


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REVIEW ON 21 Dec 1973

21 JAN 1988

**AIRPOWER DEPLOYMENTS IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL POLICY
1958 - 1963**

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USAF Historical Division Liaison Office

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FOREWORD

In a memorandum to the Chief of Staff on 18 April 1963, the Secretary of the Air Force proposed that the Air Force prepare an integrated story on recent examples of the use of airpower "packages" in support of the diversified demands of national policy.

The USAF Historical Division Liaison Office (AFCHO) compiled this study on military airpower deployments since 1958 as part of the integrated story. The quick response of the Air Force to international emergencies is shown in 13 different instances where military power was critical, plus other instances of political and humanitarian importance. An effort has been made to present each urgency, tell how the Air Force fulfilled its mission, and evaluate the lessons learned. More detailed information on most of the deployments is available in the files of AFCHO.

This document provides data on the use of airpower in support of national policy 1958-1963. It indicates the problems and the influence that airpower had on critical situations where military forces were utilized to influence the situation.

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I. Venezuelan Incident--1958

Issue

(U) On 13 May 1958, Vice President Richard Nixon and his family were stoned and spat upon by Venezuelan Communists in Caracas.

Response

(U) The JCS, on President Eisenhower's direction, ordered troops sent to Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico.

(U) Headquarters TAC received the order at 1420 on the 13th. Little over three hours later, C-130's loaded with troops began to fly out of Fort Campbell, Kentucky. By midnight, they were landing at Ramey.

(U) Twenty-five TAC C-130's participated. By 0520, 14 May, they had landed 498 soldiers and 107 tons of gear at Ramey.

(U) When Vice President Nixon left Venezuela the troops were returned to Fort Campbell. All were back at their home bases by 15 May.

Impact

(U) The operation, the first of its kind in peacetime, confirmed the efficacy of joint Army-Air Force rapid airlift plans. It also demonstrated to the world how determined and able the U.S. was to safeguard its citizens and interests from unprovoked dangers and indignities.

(U) In appreciation of the Air Force's role in the operation, General Taylor wrote General White, "... my sincere appreciation for

the outstanding cooperation provided the Army by the United States Air Force [The operation reflected] great credit upon both services"

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II. Lebanon Crisis--1958

Issue

Early on 14 July 1958, President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon requested military aid from the United States within 48 hours. This request followed by a few hours a violent coup d'etat in Baghdad, Iraq, which was interpreted as a victory for Nasserites who would be encouraged to more aggressive actions in next-door Lebanon. The response of the United States had to be based on political and strategic considerations affecting the entire Middle East.

General Response

(U) President Eisenhower's decision to assist Lebanon was made by early evening, 14 July, and by 1900 the Specified Command, Middle East, was activated and directed to execute Blue Bat, the operational plan for that area. The Commander, American Air Forces, took orders from CINCSPCCOME.

(U) Three major Air Force commands were immediately involved:
(1) Tactical Air Command, to dispatch its quick-reaction Composite Air Strike Force (CASF); (2) USAFE, to transport Army troops from bases in Germany to Lebanon; (3) MATS, to deploy C-124's to Europe as augmentation for the USAFE airlift.

~~SECRET~~ The U.S. Navy landed a battalion of Marines at Beirut at 0900 (EDT time) on the following morning--15 July. Two more battalions

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landed on the 16th and 18th, and the U.S. Air Force flew Army troops into Beirut on the 19th, after a two-day holdover in Turkey by orders of CINCSFECOM. The arrival of this large force in Lebanon soon quieted the situation. The operation was highly successful, fulfilling the request made by a friendly nation and providing good training experience in quick response.

TAC Response

(2) The TAC commander received his orders at midnight of 14 July to dispatch CASF Bravo to the Middle East. Although this was a change in plans and caught some of the combat groups unprepared, the first CASF planes—12 B-57's—took off from Langley AFB, Va., at 1420 on 15 July. The first flight of 12 F-100's departed Myrtle Beach, N.C., at 1650, and all of the CASF had taken off by early 16 July.

(3) Four F-100's flew nonstop to Incirlik Air Base at Adana, Turkey, in 12½ hours, landing at 1125 on 16 July, but the other Supersabres were forced by weather or refueling difficulties to land en route. Nevertheless, by the night of the 17th, 15 F-100's and 10 B-57's were in place at Adana; by the night of 20 July the CASF was complete, with 55 combat aircraft: 26 F-100's, 12 B-57's, 7 RF-101's, 7 RB-66's, and 3 WB-66's. In addition, there were 9 F-86's lent by USAFE, and 43 TAC C-130 transports had arrived with support personnel and equipment. CASF personnel totaled 1,100. The total CASF airlift involved the movement of 860 passengers and 293 tons of cargo.

(U) Operations conducted by the CASF over the Lebanon area consisted of cover for Army troop flights to Beirut, air defense sorties,

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show-of-force missions, training missions, a leaflet-drop mission, and air demonstrations. There was no actual combat, but the CASF remained on alert at Adana until 19 October.

(1) The chief problems for the CASF were inadequate warning time for unscheduled and substitute units, shortages of certain equipment, and inadequacy of facilities at Adana, Turkey.

USAFE Response

(1) The USAFE airlift of Army Task Force Alpha from German bases to Lebanon took place at the same time as the CASF deployment. Readied on the 15th, the 322d Air Division's first C-130's departed at 0900 the next morning. A total of 59 transports--32 C-130's, 8 C-124's, and 19 C-119's--lifted 1,749 paratroopers to Adana in 72 sorties, the last one arriving midday of 17 July. The stopover at Adana was ordered by CINCSPECOMME, who then directed an airlift of troops to Beirut commencing at 0600 on 19 July. The transports also lifted Task Force Charlie from Germany to Beirut, beginning on 18 July. Charlie was a support force for Alpha and included 1,818 Army personnel and 2,290 tons of cargo, necessitating 198 C-124 and C-130 sorties. Charlie was expected to also support a second Army task force that was never ordered to the objective area. The USAFE transports lifted the paratroops back to Germany at the end of the crisis, 25 October 1958.

(2) The chief problems for the airlift were the denial of over-flight rights by Austria and by Greece, except for one day, and the saturation of the base at Adana.

