpower, 1956-1990^{*} National Capital Region (by Fiscal Year)

1956 [°]	6,367
1957	5,566
1958	4,061
1962 ^{**}	4,905
1963	6,772
1964	6,151
1965	7,008
1966	6,894
1967	7,007
1968	7,112
1969	6,384
1970	6,179
1971 ^{**}	6,068
1972	4,601
1973 ^{**°}	4,535
1974	4,418
1975	4,122
1976	3,933
1977 ^{***}	
1978 ^{***}	305
1979	1,019

^{*} Figures are derived from USAF Authorized Manpower, NCR, 1956-1990. From 1956 to 1962, the numbers were taken from hardbound manning documents; from 1962 to 1990 they were taken from computer-generated totals produced by AF/MEA. It is important to note that the NCR was not officially defined from 1956 to 1962 but the above numbers are based on the NCR as established by the computer generated totals.

[°]Composed of HQC and HQD from 1956 to 1958.

^{**}Composed of HQJ, HQL, and HQM from 1962 to 1971.

^{**} Composed of HQC, HQL, and HQM from 1971 to 1972.

^{**°}Composed of HQL and HQM from 1972 to 1978.

^{***}Major reorganization. Handful of support elements assigned to HAF. Others reassigned variously.

^{***} Composed of ASG from 1978 to 1983.

1980	980
1981	989
1982	990
1983*	990
1984	992
1985*	820
1986	2,162
1987	2,139
1988	2,266
1989	2,256
1990	2,296

* Composed of HSG from 1983 to 1985.

* Creation of Air Force District of Washington.

Notes

1. Memo (U), Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, CSAF, to Lt Gen Lauris Norstad, DCS/Opns, subj: Review of Air Force Headquarters Organization, 24 Sep 1948, in RG 341-76-102, Box 4, Mgt 3, Mgmt Surveys.
2. For discussion see the following works: Lt Gen Victor H. Krulak (USMC, Ret.), Organization for National Security: A Study (Washington, D.C. 1983). This work presents the most pro military point of view and opposes the increasing influence of the SECDEF and the Chairman of the JCS. Barry M. Blechman and William J. Lynn (eds.), Towards a More Effective Defense: Report of the Defense Organization Project (Cambridge, MA, 1985) and Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace (Washington, D.C., 1985), give the more traditional defense analyst view points, which start from the position that most of the ills of DOD can be traced to the excessive parochialism of the military departments. The "Locher Report," formally known as "Defense Organization: The Need for Change," the Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, (Washington, D.C., 1985), contained much background information on DOD not readily available elsewhere. The Locher Report also blamed the service staffs for DOD's organizational shortcomings.
3. For a discussion of the Army Plan, see James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963 (Washington, D.C., 1975), pp. 163-167. Also see Krulac, Organization for National Security, pp. 27-49.
4. For a discussion of the National Security Act of 1947 and its text see Richard I. Wolf, The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions (Washington, D.C., 1987), pp. 61-82. Personnel numbers in this paragraph come from the "Locher Report," Tables 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3, pp. 388-390
5. For a discussion of the defense organizations of other powers, see Art, Davis, and Huntington, Reorganizing America's Defense.
6. For Maj Gen Knerr's arguments in favor of the deputy system, see memo for General Spaatz, subject: "Post-Unification Organization," March 22, 1946, (Chief of Staff File, Spaatz Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). Herman S. Wolk, Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force 1943-1947 (Washington, D.C., 1984) pp. 188-195, has a thorough discussion of the initial organization of the Air Staff.
7. For the organization of Spaatz's and subsequent Air Staffs, see Jacob Neufeld (compiler), AFP 210-5 Organizational Charts, Headquarters USAF (1947-Present), May 1989 chart. The figures on spans of control are from "The Locher Report," pp. 455-460. The overall size of the services in the 1950s are from OSD, Progress Reports and Statistics, January 19, 1956, p. 22-2, table "Total Military Personnel 1916 - 1955."
8. See Krulac, Organization for National Security, pp. 53-60 and Wolf, USAF: Basic Documents, pp. 187-201.