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MATS Response

(S) At 1840 (CDT) on 14 July, MATS received orders to provide 26 C-124's to augment the USAFE airlift. In three hours, the first aircraft departed from Donaldson AFB, S.C. In the meantime, MATS directed 13 C-124's en route in the European area on normal schedules to divert to Rhein-Main, Germany, and support the task force until the 26 could arrive from the States. The 13 began arriving within a few hours and remained on duty until all 26 from the States arrived ahead of schedule on 16 July. Ten more C-124's were dispatched on 17 July for a total of 36 augmentation aircraft. In addition, 10 MATS C-124's were already on temporary duty with USAFE, and these were diverted to the Blue Bat crisis. Seven of these airlifted 700 paratroops to Beirut on 19 July and then performed POL missions to Amman, Jordan.

(S) As of 8 September (last day of operations), MATS aircraft had moved 5,846 tons of cargo and 5,316 passengers to the Middle East in 314 sorties (6,954 flying hours).

III Airlift to Jordan--1958

Issue

➤ The government of Jordan also appealed for assistance against violence by outside agitators at the time of the Iraqi COUP d'etat of July 1958. On 16 July, two days after the Baghdad event, King Hussein asked the United States and the United Kingdom for military assistance. The two governments decided that Britain alone would send troops into Jordan, but the U.S. Sixth Fleet stood close to the eastern Mediterranean coast to evacuate Hussein if necessary. The Royal Air Force flew the first of 1,800 British paratroops into Amman on the 17th. Ultimately the number of British troops rose to 3,500.

Response

➤ U.S. airlift was requested because of a serious shortage of POL in Amman from the beginning. USAFE aircraft, lent from the Lebanon airlift, began carrying POL from Beirut to Jordan on 17 July. C-124's and C-130's lifted 608 tons by 26 July. When the British requested the airlift of supplies from Cyprus to the troops at Amman, USAFE added C-119's to the service. Through 18 August, the U.S. transports lifted a total 2,277 tons of cargo to Amman.

➤ The problem in this operation was denial of overflight by Israel part of the time and imposition of restrictions at other times.

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IV. Taiwan Crisis--1958

Issue

(U) In July 1958, before the Lebanon crisis had ended, the Chinese Communists began a military buildup opposite Taiwan. There was an increase in the number of tactical air units deployed, in aerial activities, including overflights of the Chinese Nationalist-held offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu, and in the number of artillery guns emplaced on the mainland near the Kinmens (Quemoy).

(U) After sporadic shelling of the Kinmens, the Communists unleashed a major bombardment of the islands on 23 August 1958. About 40,000 rounds of artillery were fired the first day, and in the succeeding five days the firings averaged 10,000 rounds per day, sufficient to impose an artillery blockade. Bellicose boasts by the Chinese Communist government, backed by a Soviet pledge to assist, to "free" the offshore islands and Taiwan, added to the war of nerves.

(U) To support the Chinese Nationalist government's defense of the offshore islands and Taiwan, the U.S. Government, on 29 August, directed augmentation of U.S. military strength in the Taiwan area.

Response

The Air Force sent a fighter-interceptor squadron (F-86D's) stationed on Okinawa to Taiwan. It was combat-ready in its new location seven and one-half hours after the movement order was given. Beginning

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the same day, designated tactical units in the United States, known as Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) and consisting in part of F-100, F-101, and RF-101 aircraft, began deploying to bases in the Philippines and Okinawa via Hawaii, Midway, and Guam. Travel time varied from 2 to 6 days, depending on weather, maintenance, and other factors. By 12 September, the CASF deployment was complete. In addition, 12 ADC F-104 aircraft, beginning 6 September, were carried in C-124's to Taiwan, the first airlift of this kind for tactical aircraft to an overseas destination during a crisis. These planes were made combat-ready as they arrived, and all were in place and operational by 19 September.

☛ Briefly, the major Air Force deployments from the United States were as follows:

1. <u>CASF and other units</u>	
a. Fighters	42
b. Fighter-bombers	14
c. Defense fighters	12
d. Reconnaissance, transport, tanker, and other support aircraft	<u>55</u>
Total	123
2. <u>Supporting MATS airlift</u>	
a. Passengers	1,472
b. Cargo (tons)	860.1

☛ Total USAF aircraft of all types available to the Pacific Air Forces after augmentation was as follows: Okinawa, 83; Taiwan, 79; Philippines, 58; Japan, 16; total, 236.

☛ The Fifth Air Force, with headquarters in Japan, and the

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Thirteenth Air Force, with headquarters in the Philippines, provided intratheater airlift. The Fifth brought 1,100 tons of essential items from Korea and Japan to Taiwan in the first two weeks of the crisis.

The other services likewise participated in the U.S. military buildup. The Navy dispatched the aircraft carriers Midway and Essex, plus their destroyer escorts, and other ships to the area to strengthen the Seventh Fleet. The Marines deployed 56 aircraft from Japan to Taiwan to bolster the defense of the island and provide air cover, if necessary, for the fleet. The Army sent additional artillery and other supplies and equipment to Chinese Nationalist forces on the Kinmens and dispatched a Nike Hercules unit to Taiwan.

Impact

The Chinese Communist artillery blockade of the Kinmens was shortlived. Airdrops of supplies by Chinese Nationalist Air Force pilots (assisted and advised by USAF) on the beleaguered islands and increasingly successful resupply activities by the Chinese Nationalist Navy (assisted and advised by the U.S. Navy) soon broke the blockade. Meanwhile, Nationalist fighter pilots displayed overwhelming air superiority in the Taiwan area. In 25 separate engagements during the crisis, they destroyed 32 Communist aircraft, probably destroyed 3, and damaged 10 while losing only 2 F-86 and 2 F-84 aircraft. As a consequence, the Chinese Communist government, on 6 October, ordered a "cease-fire" of the islands for a week for "humanitarian" reasons. They shelled the Kinmens only sporadically thereafter. At no time during the crisis did the Communists attempt to make good their threat

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to invade the islands.

Problems

In general, the USAF deployments to Taiwan and the neighboring areas were quite successful. However, some difficulties were experienced. In the movement of aircraft from the United States, it was found that (1) inadequate weather-reporting (primarily for lack of sufficient reporting stations) between the United States and Hawaii made the flights unduly hazardous; (2) prestocked supplies and equipment at en route bases were not always adequate nor in good condition; and (3) limited cryptographic and other communication facilities at en route bases hampered security, coordination, and control.

Major shortcomings encountered in the Taiwan area during the crisis included: (1) insufficient communication links between Taiwan and the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan; (2) short supply, poor condition, or wrong location of some prestocked supplies and equipment (bombs, rockets, ammunition, external fuel tanks, etc.); (3) general failure by all commands and services to inform MATS in advance of the amount or type of supplies and equipment requiring airlift, resulting in an extensive backlog of shipments; (4) inadequate detailed operational planning by field commands prior to the crisis (such as type of equipment and number of personnel needed); and (5) insufficient planning and preparation to fight, if necessary, a protracted non-nuclear conflict. This appeared to be the result of incomplete State and Defense Department coordination in determining a nuclear weapons policy.

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Lessons Learned

In summary, the Taiwan crisis of 1958 remained a localized conflict and subsided without loss of territory to the Chinese Nationalists. The evidence strongly suggests that the U.S. tactical show of force in the trouble area, backed by strategic airpower, deterred the Communists from enlarging the conflict after the artillery blockade of the Kimsens was broken. It was also demonstrated that air and naval power of a friendly country--in this instance, the Chinese Nationalist Government--after being reasonably modernized and trained under the U.S. Military Assistance Program, could aid in attainment of U.S. objectives.

The Taiwan crisis of 1958 also revealed a need for clearer U.S. nuclear weapon policies, for military planners to be aware of political objectives, and for political authorities to be aware of the implications of their decisions on military planning.

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V. Laos Crisis--1959

Issue

(U) On 18 August 1958 a pro-Western leader, Phoui Sananikone became Prime Minister of Laos, after the intransigence of pro-Communist Pathet Lao leaders had caused the neutralist, Souvanna Phouma, to resign in disgust. Phoui's domestic reforms and his anti-Communist leanings provoked the Pathet Lao into renewing open rebellion. By July 1959 civil war had broken out in the northeastern provinces, and by the end of August, it appeared that the Pathet Lao, with the covert assistance of North Vietnam, might soon win control of the country. And if Laos became Communist, all Southeast Asia might soon follow.

Response

(U) As a member of SEATO, which included Laos under its protective umbrella, and to bolster Free World interests in the Orient, the United States felt compelled to do what it could to protect Laos.

(U) Although the United States hoped for SEATO participation, it relied initially on CINCPAC's Oplan 32 (L)-59 to save the situation in an emergency. Oplan 32 (L)-59, published in June 1959, called for the swift seizure and control of the main cities and vital centers in Laos, thus freeing the Armée Nationale Laos (ANL) for stronger operations against the rebels. CINCPAC would deploy Joint Task Force (JTF) 116, including three battalions of the 3d Marine Expeditionary Force, from

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Okinawa to Laos, using a combination of air and sea lift. A USAF tactical fighter squadron would move to Bangkok, Thailand, to protect land forces and provide reconnaissance.

(2) PACAF would move the airborne echelon of the Marine expeditionary force and supply it by air for 30 days or until resupply could be provided overland from Bangkok. The Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces would furnish the fighter and reconnaissance planes and a photo-processing center, and possibly some C-119's. The 315th Air Division would conduct the airlift, employing 50 transports; the Airways and Air Communications Service (AACS) would provide command control, air traffic control, navigation aids, and aerial port assistance. The tactical fighters and reconnaissance units would move to Bangkok when the first Marine elements went to Laos.

(3) On 4 September, acting on a suggestion by Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas D. White, and using SEATO agreements as a legal basis for U.S. action, the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that CINCPAC alert his forces at once. At 0918, 5 September, President Eisenhower approved the military preparations, and on the same day the joint task force commander, Marine Maj. Gen. C. A. Roberts, and the air component commander, Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Moorman, Jr. reported to CINCPAC that the force was ready. By 7 September, the JCS had authorized CINCPAC to move his transport aircraft to designated airfields for troop loading, load the Marine forces that would go by sea, and to send the Seventh Fleet into the South China Sea. One C-130 squadron was sent from the U.S. to the western Pacific, and two more were to be made available on short notice.

(U) Meanwhile, on 4 September Prime Minister Phoui had called on the United Nations for assistance, on 7 September Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold called the Security Council into emergency session, and on 8 September the Council formed a subcommittee to investigate. After the subcommittee arrived in Laos on 15 September, the flames of conflict subsided.

(U) On 8 October CINCPAC began a gradual relaxation of readiness for military action. On 14 October, JTF 116 began to demobilise. The air components were deactivated, and members of the JTF staff returned to their parent organisations.

VI. Congo Airlift--1960Issue

(U) Chaos soon developed after the Republic of the Congo was proclaimed on 30 June 1960. In 11 days the government leaders were appealing for help, and on 14 July the U.N. Security Council voted to send a military force to the Congo to restore order. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold named the United States as one of the five countries to provide the necessary air transport and other support.

Response

(U) In less than 48 hours, U.S. Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft were offloading 595 Tunisians at Ndjili airport near Leopoldville, while C-124 Globemasters were unloading civil relief foodstuffs. The U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and the Military Air Transport Service (MATC) jointly mounted this airlift, which eventually transported to the Congo the U.N. troops from Austria, Canada, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Ireland, Liberia, Mali Federation, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, and United Arab Republic.

(U) The first six months of this USAF operation--July through December 1960--totaled the largest airlift since the Berlin blockade of 1948-49. The tonnages per aircraft and the distances flown far exceeded the Berlin airlift. The indispensable element in this support was the swift response of the transport fleet. And the crews operated under

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austere manning and serious hazards, ranging from navigational to downright hostile. The worst health hazard turned out to be physical exhaustion, since during the first weeks few crews saw a bed for four days at a stretch.

(U) Initially called Operation Safari but quickly changed to New Tape, this airlift presented new and stupendous difficulties. USAF transports had to respond to rapidly changing requests from virtually all points of the compass. In this cold-war type of mission, not only were flexibility, high mobility, training, and skill constantly demanded but individual initiative and dedication.

(U) Civil Relief Lift. The nonintervention principle, announced by President Eisenhower on 13 July, remained the cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Congo. The saving of human life was the paramount consideration in the refugee rescue and civil relief phase of the airlift. Beginning on 15 July USAF transports evacuated foreign refugees as well as Americans, backhauling the refugees after unloading foodstuffs in the Congo. They evacuated 2,640 refugees during July-September 1960, the majority before 27 July. Belgium's Sabena Airlines, with assistance from other airlines, ferried out about 17,000 refugees during July-August. Refugee centers were quickly improvised at Wheelus Air Base, Libya; Chateauroux Air Station, France; and at other bases in France, Germany, and Morocco.

(S) Foodlift. Acute food shortages in the Congo prompted the JCS to direct the airlift of foodstuffs to that strife-torn new nation. In the early hours of 15 July, Air Force transports began the foodlift from Chateauroux to the Congo, 16 USAFE C-130's and 5 MATS C-124's participating.