9. For an example of defense criticism generated in the late 1970s at the behest of the Carter Administration, see Archie D. Barrett, Reappraising Defense Organization, An Analysis Based on the Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980 (Washington, D.C. 1983).
10. Staff sizes taken from "The Locher Report," pp. 388-390, tables 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3.
11. Wolf, USAF: Basic Documents, pp 247-251.
12. For staff sizes in the paragraph, see "The Locher Report," pp. 388-390, tables 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3.
13. Information cited is based on discussions with Jacob Neufeld, Chief, HQ USAF Historical Division, Office of Air Force History. For a discussion of defense reform thinking before the Goldwater-Nichols Bill, see Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1961-1984 2 Vols, (Maxwell AFB, AL, 1989), II:587-601 and II:610-617.
14. Wolk, Postwar Air Force, pp. 142-145; Alfred Goldberg, Wilhelmine Burch, and Arthur K. Marmor, "Organization of Headquarters USAF 1945-58 with Particular Reference to DCS/Operations" (Maxwell AFB, AL, 1958), p. 18.
15. Wolk, Postwar Air Force, pp 188-195.
16. Brig Gen Reuben C. Hood, Jr., division chief in the operations deputation, quoted in ibid., 193n.
17. Alan L. Gropman, "Air Force Planning and the Technology Development Planning Process in the Post-World War II Air Force--the First Decade (1945-1955)," in Harry R. Borowski, ed., Military Planning in the Twentieth Century: Proceedings of the Eleventh Military History Symposium, 10-12 October 1984 (Washington, D.C., 1986), pp 187-188; Neufeld, Organizational Charts Headquarters USAF: 1947-Present, 10 October 47 chart.
18. Gropman, "Air Force Planning," pp 188-189; Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, I:276-278; Michael Gorn, Vulcan's Forge: The Making of an Air Force Command for Weapons Acquisition (1950-1985), 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1985), 1:9-14. Anderson Report quoted in Gropman, p 189.
19. Gorn, Vulcan's Forge, 1:14. See also, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, "The Organization of the Air Force," 27 Nov 51, 4-8, Box 3, Accession 63-A1749, Record Group 340, Washington National Records Center (hereafter WNRC), which relates the Air Force's organization of its major commands to that of the Air Staff.
20. Goldberg, "Organization of Headquarters USAF," 20; Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, II:306; Vandenberg quotation, ibid.

21. Secretary of the Air Staff, "Secretary of the Air Force--Air Staff Relationships Study: A Report," 4 Oct 56, Box 8, Accession 72A6888, RG 340, WNRC; memo, John J. McLaughlin, Administrative Assistant, to Mr. MacIntyre, 4 Jan 58, *ibid.* There is an analysis of this study in George Watson, "The Office of the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Staff," Chapter 7 of "History of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1947-1965," ms. in the Center for Air Force History.
22. Memo, Lt Col William G. Proctor, Assistant Secretary of the Air Staff, to Colonel Brewster, 18 Jul 51, File 020: Air Staff-Air Force Memoranda, Box 697, *ibid.*; memo, Eugene M. Zuckert, Secretary of the Air Force, to Secretary of Defense, 2 Jan 63, File Project 39A 1962-64, Box 2, Accession 341-75112, RG 341, *ibid.*
23. Neufeld, Organizational Charts Headquarters USAF, introduction.
24. E.M. Zuckert, "Management in the U.S. Air Force," speech to the Air War College, 18 May 51, File 020, Box 696, RG 340, WNRC; Jacob Neufeld (compiler), Organizational Charts for the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1947-Present, (Washington, D.C., 1989), Jun 50 and 29 May 51 charts. See also Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, "Organization of the Air Force," 3-4.
25. Public Law 150, 19 Sep 51, quoted in Wolf, Basic Documents (Washington, D.C., 1987), pp 226, 227.
26. *Ibid.*, p 223.
27. *Ibid.*, p 229.
28. *Ibid.*, p 227.
29. *Ibid.*, p 226; Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, "Organization of the Air Force," p 3.
30. *Ibid.*; H. Lee White, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, memorandum for Mr Talbott, 5 May 54, Box 3, Accession 63-A1749, RG 340, WNRC; Secretary of the Air Force Harold E. Talbott, statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 15 Jun 54, *ibid.*; Donald A. Quarles, "Security in the Hydrogen Age: Research and Development," Air Force Magazine, 37, Oct 54, 56; Neufeld, Office of the Secretary Organizational Charts, introduction; Office of the Administrative Assistant, Secretary of the Air Force, "Organizational Development Growth and Costs," Aug 55, Box 3, Accession 72-A4815, RG 340, WNRC.
31. Goldberg, "Organization of Headquarters USAF," 11-14. General White quoted in *ibid.*, 12. See also Wolk, Postwar Air Force, 134, 139, 193; HQ USAF DCS/Programs & Resources, "Examination of the Air Staff Organizational Structure," n.d., 1:2.
32. Goldberg, "Organization of Headquarters USAF," 14-15.