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By 10 August, they had lifted more than 1,000 tons of various foodstuffs for civil relief, U.N. military, and unit support purposes. They flew 37 C-130 and 43 C-124 sorties in this lift. Thereafter, through the entire Congo operation, a number of foodlifts continued to be flown.

(U) Trooplift. For the first two weeks of the trooplift, USAFE provided 52 C-130 aircrews, and MATS supplied 54 C-124 aircrews. From the supply base at Chateauroux to Leopoldville the average round trip was 9,000 miles but sometimes the itinerary lengthened to more than 20,000 miles, and the crews sometimes flew crew-days of 30 to 40 hours.

(U) The lift began modestly with 10 C-130's taking off in the pre-dawn of 15 July 1960, but by 13 December 1960, USAF transports had lifted to the Congo speedily and safely more than 16,000 U.N. soldiers from 16 nations around the globe. In addition, they had carried many other passengers and backhauled troops so that the total lift amounted to more than 21,000 passengers. They carried 4,000 soldiers to the Congo by 25 July, 9,000 by 10 August.

(U) The transports lifted 4,036.6 short tons of cargo into and out of the Congo by the end of 1960, more than half of it organic field equipment of the contingents transported. They totaled 21,389 flying hours. By 21 November they had flown an estimated 4,174,000 miles in 516 sorties; passenger miles were estimated at 83,860,694 and ton miles at 15,140,267.

(U) The costs incurred by USAFE in the Congo airlift through December 1960 were estimated at \$8.75 million: \$4.08 million for airlift and \$4.67 million for equipment, supplies, and services. Total costs to the Air Force through 2 December were estimated at \$19.4 million.

(U) Phasedown of the airlift began on 1 September 1960 with the return to the States of two of the four MATS augmentation squadrons. In October the United Nations began the establishment of a charter airlift, and by the end of December only one MATS squadron remained on the lift. But by then it was clear that the United States would have to continue the primary U.N. airlift support in order to maintain the peace in the Congo. For all of 1961, 1962, and 1963 to date (30 June), USAF transports would carry rotational U.N. contingents back and forth and would perform other support missions.

Impact

(U) The success of the airlift was clearly evident in the fact that the U.N. peace force stationed in the heart of Africa had been brought there almost totally by USAF transports. A remarkably high degree of mutual cooperation and support was achieved among the representatives of USAF, MATS, U.S. Army, State Department, United Nations, and the U.N. member nations. Only sound training could account for the very low aircraft accident rate--only three minor accidents for all USAF and MATS sorties during July-December 1960, in a maximum effort under very adverse conditions.

Lessons Learned

(U) Lessons learned included necessity for the following: area contingency planning; quick placement of cargo-loading experts at pickup points; simple traffic-control procedures with the countries concerned; overflight rights; readiness with maps, charts, and other aids; immediate

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internal and external communications capability; accessible refueling; new funding procedures; fulltime employment of the C-130 rather than the C-124; increased staffing, better transportation, and facilities for "creature comfort."

VII. Military Assistance to Mali--1961 & 1963

Issue

(1) Beginning in July 1960 the U.S. Air Force played a major role in supporting operations of the United Nations in the Congo. About the same time the Air Staff participated in setting up a JCS task group to develop a politico-military program that would increase American influence in central Africa. In February 1961, as a possible means of arresting Soviet bloc penetration in Mali, the Air Force offered Mali two DC-4's, plus crews and spares, to assist that country in establishing a commercial airline. Mali rejected the offer but, in May 1961, accepted the establishment of a U.S. military mission there in July.

Response

(2) In September 1961 the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron deployed two SC-47's with aircrews and maintenance personnel to Mali, together with an Army paratrooper element, to conduct a program of airborne training for the Malinese army. They operated there for the scheduled period of 75 days, after which the Malinese expressed complete satisfaction with the effort and requested that the training be extended. Shortly thereafter, however, a change in the political climate took place and the American contingents returned to their parent organizations.

(3) On the last day of January 1963 a second airborne training unit deployed to Mali. This detachment consisted of two C-123's from the 1st

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Air Commando Group (formerly 4400th CCTS) with their crews and maintenance personnel. Again, in conjunction with an Army paratroop element, the unit trained the Malinese personnel until 12 May 1963, when it redeployed to the United States.

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VIII. Berlin Crisis--1961-62

Issue

(U) Premier Khrushchev told President Kennedy at the Vienna meeting of June 1961 that the Soviet Union would sign a separate "peace treaty" with East Germany by the end of the year. This meant the "... liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin," Khrushchev said. The President answered that such unilateral action would in no way change U.S. occupation rights and commitments in Berlin. To demonstrate the firmness of its resolve, the U.S. launched an immediate, emergency increase in the size and strength of USEUCOM's ground and air forces. At the same time, the nation accelerated those actions begun in late 1960 and early 1961 to strengthen its non-nuclear or conventional war forces.

Response

(U) Following the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange, OSD directed the services to propose measures that would strengthen their forces to cope with a possible Berlin crisis. In their replies, the services indicated a shortage of both men and gear for any type of conflict less than all-out nuclear war.

(U) Accordingly, President Kennedy informed Congress that he intended to meet the emergency manning requirements in Europe by recalling units of the National Guard and Reserve. To cover the cost of

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mobilisation and expand the conventional war capability, he asked for additional funds. Public Law 87-117 appropriated the funds and confirmed the President's decision to recall 250,000 Ready Reservists to active duty for not more than 12 months and to suspend, for an equal period, retirements and other releases of military personnel. Executive Order 10957, 10 August 1961, directed this action.

(3) The Air Force began its build-up by coordinating with the National Guard Bureau and informing state governors of the ANG units being recalled. On 3 August 1961, it upgraded the supply precedence rating for the selected reserve units-- both AFR and ANG. It also permitted these units to man full complements and increase flying hours for training.

(4) The Air Force applied the \$754 million received in emergency funds to rebuild those squadrons that TAC had been readying for deactivation, to modernize equipment, and to expand flight training. MATS and USAFE crews used up a large portion of the increased flying-hour authorization in "corridor" airlift training. Some \$25 million went to Tank Top II--a project for improving electronic and counterelectronic jamming equipment and other navigational aids within the Berlin air corridors.

(5) On 11 August 1961, JCS directed the Air Force to plan a phased mobilization and deployment to Europe by 1 January 1962 of 24 tactical fighter squadrons, 4 tactical reconnaissance squadrons, and 2 tactical control groups. USEUCOM would station and employ the units.

(6) While awaiting the overseas deployment of the reserve units,

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the Air Force sent a number of regular TAC squadrons. The move, designated Tack Hammer, code name for this preplanned contingency operation, began on 4 September 1961, when four TAC F-100D squadrons flew to Europe. On the 16th, two additional TAC F-100D squadrons, engaged in the NATO Checkmate exercise, received orders to remain in Europe. Four days later, a TAC F-104 squadron moved overseas. All were stationed in France and Germany and passed to CINCEUR operational control. Finally, an F-104C squadron currently on rotation at Moron, Spain, had its tour extended. These eight squadrons augmented CINCEUR forces until replaced by the reserve squadrons.

~~(S)~~ The recalled forces included 28 ANG tactical squadrons (fighter, fighter-interceptor, and reconnaissance), 6 ANG transport squadrons, 5 AFR troop carrier squadrons, 1 ANG tactical control group, and 8 weather flights, plus their command and support units. Some 3,400 officers and 23,000 airmen came on active duty, bolstering tactical fighter strength by 37 percent, troop carrier by 17 percent, and tactical reconnaissance and heavy transport by 28 percent. ANG transport units were assigned to MATS, the rest to TAC. All but three ANG F-104 squadrons mobilized on 1 October 1961. The three F-104 units followed on 1 November.

~~(S)~~ Replacement of TAC squadrons in Europe with federalized ANG squadrons began late in October 1961, as Stair Step. Between 27-29 October, 8 ANG tactical squadrons and their support units flew the Atlantic in the largest single overseas transfer of tactical aircraft since World War II. Making the flight were 104 F-84's, 20 RF-84F's,

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78 F-86H's, 16 T-33's, and 6 C-47's. All aircraft were at their over-sea stations by 13 November. No planes were lost, nor was there a single accident. After 60 planes of the three F-104A/B squadrons recalled on 1 November were disassembled, MATS flew both the planes and men to Europe. The airlift began on 10 November and was over early the next month. Other mobilized ANG tactical squadrons remained in the U.S., participating with regular TAC forces in USSTRICOM and joint-service exercises. They also prepared for emergency deployment, should the need arise.

(U) Meanwhile, seven of the eight regular TAC squadrons temporarily deployed in Europe since September began returning to the U.S. in the third week of November and completed the move by 13 December. The eighth squadron, flying F-104C's, remained in Germany for the duration of the crisis.

(U) The deployed ANG units stood combat alert, engaged in close support missions with NATO troops, and practiced strikes and air superiority tactics. In short, they functioned as integral elements of the NATO defenses until their return to the U.S., completed in August 1962.

(2) The increased budget for build-up of tactical air support and non-nuclear forces enabled TAC to replace some of the reserve squadrons with newly activated regular squadrons. The ANG left its F-84's in Europe for the new units to fly until F-105's and F-110's could be shipped there. A plan was also drawn up in mid-1962 to deploy regular Tack Hammer forces to USAFE but was cancelled when the Cuban crisis arose. To fill the void left by the demobilized ANG tactical control group, TAC established an interim, regular tactical control unit.

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PROBLEMS

(U) Oversea deployment of the mobilized ANG squadrons uncovered a host of organizational, equipment, and training weaknesses. The crux of the problem was that the recalled units simply were not designed for this type of move. To correct the condition, the Air Force planned to specify the units to be recalled in future crises; then organize, man, equip, and train them as close to regular Air Force levels and standards as possible.

(U) USAFE's stand-by bases that ANG units occupied had deteriorated greatly since being placed on caretaker status in 1959. And USAFE had neither sufficient money nor time to get them in adequate shape before the ANG arrived. When the ANG pulled out in the summer of 1962, USAFE activated combat support groups at those bases not scheduled to receive regular squadrons. These units would keep the bases in operating condition and stockpile war reserve materiel and equipment. Then, as an emergency demanded, the bases would be ready for USAFE squadrons, Tack Hammer forces, or another mobilization and deployment of the reserve.

(U) Finally, the temporary and rapid build-up of USAFE forces created severe base saturation and air traffic control problems in Germany and France. These experiences, too, afforded a realistic basis for reappraisal of emergency planning for future trouble.

Impact

(U) The Berlin crisis of 1961-1962 further demonstrated this nation's intent and determination to defend Western rights.

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(U) It also pointed up the need for greater flexibility within the U.S. and NATO military forces to meet varying degrees of challenges. As President Kennedy expressed it, "We intend to have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear war." Strength in both nuclear and non-nuclear forces and weapons assures the U.S. that it would have the "right stick" as well as the "big stick" for military backing of its national objectives and convictions.

IX. South Vietnam Operations--1961-63

Issue

(U) When the Kennedy administration took office in January 1961, the United States faced four major crises--Cuba, the Congo, Laos, and Vietnam. Each represented the effort of international communism to exploit the instabilities of underdeveloped regions, and each represented a breaching of the cold war truce lines that had emerged since the conclusion of World War II. Success of the Communists in these four areas was the result of an aggressive program to foster insurgency.

(U) In a speech before the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow on 6 January 1961, Nikita Khrushchev declared "wars of liberation" both inevitable and desirable. By wars of liberation, the leader of the USSR meant coordinated acts of subversion and covert aggression for the express purpose of installing Communist governments among the newly formed nations of the world--those going through a period of transition. The United States was determined that these nations would work out their own destiny, free of intimidation from members of the Communist Bloc.

Response

Initial Air Force action in support of the national objective was to activate early in April 1961 the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron at Hurlburt Field, Fla. Its mission was to train personnel in World War II-type aircraft, provide advanced training to friendly foreign air force personnel, and improve conventional-weapon tactics and techniques of employment for

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counterinsurgency operations. The squadron possessed SC-47, B-26, and T-28B aircraft, and by 1 July it was fully manned with 125 officers and 235 airmen. The unit was to be operationally ready by 8 September 1961.

(S) Communist successes in Southeast Asia during the summer of 1961 led to a decision by the Secretary of Defense on 5 September to establish a command in South Vietnam under the Chief, MAAG, as a laboratory to develop organizations and procedures for counterinsurgency operations. The decision met with enthusiasm within the Air Force, which recognized in it an opportunity to utilize the talents of the now operational 4400th CCTS. On 19 September the Secretary of the Air Force recommended that an element of the 4400th be assigned as a unit of the experimental command. JCS concurred in the recommendation, and on 12 October affirmation came from "the highest governmental level."