33. Neufeld, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force Organizational Charts, Mar 55 and Jun 58 charts; Public Law 85-599, 6 Aug 58, quoted in Wolf, Basic Documents, pp 329-338, esp. 336; United States Government Organization Manual 1958-59 (Washington, D.C., 1959), pp 593, 594; United States Government Organization Manual 1959-60 (Washington, D.C., 1960), 601, 602. See also the discussions in Wolf, Basic Documents, pp 325-327, and Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine, pp 573-589.
34. Neufeld, Office of the Secretary Organizational Charts, Jan 58 and Jun 59 charts; Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 Jul 58-30 Jun 59, p 45.
35. Neufeld, Office of the Secretary Organizational Charts, Jan 66 and Sep 66 charts; Public Law 90-168, 1 Dec 67; staff summary sheet, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of the Administrative Assistant, "Revision of SAF 100.1," 3 Jan 68; Secretary of the Air Force Order 100.1, "Functions of the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries, and the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force," 11 Jan 68.
36. "Revision of SAF 100.1," 3 Jan 68; SAF Order 100.1, 11 Jan 68; ibid., 1 Aug 69.
37. Secretary of the Air Force Order 100.1, "Functions of the Secretary, Under Secretary and the Assistant Secretaries," 27 May 77; United States Government Manual 1977/78 (Washington, D.C., 1977), pp 166-167, 170, 177, 182, 188-189, 193, 204-205, 207; Supplement to the 1977/78 United States Government Manual (Washington, D.C., 1978), pp 38-39, 41-42, 46-47, 51-52.
38. Headquarters USAF DCS/Programs and Resources, "United States Air Force Implementation Plan for the Realignment of Departmental Headquarters and Selected Field Activities," Apr 78; Neufeld, Office of the Secretary Organizational Charts, 1 Sep 77 and 1 Oct 78 charts.
39. DCS/Programs and Resources, "Implementation Plan"; Neufeld, Organizational Charts Headquarters USAF, 1 Apr 78 and 15 Jul 78 charts.
40. History, Directorate of Manpower and Organization, 1 Jan 78-30 Jun 78, p 59; History, Assistant Chief of Staff Studies and Analysis, 1 Jan 78-30 Jun 78, p 3.
41. A useful collection of articles on these issues is in Armed Forces Journal International, 123, Supplement Oct 85.
42. Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, "Defense Organization: The Need for Change," 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 Oct 85; staff summary sheet, Directorate of Program Integration, DCS/Research, Development and Acquisition, "Defense Science Board 1985 Summer Study," 22 Jul 86; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, "Report of the Defense Science Board 1985 Summer Study: Practical Functional Performance Requirements," Mar 86; Final Report to the President by the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, "A Quest for Excellence," Jun 86, pp 53-55.