(S) The detachment deployed in November 1961 with 8 T-28's, 4 RB-26's, 4 SC-47's, and 151 personnel. The unit, nicknamed Farm Gate, operated from Bien Hoa airfield, approximately 28 miles from Saigon. On 6 December, Farm Gate was authorized to participate in operations against the Viet Cong if at least one Vietnamese crewmember was aboard each strike aircraft. First operational flights occurred during the week of 18 December 1961, and by 7 January 1962, the unit had flown 59 strike, photo reconnaissance, troop and supply drop, and transport support missions. In December 1961, Mule Train, a TAC C-123 assault transport squadron of 16 aircraft from the 464th Troop Carrier Wing deployed to Vietnam to provide air logistic support. In the same month an experiment in defoliation of the jungles got under way when Ranch Hand, six spray-equipped C-123's from the 464th TCW, moved into the area. PACAF deployed four RF-101's from theater resources to Don Muang, Thailand, where as

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Able Mable they performed photo reconnaissance over all of Southeast Asia.

☛ Air operations in South Vietnam continued to expand during 1962. The 2d ADVON, an advance headquarters of Thirteenth Air Force, was established in April and redesignated the 2d Air Division in September. All USAF activities in South Vietnam except the MAAG-AF Division came under the operational control of this headquarters.

☛ By the last half of the year, requirements dictated sustained day-to-day air operations. Vietnamese National Air Force and Farm Gate aircraft averaged 233 operational sorties per week. Approximately 120 of these were strike missions. This sustained effort exceeded Farm Gate resources and there was fear that, as the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) increased the scope of its program, there would be a progressive deterioration of capability. Citing these greatly increased requirements, PACAF in September recommended to CINCPAC that Farm Gate be augmented by 17 aircraft (5 T-28's, 10 B-26's, and 2-C47's). Two B-26's had been added to the original complement earlier and four U-10B's in August. In November, CINCPAC added another B-26 to the proposal and forwarded it to JCS. JCS agreed on 4 December and so recommended to the Secretary of Defense, who gave his approval on 31 December to augment Farm Gate with 117 personnel and 18 aircraft. Total Farm Gate strength, as of 1 June 1963, was 13 T-28's, 18 B-26's, 6 SC-47's, 4 U-10B's and approximately 300 personnel.

☛ A second TAC C-123 squadron--Sawbuck II--deployed from Pope AFB, N.C., on 31 May 1962 to Tan San Nhut, South Vietnam. This addition brought the airlift strength of Mule Train/Sawbuck to 32 C-123's and a combined personnel strength of 427. Aircrews rotated approximately every six months, but the limited number of qualified C-123 aircrews available in TAC for rotation created difficulties. Consequently, Hq USAF levied quotas on other ZI commands to

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furnish pilots, copilots, navigators, and engineers. These personnel were placed on TDY to South Vietnam after completing flight training at Pope AFB. In May 1963 a third C-123 squadron--Sawback VII--deployed to Da Nang, South Vietnam, to meet the ever-growing demand for airlift support to the South Vietnamese and American forces. As of 1 June, the Mule Train/Sawback forces included 48 C-123's and almost 600 airmen and maintenance personnel.

(b) The initial Ranch Hand defoliation operations were sufficiently successful to continue the project. One C-123 crashed and the three-man crew was killed on 2 February 1962 while conducting a low-level training mission about 25 miles from Saigon. In May 1962 the Air Force ordered another Ranch Hand C-123 to Iran to combat a locust plague. Completing the mission, the aircraft proceeded to Afghanistan, where it performed a similar task, and then returned to the United States. The remaining Ranch Hand aircraft continued to operate in South Vietnam. Spraying operations against six targets in the latter months of 1962 produced a 95-percent effectiveness against mangrove forests, with complete defoliation within 10 days. As of 31 December 1962, the detachment consisted of three C-123's, plus crew and maintenance personnel.

(c) The major problem facing the detached 46th Troop Carrier Wing units was maintenance. Technical personnel were spread so thin that the wing's retraining program was seriously hampered, both at home and at the TDY sites.

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X. Thailand Crisis--1962-63

Issue

As the pro-Western position in Laos deteriorated during the last half of 1961, Thailand began to fear for its security. During a low point of the Royal Laotian government's fortunes in December 1961-January 1962, the United States acceded to Thailand's wishes by sending a TAC squadron of C-123's to Bangkok to help Thailand supply its troops on the northeastern frontier. Then early in May 1962, Royal forces around Nam Tha in northwestern Laos were routed by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces, which quickly drove to the Thai border. Considering this a threat to its security, Thailand requested the presence of allied military forces.

Response

On 15 May President Kennedy ordered U.S. air and ground forces into Thailand "... to fulfill speedily our obligations under the Manila Pact of 1954" Spearheaded by an F-100 tactical fighter squadron from the Thirteenth AF, which landed at Don Muang Airfield, Bangkok, on the 16th, the U.S. sent a joint task force to Thailand consisting of (1) An Army logistic command and battle group, (2) a Marine brigade and Navy air wing, and (3) an Air Force contingent including, in addition to the F-100 squadron, a squadron of C-130's and a squadron of C-123's.

In addition, Australia sent 13 aircraft and 50 paratroopers,

New Zealand sent air transport planes and 35 paratroopers, and the United Kingdom sent a Hawker Hunter fighter squadron.

TAC dispatched an F-100 squadron from the United States to replace that of the Thirteenth sent to Bangkok. The C-130 and C-123 squadrons also came from the United States. The C-130's operated between the western Pacific and SEA theaters, flying from Clark AB to Bangkok. The C-123's operated within the SEA theater, flying between Bangkok and Saigon and from Bangkok to the northwestern regions of Thailand. The C-130's brought in communication and control elements and large amounts of equipment, radar being among the most important. The C-123's airlifted troops, supplies, ammunition, and equipment to the northern frontiers of Thailand and executed airdrops in sections of the defense perimeter that have no airfields. The F-100's provided a show of force.

Impact

The show of force eased the Communist threat to Thailand, as the Pathet Lao pulled back from the border and concentrated their operations elsewhere. Thailand used the time thus won to intensify its military preparations and continue the training of pilots, particularly those learning to fly the F-80 and F-84 jet fighters furnished through the U.S. Military Assistance Program.

As the tension eased, the United States reduced its land forces in Thailand. The Marine brigade and some Army combat troops were withdrawn in July and August 1962. Army logistic forces remained to build and improve roads and airfields. In April 1963 the Air Force reduced

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the F-100 squadron to eight aircraft, but about the same time it deployed an additional squadron of C-123's to operate in the SEA theater, servicing both Thailand and South Vietnam.

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XI. Cuban Crisis--1962

Issue

On 14 October 1962 a Strategic Air Command U-2 reconnaissance plane detected the existence of Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba. However, the Air Force had already taken many preparatory steps because of the deteriorating relationship with Cuba--highlighted in the summer of 1962 by the shipment of several thousand Soviet military personnel and vast stores of war materiel. Between April and October 1962, Air Force agencies had discussed and documented materiel requirements and taken measures to preposition quantities of war readiness materiel (WRM) at Homestead and MacDill AFB's in Florida and other sites in the southeastern United States. MATS airlift capability was reviewed, operational rates accelerated, and C-124 formation drop training stepped up.

Air surveillance of Cuba increased and, by 26 September, resulted in the identification and location of 11 Soviet SA-2 sites, various MIG aircraft, Russian electronic equipment, and other military gear. Thus, the advent of the crisis--triggered by perhaps the most important USAF reconnaissance flight in American history--found the Air Force in a somewhat advanced posture of readiness.

Response

The day following the discovery of the ballistic missiles,

CINCAFLANT (Commander, TAC) dispatched instructions on prepositioning aircraft, materiel, and personnel at MacDill, Homestead, and McCoy AFB's and at Key West NAS. The Air Staff set priorities for implementing parts of the USAF Short Range Requirements Plan, and the USAF War Plan was revised accordingly. Logistical support was excellent. By 19 October all requirements, with minor exceptions which did not affect operational capability, were in place. Almost 7,000 tons of materiel had been airlifted, some from as far away as the Philippines and Turkey.

On 22 October President Kennedy informed the nation of the situation and established a quarantine of Cuba. SAC implemented a one-eighth airborne alert of the B-52 force and dispersed 183 B-47's to 33 (later 32) civilian and military airfields, completing the move on the following day. ADC dispersed 161 aircraft to 16 bases in less than seven hours. During the President's speech, 22 interceptors were airborne as a precautionary measure against some rash action from Cuba. Prior to the crisis, USAF air defense forces in the southeast consisted of 4 F-102's, 6 RC-121's, and 2 F-101's. By the 22nd, Florida bases contained 32 F-106's, 36 F-102's, 6 TF-102's, and 8 F-101's. Deployment of the [] tactical strike force--prepared for an air strike on Cuba--began on 22 October. Within two days 560 aircraft were dispersed and 163 were in place at their home stations. Of the total, 471 TAC aircraft were in Florida, 459 operationally ready. USAF airlift was increased to support the combat forces. Beginning 17 October, MATS flew 54 missions to airlift approximately 800 tons of equipment into the area. In a four-day period, beginning 21 October, MATS airlifted 3,600 Marines and 3,200 tons of equipment into Guantanamo, Cuba, and the southeastern United States.

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[REDACTED] The turning point of the crisis occurred on 28 October when Premier Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the ballistic missiles. By this time, [REDACTED] forces included 1,576 aircraft and 382 missiles. There were 52 B-52's on airborne alert. The SAC force ready for immediate execution included 1,361 strike aircraft generated, with 739 under positive control; 170 missiles, including 6 Minutemen; and 1,822 weapons. On 26 October COMAD had a total of 1,066 aircraft in combat-ready condition. Of these, 220 ADC aircraft from 31 fighter-interceptor squadrons were dispersed on 19 bases. One hundred and fifty-four ADC interceptors were stationed in Florida. CINCLANT, on 28 October, reported 745 aircraft available in Florida. Of these, 612 were Air Force (TAC); 584 operationally ready. Both SAC and TAC were flying reconnaissance missions over and around Cuba, and MATS and SAC searched the seas in the blockade zone. On the morning of the 28th, 24 reserve troop carrier squadrons, 6 aerial port squadrons, and 7 wing headquarters--a total of 14,000 men--were recalled to active duty.

[REDACTED] SAC's immediate execution capability reached a peak on 4 November. It included 1,479 strike aircraft, 182 ICBM's, 2,952 weapons, and 1,003 tankers. By 15 November, adjustments were necessary to prevent degradation of crew proficiency and inventory. On 21 November SAC lowered its defense condition (DEFCON) status to 3 and terminated the one-eighth airborne alert. Three days later, SAC returned to its normal posture--DEFCON 4--and recalled the dispersed B-47 force.

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On 18 November COMAD returned its dispersed planes to their home bases and reestablished the normal one-third alert posture. As of 20 November, CONAD was on DEFCON 5 with the exception of the 32nd Region (southeastern U.S.) which maintained a DEFCON 3 status.

(S) TAC also faced the degradation-of-capability problem. At the end of October CINCAFLANT forces included 574 aircraft. To exercise the force and maintain crew proficiency, CINCAFLANT on 2 November directed that 20 percent of the aircraft fly daily, and on 8 November a reorganized strike posture was formulated. Of the 563 USAF aircraft still in Florida, 338 were placed on ready alert status to form the first two waves of an initial strike. The remaining 235 planes were released for local flying and maintenance, subject to recall within four hours. On 20 November the President announced the lifting of the quarantine in response to a Soviet agreement to remove IL-28 bombers. Low-level reconnaissance confirmed the dismantling of these aircraft on 24 November. In succeeding days all TAC aircraft and crews returned to their home stations with the exception of a small force of fighter, tanker, and reconnaissance aircraft maintained at Key West NAS and McCoy AFB.

(U) The major function of AFLC was to support the combat forces, primarily by prepositioning and maintaining war consumables. As of 24 November, AFLC had moved 17,000 tons, LOGAIR carried 1,975 tons, commercial surface lines transported 167,845 tons, and commercial airlines shifted 23 tons. By 30 November, AFLC had obligated \$28,374,000 in funds for support of the Cuban crisis.

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(S) During the crisis, MATS deployed 3,943 personnel in support of emergency requirements and provided an additional 367 for TAC augmentation. As of 10 November, 517 MATS and 563 TAC aircraft were available to support existing operational requirements.

Problems

(S) The Air Force response to the Cuban crisis was outstanding. Problems and deficiencies, however, were revealed in materiel, communications, personnel, and airlift areas. Sufficient information was lacking on the status of reserve forces, and there was inadequate coordination and knowledge of the related war plans of the several major commands. Despite these obstacles, the Air Force mustered its strategic and tactical strength within hours and was ready to meet any contingency.