43. Staff summary sheet, Directorate of Manpower and Organization, DCS/Programs and Resources, "Developing an Impact Assessment of Possible Congressionally Directed Reorganization," 15 May 86; Point paper, HQ USAF/XOXOA, "Military Department Reorganization," n.d.; Neufeld, Organizational Charts Headquarters USAF, 1 Mar 87 chart; Neufeld, Office of the Secretary Organizational Charts, Aug 87 chart.
44. Memo, E.C. Aldridge, Jr., Secretary of the Air Force, to AF/CC, 1 Jul 86; Point paper, HQ USAF/XOXOA, "Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986," n.d.; Neufeld, Organizational Charts Headquarters USAF, introduction; Neufeld, Office of the Secretary Organizational Charts, introduction. President Reagan directed the implementation of the Packard recommendations in a classified National Security Decision Directive, NSDD-219, 1 Apr 86.
45. Point paper, HQ USAF/XOXOA, "Military Department Reorganization," n.d.; Neufeld, Organizational Charts Headquarters USAF, Jul 86 and 1 Mar 87 charts.
46. Point paper, HQ USAF/XOXOA, "Management Headquarters Manpower Reduction-Titles V and VI," n.d.; ibid., executive summary, "Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 Issue Book," n.d.; memo, E.C. Aldridge, Secretary of the Air Force, to AF/CC, 1 Jul 86.
47. Memo (U), Scott W. Stucky, AF/JACM, to Jack Neufeld, AF/CHO, subj: Numerical Limitations on Air Staff, 28 Dec 1990.
48. Figures in this paragraph are from the Locher Report, pp. 53-54 Table 3-1 "History of Personnel Fluctuations of the Office of the Secretary of Defense" and p. 390 Table 6-3, "Actual End Strengths of the Top Management Headquarters of the Department of the Air Force." For the JCS figures see Historical Division, JCS, "Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1989," p. 76 Appendix 2 "Authorized and Assigned Strength of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1947-1986) and the Joint Staff (1986-1989)."
49. Sharon K. Barnett, OL-A, AFMEA, "USAF Program Reports, since 1963," AF/PRM, Dec 1990. See appendices.
50. Ibid.
51. 1947th ASG, "Departmental Personnel Strength Reports, since 1948."
52. DOD Directive (U) 5100.73, "Department of Defense Management Headquarters," 8 Nov 1973.
53. DOD Directive 5100.73, "Department of Defense Management Headquarters," 8 Nov 1973 and subsequent revisions. Also see Air Force Regulation (AFR) 26-8, "Air Force Management Headquarters and Headquarters Support," 1 Sep 1975. Ltr (U), William H. Taft, IV, Deputy SECDEF, to Vice President George Bush, President of the Senate, no subj, 7 Jan 1985; ltr (U), Mr. D.O. Cooke, Director, OSD Administration

and Management, to Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al, subj: Management Headquarters and Headquarters Support Activities, 15 Nov 1989.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

Glossary

AAF	Army Air Forces
ACS	Assistant Chief of Staff
AFDW	Air Force District of Washington
AU	Air University
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CSAF	Chief of Staff of the Air Force
DCS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DOD	Department of Defense
DSB	Defense Science Board
FY	Fiscal Year
HAF	Headquarters Air Force
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
NCR	National Capital Region
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
USAF	United States Air Force

Bibliography

- Art, Robert J., Davis, Vincent, and Huntington, Samuel P. (eds.). Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey, 1985.
- Barrett, Archie D. Reappraising Defense Organization, An Analysis Based on the Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983.
- Blechman, Barry M. and Lynn, William J. (eds.). Towards a More Effective Defense: Report of the Defense Organization Project. Cambridge, MA: Ballanger Publishing Company, 1985.
- Borowski, Harry R. (ed.). Military Planning in the Twentieth Century: Proceedings of the Eleventh Military History Symposium, 10-12 October 1984. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1986.
- Futrell, Robert Frank. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907-1984, 2 vols. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, December 1989.
- Goldberg, Alfred; Burch, Wilhelmine; and Marmor, Arthur K. Organization of Headquarters USAF 1945-58 with Particular Reference to DCS/Operations. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Historical Liaison Office, 1958.
- Gorn, Michael H. Vulcan's Forge: The Making of an Air Force Command for Weapons Acquisition (1950-1985) 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: Air Force Systems Command Office of History, 1985.
- Hewes, James E., Jr. From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963. Washington, D.C.: OCMH, GPO, 1975.
- Krulak, Lt Gen Victor H. (USMC, Ret.). Organization for National Security: A Study. Washington, D.C.: United States Strategic Institute, 1983.
- Neufeld, Jacob (compiler). AFP 210-5, Organizational Charts, Headquarters USAF 1947-Present. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, May 1989.
- Neufeld, Jacob (compiler). AFP 210-6, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Organizational and Functional Charts, 1947-Present. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1989.
- Quarles, Donald A. "Security in the Hydrogen Age: Research and Development." Air Force Magazine, (Oct 1954).
- Supplement to the 1977/78 United States Government Manual. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, 1978.

United States Government Organization Manual 1958-59. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, 1959.

United States Government Organization Manual 1959-60. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, 1960.

Wolf, Richard I. The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1987.

Wolk, Herman S. Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force 1943-1947. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1984.