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XII. Military Assistance to India--1962

Issue

(1) In October 1962, after Chinese Communist ground forces stepped up their attacks on India's northern border, the Indian government formally requested emergency military assistance from the United States. On 1 November, pursuant to provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President approved grant aid on the basis that India was important to the security of the United States.

Response

(2) Within hours after the President's approval, the Air Force began to airlift shipments of light infantry weapons, mortars, ammunition, land mines, and communication-electronic and transportation equipment from Army stocks in Europe to India. A fleet of 10 MATS C-135 cargo carriers were pressed into service. The departure base was Rhein-Main, Germany, and the arrival point Dum Dum Airfield, near Calcutta, India. Some communication equipment also came from the United States in C-135's: 155 tons from McGuire AFB, New Jersey, and 17 tons from the west coast, via Rhein-Main Air Base. By 15 November, in meeting the emergency requirements of the Indian army, USAF planes had carried about 873 tons of essential supplies and equipment in 60 trips.

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To meet India's request for intratheater airlift, JCS directed CINCEUR to dispatch 12 USAF C-130's. These aircraft departed Evreux, France, on 21 November and arrived in India on the 23d.

(U) Except for some difficulty arising out of inadequate refueling facilities at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, the airlift was completed without incident.

XIII. Military Assistance To Saudi Arabia--1963**Issue**

● In early 1963, Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia solicited U.S. assistance in establishing defenses against air attack. Fear of Nasser's United Arab Republic forces supporting the al-Salal regime in Yemen obviously prompted the request; Faisal's sympathies rested with the deposed al-Badr.

Response

● Early in March planning got under way for U.S. forces to stage to Saudi Arabia and teach its troops to defend themselves against air attack. Eight TAC F-100's, a communication and control group, and 3 KB-50 tankers were programmed for the training mission. They would fly nonstop from the U.S. to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, then on to Dhahnan airfield in Saudi Arabia, where they were to be stationed. On the day of arrival, the F-100's would "show the flag" for the benefit of the Yemenese and Egyptians in a flyby at Jidda. MATS would handle the airlift, and USAFE would carry out base support functions at Dhahnan.

● An advance party of about 160 men left the U.S. on 4 May and arrived at Dhahnan two days later. The flight was made in two TAC C-130's. However, by mid-1963, no additional men or aircraft had been deployed.

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XIV. Air Demonstrations in Support of CENTO—1960

(U) Between 9 and 27 February 1960 the Tactical Air Command conducted a series of aerial demonstrations in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) nations of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. The purpose was to provide visible proof of U.S. support of this alliance.

● In this Operation Quick Span, TAC dispatched from the United States a Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) composed of 13 F-100's, 5 RF-101's, 5 KB-50's, and 9 C-130's. The fighters flew nonstop to Moron Air Base, Spain, and thence nonstop to Adana, Turkey.

(U) The demonstrations in the three countries included air shows, static displays, and flybys for officials and the press. They were received enthusiastically. In Teheran, Iran, the Shah and 50,000 people were in attendance. In Pakistan, the demonstration coincided with the inauguration of the president.

● The entire operation was accomplished without incident, demonstrating the capability of the Air Force to react swiftly in support of U.S. policy. The U.S. representative to the CENTO Permanent Military Deputies Group reported, "Eminently successful . . . Quick Span . . . brought to the people of this area a lively awareness of United States determination to reinforce CENTO should an emergency occur."

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XV. Selected USAF Humanitarian Missions--1960-62Morocco

(U) An earthquake on 1 March 1960 at Agadir, Morocco, destroyed 70 percent of the city and buried 40,000 people under debris.

(U) At 0200 hours, 2 March, USAFE accepted the request of the U.S. ambassador to Morocco to provide relief. A total of 39 C-130's, 8 C-124's, and 5 C-119's of the 322d Air Division (Combat Cargo) flew 76 sorties in the following operations: (1) air evacuated the injured; (2) airlifted Moroccan troops from Nouasseur Air Base and USAREUR's 79th Engineer Battalion from Ramstein Air Base to the stricken area; (3) provided aerial port teams at European and Moroccan bases; and (4) airlifted medical staging and evacuation teams, medical supplies and equipment, tents, blankets, support cargo, and personnel from other bases in Europe, Africa, and U.K. to Agadir. About 500 injured were flown to hospitals. The operation ended on 14 March 1960.

Chile

(U) Earthquakes on 21-22 May 1960, followed by tidal waves caused great loss of life and property in Chile. Thousands were left homeless.

(U) Under the overall direction of CINCARIB, MATS began to fly aid in the early morning of 25 May. Between then and 21 June, it flew 82 sorties, transporting two complete 400-bed Army field hospitals (172 tons each), 113,000 pounds of medical supplies, 15,000 cases of B-rations,

10 helicopters, 140 tents, blankets, and tons of communication equipment.

Pakistan

(U) Two cyclones in East Pakistan--one striking on 10 October 1960 at Noakhali, Bakergan, and the offshore islands, and another on 31 October at the port cities of Chittagong, Meakhali, and Barisal--killed between 4,000 to 15,000 persons. Tens of thousands were left homeless.

JCS directed USINCEUR on 6 November to release 77 tons of supplies to the area, consisting mostly of blankets and medicines. On the following day, C-130's of the 322d Air Division (Combat Cargo) began transporting the materials a distance of 6,000 miles, the longest one-way run ever performed by the 322d. Over the next five days, 6 C-130's had lifted the 77 tons to Pakistan.

Tanganyika

(U) Villages along the Rufiji River, Tanganyika, were isolated by flood waters, leaving 50,000 people without food and shelter. Their government asked for airdrops of grain.

(U) MATS flew a C-124 into Dar Es Salaam on 29 April 1962 and made the first drop on 2 May. The plane flew 77 missions, dropping 1,500 tons of grain in the four disaster areas of Utete, Mtansa, Zombe, and Rusende.

Iran

(U) More than 10,000 persons were killed on 1 September 1962 in northwestern Iran in what one Iranian official described as the greatest calamity in the 2,500-year history of the nation.

(U) USAFE's 322d Air Division and TAC's 65th Troop Carrier Squadron, on rotation in Europe, made mercy flights on 4-5 September. The 322d's 26 C-130's and 3 C-124's airlifted over 900,000 pounds of hospital equipment and transport and medical supplies to Teheran, flying 35 sorties.